Research Repository

Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining

Iaryczower, M and Oliveros, S (2016) 'Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining.' Journal of Economic Theory, 162. 209 - 236. ISSN 0022-0531

[img]
Preview
Text
1-s2.0-S0022053115002227-main.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (561kB) | Preview

Abstract

© 2015 Elsevier Inc. We study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers. We establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon. We show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes, and can be inefficient. To fulfill this role, the middleman's policy preferences and bargaining position must be such that its role of intermediary is credible. But the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy change. The results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 05 Jan 2016 15:08
Last Modified: 23 Jan 2019 05:16
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/15749

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item