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Approximate implementation in Markovian environments

Renou, Ludovic and Tomala, Tristan (2015) 'Approximate implementation in Markovian environments.' Journal of Economic Theory, 159. pp. 401-442. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

This paper considers dynamic implementation problems in environments with changing private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if it is correctly implemented an arbitrary large number of times with arbitrary high probability in all (communication) equilibria. We show that if a social choice function is strictly efficient in the set of social choice functions that satisfy an undetectability condition, then it is approximately implementable.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Implementation; Undetectability; Efficiency; Dynamic; Mechanism design; Markov processes
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 30 Jul 2015 15:08
Last Modified: 30 Jul 2015 15:08
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/14463

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