Experience into psychoanalytic ideas:
A psychobiographical study of Ferenczi's *Introjection*

Yiukee Chan

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Centre for Psychoanalytic Studies
University of Essex

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Abstract

How does experience become a psychoanalytic idea? The case of Ferenczi may provide an answer. Ferenczi played an important and yet controversial role in the development of psychoanalysis. Most of the past Ferenczi studies are either about Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic ideas or life. The former usually point towards Ferenczi’s foresight and creativity in advancing the psychoanalytic movement. The latter, focus more on his relationship with Freud, especially his suffering and wounds, see him more as a victim. These two streams of research, however, rarely cross over one another. This thesis, a psycho-biographical one, provides this missing perspective.

Ferenczi is noted for his introjective character, as Borgogno (2011) names him the ‘introjective psychoanalyst’. Amongst Ferenczi’s ideas, Introjection is chosen for this study because the phenomenon behind this concept may be prevalent in his relationship with Freud. This relationship is for him to gestate his ideas, not just intellectually but experientially, i.e., psychoanalytically. Given Ferenczi’s merging life with psychoanalysis, it is hypothesized that as and before Ferenczi writes about Introjection, he has been living it in this relationship.

I search for evidence for this hypothesis by meticulous mapping of the connection between this relationship and Ferenczi’s writings, using historical documents, notably correspondence, and published papers, available. In this historiographic and conceptual study, I strive for a more historically informed position between denigration and idealization in the restoration of Ferenczi and his idea. It is important, given the controversial nature of his character and ideas. This study would throw light on Ferenczi’s inner and relational world and their connection to introjection. It is concluded that the hypothesis is supported. Although Ferenczi pays a price, his idea evolves and lives on. This thesis contributes to an understanding of the making of an idea and advancement of knowledge in the history of psychoanalysis.
Chapter 1

Introduction

On 11 October 1922, soon after Ferenczi drifts from Freud, he shares an insight with Groddeck, ‘many people project their personal complexes into scientific discoveries (as has been noted in my own case!)’ (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921-1933, p. 30), which his new friend echoes, ‘[t]hat we project our own complexes into scientific discoveries is self-evident. How else could we possibly discover anything?’ (ibid., p. 36; letter dated 12 November 1922). How does experience finds its way into a psychoanalytic idea? How does one make use of one’s experience in the making of a psychoanalytic idea? What is the price paid for the creativity? What is the gain? The case of Ferenczi may provide some answers. Caper (2008) argues that ‘psychoanalytic theories are established by the absorption of the uncontrolled experience of the psychoanalytic session’ (p. 6), as contrast to experimental science in which theories are constructed from controlled experiment. In one’s daily experience, the psychodynamics behind is similar to that of the ‘experience of the psychoanalytic session’, and daily experience is even more ‘uncontrolled’. Yet, daily experience may be richer as a source of theory. ‘Theory does not replace experience’ (Spurling, 2009, p. 47) and, in return, it is experience that generates theory. This thesis is about an experiential etymology of a psychoanalytic idea.

Ferenczi plays an important role in the development of psychoanalysis, or even has a ‘highly complex presence’ (Sauvayre, 2010, p. 191) in the history of psychoanalysis. He is regarded as the favorite son of Freud. However, the understanding of his contribution to psychoanalysis has been obscured by intense interest only in his personal life. Such interest, however, is not limited to the history of psychoanalysis. In the history of science, there is also much enthusiastic
investigation into the personal lives of historical figures. Figlio (2003) observes that we are as drawn to their intimate lives and private thoughts as we are to the lives of politicians or poets. We want to prove them right or wrong, as surely as if they were our parents; and to be as interesting to ourselves and to others as they are to us. (p. 162)

Figlio compares the new scientist to an ‘Oedipal hero’ and yet with no father and possibly no mother as well. On the other hand, I aim to show that interest in the lives of historical figures, if focused on study of how their lives, or lived experience, generate their theories, might give us a more solid view on the history of ideas.

Intense interest only in Ferenczi’s life, nonetheless, is compatible with character assassination heralded by Jones which, according to Stanton (1993b & 1997), leads to various mis-misreading of his works such as those by Masson (1984) and Myers (1996). On the other hand, the recent revival of Ferenczi to ‘a fashionable topic in psychoanalysis’, ‘a topical bandwagon that is tempting to jump on, that is, “Let’s see what Ferenczi had to say about X.”’ (Vida, 1997, p. 406), or to the position of an idol as the ‘Ferenczi cult’ observed by Erös (2003) are further examples. Stanton (1993a) aptly summarizes the zest over Ferenczi’s charisma as ‘the only person who could ever be an analyst in the Ferenczian mold was Ferenczi himself’ (p. 428). Nonetheless, these tendencies interfered with attempts to comprehend his importance.

The aim of this thesis is partly historiographic in tracing the history of Ferenczi studies and seeking a clearer understanding of the relationship between his personality, as manifested in his crucial relationship with Freud, and his psychoanalytic thinking. It is also partly conceptual in that it analyzes his contribution to psychoanalysis. The emergence of Groddeck would also be examined within the transitional context of Ferenczi’s drifting from Freud. However, Ferenczi’s living and writing introjection in relating to Groddeck would not be
covered, as the focus of this thesis would be on Ferenczi and Freud only. As far as Ferenczi’s living introjection with Groddeck is concerned, the importance of their relationship, nevertheless, is not to be under-estimated as Groddeck is once a better psychoanalytic partner with Ferenczi and, for Ferenczi, a figure replacing Freud. A lot will be gained in further exploration of the Ferenczi-Groddeck relationship (Chan 2014a).

Past studies on Ferenczi’s relationship with Freud adopted a thematic approach in understanding Ferenczi or their friendship. These studies, however, lack a longitudinal perspective, in that they did not trace the development of the relationship but instead took a snapshot and even generalized to the whole relationship, without informing us of the complexity and nuances in the development of their relationship, which are unique aspects that a longitudinal angle could supply. Also, they did not have the complete correspondence at hand for their investigation. Furthermore, they did not go into the inner world of Ferenczi, as lived in the relationship with Freud, which is where some of his ideas gestate. Also, these studies either focus on Ferenczi’s life or work, without crossing-over between them. This thesis, on the other hand, provides these missing perspectives. Anna Freud, in her letter to Michael Balint on 23 May 1935, two years after Ferenczi’s death, positioned Ferenczi as the man who ‘is inextricably linked with psychoanalysis itself’ (quoted in Haynal, 1997, p. 453). Also as Giampieri-Deutsch (1997) suggests,

[i]t is time to document and historicize the entire spectrum of Ferenczi’s contributions to psychoanalysis, his breakthroughs and dead ends, in order to be able to do justice to the complexity of his work. (p. 244)

In historicizing Ferenczi’s contributions, I would attempt to situate his work back onto his relationship with Freud, so as to map out the interaction between his life
and work.

I strive for a more historically informed position between denigration and idealization in the restoration of Ferenczi and his ideas. It is important, given the controversial nature of his character and psychoanalytic ideas, and the ‘temptation’ to oversimplify the story by polarizing them, as what Pletsch (1995) observes, ‘[i]t is apparently still too tempting to deal with Freud and his early followers in moral terms, either exalting them into heroes or damning them.’ (p. 374). This study would also endeavour to integrate the ‘snapshots’ and provide the missing longitudinal perspective in tracking Ferenczi’s contributions to psychoanalysis and conceptualizing the controversies, as well as throwing light on Ferenczi’s inner and relational world, together with their connection to his psychoanalytic ideas. Amongst Ferenczi’s ideas, Introjection is chosen for this study, not just because it is the very first psychoanalytic notion he postulates, but also that the phenomenon behind this concept may be prevalent in his character, relationship with Freud, as well as in his writings. This complex connection could be deciphered in the complete correspondence of Ferenczi with Freud. By ‘connection’, and given Ferenczi’s merging life with psychoanalysis, I hypothesize that Ferenczi has been living Introjection in his relationship with Freud, as he puts this idea into the published papers. I am not linking lived experience and theory in a general sense, nor do I only mean that Ferenczi’s life and ideas are very close. I am trying to demonstrate specifically a connection, precisely about introjection that is a prevalent process or pattern in the Freud-Ferenczi relationship and that finds itself articulated in Ferenczi’s writings. By ‘living introjection’, I mean Ferenczi is experiencing introjection as a process, unconsciously, in his relationship with Freud. It is after and during such experience that Ferenczi consciously puts it into words in his writings.
about introjection. So, I aim at finding Ferenczi’s experiential origin of introjection as connected to his articulation about introjection in his papers written. I do not mean a one-to-one direct cause and effect relationship between the experience and the writing, because Ferenczi could have many other occasions for experiencing introjection with other people and it is almost impossible to prove that a certain writing on introjection must be the result of an earlier experience of introjection. The reality could be that Ferenczi’s various introjective experiences (with different people, over the course of years) converge into a piece of Ferenczi’s writing on introjection. What I am trying to illustrate instead is a correspondence (the ‘connection’) between a piece of writing on introjection and an earlier exemplar experience of introjection, forming a part of the myriad of experiential etymology of the concept. I do not aim to find out the whole network of experiential etymology,

Henri Ellenberger, who is regarded as a ‘model of the clinician-historian’ (Beveridge, 2014, p. 187), coined the term ‘creative illness’ (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 447). It is about a person’s total absorption with himself and his extreme solitary indulgence in an idea and the search for a truth. Eventually, he emerges from this painful ordeal abruptly with a ‘permanent transformation’ (ibid., p. 448) and the firm belief that he has found a great new truth. In the case of Ferenczi, however, the situation is not the same as ‘creative illness’ in that Ferenczi is not isolated but in an intense relationship with Freud as he is experiencing introjection and then writing about it. Also, introjection is not so much a great truth that Ferenczi craves for but just a psychoanalytic concept, even though psychoanalysis, for Ferenczi, is a truth in itself, and Ferenczi has been transformed by psychoanalysis.

As relationship implies bi-directionality, the possibility that Freud, in relating to Ferenczi, also lives Introjection is implied too. My study is to search for evidence
for this hypothesis from the historical documents available, using psycho-biographical approach in an intensive reading of the correspondence, to distil the essence of introjection behind.

I will start with exploring Ferenczi’s character and arguing for an introjective core. Then I will track the historical evolution of the idea of Introjection in Ferenczi’s writings, so as to build a frame for mapping with the corresponding evolution of his relationship with Freud. I will review the past related studies to find out missing perspectives or parts. I will also argue for a case for the proper use of psychobiography and a methodology based on an intensive and psycho-biographical reading of the correspondence. For the longitudinal tracking of Ferenczi’s relationship with Freud, I will start from 1908 when Ferenczi first meets Freud. I will study in-depth six key and longitudinally linked episodes - ‘surprise attack’, ‘journey’ to their America journey, Seidler episode, Palermo episode, Elma episode and Freud’s analysis of Ferenczi - which span up to 1919, and illustrate how Ferenczi starts and furthers introjection with Freud that ends up in Freud’s need to withdraw himself from the relationship by drawing in Groddeck as his replacement. Furthermore, 1921 is seen to be a watershed in Ferenczi’s relationship with Freud as he drifts to Groddeck visibly. I will study the emergence of Groddeck in the context of the dwindling Ferenczi-Freud relationship. I will analyse and report that Ferenczi is writing as he is experiencing Introjection. I will conclude that this thesis is an original contribution to the field of history of psychoanalysis in that an idea has been shown to be evolved from lived experience, which portrays the making of a theory, and a contribution to knowledge itself.
Chapter 2

A sketch of Ferenczi’s character

In this Chapter, I investigate Ferenczi’s character, as it has been depicted in the literature. My aim is to provide a starting point for comprehending his relationship style. I draw upon accounts of people who had different relationship with him. I also use secondary sources, notably by biographers who infer from their study of Ferenczi’s life. My other aim is an exposition of a core nature of his character that might be concluded from these apparently converging portrayals. It is gathered that Ferenczi was sentimental, kind, humble, open, honest, simplistic, loveable, child-like, submissive yet also rebellious, loving but also hating women, energetic and creative. His character, being open and fluid, is related to the idea of introjection, and might as well be termed an ‘introjective character’.

For Borgogno (2012), Ferenczi represented that prototype of the Jewish intelligentsia that was prevalent in Austro-Hungarian Empire at the turn of the 20th Century. He was a ‘veritable fusion of a variety of mindsets, existential solutions, cultures and languages’ (p. 250). According to Jones (1933), in an obituary written soon after Ferenczi’s death, Ferenczi had a warm and rich personality, with unfailing kindliness, charm and even loveliness. Jones was convinced, from his personal relations with him, that Ferenczi was honest, loyal and reliable. Also, Ferenczi’s ‘sympathetic intuition was of a quality that cannot be acquired’ (p. 464), meaning he had unusual capacity in understanding people and identifying himself with others. In Ferenczi’s own words, ‘[o]ne cannot really understand without identifying with the subject’ (1933, p. 183). Similarly, Balint (1949), one of Ferenczi’s pupils, observes that Ferenczi had ‘radiant lovable personality’ (p. 215), was loved and admired. Contrasting Ferenczi’s character with Freud’s, Lothane (2010) also notes that
Ferenczi was ‘a gentler and kinder man, tended towards emotionality verging on sentimentality, and did not strive to wield power over others.’ (pp. 173-174)

Furthermore, Clara Thompson, one of Ferenczi’s noted analysands and pupils, writes that Ferenczi had a ‘naturally timid and modest nature’ (1988, p.184; original work published in 1964),

not only because of his remarkable intellect, imagination, and unquenchable scientific curiosity, but also because of his profound simplicity, humility, and gentle human kindliness. (ibid., p.182)

She believes that Ferenczi’s personality was particularly suitable for being an analyst, as he had a real concern for human suffering and conviction in the worth of every individual. Vida (1997), along similar lines, states that Ferenczi was ‘an exquisite listener to everyone else’s voice and possessed a unique ability to draw out and to facilitate those voices.’ (p. 408). Vida also sees a ‘maternal pattern’ (ibid., p. 411) in Ferenczi’s relating style, viz., ‘supportive, facilitative, feeding, self-effacing’ (ibid., p. 411). Langan (2010), moreover, has a more vivid speculation on Ferenczi’s open or introjective mind,

His mind is a chamber with an open door, or perhaps two, one for entrance and one for exit, or perhaps not doors but a thousand mouse holes of skittering possibilities, all open at once. Subjective and objective interpenetrate. The subjective presents awareness in the moment; the objective synthesizes awareness into the I who am in this quiet room, inside this body room outside.’ (p. 162).

Ferenczi approached each new analysand with the enthusiastic belief that he could be of help. With patience, he never believed that any patient was incurable but only that he had not found the right method. In Ferenczi’s own words,

It is thus only with the utmost reluctance that I ever bring myself to give up even the most obstinate case, and I have come to be a specialist in peculiarly difficult cases, with which I go on for very many years. I have refused to accept such verdicts as that a patient’s resistance was unconquerable, or that his narcissism prevented our penetrating any further, or the sheer fatalistic acquiescence in the so-called ‘drying up’ of a case. I have told myself that, as long as the patient continues to come at all,
the last thread of hope has not snapped. (Ferenczi, 1931, p. 128)

Instead of blaming the patient, Ferenczi ‘blamed’ the technique or even the analyst, and yet in so doing, it actually empowered the analyst and urged him to looking into himself and to change his therapeutic skills or attitude that may eventually help overcome the treatment impasse. In earning the trust of his patients, Ferenczi’s simplicity made them feel that he had ‘warm friendliness’ (Lorand, 1933, p. 260), who would try his best to be receptive and understanding in order to help them.

So, a visible part of Ferenczi’s personality is one of naivety and genuineness, more or less childlike. Leonard Shengold, the noted contemporary analyst working on trauma as ‘soul murder’ (1991, p. 77), advocates that ‘the mind of a psychoanalyst should be not only ordered and scientific but poetic and playful.’ (ibid., p. ix), which is seemingly a hybrid of the character style of Freud and Ferenczi. de Forest (1954), his pupil and analysand, whose family had close contact with Ferenczi and his wife, recalls that Ferenczi had a rare ability to understand children and share their joy in both naughty fun and constructive activities,

I remember vividly the family gatherings when we listened to Ferenczi and my husband spinning their dazzling webs of spontaneous phantastic thought, vying with each other in originality and humor. (p. 4)

Martin Freud, in his memoir of his father, recounts his early boyhood friendship with Ferenczi who was both a teacher and a friend as he grew up,

One of the very few psychoanalysts who showed interest in his host’s children at the Bergasse was Dr Sandor Ferenczi of Budapest. He was high in father’s favour. A lively, witty and most affectionate man, he found not the slightest difficulty in winning my devoted friendship, a friendship not affected by the fact that I knew he was assuming the role of a mentor in a worthy desire to help me on my way through adolescence to manhood. (1958, p. 109)

Thompson (1988) even adds that Ferenczi could abandon himself like a child
into the feeling of a movie and was completely indulged in the emotional ups and downs of the characters. Such indulgence, according to Borgogno (2011) is indeed similar to what children do when taking in ‘everything without being able to select and defend themselves from what they take’ (p. 160), especially when ‘the minds involved in the process are not yet completely formed’ (ibid., p. 161). Borgogno argues that this is the introjective mind’s characteristics. Ferenczi’s ability to empathize and to understand, as noted in his ability to connect to patients and to children, also suggest this fluid, receptive, or introjective character. Similarly, André Haynal, the ‘dean of contemporary Ferenczians’ (Rudnytsky, 2012, p. xviii), observes that Ferenczi related to others via introjection with authenticity, as he believes ‘cementing solidarity as the best possible achievement of human development’ (Haynal, 2013, p. liii).

However, there is another side to this character. Balint found, from his experience with Ferenczi, that Ferenczi was proud of his fantasy and even belief of being ‘the enfant terrible of psychoanalysis’ (Ferenczi, 1931, p. 127), i.e., the wise baby who is wiser than all adults added together. Haynal (1997) sees Ferenczi as the ‘intuitive, deep, curious, innovative Wise Baby’ (p. 445). Also, such an idea of the wise baby could be found only by the wise baby himself, and Ferenczi was wise enough to know this (Blum, 2004). Yet, this came with the price of being mis-understood or simply not understood at all. The baby was wise but bitter. Balint points to a stark but real possibility: even though Ferenczi was a genius in his psychoanalytic technique and insight, he was ‘essentially a child all his life’ (Balint, 1949, p. 216). So, the wise baby was, inevitably, also a baby too. He was readily accepted by children whom he treated on equal terms. This was the same for his patients who were, in some sense, unhappy ‘children’. On the other hand, in not
being able to be an adult, although he possessed all the lovely qualities that the wisest child had, Ferenczi was not, at the end of the day, treated seriously enough by adults. Being a too-ideal child, Ferenczi was in fact rather handicapped in the adult world where people operate with different rules and characters, as Balint states rather bluntly, ‘something always went wrong for him’ (ibid., p. 215). Similarly, Hoffer (2003) observes that Ferenczi is ‘always controversial’ (p. 1937). Bearing in mind Ferenczi was painfully childless throughout his life because his wife, Gizella, was too old to bear him any children, such personal qualities may be both a representation of and a compensation for this lack, i.e., he was his own ‘child’, or he was looking for, if not constructing, his own ‘child’ in the children and patients he came across. However, in ‘being’ a child, even though a troubling one, it is further plausible that Ferenczi’s character is introjective, given the identification or receptive tendency of a child.

With the frankness or even the naivety of a child, it would be natural for Ferenczi to win friends and support from others. Balint (1958) remarks that Ferenczi had ‘touchiness and an inordinate need to be loved and appreciated’ (p. 68), which might underlie Ferenczi’s sociability. Jones notes that Ferenczi was inspiring and, with his great oratory talent, he never failed to stimulate people. His enthusiasm and commitment readily influenced others to follow suit. The readers of Ferenczi’s papers readily learned something new from him, and he was very quick at tackling fresh problems and had much delight in the learning. Federn (1933), in addition to acknowledging Ferenczi’s influential personality, also attributes his capacity to influence others to eros, one of the libidinal types stipulated by Freud. Ferenczi managed to fuse daily work, creativity and effective interpersonal relationship, and always with an ‘undercurrent of joyousness’ and ‘all of an exceptionally high order’
His vision for psychoanalysis was more like a way of living than simply a career. In influencing or stimulating others, Ferenczi might be ‘dispensing’ his feeling as he introjects others who share his enthusiasm.

However, Thompson (1988) argues, in relating to people he admired with awe, Ferenczi was more submissive and appeasing, striving for recognition. He even suspended his own independence in exchange for approval. Also, he was very fearful of being rejected. He would also clothe his ideas by the terminology of the admired person or develop the latter’s idea to an extreme degree. An example of his initial zest with Freud’s advocacy of abstinence was his invention of active therapy that forbade all kinds of gratification during analysis, in order to prompt the development of transference and stop the abuse of free association.

On the other side of his submissiveness, however, could be an implicitly rebellious tendency. Blum (2004) argues that this tendency was noted very early in his relationship with Freud. In the Palermo episode in 1910 in which Ferenczi had the privilege to accompany his master to Italy, he rebelled against serving as what he thought to be Freud’s secretary, instead of the co-authorship that he desired in Freud’s work on the Schreber case. Even though they had already been discussing the psychodynamics of paranoia, Ferenczi’s rebellion, Blum believes, forfeited his chance to write a paper together with Freud. Ferenczi craved to be among men of authority but had trouble relating to them.

This dialectic between submission and rebellion might have navigated Ferenczi’s relationship with authority. Either way, however, it was Ferenczi’s search for his way of living a psychoanalytic life. Claude Lorin, who spent years in the late 1970s searching for and translating the early, or pre-psychoanalytic, writings of the young Ferenczi in Budapest, and authored the biography ‘The Young Ferenczi’,
published in French in 1984, argues that

The young Sandor, open to everything, was a nomad who became a tzigane of psychoanalysis, an innovator, certainly not a docile zealot taking the writings of Freud as dogma. (Lorin, 1997, p. 403).

Lorin believes that Ferenczi is a ‘real wise man’ (ibid., p. 403) who does not really need a master. Similarly, Bergmann (2004), comparing Otto Rank with Ferenczi, notes that, ‘[u]nlike Rank, who met Freud at a young age and was molded by Freud, Ferenczi always maintained a degree of independence’ (p. 29). The question then might not be submission vs. rebelliousness, but a tireless and independent explorer whose receptiveness and openness continues to fuel his creativity. It is only when orthodoxy comes into the background, or when ‘virtually all departures and arrivals in psychoanalysis are measured in terms of their distance from [Freud]’ (Mendes, 2011, p. 757), that submission or rebelliousness becomes the figure, or has meaning in the interface between openness and authority. Raphael-Leff (2012) summarizes that Ferenczi has ‘warm intuitive understanding and capacity to couple curiosity, playfulness, and experimentation with self-critical evaluation’ (p. xxix). Again, Ferenczi’s openness point to the possibility of an introjective character.

Women were a difficulty for Ferenczi. Jones (1955) comments that Ferenczi ‘had great charm for men, though less so for women’ (p. 157). Judit Mészáros, a noted Hungarian analyst, citing Ferenczi’s endorsement of Möbius’ assertion of women’s retardation as attributed to their ‘overgrowing female instinct’, writes about Ferenczi’s derogatory beliefs about women,

Owing to these instincts, women lack independence, are lightheaded and merry, unable to attain moral comprehension or to think, which is good, because thinking would make matters even worse. This rationale is a clear example of natural teleology, the “mental retardation” of women being not only a fact, but requirement as well: “strength, desire for the remote, fantasy and thirst for knowledge would only disquiet the woman,
would only disturb her maternal duty” (Ferenczi, 1900, p. 492). The best proof of Ferenczi’s full agreement with these ideas is his respect for Möbius, whom he called a revolutionary scientist. (Mészáros, 1993, p. 47)

Here Ferenczi believed that ‘overgrown female instinct’ impeded women’s intellectual development. Such a belief is also visible in his theory of the development of femininity that, according to Zeul (1998), is characterized by a whole series of regressive moves and renunciations, from urethrality to anality (i.e. from activity to passivity), the “abandonment” of the clitoris in favour of the vagina, and a regressive secondary-narcissistic cathexis of the entire body.’ (p. 215)

As for his relationship with women, the picture is similar,

Ferenczi’s aversion to his mother and to women in general was overtly expressed only much later, in his “mutual analytic period”; his unhappy marriage with Frau Gizella and his unanswered love for her daughter, Elma, well illustrate the sophisticated nature of his problem. (Mészáros, 1993, p.47, footnote 2)

By ‘sophisticated nature’, Mészáros might imply something more than mere aversion. Yet, she might have been only focusing on one side of the coin only. Vida (1999) in her argument against the notion that Ferenczi simply represents the role of the mother in psychoanalysis, notes the ‘fluidity of his masculine and feminine identifications’ (p. 257) that is both unconventional in that historical era but could be seen as Androgyny in contemporary discourse, which seeks to liberate men and women from conventional or rigid categories of masculinity vs. femininity. Ferenczi’s ability to identify with both genders can be noted from one of his earliest psychoanalytic papers, The Effect on Women of Premature Ejaculation in Men, in which he has a very nuanced observation and inference about a version of coitus, the ultimate union and conflict between men and women,

If men gave up their selfish way of thinking and imagined what life would be like if they always had to cut the act short before their libidinous tension was relieved, they would gain some idea of the sexual martyrdom of the female sex, which is faced with the appalling dilemma of choosing between complete satisfaction and self-respect. (Ferenczi,
In this sense, Ferenczi’s introjective character is noted in his capacity to integrate the essence of both genders into a unifying whole, in which the tension or even aversion between men and women, could still co-exist with the other aspects.

Ferenczi was so perseverant in work that, once he decided to pursue a goal, he would never give up, even at the expense of much pain. He was energetic and self-critical, and also very sensitive to others’ comments on his work. He was not easily satisfied with his work and would not accept his empirical findings as final. This mentality pushed him towards gestation of more ideas and even farfetched speculations. Balint also found Ferenczi creative and full of new ideas, with ‘uninhibited and unlimited scientific phantasy’ (1949, p. 216). He was able to look at old things as if he were seeing them for the very first time in his life. He was not satisfied with the use of old, scientific terms to describe his clinical experience. Instead, he would resort to his own way to achieve a most striking picture of his experience and observation. Ferenczi could be carried away by his creativity far away before his, or others’, rationality would be able to catch up. Mészáros (1993) adds that such traits were prevalent in Ferenczi ever since his younger days, that he had remarkable personality traits, evident throughout his professional life: extraordinary curiosity, pursuit of knowledge, attraction to books, as was reflected in his enormous reading during his younger years. (p. 49).

Jones concedes that ‘Ferenczi blazed like a comet’ (1933, p. 466), metaphorically visualizing Ferenczi’s creativity or impactful presence in the history of psychoanalysis. With his child essence and self-made myth of being the enfant terrible, or his introjective character, Ferenczi immersed himself with those people that he both craved for and abhorred. It might be in such an optimal human ecology, fusing his creativity and human connectedness, that he led his psychoanalytic life.
and evolve his psychoanalytic ideas. Yet, when such relationships eventually finished their historical role and could no longer sustain him, it would be the time for him to go his own way alone. Two of his most profound relationships that define his presence in the history of psychoanalysis are the one with Freud, the focus of this thesis, and that with Groddeck (Chan, 2014a). The notion of *Introjection*, probably not out of mere coincidence, was the very first psychoanalytic notion that Ferenczi developed after he had first met Freud in 1908. A tracking of how this idea evolves throughout Ferenczi’s writings would provide the historical and theoretical context for mapping the connection between *Introjection* and Ferenczi’s relationship with Freud. A review of the development of *Introjection* in Ferenczi’s writings would be the aim of the next Chapter.
Chapter 3

The historical evolution of *Introjection* in Ferenczi’s writings

This chapter aims to survey Ferenczi’s writings from 1908, the year he meets Freud, to 1933, the year he dies, in order to find out when and how he writes about the psychoanalytic concept of *Introjection*. It provides a chronological framework of the evolution and changes of this concept in 25 years. It also gives sign-posts of time whereby I can make reference to in the later chapters when I study the Ferenczi-Freud relationship in an attempt to find out whether and how Ferenczi writes about introjection as he lives it in his relationship with his psychoanalytic partner, i.e., to test out the hypothesis of this thesis. In this survey, I find that Ferenczi has written about *Introjection* in 16 papers. The following is my findings in more detail.

*Introjection and Transference*, first published in 1909 in *Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse*, is a long essay in which Ferenczi first attempts to work out his novel idea of *Introjection*, a new term then. Haynal (1997) sees it as Ferenczi’s ‘first grand original work’ (p. 444) that gives Freud’s established ideas ‘a new voice and a new sensibility’ (ibid., p. 444). Yet, Makari (2008) regards it as ‘the most comprehensive account of analytic technique to date’ that was written ‘with Freud looking over [Ferenczi’s] shoulder as they vacationed together’ (p. 241). Kerr (2010) puts it as ‘another important early paper on method’ (p. 506). Borgogno (2011), however, argues that the essence of introjection is already present in an even earlier paper by Ferenczi (1908), *The Effect on Women of Premature Ejaculation in Men*. Borgogno, reading into this paper the analyst’s zest for interpretation, to the exclusion of emotional contact with the patient, notes that it is the analyst’s premature interpretation that is similar to men’s premature ejaculation, leaving the
patient with anxiety and depression. Arguably, although this interpretation of the paper itself is not conducted within the consultation room between the analyst and analysand, it situates the evolution of Ferenczi’s idea back to an earlier stage in which the idea is budding but not yet explicitly formulated.

*Introjection and Transference* is composed of two separate sections, *Introjection in the Neuroses* and *The Part played by Transference in Hypnotism and Suggestion*. Transference, as the underlying mechanism of introjection and hypnosis, is the concept that ties the two parts together. As Lothane (2010) puts it, this paper is Ferenczi’s elaboration of [Freud’s] remarks on erotic transference as a resistance in psychotherapy in *Studies on Hysteria* … and the case history of Dora, whom Freud treated in 1890 and 1900’ (p. 174).

Ferenczi starts from Freud’s significant discovery of transference in analytic treatment as the neurotic's unconscious production in the therapeutic relationship and the resistance against insight. In contrast to Freud, however, Ferenczi further argues that the neurotic’s transference occurs not just in analysis, as it is present in most pathological manifestations of the neurotics, but also in daily life. Indeed, transference characterizes a neurotic: ‘the general neurotic passion for transference’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 45) and it is this passion, or mania, that explains the neurotic’s symptoms. Psychoanalysis is only a catalyst of transference. This observation not just widens the applicability of transference but also directs Ferenczi to this psychical mechanism’s other facets, paving the way for an exposition of his new idea. He notes that the hysterics’ symptoms expressed in the transference are usually exaggerated and the excessive affect, if not decoded as some kind of language, could easily be ridiculed. He acknowledges Freud who first conceives that the psychoneurotic readily imitates or copies others’ traits or symptoms, to feel for
others intensely and to identify with others in his unconscious. He lists details and examples that illustrate the analyst becoming the object of the neurotic’s transference: ‘ridiculously slight resemblances’ (ibid., p. 42) such as the analyst’s hair colour, gesture, etc., gender of the analyst and in particular, his feminine aspect, or the suspension of ethical censor in the consulting room. The neglect of transference by the doctor would have grave consequences, as the phantasies would build up to an almost hallucinatory level that may end up in a public scandal.

With that much written about transference, the most significant discovery of Freud so far, Ferenczi introduces his new concept,

To better understand the fundamental character of neurotics one has to compare their behaviour with that of patients suffering from dementia praecox and paranoia. (ibid., p. 47).

Ferenczi invites his readers to think beyond transference, the phenomenon that characterizes the neurotic. This is also thinking beyond Freud. Ferenczi introduces his new term, *Introjection*, as a mechanism opposite to what a paranoia does, i.e., projection,

Whereas the paranoiac expels from his ego the impulses that have become unpleasant, the neurotic helps himself by taking into the ego as large as possible a part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies. This is a kind of diluting process, by means of which he tries to mitigate the poignancy of free-floating, unsatisfied, and unsatisfiable, unconscious wish-impulses. One might give to this process, in contrast to projection, the name of *Introjection.* (ibid., p. 47)

Positioning *Introjection* as a ‘mirror image’ (Hinshelwood, 1991, p. 331) of Projection is, according to Borgogno (2012), ‘to counterbalance the overemphasis on the concept of projection in the literature of the time’ (p. 251). On the other hand, Ferenczi continues, while both the neurotic and the paranoiac seek objects, they do so for different purposes. The neurotic’s objects are for him to identify with, and to draw into, i.e., to introject. The paranoiac’s objects, on the other hand, are for
projection of unpleasant feelings. Their characters are also very different from each other. The neurotic has wide areas of interest, and can easily love or hate the whole world, whereas the paranoiac is more constricted and suspicious, thinking that he is being watched, persecuted or loved by the whole world. One is about a widening of his ego and the other is the opposite. Ferenczi further positions these two extreme psychic mechanisms back onto the entire spectrum of the origin and functioning of the human mind, in which the normal is somewhere in the middle.

Developmentally, according to Ferenczi, the dialectics of projection and introjection starts with the monistic world of the infant. Once he can differentiate his ego from bad things, an outer world that does not obey him will be formed. This is the very first projection, the primordial projection, which is used later by the paranoiac to expel even more of his ego into the external world. However, part of the external world cannot be cast away from the ego that easily. It continues to be imposing upon the ego, posing the challenge of either loving or hating it, fighting or befriending with it. The ego accepts this challenge and re-absorbs, partially, the external world, thus extending its interest to it. This forms the very first introjection, the ‘primal-introjection’ (Borossa, 1999, p. 40). The concept of Introjection therefore explains the building of the structure of one’s character. Also, according to Aron & Harris (2010), it anticipates the object relations approach with respect to the construction of the inner world and internal objects. In so doing, Ferenczi also shifts attention ‘from fantasy to reality, from drive-generated conflict to external trauma’ and ‘from the oedipal to the preoedipal’ (p. 37).

Introjection, Ferenczi writes, especially very early ones, is highly related to transference. At first, the infant only loves to be soothed or satisfied as its tortuous hunger is alleviated. Some of such positive or auto-erotic feelings are displaced onto
the object who elicits such feelings, and so the infant also loves the mother, the
object that satisfies him. This is the first object-love, which entails transfer of feeling
from the ego to the object that Ferenczi also conceives as transference by
displacement of feeling. This is the root of all future transference. Similar
mechanism also occurs in the case of object-hate, only with the difference that the
feeling is unpleasant or the feeling is hate instead of pleasant or love.

Ferenczi also attempts to link his new concept to those existing ones, notably
those of Freud and Abraham, which suggest that the neurotic and the normal differ
only in a matter of degree. Ferenczi also further aligns the neurotic with the normal,
that there is no basic difference between the two except for the quantitative and
practical aspects. Also, in introjecting, the healthy person does it consciously,
extending his love and interest to many people, even the whole human race.
However, the neurotic does it in the unconscious fantasies and are observable
symbolically and even in the opposite manner, viz., reaction-formation. Furthermore,
the neurotic introjects more often than the normal does when it comes to the need to
placate or dilute free-floating affects,

so as to be able to keep unconscious various affective connections with
certain objects that concern him nearly, he lavishes his affects on all
possible objects that do not concern him\textsuperscript{12}. (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 50,
footnote mine)

Ferenczi cites brief case material and experimental evidence in support of the
notion that the neurotic generalizes displacement of affect onto objects. The patient
whose phobia of books or printed material is traced to his reminiscence of sexual
events in childhood; the obsessive patient whose flight from masturbation in private
results in fear of being alone in closed space; the painter whose choice of a
profession providing pleasure of gazing is a compensation for objects that are
forbidden to the eyes. Ferenczi also re-interpreted Jung’s conclusion about the
word-association experiment in the new light of introjection that it is ‘the neurotic “introjects” the stimulus-words of the experiment’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 51), instead of words evoking reactions.

Ferenczi advocates that transference and introjection are the main therapeutic mechanisms that contribute to the patients’ recovery, regardless of whether the physician is practicing psychoanalysis or any other form of non-psychoanalytic treatment such as hypnosis and other suggestive therapy. Cure, after all, is the patient’s own attempt to do so, making use of the analyst’s offer to cure him. Healing, if it is to occur, is a matter of natural healing, in so far as the transference is allowed to develop and be used tactfully by the psychoanalyst.

Laplanche & Pontalis (1973), in their now classic dictionary, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, which adopts a ‘historical-critical’ (p. viii) approach in explaining the psychoanalytic terms, tracing the origin and development of such words in the psychoanalytic literature, mostly Freud’s writings, has an entry of Introjection. However, Laplanche & Pontalis comment that Ferenczi’s first depiction of Introjection in 1909 is rather unclear or even confusing, and that Freud’s subsequent use of this term as clearer, as distinct from projection.

In this article as a whole, however, it is hard to discern a precise meaning of the concept of introjection, for Ferenczi seems to use the word in a broad sense to indicate ‘a passion for transference’ which leads the neurotic ‘to mollify the free-floating affects by extension of his circle of interest’. He ends up by using the word to designate a type of behaviour (chiefly in hysterics) that might equally well be described as projection. (p. 230)

Understandably, Laplanche & Pontalis might have taken a part of Ferenczi’s description of Introjection, viz., ‘lavishes his affects on all possible objects that do not concern him’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 50), as one that is also about projection. It might be Laplanche & Pontalis who see the mechanism of projection as similar to
that of introjection. In contemporary terminology, what Laplanche and Pontalis meant by ‘projection’ here might be more appropriately termed projective identification, as it entails the ‘expansion of the ego into the external world, in order to control it’ (Figlio, 2013), and this might solve the problem of confusion of terminology. Going back to Ferenczi’s 1909 paper, however, the context for the definition of Introjection is that Ferenczi is speaking on the purpose of such giving out of feelings: to maintain affective connection with objects, which is apparently a form of transference or displacement. Also, Laplane and Pontalis’ dictionary focuses more on tracing the development of Freud’s thought than of anyone else’s, as it does not refer back to Ferenczi’s works anymore when describing the historical development of this new term.

In contrast to Laplace and Pontalis, Martín Cabré (2011) regards Ferenczi’s 1909 paper as a masterpiece of psychoanalytic literature, using a daring, excited style, a bit impetuous perhaps, but offering a profusion of fine, surprising, and original clinical observations (pp. 322-323).

Martín Cabré attempts to link Introjection to the contemporary concept of Intropression that includes the detrimental outcomes of violence and parental repression. Haynal (1997) sees Ferenczi’s paper as the birthplace of the notion of projective identification,

Here, in embryonic, we find the idea of the formation of an internal object by introjection and, in his highlighting of the complementary aspects of introjection and transference, we find the kernel of the later “projective identification” dear to his student, Melanie Klein. (p. 444)

Klein’s projective identification builds upon Ferenczi’s introjection in that part of the internal objects, once formed by introjection, can be projected again that forms a connection between the internal and external world. Even so, a comprehensive tracing of all what Ferenczi writes about Introjection is not yet
available in the literature and this Chapter aims to fill up this gap. After Ferenczi’s landmark introduction of *Introjection* in 1909, he writes about it on 15 other occasions, almost up till his death in 1933. He returns to *Introjection* on and off, ranging from a lapse of one to four years. In a 1912 paper, *On the Definition of Introjection*, the only occasion after 1909 that he devotes an entire paper to *Introjection*, Ferenczi clarifies some misunderstanding of his new term,

I described introjection as an extension to the external world of the original autoerotic interests, by including its objects in the ego. I put the emphasis on this ‘including’ and wanted to show thereby that I considered *every sort of object love (or transference)* both in normal and in neurotic people (and of course also in paranoiacs as far as they are capable of loving) as an extension of the ego, that is, as introjection. In principle, man can love only himself; if he loves an object he takes it into his ego. (Ferenczi, 1912, p. 316, underlined added)

For the word ‘including’, there is a remark from the translator that the German word is *Einbeziehung*, which means to ‘pull in, to integrate, to incorporate’ (Ibid., p. 316, note 4) but the translator chose ‘including’ instead because this word has no vested interest for anyone, as contrast with the previous three which have acquired certain meaning in psychoanalytic thinking. However, the use of ‘Including’ may be too neutral or official in that it obliterate the vivid sense or action of pulling in. Ferenczi considers that extension of the ego to the world is equivalent to taking objects into the ego, i.e., to introjection, as in the case of loving an object as ego’s extension. Yet, if the introjected object is not identical to the ego, Ferenczi’s ‘man can love only himself; if he loves an object he takes it into his ego’ (ibid., p. 316) should be revised as: man can only love the (new) part of his ego that is identical to the introjected object. Furthermore, this new part of the ego, although it could be something exotic, cannot be detached from the rest of the ego, as Ferenczi illustrates it with the fairy tale of the poor fisherman’s wife who is cursed to have a sausage grown on her nose. The wife feels contact with the sausage is almost
indistinguishable from that with her skin. She would strongly refuse to have the
sausage cut off, as man would feel all the suffering of his loved object as his own.

Ferenczi further writes that the neurotic’s excessive readiness to transference to
an object is actually an unconscious magnification of his addiction to introjection.
This is in direct contrast to the paranoiac’s addiction to projection as he detaches
love from the object, and after recovery, would project it again onto the world.
However, he could not tolerate any alien bodies grown onto his personality,

The true paranoiac could think of part of his own nose (his own
personality) as a sausage and then cut it off and throw it away; but
nothing could induce him to tolerate something foreign growing on to it.
(ibid., p. 317)

Ferenczi reiterates that it is introjection, or capacity for transference, that
characterizes the neurotics, whereas for the paranoiac, it is projection. He even goes
further to re-conceive Metaphysics\textsuperscript{15}. Materialism is the pinnacle of projection as the
ego is ‘dissolved’ completely into the external world. On the other hand, solipsism,
which pulls the whole external world into the ego, illustrates the most extreme form
of introjection. However, Ferenczi does not recognize that, in such extreme
scenarios, the polarities of external vs. internal will become rather meaningless,
metaphysically, semantically, or even psychoanalytically.

In response to Maeder’s mistaken conception about exteriorization or
projection, Ferenczi describes Maeder’s explication of exteriorization as: the
paranoiac identifies his body organ with a thing in the external world and treats the
two as identical, e.g. he believes that water-pipes are his blood vessels. However,
Ferenczi explains that as the paranoiac tries to project his organ’s pleasure onto the
external world, he only achieves displacement of the object of the pleasure. Ferenczi
reminds us that the ‘ego can regard its own body as belonging to the external world,
that is, objectively’ (ibid., p. 318). In other words, the body, and its organs, can be
seen as an object in the external world during the displacement process. In the above example, the paranoiac displaces the pleasure from one object of the external world (i.e., the organ) onto another similar object (i.e., the water-pipe). Ferenczi believes that this is not projection or exteriorization. Instead, it is displacement, which is a special case of introjection, as Ferenczi has shown in his 1909 paper. He further clarifies projection so as to distinguish it from introjection. The paranoiac’s projection (e.g. delusion of persecution) involves the following: a part of the personality (e.g. homosexuality) is severed from the ego, with the sense of agency also removed, and yet this part cannot be simply removed as a whole from the internal world, it is treated as something alien, or external (objective). This transformation of the subjective into the objective is the essence of projection. Back in his 1909 paper, Ferenczi states clearly that it is projection that characterizes the paranoiac. Yet, three years later, he supplements that since the paranoiac actually has a displaced interest in certain objects in the external world, the paranoiac can still introject, since, according to Ferenczi, displacement is a special case of introjection. He even surmises that the paranoiac should be regarded as not very different from the neurotic and, because of this, the paranoiac’s prognosis could be more favourable. This is the most visible difference between these two early discourses of Ferenczi on introjection.

In 1913, Ferenczi alludes to introjection in his paper on *Stages of the Development of the Sense of Reality* and attempts to build up his new ideas in developmental stages upon those of introjection and projection, or ‘in greater detail, the play of introjection and projection’ (Haynal, 1997, p. 443). He starts from Freud’s notion of the pleasure principle, which prevails in the earliest stage of development. Ferenczi, however, observes that Freud is not clear as to whether the
transition from the pleasure to the reality principle takes place gradually or in steps, and whether these developmental stages, or their derivatives, can be recognized in the normal and pathological mind. Looking for an answer, Ferenczi points to the obsessive patients’ perseverance with their belief in the omnipotence of their thoughts, feelings and wishes, regardless of whether they are good or bad. They believe they have to think of some magical formulas or engage in a certain action; otherwise something bad will happen to someone who is usually a relative. Such superstitious conviction is not changed by any repeated experience with the contrary. Ferenczi aptly points out that the obsessive patients’ development are arrested in a certain stage whereby they equate wishing with acting, as there is ‘no inhibition, postponing, reflecting thought-activity interposed between wishing and acting’ (Ferenczi, 1913, p. 216). The arrest is fostered by the mechanism that a part of the obsessive patient’s mental life is repressed, or removed from consciousness. This part cannot learn to differentiate between wishing and acting. The other part of the ego that is free from such repression, via education and experience, however, finds such equivalence rather amusing. This explains the patient’s internal conflict between knowing the absurdity but cannot help repeating it.

Ferenczi, rather obsessed with self-criticism, finds this explanation of omnipotence not satisfactory since omnipotence has not been fully understood in introjection terms. He asks himself an important question: where does the child get the audacity to equate thinking with acting? His answer is that sometime in the child’s life, he has indeed been omnipotent. By life, or indeed intrapsychic life, Ferenczi also means life as a fetus before birth, ‘it would be foolish to believe that the mind begins to function only at the moment of birth’ (ibid., p. 219). Ferenczi believes that the fetus, being simply a parasite of the mother who provides
everything automatically, without any demand or frustration imposing on the fetus, in fact creates a state of the fetus who has everything satisfied and hence has nothing remained to wish for, or simply has no want. The obsessive patient’s omnipotence is virtually a demand for a return to such good old days. Along similar lines, the baby’s sleep is also an attempt to return to this intrauterine state; the nurses’ wrapping of the newborn is also creating the illusion of the womb’s warmth and protection. As the infant has no idea about the cause-and-effect in the real world, or even about the existence of the nurse and her activity, it would feel itself having the magical ability to realize its wishes simply by imagining. Ferenczi names this stage as the ‘Period of magical-hallucinatory omnipotence’ (ibid., p. 222). He even surmises that sleep and dreams in later life are the remnants of such hallucinatory omnipotence that still survives in adult consciousness, the extreme version of which is psychoses.

Soon, merely with the wish for the gratification to appear periodically is not enough to bring about any ‘real’ wish-fulfillment. The child has to add something by giving certain signals, usually some gestures, such as crying and struggling, that involve motor activity so that the situation may change according to such actions. These magical signals indeed are very similar to those of the magician who can make something, however complicated it could be, happen by a simple gesture. The infant’s gesture may start with being rather chaotic, but would readily evolve into the form that is increasingly specialized or even meaningful to the external world, e.g. sucking when it wants to be fed, or even the latter version of regular sign language. Ferenczi calls this stage ‘the period of omnipotence by the help of magic gestures’ (ibid., p. 225). He also interprets hysteria accordingly, that it is an abrupt move from thinking to somatic processes. The normal mind, on the other hand, also entails many such gestures as cursing, blessing and praying which can be traced
back to this omnipotent stage of magic gestures, as they are believed to have an effect on the real world.

Even with such attempts to return to omnipotence, the child would gradually still faces increasingly discordant experiences that repeatedly diminish his sense of omnipotence. However, Ferenczi believes that this is also another developmental achievement that marks a new ability. He also re-introduces introjection as concordant with the omnipotent stages. He writes that the child has to

‘distinguish between certain perfidious things, which do not obey his will, as an outer world, and on the other side his ego; i.e. between the subjective psychical contents (feelings) and the objectified ones (sensations). I once called the first of these stages the Introjection Phases of the psyche, since in it all experiences are still incorporated into the ego, and the later one the Projection Phase. One might also, following this terminology, speak of the omnipotence stage as the introjection stage, the reality stage as the projection stage, of the development of the ego.’ (ibid., pp. 226-227)

In other words, Ferenczi not only thinks that introjection is about the creation of the subjective world by knowing the said distinction, but he also situates introjection backward developmentally to a very early mode of mental functioning, well before the reality or mature ego capacity come into play. This further clarifies the status and meaning of introjection as being a part of the evolution of psychoanalytic concepts in the early history of psychoanalysis, especially its relative position in comparison to projection, and extending the developmental lines back to the fetus stage whereby everything is about omnipotence, or introjection. As for the second stage, that projection phase, Ferenczi will have more to say later in 1926.

One year later, Ferenczi, in writing about the symbolism of money in his 1914 paper, The Ontogenesis of the Interest in Money, returns to Introjection again. This paper aims to study whether, and how much, individual experience facilitates the conversion of anal-erotic interest into interest in money. He endorses the prevalent
symbolic meaning of money, as noted in fairy tales, myths, superstitions and the 
unconscious, as having a very close connection to excrement. Developmentally, the 
child’s first reaction to this bodily production is that of dis-inhibited interest in the 
process of excretion and the pleasure of holding back his stools. He sees such stools 
as his very first savings, which is the prototype of later similar activities of 
collecting, hoarding and saving.

Faeces are also the child’s first toy that gives him auto-erotic gratification as he 
squeezes and presses them, together with exercising the sphincter muscle in the hold 
versus release. Ferenczi thinks that such satisfaction will be transformed, partially at 
least, into object-love, as the pleasure is displaced from the neutral sensation of the 
sphincter muscle of the anus onto the thing that causes this feeling. Hence, faeces 
are introjected and accepted as a valuable toy. Only by punishment and threat can 
the child be weaned from such toys. This occurs in a developmental stage in which 
the sense of smell is heightened and yet the child is still not yet a toddler. This 
meaning of introjection follows the one Ferenczi first proposes it in 1909. Yet, in 
this paper, Ferenczi extends the use of introjection to explain how money and faeces 
share similar mechanism of object-love.

In his 1915 paper, The Analysis of Comparison, Ferenczi studies patients’ use 
of metaphor in expressing their ideas and thoughts, and finds introjection at work 
behind. He notices that the analogies used are actually not that suitable to express 
what they want to clarify. Instead, such similes are usually witty and clever, as well 
as containing rich meaning to be exposed. He believes that there would be hidden 
psychic material in the patients’ unconscious choice of such comparison. Metaphors, 
for Ferenczi, have the same status as the target of analysis as compared to dreams, 
parapraxes and symptomatic acts, subject to the same kinds of censorship of the
repressed. The material in the metaphors, despite, or maybe because of, its apparent indifference, is found to be memory traces of the patient’s history, containing the symbols that express the unconscious. Also, there is the joke-like quality in the ‘drawing and hearing of apt comparison’ (Ferenczi, 1915, p. 406), in that the same mechanism of jokes operates here too. In choosing metaphor, the concentration on establishing similarity between seemingly unrelated things, exactly the connection that has been severely censored, the complex thus released from the oppressive censor is the reason why metaphors can be amusing, the ‘pleasure of resemblance (similarity) would therefore have to be considered as analogous to the fore-pleasure set free by the technique of wit’ (ibid., p. 406). Furthermore, behind this pleasure is another one: pleasure in rediscovery, i.e., the joy in drawing a comparison when we rediscover the old or familiar impression in a seemingly novel one. Behind this, Ferenczi surmises, is that things that we have once introjected, or psychically assimilated, become narcissistically invested with libido. The re-discovery is actually an act of re-meeting the old love, or the loved introject.

In 1919, Ferenczi publishes Concerning the Psychogensis of Mechanism in Imago, presumably a review of Ernst Mach’s book16, Kultur und Mechanik, on invention of tools and machines in human culture, published in 1915. Ferenczi argues that introjection is at work in the history of the evolution of tools and machines invented by human beings. Also, human invention of tools and machines is an adaptation to reality and has libidinal (erotic) and egoistic origin. He distinguishes between two kinds of machines or tools. He sees that some basic prehistoric tools are

introjections of a part of the external world by means of which the sphere of influence of the ego is enlarged – thus the stick or hammer. (Ferenczi, 1919, p. 390)
He calls them introjection machines. On the other hand, there are also projection machines, in which “a part of the external world is ‘given a soul’ by human will and works instead of our hands” (ibid., p. 390). These two machines are not mutually exclusive. They only refer to two different developmental stages in human’s triumph over reality. The meaning of introjection in this paper is quite similar to the one in Ferenczi’s very first paper on it in 1909, as it is about the extension of the ego onto the outer world, ‘taking into the ego as large as possible a part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 47). However, here in this 1919 paper, Ferenczi also adds that ‘the sphere of influence of the ego is enlarged – thus the stick and hammer’ (p. 390, my italics), meaning that introjection can result in more control of the ego over the external world, as shown in human’s use of the stick and hammer, obviously real objects in the external world, to exert his influence there. In this sense, Introjection in 1919 extends to the real world, instead of mere subjective world as suggested in the previous papers on introjection.

In a piece of notes dated 30 September 1920, ‘On Affect Hysteria’, Ferenczi re-visits Introjection in his scribbling of thoughts for private use,

Exaggerated disgust is directed against everything that is in any way connected with genitality… Idiosyncrasies against certain kinds of food and drink. ‘Squandering of affect’ in the work of introjection. (Ferenczi, 1920a, p. 218)

This is a recapitulation of his 1909 paper on the characters of the neurotic, and here applied specifically in the case of hysteria, ‘he lavishes his affects on all possible objects that do not concern him.’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 50)

Paranoia, written in 1922, is the next occasion that Ferenczi writes about Introjection, again, in the context of projection, and of love,

What one loves becomes absorbed into one’s ego (introjection), for in the last resort one can love only oneself. When the transition to object-love takes place one introjects (subjectivizes) objective perception. What one does not love (the bad, the vicious, the recalcitrant) is rejected from the
conscious by one of the paths available (repression or projection).
(Ferenczi, 1922b, p. 212)

Here, ‘object-love’ refers to internal object-relation, as the introjection of
‘objective perception’ leads to subjectivation of the objects. Hence, in this sense, ‘in
the last resort one can love only oneself’ would be more meaningful in analyzing the
meaning of loving someone, or in the last resort, the object that one loves is actually
an internal object, or ‘the object of unconscious phantasies’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 47),
the outcome of the internal changes brought about by introjection. Therefore, one is
indeed loving himself, if internal objects are parts of one’s self. This way of looking
at introjection indeed is identical to what Ferenczi first writes about introjection in
1909.

Again, in paper of 1922, Freud’s ‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the
Ego’: Its contributions to the Psychology of the Individual, Ferenczi highlights the
new development in Freud’s psychoanalytic thinking of group psychology and its
application in the understanding of the individual’s psychology. Ferenczi attempts to
position Introjection in the new thinking about libidinal development, linking it to
the concept of identification. One of the applications is that it leads to the discovery
of a new stage of the development of the ego and the libido, the one that precedes
primary narcissism is a ‘higher ego-stage’ (Ferenczi, 1922a, p. 373) in which an
ego-ideal is cut off from the ego. The ego-ideal takes up the four important functions:
reality-testing, moral conscience, self-observation and dream-censorship. It is also
the force behind repression that could lead to neurosis. Parallel to this
goego-development is that of the libido, in that a new libidinous process, identification,
is discovered, situating between narcissism (narcissistic oral and sadistic-anal stages
of organization) and object-love,

In this phase external objects are not really incorporated, as in the
cannibalistic phase, but are ‘incorporated’ in an imaginary fashion, or, as we term it, introjected; that is to say, their qualities are annexed, attributed to the ego. The establishment of such an identification with an object (a person) is simultaneously the building of a bridge between the self and the outer world, and this connexion subsequently permits a shifting of emphasis from the intransitive ‘being’ to the transitive ‘having’, i.e. a further development from identification to real object-love. (ibid., p. 374)

Introjection has a nuanced enrichment in meaning or complexity here, in that it is not just about absorbing things, or extending one’s feeling into the outer world. Things in the outer world are not just eaten and swallowed (incorporated cannibalistically). Instead, the qualities of the external objects are taken over and assigned to the ego (introjected, or incorporated in an imaginary way), thus forming a connection between the self and the world. The differentiation between self and object is clearer and one is no longer simply loving one self (the object within the ego), but achieving true object-love, with the ‘having’ mode triumph over the ‘being’ mode. The self can recognize the object, as it were, as an independent being to love.

In *Psycho-Analysis of the Mental Disorders of General Paralysis of the Insane*, also published in 1922, Ferenczi writes about the melancholic’s abandoning of ego functions, such as diminished libido and potency, sleeplessness, self-criticism, and loss of appetite, that can be compared to projection and be seen as “the opposite process to the gradual ‘introjection of ideas’, i.e. to what, in the light of analysis, we take ego-development to consist of.” (1922c, p. 365). In other words, Ferenczi sees the losing of ego functions in melancholia as the reverse process of ego-development in which introjection plays a significant role in the building up of the ego. The developmental function of introjection in the construction of the ego is quite a new idea, as contrast to the 1909 version of rather piecemeal function of introjection in dealing with the external world.
Ferenczi’s masterpiece, *Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality*, written in 1923, but the idea of which starts incubation since 1915, dwells on an evolutionary and biological backdrop, and expands the interpretation of the symbols of phallus, vagina and coitus into cosmic ones, with reference to embryonic, physiological and psychological data. Ferenczi derives the idea that life is motivated by the force to return to the womb. He identifies birth with the phylogenetic migration of animal life from sea to land. He connects coitus with the notion of thalassal regression, i.e., human’s longing for the sea-life from which mankind evolves in the early evolution history. He compares sleep and coitus with each other after drawing upon their respective similarity to intrauterine life. In both sleep and coitus, the same regressive goal (regress to life inside womb) is achieved, but in different degree and by different methods. The sleeper achieves it by a recluse from reality and by fantasy, and hence it is auto-erotic. It is more like a child who enjoys the perfect life within the womb, completely narcissistically absorbed and indifferent to the external world. It uses the mechanism of projection. In coitus, however, both reality and fantasy play a part, especially for the real part. The individual must first secure a suitable object, and this requires a higher sense of reality than sleep. Coitus, in other words, uses the mechanism of introjection. Even so, the part that seeks gratification in a reality sense is only limited to the genitals. The rest of the body participates only as auxiliary organs and they do not suspend their own functions, e.g., respiration. Yet, once orgasm is attained, the illusion of blissfulness is similar to that of sleep. In this 1923 allusion to introjection, it is also portrayed as a contrast to projection, in Ferenczi’s attempt to explain coitus along the spectrum of projection vs. introjection, fantasy vs. reality.

Ferenczi tries to elaborate upon, in order to clarify, his then widely misunderstood therapeutic innovation of active techniques, in his 1925 paper,
Psychoanalysis of Sexual Habits. Within this paper, in Section V, The Metapsychology of Habits in General, Ferenczi surveys the ideas on the relationship between several terms: repetition-compulsion, habit, instinct, and voluntary action. Repetition-compulsion derives from life instincts and death-instincts, and it saves energy when contrast to traveling the new paths that is a fresh adaptation (less pleasurable). Id or the unconscious is the place where habit tendencies accumulate with much libido and instinct in store. On the other hand, when adaptation is required as when a new or disturbing stimulus appears, the ego is called into action. Freud’s then latest division of id, ego and superego, however, stimulates Ferenczi to further analyse the idea of habit formation (automatism). He argues against identifying habit with instinct. Instead, habit should be placed between voluntary action and instinct. Instinct is inherited but not acquired via long term habit.

In habit-formation outer stimuli are, so to speak, introjected and work from within outwards, either spontaneously or on minimal stimuli from the outer world. (Ferenczi, 1925a, p. 286)

Here, introjection means taking in stimuli from the external world first, and then work on the internalized objects from inside towards outside. This is similar to the earliest definitions of introjection, except that the work now has an ‘outward’ direction, i.e., it is also linked to the outer world, instead of being merely subjective. So, this part is similar to Ferenczi’s idea about introjection in 1919, as it extends into the external world.

Ferenczi revisits his earlier treatise about the problem of the sense of reality (Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality in 1913) in his 1926 paper, The Problem of Acceptance of Unpleasant Ideas – Advances in Knowledge of the Sense of Reality. He revises his ideas in light of Freud’s latest essay, On Negation published in Imago in 1925. Freud regards negation as a transition between accepting and ignoring reality. However, as far as the definition of introjection is
concerned, there is nothing new in this paper, as compared to the one in 1913. Ferenczi names the first stage of development the period of introjection, in which omnipotence and subjectivity rule, together with magic gestures and words. The second stage, in which the capacity for objectivity appears, is called the period of projection. It involves the complete abandonment of omnipotence and is the scientific stage in our dealing with the world. Nevertheless, Ferenczi adds one more stage here,

the last stage of development might be thought of as the stage in which both mechanisms are employed in equal measure or in mutual compensation. (Ferenczi, 1926, p. 373).

Ferenczi believes that, even at the scientific age,

if science is really to remain objective, it must work alternately as pure psychology and pure natural science, and must verify both our inner and outer experience by analogies taken from both points of view; this implies an oscillation between projection and introjection. I called this ‘utraquism’ of all true scientific work. (ibid., p. 373)

Ferenczi moves beyond the polarities of introjection vs. projection into the real objectivity of science: the need for both introjection and projection, specifically a perpetual movement between these two poles, in order for science to achieve its real target. In other words, in the scientific mind, one presumably exemplifies man’s most adaptive or maybe healthy relationship with reality, projection and introjection need each other and form a dyad for mapping the inner world, instead of mere contrast or antagonistic to each other. Here introjection, as compared to Ferenczi’s 1919 conception, is retreating a little back to the subjective. In 1919, Ferenczi believes that introjection can lead to more ego control over the external world, as noted in human’s use of the stick and hammer, obviously real objects in the external world, to exert his influence there. So, *Introjection* in 1919 extends to the real world, instead of mere subjective world as suggested in the previous papers on introjection.
In 1926, Ferenczi gives away, or return, some function of introjection to projection, as it were. In a way, Ferenczi is also swinging between two poles in his understanding of introjection, i.e., how much introjection has in so far as contact with reality is concerned.

Four years later, in a piece of notes written on 7 Sep 1930, Fantasies on a Biological Model of Super-ego Formation, Ferenczi cites two brief cases to illustrate the formation of super-ego. He only mentions introjection briefly: The first patient H has a remark about her obesity: that all her fat is her mother. If she feels less grappled by her inner introjected mother, she would notice her fat padding literally decrease and simultaneously she really loses weight. Here, introjection is about an introjected object, a rather controlling one that would end up with the formation of the super-ego, especially the harsh one. Ferenczi’s use of introjection here does not add much new to the existing discourse, except that he relates it to the formation of super-ego.

In his almost final allusion to Introjection, Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child: The Language of Tenderness and Passion written in 1932, later published in German in 1933 and English in 1949, Ferenczi returns not just to introjection, but also to the reality of child abuse and the analytic technique required, setting it in direct contrast to the prevailing Oedipal origin of disorder. The confusion of tongue is the adult’s forcing his sexual passion onto the child that makes the child mistake it as tenderness and yet unable to respond but to identify with the adult the aggressor. There is qualitative change as produced in the young child’s mind, namely, ‘the introjection of the guilt feelings of the adult’ (p. 162). So, here, in contemporary terms, introjection means the child ‘incorporates alien and attacking self-representations by containing the other’s shame and guilt as his own’ (Lénárd & Tényi, 2003, p. 27). The child is unable to differentiate his own shame
and guilt from those of the alien aggressor. Furthermore, *Introjection* in this paper follows the theme of Ferenczi’s notes in 1930 with respect to the formation of the super-ego as the child takes up the ‘conscience’ of the aggressor too.

The final allusion to *Introjection* is in his *Clinical Diary* where Ferenczi, echoing his *Confusion of Tongues* paper, imagines the traumatized child to be totally unaware and off guard, just like a fearful and innocent animal, as the child cannot predict or understand the trauma. The trauma reduces the child ‘almost to the level of a timid animal of low intelligence’ (Ferenczi, 1932, pp. 45-46). As the child’s compensatory effort to regain strength, ‘[t]he weak and undeveloped personality reacts to sudden unpleasure not by defense, but by anxiety ridden identification and by introjection of the menacing person or aggressor’ (ibid., p. 163). In the analytic situation, the analyst, readily a significant object who can easily evoke the patient’s identification with the aggressor in the patient’s attempt to disavow his helplessness, but at the same time, leading to a repetition of the trauma and even the annihilation of the self, as Ferenczi writes,

The person splits into a psychic being of pure knowledge that observes the events from the outside, and a totally insensitive body. Insofar as this psychic being is still accessible to emotions, it turns its interests toward the only feeling left over from the process, that is, the feelings of the attacker. It is as though the psyche, whose sole function is to reduce emotional tensions and to avoid pain, at the moment of the death of his own person automatically diverts its pain-relieving functions toward the pains, tensions and passions of the attacker, the only person with feelings, that is, and identifies itself with these. (ibid., p. 104)

Hence in the identification with the aggressor, the self disappears in the experienced deadness, and most paradoxically, in the analytic scenario, the patient lives through the analyst as a defensive or survival measure, which is necessarily one of masochistic. In this sense, the identification with the aggressor is not about ‘taking in’ of the aggressor, but positioning him so that the self can live in his
shadow, as it were, and to feel his feeling. Such identification prevents the subject from disintegrating and serves as a defense against the shame of helplessness.

Ferenczi writes,

I do not feel the pain inflicted upon me at all because I do not exist. On the other hand, I do feel the pleasure-gratification of the attacker, which I am still able to perceive. (1932, p. 104)

From the 16 papers that Ferenczi writes from 1909 to 1933 on *Introjection*, we see that Ferenczi sets the basic definition of introjection, as a contrast to projection, as the taking into the ego a part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies. Apparently he does not have a mega-plan at the beginning as to how and whether his new concept is to develop, change or be finalized. Retrospectively, looking at his papers, it seems that he revises or adds new meaning to this term as time goes by, or as he accumulates certain introjective experience with Freud (and of course, with anyone in his life, possibly). Such implicit development would not result in a coherent use or definition of a term. His use of terminology is also not as strict as desired. The definition and use of introjection in this thesis, however, has to follow Ferenczi’s, and to be properly referenced to his various papers, because it is his concept. After 1909, Ferenczi also conceives introjection as an extension of the ego, as part of the mechanism of self-love, which later evolves to that of object-love, as a pure subjective mechanism to one that is moving out to the reality, and as an inseparable mechanism that exists side-by-side with projection that constitutes a more mature form of reality contact, and as the formation of superego and the pathological development as a result of introjection of the aggressor’s guilt in child abuse. The term *Introjection* goes through small changes and is enriched in meaning. As Haynal (1997) has observed, Ferenczi’s scientific creativity and spontaneity is only ‘the elaboration of a handful of
fundamental themes’ (p. 444). Apparently, this may also be compatible with Ferenczi’s own development in psychoanalysis, especially his relationship with Freud that this thesis is going to find out. He seems to be using his earliest definition as a base while covering diverse topics as related to introjection. It is as if Ferenczi himself were a living exemplar of introjection, or this term is indeed invented for and, of course, by himself (Figlio, 2013). In other words, Ferenczi seems to reach ‘the level at which the individual dissolves into ideas’ (Figlio, 2007, p. 29), and yet he also tries to write up his experience concurrently or afterwards. This is also something that this thesis is aiming to verify.

Ferenczi’s concept of introjection, moreover, can be compared with other similar or related terms so as to clarify its meaning. Freud first used the term Introjection only some six years later in his paper on Instincts and their Vicissitudes, when he described the need of the ego for the external world under the power of the pleasure principle, but still in the contrast with the mechanism of projection,

In so far as the objects which are presented to it are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, ‘introjects’ them (to use Ferenczi’s [1909] term); and, on the other hand, it expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure, … the mechanism of projection. (Freud, 1915, p. 136)

Later, in 1917, in Mourning and Melancholia, Freud did not use the term introjection, but identification instead, in his exposition of the reaction of the ego in the loss of a beloved object, as the libido is ‘withdrawn into the ego’, instead of being ‘displaced onto another object’ (Freud, 1917, p. 249), and hence establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object (ibid., p. 249).

Although using different terms, Freud’s line of reasoning is similar to that of Ferenczi’s, i.e., ‘an external object would become an object inside the ego’ (Hinshelwood, 2005, p. 155), a ‘very odd process’ (ibid., p. 155). Freud (1923) extends the concept of Introjection to the structural model. After the parents are forfeited as Oedipal objects, the child introjects them
as an independent internal object, or the superego. Karl Abraham has similar observations as he explained the oral cannibalism in mourning, and yet he credited the term introjection to Freud, instead of to Ferenczi,

At about the same time Freud approached the problem of melancholia from another angle, and he made the first real step towards the discovery of the mechanism of that illness. He showed that the patient, after having lost his love-object, regains it once more by a process of introjection (so that, for instance, the self-reproaches of a melancholiac are really directed towards his lost object). Subsequent experience has confirmed in my mind the importance of both processes – the regression of the libido to the oral stage and the mechanism of introjection. And more than that, it has shown that there is an intimate connection between the two…the introjection of the love-object is an incorporation of it, in keeping with the regression of the libido to the cannibalistic level. (Abraham, 1924, pp. 419-420)

Abraham points out that it is very frequent or simply a normal process of introjection of loved object, or as Hinshelwood (1991) puts it, ‘People carry their loved ones in their heart and continue an internal dialogue with them’ (p. 332).

After Ferenczi’s death in 1933, the term Introjection undergoes another path of evolution, with both near-extinction and revival, the coverage of which would require another very lengthy treatment. Briefly, a ‘most influential definition’ (Krause, 2010; p. 139), has been offered by Kernberg (1966),

Introjection is the earliest, most primitive and basic level in the organization of internalization processes. It is the reproduction and fixation of an interaction with the environment by means of an organized cluster of memory traces implying at least three components: (i) the image of an object, (ii) the image of the self in interaction with that object, (iii) the affective colouring of both the object-image and the self-image under the influence of the drive representative present at the time of the interaction. This process is a mechanism of growth of the psychic apparatus and it is also used for defensive purposes of the ego. Introjection, then, depends on perception and memory (that is, on apparatuses of primary autonomy), but it transcends these not only by a complex and specific organization of perceptions and memory traces but also by linking ‘external’ perception with the perception of primitive affect states representative drive derivatives. (p. 240)

Kernberg manages to clarify and organize the various facets of introjection in his definition, notably introjection as the most basic ordering of the internalization processes. Interaction with the environment is indispensable, rendering structuring implications in object-image, self-image and the affective tone of the interaction as influenced by the drive representative. Both developmental and defensive functions of introjection are included.
In the next Chapter, I will review the literature on the Ferenczi-Freud and Ferenczi-Groddeck relationship, in order to find a point of departure of my thesis, as I will argue for a need for a study on the crossover of Ferenczi’s idea and life. Specifically, the literature review will point to a justification for a study to verify the hypothesis that Ferenczi lives his idea of *Introjection* from his relationship with Freud, and putting it into words in his papers.
Chapter 4

Literature Review

With Ferenczi’s character portrayed as essentially introjective and the historical anchorage of Ferenczi’s 16 papers written on *Introjection* in the last two chapters respectively, this Chapter is to review the past studies on Ferenczi’s relationships with Freud and with Groddeck. I aim at finding out what the literature have informed us so far, and, more importantly, discovering some possibly missing parts, perspectives, or neglected methodology. Together with a Chapter on Psychobiography and another one on Methodology, it will lead to justifications and a point of departure for the current study. Presumably, this thesis is adding a new perspective to the existing ones, with respect to the mapping of Ferenczi’s experience in the Ferenczi-Freud relationship with his writings on *Introjection*. In other words, it is about how Ferenczi uses the relationship unconsciously in the gestation of *Introjection*, as to be narrated in this study in a longitudinal way.

In the case with Freud, past studies agree that the relationship is significant, historically and psychoanalytically. They focus on the reasons why they were attracted to each other, how they relate and what their relational difficulties are. Some even provide a psychoanalytic understanding of the relationship. Inevitably, the analytic parts have implications for the methodology of my current study. Most studies polarize the situation by assigning Freud and Ferenczi rather opposite roles, e.g. doctor vs. patient, father vs. son, fearful vs. courageous, distancing vs. pursuing, etc. Although such themes, each running on their own, could give us a telling, if not simplified, story about the relationship, they possibly share the risk of missing out the relationship in its entirety. They also ignore the possibility of how Ferenczi creates his psychoanalytic ideas by living them first, inadvertently or unconsciously,
in this relationship before, during and after he writes them in papers. Such neglect would have implications in attributing Ferenczi’s theoretical disagreement with Freud to mere character deficit, instead of discovering what dynamics (e.g. introjection) is working underneath the relationship and then gets transformed into words in papers. This study would attempt to fill in this possible gap in the literature by resorting to the longitudinal and micro approach in visualizing the relationship.

Freud is attracted to Ferenczi by his ‘childlike vitality, his internal struggles and unfiltered creativity’ (Lum, 1988, p. 333). Forrester (1997), along similar lines of Ferenczi’s childlike character, however, claims that Ferenczi is immature or even too immature to become an analyst. Similarly, Bacon & Gedo (1993) diagnose that Ferenczi suffers from a real severe character pathology that would interfere with a psychoanalytic candidate’s completion of training, with respect to contemporary North American training standards. Yet, it might partly be such ‘immaturity’ that Freud found appealing initially. One would even note a young Freud in Ferenczi. Simon (1992) argues that Ferenczi evokes Freud’s disavowed “wildness” that had been so much a part of his earliest phases of psychoanalytic discovery, an aspect of Freud that was tied up with his own creativity, but also regarded by Freud with deep suspicion (p. 978).

Freud’s youthful passion for unorthodox thought and introspective monitoring of his own inner world, notably his dreams in The Interpretation of Dreams, is very obvious from any biography of him. His relationship with Fliess, in which he has the sounding board for his own creativity, or even free associative thought, is recorded in their correspondence (Freud & Fliess, 1887-1904). If Freud simply sees his younger self in the younger Ferenczi, his attraction to him might be a matter of a journey, maybe a reluctant one, back to his past or his hidden self, which would not be something without ambivalence. The Freud-Ferenczi dyad, however, would have
something that both want and deny if both party have his own agenda to work on through this relationship, if there is something in the other party that echoes with one’s own past or self. Ferenczi strives for ‘an unconstrained psychoanalytic intimacy’ (Hinshelwood, 2012, p. 136). Ferenczi’s living as psychoanalysis and writing as living mode would mean that he may need such a relationship for experiencing those things first and then he is going to write about them, which is what this thesis, as distinct from previous studies, is going to show.

On the other hand, the way Ferenczi relates to Freud is also intermingled with how Freud feels about Ferenczi. Hoffer (2003) observes that the relationship is ‘intimate and often stormy’ (p. 1937). Yet, while Wolstein (1989) finds that Ferenczi is close to Freud as friend and colleague, but not too close as to suffocate Ferenczi’s creativity in psychoanalytic technique, Wolstein believes that Ferenczi could still have his own independent space. This suggests that Ferenczi is not so much gestating his ideas simply from relating to Freud, but at the same time he needs some distance from Freud in order to be that creative. Nevertheless, the psychoanalytic ideas that Ferenczi successively churns out, evidently widening to become a spectrum, range from initial extreme endorsement of Freud’s thought, such as the active technique, to the other pole of relaxation and indulgence. Such a shift, in Wolstein’s sense, means that Ferenczi can still be creative despite his closeness with Freud. Yet, from Freud’s end, Breger (2000) argues that he twists Ferenczi’s desire for intimacy into competitive motivation, and so, he has to defend against or even defeat Ferenczi. This line of thought is along the one of Oedipal struggle between fathers and sons, from the father’s perspective, or that of mis-matched pre-oedipal wish for merging and intimacy, from the son’s perspective. Hidas (1993), with the father-and-son metaphor, describes Freud as guiding, but not
staying with Ferenczi in one’s pilgrimage, that Freud is

a “pilgrim father” who outlined the maps of formerly untraveled domains of the psyche. Guide-mapped, but not accompanied, Ferenczi made his own quest of the mind. Perhaps he went too far; perhaps he stepped past the point of no return. All we know is that the most beloved pilgrim son is missing in action. (p. 214)

Blum (2004), however, depicts a Ferenczi who has a less stable image. Accordingly, Ferenczi is ‘sometimes wise, sometimes a lost child, a loyal disciple and a challenging rebel’ (p. 3). Ferenczi’s instability renders him very uniquely both mature and immature, creative yet dependent. On the other hand, from the perspective of Ferenczi’s understanding of the analytic process leading to analytic cure, i.e., character change, such ‘instability’ is the fluidity that is required, instead of the cure aiming mere at symptom renunciation. Ferenczi (1927) stated that the character must

become fluid again, so that out of temporary chaos a new, better-adapted personality may arise under more favourable conditions. In other words, theoretically no symptom analysis can be regarded as ended unless it is a complete character analysis into the bargain. (p. 248)

Furthermore, Ferenczi is ‘a very precocious pupil of Freud who could readily exchange novel ideas with his mentor while depending emotionally on and entreating recognition from his master.’ (Blum, 2004, p. 3) Blum goes further in hypothesizing that, Ferenczi was unconsciously very submissive to Freud, and yet, near the end of their relationship, in his final paper in 1933, Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child, Ferenczi demonstrates an infantile rebellion. In Blum’s version, Ferenczi is never fully adult, but he always struggles with respect to dependence and creativity. He needs Freud both to depend on and to rebel against. Either way, he is not yet independent on his own. However, Ferenczi is not the only ‘immature’ guy amongst those around Freud. In the Secret Committee formed on 25 May 1913, as a move to consolidate a group of loyal followers (Jones, Ferenczi,
Eitingon, Sachs, Rank and Abraham) in defense against Jung’s imminent defection from the Psychoanalytic Movement, and to guard against further hostility to the Cause, Freud is essentially making an ‘artificial family’ (Grosskurth, 1998, p. 94) of adult men who are expected to submit to Freud’s authority, and hence keeping them in ‘a state of permanent immaturity’ (ibid., p. 94). If experiencing without words is seen as more immature than one with words, Ferenczi’s experiencing his relationship with Freud is indeed a necessary stage for Ferenczi to finally being able to put them into words in his papers.

Within a similar paradigm of an ambivalently attached relationship, Ludmer (1998) sees Ferenczi’s relationship with Freud as simply one between the patient and analyst. The patient is afraid of the analyst’s power and he tries, at all cost, to please his analyst, consciously and unconsciously, in order to maintain a relationship that is characterized by fantasy of tenderness instead of sexual fantasy. The patient plays the mother of the analyst, just as a child would do to his own mother. However, the analyst’s detachment, all-knowingness and almightiness – or professional hypocrisy, in Ferenczi’s terms – only intensifies the patient’s burden. The patient then, in order to keep the tenderness fantasy alive, has to split off his hate for his analyst, as well as his own submissiveness towards his analyst. As a pupil, in order to stop a further oblivion of his true self, Ferenczi has to emancipate himself from his adoration, love and hate of Freud. This is reflected, if not crystallized, in his later writings that mark a further, or final, rift between Freud and Ferenczi. Ferenczi revives the trauma etiology of hysteria, adding new techniques, that deviates from Freud’s established Oedipal theory and art of psychoanalysis. The Adult (Freud) and the Child (Ferenczi) not just speak different languages, but it is exactly this difference that constitutes the trauma for the child. Ferenczi, in maintaining his nature, i.e., as a child with
tenderness and asexuality, can only break or detach himself from Freud the adult, in order to preserve his inner nature. Ludmer believes that Ferenczi’s theory cannot be separated from his own psyche. What Ludmer does not go further into, however, is how Ferenczi’s ideas and writings reflect, or follow from, his evolving relationship with his analyst, Freud.

What, on Freud’s side, does the relationship look like? As in any relationship that is usually one of mutuality and interaction, Freud cannot be a neutral party. Right at the beginning, he is trying to set the scene. Haynal (2004) notes that,

at the very beginning of their relationship, Freud writes to him as if addressing himself to a child: ‘it is understood at the outset that you will not disturb me in my work …’ (Freud to Ferenczi, 10 May 1908). You can feel here a wind of some possible later conflicts. This is not only a strange authoritarian gesture, but we can also hear in it an intuitive admonition: ‘you shouldn’t disturb psychoanalysis’ – and Ferenczi will disturb it indeed, to our great profit. (p. 15-16)

Haynal’s reading of Freud’s declaration ‘at the outset’ might be reading too much of Ferenczi’s later ‘disturbance’ to psychoanalysis backward into the stern reminder that Freud has for Ferenczi. Yet, it is clear that, right from the beginning, Freud is apprehensive of this wild child who may, inadvertently interfere with his work to a significant degree. His reprimand of Ferenczi in advance, though too authoritarian, reflects his accurate perception of Ferenczi’s possible ‘naughtiness’. However, the more Freud has to state this so clearly and firmly at the beginning, guarding against Ferenczi, the more likely that he is indeed feeling Ferenczi’s potential threat to, and even destruction of, the psychoanalytic world, or of Freud’s psychoanalytic world.

Dupont (1988), the literary executor of Ferenczi’s Estate and editor of his Clinical Diary, depicts something about what it could possibly be, when it comes to Ferenczi’s disturbance to psychoanalysis. She believes that Ferenczi’s message of
authenticity and the analyst’s need to look inward to examine his own feeling and counter-transference for a solution to a difficult therapeutic impasse, instead of the usual blaming of the patient, is indeed a threat to Freud, and to the whole analytic community. Ferenczi’s commitment to healing at the expense of anything, including his own emotional vulnerability, poses a challenge for Freud and his followers to overcome their usual defence. Ferenczi’s craving for absolute openness, however, is motivated by his immense need to be loved. Ferenczi believes, maybe naively or un-psychoanalytically, that the best way to be loved is simply to reveal oneself (Dupont, 2002). Ferenczi’s craving for examination of counter-transference manifested as a threat to the psychoanalytic community, as what Dupont sees, can also be seen as Ferenczi’s own introjection at work, as Ferenczi (1909) sees introjection as giving out of feelings, in order to maintain affective connection with objects, which is apparently a form of transference. Counter-transference, as a kind of transference, is also a manifestation of introjection. Hence, Freud’s perceived ‘disturbance’ from Ferenczi is indeed a problem of introjection that Freud has to work on, inevitably with Ferenczi. Haynal and Dupont’s exposition, therefore, is further extended by this thesis that is aiming at unraveling introjection as lived in, and written out of, the Freud-Ferenczi relationship, as well as that of Ferenczi and Groddeck as tackled in Chan (2014a).

Along similar vein, Gerber (2010), who finds reading Ferenczi ‘a powerful experience’ (p. 153) and believes that Ferenczi ‘is someone who speaks from his heart as well as from his mind, and has such great courage’ (p. 153), argues that

[Ferenczi’s] own independence and original thinking were impeded by the nature of his relationship with Freud, by his need for more of the relationship, and by Freud’s fear or unwillingness to give more.’ (ibid., p. 154).

Without blaming either of them, Tabin (1995) advocates that, as difficulty is
common in any intimate relationship, the focus should instead be on each of their
contribution to the posterity,

Neither man was a saint or a villain. Both struggled with tremendous
pressures from outside and from inside. We, who are also all too human,
can only be grateful on our own behalf that both of them persevered in
sharing so generously of their gifts, each uniquely meaningful still today.
(p. 314)

While Gerber arrives at Freud’s reluctance to give more of himself in the
relationship and Tabin seemed impartial in his verdict, they do not go into the
introjective dynamics behind that explains the relationship and finds its way into
Ferenczi’s writings. This thesis will provide this missing but important piece.

Some previous attempts to understand this relationship also turn to
psychoanalysis itself, linking the evolution of the relationship to that of Ferenczi’s
psychoanalytic practice. Kahn (1997) argues that Ferenczi firmly and clearly stands
on the side of the patient, but Freud on the side of the authority. Its ramification
shows itself in Ferenczi’s own clinical work with patients. He attempts to avoid or
reverse this ‘undesirable’ scenario. He refuses to position himself as the doctor, or
the authoritarian doctor, when relating to his patients. Instead, he is almost a patient
himself when treating his patients. Ferenczi’s experiments with mutual analysis may
have been partially influenced by his personal difficulties with Freud as he never
gets the mutuality that he desires from Freud and the relationship is a
re-traumatization for Ferenczi, who has a harsh mother. However, even so, Ferenczi
makes creative use of this trauma from Freud towards reparative and clinical use for
his patients. Kahn believes that Freud refuses to examine his own flaws: of ignoring
his tendency to side with authoritarian figures against the vulnerable persons (e.g.
Freud vs. Dora, Fliess vs. Eckstein, Jung vs. Spielrein; the analytic community vs.
Ferenczi), of refusing to undergo personal analysis. Kahn observes that Freud could
not tolerate the vulnerability of being the analysand, even though both Ferenczi and Groddeck have successively offered to analyze him, after his cancer was diagnosed in early 1920s. Kahn argues that Ferenczi was more courageous and better analyzed than Freud. So, Ferenczi is less defensive in his clinical work, or even in his relationship with Freud, although by so doing, he remains the more vulnerable one. However, such audacity and vulnerability, seemingly left unchecked, develops into the dis-inhibited version of the mutual analysis techniques.

Kahn goes further by postulating that Freud is ambivalent towards his mother since he was psychologically abandoned by her during his early years when she grieved over the death of a younger son. Freud defends himself by being intolerant of emotional dependency and neediness, which is obviously what Ferenczi is presenting to him. Kahn even surmises that the motives behind Freud’s insistence on Oedipal theory is simply the result of such ambivalence, by twisting the infantile sexuality into something to be repressed. Whereas, for Ferenczi, who does not have such ambivalence, could wholeheartedly embrace, advocate, or even idealize the child. Nevertheless, Kahn’s own discourse may itself be idealizing the child too, as Ferenczi not just idealizes the child, but also stays as a child throughout, and yet, to stay as a child, he actually needs an adult who is Freud. Freud’s role is necessary for Ferenczi’s initial evolution of ideas until Ferenczi needs something else as he moves on, or gets a little more mature, as it were. The question is how Freud’s adult role, as interactive with Ferenczi’s child role, work in Ferenczi’s experiencing of Introjection and later write it up as papers. This will be the objective and work of this thesis.

Nemes (1988) notes a significant event in 1919, that Gizella’s husband died on the day of Ferenczi’s marriage to Gizella and this triggered or even fulfilled
Ferenczi’s oedipal fantasy, marrying a ‘mother’, 10 years older, having the ‘father’ removed on the same day. Ferenczi’s subsequent removal from professorship in the University further aggravated this regression. This regression, according to Nemes, had much to do with Ferenczi’s relationship with Freud, since Ferenczi unconsciously demanded Freud (father) to be an indulgent mother. Actually such indulgence was practiced by Gizella who, before their marriage, allowed Ferenczi to date or even marry her daughter, Elma. Nemes argues that Freud’s lack of response to such demand for maternal indulgence by refusing the mutuality and absolute honesty that Ferenczi demanded, did not make Freud a tyrant. It was simply Freud’s adherence to the paternal stance instead. Ferenczi’s regression and Oedipal struggle, or even pathology, if lurking behind his choice of Gizella and later inclusion of the innocent Elma, was also something behind the development of his psychoanalytic thoughts. Given that Freud and Ferenczi establish a close yet difficult relationship, with or without pathology on either end, it seems inevitable that Ferenczi’s thoughts developed out of this relationship.

However, Haynal’s (1993a) position regarding the Freud-Ferenczi relationship is worth noting in that it is a reminder of not to polarize these two protagonists in order not to obscure their relationship and its contribution,

It has become commonplace to state that the relationship between Freud and Ferenczi was a difficult one. There has been a tendency to make a complete split between Freud’s and Ferenczi’s positions, to identify with one and declare the other wrong, dangerous or even mad. How far from the truth the proposition of such a division is can be seen from the fact that the two protagonists themselves never took up such clearly defined contradictory positions as are often attributed to them. As is well known, there were conflicts between Freud and Ferenczi that were deep rooted and tragic. It is fruitful, though, not to try to reconcile their attitudes prematurely, for to do so would not do justice to the controversial character of the dialogue. (p. 54)

Similarly, Vida and Molad (2004) note the myth perpetuated in history by
placing Freud at the centre, around whom any difference is seen as rebellion. Even so, Hoffer (2003) concludes that Ferenczi ‘remained a dissident, not a defector’ (p. 1937). Furthermore, Bergmann (1993) sees Ferenczi as a ‘modifier’ who ‘recast psychoanalytic theory or modified psychoanalytic practice’ and who stirred up controversy in psychoanalysis but ‘keep it alive and protect it from stagnation’, as contrast to Adler, Stekel, Jung, Rank and Reich, who are ‘heretics’ and ‘made important contributions, and then bolted to start their own school’ (p. 930). Still, Vida and Molad (2004) refuse to dichotomize Freud and Ferenczi. They acknowledge Freud’s difficult legacy to psychoanalysis, which has to do with difference mistaken for rebellion and contaminated error, and treated by aggressive fearful rejection, instead of being taken as part of a safer dialogue, leading to a complementarity and further development.’ (p. 339).

In light of these, the current study, supplementing the missing parts, aiming at a detailed study of the evolution of their relationship, tracking longitudinally on key events, in order to situate Ferenczi’s living *Introjection* within this relationship, appears in order. This study will expand, as it were, upon the narratives of this relationship in the literature by resorting to the chronological and psychobiographical approach, so as to map out the intricate and neglected threads between life and theory, or theory as translated or distilled from life lived, which is what might have been neglected in the complicated matrix of controversy and diverse opinions.

Turning now to the literature on the Ferenczi-Groddeck relationship, I have found that the literature is far less than in the case of the Freud-Ferenczi relationship. The studies are usually about the influence of Groddeck on Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic thinking in general. *Introjection* is not their focus. As then attested by the just published Ferenczi-Groddeck correspondence (French version), their
relationship is well-known to have been close (Bacciagaluppi, 1993). Since my thesis aims to map Ferenczi’s relational dynamics with his contributions to psychoanalytic theory (*Introjection*), this literature is nonetheless valuable.

Early works, such as Grotjahn (1966), mentions that Ferenczi was one of the fans of Groddeck in the 6th Congress of the International Psychoanalytical Association in Hague in 1920, with Ferenczi as the President, in which Groddeck was invited to give a paper. Instead of reading a prepared paper, Groddeck, positioning himself as the ‘wild analyst’, simply free-associated. This shocked most of the analysts, except Ferenczi, Rank, Horney, Simmel and Freud himself. Grotjahn, however, is the first to document that Groddeck wrote to Ferenczi’s widow to explain why he could not try to save Ferenczi in his last days from being the ‘atomizer of the soul’ (p. 318). As Ferenczi had gone his own way far too distant from Groddeck, Groddeck could not and would not join him because he had gone to ‘a flight to the stars’ (p.318), indicating that their relationship, once intimate, ended up in Groddeck being left behind after Ferenczi went alone on his way. On the other hand, it would be interesting to speculate, after such a long and close relationship, what in Ferenczi is Groddeckian that Ferenczi has taken, or introjected, when he started his journey ‘to the stars’, and whether and how Ferenczi has written these things about introjection as he moved on with, and eventually, without, Groddeck. These are also significant for a psychobiographical study of Ferenczi’s introjection. Yet it will not be covered in my thesis because I focus on the Ferenczi-Freud relationship. It will be taken up by Chan (2014a).

Fortune (2002a), the editor of the Ferenczi-Groddeck correspondence and a forerunner on the re-construction of Ferenczi (especially for his work on the relationship between Severn and Ferenczi), argues that, compared to Freud as a
father figure, Ferenczi seeks in Groddeck a ‘more open friendship’ (p. vii) as if Groddeck were an ‘older favorite brother’ (p. vii). Their relationship is an ‘intimate friendship between two passionate and original thinkers’ (p. ix). They go together in an adventure into ideas, such as self-analysis, mutual analysis, body-mind relationship, and struggle with the problem of whether psychoanalysis is or should be a science. Fortune believes that such issues still have contemporary significance.

Fortune (2002b) specifically argues that Groddeck was a critical figure in Ferenczi’s course of development in psychoanalysis after 1921, in which he almost became a Freud-surrogate, or even a better Freud. Groddeck influenced Ferenczi’s recognition of the importance of the mother that later evolved into object relations theory. Groddeck also advocated the primacy of the experience of the child and the significance of early trauma, as well as the unity of body and mind. Without Groddeck, Ferenczi did not have the audacity to challenge Freud and reconstruct the landscape of psychoanalysis. Groddeck’s strong maternal aspect, personal and theoretical, was exactly what Ferenczi wanted from Freud the man. Ferenczi went one step further than Groddeck. He defined the child as a kind of mini-god. The child’s innocence and purity, with respect to the absence of guilt, was what Ferenczi believed where psychotherapy should look forward to. Apparently, Ferenczi was ‘using’ Groddeck’s maternal stance to move forward his psychoanalytic ideas, as a kind of gestation or incubation.

Lum (1988) also argues along similar lines, that in Ferenczi’s later papers on *Problems of termination of the analysis* and *Principle of relaxation and neocatharsis*, Ferenczi had much of Groddeck’s essence,

The child became, for Ferenczi, a tabula rosa. Ferenczi was influenced in this view of the child’s pristine innocence by the work of Georg Groddeck. In his later papers (1927, 1930), he repeatedly endorsed Groddeck’s perception of the neuroses as a malignant process interfering with the
patient’s original innocence, an innocence which should be recovered in treatment. (p. 337)

Similarly, Will (1994) writes that Ferenczi and Groddeck shared much in similarity and that the close friendship was not ‘merely a matter of personal sympathy’ (p.720) but that their association served to widen the gulf between each of them and Freud who maintained a paternalistic and authoritarian position. They had mutual encouragement and the same conviction about therapeutic technique, viz., promoting relaxation and freedom and creating maternal space and eventually even a mutual analysis. Seemingly, this argument is similar to Fortune’s on the use of Groddeck as a pivotal point to further his drifting from Freud, and yet the relationship is also mutually enhancing and psychoanalytically productive. Yet, Will does not go into details about how Ferenczi’s ideas develop in concurrence with, or as informed by, his relationship with Groddeck.

Biancoli (1997), notes that Ferenczi was one of the many friends (e.g. Fromm and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann) of Groddeck who did not belong to the majority of psychoanalysts, and who learnt much from his creative and independent thought and love of truth, as well as his unconventional and provocative declaration against science. Groddeck’s endorsement of romanticism and irrationalism had obvious similarity with that of Ferenczi. Groddeck’s echoing with Ferenczi might be indicative of how he could elicit from Ferenczi his differences from Freud, and how, with such a stimulating relationship, Ferenczi could further living and writing his idea of introjection (Chan, 2014a).

Poster (2009) offers a less asymmetrical view of Ferenczi and Groddeck. He includes Rank and coins the three as pioneers in the 1920s in their creation of a ‘paradigm shift’ (p.195) in psychoanalysis regarding their respective publications, *Book of the It* (Groddeck, 1923), *The Development of Psychoanalysis* (Ferenczi and
Rank, 1924), and *Thalassa* (Ferenczi, 1923). He argues that they stimulated the thinking of one another and were the forerunners of the later development in object relations, self psychology, interpersonal and relational psychoanalysis. Still, like Fortune, Poster believes that it was Groddeck who supported Ferenczi to carry out the clinical experiments and innovations. What Poster has not done, however, is a mapping out of how such stimulation occurs, or more importantly, how it is experienced by Ferenczi, in the relationship, and how Ferenczi would write about such stimulation in his psychoanalytic papers.

Dupont (2002) surmises the reasons for their affinity to each other. She notes that both of their character is not ordinary or regular ones, and their fate shares some similarity. Both of them feel unloved in their childhood. In positioning himself with respect to the psychoanalytic movement, Groddeck publicizes his feeling of being marginalized by proclaiming himself as a wild analyst. Similarly, Ferenczi, with his increasing alienation from the psychoanalytic community because of his unorthodox techniques, finds himself marginalized too. Furthermore, both of them are physicians with the mission and compassion to cure and to care. With a common end, however, they do not share identical means. Groddeck does not believe in the necessity of understanding in the process of cure. He does not even really believe in language itself, ‘Language is such a pathetic means of getting to know others’ (Groddeck, 1916, p. 3). In first trying to describe the unconscious force that he discovered within each person, ‘a force so mysterious that Groddeck refused to give it a name, instead merely calling it “the It” (das Es)” (Harrington, 2008, p. 82), Groddeck’s paradoxical, mystical, or counter-scientific, style, as it were, probably has impact on Ferenczi’s thought and process of creativity. Of course, it is Ferenczi who, after experiencing all such ‘impact’ with or from Groddeck, would be faced
with the ‘call’ to turn them into language, and to write them into his papers, so that those outside the dyad, i.e., whoever becomes readers of these papers, would be able to have some understanding of what it is that has occurred between them and within Ferenczi. *Introjection* will be one of these ideas to be studied in Chan (2014a).

Ferenczi always tries to seek out for more insight and understanding, especially the understanding about why techniques do not work. Nevertheless, both Ferenczi and Groddeck do not subscribe to the rigid dichotomy of doctor versus patient since both agree that through healing others, one is also cured too. This is the reason why they can practise mutual analysis with each other so naturally, as this dyad can easily exchange their roles of doctor and patient, starting with Ferenczi as the patient first. Their mutual similarity and affinity, notably their fluid conception of the doctor and the patient, together with Groddeck’s influence upon Ferenczi, are consistent with a hypothesis of Ferenczi living and writing *Introjection* in his relationship with Groddeck.

From the review, it is noted that taken together all these perspectives, we might have a multi-faceted picture of Ferenczi’s relationship with these two men. However, what is missing is the relationship in a longer span, especially from a longitudinal perspective that captures crucial historical periods and events in their relationship, which is important for mapping out how Ferenczi experiences and writes about *Introjection*. Also, with the exception of Tabin (1995) who advises researchers to view Freud and Ferenczi as simply no saints, the studies that I have reviewed usually polarize Freud and Ferenczi, implying one is right and the other is wrong (e.g. Forrester, 1997; Blum 2004), one is more flexible and the other more rigid (Wolstein, 1989), or one is more fearful and the other more courageous (Dupont, 1988), or, in the case with Groddeck, one is inspiring and the other is inspired.
What is needed is a study of the dynamics of these relationships, within which introjection crystalizes and is articulated and gets written. This thesis will focus on the Ferenczi-Freud relationship, with the emergence of Groddeck in the context of Ferenczi drifting from Freud. Because of the space limitation of a thesis, the part on Ferenczi and Groddeck will be dealt with elsewhere (Chan, 2014a). This thesis will also show how Ferenczi, in relating to Freud, lives and gestates his idea.

The ‘making-of’ a theory or idea cannot be completely detached from the creator’s life, although the process may not be a very conscious or deliberate one. Malibu (1998), however, sees this connection as an asset rather than a problem.

Theoretical systems in psychology cannot escape the elements of a founder’s own personal psychology. In this sense, every theory is a personal confession. It reflects a subjective bias, even in the very questions it selects to ask and how it sets out to answer them. If acknowledged openly and taken seriously into account, this personal bias may prove to be a scientific asset rather than a liability. (p. 168).

Falzeder (1997) observes that Ferenczi ‘had been able to create theoretical insights out of personal suffering, concepts that have been influencing psychoanalysis up to the present day’ (p. 425). Bókay (1998) is more explicit about how lives generate theories, as the latter are not abstract systems but possible life-practices and modes of self-creation. The process of self-creation is inherently personal, and significant psychoanalytic trends have always crystallized around an outstanding personality whose example was emulated by disciples and patients, who then established their own school. Every psychoanalytic theory is thus countertransferential, for it is the outcome of the self-articulation of the psychoanalyst. (p. 189).

These also go with Giampieri-Deutsch’s (1997) suggestion,

It is time to document and historicize the entire spectrum of Ferenczi’s contributions to psychoanalysis, his breakthroughs and dead ends, in order to be able to do justice to the complexity of his work. (p. 244).

Haynal (1997) conceives the history of psychoanalysis as,
three separate strands: a history of the ideas of psychoanalysis, a history of the persons who thought these ideas, and a history of the "psychoanalytic movement," that is, the interactions between the persons who constituted it. Each of these strands can be looked into independently, although they are tightly interwoven." (p. 452).

Hence, following Haynal, there could be a fourth strand: the interaction between persons and ideas, especially in how these persons are developing the ideas, unconsciously, from their relationship. Mahony (1979), in analyzing Freud’s friendship with Fliess as intermingled with the development of his ideas, concludes that,

We may long await a survey of psychoanalysis ... elucidating the dynamic interrelationship between Freud’s life and his theoretical and technical writings. (p. 89).

This is echoed by O’Brien (1991) who argues that Freud’s theory is inseparable from his private life and that specifically, his theory of repression ‘was created specifically as a defense against traumatic memories from his personal life’ (p. 175). I believe a similar logic is also applicable to Ferenczi. For Dupont, Ferenczi’s life and work is ‘a lesson in humility for all analysts’ (1994, p. 319). Also, Jung (1925) observes that ‘one understands nothing psychological unless one has experienced it oneself’ (p. 200), and that such understanding comes with a price, ‘[t]here is no birth of consciousness without pain’ (ibid., p. 193). Vida (2003a) also notes that Ferenczi was ‘writing his experience as he lived it’. (p. 40). In fact, the early psychoanalytic pioneers’ creativity has been attributed to their need for self-discovery in addressing their personal problems, discovering oneself as one is helping his patient to discover himself. (Gedo, 1976). Similarly, Rudnytsky (2002) maintains that this fuels the progress of psychoanalysis: ‘psychoanalytic theory has advanced to the extent that its practitioners have confronted their areas of acutest emotional vulnerability’ (p. 182). Berman (2007), on the other hand, advocates for a more ‘de-idealizing
(though not devaluing)’ view of our psychoanalytic ancestors who were also merely human,

being both sane and “mad”, both civilized and wild, as struggling with the same personal and clinical dilemmas we all struggle with; as having formed their theoretical and therapeutic models out of their own unique life experiences (p. 214).

Ferenczi himself, in his prime time of creativity in the late 1920s, also writes about his no-pain-no-gain experience,

I really do not know whether I envy our younger colleagues the ease with which they enter into possession of that which earlier generations won by bitter struggles. Sometimes I feel that to receive a tradition, however valuable, ready-made, is not so good as achieving something for oneself.’ (1929, p. 111, my italics).

Furthermore, Hidas (1993), linking Ferenczi’s life experience with his theories, argues that Ferenczi’s (1929a) paper, The Unwanted Child and its Death Instinct, is mostly autobiographical, in that the idea of teratoma resonates with Ferenczi’s zest for cure, both as a patient and as a healer. Falzeder (1994) writes that Psychoanalysis is the only discipline in science where personal relationships, notably transference and countertransference, are closely intermingled with the passing along of knowledge and professional ability. As such, he believes that a history of ideas in psychoanalysis is inseparable from a study of those who create the ideas. A detailed study can reveal connections between personal experiences and theoretical / clinical interest. A contemporary example could be found in Kuchuck (2014). In dwelling on details, secrets or shame may be uncovered, Falzeder concludes that,

Perhaps the time has come to investigate, sine ira et studio, the connection between the <<private>> lives and experiences of the pioneers and the theories springing from them, to investigate the connection between their <<experience>> [Erlebnisse] and <<insight>> [Einsichten]. To do so, the historian must necessarily be indiscreet: like in analysis itself, it is the secret, the repressed, the warded-off, and perhaps precisely the shameful detail that has the greatest explanatory power. (pp. 188-189)
In fact, Jung, in his now classic autobiography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, commissioned in his final years, has done something similar, as he gives an evocative portrayal of the interconnection between his life and works. Solomon (2003) writes that it reveals in a very vivid way a great deal about his personal and professional life, a text where his theoretical and clinical ideas are interwoven with evocative descriptions of the personal circumstances in which these ideas arose. (p. 556).

In historicizing Ferenczi’s contributions, notably *Introjection*, in this thesis, I situate Ferenczi’s work in his relationship with Freud so as to map out the interaction between his life and work, especially how introjection is present in the evolution of this relationship, and how the relationship actually foretell, or become concurrent with, Ferenczi’s writings on *Introjection*. Positioning Ferenczi in this way not only does more justice to most parties, but also provides us with a more solid and relevant foundation for appreciating Ferenczi’s ideas and person. Because of the focus on this thesis and the limitation of space, the part on Ferenczi and Groddeck has been dealt with in Chan (2014a).

Before going into more detail about the methodology specifically used by this thesis, the background and nature of psychobiography, a tool that this study will adopt, will be addressed. In the next Chapter, *On Psychobiography*, I argue for a rationale for seeing life as theory, or theory explaining life. I explore the use of psychoanalysis in constructing a historical narrative about a historical figure. I review the history of psychobiography itself. I address the pros and cons of psychobiography and attempt to conclude about a proper pursuit of psychobiography. I also cover the historically controversial nature of psychobiography and argue for conceptual and methodological justifications of this
discipline as an application to the methodology of this thesis. I aim to get into the transient and yet live moments of their relationship and to unravel the underlying introjective dynamics, mapping it to Ferenczi’s writings on *Introjection*, and leading to an account of the experiential etymology of a psychoanalytic idea.
Chapter 5  

On Psychobiography

I attempt to explore the use of psychoanalysis, or applied psychoanalysis\(^{30}\), in the making of a historical narrative about a historical figure. The history of psychobiography itself, especially the early one, is briefly reviewed. The subject matter of psycho-history, a problematic ‘marriage between psychology and history’ (Lifton, 1972, p. 365), or a discipline that is ‘often formless’ (Colp, 1990, p. 140), including psychobiography, is explored and discussed, in the context of the criticism and controversy that have been stirred up in the field. A key issue to be examined is whether psychohistory can improve history, or whether it has something of value to add to the conventional way of doing history. Also, I address the pros and cons of psychobiography attempt to conclude about a proper pursuit of psychobiography. A related question is whether psycho-biography is a better version than biography\(^{31}\).

Historically, psycho-history starts with psychobiography, as Freud takes an important step in 1907 from interpretation of dreams to interpretation of literature. Indeed, many of Freud’s fundamental ideas originate from cultural or non-clinical material (Esman, 1998). As recorded in the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Nunberg and Federn, 1962), meeting 32 and 33, there is an increasing interest in biography and creativity. Three approaches are noted. Sadger searches for pathology of the artists as analyzed from their works. It is more like pathography than psychobiography. Hitschmann, on the other hand, studies the artist’s life history in order to understand why the artist chooses to express himself in the particular way of his works. Graf, the musicologist, stresses that the works themselves, especially the early works, should be the main source of information for the psychobiography, and the works should be studied in chronological order so as to understand the
creative process. Freud agrees with Graf more, as he believes that Psychobiography should not be mere patho-biography that shows nothing new, but should throw light on the creativity itself, ‘Some day one should investigate how infantile impressions influence great achievement, and not only how they influence later illness’ (p. 361).

Freud attempts to demonstrate this later in his Study of Leonardo (Freud, 1910), a study once seen as ‘the ideal psychoanalytic biography’ (Bergmann, 1973, p. 835) because art historians regard it as a contribution that psychoanalysis makes to the field (Abel, 1957). Notably, Freud puts much emphasis on Leonardo’s childhood memories in this study that distinguishes it from any previous biography at that time. The obvious methodological problem in analyzing childhood memories in psychobiographical studies is that, as contrast to a clinical situation whereby childhood memories can be illuminated by free association or interpretation of transference, there is no way that Freud can do so with Leonardo. Freud draws upon his interpretation solely upon deciphering of symbols, as he ‘treats literary characters as if they were patients on his couch’ (Rand & Torok, 1997, p. 49). In the famous screen memory of Leonardo’s ‘vulture’, later found to be a mistranslation of the Italian word ‘nibbio’ that means kite and not vulture (e.g. Schapiro, 1956), Freud interprets the symbolic meaning accordingly, with reference to the ancient Egyptian culture. Whereas the mistranslation is once taken as a big and embarrassing mistake of Freud’s interpretation, rendering it a ‘flawed masterpiece’ (Lichtenberg, 1978, p. 863), what is more problematic is the reliability of basing the interpretation on symbols alone, as symbols’ meaning may be more fluid and less universal as Freud has once assumed; and that the personal meaning derived in a clinical setting would be more reliable when it comes to interpretation.

Nevertheless, Freud tries to further demonstrate the power of psychoanalysis by
looking into the mysterious features of Leonardo’s two paintings: the smile of the Mona Lisa and the grouping of the Virgin and Child and St. Anne. Freud attributes the distinctiveness of the smile to the impact of a childhood memory, that Leonardo is fascinated by the smile is because it evokes something of an old and dormant memory, which is so powerful that, once evoked, he cannot be free from it but only to give it new expression in his works. Freud believes the smile is that of Leonardo’s mother, Caterina, and he is to re-find it again and again in his life. As for the other painting, Freud interprets it as Leonardo’s unconscious wish to unite two mother-figures in his life, a private meaning of the artist that evades from the audience, though for the art historian, such meaning is rather irrelevant. Bergmann (1973) believes that the Leonardo Study is ‘not only interesting, but compelling’ (p. 837), as Leonardo’s character, meaning of childhood memory and the interpretation of the paintings all complement one another into a Gestalt, a clue that the interpretation may be correct, an ‘excellent fit’ (p. 837).

The impact of this study in the early history of psychoanalysis is significant, as it encourages Freud’s followers to follow his steps in this new and exciting field. For example, Abraham (1911) offers a biographical study of the painter, Segantini. Abraham establishes the important facts of Segantini’s early trauma, namely his mother’s death when he was five and his father’s immediate desertion. With standard psychoanalytic symbols, Abraham decodes the traces of the trauma in the paintings. The lost mother dominates the painter’s choice of themes, as his repressed phantasies express themselves in the works. Abraham also comes ahead of Freud’s dual instinct theory some ten years earlier as he discovers that art work can be reparation of hostile wishes. He cites a screen memory of Segantini, explaining how he becomes an artist. During childhood, his mother asks him to draw a picture of a
little girl on her deathbed as if she were alive. Abraham’s interprets it as: it is the baby, not the mother, who dies, and it is the mother, not the baby, who is bereaved. The painter, once a baby, returns his mother with what she has lost. Later, Bonapate (1933) studies the poet, Edgar Allen Poe. Although she does not have any methodological breakthrough, her study is ambitious, going into lengths in analyzing the poet’s main themes and ends up in a big volume of over 600 pages. Accordingly, Poe lost his parents in early childhood. Bonaparte’s interpretation is that early loss of the mother would lead to a fixation in necrophilia if it is not sublimated. Bonaparte also bases her interpretation much on symbols alone, e.g. the sea representing the mother.

These early psychobiographic works turn out to be classic and pioneering exemplars in the field. By then, reading the artists’ unconscious infantile material from their works alone was seen as great achievements of reconstruction. However, by today’s standard, this may appear a little naïve\textsuperscript{32}, and even excessively optimistic because of not enough attention to methodology (Bergmann, 1973). Both Abraham and Bonaparte do not actually deal with infantile memories, but with the feelings of loneliness, pain and yearning for the lost mother. Abraham is essentially trying to demonstrate, on a very selective sample, that art and neurosis are identical, the more severe the trauma, the more powerful the repetition compulsion and the clearer the impact of the trauma. Naturally most of the creative energy of the artist would be devoted to the mastery of compulsion. The task of psychoanalytic reconstruction is therefore easier. It is in such cases that the psychobiographer is over-confident of his hypothesis and tends to devalue the biographical facts and documentation material. The psychobiographer should reconstruct the social and historical milieu of the subject’s lives to ground the psychobiography\textsuperscript{33} into a satisfactory history (Feinstein,
1982). Obviously, the historian would be more interested in the artist’s life history and documentary evidence is the most reliable. Yet, the psychobiographer would find documentary evidence least valuable psychoanalytically. He may be more interested in proving or illustrating his psychoanalytic theory, mostly of infantile determinism, than describing his subject’s history.

It is when Erikson comes to the scene that the trend starts to change. Erikson (1958) is against the reduction of any adult behaviour to its ‘origin’ in infantile strivings and fixation. He advocates a series of psychosocial phases that runs across the whole life span. He gives special significance to the identity crisis in adolescence. Such a crisis, Erikson believes, may have no infantile precursors. He maintains that the early years alone cannot account for the entire adult character or neurosis. Adolescence, on the other hand, is seen as a second chance for correcting or further exacerbating infantile pathology. Even Freud, in the 1930s, becomes less ambitious about psychoanalytic approach to biography,

Psychoanalysis can supply some information which cannot be arrived at by other means, and can thus demonstrate new connecting threads … between the instinctual endowments, the experiences and the works of the artist. (Freud, 1930, p. 212)

So, the early history of psychohistory, focusing on psychobiography, shows an initial round of over-enthusiasm, followed by a more controlled stance.

With these landmark studies in the early history of psychoanalysis as the backdrop, we now look into more recent discourse on psychohistory and psychobiography. Peter Gay, an historian and analyst, a rare hybrid, in his positive appraisal of noted historians such as Elie Halevy and Marc Bloch, believes that historians could be more informed by psychoanalysis because the perceptions of such a historian are, as it were, intransitive, they depend on the accident of individual talent rather than the ministration of a dependable psychology. (Gay, 1986, p. 31-32).
By ‘a dependable psychology’, he refers to Psychoanalysis. The problem, therefore, is whether psychoanalysis can indeed be a reliable tool in a better writing of history.

Conceptually, Psychoanalysis can be quite similar to History in some ways. Roper (2005) notes that history and psychoanalytic case study have commonality in the close connection between empirical data, evolution of theory, and interpretation. Discovering the past in one’s present life via memory, Psychoanalysis approaches the person from a historical perspective, namely, the uncovering and reconstruction of one’s recalled history, even though it is necessarily a subjective enterprise. Hinshelwood (2012), concluding from the dialectics between objectivity and subjectivity of psychoanalysis, writes that ‘[t]here is no easy way to be objective, when the object of study is subjective’ (p. 143). One’s historical truth, as discovered or constructed by psychoanalysis, is given meaning by interpretation and becomes his personal truth. Similarly, history works on ‘materially grounded claims to truth’ and hence it is about ‘partial rather than absolute truths. It delivers partial rather than complete knowledge.’ (Cox, 2013, p. 130). Cox furthers that history is very cautious in not making macro narratives and ‘overly determinist explanations of social change’ (p. 130). In terms of methodology, psychoanalysis and history both resort to ‘empathic insight and understanding’ (Loewenberg, 1987, p. 31). The historical dimension is actually part of the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, although Kerr (1992) argues that there is a huge gap between the clinicians and the historians, ‘the two professional communities separated by a common interset’ (p. 358). Meyerhoff (1987) conceives psychoanalysis as ‘a branch of history’ (p. 18), though it is usually a history of the individual but not that of a group of people. Abrams (2011) even advocates for a historiographic course in the training of psychoanalysts, starting
with ‘what is history?’ and then studying ‘the different often unrecognized influences historicizing and how those influences change meanings and applications.’ (p. 106-107).

If one writes history in the way an analyst does psychoanalysis, there could be an additional dimension of interpretation and meaning. It is not only about facts or objective historical events, but an interpreted version with the meaning, obviously psychoanalytically, and even feeling inevitably lurking behind the overt sequence of events. Fine (1979) sees that history is itself psychohistory as it is all made by human,

Human beings make history, so their psychology must be an essential part of such history. In this view all of history is essentially psychohistory, in which the scholarly reconstruction of past facts is illuminated by an understanding of the motives in the lives of the participants. It is in this sense that psychoanalysis can be said to have penetrated all historical writing. (p. 16).

Arguably, the psycho-historian is undertaking an introspective psychological project with his historical subjects, as what the analyst is doing with his live subjects. Conventional history, however, does not care much about such internal motivations of the historical subjects and how these motivations develop. These historians usually assume that their subjects are rational in their acts (Itzkowitz & Volkan, 2003). The question then is whether the rational motive is not as good as the psychoanalytical motivation that psychohistory is advocating. Ashplant (1987) advocates that in the understanding of ‘extreme historical situations’, ‘common-sense psychology has seemed inadequate to the explanatory work’ (p. 168) and psychoanalysis would appear more applicable. Similarly, Figlio (1998) argues against a full reliance on rationality as the only measure of historical explanation,

[h]istorical explanation often relies implicitly on bringing to light a previously invisible logic of a situation, as the motivational equivalent to causality in the natural sciences. Commonsense notions, such as
self-interest or rational economic behaviour, typically fill in the gaps in rational accounts, but do not provide a satisfactory account, because the unconscious introduces an irrationality in motivation and a gap in what we can know and in how we know. (p. 209)

Before proceeding to the unique features of psychobiography, one may have to address the problem of objectivity, especially in the logical positivistic sense that has also been haunting psychoanalysis ever since its inception. The subjective nature of this approach is at odds with the objectivity requirement. However, what the historical documents themselves contain is not that objective, as Alexander and Taylor (2012) aptly remind historians of ‘the omnipresence of subjectivity in the historical sources’ (p. 1). Loewenberg (1985) re-conceives the polarity by giving subjectivity the intellectual position it deserves in the pursuit of knowledge,

Social scientists who are aware of modern psychology no longer accept the existence of a dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity. All perceptions of the world are refracted through the prism of our inner life, resolving it into components that produce a significant pattern. The scholar’s task is to exercise intellectual integrity and avoid sentimentality in his treatment of sources; but his responsibility demands that he say what reality means to him in his human uniqueness. All experience is interpreted in terms of its subjective implications. The creative act of a scholar is to achieve insight into the data of observation, to subject this insight to empirical discipline, and to impart to this experience of the particular event a meaning of human validity. (p. 58)

The above assertion suggests that the knowledge one produces comes from one’s insight and interpretation of the data gathered, and such interpretation has subjective implication. The final outcome is measured by its creativity and the meaning generated after it passes the empirical test. Runyan (2003) lay down the criteria for an adequate interpretation, with respect to the consistency with all the data available and with general knowledge. Objectivity is part of the picture and subjectivity would further enhance the whole product. Taylor (2012), along similar vein, argues for the empathic connection required between the historian and his subjects that is even cross cultural, that
historical understanding involves an empathic connection between the historian and her human subjects, a connection made possible by the species similarity between individual subjectivities across place and time (p. 195).

Phillips (2012) further argues that it would be a valid research question on the historian’s defense mechanism and how it is related to his written work, i.e., ‘an obscure weaving of the individual historian’s personal past with the history that captures her imagination’ (p. 213). Similarly, in the clinical situation in psychoanalysis, the analyst and the analysand are interested in something beyond the compilation of facts. Both the historian and the analytic players would come up with significant narratives, and probably improved understanding, as Meyerhoff (1987) puts it,

Facts must be selected and interpreted so that we are shown what they “mean”. Evidence in history as in psychoanalysis is always interpreted evidence. Facts are significant only in a context of interpretation. (p. 23).

By interpretation, it implies finding meaning from the facts found, to ‘tie up’ the facts into a significant account, or a Gestalt, of what happened. This is also compatible with the psychoanalytic sense of interpretation.

Moreover, there is another aspect of subjectivity: the historian, and the psychoanalyst, is also a part of the history that he writes about his subject. Yet, they are also following the rules and principles in their respective fields in that particular historical era. They cannot be completely neutral and outside of the bigger history. The history they write will become another piece of history later, to be re-studied not just as historical documents, but as a segment in the series of historical narration as a whole. This explains why history and psychoanalytic theories are constantly being revised and re-written because of the changing demands in different times. The versions written might add together into another one that is not incompatible with the demand of objectivity. It can be a process of constant evolution by itself. History
and psychoanalysis, in this sense, are not just about the past, but a constantly revised attempt of looking at the past in the light of the present, from the perspective of the contemporary people, obviously. Psychoanalysis and History, according to Roth (2012), ‘are so closely linked, both by the stories we tell about the past and by the desire to tell them better (or get them right)’ (p. 24). Carr, the noted historian, states that,

the historian has no excuse to think of himself as a detached individual standing outside society and outside history. This is the age of self-consciousness: the historian can and should know what he is doing. (1962, p.186)

Loewenberg (1987) even believes that the historian himself is the primary tool of his research, perceiving and interpreting his data, and even using his mind to resurrect the past, or allowing the historical character to live in him. Historical knowledge is the inner experience of the historian. This epistemology of history is indeed not one of discovery of historical facts but that of a co-creation between the historian and his historical objects. Loewenberg (1985) suggests that there is a bonding between the historian and the historical material that is at once intellectual and affective,

History is a communication with the past, usually but not exclusively, through the medium of language. There is a basic intellectual-emotional bond between the historian and his material from the past, be it personal documents, geography, papers of state, or cultural artifacts such as buildings, paintings, and music. (p. 5)

Figlio (1998) envisions a similar idea about the historian’s and the psychoanalyst’s common endeavour. The object of their study ‘is no longer there’. The historian ‘has to imagine it’ while the psychoanalyst has to decipher it through the transference, as the ‘facts of individual experience are not hard objects, but revisions and re-presentations – active mental processes’ (p. 199). Some decades earlier, Collingwood (1956) has done something similar, but in an even more
introspective way. He uses empathy and identification in reconstructing history. He thinks his way into and through the minds of the historical figures, using his tools of disciplined cognition and imagination. He believes that discovery in historical research involves the historian’s re-thinking of the historical figures’ thought, or a ‘re-enactment of past thought in the historian’s own mind’ (p. 215). In other words, the historian has to surrender, at least temporarily, his thoughts and perceptions to those of their subjects (Moraitis, 2003). However, learning from Freud’s error in his study of Leonardo, Schröter (1994) reminds the historian that, before plunging into the historical subject’s inner world with empathy, he should be more aware of the gap, or the big difference, between himself and the subject, by historical, sociological and semantic means.

If the person of the historian is that important in this method of doing history, one would expect some attributes so that ‘anything goes’ would not be the outcome. Bloch (1953) places heavy emphasis on the historian’s ability to understand the present and the living first, before he can understand the past and the deceased. He believes that the historian ‘may wear himself out just as fruitlessly in seeking to understand the past, if he is totally ignorant of the present’ (p.43). The historian has to be receptive and sensitive to life experience and is able to resonate emotionally with what is happening around. In this regard, the historian has to take himself also as a historical subject too in his own daily living. Doing history in Bloch’s way is very similar to simply living in the here-and-now to the fullest that, paradoxically, renders him capable of relating to his historical subjects too,

Since the facts of the distant past are also the most obscure, there is really no escape from the discipline of working back from the better to the less well-known. … The historian … is perpetually at the mercy of his documents, most of the time he must read history backwards if he hopes to break the secret cipher of the past. (Bloch, 1966, p. xxviii)
With the methodology of starting with the person in the present, which is inherently subjective and bound to the contemporary world, one would require something more than mere awareness of the present on the part of the psychohistorian. Erikson (1975) advocates that the psychohistorian should understand himself as existing in the historical process with disciplined subjectivity as a necessary quality. Similarly, Kahr (1999) advises that

the tools of psychoanalysis must be wielded with conviction and with gentleness, and the psychoanalytical investigator must remain ever mindful of the potential unpopularity of his or her conclusion. (p. 284).

However, Strozier (1987) argues that the un-analyzed psychohistorian might compromise the disciplined subjectivity. Erikson, nevertheless, does not support psychohistorians’ mandatory analysis, as the analytic candidates should. Instead, he believes self-analytical capacity is enough in one’s attempt at studying these ‘dead’ subjects whose mind might still ‘exist’ in the historical documents ready to meet with the mind of the historian. Friedländer (1975) has a more refined understanding of dilemma of whether the psychohistorian should be analyzed or not,

if he is not analyzed, the historian risks having only a superficial understanding of analytic theories; and if he is analyzed, he risks not being able to exercise, in this new domain, a critical faculty that is absolutely essential. (p. 124).

Somehow, this ‘dilemma’ may also be similarly applicable to the analyst, when the meaning of ‘being analyzed’ has to be further specified as ‘being analyzed by who’, i.e., which school of thought, e.g. orthodox Freudian, Kleinian, Jungian, etc., For instance, one may say, if he is analyzed not in school A, he risks having only a superficial understanding of school A’s theories; if he is analyzed only in school A, he risks not being able to exercise a critical faculty with respect to school A. Commenting on whether a oral historian should be psychoanalytically trained, Figlio (1988) does not give a ‘settled opinion’ on this seemingly ‘daunting and extravagant
notion’. Yet, he highlights the ‘complementary interests’ of oral history and psychoanalysis, ‘both have begun to wonder what constitutes an event, what amalgam of the recordable and conscious with the unconscious and emotion-driven.’ (p. 130). In the case of psychohistory and psychoanalysis, as much as they are complementary to each other, having the psychohistorian analyzed or the psychoanalyst trained in history does not seem to solve the dilemma. Arguably, personal analysis of the psychohistorian cannot guarantee the prevention of misuse of psychoanalysis 40 (Moraitis, 1979). Yet, the same may also be true of the analyst, as it is too optimistic to see psychoanalysis as ‘a sort of mental vaccination’ (Myer, 1987, p. 293) against the hazardous effect of transference.

Other than affective involvement, Anderson (2003) also reminds psychohistorians to be familiar with the works of Winnicott, Kernberg and Kohut, other than those of Freud and Erikson, in order to gain more insight into the personality of the subjects under study. Friedländer (1975) concludes that the problem can be solved only when the historians can find the essential balance ‘between analytic experience and critical detachment’ (p. 124), as the real difficulties of psychohistory intrinsically exist in the ‘ambiguous situation of the psychohistorian.’ (p. 124). Gatzke (1973), quoting Walter Langer, is more pragmatic in his recommendations on doing psychohistory,

It is conceivable that some day there may be scholars equally well versed in both discipline, history and psychology, to write acceptable psychohistory. But in addition to being trained psychoanalysts they will also need the “clinical experience” that both William and Walter Langer stress as an essential prerequisite. Such persons will be hard to find. Until then, Professor Langer’s suggestion of collaboration between scholars from both disciplines remains the most promising approach if psychohistory is to take its place as a respectable field of scholarship.’ (p. 401).

deMause (1987), the contemporary psychohistorian, defines psychohistory’s
distinctiveness from history with respect to the methodology of discovery, as it attempts to ‘solve problems of historical motivation with a unique blend of historical documentation, clinical experience and the use of the researcher’s own emotions as the crucial research tool for discovery’ (p. 54). As an example, in his study of war, he searches for in-depth motivations of the people who made the crucial decisions and of those related who set up the atmosphere of expectation that allows them to carry out the decisions. He believes that historical events should be explained down to the level of individual or group psychodynamics. He resorts to rather atypical historical materials for determining motivation, such as ‘personal imagery, metaphors, slips, side comments, jokes, scribbles on the edges of documents, and so on’ (p. 55). He even believes that the conventional historians do not have enough psychological acuity to probe into the minds of the historical figures.

Binion (1987), however, adopts a less ambitious definition of psychohistory. He takes human history as the history of the mind and of motives. His methodological approach to psychohistory would resemble first of what the regular historian would do, namely, analysis of historical documents, and yet he also advocates emotional involvement in one’s understanding of the inner life of a historical figure,

To grasp a life inwardly requires mastery of its full documentary remains. It also calls for conversance with the whole run of personalities, institutions, and events, and the whole congeries of ideas, usages, and values, involved. To top that off, it takes an intellectual and emotional stunt both strenuous and delicate. The researcher must empathize and analyze at once. (p. 70)

Hence, if the historian makes good use of his own self in sorting through the historical materials, with disciplined subjectivity and self-analytical capacity, he would be able to adopt the psychohistorical approach to conceptualize major historical events. He could also use this methodology to investigate the minds of historical figures. This branch of psychohistory, namely, psychobiography, however,
receives much criticism all the way through, even in the heydays of psychoanalysis (Rosenwald, 2012). It has become an easy target. We will address these attacks in order to establish the legitimacy of psychobiography.

Controversies over methodology and abuse in the field of psychobiography abound. Indeed, Young-Bruehl (1985) notes that the literature on psychobiography is mostly about methodology. Mack (1980) even observes that the criticisms imbue psychobiography with ‘the tawdry reputation’ (p. 546). The disputes also follow the argument about which theoretical model is the correct one. It starts from the early days of dominance by Freudian theory to the post-war period of ego psychology, at least in America. Good practice is not easy to find. Some of the psychobiographers indulge in ‘wild psychoanalysis’, reading a theory into the data available. The quality of psychobiographic data, using psychoanalysis proper as a centre of reference, is especially subject to query. For example, since the historical subject is not on the couch, free association, the crucial instrument of psychoanalysis, is absent (Kohut, 1960). Also, the deficit of the psychobiographical scenario is inherent, as there are no in-vivo working through of resistance, defence, transference and counter-transference (Mack, 1971). However, Manuel shifts the focus from cure to understanding, ‘the dead do not ask to be cured’, ‘only to be understood’ (1971, quoted in Scott, 2012, p. 65).

Barzun (1974) believes that the psychobiographer’s tools and data are inevitably indirect and scant, as his ‘patient’ is absent. He could only resort to the clues randomly or inadvertently left by his subject, such as diaries and letters, in which mood expression are more frequent than evidence of actions. On the other hand, data from the therapeutic sessions elicited by the therapist are more relevant, direct and even complete. Stone (1981) rejoins that if psychobiography relies much
on childhood experience as the determinant of adult personality, it is exactly where the psychobiographer has the least amount of data because the historical subject usually does not keep such data himself. However, a value of psychobiography lies in its ability to generate hypotheses from generalization from individual cases that might provoke debate and even new insight into some previously ignored areas of study (Mollinger, 1975).

Runyan (1984) acknowledges that there are problems with psychobiography but they do not make it an impossible discipline. He suggests that psychobiography should be done only on those historical figures whose information left behind is abundant and one should avoid speculating on those with insufficient evidence. He also reminds that if childhood data are absent, one should avoid early developmental explanations. In comparing the clinical situation with the psychobiographical one, the former seems to have an edge. Yet, there are also some neglected advantages of the latter. Cody (1971) argues that the psychobiographical subject has lived his entire life and is dead. The subject has shown us how he went through all those crises and demands in various stages of his life, displaying a more complete personality. On the contrary, the analyst with his living patient only has relatively limited amount of such data, especially if his patient is young and his personality is still evolving. Anderson (1981) suggests that the psychobiographer has more channels of data collection than the analyst. He can draw upon outside sources to enrich his perspectives. Also, if the subject is already a creative or psychologically-minded person, the psychobiographer would have an ‘easier’ task in data collection or inference. The subject is already a ‘psychoanalysand par excellence’ (Cody, 1971, p.6). Even though free associations or even dreams are absent from the data box, the psychobiographer may resort to things like caricatures.
or recorded conversation as some substitutes. Also, the psychobiography is more open than the clinical data obtained in therapy. Readers can critically scrutinize the psychobiography and propose alternative interpretations, although the historical subject himself cannot answer back to both the psychobiographer and the readers. On the contrary, even though the analyst may publish some of his cases or receive case consultation, most of the data obtained from the sessions are only private ones between the patient and the analyst (Runyan, 1984). Furthermore, the analytic situation itself has its own epistemological problem of knowledge generation about the analysand. The analytic situation needs not be the ideal situation for the psychobiographer to emulate. After all, the historical character is dead. There is no immediacy or ‘realness’ of the contact, nor is there the kind of interactional exchange that occurs in the analytic sessions. However, the mind of the dead subject, as it were, as represented by or living in the archival documents, can possibly be re-activated in the mind of the psychobiographer in his historical research. If the subject’s being alive is a must for the analytic exploration, then one might question whether the depressed and suicidal patient, with an almost dead mind beyond contact, is really analyzed by his analyst in the sessions. Yet, in such cases, the analyst is still striving to connect with his patient. Arguably, the historical subject is dead only in the biological sense.

The motivation behind the psychobiographer’s choice of subject is another area of concern, especially on the prevalence of transferences. Roper (2003) writes that regardless of whether or not the historian understands the dynamics of transference and counter-transference, he is inevitably operating under such mechanism. Roper offers a nuanced guideline for the historian,
It is a case of allowing ourselves, through a process of empathetic imagination, to be projected into and to hold and process the emotional impulses conveyed through the evidence of past texts. Reflection about what unconscious material belongs to us and what does not…’ (p. 30)

Waites (1995) argues that it is the psychobiographer’s transference to his subject that dictates the psychobiography in what is included and what is excluded.

At the deepest level of mental life, it is transference that determines what facts we choose to observe, record, or speak or write about. The life history we disclose is always a history of transference, and it is transference that enables us to describe and interpret it. (p. 110).

He even warns that biography can be the psychobiographer’s autobiography in disguise, if left unchecked. For example, the psychobiographer’s need for self-aggrandizement would be fulfilled in his idealization of his subject, viewing him as an extension of himself. Some grandiose fantasies of the biographer, such as fusion with the subject to form his idealized self, or even that the subject’s greatness is a gift from the biographer whose writing on the subject immortalizes him, or else he would be lost forever to posterity. However, it is also these unconscious processes that fuel the creative process of writing. Furthermore, rescue fantasy may also operate in the biographer as he tries to transform the past. Our infantile helplessness is easily evoked by certain historical figures and writing a psychobiography is one way of defending against such helplessness. Such therapeutic fantasy of the psychobiographer is similar to that of the analyst. Ultimately, this fantasy is related to the wish for self-cure. He advocates good use of such inevitable unconscious mechanism in the writing of psychobiography, just as the analyst’s disciplined use of counter-transference in the service of analysis. Waites’ conclusion is even more educational to the psychobiographer,

Any author who dips into psychoanalysis in order to fathom a biographical subject is likely to discover a life at least as complicated, intriguing, and absorbing as that of the original subject – the author’s own life.’ (p. 114-115)
Putting biography into a bigger context, he continues,

Historical truth is a joint venture. A biography is just part of such a venture; often enough, it is a trivial and transient event with little enduring import. Occasionally, however, a biography mediates between the subject and others in a way that potentiates as well as discloses relationships between lives. When that happens, who can know the end of the story? (p. 122).

Waites sees the unconscious dimension in the writing of biography as having the potential to transform lives, maybe with surprises. In this sense, it is also similar to the journey of the analyst and analysand in psychoanalysis.

Feinstein (1982) goes even further, arguing that when a psychobiographer goes after his therapeutic fantasy with success, he can end up with a rigorous history that changes himself and his audience. Creativity of the psychobiographer usually arises from personal conflicts that strive to express themselves. The audience is an imagined listener who can also serve as the healer.

Another critique, maybe ‘the best-known criticism’ (Colp, 1988, p. 111), is about reductionism. When the psychobiographer is over-enthusiastic in making the most of the interpretative power of psychoanalysis and ignores crucial contributions from related disciplines, especially history, or ‘turning everybody (national leaders, painters, fictional figures) into patients on our couch’ (Berman & Frankel, 2000, p. 267, brackets original) and evoking justified anger of ‘academic experts and of creative artists in the various fields invaded’ (ibid., p. 257). The explanation simply reduces the subject, or his character, into a timeless type, without recourse or contextualization in the subject’s social, cultural and political realities, making it, ironically, ahistorical. For example, Hundert (1972) argues that psychobiography focuses too much on the internal life, or the psychological process of the individual, without reference to the subject’s time and place. This is especially prevalent in the
‘heroic days’ (Kris, 1952, p. 17) of psychoanalysis, in which psychobiography, as a young discipline, is trying to show its power.

Rosenwald (2012) argues that interpretation is not just about reducing the subject’s behaviour into simplistic categories of pathology (see, for example, Meyer, 1972). To avoid reductionism, the psychobiographers have to be selective; they do not apply the psychobiographic method indiscriminately. They pick up only the ‘odd or problematic pattern of action or interaction’ (p. 378) and the interpretation is done in two stages. The oddity is first extracted and refined out of the alien and even strange historical and cultural context. A biographical phenomenon that requires interpretation is different from the normative peculiarities of another era or culture. Subsequently, the oddity is put back into such context and to be understood in relation to it. The subject’s actions are to be proved to be dynamically significant within the alien context. The psychobiographical oddity manifests itself as a puzzle, with an explicit emphasis on or avoidance of certain feelings, repetitive patterns of self-harm, paradoxical strengths in one area of experience and behaviour, concurrent with deficiencies or failures in related ones. In a nutshell, ‘it is not the use of psychological concepts as such, but rather the relationship between these concepts and that which they are intended to conceptualize that must be kept in bounds. (p. 387).

Berman & Frankel (2000), acknowledging contemporary understanding of the subjectivity inherent in analysis of patients and of historical figures, argues that the clinical analyst is not more objective than the psychobiographer. Yet, for the latter, his subjects ‘continue to remain mute, at least insofar as their private, relatively unguarded thoughts are concerned.’ (p. 268). They aptly point out that it is some psychobiographers’ need for pretense to scientific objectivity that push
psychobiography to the dead end of reductionism. Instead, they advocate for a complete awareness of the psychobiographers’ subjectivity, counter-transference, and inevitably biased values that could lead to a ‘more patient, collaborative search for understanding’ (ibid., p. 268).

The causal link between childhood experience and adult character is another aspect of psychobiography that has been subjected to intense criticism. The most notable one is Stannard (1980) who launches a summary dismissal of Freud’s Leonardo Study regarding Freud’s analysis of the origin of his subject’s sexual orientation. He argues that there is no scientific proof of the relationship between the reconstructed childhood events and the creative works and adult life. Specifically the results of studies of the origin of homosexuality provide no support for Freud’s warm mother / distant father hypothesis. The weakness in Freud’s logic is that he is unable to identify a sufficient cause, i.e., a cause that is certainly followed by the effect. Stannard would have accepted Freud’s hypothesis if it had been proved that, if a mother is warm, intrusive, affectionate and lives with her son but without her husband, then the son must develop homosexuality. Similarly, Barzun (1974) does not accept Freud’s cause of homosexuality as sufficient. Their criteria of evaluation are common in natural science, but the question is whether such they are applicable to psychobiography, and maybe history itself. Indeed, according to Rosenwald (2012), historians have always been making such ‘unscientific’ claims as what Freud does, attributing historical events to some other earlier chains of events. However, Stannard and Barzun, being historians too, do not raise similar queries against historians themselves. Even amongst historians, some simply do not believe in universal laws in history and resort to narrative conceptualization. (See, for example, Day, 2008). In fact, it may not even be fair to accuse Freud of reductionism. In his
Leonardo Study, he starts with the observation of his subject’s self-contradiction, such as a struggle against erotic impulses and self assertiveness. He points to the screen memory of the vulture as a possible underlying source for analysis. Freud does not make quick and direct jump from childhood cause to adult effects. Instead, he works backward from the subject’s enigmatic disposition or behaviour and speculates, tentatively, on how the disposition might have been shaped by previous and current life experience. In fact, Freud repeatedly apologized for the flaws of his psychobiographical work as he understood his data were inadequate and conclusions debatable (Elms, 2003).

Actually, psychobiography since the 1970s, in which rarely any psychohistorians are historians by training, but were psychoanalysts instead (Levin, 1987), has responded to these charges. By 1980s, it has gone beyond the simplistic and reductionistic application of psychoanalytic theory (Kriegman, 1982), by avoiding reductionistic explanations, emphasizing both childhood and adult experience, integrating the psychological with the social and cultural, and also analyzing strengths and adaptive capacities, in addition to pathology (e.g. deMause, 2002; Mack, 1976; Szaluta, 1999). After the turn of the century, Binion (2003) observes, ‘Psychohistory came out of psychoanalysis and is still working its way free from an all-too-long infantile dependence’ (p. 237). Such dependence is to be balanced by psychohistory’s distance from History itself, so that it can become a more independent discipline, from both Psychoanalysis and History.

Friedländer (1975) emphasizes that the value of psychohistory is in its contribution to a ‘total history’ (p. 122), given the interdisciplinary nature of history. Psychohistory offers a complete investigation of an individual and social phenomenon as ‘a network of data accessible to systematic inquiry and as the
existential, irreducible reality of a person or of a group.’ (p. 122). Both systemic and intuitive understanding is covered in psychohistory. On the other hand, Scott (2012) argues that although history and psychoanalysis conceive time and causality differently, there could still be a productive collaboration,

> Psychoanalysis can force historians to question their certainty about facts, narrative, and cause; it introduces disturbing notions about unconscious motivation and the effects of fantasy on the making of history. (p. 63).

Similarly, Viederman (1992) observes that ‘the psychoanalyst, the biographer, and the historian have different concerns, methods and perceptions, it is this very tension between them that may generate new ideas.’ (p. 294). Part of this tension is further elaborated by Rosenwald (2012),

> the psychobiographer will fare better if the audience is helped to appreciate the insufficiency of the historian’s explanatory resources. Only when the readership shares the historian’s perplexity … will it be ready to learn how the hermeneutics of psychoanalysis, refined over more than a century, can be tapped to restore pieces, large or small, that have been missing from the picture. (p. 396)

This, Rosenwald continues, can upgrade the audience’s psychological sophistication by widening the audience’s common sense, instead of yielding to it. The value of psychohistory and psychobiography, therefore, lies in its unique and explanatory supplement to historical and biographical studies, as Pines (1989) observes likewise, ‘psychoanalysts and historians can yoke to each other as oxen before a plough, tilling the soil of the unconscious’ (p. 134). Similarly, Lu (2012) concludes: ‘A psychohistory that ignores history’s epistemology is untenable and a history that ignores the unconscious dimension of reality is incomplete.’ (p. 20). The use of psychobiography as a way to achieve a narrative of historical figures is a viable option.

Some of the historical or contemporary figures have also been subjected to psychobiographical study, linking the life experience to psychoanalytic ideas. For
example, Breger (2012) traces Freud’s creation of psychoanalysis as a movement to his ‘personal conflicts – the residues of his traumas, deprivations, poverty, and relations with his parents and siblings’ (p. 239). Malibu (1998) argues that ‘Jung’s infantile wounds, his lack of adequately mirroring and metabolizing parents’ (p. 167), with his genius and adaptive cure of it, are related to Jung’s analytical reading of the I Ching. Roper (2012) investigates Bion’s writings about World War I and ‘explores the connections between his experiences in the war and his psychoanalytic interests’ (p. 129). Figlio (1999) while not psychoanalyzing Robert Boyle, tries to find ‘psychoanalytically intelligible connections between his science and his religiosity’ (p. 313). Examples of psychobiographical studies on contemporary figures can be found in Samuels (2000), Benton (2010) and Noel-Smith (2001). Psychobiography, used properly, can improve history. The aim of the next Chapter on methodology is to explain how this study is to be done, viz., the raw material used and the rationale of using them, the perspective and precautions taken, review of some illustratively similar studies, the interpretative strategy that I will use, as well as its limitations.
Chapter 6

Methodology

This chapter explains the methodology to be used in this study. I will track Ferenczi’s relationship with Freud chronologically, with Groddeck’s emergence in Ferenczi’s drifting from Freud, using their correspondence as main primary sources, focusing on key selected episodes from 1908 to 1933, and map out the introjective process as what Ferenczi has written about *Introjection* in these 25 years. I will use psychobiography as a tool. Such an attempt at mapping an idea with life experience is the first of its kind in the literature on Ferenczi studies.

Runyan (2003), drawing upon the novel idea of ‘historical science’, points out that it is about the explanation of complicated sequences of ‘historically contingent events and processes, which often cannot be predicted, exactly replicated, nor subsumed under general laws’ (p. 128). This notion is applicable to this thesis in that it supports the use of a chronological perspective in tracking and exposing a unique and non-replicable historical sequence in which knowledge lies, in the sense of historical science. Tracing the development of Ferenczi’s concept of *Introjection* upon the development of his relationship with Freud is the objective of this thesis. I will look for and into antecedent events in the relationship whose development is parallel to or anticipatory of Ferenczi’s idea of *Introjection*. On the other hand, I will also investigate whether Ferenczi’s idea of *Introjection* in general could indeed also account for how the relationship evolve, given Ferenczi’s merging his life with psychoanalysis.

Schoenwald (1973) states what historical work on psychoanalysis could be: ‘resolutely historical and deftly psychoanalytic, one that dissects out main threads and then tangles and untangles them as they reach onward in time’ (p. 406).
Rudnytsky (2002) comments that, in historians’ encounter with the written texts in the history of psychoanalysis, they ‘can witness how the personal and professional lives of those who have preceded [them] are intimately intertwined’ and that they ‘have an opportunity to observe this meta-quality of psychoanalysis in a concentrated form’ (p. 108). I use the letters between Freud and Ferenczi, as well as those between Ferenczi and Groddeck\textsuperscript{46}, as historical raw material for mapping out these linkages, the ‘meta-quality of psychoanalysis’ (ibid., p. 108). These two sets of letters have been translated and published. Other than the published letters, I also looked into those unpublished but relevant materials, mostly letters, which I found from several archives. On 13 Aug 2006, I visited Michael Giefer, the editor of the German Edition of the Ferenczi-Groddeck Correspondence, in Frankfurt. He provided me with a copy of the original manuscript of Ferenczi’s Christmas Day 1921 letter to Groddeck, a letter that marked the watershed of the Freud-Ferenczi relationship (see Appendix 5). On 29 May 2007, I went to Paris to visit the literary representative of Sándor Ferenczi, Dr Judith Dupont, who kindly furnished me with unpublished letters between Jung and Ferenczi (see Appendix 6 for a sample letter). I also visited the Groddeck Archive (now named Georg Groddeck Paper, in Special Collections of the Albert Sloman Library) in the University of Essex several times. I went through the four boxes of items and found some unpublished but translated writings of Groddeck, notably the Issues of Die Arche from 1925 to 1927 (Box 2), English translation of Psychoanalytical Sessions for the Use of Sick People, lectures by Dr Groddeck in his Sanatorium in Baden-Baden, which were referred to in the thesis, as evidence in support of some arguments. In my visit to the Archive of the British Psychoanalytical Society, I found some letters between Jones and Ferenczi. I also got some unpublished letters of Freud from the Freud Museum, London.
Haynal (1997) ponders over the neglected value of letters in the history of psychoanalysis, that, with the successive publication of the letters, we are only beginning – through the various correspondences of Freud’s inner circle – to understand the unfolding of events.’ (p. 454).

Silverman (2012), reviewing the just published correspondence between Freud and Rank (Freud & Rank, 1906-1939), comments that these letters have ‘everything from sporadic disagreements to grocery lists and vacation postmortems’ (p. 126). Yet, upon closer inspection or analysis of the dynamics and interplay of human characters, they could reveal that ‘for each squabble, no matter how apparently petty, there is truly much at stake’ (p. 130). In the case of Ferenczi’s letters with Freud and with Groddeck, within the ‘events’ and ‘squabble’ are also the gestation of ideas that are to be written by Ferenczi, e.g. introjection, relaxation technique, trauma origin of severe neurosis, confusion of tongues, and mutual analysis, as they evolve because of, or at times in spite of, his relationship with these people. These letters include those between Freud and Ferenczi, Groddeck and Ferenczi, as well as those peripheral yet crucial ones between any other people in the psychoanalytic circle at that time who have something to do with Ferenczi. Notable ones include his correspondence with Jones and Jung.

That Ferenczi might be developing his analytic ideas from his experience with Freud is noted in some past studies. For example, Gedo (1997) points to the connection, a temporal and an analytic one, between Ferenczi’s developing the idea of active technique (Ferenczi, 1920), ‘designed to alter intrapsychic conditions – or to issue prohibition about extra-analytic enactments of the transference’ (Gedo, 1997, p. 431), and his experience with Freud who dictated Ferenczi’s love life in the format of analysis during World War One,

when Ferenczi turned to Freud for psychological assistance during the
War, the latter prevented him from marrying a girl he thought he loved, pushing him into marriage with her mother instead. The technique of this analysis was doubtless too active by far – hyperactive’ (ibid., p. 431)

Guntrip (1975), on the other hand, argues that it is the author’s pathology that drives the making of theory,

on the difficult question of the source of theory, it seems that our theory must be rooted in our psychopathology. This was implied in Freud’s courageous self-analysis at a time when all was obscure. The idea that we could think out a theory of the structure and functioning of the personality without its having any relation to the structure and functioning of our personality, should be a self-evident impossibility. If our theory is too rigid, it is likely to conceptualize our ego defences. If it is flexible and progressive it is possible for it to conceptualize our ongoing growth process, and throw light on others’ problems and on therapeutic possibilities. (p. 156)

Even Balint (1967), Ferenczi’s analysand and loyal pupil, concludes that his ideas are partly pathology driven,

How far this was a legitimate experiment and how far it was only a symptom of the immense desire in Ferenczi for love and affection is impossible to decide, since he died before his experiments could be concluded. Knowing his character, the most likely answer will be that it was both. (p. 164)

Even so, the manifestation of one’s pathology, or character, is to be found in one’s relationship. Guntrip’s argument about the flexibility and progressiveness of a theory, however, are reminiscent of Ferenczi’s style. Grunberger (1980) suggests that Ferenczi’s ideas and technique experiments evolve from his trauma from, and the analysis with, Freud, in terms of the deep regression and transference, as well as Freud’s detachment and lack of empathy. Freud’s rejection creates intolerable and narcissistic wounds in Ferenczi. Ferenczi turns to his patients, readily identifies with those who have also been emotionally damaged. He tries to give them the love, empathy and tenderness that he himself also longs for. His sensitivity to the non-transference aspects of the therapeutic relationship and concern over the counter-transference problems mirrors the difficulties of his complex relationship
with Freud. Thompson, Ferenczi’s pupil, once recalled that Ferenczi told her in his final years that he envied his patients who could have such indulgent kind of analysis. (Thompson, 1944). Ferenczi has consciously compared the two kinds of analysis. He could not turn Freud into a tender mother whom he believes could be the antidote to his early wounds. Facing his patients with similar issues, he creates and conducts the technical experiments of relaxation so as to prove, with his patients as his proxy and he himself being the ideal mother, that he is correct, or to have a surrogate version of what he craves for: maternal love.

Golinelli (2005) even further argues that Freud fails being Ferenczi’s ideal object and Ferenczi has difficulty separating from him, ending up in the struggle and competitive drive to excel Freud, by his ‘innovation’ in the analytic techniques,

Ferenczi’s technical experimentations should perhaps themselves be seen as a consequence of his difficult relationship with Freud. Instead of going through a normal process of disillusionment, and therefore of separation / individuation from Freud, Ferenczi ended up seeing him as a failed ideal object, needed to differentiate himself from him – all of which might have been combined with his secret wish to surpass him. (p. 947)

Myers (2000) also analyzes the entangled relationship, and comes to the conclusion that the problem lies in the multi-faceted nature: analyst, teacher, friend and colleague and its ramification in Ferenczi’s life and work. The part of Freud’s analysis of Ferenczi, whether formal or informal, is particularly problematic, in view of the contamination entailed by the multiple roles they have. Myers adopts Ferenczi’s theory that ‘patients unconsciously perceive and symbolize their psychoanalytic situation’ (p. 92), and they express, symbolically, valid and unconscious criticisms of both the analyst and their conduct. The analyst, Myers maintains, must identify and learn from the patient’s covert insight, in order for the therapy to work. Otherwise, the patient might replicate the dynamics in the dyad outside in his daily life. Ferenczi is playing Freud in his dealing with Elma and
Severn\textsuperscript{47}, repeating the multi-faceted relationships and generating the most disturbing and torturing outcomes for all relevant parties to bear. With painstakingly detective-like work, Myers points to the possibility that Ferenczi’s swing between being Elma’s lover and analyst is parallel to Freud’s own similarly complicated relationship with Ferenczi. In the case of Severn, Ferenczi’s allowing her to analyze him and to face her hatred is also echoing what he had been wanting from Freud. Hence, Ferenczi, according to Myer’s analysis, is generating his ideas from his difficult relationship with Freud.

These studies of the analysis of the connection between Ferenczi’s life experience and his psychoanalytic ideas are similar to this thesis, and yet they do not use the developmental or chronological perspective to yield a fuller and continuous picture. They also do not allow the discerning of the transition from experience to theory. This thesis’s chronological angle can fill in this void. Moreover, I use letters as the primary source of historical material. Letters can be a legitimate object of historical study\textsuperscript{48}, Rudnytsky (2013a) states the importance of letters in the historical study of psychoanalytic ideas, as a key supplementary material to the published works on theory and techniques,

If the story of psychoanalysis as an intellectual discipline is recorded primarily in the works published by Freud and other authors during their lifetimes, for the subjective underside the most indispensable sources are private letters. (p. xi)

Steiner (2013) discovers that Freud’s letter to Martha during their engagement are a ‘potential gold mine’ (p. 867) for research on Freud’s private life and scientific life in the pre-psychoanalytic days, i.e., for interpreting\textsuperscript{49} Freud. Molnar (2012), much impressed by the intensity of the exchange in these letters, advocates that historians ‘construct some new, subtler, non-reductive ways’ (p. 320) of integrating these letters into the literature, and yet he could not stop imagining historians’
‘impassioned reading of these letters’ (ibid., p. 320). Arguably, the underlying messages and association of ideas, however, might have escaped the scrutiny of a cursory reading. Freud, writing to Pfister on 5 June 1910, commenting on the latter’s new paper, *Analysis of Hate and Reconciliation*, also maintains that details are necessary in a psychoanalytic text,

Now, these psycho-analytical matters are intelligible only if presented in pretty full and complete details, just as an analysis really gets going only when the patient descends to minute details from the abstractions which are their surrogate. (Freud & Pfister, 1909-1939, p. 38)

The level of details to be covered in the Ferenczi-Freud in this thesis is not just about a fuller account of what has happened, but more importantly, it is to ‘get to a level at which a primitive attachment begins to show up behind the ordinary correspondence of two colleagues’ (Figlio, 2013a). By ‘primitive attachment’, it is also pointing to introjection, as an unconscious communication and relationship that is at the core of Ferenczi’s relating and character style. In so doing, hopefully, this thesis will achieve a ‘much richer and more nuanced history’ (Burnham, 2006, p. 222).

Roper (2005) argues that writing is itself a psychological process and letters are ‘a source of clues about emotional states’ (p. 64). Waites (1995) writes that letters uncover the dynamics of the writer, including the development of his transference. It can even be a ‘consciously autobiographical act, shaped by the self-reflective as well as the communicational motives which typify autobiography’ (p. 116). However, the use of letters as a reliable historical source has to be problematized first, with a ‘critical engagement with the records of the past’ so as to challenge ‘easy assumptions about the certainty of our knowledge about the past’ (Howell & Prevenier, 2001, p. 3). Bruner (1991) points out that there is a gap between human experience and the corresponding representation, and that even love letters merely
use conventional ready-made expression that makes such the letters not as clear a psychological record as we may wish. One cannot be entirely sure ‘what the words used meant to the writer’ (Clark, 1967, p. 63). Also, the scope of letters or other documents used will have implication on the adequacy of evidence (Stanford, 1987). Hence, letters, though intimate, might not be a true reflection of the author’s mind. This is especially the case when only a few letters are singled out for study. Howell & Prevenier (2001) remind that the historians must attend to the condition – especially the historical context - under which the historical sources, such as letters, were produced, especially the intention of the writers: ‘the events that preceded it, and those that followed, for the significance of any event recorded depends as much on what comes after as it does on what comes before.’ (ibid., p. 19). The chronological perspective of this thesis will help strengthen the justifications of using letters as a reliable historical source. ‘Without a chronology,’ Shamdasani (2009) states, ‘you really can’t understand what is taking place’ (quoted in Casement, 2010, p. 17).

In a letter, an emotional expression is recorded and transmitted when it is read, although what is transmitted may not be a whole version of what the writer has experienced. Roper (2013) argues that the ‘unconscious burden’ of the past would be felt intimately as it is ‘carried in the material evidence of the past, such as when we encounter an entry in a letter or diary that suddenly draws us in to the emotional situation of the person or people we are studying’ (p. 312). Citing an example of a historical trauma recorded in another language, Roper adds that such documented emotional experience has the power to transplant itself to ‘a different time, place and language, now heard – and felt’ (ibid., p. 313) by historians of the contemporary world. If the history of psychoanalysis arguably ‘offers a history of intimate life’
(Alexander, 1998, p. 141), letters would be one of the medium that contain such a history, in that the writers’ momentary thoughts and feeling that future generation of readers can encounter, if not also upon the writers’ invitation. Engerman (2012) argues that experience is more susceptible to historical study because it is ‘drenched with reality’, and yet ‘how historical subjects imagined their futures is crucial to understanding their pasts’ (p. 1402). Rosenfield (2000) ponders over historical figures’ own attempt to link to posterity, using letters as a medium of presence,

Fortunately, great thinkers pass away; we can write about them, judge them and ignore them. Many have left behind letters, manuscripts, notes, trinkets and other relics of lovers, ex-lovers and those they secretly pined after; they have hoped that future generations of scholars and philosophers would immerse themselves in their lives and thoughts; and they have thus sought to remain part of the contemporary scene, just as they had been an inseparable part of culture in their own day (p. 162).

Grinker (1967) argues that the interpretation of ‘accumulated volumes of correspondence’, together with ‘painstaking research, thought and dedication’ (p. 389), constitute a worthwhile psychoanalysis of historical characters. Meissner (2003) reminds us that letters must be read within a certain historical backdrop and conditions that ‘qualify the meaning of the text’ (p. 187). Similarly, Steiner (2000a) maintains that in attempting to interpret documents, ‘one must not force either their sense or their meaning’ (p. 69), and the overall context of the documents must be taken into account. The longitudinal approach of this thesis will address this problem by exposing the developmental sequence of events that lead to the critical one under investigation. Hoffer (1996) argues that an understanding of the historical context of the Freud-Ferenczi correspondences during the First World War enables readers to grasp the multiple meanings which are embedded in the letters. He cites the example of Ferenczi’s struggle against his asymmetrical relationship with Freud, with respect to his swing between obedience and rebellion in the Palermo episode, trying to make
the relationship a mutual and equal one. On a macro context, Hoffer continues, the WWI can be seen as ‘struggles against the monarch’ and the ‘monarchies lost their grip on the populace’ as some new republics are formed and power is shared by more people than before. He concludes that ‘the struggle between Freud and Ferenczi on an individual scale symbolically parallels international events in the struggle between asymmetry and mutuality, authoritarianism and egalitarianism, or, in the language of politics, monarchy and republic’ (p. xxviii). Although the letters which record such experience in the individual and relational level may not truly reflect the historical period concerned, they can offer a glimpse of it. Moreover, in this thesis, it is noted that the tightness of the Freud-Ferenczi relationship allows a specific examination of the corresponding psychoanalytic concept of introjection, or actually allows one to see introjection. The letters are not a transparent window but a medium containing the essence of the relationship in question, or at least ‘a clue to the occurrence of past events’ (Lichtman & French, 1978, p. 20), or a document where historians study for ‘evidence either about the writer’s state of mind or about the state of affairs that he or she intentionally or unintentionally reveals.’ (Stanford, 1987, p. 67). Obviously, letters are not identical to lived experience, but I have found a methodology of reading the letters that is not perfect but good enough to allow one to see introjection. It is close to an analytic understanding of experience articulated in theory.

On the other hand, as letter-writing involves rather free flow of words and ideas, Roper (2001), explicating Dawson’s ideas of composure and subjectivity in writing, argues that ‘unconscious motivations may also be “at work” in shaping a text’ (p. 320). When writing a letter, as contrasted to speaking, the writer has his correspondent both present and absent, as it were. There is no immediate dialogue
but the writer has his correspondent in mind but not in vivo. There are both real and fantasy elements in the production of a letter. Yet, the fantasy part might prevail if there is no direct contact at all. Kennedy (2009) remarks,

> “you can put in a letter what is difficult to say in person, but the danger is that communication can become unreal, with the absence of face-to-face confrontation to test out thoughts and feelings more directly. Perhaps there was an innate risk that the letters could lead to the expression of more and more fantasy.” (p. 72)

In a way, the situation is quite similar to that of a psychoanalytic session, in that there is no eye-contact between the analysand and the analyst. Most of the time, they are exchanging thoughts and emotion in a rather unstructured or unplanned manner, dwelling in the fantasy of each other or of the analytic pair, and yet, presumably, both know when and how to end each session. On the other hand, in the case of Ferenczi, on and off, he had meetings with his correspondents. There were both real and fantasy parts in the relationships and these parts did not eradicate each other. They were even in a continuum with each other, as noted from what they wrote before and after each of their meetings. If letter-writing dwells more in the fantasy aspect, be it that of the writer or that shared between the writer and his correspondent, then examining these letters would give us a close-up of the inner working of such internal or relational worlds. Roper (2001), in analyzing letters, also believes that ‘writing – in the specific form of the letter – provided a means of giving that drama an external form, an existence outside the self’ (p. 318). By ‘that drama’, he refers to one’s internal drama that is expressed in writing.

Letters capture historical moments of facts and fantasy, thoughts and emotion, movement and stagnation, as well as the correspondents’ own spoken and unspoken aspects about the relationship and the self. Such an intimate production from a person, similar to a piece of work or art work by a self-absorbed artist, contains
much of the writer’s inner world. Such texts may be equivalent to the free associations of patients on the couch, if handled with care (Burke, 1990). If the letters are comparable to psychoanalytic texts, as both are analytic writings, Ogden’s observations about writing and reading of analytic texts would also be applicable. He maintains that analytic writing is about the ‘linking of an analytic idea’ to ‘an analytic experience created in the medium of language’ (Ogden, 2005, p. 15), and that analytic reading, for Ogden, involves “‘dreaming up’ the works” (Ogden, 2009, p. 28) for himself, meaning that he resorts to his conscious and unconscious process of ‘making something of one’s own with the text one is reading’ (ibid., p. 28). Such a reading of letters, in my thesis, would involve a moment-to-moment entry into the details of the letters in order to *almost live within* the exchange between the two correspondents, so as to understand how introjection is at work. As a reader of the letters, I may be working as an observer, or maybe a participant-observer, of analytic sessions, as I find my way into and out of the dyad, in my reading, as listening to, or even ‘dreaming up’ their ‘articulation’ in the letters, and trying to build up a picture of their internal worlds, and their relational world as well. In mapping Ferenczi’s *Introjection* to his interaction with Freud, I would be attempting to follow Ogden’s (2005) idea on analytic writing, yet in a modified form, and in a reverse direction, i.e., linking analysis of experience (Freud/Ferenczi) to *recognition* of Ferenczi’s analytic writing of *Introjection*, instead of linking an idea to an experience. Obviously, I have to use both the analytic ‘reading’ and the ‘writing’ mode, as what Ogden prescribes.

A chronological perspective would give us a detailed picture of how the relationship evolved and changed, as directed by the selected ‘chronological road-signs’ (Mahony, 1979a, p. 552) that capture the key historical events and their
inter-relations. Bacon & Gedo (1993), concluding from their detailed investigation of the Freud-Ferenczi relationship, asserts the historical and contemporary value of such studies,

Their struggles are worth studying in detail because the history of intellectual controversies may suggest how to overcome unproductive disputes in the present, but we are no more likely to discover forgotten treasures in ancient psychoanalytic texts than to solve problems at other frontiers of investigation through archival research. (p. 136)

Hoffer (2010) studies in chronological detail, from August 1931 to August 1932, the correspondence involving Freud, Ferenczi, Eitingon, Anna Freud and Andreas-Salome so as to achieve a ‘historical reconstruction’ (p. 91) of the dispute between Freud and Ferenczi in that period with respect to Ferenczi’s final paper of *Confusion of Tongue between Adults and the Child*. Laying out chronologically the key messages of various correspondents in certain significant days, Hoffer concludes that Freud’s rejection is about Ferenczi’s ‘technical measures that Ferenczi employed in pursuit of that reality’ (ibid., p. 102). This conclusion is in direct contradiction to the version usually accepted by historians, viz., that Freud’s rejection of Ferenczi’s paper was about Ferenczi’s ‘assertion to the reality of infantile trauma’ or ‘prevalence of sexual abuse of children by adults’ (ibid., p. 102).

Their exchange in the letters, both intellectual and affective, is the medium of gestation of Ferenczi’s ideas. Haynal (2014) points out that the Freud-Ferenczi correspondence is the primary source that makes it clear ‘how certain concepts were formed through the exchange of ideas between the two men’ (p. xx). Yet, Haynal is referring to the explicit discussion of ideas that is found in their correspondence. In my thesis, I aim at looking into the process of their exchange in the letters that suggest whether and how the mechanism of Introjection is at work, using a psychobiographical perspective. The emotional tone of the Freud-Ferenczi letters are
captured by Haynal (1993) who observes that Freud and Ferenczi ‘express themselves spontaneously; they reveal their sensitivities and personal concerns, down to the details of their daily lives’ (p. xx). Comparing the level of intimacy of Freud’s letters to his followers, Jones (1955) similarly notes that ‘[t]hose to Ferenczi were by far the most personal’ (p. 155). Hoffer (1996) even concludes that these correspondences are ‘unself-conscious, intimate letters’ as the readers will ‘come to know these two human beings in a very personal way’ (p. xviii). These letters may not be a true representation of the correspondents’ mind and yet they are opening a window that draws the readers closer to the authors’ inner worlds. The text of the letters between Ferenczi and Freud will be examined. Although the versions of the letters available are not the original handwritten ones, in that they are transcribed, translated, edited and published, the essence of the letters is more or less preserved. Essays of transcribers, translators, and editors in the published correspondence testify to this, such as those of Meyer-Palmedo (1993), Hoffer (1993), and Haynal (1993). In tracking Introjection from the letters, it is a ‘study of creativity by directly observing the unfolding creative process’ (Moraitis, 1979, p. 288). The examination of the letters is done by a close reading, following the flow of the feeling, as well as the shift of themes and associations. In Kerr’s (2008) words, it is ‘following a bibliographic trail deeper and deeper into the associations of [the] subject’ (p. 140). This is also similar to the ‘close – indeed, microscopic – reading of some of the classic texts’ (Esman, 2008, p. 961) carried out by Rudnytsky (2002) in his applied psychoanalytic study of pioneers in the early history of psychoanalysis. It is also reminiscent of the ‘metacommunications of the analytic situation’ that ‘Ferenczi had been passionately attentive to’ (Vida, 1997, p. 404). A reading that is attentive to the contiguity of associations in the letters, as suggested by Aron (1998), would provide
us with clues to the underlying or even less conscious message the correspondent was conveying to his addressee. Furthermore, Roper (2005), envisioning a methodology for histories of subjectivity, calls for ‘a full and theoretically-informed understanding of both the linguistic and the psychological processes that go into the making of a text of emotional life’ (p. 70). Obviously, letters would be one kind of such texts.

There are some studies in the literature that have used a similar methodology. Falzeder (1997), in studying Freud’s first analysis of Ferenczi in October 1914, resorts to Ferenczi’s dream of the Occlusive Pessary that Ferenczi reported to Freud in a letter dated 8 September 1914, as an enclosure paper, immediately before their historical analysis. Falzeder adopts ‘a more microscopic view by taking the via regia to the unconscious’ (p. 417). Falzeder’s ‘microscopic view’ involves analysis of the associative flow of the dream, a dream that Ferenczi told Freud that he had ‘rendered all the essentials word for word as they come to me’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 18).

The associations lead from the events of the previous night – Ferenczi’s intercourse with his lover Gizella Palos, who used an occlusive pessary – to thought about identifying with the woman; to the stuffing of small objects into his nose and ears as a child; to tapeworms and echinococci; to the danger of venereal infection; to pregnancy; to self-impregnation; to the prolapse of vagina and uterus in Gizella, interfering with the sexual enjoyment of both partners; to childbirth; to the fear and the wish of Gizella becoming pregnant; to thoughts of Gizella’s daughter Elma, with whom he might have had children and who was presented to him as bride the day before; to memories of his own strict mother, whom he might want to show how a child should be treated properly, that is seriously and affectionately; to infantile autoerotic pleasure from micturition and defecation; to the infantile sexual theory of birth through the rectum; to his difficult relationship with Gizella’s brothers, who made him feel like an intruder and coward; to his envying two boyhood friends for the size of their penises and his fright at the size of his father’s penis. (Falzeder, 1997, p. 419)

Next, Falzeder lays out Ferenczi’s own self-analysis, or the ‘analyst’s
summarizing interpretation’ (ibid., p. 419) that Ferenczi presented in the form of an imaginary dialogue between the analyst and the patient. Upon the analyst’s interpretation, the patient has such associative thoughts: his disturbance by his mother’s genitals being too wide while his penis too little; his knowledge about little girls’ genitals being too narrow; his subsequent regression from object-love to masturbation, and failure in object choice. Falzeder interprets the mother as Gizella, and the girl is Elma, as he contextualizes the dream in Ferenczi’s then hesitation in the choice between marrying the mother or the daughter. Yet, Falzeder’s more profound question is about the identity of the analyst, depending on which level one is aiming the understanding at:

In self-analysis, Ferenczi had split himself into an analyzed and into an analyzing part, while attributing, in his comment to Freud, the first to himself and the second to Freud and, in the article, the first to an anonymous patient and the second to himself. So, on different levels, Ferenczi can be either an anonymous patient (analyzed by Ferenczi or by Freud) or a patient named Ferenczi (analyzed by himself, or an anonymous patient) or an analyst named Freud (analyzing an anonymous patient, or Ferenczi). (ibid., p. 422)

In addition to the inherent difficulties of transference and counter-transference in Ferenczi’s, or indeed anyone’s, self-analysis, Falzeder argues that Ferenczi’s dream and his dream analysis are not only conveying a message to Freud, but, more importantly, also posing a most important question of ‘Who is the analyst in Ferenczi’s self-analysis?’ (ibid., p. 422). Noting that Ferenczi’s dream and interpretation are strikingly similar to Freud’s dream of ‘old Brücke’ (Freud, 1900, pp. 413, 452-453), Falzeder concludes, from his ‘microscopic view’, that Ferenczi cannot express himself if he does not do it

\textit{in} Freud’s terms and \textit{on} Freud’s terms. The analyzing part in Ferenczi’s self-analysis was more an introjected Freud than Ferenczi’s own voice. (ibid., p. 422)

Similarly, Aron (1998) illustrates his analysis of letters as he selects an
important one from Freud to Jung on 24 September 1910, as Freud is near the end of his trip with Ferenczi to Sicily, writing from Rome,

My traveling companion is a dear fellow, but dreamy in a disturbing kind of way, and his attitude towards me is infantile. He never stops admiring me, which I don’t like, and is probably sharply critical of me in his unconscious when I am taking it easy. He has been too passive and receptive, letting everything be done for him like a woman, and I really haven’t got enough homosexuality in me to accept him as one. These trips arouse a great longing for a real woman. A number of scientific notions I brought with me have combined to form a paper on paranoia. (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 353)

Aron (1998) alerts the reader to the sequence of associations in the letter: from ‘Freud’s critique of Ferenczi’s latent homosexuality, to the denial of his own homosexuality, to the work of Schreber’ (p. 12). As both Freud and Ferenczi defend against their homosexuality differently, Freud by being distancing and paternal while Ferenczi are seeking sublimated format in intellectual exchange with Freud. Aron concludes it is the different homosexual craving evoked in each of them that dictates their quarrel.

Themes, persons or events consistently ignored or dodged by one or both of the writers would also tell us something about their taboos, untouchable areas or things repressed. For example, in O’Brien’s (1991) painstaking and perceptual interpretation of Freud’s letter to Fliess dated 4 Jun 1896, he discovers that, while the name of Minna is not mentioned at all in this letter, the text of this letter, especially the associative themes as intermingled with the narration of the events described to Fliess, that Freud is repressing his fantasy towards Minna in the manifest content, and yet exposing them in the latent content of the letter.

Also, a parallel reading of other letters, written by the correspondent to some other addressees around the day of a certain letter, would also be informative about the correspondent’s unspoken feelings towards the first addressee. An example
would be the letter Freud wrote to Jung on 24 September 1910, as quoted above, telling Jung his feeling towards Ferenczi.

This longitudinal investigation would excel the cross-sectional one in that it is continuous and comprehensive, and even more in-depth, as far as the elucidation of the evolution of any given psychoanalytic idea of Ferenczi from the relationship is concerned. Kahr (2011) goes into extreme by collecting all possible historical records, notably clinical case notes, of Winnicott around 5 February 1947, the day that he presented his paper to the British Psychoanalytical Society, a paper that was to be published two years later as the now classic *Hate in the Counter-Transference* (Winnicott, 1949). He grounds the making of this paper onto Winnicott’s difficult experience, chronologically, with his severely disturbed patients, as well as with his first wife.

Themes and the corresponding critical episodes are extracted that would point to a continuous course of development of Ferenczi’s ideas as rooted in the relationship. We could understand more about the interaction between Ferenczi’s life, inner and relational, and the gestation of his ideas. Mahony’s (1997) method of reading Freud’s letters probably also applies to a reading of Ferenczi’s, and Groddeck’s of course,

With each reading, many isolated details come together to form a fascinating gestalt within a constellation of other gestalts. Many rewards lie in wait for the patient reader who is disposed to an incremental wondering about the day-to-day revelations of Freud’s conscious and unconscious activity and his scientific development.’ (p. xiii)

I strive for a longitudinal exposition of the events in question, using a psychobiographical approach in understanding the letters, so as to situate Ferenczi’s Introjection and its development from the Ferenczi-Freud relationship from 1908 to 1933. I also look into the relationship, working along the line of a
‘relationship-centered biography’ (Breger, 2003, p. 164), from the perspective of introjection, bilaterally, or *mutual introjection*. I came across Vida (2003)’s paper after I coined the term *mutual introjection*. Vida, offering a way out of the traumatization that occurred in Conference case presentation, also used this term and she defined it as the model for ‘*autobiographical dialogue in conference space*’ (p. 491) in which as analysts ‘we can exchange something of our autobiographies, and hold one another’s difficulty as we do with our patient, we have some basis for a real meeting, for some mutual understanding, and for possible transformation of our own story through the immediacy of genuine contact with another’s survival.’ (ibid., p. 491). Apparently, Vida’s perspective has Ferenczi’s sense of openness and even honesty, with an existential touch. Yet, she does not stick to Ferenczi’s definition of introjection when conceiving *mutual introjection*.

Although it is a psychobiographical study, it will not resort to childhood experience as an explanation and hence I avoid the problem of reductionism. This is different from some psychobiography, especially those in the early history of this discipline, in which the belief in childhood determinism drives the attribution to childhood trauma as an explanatory etiology of some adult psychopathology. Also, I will limit myself to the lens of introjection as a psychoanalytic concept to understand the dynamic process in the interaction between Ferenczi and Freud. I will follow Waites’ (1995) advocate of good use of such unconscious mechanism as therapeutic fantasy in the writing of psychobiography, just as the analyst’s disciplined use of counter-transference in the service of analysis. I will not use psychoanalytic concepts pervasively and this would reduce the risk of ‘wild psychoanalysis’. In fact, as Ferenczi is not on my couch, I cannot do any ‘psychoanalysis’, let alone ‘wild psychoanalysis’, with him. It is the tightness of the Freud-Ferenczi relationship, as
recorded in their correspondence, which allows me to use my methodology. Such a methodology has not been pursued in detail in the literature with respect to the linkage between an experience and a psychoanalytic idea. My methodology, not a perfect one but one next to the best possible option, is regarded as a restrictive or focused use of the tool of psychobiography. I am not working on a psychobiography proper, or a biography, of Ferenczi. I just want to understand a certain character (introjection) of Ferenczi, and of Freud, who are locked together, as it were, with their lived experience ends up in a psychoanalytic concept.

I will take great pains to avoid the problems mentioned and I aim at a psychoanalytically meaningful portrayal of the birth and growth of Ferenczi’s notion of *Introjection* as lived in his relationship with Freud. I will also endeavour to answer a simple and yet immediate question posed Mark Phillips on Sentimental History, ‘What was it really like?’ (2008, p. 49), by zooming into the moments, or ‘the history of everyday life’ (ibid., p. 60) so as to give the readers a more empathic understanding or close-up of what it is that is seen from the historical subjects’ point of view. Understandably, one cannot really achieve an impartial history as ‘the distortions produced by bias are potentially present in any attempt to write history’ (Clark, 1967, p. 3). Similarly, Steiner (2000b) has the following humble yet provocative reminder for historians, ‘No historical reconstruction can be impartial, because, as historiographical debate has long shown us’, that

> even the most impartial historian harbours subjective variables of the historical moment in which he is living and working. To claim that one has fully comprehended the objective reality of a given situation would be to claim omnipotence. (p. 34)

A familiar reminder actually, regarding its first part maybe. The idea of impartiality may also implicates that the writer himself may be striving for omnipotence or even omniscience, both of which are indicative of being dictated by
strong unconscious motives that may actually interfere with a more proper writing of history itself. In this thesis, I strive to get as close to the immediate experience of Freud and Ferenczi as possible. It is not a clinical experience that I have with them because it is not a psychoanalytic session proper. Yet, with my methodology, I can get close to it. Although I would anchor my methodology to Steiner’s conclusion, ‘My present reconstruction is in no way exempt from these inevitable limitations.’ (ibid., p. 34), my methodology gets me as near as I can, outside the clinical setting.
Chapter 7
Ferenczi meets Freud, 1908: A ‘surprise attack’

The story of introjection may begin at a visible beginning in 1908, which is in the period that Freud, an ‘outsider in Viennese Psychiatry’ (Roazen, 1992, p. 226) begins attracting physicians and intellectuals, who are interested in his new theory of the Unconscious, from Vienna, Germany and Switzerland, after the publication of his monumental work, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, in 1900, as well as the subsequently popular ones of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* in 1901 and *Jokes and their Relations to the Unconscious* in 1905. Jones (1955) has coined the period 1906-1909 as Freud’s ‘[b]eginning of International Recognition’ (p. 27).

Back in 1902, Freud found the small group, *Wednesday Psychological Society*, with Wilhelm Stekel, Max Kahane and Rudolf Reitler. Later Hans Sachs and Alfred Adler join in. This Society was renamed *Vienna Psychoanalytic Society* in 1908 (Breger, 2000). In Feb 1907, Jung, who has already achieved respectable international status in the scientific study of dementia praecox, visits Freud in Vienna and starts their instant affiliation. Some weeks before their scheduled first meeting at 2 Feb 1908, Ferenczi writes to his guru, Freud, for the very first time, on 18 January 1908, a Saturday, with mixed feeling of anxiety and anticipation. It begins with,

I am very grateful to you that you have declared yourself ready to receive me, unknown that I am, in the company of my colleague, Dr. Stein’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 1, my footnote).

However, in Budapest, Ferenczi is already a ‘mature and well-established figure’ (Haynal, 1996, p. 26) who has published about 60 scientific papers. He is also a neuropsychiatrist who gives expert witness testimony in Courts and in his leisure, a poet. Essentially, he is a ‘typical member of the Budapest Intelligentsia’ (ibid., p. 26). For Ferenczi, he almost deletes himself and becomes nobody when
first contacting Freud. His world has been mostly occupied by Freud as the big name. In trying to meet Freud, Ferenczi has to be introduced to Freud via Dr. Stein whom Freud has known earlier via Jung. He is so grateful to Freud for the meeting, a meeting that could ‘create’ himself for Freud, as it were, via Stein, the key person for making Ferenczi known to Freud. Inside, however, he has been occupied by, or pre-occupied with, a Freud,

Not only because I am eager to approach personally the professor whose teachings have occupied me constantly now for approximately a year, but also because this meeting promises much that is useful and instructive. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p.1)

It implies that Ferenczi has introjected Freud’s words but he does not equate Freud with his words. Arguably, he wants to meet Freud because his introjective urge is not satisfied merely by reading Freud.

The next paragraph of this letter shows the state of Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud’s ideas. He is to deliver a lecture on psychoanalysis to the Budapest Society of Physicians more than two months later. The recipients, as he sees it, are ‘a partly ignorant, partly misinformed medical audience’ (ibid., p. 1). For Freud and his theory, one would also classify Ferenczi as a member of the audience, and also a medical audience as well. Ferenczi says he still needs ‘erudition more than ever’ (ibid., p. 1) when it comes to introducing psychoanalysis to this audience. In anticipating this task, Ferenczi tries to follow Freud’s advice, ‘I am keeping in mind your axiom that, in order to be true, one must be considerate of one’s audience’ (ibid., p.1). In being empathic to this group, Ferenczi may also be ‘partly ignorant, partly misinformed’ (ibid., p. 1). So, Ferenczi continues,

The task is very difficult at best; I would only do harm to the cause with a tactless surprise attack and want at least to turn out to be a master in my limitation. (ibid., p. 1).

Ferenczi believes that meeting Freud in person would give him his correct and
complete Freud. The ‘surprise attack’, as much as referring to his ignorance about
psychoanalysis, also refers to this very first letter he writes Freud. ‘Forgive me if I
get right in medias res. The subject easily overwhelms one.’ (ibid., p. 1) is his
apology in advance, an apology for his ‘damage’ done as he goes straight into the
middle of things right at the beginning. Even though he uses Latin for these words, it
does not reduce his urge and momentum to go as near to Freud as possible, without
any prelude or foreplay, as if he and Freud had known each other for a long time, or
as if the letter itself were the meeting. Ferenczi is trying to meet his Freud in this
letter, or maybe in all other letters to follow. For these, Ferenczi finds overwhelming,
maybe with affect that he himself can no longer contain. In Ferenczi’s definition of
Introjection in 1909, he writes,

> the neurotic helps himself by taking into the ego as large as possible a
> part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies.
> This is a kind of diluting process, by means of which he tries to mitigate
> the poignancy of free-floating, unsatisfied, and unsatisfiable, unconscious
> wish-impulses. (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 47)

Indeed, Ferenczi’s very first letter to Freud shows that, in his preoccupation
with Freud who is becoming a key person in his ‘outer world’, he finds the subject
of psychoanalysis overwhelming and yet enticing. He cannot ameliorate it by
himself alone. He is eager to approach Freud personally. In the name of his
upcoming lecture that he both craves and fears, he is overwhelmed with unsatisfied
and yet contradictory impulse of promoting and damaging psychoanalysis. He seeks
out, or introjects, Freud, making him an ‘object of unconscious phantasies’, so as to
dilute such inner turmoil. However, it is Freud that Ferenczi uses to dilute the
poignancy that Freud’s theory elicits inside him. This suggests that Ferenczi believes
that there is something more in Freud the man than Freud the theory.

On the other hand, this letter, polite and ordinary as it appears, could be read,
from Freud’s side, as intrusive and even un-invited, some kind of ‘surprise attack’. It is because, by 18 Jan 1908, Ferenczi has just learnt from Stein about the date of the scheduled meeting. He may not know the exact time or venue. This letter is not a necessary one for scheduling because it is Stein who has been corresponding with Freud on the arrangement of the first meeting. Maybe it is even mainly Stein whom Freud wants to meet. So, Ferenczi is using this letter to press for a special connection with Freud, in the name of his impending talk. After all, 2 Feb 1908 is already a day scheduled for him, and Stein, to consult Freud in person, and yet he still writes this letter to Freud, in the name of courtesy, but actually a ‘tactless surprise attack’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 1), as he ‘lavishes his affects on all possible objects that do not concern him’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 50). As noted before, Ferenczi’s letter is not a necessary one, and his outpouring of mixed emotions of anxiety and anticipation to Freud is even more unnecessary, if not also irrelevant for Freud. As he has not yet met Freud in person, Freud as a fresh correspondent for Ferenczi is in fact an object that is not really related to Ferenczi. Ferenczi’s including Freud as one of such objects for dispensing of his affect, and hence the introjection mechanism underlying, is apparent here. As Ferenczi (1909) also remarks, this mechanism serves to keep unconscious connection with one’s objects. It is possible that, after experiencing this mechanism in the letter (and in other similar experience), that Ferenczi writes it up in his 1909 paper on it.

Twelve days later, on 30 Jan 1908, just three days before their meeting, Freud replies Ferenczi briefly, in fact writing to Ferenczi for the very first time, re-confirming the date of visit of Ferenczi and Stein to his home at Berggasse 19. He does not respond to Ferenczi’s special request for guidance for his upcoming talk, or his in medias res manner when first approaching Freud. Instead, he tells Ferenczi,
Owing to illness in my family my wife is unfortunately unable to receive both of you as guests at table, as we were able to do so in better times with Dr. Jung and Dr. Abraham. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 2)

Even Freud himself feels that he may be the next one to be infected. Objectively, many members of Freud’s family have influenza in that week. Mathilde, Freud’s eldest daughter, age 21, even suffers from ‘an abdominal irritation after an appendectomy’ (ibid., p. 2, n. 2). On 25 Jan 1908, Freud writes to Jung,

This week influenza has been raging in my house and unless I am very much mistaken I am coming down with it myself. My daughter had at the time an abdominal irritation connected with a stitch abscess, an after-effect of her appendectomy. She is now recovering nicely’ (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 113).

The coincidental juxtaposition of infection by influenza and the ‘surprise attack’ by Ferenczi, with Freud’s conscious anxiety of being the next to be infected, or attacked, puts Freud on the defensive as he limits his ‘exposure’ to Ferenczi’s ‘infection’ in their first meeting. Also, Freud may want to convey to Ferenczi that he would not give Ferenczi the special treatment that he wants, especially for his in medias res. Freud finalizes the arrangement as:

I can only ask you to visit me at approximately 3 o’clock in the afternoon and give me the day from then on (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 2), which is probably a diminished version as compared to previous visits of Jung and Abraham. After his signature, he adds, ‘Best regards to Dr. Stein.’ (ibid., p. 2), reminding Ferenczi that Dr. Stein is also in the picture as Freud has been corresponding with Stein, instead of Ferenczi.

Apparently, there is no record of this historic meeting. We may, however, infer from their subsequent correspondence. Ferenczi writes to Freud some eight days after this meeting: first referring a female patient with delusion of jealousy to him for assessment, and then moves on to thank him for the hospitality of their first meeting, and finally discussing with him the psychology of riddle. These three
issues are Ferenczi’s re-connection or continuation of the emotional contact that he has built with Freud in their first meeting. Putting the referral first makes the letter less personal but it also sets the tone of the letter, or maybe their relationship so far. Ferenczi is confident that the Hungarian patient, Frau Marton, with ‘fresh paranoia’ (ibid., p.3), would be capable of transference and there is chance for success of the treatment, although, Ferenczi maintains, it should be done in an institution. He has sent her to Freud in Vienna for an assessment to see whether Freud also shares his view. This is Ferenczi’s very first treatment case that he seeks Freud’s supervision. This paragraph defines the supervisory relationship, with a candidate eager for his master’s recognition of his view and involvement in his treatment work. The candidate’s counter-transference, obviously not yet touched upon or analyzed, especially for his unconscious choice of this patient for consultation, might be involved in how much the patient could be representing Ferenczi in his budding pattern of relating to, or introjecting, Freud.

What makes this possibility relevant is the very next paragraph that Ferenczi writes,

Last Sunday, which I was allowed to spend in your company, is constantly on my mind, and I cannot thank you enough for the kindness and ceaseless stimulation which you showed me. (ibid., p. 4, my italics)

It portrays an instant bonding formed or constructed, from the perspective of Ferenczi⁵⁹, indicating his readiness to transference to Freud as an object. Through transference, the patient’s ‘internal world will register most powerfully and clearly’ (Spurling, 2003a, p. 37), generating raw material for understanding. According to Ferenczi (1912), transference is an indication of one’s unconscious magnification of his addiction to introjection. In other words, introjection is the capacity for transference. The neurotic’s excessive readiness to transference shows that he is
introjecting a lot. Ferenczi’s instant registering Freud on his mind suggests that he is introjecting Freud as what he is writing in 1912 regarding the neurotic’s pervasiveness with transference and hence introjection. One might raise the other possibility of Ferenczi’s reporting to Freud that Freud is always on his mind is just a matter of politeness. However, the fact that Ferenczi excludes Dr Stein, who was also present in the meeting and who was Ferenczi’s lead to Freud, from the picture shows that Ferenczi is indeed trying to form a dyadic bond with Freud. Stein is not mentioned at all in this letter. The meeting of three became one of two. Stein is absent in Ferenczi’s memory of the meeting. If jealousy is about the elimination of the third, Ferenczi’s choice of the patient, Frau Marton, who had ‘a predilection for delusions of jealousy’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p.3) might become more meaningful psychoanalytically. Marton could be a partial Ferenczi-surrogate to Freud. Here, for Ferenczi, talking about a patient is easier than talking about himself. Referring a patient to Freud is easier than referring himself as a patient.

He also reports that he has been browsing through Hungarian collection of ‘proverbs, folk songs, “riddle-tales” etc.’ and finds that the interpretation of riddles is similar to that of dreams. Freud replies very promptly, only one day later. Yet, he starts with a long report on Frau Marton that sets a distance from Ferenczi:

I saw Frau Marton today. It is a [case of] mature paranoia and probably beyond the limits of therapeutic intervention; still, she may be treated, and one can in any event learn something from her. (ibid, p.4)

Evidently, Freud disagrees right away with Ferenczi who believes that Marton’s paranoia is fresh and that treatment for her could be successful. Freud has little faith in the prognosis of Marton, and for the ‘something’ to be learnt from her, it would only be those of the dynamics of the pathology, instead of the treatment success. Ferenczi’s solution to the ‘riddle’ of Marton is different from that of Freud’s. If
Marton is a Ferenczi-surrogate, then Freud does not introject this version of Ferenczi, at this point of their budding relationship.

Even so, Freud then goes back to Ferenczi’s interest in riddle and ends the letter,

> I was very happy about your interest in riddles. You know that the riddle advertises all the techniques which the joke conceals. A parallel study would actually be instructive. No one has followed me up on aesthetic aberrations such as jokes. (ibid, p.5)

Freud is opening, or allowing Ferenczi to open, a new target of psychoanalysis, categorizing it as something similar to (‘parallel study’) the analysis of jokes. He even implies that Ferenczi is the very first one to extend his investigation of parapraxis in jokes to riddles. What Ferenczi is more interested, however, is the comparison of riddles with dreams. Freud does not respond to Ferenczi regarding this line of thought. The Interpretation of Dreams is Freud’s masterpiece that has attracted Ferenczi, as compared to Jokes and Their Relations to the Unconscious. Freud is not seemingly yet ready to get that close to Ferenczi, even on theoretical terms, although the analysis of dreams and jokes follow similar psychoanalytic means, both pointing towards the unconscious. He also does not respond to Ferenczi’s excitement about his very first meeting with him. They are still negotiating a distance that they both find acceptable. If Ferenczi is to introject Freud, what Freud offers to Ferenczi is probably not yet the one that Ferenczi wants.

Ferenczi waits for four weeks before he ‘took the liberty of reporting’ (ibid., p.5) to Freud the progress of his analysis of Frau Marton, a span suggestive of how Ferenczi takes Freud’s move. This time, Ferenczi analyzes the case in the way Freud did. He agrees with Freud’s previous judgment, e.g. ‘The prospect for therapeutic success in the case of Frau Marton = 0’, adding that, ‘She has simply woven psychoanalysis into her delusional system and suspects that I have sounded her out in the service of her enemies’ and ‘Many thanks for the instructions regarding the
analysis of Frau Marton. They greatly facilitated my task.’ (ibid., p. 6). If Marton is a
Ferenczi surrogate for Freud, Ferenczi’s change shows that he is ready to
accommodate, or maybe later sacrificing, himself in order to introject Freud.

In his reply one week later on 25 Mar 1908, Freud appreciates his new friend’s
zest and commitment to the cause, and he looks forward expectantly to meeting with
him again in the Congress in Salsburg on 27 Apr 1908, the first of its kind, and yet
he puts it as:

I am very much looking forward to seeing you and Dr. Stein again there.
Give him my warmest regards. We became very good friends in one day.’
(ibid., p.7).

Here, Freud’s explicit reference to Stein will not make Ferenczi feel good. All
along in their correspondence after the first meeting, Dr. Stein is not mentioned.
Apparently, Freud has not been writing to Stein after their meeting on 2 Feb 1908
too, as he asks Ferenczi to send him his regards. Yet, re-introducing Stein into the
picture, Freud states that the three have become good friends in one day, the day of
their very first meeting. Freud is not yet ready to be that close, or exclusive, to
Ferenczi. He needs a third person to be present between them. This is Freud’s
attempt at defending against Ferenczi’s introjection. On the other hand, from
Ferenczi’s side, before their first meeting, it has been Stein, not Ferenczi, whom
Freud first expects to see. Yet, now, it is Ferenczi via whom Freud sends regards to
Stein. Ferenczi has replaced Stein in a step closer to Freud. Before 2 Feb, Stein is
situated between Freud and Ferenczi. After that, it is Ferenczi who is between Freud
and Stein. Ferenczi is drawing Freud closer as he identifies with, or introject him
as an object.

Ferenczi’s introjection becomes more immediate in his very next letter written
at 9pm on 28 March 1908 (both the time and date were written on the letterhead),
right after he has delivered the psychoanalytic lecture, *Neuroses in Light of Freudian Research*, to the Hungarian physicians:

> I have just come out of the Society of Physicians, where I gave the lecture which I announced to you. It was a “success”, as they say; - the medical public listened to your teachings with great attentiveness and much applause. (ibid., p. 7, italics added)

Ferenczi is writing with excitement to Freud as if he were just next to him, physically and temporally. It has the immediacy of Freud being constantly on his mind, or that he has introjected Freud, or part of him, which makes Ferenczi feel Freud so close. He phrases his lecture as Freud’s teachings, rendering himself a spokesman or Freud-surrogate. Although he also reports objections from some neurologists, with heated and personal arguments, overall, he manages to defend Freud’s teaching, ‘It was easy for me to refute them.’ (ibid, p.7). One gets a sense that Ferenczi is able, not just to defend Freud’s teaching, but achieve more control over the opponents in the outside world by ‘refuting them’. Before this lecture in 28 March 1908, Ferenczi was more solitary in his pre-occupation with Freud’s teaching. The lecture, introducing psychoanalysis to a medical audience, gave him the opportunity to face the outside world, especially those who do not share his conviction about Freud’s psychoanalysis. After meeting Freud on 2 February 1908 for the first time, Ferenczi is able to exert his influence to the outside world regarding his belief about psychoanalysis. The meeting with Freud might have served some introjection function for Ferenczi, i.e., he has introjected Freud to the extent that he achieves a capacity for taking effect on the outside world. This capacity is an outcome of introjection, as the influence of the ego is enlarged to the external world (Ferenczi, 1919), instead of the mere subjective world as suggested in the 1909 paper.

Freud, apparently flattered by this first triumph of psychoanalysis in Hungary,
replies promptly two days later, addressing Ferenczi as ‘Esteemed colleague’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p.8) and is obviously happy. However, he adds, ‘Would like to believe that you defended *yourself* capably. Carry on.’ (ibid, p.8, my italics), which has a tone different from Ferenczi’s way of positioning his speech and his defence. From Freud’s side, he is not introjecting Ferenczi in the same way that Ferenczi does to him. He even wants to see Ferenczi’s psychoanalysis as something of Ferenczi’s own, instead of *their* psychoanalysis.

In a very long letter dated 12 Oct, Ferenczi jots down of his random thoughts about day-dream, unconscious fantasies, and paranoia. It reads like a free flow of ideas in written words, or as Ferenczi puts it, ‘right from the spigot’ (ibid., p. 21). The composition of this letter goes through some pauses, as Ferenczi picks it up on and off. He even adds some more paragraphs after signing the letter. He is putting Freud in the position of a ready and nearby listener, or as an object onto which he could lavish his abundant affect and interest,

> I think back with much pleasure about the evening which, alas, flew by so quickly. I feel lonely here, without someone to talk to. You will, I fear, have many letters wash over you from your very obedient Dr Ferenczi (ibid., p. 21).

He is eager to tell Freud that his cases and thoughts all confirm Freud’s theory of dreams, meaning that he can introject Freud, or anything related, without any reservation or obstacle. In return, Freud reminds him,

> Perhaps you have sought too anxiously to confirm me. If you abandon this intention, you will find rich material from whose investigation confirmation will certainly emerge in the end.’ (ibid., pp. 23-24).

To Ferenczi, Freud wants to separate himself from his work, so that Ferenczi can concentrate on the scientific work not contaminated by any personal endeavours. Also, Freud may not want Ferenczi to come too close. He is also aware of this distance as he alludes to the idea of internal versus external, twice in this letter: he
explains his late and brief reply to Ferenczi’s letters, ‘this results from an external
disruption, because internally nothing has changed between us.’ (ibid., p. 23) and, on
inviting him to Vienna for the Wednesday meeting, ‘I can say the inner as well as the
outer circle of Berggasse 19 will be happy about your visit.’ (ibid., p. 24). Freud is
thinking about the boundary, inclusion or exclusion, insider or outsider, as far as his
introjective relationship with Ferenczi is concerned. Even though at this stage, Freud
may be still quite naïve about the character of Ferenczi, Freud’s declaration to
Ferenczi that ‘internally nothing has changed between us’ serves to remind Ferenczi
and himself that even after Ferenczi pours out his inner association in the last long
letter, Freud still wants to say that such outpouring does not change the inner world
between them, or at least Freud’s inner world. In responding to Ferenczi’s ideas
about daydreams, Freud further adds, ‘I know the difficulties; one can monitor
fantasies completely only in one’s own person, and there one cannot share them.’
(ibid., p. 23; my italics). Freud may want Ferenczi to know that he cannot really
share his inner world with Freud, and probably vice versa. He is setting a barrier to
any introjection that comes from Ferenczi. He also foretells their difference in doing
psychoanalysis regarding the one- vs. two-person psychology.

However, Freud subsequently has another contradictory move: he sends
Ferenczi a copy of the second edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* as a gift. This excites Ferenczi as he replies on 22 Nov. He sees this not only as a valuable gift,
but ‘a symbol of last summer in Berchtesgaden’ (ibid., p 24). He regards this
summer as his most meaningful one. Although Ferenczi has spent the summer with
Freud in Berchtesgaden, he has little to no role in Freud’s revision of the dream book.
Ferenczi has requested to join Freud in his intellectual work during the holiday but
he has been rejected right at the beginning. Ferenczi, however, finds Freud and
himself in this gift. Ferenczi is lavishing his abundant affect onto Freud’s book and introjecting Freud. He quickly reads through the new chapter on typical dreams and finds answers to his dream problems, mostly of his Hungarian culture and language. Ferenczi tries to integrate Freud’s German into his mother tongue, pulling Freud into his inner world. He demonstrates to Freud how eloquent and ready he is to use Freud’s psychoanalysis in analyzing the minds of Hungarians, or how he is promoting the cause in Hungary. He reports to Freud the 7 Nov lecture that he has just delivered to some Hungarian physicians on the psychoanalysis of psychic impotence. There has been some criticism and hostility from the audience towards psychoanalysis at the lecture to which Ferenczi responds fluently with ‘ruthless and callous’ (ibid., p. 25) remarks. Ferenczi finds it very fulfilling, as the excitement made me incredibly eloquent, so much so that when I was finished, I was surprised by the thunderous applause. The evening was not without significance for our cause here. (ibid., p. 25, my italics)

Apparently, Ferenczi believes he has fought and won a battle for and with Freud, a battle that is also about Ferenczi’s own introjected objects.

Interestingly, it is at this point that Ferenczi tells Freud that he has been thinking a lot about projection and paranoia, as he is writing a paper, Introjection and Transference. He is eager for a private meeting with Freud on the upcoming Sunday to discuss his incumbent ideas. Freud, however, invites him to the Wednesday group in Vienna and postpones the private meeting to a later date. Freud also refers to Ferenczi’s previous report of the battle won in the lecture to the Society of Physicians, ‘The applause that you had in the Society of Physicians certainly was for your personal appearance rather than for the cause, but it still does one good.’ (ibid., p. 26; my italics). Regarding ‘personal appearance’, it could be more about Ferenczi’s own internal work about his introjects of Freud or
psychoanalysis, instead of psychoanalysis itself, though Freud does not deny that the victory is good for psychoanalysis. Repeatedly, Freud wants Ferenczi to understand more about himself and his own motive, instead of simply introjecting psychoanalysis, or Freud, and sees himself as equivalent to psychoanalysis, the cause. Nevertheless, Freud indeed values Ferenczi’s company and contribution,

The meaningful summer lies behind me like long years, and it seems positively incredible to me that another summer will come again after this year of work. (ibid., p. 27)

Freud shares with Ferenczi what he is busy working on alone: the paper on the methodology of psychoanalysis. He is granting Ferenczi more privilege of access to his own solitary writing and thinking.

Ferenczi is very happy with Freud’s letter, even though it means delay of the Sunday visit that he has been eager about, because the meeting, though postponed, means Freud will discuss with him face-to-face his latest thinking and ideas about technique. Ferenczi is surprised, and yet very elated, by Freud’s working on technique papers. He believes that Freud’s idea on technique would be very helpful as the younger practitioners who are practicing psychoanalysis face much disappointment and hardship, and do not actually have much progress by themselves. Ferenczi looks up upon Freud to give them direction on how to do psychoanalysis. Freud is giving out something precious and Ferenczi is the very first one to take. Yet, Ferenczi believes that there must be ‘something painful in simply yielding this knowledge, with such difficulty and so many sacrifices, to us youngsters.’ (ibid., p. 28). Freud does not mention or hint at such pain. It is logical to surmise that, to start with, Ferenczi believes Freud has held back such knowledge, as Ferenczi feels the difficulty of getting from Freud the intellectual part in their summer trip in Berchegarten. Here, for Ferenczi, Freud has changed a bit, as he becomes more
‘generous’ to Ferenczi. This change surprises Ferenczi and has impact on him. Ferenczi introjects this part of Freud by also writing about the technical side in his drafting of *Introjection and Transference*. He feels more confident then. With Freud’s giving and Ferenczi’s taking, Ferenczi is introjecting Freud to the extent that he feels more confident about his technique and hence his inner sadness is diluted as a result. Although we are not yet sure, in this case, what Ferenczi’s ‘free-floating, unsatisfied, and unsatisfiable, unconscious wish-impulses’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 47) refers to, we are able to make this connection to his later writing about Introjection in 1909 because Ferenczi’s is obviously elated by Freud’s giving green light to more of his private world of psychoanalytic pursuit. Ferenczi gets something more from Freud so that he can stay alone longer without the meeting as his feeling and expectation become much more positive, ‘With your accustomed openness, with which I feel very comfortable…’ (ibid., p. 28, Ferenczi to Freud 10 December 1908). He just wants Freud to be more specific about what he is to expect about the length of their upcoming meeting. Freud responds that Friday to Sunday have been reserved for him, making it ‘a more compact holiday than usual’ (ibid., p. 29) and suggests him to ‘bring along everything that you have in mind; we will find time for it. You know that the children are very much looking forward to your visit.’ (ibid., p. 29). What will make Ferenczi even happier is Freud’s inclusion of him, implicitly, into his writing of the technique papers

Technique will probably not be quite what you expect. Thirty-four pages have been done up till now, and by Christmas we won’t have more than forty or fifty, which you can then read here in order to tell me your impression of them. (ibid., p. 20; my italics).

Using ‘we’, instead of ‘I’, Freud may be telling Ferenczi subtly that he is already part of Freud’s writing. Ferenczi will even be the very first person to read and comment on Freud’s draft of the technique papers. Freud is offering much to
Ferenczi indeed.

Ferenczi is clearly excited by this news. In his reply to Freud on 15 Dec 1908, he looks forward to this Christmas meeting, but he puts it in this peculiar way, ‘It is self-explanatory that I will steal only as much of your valuable time as you have in excess’ (ibid., p. 29; my italics). He positions himself as a ‘thief’ who will only, without Freud’s awareness, take all of what Freud have in excess, suggesting a sense of devour and hunger. This can refer to his own subjective introjection, without the real participation of Freud the real person. Paradoxically, he is also foretelling this ‘theft’ to Freud the ‘victim’, making sure Freud knows this consciously, and also that Freud has the choice of how to react to such a ‘theft’ of his precious time. However, if Ferenczi is a seasoned thief, he would even be able to steal Freud’s time even with Freud’s own precaution, and without Freud’s awareness. Such a state of conscious stealing and becoming a victim, less consciously, of theft suggests that Ferenczi’s mechanism of introjection not only have both subjective and objective elements, but also that with the ‘cooperation’ of two subjective mind, there can be something objective coming out of it. Hence, there is the reality or objective element in it too. A rudimentary version of inclusion of reality or objectivity in introjection is found in his 1919 paper on Concerning the Psychogenesis of Mechanism as Ferenczi shows that introjection can lead to more control of the ego over the external world, as shown in human’s use of the stick and hammer. Moreover, in his 1925 paper on Psychoanalysis of Sexual Habits, Ferenczi includes the reality or objective aspects in introjection too, as he remarks that after taking in stimuli from the external world, the internalized objects will be worked towards the outside world, showing that objective outcome follows from subjective or unconscious mechanism. Apparently, Ferenczi’s introjection at this stage of relationship with Freud is not merely his own
inner issue, but that of extending to the outside world, viz., Freud. He starts to influence Freud. It may be of little surprise that, in this letter, he begins to analyze Freud: he picks up two of Freud’s parapraxis, that of mistaken year (1909 mistaken as 1809) in a footnote in the paper, *On the Sexual Theories of Children* and the same mistake in the second edition of the *Interpretation of Dreams*. He surmises that the mistakes are due to Freud’s dissatisfaction of the slow publication of his recent papers.

This Chapter shows that Ferenczi relates to Freud in a way that is anticipatory or illustrative of what he writes about *Introjection* (Ferenczi, 1909, 1912, 1919 & 1920), with respect to his drawing Freud in, excessive readiness of transference that is a magnification of his addiction to introjection, that introjection results in more control over the external world, and lavishing affect onto Freud. They exchange matters and feelings of concern and how they begin to situate each other in their lives, psychoanalytic and otherwise. Apparently, Ferenczi is the more forceful and expressive one, but Freud is not totally passive. They are moving towards each other in their own pace, and yet also responsive to the other’s moves in one’s own way. Ferenczi shows his unconscious tendency to introject more and more of Freud and his teaching, offering himself without reservation, plunging into the heart of the matter, *in medias res*. Freud responds consciously, or even defensively, setting boundary. Ferenczi may be disappointed at some of Freud’s responses, still he continues with his way of relating to Freud, whether it is the Freud as a person, correspondent, or simply as psychoanalysis.

After their Christmas holiday together in 1908, it is Freud who first re-starts the correspondence, on 1 Jan 1909. He is already thinking about their holiday plan in the summer, which, after many twists and turns, becomes the historic trip to America.
Their ‘journey’ in planning this journey to America will be covered in the next Chapter.
Chapter 8

The journey to their 'great journey' to America, 1909: Freud’s stalker

The year 1908 witnesses Ferenczi’s first meeting Freud and his initial attempts at soliciting an exclusive and introjective relationship with him. This is noted in Ferenczi’s ousting of Stein, the Hungarian doctor who introduced Ferenczi to Freud. Also, Ferenczi’s meeting with Freud in the April Salzburg Congress further strengthens their budding relationship as Freud then invites Ferenczi to join his family in the Summer vacation in Berchtesgaden, after which Ferenczi further joins Freud family for the Christmas holiday. Ferenczi’s aim of a dyadic introjective relationship with Freud is taking shape and such experience is also reflected in his writings on introjection. This Chapter is about how they plan for their America trip, a trip that has been meant for them only but Freud allows Jung join in later. It shows Ferenczi’s striving for a dyadic relationship with Freud. The events in this episode are also related to Ferenczi’s (1909) first, as well as some subsequent, articulation of the concept of Introjection.

Freud’s journey to America in 1909 is regarded as an important event in the history of psychoanalysis. It has been covered in Freud biographies or history of psychoanalysis, written first by early followers of Freud and recently, historians. For example, Jones (1955) recalls it ‘an event that was to introduce Freud’s personality and work to a far wider and more distant circle.’ (p. 53). Brome (1967) describes it as ‘[t]he spread of Freud’s international fame became clearly evident’ (p. 96). The coverage is so prevalent that Skues (2012) even conjectures, though skeptically, ‘there can be very little left to say or learn’ (p. 51). Makari (2012) still sees it as ‘a pivotal moment that defined a still protean psychoanalytic scene in America’ (p. 111). These expositions on the trip, however, focus exclusively on
Freud as the protagonist, with Jung as a key player, but neglect Ferenczi as a crucial partner from the very beginning of this trip.

The journey, as climaxed in Freud’s lectures in the Clark University, is itself worth historical investigation. For Ferenczi, this is his very first journey with Freud. The complex planning process of this journey is informative about introjection between them, as shown in their correspondence. There are many twists and turns in the decisions. Jones (1955) has mentioned their planning, but he does not go into their interaction64

The traveling plans were also very complicated. They tried hard to secure passages on a ship from Trieste, calling at Palermo, so as to enjoy the Mediterranean, but the final decision was to sail from Bremen on the Norddeutscher Lloyd ship, the George Washington, on August 21. (p. 54)

To begin with, Freud does not like America65, especially for its shallowness. Actually, he is ambivalent about this Country, let alone visiting it. Such ambivalence, on the other hand, is intermingled with his another ambivalence of a trip with Ferenczi. In the preparation of this historic trip to America, Freud leads Ferenczi into his changes of decision, of going or not going, how to go, how long should the voyage be, and even how their cabins should be arranged during the sea trip. At the same time, Ferenczi is following Freud closely. A dyad is forming, presumably an exemplary experiencing of Introjection, and yet it is truncated by an unexpected Jung who comes into the picture as late as in June 1909. The presence of Jung makes Ferenczi’s aversion to any third party more visible. Ferenczi retreats a bit, but it also illustrates Freud’s need to dilute the formative and yet intimate dyad.

The story begins in December 1908, when Freud turns down an invitation from Stanley Hall, President of Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, to deliver a series of lectures on the 20th Anniversary of the University in early July 1909. According to Rosenzweig (1994), a total of 29 distinguished lecturers deliver
lectures on this occasion and also receive honorary degrees from Clark University afterwards. They come from various fields: mathematics, physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology, psychology, education, anthropology, and history. Amongst them, two have just received the Nobel Prize. Also, most of them are from prestigious Universities, mostly in America such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of Chicago. This is an ‘all-star conference’ (Kerr, 2008, p. 135). The profile of Freud, a private medical practitioner in Vienna, is atypical amongst them.

The situation and manner that Freud first tells Ferenczi on 1 Jan 1909 about this\textsuperscript{66} is rather telling. It is within a context, as Freud casts it, of a catastrophe: on 28 Dec 1908, there is a serious earthquake in Sicily and Calabria. Almost 100,000 people have perished. The town of Messina is destroyed (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 31, n4). Freud writes,

> With the news from Messina you must certainly have thought about our plans for the summer. I would almost have given in to an invitation to America in July. (ibid., p. 30 - 31).

Freud puts three things into this short paragraph: an earthquake, their summer plan, and an invitation. Accordingly, on 29 Dec, Freud writes to Hall\textsuperscript{67} to decline the invitation because of bad timing and loss of income (Rosenzweig, 1994). Given the earthquake, if Freud had accepted the invitation, he would have a new option, America, for \textit{his own} summer vacation, meaning he can give up Ferenczi regarding the summer holiday because Ferenczi is not invited by Hall. Freud is telling Ferenczi that going to America alone has been on his mind. At this point, Freud has not thought of taking Ferenczi to America. That is why when he writes to Ferenczi about the ‘news from Messina’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 30), he is actually equating it to a shaking up of Ferenczi’s plan to have summer holiday with him, ‘\textit{you must certainly have thought about…}’ (ibid., p. 30 – 31; my italics). Freud is
essentially asking Ferenczi to think for himself the summer plan. Freud’s first conveyance to Ferenczi about the invitation to America has been intermingled by his constant need to keep a correct degree of intimacy, or in Ferenczi’s terms, a correct amount of Freud to be given to Ferenczi to introject. Freud’s wary of introjecting Ferenczi, or of being introjected by Ferenczi, is shown here right at the beginning of this ‘great journey’, a journey not just to America, but also one to the formation of an analytic pair that will generate great creativity (Figlio, 2013a).

Such a double and complicated ulterior message, however, poses little difficulty to Ferenczi, as recorded in his immediate response on 2 Jan,

The catastrophe in Sicily has shaken me also; naturally, I immediately thought about our plans for the summer and wondered whether they might not be jeopardized by this.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 32; my italics)

Ferenczi positions himself as a target of this earthquake. The origin of Ferenczi’s quake, however, is from Freud himself. It is Freud who may be shaking Ferenczi away, since he has not thought of taking Ferenczi to America. Yet, if they were to go to America, it would be their very first trip together, and indeed a test of how close they can be. So, for this 1909 summer trip, Ferenczi is especially enthusiastic. Upon knowing the Sicily quake, Ferenczi’s very first thought is to check whether his Freud is still with him. It is, coincidentally, Freud’s decline of the invitation to America, and Ferenczi’s own reading of Freud’s narration about it, that settles Ferenczi,

I am comforted by the fact that you only “almost” accepted the trip to America, although I am even “able” to follow you there. You see, you won’t get rid of me so easily! (ibid., p. 32; my italics)

Ferenczi is comforted by two key elements. The first is Freud’s lack of determination to shake Ferenczi away, as Freud does not accept the America invitation and dump Ferenczi right away for the summer holiday. Also, even if Freud
does abandon him, Ferenczi believes he has the means to be ‘able’ to follow Freud. Ferenczi’s double quotation mark has double meaning: he becomes a stalker and follows Freud wherever he goes, there in America, i.e., he is introjecting Freud objectively although Freud may have to ‘cooperate’ to some extent in order to make it come true. On the other hand, Ferenczi is also talking about his own inner world as he keeps thinking of Freud, giving Freud a permanent place there. However, if this is the case, it is Ferenczi himself who cannot get rid of Freud so easily, instead of the other way round. In these two senses, both objective and subjective, Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud here is similar to his exposition about introjection in his later paper, Concerning the Psychogenesis of Mechanism (Ferenczi, 1919), in which he argues that the pre-historic tools are introjections of ‘a part of the external world by means of which the sphere of influence of the ego is enlarged’ (p. 390), meaning more control of the ego over the external world. This combination of objective and subjective aspects of introjection suggest that Ferenczi has moved one step further in building his dyad with Freud. At the time of writing this letter, Ferenczi might not be aware of this mechanism of introjection that he is experiencing with Freud. However, this does not preclude the possibility that he is incubating this idea and some years later he articulates it in his paper in 1919. This might not be a direct cause-and-effect linkage between an experience and its articulation years later, but it shows that Ferenczi has indeed lived an idea before his writing it up. However, the dyad is forming and even consolidating, via introjection.

At this point, Freud believes that the chance of going to America is almost zero, as he reveals to Jung on 30 Dec 1908 that he does not believe Clark University will postpone the celebration of the Anniversary for 3 weeks in order to suit Freud’s summer holiday, or in order that Freud can go when the time for his usual summer
holiday arrives. Either way, Freud does not have omnipotent fantasy on this towards Clark. It is against this background that Freud now extends his ‘invitation’ (10 Jan) to Ferenczi to go with him,

if the trip does come about contrary to all expectation, I would also be in a position to ask you to accompany me (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 33).

This virtual invitation to a virtual tour, as it were, only suggests that, at this moment of this historic trip, Freud’s ambivalence towards Ferenczi runs in parallel with his ambivalence towards America. As for the former, it is also about the wary and pleasure in being introjected. Freud’s ‘invitation’ serves as a polite response to Ferenczi’s enthusiastic but self-serving joke about sticking to Freud, and yet behind this joke, it reveals Freud’s difficulty in situating Ferenczi’s introjection in a correct place somewhere between reality and fantasy. Freud continues with repeating his reason for his refusal of the invitation that justifies his decision: that the trip to America does not worth his giving up that much income. He even reduces it to mere monetary terms, ‘America should bring money, not cost money’ (ibid., p. 33). He also expects Americans’ rejection of his psychoanalysis once they find out his uncommon view on sexuality.

Ferenczi, however, is not excited by Freud’s virtual invitation,

The trip to America also occupies my thoughts; from a material point of view I have no insurmountable difficulties.’ (ibid., p. 35)

The problem is: his thoughts about the trip are different from Freud’s. He states his position in simple terms but it is directly opposite to Freud’s: that he has no concern about money; or money is not his obstacle. It is not yet their trip. However, Ferenczi does have one ‘insurmountable difficulty’, viz., Freud, or that Freud has ambivalence about going with him. In the letter, Ferenczi then disagrees with Freud’s repetitive devaluing of America, as he foresees that as this country loves
fashionable things, Freud’s idea will soon become trendy there. Ferenczi even anticipates that, in a few years’ time, Freud will earn much from this country for his lectures there. Ferenczi is trying, in a rather lukewarm manner though, to persuade Freud to change his mind so that both of them will have similar thoughts. Yet, Ferenczi appears discouraged,

As long as it doesn’t stop quaking in Messina, I have no real desire to inquire about travel arrangements. (ibid., p. 35).

Here, his thought goes back to the disturbing earthquake, or Freud’s ambivalent attempt to shake him off for the summer, which is still unsettling on his mind. Regardless of which destination Ferenczi has in mind when he writes about the enquiry, Ferenczi has no real interest when it is about a trip without Freud. Nevertheless, Ferenczi closes this by offering some ‘comfort’ to himself about the virtual trip,

My brother says the most comfortable thing is to make the voyage from Fiume with one of the big cruise ships of the Cunrad line. (ibid., p. 35)

At this stage, Freud’s ambivalence towards Ferenczi, no matter how subtle it is, could mean much to Ferenczi, given his desire for the whole Freud by introjection. He has difficulty in accepting a part-Freud.

Meanwhile, Freud continues to repeat his ambivalent discourse about America. He tells Ferenczi (17 Jan) that there is no news from America. He re-states his distaste for America as well his fear of its rejection. His fear, moreover, might also entail one of being introjected by this big and greedy Country, together with his own desire for it regarding the fame it offers. Then, he repeats his ‘invitation’,

If the trip should materialize, against all human expectation, then your participation is a matter of course. (ibid., p. 36)

Ferenczi does not respond to or address this ‘invitation’ anymore in his subsequent couple of letters to Freud. Apparently, he has accepted Freud’s belief that
their America trip is just an impossible trip, but he still does not want to give up the summer with Freud. About two weeks later, he adds the following after signing off his letter,

In the event that the trip to the U.S. does not materialize, I would like to recommend trying a trip to Egypt. (ibid., p. 42)

Freud replies promptly that he believes the trip to America will come to nothing, closing the case between them. However, he adds that although he has wanted to go to Egypt for a long time, he does not believe ‘one can exist there in September’ (ibid., p. 43). He would consult his handbook for travellers and, in passing, he also asks Ferenczi to find more information about it. Ferenczi does not follow up on Freud’s suggestion at all, indicating he has no desire to inquire about travel information since his internal ‘earthquake’ is still at work, as Freud is ambivalent about going to Egypt with him too.

Against all odds, by the end of February 1909, Freud receives a second invitation from Hall who really caters for Freud’s concern by raising the travelling allowance and deferring the lecture to September. Most importantly, Hall promises Freud an honorary degree, the Doctor of Laws. Freud is surprised and happy. He replies Hall on 28 Feb. He writes to Ferenczi on the same day, summarizing the development of the incident that leads to his latest decision to accept the invitation. Freud, however, does not mention the honorary degree. He is keeping his excitement from Ferenczi. Finally, he adds,

In accordance with our earlier arrangement, I ask if you want to come along on this journey. It would be a great pleasure for me. (ibid., p. 48; my italics).

It is meant to be an invitation, and yet he still asks Ferenczi again whether he wants to come, even though Ferenczi has repeatedly expressed his eagerness to go. Also Freud’s tone is rather formal. Taking Ferenczi with him seems to mean
something for both of them, and yet they have not yet been able to articulate about it. Maybe, if Freud can introject Ferenczi, an ambivalent object, he might get an immunization against the ‘bigger’ ambivalent object of America (Figlio, 2013a). Without much excitement, Ferenczi responds twice, one about what he really wants and the other fitting in to Freud’s very formal invitation,

> I have the intention of making the trip to America with you. More Correctly, I accept your kind invitation to travel along and only unforeseen obstacles could hold me back.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 48; my italics)

Ferenczi is always clear to Freud what he wants from him. However, he has to accommodate to Freud’s move so as to make his introjection possible, both in the objective and subjective sense. As long as it is not a total rejection from Freud, Ferenczi can accept and move on with what has been offered by Freud. He readily tells Freud his own need to brush up his English, learn more about America and more importantly, planning the travel, ‘studying the means of transport is a task in itself’ (ibid., p. 48). As it is going to be a long journey in the trains and ships, it will be a trip that Ferenczi can be with Freud alone, as contrast to the previous summer holiday in Berchtesgaden or the Christmas in Vienna. So, Ferenczi is also concerned about the preparation of this trip. However, he does it in a way contrary to what he wants,

> From my perspective, we could travel significantly more cheaply with the big excursion ships from Fiume (Cunard Line) – but it would take much longer. I think we will decide upon a faster ship (Hamburg A. L., Cherbourg); the passage across shouldn’t take up the main part of the entire journey, otherwise we will get to see too little of America.

> Following you advice, I will let the work on the “triggering causes” be for the time being… (ibid., p. 48-49; my italics)

Mundane and ordinary as this may appear, it reveals what Ferenczi is thinking about, or from, his internal Freud, or even as Freud because, previously, Freud has repeated to Ferenczi his concern for the America trip is saving money. Ferenczi may
think Freud would be looking for a cheap travel ticket, and so he suggests Fiume. However, Ferenczi does not know that the main determinant for Freud wanting to go to America is Hall’s giving him the honorary degree. So, whether Freud really wants a cheaper ticket is in doubt. Also, if it is really from Ferenczi’s perspective, money should not be a concern, as he told Freud some months ago. So, this is not from Ferenczi’s, but Freud’s, perspective. This appears more plausible with Ferenczi’s association to ‘Following your advice’ when he starts the next paragraph. Furthermore, in terms of speed, he thinks Freud would like more time in America, and so, against his own wish for a longer voyage, he suggests a faster ship. Ferenczi (1932) argues that in identification with the aggressor, a variant of introjection, it is the patient’s positioning himself to live in the aggressor’s shadow so as to feel his feeling. Such identification prevents the patient from disintegrating and serves as a defence against the shame of helplessness. One could sense a hint of such dynamics in Ferenczi as he keeps following Freud to the minute detail. Ferenczi, as a timid and innocent being in relating to Freud, cannot really understand Freud’s treatment of him, rendering him almost being a traumatized victim. In order to regain strength, Ferenczi acts as if he were Freud, identifying with the aggressor and living in his shadow and experiencing himself as the aggressor, the only person with feeling in the dyad and Ferenczi’s self almost disappears. Arguably, one cannot establish a direct causal relationship between this experience of Ferenczi in 1909 and his writing about the corresponding introjection dynamics in 1932. However, Ferenczi’s writing, conceived as an outcome of the total of his previous experience, clinical or daily, significant or ordinary, suggests that he manages to put the experience into words, which highly corresponds to this piece of interaction with Freud.

It turns out that Ferenczi has made the ‘wrong’ bet, but a right choice for
himself. Freud prefers the route via Patras-Palermo and advises,

'[t]he longer passage should not be avoided, since it is an exquisite pleasure, at least in the Mediterranean. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 49).

At this moment, Freud is thinking more about the voyage than the destination and this is exactly what Ferenczi wants. Freud adds that his brother will also join the trip and is busy preparing for it, which may replace or supplement Ferenczi’s effort. Even so, Ferenczi is relieved at finding out Freud’s preference for a longer cruise, although he may not have a trip alone with Freud.

I am very comfortable with the fact that we are traveling by way of Patras-Palermo and that your brother will also come along. (ibid., p. 50)

As long as Ferenczi has secured Freud for the journey, and now it is one via the longer route, he can accept such arrangements, which are not those ‘unforeseen obstacles’ that can stop him. Even better, Freud tells him two days later (23 Mar) that his brother decides not coming with them as he is bothered by the chaos of his work. However, Freud begins to have second thought about the route via Patras-Palermo because they will run the risk of arriving late if there are unexpected incidents. In early Apr, Freud tells Ferenczi that he has still not yet decided on the ship as he is still waiting for information from Hall. He will make the decision by the end of April. However, he has made another decision for Ferenczi, ‘If you have not said no by then, I will reserve a second cabin for you’ (ibid., p. 52). By this move of Freud’s, they move on as a ‘pair’, or Ferenczi is sticking to Freud, as Freud will book Ferenczi’s ticket too, making decisions on his behalf. Of course, Ferenczi does not say no to such an arrangement. He is eager for those updates from America to Freud so that the ship can be fixed upon. He even changes his initial preference for the Mediterranean so as to align with Freud’s doubt about the longer route via Petro-Palermo. He anticipates that a longer stay in America will compensate for the
loss of the blue sky in the Mediterranean. Whatever Freud offers, Ferenczi is taking it.

However, by 25 Apr, Freud has still not yet received news from Hall, but he has thought more about the various choices of ships and even made firmer decisions against the Mediterranean route. He finds that the George Washington that leaves on 21 Aug 1909 and takes eight days of sea voyage suits them most,

I am firmly committed to decide that way; we can do the Mediterranean in any other year, but America will not come again so soon.’ (ibid., p. 54; my italics)

Other than the Mediterranean, Freud also wants to be firm and clear to Ferenczi about his requirement of the cabin, for which he is going to reserve one for Ferenczi too,

It depends on whether the cabins are on the upper decks and outside. The deeper, the cheaper; the outside cabins, by the way, are usually for two, which we don’t want. Incidentally, it doesn’t make much difference, since, except for sleeping, all activity in a cabin is precluded, unless one has the royal suite. I ask once more for your consent. (ibid., p. 54 – 55; my italics)

This may indicate Freud’s thought and feeling about how he and Ferenczi should relate in the voyage, when they are supposed to be alone with each other. Instead of dwelling on the homosexual undertone, it is obvious that Freud is trying to find a ‘correct’ version of how close they could be. Freud is suggesting separate cabins in the deeper and cheaper cabin, but he also contrasts this with the outside cabins for couple that is not suitable for them and that they do not want. Yet, he also highlights the cabin rule that only sleeping is allowed, implying the fantasy that, even if they share a couple’s cabin, there would not be much difference. It seems that Freud is trying to define the maximum limit of their relationship as something like: they can be as close as a sexless couple. Yet, Freud is not going this far actually, at least not this time. In asking Ferenczi whether he agrees to booking separate
deeper cabins, and at the same time laying out his ‘floor plan’ about the couple’s cabins, Freud may also be asking whether Ferenczi agrees to this definition of their limit of intimacy. In further alluding to the royal suite where more freedom is allowed in the cabin, the degree of closeness can be more. Following Borossa’s (1999) reading that Ferenczi’s introjection is ‘constructed around the idea of taking the other inside one’s self, and blurring the boundaries of one’s self and the world’ (p. xxiii), in the scenario of permeability between two persons, mutual introjection is just all too easy to achieve. Furthermore, it is possible that these implications may not just apply to Freud, but to Ferenczi as well, as Freud may be trying to articulate Ferenczi’s unconscious fantasy.

The journey with Freud becomes more certain and is getting more real. Freud even tells Ferenczi that he will reserve places in the ship Laura (via Mediterranean) if feasible. Ferenczi writes to Freud (1 May),

Finally the great journey has been irrevocably decided upon. I am very happy about it, especially since the first – Mediterranean plan – is to be carried out. Please let me know the amount I owe so that I can send it to you with thanks. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 57-58; my italics)

However, Ferenczi seems to have forgotten previously Freud has also stated firmly that George Washington (not via Mediterranean, shorter voyage) is his firm choice and Ferenczi has also agreed with that. In this journey of booking for a journey, Ferenczi is reduced to a passive and even helpless party, although he has indeed tried to be more active. No matter to which direction Freud’s pendulum swings, he has to agree, forfeit his own wishes, and to follow. In terms of introjection, one is not sure which party is doing more of it, or who the more powerful introjector is. Is it simply Ferenczi taking in anything that Freud gives, so as to maintain the bonding or clinging? Or is it Freud who draws Ferenczi into his own fantasy and ambivalence about the best cabin or correct length of the voyage, in
his attempt to put Ferenczi in a proper and safe place in his unconscious?

This journey of booking, however, is not yet over, as Ferenczi may wish for. Freud changes. He updates Ferenczi (2 May) the cabins in Laura, the trip via Mediterranean that Freud once preferred and tickets almost booked, have not yet been confirmed. Three days later Freud announces the final verdict: Laura’s rooms are fully booked. He continues with his decision without further asking for Ferenczi’s consent,

So, after overcoming my disappointment, I made a reservation with N[orth] G[erman] Lloyd. George Washington, August 21, a proud, new ship. Unfortunately, we have to be content with the inside cabins; the outside cabins are without exception intended for two persons and would cost at least 1,000 marks per person. Now, that has well-known disadvantages, but they are otherwise well situated, right next to a bath. Price, 600 marks, 100 of which I have paid for you, and which I won’t hold to you until Bremen. The numbers are 182 and 184. I let myself be guided by the consideration that you would be willing to accept a certain deprivation of fresh air and view of the sea at night if, instead, you can be undisturbed. I hope it will be bearable. (ibid., p. 62; italics mine)

Such a lengthy justification and explanation may actually tell us more about Freud’s own settlement about his own solution to Ferenczi’s introjection. After swinging between poles, Freud finally makes this final decision. His ‘disappointment’ may only be true on one side of his ambivalence. He settles each of them in an ‘inside cabin’, right next or opposite to each other, and yet seemingly remote from the outside world (no fresh air, no sea-view at night). Both cannot disturb each other, especially at night. There is a clear and firm boundary between them. He probably also hopes both can tolerate this design, and yet also implying that it is not an ideal option that either or both of them may desire. Freud probably wants to give Ferenczi a spatial understanding of the layout, or of his design of inter-subjective world. He adds, ‘P.S. Diagram of the ship will follow.’ (ibid., p. 62), after signing off the letter. Knowing this is really the final decision as the tickets
have been booked, Ferenczi becomes less excited. He writes immediately on 7 May, 

The same disappointment had a less depressing effect the second time. 
I am very much looking forward to the trip and thank you for your efforts. 
The choice of cabins also fits my intentions. (ibid., p. 63; my italics) 

Ferenczi is counting the number of disappointment that Freud gives him. The first one, obviously, is the one Freud writes on 25 Apr, telling him for the first time that George Washington without Mediterranean is Freud’s firm choice. Disappointing Ferenczi twice in the same way may make Freud’s message or solution less powerful to Ferenczi, but it may give Ferenczi a hard time to take it. Ferenczi’s ‘great journey’ on 1 May becomes ‘the trip’ on 7 May. However, Ferenczi still compromises, probably telling Freud what he wants to hear. One would be interested to know what impact there will be on Ferenczi for him to introject Freud’s will and intention in such a way, especially when more may be coming. 

Freud soon starts thinking about the upcoming trip. By 23 May, he is saying that as they will have plenty of time talking face-to-face about the present and future of psychoanalysis on board the George Washington. On 13 June, Freud addresses Ferenczi’s concern about America’s revision of Freud’s theory. However, what disturbs Ferenczi more may be the very next paragraph: Freud’s excitement about Jung also being invited by the Clark University to give lectures. Although Ferenczi has already learnt it from Jung direct some days before, Freud’s reaction to this is new to him, 

Now, that elevates the whole business and will certainly enhance and enlarge everything for us. I don’t know whether he will succeed in sharing the ship with us, but in any case we will stay together there. (ibid., p. 67) 

Ferenczi’s reaction is two weeks’ silence. Freud sends him a very short ‘letter’ on 28 Jun 1909. It is perhaps Freud’s most ambiguous or even peculiar message to Ferenczi so far. In between ‘Dear colleague,’ and ‘Cordially, Freud’, there are only
three question marks; one may note that it is now three, instead of two, people who will be in the historic trip to America and even Freud may have some ulterior uncertainty about. One is not so sure what these mean: whether it is Freud’s attempt to prompt a reply \textsuperscript{73} letter from Ferenczi, given that there is already 14 days’ of Ferenczi’s uncanny silence, or is it Freud’s way to reflect on what is puzzling him? Ferenczi responds promptly (30 Jun) to Freud’s question marks. Ferenczi retreats from the real Freud, or Freud-the-correspondent, to his own internal Freud, a more idealized one, as represented in the dream book,

reading the last chapters of the “Interpretation of Dreams” for the \textit{nth} time – each time I get new insights from it and clarifications which I had overlooked, or hidden, as it were. I believe that the “Interpretation of Dreams” contains the kernel of everything that we know and will have to work on for the foreseeable future. (ibid., p. 68; my italics)

Circling back to years before meeting Freud in 1908, it is also this dream book that first triggers Ferenczi’s ‘hunger’ for its author, or for an exclusively close and honest relationship with him. Now, Ferenczi seems to be turning back to his inner world of his long-introjected dream book for comfort for the wound he has just suffered. In this letter of Ferenczi, although the name ‘Jung’ is absent throughout, Jung is in fact having a very powerful and even visible presence, as noted indirectly in Ferenczi’s psychological state reported in this letter, ‘In the evenings, I am usually so tired that I don’t feel any real desire for work.’ (ibid., p. 68). Ferenczi is probably feeling the threat of being displaced by Jung. After signing off this letter, the sad Ferenczi asks Freud an abrupt, and yet telling, question, ‘How are you planning to put together your wardrobe for the trip?’ (ibid., p. 68). For Ferenczi, with Jung suddenly joining, a trip of three must be too crowded or even threatening. Fast forward a bit, on 5 Oct, immediately parting from Freud after the America trip, Ferenczi writes a long letter to Freud, in which he mentions his jealousy issue,
The impulses of jealousy with respect to Jung, however, also inspired in me the infantile strengthened thought that you, too, do not fully appreciate me (my attitude, my good will, my longing for recognition). (ibid., p. 76, italics mine)

So, one could imagine that, the other question that is not about wardrobe but Ferenczi may also want to ask Freud is: ‘How are you planning to put together Jung and me for the trip?’. Haynal & Falzeder (2003) position Ferenczi and Jung under the ‘shadow’ of Freud,

The relationship between Ferenczi and Jung cannot be conceived independently of the shadow that Freud cast upon it. In fact, it is a triangular relationship, with Freud and Jung as the possible leaders – Freud the founder of psychoanalysis, and Jung the heir apparent – and Ferenczi in between, always very keen to be close to Freud, whatever sacrifice this implied. Maybe Ferenczi himself harboured some hopes to become the heir himself. (p. 467).

Ferenczi is troubled by the threesome as he hungers for a dyad with Freud only. Evidently Freud senses something in this letter and he tries to do some maintenance work. In his reply on 4 July, he says he is open to the possibility of one more meeting with Ferenczi before their expected long trip to America. He offers a ‘remote possibility’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 69) to have a lunch with Ferenczi during his trip to the wood in Tyrol, at a time when he will be waiting for a transit train in Budapest, as he senses that Ferenczi is lonely in the summer. As for Ferenczi’s question about wardrobe, Freud does respond, on the surface, literally,

As for wardrobe, besides the travel suits, I will take along a dress coat and a salon jacket. The former can probably be dispensed with. Don’t forget a good coat for the ocean voyage. One should buy a top hat there on account of the difficulty in transporting it and then throw it into the ocean before the return trip. (ibid., p. 69; my italics)

It is interesting to note the different fate of the dress coat and the salon jacket, both of which will accompany Freud in the journey. One cannot be sure how much Ferenczi has read from or into this passage, other than the literal meaning. Nevertheless, in Ferenczi’s reply some 18 days later, we have a short piece of
Ferenczi’s ‘self-analysis’ that reveals Ferenczi’s core conflict,

   Please allow yourself to plunge into your work. [That was a slip of
the pen; I intended to write not to plunge, and immediately add “although
this request struggles against an inner wish to have more and more of
you.”] (ibid., p. 70)

   And now this struggle during the upcoming trip has a new obstacle, viz., Jung. Ferenczi’s inner wish for Freud does not indicate a limit or a termination. It is always in the present continuous tense, as long as there is ‘more and more of’ Freud in the supply line. This is the same as what Ferenczi (1909) defines introjection for the very first time, as it entails taking into the ego the external world as much as possible, turning it to an object of unconscious phantasy, so as to dilute or ameliorate his inner turmoil of bearing with the Jung who is intruding into the dyad that Ferenczi strives for. Ferenczi is both experiencing and writing about his experience, not just in his writings, but in his self-analytic letter to Freud as well. Such a self-analytic letter allows Ferenczi to work on his introjection issue with Freud, on a more unconscious level, as he analyzes his parapraxis as related to his ongoing introjection process. It also draws Freud in as an analyst or at least as an analytic partner, in order that Ferenczi can attempt to understand more of what he is going through and even to write about it in his current or upcoming psychoanalytic papers. Ferenczi needs both channel to live his psychoanalytic life, as it were, as he merges life with psychoanalysis and vice versa.

   Ferenczi, on the other hand, is hinting at another person who may be competing with Freud for Ferenczi’s introjection. He tells Freud that he is not as lonely as Freud has thought, because he has a good company\(^{74}\) in the summer. Ferenczi also says that, Freud’s invitation to his trip to the woods is still attractive, but ‘for the time being it won’t work!’ (ibid., p. 70). As for money, Freud writes that he will also take the same amount as Ferenczi but he expects they will depend on each other to

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help out if needed. This move brings the dyad a little closer. In early August, Ferenczi is inflicted with intestinal illness but he declares to Freud that he has recovered and looks forward to their great journey.

Looking back at Ferenczi’s journey of preparation for their journey to America, Ferenczi starts with staying close to Freud’s ambivalence towards America, as intermingled with the ambivalence towards introjecting Ferenczi, with respect to taking him to America or not, when Freud first turns down an invitation from Stanley Hall of Clark University to deliver a lecture on an anniversary occasion. Freud puts an earthquake as a backdrop for the upstage of such ambivalences. Ferenczi sadly feels Freud’s ambivalence and he attempts to ‘stalk’, or introject, Freud, objectively and subjectively, that is ahead of his exposition of introjection in 1919. Freud’s virtual invitation to a virtual trip to America, one that was once considered impossible, is illustrative of such a dynamics. Yet, surprisingly, Clark University accommodates Freud and sends a second invitation that he accepts. It is after this point that their trip becomes more real. In their planning for the trip, their dynamics of introjection continues more forcefully. Freud is again indecisive of which route they would go, shifting between a longer one via the Mediterranean, or a shorter one in the Ship, George Washington. A longer one means more time alone with Ferenczi. Ferenczi sticks close to Freud’s swinging positions as Freud is struggling with a ‘correct’ amount of closeness with Ferenczi, or a version of introjection that he finds acceptable. On the other hand, Ferenczi even thinks as Freud, and this anticipates Ferenczi (1932)’s idea of identification with the aggressor, a variant of Introjection. Freud’s ‘design’ of their cabin arrangement shows the limits of their intimacy, viz., a sexless couple, but Freud is not yet prepared to go that far, at least for this trip. Yet, he also fantasizes a royal suite that
is suggestive of omnipotence of a King. The omnipotence stage is the one where most introjection occurs (Ferenczi, 1913). On the other hand, Freud’s excitement at Jung’s sudden intrusion into their voyage, as Jung is another guest invited by Clark University, saddens Ferenczi, as the dyad will become a threesome. Ferenczi displays two weeks of peculiar silence in their correspondence, something that puzzles Freud much. Ferenczi eventually accepts all what Freud dictates and is illustrative of Ferenczi (1909)’s writing on *Introjection*. Yet, Ferenczi also attempts to show some distancing from Freud, by resorting to re-reading Freud’s *The Interpretation of Dream* and moving closer to Gizella, his intimate partner in closet.

However, this story does not end with Freud’s days in Clark University. The Mediterranean that Ferenczi and Freud miss, one signifies their journey alone together, will return in the Palermo Episode that is to be dealt with in another Chapter. Furthermore, Ferenczi’s craving for the whole Freud, although botched by Jung in this America trip, has its payoff when Jung parts from them after their trip in America. Ferenczi successfully gets Freud to accompany him to visit a medium Seidler, in Berlin, on their way back home. This episode will be even more illustrative of Ferenczi’s forceful introjection of Freud and it will be the theme of the next Chapter, together with a mapping with Ferenczi’s writing on *Introjection*. 
Chapter 9

The Seidler episode, 1909: What is ‘Prof. Philipps’?

The Seidler Episode is a sequel to the threesome’s analytic experience in the voyage to America, notably Jung’s truncated interpretation of Freud’s dream about Martha and Minna, with Ferenczi as a witness. It is also the beginning of Ferenczi further introjecting Freud’s unconscious, as it were, by filling in the space left by Jung’s failed analysis. It is an important episode when it comes to the introjective experience in the Freud-Ferenczi relationship. It shows Ferenczi’s deepening involvement with Freud, and vice versa, with respect to the development of their unconscious relationship, using the medium Seidler as a medium of their unconscious communication and introjection. Freud and Ferenczi use Prof. Philipps, a fake name but densely packed with their own unconscious material, and secret as well, to test Seidler’s ability to read Ferenczi’s mind with Freud as a witness, or even to read Freud’s mind with Ferenczi as a medium that contains Freud’s unconscious. Arguably, the idea of one’s secret captured and re-appeared in another mind underwrites the theory of introjection. They set up this experimental name unconsciously, as part of their exploring their vulnerability to introjection, and maybe even unconsciously formulating the concept.

Telepathy, an occult phenomenon involving the transfer of thought between two persons, can be conceived as ‘a form of unconscious communication’ (Rudnytsky, 2013, email communication), or ‘thought transference’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 80) as what Freud terms it. Back to his younger days, Ferenczi was already a believer in the occult. He wrote in 1899, as a young physician, at the age of 26, in a progressive Hungarian Medical Journal, Gyógyászat, ‘Indeed, I do believe that at the heart of these phenomena there is a truth, even if it is a subjective
rather than an objective truth.’ (Ferenczi, 1899, p. 7). He advocated for a scientific study of such phenomena as it would bring about advancement in psychology. The status of occultism in academic psychology in late 19th and early 20th century in Germany was, however, characterized by prejudice and marginalization. Wolffram (2006) notes that academic psychologists, in the name of evaluating the work of occult researchers, constructed the new subdiscipline of the ‘psychology of occult belief’. (p. 237). However, it turned out that this discipline only pathologized the practitioners of the occult, the parapsychologists. On the other hand, parapsychologists counteracted that the academic psychologists simply suffered from a pathological handicap to face the reality of the paranormal. These two camps, both unable to resolve the dispute by experimental means, simply resorted to pathologizing each other (see also Wolffram, 2009). Given Freud’s eagerness for his budding psychoanalysis to be accepted as a new science, it was understandable why he wanted to stay away from being associated with Occultism. In the scenario in America, although William James, the ‘founder of academic psychology in America’ (Sommer, 2012, p. 23), saw himself as a psychical researcher and tried to ‘integrate the scientific study of mediumship, telepathy and other controversial topics into the nascent discipline’ (ibid., p. 23) of academic psychology, it turned out that American psychologists tried various strategies to expel it from scientific psychology. Similarly, the Society for Psychic Research in Germany suffered similar fate (Sommer, 2013). As in the case of Britain, in the late 19th Century, occultism was popular amongst the rich people. They practised ‘[t]able tapping, séances, and levitations’ (Viswanathan, 2000, p. 1).

However, in the history of psychoanalysis, the Seidler episode, in which Ferenczi succeeds in taking Freud with him into a mutually introjective journey,
does not receive adequate attention it deserves. It is of historical interest to know how Ferenczi succeeds in persuading Freud to visit Seidler with him. Not much was written related to this, except for Clark (1980) who had some suggestions,

Here Freud was induced by his companion to visit with him a Frau Seidler, locally known as a soothsayer able to read letters while blindfolded. Ferenczi had for a long time been inclined to accept the paranormal and this, together with Jung’s somewhat similar views, had brought Freud to a path he was reluctant to follow.’ (p. 276).

This Chapter will reconstruct this significant episode that contains a historic moment showing the permeability of boundary between psyches, with introjection lurking behind. This Chapter also analyzes Introjection as an experience, mapped to Ferenczi’s writings on Introjection as a concept.

Soon after their America trip, instead of recalling their experience there, in their correspondence, they talk about their visit to a Berlin medium Frau Seidler they had on their way home from America. This experience has a far more shocking impact to them than their visit to the Clark University. Ferenczi is almost ‘converted’ to Seidler’s uncommon ability of mind reading, or reading of Ferenczi’s thought, while Freud remains a little skeptical but similarly shocked. There are, however, some subsequent changes in Freud’s attitude towards occultism and telepathy. In his 1921 address to the members of the ‘Secret Committee’ (Grosskurth, 1991, p. 19), Ferenczi, Abraham, Rank, Jones, Sachs, and Eitingon in a Hotel in the Harz Mountains, which is published posthumously as Psychoanalysis and Telepathy in 1941, Freud is coming to reconcile the two ‘disciplines’, ‘It does not follow as a matter of course that an intensified interest in occultism must involve a danger to psycho-analysis. We should, on the contrary, be prepared to find reciprocal sympathy between them.’ (Freud, 1921, p. 178.). Yet, in another paper written immediately after this one, Freud adds, ‘Have I given you the impression that I am
secretly inclined to support the reality of telepathy in the occult sense? If so, I should very much regret that it is so difficult to avoid giving such an impression. I have every reason to be so, since I have no opinion on the matter and know nothing about it.’ (Freud, 1922, p. 220). Some ten years later, nonetheless, Freud is more ready to show his readiness to endorse the occult. In the lecture on ‘Dreams and Occultism’ in the series of New Introductory Lectures, Freud wrote, ‘I am sure you will not feel very well satisfied with my attitude to this problem – with my not being entirely convinced but prepared to be convinced. … If there is such a thing as telepathy as a real process, we may suspect that, in spite of it being so hard to demonstrate, it is quite a common phenomenon.’ (Freud, 1932, pp. 54 – 55).

In understanding the introjective experience between Ferenczi and Freud, the key is not whether the medium is a fraud or not, but whether and how Seidler is used for the introjection. After parting from Freud, Ferenczi has an urge to write to him about their Berlin trip. Ferenczi has already started writing a long letter (5 Oct), when he is alone on the train back to Budapest, which indicates that he wants to capture his thoughts and feeling of this post-America trip, and to let Freud know it as soon as possible. This suggests that, at least from Ferenczi’s perspective, he feels their Berlin visit ties them together tighter. He finds Seidler’s ability to read his thought very intriguing, something he cannot explain by reasoning or logic alone. Even more, Ferenczi is shocked to discover Seidler’s power to read Freud via him:

Reading through the cloth, i.e., with a blindfold, could be sleight of hand. But guessing the occupation of Prof. Philipps [sic] as well as the strange statement about your personality are certainly not. I said nothing that could have helped her do this; I hardly spoke at all – she didn’t even let me say a word. The card that she received (and perhaps read, cleverly and unbeknownst to me) says so little that her many pertinent remarks about your interests and intellectual tendencies are certainly striking. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 75)

Apparently, ‘Prof. Philipps’ is an irrelevant person or name used to test
Seidler’s telepathic ability. Some lines down the letter, Ferenczi discloses that it is Freud who suggests that they should pick a ‘completely strange person and not one who is quite close’ (ibid., p. 76) to him. So, the arrangement is: Ferenczi is the client or experimental subject of Seidler and Freud is only the one who accompanies him.  

However, it is of historical or even psychoanalytic interest, and with respect to introjection between Ferenczi and Freud, to investigate into their choice of ‘Prof. Philipps’. The editors of the correspondence surmise that he is probably the painter John Philipp (1872 – 1938) who is a cousin of Martha whom Freud met some 24 years ago in 1885 when Freud was just 29, learning hypnosis in Paris (see ibid., p. 78, n. 3). The editors’ speculation should be correct because later in the letter, Ferenczi has this name spelt correctly as Philipp. This Philipp, as selected by Freud, is a ‘completely strange person’ to Ferenczi but in fact, ‘quite close’ to Freud. Yet, for Freud, ‘Philipp’ may be associated with some memories that mean something. Also, for Ferenczi, his parapraxis of adding an ‘s’ to the name, in his first recall of this name in the letter of 5 Oct, may also tell us something else about his thought.

To understand the meaning of ‘Philipp’ for Freud, we have to go back to 1885. On 26 November of the year, Freud, in his five-month trip to Paris to learn hypnosis from Charcot, writes to Martha, his fiancée engaged for more than three years already,

Yesterday evening John came to see me; he sends you his kind regards. He is quite a decent boy. What amused me was that he was evidently trying to sound me about whether I keep a mistress here. I trust not on your instructions, my little woman? Perhaps it was Mary’s curiosity. Or I misinterpreted his rather naïve talk. (Freud, 1960, pp. 186 - 187)

By then, John Philipp is only 13 years old. Even though Freud phrases it as amusing, he does raise a query about his lover’s trust of him. He is a little confused, as he tries to speculate all possible reasons and meaning behind this adolescent’s
doubt about his fidelity towards Martha. He seemingly also wants to reassure both Martha and himself that ‘mistress’ issue is simply a matter of Philipp’s mis-understanding. About a week later, he writes to Martha, again on John Philipp,

Whenever John comes to see me I am embarrassed, for he keeps admiring my French, whereas I can’t speak enough to ask for bread in a café. (ibid., p. 188.)

If the ‘mistress’ in France is a French mistress, Freud’s denial of his fluency in French would imply he is pleading not guilty. Also, John Philipp’s admiration of Freud’s French may also have an undertone of either veneration of, or maybe mockery, for his ability to court a French woman, given that John Philipp is already an adolescent who would have some fantasy about dating. The point here, however, is not to establish Freud’s innocence, or guilt for that matter, when he is in Paris, as a young man engaged to Martha Bernays. Instead, these events suggest that, for Freud, the name ‘Philipp’ would be associated with infidelity and embarrassment, which is something that Freud may want to test whether Seidler can read out of this ‘name’. Introjection, as a form of unconscious communication, is at work here.

The next questions are: why would Freud choose this name, ‘Prof. Philipp’, as a test case of telepathy? What does this name, especially Ferenczi’s parapraxic version, mean for Ferenczi? And for them as a dyad? For these, we may have to circle back to their America trip, when Freud, Jung and Ferenczi are analyzing one another’s dreams, which Haynal (1999) sees as the ‘paradigm’ of ‘mutual analysis’ (p. 318) but Cambray (2003) characterizes as a ‘three-way analysis of dreams’ that can be read as ‘countertransferentially driven errors, losing the necessary asymmetry of the analytic frame’ (p. 454), whereas Kerr (2010) just puts it as an example of Jung and Freud’s ‘knowledge of each other’s personal secrets’ (p. 502). Jones (1957), nevertheless, has a neutral and brief report on it,
During the voyage the three companions analyzed each other’s dreams – the first example of group analysis – and Jung told me afterwards that Freud’s dreams seemed to be mostly concerned with cares for the future of his family and of his work. (Jones, 1957, p. 55, my italics)

To understand why Freud has to guard against his dream about Minna and Martha and how he wants to test Seidler’s ability at permeating his psychic boundary via Ferenczi by introjection, we have to go into some details about some significant events and studies as a backdrop. Jones’ version of the dream analysis in the voyage to America is not identical to what Jung told John M. Billinsky, Guiles Professor of Psychology and Clinical Studies at Andover Newton Theological School, in an interview at Jung’s home in Küsnacht, on 10 May 1957, that was published in 1969 in a Bulletin of the School. According to Billinsky, it is already after more than an hour into the interview about Christian Theology and Analytical Psychology and actually he intends to finish the interview and leave at that point. Yet, it is Jung who wants him to stay longer. Billinsky then starts asking questions about how Jung and Freud separated. Jung recalls about his visit to Freud’s laboratory in 1907, that Minna discloses to him her distress in her intimate relationship with Freud. This shocks Jung. Two years later in their 1909 America trip, in their mutual dream analysis, a ‘crucial juncture in their relationship’ (Harris, 2010, p. 219), Freud discloses to Jung, with Ferenczi as a witness, disturbing dreams that involve Minna and Martha. However, when Jung wants further associative thoughts from Freud, Freud just refuses bitterly, saying that he cannot risk his authority. In 1912, as their relationship is ending, Jung still recollects this episode of dream analysis. On 3 December 1912, he writes to Freud,

Our analysis, you may remember, came to a stop with your remark that you “could not submit to analysis without losing your authority.” These words are engraved on my memory as a symbol of everything to come. I haven’t eaten my words, however. (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 526)
Historically, the interview has sparked off a controversy, if speculative or even gossipy, about whether Freud has had an affair with Minna. As the origin of this controversy, namely Freud’s refusal to tell Jung and Ferenczi more about his dream of Minna and Martha, has much impact on Ferenczi’s subsequent introjective relationship with Freud, it requires some elaborated treatment here. The scale of the historical interest in this controversy, nevertheless, could be a ‘more primitive form of curiosity’ (Dupont, 1997, p. 201). Subsequent studies by Swales (1982), who carries out ‘gonzo detective work’ in his ‘detailed historical research’ (Schwartz, 1999, p. 18) and tries to prove the case by drawing upon materials from Freud’s writings on Screen Memories, The interpretation of Dreams, and the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, reconstructing sequence of events that lead to his conclusion, further intensifies the debate. It is the effort of Eissler (1993) and Gay (1988), who dispute these by undermining the credibility of Jung who himself is notorious for being unfaithful, that has served to dampen the storm for a while. Also, it is unlikely for Minna to have confided anything private to Jung as he was simply a complete stranger then. Breger (2000) rejoins that an affair between Freud and Minna is incompatible with their characters which are very constricted sexually and emotionally. Recently, however, Maciejewski (2006) rekindles this controversy by his discovery of Freud’s entry on 13 Aug 1898 in the guest book in Hotel Schweizerhaus, ‘Dr. Sigm. Freud and u[nd] Frau / Wein’ (p. 501), together with other historical record of Freud’s visit to Swiss with Minna at this time, implies that Freud and Minna did share a standard double room in this hotel. Lothane (2007) challenges Maciejewski’s conclusion about Freud’s having incest with Minna and that there is no evidence that Freud deceived anybody deliberately. As for Jung’s testimony against Freud, Lothane, similar to Eissler and Gay, tends to believe that
Jung ‘was the real womanizer’. (p. 131). In addition, Lothane queries Jung’s motivation, ‘Was this the belated repartee of a man with a guilty conscience over his adulterous relationships?’ (Lothane, 2007a, p. 491). He classifies Maciejewski’s work as ‘another case of bash the man and then bash his theory’ (Lothane, 2007, p. 133). Also, Jung’s own testimony that is belated for 50 years is doubtful as there was no laboratory in Freud’s house and so it is uncertain where Minna talked to Jung. In view of all these points of view that span more than half a century, one may arrive at a safer conclusion: that Freud only has some fantasy about Minna, and that is all that he does not want to tell Jung and Ferenczi when he refuses to give Jung further associative thought about his dream that might have already exposed some of the fantasy, as Freud believes such fantasy, if exposed, might compromise his authority.

What has been neglected in this prolonged historical controversy, however, is the second part of Jung’s testimony: the dream analysis on board George Washington in their America trip, in which Ferenczi has also been involved. Rudnytsky (2006 & 2011), drawing upon evidence from the Freud-Ferenczi correspondence and Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary, argues that it is Ferenczi who is the silent witness to this dream interpretation and subsequently bears the Freud’s fantasy for decades, in order to prevent the collapse of the psychoanalytic family if the dream were to be further disclosed. With these as the historical background, we now go back to answer the questions of the meaning of ‘Prof. Philipp’ in the visit of Freud and Ferenczi to Seidler.

Here we have two psychoanalytic pioneers, enthusiastically and skeptically, treading into the territory of a medium, a ‘profession’ with a much longer history than psychoanalysis, in order to test whether it is real or fraud, and if it is real, its relationship with psychoanalysis, and at best, how psychoanalysis is to understand
and make use of this uncanny connection or one-way permeability between two
derson’s minds, arguably unconscious. In Ferenczi’s terms, the question would be:
Can Seidler really introject my thoughts without my awareness? For Freud, his
question may be: Can Seidler really ‘steal’ my secret without my knowing about it?
In order to test out Seidler, they must agree upon a test case first, presumably to make
it most difficult for Seidler in order to test the maximum strength of her telepathic
power. Freud’s choice of ‘Philipp”, as noted from the above historical exposition, is
evidently associated with his own private fantasy, whether it is specifically about
Minna, or simply about doubt of fidelity. The experiment with Seidler is also a test of
whether and how introjection works, with respect to permeability of psychic
boundary between the parties involved. Freud’s tendency to veil and unveil
simultaneously has been noted by Forrester (1997) who reads the *Interpretation of
Dream* in parallel to Freud’s letters to Fliess of late 1890s, especially those critical
months before completion of the writing. He finds that Freud, in sending his drafts to
Fliess, casts himself in the role of the censor of his dreams and inner life. When the
book is published, he puts Fliess in the role of the censor as he discloses himself in
his dream to the public. ‘The dialectic of revealing and concealing’ (p. 146), or the
oscillation between ‘concealment and confession’ (Solomon, 1973, p. 142), is Freud’s
pre-occupation and he is constantly negotiating within these two poles.

What is unlikely to be coincidental is that Philipp (born 1872) is only 1 year
older than Ferenczi (born 1873). At this point, it is noteworthy to read Jones’ (1955)
recolletion of his first-hand experience with Ferenczi in an incident of going to a
cinema, for their very first time, in New York after embarking America in 1909,

I joined the party on the following day and we all dined together in
Hammerstein’s Roof Garden, afterwards going on to a cinema to see one of
the primitive films of those days with plenty of wild chasing. Ferenczi in his
*boyish way* was very excited at it, but Freud was only quietly amused; it was
the first film they had seen. (p. 56, my italics)

For Freud, it is quite possible that Ferenczi and Philipp do share some similarity with respect to age and boyish demeanour. During their voyage to America, in witnessing Jung’s doomed attempt to analyze Freud's dream about Minna, Ferenczi is cast to a role similar to that of the young Philipp in Paris: a witness who is on the verge of seeing a secret almost unraveled. It is possible that Ferenczi has stirred up in Freud his memory of that embarrassing enquiry by Philipp back in 1885 in Paris. So, for Freud, when facing Seidler, ‘Philipp’ is his introjected version of Ferenczi (as a witness of Jung’s dream analysis). Furthermore, Seidler might even be a Jung-surrogate given that Seidler is also trying to read something about Freud out of the test case of ‘Prof. Philipp’ (Seidler’s version of a dream specimen) they provide. So, here we have a sequel to the dream interpretation in the voyage to America, with the ‘threesome’ re-appearing that continues with the ‘probe’ into Freud’s unconscious, with introjection inevitably working behind. Indeed, Psychoanalysis has a very intimate contact with telepathy, and indeed introjection, at this historical moment.

It is also interesting to note that Freud and Ferenczi end up adding ‘Prof.’ to ‘Philipp’. Regardless of whether Philipp the painter is really a Professor, it is not so far-fetched to surmise that ‘Prof.’ would remind one of Freud himself. In fact, in all of Ferenczi’s letters to Freud, he addresses him as ‘Dear Professor’. For both Freud and Ferenczi, ‘Prof.’ in ‘Prof. Philipp’ may be about Freud himself.

As for Ferenczi’s part, in his post-visit first memory of this name, his parapraxis of the extra ‘s’ in ‘Prof. Philipps’ would imply that he would have, in the first place, more than one Philipp on his mind, given the fact that John Philipp is really a total stranger to him, but not to Freud. One would surmise that he has another Philipp on his mind. This is possible, as in the same letter of 5 Oct, Ferenczi
tells Freud that he

consciously regretted that I – following your advice – made inquiries about a completely strange person and not one who is quite close to me.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 76, my italics).

With this regret of Ferenczi might also be his reluctance to strictly follow Freud’s advice on the choice of name, as the parapraxis would reveal. This would appear more possible because Ferenczi is evidently the one who is ‘specially excited’ (Jones, 1955, p. 65) in seeking out this telepathic session. Ferenczi would probably want to make a test case of his own, as he, not Freud, is supposedly the experimental subject of Seidler. In Chapter 7, we learn that the grumble about Stein has not yet been over during the days of their America trip, in which Freud is evidently part of the episode. Ferenczi is still troubled by his jealousy and guilt towards Stein. It is therefore possible that Ferenczi has also attached, unconsciously, his little ‘secret’ about the Stein episode onto the test case of ‘Prof. Philipp’.

With these as the possible backdrop of their inner worlds, they have now finally decided to use ‘Prof Philipp’ as a test case, which is an amalgamation of both Freud’s and Ferenczi’s private thought, and maybe secret. Freud and Ferenczi have unconsciously introjected one another in the making of this Freud-Ferenczi hybrid, in the name of ‘Prof. Philipp’, who is essentially not a real person, but a virtual identity packed densely with unconscious material of both Freud and Ferenczi. This unconscious specimen, as it were, is now tabled as a riddle to Seidler, for her to demonstrate the power of ‘thought transference’, or one-way permeability of boundaries, or to analyze and to introject. Looking at this event in this way, this moment is indeed quite a moment, maybe even a historic one, at the crossroads of the history of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi, in closing this letter of 5 Oct, asking Freud to return to him the letter after reading, writes, ‘Perhaps this matter is the beginning
of something – then this material would be useful.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 78)

Coming back to what Ferenczi is making of this experience, it is interesting to note that Ferenczi is identifying with Seidler in his amazement and instant ‘conversion’, or even seeing her as doing what an analyst is doing. He notes that she has no idea whether she should do interpretation on an idea, or image, in a literal or abstract sense. He remarks that ‘[w]e also have this uncertainty about concrete or symbolic meaning in the interpretation of dreams.’ (ibid., p. 77). By positioning Seidler in such a way, it shows that Ferenczi does not really differentiate the essence of telepathy and psychoanalysis. He is incorporating Seidler, or what she represents, into his psychoanalytic thinking. Moreover, in presenting these to Freud, Ferenczi has allowed Seidler to merge into himself. Yet, on the surface, he does not let his narration degenerate into occult-like mystic story, or simply his amazement like that of a magician’s audience. He then demonstrates to Freud his anchorage to psychoanalysis by showing him the result of his intense self-analysis about this perplexing experience: that Seidler’s statements about Freud actually follow Ferenczi’s series of thoughts that he has really spoken about. However, Ferenczi also believes that some of Seidler’s other statements come from Ferenczi’s repressed thought. In a way, Seidler becomes a spokesman of Ferenczi’s unconscious. In analyzing Seidler’s remarks, or simply freely associating from them, Ferenczi is also telling Freud his own thought about Freud, as well as about their relationship,

   The remarks about your maturity, about your age (in the spiritual sense), your overcoming of everything human correspond exactly to a long meditation in which I immersed myself on the ship after the somewhat painful acknowledgement of my infancy about you and your personality (as an emulative example). First I overcame the spiteful thought: “I would rather be the way I am; that way I am at least happy, a happy child. You (Prof. Freud), however, are obviously intellectually so old, explaining everything, resolving all your own passions into thoughts, that you cannot
be happy.” – I soon recognized, however, that this thought was an attempt at resistance and then undertook to attempt to follow your instructions.’ (ibid., p. 76)

Here we have a first, and vivid, version of how Ferenczi struggles with introjection, between swallowing or vomiting Freud, as it were, in a way that an infant is struggling with drinking his milk or not. At the end, his ‘insight’ leads him to abandon his struggle, giving up his spiteful resistance and then he simply takes Freud, together with Freud’s unhappiness, and farewell to the ‘happy child’. Ferenczi (1909) defines the neurotic’s introjection as drawing the outer world into the ego, ‘making it the object of unconscious phantasy’ (p. 47). However, here the drawing in of Freud into his inner world would serve to dilute Ferenczi’s inner feeling of happiness (of being himself), instead of what he defines introjection in 1909 as the amelioration of internal poignancy. Obviously, introjecting Freud would solve his ‘resistance’ problem that might be a source of ‘poignancy’, but it also replaces the happy young child by the unhappy and old ‘Freud’. As noted in Ferenczi’s letter to Freud on 22 November 1908, he was writing the Introjection and Transference paper, and now on 5 October 1909, he is writing in a letter his experiential struggle with taking or rejecting Freud. Apparently, Ferenczi is processing what he is writing about introjection, especially for such a stage in which he is struggling with taking Freud or not. On the other hand, the paranoiac’s objects are for projection of unpleasant feelings. Ferenczi's experience with Freud here is illustrative of his swing between the neurotic and the paranoiac.

Also, Ferenczi’s discourse about the big gap in maturity and the difference between their ages is anticipatory of what he is going to write in *Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child* (Ferenczi, 1933). Here, Ferenczi writes about the different ‘languages’ that the adult and the child speak about their respective
feeling for each other. Yet, the adult forces his passion, rendering the child mistaking it as tenderness. The child is not capable of responding to such adult passion and his only option is to identify with the aggressor. There is qualitative change as produced in the young child’s mind, namely, ‘the introjection of the guilt feelings of the adult’ (p. 162). Ferenczi’s own ‘language’ of a happy child is confronted with Freud’s language of intellectual wisdom and unhappiness. Ferenczi’s giving up his resistance and taking Freud would be prototypical of the identification with the aggressor, becoming the unhappy little Freud as he might also have introjected Freud’s guilt as well.

After confessing to Freud that he has given up resistance and trying to ‘follow [Freud’s] instructions’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, letter dated 5 October 1909, p. 76), however, Ferenczi cannot help analyzing Freud in return. He attempts to succeed Jung, who has parted from them before their Berlin trip, in the continuation of the truncated analysis of Freud’s dream about Minna and Martha. He intimates,

The remark about your dissatisfaction with the Viennese surroundings could perhaps be an allusion to your Viennese colleagues; in all honesty, however, in analyzing your dreams I also had the thought that dissatisfaction and concern about the members of your family must play a great role with you. “Being dissatisfied with one’s soul” naturally also always has – in my thoughts – sexual significance. (ibid., p. 76, my italics)

Here, Ferenczi is trying to direct Freud back to where he wants to dodge from Jung, and from Ferenczi, in their dream analysis during the voyage in their America trip that occurred only some weeks ago. However, instead of asking for Freud’s further associative thoughts about his dream, as what Jung did but failed, Ferenczi tells Freud his own. He is filling in the gap where Freud has left, and in so doing, identifying with the part of Freud that Freud is trying to repress. At the same time, Freud may see him as somewhat threatening since Ferenczi is, unconsciously, getting one step nearer to his inner world.
Eventually, in the letter, Ferenczi concludes telepathy as something obscure, if not unsettling, even though he has tried to understand it. He says he would ask his brother in Berlin to follow it up while he is thinking of visiting another medium in Budapest. Most importantly, he reassures Freud that he will not be at risk of ‘lapsing into occultism’ (ibid., p. 77) and that although he is very interested in telepathy, it would not be his next assignment. Nevertheless, in ending the letter, he makes an unusual request,

As “supporting material” I am enclosing Frau Seidler’s original notes – Prof. Philipp’s card and your letter to me. – Please be so kind as to send me back all this (as well as this letter) when you get the chance. Perhaps this matter is the beginning of something – then this material would be useful. (ibid., p. 78, underline added).

This move may give Freud a chance to be relieved of the heaviness of this episode, and yet it is an episode that Ferenczi thinks is important. Ferenczi may be telling Freud that he is willing to shoulder it on his behalf by keeping, literally this letter, and symbolically the psychic load. A comparison of the two replies of Freud (6 & 11 Oct respectively)\(^94\) is compatible with this hypothesis,

I can’t answer you today nor send back your letter. I want to sleep on it first for a few nights and ruminate over it for a few days. (ibid., p. 79)

Five days later, on 11 Oct, Freud writes, starting,

At last I can pull myself together to write to you about your experience with Frau Seidler. I have now overcome the shock and am confronting the matter just like any other, which is not easy. (ibid., p. 79)

In Freud’s first letter, he cannot even name Seidler. He calls her ‘the person’ and ‘the woman’ (ibid., p. 79). Repression of something highly anxious is clearly at work here. It is only in the second letter that Freud can name her. In the first letter, Freud concludes,

But the transference of your thoughts in incomprehensible ways is the strange thing and possibly something new. Keep quiet about it for the time being; we will have to engage in further experiments.’ (ibid., p. 79, my
Here we have Freud alerting to Ferenczi to keep confidential about the incomprehensible thought transference, presumably including both the content of the thought and the process of the transference. As for the content of the thought, it may also include Ferenczi’s thought on Freud’s dream of Minna and Martha. This may be what Freud wants Ferenczi to keep quiet about too. Even after gaining composure, facing this episode with his usual problem-solving means proves difficult for Freud. Like Ferenczi, Freud has also been shocked. However, Freud and Ferenczi may have been shocked for different reasons. For Ferenczi, it may be more about the potential of telepathy with respect to psychoanalysis, both of which are to be understood by direct experiencing. For Freud, other than this intellectual question, he may be more disturbed by Seidler’s comment on him and Ferenczi’s interpretation of it. Freud reminds, or maybe warns, Ferenczi,

> What she says about me, nonsense in and of itself, *acquires value* if you acknowledge and legitimize it. You then have to take responsibility for it. (ibid., p. 80, italics added)

Freud does not go into any further detail about this ‘nonsense’, seemingly suggesting that the two correspondents know what they are talking about without really talking about it. Ferenczi’s acknowledgement and legitimization of the ‘nonsense’ is about his own associative thought to Freud’s dream [on the verge of the secret of Minna’s affair, as noted above; see also Rudnytsky (2011)] and his relationship with Freud. And for this, Freud in fact acknowledges its ‘value’ but Freud would not hold himself responsible for such ‘value’. Is it just a ‘value’ as a homework assignment for Ferenczi to practise interpretation? Or is it about something bigger? Freud would like to dissociate himself from the secret and transfers the whole thing to Ferenczi to introject. It becomes Ferenczi’s own secret,
or even unconscious burden, even though, inevitably, Freud has a share of it. Therefore, for a second time, Freud further reminds Ferenczi, ‘In the meantime, let us keep absolute silence with regard to it.’ (ibid., p. 81). Freud settles himself finally,

I am almost afraid that you have begun to recognize something big here, but we will encounter the greatest difficulties in exploiting it. (ibid., p. 81, my italics)

Reading this extract in parallel with Jung’s testimony,

And so, when Freud told me about the dream in which his wife and her sister played important parts, I asked Freud to tell me some of his personal associations with the dream. He looked at me with bitterness and said, ‘I could tell you more, but I cannot risk my authority’” (Billinsky, 1969, p. 42, my italics)

it could be hypothesized that Freud, again, successfully defuses the risk to his authority. In response, Ferenczi (14 Oct) assures him that the risk is really over,

I am very gratified that you so quickly and profoundly satisfied my longing for news about your reaction to the Seidler case. For me it was also an experience of the first rank, and I was glad that, despite the effect of a seemingly novel psychic phenomenon, I was able to maintain my total presence of mind and behave like a critical observer. Even so, I was afraid that you would conceive the matter differently, which my intelligence complex struggled against. Then I was all the more pleased by your lines, from which I surmise that you also, for your part, bring to the fore the interpretation that I consider the only probably one (I added the others only to cover myself, as it were). (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 81, underline added)

Ferenczi seems to be telling Freud that he splits off his interpretation of Freud’s dream in America from the theoretical deliberation about occultism and it is he himself that he wants to be the target of analysis. From this moment onwards, Ferenczi never returns to interpret this dream of Freud97 in their correspondence, even though they are going to talk about Seidler and other telepathic practitioners again in Nov 1909, but most importantly, Ferenczi is using his own material98, for reporting his self-analysis of his own dreams and for running these further telepathic ‘experiments’99 and there is no more of Freud’s ‘nonsense’. Ferenczi becomes the guardian and even owner of a part of Freud’s unconscious100, when it is being
transferred from Freud to Ferenczi in the last letter, as it were. Nevertheless, later, on
12 Dec, Freud makes a request and a remark,

I am still not one hundred percent, but I don’t want you to spare me in matters of thought transference. This weakness is about to succumb to being surmounted. … So, the matter is still not right with me, deep down. But you will find it alone.’ (ibid., p. 113)

Inevitably, Ferenczi would feel closer to Freud after this Seidler episode, one that has received little to no attention in the history of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi ends up taking a Freud into himself, as consistent with Ferenczi (1909) who defines the neurotic’s introjection as drawing objects into the ego, Ferenczi's experience with Freud is illustrative. He begins to draw Freud into his own inner world or even becoming a proxy of Freud’s unconscious, as he arranges Freud to meet his lover in Budapest in late October 1909 that marks the beginning of the Elma episode, a mirror image of Freud’s triangular relationship with Martha and Minna, an exemplar of identification with the aggressor, a variant of introjection (Ferenczi, 1932), to be covered in another Chapter. A year later, in 1910, Ferenczi will succeed in getting a trip with Freud, and Freud only, to Sicily, the place where they have skipped in their voyage to America. This event, together with how Ferenczi writes about Introjection, will be dealt with in the next Chapter on the Palermo Episode that illustrates Ferenczi’s further identification with, or introjection of Freud, becoming a ‘little Freud’, as it were.
Chapter 10

The Palermo episode, 1910: The little Freud’s *ménage à trois*

Their Sicily trip, initiated by Freud, within which the Palermo episode takes place, gives Freud a chance to experience Ferenczi’s introjective character, in vivo and upfront. This Chapter illustrates introjection as lived in their experience in this trip, its planning and aftermath, as Ferenczi forcefully introjects Freud, especially after the trip is fixed, trying to form a hybrid dyad. It is also Ferenczi’s continuation of the Seidler episode with his massive and forceful introjective pull. Briefly, this episode occurs when they are in Palermo. It is about their conflict in how to collaborate on the case of Schreber, Freud’s psycho-biographical study on the connection between repressed homosexuality and paranoia (Schur, 1972). Ferenczi thinks they can collaborate. Freud’s version of collaboration, however, is restricted to Ferenczi doing a dictation of what Freud speaks. Ferenczi disagrees, with bitterness and anger. Freud sees Ferenczi’s version of collaboration as taking the whole thing from him, suggesting Freud’s resistance to be pulled in by Ferenczi’s introjection.

Their quarrel in Palermo has been studied by Freud biographers or historians only as an example to throw light on an early conflict. They offer piecemeal explanation of this conflict without situating it within the development of the Freud-Ferenczi relationship. Early Freud biography, such as Jones (1955), takes the entire Italy trip as an illustration of ‘the beginning of their difficulties’ (p. 82). Later ones, such as Breger (2000), focus more on the Palermo incident itself, the climax of their difficulties in this trip. Dupont (1994) describes it as ‘the famous Palermo incident in 1910; the first open disagreement occurred between Freud and Ferenczi during their vacation in Sicily’ (p. 302). The Ferenczi biographer, Rachman (1997),
sees it as ‘the first serious rift in their relationship’ (p. 25). Grosskurth (1991) takes it as ‘Ferenczi’s most famous example of early rebelliousness’ (p. 54).

As for an interpretation of this episode, Jones (1955) attributes the difficulties entirely to Ferenczi’s character,

What actually happened in Sicily was merely that Ferenczi was inhibited, sulky and unreliable in the day to day arrangements: Freud described his attitude as one of “bashful admiration and mute opposition”. But behind those manifestations lay severe trouble in the depths of his personality. (p. 82, italics added)

Jones even hints at Ferenczi’s troubled personality, and continues with his own testimony and assessment, that Ferenczi has insatiable craving for fatherly love and has no bounds in his demand for intimacy and openness from Freud. Also, Ferenczi cannot openly express such demand and so he waits for Freud to make the first move. Jones believes Freud is the generous and tactful one in resolving this conflict. Together with Freud’s ‘great fondness’ (ibid., p. 84) for Ferenczi, as Jones also testifies, their precious friendship is preserved ‘for many years until, long after this episode, Ferenczi’s own stability began to crumble.’ (ibid., p. 84).102

Breger (2000) argues that the background for their quarrel goes back to Ferenczi’s striving for emotional honesty with Freud. He wants to discuss with Freud any feelings between them. Yet, Freud sees these as Ferenczi’s infantile strivings, or even worse, as homosexual and feminine longings. Freud further interprets Ferenczi’s collaboration on the Schreber case as his wish to take away the whole thing. Breger points out that it is Ferenczi who is

an Oedipus who wanted to kill the father and have everything for himself. Again and again, Freud perceived desires for intimacy in murderously competitive terms. (p. 343).

This Oedipal interpretation, however, uses Freud as the centre of reference, instead of Ferenczi being the protagonist whose longing for a dyadic openness with Freud.
fuels his introjective experiencing of psychoanalysis, and of Freud.

Rachman (1997) surmises that the Sicily trip, as culminated in the Palermo episode, is Ferenczi’s move to get closer to Freud emotionally and professionally, and yet this contradicts Freud’s own expectation for a relaxing trip only. So, Ferenczi’s move actually intensifies Freud’s defensiveness for more disclosure of his own personal matters. However, Rachman does not subscribe to Ferenczi’s immaturity as the only cause of the rift, as Freud’s authoritarianism is the other side of the same coin. Haynal (2002) sees the similarity of Freud and Ferenczi both seeking love, but with different forms of resistance, Freud is more allergic to the homosexual aspect while Ferenczi has more craving for an exclusive and absolutely open relationship. It is this difference, according to Haynal, that constitutes their rift.

These historical studies, however, only offer post-hoc comments on the Sicily trip or Palermo incident, mostly blaming Ferenczi for his infantility and dependency, but ignoring how their they plan for this trip, the process of which tells us more what has happened between them that led to this outcome of their quarrel. This Chapter tracks and analyzes this trip from its origin up to their sentimental correspondence after the trip. The earliest record of this trip can be traced back to Feb 1910, in their heartfelt meeting in Vienna, for which Ferenczi felt ‘refreshes one’s mind and spirit’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 130) and Freud is ‘invigorated … greatly’ (ibid., p. 131) when they begin to plan for a September trip. On 8 Feb, Freud assures Ferenczi that ‘The plans for September will not be affected.’ (ibid., p. 133). On 24 Apr, it is Freud who first suggests, ‘Let’s go to Sicily together then, and in conversation something will certainly break out of its latency.’ (ibid., p. 166). Ferenczi replies with much zest,

I therefore say that I have actually not allowed myself any recuperation at all for two years. I haven’t looked forward to a
vacation this much since my Matura. (In Berchtesgaden I was still full of unexplained inhibitions, which have only been explained and resolved since then.) (ibid., p. 168)

As contrast to their America trip the year before, both of them are similarly eager. Some months later, on 18 May, Ferenczi alludes to the summer vacation again, but not mentioning their agreed September trip. Freud, however, responds quickly (20 May) with sentimentality, trying to tune in with Ferenczi’s mood, or what he feels it to be,

The world has not ended here, either. I, too, still exist to alleviate your concerns; only I am still miserable in a bourgeois sort of way and am counting the days till July 14. There are still fifty-five. I hope to be compensated by a very nice vacation. Just study the timetables in your free time.

I am sorry that you are so lonely. It is soothing not to have so much interaction and communication; still it is something that one shouldn’t give up. (ibid., p. 175)

Ferenczi, responding on 27 May, does not address Freud’s invitation direct. Instead, he ends the letter, essentially a report of his recent lectures, by a soft response,

I am writing this letter late at night and am rather exhausted, which accounts for its laconic brevity and incoherent content. I only wanted to give a sign of life on my part and thank you for your kind letter. (ibid., p. 176)

Freud (5 June), on the other hand, suggests Ferenczi to come to Vienna in June and he will want Brill who is coming to Vienna from America, to join them for the trip, although the chance is low. Ferenczi first reacts with an accepting attitude, but then he displays somatic reactions to the intrusion of Brill. Eventually he confesses that he simply cannot take three as two. Brill eventually drops out of the plan as his travel schedule does not fit theirs. Freud further consoles Ferenczi,

All hopes are concentrating themselves on the September trip, which should be the subject for warm reflections later. (ibid., p. 185).

He further reassures that he will tell Ferenczi once he knows more about their
September plan. So, it is certainly only Freud and Ferenczi, the dyad that Ferenczi has always been striving after. Once their trip is fixed. Ferenczi further opens himself up, heightening his introjection, by loosening up his boundary to Freud. On 9 Jul, he responds to Freud, not about the trip itself, but about their relationship,

My birthday the day before yesterday – my 37th – released a few thoughts in me that I don’t want to keep secret from you, first of all because I know that you are interested in my personal fate, and second, because they are – I believe – of general interest. (ibid., p. 186)

Ferenczi believes that it is not just his own wish to ‘release’ himself to Freud, but also Freud’s interest in his ‘fate’. He presents himself as a case to be analyzed or to be illustrative of what psychoanalysis has transformed him to be, even though Ferenczi recalls that Freud has told him about his pessimism of the ‘immutability and unchangeable nature of men’ (ibid., p. 186), and yet Ferenczi is now using his own ‘fate’ as an illustrative counter-example,

I have already often thanked you for beautifying my profession, in fact, my whole life, through the ψ-analytic way of looking at things. But if I compare my inner psychic existence before and after ψα. insight, I must regard the most valuable thing to be precisely that inner change that you deny. It was only through ψα. that I became a man from a child, only since its mastery in me can I better subordinate the “pleasure principle” to the “reality principle” and better inhibit the senseless waste of affect. Infantile sensitivity plays a much smaller role in me than before; I have more or less reconciled myself to the thought of dying and being ill. (ibid., p. 186)

If we replace ‘ψα.’ by ‘Freud’ in the above equation, as Ferenczi would probably feel, we may have a clearer picture of how and what, unconsciously, Ferenczi has been introjecting Freud and its mutative effect is noted after Freud has also been ‘transformed’ by Ferenczi from an external object into an object of Ferenczi’s own unconscious phantasy, according to the definition of Introjection in Ferenczi (1909). Ferenczi also believes that he himself is also transformed from a child to a man, giving up the senseless waste of feeling and adopting the reality
principle. In fact, this makes him more like Freud, at least he believes so. It is even more interesting to note that, in quoting Freud’s own disbelief about the malleability of men, maybe even with psychoanalysis, Ferenczi is telling Freud the possibility that Freud’s psychoanalysis really works magic for Ferenczi. In other words, when Freud ‘becomes’ a part of Ferenczi, it works great, and yet when Freud is only Freud, it does not work, at least for Ferenczi. Apart from the concrete or somewhat ‘cannibalistic’ meaning of introjection as eating, by introjecting a person, one could say it will achieve a magical assimilation of him. Here we may want to hypothesize a prelude on Ferenczi’s creativity that is possible when Freud is introjected into Ferenczi, as what history that follows will tell us.

The picture at this point is that Ferenczi, via the introjection, becomes more like a Freudian than a Ferenczian subject, as Ferenczi finds himself subscribing more to the Reality Principle and acquiring more emotional regulation. He is too hungry to ‘eat’ Freud and to become the ‘little Freud’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 131) that he mentioned in a previous letter on 5 Feb 1910. He even tries to incorporate Freud’s own thought about dying regarding the latter’s anticipation of the age of death, bearing in mind that Ferenczi is only 37 years old by then. Ferenczi further illustrates his introjection project, one that is being actualized with another psychoanalytic partner,

I am also more optimistic than you in another respect. I believe that $\Psi \alpha$. honesty can be effected, not only among friends but also among life’s companions of various genders. The analytic association with Frau G. is making decided progress, after at times overcoming very great resistances. (ibid., p. 186)

His version of psychoanalysis as life, or vice versa, is beginning to take shape, with psychoanalytic honesty as both a means and an end, as he reports to Freud about his ‘analytic association’ with his lover, Gizella Pálos, whom Freud has met
personally in his visit to Ferenczi in Budapest in November 1909. In introjection terms, psychoanalytic honesty is something like mutual permeability of boundary between two persons. He further illustrates Frau G.’s ‘decided progress’ by associating to and evoking an uncanny yet important experience he had almost one year ago in their America trip,

As the “ménage à trois” on the George Washington became a significant experience for me and provided me with the occasion for unshackling my infantile complexes, so did the visit of a sister from Italy prove to be a ferment for Frau G, which activated her heretofore inadmissible impulses of jealousy, hate, etc. Two people get along easily. It is not until one gets to three that one constitutes a small society, with all its positive and negative passions. (ibid., p. 186, underlined added)

The French term ménage à trois, as a type of domestic arrangement, means a household of three who have sexual relationship with each other. From Ferenczi’s narration literally, he is referring to the threesome of Freud, Jung, and himself, and how he is loosening up his brother complex regarding jealousy. Also, he uses Gizella (i.e., Frau G.) as a comparable example to show how Gizella is going to resolve her jealousy and hence achieving her good progress. At this juncture, Ferenczi and Gizella share the same position of being the one who has the jealousy problem. However, on a less conscious level, especially when the term ménage à trois has a sexual connotation, Ferenczi is probably not referring to the threesome of Freud, Jung, and Ferenczi. Instead it is more likely to be alluding to Freud’s troubled dreams of Martha and Minna that Freud reports on the deck of George Washington, and as what Jung refers to in his interview by Billinsky (1969). If this is the case, Ferenczi is putting himself and Freud on the same plane for comparison as they share an important similarity of being in the middle of triangular relationship. Ferenczi is also beginning to tell Freud the profound effect of Freud’s ménage à trois on him that is taking shape. The background here is, according to the editors of the
Freud-Ferenczi correspondence, the ‘sister from Italy’ is ‘Sarolta Morando, née Altschul’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 188, n. 2). Also, as noted from a letter of Ferenczi to Groddeck, dated 8 July 1922,

We have just heard from my sister-in-law, Frau Otto Morando, in Hamburg that she would like to see us in Baden-Baden. (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921-1933, pp. 27-28)

The editor remarks that ‘Frau Otto Morando (Sarolta), née Altschul, Gizella Ferenczi’s sister, signed into the sanatorium guestbook 6th August and stayed until 17th September.’ (ibid., p. 28, n. 3). So, here we can establish that Ferenczi is hinting at his situation as indeed similar to Freud’s, by being in the middle of two women who are sisters. It is also noteworthy that Ferenczi marries Gizella in 1919, after which Sarolta becomes his sister-in-law. By saying that his ‘infantile complexes’ is ‘unshackling’, at this stage, it does not seem to imply a resolution, but only unlocking, i.e., beginning. Now, Ferenczi also has a version of his own ménage à trois after Freud’s ménage à trois becomes his ‘significant experience’. It turns out that, some years after he mentions ménage à trois, on 18 Nov 1916, Ferenczi confesses to Freud,

Yesterday afternoon – before receiving your letter - Sarolta visited me in the matter of a theater ticket. I couldn’t resist having my way with her, at least manually. But something or other (I used an odor as a pretext [schob mir einen Geruch als Grund vor]), restrained me from going further. That is typical with me. That’s the way my actual neurosis before the trip to Rome began, I permitted myself intercourse with a prostitute – then with Sarolta -, the syphilophobia came as a punishment.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 155)

However, as suggested in the extract, the exact date of the intercourse may be earlier than 1916, and closer to 1910. Rudnytsky (2011) remarks that the Rome trip in question took place in September 1912 (Jones, 1955). After the Rome trip, Ferenczi confesses to Freud in October 1912 his worry of contracting syphilis in a letter,
Naturally I was convinced that it was syphilis – especially since a doctor gave it a dubious look. Two blood tests yielded negative results, but I remained pessimistic in spite of them. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 412)

Rudnytsky (2011) concludes that Ferenczi has intercourse with Saroltà in September 1912, which is a little more than 2 years after July 1910. The way Ferenczi copies Freud’s *ménage à trois* anticipates Ferenczi (1933)’s discourse on introjection that depicts the child’s relationship with the aggressor: The child introjects ‘the guilt feelings of the adult’ (p. 162) and contains the aggressor’s shame and guilt as his own. The child is unable to differentiate his own shame and guilt from those of the alien aggressor. One may be less sure, however, from this piece of Ferenczi’s experience, whether Ferenczi has really introjected Freud’s guilt or even shame. On the other hand, Ferenczi’s confession to Freud, and Freud alone, indicates that he is exposing the guilt (the syphilis and the pessimism), whether it is Freud’s of Ferenczi’s, to Freud, and to himself as well, and to decide who should be its owner. Furthermore, Ferenczi (1932), in his Clinical Diary, states that the identification with the aggressor is about the child’s positioning himself so that he can live in the shadow of the aggressor, and to feel the aggressor’s feeling. Such identification prevents the child from disintegration and acts as a defence against the shame of helplessness. Ferenczi’s defence is working for both himself and Freud, now evidently a hybrid dyad as far their *ménage à trois*, mirror image of each other, is concerned. This hybrid dyad is more evident in Ferenczi’s attempt, as noted below, to bind himself and Freud as a paranoid pair in fighting against opponents of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi’s *ménage à trois* is almost a repetition of Freud’s, as Ferenczi ‘unshackles’ his own when he first hears about Freud’s dream about Martha and Minna on the deck of George Washington in 1909. Again, one is not aiming at establishing a cause-and-effect linkage of experience and writing, but an observation
of an engrossing experienced lived and the subsequent theoretical articulation of
similar experience in psychoanalytic papers some years later. The source of ideas of
such papers, obviously, is not limited to Ferenczi’s daily experience, but should
include his clinical experience with patients as well. However, the latter is not a
focus of this thesis.

Back to Ferenczi’s 9 July 1910 self-analytic letter to Freud. Not coincidentally,
at this point, Ferenczi has associated thoughts about blacks, America, Jung, and
anti-Semitism that further elaborates, covertly, the some of the themes of the
previous paragraphs that is illustrative of ongoing introjective experience,

The persecution of blacks in America reminds me of the case that Jung so
sagely presented, according to which the blacks represent the
“unconscious” of the Americans. Thus, the hate, the reaction formation
against one’s own vices. Along with the circumcision / castration complex,
this mechanism could also be the basis for anti-Semitism. The free, “fresh”
behavior of the Jew, his “shameless” flaunting of his interest in money,
evokes hatred as a reaction formation in Christians, who are ethical not for
logical reasons but out of repression. It is only since my analysis that I
have understood the widespread Hungarian saying: “I hate him like my
sins.” (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, pp. 186-187, underline added)

Here, Ferenczi applies Jung’s new theory, presumably of hate, to explain the
anti-Semitism of Christians, wrapping the whole narrative by Freud’s psychoanalytic
language, and ending it with Ferenczi’s own Hungarian insight on hate, retreating to
the ground zero of his own inner world of guilt. In citing his Hungarian saying, is
Ferenczi also trying to convey to Freud unconsciously something about his own
internal world of hate and sins that follows from the events mentioned earlier in the
letter involving, implicitly and explicitly, Freud, Martha, Minna, Jung, Ferenczi,
Gizella, and Saroltà, as they are intermingled or parallel to one another, with respect
to the themes of infidelity, betrayal, jealousy, and possibly sins and guilt? If,
following Jung’s reasoning that ‘the blacks represent the “unconscious” of the
Americans’, or Ferenczi’s corollary that the Jews represent the unconscious of the
Christians, who will represent the unconscious of Ferenczi? And of Freud? These are hidden yet pertinent questions given the fact that this letter is all about Ferenczi’s own self-analysis of his inner experience, as incorporating Freud and psychoanalysis.

Ferenczi continues with his remarks,

If psychoanalysis is a paranoia, then I have already been successful in overcoming the stage of persecution mania and replacing it with megalomania. (ibid., p. 187).

Circling back a little, we find that Ferenczi is associating from: the blacks and their persecutors, to Jews and the anti-Semites, and finally landing onto the psychoanalysis and its opponents (by situating psychoanalysis as a paranoia). If one looks at the later rift between Freud and Jung, and Ferenczi’s unyielding loyalty to Freud, one would find this association of Jung in the above sequence quite anticipatory. For example, on 6 Aug 1912, in the wake of the intense conflict between Freud and Jung, Ferenczi writes to Freud about Jung,

[Jung] handles psychoanalysis as though it were a personal affair between the both of you and not something objective and scientific. The other Swiss are all too much under the influence of his suggestion, and they are all a bunch of anti-Semites. (ibid., p. 400)

Essentially, Ferenczi is accusing Jung as being a double-persecutor, i.e., as an opponent to both Jews and psychoanalysis. Hence, it can be established that in this significant letter dated 9 July 1910, Ferenczi is trying to bind Freud and himself as a bundle to face the opponent of psychoanalysis, in a paranoid but omnipotent (the ‘megalomania’) way. Binding Freud to himself, or introjecting Freud, after purging Jung, Ferenczi feels even more powerful in fighting with the enemies of psychoanalysis, the cause that he has devoted his whole life to. Ferenczi is like a fetus living in the womb of his ‘psychoanalytic mother’, as it were, who provides him with the whole world, or in fact everything. With his Freud, Ferenczi can have
everything satisfied and hence has nothing remained to wish for, or simply has no want. He would feel empowered with the magical ability to realize his wishes simply by imagining. Ferenczi (1913) terms this omnipotent stage as introjection phase too.

On the other hand, even though Ferenczi declares his ‘successful’ achievement of megalomania and hence his pitying these opponents from a ‘megalomania’, or omnipotent, position, one would still want to find out the trace of Ferenczi’s own projection of his disavowed parts onto the opponents, bearing in mind his Hungarian insight, ‘I hate him like my sins’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 187). In one of the final entries (17 August 1932) of his Clinical Diary, Ferenczi, pondering over his own character and personal history, writes, ‘instead of loving and hating I could only identify with people’ (Ferenczi, 1932; p. 205). If he is to live his Hungarian insight, blending with his later insight in his Clinical Diary, his introjection would be a hallmark of his character. In introjecting or identifying with people, Ferenczi is not just building an unconscious connection with them, but also an affective one of loving or hating, which is also a kind of connection with himself too. In that ‘ideal’ psychoanalytic honesty Ferenczi advocates, there might not be a very clear demarcation of identities.

Only after such a long discourse about his latest reflection about himself and psychoanalysis, trying to drawing Freud into his own paranoiac definition of psychoanalysis that is narcissistically invested with libido (Ferenczi, 1915), that Ferenczi then moves on to respond to Freud’s previous assurance about their September 1910 trip, ‘Every day I think frequently about our approaching vacation’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 187). The long discourse serves to bind Freud to Ferenczi tighter as a dyad, as what Ferenczi’s introjection, both objective and
subjective (Ferenczi, 1926), has been working. This trip, at this point of Ferenczi’s narration, may also mean something about their upcoming ‘trip’ in the psychoanalytic movement, with them being the sole travellers, as what Ferenczi may really want.

Probably Freud has been somewhat touched by Ferenczi’s sentimental and revealing letter. He responds right away, the very next day. He starts not with the September trip literally, but in response to Ferenczi’s emotive appeal,

> Did I really ever doubt that persons like you could develop themselves? I think my pessimism had more to do with the weak people whom we are supposed to change through our influence, not those who can bring about something from themselves, with the support of external influences. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 188)

Freud’s comforting and supportive Q&A shows he has been absorbed into - and he also finds echo from - Ferenczi’s ‘paranoid’ definition of psychoanalysis too. Freud continues, ‘I am glad that you are already as far along as I am in relation to our opponents. Isn’t it best that way?’ (ibid., p. 188). Apparently, from Freud’s perspective, Ferenczi succeeds in getting Freud closer by shifting himself from introjective (neurotic) pole a little towards that of the projective (paranoid). Freud’s next assurance, however, is a key one to Ferenczi, or maybe the key as well, in understanding Ferenczi’s later ‘misunderstanding’ of Freud’s definition of collaboration in writing the Schreber paper on paranoia,

> Paranoia certainly contradicts restructure. To change the subject, your work on paranoia must go forward once and for all; it will be the material for the time when we are together. (ibid., p. 188, my italics)

Freud is highly suggestive that they will at least discuss paranoia in their September trip, if not co-coauthor something on it. They are to discuss it with each other only, and no third party is to be there. Any third party, however, could easily be classified as the outsider, or even opponent. Therefore, in view of these as a
background, paranoia, for Ferenczi at least, is not simply a matter of writing about paranoia together with Freud, but on a deeper level, is their common definition of how they are to live psychoanalysis together, or at least, how they are to face the outside world as a dyad, in a paranoid way, as fueled by Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud.

Back to their arrangement of the trip, by 10 July, Freud is clearer about his family trip in Summer and Freud is trying hard to maintain good health so that their plan for the autumn trip will not be disrupted. Freud pledges that once things are clearer, he will ask Ferenczi for suggestions of the destination of their trip. With a Freud secured on his mind, Ferenczi (17 Aug) continues with his long free-associative letter on thought transference, presumably a ‘follow-up’ of their Seidler episode. One of his thoughts is

The patient lies down as usual. But he immediately jumps up excitedly. “I smell a strong odor of phosphorus matches.”... Observations (free association): I had sexual intercourse on the same day. The thought occurred to me that it is not right to use the same couch for one’s occupation and for making love. (ibid., p. 206)

These could be the free-associative material that Ferenczi would speak to Freud when he sees him face-to-face in Sicily. Ferenczi is foretelling them, in his attempt to make himself at Freud’s disposal. On 19 Aug, Ferenczi writes that he completely agrees with Freud’s arrangements of the trip, as Ferenczi is very eager about it when the time is drawing close. He even writes a postcard on the same day to Freud to ask about their dress code, whether it is going to be an informal, domestic-like one, or a formal one, ‘Please tell me also if you are taking along a smoking jacket or a tailcoat, so that I can organize myself accordingly.’ (ibid., p. 210). In so doing, Ferenczi is literally trying to look like Freud in clothing or even appearance when they appear as a pair in the trip. With this question, Ferenczi may
also be asking Freud whether he categorizes this trip as a domestic \textsuperscript{109} or a formal one and he simply wants to follow Freud’s definition accordingly. Freud replies (22 Aug) that he thinks ‘smoking jacket and tailcoat to be out of the question and take them to be an American reminiscence of yours.’ (ibid., p. 212). Freud’s answer, however, does not show that he is totally against the idea of dress code, only that he thinks both of Ferenczi’s suggestions irrelevant or inappropriate to the situation. They are trying to reach an ‘agreement’ on how to conduct their trip, a trip they are to be alone with each other for almost a month, as an introjective pair, as it were.

On the level of exchange about psychoanalytic ideas, Freud is also responding to Ferenczi’s previous loose reports on thought transference. He (20 Aug) briefly remarks that Ferenczi’s careful observations about the patient finally confirms the existence of thought transference,

Now it is a matter of getting used to it in your thoughts and losing respect for its novelty, and also preserving the secret long enough in the maternal womb, but that is where the doubt ends. (ibid., p. 211)

Immediately before he leaves Budapest for the trip, Ferenczi writes about his excitement by Freud’s somewhat unexpected endorsement,

I am a little frightened by the fact that you view my observations on thought transference as proven. All kinds of doubts, or, better said, a feeling of uncertainty, a desire for further, for many, confirmations, have been aroused in me. I can certainly warm up to these things theoretically; I also know that they don’t shake up psychoanalysis, they only make it more complicated. Perhaps one struggles against such discoveries, however, precisely because of the unexpected complications. But I know that it is a Danaan gift when one gets such ideas, that is to say, has such experiences. – We have time, though, to think about the thing’s fate. (ibid., p. 213)

Ferenczi is not embracing telepathy fully as he states that his discovery and conclusion are not final. He even watches out for possibility that it could be an ominous gift to psychoanalysis and indeed he is inviting Freud to think more about it. However, with Freud’s endorsement about his interest in telepathy, it is really a gift.
if also ominous too, to Ferenczi as he finds more intellectual attunement with Freud, even on a subject as taboo to psychoanalysis-as-a-science as telepathy. Such endorsement of the Seidler episode signals to Ferenczi that he can expect more intellectual intimacy in the trip. Freud has given more of himself to Ferenczi’s introjection. Also, for telepathy, as what the previous Chapter, Seidler episode, attempts to show, in their use of the pseudonym, ‘Prof. Philipps’, as a test case for Seidler, shows that it is densely packed with the unconscious of Freud and Ferenczi. Telepathy is indeed a private experience, if not also a shared secret, between them. So, it is with this closeness built up in their correspondence that they start their Sicily trip, one that is exclusively Freud and Ferenczi. What happens in the trip, however, is rather beyond their expectation.

On 24 Sept, before they leave Rome and return home in the evening, Freud writes to Jung,

My travel companion is a dear fellow, but dreamy in a disturbing kind of way, and his attitude towards me is infantile. He never stops admiring me, which I don't like, and is probably sharply critical of me in his unconscious when I am taking it easy. He has been too passive and receptive, letting everything be done for him a like a woman, and I really haven’t got enough homosexuality in me to accept him as one. These trips arouse a great longing for a real woman. (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 353)

That Freud selects Jung to write about his disturbance shows that he is contrasting Jung with Ferenczi as a travel companion. Indeed this contrast has probably been there in their America trip but the threesome then might have diluted the impact of Ferenczi’s character. What disturb Freud may be a combination of Ferenczi’s infantile dependency, as well as the absence of a real woman as a travel companion in this Sicily trip. In other words, Ferenczi’s homosexual introjection, as similar but not identical to a woman’s incorporative form of love, is what Freud cannot accept because Ferenczi is simply not a real woman. It is interesting to note
Freud’s quote of Dr. Weber’s Report of 1899 regarding Schreber’s delusion of his mission to redeem the world, and to restore mankind to their lost state of bliss…. The most essential part of his mission of redemption is that it must be preceded by his transformation into a woman. (Freud, 1911; pp. 16-17).

Later in the psychobiography that Freud is writing in this trip, Freud hypothesizes,

the exciting cause of the illness was the appearance in him of a feminine (that is, a passive homosexual) wishful fantasy, which took as its object the figure of his doctor.’ (ibid., p. 47).

Freud’s writing experience and his immediate experience with Ferenczi in Palermo interact with each other. Furthermore, as Appignanesi & Forrester (2005) argue, Minna, compared to Martha, has much more common interest and concern with Freud in his intellectual pursuit in Psychoanalysis, as well his energetic trips, and has been his closest confidante other than Fliess since the 1890s. They believe that Freud is thinking of Minna in his ‘longing for a real woman’.

In coupling with a woman, the difference between the two sexes probably mitigates the extent of introjection, as Freud may have preferred more if he is to choose between introjection by a man or a woman. In other words, Freud’s resistance against Ferenczi’s introjection could be worked through if Ferenczi were a woman. Jung quickly echoes Freud on 29 Sept, with a hint of the jealousy,

So you are back safe and sound from the cholera country! Nevertheless I wish I could have been with you. I understand very well what you say about your travelling companion. I find that sort of thing exasperating, and still have an aftertaste of it from our American trip. (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 355, my italics)

Ferenczi’s first letter to Freud on 28 Sept, immediately after the trip, shows that he is still in a dreamy sort of mentality. When he returns home, he feels as if he were his own guest, as he is shopping around to find a frame for the photographs taken, in which there is ‘a serious expression’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 214) on his face. He acknowledges Freud’s stimulating words and advice on the trip and...
then he starts his apology and self-criticisms about his behaviour, ‘Still I am sorry that you had in me a travel companion who is still so much in need of education.’ (ibid., p. 214). He continues with alluding to the events\textsuperscript{110} that have happened in their trip, especially the way he reacted to them, as his target of self-criticism. Even so, Freud’s first recall of their trip actually echoes with Ferenczi’s. On 2 Oct, he writes,

Your letter has reminded me of the fact that I am the same person who picked papyrus in Syracuse, fought with the railway personnel in Naples, and bought antiquities in Rome. My identity has been restored. It is strange how easily one succumbs to an inclination to isolate the formations of personality.

You will believe me when I say that I think back about your company on the trip only with warm and pleasant feelings, … (ibid., p. 215)

It seems that both Freud and Ferenczi has managed to change each other a little in their trip, maybe by mutual introjection, as it were, when, after the trip, they find themselves not in their usual way of being. This chemistry is brief though, as they quickly resume to their usual mode of being. Freud shifts to a lecturing tone quickly,

…I often felt sorry for you because of your disappointment, and I would like to have had you different in some respects. Disappointment because you certainly expected to \textit{wallow in} constant intellectual stimulation, whereas nothing is more repugnant to me than posing, and I then often let myself go in the opposite direction. So I was probably mostly quite an ordinary old gentleman, and you, in astonishment, realized the distance from your fantasy ideal. On the other hand, I would have wished for you to tear yourself away from the infantile role and take your place next to me as a companion with equal rights, which you did not succeed in doing; and further, in practical perspective, I would have wished that you had carried out more reliably your part of the task, the orientation in space and temporality. But you were inhibited and dreamy. So much for my educational efforts. (ibid., p. 215, my italics)

Here Freud is referring to the ‘dictation’ issue Ferenczi mentions to Groddeck in his 1921 Christmas letter. Freud is explaining his insistence on dictation as collaboration: that it is due to Ferenczi’s greedy and endless introjection of Freud’s
intellectual stimulation and this is what Freud is disappointed about Ferenczi. Freud’s dictation mode is his response to Ferenczi’s wallowing because Freud dislikes to be forced upon to give, and to fit into Ferenczi’s infantile mode of introjection. In a way, in writing the paper on the paranoia case of Schreber, Freud’s plan is indeed giving something Ferenczi to introject, by speaking out his thoughts and Ferenczi is to write them down. However, Ferenczi reacts with rage, bitterness in his aloneness, and constriction in the throat, implying he cannot swallow it. Obviously the dictation mode, or merely hearing Freud’s words and transforming them into written words, is not what Ferenczi wants for a collaboration on writing a paper. In this sense, Ferenczi is not infantile. Intellectual collaboration between Freud and himself did indeed occur not long ago and both should have a common, though implicit, understanding about it. In 1909, when Freud was revising Psychopathology of Everyday Life for the third edition, he told Ferenczi that he ‘will just add your contributions to the third edition of Everyday life. You will permit me giving your full name?’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 62, letter dated 5 May 1909). Ferenczi responded that he ‘feel very honored to be cited by name in Everyday Life.’ (ibid., p. 63, letter dated 7 May 1909). Freud further clarified the details of his acceptance of Ferenczi’s ideas,

I accepted the lion’s share of your contributions but left out some as being too fine for the elementary nature of the book; I know that I can be very grateful to you for these things, and I am happy to be so. (ibid., p. 64, letter dated 23 May 1909)

Furthermore, in preparing his paper, The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy for the 1910 Nuremberg Congress, Freud prepares Ferenczi in advance how he will incorporate Ferenczi’s ideas,

You should not be surprised if in my Nuremberg lecture you again hear your thoughts and even some of your formulations. It will be the way it was with the last lecture in Worcester; I have a decidedly obliging intellect.
and am very much inclined toward plagiarism. (ibid., p. 133, letter dated 8 Feb 1910)

Nevertheless, once they are in Palermo, Freud changes the rule of their game unilaterally. Ferenczi’s dictation in fact does not entail any introjection because he is simply writing down Freud’s thoughts onto paper and in so doing, he can retain nothing about Freud’s inner world. In fact, in Ferenczi’s recall of Freud’s angry accusation against Ferenczi on the spot, we have,

So this is what you are like?’ he said, taken aback. ‘You obviously want to do the whole thing yourself.’ (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921-1933, pp. 8-9)

It is exactly because Freud is afraid that Ferenczi will take over the whole writing from him that Freud insists on dictation as the only mode of collaboration, reducing Ferenczi to a mechanical – and infantile - role of a dictation machine that does not have a mind of its own. Without a mind during the dictation, Ferenczi cannot introject Freud. In so doing, Freud would feel safe that his work, or maybe thought, would not be stolen by, or transferred to, Ferenczi. On the other hand, in Ferenczi’s mode of collaboration, which is more like co-authorship, the boundary between the two authors could be more blurred, as it entails the essence of introjection.

Ferenczi protests, with anxiety though, against Freud’s ‘educational efforts’. He writes back immediately (3 Oct), first declaring that such protest is risking Freud’s rejection and even abandonment. He says that he has done much self-analysis during and after the trip and he confirms Freud: Ferenczi admits that his infantile attitude has something to do with his inhibition that is related to his resistance against homosexual drive and his overvaluation of women. In a way, he also confirms what Freud has written to Jung after their Palermo trip. However, Ferenczi denies that he is wallowing in Freud’s intellectual substance. What Ferenczi really wants from
Freud is:

cheerful, uninhibited, cheerful companionship with you (and I can be cheerful, indeed, boisterously cheerful), and I felt – perhaps unjustifiably – forced back into the infantile role. To be sure, I did, perhaps, have an exaggerated idea of companionship between two men who tell each other the truth unrelentingly, sacrificing all consideration. Just as in my relationship with Frau G. I strive for absolute mutual openness, in the same manner … That was the ideal I was looking for: I wanted to enjoy the man, not the scholar, in close friendship.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 217-218)

Ferenczi, however is not totally unaware of Freud’s perspective, as he continues with his understanding that Freud in fact wants nothing from the trip other than relaxation after a year’s work, with a travel companion that fits him. Ferenczi continues with even more rigour,

I know very well that this passage sounds pompous and histrionic. I also now know that the entire (unconsciously strengthened) homosexual drive component is behind it. But I am making use of the opportunity and am writing – in free association – what comes to my mind so that you see me as I really am.

My dream in which I saw you standing naked before me (naturally without feeling the slightest conscious [indeed, also in the dream still unconscious] sexual arousal) was the transparent symbolization of 1.) the ucs. homosexual tendency and 2.) the longing for absolute mutual openness. (ibid., p. 218)

Ferenczi’s free association is indeed a fluent discourse, as he furthers his absolute openness, as he believes so, with mixed and heightened emotion,

Do you know which hours of our trip retain the most pleasant memories for me? The ones in which you divulged to me something of your personality and your life. It was then, and not during the scientific conversations, that I felt free of inhibitions, like a “companion with equal rights,” as you always wished me to be and as I so much would like to have been. … But don’t forget that for years I have been occupied with nothing but the products of your intellect, and I have also always felt the man behind every sentence of your works and made him my confidant. … Under “Freud” I understood his teachings and his personality, fused together in a harmonic unity. … During the trip I played the ridiculous and certainly very repugnant role of one who is misunderstood … My behavior again only ignited resistance in you … (ibid., p. 218)

Ferenczi even declares his understanding of the state of achieving insight in
psychoanalysis between two people, with a force that seems to be another ‘educational effort’, but this time, it is done by Ferenczi on Freud,

that they are not ashamed in front of each other, keep nothing secret, tell each other the truth without risk of insult or in the certain hope that within the truth there can be no lasting insult. If you had scolded me thoroughly instead of being eloquently silent! I would perhaps have felt grievously wounded in the first instant, but, just as now – if I had also very, very soon admitted the truth to myself – in fact, I would have owed you a very large debt of gratitude for it. (ibid., p. 220)

Ferenczi’s free writing has not lost its bearing, however, as he states clearly that his demand for Freud is too much. In ending this long and aggressively honest letter, Ferenczi tells Freud that he believes Freud will certainly not misunderstand the letter’s tone and content, and he believes that the Palermo episode is not an end of their intimacy, but ‘the beginning of a real understanding’ (ibid., p. 220). Here in this aspect, Ferenczi seems pretty sure his introjected Freud corresponds with the external Freud. Putting aside the letter for one day before mailing, Ferenczi writes an addendum on 4 Oct, saying that he has some second thoughts about its use, as he ponders over whether it is of any use to Freud by disclosing his own personal material and whether he is risking too much. Yet, he is clear about his intention: he is eager for a response from Freud on how he judges the letter. The impact of the Sicily trip and its Palermo episode on Ferenczi is indeed great. Ferenczi is in a state of unrest and exaggerated need for further drawing Freud into his own world. He is betting though, but he is almost making himself transparent to Freud. Ferenczi, instead of Freud, appears more like the one who is standing naked, and in front of Freud. However, the key is whether his current version of introjection in the form of nakedness, or transparency, or honesty, or permeability of boundary, is wanted or not. Ferenczi’s opening himself up to Freud to such an extent, meaning the ready state of pulling in the whole Freud, is indeed an exemplary of his account of
‘solipsism’ as an extreme form of introjection of pulling in the whole world into the ego (Ferenczi, 1912), if, at this moment, Freud is simply Ferenczi’s whole world. This is contrast with Materialism which is the pinnacle of projection as the ego is ‘dissolved’ completely into the external world. In such an extreme scenario of introjection, especially if Freud complies correspondingly, there will be a merging of identities into one single entity or world, which is not dissimilar to Ferenczi’s depiction of the omnipotent stage of the fetus.

Freud responds (6 Oct) almost as quickly as Ferenczi. He starts with his observation that Ferenczi writes much better than he speaks, seemingly contrasting his introjected Ferenczi with the real Ferenczi, confirming the mechanism of introjection as involving both reality and fantasy aspects. Freud states clearly that his response and clarification are going to be brief. Yet, Freud’s approach, nevertheless, resembles that of Ferenczi: self-apologetic and even also self-disclosure, indicating Freud’s taking over qualities of Ferenczi, as the object’s ‘qualities are annexed, attributed to the ego’ (Ferenczi, 1922a, p. 374). However, one is less sure whether Freud has built ‘a bridge between the self and the outer world’ (ibid., p. 374), i.e., Ferenczi. Freud admits it is his weakness in not scolding Ferenczi to further his insight about himself. He also admits that he is not the ‘Ψα superman’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 221), one who has overcome all counter-transference and the ideal that they have co-constructed. Freud tells Ferenczi that he has correctly analyzed Freud’s resistance to openness. Freud states that since his break up with Fliess\textsuperscript{111}, once his only confidant during his early days of intellectual isolation,

\[\text{[a] piece of homosexual investment has been withdrawn and utilized for the enlargement of my own ego. I have succeeded where the paranoiac fails.}^{112}\]

(ibid., p. 221, footnote added)
Freud says that he does not expect Ferenczi to be able to sympathize with him on this. Freud also says that he can work on the unpleasantness that Ferenczi has caused in the trip by Freud’s own ‘self-purification’ (ibid., p. 222) and so only the beautiful is left. However, Freud is very clear about one point,

\[\text{[i]t was plain to see but also easily recognizable as infantile that you presumed great secrets in me and were very curious about them. Just as I shared with you all the scientific matters, I also concealed from you very little of a personal nature, … My dreams at the time were, as I indicated to you, entirely concerned with the Fliess matter … (ibid., p. 222, my italics)}\]

Apparently, Freud is trying to cool down Ferenczi and tell him clearly to separate the science from the man and also where to stop. His allusion to the Fliess episode is the limit of his secret and disclosure to Ferenczi. He, and Ferenczi, cannot go further than that. However, to Ferenczi, Freud has already given more of himself.

Being assured of Freud’s staying in the relationship, Ferenczi still does not give up his demand for absolute honesty, as he writes on 12 Oct that he does not see it as a final resolution. He even has his little theory on secret and pathology for Freud, and another one on infantilism for himself,

I still hold firm to the conviction that it is not honesty but superfluous secrecy that is abnormal, although I do admit that the former can be overly emphasized by infantile influences. (ibid., p. 224)

Still it is a struggle between Freud and Ferenczi on how much they can both agree upon the extent of their mutual introjection, as they are still negotiating about it, without the risk of a break-up. Both state their position and want clearer to each other.

With such an exchange, it ‘ends’ their Sicily trip and the Palermo episode. It should be noted that the whole episode cannot be reduced merely to Ferenczi’s infantility or outright misunderstanding of Freud’s definition of collaboration. One should also note the background in their preparation for the trip in order to arrive at
a balanced understanding. In introjection terms, this trip, its prelude and aftermath, serve for Ferenczi to introject more of Freud’s unconscious. On Freud’s side, he feels Ferenczi forcefully open him up, as an aftermath of the Seidler episode, by Ferenczi’s massive and forceful introjective pull. Freud has resisted but he is not totally firm about Ferenczi’s demand for absolute honesty. This is exemplary of his account of ‘solipsism’ as an extreme form of introjection of pulling in Freud, his whole world, into the ego (Ferenczi, 1912). Ferenczi’s omnipotence in pulling Freud as he ousted Jung is illustrative of his idea of introjection as prevalent in the omnipotent stage (Ferenczi, 1913). His investing psychoanalysis, or Freud, with libido is anticipative of Ferenczi (1915), and transforming Freud from an external object into an object of Ferenczi’s own unconscious phantasy is in line with the definition of Introjection in Ferenczi (1909). That this 1910 trip binds them tighter as a dyad, both objectively and subjectively, is echoing Ferenczi (1926). Haynal (1997) remarked that in 1911, Freud and Ferenczi ‘hardly knew each other’ (p. 438), which is probably not true, in view of this episode that occurred in 1910. The way Ferenczi copies Freud’s ménage à trois anticipates Ferenczi (1933)’s discourse on introjection that depicts the child’s relationship with the aggressor. The Palermo episode is also a bridge to another episode of Ferenczi’s move of introjection. This time, he is not prying at Freud’s secret, but gradually exposing his own parallel version of Freud’s own ménage à trois, a prototypical one being his disclosure to Freud before their Sicily trip about his fantasy with Gizella’s sister. Yet, Ferenczi still manages to draw Freud in, at an even larger scale. This is the Elma episode, the theme of the next Chapter, one that last for 10 years or so from 1910. Ferenczi is also theorizing Introjection in his writings as he lives it.
Chapter 11

The Elma episode, 1910-1919: Proxy of each other’s unconscious

This decade witnesses the birth of and early dissensions within the International Psycho-Analytical Association which is the locomotive of ‘the Psychoanalytical Movement’ (Jones, 1955, p. 67). Also, there is continued opposition to this movement from outside. The Secret Committee is also formed in this period as a result of the dissensions and external opposition. The International Association is founded after the Second International Psycho-Analytical Congress at Nuremberg in March 1910, with affiliate associations in different countries. The Viennese members, notably Adler and Stekel, are very dissatisfied with Freud’s idea of nominating the Swiss analysts, with Jung as a key figure, to the positions of President and Secretary. It is through Freud’s intervention that Jung is eventually made President. However, such internal conflict is to last, as Adler (1911) and Stekel (1912), and eventually Jung (1913) successively break from Freud. It is Ferenczi, as joined by Jones, who proposes the formation of the Secret Committee in 1913, the mission of which is to defend the cause. It is also within this historical period that Ferenczi replaces Jung as Freud’s closest collaborator.

For Ferenczi, the Elma episode is his sequel to the Seidler Episode and the Palermo Episode. This Chapter shows Ferenczi’s attempt at solving their introjection problems of their shared *ménage à trois* via a triangular relationship of his own and drawing Freud into it, in the name of Freud analyzing and helping Ferenczi out of the dilemma. In analyzing the process in this episode, the experience is shown to correspond to Ferenczi’s writings on *Introjection*. This episode has also been covered in the history of psychoanalysis. However, it has only been described as Ferenczi’s concurrent love\textsuperscript{113} for the mother Gizella and her daughter Elma, as well
as his inability to choose between them, even with Freud’s close intervention. Ferenczi’s dilemma has not been understood within his complex introjective relationship with Freud. It is just labeled as a ‘dark episode’ (Rachman, 1997, p.8), ‘the most extraordinary entanglement’ (Kerr, 1993, p. 379), ‘the Elma affair’ (Dupont, 1994, p. 302), and ‘an upheaval’ (Rudnytsky, 2013a, p. xiii) in Ferenczi’s life. Stanton (1990) briefly describes it as “Ferenczi feels himself to be a ‘football’ between mother and daughter and ask Freud to intervene” (p. 18), and Ferenczi’s “attempt to balance the deep ‘mental love’ for Gizella with the wild sexual desires for Elma” (p. 126). Haynal (1993) remarks that while ‘Ferenczi had violated his role as psychoanalyst’, the episode illustrates

Ferenczi’s temperament and testifies to the way in which he engaged himself wholeheartedly, without a backward glance, in any therapeutic situation. It also shows that he made little clear or defensive distinction between his professional life and his private life. (pp. xxiii–xxiv)

Phillips (1996), comparing it to ‘the well-known drama of Jung’s dissension,’ puts it as

the less notorious drama of Ferenczi’s love affair with an older woman, Gizella, his mistress and future wife, and her daughter Elma, who was Ferenczi’s, and later Freud’s, analysand. (p. 106)

Hoffer (1996) empathizes Ferenczi’s ‘excruciatingly painful, often hurtful pendulum swings of indecision’ and coined it as ‘Ferenczi’s “Inner Theater of War”: Gizella or Elma?’ (p. xviii). Falzeder (1997) sees it as ‘an intense and complicated imbroglio of relationships (mainly between Freud, Ferenczi, Gizella, Elma, and Geza Pálos)’ (p. 421). Similarly, Forrester (1997) conceives it as ‘the four-sided game of beds, couches, and writing desks that Freud and Ferenczi, Gizella and Elma played at for two decades’ (p. 103). Dupont (2002) observes that ‘love, psychoanalysis, friendship and affection all played their part in turn’ and ‘the three participants would remain deeply affected by this episode’ (p. xxviii). From the side
of Elma, one of the ‘silent partners in the drama’, Golinelli (2005), quoting Berman (2004), attempts to reconstruct the Elma-Gizella-Freud-Ferenczi ‘fateful quadrangle’ as,

[from the collection of letters and photographic documents on that intricate affair, we get the impression of Elma as a woman deeply wounded by the emotionally charged events in which she found herself involved. Nonetheless, she managed to remain open to the exceptional, innovative power of psychoanalytic thought, showing in her attitude towards Freud and Ferenczi that she had treated them ‘with greater loyalty than they deserved, with more caring than they invested in her during that crucial period’ (p. 405). (p. 948)

However, these studies mostly focus on the surface of the problem, namely a dilemma that Ferenczi is facing. Therefore, they miss the underlying crucial connection between the Freud-Ferenczi relationship and the continuously refined concept of introjection as life and theory. One notable exception is Breger (2000) who notes Ferenczi ‘vacillated endlessly’ (p. 344) and most importantly, ‘Ferenczi’s conflict with these two women was completely entangled with his relationship with Freud.’ (p. 345).

As a sequel to the Seidler Episode, instead of prying into Freud’s ménage à trois as what Jung failed in interpreting Freud’s dream in the voyage to America, Ferenczi offers his own version of ménage à trois as a dilemma for Freud to analyze and to rescue Ferenczi. The Palermo episode, moreover, is Ferenczi’s attempt to merge with Freud, an antecedent for Ferenczi to pull Freud into his Elma Episode. From Ferenczi’s side, it also shows the confusion of relationship115, as echoing with his notion of confusion in the 1932 paper on Confusion of Tongues. This makes the possibility of Ferenczi living out his fantasy about Freud’s triangular relationship with Martha and Minna, Freud’s sister-in-law, less conjectural, when Ferenczi finds himself mired in his concurrent love for Gizella and Elma. To understand Ferenczi’s introjective relationship with Freud, this episode is indispensable. It indicates how
Ferenczi is using various people introjectively. For example, his taking up Freud’s qualities is anticipatory of Ferenczi’s (1922a) exposition on Introjection that the object’s qualities are introjected, or incorporated in an imaginary way, thus building a connection between the self and the world. Things in the outer world are not just eaten and swallowed. Contrary to this paper, Ferenczi’s does not seem to be able to differentiate between himself and Freud clearer than before the same paper. For different unconscious functions and in different stages, the Elma Episode revolves around the axis of Freud-Ferenczi. Yet, his introjected object also has a reality basis as he is in fact entangled in a triangular relationship with Elma and Gizella. Furthermore, by the middle of the story, Ferenczi’s efforts at striving for independence from Freud, as well as his referring Elma to Freud to continue with the analysis, suggest that Ferenczi also has the motive to ‘return’ his introjected Freud to Freud, for Freud to resolve their introjection issues. However, he does not succeed.

To understand this episode as an experience-theory nexus, i.e., experiencing and theorizing Introjection, one has to start with the first appearance of Gizella, Elma’s mother and Ferenczi’s another psychoanalytic partner as well, in the Freud-Ferenczi relationship, in order to have a broader and more meaningful context for the evolution of this entanglement. Freud pays a visit to Budapest in late Nov 1909 and is able to meet Gizella for the first time as well. He writes to Jung on 2 Dec,

Ferenczi introduced me to his lady friend and I no longer have to feel sorry for him. She is splendid, a woman who has only recently stepped down from the summit of feminine beauty, clear intelligence and the most appealing warmth. I needn’t tell you that she is thoroughly versed in our lore and a staunch supporter. (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, pp. 270 – 271)

Subsequently, Freud addresses Ferenczi and Gizella as a couple116, ‘Cordial
greetings to you and Frau G.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 110), even though in reality, an illicit one, as Gizella[^7] is to divorce her husband Géza Pálos only some 9 years later in 1919. Even before meeting Ferenczi’s Gizella in person, Freud is addressing her in correspondence as ‘Frau. G.’. After the meeting, Freud simply addresses her as ‘Gisela’. Dupont (1994) also notes that,

> the name ‘Gizella’ had a peculiar echo for both men. For Ferenczi, it was the name of his sister, who just preceded him and whom he disliked; for Freud, it was the name of his first love, Gisela Fluss. (p. 311)

In introjecting Ferenczi’s inner world, Freud is also hybridizing it with some material of his own. This kind of hybridization[^8] is similar to what Ferenczi defines introjection as expansion of the ego to include objects (Ferenczi, 1909), turning it into objects of unconscious phantasy. However, there is one key difference. It shows a combination or mixing of content of the existing objects with the new objects in one’s internal world, forming a new version of objects, as it were, that reflect the inner world of both Freud and Ferenczi. If this is the case, the possibility of mutual introjection becomes more real.

On Ferenczi’s side, in his return letter on 7 Dec, he follows Freud and starts addressing Gizella as ‘Frau G.’ as well. So, this stages a closer meeting of their unconscious via mutual introjection. Ferenczi’s next move further testifies this,

> What has happened in and with me otherwise you will find in the enclosed “diary pages.” I have made an effort to be completely honest, despite the fact that I know that you will read it. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 112)

Although the editors of the correspondence note that the enclosure was missing, and we do not know what was in the diary, writing and sending his ‘diary pages’ in a ‘completely honest’ way implies Ferenczi’s invitation to Freud to a close-up to his inner life, and more importantly, an invitation to participation as well. If their unconscious has something echoing each other already, this would imply that they
are going onto a ‘trip’ that neither of them would have full control over or awareness of. As for Ferenczi, who lives and writes psychoanalysis as one single experience, it would not be pure coincidence that at this juncture, he makes a request to Freud,

Please give me your honest opinion about the work on “introjection.” I am well aware of its weaknesses, but one is still always somewhat too lenient with oneself. (ibid., p. 112)

Freud, on the other hand, is just making his first step into Ferenczi’s inner world for real. He is less sure than Ferenczi. He replies (12 Dec),

I have no doubt about the complete success of the whole thing, only I am unsure whether the term introjection will prove to be lasting. (ibid., p. 113)

Freud’s uncertainty may imply his wish that Ferenczi’s introjection of him, or vice versa, will have an end in sight. Meanwhile, Freud, knowing that Gizella has criticism against Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic way of relating, soon begins to caution Ferenczi against his ‘using’ Gizella as both a lover and a psychoanalytic partner, especially in view of Ferenczi’s confusion of truth in science versus in love,

Truth is only the absolute goal of science, but love is a goal of life which is totally independent of science, and conflicts between both of these major powers are certainly quite conceivable. I see no necessity for principled and regular subordination of one to the other. (ibid., p. 122)

Soon after the New Year of 1910, Ferenczi has the urge to go to Vienna to see Freud for his ‘personal matters’ (ibid., p. 127), to ‘abreact something personal as soon as possible’ (ibid., p. 128), and which such ‘psychic depression’ and ‘sad demeanor’ have ‘a little to do with Frau G.’ (ibid., p. 128). Freud does not turn him down, giving him the choice of an afternoon or evening on Sunday, and even reassures him that if he ‘still bring your depression along, then you won’t take it home again.’ (ibid., p. 129). They are in opposite mood, Ferenczi sad and Freud cheerful, as they are telling each other. Ferenczi’s urgency to see Freud indicates
that he could not ‘abreact’ his personal material via writing letters but a face-to-face meeting could. Freud’s immediate presence when he abreacts seems to be necessary for him to seek introjection of Freud. Ferenczi (1922a) argues that in the identification phase that follows the narcissism phase, external objects are not just eaten or incorporated cannibalistically. Instead, their qualities are taken up and introjected, or incorporated in an imaginary way, thus building a connection between the self and the world. Ferenczi’s visit to Freud, in his state of being overwhelmed with depressed mood and Frau G., seeks to build up this connection by taking up Freud’s qualities. What makes this more probable is Ferenczi’s testimony afterwards as he has apparently taken up Freud’s elated mood. On 5 Feb, Ferenczi testifies immediately after the meeting, apparently not about Frau G. per se, but what he finds from his honest talk with Freud,

The rich – all too rich – “booty” of my latest trip to Vienna is constantly on my mind. A day like that compensates one for months of renunciation and refreshes one’s mind and spirit. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 130)

Ferenczi even asks Freud to include free discourse into his upcoming paper on the prospect of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi believes that such open and honest discourse, if practiced on a societal level, would mean more maturity with far more possibilities for social and political life. He continues with his social theory of honesty, as he no longer limits his psychoanalytic findings to the consultation room,

Just think what it would mean if one could tell everyone the truth, one’s father, teacher, neighbor, and even the king. All fabricated, imposed authority would go to the devil – what is rightful would remain natural. (ibid., p. 130)

Such a feeling of emancipation by ‘truth’, to the extent of eradicating boundaries that block people of different power, however, is not only reverberating on Ferenczi’s side. Freud (8 Feb) is also affected,
Our talk also invigorated me greatly. … My writer’s cramp is in full
convalescence. … I am more capable of accomplishment than ever. (ibid.,
p. 133).

However, Freud does not tell Ferenczi all what he feels. Earlier on 2 Feb, even
before Ferenczi wrote him, Freud has already told Jung about the meeting in a more
sentimental way,

Ferenczi was a balm to me last Sunday; at last a chance to talk about
the things closest to my heart; there is another man I am really sure of.
(Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, pp. 290-291)

Evidently, this meeting, or heart-to-heart talk, draws them closer to each other
as they would find more of themselves in each other. Ferenczi adds,

I evidently want to play the little Freud here, very eagerly instructing
someone quite inexperienced who recognizes me as his master. (Freud &
Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 131)

Ferenczi has introjected Freud’s quality and make it an attribute of his own ego
(Ferenczi, 1922a), and vice versa. This makes the possibility of mutual introjection
more real. They are hybridizing with each other in such a close connection and
exchange of qualities via introjection, the drawing in of external objects. By 5 Apr,
Ferenczi is not finished with his personal issues as he is still talking about his
‘solutions’, one is Freud letting him ‘attach such a large portion of libido’ (Freud &
Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 157) to Freud; the other is to be serious about Frau. G. that
he discusses with Freud often. However, Ferenczi tells Freud that there

…are actually no material difficulties, except for those that concern
her unmarried daughter and for the two-sided (partly communal)
relationship entails. And to that the uncertainty about nephritis\(^{120}\)

It is tactless of me to weigh you down with such purely personal
matters; I could work those out by myself. But you will find that
understandable and forgivable, considering my unsatisfied need for
support. (ibid., p. 157, footnote and italics added)

The untold obstacle for marrying Gizella, if it is what Ferenczi has in mind,
however, is something else, viz., Gizella’s remaining not yet divorced. It is not that
Ferenczi is not telling Freud the whole truth, but that he simply wants to get Freud’s assurance for his unlimited need for support, as his ‘purely personal matters’ are beginning to unfold, a bigger obstacle, however, resides within Ferenczi.

In his letter of 9 July, Ferenczi first tells Freud about Gizella’s jealousy and hate of Ferenczi’s for his liking her younger sister. This sets the frame for Ferenczi’s problem with three, as Ferenczi writes,

Two people get along easily. It is not until one gets to three that one constitutes a small society, with all its positive and negative passions.’ (ibid., p. 186)

On 17 Aug 1910, Elma, Gizella’s elder daughter, first appears in the correspondence as Ferenczi’s own unfolding problem. Soon after the new year of 1911, Gizella is taking Elma to Vienna to correct the scar from the previous tooth surgery. Ferenczi (3 Jan) wants to seize this opportunity to have Freud’s advice on Elma’s problem with love and marriage that Gizella worries. It is noteworthy that at this point, Ferenczi is still tactful enough by not intervening himself, as he knows that he cannot act and judge with a calm mind, given his emotional involvement already. Freud’s willing and prompt intervention, however, does not prove to assure Ferenczi. Freud sees Elma and diagnoses her as a case of dementia praecox, and this makes Ferenczi feel surprised and depressed. Ferenczi thinks he has overlooked the possibility of psychosis in Elma.

Between Freud and Ferenczi, Elma’s issue then fades for some months as if nothing has happened between Ferenczi and Elma. Ferenczi’s own issue of ungratified sexual needs, as related to Gizella’s old age, however, is alive. On 17 March, he confesses to Freud that after his prolonged sexual fantasy about young women, together with overcoming some inhibition, he had intercourse with a 30-year-old divorced woman who was not a patient. The result, nevertheless, is his
firm belief that he is ‘unshakably fixated on Frau G.’ (ibid., p. 263) and that he ‘should avoid such experiments in the future’ (ibid., p. 263). This ‘experiment’ suggests Ferenczi’s difficulty to see Gizella as a single object that can satisfy all his needs, erotic and otherwise, as what he thought he had been striving after. It is also telling Ferenczi that there might not be such a person or object for him to introject. Even Ferenczi’s self-proclaimed insight about his fixation to Gizella does not provide him with a solution. As for his relationship with Freud, the difficulties all along are showing even clearer to Ferenczi about such an impossibility, let alone Freud being a man instead of a woman. Ferenczi’s ideal of ‘Two people get along easily’ (ibid., p. 186) kept running up against reality as being impossible for Ferenczi.

Probably unbeknownst to himself, Ferenczi starts another ‘experiment’, that turns out to be a more dangerous one. On 14 July, he tells Freud,

Just think, I decided to take her daughter (Elma) into psychoanalytic treatment; the situation, you see, was becoming unbearable. For the moment, the thing is working, and the effect is favorable. Of course, she has to talk much more about me than other patients do, but that is not turning out to be an absolute hindrance. She is consciously overcompensating (in Adler’s sense); naturally I look for and find the most natural drives repressed behind this. (ibid., p. 296, italics mine)

Is it simply because of the situation being unbearable that Ferenczi decides to analyze Elma? Does Ferenczi believe that, turning himself into Elma’s analyst, would make the situation bearable? What is Ferenczi’s basis for such a belief? Or even for believing that he is really doing analysis with Elma? In reporting the initial progress to be favorable and yet employing Adler’s theory to understand Elma, bearing in mind that at that very historical moment, Adler is already in the climax of opposing to Freud’s theory of sexuality, is Ferenczi contradicting himself about his belief in the power of psychoanalysis? Back to 30 May, he has written to Freud,
‘Adler’s opposition must also have had a paralyzing effect on my power, that is to say, desire for work.’ (ibid., p. 284). If Elma’s ‘overcompensation’ also has such a paralyzing effect, Ferenczi’s analysis with Elma would not appear as good as Ferenczi says. In fact, Freud is less optimistic than Ferenczi. On 20 July, he tells Ferenczi that while he wishes him success in the analysis, he is afraid that it will go well up to a certain point and then not at all. While you’re at it, don’t sacrifice too many of your secrets out of an excess of kindness. (ibid., p. 296)

Even with such a prediction that shows Freud’s worry, he does not stop Ferenczi analyzing Elma. In return, Ferenczi (24 July) does not respond to Freud on this point. He simply restates that the analysis is moving on normally and that later he will orally report to him the case of Elma, in the Third Psychoanalytic Congress in Weimar (21 - 22 Sept). On 18 Oct, Ferenczi sends Freud a piece of good news together with a potential worry,

The analysis of Frau G.’s daughter (Elma) was already making very nice progress when one of the youths in whom she was (neurotically) interested (actually the only one who was worth anything) shot himself on her account a week ago. It is very questionable how the matter will go now. (ibid., p. 304)

Indeed, Ferenczi is partly aware that something is wrong but he cannot articulate it, even though consciously, he believes the analysis is ‘very nice’ (ibid., p. 304). Subsequently, Elma disappears from their correspondence for weeks, rather abruptly, and their letters are filled with a more urgent matter regarding Ferenczi’s handling of a request from Jung’s wife, Emma. This matter results in a severe misunderstanding between Freud and Ferenczi that could have a profound impact onto his analysis of Elma and Freud’s ‘supervision’ of it. Ferenczi was imbued with bitterness and sadness as arising from his poignant insight that Freud could be so alienated from him. On 14 Nov, Ferenczi sends Freud an unprecedented notification
of rebellion, or liberation,

You must have already noticed a long time ago that for a long time my letters have been less frequent and more devoid of content than before. You once even made a remark to this effect when you asked if we don’t have anything more to say to each other. I left the matter somewhat in disarray, was reluctant to cleanse myself from the inside, until today, under rather distressing circumstances (when will they finally cease with me?!), something became clear. It seems that I wanted to commit a terrible act of violence. Dissatisfied with both parents, I wanted to make myself independent! (ibid., p. 311, italics mine)

Piling up with inner chaos, bitterness, and distress, as arising from Freud's paternal ‘misunderstanding’ and Ferenczi’s submission to Freud, Ferenczi wants to tease himself away, with violence or force, from the bond to such parental figures, and be a child no more. He continues with his bitter allusion to the Palermo episode that Freud reprimands him for being too infantile and dependent in his transference, and he decides to be independent,

I don’t want to be infantile, don’t need a father confessor, want to be rid of sexual curiosity; want to come to terms with myself on my own, etc. (ibid., p. 311 – 312)

This decision of independence, however, is not independent of Ferenczi’s Gizella. Here, Elma, having disappeared for almost one month, re-surfaces, together with Gizella, as Ferenczi’s illustration of what he means by independence,

As a parallel process an apparent detachment of libido from Frau Gisela was playing itself out in me. An occasion for this was offered by the treatment of her daughter, who is in treatment with me and in the stage of transference. I thought seriously that I am true to Frau G. only out of piety, and had fantasies about marrying Elma. (Recurrence of a similar condition in the spring.) (ibid., p. 312, italics mine)

Ferenczi is saying that he is using Elma for his ‘independence’ from Gizella, a figure Ferenczi now almost positions as a parent. Also, if the ‘similar condition’ in spring refers to his fantasies of marrying Elma, it would be logical to infer that, as noted at the beginning of this Chapter, when Ferenczi decided to take Elma into analysis on 14 July 1911\textsuperscript{121}, Ferenczi had already had such fantasy even before he
took Elma into analysis. One would even wonder how much such fantasy had been
taken into account when Ferenczi decided to take Elma into analysis.

However, after all these infantile striving to be independent, Ferenczi then
reports to Freud his tearful talk to Gizella on the day of writing this letter. He finds
that he simply cannot loosen his bonding to her, even though he has strong erotic
interest in young and pretty girls. That sends Ferenczi back to his infantile position.
Ferenczi immediately moves from Gizella to Freud and seeks re-assurance from
Freud that he is still there for him,

At the same time – after a last welling-up of the striving for
independence with respect to you – I recognized that your friendship –
yes, even your fatherly advice – is indispensable to me.

The result of all these events is this letter to you, from which you see
that I haven’t gotten very far with independence. But perhaps I can at
least better control my mood and my actions with this knowledge. I hope
that my desire for work will also increase. … Please share with me soon
your impression of the content of this letter. (ibid., p. 312, my italics)

Apparently, this is the end of his drama of independence, but a beginning of
another round of even more forceful pulling of Freud into his inner turmoil of love.
Essentially, this striving for independence fails with Elma’s inability to pull Ferenczi
out of Gizella, and at the same time, pushing Ferenczi back to Freud, who,
ultimately, is the ‘indispensable’ object for his introjection. However, if Ferenczi’s
striving for independence from Freud has not really disappeared, he would be using
Elma again for the same purpose of pulling him away from Freud in his striving for
independence. This seems possible in view of Freud’s light response 3 days later,

Dear son,

You demand a quick response to your affective letter, … I would
rather have an independent friend, but if you make such difficulties, I
have to accept you as a son. Your struggle for liberation doesn’t need to
take place in such alternation of rebellion and subjugation. (ibid., p. 314)

Freud is playing with him the father-son ‘affective’ game, as he steps down a
bit from his Palermo position by willingly becoming the loving father. Freud also recommends that one does not have to do away with one’s complexes but should live with them harmoniously, and ‘they are the legitimate directors of his behavior in the world’ (ibid., p. 314) Freud even signs off with,

Now, good-bye and calm down.
With fatherly regards,
Freud (ibid., p. 314)

Freud does not touch upon anything on Ferenczi’s struggle with Elma and Gizella, or what the struggle means for Freud himself. In return, Ferenczi (26 Nov) is amused, but still hinting that his independence day is yet to come,

Your fatherly speech had an immediate effect on me. It made me laugh heartily. On the other hand, it made me think, and I had to admit you were right about everything. … I thank you for your kindness in playing the role of the father, as long as I need such a thing; perhaps I will yet have the experience of extending my hand to you as a free man. (ibid., p. 315)

Freud is still basking in this level of exchange as he writes to Ferenczi promptly on 30 Nov, starting,

Dear son,
(Until you object to this form of address) (ibid., p. 316)

Freud even alludes to his own inner voice about his own marriage, which is both a partial and covert echo to Ferenczi’s trouble with Elma and Gizella, as well as one self-disclosing step forward from his truncated dream reported in their voyage to America, with Jung’s presence, more than 2 years ago,

Sometimes I feel as though I only wanted to start a little liaison and at my age discovered that I had to marry a new wife. (ibid., p. 317)

Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud into his own inner life, viz., the Ferenczi-Gizella-Elma triangle being an introjected version of Freud-Martha-Minna triangle, or their respective ménage à trois, does have the power to loosen up things in Freud, all done subtly and gradually. Ferenczi (1919) states that introjection can

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lead to more control of the ego over the external world. Here, it is apparent that Freud’s fantasy of marrying a new wife suggests that Ferenczi’s mire has an influence on him by motivating him to copy what Ferenczi is experiencing, i.e., Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud leads to a change in Freud too. If Freud has not had close involvement in Ferenczi’s case, he could not have such a fantasy at this moment. However, Freud does not seem to be totally ignorant of what is happening within Ferenczi as he ends his letter in this way,

I send kind regards, with complete understanding for all the complications under which you now stand. (ibid., p. 317, my italics)

This clicks, but maybe unintentionally. This time, Ferenczi (3 Dec) first confesses that actually he has no right to declare any independence or maturity because this letter is written with his urge to report to Freud his personal trouble. This urge, Ferenczi admits, is evidence for his immaturity, even though he has such an insight about such ‘infantile attitude’ (ibid., p. 317). And within this attitude, a crisis, both personal and psychoanalytic, is erupting. All he needs is a cue from the ‘father’ to tell, as he writes to Freud on 3 Dec 1911,

It was sufficient that you wrote a word about your understanding of my difficult situation, and already I have to tell you everything. (ibid., p. 317)

In their previous play of father and son, they talked and analyzed well, using the language of psychoanalysis. However, with this crisis, such language seemingly collapses and Ferenczi retreats to his own language: he declares that Elma ‘has won [his] heart.’ (ibid., p. 318), as he can no longer maintain the analyst’s detachment and he ‘laid [him]self bare, which then led to a kind of closeness which [he] can no longer put forth as the benevolence of the physician or of the fatherly friend.’ (ibid., p. 318). Things are moving on faster than he can imagine. After his failed attempts at resisting temptation and as he is overwhelmed by passion, or even love, for Elma,
he does not have a clear bearing. What is worse, however, is Gizella’s ‘kindness’ and ‘love’ for him, as Ferenczi also has ‘the most tender feeling’ to her, and at the same time, ‘feel terribly sorry for her’ (ibid., p. 318).

Gizella, on the other hand, believes that Freud has the power to influence Ferenczi, as Ferenczi tells Freud, ‘[s]he knows that I am writing to you and asks you through me to compel me to make a quick decision.’ (ibid., p. 318), as if the solution were as simple as: Freud pushing Ferenczi as a button. Ferenczi may have tried to delude Gizella into believing that the key is in Freud, or maybe in psychoanalysis. Ferenczi is giving up his own agency when tackling his emotional and relational entanglement. Furthermore, in relaying Gizella’s suggestion for Freud to ‘compel’ Ferenczi, Ferenczi may also achieve his own aim of drawing Freud into his own inner turmoil, or an enactment of his own version of ménage à trois as shared with Freud’s own.

At this point, Ferenczi also tries to show Freud his own analytic acuity by tracing back his analytic failure to ground zero, as well as pointing the direction of intervention to and for Freud,

From an analytic point of view I have to conceive of the matter in such a way as to conclude that Elma became especially dangerous to me at the moment when – after that young man’s suicide – she badly needed someone to support her and to help her in her need. I did that only too well, even though I held my tenderness in check with difficulty for the moment. (ibid., p. 318)

If one reads Ferenczi’s current cry for help from Freud as a parallel script to Elma’s previous ‘dangerous’ state, one would also ask the question of whether Ferenczi is also becoming ‘especially dangerous’ to Freud too, given Ferenczi’s previous successive attempts at introjecting Freud into an exclusive dyad. He ends the letter, after hinting at his desire for a family with Elma who could bear him children, as contrast to Gizella, ‘Perhaps you can call my attention to something that
could be of use to me in my struggle to decide.’ (ibid., p. 318). Ferenczi phrases his problem, rather deceptively to Freud, as a difficult choice between the mother and the daughter.

Freud responds quickly (5 Dec). He does not address him as ‘Dear Son’ anymore. Instead, he resumes to his previous ‘Dear friend’. With a firm and directive tone, he instructs Ferenczi to stop the analysis and come to Vienna for a few days, and refrains from making any decision. He also has much pity for Gizella and asks Ferenczi to send his regards ‘many times’ (ibid., p. 319).

Freud’s position is that Elma is not qualified to compete with her mother. He doubts whether the passion between Elma and Ferenczi would last. He sees Elma as a ‘seductive demon’ (ibid., p. 321). He advises Ferenczi to find happiness elsewhere, instead of following the demon blindfolded. Freud has confidence that his analysis is correct but he has no confidence that Ferenczi would follow his advice, even though he is sure Ferenczi is thinking similarly. Freud believes that he is speaking Ferenczi’s mind, even though he states to Gizella on 17 Dec that he has no feeling about the whole thing for which he is coerced to participate. For his part, Ferenczi is casting himself as a patient and reporting his turmoil to Freud. On 18 Dec, after a heartfelt talk with Gizella, things seem to have been decided. The ‘other severely ill patient’ (ibid., p. 322), Gizella, suffers a lot. Ferenczi starts to mourn over the loss of her and is clearer about his motivation to marry Elma. However, ‘What is still missing is the fatherly blessing.’ (ibid., p. 322). Freud (26 Dec), in return, refrains from further intervention or advice, as he does not want to ruin Ferenczi’s future completely. He congratulates Ferenczi wholeheartedly and is expecting the wedding, coincidentally providing the missed ‘fatherly blessing’, although it later turns out that such blessing, which is not from Elma’s father, Géza Pálos, could not make the
marriage become real. Although these two ‘fathers’ seem to differ much, their ‘intervention’ is similar. Freud’s previous advice for Ferenczi to give up Elma turns out to be consistent with Pálos’ objection later on.

As the year 1911 is ending, Ferenczi (30 Dec) writes to Freud with confidence about his certainty to marry Elma and the wedding is to take place soon. He also gives credits to Gizella for her sacrifice. Even though she went through a severe blow, she still feels happy for them. However, with the New Year 1912 coming, something new also emerges. Ferenczi rushes to report them to Freud on 1 Jan with an express letter. The problem starts with Elma’s father but it triggers a sequence of reverberations on different people’s mind. Ferenczi recalls that when everything seems settled and everyone is in agreement, they present their plan to Géza Pálos, who has hesitation and raises objection, as he reminds them of Elma’s previous engagement that was eventually cancelled. At that moment, Ferenczi is much surprised to find that Elma starts to have second thoughts about her engagement to Ferenczi too. Ferenczi feels curious about Elma’s reaction. Upon further enquiry on Elma, he finds something that, regrettably, should have been unveiled in his previous analysis with her: when her wish for something is getting stronger, she would develop a simultaneous inner inhibition to wish and would hate with full strength and she ends up being very unhappy. Ferenczi is shocked to find out Elma’s problem with wish. However, he does not know that Elma’s problem might also be his own problem as well, given the fact that it is Ferenczi who, at this juncture, starts thinking about therapy for Elma that replaces their engagement for the time being. He even tries to prepare Elma for the possibility that, after treatment of her illness, their engagement can be cancelled as well.

Ferenczi has separated his own problem (need for a family) from Elma’s
(problem with wish) and he does not wish to be Elma’s analyst anymore. The way Ferenczi introduces Freud into the story here is telling,

Of course, I myself cannot continue the treatment. After many bitter tears (which certainly had partly to do with her own fate) she consented to go to Vienna and enter treatment with you. I and Frau G. – we could hardly decide to entrust her with anyone else. The family has been advised of the fee – If I get a positive response from you – which I very, very much wish – I will go to Vienna on Saturday evening, she will leave a day earlier, and on Sunday I can turn her over to you.’ (ibid., p. 324, italics added)

Elma cannot differentiate whether Ferenczi is her analyst or lover. She cannot even tell the difference between love as (Ferenczi’s) treatment versus love as a prelude to (Ferenczi’s) marriage with her. For Ferenczi, he is just beginning to separate these two. Therefore, she cries bitterly upon hearing the prescribed change of her analyst, and maybe of lover too. Here, Freud is a figure who has been well contemplated on the mind of Ferenczi, and whose function as a surrogate Ferenczi is long ready. Freud is to appear at this most important and correct timing. On the therapeutic mode of case handling, Freud is simply taking over a case from Ferenczi. However, Ferenczi’s last sentence in this letter might give more clues to what Ferenczi is thinking about, ‘I won’t write much now about myself. The feeling of having perhaps escaped danger mitigates the pain of disappointment.’ (ibid., p. 324, my italics). This feeling of narrow escape from danger might be Ferenczi’s compensated action for his previous lost opportunity of escaping from the other danger at the time (Oct 1911) of his first taking up Elma for treatment, during which Elma was mourning for the loss of her boyfriend who ‘shot himself on her account’ (ibid., p. 304) and was badly in need of someone who could soothe him. Now, in referring Elma to Freud, Ferenczi is putting Freud into his previous ‘dangerous’ position again. This time, Elma is mourning over the loss of Ferenczi as her lover and analyst who also, symbolically, ‘shot himself on her account’ by no longer being
her analyst or even lover. Now Ferenczi is answering the question he posed to himself, and maybe to Freud too, on 18 Oct 1911, after Elma’s boyfriend shot himself, ‘It is very questionable how the matter will go now.’ (ibid., p. 304), the question that was interceded by the weeks of Emma Jung’s letters that created much ‘misunderstanding’ and bitterness. By putting Freud into such a peculiar position, in the name of Freud taking over Elma’s analysis from Ferenczi, Ferenczi might be trying to achieve something unconsciously. In case Elma manages to turn Freud from her analyst into her lover, Ferenczi’s previous drama of independence from Freud, and hence solving their introjection problem of merging, could go one step further. So, here we have two surrogate stories going on at once. For Elma, Freud is Ferenczi’s surrogate. For Freud, Elma is Ferenczi’s surrogate. What is more, Rudnytsky’s (2011) argues that Ferenczi is unconsciously trying to live Freud’s triangular relationship with Martha and Minna. Also, as noted in the beginning of this Chapter, Elma is Ferenczi’s sister-in-law. Elma could also be seen as Ferenczi’s introjected version of Freud’s Minna, but now returned to Freud for Freud to continue with his work on the triangular relationship in his fantasy. This could underlie some of Ferenczi’s desire for ‘independence’, or the reverse of introjection or merging, from Freud. However, is Ferenczi really that ready to have his introjection of Freud stopped in such a way? Even for his sudden ‘awareness’ of Elma’s problem with wish, sending her away (to Freud) for treatment, with his own hesitation of marrying Elma, etc., are all compatible with Freud’s previous advice for him to give up Elma! Ferenczi is indeed incorporating Freud’s advice, fulfilling Freud’s own wish. In this sense, the introjection is so strong and yet subtle that the drama of independence may simply be some kind of smoke.

On Freud’s side, he is quite aware of the complicated nuance and multiple
leads of Ferenczi’s unconscious plot. He replies (2 Oct) to Ferenczi’s express letter equally quickly, and with unprecedented candour,

How bitterly I feel being perhaps more perceptive and freer of illusion than others, and having to be right. When your express letter arrived, I naturally thought it would contain the news of your engagement, and I recapitulated in myself the intentions of showing no sensitivity now that you neglect the sullen old man in favor of the charming young woman, and of waiting until the both of you have forgotten my advice on the contrary. Then I read it, and now I don’t know whether I should be more satisfied. You speak of a drastic change in yourself, as if the scales had fallen from your eyes. I know that I have done nothing to bring that about and would rather have remained grossly wrong. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 324-325, my italics)

Here, Freud’s conflict over being bitterly correct and wish for being totally wrong suggests that he is experiencing Ferenczi’s painful choice between the mother and the daughter too. Whether he likes it or not, he is already dwelling in Ferenczi’s confused and uncertain inner world, as what Ferenczi’s introjection theory would say. As for the ‘referral’ of Elma, Freud offers two realms of considerations, and yet both entail Freud forfeiting the final decision, which is something like a repetition of the Palermo episode, but with their roles reversed this time: Freud doing the dictation of Ferenczi’s will, or Ferenczi being the dictator that hijacks Freud’s mind. First, Freud writes,

If you don’t ask about my inclinations and expectations but rather demand of me that I undertake it, then I naturally have to assent.’ (ibid., p. 325, underline mine)

What is it that constitutes the ‘demand’ that Freud has to comply so naturally? The necessary condition is that Ferenczi deletes Freud’s will from the picture, i.e., there is only Ferenczi’s own will. In this sense, Freud’s ‘compliance’ to such ‘demand’ is not coming from Freud, but simply a ‘natural’ occurrence within Ferenczi’s own world. In other words, only by Freud becoming Ferenczi’s internal object that such compliance would occur naturally without any resistance. Second,
Just imagine under what unfavorable auspices I am supposed to begin. After withdrawing the bonus that can spur her on to recovery, with the knowledge that I was not in sympathy with her intentions, and with the vague desire for revenge against you, the one who is sending her into this treatment! In this humor, a woman can hardly be woo’d! (ibid., p. 325, my italics)

Freud is well aware of the subtlety behind and he is unusually frank, especially for his grumble, about it to Ferenczi. He is also aware of the possibility of his repetition of Ferenczi’s going astray with Elma’s treatment. He is resisting Ferenczi’s introjection, as it were. He continues,

In addition, if things don’t go well, there is the silent ill between us, or at least between the both of us and the noble woman, the superfluosity of my having to peer so deeply into your very own affairs without having accomplished anything for the effort. Is the attempt worth these stakes? I leave it up to you to decide. Send me a telegram if you go back on your intention. (ibid., p. 325, italics added)

Freud is weighing the whole thing against their friendship, i.e., his being Elma’s analyst could cost his friendship with Ferenczi. Yet, Freud shares his distress, ‘It pains me that I can’t be with you now. I was depressed the whole time and anesthetized myself with writing – writing – writing.’ (ibid., p. 325). Freud’s psychological state was reflective of Ferenczi’s inner world, suggesting Ferenczi’s success in pulling Freud into himself.

In response, Ferenczi (3 Jan) starts with something that could re-zoom the whole thing back to their friendship. He even addresses Freud as ‘Dear friend’, the first and only time in the entire correspondence. Actually this has been how Freud addressed him all along,

Dear friend,
I thank you from the bottom of my heart for your letter. In the trials and confusion of the last few days the memory of the cheerful and dispassionate hours of our relations of friendship was my only unalloyed joy. With respect to Frau G, the joy was mixed with sadness; with respect to Elma it was mixed with concern and regret. (ibid., p. 325)

Ferenczi is telling Freud that their relationship is the figure and everything else
is the ground, the figure of pure joy that Ferenczi is striving after in an ideal relationship of merging. However, he is unusually firm when it comes to the referral question,

I cannot spare you the effort and trouble of taking Elma into treatment. *There is no other way out.* (ibid., p. 325, italics mine)

Ferenczi sees this referral as his only way to solve their shared *ménage à trois*. To reduce Freud’s resistance and increase his sympathy, Ferenczi explains that he has not yet decided firmly to revoke the engagement with Elma, but he believes that with Elma’s absence, his transference to her will dissipate and Freud’s treatment for her would have the same effect on her. So, his plan is simply to dissolve their mutual love, seen as transference, for each other. He further justifies his adventurous love for Elma that it is out of his ‘youthful bravado’ (ibid., p. 326), as a final attempt to build a family of his own, but then he becomes modest now, as he summarizes his courtship with Elma,

I took it upon myself to fatally insult dear Frau G. and to suppress a lot of other scruples of conscience. Burdened in this way, I approached Elma as a suitor. But when, at this moment, she showed not the pure joy of a lover but rather the pain of her emotional wounds, the endurance test failed. (ibid., p. 326)

Ferenczi is looking for pure joy in Elma as a pure lover whose wounds contaminate the purity, as Ferenczi is unable to tolerate the pain in it. Ferenczi, suppressing his conscience, uses Elma as his fatal insult to his lover Gizella. Such ‘insult’ probably also brings about emotional wounds and pain in Gizella. However, Ferenczi does not consider that Gizella has failed the ‘endurance test’. So, Elma might have functioned more as a test for Gizella’s endurance instead. It follows that Ferenczi’s analysis of Elma is just a pathway for this function to be fulfilled. At this point, Ferenczi wants to dissolve the ‘transference’, or love, of himself and Elma towards each other, and he is thinking of using analysis too to achieve this end. He
ends the letter in a rather telling way,

For the moment I don’t feel all too depressed. Only a sad regret when I see Frau G. and Elma – otherwise a kind of relief, I am often reminded of your principle about Rebach, which you don’t have coming to you.  

(ibid., p. 326, underline and footnote mine)

Ferenczi’s regret, when seeing both the mother and the daughter, would be indicative of his having done something irreversible onto them at the same time, which not just hurts Gizella and fails Elma in the endurance test, but also damages the mother-daughter relationship, in an incestuous way. As Ferenczi has also admitted, it is done with suppression of his conscience. His relief is that something bad is over because he has done the bad thing, suggesting that he will not do similarly bad things again. At this point, he is thinking about Freud’s ‘principle’ of the meaning of gain as getting something that one does not own. The ‘gain’ could be meaningful to both Ferenczi and Freud with respect to their shared ménage à trois. For Ferenczi, he has gained his part by introjecting the unconscious from Freud that does not belong to Ferenczi in the first place. For Freud, he is going to gain the part of Ferenczi’s processed psychic material and now bounced back from Ferenczi. Ferenczi seems to be saying that his own chapter in their mega-plot was over, at least for a while, and now it is Freud’s turn. Here, it is not about Freud’s upcoming psychoanalysis of Elma, but about how Freud is going to take over Ferenczi’s inner drama, part of which has been instigated by Freud’s own, and now Freud is to play it himself. After signing off the letter, Ferenczi adds, ‘Elma does not suspect that you were opposed to our marriage.’ (ibid., p. 326). All along, in their conscious world, the only person who has ever opposed to the marriage is Elma’s father, Géza Pálos. Ferenczi’s reminder here would suggest that he thinks, and wants Freud to believe as well, that Freud would not appear as a father figure for Elma when starting the treatment, at least. This would add one further similarity of Freud’s status to
Ferenczi’s when he began treatment with Elma in July 1911, all the more so when Elma is now also in a similar crisis of losing a lover called Ferenczi. Freud carries out the analysis with close reporting to Ferenczi, who, in return, without Elma’s awareness, offers remarks, comments, suggestions about Elma’s analysis, and even encloses Elma’s letters with him, as illustration. At the same time, Ferenczi continues his self-analytic letters with Freud. It is somewhat like Freud analyzing Elma with a Ferenczi, who is a surrogate of Elma’s unconscious, inside Freud, or analysing a hybrid version of Ferenczi-Elma by reading Ferenczi’s own self-analytic letters. Yet, for Ferenczi’s solution to work, Freud should also have analyzed his own ménage à trois and separate his from Ferenczi’s. Freud (13 Jan) reports that Elma’s analysis has started off as neither favorable nor unfavorable and there is not much to tell. However, Freud sees Elma’s love for Ferenczi as originating from her competition with her mother in seeking intimacy with father who has spoiled her in early infancy but then Elma takes the inevitable loss of intimacy as father’s neglect. Freud adds a compulsive dimension in Elma’s love, as ‘She falls in love compulsive with doctors, i.e., with persons who see her naked, physically, and now mentally.’ (ibid., p. 327). This remark, indeed, is equally applicable to Ferenczi, and in Ferenczi’s case with Freud: it is Ferenczi who has presented himself naked, mentally, to Freud in the first place. On the other hand, in signing off this letter, Freud sends ‘regards to the dear mother’, suggesting that he begins to get closer to Elma’s world by this identification with Elma. Ferenczi’s ‘drama of independence’, or solution to their introjection problem of shared ménage à trois, therefore, has its first pay-off, by Elma replacing Ferenczi, maybe for a while, in attaching to Freud.

Meanwhile, with Elma in the psychoanalytic custody of Freud in Vienna,
Ferenczi in Budapest has more space to reflect about what he wants next, and he is still oscillating or ruminating. He writes to Freud on 18 Jan, that in his depressed mood of losing Elma, he arrives at the following self-soothing ‘compromise’, curiously with Freud occupying an important place in the equation.

I began to console myself with the fact that I would find sufficient compensation for the loss of family happiness in the understanding and loving company of Frau G. and in scientific intercourse with you.’ (ibid., p. 328, my italics)

Ferenczi’s ‘fact’, or formula, is: Frau G. + Freud = Elma, if he could not have all three at once. However, once his mood is lifted, he fantasizes his ‘positive solution’ (ibid., p. 328) of marrying Elma as he finds her pathology less serious than he thought when he read Freud’s first report on his treatment of Elma some months ago. Most importantly, once again, he feels Elma’s ability to love as he recalls scenes with her that proves his feeling is correct. Other than the promise of family (and hence children), for Ferenczi, Elma has the ability to bring out in Ferenczi something that Gizella could not, namely his enthusiasm, joy, spontaneity and cheerfulness, which Ferenczi attributes to the irrationality of love. As he wishes for such an attractive ‘positive solution’, he finds himself facing another thought that would inhibit his wish: that he is more inclined to give up the ‘possibility of happiness’ with Elma than to subject he and Elma to ‘the danger of a marriage that has too much risk attached to it’ (ibid., p. 328, italics original). It is noted that Ferenczi’s conflict is similar to Elma with respect to her problem with wish, which is the problem that prompted Ferenczi send her right away to Freud for analysis. Ferenczi (1922b) argues that ‘What one loves becomes absorbed into one’s ego (introjection), for in the last resort one can love only oneself.’ (p. 212), which implies that, in their similar problem with wish, Elma becomes an internal object that he loves, which, ultimately, he is only loving himself. However, if it is Freud
that Ferenczi introjects, Elma may simply be a Freud surrogate, especially when the
ménage à trois starts not from Ferenczi, but Freud. It is Freud who is the first to
have the problem with wish.

Meanwhile, Ferenczi also has another solution in mind,

I am also exerting myself over a difficult possibility: to ensure for myself
Frau G.’s love also in the event of my marrying Elma. It is painful to me
to see her unhappy, and I obviously wish that she should share in our joy.
(Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 329)

The difficulty is probably that of killing Ferenczi’s pain by Gizella sharing their
happiness, half of which belongs to her daughter cum ex-rival, the other half to her
son-in-law cum ex-lover. Such pain-killer for both Ferenczi and Gizella is indeed
difficult for them and so it appears more like a ‘difficult possibility’ than a solution.
In fact, even if this possibility were to become a reality, Ferenczi might have
neglected Elma’s voice. Once, Elma writes to his mother,

As long as you feel yourself so deeply affected by the loss of Sándor,
Sándor will neither tear himself away inwardly from you, nor will I be
able to accept his love without misgivings. (ibid., p. 329, quoted in
Ferenczi’s letter to Freud dated 18 Jan 1912)

Hence, even if Gizella and Ferenczi were to be become pain-free, yet, possibly,
Elma would have been taking their pain already, the pain that originates from
Ferenczi’s ‘difficulty possibility’. The Elma in this solution is very different from
the one in the very first solution, a self-consoling one. If she were Ferenczi’s wife,
she could only work as a pain-absorber. On the other hand, if she were ousted128, by
being absent, her function as being equivalent to Freud-Gizella combined becomes
even more apparent to Ferenczi. However, no matter what Elma, Gizella, and even
Freud, could mean to Ferenczi, Ferenczi might just want to have all of them, in their
myriad array of combinations and functions to him, as his introjected objects for
construction of the ego (Ferenczi, 1922c). This hypothesis, on the other hand, is not
fully compatible with the other hypothesis that Ferenczi’s major introjective figure is Freud, and the others are revolving this relationship. Yet, if these other figures are seen as temporary surrogates of Freud, which the case of Elma has shown to be at some moments of this long story, their presence is necessary for Ferenczi to complete his introjection story of Freud. Back to Ferenczi’s dilemma, or oscillation, if it is partly a matter of his holding onto all possibilities, by simply waiting. In this sense, he has made a decision already. And the decision to wait, and hence perpetuating the triangular relationship, is again a manifestation of his running his own version of Freud’s *ménage à trois*, or Ferenczi introjecting the unconscious of Freud.

Freud continues to report his treatment to Ferenczi. In less than a month after the analysis began, Freud is already observing progress. He (1 Feb) writes that they are breaking through Elma’s father identification that mostly constitutes her narcissism. He even notes the first sign of Elma’s independent thinking and excellent insight. Yet, Freud does not believe that Elma’s love for Ferenczi can stand up to analysis. Ferenczi (7 Feb) does not like this ‘progress’ very much and declares that, despite such progress, he still cannot make a decision and he has to postpone it further. He diverts Freud’s attention to analyze Elma’s aggression towards her uncle, which is a rather irrelevant thread, as Freud does not take this up. Freud (13 Feb) later reports further that the analysis is ‘moving decidedly forward’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 344) and he begins to see in her the ‘familiar human and feminine characteristics’ (ibid., p. 344). Freud, however, still disapproves of Elma’s love for Ferenczi and reminds her that such love has to pass the test of analysis, to which Elma, as Freud reports, agrees. Freud further analyses Ferenczi’s indecision as a matter of his masochism. So, here, Freud works as a gate-keeper for defining
whether Elma’s love for Ferenczi is true or mere transference and presumably Ferenczi can make up his mind after Elma’s treatment or passing of this test. Ferenczi, in return, appears softening already, as he (18 Feb) reports to Freud that his craving for Elma is fading and he attributes it partly to Elma’s problem with wish and hence her inability to love. However, he has one new uncertainty here: that he does not know whether it would be different if ‘Elma were normal and healthy’ and he ‘didn’t doubt her ability to love’ (ibid., p. 347). This sends Ferenczi back to think about himself, other than simply blaming Elma. At this point, he is thinking about Freud and himself instead,

Forgive me if today I don’t write anything more important than my personal affairs. I am conscious of the fact that I am troubling you with matters that I should actually take care of myself. But – you know! – I am still the son – albeit one who is involved in painful struggles for his independence. (ibid., p. 347)

So, the entire matter with Elma, and Gizella, might as well be a camouflage for Ferenczi’s own difficult relationship with Freud, with their shared ménage à trois lurking behind. Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud is anticipatory of Ferenczi’s (1922b) idea on introjection: in the transition to object-love, one introjects objective perception, or the subjectivation of the object in the external world. Ferenczi and Freud’s shared ménage à trois would be the outcome of such subjectivation of the object, in the internal world of both Freud and Ferenczi. Such an introjected object is also narcissistically invested with libido (Ferenczi, 1915) as what Ferenczi’s own ménage à trois is revealing. The bonding between Ferenczi and Freud as a result of such mutual introjection is not just close or tight, but also imply a confusion of identity, of what belongs to whom, and hence the implication of the utmost difficulty of separating them from each other. Ferenczi’s painful ‘Oedipal’ struggle for independence from Freud may simply be his doomed attempt at returning his
introjected Freud, notably his *ménage à trois*, back to Freud, so that he will have a more separate or independent existence from Freud. As Ferenczi, with an introjective character, obviously may have some introjective experience with some other people throughout his life, it is not claimed that his engrossing introjective experience with Freud is the only antecedent of his later writings on introjection. Yet, the extraction of such introjective process in his relationship with Freud proves to be a link between his earlier experience and later writings.

Freud (20 Feb) immediately invites Ferenczi to Vienna on the coming Sunday, without Elma’s knowing. After this meeting, Ferenczi (29 Feb) declares to Freud that their meeting brings him so much intellectual and emotional gratification that he even confesses to Freud about their Palermo episode, ‘The fault on some other occasions (Palermo!) lay not in you, of course, but in me.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 350). Admitting his Palermo mistake means that Ferenczi would stay away from Freud’s inner trouble with intimacy with Fliess, and also the privacy of Freud’s truncated dream analysis by Jung in the America voyage regarding the *ménage à trois*. This also implies Ferenczi’s ‘drama of independence’, or solution to introjection, would have a pause here. Next, he announces Elma’s file could be closed.

This trip was significant for me personally, inasmuch as my doubts about the solution to the affairs of marriage have been laid to rest. What from now on speaks against marrying Elma, outside of the logical reasons, is also my inner voice, so from now on I am also affectively convinced that this plan should be dropped. (ibid., p. 350)

Freud (3 Mar) resonates promptly, ‘Your feelings during last Sunday correspond to mine. So we have finally met on equal terms’ (ibid., p. 351). With such ‘equal terms’, Ferenczi fails to eject the introjected Freud. Freud even suggests a short Easter trip with Ferenczi. Freud further reports that there has been a ‘great
leap forward’ (ibid., p. 351) that Elma has taken and he presents a case summary of
the insights so far. Now, Ferenczi (8 Mar) regains his bearing on Freud as his centre
again, ‘The Sunday that I spent with you was a turning point for me. … Elma’s
analysis significantly diminished her value in my eyes’ (ibid., p. 352) and that he
certainly favours Gizella much more now. While he still wants to get married, his
wish to become a father is less intense. He even moves onto one dreamy, if not his
ideal solution,

A dream that I just had in this conflictual mood showed me that I
(stimulated by the plan of our Easter trip) would like to flee both women
by leaning on you and science. But that is certainly only a product of the
momentary compulsive situation. I know, of course, that I cannot exist
without the favor of a woman. (ibid., p. 353, underline added)

Here Ferenczi’s is hinting to Freud an ideal ‘solution’ to his ménage à trois
problem, a problem that has a parallel version running in Freud too, or one that
Ferenczi has introjected from Freud and cultivate it within himself, drawing Freud
into the play too at the same time. With only Ferenczi and Freud, and ‘both women’
ousted, they may have a clearer focus to work on. This ‘solution’ is anticipatory of
Ferenczi lying on Freud’s couch two years later in 1914. He further confirms Freud
with his insight by linking up the Elma’s episode and Palermo’s episode,

You were right when, on my first trip to Vienna where I revealed to you
my intention to marry, you called attention to the fact that you noticed the
same defiant expression I had on my face when I refused to work with
you in Palermo. (ibid., p. 353)

Ferenczi is using Freud’s analysis as the measure of a truth in his inner
emotional life as he agrees with Freud that his craving for Elma is just the same as
his craving for a collaboration with Freud, in that both are simply a matter of
defiance against Freud. In assigning Freud to the correct and himself in the wrong
side, Ferenczi is taking up Freud as a part of his own. What is more serious is that,
by admitting his Palermo fault, Ferenczi is in fact willingly taking up the mode or
task of dictating Ferenczi’s thought, reducing Ferenczi’s mind to that of a machine, or an empty mind without his own sense of agency, merely functioning as a container of what Freud dumps into. One would even speculate that Freud’s dictating Ferenczi to give up Elma and marry Gizella is simply his own desired solution to his ménage à trois: of staying married to Martha and ‘giving up’ Minna, here with Ferenczi as his forerunner of such a type of resolution.

In return, Freud (13 Mar) naturally echoes that Elma’s analysis is reaching an end with ‘real progress’ and ‘a completely altered demeanor and a few astute thoughts’ (ibid., p. 356), and with an assurance for Gizella too, ‘So give her mother the consolation that she will at least get back changed for the better.’ (ibid., p. 356). Freud plans to send Elma back to Budapest for the Easter.130

After the Easter trip with Freud, Ferenczi is further invigorated and he writes (17 Apr) a calm and apparently rational letter to Freud, showing his preference for Gizella and that he has stated this to Elma clearly, as he is able to ‘gauge correctly the colossal difference in worth between Elma and Frau G.’ (ibid., p. 364). However, this state does not last longer than one week. On 23 Apr, Ferenczi reports,

The pendulum swings in my inclination between Frau G. and Elma, between mother and sister, spirit and matter, are continuing’ (ibid., p. 367)

Ferenczi tells Freud that he ‘should not share the responsibility with anyone’ (ibid., p. 367) although he is sure that he does not worry his problem would damage their friendship. He is not drawing Freud in again as he knows Freud does not wish to do so, meaning that he has failed to solve his introjection problem with Freud, and he will own and run his own version of ménage à trois. What Ferenczi does is: he lives together with Elma and Gizella ‘in a threesome, as it were’ (ibid., p. 368). This actually makes his introjection of Freud’s ménage à trois even more visible or
concrete because, back in 19 Berggasse, Vienna, Minna has been living in the Freud’s house too.

When Ferenczi find himself getting interested in Elma’s mental life again, he suggests Elma to continue the analysis and Elma agreed readily. After some more weeks of difficult analysis with Elma, Ferenczi (8 Aug) finally gives up Elma’s analysis. However, Ferenczi has not really made a break with the triangular relationship. On 3 May 1913, he reports to Freud how the three are taking up different roles, but the basic structure of the triangle is more or less the same. Elma, on the other hand, wants to break away. She ends up marrying a Swedish-American journalist and writer, Herve Laurvik in Sept 1914\(^{131}\) and moves to America. One month later, in October 1914, Ferenczi finally succeeds in securing a personal analysis from Freud, an analysis that could be taken a Ferenczi’s upfront attempt at solving their shared *ménage à trois*, without a detour to Elma. Elma’s wedding, however, still does not end the triangle, as this marriage turns out to be very unhappy for Elma and most importantly, for Gizella who even fantasizes Elma divorce Laurvik and marry Ferenczi.

Eventually, and surprisingly, Ferenczi asks Freud to propose to Gizella on his behalf. For Freud, this request is quite similar to the one Ferenczi made on the very first day of 1912, viz., referring Elma to Freud for analysis. Freud cannot refuse. He responds (25 Mar 1917) right away,

> Your will be done. I will write to Frau G. and will ask her not to hide her decision behind considerations for Elma, but I can’t vouch for the outcome.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 190)

Such an uncanny arrangement of proposing by-proxy, probably Freud’s only proposal of its kind in his life, shows that it is also Freud’s will be done, or that the will of Freud’s and Ferenczi’s have been combined into a single unit, and be done
accordingly. It is both a dramatic and unconscious hint at a possible solution of their hybrid problem of *ménage à trois*, or their introjection issue. This proposal, meaning Gizella is almost Freud’s Martha, if it really works at both conscious and unconscious level of both Freud and Ferenczi as a beginning of separating their shared unconscious, may solve their *ménage à trois*. However, it does not seem to be working that ideally. On the same day, Freud writes his proposal letter to Gizella, ending, ‘I won’t be astonished if you give your answer directly to our friend.’ (ibid., p. 192), showing, in a rather joking way, that Freud and Ferenczi are interchangeable and indeed this is the case in their shared *ménage à trois* now.

Subsequently, Gizella starts a peaceful divorce with her husband. On 18 Aug 1917, Palos, who again proves to be a hidden but key person to Elma’s marriage too, finally agrees to the divorce. After completing all the financial and housing arrangement, it is already late 1918, and the ending of WWI as well. The wedding takes place on 1 Mar 1919 but Freud could not attend because of the remaining disruption of the War.

Two months into his marriage, Ferenczi (23 May 1919) is trying to return himself to Freud, as it were, after having gone around a big circle of Gizella and Elma and now back to square one, hoping to start it all over again, as he tells Freud the following insight,

since the moment in which you advised me against Elma, I have had a resistance toward your own person which could not even be overcome by the attempt at a Ψα cure, and which was responsible for all my sensitivities. With the ucs. resentment in my heart, I, as a loyal “son”, nevertheless followed all your suggestions, left Elma, again turned to my present wife, with home I have stayed, despite countless temptations from other quarters. The marriage, sealed under such unusually tragic circumstances – did not at first bring about the hoped-for inner consolidation. Yet the resistance seems to be gradually exhausting itself – and a letter such as the present one may show you that I am willing to resume – perhaps, actually – to begin the frank intercourse with you, free from petty sensitivity. It appears that I can be happy in life and content in
work only when I can be and remain in good, indeed, in the best relations with you. The realization that in Frau G. I have the best that could befall me - with my constitution -, is the first fruit of my inner reconciliation with you.

I ask you, don’t lose patience with me in the future, either. I hope to offer you less occasion for that than in the past.’ (ibid., pp. 356 - 357, italics mine)

However, this time, even it is ‘free from petty sensitivity’, Ferenczi would find ‘disruption’ in his ‘frank intercourse’ with Freud too. Two years later, on the Christmas day of 1921, he grumbles to Groddeck, his new analytic partner then,

my eroticism refuses to be satisfied by barren explanations. I, my ‘it’, isn’t interested in analytical interpretations, but wants something real, a young wife, a child! (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921-1933, p. 11)

Two months later, on 27 Feb 1922, when he analyzes to Groddeck his sudden uplift of his mental and physical states,

Prof. Freud … persists in his original view that the crux of the matter is my hatred for him, because he stopped me (just like her father did before him) from marrying the younger woman (now my stepdaughter). Hence my murderous intentions towards him which express themselves in nightly death scenes (drop in body temperature; gasping for breath). (ibid., p. 19, italics mine)

In Ferenczi’s unconscious, the Elma episode would be reflective of how he navigates himself unconsciously in resolving his introjective relationship with Freud, notably their shared ménage à trois, as it were, with Elma and Gizella being drawn into it unconsciously and yet also willingly, in order to play out his mega-plot, in the name of a painful indecision of a choice between the mother or daughter. However, it turns out that hate is also evoked, in the inevitable transference and hence introjection. Back to 1909, Ferenczi has already prophesized something uncannily familiar now,

Everything points to the conclusion that an unconscious sexual element is at the basis of every sympathetic emotion, and that when two people meet, whether of the same or the opposite sex, the unconscious always makes an effort towards transference. … When the unconscious succeeds in making this transference acceptable to the conscious mind,
whether it is in a pure sexual (erotic) or in a sublimated form (respect, gratitude, friendship, aesthetic admiration, etc.) a bond of “sympathy” is formed between the two persons. When consciousness refuses to accept the positive unconscious desire, then we get, according to the degree of intensity in each case, antipathy of various degrees up to loathing. (Ferenczi, 1909, p.65)

Now that the hate is perceived and interpreted by Freud’s side as emitted from Ferenczi’s body. It is also Elma’s (young and fertile) body that, as Ferenczi believes, Freud pulls him away from, depriving Ferenczi of children as Freud refuses to accept Ferenczi’s desire for a baby. In return, the Freud-Ferenczi psychoanalytic coitus (and the concurrent Ferenczi-Gizella version that came with Freud’s ‘prescribed’ marriage), as it were, produces quite a lot of psychoanalytic babies (psychoanalytic ideas such as Introjection), together with the hate that is now surfacing in the correspondence, with Groddeck as a residual material for Ferenczi to work on, bearing in mind that hate is also a feeling that can separate people, may be a solution to Ferenczi’s introjective merging with Freud.

This Chapter shows that in the Elma episode, Ferenczi’s writings on Introjection are reflected in his experience. For example, Ferenczi’s miring in his concurrent love for Gizella and Elma is his introjection of Freud’s ‘quality’, i.e., his ménage à trois, and make it an attribute of his own ego (Ferenczi, 1922a). Also, Elma, Gizella, and even Freud, in their various combinations and functions to him, are his introjected objects for construction of the ego (Ferenczi, 1922c). Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud’s ménage à trois anticipates Ferenczi’s (1922b), that, in the transition to object-love, one introjects objective perception, or the subjectivation of the object in the external world. Such an introjected object is also narcissistically invested with libido (Ferenczi, 1915) as what Ferenczi’s own ménage à trois is revealing. Furthermore, Freud’s wish to marry a new wife illustrates Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud into his own inner life does have the power to loosen up things
in Freud, as Ferenczi (1919) states that introjection can lead to more control of the ego over the external world.

Back to 1914 and 1916, however, there has been a showdown, in vivo, as it were, for Freud and Ferenczi to work on their introjection issue: Freud’s analysis of Ferenczi that amounts to ‘a total of some eight weeks in three “slices”’ (Rudnytsky, 2011, p. 55). This analysis is sought by Ferenczi ferociously and with much perseverance, as he may want to solve his introjective problems with Freud upfront, once and for all, by psychoanalysis proper, by lying on Freud’s couch at 19 Berggasse, Vienna. As in the previous Chapters, it will also be noted that Ferenczi will be writing about Introjection as he is experiencing it with Freud. This would be the theme of the next Chapter.
Chapter 12

Ferenczi on Freud’s couch, 1914 and 1916: A showdown

The purpose of this Chapter is to show how Ferenczi strives for a ‘showdown’ with Freud in solving their introjection problem, viz., their shared ménage à trois, and how they are to get out of each other from their introjective merging, which is also Ferenczi’s striving for independence from Freud. It turns out that Ferenczi does not succeed in solving the introjection problem even though he has tried hard to solicit the analysis and indeed got three rounds of analysis. This Chapter also portrays how such experience corresponds to Ferenczi’s writings about Introjection.

This episode occurs within the First World War that brings Europe into ‘a brutal conflict that would prove to be one of the most destructive events of the century.’ (Breger, 2000, p. 233) and pauses the ‘spread of psychoanalysis’ (ibid., p. 234). Freud’s sons are enlisted. Freud becomes more isolated in Vienna and he is more dependent on Ferenczi. Hoffer (1996) remarks that, ‘[i]n the dark days of the war, the closeness between Freud and Ferenczi reaches its peak’ (p. xviii). It is within this milieu that Ferenczi strives for and gets a precious chance of lying on Freud’s couch to settle their introjective issues. Past studies on Freud’s analysis of Ferenczi suggest that it is an important event in the Freud-Ferenczi relationship. They mostly focus on the absence of therapeutic success and speculate on the reasons behind. Yet, they just single out this incident for study, instead of putting it back to the developmental line of their relationship so that the dynamics between them would become more contextualized and historically informed. Some even just mention it in passing. Jones (1955) describes it very briefly and as a matter of fact. Makari (2008) offers a similarly brief record of this analysis. Breger (2000) argues that this brief analysis is not enough for much therapeutic accomplishment. Yet, he sees the entire
relationship as analytic because ever since their first meeting, ‘powerful emotions had been mobilized in each of them’ (p. 342). What is problematic, according to Breger, is that, Freud mixed up personal and analytic relationships in the analysis, as there were ‘breaches of boundaries’ (p. 370). Understandably, an introjective relationship implies blurring of boundaries between the two parties. Rachman (1997) remarks that the analysis is ‘necessarily incomplete’ (p. 27). While his comment is almost exclusively from Ferenczi’s perspective, he does not go into the psychodynamics of Ferenczi in the analysis. Bacon & Gedo (1993) argue that the short analysis is ‘just enough to deepen the pseudoidealization of the older man’ and Ferenczi ‘fended off a profound, negative, mother transference’ (p. 134) through it. The hypothesis of Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud is just opposite to this argument in that merging and dissolution of boundary is antagonistic to the fending off of the ‘mother transference’. I attempt to show that Ferenczi wants to use the analysis as a final opportunity to solve their introjection problem so that he can be more differentiated or even independent from Freud, instead of ‘deepening the pseudoidealization’. Yet, Freud and Ferenczi are unable to make use of this rare opportunity to get things done. Szönyi (2013) points out that Ferenczi never gets the amount of analysis from Freud that he is eager for and he strives for “super-analysis”, which aimed to remove all the blind spots of future analysis’ (p. li). Falzeder (2009) even concludes it as a failure,

the three failed tranches of analysis in 1914 and 1916, whose consequences were to occupy Ferenczi until the end of his life (and which, by the way, were a far cry from ridding him of all impure and inexact tendencies) (p. 399)

Rudnytsky (2002) argues that Freud’s analysis ‘relies entirely on a “one-person” model and does not allow for the impact of the analyst’s subjectivity or countertransference on what is inherently an interactive process’ (p. 118), and that
Freud ‘focus exclusively on the paternal dimension of Ferenczi’s transference’ (p. 121). Rudnytsky’s argument is in line with an introjective perspective in that Ferenczi’s introjective pull would be a neglected but salient force in Freud’s paternal analysis of Ferenczi, as it were. Aron and Harris (1993) are empathic to Ferenczi as they note that Freud believes that Ferenczi never resolves his negative transference to him. However, as noted in the previous Chapter, Ferenczi’s hate also serves to differentiate himself from the introjective merging with Freud. Also, Aron and Harris remind us that it is Ferenczi who always wants more analysis from Freud to work on the negative transference, only that it is Freud who turns down Ferenczi for more analysis.

Aron and Harris (1993) speculate that Ferenczi’s longing for more analysis motivates his later experiment in mutual analysis with patients. Bergmann (1996) focuses on the long term impact on Ferenczi who suffered from the premature termination of his analysis and became hostile to his analyst. Ferenczi craved for ‘greater mutuality in his analysis with Freud’ (p. 155) as he even offered to go to Vienna in 1926 to analyze Freud who was depressed at that time. Aron & Harris (1993) interpret that Ferenczi’s wish to analyze Freud is out of Ferenczi’s wish to cure Freud so that Freud can continue the analysis with him. However, Ferenczi’s analytic stance towards Freud may be similar to that towards his patients, as his introjective character and style would make the process more mutual and the two parties more merged.

The above studies give us some partial understanding of Freud’s analysis of Ferenczi without grounding the analysis historically back to the entire Freud-Ferenczi relationship itself. This Chapter situates the analysis in the Ferenczi-Freud correspondence that provides rich information on the antecedent and
aftermath of the analysis. There is no record of the content of this analysis but this has not stopped interpretation of the analysis. I hope my methodology of tracking their relationship in minute detail thorough their correspondence will bring a better understanding, at least with respect to the articulation of a theory of introjection. Furthermore, understanding the introjective quality of this analysis, and mapping it with Ferenczi’s writing, putting it as a sequel to the previous episodes (i.e., their America trip, Seidler episode, Palermo episode and the Elma episode), one would have a broader view of why and how this analysis is being materialized and its meaning in the Freud-Ferenczi relationship.

It is noteworthy that this analysis, though brief, adds to a total of 7 weeks in Oct 1914, June/July and Sept/Oct 1916, but the whole process spans about four years that started as early as 1912. According to Dupont (1994), the first clue of Ferenczi’s explicit plan to be analyzed by Freud is found in a letter dated 26 Dec 1912\textsuperscript{135}, a ‘magnificent self-analytic letter to Freud’ (Rudnytsky, 2002, p. 130). In the wake of Freud’s final break with Jung, the threesome since the 1909 America trip is becoming the dyad of Freud and Ferenczi. Freud and Ferenczi are much closer and on the same line defending against and criticizing Jung. Freud drafts a letter dated 22 Dec 1912\textsuperscript{136}, proposing to end the personal relationship with Jung. He lets Ferenczi comment on the letter. Cambray (2003) argues that Freud tries to avoid his grief over the loss of Jung by ‘transferring the functions which Jung had served to the next carrier of the archetypal heroic son, Ferenczi’ (p. 454). For Ferenczi, this is his opportunity to achieve a dyadic relationship with Freud. Ferenczi essentially becomes Freud’s proxy, offering ‘himself for that role as mouthpiece’ (Schröter, 1997, p. 127), in Freud’s break-up with Jung. Freud adopts Ferenczi’s advice, indicating Ferenczi has indeed introjected more of Freud and act
as if he were Freud himself. In this break-up, with his ‘ethnoreligious sensibility’, Ferenczi captures ‘the significance of the conflict’ (Zaretsky, 2005, p. 103). Joining Freud in expelling Jung from the threesome, Ferenczi has gone one step further in his introjection of his Freud.

Ferenczi declares to Freud that ‘Mutual analysis is nonsense, also an impossibility’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 449). This mutual analysis probably refers to their dream analysis that Freud, Jung and Ferenczi have done to each other on the deck of the George Washington in their 1909 America trip. For Ferenczi, however, such mutual analysis could lead to mutual introjection and merging, which is what Ferenczi is really after. On the other hand, Ferenczi’s declaration is giving way to the rule of mandatory analysis, i.e., turning students into patients. Ferenczi argues that every student of Psychoanalysis, except Freud alone, has to bear with a higher psychoanalytic authority and ‘accepts analytic correction’ (ibid., p. 449). Ferenczi believes that Freud is the only person who has the capacity to achieve, via his self-analysis that has taken place much earlier than all of his psychoanalytic followers’ analyses, the same outcome as being analyzed by a higher psychoanalytic authority. In other words, Freud is the final and highest psychoanalytic authority. Ferenczi tells Freud in the same letter, ‘Now I have become insightful and find that you were right in everything’ (ibid., p. 449). Putting Freud in such a position on his mind shows that Ferenczi not just idealizes Freud, an omnipotent figure then, in order to be analyzed by him, but also that Ferenczi may be ascribing omnipotence to himself by being able to kick Jung away with his alliance with, and introjection of, Freud. Such an omnipotent stage, with the subject’s equating thinking and action, according to Ferenczi (1913), is a feature of the fetus that is simply a parasite of the mother. The fetus introjects everything automatically from the mother who imposes
no demand or frustration. This creates a state of the fetus that has everything satisfied and hence has nothing remained to wish for – a state of omnipotence. Omnipotence stage, therefore, is concordant with introjection stage. Yet, one might question whether, by then, his relationship with Freud then is really as close as the fetus’ connection with the mother, given that the omnipotence he ascribes to himself is just a matter of his own wish. Freud’s break with Jung involves a myriad of people and dynamics that Ferenczi is only a part of. Introjection, presumably concordant with omnipotence stage, therefore, may not be involved in this piece of experience.

It is only after ousting Jung that Ferenczi first explicitly tables his plan, one that has been on his mind for some time, and his reasons, to be analyzed by Freud,

Now on to myself – I am also a case in need of treatment – but there has been undeniable progress to the extent that I am conscious of that fact. It was and is my intention, if you can grant me time (hours), to go into analysis with you – perhaps two weeks (maybe three), for now. – The following data may serve to orient you about me (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 450, italics added).

What follows, however, is more like disorientation than orientation, as it fills almost six pages of detailed report, in free writing style, of his somatic ailments, two dreams presumably to confirm that such ailment is neurotic, his associative thoughts and his own free associative interpretation. From Ferenczi’s perspective, his analysis, for his part as a patient, has indeed started, without Freud’s granting him sessions on the couch. One would argue that this is more like self-analysis than psychoanalysis proper, with letters as the medium of contact, as contrast to the usual one of lying on the analyst’s couch. However, Ferenczi must have a Freud in mind, conscious or otherwise, when he is putting his thoughts and feelings into words in the letter to Freud. The key is not whether Freud would give immediate response but whether Ferenczi believes Freud would sooner or later introject his free association, after

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some delay in the real time required for the delivery of the letter. Actually, Ferenczi
does not mail the letter immediately after composition, as he adds a line on the next
day as a postscript,

Today (on December 27) I feel significantly better. Hard to say
whether my awareness of an improvement in my physical condition or
this analysis was of more use.
Please forgive this gratis analysis, which I have gotten from you by
sheer obstinacy (if only in writing)! (ibid., p. 455, underline added)

The ‘apology’ in advance entails a free analytic session ‘done’ in advance, on
Ferenczi’s mind. It is as much his self-analysis as his analysis by Freud, though with
force or even aggressive intrusiveness, especially when we look at the rich free
association later on. This analysis for free, as forcefully designed, executed and
received by Ferenczi, for which Freud, at that moment, has no say yet, shows how
Ferenczi sees money and how introjection is involved. Ferenczi is sure that Freud
will receive and read his letter, as has been the case for all previous letters. This
consolidates his belief that this format of analysis is already working for him, as he
hints at the possibility that his mood lift could be related to the letter written (though
not yet sent). Ferenczi (1914) sees the symbolic meaning of money as connected to
excrement. Interest in money originates from one’s auto-erotic interest in faeces,
with respect to the pleasure associated with the sphincter muscle’s activity of hold vs.
release. Such satisfaction, according to Ferenczi, is transformed, at lease partially,
into object-love when the pleasure is displaced from the muscle onto the thing that
causes this feeling. Hence, in holding faeces, it is introjected and accepted as a
valuable toy or object. Money (as a symbol of faeces) and faeces have similar
mechanism as object-love. Saving money is similar to holding back one’s stools.
Withholding money – and actually it is Freud’s money - from Freud in his analysis,
without giving him what he deserves for doing the analysis, Ferenczi is holding onto
his own inner introjected part-Freud that strengthens his belief that his self-analysis is also an analysis by Freud, instead of merely an auto-erotic activity that has little to no ‘Freud’ in it. Before Freud has any reply, Ferenczi writes immediately again on 29 Dec, which is consistent with the above analysis,

Just now the last passage of my autoanalytic letter occurred to me ("gratis analysis gotten by sheer obstinacy"), and I find that this was a very successful condensation of anal-characteristic motives. I wrote the sentence down without thinking. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 456)

Ferenczi’s anal motives are made known to himself, and to Freud as well, one day later, but he is not that aware of how he has positioned Freud in his ‘self-analysis’. Freud’s reaction (30 Dec) is mixed,

Will you believe or be angry about the fact that I have read your autoanalytic letter, but I have not studied it as I should have? In so doing I have half frustrated your neurotic intention. So, get something from me by sheer obstinacy! (ibid., p. 457, italics mine)

Freud’s tone is somewhat provocative and challenging, if not a reciprocation to what he perceives something similar in Ferenczi’s ‘self-analytic’ letter. He sees Ferenczi’s ‘sheer obstinacy’ too intrusive and he is defending against by withholding his ‘analysis’ that Ferenczi thought he had successfully got from Freud. After sending Jung the break-up letter, Freud writes to Ferenczi on 5 Jan 1913, in which he mentions his attitude about free vs. paid psychoanalysis, as he comments to Ferenczi about Jung,

His behavior is neurotic and puerile. If he were in treatment with me and were paying for it, I would naturally have to put up with his utterances, but this way I can dispense with them and use my strength for other things.’ (ibid., p. 459)

Other than taking these remarks of Freud’s on Jung as equally applicable to Ferenczi, one would also surmise that, for Freud, the payment is the compensation for tolerance, the ‘something’ that Ferenczi is to get from Freud when the analysis is paid.
On the other hand, Ferenczi would believe that, even if Freud has only read the letter but not studied it, Ferenczi has already sent his unconscious communication to Freud. Freud, on the other hand, believes that by not studying it, he would be immune. Yet, unless he simply did not open the letter and did not read a single word of it, his unconscious could not be spared of the introjective pull from Ferenczi, as noted from Freud’s ‘half’ frustration of Ferenczi that constitute a ‘half’ abstinence. As abstinence is one of the ground rules of Freud’s psychoanalysis, it is already a ‘half’ analysis. Ferenczi (1925) argues that, in habit-formation, external stimuli are introjected and then worked outwards from inside, meaning taking in stimuli from the external world first, and then work on the internalized objects from inside towards outside. Both the objective and subjective are also involved. In Freud’s response to Ferenczi’s pulling him into analysis, it is likely that such an introjection mechanism has been at work. It is not just Ferenczi’s own subjective mechanism.

In terms of his analysis of Ferenczi, Freud is already in, although he would prefer to believe otherwise because Ferenczi has not yet lain down on his couch in Vienna.

Back to Ferenczi’s long ‘autoanalytic letter’ dated 26 Dec 1912, Ferenczi’s free associative material means not just to himself but to Freud as well. The analysis is not just about Ferenczi, but both Ferenczi and Freud. It starts with continuing from the point where it has stopped, when Ferenczi has first introjected Freud’s unconscious, and here Ferenczi wants to settle it with Freud by psychoanalysis. In the first dream that he reports to Freud, there is a little black cat jumping on Ferenczi continuously, biting him and clinging to him tightly. He grasps and throws it onto the floor with force, but it returns repeatedly. He throws it even more forcefully but he feels somewhat guilty at hurting the little cat. Eventually, it is smashed into
pieces on the floor and a poisonous snake arises from the head of the cat. The snake
scares everything away. Ferenczi continues,

[(Indistinct) A woman stands on a table and protects herself from the
snake by tightly pressing on her dress.] You and your sister-in-law play a
role in this dream; (next to it: Italy, a four-poster bed in the following
shape: [sketch]. [I can’t draw it correctly].

I don’t know any more about this part of the dream. (Freud &
Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 451, underline added)

Jung’s truncated analysis of Freud’s dream, as witnessed by Ferenczi, on the
deck of George Washington in their America trip in the summer of 1909, now more
than three years later, is still living in Ferenczi’s unconscious. Freud has refused
Jung further association to his dream about Minna and Martha. Here Ferenczi,
replacing Jung\textsuperscript{137}, continues with this ‘dream analysis’, but in the format of
Ferenczi’s own self-analysis of his own dream, instead of Freud’s. Ferenczi needs to
process this disturbing piece by dreaming about it, maybe on behalf of Freud, and
now presented as his own material, for Freud to analyze. His dream is about
something dangerous, clinging and bothering him. Yet, it is elusive or mutative that
he cannot make sense out of it, let alone getting rid of it. His dream tries to expose
and cover up something at the same time. After some further disclosure about his
rage against his mother, his father’s potency versus his suspicion of his own
impotence, as well as some interpretation about his relationship with Gizella and
Elma, Ferenczi has this significant memory recalled,

At the age of fourteen I was terribly shocked to hear that my father,
unsuspecting of my presence, told my mother that so-and-so had married
a whore. (ibid., p. 453)

Then he continues with the first dream, offering a most provocative
interpretation to Freud,

The last, muddled part of the dream is mysterious. I interpret that as
a kind of defiant apology; (father, after all, did something similar with
mother). Only you have moved to the position of father, your
sister-in-law to that of mother. [Father also said [=acted] "whore", = You once took a trip to Italy with your sister-in-law\(^{138}\) (voyage de lit-à-lit) (naturally, only an infantile thought!).] The infantile “wish fulfillment” of the dream would thus be as follows: “I satisfy my forbidden sexual desires; they won’t cut off my penis after all, since ‘adults’ are just as ‘bad’ as ‘children.’” (ibid., p. 453, underline and footnote added)

*Enfant terrible* indeed. So far, this is Ferenczi’s most explicit return to Freud’s truncated dream analysis in 1909, in the form of Ferenczi’s ‘infantile thought’. It is natural that Freud would not take Ferenczi into analysis if the free associative material and Ferenczi’s interpretation is not just about Ferenczi himself, but about Freud too\(^{139}\). Ferenczi, seeing himself as a child, is also copying, or introjecting the father’s sin by being ‘bad’. This is uncannily similar to Ferenczi (1933)’s exposition on the child’s identification with the aggressor by introjecting his guilt, taking up his conscience. The child cannot tell his own guilt from those of the alien aggressor. However, one would query whether Ferenczi is doing these unconsciously, as he is able to articulate or analyze in the letter to Freud his defense mechanism. Such analysis, on the other hand, is not just on Freud, but both Freud and Ferenczi, which suggest that their shared *ménage à trois* has to be resolved by themselves as a single unit. The castrator himself should also be castrated and hence no one should be castrated or punished. It is not difficult to envision Freud’s anger, if not fear, and withholding of analysis to Ferenczi, or not engaging himself into a debate with Ferenczi about this new ‘theory’ of bad father and bad son.

Stepping into 1913, Ferenczi tries again to go into analysis proper with Freud. He (3 May) re-states his request for analysis, now more concretely, proposing to go to Vienna in June for analysis and asks about Freud’s view. Freud, however, is not complying, and yet he presents it in an ambivalent way. He (4 May) agrees that if analysis is useful to Ferenczi, it should be of the first priority over other matters. Yet, he thinks that four or six weeks of analysis are not enough, and he adds,
For the reason something else comes into consideration, namely, my dearth of inclination to expose one of my indispensable helpers to the danger of personal estrangement brought about by the analysis. I don’t yet know how Jones will bear finding out that his wife, as a consequence of the analysis, no longer wants to remain his wife. Should it turn on the fact that women are more intelligent than we and are justified in subjecting us to their will? (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 481-482, italics mine)

Freud’s analogy of the analysis of Jones’ wife is rather telling in that it is not just implying that Ferenczi, after the analysis, would no longer become Freud’s ‘indispensable helper’, but also suggesting his worry that Ferenczi would also be justified in subjecting Freud to Ferenczi’s will. In the footnote 2, the editors of the correspondence draw attention to Freud’s self-corrected parapraxis, that Freud first wrote ‘our’; and then crossed it out and wrote the exclamation mark over the word ‘our’. And for this ‘our will’, it would mean more of Freud’s own will, instead of that of Freud’s and Ferenczi’s, as Freud may wish to have the strongest will so that he will not yield to Ferenczi’s will. So, the danger is more to Freud than to Ferenczi, bearing in mind the provocative ‘autoanalytic letter’ of Ferenczi on 26 Dec 1912, in which Ferenczi’s analysis is meant to be an analysis of both Ferenczi and Freud. After all, as Dupont (1994) reminds us, ‘Freud’s reluctance to analyze Ferenczi did not stop him from analyzing his own daughter, Anna’ (p. 303). So, it could be argued that Freud’s refusal is not about the danger of losing Ferenczi, but that of breaking down the boundary between them that makes introjection, as well as Freud’s submission to Ferenczi’s will or unconscious, easier.

Ferenczi responds (12 May) with more perseverance, but somewhat off the mark as he tries to reassure Freud,

I am convinced that my analysis could only improve relations between us. With Jones the matter is different: his wife, not he, was analyzed. I have already gone through this period, in which you analyzed Elma and I subsequently couldn’t marry her; I went through it without alienating myself from you or analysis. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 485)
Ferenczi is trying to move the ‘danger’ to somewhere else and to defuse it. He denies to Freud the powerful impact of Freud’s analysis of Elma on him, since, throughout the rest of his life, he is to resent Freud for losing Elma, as noted in his Clinical Diary and the Christmas Day letter to Groddeck\textsuperscript{140}. In trying to get an analysis by Freud, Ferenczi is rather desperate and even blind to some crucial issues between himself and Freud. This may be because of his ultimate aim to return Freud’s unconscious to Freud, as it were, a reverse of the previous introjection, and to be more independent from Freud. Nevertheless, in the months to follow in 1913, they do not mention analysis.

On 23 July 1914, Ferenczi uses a milder strategy, as compared to his previous one in Dec 1912, in soliciting an analysis from Freud. He acknowledges to Freud that his approach to things is indeed different from Freud’s and that Freud would have difficulty in following. However, Ferenczi’s ‘father complex’ (Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 6) will never push him away from psychoanalysis. Instead, it will only inhibit his work. Ferenczi states that his style is allowing his fantasy to go astray but may end up with a bundle of ideas that never actualized into words. However, Ferenczi thinks that Freud has incorporated Ferenczi’s ideas into his own writings. Ferenczi even fantasizes a new way of working,

\begin{quote}
If I had the courage simply to write down my ideas and observations without regard for your method and direction of work, I would be a productive writer, and in the end, numerous points of contact between your results and mine would still be the result. Up to now, at least, it was always the case that I have found many of my own ideas in your works (albeit in much more proper order). The better in you is the enemy of the good in me!

I hope you will make it possible for me to deal with these things psychoanalytically. (ibid., p. 8, underline mine)
\end{quote}

Ferenczi captures the way that he and Freud have ‘collaborated’ so far: that Ferenczi fantasizes within the Freudian world and Freud writes them down orderly.
In a way, it is Freud introjecting Ferenczi, willingly, for both parties, as far as intellectual works is concerned. His request to Freud is one of analysis, in that if Freud is to unshackle the limits that Ferenczi can fantasize, i.e., freeing him from the inhibition in thoughts, Ferenczi would become not just more prolific, but in the end, there would still be a connection to Freud. It is somehow like letting a kite fly higher and further away with a longer string. Ferenczi now sets up a task for Freud to analyze him, aiming at finding a ‘correct’ space that Freud is to make for Ferenczi so that he can be freer and more productive, reassuringly still within the frame of psychoanalysis. This proposal seems far less dangerous for Freud, introjectively speaking.

This time, Ferenczi’s request is catalyzed by the WWI that breaks out 5 days later, on 28 July 1914. Freud’s three sons are to be enlisted at any moment while his daughter Anna is in England, unable to return to Vienna. Freud becomes more isolated and he is inhibited in his work. He wants to see Ferenczi soon\textsuperscript{141}. However, this time, Ferenczi will be enlisted to the Hungarian army at any time too, rendering him unable to fix a day to go to Vienna. Yet, Ferenczi’s ambivalence starts to appear as the analysis is becoming real, but covered up under the threat of enlistment, and it gets more visible in the upcoming days. On 24 Aug, Ferenczi has a more concrete plan, and yet it reveals his worry that may underline his inner conflict,

\begin{quote}
I would like best to go to Vienna for about four weeks and take regular analytic sessions with you; the necessary money is available to me… I promised to muster everything, in order to mitigate the difficulties on account of which you decline to analyze Tausk. (ibid., p. 15)
\end{quote}

Roazen (1969), derived from his interview with Helene Deutsch, Viktor Tausk’s analyst as assigned by Freud, argues that the problem of Tausk is that he does not just receive ideas, but he would believe that such ideas are his own alone\textsuperscript{142}. Mahoney (1979a) also notes Tausk’s ‘aggressive and fiery independence, disruptive
of calm scientific reflection’ (p. 558) is the reason why Freud rejects him. Freud finds it extremely disagreeable to debate with him over the issue of priority or even the possibility of plagiarism. Hence, Freud firmly refuses Tausk’s request for analysis. As noted from Ferenczi’s previous self-analysis about his bounded fantasy and that his ideas have been found in Freud’s writing, Ferenczi may be worrying that he would repeat Tausk’s fate if he were to enter into analysis with Freud, an endeavour that is bound to evoke intense transference and emotion, with intensification of such introjective issue as plagiarism and ownership of ideas. He wants to assure Freud that he will not accuse Freud of stealing his ideas. Also, this time, it is not free, as he has prepared for the money to ‘compensate’ for Freud’s ‘tolerance’, as it were.

However, as noted before, Freud’s worry of the ‘danger’ is exactly the opposite: that Freud is afraid that Ferenczi would introject or ‘steal’ his unconscious, if he were to analyze Ferenczi. These two protagonists are operating on their own parallel and yet similar agenda, but would also intermingle with each other dramatically143. After some further weeks of delay, Ferenczi finally manages to go to Vienna, but with a final parapraxic act of ambivalence: he misses a train and he arrives at Vienna one day late, on 1 Oct 1914. The analysis last only three and a half weeks, with two sessions per day. It is truncated by Ferenczi’s enlistment into the Hungarian Hussars as a physician.

On 27 Oct, from Pápa where he has been posted as a physician for three days, Ferenczi writes to Freud as if it were a session (by free writing, instead of free association) that immediately follows the very last one on Freud’s couch in Vienna. Ferenczi feels the breaking off of the doctor-patient relationship very sudden, difficult and even painful. He has to fight against it by continuing the analytic
relationship by writing. From being Freud’s patient in Vienna to being a doctor, a ‘particularly powerful person’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 19), in the regiment in Pápa, Ferenczi’s has to travel a long trip that ‘seemed infinitely long’ (ibid., p. 19). He only has to work in the morning and is free in the afternoon. Once he did some self-analytic writing and imagined that he was talking to Freud. Ferenczi and the personnel there feel almost nothing about the War as they are so absorbed in the duty and their interest in the newspaper reports declines. Although Ferenczi and his comrades do not feel the atmosphere of the War at Pápa, on Ferenczi’s mind, there is already violent fantasy,

Yesterday gloomy mood; after prolonged self-torment it turned out that on account of a slight injury to my homosexual complexes, I would like to perpetrate mass murder (arson). Thereupon relief. – My nights are disturbed (restless sleep). (ibid., p. 20)

The interruption of the analysis ends up in a risk of Ferenczi being unable to contain his inner turmoil. He cannot sleep, or maybe dream, well. The prolonged self-induced agony, probably about his inability to choose between Elma and Gizella, is triggered by the slight injury. The nature and intensity of Ferenczi’s ‘slight injury’, with the unspoken pain underlying the chronic torment, is reflected in his fantasy of ‘mass murder’, as his inner turmoil is alleviated by the introjective connection to the ‘arson’ in the mass murder. Ferenczi feels dull, after one day of mania and another of melancholic. He is aware of how much he has lost in his truncated analysis with Freud, and yet his regret is still not very conscious. He does not even want to write the letter to Freud but he forces himself to do so because of his gratitude to Freud. Ferenczi is writing to Freud to undo the truncated analysis and maintain the introjective connection via correspondence that contains much of his freely associative writing, through which he analyzes himself while forcing himself on Freud. Here, the issue of analysis without payment is not mentioned anymore.
Ferenczi may feel entitled to the continuation of analysis via letters. In his prompt reply (30 Oct), Freud wants to tune down the situation. He writes that the disruption of the analysis at a point when it is ‘most interesting and productive was very stupid’ (ibid., p. 22), but no one can do anything about it. He also discourages Ferenczi’s self-analysis by predicting that self-analysis and analysis proper cannot complement each other; self-analysis will fail sooner or later. Freud’s message is essentially one of ending or terminating Ferenczi’s analysis. He does not even support Ferenczi to do it by himself. Freud’s solution, presumably a forceful and a distracting one, is to give Ferenczi some editorial work on papers written by Rank and Binswanger, which Freud believes are interesting, or Freud’s current papers on the Wolf-man and the Theory of Sexuality. Such ‘compensation’, even though similar suggestion has been made by Ferenczi himself, cannot really replace the analysis. At the end of the letter, however, Freud gives Ferenczi a hope, if not a false one when it is about continuing with the analysis in the near future,

If the train connection were human, I could visit you sometime on a Sunday. Vederemo! (ibid., p. 22)

_Vederemo_ is Spanish for ‘We shall see’ and it echoes with Ferenczi’s eagerness to see Freud ever since he has separated from Freud in Vienna and then posted to Pápa. On 3 Nov, Ferenczi tells Freud that even before Freud expects to see Ferenczi, Ferenczi has already been expecting Freud to come to Pápa to see him,

Already on the second day of my presence here the name “Freud” appeared on the guest list of the Hotel “Griff”. I run to room 10 – immediately recognize your little handbag, and went looking for you. The porter then enlightened me about my error. (ibid., p. 23)

Evidently, Ferenczi has a Freud on his mind, as represented by the name ‘Freud’ on the list and Freud’s ‘little handbag’. Ferenczi (1915) argues that introjected objects are narcissistically invested with libido and a re-discovery of this
object in the external world is actually a re-meeting with the loved introject, as mitigated by symbolism, ‘[the] tendency to rediscover what is loved in all the things of the hostile outside world is also probably the primitive source of symbolism’ (p. 407). Even with the porter’s enlightenment as an expected ending of this story, as long as Ferenczi feels the name is Freud’s and the bag is also Freud’s, he can continue to feel Freud’s presence around him. Ferenczi’s parapraxis shows that he is constantly looking out to re-discover his Freud as represented by certain things in the world outside.

On 10 Nov, despite Freud’s discouragement, Ferenczi continues with the analysis with something that he has forgotten to mention in the analysis in Vienna, when he analyzes his subjective smell of ammonia to be psychogenic as originating from his ‘infantile urinary complaints’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 25). He continues lavishing Freud with his ‘boring personal moods’ (ibid., p. 20), lavishing of feeling being a hallmark of introjection,

Today the first day in which the meaninglessness of my existence in Pápa and in the military depressed me somewhat. I was also physically worse than usual: numbness until noon, in the evening ammoniac in my nose, bad dreams at night. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 25)

He makes a superficial concession, however,

I ceased self-analysis the moment you explained it was improbable that I could continue it. Your opinion was, for me – an order! (ibid., p. 26, italics mine)

As argued before, Ferenczi’s letters are much less of a self-analytic letter than letters that are comparable to being in analysis by Freud, letters that can draw Freud in, provided that Freud has read them. Whether Freud is willing or not to be his analyst via correspondence is not important. For both Ferenczi and Freud, Ferenczi’s letter here constitutes a continuation of the analysis proper, via correspondence. So, even if Ferenczi really stops self-analysis, it does not imply that
he has stopped analysis by Freud through correspondence, as long as he continues writing letters to Freud. Also, as much as treating Freud’s opinion as an order appears to be simply a joke, putting Freud virtually into the position of Ferenczi’s senior in the military hierarchy from whom Ferenczi is to take order, suggests that, internally, Ferenczi is continuing to believe that Freud is somewhere around with him in Pápa, as what the Porter’s story shows. With this mindset, writing letters to Freud is itself comparable to, or at least reminiscent of, free associating in Freud’s couch in Vienna twice a day, one month ago. From the perspective of introjection, Ferenczi’s hunger for Freud is expressed in his wish for transfer to Budapest regarding his military posting. Freud (11 Nov) echoes this ‘in hopes of hearing about your transfer’ (ibid., p. 27). Evidently, both of them feel something is blocking between them.

Incidentally, in the wake of the WWI that has abruptly separated the analyst and his patient, the notion of death, an abrupt death indeed, creeps into their correspondence. On 11 Nov, the analyst writes,

Yesterday I received news of the death of my eldest brother. He was, to be sure, 81 years old, but the information says: railway accident. I think he would not have withstood the war; he was very full of life and got [to be] exactly as old as our father. (ibid., p. 26, italics mine)

His patient responds (15 Nov) promptly, solely about this tragedy,

I am writing only to express my sorrow over your bereavement. I often noticed how close you were to your eldest brother – who was almost like a father to you. This sad year is putting us all severely to the test; who knows what still lies ahead. (ibid., p. 27, italics mine)

Ferenczi’s reaction is almost only about his condolences to Freud for the sudden death of the old man Emanuel. However, Ferenczi explains his notion of intimacy, and hence his fantasy about the nature of Freud’s grief, by positioning Emanuel, who was a half-brother only, as almost a father to Freud. Ferenczi does
not pick up Freud’s uncertainty or even doubt about the real reason of Emanuel’s death. One would wonder whether Ferenczi, in losing Freud abruptly as his analyst, also identifies with Freud, as Freud is also almost like a father to Ferenczi too. His covert question about the next one on the death queue implies not just his death wish against Freud, his analyst and ‘father’, but also his introjection of Freud as an object that, at this point of grief, is to be indistinguishable from, or merged with, Ferenczi himself. Ferenczi is grieving over the loss of Freud as his analyst. He is also rehearsing the grief of losing Freud to death. In taking up Freud’s grief as his own, Ferenczi anticipates his later writing (1922a) on *Introjection* in which the qualities of the external objects are taken over and assigned to the ego, and forming a connection between the self and the outer world. On the other hand, one would also wonder, in this case, about the nature of the ‘connection’ between Freud and Ferenczi, as here it is about Ferenczi rehearsing his loss of Freud to death, as happening within the context of the truncation of the first segment of analysis.

After this non-alignment of communication and multiple meanings of the exchange, both the analyst and the patient are then silent for one week. The patient, however, resumes the dialogue on 22 Nov, merely identifying his resistance but has no understanding about it,

> My long silence must have a resistance at its base, but I don’t know what could have activated it. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 28)

Towards the end of the letter, Ferenczi returns to Emanuel’s death, or to his thought about it,

> Do you have detailed reports yet about your brother’s demise? Frau G. and I both had to think involuntarily about the Jungian prophecy. We hope that fate will be satisfied with one accident in the family. (ibid., p. 29)

With regard to the death wish against Freud and the rehearsed mourning, as
triggered by the truncated analysis, Ferenczi is using Emanuel’s death to continue with his interrupted analysis, with respect to the exploration of the unconscious meaning behind the abruptness of the analysis’ sudden pause. Ferenczi is also unable to contain his inner turmoil and is asking for Freud’s response, if not an echo of emotion, to this, as far as his analysis is concerned. Two days later, without Freud’s reply, he creates a rather atypical postcard of his silhouette with bust in profile, on the left hand side of the card. On the right side, he writes, ‘Here is my likeness, for the time being still in the modest uniform of an assistant physician’.

Freud responds very quickly, as prompted by the postcard, within one day, but not to the literal question about the reason for Emanuel’s death,

Your illustrious portrait, just arrived, hastens the reply that I owe you. First I want to reproach you for thinking of something so nonsensical as the Jungian prophecy on such an inopportune occasion. You are more deeply immersed in the occult than we assume. But be that as it may, don’t you consider the war to be that to which the oracle alludes? If it is drawn out and kills me in some way or another, then my own superstition, with the numbers that you know, will turn out to be right.’

Ferenczi, in his postcard, now appears to Freud as a silhouette in uniform, arguably an uncanny presentation of his unconscious as related to Freud that has the effect of prompting Freud to return an obliged reply to Ferenczi. What Freud owes Ferenczi may be something that they share ownership in their unconscious, presumably their ménage à trois. Freud has a superstitious belief that he will die at 61 or 62 (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 219), i.e., 1917 or 1918, which is just some three or four years later. Freud’s ‘reproach’ of Ferenczi is somewhat self-contradictory, and yet it reflects that Ferenczi may be on the same page with Freud’s own unconscious belief about his own personal demise, suggesting that introjection is at work between them in tying their unconscious together. Although
he scolds Ferenczi’s occult belief as nonsense, his own ‘superstition’ is equally nonsense but may turn out to be right. The ‘Jung’ that has been projected outwards from the dyad of Freud and Ferenczi, now returns as a paranoiac idea or prophecy that is haunting Freud, and maybe even Ferenczi. Freud also adds his personal reaction to the truncated analysis, the first and only one so far, ‘Since we separated, I have been very industrious’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 29) and he elaborates on his intellectual work that has no role for Ferenczi to play. Such intellectual work may serve to seal Freud off from the anxiety that Ferenczi has provoked in him during the analysis and its aftermath.

In response, Ferenczi (30 Nov) is at a loss. Such a loss suggests the acute severance of the affective connection with Freud, an object that concerns him dearly. He complains about being unable to find a correct tone for their correspondence. He is not sure whether it should be a normal or an analytic one. Yet, Ferenczi tries to pacify Freud that his interest in occultism has nothing to do with his scientific work. Ferenczi is still careful not to sabotage the chance for continuing his analysis with Freud.

After more urges from Ferenczi in the form of urgency and almost destructive acts, Freud faces it squarely. He offers appointments to Ferenczi. In fact, he has two offers,

Since you want it that way – and if your fate permits, I will thus reserve for you two hours a day from the middle of June on. I also hope to see much of you otherwise, and you should at least have one meal with us daily. Technique at least will require that nothing personal will be discussed outside the sessions. (ibid., p. 130)

Freud offers both analysis and non-analysis to Ferenczi. He tries to split off Ferenczi-the-patient from Ferenczi-the-friend, apparently setting up clearer boundary to defend against Ferenczi’s pervasive introjective moves. However, doing
these two kinds of discrete things on the same days could defeat the original purpose of boundary demarcation. Freud’s second analysis of Ferenczi lasts from 14 June to 5 July 1916. Ferenczi has a lot of positive gains to report after it. He writes to Freud on 10 July, saying that those 3 weeks are decisive ones in his life, as he finds pervasive change in his attitude towards everyone and everything. He tells Gizella that he has become another person, ‘less interesting but more normal’ (ibid., p. 132). However, he does not feel that his analysis has ended, as he finds that he still has ‘anxious sleep’ (ibid., p. 132). He takes these as indicating that he has to work on it by himself, but still he has to include Freud,

If you permit, instead of simple autoanalysis I want to attempt to analyze the particular occurrences in my letters to you; the transference will certainly “fecundate” me. (ibid., p. 132)

Ferenczi’s analogy of impregnation suggests that the transference indeed has an introjective quality. Ferenczi (1923), in his exposition on Thalassa, writes that, introjection is involved in coitus, and both reality and fantasy play a part. In the psychoanalytic coitus and impregnation between Freud and Ferenczi, as it were, it also involves introjection, as Ferenczi is taking from Freud something that is changing Ferenczi. It also implicates both real and fantasy elements. The ‘fetus’ from this fecundation belongs to both of them, but not to either one of them. Their shared ménage à trois is probably a candidate for being such ‘fetus’. The next question is, moving onward with the analogy, when the ‘baby’ is born, whether they want to raise it together as ‘parents’ or to engage in a dispute about the custody of the ‘baby’. In connecting this experience of fecundation with Ferenczi’s writing in Thalassa, however, one would have to know the limit of the analogy. Even though for Ferenczi, there are both real and fantasy parts, for Freud, he may not fully acknowledge his unconscious role in it. Here, Ferenczi wants to have further
analysis. This time, even Freud shows some interest. He writes on 13 July, ‘I don’t need to say how very interesting your letter was to me. We will see about all the rest.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 134).

However, they have different ideas about where the analysis is to be conducted. Ferenczi has several ideas. First, he wants it to be done in Budapest, ‘I would not like to give up your promised visit in Budapest!’ (ibid., p. 135). Budapest is more homely to Ferenczi but Freud may find himself removed from his secure base. Ferenczi has another idea too, one that means more unconsciously for both of them,

Another modality (a very nice one) would be the following: we could spend the last two weeks of your vacation together in the Alps or the Carpathians; it has certainly demonstrated in Vienna that being together agrees well with the treatment. But I fear that it won’t suit your to amalgamate these two weeks of vacation with an analytic hour. (ibid., p. 135)

Such a ‘nice’ idea suggests that this final round of analysis is going to be nice and somewhat similar to a holiday together. Geographically, this idea means that both Ferenczi and Freud would leave their places and do the analysis simply when ‘being together’ in a trip. It could be reminiscent of their America trip, the first one ever that analysis was done in the voyage, as Ferenczi witnessed Jung’s botched analysis of Freud’s dream that becomes the ground zero of the shared *ménage à trois* between Freud and Ferenczi, an exemplar of introjection between them too. Such analysis was more interactive and even mutual. At this point of his narration, rather abruptly, Ferenczi has the opposite thought that this arrangement may not suit Freud, which may mean that he is not sure what all these would mean to Freud unconsciously. Freud’s response (2 Aug) shows that he is uncertain about the venue too, but again, he is more certain about one more round of Ferenczi’s analysis,

Your intention to dedicate two more weeks of leave to the analysis has my full approval. The when and where then depends on the *extremely shaky circumstances* of this summer. Possibly the two of us are going to
Gastein at the end of August until the middle of September after all; the analytical hours wouldn’t fit there; my wife would always be alone. She would be adaptable to any other arrangement. From mid-September on we should be in Vienna again, in any event. (ibid., p. 137, my italics)

Freud seems to imply that with respect to Ferenczi’s proposed September / October analysis, Vienna would be a more likely option, when the reality is taken into account. Freud does not respond to the idea of doing the analysis in Budapest, nor does he entertain the idea of combining holiday with analysis as he may not want to have a ‘returned Jung’ disguised as Ferenczi to continue with the dream analysis that has been truncated, or dodged, by himself, seven years ago. In response, Ferenczi (14 Aug) prefers his proposed places, although he is prepared to follow Freud to wherever he will be,

I have set aside the two weeks of vacation for the middle of September and will travel to wherever you happen to be at the time. September in Hungary can be very nice. If the Carpathians still belong to us, we could spend two magnificent weeks there in the good Grand Hotel (Tátrafüred or Tátralomnicx). (ibid., p. 138, italics mine)

However, on 27 Aug, Ferenczi repeats his preference for a trip-cum-analysis,

I await your news. It would be nice to combine the useful (the treatment) with the pleasant (a trip together). (ibid., p. 139)

The patient and the analyst, at this point, do not have the same idea about the venue of the upcoming analysis, which may indicate that they are not on the same page regarding the analysis, or maybe such ‘disagreement’ is actually their very next therapeutic task: that Ferenczi wants to work on their ménage à trois but Freud disagrees. Without a response from Freud, and as his planned vacation in mid September is imminent, Ferenczi writes on 9 Sept, after his reminiscence,

Yesterday, on September 8, I often thought about our beautiful trips in Italy; this day should actually have found us in the Santa Maria del Popolo!

It is natural that traveling and analysis don’t get along well with each other; for that reason I will – albeit reluctantly – abandon that plan and think I will arrive in Vienna on the 22nd-23rd of September to continue the treatment. – In the meantime, I will certainly have received from you the
news of your return trip to Vienna.’ (ibid., p. 139-140)

Freud has been silent since 2 Aug, after stating his subtle preference for Vienna. Now, Ferenczi, after waiting for more than a month, suddenly changes his mind, or rather replacing it with Freud’s, gives up the ‘pleasant’ trip and retains the ‘useful’ analysis. With Freud’s silence and possibly Ferenczi’s fantasy about its meaning, Ferenczi may have been thinking with Freud’s mind too, indicating Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud again, as he is identifying with the aggressor, living in his shadow and feeling his feeling. Ferenczi recalls previous trips to Italy in order to illustrate that trip-cum-analysis will not work. Yet his repression of their America trip is even more probable. Ferenczi forces himself back to Freud’s couch in Vienna, and yet this may suggest something ominous about their upcoming third round of analysis that, even though both want it this time, it may not turn out well.

In contrast to the previous two rounds of analysis, Ferenczi is obviously more unsettled, or even disturbed, afterwards. Dupont (1994) notes that it takes Ferenczi three months to withdraw himself from the analysis so as to reduce the intensity of his transference. Ferenczi (30 Oct) writes, ‘The affects unleashed by the treatment have been undulating up and down in me’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 150).

In conclusion, Ferenczi’s request for Freud’s analysis starts when Jung and Freud break off from each other, hence transforming the threesome of the America trip into the dyad between Freud and Ferenczi, which is what Ferenczi craves for in his introjective and exclusive relationship with Freud. However, his first request to Freud is presented in a rather threatening manner that Freud avoids. His second attempt, however, is much milder and puts Freud more at ease. Freud offers him appointments, but not without ambivalence. The first round of analysis, as truncated by the WWI, leaves Ferenczi much disturbed and craves more for Freud’s
continuation of the analysis. Freud does not offer the appointments willingly. It is only after Ferenczi’s perseverance that Freud continues with the second round of analysis in Jun/Jul 1916, after which both feel the need for a third round, given Ferenczi’s transference of impregnation. Ferenczi succeeds in getting the third and final round of analysis from Freud in Sep/Oct 1916 but leads to intense conflict between them, leaving Ferenczi with feeling that the analysis is not terminated. Freud, on the other hand, feels the ‘dosage’ is enough as he could not give more, blaming him for his indecision and procrastination, and reminding him to heal himself. Ferenczi, feeling wounded, simply does not want to depend on Freud anymore. Dupont (1994) reminds that the negative transference of Ferenczi and negative counter-transference of Freud were not addressed that constitutes the failure of the analysis. Kilborne (1999) writes that this ends up in shame,

[N]ot to recognize the hate in the transference and countertransference deprives the patient of an important source of orientation in the world and can easily become shameful in itself.’ (p. 398).

However, from an introjective point of view, and following from the previous four Chapters (America trip, Seidler episode, Palermo episode and the Elma episode), these three rounds of analysis, presumably focus on Ferenczi’s own indecision of choice between Gizella and Elma, i.e., Ferenczi’ version of ménage à trois. Yet it seems to have missed Freud’s own, given that Ferenczi first introjects Freud’s ménage à trois, turning it into his own and offering it to Freud for treatment. The failure of the analysis is about Ferenczi’s being unable to get Freud out of himself, or to de-hybridize their shared unconscious, ménage à trois being an exemplar. As Ferenczi is living this experience, he is also writing about introjection accordingly, especially for his identification with the aggressor which is ahead of his writings in 1930s. In the next Chapter, we will move onto how Freud attempts to
remove himself from Ferenczi’s unconscious by finding a surrogate for himself, as well as how such introjective experience is reflected in Ferenczi’s writings on *Introjection*.
Chapter 13

Between Freud and Ferenczi, 1917: The emergence of Groddeck

This Chapter follows from their failed analysis in 1916. Ferenczi and Freud are unable to use the analysis to solve their introjection conundrum. On the surface of it, Ferenczi could not resolve his dilemma between Gizella and Elma with Freud’s analysis. On a more unconscious level, both have missed their need and an opportunity for a resolution of their shared ménage à trois so that they can eventually function more independently of each other, or in Ferenczi’s terms, to make himself more independent of Freud. After the first reluctant analysis, Freud is not willing to continue. Upon Ferenczi’s perseverance, Freud continues with a second round and then more willingly with a third one, after which both are very distressed and Freud could not go on, even though Ferenczi wants more. Freud is more determined to pull himself out of this mire. He starts introducing his surrogates - Gizella, the Lamarckian Project, and Groddeck – to Ferenczi. Freud’s retreat is also his solution to the conundrum. Interestingly, Ferenczi gradually ‘complies’ and starts drifting away. As in the previous episodes, Ferenczi writes about the Introjection that is experienced.

Past studies on the Ferenczi-Groddeck relationship focus on the reasons for their affinity and how Ferenczi is influenced more by Groddeck than by Freud, without contextualizing its beginning in the vicissitudes of the Freud-Ferenczi relationship. Fortune (2002) states that it is Freud who “attempted to connect the two men by mentioning Ferenczi’s recent paper, ‘Disease- or patho-neuroses’” (p. 86) when he first writes to Groddeck on 5 Jun 1917. Fortune notes that both Ferenczi and Groddeck have much interest in the mind-body relationship and Ferenczi admires Groddeck’s free thinking style and maternal identification. Groddeck, in
return, inspires Ferenczi to overcome his writer’s block. Groddeck shares and even celebrates Ferenczi’s child-like qualities as rebellious. Groddeck’s positive view of the body, as contrast to its almost absence in Freudian psychoanalytic discourse on sexuality, is very appealing to Ferenczi. Fortune concludes about the supplementary role of Groddeck in the Freud-Ferenczi relationship, that Groddeck ‘provided the bodily side of the equation for Ferenczi after his long association to Freud’, “‘remothering’ Ferenczi and inspiring him to follow his creative instincts’ (p. 92). Grosskurth (1991) surmises that Ferenczi ‘looked to Groddeck to replace Freud as the mother Ferenczi always wanted’ (p. 200), which suggests that Freud fails as Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic partner. Similarly, Rachmann (1997) sees Groddeck’s role as more exclusive and substitutive, as Ferenczi and Groddeck manage to achieve mutual honesty and emotional engagement: ‘Groddeck became the mutual analytic partner for which Ferenczi hungered – the partner Freud could not become.’ (p. 82). These hypotheses are consistent with a need to figure out the evolutionary context of the introjective Freud-Ferenczi relationship in order to understand why, and how, Groddeck could appear between them.

In this Chapter, I will trace the context of Groddeck’s emergence between Freud and Ferenczi as a sequel of their failed analysis, and map it with Ferenczi’s writings on *Introjection*. I will also round up Ferenczi’s relationship with Freud in their final contact in 1933. By Dec 1916, two months after the end of the third round of analysis, Freud is finding a way out. On 22 Dec 1916, he writes to Ferenczi, almost one month after his angry reprimand of him (of abusing analysis) on 26 Nov. Freud talks about several things that may reveal what he has in mind on how he is going to move on with Ferenczi. Freud is drawing into their correspondence some other unconsciously meaningful events in the external world,
I dismissed my last [female] patient today and have a long vacation ahead of me’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 166)

This dismissal may also be read as applicable to Ferenczi. Freud’s previous reprimand of Ferenczi for him to stop using analysis to further his procrastination is itself a strong and conscious message that he is not going to continue his analysis with Ferenczi. At this point, nonetheless, Freud alludes to an appeal for peace in the outside world, viz., WWI,

On closer consideration I realize that Wilson’s peace initiative, announced today, which should be taken more seriously, has had its share in bringing about a more life-affirming mood on my part. (ibid., p. 166)

Such allusion echoes with Ferenczi’s (1922b) idea, in the process of introjection, of subjectivization of objects in the external world. However, Ferenczi was writing this in the context of ‘transition to object love’ (p. 212). Freud is referring to the appeal of Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), the 28th President of the United States, who writes to all the belligerent nations asking them to make their peace term explicit (Stevenson, 2005). As for his conflictual relationship with Ferenczi in the aftermath of the failed analysis, at this point of Freud’s narration, he also makes an appeal, if also a ‘peace initiative’, to Ferenczi. In making this appeal to Ferenczi ‘via’ President Wilson’s appeal, one would wonder whether Freud is also in transition to object-love in relating to Ferenczi. Figlio (2007), in analyzing Freud’s use of Schnitzler, ‘a prominent Viennese author and playwright’ (p. 25), as his double, or as ‘an experiential reality to his theories’ (p. 26), observes that

the familiarity with the external world – of objects, of the continuity of experience and narrative – dissolved into emotion-laden bizarre perception and thoughts. Psychic elements were simultaneously internal and external, knowable only through internal and external means.’ (p. 26-27).

With Ferenczi, Freud is also merging his external experience with the WWI into his emotion-laden thoughts with Ferenczi. Here, Freud offers a collaboration,
which is of a kind that Ferenczi hungered for in their Sicily Trip regarding Freud’s writing of the Schreber’s case,

Today I was in the university library to order the Lamarck for myself. I cannot stay completely idle, and our project, “Lamarck and ΨA,” suddenly came to mind as hopeful and rich in content. I am predicting all kinds of things there and am actually already convinced about it. It is hard for me to read so much that lies more distant from me, but it will perhaps still work ad majorem dei gloriam, in honor of our painfully revered science. I would only like to have the assurance from you that you will maintain your collaboration and do something serious in the near future, even though you don’t have as much free time as I. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 166, italics added)

Freud only mentioned Lamarck\(^{147}\) to Ferenczi in passing, instead of in the form of a project, twice, on 6 Jan 1916 and 26 Feb 1916\(^{148}\) respectively. However, he coins it here as ‘our project’, an invitation to Ferenczi. Freud has already reserved a place for Ferenczi in this collaborated works to divert Ferenczi from the analysis, and to direct Ferenczi’s introjective pull into the intellectual channel. Instead of offering himself as an analyst or analytic partner, Freud is offering to Ferenczi a merging of their thoughts, as it were, in order to replace the introjective merging of themselves as what Ferenczi wants first from the analysis, an analysis that will ideally aim at final independence of the two protagonists from each other. As contrast to the Palermo Episode, Freud has no fear that Ferenczi would take the whole thing. For Ferenczi, this is indeed attractive. He responds quickly (28 Dec), declaring right at the beginning,

Let this sheet of paper be proof of the fact that I have again attained a certain degree of normality and am not incapable of putting thoughts on paper. (ibid., p. 167)

While he is trying to show Freud that he is really ready, Ferenczi still displays one paragraph of self-analysis,

You will forgive me if I again return to my own person and retrospectively share a few insights. (ibid., p. 168)
This is not only that Ferenczi’s ‘rebellious’ attitude has not fully subsided, but also that his personal is identical to his scientific. In response to Freud’s complaint of idleness, i.e., lack of patients, in Vienna during the difficult time of the War, Ferenczi’s response is mixed,

It is pure irony that I can hardly fend off the patients, while the stupid Viennese are missing the unique opportunity to be treated by you. It is not mere chauvinism on my part if I am contemptuous of them for that. I don’t know whether two patients whom I recently sent to Vienna (von Húvös, brother of the local tramway director, and Dr. Lévy’s sister) will find their way there. (ibid., p. 167-168, italics mine)

Ferenczi is alluding to Freud’s fending him off too in his analysis. His current position of being hardly able to ‘fend off patients’ is his identification with, or introjection of, that Freud who was still unable to fend him off some months ago. In Vienna, it is the patients who fend off Freud and hence Ferenczi has contempt for these ‘stupid Viennese’ for missing the chance for analysis by Freud and rendering Freud idle. One would also wonder how much Ferenczi’s ‘contempt’ is also applicable to Freud, another Viennese. In referring two Budapesters to Freud for analysis, Ferenczi may still be striving for a fourth round of analysis, the third of which is truncated not by the War, but Freud’s reluctance to further continue. The two Budapesters are not just the surrogates for Ferenczi, but also Ferenczi’s further attempt at introjection. This anticipates Ferenczi (1925) who argues that via introjection, subsequent to the taking in of stimuli from the external world, one also works on the internalized objects from inside to outside. Ferenczi adds a reality element to the concept of introjection, rendering it not just about the subjectivity of a person’s psyche, but with a reality sense. Here, introjection means taking in stimuli from the external world first, and then work on the internalized objects from inside towards outside. This is similar to the earliest definitions of introjection, except that the work now has an outward direction, i.e., it is also linked to the outer world,
instead of mere subjectivity. So, the two Hungarian patients are serving such introjective functions for Ferenczi by being both a symbolic representation of Ferenczi, and in reality, really being sent from Hungary to Vienna (Freud), with an uncertainty of whether they will reach their destination or achieve their goal of getting analysis there, which is also what Ferenczi is still striving after at this moment. Freud’s reaction noted below suggests that this hypothesis is correct, as he both answer literally the fate of the Budapesters, and associates it to their Lamarkian collaboration.

In response to Ferenczi, Freud (1 Jan 1917) sticks to his agenda and version of collaboration and pushes Ferenczi to start the work, so as to further divert Ferenczi from the analysis,

Your efforts to send me Budapesters can’t have much success. I can find no other relationship to Vienna anymore, nor Vienna to me. So one just has to wait for a basic change in conditions.

I am pleased that you are coming back to yourself from your depths. … Today I am enclosing a sketch of the Lamarck work, since I gather from your letter that you are keeping to the intention that you expressed back then. (No return!) I will then begin to read the “Zoological Philosophy” today. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 169)

Freud even disconnects himself from Vienna, apparently to dodge Ferenczi’s covert accusation of his stupidity of not continuing with the analysis, and more importantly, Ferenczi’s continuing introjective pull. He believes that his Lamarck appeal would work. It is interesting to note the Lamarckian assertion that experience can change the characteristics of organisms (and hence change the genotype and passing on such changes to the future generation). Freud may also believe that Ferenczi can be changed by their collaborative work in Lamarck. Freud’s choice of the topic for the collaboration is also rich in unconscious meaning. However, such a choice would also suggest Freud’s own loosening of the boundary between the intellectual and the personal, in that he believes Ferenczi’s ‘intellectual’ can change
Ferenczi’s ‘personal’. This is pretty similar to the case of Ferenczi, as Ferenczi
simply does not differentiate between these two realms, to start with. In this sense,
Ferenczi’s introjective work on Freud is collecting its reward.

In a fist of enthusiasm, Ferenczi responds (2 Jan) very promisingly, preceded
by some somatic symptoms though,

I have been unwell for two days (influenza), had to stay home today
(probably tomorrow as well). Otherwise, nothing important to write about myself.

So, I am making a solemn decision to collaborate on that nice plan
(Lamarckism). I will consider your notes as a basis for the work. First I
want to copy and send in the notes that I made on this theme. Then I will
ask you to designate what is useful in them and to propose specifics about
the division of labor. (ibid., p. 170)

Freud (4 Jan), in return, steers Ferenczi in finer moves, apparently, feeling less
heavy than the analysis per se, but unconsciously, still somewhat linked to each
other through somatic symptoms,

First of all, I conceive of the work on Lamarckism in such a way that
each of us reads, if possible, everything that is noteworthy, until more
specialized areas can be separated out for the individual. We should support
each other from the beginning with hints as to where things can be found.
The weather has also brought me a sore throat and cold and the concomitant
intellectual listlessness. Fortunately, one doesn’t need much now, and the
works are not pressing. (ibid., p. 171, italics mine)

Hence, they are transforming their truncated analysis into this ‘collaboration’ in
Lamarck. More than one year later, with their collaboration still not yet leading to
anything concrete, and actually would never become a reality, Freud writes to
Ferenczi on 13 Sept 1918, as he is staying in Lomnicz in miserable weather, he
suddenly has the associative thought about it, ‘Today, unsuspected, a “thought”
[Einfall] about our Lamarckian fantasies, the first impulse of its kind in two months’
(ibid., p. 293). Arguably, Freud’s Lamarckian fantasies would find its unconscious
echo in Ferenczi’s craving for analysis from Freud. Also, as far as their introjection
is concerned, they still cannot tease away from one another completely, as what their
somatic symptoms are telling them. It can be simply pure chance that any two persons are infected with flu at the same time. Yet, what is noteworthy here is that both chose to write about it to each other in the context of the Lamarkian project, or truncated analysis.

Freud’s recommended way of working together, that they ‘should support each other from the beginning with hints as to where things can be found’, a rare one indeed in their correspondence, with their botched analysis as a background, is what Freud would have wanted both of them to have done at the beginning of their analysis some year ago in 1914. Retrospectively, it also indicates a need for them to understand what belong to whom and where to find them while they offer mutual support to each other. This Lamarckian project, or a substituted analysis, as it were, is more acceptable to Freud as he feels it ‘not pressing’, probably when compared to their previous three rounds of analysis.

Ferenczi’s compliance, however, does not seem to be that lasting or perseverant. On 9 Jan, Ferenczi writes that while that he agrees with Freud’s plan of working together, his physical condition is the key as to whether he can really collaborate. He continues with a detailed report of his very weak physical condition, with influenza, fever and kidney degeneration. His concomitant depression is so severe that even Gizella’s company cannot alleviate. His physician, Dr Lévy, prescribes him at least four weeks of sick leave. At times of such distress, it is Ferenczi’s habit to turn to Freud. He writes,

The leave (which, in Dr. Lévy’s view, can still be extended) would allow me to collaborate properly on the Lamarckian work. – Or should I also pick up the thread of the analysis again?  
I await your advice. (ibid., p. 172, italics mine)

At this point, it is obvious that Ferenczi connects, if not equates, the Lamarckian work to his analysis and sees them as interchangeable with each other, a
plan that Freud has at the outset. For Ferenczi, the logic is as simple as: he must have a sound mind and body before he can collaborate with Freud. However, Freud just wants to take Ferenczi’s collaboration only, and refers his somatic or psychic ailment to elsewhere. They have different agendas as far as their mutual introjection is concerned. Yet, by shifting Ferenczi to the Lamarckian track, bearing in mind that the Lamarckian principle entails the modification of genes by experience and inheritance into the next generation, it also implies that Freud is ready to be changed by Ferenczi’s introjective pull, but Freud confines it to the intellectual channel only.

In awaiting Freud’s advice, Ferenczi is telling Freud that the Lamarckian project does not work as a replacement of his analysis. In quick response, Freud (12 Jan) is just ‘sorry to hear that your health has again been shaken’ and he states clearly that ‘We don’t want to consider resuming the analysis.’ (ibid., p. 173, italics mine). In reply to Ferenczi’s request for his advice, Freud’s use of ‘We’, instead of ‘I’, as the subject of his ‘advice’ to Ferenczi, shows that, as far as their analysis is concerned, the two are combined as a single unit, which might explain why it is that difficult to ‘tease’ themselves apart. Freud is not just speaking on behalf of Ferenczi, but also revealing to Ferenczi the state of their connection in Freud’s own unconscious. Nevertheless, Freud’s advice may not be a big ‘No’, but a proposal to shift the track to Lamarckian one as he is very ready to do such a collaborative work with Ferenczi and there might be something about this work that, at least unconsciously, is seen as satisfactory all around, despite some resistance from Ferenczi. Yet, another more extreme possibility is simply a ‘stop’ to any consideration of resumption of the analysis, cordong or sealing off the truncated analysis and not to re-open the case again.

What Freud writes next is telling the answer. He revises his plan of
collaboration, apparently to put off further introjection of Ferenczi, even on intellectual matters,

I think each of us should complete the thing as though he were alone, and then we should get together. The next thing you will receive from me will be a list of literature indicating which books contain the essential things for the individual points. I have already ordered some; I will look for others in the university library. Many foreign books will naturally remain inaccessible to us. (ibid., p. 174, italics mine)

If we read Freud’s Lamarckian project with Ferenczi as Freud’s preferred version of his analysis of Ferenczi, one would find how Freud is actually working when he ‘continues’ Ferenczi’s analysis in the Lamarckian way. He would prefer less interactive impact, as each of the protagonist should work and finish his part in parallel, and something would remain not accessible to both of them. Freud’s version of this ‘Lamarckian’ analysis would give us some clues, on Freud’s part, as to why the three rounds of analysis in 1914 and 1916 did not work. On 22 Jan, ten days after no reply from Ferenczi, Freud continues reporting his Lamarckian project,

Today I wanted to return your notes on Lamarck to you, but I discovered that I don’t own such a large envelope … My work on Lamarck is being very much delayed by conditions.’ (ibid., p. 175, my italics)

Reading this in the context of their analysis, it runs like: Freud has received, or introjected, from Ferenczi something that is meant for Freud to process (to read), now ends up staying on Freud’s side, and he is apparently unable to return it to Ferenczi in a therapeutically processed form. In Spurling’s (2009) formulation, the therapist is unable to offer the patient ‘an experience of containment’ (p. 23). Freud’s lack of a large ‘envelope’ to contain the Ferenczi’s material, or that his psyche is not large enough to introject, probably signifies his difficulty, and hence reluctance, in analyzing Ferenczi. Just one day later, Freud writes to Gizella about Ferenczi and Gizella’s crucial role, without Ferenczi’s knowing,
He is not a person who can live and work without intimate belonging to another, and where would he find anymore more excellent than you?... it became evident that he is incapable of doing without you and replacing you. I have really left nothing untried and have met with no success. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 176)

Freud is trying to use Gizella to replace himself, as this ‘big envelope’ to introject and to contain Ferenczi, especially when he finds that his Lamarckian project does not work with Ferenczi too. However, it turns out that Gizella does not work either. On Ferenczi’s side, after being silent for 14 days, he writes on 25 Jan, reporting findings of serious somatic problems as X-ray showing his lungs being ‘less transparent’ (ibid., p. 177) and hence accounting for his fatigue and weight loss. Still, he maintains his wish to see Freud at least before he goes to the mountains for rehabilitation as advised by Dr Lévy. He even has thought about his own imminent death as he offers an idea to Freud on how to dispose of his Notes: ‘organize all notes so that they can at least be published posthumously’ (ibid., p. 177) Here, as the Lamarckian project is unconsciously a continuance of Ferenczi’s analysis, Ferenczi may be expressing his wish for Freud to work on his analysis even after Ferenczi’s own death. Freud (28 Jan) tries to placate Ferenczi’s fear by suggesting that his illness could simply be a mild one. Other than expressing regret at learning about Ferenczi’s condition, Freud does not take up much of Ferenczi’s worry and fear, let alone dwelling on the fantasy of ‘posthumous’ publication. Furthermore, Freud even starts to retreat from his Lamarckian project, as he may have sensed that Ferenczi is stopping his work. He reports his discovery that their thinking on the Lamarckian project is entirely compatible with what has been said in the literature and they have ‘little to say that is completely new’ (ibid., p. 179). On 2 Mar, Freud even joins Ferenczi’s pause in the work. He soothes Ferenczi not to worry about his pause at work as he himself has no progress either; he has stopped working in the evening in
the cold and dark days with insufficient lighting,

My motives for work have been partly extinguished, partly forced back, at present. The suspense over what is about to happen in the world is too great. I am warming up to the idea of taking up the work in the summer, when one has to renounce nature and, in the city, doesn’t know what to do with oneself. (ibid., p. 186)

More than two months later, Freud (29 May 1917) even writes,

I am not at all disposed to doing the work on Lamarck in the summer and would prefer to relinquish the whole thing to you.’ (ibid., p. 210, my italics)

Essentially, this could be the beginning of another truncation of Ferenczi’s ‘analysis’, the ‘analysis’ that is taking the form of Lamarckian project that Freud has instigated himself. This truncation, however, is not brought forth by anything outside the dyad, such as the War, but by Freud himself. This could have much impact on Ferenczi, as Freud is drawing a clearer internal boundary between them, obviously antagonistic to Ferenczi’s introjective pull or the force of merging. In his reply, Ferenczi shows little about such a possible impact, and yet his parapraxis may somehow betray him. He starts his 2 Jun letter right away with an incident about his regular mailing of daily necessity to Freud

A transport column has picked up what was meant for you. But because of misunderstanding, about twenty kilograms of white, powdery material, as well as twenty kilograms of granular green rye – all of which belongs to somebody else – was also sent to your address. Don’t be entirely too sad if they pick up the latter from you. The remaining:

1) unguentum simplex
2) white powder material
3) white crystal

belongs to you; so don’t give away everything white! (ibid., p. 210-211, my italics)

Such materialistic items should also be imbued with Ferenczi’s feeling and even representative of some of Ferenczi’s internal objects that are to be transferred from Ferenczi to Freud, at the time of the War. The ‘misunderstanding’ is probably between Ferenczi and the transport column, as Ferenczi has made an error by
mailing to Freud something that does not belong to Freud. The important point here is the meaning behind Ferenczi’s including this episode of parapraxis here at this point of their interaction. Also of concern is: at this juncture, Ferenczi believes that it is an error that he is trying to correct. Whether the parapraxis is a true one is of secondary importance. Ferenczi discovers this error after mailing and then tells Freud what really belongs to him; the transport column is going to take away from Freud those items that belong to ‘somebody else’. This ‘error’, however, also reflects the process of their interaction so far about the Lamarckian Project, or even the analysis proper earlier on. In sending ‘everything white’ to Freud, Ferenczi may be identifying with Freud in Freud’s ‘relinquishing the whole thing’ of the Lamarckian Project to Ferenczi. However, as far as the analytic meaning of the Project between them is concerned, such a ‘relinquishment’ also means Freud truncating the collaboration and hence taking the analysis away from Ferenczi, but Freud is not taking the analysis back either, rendering the analysis belonging neither to Freud, nor to Ferenczi, but to ‘somebody else’. Ferenczi’s recommendation for Freud of ‘Don’t be entirely too sad’ is also applicable to Ferenczi himself as he may be preparing to accept the fact that Freud’s analysis of him is indeed coming to an end, but still there is a ‘somebody else’ that may take up the analysis. In prescribing a specified amount of ‘sad’ feeling to Freud, Ferenczi may also have done it via projective identification. Sadness, obviously, is the sequel of loss, at least for Ferenczi, and hopefully, for Freud as well, as their difficult analysis is near ending, on both sides. In this letter, Ferenczi says nothing overtly about his reaction towards Freud’s ‘relinquishment’. Consciously Ferenczi is repressing his thoughts and feelings, and yet he is expressing them unconsciously via his parapraxis, viz., the error of mailing to Freud something that does not belong to Freud.
Interestingly, Georg Groddeck, the future surrogate of Freud to Ferenczi, already wrote to Freud on 27 May 1917, with much enthusiasm for the Psychoanalytic movement, or the cause, which is two days earlier than Freud’s ‘relinquishment’ letter (29 May) to Ferenczi. If Freud has received and read Groddeck’s letter of 27 May before he writes to Ferenczi on 29 May to convey the ‘relinquishment’, then it is not a coincidence, but a cause-and-effect. Between Freud and Groddeck, this is the very first time Groddeck writes to Freud and Freud is much agreement with him. Between Freud and Ferenczi, Groddeck is indeed this ‘somebody else’. Freud immediately notes the potential mutual attraction between Ferenczi and Groddeck and ‘put[s] them in touch with each other’ (Hristeva & Poster, 2013, p. 242), as Freud instantly recognizes that Groddeck has the same viewpoint as Ferenczi in their belief that the unconscious, as contrast to the conscious, has a great and decisive influence on somatic processes (Poster, 2009). Freud tells Ferenczi on 3 June, even before replying Groddeck, about this letter. Freud is beginning to refer Ferenczi to Groddeck, to the effect that he has found an analyst, to replace himself, for Ferenczi, a candidate who can take up both versions of analyses (Lamarckian project and analysis proper) which have just ended. Dupont (1994), discussing Freud’s case cited in his 1937 paper *Analysis Terminable and Interminable*, published after Ferenczi’s death in 1933, that is obviously alluding to Ferenczi [see Freud (1933), p. 228 & Freud (1937), p. 221, n.1] who complains about the analyst failing to give him a ‘complete analysis’ (ibid., p. 221), argues that the analysis is obviously not terminated in both Freud and Ferenczi. The analysis triggers in Ferenczi a ‘continuous development’ (Dupont, 1994, p. 317). Dupont continues,

Perhaps one could say that he acquired a very sharp insight and capacity for self-criticism, but insufficiently strong defences to deal with the
emotional situation that ensued. Moreover, his development permitted him to realize himself to a large measure in his professional life, although much less in his private life. (ibid., p. 317)

This moment of ‘referral’, as it were, is a watershed in the Freud-Ferenczi relationship, as Freud might feel that he has found a solution for himself regarding their introjection problems:

Next time I will send you the most interesting letter from a German physician that I have ever received, the contents of which impinge lavishly on your pathoneuroses and the Lamarck idea. I still have to reply to him. (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 212, my italics and footnote)

In ending this letter, Freud appears somewhat concerned whether his ‘referral’, plus the relinquishment, is bothering Ferenczi, as Freud finds himself asking Ferenczi some rare questions, given Ferenczi’s total lack of response to these two important decisions,

And what is happening to you? Is everything steering towards the final solution? Are you able to work well? (ibid., p. 212, my italics)

The ‘final solution’, an uncanny or even eerie term used between them to denote an unsettling idea, other than referring to the obvious and chronic question of Ferenczi’s final decision to marry Gizella or Elma, could also be describing Freud’s own ‘final solution’ about ending Ferenczi’s ‘analysis’, viz., giving up the Lamarckian Project and the analysis proper, referring them altogether to Groddeck. Freud is concerned whether his own ‘final solution’ works for Ferenczi. In response, Ferenczi (5 Jun) continues with his meticulous details of the arrangement that he makes, with the hospitality of Dr. von Freund, the rich brewery merchant and a friend of Ferenczi, for Freud to spend the upcoming summer in Csorba. The level of Ferenczi’s hospitality for Freud almost renders Freud a passive recipient,

I had a German Tátra guide sent to you by Dick. But in the meantime buy yourself the—very good—Tátra guide from Grieben’s travel library. Don’t forget to take along travel blankets, warm outer – and underclothes, galoshes, etc’ (ibid., p. 213).

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These are, however, reminiscence of Freud’s complaint, to Jung, about Ferenczi’s passivity in their Sicily trip in 1910. Ferenczi and Freud are reversing their roles, suggesting that their merging, or introjection problems, has not find a solution.

As for Freud’s ‘final solution’, Ferenczi does not respond to it, but adds, ‘On personal matters next time’ (ibid., p. 213) near the end of the letter. In the very next letter (6 Jun), Ferenczi ends with, ‘I eagerly await the letter from the German physician.’ (ibid., p. 215)

Yet, Freud is still concerned whether his ‘final solution’ works. On 8 June, he continues with his referral of Groddeck, with an alluded ‘sorry’ to Ferenczi,

Yesterday the interesting letter went off to you, … I am sorry that your transfer resulted in inconveniences for you. Perhaps things won’t be as bad they seem. I am very much in suspense about your personal news. (ibid., p. 215, my italics)

The ‘transfer’ is about Ferenczi’s military re-posting to Neupest that Ferenczi has been grumbling about. Between Freud and Ferenczi, however, there is another ‘transfer’ going on, viz., transferring Ferenczi from Freud to Groddeck, for which Freud hopes Ferenczi would not find that bad. On 13 Jun, Ferenczi responds about Groddeck, for the very first time. He receives and reads Groddeck’s ‘extremely interesting’ (ibid., p. 217) letter and returns it to Freud immediately afterwards. However, Ferenczi is skeptical about Groddeck’s claim of the impact of the unconscious on the soma, as well as the Groddeck’s method of investigation as he does not believe that Groddeck is working psychoanalytically, but simply using suggestion – very effectively - instead. Ferenczi even fantasizes that Groddeck may be using thought transference to cure. He also worries about Groddeck’s tendency towards mysticism, given his persistent use of ‘It’ instead of ‘unconscious’. Even worse, Groddeck reminds Ferenczi of a medium, Parson Staudenmayer, whom he
has visited. However, Ferenczi later found the medium to be suffering from dementia praecox. Ferenczi sees Groddeck as more like a dreamer, with a worry that he could be even worse than that, although he still believes that Groddeck can teach them something new. Fortune (2002), however, sees Ferenczi’s skepticism as something about jealousy, ‘If Ferenczi was in fact pushing Groddeck away, it was quite probably because he was jealous over Freud’s enthusiasm for Groddeck.’ (pp. 86-87). While this hypothesis readily goes along with the one on Ferenczi’s jealousy against Jung some years ago, Freud’s insertion of Groddeck here is more about displacing Freud, instead of Ferenczi, because they are working unconsciously on the sequel of the failed analysis.

Most importantly, Ferenczi is eager to know how Freud perceives Groddeck. In this letter, Ferenczi is telling Freud that he fails Groddeck as a replacement for Freud, despite the possibility that Groddeck’s ‘psychoanalytic profile’ is more similar to Ferenczi’s than to Freud’s. Yet, Groddeck’s ‘failure’ of replacement this time is not a total failure, as Ferenczi is still curious about Groddeck.

In reply, Freud (15 Jun) attributes Ferenczi’s rejection of Groddeck to his character,

In your reaction against Dr. Groddeck I again find a long-standing characteristic trait in you, the tendency to leave a stranger standing outside.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 220, my italics)

Freud is talking about Ferenczi’s inclination to eliminate the third who could intrude into the dyad, something Freud does not find surprising. While Freud also shares some of Ferenczi’s doubt, overall, Freud is more accepting of Groddeck than what Ferenczi appears to be. Freud, however, reminds Ferenczi, ‘But the whole thing is pressing toward our work on Lamarck’ (ibid., p. 220), which has both a literal and symbolic meaning.
Ferenczi does not dismiss Groddeck summarily and he starts to make unconscious connection between Freud and Groddeck. He replies to Freud (21 Jun),

I will be very interested to hear how Dr. Groddeck responds!

Finally, I have a wicked confession. I succeeded in losing the manuscript of the translation of your paper on war and death! (ibid., p. 221)

The translation of the paper into Hungarian is what Ferenczi has promised Freud earlier on. Losing the translated manuscript, as a parapraxis, suggests that Ferenczi has already managed to show Freud his attempt at undoing of what he has introjected from Freud, if Freud’s analysis of Ferenczi and its truncations have any meaning associated with this paper. At this point, Ferenczi’s interest for Groddeck is more visible. After exchanging a couple of letters with reference to Groddeck in passing, mostly of some incidental remarks as before, about Groddeck’s approach, Freud and Ferenczi are silent about Groddeck for months. They seemingly cannot arrive at a consensus yet as to what to do with the ‘Groddeck’ between them.

It is until October of the same year that Freud strategically wants to include Groddeck as an adherent, whose idea is novel but not interfering, to the cause that he (9 Oct) asks Ferenczi to do something positive about Groddeck,

Sachs will send you a little publication from Groddeck in Baden-Baden, for which you have been prepared by his correspondence with me, and to which I ask you to dedicate a detailed, benevolent review without much delay. I know and share your objections, but the heart of the matter coincides with your pathoneuroses and our Lamarck idea, and is certainly noteworthy. To what extent Groddeck’s assertions are justified will be left to verification through suitable experience. Moreover, we have a personal interest in drawing him into the circle of our collaborators and to cultivate divergences from our way of thinking that are not fundamentally disruptive. (ibid., p. 241)

Here, Freud is not proposing a dictation of Freud’s own idea. Instead, it is about Ferenczi’s ‘articulation’ of Ferenczi’s own thought about Groddeck, and yet ‘dictated’ by Freud’s assigned, ‘benevolent’, line-to-take. This review is a new form
of ‘collaboration’ between Freud and Ferenczi so far, given the previous failed one in the Schreber’s Case in their Palermo trip, and the latest failing one of the Lamarckian Project. Ferenczi executes Freud’s order of benevolence faithfully. He writes that Groddeck makes the first courageous attempt in applying psychoanalysis to organic medicine, with new viewpoints and value that is beyond doubt: ‘What he describes is mostly not hypothesis, but fact.’ (Ferenczi, 1917, p. 342). Furthermore, Groddeck can demonstrate the effectiveness of his treatment with numerous cases of different ‘purely organic illness’ (ibid., p. 342). However, what makes Ferenczi’s review personally relevant is his portrayal of Groddeck’s background and character, which is similar to Ferenczi’s,

Dr. Groddeck is a practitioner who did not start with psychoanalysis, but came upon our psychotherapy by chance in his search for a useful treatment of organic illness. This explains the far-reaching differences between him and ourselves, both in theory and, particularly, in the meaning attributed to some of the process and mechanisms in question. There is, however, sufficient agreement to raise the hope that the barrier separating the two series of observations will soon be cut through. … Further, we must respect this author who, in his great love of truth, in the service of science does not hesitate to expose several weak points and shortcomings of his own physical and mental organization. (ibid., p. 343, my italics)

What Ferenczi says here about psychoanalysis may also be applicable to himself, as it is not about the Freudian vs. Groddeckian mode of thought, but about Ferenczi and Groddeck. Ferenczi sees in Groddeck something of his own inner vibrant process that strengthens his affinity for Groddeck, with the hope that the boundary between them would soon be removed, that would allow introjection, from either direction, to occur. One year later, Ferenczi witnesses, as derived from the perspective of a difficult patient, the healing power of Groddeck, which is something he is amazed about. On 14 Jun 1918, he tells Freud,

The enclosed letter from the crazy Swedish woman provides us with interesting insights into Dr. Groddeck’s method of treatment. He must be
a very uncritical man if he initiates a patient like this Swede into his correspondence with you. It strikes me altogether as more and more probable that Groddeck is not curing at all with analysis, but rather that with the aid of transference he puts the plastic power of hysteria into the service of the organic tendency to heal. Precisely because he doesn’t analyze but rather displaces the tendencies as a block, he is able to perform such feats. – Should I get the Swedish woman to give us further information? (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, pp. 288-289)

Freud, however, has little interest in this, as he responds (18 Jun),

The Swedish letters are enclosed. I wouldn’t interrogate that woman any further; she is certainly a too clouded source. (ibid., p. 289)

Ferenczi is not so much interested in the Swedish patient per se, but is rather curious about how one can use transference without interpretation. He sees Groddeck’s treatment as a new and potentially promising kind of therapy, maybe for his own chronic ailments, somatic and psychic, as well. Freud’s indifference to Ferenczi’s curiosity paves the way for Ferenczi to seek it out himself, which, however, is compatible with Freud’s initial plan to refer Ferenczi to Groddeck, after the failure in their Lamarckian Project. In Groddeck, Ferenczi is seeking both a healer and a psychoanalytic partner, if not also the introjective kind. The ‘transfer’ from Freud to Groddeck, however, does not take place immediately in 1918. The ‘transfer’ originates from Freud’s failed analysis with Ferenczi as Freud has tried with Gizella and the Lamarckian Project as replacement for the analysis, both of which fail too. The failure on the couch is about the inability of Freud and Ferenczi to find a way of collaboration, or introjection that is agreeable with each other, and also about losing an opportunity to solve their shared ménage à trois so that eventually, they could be more independent of each other. After the failure of the analysis proper and the replacement versions, the process for Ferenczi’s ‘departure’ from Freud begins to evolve. It only takes some more time for Ferenczi’s distancing from Freud, or for Ferenczi’s change of introjective objects from Freud to Groddeck,
to evolve.

Three years later, in 1921, after the end of WWI in 1918, the political upheaval in Budapest that removes Ferenczi from the Professorship of Psychoanalysis and the Physicians’ Association, together with Ferenczi’s own withdrawal from the Presidency of the International Psychoanalytic Association shortly after being in post, as well as Ferenczi’s fateful wedding to Gizella in 1919, Ferenczi is already thinking about various new options for himself, e.g. moving to America. The year 1921, moreover, is another watershed in that Ferenczi is drifting to Groddeck visibly. This year, during which Ferenczi begins his regular treatment by Groddeck in his Sanatorium in Baden-Baden, also marks the beginning of Ferenczi’s introjective relationship with Groddeck up till Ferenczi’s death in 1933. Furthermore, the year 1921 signifies the beginning of the period in which Freud and Ferenczi’s ‘intellectual symbiosis underwent a progressive dissolution’ and,

giving rise to an increasing theoretical and technical distance between the two men which, in 1929-33, culminated in the intense conflict truncated only by Ferenczi’s premature death’ (Bonomi, 1996, p. 165).

As ‘referred’ by Freud, Ferenczi seeks Groddeck as a psychoanalytic partner. Ferenczi finds a more maternal connection with Groddeck, which is what Ferenczi wants. Their mutual introjection is noted to be significant, providing much inspiration for Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic thought, but somehow it peaks and then declines later with Groddeck’s allegation of Ferenczi’s plagiarism on the jump from psyche to soma, in 1929. Ferenczi’s final letter to Groddeck in 1933 reveals how Ferenczi’s previous introjective relationship with Freud takes its toll in Ferenczi’s own physical decline and death (Chan, 2014a).

In his second last letter to Groddeck on 3 Mar 1932, Ferenczi is telling Groddeck how absorbed he is in his own psychic and clinical experience with
patients, presumably his latest psychoanalytic partners,

Matters which occupy me intellectually have still not matured to the point where I could communicate them. My ‘Scientific imagination’, although ‘well-disciplined’ (Freud), induces me to fly beyond the unconscious at times to the so-called metaphysical, which I find reflected in almost identical form in the material my patients produce. There seems to be a path which leads from dreams to a deeper understanding of the splitting of the personality, and psychoses too. I owe my technical advances to what my patients tell me about their own resistance. (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921-1933, p. 103)

As recorded in the Clinical Diary (Ferenczi, 1932), one of these patients is Elizabeth Severn, as Ferenczi practices mutual analysis with her. They are also exploring Severn’s ‘telepathic healing’ (p. 158), with respect to the metaphysical (Fortune, 2002b). In the entry of 7 July 1932, Ferenczi writes about his work with Severn when interpreting a nightmare of hers,

this personality, shattered and made defenseless by suffering and poison, is attempting, over and over again but always unsuccessfully, to reassemble its various parts into a unit, that is, to understand the events taking place in and around her. But instead of understanding herself (realizing her own misery) she can only display in an indirect unconscious: she must concern herself with analogous mental states in others (the reason for her choice of career), perhaps in the secret hope that one day she will be understood by one of these sufferers. (Ferenczi, 1932, p. 158)

Such a description of Severn appears equally applicable to Ferenczi himself. Their mutual analysis, although declared by Ferenczi as not successful eventually, seems to suggest that Ferenczi also finds himself in Severn. He continues,

Her hypersensitivity – as says the association – goes so far that she can send and receive “telephone messages” over immense distances. … As she links her own life history with that of the analyst, she suspects that even as a child she found the analyst, who is subject to similar suffering, “over a long distance” by means of telepathy, and after some forty years of aimless wandering has now also sought him out. However, the obstacles and amnesia in the analyst himself have delayed the emergence of an understanding (in the analyst; see her complaints about my erroneous judgments), and only now, as I begin to realize my mistakes and recognize and exonerate her as an innocent and well-intentioned person … , are we approaching the possibility of fitting the fragments of her personality together and of enabling her, not only indirectly but also directly, to recognize and remember the actual fact and the causes of this
disintegration. Until now, she could read (know) about her own circumstances only in mirror-writing, that is, in the reflection of the analogous sufferings of others. Now, however, she has found someone who can show her, in a, for her, convincing manner, that what she has uncovered about the analyst she must acknowledge as a distant reflection of her own sufferings.’ (ibid., pp. 158-159)

The Severn–Ferenczi relationship is indeed reminiscent of the one of Ferenczi-Freud, as rooted in their ‘telepathic’ or introjective issues represented in the Seidler episode, although Ferenczi may not yet have the same insight for himself as he has uncovered for Severn. Introjecting his patients, Ferenczi finds more about himself. That Ferenczi’s has introjected Freud’s unconscious, and hence guilt, appears more probable in light of these.

So, beginning with his imagination, as disciplined by Freud, Ferenczi’s flying past the unconscious and landing onto the ‘metaphysical’ in his patients’ material, suggest that he has managed to go beyond the dyad with Freud, and even beyond that with Groddeck, and reached the point where telepathy, or the ‘so-called metaphysical’, appears, or actually re-appears as Ferenczi has left behind the issue of telepathy between himself and Freud ever since the Seidler episode in 1909. Their issue of telepathy is deeply reverberating within the unconscious – and secrets - of both Freud and Ferenczi that exemplifies introjection between them. As noted in Chapter 9, this episode shows that the internal boundary between Freud and Ferenczi could be permeable that allows unconscious material to pass through in between, via the medium Seidler.

Ferenczi (1929) speculates on the profound impact of trauma on the personality, evoking, for the first time, the notion of teratoma, for it is no mere poetic license to compare the mind of the neurotic to a double malformation, something like the so-called teratoma which harbours in a hidden part of its body fragments of a twin-being which has never developed. No reasonable person would refuse to surrender such a teratoma to the surgeon’s knife, if the existence of the whole individual
were threatened.’ (p. 123)

In the cases of severe infantile trauma that he has treated, Ferenczi finds that
the greater part of the personality becomes, as it were, a *teratoma*, the task
of adaptation to reality being shouldered by the fragment of personality
which has been spared. Such persons have actually remained almost
entirely at the child-level, and for them the usual methods of analytical
therapy are not enough. (ibid., p. 124)

Stanton (1990), with the assumption that Ferenczi derives his psychoanalytic
ideas from his life experience, locates teratoma in the psychoanalytic testing-space
between Ferenczi and Groddeck, that Ferenczi is trying to understand and treat his
trauma with Groddeck’s help, or even to remove his own ‘teratoma’ that is the
outcome of his trauma with Freud, in his therapy by Groddeck. Vida (2001) further
traces this concept from its medical origin, that teratoma is

the primordial germ cells in the embryo, which in the course of
development becomes displaced, sequestered and grotesquely overgrown;
they can never become the tissues they were meant to be. Their potential is
forever squandered. “Monsters” they may be; “doubles” they may seem;
but they are utterly non-viable. (p. 235)

Yet, Ferenczi, with his introjection of Freud, ever since the beginning of his
psychoanalytic life in 1908, and especially after the dream analysis in their voyage
in the America trip in 1909, such a teratoma remains with him as a ‘non-viable’ but
un-removable entity inside. On 20 March 1933, already in a feeble state, and about
two months before his death, Ferenczi writes to Groddeck, which turns out to be the
last letter. Curiously, this letter is mostly about Freud. The beginning of this letter is
reminiscent of the theme of salvation in the Christmas Day letter written to
Groddeck in 1921, as well as a hint at the shared unconscious between Freud and
Ferenczi – with the corresponding guilt,

It seems that one cannot sin and go unpunished, at least of all for years on
end. My indisposition in Baden-Baden was the beginning of an extremely
dangerous anaemia which almost struck me down in France, so that I just
managed to drag myself home - prematurely’ (Ferenczi & Groddeck,
Soon before his very last visit to Freud in Vienna in August 1932, Ferenczi writes to Freud, ‘I don’t think I am doing useless work if I continue my present manner of working for a time.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1920-1933, p. 435). Subsequently, he goes to Vienna to read to Freud his Wiesbaden Congress paper of Confusion of Tongues between Adults and the Child (Ferenczi, 1933), his ‘swan song’ (Haynal, 1997, p. 438) and ‘spiritual testament’ (ibid., p. 443), which Freud disapproved of. Freud’s rejection rendered Ferenczi very depressed. After the Congress, Ferenczi visits Groddeck in Baden-Baden, and then returns to Budapest via France. He blames Freud for his health deterioration,

The underlying psychological reason for this decline was due, apart from sheer exhaustion, to my disappointment in Freud, about which you also know. We have stopped corresponding for the time being …’ (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921-1933, p. 105)

Ferenczi sees his serious illness as a punishment for his sins, and yet Freud is also a part of the protagonist for the ‘sins’. Ferenczi’s final paper is well-known for its ‘subversive’ power in overturning Freud’s well-established oedipal theory and infantile sexuality, as it re-emphasizes the salience of trauma in the genesis of severe neurosis or character deformation, as well as the different technique in treatment. It is in direct contrast to the Freudian notion of intrapsychic phantasy as the origin of neurosis. Ferenczi’s ‘subversion’, at the final phase of his life, can also be read in the context of his shared unconscious with Freud, or the product of their mutual introjection, that Ferenczi’s attempt at ‘publication’ is also one of ‘publicising’ the long-held secret that can be traced to Ferenczi’s living Freud’s unconscious via introjection. Nevertheless, in private, in his Clinical Diary, Ferenczi still upholds infantile sexuality even as late as 5 Apr 1932: the ‘fact that infantile sexuality exists obviously remains undisputed’ (Ferenczi, 1932, p. 79). For Ferenczi, Freud’s
‘sins’ may not be just the refusal to shake hands with him, but his refusal to acknowledge the reality of child sexual abuse and its genesis of trauma, as what Ferenczi writes about the Adult’s language of passion as contrast with the Child’s language of tenderness when it comes to Adult’s imposition and overwhelming of the Child with his own sexuality, forcing the Child to introject the Adult’s guilt and identify with the aggressor. More importantly, Freud rejects Ferenczi’s technical measure, notably relaxation and breach of neutrality, used in pursuit of the reality of infantile trauma (Hoffer, 2010). Freud’s refusal to shake hands with Ferenczi exemplifies the gap between Freud—the-adult and Ferenczi—the-child, one that renders the Child to be on his own, suffering with the introjected material from the Adult. Furthermore, such refusal also signifies Freud’s refusal to have any physical contact with Ferenczi’s body, an entity that is already embodied with the damage (illness) of the introjected unconscious of Freud, or of shared psyche in the Freud-Ferenczi dyad. That Ferenczi is returning to this dyad in his final days, by telling Groddeck, once his ideal analytic partner, may indicate Ferenczi’s attempt to return to Groddeck as his final anchor, a more stable one, for depositing himself, for the last time,

I admire your stamina and your enthusiasm not to have given up, despite illness and difficulties. … I am beginning to think that your strength of mind will surmount all difficulties. … this is the first letter in a long time to put me in touch with the outside world, which is no doubt a sign of our indestructible friendship, …’ (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921–1933, pp. 105–106)

Ferenczi dies at 2:30pm, 22 May 1933. The cause of death is pernicious anaemia, an illness that is triggered by the body’s own immune system destroying the parietal cells in the stomach. As parietal cells are responsible for making intrinsic factor that help the body to absorb vitamin B12 in the intestine, the loss of such cells eventually leads to severe deficiency of Vitamin B12 that underlie pernicious
anaemia. Here, we have a parallel case in Ferenczi’s own psyche too. In introjecting Freud, Ferenczi’s defence mechanism, once trying to attack or ‘murder’ the introjects, ends up becoming self-destructive, as the merging with Freud is not totally reversible. Even with Groddeck’s maternal pull and womb-like nursing, Ferenczi cannot totally split himself off from the dyad with Freud. Falzeder (1997), analyzing the immense transference neurosis Ferenczi developed towards Freud that Freud failed to deal with, concluded that ‘the representative of him in Ferenczi remained to be a hardly digested “introjects”’ (p. 425). Rachman (1999) believes that Ferenczi dies ‘physically of pernicious anemia, emotionally of a broken heart’ (p. 160). Plausible as it seems, Freud’s rejection breaks Ferenczi’s heart. Yet, what really ‘kills’ may be Ferenczi’s inability to rid himself of Freud. So, when Ferenczi dies, his Freud also dies with him. It may not be coincidental that Ferenczi dies at almost 60, which is closer to the age that Freud once believed he himself was to die. Freud has a superstitious belief that he will die at 61 or 62 (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 219). It turns out that Freud dies in 1939 at age 83 instead. The possibility that Ferenczi introjecting Freud’s unconscious has another echo here.

Concluding his experience with Freud, in the very final entry of his Clinical Diary on 2 October 1932, Ferenczi writes with much pain,

The insight this experience has helped me to attain is that I was brave (and productive) only as long as I (unconsciously) relied for support on another person, that is, I had never really become “grown up”. Scientific achievements, marriage, battles with formidable colleagues – all this was possible only under the protection of the idea that in all circumstances I can count on the father-surrogate. Are the “identification” with the higher power, the most sudden “formation of the superego,” the support that once preserved me from final disintegration? Is the only possibility for my continued existence the renunciation of the largest part of one’s own self, in order to carry out the will of that higher power to the end (as though it were my own)? (Ferenczi, 1932, p. 212)

Citing the parallel case with his terminal illness, Ferenczi continues,
And now, just as I must build new red corpuscles, must I (if I can) create a new basis for my personality, if I have to abandon as false and untrustworthy the one I have had up to now? Is the choice here one between dying and “rearranging myself” – at this at the age of fifty-nine? (ibid., p. 212)

Hence, Ferenczi is still unable to ‘eject’, let alone ‘digest’, the Freud that he has introjected, a superego-introject, in his identification with the aggressor (Ferenczi, 1932). Langan (2010) argues that Ferenczi ‘reels from the impact of the realization that over his lifetime he has not truly been himself because he has relied for illusory support on his father-surrogate, Freud.’ (p. 164). Ferenczi is suffering psychologically and somatically, as what Dupont (2002) concludes from her reading of the Clinical Diary, that the impossibility of psychoanalysis for Ferenczi leads him ‘into those regions of suffering and despair to which the Diary testifies, and from which he was unable to escape alive’ (p. xxvii). This thesis shows, however, his writings on Introjection - and his letters - become live testimony of such an engrossing introjective journey.
Chapter 14

Conclusion

ffytche (2014) raises the challenge that, even with the commitment of contemporary historians, ‘what, or how, a psychoanalytic history could be today remains a conundrum’ (p. 275), given a lack of ‘the larger vision of what it could produce’ (p. 273). Nonetheless, in addition to the large, we need something ‘small’ too: a very detailed vision of the micro world of historical moves. In this thesis, I regard a History of Psychoanalysis, at least that of Ferenczi, as also about an evolution or progression, and indeed progress itself from the perspective of posterity, ever since its inception with respect to the term psycho-analysis in 1896 and Ferenczi’s soon coming into the historical scene twelve years later in 1908. Yet, with Ferenczi’s introjective character, we have an even earlier beginning. I have tried to show how such an evolution, as with all other kinds of evolutions, is moving onwards gradually, as evidenced in the lives, or ‘the history of everyday life’ (Phillips, 2008, p. 60), of the psychoanalytic forerunners. Arguably, it is in the summation of such daily lives that we have the mega data bank for writing such a history. By daily lives, I refer to their lived experience, as captured in their relationship, or their interaction. What makes their daily lives worth studying in detail is probably a discovery of how they have been making use of such experience in the making of their theory. They corroborate, distill, express, and even put together the experience into theory, the process of which is also like an evolution, in that it is gradual, or even slow, and yet lacking a conscious macro-plan from the beginning. That is to say, I want to show in this thesis that psychoanalysis progresses through ‘translation’ of experience into theory. This translation, as with progress or with evolution, is not a conscious or premeditated act, nor is it a single act that is
done once and for all. It also shares the goal of evolution, viz., progression and perpetuation of psychoanalytic ideas, and psychoanalysis itself. Most importantly, the theory — including the practice of psychoanalysis itself as an enactment or operationalization of a theory - has its own additional contribution to human experience and knowledge, or else it may become something like a piece of literature or narratives only. Ferenczi’s writings about *Introjection* are a testimony to such a value of theoretical knowledge.

In this thesis, I have chosen Ferenczi because of his relational and character style. I set out to examine such an evolution process as exemplified in Ferenczi’s idea of *Introjection*, i.e., how he translates his experience into this idea. My hypothesis is: whether and how Ferenczi lives *Introjection* before, during and even after he writes about it, analyzing his relationship with Freud. Ferenczi lives psychoanalysis in that he pursues his personal and professional relationship in such intensity that he has to involve others so passionately and intimately and yet he often evokes or even provokes their resistance or distancing. However, he articulates his experience in his theory and hence makes important contributions to psychoanalysis. This pattern is most visible in the case of introjection since Ferenczi is so eager, or even hungry, to incorporate, or introject others.

Obviously, I cannot analyze Ferenczi in vivo. I do not have an analytic relationship with him that entails his transference to me as the basis for my analysis or interpretation. However, I have devised a second-best solution that is to examine Ferenczi’s interaction with Freud through their extensive correspondence. I have done it in such minute detail that I have almost revived Ferenczi’s relationships, as it were, ‘expanding and nuancing’ (Cheng, 2009, p. 95) past historical studies. Also, I have added a chronological dimension in the investigation as I map out the
connection between the development of his relationship to that of his idea of Introjection. Before I did all these, methodologically and conceptually, I have gone into the once troubled waters of psychohistory and psychobiography, and notably the corresponding critical literature against them. I have confronted, addressed, and may have even settled the criticisms of subjectivity, reductionism, lack of transference of the historical subject to the psychobiographer, and the unchecked counter-transference of the psychobiographer to the historical subject. I have managed to come up with a necessary methodology of an exceptionally close reading of historical letters, after reviewing and processing some key studies using similar methodology that justifies my own. I have overcome the problems of psychobiography in this thesis by such a methodology, a methodology that brings relationship cum its hidden genesis of theory, to light, and to life as well. I have also incorporated the extensive secondary literature into my analysis at every stage. Such an approach may not be applicable to all cases in this history of psychoanalysis. Yet, the availability of the far-reaching, thorough, experiential and even ‘theoretical’ correspondence between Ferenczi and Freud as the primary source material for analysis, has made it possible for me to pursue this methodology in the case of Introjection, a signature idea of Ferenczi. This methodology might not be applicable in every case, but that would be because there are insufficient historical raw material, and not because the method is flawed.

Ferenczi is a ‘psychoanalyst of unsurpassed importance to contemporary theory and practice’ (Rudnytsky, 2014, p. xiii). What have been more controversial are his once subversive thinking - subversive to the psychoanalytic establishment of course - and even his character, which have been once subjected to dispute and marginalization. Most of the recent research on Ferenczi, which aims at restoring
Ferenczi to his deserved place in psychoanalysis, and in the case of, say, Mészáros (2014) who ‘neither glorifies nor vilifies’ (Haynal, 2014, p. xviii) Ferenczi, investigates his life and ideas in parallel, and they lack a chronological perspective. Also, Ferenczi does not differentiate between his life and work, i.e., between his life and psychoanalysis, or at least his own version of psychoanalysis. He simply sees them as identical with each other. What is needed in the historical investigation is whether and how his psychoanalytic ideas evolve from – and echo with - his life, especially his relationship with Freud. This thesis aims to fill up this gap in knowledge.

Amongst Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic ideas, Introduction is chosen because of its historical and psychoanalytic significance. It is Ferenczi’s first coined psychoanalytic term, as contrast to Freud’s projection, from which Ferenczi furthers his creativity in his psychoanalytic career. I have reviewed Ferenczi’s 16 papers on Introduction. I find that Ferenczi sets the basic definition of introjection as a contrast to projection, as the taking into the ego a part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies, as an extension of the ego, as part of the mechanism of self-love, which later evolves to that of object-love, as a pure subjective mechanism to one that is moving out to the reality, and as an inseparable mechanism that exist side-by-side with projection that constitutes a more mature form of reality contact, and as the formation of superego and the pathological development as a result of introjection of the aggressor’s guilt in child abuse. The term Introduction goes through changes and gets richer in meaning. This is consistent with Ferenczi’s own development in psychoanalysis and his relationship with Freud. He seems to be holding onto his earliest definition as an axis or core while covering diverse topics, as revolving around this core. It is as if Ferenczi himself were a
living exemplar of *Introjection*.

Throughout the thesis, my definition of introjection as illustrated in my various description of or allusion to introjection, as summarized below, inevitably follows from Ferenczi’s. Yet, it would need some clarification here in order that its various facets do not appear to be different from one another. For example, introjection as identification with an object refers to Ferenczi (1909), who states that the neurotic’s objects are for him to identify with, and to draw into his ego, i.e., to introject. Obviously, the use of the word ‘identify’ is to be historically anchored to its meaning in Ferenczi’s days, instead of taking its contemporary meaning for granted. 

Introjection as allowing oneself to be taken over by the other refers to Ferenczi (1922a), in that the qualities of the external objects are taken over and assigned to the ego. As a result, a connection between the self and the world is established. Introjection as the other’s proxy corresponds to Ferenczi (1932)’s idea of introjection of the aggressor to the extent that the self is almost annihilated, functioning like an automaton, as it were. Demanding the physical presence of the other is about Ferenczi’s (1919) writing, that introjection necessitates the objective presence of the object, in addition to mere subjective mechanism as stated in the previous papers. Eating up or spitting out the object refers to Ferenczi’s (1909) very first definition of introjection as drawing in of parts of the world, and spitting out as the projection of unwanted feelings onto the outside world. By then, Ferenczi introduces introjection as an opposite or mirror image to projection. Both symbolic impregnation by the other and Plagiarism refer to Ferenczi’s (1922a) enrichment of the concept of introjection, that qualities of the external objects are taken over and assigned to the ego, hence building a connection between the self and the outside world. Yet, the former involves more transformation of the ego as a result of the
‘impregnation’. To be affected or influenced by the other corresponds to Ferenczi (1919) who argues that introjection can lead to more ego control over the external world, as noted in human’s use of the stick and hammer, real objects in the real world, to exert his influence there. It adds more reality or objective element to the definition. Loving refers to Ferenczi (1922b) in that what one loves becomes absorbed or introjected into one’s ego. Opening up onself to the other is about Ferenczi (1912) who states that ‘solipsism’ as an extreme form of introjection of pulling in the whole world into the ego. In opening up onself completely, in the form of total honesty, one is introjecting almost the whole world. Introjection as transference is about Ferenczi’s (1912) definition of introjection in that the neurotic’s hyper-readiness to transference to an object is indeed an unconscious magnification of his addiction to introjection. Introjection as Ferenczi’s demand for an exclusive and dependent relationship with Freud refers to Ferenczi’s (1909) definition of introjection in that ‘neurotic helps himself by taking into the ego as large as possible a part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies’ (p. 47), given that Ferenczi almost treats Freud as his total world in his psychoanalytic life. Taking as much of Freud as possible necessitates an exclusive and inter-dependent relationship with him.

The use of psycho-biographical methodology, indeed one that reverse the process of creation of psychoanalytic ideas, by going from ideas to life, is found to be applicable to this thesis, in that a psychoanalytic reading of the correspondence and related historical material may provide evidence for the hypotheses, as well as some fresh perspectives for further historical understanding.

I have found that, mapping his relationship with Freud from 1908 to 1921 and then with Groddeck coming in as a Freud-replacement in 1921, with his 16 papers
on *Introjection*, Ferenczi has indeed lived, more or less unconsciously, with these key psychoanalytic partners, viz., merging and incorporation. He has also articulated this concept in his writings during and after such experience as noted below.

Ferenczi’s introjection with Freud – and vice versa - is particularly engrossing, with respect to the intensity and the long-term aftermath of the merging and shared unconscious. That Ferenczi’s craving for and taking in the whole Freud in an exclusive relationship is clear in his very first letter to Freud on 18 January 1908, in which he attempts to replace Philipp Stein, the Hungarian physician who has led him to Freud. Freud sets clear and firm boundary at the very beginning but Ferenczi has succeeded in joining his family vacation some months after their first acquaintance in 1908. These dynamics are visible in Ferenczi’s (1909) definition of introjection as idenfitication, drawing in a large part of the outer world to form inner objects and to mitigate poignancy, as well as lavishing of affect. With their fateful Journey to America in 1909 and Jung’s catalytic role of almost succeeding in drawing from Freud the disclosure of his disturbing dreams about Minna and Martha, with Ferenczi as the silent witness, Ferenczi’s introjection of Freud’s unconscious, forming their shared *ménage à trois* through which he bears Freud’s secret or fantasy\(^{164}\). In Ferenczi’s (1912) exposition of introjection, he refines the definition by narrowing the drawing in of a large part of the outer world to the including of the objects that one loves, i.e., taking loved objects into one’s ego. This bears resemblance to Ferenczi’s restricting his introjection of Freud to the *ménage à trois*. Ferenczi being Freud’s ‘secret caretaker’ (Kerr, 2003, p. 156) becomes more prominent and engrossing and reaches its first pinnacle in the Seidler Episode in 1909, soon after they have just finished the America trip. Their mutually constructed case, ‘Prof. Philipps’, for testing Seidler’s telepathic power, is illustrating a enriched
meaning of introjection, as Ferenczi’s (1915) remarks that, things once introjected, or psychically assimilated, become narcissistically invested with libido. Ferenczi’s share of the unconscious meaning of the name is foretelling his version of ménage à trois that is to come. Freud is always wary of Ferenczi’s hunger to assimilate him, and his growing fear of Ferenczi’s ability to ingest his work and to merge with him is well illustrated in the Palermo Episode in 1910. This is reminiscent of Ferenczi’s further adding in 1919 that introjection involves extension to the real world, instead of being confined to one’s subjective world. On the other hand, Figlio (2007) has pointed out that Freud has fear of being ingested in general, regarding Freud’s uncanny insight of discovering himself – and his theories of the unconscious psychic mechanism - in the writing of Schnitzler\textsuperscript{165}, a famous writer and playwright in Vienna: ‘[i]n that emotional immediacy, he recognized his theories as experiential realities’ (p. 37, n. 3).

Ferenczi then learns to back off a little then but still he is essentially, or maybe mistakenly, using his own problem (the Elma Episode) of the triangular relationship with Gizella and Elma as the raw material to replace Freud’s corresponding problem of the triangular relationship that involves Martha and Minna. In Ferenczi’s writing on introjection, this corresponds to another new meaning of introjection as Ferenczi (1922b) remarks that the in absorption of the the loved object into the ego, one also subjectivizes objective perception. Ferenczi’s own Elma episode is his own subjective version of the objective reality of Freud’s problems with Martha and Minna. Also, it is Ferenczi’s diverted yet botched attempt at solving their introjection problems, that is to say, to eventually rid himself of Freud’s unconscious that he has introjected in their trip to America. At the same time, it is also an attempt at healing Freud his analyst. Indeed, Groddeck (1923), in The Book of the It, has first
raised this possibility of ‘the patient’s functioning as therapist to the doctor’ (Searles, 1975, p. 446). Searles regards Groddeck as ‘a pioneer of high courage in his reporting’ (ibid., p. 446). Groddeck writes about a patient whose childlike demeanor towards him forced him to take up the mother’s role. He finds within himself ‘mother-virtues’ evoked that dictates his therapy. Later he has a surprising insight,

I was confronted by the strange fact that I was not treating the patient, but that the patient was treating me, … It was no longer important to give him instructions, to prescribe for him what I considered right, but to change in such a way that he could use me.’ (Groddeck, 1923, pp. 262-263)

Vida (2005), following upon Ferenczi’s identity as the wise baby, observes that

the “wise baby”, by virtue of his unique endowment, has the ability to read not only his own unconscious but the unconscious of adults and innocently believes that adults will appreciate the information. When adults do not, it is traumatizing. (p. 8)

Furthermore, Hoffer (1993) sees Ferenczi as the mother of psychoanalysis while Freud is the father. He argues that the controversy between Freud and Ferenczi, leading to a disavowal of Ferenczi, is a trauma to the psychoanalytic family. In the light of Ferenczi’s introjecting Freud’s unconscious, disavowal of Ferenczi is equivalent to a collective repression of Freud’s unconscious that Ferenczi bears. This disavowal constitutes a collective trauma. Bonomi (1996) argues that Ferenczi takes over from Freud emotional heritage and Ferenczi goes through such emotional process himself and ends up in his ideas about trauma. In this thesis, Ferenczi’s contribution to psychoanalysis, with respect to his contemporary significance in the theory of trauma, has its origin in the personal price that he has inadvertantly paid during his experiencing of such a trauma that involves introjection of Freud. Given Ferenczi’s merging of life with psychoanalysis, such a cost in creativity seems inevitable. Bonomi writes that Freud is ‘a person off such a volcanic nature that proximity to him was not only intellectually demanding, but also emotionally
dangerous’ (p. 168), and such ‘danger’ is first experienced by Jung, who cannot stand it, and then by Ferenczi. Focusing on Freud’s death anxiety, Bonomi (2012) further maintains that Ferenczi ‘introjected significant pieces of Freud’s unconscious mind’ (p. 240), as Ferenczi, after witnessing Freud’s first fainting in front of Jung, is able to predict his second fainting. Bonomi concludes that Ferenczi’s re-discovery of trauma has a resonance within Freud that has to be repressed.

After the failed Elma episode, Ferenczi presses for an analysis proper with Freud, to solve their introjection problem up front and direct. It takes place in three segments, once in 1914 and twice in 1916. Ferenczi’s use of his own dream to analyze Freud’s in the voyage in America in 1909 corresponds to another new element of introjection which Ferenczi (1922a) articulates, that the qualities of the object are taken over and assigned to the ego, as introjected or incorporated in an imagined way, thus forming a connection between the self and the outer world. In view of the above exposition of the patient healing the analyst, however, Ferenczi’s seeking of analysis from Freud could also be read as his attempt to heal Freud too. In fact, after Freud has been diagnosed of jaw cancer in 1923 and the subsequent series of painful surgeries and heart problems, Ferenczi has indeed offered to go to Vienna to analyze Freud. Ferenczi writes to Freud on 26 February 1926, with a tone and confidence indeed, as a Freud’s analyst,

> Perhaps this is the occasion on which I can say to you that I find it actually tragic that you, who endowed the world with psychoanalysis, find it so difficult to be – indeed, are not at all – in a position to entrust yourself to anyone. – If your heart ailments continue, and if the medications and diet don’t help, then I will come to you for a few months and place myself at your disposal as an analyst – naturally: if you don’t throw me out.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1920-1933, p. 250)

Freud does not throw Ferenczi out, but he declines his ‘touching suggestion’ (ibid., p. 252), adding that he doubts whether dying, even with its ‘psychic roots’,
can be ‘mastered through analysis’ (p. 252). Without any further chance of analysis proper, by or on Freud, Ferenczi, who ‘knew Freud more deeply than anyone else in the psychoanalytic world’ (Rudnytsky, 2014a, p. 283), can only continue bearing Freud’s unconscious, maybe until either one of them is to die first, so that each may have a chance to get out of the other’s mind, or to get the other out of his mind167.

Back to 1916, the failure of their analyses intensifies Freud’s eagerness to push Ferenczi away by proposing collaboration in the ‘Lamarckian Project’, a bait for Ferenczi indeed but it does not work. Then Freud draws in Groddeck as a replacement in 1917. Ferenczi ends up accepting Freud’s ‘recommendation’ of Groddeck as a replacement figure. In 1932, Ferenczi is more secluded with his patients as he records the clinical findings in his Clinical Diary. His final letters to Groddeck show that he is gaining more confidence and certainty in his psychoanalytic viewpoint.

However, Freud’s final rejection of Ferenczi in their fateful final meeting in Vienna before the Wiesbaden Congress in September 1932, triggers Ferenczi’s depression, and with it comes his terminal illness of pernicious anaemia. Ferenczi’s final view on *The Confusion of Tongues between the Adults and the Child* in Child sexual abuse well summarizes his relationship with Freud, with respect to his introjecting Freud’s unconscious, as a identification with the aggressor, and his living it – their shared *ménage à trois* - in his own ordeal in marriage and love life.

This conceptualization about this paper is a prime exemplar of my hypothesis of life as the precursor of theory, as Ferenczi translates, or even transforms, his unconscious introjective experience with Freud into a theory of introjection. Grosskurth (1998) notes a fascination in the history of psychoanalysis, viz., ‘who analyzed whom’ in that ‘the analysand will inevitably absorb the ideological beliefs
of his analyst’ (p. 95). Yet, in the case of Ferenczi, it is more than mere belief. It is also Freud’s fantasy or secret that he has absorbed or introjected, as originating from Jung’s truncated analysis of Freud’s dream in their America Journey in 1909 with Ferenczi as the silent witness. Such introjected unconscious has dictated his conscious and unconscious life. Grosskurth concludes that

[t]he dynasty in the analytical world is not a series of begetting, but the passing down of beliefs through the instrumentality of being privy to the secrets of someone else’s soul (ibid., p. 95).

Nevertheless, as for Ferenczi and Freud, their relationship informs us more of the bi-directionality of the ‘privy to the secrets’, or even the confusion of to whom the ‘secret’ belongs, as their mutual introjection is engrossing, and of course, given his introjective character, Ferenczi, ‘utterly devoted to Freud, yet he long nursed feelings of deep resentment towards his mentor’ (Grosskurth, 2001, p. 379), has inevitably bore Freud’s secrets or fantasy. Now Ferenczi has been using his own unconscious and conscious life as Freud’s proxy. This is the price paid, but the goods delivered are Ferenczi’s write-up of Introjection in his papers. Ferenczi’s contribution to psychoanalysis, namely the idea of introjection, has its hidden price that Ferenczi has paid.

Ferenczi’s final paper and urge for its publication may be his final unconscious attempt to ‘publicize’ the ‘secret’ or fantasy that he has long held for the Master by having lived it with his own body and mind, and hence it maybe indistinguishable as to whose ‘secret’ or fantasy it belongs at the end of the day. Freud’s prohibition of the paper’s publication, on the other hand, may be his final and even successful attempt at getting himself out of Ferenczi’s mind. Freud’s refusal sends Ferenczi into depression, and as Ferenczi believes, somatizes it into pernicious anaemia, an illness that is to kill him months later. When Ferenczi dies, a Freud that is inside Ferenczi
also dies with him. Paradoxically, Freud gets out of Ferenczi by being annihilated. Anyhow, on Ferenczi’s side, as he dies, his own introjection problem is solved. In his final entry to the Clinical Diary on 2 October 1932, Ferenczi associates his fatal illness to his reaction to the split with Freud, his ‘higher power’,

"The blood-crisis arose when I realized that not only can I not rely on the protection of a “higher power” but on the contrary I shall be trampled under foot by this indifferent power as soon as I go on my own way and not his. (Ferenczi, 1932, p. 257)"

Groddeck is Ferenczi’s final station in that Groddeck has indeed managed to contain and nurture Ferenczi’s unconscious life, as exemplified in his treatment of Ferenczi’s psychological and somatic ailment. On the other hand, Ferenczi also introjects Groddeck regarding the latter’s ideas and nourishment. In a way, the introjection can be mutual, just as in the case of Freud with Ferenczi. In his final letter to Groddeck, Ferenczi tries to return, anchor and deposit himself in Groddeck, or maybe his ‘It’, the fetus’ Universe that would be Ferenczi’s place of final peace, the ‘womb’, Ferenczi hopes, that could introject him for good.

The legacy of Ferenczi in Freud and Groddeck plants the seeds for further evolution of Ferenczi’s ideas, as noted from the contemporary development and trend about psychoanalysis. Ferenczi’s death in 1933 is at once an end and a beginning of what psychoanalysis is about: the foray into the unconscious via introjective relationships that perpetuate themselves, generation after generation. If, ‘[f]or Freud, psychoanalysis was Seelenkunde – the study of the soul’ (Figlio, 1984, p. 113), then, for Ferenczi, psychoanalysis would be the introjection of souls, the souls in the external world, as it were, ‘by taking into the ego as large as possible a part of the outer world, making it the object of unconscious phantasies’ (Ferenczi, 1909, p. 47). Thurschwell (1999) maintains that Ferenczi introjects psychoanalysis as well,
Undoubtedly, Ferenczi did and lived psychoanalysis. By theorizing and acting out his own spectacular transmissions and binding identifications, one might even say, he *swallowed it whole*. (p. 173, my italics)

In ‘swallowing it whole’, Ferenczi may even *become* psychoanalysis, as he does it ‘as it is a living pulsation’ (Chertok & Stengers, 1992, cited in Thurschwell, 1999, p. 173). One would even argue that Ferenczi has inadvertently transformed himself from a historical figure to a psychoanalytic seed, as it were, that can plant itself into any willing heart open to introjection that he writes and lives. This is echoed by Figlio (2007)’s observation of Robert Musil’s new naturalism that reaches to a depth of experience in which ‘the individual dissolves into ideas, impersonal forces that intersected in individuals and moved them’ (p. 29). As such, Ferenczi is not childless. Instead, he has a lot of ‘children’ by whom Ferenczi is also survived. These ‘Ferenczi children’ live on his legacy. If there is a Groddeckian ‘It’ within the ‘Universe’ of the History of Psychoanalysis, Ferenczi may be one candidate. In such a case, the problem of merging, plagiarism, introjection and confusion of identities or tongues, or even the speculations about Minna, may no longer matter that much, although they are necessary historical ‘problems’. What matters more is the perpetuation of psychoanalytic ideas, the essence of the psychoanalytic movement, of which individual minds and bodies are simply media as such, just like biological perpetuation of a species in the grand history of evolution, in which individuals can be conceived simply as bundles of genes and what goes on is the transmission and proliferation of genetic information with the collective aim of progress. Ferenczi once envisions the power of psychoanalysis,

> Psychoanalysis – once unleashed – is like energy, it cannot be destroyed. It will not leave people in peace until they come to terms with it. It is no use to struggle or resist. (Ferenczi & Jones, 1911-1933, p. 3)

A History of Ferenczi could also be conceived similarly, ‘to infiltrate the field
of psychoanalysis in the absence of a school that specifically invoked his name’ (Haynal, 2002, p. 126) and yet the perpetuation constitutes the progress of psychoanalysis. Historically, fragmentation from within psychoanalysis (the various schools) and marginalization by other disciplines such as psychiatry and clinical psychology have indicated urgency for a ‘cohesive discipline with the specialized knowledge that is the hallmark of any profession’ (Stepansky, 2009, p. 216), if psychoanalysis is to move forward. Such cohesion and hence perpetuation become more possible because of the commonality that humanity share with Ferenczi, or vice versa. Ferenczi (1932a), in integrating ‘knowledge about the Universe’, proposes a principle of universality as “only groups, only world-total, only associations exist; individuals are ‘unreal’” (p. 252). Similarly, Ludmer (1998) remarks that in the ‘universals behind [Ferenczi’s] individual experience’ (p. 235) there is something that every analyst of any generation would compare and reflect on the particulars of his own experience and to search for the universals that transcend his own life and times as well as those of Sándor Ferenczi (ibid., p. 238).

Borgogno (2012) conceives Ferenczi as ‘a symbol of “otherness” in the history of psychoanalysis’ (p. 249). By “otherness”, he means an internal one because Ferenczi, from the very beginning, has ‘contributed from inside psychoanalysis’ (ibid., p. 249). I would also add that it is also from the ‘inside’ of each analyst, Freud included of course, that Ferenczi is contributing. If, as Phillips (2014) wryly points out, ‘the practice of psychoanalysis was, Freud increasingly discovered, difficult to find analogies for’ (p. 4), then the Universals behind Ferenczi’s experience may be a suitable metaphor. Without ever the need for a Ferenczian School of thought, such a History of Ferenczi may be what he wants his psychoanalytic posterity to learn about psychoanalysis: Live it and psychoanalysis will thrive and evolve. In one’s
attempt to restore Ferenczi’s position within psychoanalysis, one may land onto the possibility that Ferenczi is not just a ‘mother of psychoanalysis’ (Hoffer, 1993), but indeed a fertile, perpetual and even nameless mother as well, a mother who generates and whose living of psychoanalysis becomes an exemplar for her offsprings.

As for some other research that may further follow from this one, one would consider Ferenczi’s relationship with other significant figures that could be of similar importance to the germination of Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic thinking. For example, the Hungarian doctor, Miksa Schachter (1859-1917), who was the owner, director and editor of Gyógyászat (Therapy), the progressive Hungarian Medical Journal that published papers which were critical of the medical establishment. Ferenczi’s pre-analytic papers were mostly published there. It also became, at the beginning of Hungarian psychoanalysis, the main journal for publication of psychoanalysis (Mészáros 1993a). Schachter was a teacher, a close friend and a supporter of Ferenczi’s psychoanalytic endeavours and other themes, such as medical ethics. In 1898, Ferenczi was 25 and he just came back from medical training in Vienna, when he first knew Schachter who was 14 years older. Ferenczi recalled that Schachter gave him moral support and his ‘hospitable family’ offered him a ‘second home’ and that his friendship with Schachter was ‘truly a period that shaped [his] character’ (Ferenczi, 1917, re-published and translated posthumously in Ferenczi, 1993, p. 431). He sees Schachter with great talents and tough character. His relationship with Schachter was so unique that some colleagues called him the ‘Schachter-boy’ (ibid., p. 431). He even idealizes Schachter’s character as comparable to ‘a single piece of perfect marble free of fractures or faults’ (ibid., p. 431). Stepansky (1999) observes that Schachter was only ‘second to [Ferenczi’s]
father as a loved and revered model’ (p. 83). With Schachter, Ferenczi ‘developed an affection’ that was ‘similar in many ways to the one he would develop later with Freud.’ (Casonato, 1993, p. 738). Schachter also reinforced Ferenczi’s trait of rebellion against authority and acceptance of those with less authority. Inspired by Schachter, Ferenczi was more perseverant in finds new thinking and research, with more emotional investment in new ideas and more courage to admit his own mistakes (Mészáros 1993a). It would be worthwhile to see how Ferenczi lived Introjection in his relationship with Schachter. Furthermore, a more integrated biography of Groddeck would be another research worth pursuing in order to enrich the side of Groddeck’s story in his in-depth relationship with Ferenczi.

I also note that, rather unexpectedly, even after the death of Ferenczi, the story still lingers on a bit. On Freud’s side, his introjection problem might not have been really solved once and for all with Ferenczi’s death. It is Freud’s unconscious that is annihilated with Ferenczi’s death, but not the other way round because, after all, Ferenczi is survived by Freud, as it were. In the six years after Ferenczi’s death in 1933 and before his own death in 1939, Freud finally has the secure space to work on the after-effect of this introjective relationship. In a way, there is a Ferenczi that lives on in Freud after 1933 in that Freud starts to think more like Ferenczi (see Bonomi, 2013). Haynal (1993) documents that,

Many of Ferenczi’s notions and concepts reappear, often after an extended latency period, in works by Freud, mixed with Freud’s own thoughts – on homosexuality, paranoia, phylogenesis, trauma, transference and countertransference, development of the ego, psychoanalytic technique, parapsychology, and other topics. (p. xx)

Indeed the years after Ferenczi’s death are one such latency period, or even a more secluded one for Freud. It sounds like Freud has to get Ferenczi out of his mind, to the sufficient extent that it allows Freud to speak his thought. Figlio (2014)
points out that, in Money-Kyrle’s theory of interpretation, this is significant in the discourse about the transition from life to theory, because articulation of thought is then seen as projection of an internal object. The analyst projects the patient so as to talk about the patient coherently, or ‘reprojects the patient in the act of formulating his interpretation’ (Money-Kyrle, 1956, p. 364). This would be another worthwhile project possibly as a sequel to this thesis. Similarly, for Groddeck, he has one more year to go because he dies in 1934. The idea of a Ferenczi living on within Groddeck may also be researched in another project. Furthermore, Ferenczi’s introjective relationship with Groddeck that generates Ferenczi’s writing on introjection will be another worthwhile continuation to this thesis, which I attempted to deal with elsewhere (Chan, 2014a) because of the limitation of space in this thesis. Finally, other than Introjection, Ferenczi’s other ideas, such as countertransference, trauma and relaxation may also be researched along similar methodology of this thesis.

The weakness of my methodology is that, if verification from the subject of the analysis, viz., Ferenczi, is required, as in the case of an analysis proper between the analyst and the analysand, my hypothesis would remain unverifiable. Dupont (1997) observes that,

> To analyze a person of the present or of the past, in his absence and solely on the basis of his works and that which one can learn of him, may lead to a set of stimulating hypotheses. But while these may be credible, they remain unverifiable in the absence of any confirmation coming from the person concerned. It is the same with analyses that we devote to our psychoanalytic ancestors. (p. 201)

However, such intrinsic ‘shortcomings’ of psychobiography, with in vivo analytic sessions as the benchmark for a proper psychobiographical study, would do injustice to psychobiography itself, or to applied psychoanalysis in general. It also re-centres psychoanalysis back to the analytic sessions as the only viable and possible form of psychoanalytic knowledge, or as Lu (2013) queries, ‘whether
clinicians have a monopoly on understanding the unconscious’ (p. 416). Also, even with a live analysand on the couch, the outcome of the criteria of ‘verifiability’ would still depend very much on how the two protagonists conduct or co-construct their analysis.

Nevertheless, in my immersing into and surfacing from the letters, or even the minds of Ferenczi and Freud, I feel I have encountered and almost lived in some of the historic moments of this relationship, in its very subjectivities, as I co-construct mine with it by translating my reading experience – of the letters and of the theory - into this thesis. Hopefully, this is a thesis that offers a fresh and live understanding, or even a theory, of the making of a psychoanalytic idea, and that of an advancement of psychoanalytic knowledge.
Notes

1 The International Association for the History of Psychoanalysis was founded in Paris in 1985; the Symposium, “100 years of Psychoanalysis” took place in Geneva in 1993. From 1999 onwards, a new section, “History of Psychoanalysis” was included in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis. “Psychoanalysis and History”, a journal examining and strengthening the link between psychoanalysis and history, started her publication in 1998.

2 Interest in Ferenczi’s life and work was evident in the past decades. The Sandor Ferenczi Society, formed in Hungary in 1988, hosted an International Ferenczi Conference in Budapest in 1993 to celebrate an anniversary of Ferenczi’s birth [in 1873]. Altogether, 9 International Ferenczi Conferences were held: in New York, Sao Paolo, Madrid, Tel Aviv, Turin, Baden-Baden, Buenos Aires, and Budapest [see Bonomi & Borgogno (2014) for a complete listing of the Conferences]; the latest one was in Toronto, May 2015. The Society’s journal, Thalassa had its first issue published in 1990-91. In America, the Sandor Ferenczi Institute was founded by Arnold W. Rachman in 1993 in New York City, aiming at training and research on humanistic psychoanalysis from Ferenczian approach (Rachman, 1997). In the 1993 Geneva Symposium on 100 years of Psychoanalysis, Freud and his intimate Sandor Ferenczi was one of the two themes. CONFERENCEZI: Hungarian Psychoanalytic Ideas revisited took place in the London Freud Museum in Apr 2004. As for publications, The Clinical Diary of Sándor Ferenczi, edited by Dupont’s (1988a) and the 3-volume series: The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi, edited by Brabant, Falzeder & Giampieri-Deutsch (1993), Falzeder & Brabant (1996), and Falzeder & Brabant (2000) respectively, provides source material in the study of history of psychoanalysis. Other than the increase in number of papers on Ferenczi in psychoanalytic journals, e.g., a special issue, Psychoanalysis’ Favorite Son, devoted to Ferenczi, was published in the Psychoanalytic Inquiry in 1997 under the editorship of Arnold Rachman [see also Bonomi & Borgogno (2014) for a complete listing of the Special Issues]. Aron & Harris’s (1993) The Legacy of Sándor Ferenczi, Rudnytsky, Bókay & Giampieri-Deutsch’s (1996) Ferenczi’s Turn in Psychoanalysis, and Harris & Kuchuck (2015) The Legacy of Sándor Ferenczi: From Ghost to Ancestor provide key collections of clinical and history papers, with newly found historical data and re-positioning both Ferenczi and psychoanalysis. For Biographies on Ferenczi, see de Forest (1954), Lorand (1966), Brome (1967), Stanton (1990), Rouzen (1992), Rachman (1997), Haynal (1989, 1993b & 2002), and Haute & Geyskens (2004).

3 A recent biography of Freud by Makari (2008), that Haynal (2008) regarded as ‘neither an exaltation nor a depreciation of Freud’s achievement’ (p.1089), and ‘an important and timely book for the revision of our perspective on the history of psychoanalysis’ (p.1093), contains much previously unavailable information but tells the story more with Freud as the centre of reference.

4 Bókay (1998) noted that, ‘Psychoanalysis, for Ferenczi, is not a profession but a way of life, a radical new mutuality, a self-creation through dialogue. Its precondition is reciprocity, and its embodiment is transference and countertransference, the passions of hatred and love.’ (p. 195).

5 An event recalled by a Viennese analyst, Richard Sterba (1982), shows how Ferenczi’s charm, openness, and spontaneity bring fun to people around, ‘A very charming episode occurred in the late twenties after a society meeting in which Ferenczi had presented a paper. A group of us went with Ferenczi to a nightclub at which the famous American dancer Josephine Baker was performing. We all enjoyed the graceful, supple movement of her beautiful body and were enthusiastic about her performance. After her appearance on the
stage, Josephine Baker joined the audience. I have no idea what made her pick out Ferenczi for an enchanting little scene. She came to our table and in a most natural fashion sat on Ferenczi’s lap. She glided her hand through her own black hair, which was smoothly and tightly glued to her scalp by a heavy pomade. Then she stroked the bald center of Ferenczi’s head and, rubbing the pomade on his hairless scalp, said, “So, that will make your hair grow.” Ferenczi and our whole group thoroughly enjoyed this episode; Josephine Baker’s irresistible charm made inoffensively humorous what otherwise could have been considered an impudent transgression.’ (p.72). For a theoretical and historical analysis of Josephine Baker as an icon, see Cheng (2013).

6 From the gift of the Dionysian ring that Freud gave to Ferenczi on 25 May 1913 in the Secret Committee meeting, Emery (1995) surmises that Freud fantasized the fate of Ferenczi as Dionysus. Dionysus, the Greek god of wine, also a precocious child-god, was born again through the mask and of fire from his father Zeus. Emery believes that Ferenczi is destined to remain misunderstood, given his Dionysian fate.

7 The term, technique, according to Haynal (1997), as used in the early history of psychoanalysis, in the historical milieu of Vienna and Hungary, is not associated with the idea of technology as what it is today. It is more evocative of art: ‘The technique of psychoanalysis, then, is the art of psychoanalysis, as opposed to its theory.’ (p. 447, fn10)

8 For a complete reference list of these 16 papers and a bibliographical account of Ferenczi’s published works in general, see Appendix 1 and 2 respectively.

9 Soon after Ferenczi’s paper was published in the Jahrbuch, Freud wrote to him on 12 December 1909 on his first reaction to this new concept, ‘I have no doubt about the complete success of the whole thing, only I am unsure whether the term introjection will prove to be lasting.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 113)

10 Haynal (1997) observes that Ferenczi’s notion of transference is certainly different from Freud’s. Haynal believes that this paper and Ferenczi’s later ones in late 1920s would make him the ‘father of modern psychoanalysis’ (p. 444).

11 Haynal (1997) conceives it as the neurotic’s ‘desire of introjection’ (p. 444). In the addiction to introjection, there is a ‘constant desire to receive, to enrich his inner self’ (ibid., p. 444). Vida and Molad (2004) develop the ‘desire’ further: “The essence of ‘introjection’ is, of course, not the object at all, but the desire for the object; it is the desire, even and especially the thwarted, unmet desire, that is taken in and known to be real.” (p. 342-343). Haynal highlights the urge as the momentum for introjection. On the other hand, for Vida & Molad, the desire (for the object) itself is also introjected. Both seem to agree that the force of introjection is significant. Once introjected, the person is transformed and is ‘never to be the same again, and the transformation is visible to others, if they are able to look’ (ibid., p. 347). Apparently, introjection has the essence of changing a person, and with significant urge too. On the other hand, loss is also an antecedent of introjection, as Haynal (2003) argues that, loss, ‘as eternal flux and change, is accompanied by the gain inherent in change, and by the concomitant affect; the outcome then is “introjection” – that is, the process of keeping the moment, or, in everyday language, a memory.’ (p. 34). Haynal continues, ‘filling in the void by taking in the object and restoring it, the Arts were born – as the offspring or elaboration of memory, of the memory of our losses, of what we lack, a creation stemming from something we have introjected, and perhaps at the same time a transformation of that introjects.’ (ibid., p. 34). So, according to Haynal, the object as introjected, in addition to the subject, is also transformed in introjection as a reaction to loss.

12 In the version edited by Julia Borossa (1999), the translation is more readable: ‘so as to
be able to keep unconscious various affective connections with certain objects that particularly concern him, he lavishes his affects on all possible objects that scarcely concern him at all.’ (p. 41)

13 In his address to the Scientific Meeting of the British Psychoanalytical Society on 16 November 2005, Pontalis, the second author of this monumental psychoanalytic dictionary, expressed his ‘annoyance’, with a bit of humour, at his being ‘known in England primarily as the coauthor of The Language of Psychoanalysis (Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse), commonly referred to as “Laplanche and Pontalis”’, which is ‘as inseparable as let’s say Marks and Spencer’ (2006, p. 148).

14 Pines (1985) regards this dictionary as ‘[nowhere] else have Freud’s own words been so closely scrutinized, so carefully translated, so much theoretical sophistication applied to’ (p. 1).

15 For introjection and projection, which involve constant transport between the external and the internal, to have meaning, the duality of external vs. internal must be upheld. Sandler and Perlow (1987) adopted a pragmatic approach when using such concepts, ‘While many may disagree with such concrete formulation of psychological processes, it should be borne in mind that such reification may be extremely useful from the point of view of description. We are throughout dealing with concepts, with theoretical constructs whose value should be considered primarily in terms of their clinical utility.’ (p. 1).

16 According to Figlio (2007), Mach was one of the most outstanding scientists and philosophers at that time. Mach belonged to the philosophical tradition of positivism, and yet he attempted to ‘show that scientific method could dispense with metaphysical ideas, and base itself on the factual foundation of observation, ultimately the sense data that were elements of observation’ (p. 27).

17 The historical background of these documents is recorded in the Editor’s (Michael Balint) Note in Chapter 21, ‘Notes and Fragments’ in Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis, ‘On Ferenczi’s death a number of notes were found among his papers. These were jottings of ideas that were to be worked up later, if occasion arose, into more permanent form. They were for his private use, in the four languages which served as the medium of his thought, and were scribbled on odd bits of paper, using abbreviations for phrases and ideas which need some effort to discover and correctly to transcribe. Ferenczi’s literary executors translated the bulk of these notes into German (where that language was not originally used) and published them in the Bausteine, Vol. IV. The originals were burnt when Ferenczi’s charming house in Buda was destroyed in the siege of 1944-45.’ (p. 216)

18 This paper was published posthumously, first in German: Bausteine IV in 1939, later in English in 1955.

19 It is first published in German in 1922, as Chapter III of a book co-authored with S. Hollós, Psycho-analysis and the Psychic Disorders of General Paresis.

20 Freud (1933), after Ferenczi’s death, describes it as ‘perhaps the boldest application of psycho-analysis that was ever attempted’ (p. 228).

21 See, for example, Malancharuvil (2004)’s reformulating projection, introjection and projective identification. He proposes that projection is not just for defensive function, as it has usually been thought to be. Rather, projection is necessary for human perception to be possible. It renders human tests and evaluates reality in terms of his experience and his need for survival and nourishment. Malancharuvil even proposes that projection is simply the
early phase of introjection. This is opposite to what Ferenczi says regarding the primacy of introjection in the intrauterine life.

22 According to Hazan (1999), this paper was first presented at the 12th International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Wiesbaden, at 9am on September 1932. It was published in German in 1933 but Ernest Jones withdrew it from circulation. Its English version was published 16 years later. The original title of the paper is ‘The passions of adults and their influence on the sexual and character development of children’ (Lothane, 2010, p. 176).

23 Borgogno (2007) senses in the Clinical Diary Ferenczi’s ‘force and freshness’ (p. 226) that could not find a counterpart in the psychoanalytic writings of those days. He sees this work as a ‘lesson in freedom and humility founded on self-analysis’ (ibid., p. 226). Similarly, Green (2004) regards it as ‘a most valuable document’ (p. 121) and that we are indebted to Ferenczi for ‘the description of some of the deepest mechanisms of pathology’ (ibid., p. 121).

24 Frankel (2002) remarks that there was a widespread misunderstanding that Anna Freud (1936) was the creator of the concept of identification with the aggressor. Frankel notes that it was Ferenczi who first coined this term and introduced this concept in 1932. Also, Anna Freud defined it as ‘impersonating the aggressor, assuming his attributes or imitating his aggression’ (p. 113) which is not what Ferenczi means. Furthermore, Anna Freud did not mention Ferenczi in her discussion of this concept (Huopainen, 2002), which might have contributed to the widespread misunderstanding.

25 See Appendix 3 for a bibliography on Groddeck.

26 See Chan (2014c) for a brief biography of Groddeck.

27 For a recent historical study of the International Psychoanalytical Association, see Loewenberg & Thompson (2011).

28 Fortune (1993) characterizes the case of Elizabeth Severn as an ‘important paradigm case’ (p. 436), a fulcrum in the history of psychoanalysis comparable to those of Anna O and Dora. Severn initiated mutual analysis experiment with Ferenczi and demanded Ferenczi to examine, experientially and theoretically, the clinical significance of counter-transference that is to become a major trend of analytic technique in contemporary psychoanalysis.

29 Aniela Jaffé, the co-author and editor of ‘Memories, Dreams, Reflections’, remarked that the inception of the book was in the summer of 1956 in the form of a biography to which she was to be the author. The work began in the spring of 1957. With Jung’s well-known ‘distaste for exposing personal life to the public eye’ (Jaffé, 1963, p. 7), her job was to ask Jung questions and record his responses, and yet it was further decided that the book would be published in the form of an ‘autobiography’, with Jung as the narrator, instead of a biography, but with Jaffé as the writer of the ‘autobiography’. She was given an afternoon every week to work with Jung. Once they began, with some initial reticence, Jung recollected a lot of childhood memories that seemed to have stirred up his motivation to do the writing himself. It ended up that Jung wrote several chapters of the book, especially the first few chapters on his early days, while Jaffé wrote the rest that was based on the information gathered from the interviews. Jung read and, after some correction or supplement, approved all the chapters that Jaffé wrote. Jaffé recounted the collaboration as ‘[t]he further the book progressed, the closer [it] became the fusion between his work and mine’ (ibid., p. 9). However, Jung ‘did not regard these memoirs as a scientific work, nor even as a book by himself. Rather, he always spoke and wrote of it as “Aniela Jaffé’s project,” to which he had made contributions. At his specific request it is not to be included.
Defining applied psychoanalysis as ‘using psychoanalytic concepts and interventions outside the traditional clinical consulting room’ (p. 192), Gourguechon (2013) reviewed the history of this discipline and offered seven categories in a typology of applied psychoanalysis: ‘psychoanalytic social advocacy, psychoanalytic social commentary, psychoanalysis in the community, psychoanalysis of the community, psychoanalytic interpretation in the academy, using data to promote social change, and developing the meta-theory of applying psychoanalytic thought’ (ibid., p. 192). Psychohistory and psychobiography belong to the category of ‘psychoanalytic interpretation in the academy’. Furthermore, from a more radical angle, Rudnytsky (2002) does not believe in the sharp distinction between pure analysis and applied analysis. He even sees psychoanalysis itself as a body of knowledge to be applied to many other disciplines, psychotherapy or psychoanalysis being exemplars of such disciplines only. Therefore, Rudnytsky lifts applied psychoanalysis to the level of psychoanalysis proper. He agreeing with Roy Schafer’s recommendation of ‘viewing clinical analysis as a form of applied analysis’ (Schafer, 1992, p. 180) instead of only ‘viewing applied analysis as parasitic on clinical analysis’ (p. 180). Similarly, Widlocher (2003) differentiates between activities that sees ‘psychoanalysis as a research tool with one that considers it as an object of research’ (quoted in Hinshelwood, 2013, p. 11), and applied psychoanalysis may belong to the former type. However, Figlio (2009) takes psychoanalysis as a combination of ‘a form of therapy with a research methodology and a body of knowledge’ (p. 356). These differences in viewpoints suggest the relative primacy that one places psychoanalysis upon, as well as its instrumental use in the argument to be put forward, although historically, psychoanalysis was therapy first.

For an argument for the case of making biography a basic discipline of human science, see Young (1988).

Elaine Zickler, trained as both a psychoanalyst and a scholar in literature, alerts to the possibility of over-reading a theory into literature, and even of ‘a “rape” of literature’ (2010, p. 613) by psychoanalysis. She is less idealizing about the relationship between psychoanalysis and literature, trying to return psychoanalysis to where it should belong and reverse the relationship between psychoanalysis and literature: ‘At this juncture in our history, as psychoanalysis moves steadily back toward the medical model in theory and in practice, I am convinced that literature can do very well without psychoanalysis, but that psychoanalysis needs literature and the other arts in order to save its soul.’ (ibid., p. 615). On the other hand, Borossa & Rooney (1998) concede that while they note many common ‘interests and agenda’ between literature and psychoanalysis, they also discover ‘a sense of how literature and psychoanalysis might be each other’s other, gaining a certain disciplinary coherence in the very lack of relationship between them.’ (p. 167). A reconciliation of such diverse views might involve a historical study of the interface between psychoanalysis and literature that inevitably would touch upon the history of psychobiography.

As an example, see Stromberg (1976).

Some of the hallmark publications in the recent history of psychohistory are as follows, chronologically. Albin (1980) edits the collected papers in the 1977 Adelphi Conference in honour of Erikson. This collection attempts to show that psychohistory as already go beyond the simplistic and reductionistic model that he has been criticized about. Pomper (1985) puts forward a structural analysis of the psychohistorical formulas developed by Freud, Erikson, Marcuse, Brown and Lifton. Runyan (1988) has contributors such as Peter Gay, Loewenberg and Weinstein. The papers address attacks seriously, such as reductionism and value of psychohistory. They also include responses to social historians’ criticism on how the public experience affects private life. They attempt to place psychoanalysis in an
important position within history. Lawton (1989)’s handbook manages to have a wide coverage, on the nature, methodology and various fields of psychohistory. It gives more structure to the subject matter of psychohistory, as it is often presented in a vast diversity of views and theories, as well as disputes. Szaluta (1999) strives to offer a clear and thorough portrayal of psychohistory with respect to definition, applications, biography, group dynamics, history of childhood and history of the family.

They are connected by the psyche, as Kohut (2003) argues. He reminds both historians and psychoanalysts the neglected influence of historical events on the psyche, in addition to how the psyche has impact on history. He sees the two directions as equally important. Being a psychohistorian who sees both history and psyche as equally important, he argues that, through our experience with the external world, our inner world is shaped. One cannot really know the psyche if one ignores the ‘creative power of history’ (p. 235). In the same vein, ‘we cannot truly know either the past or the present if we ignore the creative power of the psyche’ (p. 235). Kohut strongly advocates for historicizing psychoanalysis, grounding it onto its historical era and cultural milieu. Kohut’s psychohistory, or psychoanalysis, therefore, is about the constant interplay between the psyche and history that inform us ‘how history flows through human beings’ (p. 226). It is something more than the mere psychoanalysis of the minds of historical subjects.

Ironically, Ricardo Steiner, the noted historian of Psychoanalysis, has a critical view about psychoanalysts’ attitude towards the history of Psychoanalysis, ‘Psychoanalysts usually are not very much interested in the history of their discipline, particularly today. Due to the way they often think about themselves as clinicians, what matters most for them is how to make sense in clinical and theoretical terms of what happens in the “here-and-now” of the session.’ (2003, p. xi). He advocates for the ‘historical approach to psychoanalysis’ (p. xiii) so that the complexity of this discipline is not reduced to mere research methodologies and epistemological concerns.

For example, Loewenberg (2011), drawing upon self-psychology and his experience of teaching psychoanalysis in China, analyzes the lasting impact of imperialism in the recent history of China. He argues that, historically, China used to, if not felt entitled to, command respect from the West. However, the invasion of the West in the years of imperialism heightened China’s narcissistic vulnerability, turning face into humiliation. He concludes that, face, or its maintenance, dictates contemporary Chinese collective behaviour in international relations, ‘The 150 years of imperialism, 1800-1949, which included insult, contempt, and defeat, constituted a deep and lasting trauma to Chinese self-esteem and face. The massive and repetitive humiliations and the large and small indignities of imperialism in nineteenth and twentieth century China, especially the Sino-Japanese War and occupation, 1931-1945, left lasting scars on Chinese collective self esteem and heightened sensibilities to issue of national face in a culture that initially developed and over many centuries refined the concept of face... The scars of 150 years of Western colonialism are not healed. That narcissistic injury must be redressed by the West’s acknowledgement, respect and admiration in the way Matteo Ricci did in the seventeenth century.’ (p. 704-705)

Obviously, Freud does not treat facts in psychoanalysis as a matter of fact, ‘The facts in psycho-analysis have a habit of being rather more complicated than we like. If they were as simple as all that, perhaps it might not have needed psycho-analysis to bring them to light.’ (1917a, p. 300). Freud implies that historians’ understanding of facts may be oversimplified from a psychoanalytic point of view. For a brief epistemological and psychoanalytic commentary on the idea of fact, see Figlio (2000) and Roazen (2003).

Grinker (1967) has a similar attitude towards the use of psychoanalytic tools, viz., ‘applied wisely with restraint’ (p. 389).
Moraitis (1979) designed and carried out an experiment of a dialogue between a historian and an analyst strives to find a solution for reducing the bias of the psychohistorian. However, Green (2001) states a very important reminder for a psychoanalyst to become a historian of psychoanalysis in that his identity as analyst cannot be deleted when he writes the history. Such an identity is indeed a ‘specific problem’ (p. 28) that is also an unavoidable, or even unsolvable, problem, pointing again to the dilemma of whether a psychohistorian should be analyzed first.

Arguably, psychobiography may be taken simply as a methodology itself of the biographers, instead of a discipline; it is only one of the many tools available to a writer of biography, in his attempt to understand and portray his subject.

In the case of the biographer, however, the scenario is different and yet maybe similarly unwelcome. Solomon (2007) writes that the ‘biographer is often seen as uninvited and unwelcome guest, an unlicensed detective, a snoop, an enemy within, or, perhaps, an unwanted sibling. Unlike a burglar after a successful break-in, the biographer does not leave quietly, but sets up offices in one’s study, kitchen, and bedroom, seizing the role of omnipotent observer, critic, and moral arbiter.’ (p. 19). Freud’s aversion to biography, and biographers as well, is well known. His own ‘Autobiographical Study’ (Freud, 1925), obviously an ‘unpsychological self-portrait’ (Solomon, 1973, p. 142), is his own attempt to set his own official version in order to pre-empt any other biographers’ attempt. Yet, when an admirer, Dr Roy Winn, requested him to write a more personal version, Freud rejected him right away, saying that ‘[p]ersonally, I ask nothing more from the world than that it should leave me in peace and devote its interest to psychoanalysis instead.’ (Freud to Dr. Roy Winn, 23 April 1933, quoted in Solomon, 1973, p. 142). In a postscript to his Autobiographical Study, Freud adds, ‘The public has no claim to learn anymore of my personal affairs – of my struggles, my disappointments, and my successes’ (Freud, 1925, p. 73). Finally, responding to Arnold Zweig’s request to write his biography, Freud states clearly, ‘Anyone turning biographer commits himself to lies, to concealment, to hypocrisy, to flattery, and even to hiding his own lack of understanding, for biographical truth is not to be had, and even if it were it couldn’t be used.’ (E. Freud, 1960, p. 43). Yet, such a paradoxical and rejecting attitude towards biographers, however, should also be applicable to autobiographers as well. On the other hand, Mahony did experience the difficulty of doing psychohistorical work in the 1970s, as he combed through the vast amount of primary and secondary source material available, that ‘behind each constellation of enlightening data there were darkened spaces literally as limitless as the unconscious. It is uncontestable that the development of psychoanalysis itself presents some of the most defiant obstacles to psychohistorians.’ (Mahony, 1979a, p. 55)

Steiner (1995b) maintains that he does not object to a psychohistorical study of the history of psychoanalysis, but he is acutely aware of the highly complex web of unconscious motivation and hidden agenda which are prevalent in any historical era in the archivists, historians, writers of letters and other historical documents. It is so complicated a web that it is almost impossible to comprehend, without fear of misunderstanding, a simple or obviously clear sentence within a letter. He argues against a relativistic position in writing history, a position that he associates with destruction dressed in Hermeneutics (Steiner, 1995a). On the other hand, as early as in the 1980s, Stepansky (1983) has pointed to the lack of study of the history of ideas in psychoanalysis, as he starts his own on Adler. He notes that ‘the history of psychoanalysis represents unexploited terrain for the historian of ideas’ and that ‘both that the subject matter of psychoanalysis is sufficiently important to warrant critical historical treatment and that our comprehension of this subject matter can be enriched if it is elaborated in a historical way.’ (p. x).
Mazlish (2003) points out potential of psychohistory in the arena of international politics in that successful psychobiography of past people prepare us for the analyses of today’s inter-group relations that is badly needed.

Brett Kahr (1999) notes that after the bad times of psychohistory with ‘sloppy works of the earliest practitioners’ and conventional historians’ emotional rejection that contributed to the defaming of psychohistory, there has been indeed a revival and raise of status and popularity of this discipline with respect to the appearance of more careful research, increasing appreciation of the ‘lasting value of psychoanalytical insights’ (p. 278). He documents his observations: “In 1984, that late Richard Ellmann devoted his Chichele Lecture at All Souls College, Oxford, to the subject of ‘Freud and Literary Biography’, in which he argued for a greater rapprochement between psychoanalysis and biography, and in 1985 Peter Gay published Freud for Historians, an impassioned plea to historical colleagues, trumpeting the virtues of Freudian analysis.” (ibid., p. 278)

See Appendix 4 for Listing of published letters (in English) involving Freud, Ferenczi, or Groddeck

Elizabeth Severn is the difficult patient whom Ferenczi called R.N. in his Clinical Diary, and with whom Ferenczi practiced mutual analysis. Severn creates much pain and therapeutic impasse, as well as inspiration of psychoanalytic technique, for Ferenczi. She will be dealt with more in later chapters of this study.

Letters are also amongst those historical documents that historians have passion for. Grosskurth (2001) recounts her exhilarating or even surreal experience of archival work in the Circular Letters (Rundbriefe) in her writing of the history of the Secret Committee, ‘Historians love documents. They pour over letters, minutes of meetings, scraps of paper passed from one person to another. It was difficult enough to comprehend and encapsulate the Rundbriefe exchanged among the members of Freud’s Secret Committee when I was writing The Secret Ring, yet the task would have been almost impossible if they had communicated by e-mail. It is difficult to convey the intense excitement of handling bits of the past, of teasing out ironies, veiled threats, abject protestation. For the truly dedicated historian the past is almost more real than the present, for at least it can give the impression of being comprehensive.’ (p. 380). Furthermore, Figlio (2003) argues that historians’ examination of historical documents constitutes ‘invading, destroying, rebuilding, fearing, loving, respecting, repairing. To preserve a moment of the past is to infiltrate it at the same time as to keep it alive’ (p. 162). Such a conflict, according to Figlio, is never-ending and it propels the ‘proliferation of historical controversy’ (ibid., p. 162) One may derive that History may involve a difficult hybrid of the historian’s present with the historical subjects’ ‘utterly unreacheable’ (ibid., p. 158) past.

In contrast to the psychobiographers, professional archivists aim at an empirical orientation in that, during the collation and organization of archival materials, they would not have pre-conceived, and especially, rigid notion of the relative importance of the historical documents archived. Archivists avoid any immediate interpretation of these documents and yet ‘[t]here is the wish not to lose contact with a certain past, with the most brilliant and most heroic moments in the history of psychoanalysis, which, when all is said and done, Freud and his first pupils helped to create’ (Steiner, 2001, p. 63).

Other than letters, Warner (1995) notes that documents on patients, notably clinical records, are the most neglected source of material in understanding the creativity embedded in the clinical context, as far as the history of medicine is concerned.

The dream was later published in 1915 as ‘The Dream of the Occulsive Pessary’, but the
dreamer was identified as a patient, as Ferenczi reminded Freud in the letter of 8 September 1914, ‘don’t mention my personal provenance’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 18) in the published paper: ‘A patient recounted the following dream: I stuff an occlusive pessary into my urethra. I am alarmed as I do so lest it might slip into the bladder from which it could only be removed by shedding blood. I try, therefore, to hold it steady in the perineal region from outside and to force it back or to press it outwards along the urethra … Here it struck him that in a dream fragment preceding this dream the pessary was stuffed into his rectum. Supplement: in the dream I was aware that the elastic thing would spread itself [sic] in the bladder and then it would be impossible to get it out again.’ (Ferenczi, 1915a, pp. 304-305). Later in the paper, it was added, ‘I remember clearly now that the pessary was too wide for the rectum and threatened to fall out; for the urethra, however; it was too narrow.’ (ibid., p. 308)


53 Mészáros (1993) notes that the year 1908 has a meaning for Ferenczi; it ‘marked the beginning of Ferenczi’s lifelong commitment to psychoanalysis, the new way of thinking and healing. He became a herald and promoter of a truly revolutionary science, and a disciple, friend, admirer, and rival of Freud.’ (p. 49).

54 It is Jung who first relays to Freud the wish of Stein and Ferenczi to visit him, in a letter dated 28 June 1907, ‘Dear Professor Freud, First some “business” news: Dr. Stein of Budapest and another mental specialist, Dr. Ferenczi, want to visit you sometime in Vienna and have asked me to inquire when it would be most convenient to you. Dr. Stein is a very decent fellow with a good intelligence, who has done some experimental work with me. He is still something of a beginner in the art, but has grasped the essentials surprisingly quickly and put them into practice. I think it would be best if you contacted him directly (Dr. Stein, Semmelweisgasse 11, Budapest).’ (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 65-66). Jung does not say anything else about Ferenczi. In fact, Jung and his wife, after their visit to Freud on 3 Mar 1907, go on to visit Stein in Budapest, before returning to Zurich via Fiume and Abbazia. (ibid., p. 24). In another letter to Freud dated 10 Oct 1907, Jung calls Stein ‘My pupil, Dr. Stein in Budapest’ (ibid., p. 48) and tells Freud about Stein’s contribution to the Cause. Obviously, Jung is more familiar with Philip Stein than with Sandor Ferenczi. Stein is the more important visitor. Subsequently, Freud expects to meet Stein but misses an opportunity. On 14 Jan 1908, he writes to Jung, ‘I hope soon to make the acquaintance of Dr. Stein of Budapest; I was prevented by the above-mentioned domestic matters from receiving his visit last Sunday.’ (ibid., p. 110). So, it is probably around these few days that Freud writes to Stein that he is ready to receive him and Ferenczi on 2 Feb 1908. Ferenczi probably gets this news from Stein and then writes his first letter promptly to Freud on 18 Jan 1908 that shows his eagerness to see Freud.

55 It was during Jung’s visit to Stein in Budapest in March 1907 that Ferenczi could meet Jung in person for the very first time. Subsequently in the same year, Ferenczi went to the Burghölzli Clinic in Zurich to study under Jung his word association experiment. Falzeder (1994) writes that it was in this occasion that Jung seized the opportunity to analyze Ferenczi along Freudian principles, which lasted at most a few weeks. It turned out to be the very first training analyses in the History of Psychoanalysis, although it was not conducted by Freud himself. In the Ferenczi Archive kept by Judith Dupont (later transferred to the London Freud Museum), there are four unpublished letters from Jung to Ferenczi, dated 1 Oct & 7 Nov 1907, and 4 Jan & 12 Dec 1908. In the first letter, Jung encouraged Ferenczi to found a Psychoanalytic Society in Budapest, and that his own in Swiss had accumulated 12 members; Jung also analyzed Ferenczi’s handwriting that Jung noted some changes recently. In the second letter, Jung updated that there were 22 members in his Society and, again,
encouraged Ferenczi to follow suit in Budapest. Jung discussed some cases with Ferenczi and recommended Ferenczi to try his word association experiment. He also asserted that spiritism is compatible with psychoanalysis. In the third, Jung analyzed Ferenczi’s cases. In the fourth one, Jung wrote about the heavy editorial work on the Yearbook of Psychoanalysis and apologized for not writing more frequently. (see Appendix 6 for a sample copy of these letters).

After replying to Ferenczi on 30 Jan 1908, Freud writes to Jung the next day, ‘On February 2nd I am expecting the two colleagues from Budapest, Dr. Stein and Dr. Ferenczy [sic].’ (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 116). Freud does not even spell Ferenczi’s name correctly. Before their first meeting, for Freud, Ferenczi is an unknown person, at least when compared to Stein. Forrester (1997) even classifies Ferenczi as Freud’s ‘unexpected object of Freud’s deep affection’ (p. 46).

After meeting Freud on 2 February 1908, Ferenczi had a confession, as published in Gyógyászat, a popular Hungarian Medical Journal, or ‘the progressive review oriented to the spread of new ideas’ (Casonato, 1993, p.738), as compared to the other one, Orvosi Hetilap, ‘the management conservative review’ (ibid., p. 738). He wrote about his initial, pre-meeting, disbelief in Freud’s sexual etiology of neurosis, ‘Now that I am completely convinced on the soundness of the Freudian ideas I rightfully keep asking myself, why did I refuse these ideas outright at the first hearing? … and furthermore why did I develop such displeasure and repugnance against the whole concept, against the theory of sexual genesis of neuroses to such an extent that I did not even take pains to check whether there was any truth to the matter?’ (Ferenczi, 1908, quoted in Mészáros, 1993, p. 48)

Jones briefly commented that ‘the effect was electric’ (Jones, 1955, p. 34). Kerr (1993) deduced that when Ferenczi met Freud in February 1908, ‘he found him to be an arresting figure and rapidly developed his own equivalent of a religious crush; a lifelong friendship thus began.’ (p. 176). On the other hand, Ragen (2008) had this imagery about the meeting: ‘Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi are having tea in the parlor of Freud’s home in Vienna. Ferenczi is age 35 and Freud age 52. Ferenczi’s face is brimming with excitement and admiration. As they talk on, Freud becomes more and more intent.’ (p. 605).

Before that, in 1906, after reading Jung’s new book on association experiment, he immediately ‘bought a chronometer and carried out his “experiments” everywhere, including in the literary cafés he used to frequent’ (Haynal, 1997, p. 441). Ferenczi’s zest in whatever that might unlock the mysteries of the mind was already part of his character even before he met Freud in 1908. Haynal (1997), studying Ferenczi’s writings in his pre-analytic days, found that ‘Ferenczi the pre-psychoanalytic is in truth already psychoanalytic without knowing it.’ (p. 441). This has been testified by Casonato (1993) who, introducing the just published preanalytic writings (French edition) of Ferenczi, notes that ‘the first hints or the first detailed treatment of themes that will be present in Ferenczi’s later work and that characterize his thought and originality’ (p. 737) and ‘mark his later interests when he became a psychoanalyst’ (ibid., p. 744).

For a more elaborated exposition of the fate of Stein in Ferenczi’s early introjective relationship with Freud, see Chan (2014b).

The first time that Ferenczi received this book as a gift was, according to Roazen’s interview of Kata Levy (the wife of Lajos Levy), from Lajos Levy, a friend and later the physician of Ferenczi (Roazen, 1995) in 1901. This was a book that Ferenczi simply ‘picked up and then put down’ (ibid., p. 48) and ‘dismissed it with a shrug of his shoulders’ (Jones, 1955, p. 34). Yet, by 1902, Ferenczi was enthusiastically reviewing other theories on dreams, such as those of Sante de Sanctis, a psychiatry professor in Rome. It was only some years
later in 1907, with the encouragement of Philipp Stein, he really read Freud’s monumental dream book and was deeply influenced by it (Mészáros, 1993). Falzeder (1997) even observes that Ferenczi ‘knew every sentence of The Interpretation of Dreams’ (p. 423). Twenty-four years later, in 1931, near the end of his life, such influence was still visible when Ferenczi addressed the Vienna Psycho-analytical Society on 6 May 1931, on the occasion of celebrating Freud’s 75th birthday, that this book ‘is so highly polished a gem, so closely knit in content and in form, that it withstands all the changes of time and of the libido, so that criticism scarcely ventures to approach it.’ (Ferenczi, 1931, p. 127).

62 Chronologically, examples include: Sach (1945); Oberndorf (1953); Jones (1955); Shakow & Rapoport (1964); Ruitenbeek (1966); Brome (1967); Burnham (1967); Ellenberger (1970); Hale (1971); Schur (1972); Ruitenbeek (1973a & b); Clark (1980); Kurzweil (1989); Grosskurth (1991); Gelfand & Kerr (1992); Kerr (1993); Rosenzweig (1994); Ferris (1997); Gay (1988); Roth (1998); Breger (2000); Flem (2003); Borch-Jacobsen & Shamdasani (2012); and Burnham (2012). Early biographies of Freud, however, notably suffer from the ‘failure to present competing perspectives on the same (and gradually expanding) body of materials’ (Sprengnether, 1995, p. 9). Historians in the contemporary realm of the ‘New Freud Studies’ (Burnham, 2012, p. 259) are raising doubt about the received version of the history of psychoanalysis.

63 Skues (2012), citing meticulously researched historical material, argues that the success and importance of Freud’s lectures in Clark University is more of a post-event myth-making and the trip is not as important as once thought. He argues against the notion the Freud’s America trip brings about a sea change in the progress of the psychoanalytic movement. He concludes, ‘let us be prepared nevertheless to recognize the symbolic, iconic standing of his visit without necessarily being led thereby into assuming there were consequences stemming from it that quite possibly never had.’ (p. 82).

64 Jones (1955) gives a very brief description of an incident in their planning for the trip, ‘Ferenczi was concerned over whether he should bring a silk hat with him, but Freud told him that his plan was to buy one there and heave it to the sea on the way back.’ (p. 54).

65 For an exhaustive investigation into Freud’s hate of America, see, e.g., Falzeder (2012). He argues that Freud’s anti-Americanism swings between two pairs of poles: ‘ambition and humiliation, and envy and gratitude’ (p. 108). According to Falzeder, Freud has been almost seduced by the American lifestyle but then he despises it. Freud’s dilemma is that he has aspiration for money, affluence, reputation and autonomy, but he does not want to be indebted to America who can indeed make it possible.

66 On 30 Dec 1908, Freud writes to Jung first about his refusal of Hall’s invitation. He has a longer and more straightforward exposition on this incident, but with a more agitated tone, which is mainly about money and the bad timing and yet also revealing his ambivalence, ‘I have declined without even consulting you or anyone else, the crucial reason being that I should have had to stop work 2 weeks sooner than usual, which would mean a loss of several thousand kronen. Naturally the Americans pay only $400 for travel expenses. I am not wealthy enough to spend five times that much to give the Americans an impetus. (That’s boosting; two-and-a-half to three times as much!).’ Freud continues, ‘[b]ut I am sorry to have it fall through on this account, because it would have been fun. I don’t really believe that Clark University, a small but serious institution, can postpone its festivities for three weeks.’ (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 192-193)

67 Rosenzweig (1994) contains the complete correspondence between Freud and Hall, as provided by Anna Freud. On 29 Dec 1908, Freud writes to Hall, upon receiving his invitation dated 15 Dec, to decline the invitation, ‘If I were to lecture in America in the first
week of July, I should have to suspend my medical work three weeks earlier than usual, which would mean a significant and irretrievable loss for me. This consideration makes it impossible for me to accept your proposal.’ (p. 342).

68 In Ferenczi’s letter dated 5 Oct 1909 immediately after the trip, he tells Freud, ‘America is like a dream. On the whole, it went as I expected – I had much more reward and satisfaction from the company on the voyage than from what I engaged in over there. But I am extraordinarily glad to have made the trip.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, pp. 77-78).

69 Rosenzweig (1994) explains that the postponement is also in response to the decline of Wilhelm Wundt and August Weismann to Hall’s previous invitation, but these two guests have declined without any condition.

70 In telling Jung later on 9 March 1909 about Hall’s second invitation, Freud writes, ‘I must admit that this has thrilled me more than anything else that has happened in the last few years – except perhaps for the appearance of the Jahrbuch – and that I have been thinking of nothing else.’ He continues, ‘… I am to go to America after all, not, to be sure, to make money, but in response to an honourable call! We shall have a good deal to say about this trip and its various consequences for our cause.’ (McGuire, 1974, p. 210). Freud does not literally mention the honorary degree to Jung. Rosenzweig (1994) remarks, ‘But probably even more significant was Hall’s promise that Freud would receive an honorary degree. That promise assured Freud that at least Hall and his associates did not entertain reservations. A friendly reception could be expected in Worcester.’ (p. 27)

71 In one of his subsequent correspondence (9 Aug) with Freud on the latter’s arrangement for the trip to Clark, Hall warmly invites Freud to stay in his house as a guest and has prepared a room for Freud. By then, Hall has no idea with whom Freud will come, ‘Should Madame Freud accompany you, it would give Mrs Hall and myself great additional pleasure.’ (Rosenzweig, 1994, p. 350.). It is only till 1 Sep, when Freud is already in New York, that he writes to Hall, telling him he gratefully accepts the invitation to be his guest, and that he is coming alone without his wife, but travelling with Jung, Ferenczi and Brill.

72 Towards the end of his life, Freud has this insight about space, ‘Space may be the projection of the extension of the psychical apparatus. No other derivation is probable.’ (Freud, 1938, p. 300). This echoes with my hypothesis that Freud is trying to place Ferenczi in a position that is compatible with what Ferenczi represents in Freud’s inner world.

73 The last paragraph of Freud’s 13 June letter is about inviting Ferenczi to a dinner of the Wednesday Psychological Society, ‘Wouldn’t you like to participate in our Wednesday farewell dinner on the Konstantinhügel? Stegmann is expected as a guest; Rank will already send you the invitation.’ (ibid., p. 67)

74 The editors of the correspondence surmise in a footnote about the identity of this person, ‘Possibly the first mention of Ferenczi’s love and future wife, Gizella Pálos, nee Altschul (1865-1949).’ (ibid., p. 70, n. 2). It turns out that the speculation is correct. Forrester (1997), in analyzing the episode of the entangled matrix between Freud, Ferenczi, Gizella and Elma from 1911 to 1919, in what he terms ‘Casualties of Truth’ (p. 44), as Freud intervenes ruthlessly into Ferenczi’s indecision of marrying the daughter (Elma) or the mother (Gizella), argues that in the initial stage of Ferenczi’s seeking of his ideal relationship with Freud and with Gizella, Ferenczi is looking for ‘one in which the division between homosocial and heterosexuality, between public and private, between scientific and erotic, was dissolved.’ (p. 50). He compares Ferenczi to the ideal analysand who ‘fell in love with those to whom he told the truth – Gizella and Freud.’ (p. 97). Forrester even remarks that somewhere into 1917, Ferenczi has ‘found an ally, as ever, in Gizella. But not in Freud.’ (p.
94), in Ferenczi’s indecision, which Forrester believes is in fact a decision to have both the mother and daughter, as supported by Gizella’s own procrastination of divorcing her husband Géza Pálos, the father of Elma.

75 See also Thurschwell (2001) for Freud’s position in the history of occultism in the late 19th and early 20th century.

76 Regarding their itinerary for the return trip, Freud writes to Ferenczi (9 Aug), ‘On the way back, where Jung will probably leave soon after disembarking, we will then finish up in Hamburg and Berlin, which we can probably be done together, and then we will separate for the unavoidable duties with respect to relatives.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 73; my italics). The trip to Berlin will include the visit to the medium Frau Seidler. Jones’s (1955) recall of the return trip also testifies that they have actualized their Berlin plan, ‘[Freud, Jung and Ferenczi] traveled back to Bremen by the same route. Jung went home and the other two proceeded to Berlin where they both had relatives to visit, as well as Abraham. It was there that they had their first telepathic séance with a clairvoyant, over which Ferenczi was specially excited.’ (p. 65).

77 This has also been noted by Jones (1957), ‘I eagerly looked forward to reading Freud’s letters to Ferenczi on their return from America in 1909, hoping they would contain some interesting exchange of impressions over that famous visit. There was not much.’ Instead, Jones finds from the letters which are ‘almost entirely taken up with an animated discussion of an experience they had had in Berlin on the homeward journey.’ (p. 384). By then, Jones was the only person who had access to the entire Freud-Ferenczi correspondence that had not been published (Balint, 1969; Maddox, 2006).

78 There are, according to the editors of the correspondence, two parts in this letter. The first part is written on the train but is missing. Only the second part survives, with each page numbered by Roman numeral in the upper right hand corner, in blue pencil and starts with II. (see Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 78, n. 1). The loss of the first part, written by Ferenczi on the train, presumably a significant one, could be either due to chance or some other unknown factor. Record from the correspondence shows that Freud, after reading the letter, did return it, together with enclosures, to Ferenczi on 11 Oct 1909 upon his request for filing. Freud remarks, ‘Returning enclosures as the beginning of a dossier.’ (ibid., p. 81) after signing his letter.

79 It is interesting to note that in the historical record or remarks as related to this incident, it is easy to misunderstand that Freud is not present with Ferenczi in the visit to Seidler. For example, even in the editors’ footnote, we have, ‘After returning from America, Ferenczi had looked up Frau Seidler, a medium, with the intention of investigating parapsychological phenomena.’ (ibid., p. 78, n. 2). Also, in Freud’s reply letter to Ferenczi on 11 Oct, he starts with, ‘At last I can pull myself together to write to you about your experience with Frau Seidler. I have now overcome the shock …’ (ibid., p. 79, my italics).

80 On the webpage of the AskART The Artists’ Bluebook™ -- Worldwide Edition, at URL: http://www.askart.com/askart/alpha/P14.aspx, there are 13326 artists listed under family names that start with ‘P’, in which John Philipp (1872 – 1938) could be found, together with some of his paintings. However, under the section of biographical information, nothing has been written there. So, it is not yet able to verify whether he is a Professor or not. On the ‘top artists’ who have many auction lots, John Philipp is not listed.

81 Pontalis (1974) captured the isolated and impoverished plight of Freud in Paris, as Freud maintained his intense relationship with Martha via correspondence, ‘Freud arrived in Paris on an October morning in 1895 and put up in a small hotel, half-way between the Panthéon
and the Sorbonne. He was to live there for five months. It was to be a time of poverty, with only a grant to live on; of chastity, despite the contemporary cliché associating Paris with loose and easy living; and of isolation, as he wandered through a town that spoke a strange language, amidst disconcerting crowds and customs. At times, he retreated for hours on end to the top of the towers of North Dame. He went to the theatre (Sarah Bernhardt, what a voice!) accompanied by a Russian doctor, a friend whom he met by chance. He wrote long letters to his fiancée, which alternated between dejection and exaltation.’ (p. 455)

82 A contemporary version of such mutual dream analysis could be found in Vida & Barish (2003), Founding Member and Board Member respectively of the Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis in Los Angeles, who published their experience in a paper that acts as a ‘vehicle’ for them to experience themselves ‘in relation in an uncertain, mingling way, conscious and unconscious, trying not to be self-conscious and not defensive.’ (p. 123). See also Barish & Vida (1998).

83 Haynal (1999) also listed the mutual analysis between Jung and Otto Gross, and that between Ferenczi and Groddeck, as ‘the other two well-known examples’ of mutual analysis practised by ‘pioneers of psychoanalysis’ (p. 318).

84 The fuller version is:

“‘At Freud’s home that evening, during dinner, I tried to talk to Freud and his wife about psychoanalysis and Freud’s activities, but I soon discovered that Mrs. Freud knew absolutely nothing about what Freud was doing. It was very obvious that there was a very superficial relationship between Freud and his wife.

Soon I met Freud’s wife’s younger sister. She was very good-looking and she not only knew enough about psychoanalysis but also about everything that Freud was doing. When, a few days later, I was visiting Freud’s laboratory, Freud’s sister-in-law asked if she could talk with me. She was very much bothered by her relationship with Freud and felt guilty about it. From her I learned that Freud was in love with her and that their relationship was indeed very intimate. It was a shocking discovery to me, and even now I can recall the agony I felt at the time.

Two years later Freud and I were invited to Clark University in Worcester, and we were together every day for some seven weeks. From the beginning of our trip we started to analyze each other’s dreams. Freud had some dreams that bothered him very much. The dreams were about the triangle – Freud, his wife, and his wife’s younger sister. Freud had no idea that I knew about the triangle and his intimate relationship with his sister-in-law. And so, when Freud told me about the dream in which his wife and her sister played important parts, I asked Freud to tell me some of his personal associations with the dream. He looked at me with bitterness and said, ‘I could tell you more, but I cannot risk my authority.’ That, of course, finished my attempt to deal with his dreams. During the trip Freud developed severe neuroses, and I had to do limited analysis with him. He had psychosomatic troubles and had difficulties in controlling his bladder. I suggested Freud that he should have complete analysis, but he rebelled against such an idea because he would have had to deal with problems that were closely related to his theories. If Freud would have tried to understand consciously the triangle, he would have been much, much better off.

It was my knowledge of Freud’s triangle that became a very important factor in my break with Freud. And then I could not accept Freud’s placing authority above the truth. This, too, led to further problems in our relationship. In retrospect it looks like it was destined that our relationship should end that way. It was full of questions and doubts from the very beginning.” (Billinsky, 1969, p. 42-43)

85 In 1881, Minna was engaged to Ignaz Schönberg. However, in 1884, she broke the engagement because of his lung disease. He died in 1886. After Freud’s father died in
October 1896, Minna moved in to live with the Freud family for good. (Mahony, 1979)

86 In his autobiography that was commissioned also in 1957 (the same year as the Billinsky interview), and published in 1963, which was 6 years earlier than the publication of Billinsky’s interview with Jung, Jung did not give the details of the dream in their dream analysis in their voyage on board of George Washington, which he characterized as ‘a severe blow to the whole relationship’ (Jung, 1963, p. 181): ‘Freud had a dream – I would not think it right to air the problem it involved. I interpreted it as best I could, but added that a great deal more could be said about it if he would supply me with some additional details from his private life. Freud’s response to these words was a curious look – a look of the utmost suspicion. Then he said, “But I cannot risk my authority!” At that moment he lost it altogether. That sentence burned itself into my memory; and the end of our relationship was already foreshadowed. Freud was placing personal authority above truth.’ (p. 181-182, my italics).

87 One can gauge the impact of this historical controversy at the level of the lay public, obviously outside the academia, by noting that there are even novels related to or even written on this historical event. See, for example, Daniels (1992), Rosen (2004), Behling’s (2005) and Gale (2013). See Lothane (2007a) for an academic’s conclusion on this phenomenon.

88 One point that is almost ignored in Jung’s testimony is his remarks about Minna’s intellectual relationship with Freud, ‘she not only knew enough about psychoanalysis but also about everything that Freud was doing.’ (Billinsky, 1969, p. 42) Instead of a historical study about the Minna’s affair, it may be more fruitful for a historian to find out how Freud’s psychoanalytic thinking has been influenced by Minna. Mahony (1979) argues that Minna is ‘a strong transferential object’ who ‘assumes an adjunct analyst’s role in Freud’s self-analysis’ (p. 75) and that during Freud’s days of intellectual isolation in 1890s, in addition to Fliess, Minna is the other intellectual companion. Theodor Reik, in his first interview by Paul Roazen on 26 October 1965, also testifies that ‘Martha had been a “hausfrau,” whereas Minna was “more intellectual”’ (Roazen, 2006, p. 677). Lothane (2007a) aptly reminds that what is neglected in this story is ‘Freud’s rare friendship with Minna, of her intellectual status as Freud’s muse and confidante in matters professional.’ (p. 491). Lothane adds that ‘Freud writes to her about his book on aphasia, the cold reaction it got from Breuer; discusses his treatment of patient Anna von Lieben; and has Minna check the proofs of his translation of Bernheim’s book on hypnosis.’ (ibid., p. 491).

89 Schwartz (1999) notes that ‘Swales enjoys tilting at the windmill of Freud’s fame, playing the bad boy of Freud scholarship. But taken together his papers provide a refreshing, iconoclastic picture of Freud as a real man rather than as a cultural myth.’ (p. 18). Understandably, Swales provides an alternative perspective to the orthodox Freudian biography. He presents a version of Freud, or of the history of psychoanalysis, with the unusual rigor of historical research and psychobiographical effort, that demands a response, or even a dialogue with the mainstream historian in psychoanalysis. Grosskurth (2001) concedes that the psychoanalytic community should be grateful to people like Swales because they ‘have created a stimulating debate, whatever the merits of their argument’ (p. 380).

90 Peter Gay, presumably a contemporary leading figure in the Freud establishment, tries not to be dogmatic in his position regarding the Minna affair. He even attributes the spread of rumour to the restrictive policy of the archive material. In a biographical essay in his now classic Freud Biography, he writes, ‘The Freud Collection at the Library of Congress includes a packet of letters between Freud and Minna Bernays that are being scrutinized before being released; at this writing they are (maddeningly) not yet available. Given the
incompleteness of the evidence (another instance of how the restrictive policy of Freud’s guardians, either denying or slowing down access to important materials, nourishes rumors), one cannot be dogmatic – at least, I cannot be. Freud wrote some passionate letters to Minna Bernays while he was engaged to her sister, but this, rather than offering support to the Jung-Swales theory, seems to me to make it all the less probable. If dependable independent evidence (as distinct from conjecture and clever chains of inferences) should emerge that Freud did indeed have an affair with his sister-in-law and actually (as Swales has argued in some detail) took her to get an abortion, I shall revise my text accordingly. Meanwhile, I must accept the established, less scandalous view of Freud as correct.’ (Gay, 1988, p. 753). In the Freud Collection at the Library of Congress, there are 48600 items. In Box X1, there are 9 folders containing Minna’s correspondence with Freud of the years, ‘1882-1898, 1910-1913, 1922, 1930-1931, 1938, n.d.’. They are marked ‘closed’ without a date of release. (Source: Sigmund Freud - A Register of His Papers in the Sigmund Freud Collection in the Library of Congress, 2006, p. 50). A recent updated search (19 July 2013) of the webpage of the Library of Congress at URL: http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/eadmss.ms004017 shows that the restriction status of these letters remains unchanged. Gay (1989) did read these letters, ‘In late 1987, when I visited the Library of Congress once again and much of my “Freud: A Life for Our Time” was already in galley proofs, I saw the bundle of the Freud-Minna letters but was not permitted to read them. I kept in touch with the Manuscript Division, however, and once this set of letters was opened, I hastened to Washington to read them at last.’ (p. 9). It is noteworthy that, Jeffrey Masson, once the Director of the Freud Archive and then a Freud basher, however, gives some hint, as he told Ralph Blumenthal, the New York Times Journalist, that ‘the unpublished letters he had seen from Freud to Miss Bernays betrayed no hint of sexual intimacy’ (quoted in Lothane, 2007a, p. 488).

91 Mahony (1979) gives a stock-taking about the trips that Freud had ‘alone with Minna: 1897, 1898, 1990, 1903, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1913, 1919, 1920, 1921, and 1923’ (p. 76), and they added up to 12 trips.

92 This is similar to what Bollas (1987) terms as “extractive introjection” which “occurs when one person steals for a certain period of time (from a few seconds or minutes, to a lifetime) an element of another individual’s psychic life. Such an intersubjective violence takes place when the violator (henceforth A) automatically assumes that the violated (henceforth B) has no internal experience of the psychic element that A represents. At the moment of this assumption, an act of theft takes place, and B may be temporarily anaesthetized and unable to ‘gain back’ the stolen part of the self. If such extraction is conducted by a parent upon a child it may take many years of an analysis before B will ever recover the stolen part of the self.” (p. 158)

93 However, compared to the Palermo episode which is evidently more famous, this Seidler episode receives far less attention in the history of psychoanalysis.

94 Freud changes his manner of addressing Ferenczi. He uses ‘Dear friend,’ from this letter onwards. Before that, it is ‘Dear Colleague’ or ‘Dear Doctor’.

95 Freud’s worry about the illegitimacy of the study of occultism as a scientific enterprise may find some reassurance in parapsychological phenomena’s contemporary status in science. Michio Kaku, a contemporary leading theoretical physicist and the co-founder of the String Field Theory, is indeed serious about telepathy as one of the legitimate areas of scientific study in the ‘Physics of the Impossible’, amongst other even more crazier impossibilities, such as time travel, ‘…natural telepathy, the kind often featured in science fiction and fantasy, is impossible today. MRI scans and EEG waves can be used to read only our simplest thoughts, because thoughts are spread out over the entire brain in complex
ways. But how might this technology advance over the coming decades to centuries? Inevitably science’s ability to probe the thinking process is going to expand exponentially.’ (Kaku, 2008, pp. 86 – 87; see also Kaku, 2005 & 2011). In a more recent work, Kaku reports even more concrete progress, ‘Telepathy is now the subject of intense research at universities around the world, where scientists have already been able to use advanced sensors to read individual words, images, and thoughts in a person’s brain.’ (2014, p. 63-64).

96 About two years later, on 17 Nov 1911, Freud restated his position on how Ferenczi should go about occultism with respect to Freud’s own personal material, ‘Witness your studies in occultism, which perhaps contain an excess of zeal as a result of this striving [for independence]. Otherwise, don’t be ashamed to be of one mind with me, and don’t demand anything more from me personally than I am willing to give.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 314)

97 As noted in Chapter 7 of this thesis, Freud first warded off Ferenczi’s attempt of discussing dream interpretation with him, limiting Ferenczi to the riddle of jokes only. Between Freud and Ferenczi, dream may be too intimate a medium, as far as introjection is concerned.

98 Freud noted this too, as he wrote to Ferenczi a month later on 10 Jan 1910, commenting on Ferenczi’s reported dream and self-analysis, ‘I wonder if you don’t also have a secret reason for sharing this analysis of your dream with me, and I think I have actually found it. The dream must also have a relation to me.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, pp. 122-123)

99 It turns out that further experiments with Seidler ends up in a ‘complete failure’ since ‘she didn’t want to place herself at [Ferenczi’s] disposal at all’ (ibid., p. 388).

100 Ogden (2009) depicts the mechanism of analysts doing the unconscious work with the patient’s emotional experience as, ‘[w]hen an individual’s emotional experience is so disturbing that he is unable to dream it (i.e., to do unconscious psychological work with it), he requires the help of another person to dream his formerly undreamable experience. Under these circumstances, it requires two people to think. In the analytic setting, the other person is the analyst’ (p. 25). In a way, Ferenczi is playing the role of Freud’s analyst as far as his unconscious work with Freud’s experience is concerned. Ogden further argues from his own experience that projective identification must be involved, ‘Projective identification at its core is a conception of one person participating in thinking/dreaming what another person has been unable to think/dream on his own. I have spent the past thirty-five years rediscovering this concept.’ (p. 27). Ogden’s exposition of the unconscious work is consistent with the idea that Ferenczi is introjecting Freud’s projected unconscious material.

101 Lothane (2003) writes about the essential role of history in psychoanalysis, ‘For psychoanalysis history is not bunk; it is its very heart and guts. Like an individual or a nation, psychoanalysis lives its history and rediscovers it in every generation.’ (p. 609). In re-discovering its history perpetually, psychoanalysis is also clearing up its myths by being more historically informed with the effort of historians.

102 Actually, Jones’ treatment of this episode, though brief in itself, sets the stereotype of Ferenczi as an immature and troubled character that foretell his later character assassination against Ferenczi. He even implies that Ferenczi does not fit Freud as a close collaborator or friend. Bonomi (1999) has an exhaustive historical review of Jones’ allegation of Ferenczi’s madness. Bonomi manages to trace Jones’ plan of character assassination against Ferenczi, by going into chronological details in the final days of Ferenczi, with the support of new historical documents, such as letters of Erich Fromm, Jones, Lajos Levy, and Elma Laurvik. He concludes that Jones’ accusation against Ferenczi is unjustified and that the myth of
Ferenczi’s progressive psychosis was not just created by Jones’ himself, but also shared amongst the analysts, especially Freud, of that generation. This shared myth propagated into subsequent generations of analysts, although Balint (1958) and Fromm (1959) had tried to correct Jones’ allegation but more or less in vain. Recently, historians, such as Mészáros (2002), have sympathy for Balint who faced immense difficulty in telling the truth about Ferenczi’s mental state, as the majority of analysts tended to believe Jones’ version that was endorsed by Freud himself.

103 After their America trip in 1909, Freud seems to be closer to Ferenczi than to Jung. On 2 Feb 1910, the second anniversary of his first meeting with Ferenczi, Freud wrote to Jung, reporting his recent heartfelt meeting with Ferenczi, but contrast it with his distance from Jung, ‘Living so far apart, we are bound to have experience of all sorts that we cannot share. … Ferenczi was a balm to me last Sunday; at last a chance to talk about the things closest to my heart; there is another man I am really sure of.’ (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, pp. 290-291)

104 According to Romm (1966), A. A. Brill was Freud’s first American follower and the pioneer of psychoanalysis there, even before Freud’s visit to Clark University. Born in Austria in 1874 in poverty, he went alone to America at age of 15, ‘without a dollar in his pocket’ (p. 210). He survived years of hardship in his early years but still remained optimistic. Trained as a medical doctor, he had intense interest in the dynamics of schizophrenia; he was also the first translator of Freud’s work into English for the Americans.

105 On 2 Dec 1909, Freud wrote to Jung, ‘Ferenczi introduced me to his lady friend and I no longer have to feel sorry for him. She is splendid, a woman who has only recently stepped down from the summit of feminine beauty, clear intelligence and the most appealing warmth. I needn’t tell you that she is a thoroughly versed in our lore and a staunch supporter.’ (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, pp. 270-271). Gizella (1863-1949) (ibid., p. 271, n.1) was 10 years older than Ferenczi and 7 years younger than Freud.

106 In fact, soon after their America trip, on 7 Dec 1909, Ferenczi wrote to Freud trying to convince Freud that he has resolved his brother complex and willingly surrender himself somewhere outside the Freud-Jung dyad, ‘I wrote Jung a long letter in which I confessed candidly about my “brother complex” and explained that guerilla war cannot be the tactic of choice in psychoanalysis; someone must lead, and this one person, besides you, is by nature Jung himself. I also told him (probably in order not to garner any more sympathy) that you have altered your views about the “dead-end” that I have gotten into.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 112)

107 Actually, Freud ends this letter with, ‘I, too, gratefully acknowledge the elevation of life through ΨA. A more complete view of life should certainly be based on it.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 189)

108 Writing in a free-associative way has been Ferenczi’s indulgence even before he met Freud. He recalled in a 1917 paper about autonomic writing, ‘I would thus take a pencil and, holding it lightly, would place the point on a sheet of white paper; I was determined to abandon completely the instrument to itself, to let it write what it pleased.’ (Ferenczi, 1917, quoted in Haynal, 1997, p. 439, n.4). Freud (1920), in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, also sees the potential of free-associative writing, ‘It is surely possible to throw oneself into a line of thought and to follow it wherever it leads out of simple scientific curiosity’ (p. 59). Freud’s free writing, however, still has a flavor of scientific work, while Ferenczi’s has no such constraint.
Regarding Ferenczi’s possible conception about domesticity, indeed, immediately after the trip, Ferenczi describes to Freud the Sicily trip as ‘the events of our living together’ (ibid., p. 214; letter dated 28 Sept 1910; my italics).

Ferenczi does not state to Freud what events he is referring to as Freud should probably know what he is talking about. In a letter written to Groddeck some 11 years later, Ferenczi complains about this episode, “[Freud] was too big for me, there was too much of the father. As a result, on our very first working evening together in Palermo, when he wanted to work with me on the famous paranoia text (Schreber), and started to dictate something, I jumped up in a sudden rebellious outburst, exclaiming that this was no working together, dictating to me. ‘So this is what you are like?’ he said, taken aback. ‘You obviously want to do the whole thing yourself.’ That said, he now spent every evening working on his own, I was left out in the cold – bitter feelings constricted my throat. (Of course I now know what this ‘working alone in the evenings’ and this ‘constriction of the throat’ signifies: I wanted, of course, to be loved by Freud.”) (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921-1933, pp. 8-9)

Gay (1988), with his belief that most of Freud’s writings has a autobiographical dimension, also argues that Freud has anxiety in writing Schreber, because it re-opens the wounds of his separation from Fliess, but he struggles to resist the influence of his complexes, of which he is partly aware of. Gay concludes, ‘To study Schreber was to remember Fliess, but to remember Fliess was also to understand Schreber.’ (p. 279). If Freud sees a shadow of Fliess in Ferenczi, Freud’s definition of collaboration as dictation would be meaningful in the context of his attempt to seal off Ferenczi’s involvement in this project. He only allows Ferenczi to hear the final product of his thoughts, by dictating him to write them down word-for-word. Furthermore, given the similarity of Schreber’s father complex with that of Ferenczi, as well as their femininity, Schreber-Fliess-Ferenczi may contain much complicated entanglement that Freud may want to differentiate by blocking Ferenczi’s way of collaboration.

Breger (2000) interprets it as Freud’s fear of a psychotic breakdown, ‘Freud saw his own longings for love, whether from Fliess or Ferenczi, as “homosexual” impulses, so dangerous they could cause a psychosis, and he forcefully suppressed them: “I have succeeded where the paranoid fades.”’ (p. 344). If this is the case, Freud’s definition of love has a primacy in gender, whereas for Ferenczi’s, in introjection, mutually, as merging of two selves.

The residual of Ferenczi’s tragedy of love can be seen in some contemporary analysts’ thought about Ferenczi and love, e.g., ‘Ferenczi, from the conservative point of view, is still the absolute psychoanalytic bête noir when it comes to “love”’ (Vida, 2002, p. 436, bête noir refers to someone highly disliked).

Haynal (1993a) notes the repetition of Freud’s involvement in triangular relationship as a pattern, ‘After the triangular situation formed by Breuer, Anna O, and Freud, Freud was to find himself – as far as we know – on two more occasions at least, involved in similar transference-triggered love affairs: that between Sabina Spielrein and Carl Gustav Jung and, a few years later, that between Elma Pálos and Sándor Ferenczi.’ (p. 55).

Ferenczi’s younger brother, Lajos, married Magda in 1909 (Berman, 2004). So, after marrying Gizella in 1919, Ferenczi became the step-father-in-law of his brother, and yet, Magda was both Ferenczi’s step-daughter (with respect to his marriage to Gizella), step-daughter-in-law (with respect to his step-father-in-law relationship with Lajos), and sister-in-law (with respect to his sibling relationship with Lajos). What is more important, as suggested by Rudnytsky (2011), the elder sister of Magda, ‘Elma, was also (at least by poetic license) his sister-in-law!’ (p. 21), given Ferenczi’s sibling relationship with Lajos and Elma being Magda’s elder sister.
116 In his New Year letter on 2 Jan 1910, Ferenczi sent his greeting with Frau G. too, ‘Best regards from me and Frau G. – She thanks you for the New Year’s wishes.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 120)

117 Freud spells Gizella’s name here as ‘Gisela’ which was the name of Freud’s first love, Gisela Fluss. The young Freud first met her in the summer of 1871, and then in 1872, in which he ‘had fallen head over heels in love with her, but feigned near-indifference, hiding his true feeling’ (Boehlich, 1990, p. xviii). Later, Freud used a different strategy. He ‘pretends that his affection lies with the mother, not with the daughter, that he has transferred his esteem for the mother to friendship for the daughter.’ (ibid., p. xviii). However, Freud also has his own feeling for the mother, ‘I am full of admiration for this woman whom none of her children can fully match.’ (Freud & Silberstein, 1871-1881, p. 17). Freud sees Gizella as the ideal combination of feminine beauty and psychoanalytic potential. She is also an echo of his archival passion for Gisela Fluss and her mother during his adolescence almost 40 years ago.

118 Abraham (1924) writes about it as some kind of mental eating, meaning taking objects into oneself and then assimilating them into one’s mind.

119 On 3 Jan 1911, Ferenczi also told Freud, ‘One must from time to time interrupt communication by letter with a personal one, otherwise one all too easily loses contact with reality and corresponds not with a really living person but with one that one makes up in fantasy at one’s pleasure.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 248)

120 The unmarried daughter referred to Elma, who was the elder daughter. Later letters would reveal her emotional difficulties that required much attention from Gizella and even Ferenczi. Ferenczi’s worry about kidney problem turned out to be unwarranted (ibid., p. 159, n. 5)

121 To recap, on 14 July 1911, Ferenczi wrote to Freud, ‘Just think, I decided to take her daughter (Elma) into psychoanalytic treatment; the situation, you see, was becoming unbearable.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 296, italics added).

122 In his very first letter to Gizella, sent via Ferenczi, on 17 Dec 1911, Freud wrote about Ferenczi’s seeking advice from him on his choice between Gizella and Elma, ‘Our friend has hurt me very much and has forced me, myself, to give advice in which my feelings do not participate.’ (ibid., p. 319). In the same letter, Freud also described his decision as ‘painful uncertainty’ (ibid., p. 321). Also, after their urgent meeting in Vienna, Ferenczi went back to Budapest. Freud wrote to Ferenczi, ‘I had a difficult week in which I wasn’t able to work at all’ (ibid., p. 319).

123 This shows Ferenczi’s advantage, if an unethical one, in playing dual roles as analyst and lover to Elma.

124 Some two weeks into Freud’s analysis of Elma, Ferenczi told Freud more about what Freud’s involvement mean to him, or to them, ‘The role that you play in this important matter in my life makes it necessary for me to raise honesty to a peak and to tell you things about myself which you would perhaps rather be spared knowledge of.’ (ibid., p. 336, letter from Ferenczi to Freud dated 27 Jan 1912).

125 Freud’s actual wording is a little different. On 17 Nov 1911, Freud wrote, ‘Whatever you don’t have coming to you is Rebach’ (ibid., p. 314). According to the editors’ footnote,
Rebach means credit or gain in Yiddish.

126 Some 55 years later, Elma, at 80, had a chance to recall her 3-month analysis by Freud, when she was interviewed by Paul Roazen in her New York Apartment in the spring of 1967, three years before her death. By then, Roazen was working on his big project of oral history by interviewing figures, notably analysts and patients, of the early history of psychoanalysis who were still alive. Roazen (1997) reported that his interest in the history of psychoanalysis rendered Elma agreeing to see him. Elma was sure that the analysis was arranged by her parents and paid by her father, but she was less sure it was under Ferenczi’s influence. Elma remembered her father as a ‘kind soft man’ (p. 56) and ‘tender and passive’ (p. 57), but was unlucky in everything. He became deaf and could not communicate with people and was sad. Elma saw her father as accepting of everything and he did not even have the courage to face the romance between Ferenczi and his wife Gizella. On the other hand, Elma recalled that Freud was very nice, though at the beginning of the analysis, she was very frightened but Freud was very easy to talk to. She thought Freud helped her much and that she went back to Hungary ‘as a different person’ (p. 56). Elma still remembered that in her youth, she was ‘an unbalanced girl’ as ‘her youth took hold’ of her (p. 56). When the analysis ended, Freud gave her these words, ‘as soon as you understood something you could make use of it’ (p. 56). However, she dated the analysis 1907, which was 5 years earlier than the correct year.

127 Ferenczi told Freud, ‘Since Elma is inclined to hide things, or more precisely, to reveal them elsewhere, in the interest of her analysis, I want to share with you the content of today’s letter from her.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 329, letter dated 18 Jan 1912). To further complicate the matter, Elma also told her father the details of her analysis. Palos, whom Ferenczi described to Freud as ‘a very eccentric, self-centred person’ (ibid., p. 327), was obviously upset and at the beginning wanted to intervene by trying to write Freud a letter, but probably did not exert much effect, given Ferenczi’s stronger intervention on Freud, ‘Please don’t allow yourself to be influenced in the slightest by his remarks. I don’t think he wants anything but to show that he, too, is there, and I think he would consider himself happy if you replied to him and perhaps dropped a flattering phrase about his intellect or his style of writing.’ (ibid., p. 327-328, letter dated 17 Jan 1912)

128 Elma appeared firmer than Ferenczi in her entanglement in this triangular love affair. In a letter to her mother, she wrote ‘Let Sándor know that I am almost always thinking about him. I wish so much to see him happy and myself with him. I certainly hope very, very much that everything will turn out well – but I am anxious about the future. My character is so unbalanced, such a terrible chaos is reigning in me that it would be a risk for anyone to take me as a wife. … Your untroubled feeling deserved to be spared more than mine. My future is a series of difficulties anyway’ (ibid., p. 329, quoted in Ferenczi’s letter to Freud dated 18 Jan 1912).

129 The instruction of waiting was first issued by Freud as he urgently asked Ferenczi to stop Elma’s treatment immediately and ‘don’t decide anything yet’ (ibid., p. 319, letter from Freud to Ferenczi dated 5 Dec 1911). Further on, there was a shared understanding that Freud’s treatment of Elma was meant to help Ferenczi make up his mind. Two weeks into Elma’s treatment, with Freud reporting little accomplishment, Freud remarked to Ferenczi, ‘I know that a decision will be possible for you only after the end of the treatment’ (ibid., p. 333, letter from Freud to Ferenczi dated 23 Jan 1912, my italics).

130 Some weeks before the Easter for which Freud and Ferenczi were to go for a trip to the island of Arbe, Freud was firm about the termination, ‘Things have come to a total halt with Elma. … Easter is near, and I don’t want to keep her over Easter’ (ibid., p. 360, letter from Freud to Ferenczi dated 18 Mar 1912). Evidently, Elma had protested against the
termination. She ‘doesn’t seem to finish with me; i.e., because of the transference she wishes to extend her stay past Easter, which I don’t want to do. So I am cooling off noticeably again.’ (ibid., p. 362, letter from Freud to Ferenczi dated 24 Mar 1912)

131 Also, in Oct 1914, with the outbreak of WWI, Ferenczi was enlisted to the Hungarian cavalry as a Hussar Officer and posted to a small garrison town of Pápa. Away from Gizella and Elma, Ferenczi spent his free time translating Freud’s writings into Hungarian, drafting short psychoanalytic papers, continuing with self-observation and analysis about himself and his somatic illness (Hoffer, 1996).

132 The Elma episode did not really end with Ferenczi marrying Gizella in 1919. Even as late as 1927, Elma came back to the Ferenczi-Gizella dyad; by then, Ferenczi was 54, Gizella, 64 and Elma, 40. Gizella proposed a solution by divorcing Ferenczi so that he could marry Elma. The couple, Vilma and Frédéric Kovács, was personal friends of Ferenczi and Gizella. In a letter dated 8 Jan 1927 to his wife, during his stay in Groddeck sanitorium in Baden-Baden, Kovács wrote, ‘Groddeck told me yesterday when he made his regular visit to me: Ferenczi loved Gizella first, when he got engaged to Elma. The couple, Vilma and Frédéric Kovács, was personal friends of Ferenczi and Gizella. In a letter dated 8 Jan 1927 to his wife, during his stay in Groddeck sanitorium in Baden-Baden, Kovács wrote, ‘Groddeck told me yesterday when he made his regular visit to me: Ferenczi loved Gizella first, when he got engaged to Elma; but the engagement was broken off, and she got married in America, and it was then that Ferenczi married Gizella. What do you say to that? What’s more, Gizella’s dearest wish, at present, and her plan, is that Sándor should divorce her and marry Elma – she would not give him up for any other women, only for Elma – and she would content herself with playing the role of the mother.’ (Kovács & Kovács, 1927, p. 120)

133 For the first round of analysis in 1914, Jones (1955) writes, ‘On the last day of the month Ferenczi came to Vienna to be analyzed by Freud, but this was unfortunately interrupted after three weeks by his being called up.’ (p. 174). For the second round in 1916, Jones (1955) is equally brief, ‘In the middle of June Ferenczi came to Vienna for three weeks and was analyzed for two hours a day; but this was again abruptly brought to an end through his military duties.’ (p. 189) Jones does not even mention the third round that was to take place in September and October of 1916. Kerr (1993), on the other hand, argues that the first training analysis that Freud gave Ferenczi occurred as early as in their first summer vacation in Berchtesgaden in 1908, as Ferenczi, ‘under Freud’s watchful eye… also discussing his own personal foibles’ (p. 199).

134 Makari (2008) writes, ‘In an attempt to resolve his ambivalence, Ferenczi asked Freud to take him into analysis. In 1914, three weeks of analysis took place, just before Ferenczi was called up for duty. The two men met briefly two more times to take up Ferenczi’s analysis.’ (p. 309)

135 As noted in the previous Chapter, 1912 is also the year that Freud analyzes Elma after Ferenczi’s counter-transferential failure in the analysis of Elma. Freud returns Elma to Ferenczi before the Easter, after a brief analysis of 3 months. Dupont (1994) argues that Elma’s analysis by Freud is a prelude to Ferenczi’s analysis by Freud, as Ferenczi’s ‘first attempt to obtain an analysis from Freud, as it were by proxy’ (p. 302).

136 This draft is included as letter ‘340F’ in the Freud/Jung letters. The editor remarks that this letter was ‘apparently not sent, was found among Freud’s papers’ (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 536, n.1). This is evidenced in Freud’s letter to Ferenczi on 30 Dec 1912, ‘The letter to Jung has not been sent and will not be replaced by another.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1908-1914, p. 457). However, Freud later changes his mind and writes a revised letter of the proposed break-up to Jung on 3 Jan 1913. On 5 Jan 1913, he reports to Ferenczi the reason of his change of mind, ‘I will share with you the fact that I found a few good, polite, but unambiguous sentences to put an end to my private relations with Jung’ (ibid., p. 459), which is, ‘It is a convention among us analysts that none of us feel ashamed of his own bit
of neurosis. But one who while behaving abnormally keeps shouting that he is normal gives ground for the suspicion that he lacks insight into his illness.’ (Freud & Jung, 1906-1923, p. 539, dated 3 Jan 1913)

137 Once, Freud draws a similarity between Ferenczi and Jung in their approach to his inner world. On 22 July 1914, Freud writes to Ferenczi, ‘[Y]ou overestimate Jung’s significance for my emotional life in much the same way he did.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 6)

138 Dupont (1994) has a very brief interpretation of Ferenczi’s dream about Minna, instead of Martha, being his mother, while Freud was his father, ‘One could not be clearer about the transference’ (p. 303).

139 In 22 July 1914, Freud writes to Ferenczi about their difference in approach, ‘You grasp things differently and for that reason often put a strain on me.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 6)

140 Ferenczi writes to Groddeck on the Christmas Day of 1921, that Elma ‘should have been my wife; indeed who was in effect my bride until a somewhat disparaging remark of Freud’s prompted me to fight this love tooth and nail – literally to push the girl away from me’ (Ferenczi & Groddeck, 1921-1933, p. 9)

141 Freud tries, rather desperately, to connect with Ferenczi on 14 Aug 1914, not sure whether the mail will still deliver, ‘I am attempting it with a card. What are you doing? Where are you? We have been together in Vienna since the 5th of the month, except for Martin, who voluntarily enlisted in Salzburg, and Annerl, who is cut off in England. I am lacking all the concentration for work. These are hard times, our interests depreciated, for the time being.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 11)

142 For a collection of Tausk’s papers, see Roazen (1991), especially his paper, published posthumously, on the ‘Influencing Machine’ (Tausk, 1933).

143 See also, e.g. Falzeder’s (1997) speculation on Freud’s difficulty in deciding whether to take Ferenczi into analysis, that Freud felt tempted, intellectually, to analyze ‘such an interesting, brilliant and complicated person’ (p. 424) as Ferenczi. In addition, he liked Ferenczi a lot and did want to help him and to prove to him that Freud’s opinion regarding his marriage dilemma would be best for him.

144 In comparison, he has nothing to say to Gizella after writing her a sincere letter on his first day at Pápa.

145 Freud expects Ferenczi to focus on psychoanalysis with respect to intellectual editorial work or writing, instead of being the demoralized patient. On 9 Nov 1914, Freud shows his discontent, ‘I conclude from your actions that you still haven’t pulled yourself together, and I am very dissatisfied with that.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 24)

146 Ferenczi mentions in the same letter that he has been selected by the commander to be promoted to the post of ‘Chief Physician’.

147 Jean-Baptiste (Antoine Pierre) de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck (1744-1829) was a French natural scientist and the founder of biology. In his monumental work, Zoological Philosophy, he argued against the immutability of species. He believed that feature of organisms are changed by environment, which would then be encoded in the genotype and passed onto to future generations. This theory was endorsed by most scientists of the 18th and 19th centuries. While the thinking of Freud and Ferenczi were much influenced by
Lamarck, their planned collaborative work on it was never actualized (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 102, n. 4). The Lamarckian thesis, however, finds its way into Ferenczi’s *Thalassa* in 1923.

For Ferenczi’s interest in the Lamarckian idea, it can be traced back to some months even earlier, as he wrote to Jones on 15 May 1915, ‘I am thinking about problems on the frontier of psychology and biology; whether something useful will come of it is very much in doubt.’ (Ferenczi & Jones, 1911-1933, p. 69). Rudnytsky (2013b) observes that such problems are linked to Lamarck’s phlogenetic theory which sets the theoretical frame for Ferenczi’s later works, *Thalassa*.

On 27 Feb 1917, Ferenczi reports very good recovery, ‘[t]here is a noticeable improvement in my condition: gain in energy and body weight, lowering of pulse rate.’ (ibid., p. 293)

Ferenczi (1916-1917) writes about his shame at the truncated collaboration with Freud, that could well include the Lamarckian Project, as he has not ‘achieved any of the work planned in common with [Freud]’ (p. 302)

In the difficult days, especially for Vienna, in WWI, Ferenczi is very generous, paying much and extra effort, as he mails from Budapest daily necessity to Freud in Vienna, helping out Freud much with respect to the material need. For example, on 27 May 1917, Ferenczi writes to Freud, ‘It is not beyond the realm of a possibility that in the near future I will be successful, by means of a munitions transport at the Vienna arsenal, in having more important provisions than bread (sugar, lard, flour) sent to your address.’ (Freud & Ferenczi, 1914-1919, p. 208). Ferenczi even jokingly adds, ‘It won’t be goose liver.’ (ibid., p. 208).

Some years later in March 1921, Oskar Pfister, a Swiss Protestant clergyman and, against all odds, Freud’s good friend, who maintained correspondence with Freud for 30 years, criticized Groddeck as ‘wavers between science and belles lettres’ (Freud & Pfister, 1909-1939, p. 81). Freud defended Groddeck, ‘I am not giving up my view of Groddeck either, I am usually not so easily taken in by anybody.’ (ibid., p. 82)

On 8 June 1917, Freud mails Groddeck’s letter to Ferenczi, after he has written his first reply letter to Groddeck on 5 June 1917, in which he introduces Ferenczi to Groddeck as he draws upon Groddeck’s idea of the impact of the unconscious on somatic process, ‘My friend Ferenczi who knows about this has a paper on pathoneurosis waiting to be printed in the *Internationale Zeitschrift* which is very close in its ideas to yours.’ (Groddeck & Freud, 1917-1934, p. 37)

Freud wrote to Eitingon on 29 August 1932 to halt Ferenczi’s presentation of the paper, ‘He must be prevented from reading his essay [COT]. Either he presents another one, or none at all.’ Cited in Hazan (1999, p.341, n.1).

Freud’s letter to Anna Freud on 3 September 1932, which has just been published in English, provides us with the scenario from Freud’s side, ‘So the Ferenczis came before 4 o’clock. She as kind as ever, from him an icy coldness. Without further ado or greeting he began: I want to read you my paper. This he did, and I listened appalled. He has regressed completely to aetiological views, which I held thirty-five years ago and have abandoned, that the regular cause of neuroses is crude sexual dreams in childhood; he uses almost the same words as I did back then. … The conclusions confused, artificial and unclear. The whole thing in fact stupid or seemingly so because it is so insincere and incomplete. … The paper appeared harmless to me and can only damage him… .’ (Freud & Freud, 1904-1939, p. 386). From Ferenczi’s side, we have Fromm’s record of Ferenczi’s ‘conversation with a
trusted friend and disciple’ (Fromm, 1959, p. 63): ‘The Professor listened to my exposition with increasing impatience and finally warned me that I was treading on dangerous ground and was departing fundamentally from the traditional customs and techniques of psychoanalysis. Such yielding to the patient’s longings and desires – no matter how genuine – would increase his dependence on the analyst. Such dependence can only be destroyed by the emotional withdrawal of the analyst. In the hands of unskilled analysts, my method, the Professor said, might easily lead to sexual indulgence rather than an expression of parental devotion. This warning ended the interview. I held out my hand in affectionate adieu. The Professor turned his back on me and walked out of the room.’ (ibid., pp. 64-65).

156 In the final lines of the final entry (2 October 1932) of his Clinical Diary, Ferenczi (1932) is also writing about sins: ‘Sin Confession Forgiveness There must be punishment. (Contrition.)’ (p. 215), in the context of Ferenczi’s thinking about his mutual analysis, an unsuccessful one, with Severn.

157 On the other hand, Freud wrote to Eitingon on 24 Aug 1932, in the midst of the heightened tension between Freud and Ferenczi, ‘In Fer’s case I am, for once, completely blameless’ (quoted in Hoffer, 2010, p. 97).

158 See also Galton (2006) for a more exhaustive psychoanalytic understanding of ‘touch’ in analysis.

159 Dr. Marianne Horney Eckardt, born in 1913, a daughter of Karen Horney, is probably one of the longest living psychoanalysts. At 100, she is still seeing patients. In an interview by Jeffrey Rubin who regards her as ‘a treasure trove of insights about psychoanalytic history’ (Rubin, 2014, p. 119), Eckardt states that Psychoanalysis is ‘evolving and [she doesn’t] think it has taken any wrong turns’ (ibid., p. 116). She also warns about idealization of psychoanalytic figures, as well as the destructive effect of some psychoanalytic schools that tends to pathologize people. In particular, she highly values the analyst’s curiosity, humility and creativity. Her life is a living exemplar of such values, and also reminiscent of Ferenczi himself. With her long life, she has been living concurrently, or even witnessing almost the whole history of psychoanalysis for herself.

160 In discussing the aetiology of hysteria and obsessional neurosis, Freud (1896) first used the term psycho-analysis, and yet he did not attribute this ‘new method’ to himself, ‘I owe my results to a new method of psycho-analysis, Josef Breuer’s exploratory procedure; it is a little intricate, but it is irreplaceable, so fertile has it shown itself to be in throwing light upon the obscure paths of unconscious ideation.’ (p. 151).

161 Ffytche (2012), in his attempt to answer the question of ‘where does psychoanalysis begin?’ (p. 1), arrives at ‘a new and more complex account of the emergence of the idea of the unconscious’, ‘giving psychoanalysis a much deeper historical context’ (p. 2). He provides a more profound historical account of the development of the unconscious as a prevalent idea before Freud’s. For a similar question of where Ferenczi’s psychoanalysis begins, Ferenczi’s character and his pre-psychoanalytic days are areas where possible answers could be found.

162 Lu (2011) distinguishes between ‘psychohistory, which refers to reductive studies championing the psychoanalytic lens with little regard for historical method, and psychoanalytic history, which utilizes depth psychology only when appropriate, as one perspective out of many upon which the historian can draw. The latter emphasizes responsible history, rather than advancing one particular approach to it.’ (p. 24, note 1). This distinction advocates the optimal and accountable application of the psychoanalytic method in enriching, instead of replacing, history by psychohistory. Similar lines of thought on
psychobiography have been expressed by Bergmann (1973) too, ‘By its very nature, a psychoanalytic biography is a partial biography. It may highlight what biographers have ignored, draw attention to links others have missed, but a full length psychoanalytic biography is difficult to visualize.’ (p. 844). Rosenwald (2012) also reminds about the significant function of history itself, ‘historical study … protects the psychobiographer against making extravagant, simplistic, and/or decontextualized interpretations.’ (p. 375)

Spurling (2003) portrays one aspect of the counter-transference as, ‘the psychoanalytic figure being written about is part of oneself” (p. 34).

Fantasies, for Freud, ‘are psychic facades produced in order to bar access to these memories’ (Freud & Fliess, 1887-1904, p. 240; letter from Freud to Fliess dated 2 May 1897, Enclosure Draft L, *The Architecture of Hysteria*). The memories refers to those of the ‘earliest [sexual] scenes’ (ibid., p. 240). So, even fantasy is not just internal but has some bearing or linkage to an external event as mediated by memory.

Figlio also highlights Freud’s fear of doubles in the case of Viktor Tausk who simply took Freud’s thinking as his own.

Balint (1969) shares a similar position. Blum (2004), however, does not believe that the impact to the psychoanalytic community is really that traumatic. Instead, he argues that the horror of the holocaust, in comparison, was far more horrible and traumatic to psychoanalysts of that generation, and that the ‘trauma’ of the Freud-Ferenczi controversy ‘pales by comparison’ (p. 4). Erös (2012) conceives the history of psychoanalysis in Eastern Europe as a bit of both, in that it has ‘multiple layers that concern persons, groups, movements, intellectual currents, and ideologies which had been excluded, marginalized by, or fallen victim to Communist policies in different periods and in different ways.’ (p. 204-205)

Figlio (2012) writes about mutual creation in the earliest form of ego and object and their differentiation: that ‘difference has to be established. There is no pre-existent ego and object. They are mutually created in projection and introjection.’ (p. 18)

Kerr (2010) notes that, even in the early days of psychoanalysis, i.e., in the early 1900s, Freud had ‘policed papers prior to publication, at times inserting his own paragraphs’ (p. 506). Yet, in the case of Ferenczi, other than this final paper of *Confusion of Tongues*, Freud had never prohibited him from publishing anything.

Similarly, Haynal (2014) visualizes Mészáros (2014)’s portrayal of Ferenczi’s lasting influence as ‘the seed planted by Ferenczi grew into an enormous oak with a great many branches that would stretch into the skies of psychoanalysis.’ (p. xx).

According to Stepansky (1999), Freud once used surgery as a metaphor of psychoanalysis. Ferenczi preferred ‘midwifery of thought’ (p. 81) instead.
References


Ferenczi, S. (1917) Review of ‘Die Psychische Bedingheit und Psychoanalytische


Ferenczi, S. (1929a) The Unwelcome Child and its Death Instinct. In M. Balint (ed.) & E. Mosbacher (trans.) *Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of


Kaku, M. (2014) The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest to Understand,
Enhance, and Empower the Mind. NY: Doubleday.
Press.


Appendix 1

References for Ferenczi’s papers on Introduction*


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*This listing of the English translation of Ferenczi’s works might not have captured all of Ferenczi’s writings on Introjection, especially those papers written in Hungarian and German which are not yet translated into English (please also see Appendix 2). However, this is a limitation faced by most researchers who use English sources. It may be ameliorated if there is a complete collection of Ferenczi’s works in English.
Appendix 2

A bibliographical account of Ferenczi’s published works


These three volumes, however, have been critically assessed as ‘hopelessly dated and inaccurate… also incomplete, as many of the early Hungarian articles, some German lectures and most of his trenchant reviews remain untranslated. Finally, the work is not chronologically ordered, nor cross-referenced, nor edited sufficiently to explain the forgotten details of faded debates.’ (Stanton, 1990, p. 55). A more refined translation and selection of Ferenczi’s writings, and yet less cited, was compiled and edited by Julia Borossa in 1999, *Sándor Ferenczi: Selected Writings*, with a total of 27 papers selected from the above-mentioned three-volume series, in addition to six Hungarian papers, four of which written in Ferenczi’s pre-psychoanalytic days. Borossa also further improved upon the translation of the 27 papers; she ‘often had to revise the existing English text, sometimes extensively.’ (ibid., p. xliii), rendering this selection more readable and robust.


Stanton managed to compile a chronological list, from 1899 to 1930, of Ferenczi’s writings in Hungarian or German, which are unreferenced and not yet translated into English (ibid., p. 204-212). He even planned to ‘coordinate a translation and edition of these unpublished texts to form a fourth English volume of Ferenczi’s work’ (ibid., p. 212). Apparently, this plan has not been
materialized. Yet, with the establishment of the Ferenczi Center at The New School for Social Research in New York in 2008, which aims to ‘encourage and facilitate scholarship on Ferenczi and translation of Ferenczi’s works’ (Choder-Goldman, 2010, p. 67), it may become more likely that Ferenczi’s works will be made more available to the English readers.
Appendix 3

A bibliography on Groddeck

Some of Groddeck’s writings in German have been translated into English:


There are three biographies on Groddeck:


In the *George Groddeck Papers*, Special Collections of the Albert Sloman Library of the University of Essex, there are 4 boxes that contain 30 letters from Groddeck to Mary Collins, Oscar Köllerström, her sister, and “Mollie” from 1927 to 1934 (Box 1); Issues of *Die Arche* from 1925 to 1927 (Box 2); English translation of ‘Psychoanalytical Sessions for the Use of Sick People’, lectures by Dr Groddeck in his Sanatorium in Baden-Baden, translated by Roger Lewinter (Box 3); English translation (typescript) of *The Soul-Seeker*, translated by Christian Darnton (Box 4).

As for the French translation, which only covers part of Groddeck’s work, see the lists compiled by Ávila (2003, p. 99, n. 48) and Bianchi (1986, p. 658). On the other hand, there are relatively more written in French about Groddeck, e.g. biography by Roger Lewinter and Jacques-Antoine Malarewicz. A notable work, published in 1978, is the translated lectures of Groddeck’s 115 ‘Psychoanalytic Conferences for the Use of the Ill’ (ibid., p. 658) in Baden-Baden from 1916 to 1919. The English counterpart, translated from the French though, has not been published but archived in Box 3 as noted above in Essex.
For a listing of works on Groddeck as well as Groddeck’s complete works in German, see Ávila (2003, p. 100, n. 51 & 50). See also Bos (1992, p. 434, n. 4).
Appendix 4

Listing of published letters (in English) involving Freud, Ferenczi, or Groddeck


Budapest, am Weihnachtsfage 1921

Lieber Freund,


Mit freundlichen Grüßen,

[Firma]
II.

Auf alle Fälle vorsichtiger als jetzt die Anrupfung der Absicht, mit "als erstem Schaubildungsnach
unseren Verhältnissen. Gehen wir lieber von Aktualitäts
sachen aus. Also:

Der Brief von einem Wochenabend, de
nach einiger endloser, vieler, 8 Uhr 30, in denen
ich fast ohne Atmen, mit ganz abgespannter Hand an
fast publizisch (me, dumm die eig-
verständlich) erwartete und mein ganzes Verhalten
in die gebunden, in großer präzisierenden von Ende
im Gedächtnis. Der Brief spricht nicht zu einer
antagonistischen Stimmung. Er hat mir, wie ich es
mit moralischer Ausdrucksweise auf, als fast
wenn Preis - mein auch mir teilweise zu
den vornehmsten - mein auch mir teilweise zu de-
vermeinten - meine von der Töchter die meine
von mir entfernte Liebe von ihrer Töchter die meine
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von mir entfernte Liebe von ihrer Töchter die meine
von mir entfernte Liebe von ihrer Töcher...
Im J. 1915. als ich in einer kleinen, rübigemütigen Halle übers 
Gebäude ging, entschloß ich, meine Entwicklung 
als neue Tatsache und Großartigkeit der Geschobenheit 
richtiger als Reaktion der Thiere auf die Entscheidung 
von Gefahr bei der Aufnahme auszudrücken. 
Die Rede mündete in eine Schriftstelle. Manchmal war 
ich in einem neuen, oft einmal, nein, meine 
Stelle es heut Fei, Kaul, Jone, Abraham 
eh, Gell, trotzlich gut in Aletheeren. Mein 
Schweizer, von neuer Art hab' ich, die nach 
meinem Ankunft erweitert ist). 
Zu gleicher Zeit entstand meine vor der Art 
Salone (neue, das war, noch in 1914, in München), 
meine philosophischen Untersuchungen, die meiner 
feuchten, neues, Jahres, entsprechen, wenn auch 
ein wenig von „Jeffersons“ entsprechen, aber im 
zu gelernt, der Macht zur Prognose span 
noch viel, immer noch so, mit 
dieser augenblicklich, halt, dieser unverwüstlichen, 
kleinen Impressionen, derischen, damals 
mein nicht ganz unstift 
man nicht gewachsen ist. Sie 
liegen, hier, der, in der Stätte - 
ich, aber auch, in der, die, das 
feine studiere, leider, ich, ein 
Vorträge zu halten. 
Pfosten in ihren 
Verträge zu halten. 
Denn trotz so, aus der, soll es spreken, 
keine Worte noch geschrieben oder cortierte.


Ihr, [Name]

P.S.: Denken Sie daran, dass auch ich Ihre Sorgen teile.
Sagt mir da der alte Jude,
Sagt mir da der alte Jude,
Sagt mir da der alte Jude.

Einsfälle von Weihnachtsabend im englischen Stil...

Guten an Weihnachtsabend im englischen Stil...

Kinder, ein etwas 'bei' 'spiel' gespielt. 

Keine, und etwas 'bei' 'spiel' gespielt. Töchter, nicht aus der Stadt...
IV. Die Sonne, die Kuh, ist nach mir aufgezogen.

Ja, die Sonne, die Kuh, ist nach mir aufgezogen.

Die Sonne, die Kuh, ist nach mir aufgezogen.

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Ja, die Sonne, die Kuh, ist nach mir aufgezogen.

Die Sonne, die Kuh, ist nach mir aufgezogen.

Ja, die Sonne, die Kuh, ist nach mir aufgezogen.
Fay ist ein Familiename. Aber das Vor- oder Hervorheben, nicht tröpflich oder affektv, was geben hat, was ich nicht.


3. Nachtrag.

Appendix 6
A sample letter from the unpublished letters between Jung and Ferenczi
(Courtesy of Judith Dupont)

Dr C.G. Jung,
Burghölzli, Zürich, 1.X.07.

Verehrter Herr College!

Besten Dank für Ihre Nachrichten! Sie waren ja
förmlich verschollen! Ich habe immer lebhaft bedauert,
dass Sie nicht mehr Zeit zur Verfügung hatten (was auch
damals leider für mich der Fall war), sodass ich nur
Gelegenheit für einige Weisheitssprüche hatte und nicht
für eine tüchtige wissenschaftliche Arbeit, die einem ja
immer gut thut, auch wenn man später keine wissenschaft-
liche Laufbahn ergreifen will. So habe ich jetzt auf
Ihnen ein gewisses sentiment d’immmen d’incomplétude, näm-
lich dass Sie bei uns nicht Alles prophiiert hätten,
was Sie hätten profitieren können. Wir haben jetzt hier
eine Freud’sche Gesellschaft gegründet, die etwa alle 14
Tage zusammenkommt. Am letzten Freitag hatten wir die
erste Zusammenkunft, wobei Dr. Main und Dr. Riklin Referate
hatten. Es waren 12 Personen anwesend. Ich empfehle Ihnen,
später, wenn Sie einmal mehr Leute zu Freud verführt
haben, das Gleiche zu thun. Soetwas ist ungemein fördernd.

Das Jendraschik’sche Urteil wundert mich gar
nicht. Bei uns hat sogar Bezzola, der ja nur von Freud
lebt, das gleiche Urtheil. Ich habe in Amsterdam gesehen,
dass die Leute noch ganz erschreckend wenig wissen und
deshalb geradezu blödsinnig urtheilen.
Es ist sehr aufmerksam von Ihnen, dass Sie hier et-was vergessen haben (!). Ich werde Ihnen die Sache gleich schicken. Dem Dr. Main werde ich alles ausrichten.

Ihre Handschrift hat sich auffallend verändert, wenn ich Ihren jetzigen und Ihren früheren Brief vergleiche. Im Namen Freuds erlaube ich mir die Bemerkung, dass Ihre frühere Handschrift das Symptom einer leichten Gezirtheit zeigte, das jetzt ganz verschwunden ist.


Früher: L. jetzt L. etc.

Verzeihen Sie gütigst, man kann das Métier nicht lassen.

Empfangen Sie die herzlichsten Grüße von Ihrem ganz ergebenen Jung

Viele Grüße an Dr. Stein!