This essay is about the ongoing anti-immigration campaign against Romanians and Bulgarians in the United Kingdom. Its aim is to examine the campaign’s central discourses, arguments and internal logics, as well as their connection and departure from earlier discourses of ethnic and racial exclusion in the UK. While anxiety about Bulgarians and Romanians is not fully separated from Britain’s experience with other ethnic minorities, it is also the case that East Europeans are subject to different cultural representations than people of South Asian, Middle Eastern, African or Caribbean origin. As a result, the campaign against Bulgarians and Romanians is based upon new lines of racist argumentation, which, due to their novelty, evade the censorship of commonly-accepted social regulations about what language can and cannot be legitimately used when discussing race, ethnicity and immigration. This has enabled neo-racist and xenophobic ideas about Bulgarians and Romanians to circulate freely in the media with little successful resistance or opposition. In this essay I argue that there are three lines of anti-immigration discourse. These are based on (1) cultural stereotypes of East European criminality, (2) the difference in the economic prosperity of Britain and Eastern Europe, and (3) a fear that immigrants, particularly those of Roma origin, will disrupt the cohesion of British community life. I address these anti-immigration discourses by offering an assessment of their consistencies and inconsistencies, as well the ways in which they propagate xenophobic ideas and racist stereotypes through apparently non-racist and ethnically neutral language.

Introduction to the anti-immigration movement

Bulgaria and Romania gained accession to the European Union in 2007, giving their citizens the right to travel and live anywhere within the union without a visa. The United Kingdom, however, along with a number of other European countries, imposed temporary restrictions on the working rights of Bulgarians and Romanians and maintained a policy of work permits. These restrictions, according to EU law, could only remain in place for a maximum of seven years, and so on January 1, 2014, they were lifted.

The full opening of the British labour market to Bulgarians and Romanians has led to a media frenzy, a widespread concern about an influx of migrants, and a rather unfortunate rhetoric of exclusion targeting these two countries. Among those most alarmed are factions of the governing Conservative Party, and the Eurosceptic United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and its supporters. UKIP, to be sure, prides itself on being the only political party that genuinely intends to stop immigration, and it constantly accuses the Conservatives of not doing enough about the immigration problem. The anti-immigration and anti-EU rhetoric of UKIP is indeed phrased with more aggressive language and proposes harsher measures than that of the Conservatives, but I would argue that insofar as internal logic and proposed reasons for border control are concerned, the two parties are very similar if not identical on their stance towards immigration. For instance, in response to the 2014 lifting of
working restrictions, David Cameron has suggested that “free movement within Europe needs to be less free,” while Nigel Farage, the leader of UKIP and a member of the European Parliament, has called for an overall five-year ban on permit-free immigration for Bulgarians and Romanians. One right-wing tabloid supported by UKIP, *The Daily Express*, has even invited its readers to join “a crusade” to “stop new EU migrants flooding into Britain” by signing a petition against the lifting of working restrictions for Bulgarians and Romanians.

This anti-immigration talk and its Eurosceptic underpinnings have provoked a sharp reaction from Brussels. In particular, Viviane Reding, the vice-president of the European Commission, has accused British politicians of populism and misleading the public:

> This supposed invasion of foreigners coming to the UK and stealing the jobs and stealing the social security and the health money. The fact and figures, and we all know this, show it is simply not true […]. What is leadership if you just try with populist movements and populist speech to gain votes? You are destroying the future of your people.

Yet, the British public seems to be just as concerned as its political leaders about open borders and the arrival of new immigrants: recent polls have predicted that UKIP will outperform both Labour and the Conservative Party in the upcoming European election of May 2014, and one major think tank study on British social attitudes has reported that seventy-seven per cent of respondents want a reduction in immigration to the UK. The UK is thus facing significant Euroscepticism and anxiety about immigration, and this may well put its future membership of the EU at stake.

**Unification, fragmentation and the multiculturalism backlash: the context of European racism**

The anti-Bulgarian and Romanian campaign is not an isolated incident of ethnic, racial or religious exclusion in Europe, but part of a much larger pattern in which European expansion coexists with fragmentation and nationalist sectarianism. As Rosi Braidotti observes:

> the expansion of European boundaries coincides with the resurgence of micronationalist borders at all levels in Europe today. Unification coexists with the closing down of borders; the common European citizenship and the common currency coexist with increasing internal fragmentation and regionalism; a new allegedly postnationalist identity coexists with the return of xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism.

At the heart of the matter of xenophobia and nationalist resurgence lies the problem of how people represent themselves, others, and the differences between themselves and others as ethnic and national subjects. These representations are often multiple and contradictory, and they involve existential riddles and questions about who one is and how she or he ought to treat others. In Britain, as in many other countries, such questions are mediated by the fact that xenophobia and racism carry negative connotations, and few people would consciously identify with racism or want to live in a racist community. Furthermore, border control and exclusion of immigrants can be seen by people as a matter of sustainability and management of resources and populations, and not a matter of stereotyping, racializing, and exerting violence upon others. From an analytical perspective, the idea that the two sides can be separated from one another is questionable, but so is the idea that all anxieties over immigration can be reduced to racist motivations and practices. This makes nationalist
exclusion in Britain complex and ambiguous: on the one hand, neither exclusionary political discourses and policies, nor people’s representations of themselves and others can be reduced to the simple categories of racist or non-racist, xenophobic or non-xenophobic; on the other hand, violent racism and xenophobia may indeed lurk underneath apparently non-racist discourses, and use the latter as just another tool for reproducing racial and ethnic hierarchies and marginalizing minorities.

This ambiguity is a prominent feature of contemporary western racism, and also of the so-called “multiculturalism backlash.” As a number of authors observe, the dominant discourse of racial and ethnic exclusion in Western Europe is no longer based on notions of “race” and “racial” hierarchy as it was in the 1960s and early 1970s, but rather on the idea of cultural attachment and insurmountable cultural incompatibilities. Difference between groups is imagined as difference in the cultural practices, traditions and beliefs that each group holds and is persistently attached to. The problem of difference, according to this discourse, is not that one group is inferior or superior to another, but rather that the cultures of minorities are at odds with that of the majority. Racial and ethnic exclusion is thus based on a fear that immigrants or minorities will not integrate, and will consequently fragment the national community. Etienne Balibar makes this point succinctly:

Ideologically, current racism [...] fits into a framework of “racism without races” [...] It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or people in relation to others but “only” the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions: in short it is [...] a differentialist racism.

This way of imagining racial or ethnic difference also underpins the recent scepticism towards multiculturalism in Britain and elsewhere in Europe. In Britain, especially since the London bombings of 7/7, there has been much anxiety about home-grown Islam, Islamic “faith schools,” and the supposed failure of Muslims to integrate into mainstream culture even when they were born and raised in the UK. Multiculturalism is thus often perceived as a failed policy, which has stimulated ethnic insularity and religious sectarianism that clashes with British liberal values.

As Ralph Grillo has shown, however, what the British white majority fears is not cultural diversity in itself but an over-identification with cultural difference, which spills over into public life. Grillo cites a BBC/MORI poll according to which sixty-two per cent of those surveyed agreed that multiculturalism “makes the country a better place” (despite the increasing scepticism towards it), while fifty-eight per cent thought that “people who come to live in Britain should adopt the values of and traditions of British culture.” This data suggests that many Britons indeed value ethnic and cultural diversity but only insofar as it does not entail incompatibility between minorities and “British culture.” Critics of multiculturalism tend to hold the same view, but what is specific about many of them is the way they conceive of the term. Multiculturalism, as Grillo argues, is an ambiguous concept that can either have a “strong” or a “weak” variation: “strong multiculturalism” refers to “institutional recognition for difference in the public sphere, with special provisions in language, education, health care, welfare, etcetera, and the organization of representation on ethnic/cultural lines” ; “weak multiculturalism,” in contrast, is about “cultural difference recognized [...] in the private sphere, with acculturation in many areas of life and assimilation to the local population in employment, housing, education, health care and welfare.” The problem is that while in practice multiculturalism is usually “weak,” its critics often perceive it as “strong.” The backlash against multiculturalism thus follows the same logic as the “cultural racism” or “differentialist racism” that Balibar and others write about: it is based on the fear that migrants will fragment British cultural life in the public
sphere and disrupt the cohesion of the British community as a result of their incompatible cultures, values and beliefs.

This view is fundamentally different from that of classical racism, and as the data shows, it is not necessarily incompatible with genuine appreciation for cultural difference and “weak multiculturalism.” I would go as far as to argue that many people who hold the views of differentialist racism would themselves abhor classical racism and its logic of biological hierarchy. The danger here, however, is that this abhorrence—as genuine as it may be—might act as an anti-racist disguise that conceals new racist forms of exclusion. This obfuscation, furthermore, is not only a matter of how people relate to others, but also a matter of how they relate to themselves and whether they recognize their own racism.

**From cultural difference to economic disparity: delinquency and poverty in Eastern Europe**

What, then, are the discourses of the current campaign against Bulgarians and Romanians and where do they fit within this dominant ideological framework? The fear of community fragmentation which is central to “differentialist racism” forms only one aspect of a complex and multi-layered set of stereotypes and representations about culture, economy and community. In fact, as I show in the next section, Nigel Farage, the leader of UKIP, seems to use it as a kind of fail-safe—as an argument that is evoked when the favoured argument about the economy is no longer persuasive.

In the 2000s the common stereotypes of Romania and Bulgaria were based on a culture of corruption and scams (including a counterfeit UK visa scam in 2004 that led to the resignation of the British immigration minister), as well as a substantially large, disenchanted and impoverished Roma community that often resorts to begging and petty theft as a means of subsistence. As one study from 2009 puts it:

> It would seem that public perceptions about Bulgarians and Romanians […] revolve around criminality and corruption, but also the large Roma populations of Romania and Bulgaria. As in the rest of Europe, Roma are the subject of much prejudice in the UK […]. The visa scandals [of 2004] also confirmed in many people’s minds that there would be large numbers of immigrants “trying to beat the system”. Some of the perceptions were apparently confirmed in a leaked Home Office document of July 2006 that warned of “45,000 undesirable” criminal migrants expected to arrive in the UK from Romania and Bulgaria after accession.17

The fear of East European criminality has no doubt persisted in the immigration debate to this day. Hence, Nigel Farage has recently spoken of “a Romanian crime epidemic” in London;18 Gerard Batten, a UKIP member of the European Parliament, has complained that the EU has given Britain “criminals, drug addicts, alcoholics, beggars, vagrants and benefit seekers”;19 David Cameron has pre-emptively declared that “if people […] are begging or sleeping rough—they will be removed”;20 and *The Daily Mail* has even (allegedly) exposed a Bulgarian consultancy that counterfeits documents for Bulgarians to claim benefits in the UK.21 My contention, however, is that despite its continued presence this language has largely given way to a new discourse, which focuses less on crime and scams *per se*, and more on the economic causes and consequences of immigration. In this way, the focus is no longer on the cultural stereotyping of Bulgarians and Romanians as vagrants, fraudsters and criminals—although the persistent salience of these stereotypes underpins the whole discourse and should not be underestimated—but rather on the more ethnically and culturally neutral language of economic circumstances and income disparity.
Today, it is emphasized over and over that Bulgaria and Romania are the poorest member states of the EU, with the implication that migration to Britain is an economically rational thing to do for anyone from a less wealthy country. David Cameron has stated, correctly in my opinion, that “vast population movements [are] caused by huge disparities in income,” while Nigel Farage has spoken, in somewhat more harsh and populist terms, about “total, uncontrolled immigration from twenty-nine million poor people in Romania and Bulgaria,” and declared in a Channel Four documentary that “if I was a Bulgarian, I’d be packing my bags now, wanting to come to Britain.” From there, it is assumed that if the driving factors behind immigration are primarily economic, then so are the consequences that the UK will suffer once the newcomers arrive, and so are the reasons for which immigration must be stopped.

Three specific concerns can be pinpointed as particularly pronounced within the discourse on the economy. The first is simply that the current institutions and infrastructure are not fit to absorb further population growth. In Nigel Farage’s words,

[a]s a small country we simply cannot accommodate the hundreds of thousands who may look to Britain as an opportunity for a more comfortable life. The result will be so much pressure on public services, employment, housing and education that the quality of living in the UK drops for all.

Or yet again:

We have rising youth unemployment, overcrowding in schools and hospitals. We simply cannot afford to have thousands more people coming to live in the UK in January [2014] while we are still trying to patch up our fragile economy.

The second concern is the much-discussed “benefit tourism” in which migrants allegedly arrive in the UK for the sole purpose of claiming social security benefits at the expense of the British taxpayer. There is a widespread anxiety that according to EU law Bulgarians and Romanians can come to the UK without any intention of working or contributing to the economy, and have entitlement to the same housing and unemployment benefits as British citizens. This issue has been widely discussed in British politics and media, and it has even prompted the Prime Minister to explicitly denounce “benefit tourism” and implement policy changes that make it more difficult for immigrants to claim benefits. This discourse on “benefit tourism” has a double logic that needs to be emphasized here. On the one hand, the concept is underpinned by the above-mentioned stereotype of East European fraudulent and unethical behaviour. On the other hand, it is also treated as an economically rational practice that would naturally draw migrants to the UK. Farage makes this last point implicitly in his Channel Four documentary when he interviews a wife and husband living in Sofia’s Roma ghetto. When the woman complains that she has no job, rummages through rubbish bins to survive, and faces abuse on a regular basis, Farage answers as follows: “but from next year, if you wanted to, you could move to London where the British government will give you somewhere to live that’s heated, and a chance of work, and you’d be […] financially a lot better off. Do you think that would be attractive to people living here [in the Roma ghetto]?” This is no doubt a rhetorical question intended to highlight the inevitability of immigration as a result of poverty in Bulgaria, and the consequences of British open border policy. Thus, when the Roma man tries to retain some dignity in the face of Farage’s patronizing question and answers in the negative, the scene conveys a second point, namely that Bulgarians’ claims about not wanting to immigrate to the UK defy common sense and are most likely false.
The third economic concern about immigration is that Bulgarians and Romanians will take jobs that would otherwise go to young British people. This is a problem related to the economy and economic well-being, but also to the social cohesion of communities (see below). As one 2013 news article on UKIP’s website presents the problem:

UKIP remains very concerned about the rise in youth unemployment. Youth unemployment has increased by another 15,000 to 973,000. With the prospect of Romania and Bulgaria having the free movement of people next year, UKIP believes that the only way to truly tackle youth unemployment and get our young people back to work is by limiting the number of migrant workers coming in from Eastern Europe.29

Here, once again, David Cameron is aligned with UKIP when he says that “[y]ou cannot blame people for wanting to come here and work hard; but the real answer lies in training our own people to fill these jobs.”30 The point, as I understand it, is that while Bulgarian and Romanian migrants may have good intentions about working hard and being good citizens, they still pose a problem because they marginalize British workers from the labour market and contribute to their unemployment.

What is striking about the “benefit tourism” and youth unemployment arguments is that when combined together they form a foolproof attack against immigration and deny the very possibility that immigrants could contribute to the British economy. If Bulgarians and Romanians come to Britain without the intention to work—i.e., if they come to exploit the benefits system—then they are detrimental to the economy and they are not wanted; if, however, they do come with the intention to work, then they are taking jobs away from British youth and are once again detrimental, if not to the British economy, then at least to the economic well-being of British young people. Whether immigrants come to work, or whether they come to not work, their presence will have a negative impact all the same. This rationale is far more exclusionary than the earlier discourses of criminality because it encompasses and targets all Bulgarians and Romanians, regardless of their profession, character or intent. It is also far more culturally and ethnically neutral (despite the insulting assumption that Bulgarians and Romanians are “benefit seekers”) because it attempts to pose the issue in terms of real, statistically verifiable economic differences between Britain and Eastern Europe, without making claims to cultural superiority or moral values. The issue here is not that Bulgarians and Romanians are disliked—saying that would be overtly racist and thus socially unacceptable—but rather that their arrival in large numbers cannot be accommodated.

From economy to social cohesion: the problem of the Roma

One wonders to what extent the anxiety provoked by Bulgarian and Romanian immigrants is really about economic issues as opposed to something else that is perhaps only expressed and disguised as an economic concern. The reason I say this is because there is substantial evidence that immigrants from East European countries have made a positive economic impact since 2000, and have paid more taxes and used less benefits than British citizens. The positive contribution of East European immigration has been emphasized by high-ranking state officials and publicized by the media,31 but it has not quelled public fears about immigration, and certainly has not convinced right-wingers like Farage. In fact, when confronted with this evidence, Farage has responded by deferring the problem from the domain of the economy to the domain of social cohesion, adding yet another layer to the cultural and economic reasons for closing the borders. Here is how he did this in an interview on BBC Radio Four:
If you said to me, would you want to see over the next ten years a further five million people coming to Britain, and if that happened, we would all be slightly richer, I would say ‘actually, you know what, I’d rather we weren’t slightly richer, and I’d rather we had communities that felt more united, and I’d rather have a situation where young, unemployed British people had a realistic chance of getting a job.’ So yes, I do think that the social side of this matters more than pure market economics.

It is somewhat unclear where these five million people will come from (perhaps over a quarter of the twenty-nine million Romanians and Bulgarians that he talks about have plans to immigrate to Britain), but the general point is easy enough to grasp: foreigners remain foreign (as opposed to becoming British), they take the jobs of local youth, and they divide communities. In another interview, Farage makes this point even more explicitly, while simultaneously paying lip service to British “multiracial society”:

A multiracial society can be harmonious, successful, and in most parts of this country, it is. What I’m afraid we’ve had in the last few years are very large numbers of people coming to Britain who don’t even speak English. When you have that situation, there’s no chance of integration happening within our towns and cities and we finish up with a more divided society.

Here, we arrive at the logic of “cultural racism” where too much cultural difference and too many immigrants become a threat to community cohesiveness, despite the potential economic benefits. This shift in focus from economy to community coincides with a shift from Bulgarians and Romanians to East European Roma gypsies as the main threat.

The integrity and cohesion of British communities is seen as specifically threatened by the East European Roma. This has been highlighted by the Labour MP David Blunkett and the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg in relation to a specific case in Sheffield, where Roma immigrants from Slovakia have allegedly caused trouble in the community. The Roma, according to local residents, are an isolated group showing no sign of integrating into British life; they are loud and disturb the neighbourhood during late hours, they are always out on the streets, and they do not practice proper waste disposal. The tensions between the Roma and local residents are apparently so severe that Blunkett, the MP for Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough, has gone as far as warning that the Roma may cause new race riots in the UK. This fear of the Roma, of course, has consequences for Bulgaria and Romania because they have substantial Roma populations that could potentially move to the UK and cause similar trouble in other cities. Thus, the problem is that while immigration may bring an overall economic benefit, one aspect of it—the threat of the Roma—can have disastrous consequences for communities across Britain. In this discourse, the Roma are singled out as the most dangerous group of all the “twenty-nine million poor people in Bulgaria and Romania”: they are stereotyped as anti-social and with little regard for the rules of the communities they move to; they are at the very bottom of the economic ladder; and they are even seen as potential initiators of riots.

There is an implicit slippage in this discourse from the exclusion of the particular Roma community to the exclusion of Bulgarians and Romanians as a whole. The fact that “the dropping of border controls for Bulgarians and Romanians […] has […] sparked a public outcry about the potential influx of Roma gypsies,” is closely tied to arguments against the lifting of working restrictions in 2014. Because of this, fear of the Roma and fear of loosening border controls for Bulgarians and Romanians are often conflated. This slippage takes place in conjunction with the shift described earlier from an economic argument to a social cohesion argument, and it completely nullifies the fact that immigration from Eastern
Europe is advantageous. The implicit line of reasoning is as follows: Bulgarian and Romanian immigration as a whole may be economically beneficial, but a part of it—Roma immigration—is socially (as well as economically and culturally) detrimental; consequently, Bulgarian and Romanian immigration as a whole is detrimental and this is why the UK should keep its borders shut. Singling out the Roma in this way, and proposing anti-immigration policies against two entire countries on the grounds of their large Roma populations, is extremely dangerous for at least two reasons: first, this alienates and marginalizes the Roma even further; and second, it will likely make the ethnic majority in Bulgaria and Romania feel excluded from Europe on account of the Roma, leading to even stronger anti-Roma sentiments in these countries.

Nigel Farage has tried to preventively clear himself from potential charges of alienating the Roma by shifting the blame to Bulgarians and Romanians, and emphasizing the Roma’s exclusion from mainstream society in these two countries. In an interview on “the Roma threat” posted on his personal blog, Farage claims to sympathize with the Roma’s social and economic conditions and the persecution they suffer in Eastern Europe. 38 Yet, when the interviewer asks whether this is not sufficient reason to try to help the Roma as opposed to excluding them even further, Farage—clearly caught by surprise—declares that Britain has enough problems as it is:

Farage: I have visited their communities, they are singled out, they are treated about as well as the Jews were in the mid-1930s in Germany. Let’s be frank: these are the circumstances these people are living in in Romania and Bulgaria. If you don’t believe me, go and see it, it’s unbelievable. But…

Interviewer: Isn’t that a very good case then for taking them?


Interviewer: I mean a very similar debate was had about the Jews in the 1930s.

Farage: Well, but they are not—yeah—they are excluded from society, I don’t think because they are excluded from society, they count as refugees. They’re not actually gonna be perse—you know they’re not—they’re not actually being killed, they’re just being treated very badly in their own communities. And whilst I feel sorry for them because I’ve been there and met them, I think the message that has to come from this country is we’ve got enough social problems of our own, without taking on any more.

This astonishing exchange is indicative of the way in which Farage perceives the difference and relationship between the British on the one hand, and Bulgarians, Romanians and Roma, on the other hand. Beneath the layers of cultural, economic and social argumentation, there is a gulf between the two sides that more or less forecloses any form of empathy or ethical commitment towards either the Roma minority or the Bulgarian and Romanian ethnic majority. This is where Farage’s racism comes the closest to exposing itself as such—as the absolute refusal to identify with the other, to put himself in the other’s shoes, or to show genuine concern without implicating negative stereotypes. With respect to the Roma, Farage claims to “feel sorry for them” because they are marginalized in all imaginable ways, but he expresses no willingness whatsoever to improve their condition because, in his words, “they’re not actually being killed.” With respect to the ethnic majority in Bulgaria and Romania, Farage evokes a rather callous double standard: when Bulgarians and Romanians marginalize the Roma, they are compared to German Nazis in the 1930s; yet when Farage marginalizes the same people, it is because Britain has enough problems as it is. Evidently,
it does not occur to him that maybe the “poor people in Romania and Bulgaria” turn their backs on an isolated, impoverished, and anti-social Roma community for the same reason as he turns his own back on it—because they have “enough [...] problems of [their] own, without taking on any more”? Had this occurred to Farage, and had he been genuinely concerned about the Roma’s condition, he might have approached the issue differently and tried to work with both the Roma and the ethnic majority in Romania and Bulgaria, as opposed to shutting the doors to both and portraying them as lesser human beings.

Conclusion

This essay argues that the anti-immigration campaign against Bulgarians and Romanians is based on three main logics of exclusion, revolving around (1) cultural stereotypes of criminality, (2) the economic disparity between the UK and Eastern Europe, and (3) British social cohesion and the threat of community fragmentation. These logics can converge upon one another to form complex and multi-layered representations of immigrants (the fraudulent and poor “benefit seeker,” the impoverished Roma who disrupts community life), and they can also act as fail-safes for one another (e.g., when immigration proves economically beneficial and the focus is shifted to the problem of social cohesion). As someone reluctant to reduce all immigration anxiety to racism, I think we ought to be cautious when dispensing accusations of racism against politicians and people who want to see immigration reduced. Yet, I also think that the contradictions, slippages, and deferrals of the anti-immigration discourses discussed here should alert us that the apparently neutral languages of economic sustainability or community cohesion often conceal xenophobia, ethical indifference, and a stubborn refusal to give up one’s fear of otherness.

Notes

1 These were Portugal, Spain, Greece, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Malta.


20 Cameron, “Free Movement”.


22 Cameron, “Free Movement”.


28 See Rugman, “Immigration Nation”.
30 Cameron, “Free Movement”.  
32 Nigel Farage interview by John Humphrys.