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Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation

Hovi, J and Ward, H and Grundig, F (2015) 'Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation.' Environmental and Resource Economics, 62 (4). pp. 665-688. ISSN 0924-6460

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Abstract

We review formal (and some more informal) models of climate cooperation derived from economics and political science. These models convey two main messages. On one hand, they suggest that the prospects for effective climate cooperation are bleak: The standard view is that stable coalitions are small and that renegotiation-proof equilibria require that only a few countries participate. On the other hand, there might be light at the end of the tunnel after all. First, more recent work suggests that larger coalitions can be made stable. Second, other recent work suggests that it may be possible to design a renegotiation-proof climate agreement with broad or even full participation. Third, deposit-refund systems might help solve some of the obstacles for effective climate cooperation. Fourth, although the ?law of the least ambitious program? pinpoints severe constraints on effective cooperation, this law has its limits. Fifth, countries may use cooperative probes to build trust. Sixth, cooperation might emerge in a completely decentralized fashion. Finally, experiments indicate that some of the conditions for effective cooperation that are taken for granted in most formal models might in fact be overly strict.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Climate change; Game-theory; Collective action; International agreements; Participation Compliance
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 15 Dec 2014 10:46
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2022 01:08
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/12137

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