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Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination

Staudigl, M and Weidenholzer, S (2014) Constrained Interactions and Social Coordination. UNSPECIFIED. University of Essex, Department of Economics, Economics Discussion Papers, Colchester.

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Abstract

We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2x2 - coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff domination convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their linking choice. The main reason behind this result is that whenever there is a small cluster of agents playing the efficient strategy other players want to link up to those layers and choose the efficient action.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 28 Aug 2014 18:14
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2017 17:49
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/10007

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