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Environmental Interest Groups and Authoritarian Regime Diversity

Böhmelt, T (2015) 'Environmental Interest Groups and Authoritarian Regime Diversity.' Voluntas, 26 (1). 315 - 335. ISSN 0957-8765

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The literature increasingly disaggregates political systems for examining the differences in international policies and domestic decision-making according to diverse regime typologies. The following research adds to this literature by studying the impact of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) on the likelihood of ratifying international environmental agreements in different types of autocratic regimes. Building on a theory that focuses on the provision of environmental public goods, the author distinguishes between single-party regimes, military juntas, monarchies, and personalist dictatorships. The core argument claims that the provision of public goods varies among those regime typologies, ultimately leading to the expectation that the lobbying efforts of ENGOs should be most weakly pronounced in those autocracies that are likely to provide more environmental public goods anyway, i.e., single-party regimes. The empirical analysis using data on the ratification of international environmental agreements and autocratic regime types between 1973 and 2006 supports the theory.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 16 Oct 2014 11:05
Last Modified: 07 Apr 2021 19:15

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