editorial

Paid in Full? Writing Beyond the Pale
Anthony O'Shea and Christian De Cock 309

articles

Thomas Pynchon and the Scrambling of Literary Codes: Implications for Organization Theory
Alexander Styhre 315

Realizing Rogues: Theory, Organization, Dialogue
Adam Hansen 328

The Organization of Wire and String: Notes on an attempt to follow the Ben Marcus
Thomas Basbøll 347

notes

In The Call Centre
J. J. King 353

reviews

Academic Work: Is it Worth the Trouble?
Johanna Hakala 367

Constructive Spatial Criticism on Critical Spatial Construction
Sammy Toyoki 376
Paid in Full? Writing Beyond the Pale

Anthony O’Shea and Christian De Cock

Two major management journals have published special issues on language and discourse this year. Much of what is contained in these volumes reproduces the debates and concerns outlined in the 2000 special issue of *Organization*. That is, the work remains part of “different epistemological and ontological positions” that do not concern themselves with “what kind of discourse [do] we want to create and how free we are to constitute new discourses” (Boje, Oswick and Ford, 2004: 573). This issue of *ephemera* is also concerned with texts, discourse and organization; how discourse organizes and the organization of discourse. Without wanting to speak for the various contributors, what we, as the editors of *ephemera* 4(4), want to do is focus on the quotation above in relation to new forms of writing.

In short, the papers presented in this issue either discuss or are themselves new forms of writing. For us, new writing should not conform to established systems and canons and must therefore be free from them. Our intention is to open up a space for new writing that is arguably outside of the established academic domain. In so doing, and against Boje et al. (2004), we believe that new writing is neither recognised nor encouraged by academia. Thus, it is not an issue of how free we are to develop new writing in the academy but more that to have new writing we must be free of the academy.

It is now well established that there are many forms of writing ranging from those that may be termed, paraphrasing Blanchot (1949), ‘technical writing’, to those more concerned with aesthetic style. Arguably much of what passes for writing in management and organization studies concerns itself with the former as it aims to convince the reader of an argument; the causal relations between events are explained explicitly, rather than being implicit in the form of the narrative itself. In other words, the explanatory form is made autonomous. Yet the double slope of writing requires that

---

* Eric B and Rakim *Paid in full* ©Fourth and Broadway, 1996. Some years ago whilst Tony was a PhD student his then supervisor was cited in a major management journal as one of several important but marginalized academics writing on organization to which organization studies owed a major – and as yet unpaid – debt. (We’re not providing the reference so as not to unduly embarrass Tony’s supervisor). Perhaps cynically the article was published in a journal that arguably continues to ignore and marginalize new forms of writing.

1 *The Academy of Management Review* 29(4); *Organization Studies* 25(1).

2 *Organization*, vol. 7.
even such ‘technical writing’ must have aesthetic style: one cannot have content without form, or style without substance. Nonetheless style here is secondary, ostensibly concerned only with issues of clarity and impartiality, the issue is to convince rather than affect readers.

A poet’s work seeks to move us, to convince not by recourse to reason but by affect. Javier Cercas quotes the Spanish Falangist José Antonio Primo de Rivera – a man often surrounded by poets – as saying “people have never been moved except by poets” before Cercas goes on to argue that “young men go off to the front and kill and are killed for words…and that’s why poets are always the ones who win wars” (2001/2004: 39).

Poetry, passion, polemic, rhetoric, uncertainty, a certain lack of clarity – all have little place in Plato’s world; all are marginalized or perhaps regarded as beyond the pale as accepted canonical form. Perhaps poets are what Boje, Oswick and Ford still seek in 2004? Nonetheless, as writers we need to recognize that all writing has both a technical and an aesthetic slope. Organization studies needs to address both without preferencing one at the expense of the other. Is it time now for new writing to come in from the cold and for the academy to welcome back its prodigal writers?

Scrambled Eggs

To be forced to admire what one instinctively hates,
And to hate all which one would naturally love is the
Condition of our lives in these bad years, and so is the cause
Beneath other causes for our sickness and our death.
(Norman Mailer, Advertisements for Myself)

(Tony, at home in his studio)

I hate reading management texts. Why? Because I find most of them to be arid and dry. They do little for me beyond instilling a sense of boredom. I’d much rather read a novel, watch a film or listen to music. At least these tend to reach out and touch me in a way that management texts so rarely – if ever – do.

I have to pay the bills though, and so I research and (occasionally) publish on organization theory. Now, I’ve lost count of the journal reviewers who tell me I need to reference the management canon more. For Christ sake aren’t there enough of us doing that already! I’d much rather reference works – any work whether it’s a novel, poetry, music, art, whatever – that mean something to me; do something for me. But I have to pay the bills and so I need to ‘keep my views undercover’.³ Oops!…I did it again.⁴

Ho hum, guess I’ll have to make the claim that my work is grounded in ‘the new/literary journalism’ and like Capote, Mailer and Wolfe I’m just being frank, human, informal and, err, ironic. Convinced?

---

³ Black Radical Mark II Monsoon ©To the Bone Records, 1989.
⁴ Britney Spears Oops!...I did it again, ©Jive Records, 2000.
In his article Alexander Styhre follows the canonical management writing style to discuss the writing of Thomas Pynchon. Styhre sets out to convince readers that Pynchon’s ‘scrambling of literary codes’ offers a new means from which we may write on, and so understand, organizations more clearly. For Styhre, Pynchon offers a means by which we may break from ‘received modes of representations’ and ‘reinforce the prerogative of ‘freedom of speech’. He follows Pynchon to question the orthodox belief in scientific progress and its operation as a root paradigm in organization studies before utilising the work of Best and Kellner (2001) to argue a need for ‘aesthetic maps’ in addition to the ‘theoretical maps’ more traditional to the management and organizational studies literature.

There is a tremendous sense of fun, play and irony in Styhre’s piece for he follows a ‘theoretical map’ in order to question and unground the self-same unquestioned use of them. Thus, whilst Styhre does not follow Pynchon’s style of ‘scrambling literary codes’ he manages to offer an alternative to the canon in the form of a reflexive irony at play (notably one of Styhre’s early references in the article is to Richard Rorty) that gently mocks whilst appearing to conform.

Adam Hansen’s paper is concerned with understanding ‘deviant mobility of ‘rogues’ in organizations’. In a beautifully written article he draws out the way that rogues have been understood historically to call for a reappraisal of roguish behaviour in our current ‘bad’ years. It would seem that we have as much need now for rogues as we do for new forms of writing. Rogues and new forms of writing must of necessity remain beyond the pale so as to maintain a dialogism with, and be transgressive of, the mainstream. What we need, perhaps, is not another hero, not another major addition to the accepted and normalizing canon, but someone who will piss in its gene pool.

Thomas Basbøll may well be pissing in the gene pool in his article. Rather than presenting a ‘theoretical map’, he instead offers a piece of writing that is an aesthetic one. This is a ‘scrambling of codes’ in action, canonical texts are brought forth in order to be questioned and dismissed. The very use of quotation marks around the names of established theorists in management and organization studies underscores the shallow and ephemeral nature of a canon. There is no attempt to convince and explain but instead this is writing as aesthetic pleasure: you are either touched by it or not. This piece has all the wolfish and roguish charm of transgression – there is no attempt to play by the rules – and in so doing it calls rules into question and demonstrates that canonical rules are there to be broken. All of a sudden the canon appears to be built on very shaky foundations. But Basbøll does not set out to replace one set of old rules with new ones: this isn’t a case of ‘meet the new boss, same as the old boss’. As a transgressive act, and as Styhre points out in discussing the destructive nature of Pynchon’s work, the concern is to transgress not to form new rules for others to abide by. Basbøll leaves it up to you to choose what you do next in an uncertain world. It is – literally – time to make up your mind.

Jamie King, we would venture, has made up his mind. His note, taken from his forthcoming novel, paints a grim picture of life in a call centre. In the last twenty years

5 The Who, Won’t get fooled again, © Decca, 1971.
many academics have offered theoretical analyses of call centre management, some of which are empirically grounded in thick descriptions. King’s note sidesteps the theory and instead fictionalises an account, and in so doing tells it ‘like it is’: all the beauty, all the pain, the glory, the passion, the little details that make up the real. Reminiscent of James Kelman’s writing, this is a thick description that isn’t afraid to include the boredom, vacuity and meaninglessness of modern life. If anything it is the repetition of this vacuity in a modern Kafkaesque organisational setting that provides the narrative drive. Few, if any of us, would be able to claim that we’ve never experienced something similar.

Is this however new writing? King’s piece reminds us of Kafka, Joyce and, as we’ve already suggested, James Kelman. Perhaps we need to relax the stranglehold around management writing and draw a deep breath; realise what we in the academy have missed for so many years and just how far writing has developed beyond our circumscribed view of what writing ‘should be’.

Hakala reviews two texts concerned with knowledge production. In general terms, the debate centers on the Mode 1-Mode 2 distinction which supposedly captures the difference between inquiry governed by strictly academic interests and inquiry guided by more socially relevant interests. In practice, however, ‘Mode 2’ is much more diffuse than ‘relevance’ normally connotes – closer to a ‘market attractor’, reducing the university from an institution with the aim of unifying knowledge to a convenient physical space that enables the ‘communication’ of various knowledge interests. In reading the piece we were struck by the potential for Mode 2 production to succumb to Bourdieu’s critiques that Hakala does well to draw out. In relation to writing we are again left with Boje et al.’s (2004) question regarding a space for new writing: is there any room for this in an academy obsessed with developing and maintaining a canon? It seems, following Hakala’s use of economic nomenclature, that there probably is not.

In Toyoki’s review of Hernes, Toyoki discusses Lefebvre’s concept of space and spatial production. Rather akin to Bergson’s philosophy of time (1911), here is a resounding critique of the prevailing view that we only inhabit space, suggesting rather that we also live through it. For Toyoki, space, like time, has both properties. This introduces the potential that the space of writing is both form and content, technical and aesthetic, ontological and epistemological. Thus it is not just the text produced that is important but what/that the writer comes to be (through) writing. Interestingly Toyoki acknowledges this in the afterword. This opens up a space for discussion and debate and introduces concerns about the production and utilisation of Lefebvre. Hernes, perhaps, has found a place whilst Toyoki is more open and still willing to continue to search for a space to be.
And the News Is

(Tony, sitting in his office at work but wishing he had stayed at home in his studio)

I’m surrounded by second level undergraduate essays that I’ve just finished marking. The assignment curiously enough required them to reflect on the adequacy of their own writing and consider how they might develop their academic skills here further.

Some seem to have more to say, and can do so more thoughtfully, than I can. I’m struggling with this, I don’t know what to write about writing and my interest, to be honest, is slipping. What I’d rather be doing is playing with some music software – Ableton Live V4 – that I’ve just acquired for my recording studio. The only thing that’s stopping me is that I really should stop messing with it and instead sit down and read the manual (note to self – RTFM).

And that’s a problem. It’s soooo dull, if it wasn’t I wouldn’t be writing this now. Yet another technical manual – and as a geek I’ve got loads but have read very few of them – that is so very boringly written and presented. Sure there are some pretty screen shots, sure there are lots of examples, but the writing style… I think I’m going to cop out and buy the training video instead. Or then again, maybe I’ll just carry on playing with it – it doesn’t really matter that I won’t ever get to know all the ins and outs of the software, I can get by with ‘good enough’.

Sad to say the Ableton manual isn’t the worst, not by a long mile. You should try the Steinberg Cubase SX manual. Better still with this one you have to pay extra to get a printed copy and I haven’t got £550 for the software and then an extra £20 for the printed manual… no thanks. So I have to read that PDF file, continually tabbing between the software sequencer screen and the PDF. Yet again it’s written in such a boring style that I lose interest far too quickly.

I’ve just bought an IRiver hard disc MP3 player. I’ve read the manual seven times and still can’t understand it. Maybe I’m just stupid, but it simply doesn’t make sense to me. Fortunately I’ve worked out what to do. Great player, shame about the manual.

Why can’t someone write a technical manual that’s funny? Is it really the case that we can only convey a technical issue in a dull, dry and linear way? The medium of PDFs and electronic hypertext manuals is non-sequential and can embed other media such as video clips. This is supposed to be ‘new media’ so why is it all so boring?

My daughter is now learning to read and write at school. She combines pictures, collages and photos in her writing. Her latest is a sign for her bedroom. ‘No boys allowed, only girls in this bedroom’ says the speech bubble coming out of the mouth of a girl pointing at a much smaller boy. She says that the picture makes the sign much nicer to look at.

And she is right.

So why does a four-year old understand the intertwining of the aesthetic and the theoretical maps so well? It isn’t just the intertwining of other aesthetic forms; it’s also the wit, humour and intertextuality. If a four-year old can do this, why can’t we? Is it because we have been constrained for too long and now have too much invested, too much to lose? At what stage will we educate this out of her in order that she concentrate on dull, lifeless but academically correct prose? When will she be restrained to writing through a glass darkly?

A few years ago we attended a conference themed around new approaches to presenting and understanding organizations. Tony presented his paper having previously recorded it against a music backdrop onto his laptop. It didn’t take long before some of the audience left muttering about how Tony showed no respect for an academic audience
and that his taste in music sucked. Apparently as academics we can talk about alternatives and difference just so long as we aren’t (too) alternative.

So in response to Boje et al.’s questions about what kinds of new discourse we are allowed in management and organization texts, the answer seems to be: apparently nothing. It seems that the canon is happy to have a rhetoric around heteroglossia but prefers that ‘the new boss is the same as the old boss’. Has management and organizational studies opened their doors to welcome new ways of writing since it lauded those at the margins? No, not really. If they have, then of the thousands of articles published annually, why are there so very few that either are new writing or discuss it?

We’re still on the fringe, forced to take risks and sneered at if we fail: rogues and vagabonds, perhaps admired from afar for what we are but not acceptable, at least NIMBY (a UK acronym for ‘not in my back yard’). The politics of writing in management academia is about repetition, not difference. The canon knows and is confident of and in itself by being able to separate out and repudiate ‘the other’. That’s not a game we wish to be part of.

Paid in full? Like hell.

references

the editors
Anthony O’Shea is member of the editorial collective of *ephemera*.
E-mail: tony.oshea@sunderland.ac.uk

Christian De Cock is senior lecturer in organisation studies at the School of Business and Economics, University of Exeter.
E-mail: C.De-Cock@exeter.ac.uk
Thomas Pynchon and the Scrambling of Literary Codes: Implications for Organization Theory

Alexander Styhre

To write is to impose a favoured epistemological framework on the empirical material. This paper aims at discussing the literary work of the American novelist Thomas Pynchon and what implications his treatment of the line of demarcation between science and literature, derived from his idiosyncratic epistemological position defying any strict separation of genres and language games, has for the field of organization theory and management studies. The paper concludes that Pynchon's work is valuable within a broad ranging critique of the function and use of language and narrative forms of expression in management texts. Writers like Pynchon help unsettle the received epistemologies of the dominant scientist forms of writing in organization theory and function to de-familiarize the established forms of thinking.

Introduction

I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there’s no way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet it’s through this very impossible that the truth holds onto the real. (Lacan, 1974/1990: 1)

The much-discussed “linguistic turn” in the social sciences (see e.g., Rorty, 1999: 24-25, passim) has increased the interests for a broad array of linguistic and textual practices and entities in organizations and companies. Methodological frameworks such as discourse analysis, conversation analysis, and narrative studies are all derived from the emphasis on social reality as being based on joint linguistic and symbolic interactions. In this respect, organization theory follows adjacent disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, political science and gender studies. In all domains of the social sciences, society is regarded as an accomplishment embedded in the human capacity for exchanging statements and thoughts. What has not changed very much within this general reconceptualization of social and organizational realities is the form of expression employed by researchers and management writers. Here, one may rather believe that there is a kernel of truth in the dictum ‘the more things change the more they stay the same’. The practices of writing is still very much adhering to what
Czarniawska (2004) calls a ‘scientistic’ form of writing, a mode of expression that favours transparency, objectivity, clear-cut formulations, and, as a consequence, a rather modest emphasis on the written text’s literary qualities. Breaking with this received mode of representation remains one of the main challenges for organization theory. To date, there are few and primarily marginal examples of new forms of writing that open up for new forms of expression. Gherardi (1995: 3) writes: “[W]e have few examples of how to write ‘differently’, mainly because the scientific community – colleagues and reviewers – is strongly biased toward the ‘normalization’ of language”. In addition, a number of writers have suggested that organization theory should be influenced by literary works (Czarniawska, 2003; Patriotta, 2003; ten Bos and Rhodes, 2003; Fleming and Sewell, 2002; De Cock, 2000; Carr and Zanetti, 2000; Czarniawska-Joerges and Guillet de Monthoux, 1994). It is somewhat surprising that all the fruitful insights and concerns regarding the limitations and possibilities of language are expressed in a rather conventional prose rather than being given a proper expression that would further emphasize that point in the very composition of the text. One of the few examples of such a writing strategy is continental and primarily French post-structuralist writings of philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze. Both Derrida and Deleuze have received massive critique for writing difficult and unnecessarily complicated prose, while at the same time they have been praised for their elaborations on expression. In Rosi Braidotti’s formulation, criticizing language for its imposed linearity in a linear form is an impotent form of critique and therefore one needs to transgress such a style of writing: “To attack linearity and binary thinking in a style that remains linear and binary itself would indeed be a contradiction in terms. This is why the poststructuralist generation has worked so hard to innovate the form and style, as well as the content, of their philosophy” (Braidotti, 2002: 8). Enabling for new ways of composing a text may be achieved through two different strategies: On the one hand, one may point at alternative styles of writing that in various ways improve our abilities to give expression to experiences and events. This would be a positive approach to writing, opening up for new perspectives and expressions. On the other hand, one may choose a negative approach, that is, to undermine the incumbent and ready-made forms of expression that prevails within a field. This approach would not as much aim at being constructive as being deconstructive or even destructive. Or as Buchanan puts it, speaking about Deleuze’s writings: “[T]he most deeply utopian texts are not those that propose of depict a better society, but those that carry out the most thoroughgoing destruction to the present society” (2000: 113).

This paper aims at discussing the literary works of Thomas Pynchon, a noted ‘postmodernist’ writer, and to point at the deconstructive or destructive modus operandi of Pynchon’s texts. The paper aims at pointing at the forces inherent to alternative forms of expression that a number of commentators have identified in Pynchon’s text. Learning from highly innovative and, for the lack of a better word, ‘creative’ writers such as Pynchon may make management writers alter their relationship with writing and develop a more affirmative view of other forms of expression. This paper does not suggest a mimetic approach, i.e., that ‘one should write like Pynchon’ but rather wants to point at the need for what we may call after Buchanan (2000), ‘utopian writers’ who are willing and capable of breaking with the doxa of writing. This does not however mean that praised authors such as Thomas Pynchon are turned into heroes of literature that one must admire and respect. Instead, it implies that innovative writing may be a
source of influence within the social sciences, and which can be referred to without being discredited for blurring the line of demarcation between science and fiction, truth and imagination. One of the key consequences of the linguistic turn is to overcome such a strict demarcation without throwing out esteemed scientific virtues – whatever such locally enacted qualities may be – with the proverbial bathwater. Writing organization theory after the linguistic turn then means to claim the right to experiment on the form of expression. The working lives in contemporary organizations are worthy of a proper form of expression that does not restrict its writing practices to a narrow range of sources. Therefore, someone as original a writer as Thomas Pynchon is may be brought into discussion to reinforce the prerogative of ‘freedom of speech’.

**Learning from Thomas Pynchon**

The point of departure for this paper is the commonly received wisdom that literary language and scientific language is strongly distinguished; literary writing is poetic and expressive, scientific language is denotative and transparent. This is a pervasive belief in contemporary society. There is however nothing that says that scientific writing of necessity needs to operate within a realm of language bereaved of literary and poetic qualities (Stengers, 1989/1997: 150; Knorr Cetina, 1981: 95; Linstead, 1994). On the other hand, literary works are not hermetically sealed from scientific discourses. Some genres, for instance the genre of ‘Science Fiction’ (see Parker, Higgins, Lightfoot and Smith, 1999), are even highly dependent on the writers’ ability to adapt to a scientific discourse in the literary work. In the same manner, crime stories often draw from a wide body of resources within academic research in disciplines such as psychology, sociology and criminology. Therefore, literary and scientific works are not always located on the endpoints of a continuum.

The American writer Thomas Pynchon is one of the most praised authors in contemporary American literature. Notorious for his refusal to give interviews and the lack of photos of the author in conjunction with his highly personal and idiosyncratic literary oeuvre, Pynchon has attained cult status in American literature. Pynchon belongs to a group of modern fiction writers that manage to express what one may call a ‘double articulation’ in their texts; their texts are never wholly self-contained and transparent but always maintain a sense of heterogeneity in all its formulations and expressions. Other examples of authors praised for these skills include Jorge Luis Borges, Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, Virginia Woolf and Herman Melville (see ten Bos and Rhodes, 2003; De Cock, 2000; Deleuze, 1993/1997, 1969/1990; Adorno, 1981; Auerbach, 1946/1968). Since Pynchon’s literary work is, if not vast, at least complex and wide spanning, it is not easy to summarize Pynchon’s work in a few sentences. For Best and Kellner (2001: 25), Pynchon is representative of what is called the Menippean satire, a Greek literary genre aimed at poking fun at authorities and offering a social critique. In similar terms, Herman (1999) speaks of Pynchon’s novels as being parodies, that is, “the comic refuncti oning of preformed linguistic or artistic material” (in Margaret Rose’s, 1993, formulation, cited in Herman, 1999: 209). To speak of Pynchon’s texts as satires or parodies does not imply that they are wholly frivolous. Instead, Pynchon employs a highly complex and heterogeneous language to make
certain social practices and conditions problematic. Here are some of the distinguishing features of Pynchon’s texts: The personal form of expression, the adherence to scientific discourses (Pynchon holds a degree in Engineering from Cornell University and worked previously as an Aircraft engineer at Boeing), the mixture of styles and genres, the oscillation between mundane and even grotesque language and highly refined and cultivated speech, and, above all, the blending of genres. In Best and Kellner’s (2001: 25) account, “Pynchon scrambles literary codes, mixing styles, genres and discourses in a highly implosive text that disseminates portrayals of chaos, entropy, indeterminacy, and contingency, thus taking on principal themes of postmodern science and social theory” (see also Tabbi, 1995, ch. 3). Pynchon’s treatment of language is thus capable of both giving the impression of full mastery over it at the same time as language is crumbling under its own weight, slipping through the fingers as soon as the reader believes he or she understands its workings. Mattessich (2002) explores Pynchon’s *Gravity’s Rainbow*, a novel first published in 1973 that today has attained the status of a minor classic. A book like *Gravity’s Rainbow* is complicated to summarise in a few sentences but one may argue that it examines the relationship between military technology and military activities and civil society. The book is set in the end of World War II when the Germans were developing their V2 rocket, a technological innovation embodying the latest scientific achievements but in the form of a lethal weapon capable of new advancements in mass killing and destruction. For Mattessich (2002: 75), the ambiguities of the virtues and values of science penetrate the language of the text: “*Gravity’s Rainbow* is language as technē, the deployment of metaphor, analogy, repetition, and narrativity to tell the story of a culture’s rationalization and objectification by thought. But it is also in some sense a broken language, the text of resemblance gone mad, incited to a proliferation of meanings”. The following passage from the novel *Gravity’s rainbow*, is representative of Pynchon’s blending of science (mathematics) and more mundane matters (here represented by pornography and sexuality):

Three hundreds years ago mathematicians were learning to break that canonball’s rise and fall into stairsteps of range and height, \( \Delta x \) and \( \Delta y \), allowing them to grow smaller and smaller, approaching zero as armies of eternally shrinking midgets galloped upstairs and down again, the pattern of their diminishing feet growing finer, smoothing out and out into continuous sound. This analytic legacy has been handed down intact – it brought the technicians at Penemünde to peer at the Askatian films of Rocket flights, frame by frame, \( \Delta x \) by \( \Delta y \), flightless themselves…films and calculus, both pornographics of flight. (Pynchon, 1973: 567)

Here, mathematics and Rocket Science – a synecdoche for all scientific practices – are regarded as a form of indecency, a sort of voyeurism, enabling for increasingly detailed images of reality. Elsewhere, sexuality and fetishism and mathematics are associated; a ‘mathematics of pornography’ is sketched:

All of Margherita’s chains and fetters are chiming, black skirt furled back to her waist, stockings pulled up tight in classic cusps by the suspenders of boned black rig she’s wearing underneath. How the penises of Western men have leapt, for a century, to the sight of this singular point at the top of a lady’s stockings, this transition from silk to bare skin and suspender! It’s easy for non-fetishists to sneer about Pavlovian conditioning and let it go at that, but any underwear enthusiast worth his unwholesome giggle can tell you that there is much more here – there is a cosmology: of nodes and cusps and points of oscillation, mathematical kisses…singularities! Consider cathedral spires, holy minarets, the crunch of trainwheels over the points as you watch peeling away the track you didn’t take…mountain peaks rising sharply to heaven, such as those holding potent
mystery…rose thorns that prick us by surprise…even, according to the Russian mathematicians Friedman, the infinitely dense point from which the present Universe expanded….In each case, the change from point to no-point carries a luminosity and enigma at which something in us must leap and sing, or withdraw in fright. (Pynchon, 1973: 396)

Mathematics and scientific endeavours are here regarded as being interrelated in the domain of the human faculties; they spring from the same human condition. Science and desire are mutually co-dependent; the topology of the mathematician may be applied to the female body that is examined as an object of investigation.

Not only does Pynchon portray scientific work as being entangled with basic human needs and conditions. He also introduces epistemological concerns making scientific work problematic at the level of theory. At the beginning of the book, Pynchon introduces two statisticians, Pointsman and Mexico, who represent different scholarly epistemes or paradigms and thereby are in opposition to one another’s views. When trying to figure out some regularities or pattern in the bombing of London during the Blitz, Pointsman and Mexico become aware that they adhere to different scientific projects:

The young statistician [Pointsman] is devoted to number and to method, not table-rapping or wishful thinking. But in the domain of zero to one, not-something or something. He cannot like Mexico, survive anyplace in between. Like his master I. P. Pavlov before him, he imagines the cortex of the brain as a mosaic of tiny on/off elements. Some are always in bright excitation, others darkly inhibited. The contours, bright and dark, keep changing. One or zero. ‘Summation’, ‘transition’, ‘irradiation’, ‘concentration’, ‘reciprocal induction’– all Pavlovian brain-mechanics – assumes the presence of these bi-stable points. But to Mexico belongs the domain between zero and one – the middle Pointsman has excluded from his persuasion – the probabilities. A chance of say 0.37 that, by time he stops to count, a given square on his map will have suffered only one hit, 0.17 will suffer two…

/…/’I’m, sorry. That’s the Monte Carlo Fallacy [Mexico says]. No matter how many have fallen inside a particular square, the odds remain the same as they always were. Each hit is independent of all the others. Bombs are not dogs. No link. No memory. No conditioning.’

Nice thing to tell a Pavlovian…If there is nothing to link the rocket strike – no reflex arc, no Law of Negative Induction/…/How can Mexico play, so at his ease, with these symbols of randomness and fright? Innocent as a child, perhaps unaware – perhaps – that in his play he wrecks the elegant room of history, threatens the idea of cause and effect itself. What if Mexico’s whole generation have turned out like this? Will post-war be nothing but ‘events’, newly created one moment to the next? No Links? Is it the end of history? (Pynchon, 1973: 55-56)

A theory based on binary thinking and laws of nature is contrasted against a theory of the event, of statistical oscillation between the zero and the one. Pynchon here addresses a major epistemological concern, that of the potential incommensurability of different theoretical systems and frameworks. The grand theory of the Pavlovian program is here depicted as an impotent framework for dealing with practical problems. Furthermore, it cannot become aware of its own blind spots (e.g. ‘The Monte Carlo Fallacy’) while at the same time its spokesmen draw far-reaching conclusions when confronting alternative and competing explanatory frameworks. Pynchon portrays a crisis of a scientific program and points at its consequences in terms of the moralist standpoints taken.
In addition to the epistemological critique of science in *Gravity’s Rainbow*, Pynchon instils a certain anxiety within language, in the very expression he uses to portray the industrial-military complex responsible for the latest techno-scientific achievements (see Melley, 1994: 736). The following section brings together a detailed account on chemistry and a paranoid connection between certain organizations, is representative of this thematic:

Imipolex G has proven to be nothing more – or less – sinister than a new plastic, an aromatic heterocyclic polymer, developed in 1939, years before its time, by one L. Jamf for IG Farben. It is stable at high temperatures, like up to 900°C., it combines good strength with a low power loss factor. Structurally, it is stiffened chain of aromatic rings, hexagons like the gold one that slides and taps above Hilary Bounce’s navel, alternating here and there with what are known as heterocyclic rings.

The origins of Imipolex G are traceable back to early research done at du Pont. Plasticity has its grand tradition and mainstream, which happens to flow as The Great Synthesist. His classic study of large molecules spanned the decade of the twenties and brought us directly to nylon, which is not only a delight to the fetishist and a convenience to the armed insurgent, but was also, at the time and well within the System, an announcement of Plasticity’s central canon: that chemists were no longer to be at the mercy of nature. They could decide now what properties they wanted a molecule to have, and then go ahead and build it. At du Pont, the next step after nylon was to introduce aromatic rings into the Polyamide chain. Pretty soon a whole family of ‘aromatic polymers’ had arisen: aromatic polyamides, polycarbonates, polyethers, polysulfanes. The target property most often seemed to be strength – first among Plasticity’s virtuous triad of Strength, Stability and Whiteness (*Kraft, Standfestigkeit, Weiß*): how often where these taken for Nazi graffiti…). J. Lamf, among others, then proposed, logically, dialectically, taking the parental polyamide sections of the new chain, and looping them around into rings too, giant ‘heterocyclic’ rings, to alternate with the aromatic rings. This principle was easily extended to other precursor molecules. A desired monomer of high molecular weight could be synthesized to order, bent into its heterocyclical ring, clasped, and strung in a chain along with the more ‘natural’ benzene or aromatic rings. Such chains would be known as ‘aromatic heterocyclic polymers’. One hypothetical chain that Jamf came up with, just before the war, was later modified into Imipolex G. (Pynchon, 1973: 249-250)

Scientific progress (in chemistry), politics, ideology and desire (‘Hilary Bounce’s navel’) are again interrelated and mutually dependent. The American company du Pont (a standing reference in the management and accounting literature) and the German company IG Farben, although being separated into two political spheres, share the concern for chemistry and scientific advancement, and inform the political agendas and vocabulary. There is no compartmentalized view of science and politics, mathematics and sexuality, high and low, the mundane and the sophisticated, but all are aspects of human undertakings being folded into one another.

For Mattessich (2002), Pynchon is, albeit in his own somewhat curious ways, representative of the American counterculture of the 1960s and its criticism of militarism and its implied colonialism. But contrary to much of the 1960s ‘movements’, Pynchon does not suggest that one should overturn this system displacing it with something different, a supposedly more ‘human’ world order or whatever category one may prefer. Instead, Mattessich (2002: 3) suggests, Pynchon maintains that ‘escape’, withdrawal and refusal are the only worthwhile strategies vis-à-vis the technoscientific development and its penetration into the life world of everyday life. Mattessich argues: “*Gravity’s Rainbow*, principally in the trope of the Rocket, expresses a perspectivist
critique of the technological paradigm at the heart of the scientific institutions and methods. This paradigm is metalinguistic because it links social power to global systems of communication and information that satellitize social life” (2002: 19). Therefore, as Best and Kellner suggest, Pynchon is not offering positive alternative images of society but is rather concerned with envisioning our contemporary society as something that is problematic: “Like many postmodernists, Pynchon is concerned not with generating positive models of change, but rather with problematizing and deconstructing already existing models” (2001: 48).

In a later book, *Mason & Dixon*, first published in 1997, Pychon returns to the issue of technology and science and its implications for social life. While *Gravity’s Rainbow* was set in the turmoil of the end of the World War II, the formative years of our contemporary modern society, fundamentally based on the belief in technological progress, *Mason & Dixon* returns to the Enlightenment period when scientific thinking still had to confront both theological epistemologies and common sense thinking and folk psychology. In *Mason & Dixon*, Pynchon tells the story, again a highly complex and heterogeneous assemblage of genres and styles, of how the astronomer Charles Mason (1738-1786) and surveyor Jeremiah Dixon (1733-1779) draw the line (the so-called Mason-Dixon line) between Protestant Pennsylvania and Catholic Maryland, thus imposing a line of demarcation between the industrious North and the agricultural South of the USA, an (imaginary) line later playing an important role in American history. The text thus combines a number of topics such as science, technology, colonialism, and forms of exclusion and demarcation. Cowart writes: “Here [in *Mason & Dixon*] Pynchon scrutinizes the age in which technology began to come into its own – bringing with it the modern world’s spiritual desperation. He exposes the fallacy of scientific rationalism at the moment of its great efflorescence in the eighteenth century” (1999: 342). He continues:

Dixon, a surveyor with an above-average education, and Mason, a sensitive scientist of the second rank, attempt to be good eighteenth-century empiricists, men of reason, but neither can stop seeking evidence of magic and the supernatural…Mason and Dixon enact within their own intellects the increasingly unequal struggle between reason and magic. (Cowart, 1999: 347)

Pynchon thus seeks to capture the spirit of the emerging scientific communities playing an increasingly important role in what is becoming the modern society. Yet, the old modes of thinking, entangled with religious belief, remain highly influential within the new worldview. For instance, the philosopher Emerson’s enthusiasm over scientific progress and refinement is associated with his relationship to God:

The Telescopes, the Fluxions, the invention of Logarithms and the frenzy of multiplications, often for its own sake, that follow’d have for Emerson all been steps of an unarguable approach to God, a growing clarity, – Gravity, the Pulse of Time, the finite speed of Light present themselves to him as aspects of God’s character. It’s like becoming friendly with an erratic, powerful, potentially dangerous member of the Aristocracy. He holds no quarrel with the Creator’s sovereignty, but is repeatedly appall’d at the lapses in Attention, the flaws in design, the squand’rings of life and energy, – first appall’d, then angry. We are taught, – we believe, – that it is love of the Creation that drives the Philosopher in his Studies. Emerson is driven, rather by a passionate resentment. (Pynchon, 1997: 220)
As an effect of the new scientific *Weltanschauung*, old – or, ‘traditional’, in Max Weber’s vocabulary – modes of thinking, drawing on mythology, folklore and religious beliefs, compete with the new worldviews:

These times are unfriendly toward World alternative to this one. Royal Society members and French Encyclopaedists are in the Chariot, availing themselves whilst they may of any occasion to preach the Gospel of Reason, denouncing all that once was Magic, though too often in smirking tropes upon the Church of Rome, – visitations, bleeding statues, medical impossibilities, – no, no, far too foreign. One may be allowed an occasional Cock Lane Ghost, – otherwise, for any more in that Article, one must turn to Gothic Fictione, folded acceptably between the covers of Books. (Pynchon, 1997: 359)

Mythology is here reduced from the status of being a legitimate explanatory framework to a form of entertainment (‘fiction’). The age of Enlightenment wielded destructive effects on common sense thinking. In addition to being in opposition to mythology, scientific thinking is also conceived of as an ethnocentric form of knowledge, embedded in particular social, cultural and historical conditions specific to the European experience. In one of the passages, Mason discusses the line with a Chinese *Feng-Shui* expert:

‘The object being [Mason says], that the people shall set their homes to one side or another. That it be the boundary, nothing more’.

‘Boundary!’ The Chinaman begins to pull upon his hair and paw the earth with brocade-slipper’d feet. ‘Ev’rywhere else on earth, Boundaries follow Nature, – coast-lines, ridge-tops, river-banks, – so honouring the Dragon or *Shan* within, from which Land-Scape ever takes its form. To mark a right Line upon the Earth is to inflict upon the Dragon’s very Flesh, a sword-slash, a long, perfect scar, impossible for any who live out here the year ‘round to see as other than hateful Assault. How can it pass unanswere’d?’

This is the third continent he has been doing *Feng-Shui* jobs on, and he thought he’d seen crazy people in Europe, but these are beyond folly. (Pynchon, 1997: 542)

The scientific practices pursued by Mason and Dixon on behalf of the Royal Society and mankind is then far from being value-free and capable of ‘aperspectival objectivity’ (see Feldman, 2004) but are closely associated with the Eurocentric culture.

While *Gravity’s Rainbow* explored the morally bankruptcy of the ideologies and beliefs preceding and enabling World War II, *Mason & Dixon* conceives of the notion of the line, the geometrical master figure of the novel playing the same role as the parable in *Gravity’s Rainbow*, both in practical and metaphorical terms as the main ideological marker of the American and Western societies developed in the Enlightenment years. Cowart offers an explication:

Pynchon represents the Line as archetypical, emblematic of divisions the Christian West has always construed as essential. The drawing of lines – in division, differentiation, discrimination, and other boundary making – is as old, it seems, as the creation itself. According to the Genesis presumably read by Catholics and Protestants alike, acts of demarcation were among the first items of divine business. They commence a mere four verses in the Old Testament as the deity divides light from dark and ordains the firmament to divide the primordial waters. (1999: 355)

The need for structuring and organizing around the geometrical figure of the line is thus inextricably bound up with the dawn of Western culture. Dividing light from dark has
remained a longstanding and abiding political concern in Western thinking. Pynchon let the philosopher Emerson discuss the historical significance of the Line:

‘The Romans’, he [Emerson] continues, in class the next day, ‘were preoccupied with conveying Force, be it hydraulic, or military, or architectural – along straight Lines. The Leys are at least that old, – perhaps Druidic, tho’ others say Mithraic, in origin. Whichever Cult shall gain the honor’, Right Lines beyond a certain Magnitude become of less use or instruction to those who must dwell among them, than intelligible, by their immense regularity, to more distant onlookers, as giving a clear sign of Human Presence upon the Planet. (Pynchon, 1997: 219)

For Cowart (1999), Pynchon offers a genealogical literary account of this politics. Mason and Dixon were men of the Enlightenment; they were both struggling to overcome their own beliefs inherited from the tradition and for them, in Pynchon’s text, drawing the line represented a form of mastery over legitimate and illegitimate forms of knowledge and cognition in the Enlightenment epistemology. Both Gravity’s Rainbow and Mason & Dixon thus share a certain form of social critique that by no means is utopian in terms of offering alternatives and complementary forms of thinking. Pynchon does not provide solutions or give us suggestions. What Pynchon does though, is offer literary works that effectively undermine a sense of certainty, stability and predictability. The high and the low, the right and the wrong, and a number of other binary distinctions are deterritorialized and constitute a melée of opposites in Pynchon’s novels. Pynchon thus overturns both literary and scientific languages in the very combination and mingling of the two. Cowart writes: “The fluid, unfixed line between history and romance, between the real and the imagined, indicts the very logic of rationalism. Any attempt to firm up this line leads not to objectivity but to the imposition, more or less fascistic, of a single official perspective” (1999: 356). The scientific and the literary are, to use Jean Baudrillard’s (1983) term, imploded into one single, yet heterogeneous form of expression, which in itself is fluid and fluxing, moving and in a state of becoming. That is the contribution of Pynchon for scientific writers, e.g., the organization theory writer, the ability to not only join opposites but to actually make them become folded into one another, making them constitute a new form of expression, a new form of language. That is what we can learn from a writer such as Thomas Pynchon.

Discussion

The ‘scientistic’ forms of writing that have been predominant in organization theory have a number of emotional consequences. For the first, it represents a fear of the narrative, that is, the unwillingness to recognize that all events and occurrences in organizations are capable of becoming expressed in a narrative form, in a plot that emerges as a series of temporally embedded events and actions. Secondly, the fear of innovative writing is an abiding concern operating under the aegis of the presupposed objectivity of scientific writing. Thirdly, very much a consequence of the first two effects, there is an anxiety associated with blending genres and styles which might turn what is supposed to be transparent and reproducible into something that is more messy and confusing.
Historian Hayden White has discussed the use of narratives in historical writing. In White’s account, historical events are never enclosed and clearly demarcated occurrences in time that immediately present themselves as something intelligible. Instead, historical events can be accounted for in the form of annals, a sequence of events in time, in chronicles, as stories told but without proper beginnings and ends, or as narratives, in the form of a structured plot with meanings, beginnings and ends. White summarizes:

What I have sought to suggest is that this value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary. The notion that sequences of real events possess the formal attributes of the stories we tell about imaginary events could only have its origin in wishes, day-dreams, reveries. Does the world really present itself to perception in the form of well-made stories, with central subjects, proper beginnings, middles, and ends, and a coherence that permits us to see ‘the end’ in every beginning? Or does it present itself more in the forms that the annals and chronicles suggests, either as mere sequence without beginning or end or as sequences of beginnings that only terminate and never conclude? (1987: 24)

As a consequence, there is no longer any clear-cut and epistemologically transparent line of demarcation between the real and the imaginary events (White uses this Lacanian formulation throughout his text without fully explaining his choice of words). White continues: “[W]hat distinguishes ‘the historical’ from ‘fictional’ stories is first and foremost their content, rather than their form. The content of historical stories is real events, events that really happened, rather than imaginary events, events invented by the narrator” (1987: 27). The difference between the historical and the fictional is then not a matter of form but of content. In other words, expressing a sequence of historical events in an annal is then no more deceiving than making it appear in its original form. What matters for White (1987) is the ability to communicate underlying, ‘real’ historical events and not to be overtly concerned with the form. In fact, working within an epistemological tradition that intersects with popular culture, one need to be concerned about even using expressions such as ‘real events’. White concludes:

The fact that narrative is the mode of discourse common to both ‘historical’ and ‘nonhistorical’ cultures and that it predominates in both mythical and fictional discourse makes it suspect as a manner of speaking about real events. The nonnarrative manner of speaking common to the physical sciences seems more appropriate for the representation of ‘real’ events. (1987: 57)

Following a similar line of reasoning as White, Best and Kellner (2001) speak of the difference between ‘theoretical’ and ‘aesthetic’ maps giving expression to different aspects of an empirical material at hand. Best and Kellner (2001) write:

While theoretical maps typically employ the codes of science (clarity, rigor, empiricism, objectivity, etc.) to represent the social world, aesthetic maps offer phenomenological illuminations of everyday life that affords visions and experiences that theoretical maps are unable to supply. If the ‘personal is political’, then social mappings have to move beyond the co-ordinates of public institutions and the limitations of objective discourse into the emotional and subjective dimensions of private life. (2001: 52)

Theoretical maps thus defy any narrative account because of its disregard of the subjective and the fictional elements in all writing. On the other hand, aesthetic maps may serve as an influence when bridging the personal and the public, the actor with structure. Blending two seemingly incommensurable forms of writing is thus not
problematic for Best and Kellner (2001) but is rather a form of expression that may overcome or synthesize two different traditions of writing. Herein lies the potential in Thomas Pynchon’s fiction; since it effectively ‘scrambles the literary codes’ and folds the scientific and the fictional (and the mythological and the mundane) into one another, yet never pretends to be anything but fiction, his texts are exemplary in providing a mode of writing that disturbs the line of demarcation between the literary and the scientific. Scientific language is combined and brought together with a variety of uses of language that would not qualify as scientific in all communities. Pynchon’s texts are then aesthetic maps that at the same time to some extent are theoretical maps. William Gibson, the science fiction writer who coined the concept *cyberspace*, in the same manner bridges the aesthetic and theoretical maps in terms of providing visionary and creative images – not to be confused with naïve ideas of progressive development – of the opportunities with computer-based technologies. The fictional and the scientific then implode and become entangled.

When making organization theory and management studies become something more than a subset of what August Comte (1830-1856/1975: 77) called ‘social physics’ and the practices of social engineering Henry Ford (1929: 100) dreamed about, that is, breaking with what Adorno (1981: 64) calls the ‘cult of the fact’, it might be fruitful to recognize the potentiality inherent to the scrambling of literary codes and imploding theoretical and aesthetic maps. Robert Chia argues: “While the traditional scientific mentality emphasizes the *simplification* of the complex multiplicity of our experience into manageable ‘principles,’ ‘axioms,’ etc., literature and the arts have persistently emphasized the task of *complexifying* our thinking processes and hence sensitizing us to the subtle nuances of contemporary modern life” (1996: 411). Chia thus seems to agree with critical theory writers such as Walter Benjamin and Theodore W. Adorno that there is a liberating potential in literature and art. Giving new expressions to managerial practices and organizational undertakings is therefore a contribution to the field in its own terms. Following Erich Auerbach (1946/1968), one may then argue that it is possible to understand a society through its literature, through literary techniques and devices permitted and used. Making science and fiction intersect is not a form of decadence or manifestation of regression but is, on the contrary, indicative of a genre in the making, on the move to explore new domains. Organization theory writers may therefore learn from writers like Thomas Pynchon and his unorthodox relationship with the literary text.

In more practical terms, this implies that a variety of discourses and language games may co-exist within the field of organization theory. Notions such as narratology, messy texts (Marcus, 1998), and rhizomatic writing (Law, 2002) are some examples of concepts that seek to designate a practice of writing that effectively deals with complex or chaotic systems that do not let themselves become captured by conventional forms of writing (see e.g., Hayles, 1991). The movement towards a broader recognition of qualitative methodologies in organization theory represents a decisive step toward a more pluralistic view of the study of organization and management practice. The next domain of debate and discussion may be the inherent views of organization writing that are predominant in the academy and in business schools. In that debate, a variety of resources such as that of the works of Thomas Pynchon may be invoked and serve as role models or sources of inspiration.
Conclusion

This paper has argued that the writings of Thomas Pynchon may serve as a fruitful source of influence within organization theory because Pynchon effectively frustrates the line of demarcation between science and fiction without privileging the one over the other. Pynchon’s work thus emerges as a multiplicity of genres, vocabularies, plots, styles of writing, and other materials that are employed in the texts. A writer like Pynchon is then – in an analogy that may be somewhat far-fetched but still applicable – doing the same thing to literary genres as ethnomethodology sociologist like Harold Garfinkel (1967) do to our outlook on social reality: They de-familiarize and de-naturalize what are very much taken for granted, yet rest on fragile epistemological grounds. If Pynchon knows something, it is what Jacques Lacan says of language, that it is not possible to fully master and control it since language is always deceiving, not staying in its place, and moving in parables that are neither easy to understand nor to predict. Therefore, saying the truth is ‘literary impossible’ – words fail us. As a consequence, there is too much concern for the line of demarcation between science and fiction, truth and false, and (in White’s, 1987, use of the terms) the real and the imaginary. In organization theory, one may to a larger extent draw on the innovative use of language developed by writers such as Thomas Pynchon.

References


the author

Alexander Styhre (Ph.D., Lund University) is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Project Management at Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden and Research Fellow at Institute for Management of Innovation and Technology (www.imit.se). Alexander has written on a variety of topics pertaining to organization theory and management studies and is at present participating in research projects in the pharmaceutical, automotive, and construction industries. At the moment, Alexander is working on the book *Management Writing Out of Bounds: Writing After Post-colonialism* (Copenhagen Business School Press, forthcoming).

Address: Dept. of Project Management & Fenix Research Program, Chalmers University of Technology, Vera Sandbergs Allé 8, SE-412 96, Göteborg, Sweden.

E-mail: Alexander.Styhre@fenix.chalmers.se
Realizing Rogues: Theory, Organization, Dialogue

Adam Hansen

Examining the work of Isaac Julien, and theorists such as Marx, Deleuze and Negri, the paper employs an interdisciplinary and interperiodic methodology in order to evince how the deviant mobility of rogues renders proximate places, spaces and people otherwise strenuously differentiated. Yet such mobility is in fact made possible by prescribed patterns. Rogues do not simply subvert or parody normative states and relationships; rather, they circulate along vectors commencing from within normative states. Those dislocated are excrescences that emerge within, and exemplify the deepest structures and contradictory potentialities of, material and ideological organization. Ultimately, means of realizing the differentiation of one person or group from another habitually animate the very relationships that are being prohibited. The intention is not to presumptuously speak for, or organize, rogues as such: that would be to offer an account of deviant mobility from a safely sedentary position, and one that further marginalizes the already marginal. If anything, the aim is to show how people are written out of history, but are nevertheless, in that negation, written into history in compelling ways. Admittedly, this in turn may provide insight more into normative than deviant socio-cultural modes: but to realize the roguish is necessarily to realize those who made them so.

Introduction

This paper seeks to establish an interdisciplinary and interperiodic dialogue between theorists, commentators, and artists concerned with the theme of the deviant mobility of ‘rogues’ within organizations, whether those organizations are economic, material, social or cultural (or a combination of these). I draw on texts, architecture and visual art selected from the period of globalized capital (early modernity to the present), a period in which deviant mobilities were at once dynamized and prescribed by globalized capital. Using history to read theory, and vice versa, it is possible to argue that to realize rogues is to realize the proximities effected by deviant mobility.

The paper is in three parts. After outlining a history of problematic definitions of rogues, I then evaluate some theories of deviant mobility. Finally, I analyze one contemporary aesthetic response to the topic: by being sensitive to both the histories and theories of deviant mobility, the film-artist Isaac Julien realizes some of the inconsistencies of discriminations between the roguish and the reputable.
The interrelation of theory and history has already produced much excellent work exploring early modern representations of rogues.¹ Yet the proximities effected by deviant mobility, and realizations of it, afflict the discriminatory organizations produced by and reinforcing normative ideological and material structures in other periods too, as this paper will show. To realize rogues is not only to realize challenges to normative structures at particular historical moments, but also to recognize that these challenges are only possible because of instabilities within those normative structures at those moments. My intention, then, is not simply to try to redeem an essentialized rogueshness for radicalism. Rather, I wish to describe some of the ways in which realizing rogueshness embodies and exposes ambivalences and inconsistencies within specific socio-cultural organizations.

This is a significant period in which to use both theory and history to think critically about these ambivalences and inconsistencies. In recent years, policy makers and presidents have organized the world anew around polarized axes of ‘good’ and ‘evil’.² In the words of both the Clinton and Bush administrations, the latter axis is composed of countries the West has designated ‘rogue nations’ and ‘rogue states’.³ Whatever the merits, shortcomings, substance or spuriousness of these designations, they inform and reinforce discourses that permit processes intimately akin to those detailed by Edward Said in Orientalism. Designating a state or nation ‘rogue’ rationalizes ideological and material practices aimed at “describing…teaching…settling…ruling…dominating, restructuring, and having authority”.⁴ When governments organize an ‘axis of evil’ made of ‘rogue states’ they also construct deviant Others; in turn they affirm a willed discontinuity with these Others, denying the possibility of dialogue or ambiguity in order to consolidate a coalition of the ‘just’, ‘free’ and ‘civilized’.

As a reading of Said suggests, by deploying the term ‘rogue’ in this way, contemporary governments are operating in a well-established tradition. Yet the tradition reaches further back, as Craig Dionne and Steve Mentz indicate, in their introduction to a recent anthology of literary-historical criticism examining early modern rogues, or ‘cony-catchers’:

> Is there a sense that non-rogue nations depend on the presence of rogues to define themselves and to designate the outer reaches of acceptable behaviour in international relations, just as … the cony-catcher serves as a demon Other and tutor for early modern men and women negotiating the cultural changes of the city?⁵

---

Yet as with terms describing early modern rogues, the concept of ‘rogue state’ is “highly nuanced”.\(^6\) Who or what is deemed roguish depends more on the interests of the designator than the actions of the designated. To cite Noam Chomsky, “a ‘rogue state’ is not simply a criminal state, but one that defies the orders of the powerful – who are, of course, exempt.”\(^7\)

Indeed, so nuanced is the concept of ‘rogue’ that it is liable to critical appropriations that render ambiguous and subvert normative definitions of decent and deviant states. These subversions expose the often latent moral and material continuities between the poles of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ (evident in arms sales by the West to brutal regimes, for example). As one specialist in international legal relations has asserted:

> Particular states or groups of states that set themselves up as the authoritative judges of the world common good, in disregard of the views of others, are in fact a menace to international order, and thus to effective action in this field.\(^8\)

Hence, to Ibrahim Nafie, writing in Egypt, Israel is a ‘rogue state’; and in recent works both Chomsky and William Blum identify the US as the pre-eminent ‘rogue nation’.\(^9\) Even conservative commentators like Samuel Huntington accept that to most of the world, America is “becoming the rogue superpower”.\(^10\)

Such reversals manifest not only the dangerous paradoxes of recent political terminology, but also the roguish qualities of ‘rogue’. Supple and inclusive, it evades definition as it problematizes distinctions of licit and illicit, Other and Same, facilitating connections that are habitually disavowed by authorities seeking to police relations between such positions. As will be seen, in its etymology, usage, associations and history, ‘rogue’ has confounded attempts to arrest its meaning. In this, the word itself is comparable to those designated roguish. By exploring the dialogic potentials of rogues, we can perhaps revive or incite critical evaluations of certain of the terms deployed in contemporary discourse.

The use of ‘rogue’ is as persistent (and persistently problematic) in current international economic affairs as it is in global political or military relations. In 1995, Nick Leeson brought down Barings Bank, while working as a broker in Singapore. His fraudulent speculations and dodgy dealings ultimately cost 1200 people’s jobs, while earning him marketable notoriety as a ‘Rogue Trader’. Before his trial, however, Leeson shrugged off the roguish associations he would later capitalize upon, to protest: “I don’t think of myself as a criminal”.\(^11\) Yet there is more to Leeson’s words than a plea of innocence. As the economic commentator Will Hutton has argued, Leeson’s activities simply

---

\(^7\) Chomsky, op.cit., 30.
\(^11\) [http://www.bbc.co.uk/crime/caseclosed/nickleeson.shtml].
represented ‘capitalism in extremis’.12 Indeed, echoing nineteenth-century commentators (notably Marx, as will be seen below), Hutton identifies roguish characteristics in contemporary capitalism: “Financial capital…is mobile and flexible; it has no loyalties, nor does it expect any. Its job is to chase the highest returns.”13 In a sense, this is all Leeson did in his pursuit of ever larger profits, thereby adhering to the rapacious imperatives of his trade. Conceived in these terms, Leeson could legitimately claim he wasn’t a ‘criminal’ simply because the system in which he operated was inherently criminal. Fittingly, Dionne and Mentz make further interperiodic comparisons to determine the roguishness of modern enterprise:

While many of the factual details of recent shady financial practices remain as murky as the true history of the early modern rogue, several features of modern American capitalism in its current crisis resonate with the interrogations early modern writers made of Tudor-Stuart rogues, including the mystique of a private language, an opaque but demonstrable solidarity among coconspirators, and a way of doing business that relies on the credulity of a vast number of conies.14

With regard to other key words in my title, ‘Representations of’ stood in stead of ‘Realizing’ for a long time. I selected the latter because it offers a wider range of interpretations. ‘Realizing’ invokes a sense of displaying and representing; it also suggests how representation is informed by, and sometimes constructs, the real, and how this dynamic, phrased in a continuing aspect, is in process. It similarly conveys apprehension – comprehending, capturing, and unease. Comprehension sometimes works to facilitate capture, textual and actual: the attempt to understand rogues often involves an attempt to contain them. But when rogues thwart containment, bringing about proximities that material and ideological segregations seek to inhibit, they induce unease in those who seek to organize through such segregations.

My ideas about dialogue are informed by the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin developed the concept of the dialogic by analyzing characteristics specific to, and interstitial between, languages, ideological formations, identities, and literary genres (notably the novel).15 This concept is not only applicable to, and discernible in, discursive or textual formulations. It also helps to analyze the material and social forces represented in, and reproduced by, the meanings that discourses and cultural products appropriate and generate. Michael Holquist glosses the concept thus:

Dialogism argues that all meaning is relative in the sense that it comes about only as a result of the relation between two bodies occupying simultaneous but different space, where bodies may be

---

14 Dionne and Mentz, op.cit., 9.
thought of as ranging from the immediacy of our physical bodies, to political bodies and to bodies of ideas in general (ideologies).  

Bakhtin’s consistent emphasis on ‘interorientation’ adds significance to the concept of dialogism. Interorientation suggests the ways in which meaning, as conditioned by material circumstances, is contingent, not limitless (and is in fact rigorously context-bound). Yet meaning is nonetheless negotiable, either in contentious and explicit ways, or in subtle and more latent fashions, precisely because of its material bases. More than one voice, identity, position, or logic is articulated or articulating at any one time, even when only one voice is expressed. Indeed, monologue is possible only through a disavowal of, and thus in relation to, other voices. Hence Bakhtin’s related coinage: heteroglossia (other tongues).

Dialogism, interorientation, and heteroglossia do not ‘explain’ all cultural products or material contexts all the time, in this study or beyond it. However, Bakhtin’s ideas do provide a catalyst for discussing the relations between texts and contexts, materiality and representation, especially in relation to deviant mobility. Dialogism is manifested as the ingressions, egressions, and transgressions of rogues reveal the conflicted and permeable nature of ideological and physical environments where such hybridity is demonized. Moreover, dialogism animates how art realizes this deviant mobility. It indicates the ways in which aesthetic products cultivate ambiguity and irresolution by juxtaposing disparate discourses, thereby responding to the confusions constituting material realities. With dialogism, as with Bakhtin’s theory of the Carnivalesque, transgression and the containment of transgression can occur simultaneously. Expressions, communications, and the material contexts they realize, are hybrids, internally unstable, and radically suggestive. Even as opposed and distinct discourses are articulated, through dialogism denials can become affirmations, rejections can signal inclusions, and transgressive intercoursings are impossible to resist. These features of dialogism are perhaps initially best appreciated through an analysis of attempts to define rogues.

Definitions

Rogues are not necessarily, inherently, or intentionally illegal, subversive or deviant, though the mere fact of their existence may render them so. They are not always mobile,

and even if they were that would not equalize their experiences, or representations of their experiences. For the purposes of this paper, ‘rogues’ are defined as those who enact what is considered deviant mobility, whether they deviate from geographical, intellectual or moral norms.

The inclusiveness of the term ‘rogue’ is evident in its genesis. Dionne and Mentz assert:

The word *rogue* was coined in the 1560s, possibly by Thomas Harman, to describe vagrants who used disguise, rhetorical play, and counterfeit gestures to insinuate themselves into lawful social and political contexts. As plays, pamphlets, court records, and other historical and literary documents described this figure, the term *rogue* took on a large range of connotations, including ‘scoundrel’, ‘villain’, ‘atheist’, and ‘double-cropper’. *Rogue* became a catchall term for a variety of social deviants and outcasts, from rural migrants to urban con artists. … In a short time the term became popular and polysemous.

This account illustrates the perplexing confluence of fact and fiction that produced ‘rogues’, a confluence that in turn evokes the mixture of social types that the word came to represent. As Martine Van Elk has shown, Elizabethan Bridewell Court records “present us not merely with a set of records about vagrants, but with a spectrum of socially condemned behaviour, linking the crime of vagrancy to crimes of sexuality and insubordination more generally”. Crucially, Elk continues, this penal and judicial treatment “would have enhanced the impact of stories of vagrants such as those found in the rogue literature, which must have resonated in a much wider way with deviant behaviour at all levels of society.”

In efforts to determine what is meant by ‘rogue’, commentators past and present have often characterized rogues by their mobility. While this aids definition, it is important to recognize that there are many different types of movement, some local, some global,

---


20 Dionne and Mentz, op.cit., 1-2.


some forced, some forceful (some combining both of these, as in the arrogating enterprises of imperialism), some chosen, some needful, some predatory, some allowed, some proscribed. Diverse stratifications complicate what it is to be, and hence what it is to realize, the mobile. Such stratifications involve class, rank, or degree (past and present, ascribed, achieved, imitated, desired), age, gender, ethnicity (presumed, self-affirmed, designated), place of origin and distance from it, skills, criminality, legitimacy (whether apprehended or self-identified as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’, ‘sturdy’ or infirm), and what Alexandre Vexliard has termed ‘elementary’ and ‘structural’ vagabondage.23 Effacing this diversity risks de-historicizing the mobile and responses to them, aesthetic or socio-political. A wandering female hop-picker in the 1800s did not share the same material status and was not represented in the same way as a gentleman-highwayman (however rare a creature) in the early 1700s. In turn, neither is the same as one John Bodle. When questioned about his peregrinations in Southampton in 1639, Bodle replied that he was “by profession a bricklayer, and that hee doth not use to worke at his profession in the winter time, but doth go abroad to see fashions”.24 Such meandering compromises taxonomical organization.

Nonetheless, historically, material realities and ideological programmes interconnected to prevent the proximity of mobile and sedentary states. This separation has depended on definitions that essentialized and homogenized roguishness. However, historians working on a variety of periods and places have come to argue that no essential identity or universal experience of roguishness existed. Neither was there an organized subculture of roguish criminality, nor absolute dividing lines within and between the mobile and the sedentary. Even as extremes of stability and itinerancy existed, people slipped in and out of mobile and/or criminal states.25 This problematizes the attempted demarcation of roguish and decent identities.

Precisely because of this indefiniteness, legal, penal, and ideological authorities have consistently attempted to categorize and determine precisely who or what was or was not a ‘rogue’, and, by association, a ‘vagabond’ or ‘vagrant’. Yet as Paul Slack notes, such figurings were ‘emotive, elastic’, and context-specific.26 Accordingly, they rarely


provided either semantic or material settlement. Terms and people were aggregated. During the English Civil War, Parliamentary legislation cemented associations between various types of mobile deviants. The “divers vagrant persons” who had become “Hawkers, to sell and cry about the streets” were to be whipped and imprisoned like “common rogues”.\textsuperscript{27} Writing over 100 years later, Henry Fielding asserted that the very problem of defining ‘Vagabonds’ led to the inefficacy of statutes issued to ‘extirpate’ them. Such words assumed “a more complex Signification” with “vulgar Use”.\textsuperscript{28} To combat this complexity, Fielding embarked on a resolute taxonomical organization of roguish wanderers. But his various classifications only worsened the dysfunction of the definitions, and the problems of ‘signification’ were still evident long after.

In Victorian society it was equally difficult to isolate the putatively roguish from the decent and sedentary. The poor shared lives of intermittent mobility and stasis, shared casual labour, shared economic misfortunes, and shared risks of illegality. Their numbers swelled with seasonal shifts and wage and price changes: “The tramp, the navvy, and the pedlar might be one and the same person at different stages of life, or even at different seasons of the year”\textsuperscript{29} Even skilled workers were forced into itinerancy throughout their careers: “the nomadic phase and the settled were often intertwined”\textsuperscript{30}

Negotiating this confusion, and illuminating the confluence of fact and fiction, the literary historian Patricia Fumerton offers a pragmatic way of conceiving mobile identities in the early modern period (but with relevance outside it). Fumerton argues that the term \textit{vagrant} can be seen “metonymically to embrace most of the lower orders, not just the indigent and homeless...: itinerant labourers, including servants and apprentices, as well as those poor householders from the lowest depths of the amorphous ‘middling sort,’ who were at any time liable to...unsettling change”\textsuperscript{31} To parish, ward, and judicial authorities, “the vagrant experience need not involve physical mobility or even homelessness.”\textsuperscript{32} Indeed, despite their efforts, those authorities exacerbated this confused classification as they “continued to have difficulty distinguishing the unemployed, the underemployed, and the multi-tasked or in-transit labouring poor from the incorrigibly idle or ‘sturdy beggar’”.\textsuperscript{33} Making a case for

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{30} Samuel, op.cit. 153.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{32} Fumerton, op.cit., 210.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{33} Fumerton, op.cit., 214.
\end{flushright}
“lowly lines of connectivity” amongst these types, Fumerton suggests this useful definition:

Rather than thinking of vagrants as constituting an organized subculture or specific class, we might best think of them as sharing an array of practices or habits – foremost being social, economic, and geographical mobility – that could be experienced in some forms and on certain occasions by more than the legally vagrant.34

We can therefore legitimately consider Fumerton’s vagrants as rogues, real, represented and realized. Their behaviour, ascribed or actual, is quintessentially dialogic, their identities are contingent and contested, and their motions connect disparate states. This dialogic character of roguishness will be exemplified by appraising the work of Isaac Julien. Before this, however, I will sketch some relevant theoretical perspectives that might be seen to enrich this reading of deviant mobility.

Theorizing Deviant Mobility

Despite the efforts of any number of authorities, deviant wanderers defied the distinctions imposed upon them. The proscribed mobility of rogues actually connects and confuses ideas of the ‘sedentary’ and the ‘mobile’, insides and outsides, centres and margins. Such connections render proximate places, spaces, and people that are otherwise strenuously differentiated by legal, penal, and ideological organization. However, the deviant mobility that effects these connections is made possible by prescribed patterns of circulation. Rogues do not simply subvert or parody normative states and relationships. They travel along and beyond vectors commencing from within these normative states:

Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – the annihilation of space by time – becomes an extraordinary necessity for it.35

As the above quote signals, in Grundrisse (1857-58) Karl Marx diagnosed compulsive restlessness as symptomatic of a versatile but insecure circulatory system, a system impelled to destroy as much as it creates, and in so doing creates, and only partially restrains, dissident energies.

Yet for Marx, of course, rogues were problematic, politically, theoretically and expressively. As part of what he termed the lumpenproletariat, they could not be trusted to manifest progressive imperatives.36 Marx feared they opportunistically served reactionary interests all too easily. Aggregated with “ruined and adventurous offshoots of the bourgeoisie”, ‘decayed rouës’, ‘discharged jailbirds’, ‘lazzaroni … maquereaus’

34 Fumerton, op.cit., 208, 217-18.
and ‘literatti’, and located somewhere at once within and without the main body of the working classes, vagrants, ‘vagabonds’ ‘tinkers’ and ‘beggars’ destabilized Marx’s dynamics and taxonomies of class struggle.37 As Peter Stallybrass has noted, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) Marx subjects the lumpenproletariat to a ‘hysteria of naming’, breathlessly detailing the profusion of types who made up “the whole indefinite, disintegrated mass”, and doing so in a comparable profusion of tongues, whereby he “ransacks French, Latin and Italian”.38 Yet by this, the integrity of Marx’s theory, the language he uses to articulate it, and his own status are compromised: is he implicating himself and his similarly polyglot, socially and geographically dislocated friends as revolutionary rogues?39

Negotiating Marx’s ambivalence, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have antagonistically re-written and revitalized his diagnoses. They sustain a sense of the deviance of roguish mobility, based on the knowledge that precisely because such mobility is demonized, its effects can never be reduced to a reactionary imperative. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize how capitalism produces an “awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear”; they proclaim that, in its expansiveness, “capitalism is continually reterritorializing with one hand what it was deterritorializing with the other”.40

Hence the relevance of the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari to the process of realizing rogues: they elaborated the ways in which illicit energies are produced within, and are mobilized through, licit structures. Importantly, Deleuze and Guattari foreground errancy in their figuring of the perverse, the libidinal, the psychotic, the nomadic, and the ‘schizo’, as entities “continually wandering about, migrating here, there, and everywhere”, immanent to, and disruptive of, the repressive relations of capitalism. But all such errancy is conditional upon pre-existing circulatory patterns. Thus:

The schizophrenic deliberately seeks out the very limit of capitalism: he is its inherent tendency brought to fulfillment [sic], its surplus product, its proletariat, and its exterminating angel.41

Rather than diminishing the ‘schizo’s’ troubling charge, this immanence only enhances it. But rather than this charge simply replacing repression with liberation wholesale, the reterritorializations of capitalism precipitate dialectic:

The capitalistic axiomatic generates schizo-flows which are the basis of its restless and cosmopolitan energy while at the same time setting new limits on the socius.42

39 Many thanks to my anonymous reviewer for this point.
41 Deleuze and Guattari, op.cit., 35.
Adapting Deleuze and Guattari, one can therefore situate in the trajectory of the astonishingly adaptive abstraction depicted as ‘capitalism’, the (seemingly) feeble, yet (unintentionally) dissident multiple figurings of the roguish. Deviant and heterogeneous restlessness mimics the rapacity of commerce. As Celeste Langan puts it: “the vagrant is the…hallucinatory double of capital, his endless mobility and identity…simulating the endless circulation of capital. …Vagrancy is the symptom of a production whose sole logic is expansion.”

Certainly, in the nineteenth century, the intercoursings induced by free trade could cause social instabilities, perceived as having a distinctly roguish cast. Late in Thomas Carlyle’s *Past and Present* (1843) comes a section entitled ‘Permanence’:

> Permanence, persistance [sic] is the first condition of all fruitfulness in the ways of men. The ‘tendency to persevere,’ to persist in spite of hindrances, discouragements and ‘impossibilities:’ it is this that in all things distinguishes the strong soul from the weak; the civilised burgher from the nomadic savage, – the Species man from the Genus Ape! …The civilised man lives not in wheeled houses. He builds stone castles, plants lands, makes life long marriage-contracts; – has long-dated hundred-fold possessions, not to be valued in the money-market; has pedigrees, libraries, law-codes; has memories and hopes, even for this Earth, that reach over thousands of years.

Yet just as Carlyle settles into his mutually exclusive binary segregations, so does he explicitly identify that transience as a characteristic of the society of which he was a part:

> The Nomad has his very house set on wheels; the Nomad, and in a still higher degree the Ape, are all for ‘liberty;’ the privilege to flit continually is indispensable to them. Alas, in how many ways, does our humour, in this swift-rolling self-abradin g Time, shew itself nomadic, apelike; mournful enough to him that looks on it with eyes!

Carlyle, of course, is hardly averring kinship with nomads. Nevertheless, he is projecting mobility with savage associations onto those who exploit the mutability of the industrialized cash-nexus society. Im permanence and ape-like humours are *produced* by society as it stands, or rather shifts, at the present time. And not only communal identity is afflicted: personal identity is eroded and made transient in the friction of this motion. For as Carlyle put it in *Chartism* (1840), approvingly cited in Friedrich Engels’s *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (1845), “English commerce” materializes “world-wide, convulsive fluctuations”.

Precisely because of this, rogues provoked repressive responses, designed to curtail potential and actual deviance in normative systems. Yet rogues continued to travel through the same infrastructures as those very social, material, and economic forces which so desperately seek to prevent restlessness (by coercing and compelling the geographically or ideologically errant into productivity, or, if they will not be coerced, by displacing or confining them).

---

43 Langan, op.cit., 12, 224. See also Fumerton, ‘Making Vagrancy (In)visible’, 198.
45 Carlyle, op.cit.
The displaced and mobile exemplify the contradictory potentialities of circulatory socio-economics. Indeed, it is this characteristic that guarantees the urge to discriminate. As Jonathan Dollimore avers: “The other may be feared because structured within an economy of the same”.\(^47\) One might modify Dollimore: the other may be feared and therefore structured – accommodated – within a material and moral economy of the same. In *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), Adam Smith fixed vagrants in a description that seeks to diminish their dissident charge by including them in a general political economy:

> Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. … The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food. The old cloths which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other old cloths which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, cloths, or lodging, as he has occasion.\(^48\)

This does not disavow relations but organizes them. Smith offers an ostensibly unproblematic rendering of beggars as in equivalence and concord with the autonomous, rationally-consuming individuals that he deems everyone else to be. Smith simultaneously sanitizes the threat beggars pose, and obscures the material dislocations they have endured. His description evokes a sense of connection, even as the very existence of beggars reveals the disconnections that indict a socio-economic system with no home for such people. Smith effects an urgent sheltering, a necessary display of the seeming naturalness and omnipresence of the patterns of economic behaviour that he valorizes. However, for all that, the description is a display, a tendentious reconfiguring, shadowed by the fear that the alienation it effaces is the truly omnipresent phenomenon.

As Marx, Carlyle and Smith variously indicate, the insatiable valencies of capitalism problematized spatial segregation, social discrimination, and even personal identity, as they produced deviant mobilities. Yet because of the deviant mobilities produced, these valencies also produced “repressive geopolitics” that sought to organize mobility, the latter by financing the booming “fiscal-military state”.\(^49\) By moving within legitimate structures, deviants may destabilize but not always efface the distinctions inherent to such structures.

More recent commentators have contributed to the theoretics of mobility, as a deviant force with bases in normative structures, structures that seek to suppress this deviance. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt developed Marxist and Deleuzian approaches to describe the ways in which the international matrices of post-modern socio-economics simultaneously produce, depend upon, and yet are jeopardized by, ‘savage mobility’.\(^50\) To Negri and Hardt, as also to Edward Said, this mobility within and between nation

\(^{47}\) Dollimore, op.cit., 229.


states is cause and effect of grievous coercions. People endure great hardship and insecurity as they move to escape wars and oppression, or to find work. Yet even as this mobility is impelled in part by globalized capital, so has the ‘power’ underwriting capital directed ‘extreme violence’ against it. This is because mobility between and within states causes cultural ‘miscegenation’ that disrupts the identities and constructs on which power is based. Such disruption constitutes a “spontaneous level of struggle” against this power.

Though this grandly liberationist narrative can be critiqued, these are stimulating analyses of the instabilities induced by the circulation of people and things. However, despite Negri and Hardt’s otherwise rigorously interperiodic approach, such analyses fail to consider prefigurations of the phenomena they describe. It is possible to chart earlier alignments of the internally displaced and the globally mobile.

For example, the material reality of Elizabethan and Jacobean colonial plantations in Ireland actually induced vagabondage as much as it profitably cleared lands and civilized a supposedly barbarous populace. Some exiled Ulster ‘peasants’ ended up as vagrants on the streets of London, constituting a ‘great eyesore’, as a letter of 1606 from the Privy Council to the Lord Deputy of Ireland and the Irish Council complained. The letter also condemns “the negligence of the officers of ports” for allowing the indigent Irish to enter the country. Such realities indicate the inconsistencies bedevilling dominant socio-political practices.

Succeeding centuries offer other material manifestations of the disruptive alignment of the internally roguish and the globally displaced. Rogues co-opted by impressment into colonial enterprises; native vagrants relocated to new territories for punishment; aliens dislocated by mercantile expansions and imperial arrogations, and then treated like vagabonds in the very heart of that empire: these are disparate experiences, yet they signify the enforcement of power, over rogues and sometimes by them.

52 Hardt and Negri, op.cit., 212.
53 Hardt and Negri, op.cit., 362, 213.
54 In Negri and Hardt’s words, their approach is reliant on a ‘postcolonial hero’ capable of destroying ‘particularisms’ and thereby creating an essentialized, supra-national, super-sovereign ‘common civilization’(363). One might argue the contrary. Homi K. Bhabha (1994 rpt 2000) suggests that contemporary hybrid ‘hyphenations’ actually ‘emphasize…incommensurable elements’ and ‘differential identities’ as the basis of ‘cultural identifications.’ See The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 219. In turn, though acknowledging the significance of Bhabha’s arguments, Negri and Hardt question the utility of them; see Empire, 143-46.
Correspondingly, however, deviance is immanent to these histories of settlement and disruption. As Peter Linebaugh puts it, a “red ‘Rogue’s thread’ ran through “the cordage and sailcloth of HM Naval Stores”.

Art, Dialogue, and Deviant Mobility

Awareness of the ambiguities inherent to this heritage of deviant mobility and roguish states makes it possible to conceive the contemporaneity of these concerns.

Currently, competing hegemonies perniciously organize the direction of the benefits of global and local socio-economic systems. It is grossly simplistic to affirm that “you cannot help but feel that the march to a ‘borderless world’ is proceeding briskly.” For despite the myriad mobilities and intercoursings that have historically constituted and continue to make communities, local-global authorities are consolidating boundaries, in what the sociologist Nikos Papastergiadis terms a ‘haunting paradox’. Naomi Klein accentuates the paradox: “as barriers to trade come down, barriers to people go up”. As David Sibley has observed: “Not being able to cross boundaries is the common fate of many would-be migrants”. More than ever before, mobility is divided into legitimate and illegitimate forms. Individuals as well as nations endure their own ‘rogue’ status, with all the historical and semantic inconsistencies of such status conveniently ignored. ‘Rogue state’ designations are but one indication of this: police authorities in an ancient English university town recently revived 180-year old legislation – contentious at its inception – to prosecute beggars. Given this, we would do well to ask how present-day artists have realized the histories of roguish mobility outlined here.

Isaac Julien’s work typically and brilliantly interrogates formations and deformations of sexual and racial identities (and, importantly, the relations of these across normative discriminatory boundaries). But his concerns range wide. Kobena Mercer asserts:  

---


60 Papastergiadis, op.cit., 2-3.


Julien’s work makes a difference not because some mysterious negro homosexual ectoplasm has been magically transferred onto acetate and celluloid, but because as an artist he has made cultural and political choices that situate him in a critical position at the interface between different aesthetic traditions. In other words, he makes use of experiences of marginality to uncover the complexity of lived relations in the spaces between relations of “race, class, gender”.64

Julien is thus ideally placed to devise art that connects the displacements induced by imperialist organizations, practices and discourses with the dislocations and relocations of local-global rouguishness, Hardt and Negri’s ‘savage mobility’. Indeed, citing Julien, Teshome H. Gabriel has sought to theorize the congruence between ‘black people’ and ‘nomads’. While noting they are “racially and ethnically distinct”, Gabriel asserts: “They are also united in the very idea of space – they are both marginalized and (de)territorialized peoples. …Just as the nomads are synthesizers of surrounding cultures they pass through, so are the blacks.”65

In 2000, Julien exhibited a piece entitled Vagabondia. In the split screens of this work, a man dressed in ragged eighteenth-century garb dances and distorts his body while wandering through that temple to edifying antiquity, Sir John Soane’s Museum.

The museum, located at Lincoln’s Inn Fields in London’s legal heartland, is an idiosyncratic arrangement of artefacts, ephemera and icons, from around the world. The objects are diverse: books, paintings, sketches, casts, antique vases, reproductions, mosaics, cabinets of keys, ceramic fragments, sarcophagi, cameos, busts, bronzes, gems, astronomical clocks, architectural models, slave shackles, a Sumatran fungus, and more. They are raised on plinths, scattered over walls, hung on hinged frames, or hidden in recesses. Soane acquired his collection during tours of Europe in the latter half of the 1700s, in an effort to educate genteel young men about “every aspect of architectural practice”; he wanted them to learn “the language of the classical Orders alongside the daily business of the office.”66 Soane served as architect for Prime Minister William Pitt. He worked on rebuilding Newgate Prison after the Gordon Riots of 1781; designed the Bank of England in 1788; drew up plans for law courts and the Houses of Parliament; and in his grandest vision, re-drew London to surpass the glories of Rome. Soane was manifestly part of the establishment. His aesthetic was as solid as his material credentials: “Soane was no proselytiser but the enlightenment was his creed and classical antiquity his church.”67

Viewing Soane in this light, the performance by Julien’s rogue is obviously subversive. There is something stimulating about the incongruity produced by bucking normal patterns of material, ideological, and cultural displacement, to situate a houseless and irreverent figure in a monument to building, instituted by someone who made a career

67 Darley, op.cit., 159.
out of pragmatically setting segregation – of capital, people, and culture – in stone. The rogue’s grotesque, somatic, and playful capers compromise classical decorum. The continence that such decorum embodied has no power over the dancer, even here, in all the accreted, arrogated splendour of an empire’s capital’s museum, a structure with a ‘bibliophile’s sanctum’, and a walled garden accessible only to key-holders. It is impossible to keep the scum out, to restrain society’s excrescences. They bring about disavowed proximities between states roguish and reputable, disturbing the integrity of art, and the powers that underwrite art’s value and whose values are underwritten by art.

But to see Soane as a designer-in-chief for a matrix of authoritative interests (financial, penal, and cultural), and hence to cast Julien’s work as a record of cultural sabotage, is to see only part – one screen – of the picture. Soane was the son of an anti-clerical brick-maker. As he ascended the ranks of his profession to build for the great and the good, his past’s dust stuck: “throughout his life he deliberately avoided all mention of his origins.” His aesthetic may have been rigorously ordered, but Soane’s ‘personality’ was ‘suppressive’; to Gillian Darley, this suppression resulted from necessity as much as design: “if his architectural language was one of classicism and his intellect tended towards an Enlightenment view of the world, then his personality was a maelstrom of conflict”. This disseminator of the disciplined (and disciplining) formal ideal was afflicted by intellectual errancy, being “naïve, impressionable, easily thrown off course.” Sir John Summerson, curator of the museum from 1945 to 1984, believed that Soane displayed “a streak of instability, even paranoia…at moments (often exacerbated by bad physical health and, especially, the fear of blindness) he lost his reason, sense and self-control.”

To perceive Soane in this light is to begin to appraise Julien’s art more scrupulously, to see the whole/broken screen(s) of the picture. The rogue’s motions can only be understood in relation to the normative structures of the museum and the cultural values it materializes, and also, importantly, in relation to the instabilities inherent to such structures. To depict someone moving in so deviant a fashion here, in the house of someone beset by cultural and personal tensions, is to bring those tensions to life. Darley notes that “the house is, above all, an autobiographical statement – with all the ambiguities that that suggests.” Developing this idea, we can see that the ambiguities of the museum are simultaneously cultivated and suppressed by Soane himself.

---

68 Darley, op.cit., 100.
69 As Stallybrass and White observe in their discussions of the grotesque body as articulated by Bakhtin: ‘By disowning the grotesque body the Enlightenment rendered itself peculiarly vulnerable to the shock of its continual presence or to its unexpected rediscovery’. Stallybrass and White, op.cit., 108. For Bakhtin’s analyses of bodies classical and grotesque, see Bakhtin, *Rabelais*, 18, 21, 26, 316-17, 415-16, 435.
70 Darley, op.cit., 1.
71 Darley, op.cit., ix.
72 Darley, op.cit., vii-viii.
73 Darley, op.cit., vi.
Due to the presence of the scruffy vagabond, the structural (and conceptual) foundations and limits of Soane’s museum become a little shaky. Yet Soane was perhaps aware of this instability. In Crude Hints towards the History of my House (1812) this obsessive collector of the detritus of decayed worlds imagined himself “spectrally visiting the ruins” of his home in 1830.74

This is not, however, to imply that Soane pre-empted all subversive potentialities, nor, indeed, that the rogue’s challenge can be obviated. It is more useful to argue that Julien detonates existing fissures, extrapolates from disturbances in the fabric of the museum, and thereby synthesizes his aesthetic with Soane’s, combatively and collaboratively:

Elements previously found or fixed in one code or tradition are freed up to travel through unexpected conduits and passageways, along the lines of the trickster’s tap-dances…75

The pocked and permeable geometry of the museum is “encrusted...with convex mirrors”; Soane lined the rooms with “glittery…interiors”:

Shadows and light, memory and reflection, were at the heart of his house: enclosed within the labyrinth, the obsessive aspect of Soane’s personality was completely at home.76

Julien’s response to this orchestrated environment is thus as deeply sympathetic as it is critical. His visual style, exemplified in Vagabondia, concords with Soane’s grand designs, involving “fragmentation”, the “kaleidoscopic confluence of looks and gazes…and internal mirror effects”.77 Comparably, when discussing the possibilities offered by digital technologies, Julien has characterized his representational mode as a “visually transgressive intertextuality” of “bricolage techniques”.78

Exacting as his cultural discriminations are, Soane too can be considered a bricoleur, an assimilator, a juxtaposer. Julien therefore realizes a profound relationship with his subject, via what the critic Kobena Mercer terms a ‘syncretic dynamic’ involving a ‘hybridizing tendency’ which “critically appropriates elements from the master-codes of the dominant culture and creolizes them”.79

Subsequently, the vagabond is not just a person out of place – he is at home here, in Soane’s house, and in the city and empire surrounding it.80 Hidden vectors of movement and roguish states are mapped and facilitated by Soane’s designs, but only Julien’s engagement with the museum reveals their trajectories:

76 Darley, op.cit., 305, 101, 306.
Inside No. 13, rather than the conventional eighteenth-century compartmentalisation of space within a slice of terrace…Soane contrived a flowing sequence of rooms.81

It is at once through, against, and with this flow that Julien’s rogue wanders.

Conclusion

Thinking in this way opens up a conception of art (Soane’s, Julien’s, Mercer’s, and otherwise), that does not confine its creation or reception to monologic models.

Said suggests that by reading Theodor Adorno on and in exile one learns of both the “negative advantage of refuge in the émigré’s eccentricity” and “the positive benefit” of “challenging…the irresistible dominants in culture”.82 Comparably, Papastergiadis suggests:

Movement is not just the experience of shifting from place to place, it is also linked to our ability to imagine an alternative.83

Julien alerts us to the relationships and possibilities indicated by mobility and roguishness inherent to his own art, to Soane’s, and to the cultures that envelop both. Such possibilities evince that challenges to the false decorum and integrity of dominant discriminatory spatial and ideological organizations exist within and relative to such organizations. Simultaneously, Julien identifies the problems of using ideas about and designations of ‘roguishness’. It is impossible to essentialize experiences or realizations of rogue states, or, accordingly, to separate ‘rogue’ from ‘reputable’. Julien illuminates how the rogue can be realized, past and present: roguishness is relational, not absolute.

Fittingly, this is a way of making and looking that does not coerce art into being the pure product of one mind expressing one thing purely, either reputable/good or roguish/evil; either subversive/liberatory or reactionary/repressive; either deterministically saturated by, and crudely reflective of, the contexts of production, or transcendentally separate from those contexts; either continuous with cultural or ideological norms, or radically discontinuous with them. Vagabondia presents an interaction between two men worlds apart, with Julien teasing and Soane playing the game. This transgressive interaction offers a dialogic model that informs ways of seeing and reading in other areas, where dialogism is characterized as a concept that allows art, artists and critics to articulate alternatives, to manifest the incommensurable, and to realize and live the contradictions of their selves and the cultures they inhabit.84

81 Darley, op.cit., 212.


83 Papastergiadis, op.cit., 11.

In other words, dialogism simultaneously accepts and problematizes the differences and connections that characterize rogues' mobility, (differences often marshalled for reactionary ends, connections often shrouded for the same ends). In turn, this perspective suggests that challenges to dominant discourses may not revolutionize in one context or moment but may release ideas, the manumission and effects of which cannot always be legislated against or for, because ideas in another time or place may prove inspirational, despite the cost of the challenge. It realizes that art and criticism, in their responses to histories of which they are constituents, in their rehearsal and revision of orthodoxies, and in their impure hybridity, present exhilarating and discomfiting aspects. Finally, and with relevance for the ways in which this study was and might be conceived, it suggests that there are many voices, not one, all arguing, agreeing, connecting, discriminating, ignoring, adapting, adopting, deviant and normative, critical and creative:

We can’t afford to let dialogue become a lost art…our networks and channels of communication have got to remain open.

It’s not possible to construct truth out of one idea or one set of ideas, one individual or one set of individuals. Ideas don’t belong to anybody. Every idea that there’s ever been is shaped collectively, by the dead as well as the living. If we take one we don’t have to take them all; and we can take part of one and leave out the other bits. If there’s one thing worth reading in the works of Lenin or Trotsky or especially Marx, then it’s the index. You don’t have to go away and study all the writers and thinkers that they did. You just have to recognise that that is what they did. They explored. Nothing’s sacred. That’s not how it works.5

Adam Hansen was recently awarded his PhD from the University of York for a thesis entitled ‘Vagabondia: Realizing Rogues 1535-1870’; this looked at (amongst other things) Elizabethan Rogue Pamphlets, Daniel Defoe, William Godwin and Dickens, and the relations between literature, history and ideology. Having spent 2003-2004 engaged in peregrinations of his own, as Director of English Studies at South East European University (Tetovo, Macedonia), he started work at Brasenose College (Oxford) in October. He’d like to thank Angela Bate and Matt Hartman for their help with this paper.

Address: Brasenose College, Radcliffe Square, Oxford, OX1 4AJ.
E-mail: hansenadam@yahoo.com

The Organization of Wire and String: Notes on an attempt to follow the Ben Marcus

Thomas Basbøll

It is not obvious, or it is at least not obvious to everyone, that the study of organization must proceed from the classics of organization theory. That is, it is not clear that these books are the most relevant ones to struggle with when attempting to describe organizational or organized life. Nonetheless, it seems necessary to read something exemplary before attempting one’s own descriptions of the manifold phenomena of organizing and to let that reading have some effect on the way one writes. Borrowing some terminology from Harold Bloom, we can say that the working management theorist must ultimately locate a given phenomenon on a ‘map of misreading’ resulting from a struggle with ‘the anxiety of influence’ that is occasioned by a set of often canonical works. The coordinates and major points of interest on such a map will define the ‘field’ in a quite literal sense. A map that includes ‘Mintzberg (1994)’ and ‘Chandler (1977)’ can be distinguished from one that leaves these out but includes instead, say, ‘Williamson (1996)’ and ‘March & Simon (1993)’. Nobody ever really follows these maps, of course, at least not very closely. But they are interesting to draw whenever we are faced with new work and especially in such cases where this work seems to have opened one or another undiscovered country (or lesser death). Today, indeed, the world having grown perhaps altogether too familiar, there seems to be some interest in drawing up wholly novel maps or, more profoundly, work is emerging that seems to have gotten wherever it did precisely by ignoring, losing, tearing or cutting the orthodox maps, guided by a combination of highbrow intuition and primitive occultism. There seems, in any case, to be some support out there for proceeding on the basis of maps less famous than those that include the books just mentioned (not used). We experiment with the real in our attempts to follow and/or be misled by those maps.

One such map calls itself Ben Marcus. It is my work with a particular book of his, called The Age of Wire and String, my attempts to orient a set of inquiries by way of that map on the territory of organization studies, that I would like to present here. Marcus’ book and the texts to follow are exercises in experimental writing, or simply literary experiments. Writing becomes experimental in the degree to which it seeks less to communicate an experience (i.e. to represent one or another state of affairs experienced, however vicariously, by the researcher), and more to occasion a reading that can itself serve as the relevant experience. In the case of writing on organization, the experimental text works only in so far as it occasions awareness of the reader’s
current degree of organization and, hopefully, thereby also provides some insight into organization ‘as such’. The question of whether it is successful should be left to one’s peers working in the field, following the map and getting themselves interestingly or relevantly lost, seeing whether the experimental descriptions bring anything new or interesting or relevant to light. It is in the search for such criticism that I submit these short pieces to public scrutiny.

I offer three texts and some concluding commentary. The first is a programmatic statement that goes to the way the research itself has been organized (though all witnesses, as we will see, are false in this domain). The second and third present the results of such research. It is difficult to say anything very conclusive about these texts and I will not make the attempt here. Some information drawn from The Age of Wire and String itself might, however, be of use to the reader. First, the proximal ‘setting’ of these texts is present-day Ohio, making them descriptive only in the sense of being sad-faced (or vaguely Weberian) ideal types. “There will never be a clear idea of Ohio,” of course. It is, perhaps, enough to know of “the person moving forward or standing still, wishing it was near” (Marcus, 1995: 61). ‘Ohio’ has also been defined simply as “the house” (ibid.) and it may be said that the task of the writing I am attempting here is either to locate the problem of organization on the map of Ohio or, as it were, find suitable housing for it. Second, Emerson’s dictum that ‘Every word was once an animal’, is printed early on in the book, ostensibly as an epigraph. Third, “the Ben Marcus” is defined (ibid., 76) as, among other quite different things, a “false map” and “a fitful chart in darkness” whose only real message is “that we should destroy it and look elsewhere for instruction”. Fourth, the book is introduced with an ‘argument’ pleading the case for “a document of secret motion and instruction” suitable, of course, for life in “the age of wire and string”. Fifth, a passing reference is made in the just mentioned argument to the obscurity of terms within “the living program”. Sixth and last, the book itself (and thus this attempt to follow it) is offered (or imposed) as “a catalogue of poses and motions produced from within a culture”. This offer is equipped with the worrisome caveat that “by looking at an object we destroy it with our desire” and the hopeful suggestion, therefore, that “the thing must be trained to see itself” (ibid., 3-4).

We can, in any case, say of the pieces of writing to follow that they were written by a management philosopher who had been inspired to do so by the work of Ben Marcus. ‘Inspired’ can, of course, be variously interpreted. The texts may have resulted from the rather prosaic attempt to follow the false map known as (the) Ben Marcus, thus amounting to what a good Latinist is entitled, perhaps, to call *imitatio*, and in which case they must be considered an error, leaving their author neither here nor there, but leaving the *reader*, by fortuitous contrast, exactly where the reader is. *Here*. Alternatively, it may have been produced under the influence of the controlling Thompson (cf. *ibid.*, 27), in which case it is itself a manifestation of Thompson and authorship must, of course, be ascribed to Perkins (*ibid.*, 26). One departs from such a map at one’s peril. It is, fortunately, forever too soon to tell and I mention the possibility here simply for the sake of good order. I suppose we are consigned to the quite unhelpful, and slightly helpless, insight that these texts must speak for themselves if they are to say anything at all – or, yes, despite themselves.
I. The Department of Wire and String

To pretend that there are other concerns is to pretend. (Ben Marcus: 4)

The Department of Wire and String is committed to the articulation of experience, whether material or social, natural or cultural, with such means as are provided by the Legal Beast Language. It organises research and teaching to this end.

As best as we have been able to determine, among the four, six or nine allowed terms prescribed by the lexicon are skin, cloth, paper, string, wire, house, settlement, and weather – words that are always recently animal. Whatever hope we have is constituted by the (logical) possibility of articulating contemporary experience in documents that depend for their interpretation on a working understanding of only these terms.

While we demand strict compliance, the combined implicature of the lexicon indicates a certain liberalty of usage. For example, most collections of animate matter can be articulated as compositions of skin, wire and weather; the house implies both the knife and the bed; etc. To understand dogs and birds is to master the grammar of skin, wire and weather. To understand the house implies mastery of the bed-and-knife assemblage.

On this logic, everything of importance can receive articulation, i.e., proper documentation of the age can be provided, contrary to assumptions of reigning orthodoxy.

Articulation, preferably on cloth or paper (but we are open minded as to media) can be attempted by either (a) arrangement or (b) folding of the primary beast lexicon. What is essential is that that the surface attain its metaphysical composure. In a metaphysical composition the object is experienced as an apperception that includes it. The Department of Wire and String is committed to the task of training the things named by the Legal Beast Language to see themselves. Following Sernier, we believe that in perception objects are consumed by the desire of the perceiver. Our ambition, such as it is, is to allow things to consume themselves if at all, and thus to attain accurate vision.

II. The House of Paper and String (The Bureau)

These several things are best arranged openly. Like doors, they ought to be installed on hinges in stable frames, i.e., in a durable but revisable arrangement. Connect pages (pieces of paper) by string-like associations (bindings, references, file folders). Lighting affords a proper vantage on the paper work; the work is carried out upon the paper; that is, the office does something to parchment of various kinds. This doing is a species of articulation, retraceable to barking in its final analysis. Do not retrace. An office is no place for simple, inarticulate grunting (as a home might be). Articulation seeks the inhabitable region (paper) between the dog’s barking and the tree’s. Install the page in fitting proximity to the skin (determine this distance by careful experimentation). Past research indicates that the skinned body affords a region of legibility across which the page may be passed and registered, where after it is often retained within. I.e., it now sits between the weathered skins of the body as a paper boat set upon an inland sea or
the tide of a storm in the interior. Such retention should be avoided in the present context, i.e., it should be officially denied or, if need be, admitted and denounced. The office landscape should offer no soil for permanent habitation or settlement. Only temporary frame shelters may be established on the shore for contemporaneous habitation by several persons (weathered skins, concealing voids traversed largely by wire and string and the unnameable grey substance concealed by what passes between us as cloth). A general sense of well being and good feeling (whose model is that of natural fabrics set carefully upon skin or a settlement braced resolutely against whatever weather) may be encouraged by gently sliding loops of string (and their attachments) along wires (between the housing frames that keep them taut). The windows and doors may be adjusted by opening and, where applicable, closing them in order to produce or reduce drafting effects. These might all too easily cause discomfort as papers are shuffled haphazardly in the open air above the desks. (This is called Unofficial Weather and is rarely good.) Securing an office environment (managing its climate, providing Official or ‘Fair’ Weather) depends upon the careful folding and unfolding of skins, into more or less self-organizing bodies that respect the integrity of the papers involved and the necessity of intermittent settlement. These bodies ought to be trained to know when to move on, i.e., to see themselves as skins passing along wires smooth enough to spare them pain, even if pain belongs not to the skin but to the storm within.

III. Dressing the Part

How, then, comes it, may the reflective mind repeat, that the grand Tissue of all Tissues, the only real Tissue, should have been quite overlooked by Science, --the vestural Tissue, namely, of woollen or other cloth; which Man`s Soul wears as its outmost wrappage and overall; wherein his whole other Tissues are included and screened, his whole Faculties work, his whole Self lives, moves, and has its being? (Thomas Carlyle: 2)

Best to keep some things hidden. There are parts that ought to be sheathed in wool, cloth or paper so as to avoid detection, even under conditions of great excitement. These parts, which are of course already proximally concealed by (or as) skin, must be set at a distance not to motion but to sense (implying an ideological arrangement rather than an geographical one). The skin must be rendered insensate; it must become unaware of its own sensible sensations, and ultimately less wary of itself. This allows for the accurate apperception of other bodies (‘seeing the other as oneself’), whether skinned or not, distributed beyond the skin but beneath the weather. Cloth or wool vestments may be employed in establishing the necessary distance. Where these are unavailable, darkness and stillness (obscurity and immobility) may be used. It is important to apply such operations in concert. A concert of darkness and motion, for example, is likely to lead to contiguous skin surfaces, a situation which is not recommended, especially in the dark where the professionalism of other skinned bodies cannot dependably be presumed. Practical coverings (work clothes or aprons) are therefore ideally suited to well-lit situations calling for motor skills or the display of other discernibly beastly behaviours. Be aware, however, that garments are themselves implicatures often indicating their removal by subtle and even occult gestures that are, as it were, woven into the very fabric of these false skins or proximate coagulations of very stable weather (‘clouds that cover the man’). Winds under the cloth but above the skin are unlikely and even
unseemly but not unheard of. While a variety of lulling lotions have been proposed throughout history, their application all too often renders the relevant parts conspicuous. Darkness or loose clothing1 (under cover of which the necessary obscurity may be established) is therefore in any case advisable here. In apprehending the covered skin, decency suggests sensing only the immediate surface and ignoring the (unfortunately) fashionable gesture to what is ‘below’ it (this pretentious preposition is itself a fashionable or ‘white’ lie). Business can be conducted efficiently in this tension. Local weather conditions and general changes in climate can of course account for or excuse breaches or openings in fabrics whose true function is to close tightly upon the skin wherever possible. Tissue paper may be used to soak up the residual effects of the necessary dissonance between the original equipment (beast tissue) and the standard issue (official garbing). What is called ‘expression’ (the export of the beast and its subsequent capture by a purposefully designed urban setting) occurs by means of this residue, which can be refined and worked up into a lather. From this substance articulation may proceed, affording a variety of tongues or languages, which may be preserved in frame structures established beyond the cloth, and (ideologically if not proximally) well beyond the skin, arranged upon the ground of whatever settlement has been reached, however tentative. There, and only there, can the negotiation of one or another cloth-peeling (‘the repealing of the cloth’) suitably commence.

Commentary

Suppose we read these pieces in the context of specific problematics. Take, for example, ‘research management’ (or social epistemology more generally), ‘corporate restructuring’ (or strategic management) and ‘sexual harassment’ (or professional ethics). If there is a tendency in I, II and III to be organized under any one of these headings more ‘naturally’ or ‘intuitively’ than the others, then it seems to me that an argument begins to form for the relevance of these texts to those contexts. Such an argument would emphasise the immanent likeness of the texts to their contexts and thus the potential of the texts to serve as catalysts for the experience of that context’s haeceity or immanent ‘this-ness’. Such potentials, if I understand a good portion of the contemporary critique of organization theory in general, are very much in demand, if rarely supplied. I wonder if I have met even a small portion of the demand here.

In any case, what I am after is obviously a particular style of writing, and I am trying then to apply this style to some issues that arise in the description of organizations, without further comment on those issues. It is an exercise in presentation, not interpretation. Style is the way one expresses oneself; still more concretely, it is the choice and combination of one’s words. This is especially clear here, where the style seems to emerge from the adoption of a relatively limited and concrete vocabulary, embedded in a more or less scholarly and somewhat abstract (even distracted) prose idiom. The style of ‘the Ben Marcus’ is clearly one that aims to achieve its effects by the wholesale, pre-emptive imposition of estrangement on the text, only after which an

---

1 Darkness, when construed as ‘weather you can wear’ (as in popular advertising, for example), is of course thereby understood as the ‘loosest’ possible form of dress.
attempt is made to produce simple, if struggling, imagery as this strange lexicon is articulated in ordinary grammatical forms. Is this, at bottom, anything more sophisticated than circumlocution and euphemism? Is it worth the effort (whether of reading such texts or of writing them)? Time and more experiments will tell. But it seems clear to me that if something new is to happen in areas like knowledge policy, the theory of modern bureaucracy and the gender politics of the office, which is to say, in organization studies, the problematics that comprise them and the contexts that house them, then it will have to come by way of experimentation with modes of expression, with styles. The aim of writing, said Ezra Pound, is to get “off the dead and desensitized surface of the reader’s mind, onto a part that will register” (Pound, 1938: 51). We have only the lexicon and the grammar to work with: the imperfect maps handed by often doubtful teachers to perfectly incredulous students. These maps are normally presented as ‘theories’ but their effects are felt in the style of writing that goes on in the academy and, of course, in the organizations populated by their graduates. If theories are, as Bourdieu (1992) proposed, ‘programmes of perception’, then styles are, perhaps, manifestations of ‘the living program’ so often obscured. Orthodox (or ‘famously correct’) maps don’t encourage experiments in the way of expression. Perhaps patently false maps could do some good.

references


the author

Thomas Basbøll received his MA in philosophy from the University of Copenhagen in 1999. He received his PhD from the Copenhagen Business School in February of 2004, where he is currently employed at the Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy as external lecturer and language auditor. He is interested primarily in the technical problems of writing, whether in academic or non-academic contexts, and is occupied mainly with issues related to doing research in a second language (English) and the craft of conceptual notation (logic in a broad sense).
Address: Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, Blaagaardsgade 23B, 2200 Copenhagen N.
E-mail: tb.lpf@cbs.dk
In The Call Centre

J. J. King

abstract

This excerpt from the unpublished novel Dead Americans was largely produced just after the 2003 No Border camp in Frassanito, Southern Italy, at which a number of internees were successfully liberated from an Italian detention centre. Like all intellectual works, it is hypertextual. The sources it links most immediately are Heart of Darkness, by Joseph Conrad, Hotlines: Call Centre Inquiry / Communism, by Kolinko, and The Logic of Sense by Gilles Deleuze. In particular, the Kolinko study is used contextually throughout, and is highly recommended for those wishing to understand the contemporary organisation of the call centre. The final section employs scan and tone, not to mention a muddled line or two, of Wallace Stevens’ The Idea Of Order At Key West (‘Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know…’); Basil Bunting’s At Briggflatts Meetinghouse provides the excellent ‘thud of the ictus.’ The title refers to Franz Kafka’s In The Penal Colony. The author will ignore suits from the acquisitive estates of dead authors. For the living (Kolinko), it is hoped this attribution, and a further exhortation to read their text, will repay the license of using it.

They arrive in the early morning at an empty place, an industrial park, could be anywhere on earth. A minibus has brought them non-stop from Waterloo, the same grey light all the way, the same slant of rain.

Variegated towers of shipping crates suggest a port nearby – but there are only long, squat galvanised buildings receding in tight tessellation to the distant weld of land and sky. Sea would give border, land’s end, limits of a nationality that has been long redundant here. Corporate jurisdictions spread in muted quadrangles, marked by the loose flutter of logos, the tri-spiked flag of Mercedes, the bitten Apple, Fiat’s rippled

1 Available at [http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/ConDark.html]. Throughout this and the rest of Dead Americans, Conrad’s prose is invoked only in inverted form. This is not simply to deal with copyright issues.
2 Available at [www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/kolinko/lebuk/e_lebuk.htm] From memory, George the Hotcubist exists in the original. The Ultraglitch and Telematic Hypertrophy Sickness (THS) are pure figment.
4 Available at [cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Poetry/Stevens/The_Idea_of_Order_at_Key_West.html]
5 Available at [www.jamie.com/archives/000214.html]
6 Available at [www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/kafka/inthepenalcolony.htm]
slashes, each with their own sentries guarding their particular borders, barriers raising to let chauffeured executive cars swish into wide stencilled bays.

Unchallenged, at the centre of generic roundabouts, or by traffic lights at which no cars wait, lonely adverts on massive hoardings obscure any sign of the landscape that subsists beneath them.

The driver doesn’t seem to know what to do next: he hands over a set of keys, shrugs toward a long, squat hangar, leaves them standing outside the expanse of building amongst their strewn packs. They let themselves into the interior, low and immense and windowless, ribbed with fluorescents, intersected by movable partitions at head height that do nothing to obscure its volume. The peculiar football field has remnants of arbitrary rules, teams, traces of movements and flows. Across the expanse of light grey carpet, in zones roughly delineated by great desk archipelagos and hanging signs in pastel hues, ghostly demarcations of activities that, though ceased, still leave their trace: Customer Services with its litter of phones and filthy headsets; Credit Control, and half a square kilometre of Sales, Sales, Sales.

At the very centre of the huge room is a raised transparent box, visible from every point, its empty swivel chair suggestive of a spectre provided with perfect vision, or a feudal lord whose scope had extended across each demesne of this miniature sovereign territory.

This place was once a call centre, the final terminus of many million enquiries concerning thousands of different products, the originary point of legion upon legion of sales pitches.

Now it is empty.

Puck and the Scots break six-packs of lager and work up an astonishing accumulation of empties. Others arrive across two or three dilated hours, in groups of five or six, all younger than Trace and the others, boys in fact, working hard to impress each other, rigid and strutting, stiff-legged.

To look at any of them is to know their story, to have a picture of how they came here.

This one joined the army at sixteen, served a year, maybe two. No one found him intelligent, no one found him gifted. He got drunk and he beat someone up in a bar. He was pretty drunk, and he beat up this someone pretty badly. In the brig for six months, and then back in the world with nothing but an unclean record and a uniform he puts on from time to time to impress his girlfriend, or to remember how it was before it all got fucked up.

He can put together a grease gun, fire it off, break it down, just like they do in Full Metal Jacket, which he’s always thought was a pretty cool film.

Once a month they used to run him eight miles with a full pack, and the last five times before the bar incident, he did it without puking.
He came out with nothing, and now this is what he has. A job for people he doesn’t know, in a place he’s never heard of, doing something that he doesn’t understand.

They said something about diamonds.

They said something about mining.

He understands enough to know this means money, and danger.

But what does this boy see when he looks around the huge room? Some guys who look pretty dangerous, dangerousness of a different order to his own, a quiet brooding dangerousness that doesn’t need to brag or announce itself. It is there, undeniable, true.

These guys, they don’t look like people you can trust. Some of them don’t look like people at all.

He watches them corralling the chairs and tables into herds, making clearings in which they lay down packs and sleeping bags. Already they seem completely at home in their surroundings, as if this spooky deserted call centre was their natural and preferred habitat. They don’t look at him. They don’t look at any of the younger men. They hardly even look at each other. They seem self-contained units, each with its own intention, its own business. But there is one they all avoid – no, avoid is wrong: the way they navigate around him seems more unconscious than that. Why is he so frightening? Something in his unmovingness, the way he seems completely embedded, folded in to the place in which he has put himself. How could a man be so completely relaxed and concentrated, focussed on something so private, when all this young soldier can think of is what waits for them, in Africa, the possibility of death looming around the corner?

Watching the man is like staring into a deep, deep chasm. Your eye moves away, it tries to protect you from the thing you don’t want to see. It scans the room for something else, something it can deal with.

The Scottish trio lounging with their pile of beer cans.

The quiet, shaven headed guy who just seems to pack and unpack his bags.

The completely incongruous, shortish, plumpish man studying and fiddling with a drinks machine in the corner of the room... You watch him. Your eye is safe there. You watch him and hope that, soon, some of this will make sense.

***

Sixteen months ago, this machine, the machine the young ex-soldier watches Darko van Couvering study, and three others like it, are in full working order. Each is capable of dispensing seven varieties of vile, hot syrup. They are poised at each door to the vast flat hell pit, ruminating, as employees pass by and stuff them with pocket change.

The hell pit is the place in which you work, an inestimably extended grey lozenge saturated with the insect fizz of fluorescents, sluggish air shoved by the air conditioning system over rank on rank of partitioned desks.
Shift is starting. It is seven forty eight AM. You are dabbing with an inadequate paper napkin at the acrid coffee you have splashed semi-deliberately onto your lap. You have been dabbing at the coffee on your trousers for almost two and a half minutes now, because you know that the best chance for a system crash is if you log in at around 8am. Much later or earlier and the chances are that you will be able to start work straight away.

Seven fifty one AM.

A crash will eat five to seven minutes of your working day, depending on the load on the network. Five to seven minutes is a considerable achievement in terms of calls you do not have to take. It might mean one call, it might mean more.

Seven fifty two AM, and thirty seconds.

While you are dabbing at the coffee with the napkin, which is now autoshredding itself against your inner thigh, the grinning hyena who is your Team Leader comes sneaking up behind you and slides the stats from yesterday’s work onto your keyboard: the amount of calls you took; their duration; your total idle time, your total time in ‘ready’ mode, your total time in ‘after-call work’ mode... on and on, over a whole page of A4. The Team-Leader-Hyena is standing there grinning at you and at the piece of paper. You attempt to ignore both him and it. You put the paper aside and try to look busy with your beverage mishap.

The Team-Leader-Hyena never stops grinning, because this is how it has been taught. It has evolved the ability to communicate its wishes via subtle variegations of the permagrin. Now the Hyena switches the grin’s direction to the coffee stain on your lap flecked with the pieces of decimated napkin you are massaging into it. The grin becomes somewhat more insipid. This indicates you should stop massaging napkin into your crotch, boot your computer and get on with your work.

Thus at seven fifty three AM you are forced to press the power button on your computer. It is not going to crash, and you will not gain five to seven minutes in which you could chat to the person sitting at the partitioned desk next to you, smoke a cigarette, or go to the toilet. Any moment now the first call of the morning is going to come rattling through your headset into your brain.

Meeeeeep.

And then you know there’s a caller on the other end of the phone, expecting you to say something.

This is the miracle of Automated Call Distribution.

You look on your display to see what kind of caller it is. There are different codes for regular callers and first-timers. There are different codes for each different product. Callers and products and codes, that’s all there is from now for the rest of the day.
'Hello,' you say, and then you say the name of the company, and then you tell them your own name, and then you ask, ‘How can I help you today?’

You wait to hear what they’ve got on their minds. If they’re a bad tempered asshole or a good-tempered joker. Both are equally intolerable.

Then the improvising begins, and the handing off, and the passing on, and the lying.

Meeeeeep.

Hello, Fujitsa Customer Services, how can I help you today?

The conveyor belt’s running now, they come one after the other, straight into your brain, and you handle them like a machine, like they’re a machine and you’re a machine: you’ve been programmed to piss when the time is right, start talking when the signal sounds, move your mouth like you’ve been instructed.

They really do tell you how to move your mouth.

Between calls, you take a look at the stats left by the departing Hyena. They don’t look all that good because, just like now, you’ve been trying to stretch the amount of seconds you can wait after finishing one call and accepting the next, the so-called ‘Wrap time’.

You’ve also been lingering by the coffee machines, loitering in the toilets, and lolling in the corridors.

You’ve been doing all these things in increasing increments for quite some time now, and the computer in front you has been grassing you up, spilling the beans, dobbing you in, timing your work and recording data about everything you do, estimating on its own incalculable metrics the ‘quality’ of your work. This computer is not your friend: it may ‘wire you to the information revolution’ and ‘streamline your work practices’, but those things are not good for your health. You have come to despise it. If you had a moment when no one was looking, and thought you could get away with it, you would take the butt of your telephone, the one that never rings since Automatic Call Distribution was installed, and ram it into the screen.

There would be a satisfying shatter, the pop of the vacuum tube filling up with call centre atmosphere, a pleasant glittering of glass, under the ranks of fluorescent lights, on the grey nylon carpet.

And by tomorrows the glass would have been swept up, there would be a new screen on your desk, and a new employee would be sitting in front of it, beaming, just like he or she had been told to, into the imperceptible flicker of the cheap, low-refresh rate, high radiation Samsung monitor, as the calls came in at a rate of one every five to seven minutes.

The computer would still be collecting data on him or her, piping it all to a fresh file and passing it obligingly to the raised box in the centre of the room.
They call this box the Hotcube.

Sitting in the Hotcube is George, a fucker who, as such, has recently been promoted. George’s job is to monitor your calls, watch your times, and to listen in to what you’re saying if he deems it necessary. George always deems it necessary.

At the end of the day, if you’ve been particularly good or bad, George will write you up in a report. Stay on a call longer than thirty minutes and your name goes into George’s log. Sit in Wrap for longer than three minutes, and your name goes in George’s log. Leave your desk without an appropriate code – your name’s in George’s log.

George hangs around in front of his screen, staring at it. When your name pops he swings into action, enthusiastically shooting off emails, calling you on your phone, informing team leaders and dashing off letters of warning.

Or there might be a beep in your headset, and it’s not a ‘customer’, it’s George on the line.

‘Did we have a bit of a bad day, yesterday?’

‘Fourteen minutes, twenty seconds in the toilet on Tuesday. Do we think that’s a little excessive?’

‘Your break yesterday afternoon was one minute and twenty five seconds over the limit.’

You will wish that George would drop dead in his fucking Hotcube, but it’s a fact that George is thriving in there.

George will say, ‘We can give you some assistance. Tomorrow Tim the Team Trainer will listen to some of your calls. He’ll give you great and useful advice!’

This means you will have to listen to Tim the Team Trainer going on about the missing ‘smile’ in your voice, about how you’re using forbidden words like ‘problem.’ (There are no problems in this world. There are only challenges.) Tim will annoy you by sitting next to you, or plaguing you with ‘mystery’ calls. Later he will present a list of your mistakes, your stammering during calls, the missing ‘smile’ in your voice. He will touch your shoulder and talk about how your attempts are promising, and how there’s always ‘room for improvement.’

Tim the Team Trainer will say all this because he learned it at the Total Quality Management seminars he attended throughout the preceding year. He will go on and on about this ‘quality’, and talk about things like ‘total customer experience’. He’ll never talk, of course, about the endless piped music queues, the fundamentally fucked products, the constantly increasing quotas, the mindless repetition...

MEEEEEP. Click.

Hello, Hyundo Corporation. My name is [your name]. How can I help you today?
Scratched on the underside of your desk is written:

INMATE IN THE JAIL OF TELECAL

It’s there because you wrote it there yourself, one month and ten days ago.

In sixteen months and two days, a man who you do not know and will never meet, a mercenary soldier, sleeping under what used to be your desk, will read your carved inscription as he is waking up. Due to circumstances peculiar to that moment, he will not have time to even wonder what it means.

This mercenary will be the only person, ever, to even glance at what you wrote under your desk that day.

* * * *

The sealed crates of weapons which have been sitting incongruously amongst the empty water coolers and stacked office chairs prove too much of a temptation: someone prises the lid off a box of M16s one morning and squeezes off a round in the basement.

Trace has woken just before this moment and is looking with clearing eyes at something scratched under the desk he has been sleeping beneath. The report of the M16, incongruous in the deserted hangar, extracts him from his sleeping bag. He stalks down to the basement to make sure that all the M16s are accounted for, to put the nails back in the weapon crates and to collect a gun from anyone who might have one.

The someone who prised the lid off and fired the weapon has disappeared by the time he gets there.

The weapon is back in its grease. He puts the lid back on and secures the crate.

* * * *

The purpose of the call centre stay is to brief the assembling crew on the expedition. Men lounge on office chairs that buckle and distort under their weight; they range over the acres of carpet, listening to briefings given from makeshift pontoons on the sea of tiled carpet. There are projectors and rough screens made from stapled sheets of paper. Maps appear and disappear, aerial photographs, satellite pictures with rivers squirming across them like gristly veins, tapped by men they have never seen before, men who arrive with sleekly silvered notebooks, talk and click through PowerPoint presentations, then leave in cabs to God knows where...

The lizards are in a continuous, private conference that occasionally rises to a row.

Everything now is the plan, the plan: an insatiable appetite for information grips the men, as if in these anonymous surroundings the plan is the only thing that can give them any identity, any certainty. Men stop each other in corridors, roll each other over in sleeping bags, to ask, were you briefed today?
Were you briefed today?

What do you know? What did they tell you? Can you tell me?

No one is content with what he himself has been told. The demand for information is proportionate to the muted, generalised fear swelling everywhere. Men are lying awake at night, looking into the patterns of the Styrofoam ceilings, their only thought that with more or better information, a clearer picture of what’s awaiting them, could solve all tomorrow’s unseen fuckups in advance...

And yet each new piece of information seems merely to require another, because the thing they are zeroing in on is the unknowability at the end of all enquiry, death itself, and specifically the possibility of meeting with it in a dark piece of jungle. There’s no quantity of knowledge that can keep you safe from death, show you the trajectory the bomb will arc in on, so that, at the last moment, you can step aside; no critical datum that will tell you whether, when the ground plumes, and the others fall all around, you’ll be saved. You’ll never reach this plateau of understanding you imagine; the information can’t become knowledge, can’t specify the land’s contour, its swell and fall, what face the enemy will wear. So all the briefings remain mere words and images, never resolving to an object that can be seen and touched, oriented around; and each new piece of information only takes you a step further away from your imagined plateau, ratchets up the terror, galvanises the fear. The plans and maps pick out the outline of something insistently absent. Nothing you could know, no secret you could obtain, will help you to fill this gaping void. Not even if this deserted, decaying infrastructure, this monument to the delivery and dispersal of information lying everywhere dead and lifeless, ran again, not even if all these dead lines surrounding you were to bring the signal streaming in, sheer and strong, would you find something to shore you against the chaos, to base yourself on, to give you certainty.

The certainty you need, now, is not of that kind.

After all the plan is simple: you’re going into the jungle to protect some geologists, mining diamonds.

You take them in.

You set up a perimeter.

You guard it.

You take them out.

And at every moment risk will stalk you from the shadows, as you lie there surrounded by razor wire, as you sleep in your hooch, as you gaze into the bushes, your gun nosing out into the darkness.

If there’s an insurance policy that covers the likes of you, it’s not one you could afford.

* * * *
At the end of each call, you have to ask: ‘Did I provide you with an excellent service today?’

Did I provide you with an excellent service today?

Did I provide you with an excellent service today?

Did I provide you with an excellent service today?

You’ll ask that just less than two hundred times in this ten hour shift, and not once will you give a fuck about the answer.

Did I provide you with an excellent service today?

Did I?

You have to ask this to a caller who had been holding for thirty five minutes enduring Vivaldi’s *The Four Seasons* squeezed through the receiver of their phone before their call was dropped and they had to call back and listen to the same thing for another eighteen minutes, at which point they got through to you.

The product they wanted to discuss, you didn’t even know what it was yet: so you consulted the sheets for the thing, which were only placed on your desk by the Hyena this morning. Then you fobbed them off and promised to call them back.

Calling them back is a thing that you’re not, in matter of actual fact, allowed to do.

In other words you lied barefacedly to get them off the line.

That’s what you’re paid for and that’s what you do.

Did I provide you with an excellent service today?

Of course it is impossible to provide an excellent service because (and this is an open secret) the products that have been sold to these callers do not work properly, and never will. All of the troubleshooting, escalating, passing-along, finessing or fobbing-off is meant to occlude this systemic, basic fact and to support the illusion that, fundamentally, everything is functional, if marred by an absolutely unrelated series of glitches.

That is what the illusory ‘team’ dedicated to this product the caller has bought are for, these real experts who know this particular product intimately and use it personally, as a matter of personal preference, and are fully confident that, given the correct reconfiguration, or the supply of a missing, minor, part, or an engine check, or a flash of the thing’s BIOS, the glitch will be ironed out, and it will work in exactly the gee-gaw way it’s supposed to.

Without the ranked agents of the call centres, who knows but that all the glitches might coalesce into one massive ultraglitch: and the consumers at the end of all the
unanswered phone calls might realise, perhaps during an inspiring peak of the very *Four Seasons* meant to distract them, that this ultraglitch extends all the way down, not just into the core of the product they’ve bought, but right the way down into The Real Thing itself, eating away at it, and who knows but that at this moment The Real Thing is revealed to a million callers at once as the rotted, cankerous Real Thing it is, all slapped over with makeup and bright toothy gleaming smiles, but rotted nonetheless and leering now at them with its rotted ghastly zombie visage?

And say this bright, toothy, rotten, gleaming-zombie truth was revealed? What, then, would happen?

If people, transported on the anger of the unanswered support call, cracked on to this idea of the ultraglitch, maybe no amount of customer service would be able to straighten them out.

Your real task, never of course stated in any job description anywhere (for the real tasks never are), is to delay the moment at which this mass, disastrous comprehension of the ultraglitch will occur (for the moment is inevitable), and to sit up straight in front of your screen, and smile! while you’re at it. That’s why, in the middle of your shift, each day, the Team Leader Hyena finds you slouched in your swivel chair, ogling your monitor with swollen, bloodshot orbs, grinding your teeth in great clashing, shearing revolutions, with your legs poised and juddering on their nerves, your plastic cuplet of acrid coffee sloshing freely onto your desk. It’s the accumulating stress of suppressing the ultraglitch.

That’s why as soon as the Hyena’s back is turned, you’ll jab the CTRL-ALT-DEL combination with rictussed fingers; your Windows(TM) machine will go into a paroxysm and restart itself. You will manage to smoke two cigarettes in the three minute break this gives you.

Everyone here uses the CTRL-ALT-DEL thing, when the weight of suppressing the ultraglitch becomes too much.

Some people can’t help themselves and do it three or four times a day, and then they are fired. Others kick out the cables at the back of their computer and then the technician has to come round and fix it: ten minute break from the ultraglitch.

You have seen certain workers demolishing their headsets and computers and sabotaging their software by changing settings, removing essential system files and physically taking memory chips out of the machines. All due to the burden of the ultraglitch.

Things like this are happening with increasing frequency in the Telecal centre. These certain workers have been telling other workers how to do this. Still the weight of the ultraglitch is upon them. In five months time, something strange will happen in this call centre. This strange thing will become the object of more than one sociological study. It is what will will lead to the Telecal call centre becoming empty and, eventually, to its empty shell being rented out to a bunch of mercenaries on their way to a newly democratised state.
The strange thing that will happen will later be called, by sociologists, psychiatrists and doctors, ‘Telematic Hypertrophy Sickness’ or ‘THS’ for short.

And the fear you felt in this place, the terrible fear brought in by these thousands of lines with their hundreds of thousands of callers and queries and complaints and unfathomable questions in fourteen different languages, arcing in from all over Europe, all over the world, the fear of these desperate tones, the massive cascades of information into your call centre, all to be dealt with and filed and, above all, deflected; all this will have its proper, insufficient name.

The crumpled faxes, memos, pink slips, sick notes that still lie around on the floor of the room will tell the story for months after you’re gone.

The sick notes will have an alarming similarity.

Hearing difficulties.
Auditory deficiency.
Sudden onset of deafness.

The notes will look genuine and be signed by doctors and this will be because they, like the sickness they describe, will be genuine.

You yourself will fall to it in only three months’ time.

You’ll be in the middle of a call, and then there will be this massive sudden supping and all the noise will go out of the room, out of the world, out of your headset. You will smile because you won’t be able to hear the person on the other end of the line, and all the more because the person on the other end of the line was the Team Leader Hyena warning you, with a permagrin in its voice, to keep your toilet breaks to time.

You will rise from your desk and stagger towards the door with its drinks-machine sentinel, and there will be tears in your eyes.

You are crying because you are about to walk out of this job and you have just this moment realised that holding back the ultraglitch was destroying you, organ by organ, from the inside.

You are weeping because there is something beautiful about the journey out of the room without the sound of call agents saying any shit that comes into their heads to another stupid caller on another line; because you hear no sales people ranting from pre-prepared call sheets like fleshy robots; because there is something beautiful about how the fluorescents shine now without their insect fizz, how your footfall feels on the grey carpet without the sickening deadened sound of its impact. There is something beautiful about how this whole channel of information, sound, just got cut out of your world. You’ll feel like you wouldn’t care if this channel were never restored. You’ll still be blubbing with pleasure, with relief, as the Team Leader Hyena comes cantering up to
you with a violent, questioning grin on its face. You’ll be bawling as you hold your hands to your ears and shake your head, and say, ‘I can’t hear anything. I can’t hear...’

Then you’ll start laughing, when you realise you can’t even hear your own voice as you say this. That even this channel of noise has been cut out of your world.

You also can’t hear your own laughter.

Telecal, the company you worked for, will try to hush it up. But fifty employees going deaf in two weeks is not an easy thing to hush up, even with all the experience Telecal has in information control.

They’ll try to deflect their incoming calls to other call centres – but by some mysterious and unknown causality the sickness will be passed along with the stream of calls, and the employees of the next call centre in line will begin to fall deaf, too, not under the simple weight of calls, but under the subliminally felt weight of preventing the million glitches coalescing into one; and the next centre, and the next, until no one will accept Telecal’s excess, because the other companies have realised their truly superstitious natures and come to believe that Telecal is somehow responsible for the transmission of an illness which could ultimately destroy the call centre industry.

Later someone will take out a class action against Telecal, and you’ll get a settlement.

You’ll get more money than you earned in the entire time you worked at Telecal, which will still not be very much.

Telecal will sack all its deafened workers without a moment’s thought, but in the end they will have to give them all money. A lot of money. Enough money to nearly ruin the company.

With the last of its resources, losing business steadily, the company will employ new workers.

It will make them fill out complex assessment forms in order to establish whether or not they’ve ever heard of Telematic Hypertrophy Sickness, in case they too get the idea of falling ill to it. Any potential workers who are even suspected of knowing about THS are immediately barred from the selection process.

But Telecal is dealing with something it is not equipped to understand: it does not know, because the doctors and psychologists cannot tell it, that what underlies THS is the ultraglitch. As it ratchets up the pressure on the new workers, even tighter quotas and higher loads, cutting margins in an attempt to claw its way back to financial stability, the principle that rebelled against Telecal in the first place, will still be active.

The new employees’ tongues will swell in their heads and they will no longer be able to speak into their grimy headsets.

They will be able to hear the calls alright, but they won’t be able to answer them.
Beeeeep.

Hmmmmoo. Vfff Ifff Mffff Hf. Hoo....

It is difficult to provide Excellent Customer Service with a tongue so large that it won’t move in your mouth.

The huge-tongued workers will be escorted out of the Telecal building like poxy criminals. The sum that will be paid out to them will be the final ruin of Telecal, and the superstition that has by now accrued to the place will explain why it is evacuated, why no other company moves in to use its mouldering infrastructures, even a year later.

* * * *

O! pale worker! Oh ghost of a call agent! Come to us now, walk once again in this place. Let your ears hear again, so you may hear our questions, or let your swelled tongue shrink, so that you may answer! – There are no Team Leaders here any more, no Direct-to-Ear technology, and no calls for you to take. You are safe here, and must tell these scared soldiers what you know.

Tell them how no sheer quantity of information can ever conjure what they are searching for: certainty, an object at the centre, something that can be touched and held.

Tell them how useless to their aim is information.

Tell them what you learned as the deafness descended on you, as your tongue swelled in your head, what they truly already know: all the noise in the world, all the adverts and papers and conversations and magazine articles and reviews and phone calls, cannot make up for the fact that there is nothing at the centre of this giant construction – that there is nothing there but the absence of centre – an appalling vacancy, whose yawning margins we flee every day, for fear of admitting our complicity in maintaining a world that has no reason to be this way, whose shape is utterly, completely arbitrary.

Tell them.

Tell them about the ultraglitch.

How you journeyed to the dead centre of the world and discovered the void there, lined with call sheets and ring tones, strewn with headsets and telephones and processors and monitors, sucking in all the paraphernalia, all the corrupted designs and gestures, trademarks and brands and slogans, washing at its shores in scraps and tatters, the doggerel of signification, dashed on the rocks of what, ultimately, opened beneath your feet.

Tell them how at the pale horizon of your deafness, you discovered the acutest vanishing of meaning.

Your call centre was one part of the machine that ranked many hundreds of thousands of humans for a single intricate purpose, advanced through a million human
improvisations: suppressing the ultraglitch. Its final failure would be rest, plans’ end, manuals’ destruction, rupture of sense, the moment at which world reveals itself as balanced on nothing but world, a foundationless misery with one overriding imperative, to insist on its missing foundations: for if that absence were discovered! If that discovery ramified! Then oh! what could possibly keep all this in place?

Tell them what you knew the day the deafness came: that everything’s returning to the surface now, the centrelessness exposing itself, the ground rumbling, the surface of things buckling: no army can stop the world from stripping itself back to subterranea, freeing the phantasms to walk once more. What was concealed will be bared, leaving us less than nothing, more divine than gods, no longer animated by these fantastic machineries, beyond refusal or contempt, divinely dissipated, skins stretching like drums’ over the hollow world’s whole frame, the impossible end of the infinite circulations, sense’s production, of the awful inadequacies of freedom, of mind, of self; more strength, in the silence, for each and all of us than we’ve ever dreamt...

As these soldiers leave the place that you used to haunt, a ghost before dying, as all of us, tell them, as they face the interminable waterway of the North Sea, the vanishing flatness of this airstrip, the ground dark below, the air dark above, the water shining blackly, the sky a perturbed immensity of stained light; tell them that somewhere flight stops, sense peters out, ears come keen to the thud of the ictus; as death crowds them, as they glance toward their own inward directionless foreign shores, unsatisfied with what they know, hankering, fearful: tell them there’s nothing that is or should be mysterious to them now: life’s substancelessness is plain: everything’s available to alteration, even death itself, existence’s last inscrutability. Tell them their error: they are trying to prepare themselves for what they must meet with: another calculation, another addition to all this extant senselessness; useless against the absence of sense itself. The end of flight. The final impossibility of return.

J.J. King is currently accepting rejections for Dead Americans while working on a new biotechnology murder-mystery novel. He is also an editor at Mute magazine (www.metamute.com), a lecturer at Ravensbourne College, a member of the music collective Antifamily (www.antifamily.org) and an activist in the area of intellectual ‘property’ (knowfuture.makidoke.org). Address: M.I.T.R.E. 71 Downham Road, London. N1 5AF. E-mail: jamie@jamie.com
Academic Work: Is it Worth the Trouble?

Johanna Hakala

**Review of:**


In 1918, the sociologist and political economist Max Weber was concerned about the integrity of the academic profession and the poor career prospects faced by “a graduate student who is resolved to dedicate himself professionally to science in university life”. He believed that the German university was being Americanized in all disciplines, with the end result that younger scholars face “the same condition that is found wherever capitalist enterprise comes into operation: the ‘separation of the worker from his means of production’” (Weber, 1946/2004: 2). Whether they have possibilities to advance from this position is mostly a matter of chance. Whatever the case, only by strict specialisation – and passionate devotion – can the scientific worker wish to accomplish anything worthwhile *(ibid.)*.

More than eighty years later, similar issues are discussed in a book edited by Merle Jacob and Tomas Hellström, *The Future of Knowledge Production in the Academy* (2000), and in Steve Fuller’s book *Knowledge Management Foundations* (2002). These books present new contributions to the 1990s debate on the ‘new mode of knowledge production’ (Gibbons *et al*., 1994) and ‘academic capitalism’ (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). The basic question is whether universities’ increasing dependence on and contacts with the financiers and potential users of research – such as ministries and public funding agencies, companies and the EU – have positive or negative impacts on the organisation and conduct of academic work as well as those who do the work. The two books reviewed here highlight the positive impacts. This does not mean that they

---

are uncritical about the ongoing changes in academia: cuts in university budgets; increased emphasis on the relevance and commercial value of research; measures aimed at accountability and efficiency such as evaluation; and the growing division between teaching and research functions. Rather, their common starting point is that there is little worth in saving the ‘traditional’ academic practices and values and thus the ongoing changes – however violent and unpleasant they may seem – provide an opening for re-thinking the purposes and conditions of scientific knowledge production. As Merle Jacob puts it, “constant recitation of the traditional values of the academe […] will achieve no positive gains for the university and […] the present trends will continue well into the future” (p.141). Fuller’s basic standpoint became clear already in his previous book, *The Governance of Science* (1999), where he stated that “what may be best for science may not turn out to be so good for scientists” (p.41). By this he meant two things: first, that scientists’ views on science do not represent an ‘objective truth’, and second, that as a consequence of recognizing this fact, scientists may have to give up some of their vested interests.

There are also some significant differences between the two books. The articles in Jacob and Hellström’s book are framed by and linked to the idea that the traditional mode of knowledge production (Mode One), which has prevailed in autonomous universities, is giving way to a fundamentally new mode of research (Mode Two), which is utility-oriented, transdisciplinary and project-based, and involves both academic and non-academic actors. Jacob and Hellström’s book is basically an empirically based exploration of the challenges, promises and problems of Mode Two, and, as such, coherent and easy to read. In contrast, Fuller’s approach is more philosophical and his inspiration comes from many different sources – political theory, economics and cognitive science – and his book covers a wide range of themes, ideas, classifications and examples, the common denominator of which is sometimes hard to discern. This fault aside, Fuller offers many interesting insights not only on the changes taking place in academia, but on the persistence of some ‘traditional’ characteristics, no matter how detrimental they seem.

### Vested Interests and Disciplinary Strongholds

In line with the title of the book, *Knowledge Management Foundations* Steve Fuller, Professor of Sociology at Warwick University, starts with asking whether knowledge production can be managed – that is, organised, controlled and planned – and what are the interests linked to attempts to manage it, in business as well as in academia. The emphasis of Fuller’s analysis is clearly on ‘foundations’: the nature of knowledge and expertise and the conditions of knowledge production in the ‘knowledge society’, where knowledge is increasingly treated as property that can be sold, bought and utilized according to (immediate) needs. He argues that while knowledge can hardly be treated as an ordinary good (divisible and private, like cars or bananas), labelling it as a public good (indivisible and available to all, like air) is no solution either. This is so because the notion of a public good tends to hide two important aspects of knowledge. First, not everyone is able to utilize knowledge equally, and therefore we should also think about
the access costs of knowledge. Second, the value of knowledge is related to its scarcity; for instance, the democratic extension of education tends to lower the value of degrees.

As Fuller points out, the intangibility and unpredictability of knowledge make it difficult to control and plan knowledge production and to evaluate and predict the value of knowledge. Nevertheless, attempts to this end are made both in companies (where knowledge managers and knowledge management flourish today) and in academia (where the demand for accountability and the measurement of results are continuously extended over new areas of activity). However, there is a crucial difference between these two sites of knowledge production. ‘Knowledge managers’ in companies are mainly interested in exploiting existing knowledge as effectively as possible while they tend to view the production of new knowledge as a necessary evil, costly and uncertain. They have no inherent interest in scientific discoveries, since small inventions and improvements can bring big profits and big inventions can end up being ignored by the market or do not even get there (pp.24-25). In contrast, the academic world, or at least the disciplinary strongholds of it, focuses on producing more and more knowledge – more discoveries, articles, books, lectures, innovations – with little concern about its potential uses.

While Fuller does not want to give in to the logic of ‘knowledge managers’ (a group of people whom he never describes properly), he applies the vocabulary of economics to question the academic logic according to which we never know enough. He argues that there is nothing wrong in considering the costs of academic knowledge production in comparison to the results it yields, or the opportunity costs of pursuing a particular line of inquiry instead of another. This amounts to rejecting the academic “dogma of ‘trickle-down effects’” (p.32) – the belief that the scientific knowledge produced now will inevitably be worth the effort sooner or later.

According to Fuller, re-thinking these issues – and thus perhaps entering into a fruitful debate with business-minded knowledge managers – has been hindered by the specialization of research and the power of disciplinary strongholds defending their own interests. A good example of this is the (American) physics community, which has faithfully promoted the assumption that, in order to progress, scientists must follow the internal conjectures of science – no matter what the costs – while they have no way of predicting what will be discovered and whether the discoveries will be useful to anyone. Fuller underlines that the aim of science cannot be to produce an unlimited number of ‘original discoveries’. Instead, progress in science should be measured in terms of “increased receptiveness to changing a course of action once its negative consequences have outweighed its positive ones for sufficiently many over a sufficiently long period” (p.54).

But why are these two characteristics – the ever increasing specialisation and power of disciplinary communities – so persistent? One answer is that the prevailing academic ethos tends to correspond with what Fuller calls wage orientation. In the wage orientation, the academic worker can be likened to a hard-working farmer: no matter what the harvest brings, the work itself provides satisfaction that makes her go on. In other words, it is the process and the present moment rather than products and the future that matter most. Even though the profit orientation has made its inroads into academia,
it has not (yet) influenced academic ethos as much as the rent orientation. The rent orientation is manifested in the British Oxford-Cambridge tradition where academics, having earned the appropriate credentials, have no particular incentive to make new innovations or re-direct their research efforts, as they can rely on the benefits brought by their past achievements.

This type of academic ethos is backed up by the prevailing publishing and citation culture and the evaluation methods based on it. Fuller reminds us that academics do not share knowledge because they are motivated by the Mertonian norm of communism, which states that scientific knowledge is public and everyone must have access to it (see Merton, 1942/1973: 273-275). According to Fuller, scientists share knowledge because this is the way a scientist can earn credit and because they fear colleagues’ punishment, which is exclusion from the game where merits and reputation, research funding and academic posts are at stake. The same applies also to citation patterns: unless one refers to certain texts written by certain scholars, the text will probably be ignored.

In the appendix of his book, Fuller envisions a reform of the peer review system. He starts by listing the multiple and cross-cutting functions of peer review: for instance, exercise of quality control, standardization of the conduct of research, influencing the future direction of research, extending the learning of researchers, and protecting the public from using erroneous research results. The question of power is always present, and Fuller claims that currently the system maintains existing disciplinary hierarchies and orients science to past achievements rather than future. To moderate this tendency, he suggests reducing the domination of ‘absolute peers’ and giving a role to ‘relative peers’ who would include, for instance, people from other fields of study and more teaching-oriented academics, possibly also non-academic people. This way all expensive research initiatives would be evaluated in terms of their benefits to other research areas as well as teaching purposes. It is also vital that contract researchers, who are perhaps less interested in doing peer reviews and rarely asked to do them, would be included in the process.

These suggestions – which, it should be noted, have also appealed to science policy makers in many industrial countries – are part of Fuller’s larger ‘republican agenda’, which is presented in the last chapter of the book. Management is here defined as ‘governance’ for the reason that this concept highlights better “the need to carve out more space for autonomy in the world of control” (p.197). Fuller offers no clear definition of republicanism, but it seems that he refers primarily to an ethic of civic participation. In the context of science, it means a general duty to recognize the constructed nature of knowledge production arrangements and to commit oneself to continuously questioning and improving these arrangements.

Fuller introduces three vehicles for governance. The first one is knowledge worker unions, by which Fuller refers to discipline-based professional associations, which would act as “a launch pad for a social movement within which standing conflicts in the society can be expressed, elaborated, and to some extent, resolved” (p.213). How current disciplinary strongholds could be transformed into movements of this kind remains, however, unclear. The second vehicle proposed is consensus conferences, which have already been experimented in many countries with varying results. In the
best case, they provide forums where academics can become more sensitive to lay people’s concerns and lay people can have a say in the formation of scientific agendas. The ultimate republican vehicle for governance, however, is the university.

In the last pages of the book, Fuller provides an interesting and balanced analysis of the republican potential of different types of universities (German, American, British) and university strategies (priestly, monastic). However, the reader is somewhat disappointed: the analysis does not lead to a vision of the future university but ends up repeating the equal dangers of either isolating university from society or giving up to financiers’ demands and thus loosing autonomy. The book’s one-page long conclusion merely sums up the argument that academia and society can either aim at producing ever more knowledge or think more closely about why we need all the knowledge. A more comprehensive conclusion would probably have helped the reader to better see the links between the various analyses and the potential of the university as well as other knowledge producing institutions as places where some of the problems could be solved.

**Improving the Contract Researcher’s Lot in Mode Two**

*The Future of Knowledge Production in the Academy*, edited by Merle Jacob and Thomas Hellström and consisting of nine articles written by science studies scholars from countries such as Sweden, Britain and the US, continues from where Fuller stops. While Fuller’s book can be seen as an exploration of traditional academic science, the articles in *The Future of Knowledge Production* are focused on the implications and challenges presented by the ‘new mode of knowledge production’. Using Fuller’s terminology, the writers are interested in developing Mode Two type of knowledge production so that it will not be identical with the profit orientation and financiers’ short-term interests. Instead, they think that Mode Two should espouse ‘republican’ virtues such as concern for lay people’s knowledge needs and the social implications of research. The writers do not apply Fuller’s terminology themselves but it is clear their views are rarely in conflict with Fuller’s. Fuller has also written the foreword of Jacob and Hellström’s book.

The main focus of *The Future of Knowledge Production in the Academy* is on exploring life in Mode Two from the perspective of contract researchers. Merle Jacob sets the tone in her introductory article by asking: “is Mode Two research worth it from the individual researcher’s point of view?” (p.25). The answer seems to be that this is not the case, as long as the university as an organization is built on the idea of strong disciplines and life-long tenure. As Jacob and Hellström argue in their joint article, today’s universities seem to accept change in knowledge production – and to make organisational changes and reorient funding accordingly – only when there are immediate financial rewards (p.89). This means that Mode Two exists only in a distorted version, in which academics are in danger of ending up to be exploited and overworked slaves of companies, which have outsourced their knowledge production to universities with low costs. The common aim of the authors is to prevent this from happening and to imagine a university where aims are not dictated by companies but
where research done for and with non-academics would be appreciated as highly as discipline-based work.

One important question concerns the demands that Mode Two research puts on individual researchers. According to Elizabeth Shove (chapter four), who examines the day-to-day life in British university research centres in the social sciences, continuous engagement with non-academic actors has its advantages and disadvantages. On the minus side, there is the fact that traditional rewards like job security, public esteem and academic freedom are not available for the contract researcher. Yet, financiers expect the research also to be methodologically sound, thorough and original. There are also “the stresses and strains of simultaneously inhabiting different ‘worlds’” (p.65). Reputation has always been important in academia, but the contract researchers must be able to attain a good reputation in several arenas, and carefully calculate their investments in each of them, because they are only partly interchangeable. The contract researcher needs to have good communication skills and flexibility, and a certain amount of creativity to piece together projects that can be ‘sold’ to the financiers. On the other hand, Shove believes that the ensuing re-packaging of knowledge is what guarantees contract researchers some breathing space, since the financiers do not know exactly what they buy and what the researcher has sold to other financiers. The plus side includes also access to different networks, as well as the knowledge, data and money they provide.

Shove also pays attention to the question of how new entrants to the academy can gain the new skills needed in Mode Two research. She introduces two alternatives, both of which have their own faults. The first is based on apprenticeship. The young researcher is clearly in a subordinate position in her research group but she is included in all phases of the research process from the very beginning. This is the way she learns to design a project, to negotiate with the financiers of research and to write up the results in an appropriate way. She might have trouble with establishing herself as an independent researcher, as she tends to be associated with her supervisor and/or group. She is unlikely to bring any major changes to the networks she is introduced to.

Another way of getting to know the networks that are vital to a contract researcher is ‘cold calling’. The junior researcher does not rely on other researchers working in the same project or institution, but begins to develop her own contacts independently. She will have fewer benefits from the reputation of the group or supervisor, and much of her work may end up being useless. On the other hand, if she is successful, the benefits are all hers. If she chooses to leave the university, she takes the contacts with her.

Sujatha Raman (chapter seven) is also interested in the fate of researchers trying to cope with Mode Two conditions, but more from the perspective of labour politics. She criticizes Michael Gibbons and his co-authors for presenting a too harmonious picture of Mode Two research, whereas in reality the co-existence of Mode One and Mode Two only reinforces the divisions between have and have-nots at universities. She also considers the possibility that in the future, knowledge production is ‘offshored’ to Third World countries. However, Raman argues that Mode Two presents an opportunity to overcome the ‘feudal patronage’ system that is part of the traditional, disciplinary mode of knowledge production. She believes that “the new class of ‘pieceworking’
academics” have little to loose and thus they might be ready to take radical action to change the hierarchical structures of academia. Results could be achieved only if researchers allied with other social activists interested in changing current forms of knowledge production.

On the other hand, Raman admits that, as no revolution takes place, academics doing contract research in Mode Two types of research environments still have the same objective as more traditional academics: to have tenure. They wish to have a secure income but also the prestige that is attached to having an academic post. In this sense, Mode Two does not form a self-sustaining research culture that could replace the traditional academic culture(s).

Several articles of the book look into the future of the university as an organization (chapters five, eight and nine). The basic argument here is that “the university needs to become networked and not just harbour networked researchers” (p.87). Relationships to non-academic actors need to be institutionalized and shifted ‘from sponsorship to partnership’. In the concluding chapter, Jacob envisions a network university consisting of inter-disciplinary networks, which unite researchers and the financiers and users of research. The networks would be monitored and evaluated by boards consisting of similar people. In this scenario, universities have to be willing and able to show that their knowledge is useful and to assist in the transferring and application of the knowledge. Accordingly, networks are evaluated in certain intervals and those that do not keep up with the performance criteria set for them are terminated. All research is done in projects and there are no permanent academic posts. All this means more jobs for knowledge managers, a group of people Jacob contrasts with traditional administrators but does not really describe more thoroughly.

Jacob’s vision is true to her claim that it is time to give up academic nostalgia and move to new directions. However, it is not very likely to solve the problems faced by contract researchers today, even though fights over academic posts and the division of people into tenured academics and project workers would end. It is also hard to believe that the current teaching obligations could be fulfilled in the network university. Jacob seems to recognize this, since at the end of her article she notes that the network university is not meant to be a model for universities in general, but an alternative and competitor to the public university. This leaves the reader to wonder how the majority of universities should be reformed, or whether one should accept that contract researchers can only find their home in the (future) network university.

**Academic Work: Is it Worth the Trouble?**

There are at least two ways in which the above question can be understood. One of them is present in Steve Fuller’s book, namely in the view that academic work is not valuable in itself but we should always consider its value in relation to the costs and benefits of knowledge production. But is this not exactly the point made over and over again by today’s science policy makers and financiers of research, who do not wish to waste their monies? The answer is negative: in addition to the nuanced analyses of the different
logics of knowledge production, Fuller provides a worthwhile agenda for making visible and improving the political processes of science. One step to this end is that academics themselves acknowledge that when defending the purity of science, they may actually be defending their own interests. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that disciplines are not alike: as empirical research shows, they have different ideals and practices, different audiences and relationships to society as well as different internal structures and hierarchies (e.g. Becher, 1989; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Hakala and Ylijoki, 2001). Thus they also differ in terms of their ‘interests’ and the power they are able to exert.

Another type of answer to the question presented in the title is found in Jacob and Hellström’s book. Here the focus is on the individual contract researcher, or any academic who does not hold a permanent academic post. She faces an incredible combination of demands and gets little in return; it really does not seem worth the effort, unless she is able to escape to the network university, which at least recognizes the nature of project research and tries to create continuity. And yet, even though interest in ‘academic career’ has declined in many countries, there are plenty of young people who are ready to try their luck in traditional academia. One reason for this is that today more and more people get a university degree, and when searching for a job, project research at the university may seem as attractive as other jobs available, the majority of which are short-term anyway. The critical question is what kind of researchers this young generation of project researchers will become: Do they have possibilities to develop such skills and characteristics that are needed in constructing their own research questions instead of simply providing solutions to problems provided by the financiers of research? How many of them can ‘change sides’ and become part of the disciplinary establishments; how many can become successful ‘academic entrepreneurs’? Most important of all, do they have time and energy to act in a republican spirit and engage in reflection and debate on why they do what they do and whether things could be done differently?


**the author**

Johanna Hakala is a researcher at the Tampere University Research Group for Science, Technology and Innovation Studies (TaSTI). Her current research themes include the transformation of the academic profession and academic cultures as well as the socialization of junior researchers into academic work in different disciplinary and organizational contexts.

Address: Research Group for Science, Technology and Innovation Studies, Science Studies Unit, Research Institute for Social Sciences, 33014 University of Tampere, Finland.

E-mail: johanna.k.hakala@uta.fi
Constructive Spatial Criticism on Critical Spatial Construction

Sammy Toyoki

review of:  

Space is back on the agenda. Over a decade after the English translation of Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) seminal spatial treatise The Production of Space shook the grounds of human geography and sociology, its theoretically reorienting coil has finally penetrated the thick defences of other social sciences in the form of Tor Hernes’s The Spatial Construction of Organisation. With the aim to replace the traditionally more static organisational proxy ‘context’ with that of the more emergent, notion of ‘space’, the author sets out to challenge the conventional view of organisation as a predetermined unit and seeks instead to establish foregrounds for the study of organisation as an evolving phenomena. However, as noted by the author “This is not a book on the philosophy of space, on which there is a long tradition, but it is an attempt at fitting the idea of space to organisation. Hence, the aim is not to present an exhaustive account of a theory of space” (p.65). Accordingly, although a good effort in applying a complex theory of space to organisational studies, due to its somewhat selective application, this book will probably be on the light side for the initiated ‘Lefebvrian’ reader, but as for the novice, it could be said that it takes adequate measures in ‘breaking in’ the idea of spatiality. Nevertheless, despite its overall smoothness, a range of theoretical issues do arise due to the casual ‘fitting’ of Lefebvre’s original theory. The question then remains: regarding the field of organisation, does Hernes’ approach to spatial construction fair better than the original framework it draws from?

It follows then that the first half of the book until Chapter Five takes as its objective to review the underlying tenets of the term ‘context’ in organisational analysis with the ultimate aim to suggest its replacement with an alternative proxy – ‘space’. Starting from Chapter One, Hernes draws the distinction between the understanding of ‘bounded’ and ‘unbounded’ organisation. Whereas the former represents the more dominant view of a deterministic and relatively monolithic entity with overall characteristics of structure, functions, boundaries, goals etc. (Hernes, 2004), the latter
espouses a more indeterminate standpoint where “‘Organisation’ is not seen as being circumscribed by organisational boundaries but is defined more loosely as contexts for action and interaction” (p.1). Through this distinction, Hernes then advances the argument that by letting go of the assumption of ‘boundedness’, and by viewing the organisation, as something emergent, unfinished, multiple and amorphous instead, “we retract from the organisation as a pre-existing entity” (p.8) and hence enable the study of organisation as an evolving phenomena.

So far so good. After chapters Two and Three Hernes reaches the point in his overall thesis, where ‘context’ is now established as that semi-construct between the micro and the macro that enables the analysis of action and interaction as they might occur in space and time. However, as Hernes puts it himself, “The term ‘context’ serves primarily to understand how factors influence human actions and interactions. As a term for understanding the dynamics of organisation, however, it is beset with limitations” (p.59). The particular limitations Hernes has in mind are those of ‘inwardness’ and ‘immutability’. The former implies the exclusive focus on internal mechanisms of organisation rather than the potential interplay that might occur across boundaries. The latter, to an extent a consequence of the former, refers to the binding and fixed treatment of ‘context’ – that is, the antithesis to “an entity of emergence and transformation” (p.61). In other words, aside its etymologic and methodical hang-ups, ‘context’ falls short mainly for its inability to demonstrate how organisation is produced and reproduced. So it follows, halfway through the fourth chapter, Hernes gives up on the ability of ‘context’ to explain the ‘evolving organisation’ and sets forth the new proxy – space.

A central objective of Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) theory of space, a treatise upon which Hernes’ work relies on heavily, was not to offer a mere discourse of space but rather to produce a holistic knowledge of it. The aim was to expose the actual production processes involved by “bringing the various kinds of space and the modalities of their genesis together with a single theory” (Lefebvre, 1991: 16). In other words, a holistic knowledge of spatial production requires an appreciation of the dialectic dynamics between ontology (what are the types of space), and epistemology (how are these types of spaces known) (See Table 1). Following Aristotle’s lead, Kant insisted on a reason that strictly differentiated form and content, the object of knowledge and faculties of knowledge, or in other words, ontology and epistemology.¹ Lefebvre, however, disputed

¹ Dating back to the Aristotelian tradition there has been a clear distinction between formal logic and content, that is, the law of the excluded middle affirms that something is either A or not-A, identity or non-identity: “Formal logic is only concerned with the structure and universal, analytic form of propositions and their relation. Where examples are given they are purely for illustrative purposes – they are not relevant in their own terms. Formal logic contents itself with notions of clear identity… The content of such propositions is irrelevant to their formulation and relation” (Elden, 2004: 29). What this argument essentially means is that next to A or not-A there can be no ‘third’ that might signify a relation. Lefebvre, however, disputed that logic can be so definitely separated in form and logic: “In point of fact formal logic never manages to do without the content, it may break a piece of this content and reduce it, or make it more and more ‘abstract’ but it can never free itself from it entirely. It works on determinate judgements, even if it does see their content simply as an excuse for applying the form. As Hegel points out, a completely simple, void identity cannot even be formulated” (Elden, 2004: 29). Consequentially, Lefebvre comes to the conclusion that there is in fact a ‘third’ and that it is within the thesis itself: “A itself is the third term to ‘plus A’ and ‘minus A’.
the idea that logic could be so clearly separated in form and content. By collapsing these two into one integrative yet analytically divided whole, Lefebvre sought a historically informed dialectic logic (‘dialectic materialism’) he could then apply in a theory of spatial production. In this theoretical framework, Lefebvre set out three ontological modes and three epistemological modes of space. The ontological ‘level’ consisted of the ‘Physical’, the ‘Mental’, and the ‘Social’, whereas the epistemological consisted of ‘spatial practice’ (‘perceived’), ‘representation of space’ (‘conceived’) and ‘representational space’ (lived) (see Table 1).

Table 1: Lefebvre’s framework of spatial modes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontological distinction</th>
<th>The Physical</th>
<th>The Mental</th>
<th>The Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(How space is?)</td>
<td>Nature’s space</td>
<td>Planned space</td>
<td>Lived space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Real’ space</td>
<td>Space of the Cartesian cogito</td>
<td>The imaginary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemological</td>
<td>Spatial Practice</td>
<td>Representation of space</td>
<td>Representational space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>distinction</td>
<td>(How is space known?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The perceived</td>
<td>The conceived</td>
<td>The lived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The practiced body</td>
<td>The scientific body</td>
<td>The fully lived body</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is outlined here, albeit in a rather brief manner, is in fact one schema unifying a knowledge of the ontological and the epistemological. It is the contention of the reviewer that these distinctions share a dialectic relationship both vertically (i.e. Ontological distinction – Epistemological distinction), and horizontally (i.e. spatial practice – representation of space – representational space). That is to say, ‘how space is’ (ontology of space) both depends and reflects on its relation to ‘how space is known’ and in turn, ‘how space is known’ depends on the dialectic interplay between the subjectively experienced, epistemological modes of space: “Each aspect of this three-part dialectic is in a relationship with the other two. Altogether they make up ‘space’” (Shields, 1999: 161). Ultimately, when aligned together, this schema represents one dialectically driven and unified ‘triad’: “Against the tendency of theorising space in terms of its codes and logic, what is necessary, argues Lefebvre, is an approach that

Refuting purely analytical judgement, Lefebvre consequentially contends that formal logic is always tied to its content, to a concrete significance: “A concrete logic, a logic of content is what is needed, of which formal logic is an element within it. This is dialectical logic. Form and content are thus linked, indeed inseparable but still different” (Elden, 2004: 30).

For Lefebvre binary thinking was one aspect of orthodox Marxism that needed to be transcended. For him, it was not just ‘the bourgeoisie and the proletariat’ but ‘the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the nation-state’. In effect what Lefebvre did was spatialise the dialectic (Shields, 1999).

This in turn demonstrates how Lefebvre has conjoined Critical Realist structuration with his own formulation of a three-part trialectic. In terms of the former (vertical dialectic) ‘structure’ is taken ontologically and ‘agency’ analytically whereas with the latter (horizontal trialectic) ‘thesis’ and ‘antithesis’ is continued with a ‘synthesis’ based not on negation and eventual halt but on a constant and recursive motion of becoming (Elden, 2004).
seeks to understand the dialectical interaction between spatial arrangements and social organisation itself” (Shields, 1996: 157).

Now, why explain this in such length? Simply put, when offering explanations to how spatial production and reproduction might occur organisationally, Hernes deems the epistemological distinctions as too complex (this is probably why he confuses them badly in p.69) and so he only applies the ontological ‘level’ of Lefebvre’s schema: “Lefebvre’s distinction between spatial practice, representational space and representation of space is by no means a tidy one. It is certainly difficult to apply, although it provides some abstract notions about different epistemologies related to space… We will therefore not attempt to carry on his multidimensional framework but rather take it as a testimony to the multiple conceptualizations and uses of the imagery of space. His distinction between physical, mental and social space, however, will be pursued in the chapters that follow” (p.74). Hernes demonstrates the remaining ontological distinctions and what he understands as their characteristics in Table 2.

Table 2: A three-pronged notion of space in relation to organization. (p.72)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontological distinction</th>
<th>Physical space (natural)</th>
<th>Social space</th>
<th>Mental space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Examples</td>
<td>Budgets, electronic domains, physical barriers, work schedules, rules</td>
<td>Trust, identity, loyalty, love, dependence, norms of behaviour</td>
<td>Knowledge, meaning, strategies, sense-making, learning,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic element</td>
<td>Tangible structures</td>
<td>Social relations</td>
<td>Thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Human presence</td>
<td>Cues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary defined by</td>
<td>The allowable</td>
<td>The permissible</td>
<td>The thinkable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After briefly establishing these three categories of space as a basis for organisation, Hernes takes the next step in attempting to ‘fit’ Lefebvre’s theory to an organization context and introduces the idea of ‘boundaries’. He states, “If we wish to study change, we are well advised to study boundary-related dynamics” (p.77). Briefly put, Hernes sets forth the argument that in order for the observation of space to be possible space must be distinguishable from other spaces. As such a distinction, boundaries of space relate to how the space might be defended, promoted and integrated: “Boundaries are not “by-products” of organisation, but organisation... evolves through processes of boundary setting. Like any social system, an organisation emerges through the processes of drawing distinctions, and it persists through the reproduction of boundaries. The focus is moved from what goes inside the organisation to its margins, where it is produced and reproduced” (p.80). What he presents is a three-part framework of ‘Physical Boundaries’, ‘Social Boundaries’ and ‘Mental Boundaries’ (see Table 3).
Table 3: A framework for interpreting boundaries and corresponding research questions. (p.81)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Physical Boundaries</th>
<th>Social Boundaries</th>
<th>Mental Boundaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relate to:</strong></td>
<td>Bounding of core ideas and concepts that are central and particular to the group or organisation</td>
<td>Identity and social bonding tying the group or organization together.</td>
<td>Formal rules, physical structures, regulating human action, interaction in the group or organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ordering</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which boundaries regulate internal interaction</td>
<td>To what extent are main ideas and concepts decisive for what members do?</td>
<td>To what extent do structures regulate the way groups are socially bonded?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distinction</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which boundaries constitute a clear demarcation between the external and the internal spheres</td>
<td>To what extent are core ideas and concepts distinctively different from those of other groups?</td>
<td>To what extent are we socially distinct from other groups?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threshold</strong></td>
<td>The extent to which boundaries regulate flow or movement between the external and the internal sphere?</td>
<td>To what extent can outsiders assimilate core ideas and concepts?</td>
<td>To what extent is it possible for outsiders to be considered full members of groups?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In interpreting spatial boundaries Hernes states that “First, boundaries may be grouped according to the substance of the space, which distinguishes between social, physical and mental boundaries. Second, boundaries may be grouped according to how they regulate the space in question” (p.84). What the reviewer believes has happened here is that Hernes has taken the principle format of Lefebvre’s spatial ontology and conflated it with his own boundary-related distinctions. Now this is all fine insofar as long as Hernes can successfully demonstrate how this one, conflated level of ‘boundary’ distinctions explicates spatial production and reproduction. In a Giddensian spirit, Hernes (p.80) states, “boundaries emerge and are reproduced through interactions (Giddens, 1984)”. And in turn, these ‘boundaries’ are what essentially demarcates space(s) into spatial ‘fields’: “A field, as the term is used in the present chapter, is seen through the lens of interactions of the entities that make it up” (p.79). Accordingly, organisation is created by drawing distinctions between boundaries of spatial fields and ‘persists’ through reproducing these boundaries through ‘interaction’. The problem here is that Giddens’ ‘structuration’ theory, although renowned for its explication of social interaction, does not explain spatial production (Urry 1991), and consequentially, nor
does it explain ‘boundary’ production. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, if one were to look through Giddens’ (1984) book ‘The Constitution of Society’ it is riddled with references to how interaction of this structure and that agency occurs across time and space. ‘Across’ but not ‘through’ time and space? Surely this means something? Time and space in this formulation are viewed as given, static backgrounds, not explicit products of interaction. Why? Because structuration theory is in fact based on a dualism (Archer, 1982; Mouzelis, 1989) that is analytically incapable of explaining time-space production. It is founded on a binary relation between structure and agency where the former, although attributable with spatial characteristics, is not viewed in terms of production and symbolisation but only in terms of the structural effects on human agency. As Urry aptly puts it, “Time and space paradoxically remain for him [Giddens] as ‘structural’ concepts demonstrating not the duality of agency and structure but their dualism. No real account is provided as to how human agency is chronically implicated in the very structuring of time and space. They are viewed as essential to the context of human actions but as such they channel or structure such actions from the outside” (1991: 160). Secondly, and related to the above notion of dualism, how can structuration theory, which is based on the principle interplay between two levels possibly be able to explicate the simultaneous interaction of three? Lefebvre’s epistemological level is of three parts and so is Hernes’ level of boundary-distinctions!

So, in omitting Lefebvre’s epistemological distinctions of space from his framework, Hernes has effectively dismantled it from the analytic mechanism that actually explains spatial production. But how does Lefebvre’s schema succeed where Hernes’ and Giddens’ fails? Firstly, the dualist arrangement in ‘structuration’ is based on a ‘closed dialectic’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1973). That is, “this duality of forces… leaves no room for choices based on free will or the ability to act otherwise” (Sack, 1992: 14) and thus the actor is left imprisoned by the horizons of one’s lifeworld (Habermas, 1987). Because Lefebvre’s epistemological ‘triad’ is in fact based on a three-part dialectic it transcends this dualism by breaking through it. Whereas ‘representation of space (the ‘conceived’) is analogous to ‘structure’ and ‘spatial practice’ (the ‘perceived’) to ‘agency’, they are both transcended by a third dialectic counterpart, ‘representational space’ (‘the lived’). By introducing this third mode or ‘Third-as-Othering’, as Soja (1996) puts it, Lefebvre (1991) has effectively rethought the traditional Hegelian dialectic of ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’ that so clearly restricts Hernes. Theoretically speaking, the reason why the Hegelian dialectic is ‘synthetic’ is because in the proposition ‘1+1 = 2’, ‘2’ is not simply a repetition of ‘1’ – there is something new, a synthesis. However, what Lefebvre discovered was that as well as being central for identity; ‘1+1’ also creates difference – because of the repetition (Elden, 2004). Hence, in representing this ‘difference’, it is the third mode, the mode of the ‘lived’ in Lefebvre’s dialectic logic that surpasses and opens up the closed circle in Giddens’ and thence Hernes’ thought. In this way, the three-part epistemological level of spatial modes allows the analysis of not just the simple but also the complex, and in so doing, it surpasses mere categorisation and becomes the analytic for becoming. Or what is in this case more pertinent, the analytic for the production of space.

Secondly, by taking the ontological level of spatial modes and ‘conflating’ it with his own boundary-related distinctions, some might argue that Hernes is bringing form and content together in the same way Lefebvre does (the dialectic unity of ontology and
epistemology). In fact, and quite curiously, Hernes states at the end of Chapter 5, “Characteristics of boundaries are likely to influence, not only how people behave in relation to the spaces, but also how spaces interact when brought into contact with one another” (p.84). In other words, what Hernes is implying is a logic of relation reminiscent to that of Lefebvre’s original schema. The crucial difference being, however, that for Hernes spaces affect human behaviour but not the other way around. For Lefebvre on the other hand, there is a dialectic interplay here, ‘how space is’ (ontology of space) depends on its dialectic relation to ‘how space is known’ and in turn, ‘how space is known’ depends on the dialectic interplay between the subjectively experienced, epistemological modes of space. In other words, Hernes seems to be arguing for either a unity between ontology and epistemology, or he is arguing just for ontology by itself (the reviewer is undecided), in which case he is bordering on a kind of structuralism. If he is arguing for a ‘unity’, he is in fact promoting identity: as in ‘1+1=2’ or ‘space is as you think it’. In other words, the ‘known’ and the ‘knower’ are the same. If he is arguing for an ontology alone, that is, a sole reliance on ‘form’, then space is merely seen as a predetermined structure that confines the unwitting agent. The distinctions of ‘Physical Boundaries’, ‘Social Boundaries’ and ‘Mental Boundaries’ are suggestive of this latter argument as they relate to the extent to which boundaries might dictate our thoughts, our identities and our bodies through ‘ordering’, ‘distinction’ and ‘thresholds’ (see Table 3). Hardly a fruitful foundation for space production. Now, Lefebvre, on the other hand, argues for a dialectic interplay between ontology and epistemology. This dialectic ‘unity’ is at the same time ‘enabling’: ‘how space is depends on how you see it and vice versa’. Thus it is the emitting of subjectivity into the equation that enables the actor to (analytically) produce space.

So how does Hernes’ approach to spatial construction fare compared to the original framework it draws from? Perhaps it’s too early to speculate where it might go with some further refinement. But to strip Lefebvre’s theory from its methodical engine (epistemological triad) and to replace it with ‘boundaries’, an apparently unfinished and alien dynamic to its body, will incur a price. After all, to work a three-part dialectic is not just about having three whatever counterparts and relating them, the overall compilation has to be carefully thought through. Take Lefebvre’s schema for example, the primary object of knowledge in this conceptual ‘triad’ is the fragmented and uncertain connections between representations of space on the one hand and representational space on the other. This relationship in turn implies and explains the subject “in whom lived, perceived and conceived (known) come together within a spatial practice” (Lefebvre, 1991: 230). Through an oscillating motion practice moves between conceived and imagery space, between mediated reflections and lived experience, dialectically producing and reproducing identities and social organisation on the one hand and new spaces on the other (Lefebvre, 1991). In effect, this ‘triad’ could be seen as “both outcome/ embodiment and medium/ presupposition of social relations and social structure, their material reference… social life must be seen as both space-forming and space contingent, a producer and product of spatiality” (Soja, 1989: 129). If one were to really pore over Lefebvre’s schemata as a whole, what would also become apparent is how ‘Physical, Mental, Social’ space are in fact products of the epistemological triad (and vice versa of course). Now to separate these three ‘modalities of space’ from their ‘genesis’ (Lefebvre, 1991) and to merely give them labels as Hernes does, is like taking out the engine of a car and selling it as real ‘go-getter’. You
do see the dilemma here? Lefebvre’s schema is the result of a scholarly career spanning over sixty five years. ‘Fitting’ it to any discipline, not just organisational studies, warrants slightly more consideration and care than the current application offered by Hernes. Moreover, saying that Lefebvre’s epistemological level was too ‘untidy and difficult to apply’ while confusing their characteristics completely when defining them (Hernes confuses parts of ‘representation of space’ with that of representational space’ and vice versa on p.69) is suggestive of the possibility that Hernes never took the time to understand Lefebvre’s schema in the first place.

In any event, excluding the epistemological level, replacing it with ‘boundaries’ and then using Giddens’ structuration theory to mobilise it doesn’t seem to work. Organisational reproduction through ‘boundary interaction’ is nevertheless a good idea but since the framework does not, at least explicitly, introduce ‘practice’ as a variable, its operationalising remains in the reviewer’s mind slightly unclear. Perhaps if the horizontal dimensions (‘ordering’, ‘distinction’, ‘threshold’) were conceptualised as a kind of ‘doing’ instead of as constructs indicative of the ‘extent’ to which they ‘permit’ something to happen (see Table 3), and if these adjusted practice-orientated constructs were then dialectically juxtaposed as in Lefebvre’s schema, the overall framework would seem in the reviewer’s mind methodically more approachable? What is also curious is how Hernes has dedicated whole chapters to each ontological mode (chapters six, seven and eight) explaining, through terms such as ‘emergence’, ‘reproduction’, ‘history and time’ and ‘subject’ “how each type of space interacts with itself” (p.127) (emphasis mine) whilst overlooking how they might interact with each other! Admitted, Hernes does discuss spatial dynamics in Chapter nine and seems to be quite aware of the significance of the ‘socio-spatial’ dialectic but because he does not explicitly apply its principles in his theoretical framework, or in any other part of the book for that matter, the overall delivery of what Hernes is theoretically trying to pitch to the reader remains obscure. The same critique is levelled to the question whether Hernes has consciously conflated ‘ontology’ with ‘boundaries’ (form and content) or merely regressed to a mild structuralism. Either way, since he leaves the reader guessing at his intentions, the use-value of the book is further deflated. Unfortunately, to critically comment on what is already considered as critical knowledge leaves little manoeuvring space for the reviewer – hence the occasional ‘nitpicking’. Some might ask why the reviewer ignores Hernes’ explicit apologies for the ‘modest’ application and ‘fitting’ of Lefebvre to organization studies and proceeded to do a point-by-point critique? ‘Who cares if Hernes has not applied Lefebvre from word to word?’ Well, that’s not really the point is it! Ultimately, through this partial treatment Hernes is not stretching the boundaries enough to provide insight into what an organisational analysis of space could be!

references


Afterword

Now that the critical masturbation is over, it is perhaps timely to say out loud the obvious limitations of this review. Coming from a purely Lefebvrian perspective, it is admittedly narrow in focus and omits a wider commentary on the text’s otherwise purposeful and well-delivered pedagogic whole. The challenges levelled at this text probably flank the originally intended subject-matters, leaving a distorted and necessarily biased exposition. Because mounting such attacks in the name of ‘criticality’ only perpetuates the dilution of this already thinly spread out concept, the reviewer secretly hopes for a response of some form. In good faith of course… Long live the power of debate!

Sammy Toyoki is a second year doctoral student at the Marketing and Strategic Management department of Warwick Business School (WBS). His research interests revolve around consumption, space-time and social rhythms.

Address: MSM, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.

Email: sammy.toyoki03@phd.wbs.ac.uk