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Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures

UNSPECIFIED (2014) 'Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures.' Games and Economic Behavior, 87. 397 - 411. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. In the presence of information spillovers, we provide a condition on the network structure that guarantees the emergence of efficient conventions. In contrast, if this condition is violated we will observe inefficient conventions, even in the presence of information spillovers. © 2014 Elsevier Inc.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 14 Jan 2015 15:47
Last Modified: 10 Jan 2019 15:19
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/12317

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