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Choosing what to protect: Strategic defensive allocation against an unknown attacker

Bier, V and Oliveros, S and Samuelson, L (2007) 'Choosing what to protect: Strategic defensive allocation against an unknown attacker.' Journal of Public Economic Theory, 9 (4). 563 - 587. ISSN 1097-3923

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We study a strategic model in which a defender must allocate defensive resources to a collection of locations and an attacker must choose a location to attack. In equilibrium, the defender sometimes optimally leaves a location undefended and sometimes prefers a higher vulnerability at a particular location even if a lower risk could be achieved at zero cost. The defender prefers to allocate resources in a centralized (rather than decentralized) manner, the optimal allocation of resources can be non-monotonic in the value of the attacker's outside option, and the defender prefers her defensive allocation to be public rather than secret. © 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 14 Jan 2015 12:39
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2019 16:15

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