ANXIETY’S AMBIGUITY
VIA KIERKEGAARD & HEIDEGGER

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation produces a systematic account of anxiety, and does so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The methodology of this dissertation is such that it interprets the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and also interprets the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. By this method this dissertation harmonizes the accounts of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and in this way produces a systematic account of anxiety by way of these two authors. In particular, this dissertation argues that anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger has a particular structure: that it is ambiguous, which means that it is structurally constituted by an antipathy (a repulsion) and a sympathy (an attraction). In harmonizing Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s accounts of anxiety in this way, this dissertation produces a systematic account of ambiguous anxiety.
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I think [Johann Sebastian Bach] would have been delighted by any sound that was born out of a respect for the necessity, the abstract necessity, of [his] structures²

Glenn Gould

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to produce a systematic account of anxiety, and do so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by two thinkers: Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The method of this dissertation is such that on the one hand I will interpret the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and on the other hand I will also interpret the concept of anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. It is through this double interpretation that I will attempt to produce a systematic account of anxiety.

The choice of Kierkegaard and Heidegger here is motivated by the fact that the concept of anxiety is central to these two authors’ major productions. Regarding Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings, Haufniensis’ 1844 *The Concept of Anxiety* is, of course, Kierkegaard’s key text regarding anxiety, and yet his other pseudonymous texts revolve around this one in such a way that any full appreciation of *Anxiety* must be supplemented by the other pseudonymous writings. In approaching Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety I will approach his pseudonymous writings in this way: I hold *Anxiety* to be at the core of that pseudonymous oeuvre, and I will use various other pseudonymous writings to supplement *Anxiety*. Regarding Heidegger’s 1927 *Being and Time*, one of the central concepts in that book is the concept of anxiety. Indeed anxiety is literally at the center of that text in that it is the central concept at both the end of ‘Division One’ and the beginning of ‘Division Two’ and thus also marks the divide. Thus I approach *Being and Time* in this way: I hold that the concept of anxiety is at the core of *Being and Time*, and I will use the rest of *Being and Time*, and indeed some of the other writings of Heidegger from around this same period, as supplements. Anxiety is at the heart of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre as well as at the heart of Heidegger’s *Being and Time* – like that white icicle at the core of Picasso’s last *Weeping Woman*.

And while the concept of anxiety is central to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous productions as well as Heidegger’s magnum opus, I use these two thinkers in this dissertation to produce a systematic account of anxiety. Again this will be done by way of the method of interpreting the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and also interpreting the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. Through this method I will produce an interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard which harmonizes with my interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, and my interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger will harmonize

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with my interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard: in short through my method I will produce a systematic account of anxiety drawing from these two thinkers.

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This dissertation has two parts. Part I interprets anxiety in Kierkegaard (that is, Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, using _Anxiety_ as the centrepiece and various other pseudonymous writings as supplements), and part II interprets anxiety in Heidegger (that is, uses the concept of anxiety at the core of _Being and Time_ as the centrepiece, and uses the rest of _Being and Time_ and various other writings of the same period as supplements). But since I am always implicitly interpreting the anxiety in Kierkegaard by way of Heidegger, and vice versa, this means that part I is always implicitly interpreted by way of part II, and part II is always implicitly interpreted by way of part I. In this way a balance between the two parts will be achieved, such that all the central concepts of each part will be mirrored in the other part. But, in accordance with the nature of a mirror image, the _movement_ of each part, as I will now specify, is inverted: for part I has a retrogressive movement, while part II has a progressive movement.

Part I interprets anxiety in Kierkegaard, always implicitly by way of Heidegger, and interprets anxiety _retrogressively_. As I will argue in detail, anxiety, within Kierkegaard’s writings themselves, has a particular structure – anxiety is _ambiguous_, that is, it has an antipathetic (repulsion) and sympathetic (attraction) aspect. I specify that, in Kierkegaard, there are three different encounters which spirit may have with this ambiguous anxiety, and interlinked with each of these encounters are three different corresponding modes of spirit. For, as I will detail in this part of the dissertation, anxiety can be encountered in such a way that it is manifest – that is, its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest – and one uses this anxiety as a springboard to perpetually spring into the mode of spirit called faith; anxiety can be encountered in such a way that it is manifest – its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest – and yet one uses this anxiety as a springboard to perpetually spring into the mode of spirit called sin; and finally anxiety can be encountered in the mode of spirit called spiritlessness such that anxiety does not show itself as it is, but shows itself in a heavily disguised form – and here the disguise is such that the sympathetic aspect is completely covered over while the antipathetic aspect partially shows itself. Now, in order to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard, I hold that we must track the _movement_ through the three encounters of anxiety, showing how each encounter is related to the next. Haufniensis tells us that when anxiety is encountered such that it gives rise to faith, this is ‘anxiety rightly used’, and thus this encounter is the _telos_ which one ought to achieve. Thus when I say that part I interprets anxiety _retrogressively_, this means that we will track the movement through the three encounters of anxiety by first dealing with manifest ambiguous anxiety _rightly used_ which gives rise
to faith, then dealing with manifest ambiguous anxiety *misused* which gives rise to sin, and finally dealing with ambiguous anxiety as it shows up in spiritlessness in *disguise* — and in proceeding retrogressively in this manner, I detail how each encounter is related to the next. Part I tracks the retrogressive movement through anxiety: a repulsion away-from the *telos*.

Part II interprets anxiety in Heidegger, always implicitly by way of Kierkegaard, and interprets anxiety *progressively*. As I will argue in detail, anxiety, within Heidegger’s writings themselves, has a particular structure — anxiety is *ambiguous*, that is, it has an antipathetic (repulsion) and sympathetic (attraction) aspect. I specify that for Heidegger there are three different encounters which Dasein may have with this ambiguous anxiety, and interlinked with each of these different encounters is a different corresponding mode of existence. For, as I will detail in this part of the dissertation, anxiety can be encountered in the mode of existence called the undifferentiated, in which anxiety does not show itself as it is but shows itself as heavily disguised — and the disguise is such that the sympathetic aspect is completely covered over while the antipathetic aspect partially shows itself; anxiety can be encountered in such a way that it is manifest — its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest — and acts a springboard from which one perpetually springs into the mode of existence called inauthenticity; and anxiety can be encountered in such a way that it is manifest — its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest — and it acts as a springboard from which one perpetually springs into the mode of existence called authenticity. In order to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, I again hold that we must track the *movement* through these three encounters, showing how each is related to the next. Now, assuming that when anxiety is encountered such that it gives rise to authenticity this is anxiety rightly used, I assume that this particular encounter of anxiety is the *telos* which one ought to achieve. Thus when I say that part II interprets anxiety *progressively*, this means that we will track the movement through the three encounters of anxiety by first dealing with how ambiguous anxiety shows up in *disguise* in undifferentiatedness, then dealing with manifest ambiguous anxiety *misused* which gives rise to inauthenticity, and finally dealing with manifest ambiguous anxiety *rightly used* which gives rise to authenticity — and again, in proceeding progressively in this manner I detail the interrelation between each of the encounters. Part II tracks the progressive movement through anxiety: an attraction towards the *telos*.

And thus the interpretative method — the inherent interpretation, from each author to the other, from each part of the dissertation to the other — is always in play, for this is reflected in the mirror image: all of the central concepts from part I are mirrored in part II and vice versa — i.e. the three different encounters with ambiguous anxiety, and the three corresponding modes of spirit/ existence; and further, in accordance with the nature of a mirror image, the respective movements of each part are inverted — i.e. part I moves retrogressively through the three encounters, part II moves progressively. And it is by this
methodology that I attempt to produce a systematic interpretation of anxiety, drawing from these two thinkers. For as part I attempts to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard by tracking the retrogressive movement through its three encounters, and as part II attempts to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger by tracking the progressive movement through its three encounters, taking the two parts together I attempt to produce a systematic interpretation of anxiety drawing from both of these thinkers.

Now, before we proceed with this dissertation I note here a risk in this methodology. For in interpreting Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety through Heidegger’s lens, and in interpreting Heidegger’s account of anxiety through Kierkegaard’s lens, is this dissertation not at risk of forcing an interpretation onto one or both of these authors in an objectionable manner? For example, while this dissertation’s aim is to produce a mirror image of its two parts, such that all the key concepts are mirrored, is such a procedure not going to fall victim to, at least at certain points, forcing a Heideggerian interpretation onto Kierkegaard, and/or forcing a Kierkegaardian interpretation onto Heidegger? Here I want to be clear that the focus of this dissertation is on anxiety, and that I am detailing the structural similarity of ambiguous anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger. And although, as I will detail, anxiety acts as a springboard for sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and in a similar manner acts as a springboard for inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger, I am not arguing that sin is the same thing as inauthenticity, nor that faith is the same thing as authenticity. Rather, I am arguing that the anxiety in both authors is structurally the same, and that they play a similar role in both authors: i.e. ambiguous anxiety acts as a springboard for sin and faith in Kierkegaard and for inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger. But before I can investigate this question in more detail we must first launch into the dissertation itself and observe the details of the mirror image of the readings. Once I have finished with my double interpretation I will, in the Conclusion, address this question of whether and where I have objectionably forced an interpretation.

Secondary Literature

Before we launch into the dissertation itself and detail my interpretation of anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, I will here give an overview of some of the prevalent work in the secondary literature which deals with the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship. In giving this overview I will highlight the way in which this dissertation is related to this secondary literature. In particular, while laying out this overview I will highlight how my dissertation, by focusing on the way anxiety has a similar structure in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger – that is, that it is ambiguous (antipathetic and sympathetic) – gives us three things which we generally do not find in this secondary literature. First, by focusing on the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in both authors we are given an account of the strange
agency involved in both strict sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and both strict inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger. Secondly, by focusing on the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity we are also given an account of faith in Kierkegaard, and authenticity in Heidegger, in which the way one relates to this concept is brought to the forefront. And thirdly, focusing on the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in both authors will lead us to give an account of psychosis in both authors. I will specify in more detail what I mean with all three of these points as we proceed.

In 1927 Heidegger wrote that Kierkegaard was “philosophically essential”5 for him in his analysis of Dasein – but what is the extent of Kierkegaard’s influence upon Heidegger’s Being and Time? Much of the secondary literature on the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship revolves around this question. As is well known, Heidegger, in Being and Time, references Kierkegaard in three different places, all of them being footnotes. The first footnote is from Heidegger’s main section on anxiety – section ‘40’ – and here he writes:

The man who has gone farthest in analysing the phenomenon of anxiety – and again in the theological context of a ‘psychological’ exposition of the problem of original sin – is Søren Kierkegaard. Cf. Der Begriff der Angst [The Concept of Anxiety], 1884 ([SZ 190])

Here Heidegger to a certain degree acknowledges that his account of anxiety is indebted to Kierkegaard’s account of the same concept, and indeed explicitly references Anxiety in this regard. However, here too Heidegger notes that Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety is in the context of a “psychological” exposition, the meaning of which becomes clear in Heidegger’s two other footnotes. That is, Heidegger here seems to be intimating that while Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety was influential, Kierkegaard’s insights are only valuable on the existentiell level, and not the existential-ontological level. In the second footnote this point is stated more clearly:

In the nineteenth century, Søren Kierkegaard explicitly seized upon the problem of existence as an existentiell problem, and thought it through in a penetrating fashion. But the existential problematic was so alien to him (...) Thus, there is more to be learned philosophically from his ‘edifying’ writings than from his theoretical ones – with the exception of his treatise on the concept of anxiety. (SZ 235)

In this second footnote it is clear that Heidegger, in acknowledging his indebtedness to Kierkegaard, holds that Kierkegaard’s helpful insights are to be found only on the existentiell level, since, as Heidegger holds, the existential-ontological problematic remained alien to Kierkegaard. And again, in this second footnote Heidegger explicitly references Anxiety, thus noting that Kierkegaard’s mere existentiell insights from that text were influential upon him.

Finally, in the third footnote Heidegger again repeats that Kierkegaard’s insights are to be found merely on the existentiell level, and this time specifies a place where Kierkegaard came up short regarding the existential-ontological problematic. Kierkegaard’s shortcoming, according to Heidegger, has to do with the existential-ontological concept of temporality.

S. Kierkegaard is probably the one who has seen the existentiell phenomenon of the moment of vision with the most penetration; but this does not signify that he has been correspondingly successful in interpreting it existentially. (…) If, however, such a moment gets experienced in an existentiell manner, then a more primordial temporality has been presupposed, although existentially it has not been made explicit. (SZ 338)

Again the idea here is that while Kierkegaard had influential insights regarding the existentiell experience of time, he did not make explicit the underlying existential-ontological temporality, which, as Heidegger holds, is nevertheless presupposed (unbeknownst to Kierkegaard) in Kierkegaard’s own existentiell insights.

Now, much of the secondary literature on the Heidegger-Kierkegaard relationship takes its lead from these footnotes from Being and Time. As I will show, some agree with Heidegger’s own assessment of his relationship with Kierkegaard, while others (and this is the majority) hold that Heidegger is drastically downplaying the influence, and Kierkegaard’s influence run’s all the way down to Heidegger’s existential-ontological analysis, and even, some hold, beyond it.

Patricia Huntington, in ‘Heidegger’s Reading of Kierkegaard Revisited’⁶, notes how many commentators have indeed agreed with Heidegger’s own assessment of his relationship with Kierkegaard. Huntington notes that commentators have held that Being and Time provides the existential-ontological analysis that is missing in Kierkegaard’s mere existentiell analysis, and further, notes that commentators have held that this comes to have methodological import in Heidegger’s existential-ontological analysis. Huntington notes that is has been held that while Kierkegaard “offer[s] only “ontic-existentiell” descriptions of humans (…) phenomenology supplies the missing “ontological-existential” analysis presupposed by such theories” (p. 44). Huntington also notes that this alleged advancement is expressed in Heidegger’s methodological “systematic Destruktion of Western ontology” (p. 46), which, as some hold according to Huntington, is missing in Kierkegaard’s work.

Michael Wyschogrod, in Kierkegaard and Heidegger⁷, writing of the way each author conceives of temporality, follows Heidegger’s assessment of his relationship with Kierkegaard. Wyschogrod focuses on Heidegger’s claim that Kierkegaard lacked a proper understanding of temporality because Kierkegaard was dominated by Hegelian ontology (SZ 235). Wyschogrod holds that Kierkegaard’s notion

of temporality – as the moment when time intersects the eternal – is dominated by Hegel’s ontology, since, according to Wyschogrod, what Kierkegaard means by the ‘eternal’ is what Hegel meant by ‘Being’. And thus Wyschogrod notes that even though Kierkegaard did have original insights, over and above Hegel, concerning the way in which time intersects the eternal (or Being), nevertheless Kierkegaard was ultimately working within Hegel’s ontology (p. 127): “(Kierkegaard’s) thinking is an acceptance of the traditional ontological categories with the novelty of the existential innovation being rooted not in a basically new ontology but in a new juxtaposition of the old ingredients.” (p. 128)

Joan Stambaugh, in ‘Existential Time in Kierkegaard and Heidegger’ 8, also focuses on the way temporality is conceived in both authors, and again follows Heidegger’s own assessment and holds that “Kierkegaard’s conception of existential time remains psychological in the best sense of the word, whereas Heidegger’s conception claims from the outset to be ontologically oriented” (p. 60), and whereas “Kierkegaard (...) appears to move pretty much within the traditional understanding of time” (p. 48), Heidegger strives to give us a new ontological understanding of time and in this sense “Heidegger’s analysis and interpretation of time is unquestionably more “radical” than that of Kierkegaard’s” (p. 52).

Thus the above sources show that there is a strand in the secondary literature which follows Heidegger’s own assessment of his relationship to Kierkegaard – namely, that Kierkegaard has valuable insights merely on the existentiell level, while he either overlooked the existential-ontological, or was indeed dominated by Hegel’s ontology; and that Heidegger drew from Kierkegaard’s key existentiell insights to produce an original ontology. However, there is also a strand in the secondary literature (and this seems to be the larger group) which does not follow Heidegger’s assessment, who hold that Heidegger radically downplays Kierkegaard’s influence upon him, who hold that Heidegger’s ontology is already found in Kierkegaard, and in some cases hold that Kierkegaard went even beyond Heidegger’s ontology.

Clare Carlisle, in ‘Kierkegaard and Heidegger’ 9, focuses on the ontological concept of temporality in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger – more specifically, focuses on authentic temporality: ‘repetition’, in both authors – and holds that Kierkegaard’s ontology is precisely what Heidegger takes up in Being and Time: “it is precisely Kierkegaard’s ontology (...) that Heidegger takes up and develops in Being and Time.” (p. 429). More specifically, whereas we might normally think of the past as something irrevocable that cannot be changed, Kierkegaard’s notion of repetition, Carlisle argues, emphasizes that the past can be changed since for God all things are possible (p. 424). And, as for Kierkegaard, this notion of repetition emphasizes that we stand in relation to our past by way of encountering it as a possibility

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which can be changed, “[I]ike Kierkegaard, [Heidegger] suggests that the true freedom in repetition involves encountering the past as possibility, rather than in its factual concreteness” (p. 433).

While authors like Carlisle attempt to show that Heidegger’s ontology was already found within Kierkegaard, John Caputo, in ‘Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and the Foundering of Metaphysics’ – while again focusing on the concept of repetition in both authors - takes a further step and claims that Kierkegaard went even beyond Heidegger’s ontological project which we find in the published portion Being and Time. Caputo holds that Kierkegaard – by way of his concept of repetition – argues for the deconstruction of ontology, and Kierkegaard does this by showing the way ontology founders on the question of repetition: “[i]n Repetition Kierkegaard thinks the history of metaphysics as a whole, effects a certain “closure” of it as it reaches its “end”, and helps to precipitate the “foundering” or “coming to grief” of metaphysics.” (p. 205) Similarly, Caputo emphasizes that the unpublished portion of Being and Time was to be a destruction of the history of ontology (p. 204), which, being unpublished, Caputo emphasizes, was never attained in Being and Time. Furthermore, Caputo notes how Heidegger characterizes this destruction as precisely a playing out of repetition (p. 203) – and thus Caputo holds that Heidegger had planned to use his concept of repetition in order to produce this destruction. But as Heidegger never achieved this in Being and Time, and while Kierkegaard, with his concept of repetition indeed did, Caputo holds that Kierkegaard actually went beyond the project which we find in Being and Time.

Thus many commentators who work on the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship take their lead from Heidegger’s own footnotes – whether they agree with Heidegger’s own assessment of his relationship with Kierkegaard, or whether they disagree with Heidegger’s assessment – and because of this these commentaries tend to focus on the ontological category of temporality in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, many by way of investigating the concept of repetition. Now, in this dissertation I am not investigating the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship in this way. Rather, in this dissertation, as I have been noting, I am focusing on anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and am taking a more structural approach to the comparison between the two thinkers: arguing that the structure of anxiety is the same in both thinkers (i.e. that anxiety is ambiguous and has an antipathetic and sympathetic side). Further, I am not only reading Heidegger in light of Kierkegaard, but I am also reading Kierkegaard in light of Heidegger – and while I have not found another commentator who has done this, Carlisle, in her ‘Kierkegaard and Heidegger’, notes that such an endeavor would have benefits: “to what extent is a contemporary reader’s interpretation of Kierkegaard already shaped by Heidegger’s philosophy? – and,

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indeed, is one also reading Heidegger in light of Kierkegaard? (…) it may (…) be illuminating to see what these mutually-informed readings of Kierkegaard and Heidegger might look like.” (p. 422)

Thus my ‘mutually informed readings’ will stay more on the structural level and detail how the structure of anxiety is the same in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger – i.e. that it is ambiguous11 – and this dissertation will not be as interested in spelling out the content of related concepts. Even though, as mentioned last subsection, I hold that for Kierkegaard anxiety acts as a springboard which when ‘used wrongly’ springs one into strict sin and when ‘used rightly’ springs one into faith, and similarly for Heidegger anxiety acts as a springboard which when ‘used wrongly’ springs one into strict inauthenticity and when ‘used rightly’ springs one into authenticity; even though I hold this, my work in this dissertation is primarily focused on the structural similarities of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and is not as interested in spelling out the content of e.g. strict sin and faith, and inauthenticity and authenticity. But here someone might object and hold that if I am not concerned so much with the content of sin and faith, and inauthenticity and authenticity, but am concerned primarily with the structural similarities of anxiety in both authors, then my work on anxiety and how it is ‘rightly used’ to achieve faith in Kierkegaard and authenticity in Heidegger, and ‘wrongly used’ in sin in Kierkegaard and inauthenticity in Heidegger, may be an empty conception, since, indeed, I am not so focused on the

11 Two notable works which deal with ‘ambiguity’ in Kierkegaard are: Simone De Beauvoir’s The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. B. Frechtman (Philosophical Library: New York, 1948), and George Pattison’s Kierkegaard and the Quest for Unambiguous Life (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013). However, both of these works, while detailing what they take ‘ambiguity’ to mean, do not explicitly spell out in what way they consider anxiety to be ambiguous – in more detail they do not give an in depth account of the antipathetic and sympathetic aspects of anxiety.

De Beauvoir in Ethics of Ambiguity claims that existentialism defines itself as a philosophy of ambiguity, and notes Kierkegaard in this regard (p. 9) as well as Sartre (p. 10). However De Beauvoir’s account of ambiguity seems to be more indebted to Sartre than to Kierkegaard. De Beauvoir focuses on the ambiguity of existence, and writes: “to say that [existence] is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never fixed, that it must be constantly won.” (p. 129) In particular, in holding that existence is ambiguous in that its meaning is never fixed, De Beauvoir holds that existence faces a particular problem: “human transcendence must cope with the (…) problem: it has found itself, though it is prohibited from ever fulfilling itself.” (p. 130) This ambiguity of existence seems to be drawn from Sartre, e.g. his position that existence ‘is what it is not and is not what it is’, that existence is an inherent non-coincidence with itself, as contrasted with a thing which has, as De Beauvoir notes, an “exact co-incidence” with itself (p. 10).

Pattison, in Kierkegaard and the Quest for the Unambiguous Life, is sympathetic with De Beauvoir’s work on ambiguity (pp. 112, 124, 215, 222), and also deals with ambiguity in Kierkegaard, tending to link ambiguity with a negative quality attached to the world, which, on Kierkegaard’s view, one should strive to overcome. Pattison refers to “the pervasive ambiguity of the modern world” (p. 24), a “world that is often shrouded in a fog of ambiguity” (p. 219), and notes that “[i]n the carnival of the world everything has become ambiguous” (p. 57). And while ambiguity for Pattison tends to be linked to the world, Pattison also emphasizes how Kierkegaard’s work exemplifies that one ought to strive to overcome this ambiguity – “the Kierkegaardian individual begins the process of orientating him- or herself in the fog of worldly ambiguity and undertakes the first hesitant steps on the long journey towards the light of freedom and self-knowledge” (p. 194); “the self might struggle against the tide of ambiguity and self-forgetfulness” (p. 219).

However, while De Beauvoir and Pattison each deal with ambiguity in Kierkegaard in their own way, as noted above, neither of them detail the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity, and, perhaps for this reason, neither do they deal with the three upshots (detailed below) which I believe that such a discussion leads us to.
content of sin and faith, and inauthenticity and authenticity. However, in this dissertation I will show that focusing on the structural similarities of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger will lead us to various upshots, some of which actually specify certain similarities between the content of sin and inauthenticity, and faith and authenticity. Again, this is not to say that sin is the same as inauthenticity, nor that faith is the same as authenticity, but that by focusing on the structural similarities of anxiety in both authors, we are indeed lead to various upshots which show some similarities between sin and inauthenticity, and faith and authenticity. And thus showing that faith and authenticity, and sin and inauthenticity, at least have these similarities will help to show that my account of anxiety ‘used wrongly’ or ‘used rightly’ in Kierkegaard and Heidegger is not meaningless.

Now, what are the upshots on focusing on the structural similarity of anxiety’s ambiguity in both authors? As I will show in this dissertation, focusing on this structural similarity in both authors will provide us with three things: first, by focusing on this structure of anxiety we are given an account of the strange agency involved in both strict sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and both strict inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger – a type of agency which is both, we might say, active and passive; secondly, by focusing on this structure the way in which one relates to the concept of faith and authenticity is homed in on; and thirdly, focusing on this structure will lead us to give an account of psychosis in both authors. Let me treat the first point first.

This dissertation will spend much time arguing for what I will now briefly sketch. I hold that the structure of anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger is ambiguous which means that it has an antipathetic and sympathetic side. Further, I hold that this ambiguous anxiety is a springboard from which one may spring, in Kierkegaard, into strict sin or faith, and, in Heidegger, into strict inauthenticity or authenticity. But I will show that when we detail how anxiety has an ambiguous structure, this will lead us to detailing how the type of agency involved in springing off anxiety into sin or inauthenticity, or springing off anxiety into faith or authenticity, is a strange agency made up of both an active and a passive aspect. For as I will show in much detail, in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, anxiety’s antipathy discloses a possibility which can be achieved in a willful (we might say active) manner, while anxiety’s sympathy discloses a possibility which can only be achieved in a receptive (we might say passive) manner, and while both must be achieved to attain faith or authenticity, focusing on anxiety’s ambiguity leads us to show how the agency involved in attaining faith or authenticity is a strange one made up of both a willful and receptive aspect. And as I will also show in much detail, in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, while anxiety’s antipathy discloses the possibility which is achieved only in a willful manner, not achieving this is due to a weakness (we might say a passivity) where one should be active; and while anxiety’s sympathy discloses the possibility which is only achieved by way of a receptivity, not achieving is due to a willful defiance (we might say an activity) where one ought to be receptive. And as this
double-failure makes up, as I will show, springing into strict sin or strict inauthenticity, this means that the account of anxiety’s ambiguity has led us to show how the agency involved in sin or inauthenticity is also made up of this strange type of agency: part cowardly weakness, part willful defiance.

Again this dissertation spends much time fleshing this out, and I will not further spell out the details here. Rather what I will note here is the secondary literature on the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship which comes closest to what I am doing in this dissertation on this point. There are two commentators who, in dealing with the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, feel that the key to this relationship is to be found in anxiety, who home in, in particular, on anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, showing the structural similarities for both authors, and in doing so also spend time focusing on the nature of the agency involved in sin in Kierkegaard and inauthenticity in Heidegger, and/or faith in Kierkegaard and authenticity in Heidegger.12

Vincent McCarthy, in ‘Martin Heidegger: Kierkegaard’s Influence Hidden and in Full View’13, holds that “in Being and Time, Heidegger followed Kierkegaard nearly step-by-step in the exploration and exposition of anxiety, in descriptions of the phenomenon of anxiety and attendant phenomena” (p. 106), and accordingly goes on to sketch the similarities in Kierkegaard and Heidegger – that is, the similarities in relation to anxiety and the attendant phenomena of sin and inauthenticity, and faith and authenticity. However, what is strikingly lacking in this commentary is the fact that anxiety in Kierkegaard is ambiguous, and also where Heidegger’s anxiety stands in relation to this concept. Now, one conclusion of McCarthy that is important for me is his claim that while anxiety is indeed something of a springboard for faith in Kierkegaard and authenticity in Heidegger, achieving this faith and authenticity is conceived of differently for both authors in that “Heidegger’s secular phenomenology would constitute a form of contemporary Pelagianism in which humans seem to have it in their own power to recover from their Fallenness” (p. 114) in contrast to Kierkegaard’s “Augustinian” (p. 114) view in which one requires God’s “grace” (p. 113). Thus in regards to the agency involved in achieving faith and authenticity, McCarthy seems to be suggesting that there is difference between Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s view in that, for Kierkegaard faith is achieved by way of a more passive-receptive movement, while for Heidegger authenticity is achieved by way of a more active-willful movement. In this dissertation I of course will argue that for both thinkers faith or authenticity is achieved by way of a strange combination

12 Other notable sources that, in dealing with the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, compare and contrast Kierkegaard’s concepts of sin and faith with Heidegger’s concepts of inauthenticity and authenticity are Daniel Berthold-Bond’s ‘A Kierkegaardian critique of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity’, Man and World 24 (1991), and Harrison Hall’s ‘Love and Death: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on Authentic and Inauthentic Human Existence’, Inquiry 27 (1984). However these sources do not focus on the type of agency involved in sin and faith, or inauthenticity and authenticity (and neither do they spend much time comparing the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger), and for these reasons I will not treat these in any detail.
of willfulness and receptivity, and again, I think that by my focusing on the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in each thinker – something McCarthy does not do – leads us to this insight.

Dan Magurshak, in ‘The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger Relationship’¹⁴, argues that Heidegger’s concept of anxiety in *Being and Time* is heavily indebted to Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety. Magurshak shows in his own way how as anxiety is the springboard for both sin and faith in Kierkegaard, so too it similarly acts as the springboard for both inauthenticity and authenticity in *Being and Time* (pp. 173-175, 182-184). However in this essay Magurshak does not investigate in detail the type of agency involved in sin and faith, nor does he investigate in detail the agency involved in inauthenticity and authenticity (although, we can piece together his implied view here). In relation to this, what is also lacking in Magurshak’s analysis is whether and how Heidegger took up Kierkegaard’s characterization of anxiety being *ambiguous* – i.e. made up of a sympathetic and antipathetic aspect – and of course I hold in this dissertation that it precisely by focusing on this question that we are lead to the type of agency involved in the above states.

Dan Magurshak further investigates the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship in his ‘Despair and Everydayness: Kierkegaard’s Corrective Contribution to Heidegger’s Notion of Fallen Everydayness’¹⁵. Here Magurshak indeed investigates in detail the type of agency involved in sin (despair) in Kierkegaard and inauthenticity in Heidegger. The main point of this essay argues that whereas Kierkegaard had a nuanced account of despair – such that e.g. the agency involved is understood “either from weakness or from defiance” (p. 226) – Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity is not as nuanced – such that e.g. the agency involved is merely a type of a weakness, and indeed Heidegger’s account of this weakness is not even as developed as Kierkegaard’s (pp. 228-229). Magurshak holds that, when compared to Kierkegaard’s analysis, Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity “inadequately describes the complexity of the phenomena.” (p. 211) To put this point in my terminology, whereas Magurshak holds that the agency involved in sin in Kierkegaard is either passive (weakness) or active (defiance), Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity is less nuanced in that he only accounts for a passive (weakness) agency involved, and indeed Kierkegaard’s analysis of weakness is more developed than Heidegger’s.

In this dissertation I will of course argue that not only is the agency involved in Kierkegaard’s account of sin and faith a strange combination of activity and passivity, but so too the agency involved in Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity and authenticity is likewise a strange combination of activity and passivity. And, this is the first upshot of my focusing on the structural similarities of anxiety in both

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Kierkegaard and Heidegger – i.e. focusing on the ambiguous (antipathetic and sympathetic) structure of anxiety in both authors. For while there has been literature which focuses on anxiety in the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, and how anxiety acts as a springboard for both sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger, I believe that by specifying the ambiguous nature of this anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger will lead us to a detailed description of the strange agency involved in sin, faith, inauthenticity, and authenticity – as consisting of both a passive and active side, which is something the above mentioned secondary literature on the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship tends to miss. (And, as we will see, as we proceed I will also be detailing secondary literature that deals only with Kierkegaard on these points, and literature that deals only with Heidegger on these points, and how this literature as well tends to miss the strange agency involved in these states.)

While the first upshot of focusing on the structural similarity of anxiety’s ambiguity in Kierkegaard and Heidegger has to do with capturing the strange agency as highlighted above, the second upshot of focusing on this structural similarity is that doing so leads us to an account of faith in Kierkegaard and authenticity in Heidegger in which the way one relates to this concept is brought to the forefront. As I will argue for in detail in the dissertation, specifying the ambiguous nature of anxiety – i.e. detailing the antipathetic and sympathetic side – will lead us to detail that the state of faith in Kierkegaard, and authenticity in Heidegger, is absurd. For as I will highlight that the antipathetic side of anxiety discloses a particular possibility, while the sympathetic side discloses another particular possibility, and as faith and authenticity consists in achieving both of these possibilities together, the result is that this state of faith and authenticity is absurd. Now, I will spend much in this dissertation time detailing in what way this is absurd, but now I want to sketch why I am indeed focusing on this absurdity.

Kierkegaard actually explicitly claims that his account of faith is absurd, and Clare Carlisle, in her *Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling*¹⁶, highlights the role that this absurdity plays. In short, Carlisle holds that due to the fact that faith is absurd, the reader’s relation to this concept is brought to the fore in a pressing manner. As Carlisle puts it, due to the absurdity of faith, “there are two alternative ways of responding to [the concept of faith]. She may (…) be filled with admiration for faith, choose to recognize it as the highest spiritual task, and embark wholeheartedly on the path of becoming a Christian. Or she may reject faith as an ideal precisely because she sees its absurdity so clearly. What [Kierkegaard] tries to exclude is a middle ground between these two extremes, in which faith can be regarded as comfortable and easy”. (p. 96) That is, as Carlisle notes, because faith is absurd for Kierkegaard, this “presents the reader with a decision” (p. 96), indeed “force[s] its reader (…) to a point of crises” (p. 97), in which the reader must choose between this either/or. I fully agree with Carlisle on this point, and this is what I mean.

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when I say that focusing on the absurdity of faith will bring one’s relation to the concept of faith to the fore. And again, in this dissertation we will be brought to this absurd concept of faith by way of focusing on anxiety’s ambiguity.

Now, I have not been able to find any secondary literature that deals with the concept of the absurd in the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, and thus as we proceed in this dissertation I will simply be dealing with Kierkegaard and Heidegger scholars in isolation. But I of course argue that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s account of authenticity is absurd in a similar manner that Kierkegaard’s notion of faith is absurd. And again, we will be lead to this conclusion by way of first detailing the structural ambiguity in Heidegger’s anxiety – just as it is in Kierkegaard’s anxiety (sympathetic and antipathetic) – showing how this ambiguous anxiety discloses two possibilities, and showing how when one properly springs off this anxiety in authenticity this state is absurd. And again the upshot of showing this absurdity is that it, as in the case of Kierkegaard, brings the relationship between one and the concept of authenticity to the fore.

Finally, the third upshot of showing the structural similarity of anxiety’s ambiguity in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger is that it will lead us to an account of psychosis in both authors – or, we might say that it will at least help open up a dialogue, or develop the dialogue which there is on this topic in both authors. Like the second upshot I have not been able to find any secondary literature which deals with psychosis in the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, and thus as we proceed in this dissertation I will be dealing with Kierkegaard and Heidegger scholars in isolation. But even here, there simply is not much literature on this topic of psychosis in Kierkegaard and Heidegger. There is good reason for this lack, as Kierkegaard does not treat psychosis in any depth in his writings, and for Heidegger in *Being and Time* this topic seems outside of his purview. But nevertheless there is some literature on this topic. For example, Nordentoft, in his *Kierkegaard’s Psychology* has a section entitled ‘Madness’ (pp. 233-249), and holds here that Haufniensis has an account of psychosis – Nordentoft holds that psychosis for Haufniensis is a state in which one lets go of contact with the external world (pp. 234-235). However, not much detail is given regarding what Nordentoft means here. And while in Heidegger scholarship there is not much work on this concept of psychosis, nevertheless Ludwig Binswanger used Heidegger’s work in *Being and Time* to develop his own account of psychosis – for example, in his ‘The Case of Ellen West’ , Binswanger gives an account of psychosis, drawing heavily from *Being and Time* and Heidegger’s concept of anxiety, emphasizing how one, in psychosis, stands in absolute isolation (p. 297). And while both Nordentoft and Binswanger are aware of the pivotal way anxiety is related to psychosis, neither of them hold that this anxiety is ambiguous. However, I wish to show that detailing the ambiguous

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nature of anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger will help us continue this dialogue of psychosis in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, such that we give a more detailed account of this concept in both authors.

To sum up, much of the secondary literature on the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship takes its lead from Heidegger’s footnotes on Kierkegaard – in which Heidegger claims that while Kierkegaard had fruitful insights on the existentiell level, he did not have fruitful insights on the existential-ontological level – and focus on the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship in these terms, in many instances focusing on the ontological content of temporality and the content of repetition. As we saw, there is a group which follows Heidegger’s own assessment, and holds that Heidegger radicalized Kierkegaard and supplied the ontology which is missing in Kierkegaard. As we also saw, there is another group which holds that Heidegger drastically downplays his appropriation of Kierkegaard and indeed Heidegger’s ontology, e.g. temporality, is dependent on Kierkegaard’s ontology. Now while this literature – focusing on the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship in this way (e.g. focusing on the content of temporality and repetition in each author) – is helpful, this dissertation takes a different approach. I pull out the structural similarities of anxiety in both authors – i.e. detailing that anxiety is ambiguous in both authors (part antipathetic, part sympathetic) – and in doing so I believe there will be three upshots to such an approach. Firstly, detailing the structure of ambiguous anxiety in both authors will lead us to show how the agency involved in sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger, is a strange combination of both activity and passivity – something which the secondary literature tends to overlook. Secondly, detailing the structure of ambiguous anxiety in both authors will bring the way in which one relates to the concept of faith in Kierkegaard, and authenticity in Heidegger, to the fore in a particularly pressing manner – again, something the secondary literature tends to overlook. And thirdly, detailing the structure of ambiguous anxiety in both authors will lead us to give a detailed account of psychosis in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger – more detailed than we currently find in the secondary literature.

As we now proceed into the dissertation I note that my treatment of the secondary literature will primarily be in relation to the above three upshots – in this way I will pinpoint what secondary literature I am going to focus on, and what I am going to bracket out. That is, my treatment of the secondary literature on Kierkegaard, as well as my treatment of the secondary literature on Heidegger, will primarily be concerned not only with the topic of anxiety’s ambiguity in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, but also, following from this, with the claim that the agency of sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger, is one of part activity, part passivity, as well with the idea of how one’s relation to the concept of faith in Kierkegaard, and authenticity in Heidegger, is brought to fore in a particular manner, as well as with the topic of psychosis in both authors.
I

KIERKEGAARD: ANXIETY INTERPRETED RETROGRESSIVELY
In this part of the dissertation I am after a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard. I want to show that anxiety, in Kierkegaard’s writings themselves, has an ambiguous structure – that is, that it is made up of an antipathetic and sympathetic aspect. I hold that there are three different encounters which spirit may have with this ambiguous anxiety. I also hold that to give a detailed account of anxiety in Kierkegaard we must track the *movement* through the three encounters of it, detailing the interrelation between them. In this part we are tracking this movement *retrogressively* – that is, away-from the telos.

For as I will show, the encounter with ambiguous anxiety such that it is manifest and *rightly used* giving rise to the mode of spirit called faith is the telos, and in this part of the dissertation this is our starting point. We then proceed away from this telos, next detailing manifest ambiguous anxiety *misused* which gives rise to the mode of spirit called sin, and finally we will arrive at *disguised* ambiguous anxiety which shows up in the mode of spirit called spiritlessness.

I hold that anxiety is at the core of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings. I noted that Kierkegaard’s main text on anxiety is of course Haufniensis’ *Anxiety*, and yet I also noted that any full appreciation of this text must be supplement by various other pseudonymous texts of Kierkegaard. For by itself *Anxiety* is a notoriously difficult book, and many of its key concepts are left underdeveloped, perhaps leaving the reader utterly confused. Therefore, in approaching *Anxiety* I will continually be using other pseudonymous works to supplement my reading. In particular I will use three other pseudonymous texts: A’s *Either/Or* Part I19 (in particular the set of three lectures delivered to the ‘Συμπαϱανεϰϱώμενοι’20), Johannes de silentio’s *Fear and Trembling*21 (in particular the section ‘Preliminary Expectoration’), and Anti-Climacus’ *The Sickness Unto Death*22 (in particular ‘Part One’).

Now, in using these other texts to supplement my reading of *Anxiety*, I will not be adding anything that is not already in *Anxiety*. Rather, as I will argue, I will be clarifying key concepts that are in *Anxiety*, albeit in an underdeveloped form. My strategy for using these three other pseudonymous texts will be as follows. From *Anxiety* we are given the clearest expression of anxiety and of the three encounters of anxiety. However, as I will demonstrate, each encounter is co-present with a particular mode of spirit. Now while *Anxiety* gives us the clearest expression of anxiety, its account of the three co-present modes

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20 ‘The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama: A Venture in Fragmentary Endeavor’; ‘Silhouettes: Psychological Diversion’; and ‘The Unhappiest One’. ‘Συμπαϱανεϰϱώμενοι’ is translated as ‘fellowship of the dead’ or ‘society of buried lives’.
of spirit is underdeveloped. Therefore, I use these other pseudonymous texts as supplements to help
develop and clarify these three modes of spirit.23

Firstly, when anxiety is encountered such that it is used rightly, it acts as the springboard to
spring one into the mode of spirit faith. Now, while the concept of faith is indeed in Anxiety, it is in this
book in an underdeveloped manner, and thus may give rise to confusion. Thus here I use Johannes de
silentio’s Fear and Trembling (‘Preliminary Expectoration’) as a supplement to clarify this concept of
faith which is already in Anxiety – for Fear and Trembling gives us the most developed account of faith
of all the pseudonymous writings of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. Proceeding with the retrogressive
interpretation of anxiety, the next encounter of anxiety is one in which it is misused such that one springs
into the mode of spirit sin. And while the concept of sin is indeed in Anxiety, it is in this book in an
underdeveloped, which is to say potentially confusing manner. Thus here I use Anti-Climacus’ Sickness
(‘Part One’) as a supplement to clarify this concept of sin – for Sickness gives us the most developed
account of sin from out of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre. Proceeding with the retrogressive
interpretation of anxiety, anxiety is also encountered such that it does not show itself as it is, but shows
itself heavily in disguise in the mode of spirit spiritlessness. Again while the concept of spiritlessness is
already in Anxiety, it is there in an underdeveloped manner. Thus here I again use Sickness as a
supplement to clarify this concept of spiritlessness – for again Sickness gives us the most developed

23 Roger Poole, in his Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (University of Virginia Press: Virginia, 1993)
speaks of the “great tradition” (p. 1) of misreading Kierkegaard, insofar as most of the secondary literature on
Kierkegaard precisely ignores the fact of pseudonymity, assuming that the pseudonymous writings represent
Kierkegaard’s view. Here I would like to specify that when I write of ‘Kierkegaard’ I am simply referring to his
pseudonymous oeuvre, and am not implying that Kierkegaard himself held any of these views.

Now, Poole stresses that to properly understand these texts, one must focus on the artistic interplay between
the form and content of them. However, we might criticize Poole for the fact that his writings themselves do not
exhibit an interplay between form and content. And thus while Poole speaks of the great tradition of misreading
Kierkegaard we might speak of the great tradition of miswriting on Kierkegaard, Poole included. For if it is essential
to Kierkegaard’s concepts that they are born out of an artistic interplay between form and content, then don’t
straightforward accounts of his concepts – even if these accounts ‘decipher’ Kierkegaard’s indirect communication
– inherently corrupt the concept? But it seems to be the case with all of Poole’s chapters that he is giving us a
straightforward deciphering of Kierkegaard’s indirect communication.

However if we are to be charitable to Poole, then we might make an exception of his chapter on Anxiety
(pp. 83-107), which, if we are charitable, turns out to be the best piece of secondary literature on Anxiety, since, if
we are charitable, Poole’s chapter itself exhibits an artistic interplay between its form and content. For the content of
Poole’s chapter is the claim that Anxiety is a spoof which is about uncertainty: and yet, being charitable to Poole, we
might say this about the form of Poole’s chapter itself, that is, that it is a spoof about uncertainty (p. 107) – Poole’s
claim, holding that Anxiety is about the repeated sibilant ‘s’ throughout the text, the serpent’s hiss (p. 107), is itself a
spoof. Therefore this chapter on Anxiety is his best insofar as it is a spoof.

Similarly, the artistic interplay between form and content is precisely the reason why James Conant’s
article – ‘Must We Show What We Cannot Say?’, in R. Fleming and M. Payne (eds.), The Senses of Stanley Cavell
(Bucknell University Press: Pennsylvania, 1989) – is also one of the best articles on Kierkegaard: its content is
about Johannes Climacus’ revocation of his book, while its form is that of a story about how Conant couldn’t write
his own article.
account of this concept. Thus in this way I use *Fear and Trembling* and *Sickness* to help flesh out these modes of spirit which are co-present with the particular encounters of anxiety.

Now, I use A’s *Either/Or* (‘Συμπαράσχομενοι’ lectures) in a slightly different manner. I note that Haufniensis in *Anxiety* is concerned with how his concepts may be aesthetically represented – Haufniensis notes that he is concerned with “the esthetic problem of how [his concepts] may be represented” (*CA* 132), and notes that “the question of how [his concepts] can best be presented may be considered from a purely esthetic point of view” (*CA* 131). And indeed, Haufniensis often gives us aesthetic representations of his concepts (e.g. his use of painting in relation to sensuousness (*CA* 65), his use of ballet and mime in relation to sin (*CA* 131)). But this leads us to how I will use the Συμπαράσχομενοι lectures to supplement *Anxiety*: I will use these lectures as giving us aesthetic representations of Haufniensis’ concepts of sin and spiritlessness.

Thus in total, I use *Anxiety* as the centrepiece from the pseudonymous oeuvre, and I use *Fear and Trembling*, *Sickness*, and the Συμπαράσχομενοι lectures as supplements. Again I stress that I am not adding anything to *Anxiety* with this procedure, but merely developing what is already there. For in *Anxiety* we are given an account of anxiety, and with this we are given an account of how there are three different encounters with this anxiety which correspond to three different modes of spirit. I am interpreting anxiety in this part retrogressively – which is to say that as the *telos* is using anxiety rightly such it gives rise to faith, which one ought to achieve, this part of the dissertation begins by interpreting this anxiety rightly used and proceeds backwards, ultimately detailing disguised anxiety. Firstly, when anxiety is manifest and rightly used (the *telos*) this is co-present with faith, and I use *Fear and Trembling* to develop this concept. When anxiety is manifest and misused it is co-present with sin, and I use the Συμπαράσχομενοι lectures to give us an aesthetic representation of this concept, and I use *Sickness* to develop it. Finally when anxiety shows itself in spiritlessness, it shows itself heavily in disguise, and here I use the Συμπαράσχομενοι lectures to give us an aesthetic representation of this, and use *Sickness* to develop it. In this way I will interpret the anxiety from *Anxiety* retrogressively, using the other pseudonymous texts as supplements. For I think that in order to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety we must track the *movement* through the three encounters, detailing the interrelation between them. In this part we are tracking this movement retrogressively: a repulsion away-from the *telos*.

However we should keep in mind that this retrogressive interpretation of Kierkegaard is always implicitly being interpreted by way of my interpretation of *Being and Time*, which I spell out in part II. For not only do I want to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard’s writings themselves, but ultimately I also want to pull out a systematic interpretation of anxiety from both Kierkegaard and Heidegger. And thus the account of anxiety in Kierkegaard which I lay out in this part will harmonize with the account of anxiety which I draw from Heidegger in the next part. Indeed we will see that all of
the key concepts from this part will perfectly mirror the key concepts in the next part – for in accordance with my methodology I am always interpreting the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens. We should always keep in mind that the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in part I is always implicitly being guided by way of the progressive interpretation of anxiety in part II.
A
ANXIETY RIGHTLY USED: THE ABSURD TELOS

Thus we begin the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard with the telos – manifest anxiety used rightly. In this section I will begin to show how anxiety has an ambiguous structure (an antipathy and a sympathy), and I will detail how when this anxiety is rightly used it springs one into the mode of spirit called faith. This using anxiety rightly such that one springs into faith is that which spirit ought to achieve, and thus I call this the telos.

Now, we are beginning the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety, in §A, by highlighting this telos, so that we can then proceed in the sections which follow, to make the movement away-from this telos. For after we have a grip on how manifest anxiety is rightly used, we will be able, in §C, to highlight how manifest anxiety is misused such that it gives rise to strict sin, and finally, in §D, to show how anxiety shows up such that it does not even show itself as it is, does not show itself manifest, but shows itself in disguise. For I am after an interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard and I think that to understand this anxiety we must track the movement through the three encounters, showing the interrelation between them. And thus in this part of the dissertation we track this movement retrogressively – we track the movement away-from the telos.

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As mentioned in my Introduction, there are two upshots, in relation to Kierkegaard’s account of faith, which we achieve by way of detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity (i.e. detailing anxiety’s antipathetic and sympathetic aspects). Both of these upshots I will detail in this section, but let me now sketch them before we launch into them in this section.

Firstly, by detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity, we are led to an account of the agency involved in faith as a strange one made up of part activity and part passivity. For as I will show, anxiety’s antipathetic aspect is a springboard from which one may achieve a first movement, which, as I will specify, can be achieved with one’s own willpower (and in this sense it is an active mode of agency). Anxiety’s sympathetic aspect is a springboard from which one may achieve a second movement, which, as I will specify, can only be achieved by way of a receptivity (and in this sense this is a more passive mode of agency). And as faith, which is achieved by way of springing off anxiety, is this double-movement, detailing anxiety’s ambiguous structure will thus lead us to show how the agency involved in faith is one made up of part willfulness and part receptivity.
Secondly, by detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity, we will also be lead to bring the way one relates to the concept of faith to the fore. For as I will detail in this section, while one in faith achieves both the antipathetic and, simultaneously, the sympathetic movement, faith as the double-movement is, as Kierkegaard tells us, ‘absurd’. Now in this section I will detail what Kierkegaard here means by calling faith absurd. But the important thing to note is that there is a method to Kierkegaard highlighting that the double-movement is absurd: namely, as Carlisle notes (as pointed out in my Introduction), because the double-movement of faith is absurd, this forces the reader to consider where they stand in relation to this concept, and forces them to make a decision for themselves. Thus the absurdity of faith has this methodological significance. And since, in this dissertation, the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity will lead to demonstrating this absurdity, this means that the second upshot of focusing on anxiety’s ambiguity is that it brings the way one relates to the concept of faith to the fore.

Now, when I conclude this section I will look in some detail at some of the prevalent work in the secondary literature which deals with anxiety and faith in Kierkegaard. At the end of this section I reference these particular sources, but for now I will just note that what we find is that there is particular gap in the secondary literature on both of the points mentioned above. That is, the secondary literature, while focusing on the content of faith in Kierkegaard, generally does not detail the mode of agency involved, nor does it detail how this faith is absurd (and neither does it thus bring to the fore one’s relation to the concept). Perhaps the reason for this gap is that, generally, the literature, in focusing on the content of faith, overlooks the structure of anxiety as ambiguous (does not detail this), and in turn the literature is not led to give an account of my above two points. But in this section of course it is precisely by detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity that we are led to an account of the strange agency involved in the double-movement (as both willful and receptive), as well as to detail the absurdity of the double-movement.

The Concept of Anxiety

Early in Anxiety Haufniensis lays out what we can call the structure of anxiety. Anxiety is such that its ‘object’ is ‘nothing’ and anxiety’s relation to this nothing is ‘ambiguous’ – “the relation of anxiety to its object, to something that is nothing (...) is altogether ambiguous” (CA 43). The ‘nothing’ means, primarily, ‘possibility’, which I will spell out in more detail in what follows. But first I specify what Haufniensis means when he tells us that anxiety’s relation to the nothing is ambiguous. This ambiguous relation means that the relation to the nothing (possibility) is part antipathetic (it repels), part sympathetic (it attracts):

he stands in an ambiguous relation to it (sympathetic and antipathetic). (CA 97)
The ambiguity lies in the relation (...) The relation, as always with the relation of anxiety, is sympathetic and antipathetic. (CA 103)

Thus the structure of anxiety is such that its object is nothing (possibility) and anxiety relates to this nothing by way of ambiguity, that is, partly antipathetically, partly sympathetically: the nothing is part disquieting (CA 61), hostile (CA 43), terrifying (CA 159), provoking fleeing (CA 44); and part captivating (CA 42), friendly (CA 44), sweet (CA 61), joyful (CA 156). Haufniensis proceeds to aggravate this ambiguity by noting that this ambiguity is “elastic ambiguity” (CA 41), which comes to mean that the antipathy and the sympathy intertwine together in elasticity:

When we consider the dialectical determinations of anxiety, it appears that exactly these have psychological ambiguity. Anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy. (CA 42)

This then is the structure of anxiety: anxiety’s object is nothing, and this nothing (possibility) is related to by way of an antipathetic sympathy and a sympathetic antipathy. Haufniensis captures this structure in his famous analogy between anxiety and the dizzying look down into a yawning abyss:

Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. (...) anxiety is of all things the most selfish, and no concrete expression of freedom is as selfish as the possibility of every concretion. This again is the overwhelming factor that determines the individual’s ambiguous relation, sympathetic and antipathetic. In anxiety there is the selfish infinity of possibility, which does not tempt like a choice but ensnaringly disquiets with its sweet anxiousness. (CA 61)

Anxiety’s relation to the nothing is analogous to looking down into the yawning abyss: when one looks into the abyss one becomes dizzy, likewise while anxiety discloses nothing (possibility), and this is related to in an ambiguous fashion, part sympathetic, part antipathetic, such that these intertwine into a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy, one begins to reel in ambiguity. Now, with this citation we are given a further specification of the nothing (possibility). For here Haufniensis characterizes this as the “infinity of possibility” which means “the possibility of every concretion”. Thus what anxiety discloses is not this or that possible concretion, but discloses the possibility of any and all concretions – I emphasize that this ‘nothing’ has to do with the category of totality. But to further flesh this out – in particular how this anxiety can spring one into the mode of spirit called faith – we must turn to chapter ‘V’ of Anxiety.

In chapter ‘V’ of Anxiety Haufniensis gives us an account of how when anxiety is “rightly used” (CA 53) it acts as the springboard from which one springs into faith. For the title of chapter ‘V’ is ‘Anxiety as Saving through Faith’ (CA 155), and indeed in the first paragraph Haufniensis notes that “[w]hoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate” (CA 155), that is, he notes that when one learns to use anxiety rightly one will spring into the mode of spirit called faith. Anxiety
discloses nothing and relates to the nothing by way of the intertwined antipathy and sympathy: and this intertwined elasticity is the springboard from which, when rightly used, one springs into faith.

For in chapter ‘V’ Haufniensis echoes the structure of anxiety which he had earlier characterized, and holds in this later chapter that anxiety which gives rise to faith is such that it discloses possibility (nothing), and that this nothing shows up for one in anxiety as partly terrible (antipathetic), partly joyful (sympathetic):

in possibility all things are equally possible, and whoever has truly been brought up by possibility has grasped the terrible as well as the joyful. (CA 156)

As this citation also specifies, the possibility (nothing) that is at issue is not this or that thing, but rather, “all things” – this echoes the earlier citation which I noted stresses that what is at issue is the category of totality (“infinity of possibility”, the “possibility of every concretion”) which is related to by way of the intertwined antipathy and sympathy. Thus this possibility is related to, on the hand as terrifying, and on the other hand as joyful – what does this mean? And how does this springboard, when rightly used, give rise to faith?

A close reading of chapter ‘V’ reveals that while anxiety discloses this possibility (nothing), anxiety’s antipathy acts as a springboard for one particular movement, while anxiety’s sympathy acts as a springboard for another particular movement – and thus a close reading reveals that achieving the mode of faith is done by way of a double-movement. In short, anxiety’s antipathy is the threatening possibility of losing all, the totality, of the concrete, finite, or actual back, or more precisely one’s concern for these; and anxiety’s sympathy is the joyful possibility of gaining all, the totality, of the concrete, finite, or actual back, or more precisely one’s concern for these:

whoever took possibility’s course in misfortune lost all, all, as no one in actuality ever lost it. Now, if he did not defraud the possibility that wanted to teach him and did not wheedle the anxiety that wanted to save him, then he would also receive everything back, as no one in actuality ever did (CA 158)

Anxiety discloses possibility (nothing) and relates to this nothing in a partly antipathetic way (it repels): the possibility of losing all of the concrete, finite, or actual is terrifying – “whoever took possibility’s course in misfortune lost all, all”. By ‘finite, actual, and concrete’ I mean what we might call the concerns of the world – the concern with intraworldly entities and events, as we might also put it. What the antipathy discloses is not the possibility of losing one’s life (it does not disclose the possibility of death in the commonsense notion), but rather discloses the possibility of losing all of one’s concern that one has with the intraworldly, yet while still remaining alive. What is at issue is not the possibility of merely losing this or that concern – for if this is merely done one always retains a at least a remnant of concern: “[i]n actuality, no man ever became so unhappy that he did not retain a little remnant” (CA 158) – but what is at issue is the possibility of losing absolutely all of one’s concern, the totality of one’s
concern. This is an antipathetic disclosure, it is terrifying. The possibility of this utter loss of concern for
the intraworldly is terrifying, is an antipathetic disclosure of possibility (nothing).

But anxiety is ambiguous and it also relates to possibility in a partly sympathetic way (it attracts):
the possibility of gaining back all of the concrete, finite, or actual is joyful – “then he would also receive
everything back”. Again what is at issue is not gaining back merely this or that concern, but what is at
issue is gaining back precisely all the concern that one has absolutely lost. Herein lies the joy. For if one
has never lost something then perhaps one does not have a joy over having it. But when one loses
something, and something valuable to one, then receiving this very same thing back is joyful. And when
one loses absolutely all, and then gains all back, this is joyful. The possibility of gaining back utterly all
the concern for the intraworldly that one loses is joyful, is a sympathetic disclosure of possibility
(nothing).

Haufniensis reiterates this structure of anxiety – the antipathy and the sympathy relating to the
nothing:

he who sank in possibility – his eye became dizzy, his eye became confused, so he could not
grasp the measuring stick that Tom, Dick, and Harry hold out as a saving straw to one sinking (...)
He sank absolutely, but then in turn he emerged from the depth of the abyss lighter than all the
troublesome and terrible things in life. (CA 158)

Here Haufniensis echoes his earlier characterization of anxiety as analogous to the “dizziness” of
looking into the “abyss”. Again here possibility (the abyss) is related to in both an antipathetic and
sympathetic manner. On the one hand the antipathetic possibility is the possibility of “sinking
absolutely”, that is, losing absolutely all of one’s concern for the intraworldly. This is absolute, for what
is at issue is not losing merely this or that concern – for “[i]n actuality, no one ever sank so deep that he
could not sink deeper” (CA 158) – but what is at issue here is sinking absolutely, losing absolutely all of
one’s concern such that the “measuring stick” is lost, such that it is not a matter of sinking more and
more, but of sinking absolutely. This antipathetic possibility is terrifying. But anxiety is ambiguous and it
also relates to possibility in a partly sympathetic manner: the possibility of gaining back absolutely all of
one’s concern one has absolutely lost is joyful – the possibility of emerging “from the depth of the abyss
lighter than (...) the terrible things in life” is joyful. Again what is at issue is not gaining back merely this
or that concern, but gaining back precisely what one has lost in the antipathy, the totality of one’s
concern. And herein lies the joy – gaining back the concern one had, once one has absolutely lost it. This
sympathetic possibility is joyful.

In this way anxiety acts as the elastic springboard which, when rightly used, springs one into the
mode of spirit called faith – faith is that mode in which one springs off anxiety such that one, in terror,
loses absolutely all of one’s concern for the finite, and yet therewith, in joy, gains back that very concern.
Now, what is the purpose of this double-movement, is it not pointless to lose all and simultaneously gain
it back? It is important to note that whereas before one has achieved faith one is, in one’s concern, sinfully bungled – ensnared or entangled – in the finite (CA 160). (In a later section I will flesh out in more detail what this being ensnared in the finite means; in a later section I will show that this entanglement is modelled on the Augustinian account of concupiscientia.) Now, whereas before one has made the double-movement one is indeed, in one’s concern, entangled in the finite (in the manner of concupiscientia), the way to disentangle oneself from the finite is by way of making the antipathetic movement of losing all of one’s concern for it. And then, when one therewith gains all this concern back by way of the sympathetic movement, one gains it back such that one is no longer ensnared in the finite. This is the upshot of the double-movement: through the antipathetic movement one disentangles oneself from the finite by way of losing all of one’s concern, through the sympathetic movement one gains back one’s concern now in the transformed manner of no longer being entangled in it.

This, then, is the springboard of anxiety: anxiety discloses nothing (possibility), and anxiety relates to this nothing in a partly antipathetic, partly sympathetic manner. On the one hand the antipathetic possibility of losing absolutely all of one’s concern for the intraworldly is disclosed, and disclosed as terrifying – and before this movement is made one is ensnared in the finite, and it is by way of this movement that one disentangles oneself; on the other hand the sympathetic possibility of gaining back absolutely all of one’s concern which one has lost is disclosed, and disclosed as joyful – and when this second movement is made along with the first, one gains back one’s concern such that one is no longer entangled in the finite. But the antipathetic possibility of absolute loss is internally related to the sympathetic possibility – for (as I will detail next section) one can only properly spring off the antipathy when one simultaneously gains back all that one loses. And it is for this reason that the antipathy, to speak precisely, is the sympathetic antipathy. And the sympathetic possibility of gaining back absolutely all of what is lost is internally related to the antipathetic possibility – for one can only properly spring off the sympathy and gain back what one has lost such that one is no longer entangled in it, only when one has indeed absolutely lost it all and disentangled oneself. And it is for this reason that the sympathy, to speak precisely, is the antipathetic sympathy. And thus this ambiguous anxiety – the sympathetic antipathy and the antipathetic sympathy relating to nothing (the category of totality) – is the elastic springboard from which, when rightly used, springs one into faith.

Now that we have a grip on the structure of anxiety and have a sketch of how one uses it rightly, I will specify the role of the agency involved in this using anxiety rightly. How does one make this double-movement, this dialectical spring off anxiety? Is it self-willed or receptive or somehow a combination of both willfulness and receptivity? Haufniensis subtly specifies that the antipathetic possibility – losing all – can be achieved merely with one’s own willpower: Haufniensis subtly holds that properly springing off the antipathetic springboard is achieved with one’s own strength. In this sense I call this first movement
willful. But Haufniensis also subtly specifies that the sympathetic possibility – gaining all back – cannot be achieved merely with one’s own willpower: Haufniensis holds, subtly, that properly springing off the sympathetic springboard is not something an individual can do with their own strength, own will, but is something that can only be achieved by way of a receptivity in something above and beyond them. In this sense I call this second movement receptive. Haufniensis writes,

the individual himself must (...) have possibility in himself and himself develop that from which he is to learn, even though in the next moment that from which he is to learn does not at all acknowledge that it is formed by him but absolutely deprives him of the power.

However, in order that an individual may thus be educated absolutely and infinitely by the possibility, he must be honest toward possibility and have faith. (...) When the discoveries of possibility are honestly administered, possibility will discover all the finitudes, but it will idealize them in the form of infinity and in anxiety overwhelm the individual until he again overcomes them in the anticipation of faith. (CA 157)

I take Haufniensis to be subtly saying that the individual can and indeed should, with one’s own willpower, spring off the sympathetic antipathy and absolutely lose all of one’s concern for the finite – “have possibility in himself and himself develop that from which he is to learn”. Indeed Haufniensis later stresses that, regarding this achieving the loss of all, the individual must be “transformed by himself” (CA 160), must be “weaned away (...) by himself” (CA 161). This is something an individual can do merely with one’s own strength, one’s own willpower, and indeed ought to, since this disentangles one from the finite. This is a willful achievement. However, I take Haufniensis to also be subtly saying that while an individual indeed should achieve the second movement, the individual cannot, with one’s own willpower, spring off the antipathetic sympathy and gain back that which one has absolutely lost – this movement “absolutely deprives him of the power”. While one can indeed, merely with one’s own willpower, eradicate all of one’s concern for the finite, one cannot merely with one’s own willpower get that concern back. Thus, Haufniensis writes, this second movement – properly springing off the antipathetic sympathy – requires faith in something beyond one, faith that one indeed will get back this finite that one is with one’s own power absolutely losing – “he again overcomes” the loss of all. This is a receptive achievement.

And thus, taking these two ideas together – that the loss of all can be achieved completely with one’s own willpower, and yet gaining all back cannot be achieved merely with one’s own willpower, but can only be achieved by faith in something beyond one – the penultimate paragraph of Anxiety concludes:

The true autodidact is precisely in the same degree a theodidact (...) or to use an expression less reminiscent of the intellectual, he is αὐτουργός τις τῆς φιλοσοφίας [one who on his own cultivates philosophy] and in the same degree θεουργός [one who tends the things of God]. (CA 162)

What is at issue is being ‘properly taught by anxiety’, that is, properly springing off the springboard, and this ‘being taught’ has two aspects, which of course correspond to anxiety’s sympathetic
antipathy and antipathetic sympathy. For on the one hand one must be an “autodidact”, self-taught – for one can and indeed should, with one’s own willpower, spring off the sympathetic antipathy and willfully achieve the absolute loss of the finite – one can make this movement “on his own”. But on the other hand one must also be a “theodidact”, taught by God – for one cannot, merely with one’s own willpower, achieve the gaining back of the finite that one has lost, but this can only be done with a receptive faith that God will grant one this.

Now, while Haufniensis’ account of anxiety – as the elastically ambiguous sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy relating to nothing – is quite developed, his account of how this springboard is properly sprung off into faith is, as stated, quite subtle. But Haufniensis, in a footnote in the Introduction of Anxiety, implies that his account of faith, as the double-movement, will harmonize with de silentio’s account of faith in Fear and Trembling:

In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio (…) bring[s] to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality (…) This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap [Spring] and in the positive mood – “Behold all things have become new” as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd. (…) Either all of existence comes to an end (...) or the condition is provided and the whole of life and of existence begins anew (CA 17)

I take Haufniensis to be highlighting the harmony between his account of faith and de silentio’s, and also to be noting how his account of anxiety underlies that account of faith. For Haufniensis characterizes de silentio’s account: “the religious ideality” (i.e. faith) breaks forth in “the dialectical leap [Spring]” (i.e. the double-spring) off from the “mood” (i.e. anxiety – the sympathetic antipathy and the antipathetic sympathy) in such a way that, on the one hand “the negative mood” is sprung off from such that “all existence comes to an end” (i.e. one springs off the sympathetic antipathy in such a way that one loses absolutely all of the finite), and on the other hand “the positive mood” is sprung off from such that “the condition is provided and the whole of (...) existence begins anew”, “all things have become new” (i.e. one springs off the antipathetic sympathy in such a way that one gains back the lost finite, indeed such that one is no longer ensnared in it). In this footnote Haufniensis thus notes the way the structure of anxiety underlies de silentio’s account of faith, an account which, as I have been holding, Haufniensis also holds, yet in a subtle manner. And finally, the above citation also notes that, as anxiety underlies faith, underlies it as the springboard for it, this anxiety is the “passion of the absurd” – anxiety is the springboard for leaping into that which is absurd. But to clarify this we must now turn to de silentio.

Fear and Trembling
As noted, while Anxiety is the centrepiece for my interpretation of Kierkegaard, I will use de silentio’s Fear and Trembling to develop and clarify the concept of faith that is in Anxiety, without, however, adding anything that is not already in Anxiety, albeit in a perhaps very subtle manner. For Fear and Trembling gives us the most developed account of faith from Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, and indeed, as I show in detail now, this account harmonizes with the one subtly given to us in Anxiety, and indeed clarifies and develops it. Furthermore, de silentio also continually stresses the anxiety which helps give rise to faith, yet this account of anxiety in Fear and Trembling is underdeveloped, and is only clarified by Haufniensis. For while de silentio’s book is titled Fear and Trembling the passion that is at issue in this book is not fear, but is “anxiety” (FT, 27, 30, 48, 61, 80, 88, 100): the phrase ‘fear and trembling’ is used because it is a direct quote from the Bible, but the mood that is really at issue is what de silentio continually repeats as ‘anxiety and distress’ (FT 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 74, 75, 113, 118). Thus de silentio is on board with Haufniensis insofar as they both consider anxiety to be something of springboard which, when rightly used, springs one into faith. For as Haufniensis noted, in citing Fear and Trembling, that anxiety is the “passion” which helps give rise to faith, de silentio notes in a footnote that the leap (spring) into faith requires passion – and since he continually stresses anxiety in this regard, we can read this to mean that de silentio also understands anxiety as the passion which is the springboard for faith.

This requires passion. Every movement of infinity is carried out through passion (...) This is the continual leap in existence that explains the movement (FT 42)

As Haufniensis details anxiety as made up of the dialectical determinants – the sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy, relating to nothing – which helps give rise to the “dialectical leap [Spring]”, de silentio details in a more developed way what this dialectical leap consists in.24 For in the section of Fear and Trembling, titled ‘Preliminary Expectoration’ (FT 27), de silentio stresses that faith is

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24 The relationship between Haufniensis and de silentio here, and in particular the centrality of anxiety as the springboard for faith in Fear and Trembling, has generally been overlooked in the secondary literature. Here I stress one section of Fear and Trembling in which anxiety as the underlying springboard for faith is given artistic expression, and yet this has been overlooked – the section titled ‘Exordium’ (FT 9), in which de silentio gives us four poetic constructions of Abrahams struggle. Mooney, in his ‘Art, Deed, and System: The Prefaces to Fear and Trembling’, in R. L. Perkins (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary: Fear and Trembling and Repetition (Mercer University Press: Georgia, 1993), holds that these poetic constructions illustrate examples where Abraham is failing to achieve faith (pp. 80-81), and Mulhall in his Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), follows Mooney on this line and develops the details of a fourfold failure (pp. 373-375). While I do not disagree with Mooney and Mulhall here I highlight that this section is subtly illustrating how anxiety underlies the movement of faith, whether the movement fails or is successful, and this both Mooney and Mulhall do not address. De silentio artistically expresses this underlying anxiety by having within each of the four sections two sub sections (a top section and bottom section, separated by a space). The top section illustrates Abraham’s struggle with faith, while the bottom section subtly illustrates, I hold, the anxiety which underlies this struggle (without ever explicitly referring to anxiety). For the bottom section of each of the four sections writes of a ‘mother’ who ‘weans’ her ‘child’, and the ‘fortunate’ aspect of this. But I hold that the mother is anxiety, the child is Abraham, and anxiety is weaning Abraham off the finite. For consider how Haufniensis characterizes the anxiety which gives rise to faith: “one may say that it is fortunate to have present such a deceiver [anxiety] who piously deceives and always weans the child before finitude begins to bungle him.” (CA 160)
made up of two simultaneous movements (two simultaneous continual leaps) – what he calls a “double-movement” (FT 36), which makes up the “dialectic of faith” (FT 36). I take this double-movement, this dialectic of faith which de silentio details here, as giving us a more developed account of the double-movement which we have highlighted in Anxiety – the spring off the sympathetic antipathy and the spring off the antipathetic sympathy. Now, de silentio is continually stressing that this double-movement is ‘absurd’. I will wait until the end of this section to interpret the details of why this is absurd, but for now I will specify each of these two movements as we find them in de silentio.

The first movement is what de silentio calls infinite resignation. We can define ‘resignation’ as resigning, “renouncing” (FT 40), one’s concern, one’s care, from what de silentio calls the ‘finite’, the ‘temporal’, the ‘world’. I take this to means that in resignation one resigns one’s care or concern from intraworldly entities and intraworldly events. Now, this resignation is ‘infinite’ insofar as one resigns one’s care, concern, for the intraworldly absolutely – it is not the case that one resigns one’s care from merely this or that, from more and yet more, but rather one resigns one’s concern from absolutely all of the finite, the totality of the finite. In infinite resignation, one gives up absolutely all of one’s concern regarding the finite world.

Now here de silentio explicitly speaks of ‘death’ in relation to infinite resignation, and in doing so he distinguishes the use of ‘death’ in its commonsense meaning, from the ‘death’ of infinite resignation. This distinction will help clarify why I refer to infinite resignation as the loss of all concern for the world, rather than the loss of the world (and in relation to anxiety, it will clarify why I speak of anxiety’s antipathy as disclosing the possibility of the loss of all concern for the world, rather than the loss of the world). In ‘death’ in its commonsense meaning, when one dies one is annihilated, and in this sense death marks one as mortal. In this typical sense of death – death as annihilation – we can say that when one dies the world is lost. However, in infinite resignation there is something of a ‘death’, but one is still there in a certain sense, in infinite resignation one is not necessarily annihilated. In this regard de silentio writes that he opposes the view that “no one can experience death before one actually dies” (FT 46), since in infinite resignation one indeed dies in a certain sense, without, however, being annihilated. How does one die in infinite resignation? One dies here in that one loses utterly all of one’s concern for the world, while, however, one is still alive, one is not annihilated – or in other words, the world is not lost, one has not died in the commonsense meaning.

In the movement of infinite resignation all of one’s concern for the intraworldly is lost, but yet in infinite resignation one is still alive, and thus I call this a living death. It is in this sense that de silentio tells us that “dying is one of the most remarkable leaps” (FT 42), that is, infinite resignation is a leap into the living death. Furthermore, when infinite resignation, the living death, is achieved, de silentio tells us, a consciousness of God is therewith achieved – which, before the resignation, one has not had (FT 43, 48).
For before infinite resignation is achieved, before one renounces all of one’s concern for the finite, one is entangled in this concern for the finite, and it is only by way of the movement of infinite resignation that one disentangles oneself, and establishes this consciousness of God.

Now, de silentio continually reiterates that the movement of infinite resignation is something that one can achieve merely with one’s own willpower – he notes that this movement is such that it “is essential that it not be a unilateral result of a dira necessitas [cruel constraint of necessity]” (FT 46), and rather that it is made “proprio motu et propriis auspiciis [of his own accord and on his own responsibility]” (FT 35); he stresses that “I can resign everything by my own strength” (FT 49). And finally, de silentio tells us that underlying this movement of infinite resignation, which one can achieve with one’s own willpower, is the passion of a “terrifying” (FT 33) “pain” (FT 40, 43, 45, 47, 50, 51) – “[i]nfinite resignation is that shirt mentioned in an old legend. The thread is spun with tears, bleached with tears; the shirt is sewn in tears (...) each person must sew it himself” (FT 45). For de silentio noted that each leap requires a passion, and the movement of infinite resignation springs off anxiety’s antipathy – here, one looks the “terrifying face to face” (FT 33) (the possibility of losing absolutely all) and in pain one makes the spring: with one’s own willpower one achieves infinite resignation (therewith establishing a consciousness of God).

The second movement is what de silentio calls faith (while the double-movement itself is called ‘faith’, the second of these movements is also called ‘faith’). While the first movement absolutely renounces all of one’s concern for the finite world, the second movement –faith – gains back, completely gains back, one’s concern for the finite world – “here in the world.” (FT 36) Now, what is gained back is not concern for something other than what one renounces, but what is gained back is precisely the very same concern that one absolutely renounces – “to win the very same finitude again by virtue of the absurd” (FT 36) (herein lies the absurdity which I will spell out below). This means that while the first movement renounces absolutely all of one’s concern for the intraworldly, the second movement absolutely gains back the very same concern, the totality of that concern.

Now, de silentio reiterates that this second movement, faith, is not something that one can achieve with one’s willpower. Indeed de silentio stresses that one uses all of one’s strength in the movement of infinite resignation, and thus the second movement cannot be made with one’s own strength – “[b]y my own strength I cannot get the least little thing that belongs to finitude, for I continually use my strength in resigning everything.” (FT 49) How then is one to make the second movement, gain back the finite? This second movement can only be made for one by God: for while it is not possible for one under one’s own willpower to gain back that which one infinitely resigns, de silentio stresses that “for God all things are possible” (FT 46), and thus one can only make this second movement by way of a receptive faith in God. And finally, de silentio tells us that underlying this movement of faith, which can only be achieved by
way of a receptivity to God, is the passion of joy – “the joy of faith” (FT 34). In the movement of faith one “rall[ies]to finitude and its joy” (FT 37) – for in after having absolutely lost the finite world, when one gains back that very same finitude one gains it “more joyfully than the first time” (FT 36). De silentio noted that each leap requires passion, and the movement of faith springs off anxiety’s sympathy – here the possibility of gaining back all that one has lost is disclosed, and with joy one makes the spring: with a receptivity in God one achieves faith.

Thus, faith is a double-movement: the movement of infinite resignation, which can be achieved with one’s own willpower, and in which a terrifying pain underlies; and the movement of faith, which can only be achieved by way of a receptivity in God, and in which a joy underlies. This is very abstract, so de silentio gives us an example to help flesh it out, and indeed specifies it in more detail – he gives us an example of young lad in love with a princess.

Here de silentio clarifies that a prerequisite for making the movement of infinite resignation is that one must first concentrate the entirety of one’s concern with the finite into a single finite desire – “concentrate the whole substance of his life and the meaning of actuality into one single desire.” (FT 43) In the example, this desire is thus ‘to have the princess’ – “he is not afraid to let it twist and entwine itself intricately around every ligament of his consciousness” (FT 42). In this way the entirety of one’s concern with the finite revolves around the central desire, e.g. to have the princess. It is as if one’s concern with other finite things is born out of one’s central desire, and this central desire gives all other finite things their significance. And now one is in the position to make the movement of infinite resignation. For if one resigns one’s concern, one’s care, from the central desire one therewith resigns absolutely all of one’s concern for the finite. For the significance of the other finite things are born out of the central desire, and if this central desire is resigned, therewith the entirety of concern with the finite is resigned. Thus one here makes the movement, and makes it with one’s own strength, merely with one’s own willpower. In pain the central desire is resigned, and with this the entirety of the finite is resigned. With infinite resignation the central desire, e.g. having the princess, becomes, as de silentio writes, an ‘impossibility’ and, therewith, the entirety of one’s concern for the finite becomes an impossibility. In pain one resigns one’s concern for the central finite desire – “[h]e is no longer finitely concerned about what the princess does” (FT 44) – and this therewith unthreads the entirety of one’s concern for the finite. When this movement is made one manages “in the pain of resignation, to look the impossibility in the eye.” (FT 47) And yet with this resignation one disentangles oneself from the finite, which one has hitherto been entangled in, and a consciousness of God is established. De silentio explains that in this example, the love which the lad hitherto had for his princess (before resignation was achieved) is (once resignation is achieved) transformed into a love of God (FT 43) – and in this way the lad disentangles himself from the finite and establishes a consciousness of God which he hitherto did not have.
But the second movement is such that what has become absolutely impossible – i.e. concern for the entirety of the finite world – becomes ‘possible’. For while one, with one’s own willpower, renounces all concern for the finite in the first movement (such that this becomes absolutely impossible), the second movement is made only by way of a receptive faith in God, for whom all things are possible. In his example de silentio tells us that while the young lad, with his own strength, renounced his finite concern for the princess, therewith making all concern impossible, the young lad makes the second movement, gaining back his finite concern for the princes, only by way of a receptive faith in God – “[n]evertheless I have faith that I will get her” (FT 46). Now, since, as de silentio specified, the young lad had concentrated the entirety of his concern with the finite into the one central desire of ‘having the princess’ such that all other concern with the finite is dependent on and branches out of this central concern, when the young lad, by way of faith, gains back his concern for the princess, he therewith gains back all of the concern for the finite which branches out of the central desire. For just as when the lad renounces his central desire in infinite resignation this therewith renounces all other finite concern (it all becomes impossible), so too when the lad gains back this central concern by way of faith this therewith gains back all other finite concern (it all becomes possible). And thus while the first movement looks the impossibility in the eye, the second movement nevertheless makes that which is impossible possible – “the unshakability of faith in the full recognition of the impossibility.” (FT 48) Considering these two movements together de silentio writes,

The moment the knight executed the act of resignation, he was convinced of the impossibility (...) in the finite world where it dominates this having was and continues to be an impossibility. The knight of faith realizes this just as clearly; consequently, he can be saved only by the absurd, and this he grasps by faith. Consequently, he acknowledges the impossibility, and in the very same moment he believes the absurd, for if he wants to imagine that he has faith without passionately acknowledging the impossibility with his whole heart and soul, he is deceiving himself and his testimony is neither here nor there since he has not even attained infinite resignation. (FT 46-47)

And thus with this example de silentio fleshes out the double-movement, and indeed specifies it in more detail. The movement of infinite resignation is made by first concentrating all of one’s finite concern into one central finite desire such that all other concern branches out of it, then, by way of one’s own willpower, renounces this central concern, and with it all other concern, such that all finite concern becomes an impossibility (therewith disentangling oneself from the finite and establishing a consciousness of God) – and underlying this movement is terrifying pain; the movement of faith is made by way of a receptivity in God, for who all things are possible, such that one gains back one’s concern for the central desire and with it all of one’s concern with the finite, such that all finite concern becomes, once again, possible – and underlying this movement is joy. De silentio captures the subtleties of successfully making this dialectical leap by way of an analogy:
It is supposed to be the most difficult feat for a ballet dancer to leap into a specific posture in such a way that he never once strains for the posture but in the very leap assumes the posture. (...) But to be able to come down in such a way that instantaneously one seems to stand and to walk, to change the leap into life into walking, absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian – only that knight can do it (FT 41)

The movement of the ballet dancer upward, off from the ground – analogous to the movement of infinite resignation – is difficult in its own right; but to make the simultaneous movement downward, back onto the ground – analogous to the second movement, faith – landing back onto the ground without “wavering” (FT 41), that is extremely difficult to master. And so too springing off the sympathetic antipathy – absolutely resigning all of one’s finite concern by way of one’s own willpower (which is terrifying), establishing a consciousness of God – is difficult considered on its own; but to simultaneously spring off the antipathetic sympathy – absolutely gaining back, by way of a receptivity in God, all of one’s concern (which is joyful) which one is simultaneously absolutely losing – this simultaneous acrobatics is extremely difficult to master. For in the spring off the ambiguous springboard one must know in subtle detail how, where to be willful, and how, where to be receptive, in making the gymnastic manoeuvre.

Finally, as this gymnastic manoeuvre makes up the dialectic of faith this double-movement is, as has been continually noted, absurd. Why, in detail, is this absurd? The first step in approaching this question is to note that in the dialectic of faith, I hold, each of the two movements are continually made in simultaneity. For de silentio notes that the first movement – infinite resignation – is made in this dialectic continually: “I continually use my strength in resigning everything.” (FT 49) De silentio also notes that the second movement – faith – is made in this dialectic continually: “the movement of faith must continually be made by virtue of the absurd, but yet in such a way, please note, that one does not lose the finite by gains it whole and intact.” (FT 37) And thus this means that both movements are being made continually in simultaneity: “[h]e is continually making the movement of infinity, but he does it with such precision and assurance that he continually gets finitude out of it” (FT 40-41). It is in this simultaneity of the two movements, each being continually made, that the absurdity of the dialectic of faith lies. That is, in the dialectic of faith, one is, on the one hand, continually renouncing absolutely all of one’s concern for the finite world (with one’s own willpower); and, simultaneously, one is, on the other hand, continually gaining back absolutely all of one’s concern that one is simultaneously absolutely losing (with a receptivity towards God). In other words, on the one hand one’s finite concern is an absolute impossibility, and, simultaneously, that very same finite concern is possible (and indeed it is by way of this absurdity that one gains back one’s concern for the finite such that one is no longer sinfully ensnared in it).
Now, while the above citations show that de silentio stresses that these two movements are made *continually*, at this point one might want to resist my interpretation that this means that the two movements are made simultaneously. For example, one might want to avoid this simultaneity by holding that while these movements are indeed made ‘continually’, this only means that the double-movement is something of a cyclical process – i.e. that the movements are not simultaneous, but rather one first makes the first movement, and then later makes the second movement, and after a time goes back to making the first movement, and then back to the second, etc. In this way the ‘simultaneity’ of the two movements is avoided, while at the same time this interpretation tries to account for de silentio’s use of ‘continual’.

However, only a few lines above one of the citations in which de silentio tells us that the two movements are made “continually” (*FT* 40-41, cited above), de silentio specifies regarding the first movement: “this man has made and at every moment is making the movement of infinity.” (*FT* 40) It is citations such as this one – which stress that both of the movements are made “at every moment” – which tend to suggest that the cyclical reading of ‘continual’ is not as supported by the text as the simultaneous reading which I am holding. And finally, it is by juxtaposing the two continual movements in there simultaneity, that we have arrived at the first step in detailing the absurdity of the double-movement.

This leads us to the second step in approaching this question regarding the absurd. Namely, de silentio implies that this absurd double-movement – both continually made in simultaneity – will tend to appear to be an utterly incompossible mode of spirit. That is, the two modes – both utterly renouncing all concern, and yet also getting that very same concern back – will tend to appear to be not mutually possible, tend to appear incompatible, if they are to made simultaneously. (De silentio suggests that for the “domain of the understanding” (*FT* 46), or “human calculation” (*FT* 35), and even “thought” (*FT* 53), the absurd double-movement will appear to by an utterly incompossible mode of spirit.) And therefore while the first specification of the absurd highlights that the two movements are made continually in simultaneity, the second specification of the absurd highlights that this mode of spirit will tend to appear to be incompossible. In this sense the double-movement is absurd.

And thus in this way anxiety rightly used is the absurd *telos*. For I believe I have now shown that de silentio’s account of faith not only harmonizes with the account given to us by Haufniensis, but also develops it and clarifies it. For while Haufniensis gives us the detailed account of ambiguous anxiety – as the sympathetic antipathy and the antipathetic sympathy, relating to nothing (the category of totality) – and very subtly gives us a sketch of how one uses this springboard rightly to achieve faith, I believe I have shown how de silentio provides us with the details of the double-movement of faith. For de silentio specifies that properly springing off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy is achieved by one with one’s own willpower by concentrating all of one’s concern into a single finite desire and then renouncing that, therewith renouncing absolutely all of one’s concern, disentangling oneself from the finite and
establishing a consciousness of God; and he specifies that properly springing off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy is achieved by one by way of a receptivity towards God in faith such that one receives back that central desire, and with this, receives back all of one’s concern for the finite which one renounces; and furthermore these two movements are both continually made in simultaneity, even though this may appear to be an incompossible mode of spirit. In short this double-movement is absurd. That is, using ambiguous anxiety rightly, properly springing off the sympathetic antipathy and, simultaneously, the antipathetic sympathy, is the absurd telos.

Secondary Literature

As I mentioned in my Introduction, and as I hope to have now shown in detail, two of the upshots of my strategy of focusing on the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in Kierkegaard are the following: firstly, that in doing so we are led to an account of the strange type of agency involved in, e.g. faith (in that it is part active, part passive); and secondly, that in doing so we are also led to bring to the fore one’s relation to the concept of faith (in that faith is absurd).

In the first case, after detailing how anxiety is ambiguous in that its antipathetic aspect acts as a springboard for achieving the first movement, infinite resignation, and its sympathetic aspect acts as a springboard for achieving the second movement, faith, this account of anxiety’s ambiguity led us to detailing the strange agency in properly springing off anxiety into faith. For I showed in detail how the agency involved in springing off the antipathy and achieving infinite resignation is a willful achievement that one can do with one’s own strength, while the agency involved in springing off the sympathy and achieving faith is a receptive one that only God can grant one. And – as faith is only achieved when one makes both the antipathetic and sympathetic movement – in this way, the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity led us to detail how the agency involved in faith is part willful, part receptive.

In the second case, detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity also led us to detail how Kierkegaard’s account of the double-movement, faith, is absurd. For we noted that as faith is made up of the double-movement of both springing off the antipathy and achieving infinite resignation, and springing off the sympathy and achieving faith, and as these two movements are made continually in simultaneity, this marks the absurdity of this double movement. And in this way the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity led us to detailing the absurdity of faith. Now, the upshot of showing that faith is absurd is that this brings to the fore the way one relates to the concept of faith. As noted in my Introduction, Carlisle, in her Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling\textsuperscript{25}, holds that de silentio’s account of the absurdity of faith – which is,

as she notes, “the ‘double movement’” in which the first movement is made “at the same time” as the second movement (p. 93) – is intended to bring the reader to a “point of crises” (p. 97), in which the reader must make a decision for themselves between an either/or: whether they recognize faith, precisely because of its absurdity, “as the highest spiritual task” which they will attempt to achieve; or, precisely because of its absurdity, “reject faith as an ideal” (p. 96). Now, I follow Carlisle in her assessment of how the absurdity of faith brings one’s relation to this concept to the fore, but what Carlisle does not mention is how this concept of absurd faith (which we find in de silentio) is related to Haufniensis’ concept of anxiety, and anxiety rightly used. However, I hope to have shown, by detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity, how this concept of the absurdity of faith is also in play in Haufniensis’ concept of anxiety rightly used.

Let me now show how my account, regarding both of these upshots, relates to some of the other secondary literature on the topic of anxiety and faith in Kierkegaard. When we look at some of the prevalent secondary literature on anxiety and faith in Kierkegaard, what we find is something of a gap concerning both of these points – that is, most literature that deals with anxiety and faith in Kierkegaard simply does not detail the type of agency involved in using anxiety rightly to achieve faith, nor does it detail how anxiety rightly used in faith is absurd. A quick look at some of the prevalent work on anxiety and faith in Kierkegaard shows this gap.

Gordon Marino, in ‘Anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety’26, gives an account of anxiety and faith in a section entitled ‘Being Educated by Anxiety and Possibility’ (pp. 324-327). Here Marino gives an account of how anxiety can be used to spring one into faith, and he focuses on the content of how anxiety discloses that one is in sin and how one must become conscious of this fact in order to be able to achieve faith. Marino does not specify how anxiety is here ambiguous, nor does he specify the type of agency involved in achieving faith, nor does he imply that this faith is absurd.

Robert Roberts, in ‘The Socratic Knowledge of God’27, also deals with anxiety and faith in a section titled ‘The Anxiety of Possibility’ (pp. 135-137). Roberts focuses on how anxiety, when rightly used to achieve faith, is used in such a way that one has a lucid awareness that one may lose all of the finite, but, according to Roberts, one does not actually need lose it in the double-movement. Roberts does not specify anxiety’s ambiguity here, does not specify the type of agency involved in faith, and neither does he specify the absurdity of faith.

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Jamie Ferreira, in *Kierkegaard*\(^{28}\), also gives an account of anxiety and faith in the section ‘Anxiety as teacher’ (pp. 88-89). Here Ferreira too focuses on how when anxiety is rightly used one has an awareness of the possibility of losing all, while it seems that, on Ferreira’s account, one need not actually lose it all in the double-movement. And here Ferreira does not specify anxiety’s ambiguity, does not specify the agency involved in faith, and does not hold that faith is absurd.

David Kangas, in *Kierkegaard’s Instant*\(^{29}\), in a section titled ‘Absolute Sinking: Gelassenheit’ (pp. 191-194), details his account of anxiety and faith. Kangas holds that anxiety is rightly used to achieve faith by way of a “letting-go, releasement, or Gelassenheit” (p. 192), and more specifically Kangas writes, “[b]eing led by anxiety, faith lets go of its own will absolutely” (p. 194). Now, Kangas does not detail anxiety’s ambiguity here, nor does he hold that faith is absurd, but he does seem to give an account of the agency involved in achieving faith: and that seems to be one which does not involve any type of willful achievement.

Vincent McCarthy, in *The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard*\(^{30}\), also deals with anxiety and faith in a section titled ‘Resolution and Significance of Anxiety’ (pp. 45-47). Here McCarthy holds that anxiety is rightly used to achieve faith as a transformative experience, and more specifically “[s]uch willingness to be transferred can only be actualized by an act of the will” (p. 46). McCarthy does not detail anxiety’s ambiguity here, nor does he hold that faith is absurd, but he does seem to give an account of the agency involved in achieving faith: one that seems to be purely a willful achievement.

Finally, Arne Grøn, in *The Concept of Anxiety in Søren Kierkegaard*\(^{31}\), details his account of anxiety and faith in the sections ‘Anxiety and Faith’ and ‘The Decision of Faith’ (pp. 147-153). Here Grøn does not specify how anxiety rightly used to achieve faith is ambiguous, nor does he detail what type of agency is involved using anxiety rightly, but he does go the farthest of any commentator I am aware of in connecting this using anxiety rightly with de silentio’s claim that faith is absurd. After describing using anxiety rightly as a ‘paradoxical possibility’ Grøn notes, “[t]he paradoxical possibility that I touched on is described in *Fear and Trembling* as the absurd: the possibility of getting “everything” back that was lost” (p. 151), and goes on to claim that because of this “faith becomes the individual’s decision” (p. 152).

Now while all of the above sources have sections dedicated to anxiety and faith in Kierkegaard, I hope to have shown that there is a particular gap in this secondary literature that my work will hopefully fill. Firstly none of the above sources detail how anxiety, when it is rightly used, is *ambiguous* (i.e. made

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up of an antipathetic and sympathetic aspect). Secondly, and perhaps following from the first, none of the above sources hold that the agency involved in anxiety rightly used is made up of a strange combination of willfulness and receptivity – for while most sources do not touch on this topic, Kangas seems to hold that it is achieved without any willfulness, while McCarthy seems to hold the opposite, that it is achieved purely by willfulness. And thirdly, and perhaps following from the first, none of the above sources, with the exception of Grøn, hold that using anxiety rightly will be absurd in some sense. This is thus the double upshot of this section in this dissertation on anxiety rightly used: in focusing on the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity (i.e. detailing the antipathetic and sympathetic aspects of anxiety), this leads us to detail the strange agency involved in the double-movement (as part willful, part receptive), and also leads us to detail the absurdity of the double-movement, which brings to the fore the way one relates to this concept (in that faith’s absurdity tends to, as Carlisle specifies, force the reader to make a decision regarding where the stand in relation to it).

32 While I have primarily dealt with readings of Haufniensis’ Anxiety above, here I would also like to deal with a strand in the secondary literature on de silentio’s Fear and Trembling. There is a prevalent line in the secondary literature on de silentio which argues that faith, when rightly conceived, is not absurd – however I think that this view is self-defeating, and for the following reasons.

Here what is at issue is my first specification of the absurd – namely, that faith is made up of the two continual and simultaneous movements of both renouncing absolutely all of one’s concern for the finite, and yet gaining back precisely that which one is utterly renouncing in the first movement. This strand in the secondary literature holds that the double-movement only appears absurd to one outside of faith, while for one inside faith it is not absurd – that is, it only appears to one’s outside faith that one loses precisely what one gains back. This is not Johannes de silentio’s expressed view – for de silentio simply holds that faith is absurd – and thus commentators who take this line normally ground their account on a famous citation of Kierkegaard’s (not de silentio’s). Kierkegaard writes,

> "When I believe, then assuredly neither faith nor the content of faith is absurd. Oh, no, no – but I understand very well that for the person who does not believe, faith and the content of faith are absurd, and I also understand that as soon as I myself am not in the faith, am weak, when doubt perhaps begins to stir, then faith and the content of faith gradually begin to become absurd for me. But this may have been the divine will: in order that faith – whether a man will have faith or not – could be the test, the examination, faith was bound up with the absurd, and the absurd formed and composed in such a way that only one force can prevail over it – the passion of faith (FT 262)"

Two examples of writers who take the line that faith appears absurd only to ones outside it, while for one’s inside it faith is not absurd, and who then proceed to give a positive non-absurd account of faith, are Mooney in his Knights of Faith and Resignation (State University of New York Press: New York, 1991) pp. 55-58 and 128-131, and Lippitt in his Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling ( Routledge: London, 2003), pp. 54-76. Mooney holds that what is resigned are “proprietary claims” to the finite, and in faith one still has “care” for the finite, and thus the absurdity is dissolved (p. 56) – that is, Mooney does not hold that what is resigned in the first movement is the same thing that is then gained back in the second movement. Lippitt, in describing Abraham, holds that Abraham, in resignation, “acted” like he was going to murder Isaac, yet in faith “believed” that he would still have Isaac, and thus the absurdity is dissolved (pp. 68-69) – that is, Lippitt also does not hold that what is resigned in the first movements is the same thing that is then gained back in the second movement.

Now, both Mooney and Lippitt reference Kierkegaard’s above extract to support the lines which they take (indeed without such a citation their re-working of a central concept in Fear and Trembling would seem unfounded). However, I think that if one cites Kierkegaard in order to support a view of Fear and Trembling which de silentio does not express, then one must be very clear about exactly what Kierkegaard says. But what Kierkegaard seems to
be saying in the above extract is that faith will necessarily appear absurd to one outside of it – “for the person who does not believe, faith and the content of faith are absurd” – and in this way faith is the “test” such that it was “bound up with the absurd, and the absurd formed and composed in such a way that only one force can prevail over it – the passion of faith”. In order for faith to be this test, it will necessarily appear absurd to one’s outside of faith, and only for ones inside of faith will it not appear absurd. But now that I bring this specification to light, I believe Mooney’s and Lippitt’s lines, and indeed any position which takes the same line, undermines itself.

For if the double-movement necessarily appears absurd to one outside of faith, then if an author’s account of faith is accurate, that account must appear absurd to one outside of faith. Thus, in one’s attempt to give non-absurd accounts of faith (to any reader, whether outside or inside faith, which is precisely what Mooney and Lippitt attempt to do), this very project is based on the condition that this account must appear absurd to those outside of faith (for this line needs Kierkegaard’s citation as support). Thus in taking their respective lines Mooney and Lippitt undermine their own accounts: they give a positive account of faith which is not absurd, and yet must be absurd (to those outside of faith).

Now, what is perhaps the crux of the problem for Mooney and Lippitt here is that they are overlooking what I wanted to pinpoint: that the absurdity of faith is intended to bring to the fore one’s relation to this concept, it, as Carlisle points out, forces the reader to consider where they stand in relation to this concept. But it is precisely this question of where the reader stands in relation to the question of the absurdity of faith that Mooney and Lippitt are overlooking. For as mentioned above, if the reader is indeed outside of faith, then according to Mooney and Lippitt, this reader must consider faith to be absurd, and yet Mooney and Lippitt want to give a non-absurd account to that very reader, and in doing so, seem to betray that they overlook the role that the absurdity of faith is intended to play (as forcing the reader to decide where they stand in relation to the absurd).
APPENDIX
THE PSYCHOTIC TELOS

Before we proceed with the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard, we pause and take a side-step in this appendix to investigate a type of springing off from anxiety which springs one out of spirit in a strong sense (and this is important since this possibility plays a pivotal role in how I understand the perpetuum mobile of anxiety misused, which I will detail in a later section). It has been continually stressed that using anxiety rightly is such that one makes the simultaneous double-movement of infinite resignation and faith. But now we consider what results when one only makes one of these movements without therewith making the other. But can one make the second movement of receptive faith without making the first movement? No, this cannot be done, making the first movement is a prerequisite for the possibility of making the second movement – “anyone who has not made this movement [infinite resignation] does not have faith” (FT 46) – for one can only receptively receive God’s grace if one simultaneously achieves, with one’s own willpower, infinite resignation. That is, and as I have been reiterating, one can receive back one’s concern for the finite such that one is no longer entangled in it, only if one simultaneously disentangles oneself from the finite by way of the first movement. But can one make the first movement without simultaneously making the second movement – can one spring off the sympathetic antipathy, achieving infinite resignation, without properly springing off the antipathetic sympathy? Indeed this is possible, and if this is done what results is the darkest mode of existence, in which, speaking strictly, one is no longer ‘spirit’ since one has snapped oneself out of one’s relation with anything finite the latter of which is a necessary element of spirit (as I will show next section). What results is thus a state in which one is no longer spirit in a strong sense: what results is psychosis. And whereas psychosis might be thought of to happen involuntarily to one, psychosis on this account is something one brings upon oneself – and brings it upon oneself for particular ends – it is a psychotic telos.

Thus using anxiety rightly – that is, properly springing such that one makes the simultaneous double-movement – is no safe venture, but rather is bordered by this darkness and is flirting with psychosis. For spirit will always have some concern for the finite world, concern for others in the world, but if spirit completely snaps itself out of all concern – which recall is possible with one’s own willpower – and does not get this back by way of the second movement, then, Haufniensis tells us in Anxiety, “complete insanity” results:

In case the inclosing reserve does not drive the individuality to complete insanity (...) the individuality will still retain a certain continuity with the rest of human life. (CA 130)
I will spell out ‘inclosing reserve’ in a later section – as a sphere of solipsism – but for now I note that when an individual still has some concern for the finite, for others in the world, then one is not psychotic, and I also read this to mean that if someone indeed snaps oneself completely out of one’s concern for the finite without getting it back – therewith gaining an absolute solipsism – then psychosis is the result. As mentioned, strictly speaking it is wrong to say that this is a psychotic ‘spirit’ since spirit will always have some concern for the finite and in psychosis all concern for the finite is given up and not gotten back, and thus in a strong sense in psychosis one’s spirit (self) is also lost. And thus Haufniensis characterizes this psychosis as a self-murder, that is, as suicide (Selvmordet). Achieving the absurd telos is no safe venture, but flirts with the danger of psychosis, that is, existential suicide. In chapter ‘V’ Haufniensis writes,

However, I will not deny that whoever is educated by possibility is exposed to danger, not that of getting into bad company and going astray in various ways as are those educated by the finite, but the danger of a fall, namely, suicide [Selvmordet]. If at the beginning of his education he misunderstands the anxiety, so that it does not lead him to faith but away from faith, then he is lost. (CA 158-159)

In being educated by possibility, that is, being educated by anxiety, one is exposed to the dark danger: not the danger of absorbing oneself in one’s concern for the finite, for this is precisely what the danger absolutely gives up, but the danger of losing absolutely all of one’s concern for the finite, and not getting that concern back – the danger of existential suicide. The danger is making the first movement and not therewith making the second. This is why Haufniensis stresses that the danger lies in “the beginning of his education”, that is, the danger lies in the first movement. For when one is ‘properly taught by anxiety’ then one springs off the sympathetic antipathy, achieving the loss of all concern (the living death), and one simultaneously springs off the antipathetic sympathy, achieving faith – thus when one makes the second movement simultaneous with the first, one gets back one’s concern simultaneously as one loses it, and thus the second movement perpetually extricates one from the living death of the first movement:

faith does not thereby annihilate anxiety, but, itself eternally young, it extricates itself from anxiety’s moment of death. (CA 117)

However, if one makes the first movement and does not therewith make the second – if one merely springs off the sympathetic antipathy achieving living death – then one is not extricated from the moment of death, one is indeed dead in the sense that one has committed existential suicide: one is psychotic.

While I am using Anxiety as the centrepiece for my interpretation of Kierkegaard, this theme of existential suicide – psychosis – as a result of making merely the first movement without the second is also implicit in de silentio’s Fear and Trembling. In this respect the two texts again harmonize, and
indeed *Fear and Trembling* develops this possibility of psychosis in a bit more detail. This can be seen by a close reading of de silentio’s account of Abraham (who is, for de silentio, the exemplar for faith). Recall that for de silentio a prerequisite for making the first movement of resignation is that all of one’s concern for the finite must be bound up in one central finite desire, such that all of one’s concern for the finite branches out of this one desire. For Abraham this one central desire is to love his son (*FT* 21, 31), his son who was only given to him after years of faith, and which is the central finite thing which gives all other concern to the rest of the finite for Abraham. I stress that Isaac is thus a symbol for Abraham’s concern for the finite itself. But then God demands Abraham to kill Isaac. Isaac is the symbol for Abraham’s concern for the finite itself, for if Isaac dies, so too all the rest of the concern for the finite which branches out of this central desire is also lost. Thus I hold that what is at issue here is that God demands that Abraham kill all of his concern for the finite. Now, this killing, de silentio stresses, can be looked at from two ways: killing Isaac is either *murder* or *sacrifice* – that is, ethically considered the killing will be murder; religiously considered the killing will be sacrifice. De silentio continually reiterates this point, and here is one such citation:

> The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he meant to murder [*myrde*] Isaac; the religious expression is that he meant to sacrifice Isaac (*FT* 30)

How do we make sense of this distinction? The religious expression of killing Isaac – killing all concern for the finite – is *sacrifice*, I hold, in the sense that what is given up (concern for the finite) is simultaneously received back by way of a receptivity in God. Thus in sacrifice what is given up is gotten back by way of the absurd – if the first movement is sacrifice, then therewith the second movement of faith is also made and the absurd *telos* is thus achieved. The ethical expression of killing Isaac – killing all concern for the finite – is *murder*, I hold, in the sense that what is given up (concern for the finite) is therewith not gotten back. (For ethics accounts only for what an individual can do with their own willpower, and thus the second movement of receptive faith lies outside of its purview.) Thus in murder what is given up is not gotten back – if the first movement is murder, then the absurd *telos* is thus not achieved. In murder what results is a state in which one has snapped oneself completely out of one’s concern for the finite, and therefore has lost one’s spirit in a strong sense also. Thus murder here comes to mean spirit-murder, self-murder (*suicide*, *Selvmordet*). And thus in the most explicit place where de silentio sketches what would result had Abraham not had faith, but had doubted, he explains:

> If Abraham had doubted, then he would have done something else (...) He would have gone to Mount Moriah, he would have split the firewood, lit the fire, drawn the knife. (...) He would have thrust the knife into his own breast. (*FT* 20-21)

And thus if Abraham had doubted, he still would go through with killing his object, but therewith he would not get it back, and this killing would be a killing of oneself, a self-murder. Murdering Isaac –
and Isaac is the symbol for Abraham’s concern for the finite – would be existential suicide, snapping oneself out of all concern with other people and the finite without getting that concern back. Murdering Isaac, that is, murdering oneself, results in psychosis. Speaking of making merely the first movement, without the second, de silentio writes,

> if madness held its fool’s costume before [a person’s] eyes (...) a person can still concentrate his whole soul in one single look to heaven, from whence come all good gifts, and this look will be understood by himself and by him whom it seeks to mean that he has been true to his love. Then he will calmly put on the costume. *(FT 49)*

For recall that in the first movement, one’s central desire is given up, and then transformed into a consciousness of God (e.g. love for God). Now, if only this first movement is made, this results in psychosis (“madness”), and yet one will still have a relation towards God in this psychosis – a psychotic relation. In short, what is at issue in this ‘murder’ is not killing another, but killing oneself. Killing all of one’s concern for the finite in such a way that one does not simultaneously get it back by way of the second movement is existential suicide, and results in psychosis.

*(This is also the way I interpret de silentio’s story about the horror and confusion involved in how a man listening to the preacher preach on Abraham subsequently went home and wanted to “murder [myrde] [his] son” *(FT 28).* I take this to mean that the man went home and made the first movement of infinite resignation – as his son, like Isaac, is the symbol for all concern for the finite – without making the second movement of faith. This then is the horrible misunderstanding involved: that the man went home and committed existential suicide, that is, became psychotic – “sent to the madhouse” *(FT 29).* )

And thus in this way achieving the absurd *telos* is indeed a dangerous venture, for it is flirting with the darkness of psychosis. For in one’s attempt at faith, in order to make the second movement, one must indeed make the first movement and achieve the living death (for this latter movement is a prerequisite for the former) – and yet this living death can be either sacrifice or suicide. And if, in one’s attempt to achieve faith, one makes the first movement and does not therewith make the second movement – marking the living death as suicide and not sacrifice – and has thus snapped oneself out of spirit in a strong sense, one has become psychotic.

However, this psychosis is not only a mere danger, it is also something that one might want to achieve for a particular end. For perhaps one does not want to have any concern for the finite, concern for others, perhaps one wants to completely snap oneself out of the world, to escape it. In that case existential suicide gives rise to the psychotic *telos.*
Achieving the absurd telos is no safe venture therefore, but is always flirting with the darkness, psychosis. Haufniensis and de silentio do not give us a developed account of psychosis, but merely hint at the structure thereof: i.e. snapping oneself out of all concern with the finite and others, and not getting that concern back, which also includes some sort of psychotic relation towards God. Their main interest is precisely to flesh out the absurd telos, and thus they just mark the danger involved in this venture, the darkness which borders anxiety used rightly. However here I would like to follow up on Haufniensis’ and de silentio’s lead, and give a fleshed out account of psychosis in accordance with Haufniensis’ and de silentio’s framework. Here I will turn to a famous autobiographical account of psychosis, Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, published in 1903, and use Schreber’s account of his illness as a case-study to both defend my account of psychosis which I draw from Haufniensis and de silentio, as well as to flesh it out in a particular case to give a detailed look at what the experience of psychosis may be like.

My assumption in this appendix is that in cases of psychosis – or at least in Schreber’s case – the ‘psychotic system’ which psychotics create in an obsessive manner actually expresses the truth of their situation, yet expresses it in a highly poetic form, and thus with subtle interpretation of that poetic expression one can lay bare that situation. In particular, we will find that there are two key poetic threads running through Schreber’s Memoirs, the first of which I will interpret to mean that Schreber made the movement of what de silentio calls infinite resignation (sprang off anxiety’s antipathy), and the second of which I will interpret to mean that Schreber did not make the movement of what de silentio calls faith (failed to properly spring off anxiety’s sympathy).

Before we launch into my interpretation of Schreber’s Memoirs I will first say a few words defending my strategy of bringing in the Schreber case-study here. For it might be wondered what right I have to claim that Schreber’s psychotic system expresses the truth of his situation which my interpretation is going to lay bare, and what right I have in thinking that Schreber’s case-study can help illuminate Kierkegaard. For one might think that I am romanticizing mental illness in this section – that is, one might object that I am finding a rational interpretation of Schreber’s psychosis (i.e. my interpretation that Schreber made what de silentio calls the movement of infinite resignation without therewith making the movement of what de silentio calls faith) which we simply do not find in his madness. In response to these possible questions, I now turn to the work of a self-proclaimed ‘existential-phenomenological’ psychiatrist – someone who had much first-hand experience treating psychotics – R. D. Laing.

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34 As Dinnage writes in her introduction within Memoirs, “generations of psychiatric writers have used the book as the nub of successive theories.” (MNI xi) I am thus using the book in the same manner, that is, as the nub to highlight my account of psychosis as it is situated in the framework of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings, Anxiety as the centrepiece.
Laing’s The Divided Self\textsuperscript{35} is a book on psychosis, the first two chapters giving an account of the build up to psychosis, and the final and third chapter giving an account of psychosis itself and its outbreak. Laing, as mentioned, considers himself to be working in a ‘existential-phenomenological’ vein (pp. 15-39), and explicitly mentions his intellectual indebtedness to “Kierkegaard” (and “Heidegger”) (p. 9). Laing describes in what sense he considers himself to be working in this vein by way of contrasting ‘existential-phenomenological’ thinking from what he calls the “objective clinical psychiatric point of view” (p. 170). Laing holds that a person, including a psychotic person, can be looked at in two ways: as a person or as a thing/organism – “man can be seen as person or thing” (pp. 18-19), as “person [or] organism.” (p. 20) Laing holds that the standard clinical psychiatric point of view of his day viewed people, e.g. psychotics, as things or organisms. Laing calls this a “‘scientific’ or ‘objective’” (p. 31) point of view. From this point of view Laing holds that one sees the other merely “as a complex physical, chemical system” (p. 19), and that in explaining the behavior of the other, “[t]he ultimates of our explanations are not his intentions to his world but quanta of energy in an energy system.” (p. 21) In contrast to this way of viewing a person, the existential-phenomenological viewpoint, Laing holds, attempts to understand the “‘subjective’” (p. 23) nature of the other, or what Laing calls the other’s ‘existence’. This viewpoint understands the other’s “behavior as expressive of his existence. The existential-phenomenological construction is an inference about the way the other is feeling and acting.” (p. 31) In attempting to understand the other’s subjective existence, Laing holds, “[e]xistential phenomenology attempts to characterize the nature of a person’s experience of his world and himself.” (p. 15)

Now, these two different ways of viewing a person, e.g. a psychotic, also gives rise to two different manners of how a psychiatrist deals with what a psychotic is saying. For Laing holds that the ‘objective clinical’ viewpoint of his day – in thinking of the psychotic as an object or organism, and ignoring the psychotics subjective experience – tend to think of what a psychotic says as having no relation to their subjective experience: they tend to think of their talk as “only a series of disconnected sentences having no relation whatever to the general situation” (p. 30). The existential-phenomenological viewpoint, however, attempts to understand what the psychotic is saying as an expression (albeit an extremely strange one) of their subjective experience.

Throughout his book Laing keeps revisiting the manner in which psychotics tend to speak about how they have committed ‘suicide’ or how they have ‘murdered themselves’ – giving detailed examples of such speech from his own person treatment of psychotics. Now, Laing implies that the ‘objective clinical’ point of view will write these statements of suicide off as irrelevant ‘delusions’, whereas the existential-phenomenological point of view will attempt to decipher what the psychotic is saying about

their subjective experience: “It is not uncommon for depersonalized patients, whether or not they are schizophrenic, to speak of having murdered their selves and also of having lost or been robbed of their selves. Such statements are usually called delusions, but if they are delusions, they are delusions which contain existential truth. They are to be understood as statements that are literally true within the terms of reference of the individual who makes them.” (p. 162) Indeed Laing goes into detail concerning the way he interprets psychotics’ talk of suicide: for Laing psychotics constantly speak of suicide because ‘suicide’ for them is an expression of their passage into psychosis, the outbreak of their psychosis. According to Laing, it is by way of psychosis that the person intends to get away from having an “identity”, intends to get away from being “defined as an actual person engaged in specific tasks with others” (p. 170), and when this is accomplished, this is referred to by the person as having committed self-murder or suicide.36

(To give an example, I will sketch Laing’s final and most comprehensive case-study in The Divided Self - Julie. Julie’s “basic psychotic statement” was that a “child had been murdered” (p. 196). Julie was unsure whether or not that child was herself – the child was allegedly wearing Julie’s clothes when it was murdered – and furthermore, Julie was unsure who had murdered the child, Julie herself, or Julie’s mother (p. 196). Julie’s expressed opinion was that “her mother had murdered a child” (p. 200). Referencing the details of Julie’s case, Laing concludes that what Julie was expressing here was that Julie herself (as mother) had killed herself (as child), and this self-murder expresses the crux of her psychosis. Laing interprets what he calls the incident “that was probably the efficient cause in the transition” to Julie’s psychosis (p. 212). Julie had a doll which she called ‘Julie doll’, and one day the doll was gone – a catastrophic event for Julie – and Julie blamed her mother for killing it. However, Laing interprets the event in this way: in playing with the doll, Julie identified the doll with herself, and Julie identified herself as its ‘mother’. Ultimately Julie (identified as the mother) killed off the doll (identified as Julie), which was a playing out of the onset of her own psychosis (p. 213). That is, the onset of her psychosis is understood as and played out as self-murder, suicide.)

The above account of Laing will help support my use of the Schreber case for two reasons. Firstly, as Laing held that the ‘existential-phenomenological’ interpretation attempts to understand the

36 Karl Menninger, in Man against Himself (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.: New York, 1938), also spends much time connecting ‘suicide’ with psychosis – indeed he has an entire chapter dedicated to demonstrating this connection. Menninger’s book investigates what he calls the “various ways in which men commit suicide” (p. 8), and one such way is “psychosis” (p. 212), as detailed in ‘chapter 5’. On Menninger’s account, psychosis is understood as abandoning one’s “loyalty to reality” (p. 212) or rejecting reality (p. 213). For Menninger, the outbreak of psychosis is achieved by one by departing from reality, and this departure is often imagined by the psychotic as having killed themselves: “[t]his departure from reality standards enables the psychotic person to destroy himself in a unique way not available to anyone else. He can imagine himself dead; or, he can imagine a part of himself to be dead or destroyed.” (p. 214) Thus again, like Kierkegaard and Laing, Menninger links psychosis with some type of ‘suicide’.
subjective experience of the psychotic, and indeed takes their ‘psychotic system’ to be an expression (albeit a strange one) of that experience, so too I hold that Schreber’s psychotic system is a highly poetic expression of the truth of his situation which interpretation can lay bare. In this regard it is important to note that Memoirs is perhaps the most detailed first-person account of psychosis and a psychotic system ever written, and thus it stands out as an important text to use if one is interested in understanding the subjective experience of a psychotic. Secondly, and more particularly, I have shown how Laing – who had much first-hand experience with psychotics – explicitly links psychotic talk of ‘suicide’ with the onset of psychosis, and this helps support my interpretation of Kierkegaard’s use of the term ‘suicide’. For as I argued above, both Haufniensis and de silentio, when they write of ‘suicide’, are, on my account, referring to the onset of psychosis. Further, as Laing (like Kierkegaard) maintains a connection between psychotic talk of suicide and the onset of psychosis, so too I will, in attempting to lay bare the truth of Schreber’s situation, show that in Schreber’s psychotic system, Schreber understands the onset of his psychosis to be a type of suicide – a ‘soul murder’ which he suspects to have committed on himself. And thus both my technique of interpreting Schreber to get at the truth of his situation, as well as the interpretation itself as consisting of understanding Schreber’s talk of suicide to signify the onset of psychosis, are supported by the above treatment of Laing.

Memoirs of My Nervous Illness

Daniel Paul Schreber – a distinguished German jurist – was admitted to the psychiatric asylum in 1893, spending the next 7 years in different asylums (three total), and in 1900 decided to write his Memoirs. Schreber’s Memoirs is an autobiographical account of the events of those ill years which span from 1893-1900 in the asylums, but more importantly it is a grand psychotic system, what Schreber calls the “structure of an entirely new religious system” (MNI 173) – akin to a philosophical system – and the details of the autobiographical events are intended to support the system itself. As Dr. Weber, the superintendent of one of the asylums in which Schreber stayed, writes (in an official letter to the court), “[t]his kind of illness is (...) characterized by the fact that next to a more or less fixed elaborate delusional system there is complete possession of mental faculties and orientation” (MNI 331) – that is, Schreber’s psychosis is such that with his psychotic system he has complete possession of his mental faculties such as formal logic, intelligence, and memory. Thus reading his Memoirs – a 330 page treatise (with another 100 pages of official letters to the court) – is akin to reading a systematic philosophical work of a very intelligent person, only a psychotic one as well. But let us now commence the Schreber case-study.
Firstly I note that the build up to the outbreak of Schreber’s psychosis, as reiterated in chapter ‘4’ of Memoirs, was dominated by a rising intensity of anxiety (MNI 48-52) along with simultaneous thoughts of suicide (MNI 49-52). For example, Schreber writes,

every little distance of a few hundred paces seemed a hazard on which I could not decide without inner anxiety. (...) I could hardly, if at all, manage any intellectual occupation such as reading newspapers. Even mainly mechanical occupations such as jigsaw puzzles, patience and suchlike increased my nervous tension to such a degree that I usually had to stop after a short time (...) The laxity of my nerves increased with the simultaneous reappearance of states of anxiety (...) I could see nothing in the future but a fatal outcome, perhaps produced by committing suicide eventually (MNI 52)

The build up to the outbreak of Schreber’s psychosis was such that it was dominated by an anxiety in which all occupations become more and more impossible, and with this impending collapse of all possibilities, Schreber has the intimation that this will lead him eventually to suicide. The two main occupations in Schreber’s life were his job as a jurist, and his role as a loving husband to his wife. Schreber is clear that he loved his job “wholeheartedly” (MNI 165) and deeply loved his wife (MNI 165) as well. I do not decide here which of these forms Schreber’s central finite desire (for either of these could play that role), but we can assume that either Schreber’s love for his job or his love for his wife were such that they gave all other intraworldly entities and events their significance, and that what Schreber was experiencing with the anxiety that led up his outbreak was an intimation of the collapse of this central desire into an impossibility, which in turn, also means the collapse of all other concern for the intraworldly.

As mentioned Schreber repeatedly connects this looming collapse of all possibilities which anxiety is disclosing with ‘suicide’. But note that Schreber does not intimate getting back these possibilities which appear to be collapsing. This ‘suicide’ thus marks the collapse of all possibilities into impossibilities, without getting them back. Indeed when Schreber’s psychosis finally breaks out – that is, when all of the possibilities become impossible, and Schreber does not get them back – Schreber’s account of why this breaks out is that someone has committed soul murder on him. Now, Schreber’s account of ‘soul murder’ is extremely vague, and yet at the same time is one of the most important concepts, for it is supposed to explain the genesis of his psychosis.37 Schreber writes,

the crises that broke upon the realms of God was caused by somebody having committed soul murder; at first Flechsig was named as the instigator of soul murder but of recent times in an attempt to reverse the facts I myself have been “represented” as the one who had committed soul murder. (MNI 34)

37 Indeed as Macalpine and Hunter (the editors of Memoirs) note: “[s]oul murder (...) is the most obscure issue in the Memoirs and also the most important one. It caused (...) his illness” (MNI 444).
Thus at times Schreber believes that Flechsig (the superintendent of the first asylum Schreber stayed at) committed the soul murder, at other times Schreber is led to believe that he himself has committed the soul murder. Thus there is some confusion for Schreber here. Furthermore, in places where Schreber, in *Memoirs*, intends to elaborate on the soul murder, this material is ultimately censored out. For example, in chapter ‘2’ we find: “I cannot enlarge on the essential nature of soul murder or, so to speak, its technique. One might only add (the passage which follows is unfit for publication).” (MNI 38)

And further, almost the entirety of chapter ‘3’ is censored – “(t)he further content of this chapter is omitted as unfit for publication.” (MNI 43) – a chapter which was supposed to help explain the soul murder (MNI 43). From this confusion between who committed the soul murder on Schreber – Flechsig or Schreber himself – combined with the constant censoring of the details of this concept, I draw the following conclusion. Schreber indeed committed soul murder on himself, but will not own up to this fact (but instead wants to pin it on Flechsig). In other words, Schreber himself, with his own willpower, brought about his own psychosis, by willfully collapsing his leading desire (either his love of his job or his love of his wife, here I do not decide) and with this, collapsing all of his concern for the finite and *not getting it back*. Thus Schreber’s intimation, in the intensifying anxiety which was the build up to the outbreak, that the collapse of all possibilities is linked with his own suicide, is played out. Soul murder is self-murder, that is, existential suicide. And this existential suicide – collapsing all of one’s concern for the finite and not getting it back – is the genesis of psychosis.

*

Thus the build up to the outbreak of Schreber’s psychosis was dominated by an increasing anxiety, and the outbreak itself was by way of existential suicide. But I will now show in detail how Schreber’s psychosis itself is such that it is a mode of fractured ‘spirit’ in which Schreber has resigned all of his concern for the intraworldly, and yet has not simultaneously gotten it back – indeed I will show that Schreber’s psychotic system (the so-called structure of a new religious system) itself expresses, in an imaginative way, this giving up all and not getting it back. I will start with the former – the losing all. The first movement – infinite resignation – has two aspects: first is loss of all concern for the intraworldly, secondly is the transformed relation towards God amidst this collapse. We find these two aspects in the case-study. Schreber tells us that because of the soul murder on him (because he has committed existential suicide) two interlinked consequences result: firstly the so-called *end of the world* has come to pass, and secondly an indissoluble relation between Schreber and *God* has been set up.

Firstly I will highlight the “*end of the world*” (MNI 75) which Schreber considered to have come to pass. The end of the world signified for Schreber that all human beings, with the exception of Schreber
himself, had perished, and with this, the entirety of that world that these human beings made up – the social occupations, intersubjective relations, etc. – had also perished: “I believed the whole of mankind to have perished” (MNI 71); “the world had perished” (MNI 78). Because all of mankind, and the shared world, had both perished according to Schreber, he naturally did not consider any human shape which he saw to be a real human, but rather considered all of these human shapes as ‘fleetingly-improvised-men’, that is, as miracles intended solely for Schreber himself, and which did not have an existence outside of its encounter with Schreber:

I thought this period [the end of the world] had already expired and therefore thought I was the last real human being left, and that the few shapes whom I saw apart from myself (...) were only “fleeting-improvised-men” created by miracle. (MNI 76-77) mankind and all its activities have only been artificially maintained by means of direct divine miracles (MNI 89)

I naturally considered (...) all the other human shapes I saw, only as “fleetingly-improvised”. (MNI 103)

Schreber considered these “miraculously created puppets” (MNI18) to be mostly a ‘play with miracles’ always ultimately for Schreber himself. Indeed these fleeting improvised men had no existence outside of their relation to Schreber, for they would normally dissolve as soon they were outside of Schreber’s view. The end of the world was for Schreber in part a gruesome experience. To give a taste of what this was like for Schreber I note his experience upon moving from his first asylum to his second, where he naturally encountered many new patients, and naturally therewith considered them all to be fleetingly improvised.

At this new asylum – what Schreber calls ‘devil’s kitchen’ – there was the wildest ‘mischief’ of miracles, in which the fleeting improvised men appeared in the most extravagant fashion. Schreber had a roommate in this asylum. Schreber naturally considered him a fleeting improvised man and during a very light June morning Schreber witnessed this human form “become one with his bed; that is to say I saw him gradually disappear” (MNI 103). Also, in the common room of the asylum many patients would gather, and Schreber, naturally considering them all fleeting improvised men, “repeatedly witnessed that some of them changed heads during their stay in the common-room; that is to say, without leaving the room and while I was observing them, they suddenly ran about with a different head.” (MNI 103) And when it came time to return from the common room Schreber held that the human forms he did not see leave the common room “must have remained outside all the time, there to dissolve in a short time like the “fleeting-improvised-men” which indeed they were.” (MNI 105) Also, Schreber witnessed a few ladies pass by him only to then ‘vanish’, and this vanishing was “repeatedly accompanied by the peculiar rattle connected with the “taking away” (dissolving themselves) of the “fleeting-improvised-men.”” (MNI
This gives us a taste of the gruesome experience that Schreber went through in connection with living through the end of the world.

Interlinked with this end of the world for Schreber is his newly found indissoluble connection with God. Schreber holds that God does not have a direct connection with human beings and it is only for Schreber himself, the lone survivor of the end of the world, that God establishes this direct connection. God, for Schreber, is made up of ‘divine rays’ – God is ‘many in one or one in many’ – and God is intimately connected with the stars, in particular our sun. Schreber holds that our sun is something of a portal through which God may connect with humans: God – that is, the divine rays – somehow uses the sun and its rays to connect with human beings, in this case, with Schreber (MNI 21). In particular, Schreber holds that there is a ‘lower god’ (‘Ariman’) and an ‘upper god’ (‘Ormuzd’) – the lower god is equated with our sun, while the upper god is something of a sun-like disc at a vast distance, who only issues his rays through the portal of the lower god (the sun) (MNI 91). As a rule God does not interact with human beings, but Schreber, having lived through the end of the world, is the exception. Schreber holds that he, an exception as there never was, has a special relation to the divine rays (God) such that Schreber has an overwhelming power of attraction onto these rays, and is perpetually pulling these divine rays towards himself – and furthermore there is a mutual attraction between the divine rays towards Schreber, and Schreber towards the divine rays (MNI 40).

Amidst the end of the world – in which the world and humankind have perished, and only fleeting improvised men are miracled for play only to later dissolve – Schreber, the lone human being, experiences a stream of divine rays being transmitted through the sun, with a great power of attraction, towards Schreber’s head:

the filaments aiming at my head and apparently originating from the sun or other distant stars do not come towards me in a straight line but in a kind of circle or parabola (...) I clearly saw this circle or parabola in my head (with my eyes open in the sky itself) (MNI 276)

The stream of divine rays, being issued from Ormuzd by way of Ariman (the sun), spiral in a parabola through the sky towards Schreber’s head – in accordance with Schreber’s power of attraction on the rays, and the mutual attraction between Schreber and the rays – and at times give Schreber’s head a “shimmer of light owing to the massive concentration of rays”: a so-called “crown of rays” (MNI 80).

Finally the two aspects which I have highlighted – the end of the world, and the indissoluble connection with God (divine rays) – are essentially interconnected:

if God were permanently tied to my person, all creation on earth would have to perish with the exception of some play-with-miracles in my immediate surroundings (MNI 41)

the (...) end of the world, as a consequence of the indissoluble connection between God and myself. (MNI 75)
According to Schreber there is an essential link between his connection with God and the end of the world: all mankind and the world needs to perish in order for a connection with God’s rays to be set up with Schreber; and when Schreber has an indissoluble connection with God therewith the end of the world has come to pass. We can piece together a theory of how these two aspects are connected according to Schreber’s system. As the divine rays are intimately connected with the sun’s rays, Schreber holds that it is through the warmth of the sun’s rays that God maintains life on earth. Therefore if the divine rays and the sun’s rays are withdrawn from the earth, this would bring about the end of the world – that is, this would bring about an ice age:

God was also able to withdraw partially or totally the warmth of the sun from a star doomed to perish (or the respective fixed star which served to warm it); this would throw new light on the problem of the Ice Age (MNI 59)

And this is exactly what Schreber considered to have happened during his life, that the end of the world was caused by the divine rays and the sun’s rays having been withdrawn from the earth, and that a “general glaciation” (MNI 88) had thus followed:

the end of the world (...) I thought (...) already past. (...) I always thought of a decrease in the warmth of the sun through her moving farther away, and consequently a more or less generalized glaciation. (MNI 93)

And as there is an essential connection between the end of the world and Schreber’s indissoluble connection with God, so there is an essential connection between the general glaciation of the earth and Schreber’s power of attraction on the divine rays. The divine rays (the sun’s rays) have withdrawn from the earth, causing a generalized glaciation (end of the world), and therewith have been set up in a direct streaming parabola towards Schreber’s head (the lone human survivor).

I of course take these two aspects of Schreber’s psychotic system – the end of the world, and the direct connection with God – to be a highly poetic expression of Schreber’s having achieved the movement of infinite resignation. That is, through existential suicide (soul murder) Schreber resigned all of his concern for the intraworldly (the end of the world via glaciation having come to pass such that human forms are fleetingly improvised miracles) by way of giving up his central desire; and therewith established a direct relationship with God (the streaming parabola of divine rays attracted to Schreber).

Now, I want to hold that Schreber’s psychosis is a result of making the first movement of infinite resignation and yet not making the second movement of receiving back that which one resigns. Indeed when I now complete my sketch of the Schreber case-study we will see that this ‘not receiving back’ plays an essential role in Schreber’s psychotic system.

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While one thread running through *Memoirs* gives a detailed account of the end of the world and the interrelated indissoluble relation between Schreber and the divine rays (God), another thread gives a detailed account of the so-called *unmanning* which Schreber was supposed to undergo in order to subsequently *be fertilized by God and give birth to new human beings*. That is, whereas the first thread is concerned with detailing how the end of the world has come to pass and thus all human beings and the world have perished; the second thread is concerned with detailing how Schreber was supposed to be unmanned in order to bring human beings back into existence. And thus while the first thread exhibits that Schreber made the movement of infinite resignation, the second thread exhibits – in a psychotic imaginative manner – that Schreber was supposed to make the second movement, in which God will give back to Schreber all that he has lost, that is, all concern for others and the intraworldly. However, as I will now show, Schreber outlines in detail how he was not able to make this second movement.

Whereas the first thread emphasizes the end of the world, the second thread emphasizes that Schreber ought to bring back human beings into existence which is in accordance with the ‘order of the world’ – that is, the first thread is concerned with the collapse of the world, the second with the re-establishing of the world.

the tendency, innate in the Order of the World, to *unman* a human being who has entered into permanent contact with rays. (...) the basic plan on which the Order of the World seems to rest, that in the case of world catastrophes which necessitate the destruction of mankind on any star, whether intentionally or otherwise, the human race can be renewed. (...) In such an event, in order to maintain the species, one single human being was spared (...) [and] had to be *unmanned* (transformed into a woman) to be able to bear children. (*MNI* 59-60)

Thus according to Schreber’s psychotic system, it is innate in the “Order of the World” that when a world catastrophe – i.e. the end of the world – occurs, the human race can still be renewed insofar as one single human being has survived the end of the world. Indeed the one who has survived the end of the world will have “entered into permanent contact with rays”, as according to Schreber’s system the end of the world and the surviving single individual entering into an indissoluble connection with God’s divine rays are interlinked. And the way the human race can be renewed is by the lone survivor being “unmanned” – transformed into a woman – so that she will be able to give birth to the new human race. Now, of course Schreber believed he was the lone survivor of the end of the world and thus it was him who was to be unmanned in order to bear these new humans:

I lived in the certain expectation that one day my unmanning (transformation into a woman) would be completed; this solution seemed to me absolutely essential as preparation for the renewal of mankind, particularly while I thought the rest of mankind had perished. Indeed, I still regard this as the solution most in accordance with the essence of the Order of the World. (*MNI* 254-255)
Thus in accordance with the order of the world, Schreber, having lived through the collapse of the world and the perishing of all humans – “I thought the rest of mankind had perished” – was thus to be unmanned so that he could bear the new race. And how was he to conceive of these new humans? Once his unmanning was complete, he was to be fertilized by God’s divine rays. For interlinked with the end of the world was establishing a connection with God’s rays, and it is precisely these rays which were to fertilize Schreber:

> I could see beyond doubt that the Order of the World imperiously demanded my unmanning, whether I personally liked it or not, and that therefore it was common sense that nothing was left to me but reconcile myself to the thought of being transformed into a woman. Nothing of course could be envisaged as a further consequence of unmanning but fertilization by divine rays for the purpose of creating new human beings. (*MNI* 164)

Thus amidst the end of the world – the glaciation and the streaming parabola of divine rays into Schreber – Schreber was to undergo unmanning so that these divine rays could fertilize Schreber and Schreber could give birth to the new race – “fertilization by divine rays for the purpose of creating new human beings”.

However, whereas the first movement – the end of the world, connection with God – was accomplished by Schreber, the second movement – fertilization by God and birth to the new race – was never accomplished by Schreber. Much of the *Memoirs* details the intricate theories of why this never occurred. It seems the main reason, according to Schreber, was due to the fact that the process of unmanning (transformation into a woman) was never accomplished, and as this was a prerequisite to fertilization and birth, the latter was thus never accomplished. For throughout *Memoirs* Schreber highlights the manifestations of development of unmanning on his body – his breasts were intermittently growing into a woman’s bosom, his buttocks were growing, his skin was softening, and his nerves were becoming female nerves (Schreber could feel these female nerves as string-like ligaments under his skin) (*MNI* 246) – and yet Schreber never completely achieves the unmanning, and thus neither does he ever become fertilized and give birth to the new race.

Now, I take these psychotic manifestations regarding having the imperative to be impregnated by God’s rays to give birth to the new human race to be a highly poetic expression of the imperative of the second movement – that is, to allow God to give back that which one resigns, one’s concern for the finite world. The second movement is a movement of receptivity in God (whereas the first movement is a willful one). And thus Schreber’s idea of unmanning is an expression of the receptivity involved in the second movement: it is only by way of a receptivity in God that one gets back precisely what one is infinitely resigning. In Schreber’s system: it is only by way of unmanning (transformation into a woman) that he will be able to be fertilized by God’s divine rays and give birth to the new human race.
Schreber, however, was not able to be unmanned, and thus the second movement was never made. In short, Schreber was never able to make the movement of receptivity in God. And thus Schreber made the first movement of infinite resignation (existential suicide) and therewith established a direct relationship with God in such a way that he did not make the second movement in which he gets back precisely that which he is resigning. This is expressed poetically in Schreber’s psychotic system in the following way: soul murder was committed on Schreber, and in turn the end of the world came to pass (God’s rays were withdrawn from all humankind and the world, causing a generalized glaciation) and God’s divine rays streamed directly into Schreber’s head; and while Schreber was to be unmanned so that he could then be fertilized directly from these divine rays in order to give birth to the new human race, Schreber never accomplished this unmanned, and thus neither did he ever become fertilized and give birth to the new race.

We diverted the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in this appendix to take a look at what would happen to one if one sprang off anxiety by way of making the first antipathetic movement without therewith making the second sympathetic movement (and indeed we took a sidestep from the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety because the possibility of psychosis will play a pivotal role in how I understand the perpetuum mobile of anxiety misused, which I will explain in a later section). I held that doing so is what Haufniensis and de silentio call suicide, which results in psychosis. I assumed that Schreber’s psychotic system poetically expresses the truth of his situation, and I accordingly used Schreber’s Memoirs as a case-study – subtly interpreting that poetic expression – to defend the claim that psychosis is understood as precisely, out of anxiety, making the first movement without therewith making the second (committing existential suicide), as well as to flesh out what a particular case of psychosis may be like.

Secondary Literature

As mentioned in the Introduction of this dissertation, one of the upshots of detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety in Kierkegaard is that it will lead us to give an account of psychosis in Kierkegaard – or at least help open up and develop such an account. In this section I hope to have shown how this is the case. For while I have detailed that anxiety’s ambiguity is such that its antipathy acts as the springboard to achieve the first movement of infinite resignation (utterly renouncing all concern for the finite) while the sympathy acts as the springboard to achieve the second movement of faith (regaining that which one renounces), I hope to have now shown how psychosis in Kierkegaard can be understood as having made the first movement – achieved the living death by springing off the antipathy – without
therewith making the second. And I also hope to have shown how turning to the Schreber case-study helps defend and flesh out this idea.

Now, I believe that there is something of a gap in the secondary literature on this topic of psychosis in Kierkegaard, and perhaps part of the reason for this is that Kierkegaard sometimes speaks of psychosis – as I have argued in this section – metaphorically, calling it ‘suicide’. However I hope to have shown that when Kierkegaard speaks of suicide in these instances, he is referring to psychosis – that is, he is referring to having sprung off anxiety’s antipathy achieving the living death, without therewith springing off the sympathy. In this sense the death of the first movement is, as I have argued, suicide rather than sacrifice. I believe that I have good reasons for reading it this way – this reading of ‘suicide’ is not only supported by psychiatrists like Laing, as noted above, but also this reading is supported by Kierkegaard’s various pseudonyms. For by reading it in this metaphorical manner I think I have made sense of Haufniensis’ claim that the danger of suicide lies in the ‘beginning of one’s education’ – that it is, the danger lies in the first movement of the living death. Furthermore I believe my metaphorical reading pulls together de silentio’s claims regarding how ethically considered Abraham’s action was murder, but considered religiously, it was sacrifice, and ties this together with the idea that if Abraham had doubted he would have thrust the knife into his own breast. But my metaphorical reading is perhaps given its best support from Anti-Climacus’ Sickness, which I have not treated here because I will treat it in detail in later sections. As we will see in these later sections, Anti-Climacus echoes Haufniensis’ claim and holds that the danger of ‘suicide’ lies in the first movement. But most importantly, as we will see, in Sickness Anti-Climacus explicitly holds that his use of ‘suicide’ is not referring to dying in its normal meaning as ‘literally ending one’s life’. Therefore if we read all of these texts together it is clear that Kierkegaard is not using suicide in its normal meaning, and this gives even more support for my metaphorical reading as the onset of psychosis.

That there is a gap in the secondary literature on this topic of psychosis can be seen when I note that when we look at the secondary literature on the topic of suicide in Kierkegaard what we find is that suicide is normally understood in its normal signification as ‘literally ending one’s life’ – see for example, Sheil’s Starting With Kierkegaard38 (pp. 93-94) in which Anti-Climacus is read this way; and see Ferreira’s Kierkegaard39 (p. 99) in which Haufniensis is read this way. But considering my above reasons I believe that my metaphorical reading is to be preferred. Now, there are some commentators who do not read suicide in the straightforward way, but indeed read it metaphorically. However, these commentators do not read it as I do, as the onset of psychosis. For example, Mjaaland, in ‘Suicide and Despair’, reads

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suicide metaphorically and equates it with despair; and Roberts, in ‘The Socratic Knowledge of God’\(^\text{41}\), reads suicide metaphorically and equates it with a type of stoicism (p. 152). However, I believe that my account of suicide as the onset of psychosis is the most nuanced reading, and also is the one most supported by the texts in question. For in simply equating suicide with despair, as Mjaaland does, suicide is simply an interchangeable term with despair, which does not specify anything in particular. If one goes this route one does not take into consideration the fact that both Haufniensis and Anti-Climacus hold that suicide lies at the beginning of the education, in the first movement. Thus this reading is perhaps not as nuanced as mine. And when Roberts equates suicide with a type of stoicism, this line does not seem to be strongly supported by the texts. For stoicism does not seem to be connected with suicide in these texts, whereas psychosis – complete insanity, or madness – does. And finally, in this section I have used Laing to help strengthen my reading of ‘suicide’ as psychosis in Kierkegaard. For I showed earlier how Laing – a psychiatrist with much experience with psychotics – points out how psychotics often metaphorically refer to the onset of their psychosis as having committed suicide.

Now, while there does seem to be a gap on this topic of psychosis in Kierkegaard, one author who does treat of psychosis in Kierkegaard is Nordentoft in his *Kierkegaard’s Psychology*\(^\text{42}\), (pp. 233-239). In the section entitled ‘Madness’ Nordentoft calls Haufniensis’ little citation on insanity (which I quoted above) an “especially accurate description” of psychosis if we conceive of psychosis as the a state in which the individual lets go of contact with the external world and surrenders itself completely to its inner world (pp. 234-235). I am in agreement with Nordentoft on this point. But while I agree with Nordentoft in holding that Haufniensis’ characterization of complete insanity is an accurate description of psychosis, Nordentoft fails to proceed to give details regarding e.g. how, in Haufniensis’ account, one becomes psychotic. These details I believe I have given, and we were of course led to these details by way of first detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety. For after showing how anxiety’s antipathy is the springboard for making the first movement of infinite resignation (renouncing concern for the intraworldly), while anxiety’s sympathy is the springboard for making the second movement (getting that concern back), I detailed that the danger lies in the first movement, detailed that psychosis is initiated when one makes the first movement, springing off the antipathy, without making the second. Now, it is not a surprise that Nordentoft does not give the details that I have given since my account requires, firstly, an understanding of ambiguous anxiety as the springboard for these two movements. But Nordentoft, in his book, does not conceive of anxiety as ambiguous in this manner, does not conceive of anxiety as the springboard for making these two movements, and thus he is not in a position to flesh out psychosis as a state in which


the first movement is achieved without the second. In this way I think that my account of psychosis in Haufniensis and de silentio – an account which we were led to by way of having detailed the ambiguous structure of anxiety – helps fill in a gap in the secondary literature.
B

THE DIALECTIC OF SIN

Part I of this dissertation interprets anxiety in Kierkegaard retrogressively. I want to interpret the anxiety in Kierkegaard, and yet there are three different encounters which spirit can have with this anxiety. I hold that to properly understand this anxiety, we must detail the movement through the three different encounters of it, showing in detail the interrelation between them. And thus in this part we are tracking the retrogressive movement through the three encounters of anxiety — away-from the telos.

In §A we began by highlighting the telos — anxiety used rightly — which gives rise to the mode of spirit called faith. (In the appendix I highlighted a springing off anxiety which springs one out of being spirit in a strong sense insofar as one becomes psychotic.) Anxiety rightly used was the starting point of my interpretation of anxiety, and thus we must now proceed retrogressively through the other two encounters and the modes of spirit therein. That is, we must now proceed to detail how anxiety can be encountered such that it is misused which gives rise to mode of spirit called strict sin; and we must then proceed to detail how anxiety can be encountered in disguise in the mode of spirit called spiritlessness — and of course, in doing so, show the interrelation between all three encounters of anxiety.

However, before I can show how anxiety is encountered misused in strict sin, and how anxiety is encountered in disguise in spiritlessness, I must first, in this section, sketch an overview of the relation between the two modes of spirit: strict sin, and spiritlessness. One thing is certain: strict sin and spiritlessness are modes of spirit in which one has not achieved faith (the absurd telos). However, in more detail how do we understand the relation between these two modes? Are we to understand this relation such that these two modes are mutually exclusive modes of spirit, such that one is either in the mode of spiritlessness or in the mode of strict sin? I do not go this route — for I think that Kierkegaard’s texts allow for, or even require, a different reading. Rather, I hold in this section that strict sin and spiritlessness are best understood as making up the dialectic of sin which one who has not achieved faith is dwelling in: and this dialectic is one of a relative admixture between strict sin and spiritlessness. That is, I hold in this section that the sinner is always inhabiting both of these modes, but neither of them completely, such that the more it is inhabiting the one, the less of the other. I dedicate this section — §B, ‘the dialectic of sin’ — to fleshing it out in detail.

Once I have sketched the overview concerning the relative admixture between strict sin and spiritlessness — which is the purpose of this section — we will then be in place to proceed with the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard. For in §C we will then home in on the mode of
spirit strict sin, showing in detail the encounter of anxiety therein; and in §D we will conclude by homing in on the mode of spiritlessness, showing in detail the encounter of anxiety therein.

Συμπαρανεκρώμενοι

As noted, the way I will use A’s three Συμπαρανεκρώμενοι (fellowship of the dead) lectures from Either/Or I is by understanding them as giving us what I called an ‘aesthetic representation’ of certain central concepts in Haufniensis’ Anxiety with which I am concerned. In this section, §B, I am after the ‘dialectic of sin’ as it is in Anxiety, and thus here I use one of A’s three lectures to give us an aesthetic representation of the dialectic of sin. In this way we will ease our way into Anxiety, by first presenting A’s aesthetic representation and then dealing directly with that concept in Anxiety.

In particular, I will here primarily use A’s lecture – ‘The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama’ (EOI 137) – the first of the three lectures. This lecture is primarily concerned with giving us an account of tragic guilt – that is, an account of the guilt of the tragic hero from what A calls ‘true’ tragic productions. According to A, all true tragedies will exhibit an essential structure regarding the tragic guilt of the hero – for whether we are considering ancient or modern tragedy, the essential structure of that tragic guilt remains the same (EOI 139). According to A, the essential structure of tragic guilt is such that that there are two aspects in play for the tragic hero. On the one side there is a guilty action by the tragic hero, a guilty deed – as I will detail, this guilty action takes place in a sphere of solipsism, what A calls ‘inclosing reserve’, in which one, in anxiety, is conscious of one’s guilt. On the other side there is a suffering of guilt of the tragic hero, a fateful aspect of guilt that is inherited from e.g. family, kindred, and state – as I will detail, this suffering of guilt takes place in a sphere shared with others, in which one is indeed not conscious of that guilt. Now, A calls the former aspect – the guilty action in the sphere of inclosing reserve – ‘guilt’; and A calls the latter aspect – the suffering under inheritance in the shared sphere – ‘guiltlessness’.

It is of utmost importance for me to highlight that for A this distinction is not one of mutually exclusive states, but rather, the distinction must be understood as a “relative admixture” (EOI 143) between the two, such that the tragic hero is always inhabiting both of these modes, yet neither one completely: tragic guilt is always part conscious action by the individual in inclosing reserve, part unconscious suffering of inherited guilt; that is, part guilt, part guiltlessness:

Tragic action always contains an element of suffering, and tragic suffering an element of action; the esthetic lies in their relativity. (EOI 150)

the tragic guilt must vacillate between guilt and guiltlessness (EOI 154)
A’s entire article revolves around demonstrating the intricacies of this relative admixture inherent in tragic guilt – for this (the relative admixture of guilt and guiltlessness) is the essential structure of tragic guilt which all true tragedy will exhibit according to A, whether ancient or modern. And thus A proceeds in his article by highlighting both aspects of this relativity as they are in true tragedy (including their proper aesthetic expression, and the proper mood that they ought to evoke in the spectator), and yet continually reiterates that these two aspects makes up a dialectic which is one of a relative admixture: the more guilt the less guiltlessness, and vice versa.

‘Guilt’ is the guilty action of the tragic hero which takes place in the sphere in which it is cut off from others in a solipsism (EOI 149) – “inclosing reserve” (EOI 169) – and in which it is, in anxiety (EOI 154-155), conscious of its guilt. A refers to this aspect of guilt as “Pelagian” – however, A at the same time reiterates that this is merely one aspect that must be counterbalanced by the other aspect:

the more the subjectivity is reflective, the more Pelagianly one sees the individual thrown solely upon himself, (...) we load his whole life upon his shoulders as his own deed, make him accountable for everything (...) when one wants to affirm the tragic within this isolation, one has evil in its badness, not the authentic tragic guilt in its ambiguous guiltlessness. (EOI 144)

Thus while this first aspect of tragic guilt highlights the guilty deed of the individual – which takes place in the sphere of inclosing reserve in which it is cut off from others and conscious of its guilt – A stresses that true tragedy must not exhibit merely this aspect without the other, for in that case it has lost the admixture of guilt and guiltlessness. A goes on to compare this first aspect with “sin” (EOI 149), but again stresses that true tragedy must always counterbalance this aspect with the other.

Now, this first aspect, A tells us, finds its proper aesthetic expression in the tragedy in the “character” – the individual tragic hero – and that character’s “action” in the “situation”, and “dialogue” in the “situation” (EOI 143, 147). For these – the character’s action and dialogue in situation – aesthetically express the hero’s deeds and guilt. And finally, A tells us that the mood that is to be evoked in the spectator by this first aspect is that of ‘pain’. We watch the tragedy. We see the tragic hero as character acting in the situation, engaging in dialogue, which expresses the deeds of the hero and the guilt of the hero. This guilt, brought to life from the character’s action and dialogue in the situation, evokes pain – and “[t]he more pronounced the idea of guilt, the greater the pain” (EOI 148).

‘Guiltlessness’ is hereditary guilt which takes place in the sphere which is shared with others – shared with e.g. ‘family, kindred and state’ (EOI 143) – which the tragic hero inherits and suffers under, and in which it is not conscious of this guilt. A stresses that this aspect of tragic guilt – guiltlessness – always counterbalances the first aspect:

Even if the individual moved freely, he nevertheless rested in substantial determinants, in the state, the family, in fate. (...) The hero’s downfall, therefore, is not a result solely of his action but is also a suffering (EOI 143)
A goes on to compare this aspect, the suffering of hereditary guilt which one inherits in the shared sphere, with ‘hereditary sin’, yet is careful to stress that this aspect must always be counterbalanced by the other – “tragic guilt is more than just subjective guilt – it is hereditary guilt; but hereditary guilt, like hereditary sin, is a substantial category” (EOI 150).

Now, A tells us that this aspect – the suffering of hereditary guilt – finds its proper aesthetic expression in the tragedy in the ‘chorus’ and ‘monologue’. For the chorus seems to represent something beyond the hero’s solipsistic action; and the monologue, according to A, tends not to express the individual action insofar as the monologue, in its lyricism, also goes beyond the individual, expressing something more epic (EOI 143). And finally, A tells us that the mood that is to be evoked in the spectator by this aspect of guiltlessness is that of ‘sorrow’. We watch the tragedy. The chorus transcends the individual expressing the hereditary guilt which spreads through the substantial categories; the monologue, in its lyricism, likewise transcends the individual expressing the epic suffering. But this hereditary guilt, this guiltlessness, expressed by way of the chorus and monologue, evokes sorrow – and “[t]he greater the guiltlessness, the greater the sorrow.” (EOI 149)

Tragedy contains a relative admixture of guilt and guiltlessness in the tragic hero, of pain and sorrow in the spectator. While the first aspect is localized in the sphere of solipsism in which the hero is, in anxiety, conscious of its guilt – guilt – which is expressed by way of the tragic hero’s action and dialogue in situation; the other aspect is localized in the sphere shared with others in which the hero suffers, unconsciously, hereditary guilt – guiltlessness – which is expressed by way of the chorus and monologue. True tragedy contains a relative admixture of the two – “[b]etween these two extremes lies the tragic.” (EOI 144) This means of course that the tragic hero’s guilt, while always part guilt and part guiltlessness, is neither one completely – accordingly, A stresses that tragic guilt is not a combination of “absolute guiltlessness” and “absolute guilt” (EOI 150), but rather lies in between these two extremes, containing a relative admixture of both:

just as the action in (...) tragedy is something intermediate between action and the suffering, so also is guilt, and therein lies the tragic collision. (...) If the individual has no guilt whatever, the tragic interest is annulled, for in that case the tragic collision is enervated. On the other hand, if he has absolute guilt, he no longer interests us tragically. (EOI 144)

And as guilt, as expressed in the character’s action and dialogue in situation, evokes pain in the spectator, and as guiltlessness, as expressed in the chorus and monologue, evokes sorrow, this means that true tragedy will be comprised of a relative admixture of these two moods in the spectator:

The true tragic sorrow, then, requires an element of guilt, the true tragic pain an element of guiltlessness; the true tragic sorrow requires an element of transparency, the true tragic pain an element of opacity. I believe this is the best way to suggest the dialectic in which the qualifications of sorrow and pain touch each other, and also the dialectic implicit in the concept: tragic guilt. (EOI 151)
Thus, in this lecture, while A highlights the two aspects inherent in the concept of tragic guilt—guilt and guiltlessness—the purpose of his article is to show that tragic guilt is to be understood as being made up of a relative admixture of the two: and this means they are both in play such that the more of the one, the less of the other. The conscious guilt of the tragic hero in the sphere of inclosing reserve (expressed by the character’s action and dialogue in situation) is always relative to the unconscious guilt in the shared sphere (expressed by the monologue and chorus); and the spectators pain is always relative to their grieving sorrow—true tragedy gives “the daughter of sorrow a dowry of pain as her outfit” (EOI 153), tragedy has “placed the fruit of grief in the bowl of pain.” (EOI 156)

The Concept of Anxiety

The reason why I turned to A’s Συμπαρανεκρόμενοι lecture on the nature of tragic guilt was to use it to give us an aesthetic representation of what I am after in this section: the dialectic of sin. I am of course using Haufniensis’ Anxiety as the centrepiece for my analysis of anxiety in Kierkegaard, and thus now that I have detailed A’s aesthetic representation, I will turn to Anxiety and spell out the dialectic of sin (which will in turn show how A’s article is an aesthetic representation of this).

Indeed A has already given us the lead. For in A’s account of the nature of tragic guilt, he held that this guilt will be made up of a relative admixture of two aspects: one the one side the conscious guilty action in the sphere of inclosing reserve, which he compared to sin; on the other side the unconscious suffering of guiltlessness in the shared sphere, which he compared to hereditary sin. Indeed, as I will now show, I hold that on Haufniensis’ account of sin at its most general level, sin is made up of the dialectic: on the one side there is the (Pelagian) sin in the sphere of inclosing reserve in which, amidst manifest anxiety, one is conscious of one’s normative orientation towards good and evil (sin); on the other side there is the (Augustinian) inherited sinfulness in the sphere of the race’s world in which, while anxiety is latent, one is not conscious of one’s normative orientation (hereditary sin). And importantly, just as A stressed regarding tragic guilt, this dialectic of sin is one of a relative admixture: a sinner always inhabits both of these modes, yet neither one completely, such that the more of the one, the less of the other.

Haufniensis tells us that what is essential to human existence (spirit) is that any spirit is simultaneously made up of two aspects: part individual, part race:

what is essential to human existence: that man is individuum and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race. (CA 28)

In particular, an understanding of sin is grasped only in relation to this distinction. For sin, at the most general level, has two aspects which I just sketched: there is the sin of the individual in inclosing
reserve, and there is the inherited sin of the race in the shared sphere – a distinction which, I hold, is one of a relative admixture. Indeed the aim of much of the early chapters of *Anxiety* is to show how this relative admixture of the sin of the individual and the sinfulness of the whole race, in any human existence, is in play. The hereditary sin of the race is that aspect of sin which has a continuous history throughout the history of the race, which is inherited by way of the shared world, and which any spirit will suffer under insofar as they are member of the race, and indeed in this sphere one is not conscious of one’s normative orientation towards good and evil, and neither is anxiety manifest. Contrarily, the sin of the individual is that aspect of sin which the individual brings into being with their own agency, for this sin springs out of a sphere of solipsism (‘inclosing reserve’) in which one is indeed conscious of one’s normative orientation towards good and evil, and which anxiety is indeed manifest. While the former is a suffering under inheritance, the latter is a conscious activity by the individual – and thus the latter is called a “leap [Spring]” to emphasize this. Haufniensis continually highlights the dialectical interplay between these two aspects of sin, and here are two such citations:

Since the race does not begin anew with every individual, the sinfulness of the race does indeed acquire a history. Meanwhile, this proceeds in quantitative determinations while the individual participates in it by the qualitative leap [Spring]. (CA 33)

the view presented in this work does not deny the propagation of sinfulness through generation, or, in other words, that sinfulness has its history through generation. Yet it is said only that sinfulness moves in quantitative categories, whereas sin constantly enters by the qualitative leap [Spring] of the individual. (CA 47)

Haufniensis, I hold, is after the relative admixture between the two aspects of sin. But I will now explain each aspect in turn remembering, however, that a sinner always inhabits both modes, but neither one completely – remembering, that is, the relative admixture.

*Sinfulness*, or hereditary sin, is the sin of the race. This, as mentioned, has a continuous history within the race, and, in an important sense, a particular existence suffers under this sinfulness which it has inherited. Now, I have been noting that this aspect of sinfulness is the sin of the race, that is, is the sin that is localized within the shared world. For Haufniensis is continually reiterating that the hereditary sin of the race is the sinfulness in the world (CA 32, 57), and indeed when detailing hereditary sin he refers to this world as the “historical environment” (CA 73, 74), and indeed “historical nexus” (CA 73), which one is thrown into. The ‘race’ aspect of spirit is that race’s world, that is, the shared world which one is thrown into and absorbed in. And this shared world is nothing other than the finite world which I have been referring to in the earlier sections of this part of the dissertation, and this hereditary sin of the shared world is nothing other than the tendency towards becoming entangled in the finite, the intraworldly, which I have been referring to in the earlier sections of this dissertation.
In chapter ‘III’ of *Anxiety* Haufniensis considers this sinfulness in more detail. The title of this chapter is telling: ‘Anxiety as the Consequence of that Sin which is Absence of the Consciousness of Sin’ (*CA* 81). Sinfulness is such that it is suffered under in such a way that the spirit in question is not conscious of sin nor is it conscious of the possibility of faith – in short it is has no conscious orientation towards good and evil, nor is it conscious of anxiety (anxiety is here latent). Haufniensis terms this absence of consciousness *spiritlessness*. In spiritlessness one has no conscious orientation towards good and evil (anxiety is latent), and, in accordance with sinfulness, one becomes ensnared in the finite and indeed ensnared in such a way that one feels like all is well, feels happy. Haufniensis is thus trying to capture the ambiguity involved in this phenomenon of hereditary sin – absorbed in the shared world the sinner becomes entangled in the finite, yet in such a way that it is not conscious of this fact, and indeed considers itself to be happy.

Now, this aspect of sin – the spiritless hereditary sin inherent in the shared world – is, I hold, Haufniensis’ appropriation of the theological account of *concupiscientia*. For Haufniensis wants to allow a place for what he calls the “dogmatic presupposition” of hereditary sin (*CA* 19-20, 58) and he tells us that “[t]he strongest, indeed, the most positive expression the Protestant Church uses for the presence of hereditary sin in man is precisely that he is born with *concupiscientia*” (*CA* 41). Now, the most influential account of *concupiscientia* is from Augustine – in particular his *Confessions*43 – and I now turn to that text for a moment to show how Haufniensis’ account of the spiritless hereditary sin inherent in the shared world can be understood as appropriating Augustine’s account of *concupiscientia*. Augustine grounds his account of *concupiscientia* in this citation from 1 John 2:

> For everything in the world – the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life – comes not from the Father but from the world. (*NIV* 1 John 2: 15-17)

Thus Augustine is signalling that the ‘lust of the flesh’ – *concupiscientia carnis* – and the ‘lust of the eyes’ – *concupiscientia oculorum* – emanate from out of the world, are localized within the world. *Concupiscientia carnis* and *concupiscientia oculorum* are two aspects of *concupiscientia* for Augustine – the former is a *concupiscientia* inherent in the way the five senses deal with the intraworldly, the latter is a *concupiscientia* inherent in the way the mind deals with the intraworldly. Now, Haufniensis not only wants to allow a place for the theological concept of *concupiscientia*, but, in more detail, he continually reiterates, when speaking of hereditary sin, that “sensuousness is sinfulness” (*CA* 59). I take Haufniensis to here be echoing Augustine’s account of *concupiscientia carnis*, the ‘lust of the flesh’. Therefore, I will sketch out this aspect of *concupiscientia* in *Confessions*, with the aim of showing how Haufniensis’ account of spiritless hereditary sin is an appropriation of Augustine’s account.

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43 Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. F. J. Sheed (Hackett Publishing Company: Indiana, 2006); hereafter *C.*
In *Confessions*, ‘Book Ten’, Augustine details *concupiscentia carnis*, and he very carefully goes through each of the five senses, detailing how inherent in each one, as it deals with the intraworldly, is a tendency towards getting ‘entangled’ or ‘ensnared’ in the intraworldly – ensnared such that one is closed off from one’s proper relation to God. As Augustine also highlights, this getting ensnared, and thus closed off from one’s proper relation to God, is also ambiguously experienced as a ‘pleasure’. While Augustine highlights each of the five senses in this regard, I will quickly reference three of these. Regarding the *concupiscentia* inherent in seeing the intraworldly, Augustine writes,

the pleasure of the eyes of my flesh (…) affect me in all the waking hours of every day (…) For light, the queen of colours, suffusing all things I see (…) entices me as it flows before my sight in all its variousness (…) I (…) entangle my feet in these lower things of beauty (C 217-219)

Regarding the *concupiscentia* inherent in hearing the intraworldly, he writes,

The pleasures of the ear (…) often ensnares me, in that the bodily sense does not accompany the reason as following after it in proper order, but having been admitted to aid the reason, strives to run before and take the lead. In this matter I sin unawares (C 216)

And also regarding tasting of the intraworldly, Augustine writes,

But while I am passing from the from the pain of hunger to the satisfaction of sufficiency, in that very passage the snare of concupiscence lies in wait for me. (…) this is not the kind of thing I can resolve one and for all to cut off and touch no more (C 213-215)

Thus these two aspects – that in one’s sensuous concern for the intraworldly one tends towards getting entangled in them, and getting thus entangled is experienced as a pleasure – sketch the concept of Augustine’s *concupiscentia carnis*. Turning back to Haufniensis’ account of spiritless sinfulness, I hold that his account here is an appropriation of Augustine’s account of *concupiscentia*. That is, Haufniensis’ account of the inherited hereditary sin, inherent in the shared world, (such that ‘sensuousness is sinfulness’) is based on the model of *concupiscentia carnis* from Augustine. This marks being thrown into the shared world in such a way that one, in one’s (e.g. sensuous) concern for the finite, tends towards becoming ensnared in the intraworldly, and indeed entangled in such a way that one ambiguously experiences this entanglement as if all was well.

Furthermore, Haufniensis implies that insofar as one has not achieved faith, one indeed falls victim to these snares – that is, insofar as one has not achieved faith, one is, in accordance with the tendency of hereditary sin, indeed ensnared or entangled in the finite world. This thus becoming ensnared is understood as a suffering under inheritance, for here spirit is not conscious of its normative orientation towards sin and faith (and neither is anxiety manifest), but rather, having been thrown into these snares becomes entangled in them in such a way that it thinks all is well. It is important to specify that here, entangled in the finite world, what is at issue is the category of the particular – this or that particular intraworldly thing; and that here the category of totality (the totality of one’s concern, as revealed in
anxiety) is not at issue. Now, I am arguing in this section that spiritless sinfulness is merely one aspect – the inherited aspect – of the dialectic sin, and must be counterbalanced by the other aspect.

*Sin* in the strict sense is the leap of sin of the individual. Haufniensis deals with sin in chapter ‘IV’ of *Anxiety*, and here again the title of this chapter is telling – ‘Anxiety of Sin or Anxiety as the Consequence of Sin in the Single Individual’ (*CA* 111). This of course is aspect of the dialectic of sin which is concerned with the conscious deed of the individual. For, whereas the former aspect suffers under a lack of consciousness, an unconsciousness, this latter aspect is *conscious* – here the individual has a conscious orientation towards good and evil, and also one consciously experiences anxiety. Whereas the former aspect is that aspect which is within the race’s world, this aspect concerns the individual, indeed such that this aspect is cut off from the race and indeed cut off from others in a sphere of solipsism. This sphere of solipsism is what Haufniensis calls “inclosing reserve” (*CA* 123) – and here, in inclosing reserve, as anxiety is manifest what is at issue is the category of totality, the totality of one’s concern for the finite, as detailed above. Cut off from others here the individual has a conscious orientation towards good and evil (amidst manifest anxiety) and is perpetually choosing sin, perpetually holding off the good (faith). This is a conscious deed of the individual, and to emphasize this Haufniensis calls this the ‘leap’. Haufniensis specifies that, as the leap is a deed committed by the individual, the leap is not caused by the sinfulness which one is thrown into:

It is therefore a superstition when it is maintained in logic that through a continued quantification a new quality is brought forth. (...) The new quality appears with the first, with the leap [Springet], with the suddenness of the enigmatic. (*CA* 30)

To emphasize that the leap is not caused by the inherited sinfulness, Haufniensis holds that the leap occurs “with the suddenness of the enigmatic”. The leap is an act by the individual, who, inclosed in a solipsism (amidst conscious anxiety), is consciously grappling with its orientation towards good and evil. However, strict sin is merely one aspect of the dialectic of in, and must be counterbalanced by the other aspect.

The dialectic of sin is made up of *sin and sinfulness, and this dialectic is one of a relative admixture*, the more of one the less of the other. Insofar as faith has not been achieved, and one is a sinner, this sin is part unconscious suffering, part conscious action. It is neither wholly one or the other, but is a relative admixture of the two. For spirit is always *both* the individual and the race, and regarding the sinner this means that the sinner is always *both* inclosed in an individualized solipsism amidst manifest anxiety, conscious of its normative orientation – where what is at issue is the totality of one’s concern for the finite – yet actively *leaping* (suddenness) into strict sin; and absorbed in the shared world of the race it is thrown into and the hereditary sin of that race (*concupiscentia*) that it is also thrown into, in which it is not conscious of its normative orientation (spiritlessness) and in which it becomes entangled
in the finite – where what is at issue are particular finite things, and in which anxiety is latent. And while
the sinner inhabits both modes, it inhabits neither one completely, for the more of the one, the less of the
other.

I want to be clear that this ‘relative admixture’ does not mean that there is a constant vacillation
back and forth between sin and sinfulness, but rather that the sinner is always simultaneously inhabiting
both sin and sinfulness. But how can one be both absorbed in the race’s world unconscious of one’s
normative orientation, and at the same time isolated in a solipsism, with a conscious normative
orientation? There are two points which I have been stressing above. First, while one inhabits both modes,
one inhabits neither one completely, which means that while one is always absorbed in the race’s world to
a certain degree, this absorption is also always undermined to a certain degree by the simultaneous
conscious anxiety in isolation; and likewise while one is always isolated in conscious anxiety to a certain
degree, this is always undermined to a certain degree by one’s unconscious absorption. Thus the above
descriptions of sinfulness and strict sin which I described in isolation from one another are pure cases
helpful for our understanding, yet which the sinner never experiences in that purity, since the sinner
indeed never dwells in either one completely, but always both partially. Secondly, the ‘object’ differs in
sin and sinfulness: in unconscious absorption what is at issue is the ‘particular’, particular intraworldly
entities, whereas in conscious anxiety what is at issue is the totality of one’s concern (i.e. the ‘object’ is
‘nothing’: the antipathetic possibility of losing all of one’s concern, and the sympathetic possibility of
gaining it all back). Taking these two points together, this ‘relative admixture’ means that one’s
unconscious absorption in the world in which what is at issue is the particular is always undermined to a
certain degree by one’s isolated anxiety in which what is at issue is the totality; and vice versa.

Haufniensis very subtly stresses this relative admixture:

while the life of an individuality goes on to a certain degree in continuity with the rest of human
life, inclosing reserve maintains itself in the person as an abracadabra of continuity that
communicates only with itself and therefore is always the sudden. (...) In this respect, every
individuality has a little of this “suddenness,” (CA 130)

In the dialectic of sin, the two modes – strict sin, hereditary sin – are distinguished by way of a
relativity: for to a “certain degree” the sinner exists in the shared world suffering hereditary sin; yet at the
same time will always have a least “a little” of inclosing reserve in which in solipsism it is making the
sudden leap into strict sin. What is at issue in the distinction is that of a relative admixture – the more of
the one the less of the other. On one side existence is the race, that is, the shared world, the finite world,
and thus the sinner has inherited sinfulness – e.g. concupiscencia carnis – such that, insofar as it has not
achieved faith, it indeed becomes ensnared in the finite, and indeed entangled in the finite in an
ambiguous manner such that it considers this to be the happy life. This is spiritlessness, and here an
unconsciousness prevails – here one is not conscious of anxiety, and neither does one have a conscious
normative orientation towards good and evil (for here what is at issue is the category of the particular). But this aspect is continually counterbalanced by the other aspect. For existence is also part individual and here, in an inclosing reserve, the individual sinner is conscious of anxiety and is consciously grappling with its normative orientation towards good and evil (for here what is at issue is the category of totality), yet evil is perpetually the victor, as the leap into sin is here being perpetually made by the individual. I stress that this distinction is one of relativity: the more one exists in the shared world, prey to hereditary sin and entangled in the finite, the less one exists in a solipsism in which one makes the leap amidst manifest anxiety, and vice versa; the more unconscious spiritlessness (in which anxiety is latent), the less conscious inclosing reserve (in which anxiety is manifest), and vice versa.

_The Sickness Unto Death_

While I am using _Anxiety_ as the centrepiece for my Kierkegaard interpretation, as noted, I am using Anti-Climacus’ _Sickness_ to develop and clarify certain key concepts from Haufniensis’ _Anxiety_. I hold that _Sickness_ gives us the most developed account of sin in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, and I am going to thus use it to develop the account of sin given to us from _Anxiety_. But again, I am not adding anything that is not already in _Anxiety_ with this procedure, only developing and clarifying certain themes that are already in _Anxiety_, yet in it in a very subtle manner. And thus in this section the key concept from _Anxiety_ which I am going to help clarify by way of _Sickness_ is the concept of the ‘dialectic of sin’. In _Sickness_, ‘Part One’, Anti-Climacus calls sin ‘despair’ and I am now going to show how Anti-Climacus’ account of despair, at the most general level, is that of a particular dialectic, which helps clarify the dialectic of sin which we find in _Anxiety_.

Indeed Anti-Climacus explicitly notes that his account of despair – which as I will show is made up of a particular dialectic – will harmonize with Haufniensis’ dialectic of sin from _Anxiety_:

The relation between ignorance and despair is similar to that between ignorance and anxiety (see _The Concept of Anxiety_ by Vigilus Haufniensis); the anxiety that characterizes spiritlessness is recognized precisely by its spiritless sense of security. Nevertheless, anxiety lies underneath; likewise, despair also lies underneath. (SD 44)

Here Anti-Climacus explicitly refers to “the relation (...) between ignorance and anxiety” in _Anxiety_ – what Anti-Climacus is referring to here is the dialectic of sin in _Anxiety_ explained above: on the one hand spiritless hereditary sin, in which one is not conscious of one’s normative orientation to good and evil, nor is one conscious of anxiety, but rather one is, in one’s concern with the finite, prey to being entangled in it, and indeed becomes ensnared such that one thinks one is living the good life (a “secur[e]” “ignorance”); and on the other hand strict sin, in which anxiety is manifest and one is conscious of one’s normative orientation, where one is in a solipsistic inclosing reserve, perpetually leaping into strict sin.
(the “anxiety” that “lies underneath”). And thus when Anti-Climacus here intimates that “the relation between ignorance and despair” is similar to Haufniensis’ dialectic of sin, he thus signals that he is going to proceed to explain his dialectic of despair which harmonizes with Haufniensis’ dialectic of sin.

Straight from the outset of ‘Part One’ Anti-Climacus marks a distinction between despair in the “strict sense” and despair “not in the strict sense” (SD 13-14). The primary way this distinction is made by Anti-Climacus is by considering the category of consciousness in relation to these two forms: that is, despair in the strict sense is marked by a particular consciousness; despair not in the strict sense is marked by a particular unconsciousness.

Despair must be considered primarily within the category of consciousness; whether despair is conscious or not constitutes the qualitative distinction between despair and despair. (SD 29)

Now, what is this particular consciousness or unconsciousness that marks the distinction between the two forms of despair, between strict despair and non-strict despair? Strict despair is the mode of despair in which one is, in anxiety, conscious of one’s normative orientation towards sin / despair and faith, and indeed is conscious that one is in despair – strict despair is the mode in which one is conscious that one is in despair and that one ought to uproot oneself from this sin and achieve faith. Non-strict despair is the mode of despair in which one is not conscious of this normative orientation towards sin and faith, and indeed is not conscious of the fact that one is in despair – non-strict despair is a mode in which an unconsciousness of sin and faith prevails, and indeed prevails in such a way that one thinks that one is living the good life when one is in fact in despair. But I will now spell out this distinction in more detail and in doing so emphasize what is of central significance to my interpretation: that this distinction between conscious and unconscious despair is not a distinction of mutually exclusive states, but is a distinction of a relative admixture – the person in despair is always inhabiting both of these modes, yet neither of them completely, such that the more of the one, the less of the other.

Unconscious despair, non-strict despair, is the mode of despair in which one is not conscious of one’s normative orientation towards sin and faith, is not conscious of the fact that one is in despair and that one ought to root this out and achieve faith. Anti-Climacus emphasizes this lack of consciousness in this mode by referring to this mode of spirit as “spiritlessness” (SD 45). Further, in spiritlessness, one is unconscious of one’s despair and one’s normative orientation such that one experiences this as a type of security, tranquillity – “a sense of security and tranquillity can signify being in despair; precisely this sense of security and tranquillity can be the despair” (SD 24). Indeed this secure tranquillity can even be a happiness, yet, ambiguously, this happiness is the despair – “is still despair, is happiness” (SD 26). This experience within unconscious despair – experiencing despair as a tranquil secure happiness – expresses the type of ambiguity within spiritlessness that Anti-Climacus wants to capture – “the individual in despair is like the consumptive: when the illness is most critical he feels well, considers himself to be in
excellent health, and perhaps seems to others to radiate health.” (SD 45) For while one is indeed in despair, unconscious of one’s normative orientation, this secure tranquillity is detrimental to one, for when one ambiguously considers oneself to be healthy when one is sick, then one is closing off the possibility of becoming healthy – “that is, he is altogether secure in the power of despair”. This mode of despair (unconscious) and mode of spirit (spiritlessness) is further fleshed out by highlighting that these modes are particularly lost in one’s relation’s with others (SD 33) – “in immediate connection with “the other”” (SD 51). I take Anti-Climacus to be highlighting that spiritless unconscious despair is localized within the shared world (what Haufniensis calls the race’s world), the finite world. That is, one is absorbed in the shared world – “absorbed in all sorts of secular matters” (SD 33); “absorbed in all temporal goals” (SD 35) – such that one, in one’s concern for the finite, exists in the mode of spiritless unconscious despair; and here what is at issue in one’s absorption are particular finite things which one concerns oneself with, i.e. that category of totality is not at issue. Unconscious despair is localized in one’s absorption in the shared world, in which one’s normative orientation towards sin and faith is unconscious, and in which one is entangled in the finite in such a way that one experiences the ambiguous secure tranquillity.

Conscious despair, on the other hand, is characterized by a consciousness of one’s orientation towards sin and faith, and is indeed conscious that one’s state is despair (sin). Here one consciously grapples with one’s normative orientation: one grapples with the fact that one is in despair and that one ought to root out this despair and achieve faith. Whereas spiritless unconscious despair is fleshed out as being absorbed in the share world, conscious despair, on the other hand, is fleshed out as precisely not being thus absorbed, but rather, as inhabiting a sphere of isolation, a solipsism. Anti-Climacus continually stresses, that is, that conscious despair inhabits the sphere of inclosing reserve [Indesluttethed] (SD 63, 72). In inclosing reserve the individual exists cut off from others, cut off from its absorption in the shared world – the individual exists behind an “in-closure [Indelukke] (...) ex-clusively [udelukkende] for itself” (SD 73). And as it is precisely one’s absorption in the world in which one is unconscious in a secure tranquillity and becomes ensnared in the finite, in inclosing reserve one is precisely not ensnared and one’s consciousness of one’s normative orientation is manifest. Further, contrary to the secure tranquillity of unconscious despair, in this inclosing reserve in which one is conscious of their despair and normative orientation one is also conscious of anxiety – in inclosing reserve one’s despair and normative orientation “signals its presence (...) in and through an anxiety” (SD 22). For in inclosing reserve, what is at issue is precisely the totality of one’s concern for the finite – which is what anxiety reveals, as explained above – and in this way inclosing reserve is distinguished from absorption in the shared world. And finally, it is in this inclosing reserve, cut off from the shared world, in which anxiety is manifest and one grapples with one’s normative orientation; it is in inclosing reserve that despair in the strict sense is actively brought
about. That is, strict despair is not something that happens to one, rather it is a deed that one brings upon oneself (Haufniensis calls this the leap) – “every moment he is in despair he is bringing it upon himself.”

That is, in conscious despair one grapples with the fact they are in despair and ought to root this out and achieve faith, yet insofar as they do not do this, but remain in despair, this remaining in despair is a deed which they are perpetually bringing upon themselves.

Now, of upmost importance for my interpretation here is the idea that unconscious despair and conscious despair are not mutually exclusive states but make up a relative admixture. Anti-Climacus emphasizes that one in despair indeed inhabits both of the modes, but is neither absolutely inhabiting the former nor absolutely inhabiting the latter: the distinction is one of a relative admixture – the more of the one, the less of the other.

Actual life is too complex merely to point out abstract contrasts such as that between a despair that is completely unaware of being so and a despair that is completely aware of being so. Very often the person in despair probably has a dim idea of his own state, although here again the nuances are myriad. To some degree, he is aware of being in despair (SD 48)

The distinction between unconscious and conscious despair is always one of a relativity – for one in despair always inhabits a relative admixture of both. For while one inhabits, partially, spiritless unconscious despair – absorbed in the shared world, secure in its ambiguous happiness – one also has, however “dim”, a co-present conscious despair – in inclosing reserve amidst manifest anxiety. For the distinction is one of “degree[x]”: the more unconscious despair, the less conscious despair, and vice versa.

Indeed in the very beginning of the section entitled ‘Despair as Defined by Consciousness’ (SD 42) Anti-Climacus gives us his clearest expression of this distinction – which I take to be his definitive expression – and in this he stresses that the distinction is to be understood as a relative admixture, and indeed stresses that the distinction is one of “degree[x]”:

the greater the degree of consciousness the more intensive the despair (…) There is the least despair when this kind of unconsciousness is greatest. (SD 42)

Thus on Anti-Climacus’ account, the relation between unconscious and conscious despair is always one of a relative admixture: one in despair indeed inhabits both modes, yet the more one in spiritlessness is absorbed in the shared world entangled in the finite with an ambiguous secure tranquillity, the less one exists in a solipsistic inclosing reserve in which one grapples with one’s normative orientation, and vice versa; the more unconscious despair, the less conscious despair, and vice versa. This means that one’s unconscious absorption in the world, in which what is at issue is the particular, is always undermined by a certain degree by one’s isolated conscious despair in which what is at issue is the totality of one’s concern (i.e. to renounce it and to gain it back); and vice versa.

And thus I believe I have now shown how Anti-Climacus’ account of the dialectic of despair not only harmonizes with what I called the dialectic of sin in Anxiety, but indeed clarifies the account
indicated in *Anxiety* in a very subtle manner. For while Haufniensis clearly marks the distinction between the individual and the race (holding that these are always ‘simultaneous’) and thus also marks the distinction between the hereditary sin of the race’s world (in which, in spiritlessness, unconscious of anxiety and one’s normative orientation towards sin and faith, one becomes ambiguously entangled in the finite on the model of *concupiscentia* – where what is at issue is the category of the *particular*), and the sin of the individual (in which, in inclosing reserve, conscious of anxiety and one’s normative orientation – where what is at issue is the category of *totality* – one perpetually makes the leap into sin), Haufniensis does not spend much time specifying that this distinction is to be understood as a relative admixture, but only subtly hints at this. However I have now shown that Anti-Climacus’ account of the dialectic of despair (unconscious despair, conscious despair) not only harmonizes with Haufniensis’ account of the dialectic of sin, but have also shown that Anti-Climacus’ account of this dialectic clearly specifies that the distinction is one of a relative admixture, and thus I have provided further support that the ‘dialectic of sin’ in *Anxiety* is also to be understood in this manner.
Now that I have laid out the dialectic of sin at the most general level, we are in a position to continue in detail with the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard. For I am after an interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard, arguing that anxiety in Kierkegaard is ambiguous, and as there are three encounters which spirit may have with this anxiety I hold that to understand this anxiety we must track the movement through the three encounters, detailing the interrelation therein – and in this part of the dissertation this means tracking the retrogressive movement, the movement away-from the telos. We began in §A – ‘the absurd telos’ – by highlighting rightly used anxiety and how this gives rise to faith. (And in the appendix I highlighted a springing off anxiety which springs one out of spirit in a strong sense insofar as one becomes psychotic.) I have now shown in §B – ‘the dialectic of sin’ – how, insofar as one is not using anxiety rightly, one is in sin such that this sin is made up of a relative admixture of part strict sin of the individual, part sinfulness of the shared world (spiritlessness). Thus now we are in a position to continue our retrogressive interpretation: for we will now detail the way anxiety is encountered in strict sin such that it is misused, and we will then conclude by detailing the way anxiety is encountered in spiritlessness such that it shows up in disguise.

We now home in on the sin of the individual, detailing the encounter of anxiety therein. For I have been continually noting that in this inclosing reserve anxiety is manifest, yet now I detail how this manifest anxiety is encountered in strict sin – that is, I now detail how this manifest anxiety is misused giving rise to what I will call the dialectic of strict sin. I have explained manifest anxiety rightly used in faith, and this will help us grasp misused manifest anxiety insofar as the latter is a privation of the former. I have shown how manifest anxiety is rightly used such that one makes the dialectical spring off that elastically ambiguous (antipathetic and sympathetic) springboard, achieving the dialectic of faith – and now we home in on how manifest anxiety is misused such that one makes a dialectical mis-spring off that elastically ambiguous (antipathetic and sympathetic) springboard, giving rise to the dialectic of strict sin (and indeed we will also see how the possibility of psychosis plays a pivotal role in understanding this dialectical mis-springing). After we now, in §C, highlight the encounter of manifest anxiety such that it is misused giving rise to the dialectic of strict sin, we will conclude, in §D, by highlighting the way anxiety shows up in disguise in spiritlessness – for we are proceeding retrogressively.
As mentioned in my Introduction, one of the upshots of focusing in detail on the ambiguous structure of anxiety (detailing its sympathetic and antipathetic aspects) is that this will lead us to not only an account of the strange agency involved in faith, but also to the strange agency involved in strict sin. For as anxiety is the springboard for springing one into either faith or strict sin, detailing the ambiguous structure of this anxiety leads us to detail how the agency involved in not only faith, but also strict sin is one made up of both an active and passive aspect. In the section on faith, above, I showed how detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity led us to show how the agency involved in faith is made up both a willful movement as well as a simultaneous receptive movement. In this section I will show how detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity leads us to an account of the agency involved in sin as made up both a passive cowardly weakness, as well an active willful defiance. For I will show that as anxiety’s antipathetic aspect acts as the springboard to make the movement of infinite resignation, which can be achieved with one’s own willpower; and as anxiety’s sympathetic aspect acts as the springboard to make the movement of faith, which can only be achieved by way of receptivity in God, failing to make this double movement, failing to properly spring off ambiguous anxiety, is understood as a mode of agency which is part a cowardly weakness of not making the antipathetic movement (i.e. not mustering the courage to make the first movement with one’s own willpower), and part a willful defiance of not making the sympathetic movement (i.e. defiantly willing against what God is offering to one).

In other words, the upshot of this section is that, in detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in Kierkegaard (detailing how anxiety is made up of a sympathetic and antipathetic aspect), we are led to an account of the agency involved in strict sin as part cowardly weakness (passivity), part willful defiance (activity). Now, when we look at some of the prevalent secondary literature on this topic of the agency involved in strict sin in Kierkegaard (in particular, literature on Anxiety and Sickness), we notice, in a variety of different ways, that this point is generally not made. That is, the claim that the agency involved in strict sin is made up of part activity, part passivity, is not generally made. What we generally find in the secondary literature – as I will sketch now, and detail at the end of this section – are the following two positions.

Firstly – and this is the majority of the secondary literature on this topic – it is held that the agency involved in strict sin is either one of willful defiance, or one of passive weakness. That is, it is generally held that the agency of the sinner here can be one or the other, but it is not held that this agency is made up of a combination of the two. In this first group there are two sub groups. The first group simply holds that the agency involved here is either willful defiance or passive weakness, without detailing much further. The second sub group holds that there is a type of developmental or linear progression involved in this agency. This sub group holds that the agency involved in strict sin is first of
the passive variety until, at some point, it switches over into the active defiant variety – and this way a type of linear progression is involved.

Now, the second group of authors which we find in the secondary literature concerning this question of the agency of strict sin makes a different move than the first group. This second group, rather than holding that the agency involved is either one of defiance or weakness, holds that there is only one type of agency involved. Let me explain. On one side here there are authors who hold that, despite appearances, the agency involved in strict sin is only one of an active defiance, and those cases which seem to be passive weakness can ultimately be shown to actually be cases of active defiance. On the other side here there are authors who make the opposite reduction. That is, other authors claim that despite appearances, the agency involved in strict sin is only one of a passive weakness, and those cases of what seem to be active defiance are ultimately shown to be cases of weakness. So, although this group is likewise made up of two subgroups, the idea is similar in both cases: that there is always and only one type of agency involved in strict sin: some say it is active defiance, others passive weakness.

Of course my line differs from the above two groups in that I want to show that the agency involved in strict sin is made up of both an active defiance and simultaneous passive weakness. And the way that I am going to show this is of course by focusing on the ambiguous structure of anxiety in detail (i.e. detailing the antipathetic and sympathetic aspects of anxiety). And thus in this way detailing anxiety’s ambiguity will lead us to a nuanced account of the agency involved in strict sin, one which we do not generally find in the secondary literature.

Συμπαραγωγώμενοι

I of course use A’s three Συμπαραγωγώμενοι (society of buried lives) lectures from Either/Or I by understanding them as giving us an ‘aesthetic representation’ of the central concepts from Anxiety with which I am concerned. In this section, §C, I am after how anxiety is misused such that it gives rise to the dialectic of strict sin, and my central text for this concept is Anxiety. Here I thus use one of A’s three lectures to gives us an aesthetic representation of this misuse of anxiety, this dialectic of strict sin. This treatment of A will thus lead us into my treatment of Anxiety on this topic – that is, I first deal with the aesthetic representation, before I deal directly with the concept itself.

For these purposes I will now primarily use A’s third lecture from the set of three – ‘The Unhappiest One’ (EOI 217). There is indeed a continuity, a harmonization between the three of A’s lectures. In particular whereas the first lecture – ‘The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama’ – detailed the nature of tragic guilt as that of a relative admixture between the unconscious guiltlessness in the shared world, and the conscious guilt of inclosing reserve amidst
manifest anxiety, this third lecture – ‘The Unhappiest One’ – homes in on the state of inclosing reserve amidst manifest anxiety, no longer calling this ‘guilt’, but now calling it ‘unhappiness’ (and indeed many of the case-studies which A refers to here are tragic characters, e.g. Antigone (EOI 227)).

For this third lecture leads the reader into the sphere of inclosing reserve. The essay is framed with the story about how there is a grave with the inscription ‘the unhappiest one’ on the tombstone, and how this grave was opened yet no one was found inside. The fact that no one was found inside signifies that the ‘unhappiest one’ in the grave is indeed alive, yet is somehow struggling with death. Now my interpretation of this story is that the grave signifies inclosing reserve – literally cut off from others, cut off from the shared world, enclosed in isolation (and yet recall that this inclosing reserve is always relative to one’s absorption in the shared world). A’s third lecture thus leads us into that enclosed sphere.

Now, I have been reiterating that in the first lecture, on tragic guilt, A holds that one locked up in inclosing reserve encounters manifest anxiety – and thus A held in that lecture that “anxiety is a genuine tragic category” (EOI 155). A writes in that first lecture about this anxiety,

anxiety is a reflection category (…) anxiety always contains a reflection on time, for I cannot be anxious about the present but only about the past or the future, but the past and the future, kept in opposition to each other in such a way that the present vanishes, are categories of reflection. (EOI 155)

Now, in that first lecture A does not elaborate much more on this conception of anxiety, but simply holds that this anxiety is manifest in that sphere of inclosing reserve. However, in the third lecture, ‘The Unhappiest One’, as A homes in on this inclosed sphere, he indeed elaborates on this anxiety. For as I will now show, absolutely central to this third lecture is detailing how one in inclosing reserve (the grave), is on the one hand anxious about the past such that the present vanishes; and, on the other hand, anxious about the future such that the present vanishes. And as I will show, this encounter with manifest anxiety is such that one spirals in what A calls a “perpetuum mobile” (EOI 178). Enclosed in a grave of solipsism, cut off from others, one is anxious about the past and the future such that the present vanishes, and in this anxiety one is spiralling in perpetuum mobile. Let me explain.

In ‘The Unhappiest One’, A first circumscribes what he calls the “whole territory of the unhappy consciousness”, and we can see that he is echoing his account of anxiety from his first lecture. He writes in his third lecture,

The unhappy one is the person who is always absent from himself, never present to himself. But in being absent, one obviously can be in either past or future time. The whole territory of the unhappy consciousness is thereby adequately circumscribed. (EOI 222)

That is, in inclosing reserve one is anxiously reflecting on the past and the future such that the present vanishes. What does this mean? A goes on to say that there is a past in which the person is present in this past, and there is a future in which the person is present in the future; yet for the unhappy one, one
reflects on the past such there is no present in the past (‘recollecting’), and reflects on the future such that there is no present in the future (‘hoping’):

there is a \textit{tempus} that is present in a past time and a \textit{tempus} that is present in a future time, but (...) there is a \textit{tempus} that is \textit{plus quam perfectum}, in which there is no present, and a \textit{futurum exactum} with the same feature. There are the hoping and the recollecting individualities. \textit{(EOI 223)}

The unhappy one is either recollecting or hoping. Unhappy recollection recollects a past that “had no reality” \textit{(EOI 224)} for the individual; unhappy hope hopes for a future that “can acquire no reality for him” \textit{(EOI 224)}, that “he himself knows cannot be realized” \textit{(EOI 224)}. In this sense unhappy recollection is ‘not present’ in the past; and unhappy hope is ‘not present’ in the future. In both cases, unhappiness “comes into conflict with the particular elements of finiteness.” \textit{(EOI 223)}

When we consider unhappy recollection or unhappy hope by themselves we already begin to see the \textit{perpetuum mobile} of this inclosed anxiety. In unhappy recollection the individual attempts to recollect a past that had no reality for them. We are given the example of someone who went through childhood in such a way that it had no meaning for them \textit{(EOI 224)}, perhaps such that they did not experience the joy of childhood; however, now an adult this person wants to recollect the reality of their childhood, wants to recollect the joy of their childhood. However, this recollection is in perpetual conflict with the elements of finiteness – for their childhood had no reality, no joy – and thus this recollection is perpetually broken, collapsing, and (insofar as one still recollects unhappily) perpetually built up again, only to again collapse. So too with unhappy hope. In unhappy hope the individual attempts to hope for a future that they know cannot acquire reality for them. Thus this hope is in perpetual conflict with finitude – for they know that what they hope for cannot be realized – and thus this hope is perpetually broken, collapsing, and (insofar as they still hope unhappily), perpetually built up again only to collapse – “he cannot become present to himself in hope but loses his hope, then hopes again, etc.” \textit{(EOI 223)} Thus unhappy hope and unhappy recollection, considered in themselves, already show the \textit{perpetuum mobile} of this inclosed anxiety.

However, A continues with the implicit aim of bringing this \textit{perpetuum mobile} to its uttermost. He now considers unhappy hope and unhappy recollection together, forming a dialectical relationship such that one mode of unhappiness is internally related to the other:

The only combination possible is one in which it is recollection that prevents him from becoming present in his hope and it is hope that prevents him from becoming present in his recollection. \textit{(EOI 225)}

Here A’s aim is to give voice to the uttermost \textit{perpetuum mobile} of this enclosed anxiety. For here one’s hope is continually collapsing insofar as what one hopes for cannot acquire reality for one, yet here the reason \textit{why} this hope is being perpetually disappointed is traced back to one’s unhappy recollection – “recollection (...) prevents him from becoming present in his hope”. On the other hand, here
one’s recollection is continually collapsing insofar as what one recollects did not have reality for one, yet here the reason why this recollection is being perpetually disappointed is traced back to one’s unhappy hope – “hope (...) prevents him from becoming present in his recollection.” Thus, here one’s unhappy hope is ultimately due to one’s unhappy recollection, and one’s unhappy recollection is ultimately due to one’s unhappy hope, and continuing in this reflection will, while indeed producing the perpetual motion in the manner of a spinning wheel, lead nowhere. The individual – enclosed in the tomb, cut off from others in a sphere of solipsism – grapples with the dialectic of unhappiness, and in anxiety is spiralling in perpetuum mobile.

*The Concept of Anxiety*

We turned to A’s Συμπαρανεϰϱώμενοι lecture which homes in on manifest anxiety in inclosing reserve, detailing the dialectic of unhappiness, in order to give us an aesthetic representation of what I am after in this section: the way anxiety is misused such that it gives rise to the dialectic of strict sin. For I am using *Anxiety* as the centrepiece for my interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard, and now that I have detailed A’s aesthetic representation, we turn to *Anxiety* and spell out misused anxiety giving rise to the dialectic of strict sin. In particular I will now show how A’s account of the perpetuum mobile of inclosed anxiety (in the dialectic of unhappiness) serves as an aesthetic representation of what Haufniensis also calls the “perpetuum mobile” (CA 130) of inclosed anxiety (in the dialectic of strict sin).

I showed last section how in the early chapters of *Anxiety* Haufniensis reiterates that sin is part hereditary sin of the race (spiritless absorption in the shared world), part strict sin of the individual (the leap – suddenness – amidst manifest anxiety in inclosing reserve) – and I stressed that this distinction is that of a relative admixture. In chapter ‘IV’ of *Anxiety* Haufniensis homes in on this strict sin of the individual, Haufniensis homes in on this inclosed sphere in which anxiety is manifest yet misused by way of the perpetual leap into sin. Now, what are the details of this encounter of anxiety (misused) such that it gives rise to the dialectic of strict sin, and indeed in the manner of a perpetuum mobile? To answer this we must first recall where we began in this part of the dissertation – anxiety used rightly, the absurd telos. For misusing anxiety is a privation of using it rightly, and when we thus recall that absurd telos, we will be in position to detail how it is misused in the perpetuum mobile of strict sin.

Recall that anxiety’s object is ‘nothing’ (possibility regarding the category of totality), and anxiety’s relation to this nothing is ambiguous, that is, part sympathetic, part antipathetic. The antipathetic possibility is the possibility of losing all of one’s concern for the finite world, losing the totality of one’s concern for the actual – this is terrifying and painful. This is the possibility of infinite resignation. This antipathetic possibility is something which one can achieve merely with one’s own
willpower – one can bring about infinite resignation by way of focusing all of one’s concern for the finite world into one central desire, such that all other concern branches out of this desire, and then resigning this desire, which therewith resigns absolutely all of one’s concern for the finite world. And finally, this antipathetic possibility, which one can achieve with one’s own willpower, is something which one ought to achieve. For, in one’s concern one is initially entangled in this finite world – in the manner of concupiscentia – and one can only disentangle oneself by way of resigning all of one’s concern in infinite resignation. The sympathetic possibility, on the other hand, is the possibility of gaining all of one’s concern for the finite world back, gaining back one’s central desire and therewith the totality of the concern which branches out of it – this is joyful. This is the possibility of faith. This sympathetic possibility is not something one can achieve merely with one’s own willpower, but can only be achieved by way of a receptivity in God. And finally, this sympathetic possibility, which can only be achieved by way of a receptivity in God, is something which one ought to achieve. For when one gains back one’s central desire and all concern for the finite world by way of this movement, one gains back that concern such that one is no longer entangled in the finite – no longer ensnared in the manner of concupiscentia. Thus anxiety’s object is nothing (possibility regarding the category of totality) and this nothing has an antipathetic and sympathetic side: and yet the antipathetic possibility only makes sense in relation to the sympathetic possibility and vice versa – and therefore anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy, which is the springboard for making the dialectical spring into faith.

Now, whereas when anxiety, so conceived, is rightly used it gives rise to the dialectic of faith, when it is misused, it gives rise to the dialectic of strict sin. That is, in the sphere of solipsism, cut off from others (which is always relative to one’s entangled absorption in the shared world), anxiety is indeed manifest, the possibility concerning the category of totality is indeed manifest, and with this one’s normative orientation towards sin and faith is manifest – the antipathetic possibility and the sympathetic possibility are indeed manifest, and manifest as that which one ought to achieve – yet here one fails to use anxiety rightly: one botches the antipathetic movement, and one likewise botches the sympathetic movement. In the sphere of inclosing reserve (relative to the sphere of ensnared absorption in the shared world) anxiety, as springboard, is manifest, yet it does not spring one into the dialectic of faith, but rather perpetually mis-springs one into the dialectic of strict sin.

Haufniensis begins chapter ‘IV’ by noting that the anxiety in this inclosed sphere has a “relation” with two modes of actuality:

First of all, actuality is not one factor; second, the actuality posited is an unwarranted actuality. So anxiety again comes into relation with what is posited as well as with the future. (CA 111)

Here I take “actuality” to signify the finite world (the shared world), more specifically, one’s concern for the finite world. Haufniensis tells us that here anxiety is related to two types of actuality: the
actuality that is posited, which is also an unwarranted actuality; and the actuality that one may acquire in the future. In short the first actuality is the totality of that concern for the finite world which one has had in the past, and currently has; and the second is the totality of that concern for the finite world which one may acquire in the future. The first actuality is unwarranted because this concern is such that one has been, and is, sinfully entangled in the finite world (in the manner of concupiscentia) and thus Haufniensis tells us that this actuality is to be negated – “[s]ince sin is an unwarranted actuality, it is also to be negated.” (CA 113) The second actuality is, we might say, warranted, indeed it is the concern one ought to acquire insofar as this concern is, I hold, such that one is no longer ensnared in the finite world. That is, here at the beginning of chapter ‘IV’ Haufniensis highlights very subtly the same anxiety which I have already been explaining: anxiety as disclosing possibility ambiguously, that is, on the one hand the antipathetic possibility of infinite resignation of the totality of the finite world which one ought to achieve since this disentangles one from the finite; on the other hand the sympathetic possibility of gaining back the totality of this finite world in faith such that one is no longer ensnared in it, and which one ought to achieve.

And thus it is in this way that in the sphere of inclosing reserve, cut off from others in a solipsism (yet always relative to one’s sinful absorption in the finite world) that anxiety is manifest and one grapples with one’s normative orientation towards sin and faith – here “the distinction between good and evil is posited in concreto.” (CA 111-112) Here, in inclosed anxiety, one knows that one is a sinner, and that one ought to achieve faith – that is, knows that one ought to make the dialectical double-movement of infinite resignation and faith. However, while one in this sphere indeed knows that one ought to make this double-movement, this dialectical spring off from anxiety, one fails to make this spring (leap) properly, and instead perpetually mis-prings off this anxiety, giving rise to the dialectic of strict sin – for remaining in sin “is not a simple consequence but a new leap [Spring].” (CA 113)

The leap off anxiety into sin is, as I highlighted last section, characterized by Haufniensis as ‘suddenness’. Haufniensis develops this concept. He tells us that this leap into sin is characterized as suddenness when we consider its relation to time: “when time is reflected upon, it is defined as the sudden.” (CA 129) More specifically, he tells us that the suddenness of the leap signifies that there is a particular abstraction from the past and from the future: “the sudden is a complete abstraction from continuity, from the past and from the future.” (CA 132) I take this to mean that while anxiety discloses the possibility of resigning one’s past actuality, which one ought to do since it is unwarranted and to be negated, one botches this movement of infinite resignation; and while anxiety discloses the sympathetic possibility of gaining back that concern in the future, which one ought to do, one botches this movement of faith. That is, the antipathetic possibility is oriented more towards the past, while the sympathetic
possibility is oriented more towards the future – in this way perpetually mis-springing off anxiety into strict sin is the sudden in that there is a particular abstraction from the past and the future in play.

But I will now proceed step by step and explain the details of this dialectical mis-springing off anxiety which gives rise to the dialectic of strict sin. That is, I will first detail how one mis-springs off the sympathetic antipathy, botching the antipathetic movement (abstraction from the past); I will then detail how one mis-springs off the antipathetic sympathy, botching the sympathetic movement (abstraction from the future); and I will conclude by bringing these two mis-springs together showing how they interrelate in the dialectic of strict sin. In proceeding in this manner I will also be explaining the perpetuum mobile in play in this inclosed mis-springing: for I will show how each of the botched movements give rise to a perpetuum mobile in themselves, and yet I will bring this perpetuum mobile to its uttermost when I detail the interrelation between the two (and in doing so I will in turn be showing how A’s account of perpetuum mobile is an aesthetic representation Haufniensis’ account).

Chapter ‘IV’ of Anxiety has two subsections: ‘Anxiety about Evil’ (CA 1113), and ‘Anxiety about the Good’ (CA 118). What is obvious is that these sections detail two modes of mis-springing off anxiety, two modes of leaping into sin. But how do we understand in detail these two modes? I have a systematic account of these two modes. Namely, I hold that ‘anxiety about evil’ is the mode of mis-springing off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy, botching the movement of infinite resignation; and ‘anxiety about the good’ is the mode of mis-springing off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy, botching the movement of faith. I will now detail anxiety about evil and anxiety about the good each in their own right, before bringing them together detailing the interrelation between them, and therewith bringing the perpetuum mobile of anxious inclosing reserve to its uttermost.

‘Anxiety about evil’ is thus the botched movement of infinite resignation of the actual, is mis-springing off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy. This is more oriented towards the past, towards the actuality of being sinfully ensnared in the finite world which is to be negated – yet here there is a particular abstraction from the past in play. For the actuality of sin is understood by one as an ‘unwarranted actuality’ that is ‘to be negated’ – for one indeed ought to make the movement of infinite resignation, since this is the way to disentangle oneself from the finite world – however, “[t]his work anxiety will undertake (…) [with] ingenious sophistry” (CA 113). For one to spring properly off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy, one must make this movement infinitely, that is, resign one’s concern from absolutely all of the finite world, the totality of the finite, however, here the sophistry of anxiety takes place:

Anxiety wants to have the actuality of sin removed, not entirely but to a certain degree, or to put it more exactly, to a certain degree it wants to have the actuality of sin continue – but note, only to a certain degree. (CA 114)
The sphere of inclosing reserve, cut off from the shared world in a solipsism in which anxiety is manifest, is always relative to the sinner’s ensnared absorption in the shared world – the more of the one the less of the other. And thus in this anxiety the enclosed individual may resign more and yet more of its concern for the finite (which increases its solipsism more and yet more), and this is indeed the strategy of the sophism here. For one knows that one ought to spring off the antipathy such that one resigns the totality of one’s concern, yet one “continually skirts the point” (CA 114) by way of merely resigning more and yet more of its concern, yet without ever coming to fulfil the movement of infinite resignation. That is, one removes one’s concern for the finite merely to a “certain degree” (therewith increasing one’s inclosing reserve to the same degree), so that indeed one does not make the movement – that is, one does not make the proper spring (leap) off the antipathy.

Therefore anxiety is not disinclined to flirt with quantitative determinations. The more developed anxiety is, the further it dares to pursue this flirtation. But as soon as the jest and diversion of quantitative determinants are about to capture the individual in the qualitative leap [Spring], which lies in wait like the larva of the ant-lion in the funnel formed in the loose sand, anxiety cautiously withdraws; then it has a little point that must be saved and that is without sin, and in the next moment another point. (CA 114)

I showed that a prerequisite for making the movement of infinite resignation is to first concentrate one’s concern into a single desire, such that all of the rest of one’s concern for the finite world branches out of this central desire. Then, when one resigns this central desire, therewith the entirety of one’s concern for the finite world is likewise resigned. And thus this is perhaps part of the failure involved in botching this movement: one has not achieved that prerequisite, or, if one has, one does not resign it, but perhaps resigns other desires, therewith resigning more and yet more of the finite concern (relatively increasing the inclosing reserve), without however, achieving the movement.

(Indeed de silentio, holding that one botches the movement of infinite resignation by way of a ‘cowardliness’ (FT 48, 52), writes,

If he lacks this focus [concentration into a single desire], his soul is dissipated in multiplicity from the beginning, and he will never find the time to make the movement (...) for in the very moment he approaches it, he will suddenly discover that he has forgotten something and therefore must go back. In the next moment, he thinks, it will be possible, and this is quite true, but with such observations one will never come to make the movement but with their help will sink deeper and deeper into the mire. (FT 43))

Now, most significantly, Haufniensis details that this failure, this botching of infinite resignation, is a type of cowardly weakness. For as I have been holding, the movement of infinite resignation is something which one can achieve completely with one’s own willpower – one can make this terrifying movement with one’s own willpower if one musters the courage, one ought to be an autodidact in this regard. And thus since this movement is that which one can indeed achieve completely with one’s willpower, botching this movement is thus a maintaining a cowardly weakness (not willing) when one
ought to exhibit a courageous willpower. For Haufniensis characterizes anxiety about evil – that is, botching the movement of infinite resignation by way of the sophism – as a self-deception in which one holds that one is trapped in a “bondage of sin” (CA 119), and one merely “sorrow[s] over” (CA 115) one’s sinful absorption. In the face of the terrifying possibility, where one ought to act with a courageous will, one instead botches this movement in a cowardly weakness, and in self-deception holds that one is trapped, that one is prisoner to this being entanglement in the finite world. Yet anxiety again discloses that one ought to properly spring off this sympathetic antipathy, that one ought to make the movement of infinite resignation, and thus again one may perhaps resign more and yet more, but ultimately resorts to the illusory bondage as an excuse.

But here we can see the perpetuum mobile in play in this aspect of misused anxiety alone. For one is continually grappling with resignation, one perhaps resigns more and yet more, moving deeper and yet deeper into inclosing reserve – for “[n]o matter how deep an individual has sunk, he can sink still deeper” (CA 113) – but never makes the infinite movement. If the infinite movement is not made, then one is continually deliberating, continually spinning, in cowardly illusory bondage.

‘Anxiety about the good’ is thus the botched movement of regaining the totality of the actual in such a way that one is no longer entangled in the shared world, is the mis-springing off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy. This is the botched movement of faith. For Haufniensis tells us that “[t]he good, of course, signifies the restoration of freedom, redemption, salvation, or whatever one would call it” (CA 119), and anxiety about the good is simply “anxiety about faith” (CA 144), that is, “anxiety about its acquisition” (CA 143). This is more oriented towards the future, towards regaining one’s concern for the finite world in such a way that one is no longer ensnared in it, which is something one ought to gain – yet here there is a particular abstraction from the future in play.

In the sphere of inclosing reserve, anxiety discloses to the individual that they indeed ought to make this movement of faith, that they ought to properly spring off this antipathetic sympathy and regain absorption in the shared world one is already absorbed in, yet now such that one is no longer entangled in it – yet of course this movement can only be made by way of a receptivity in God. For only God can grant one this, and in this sense one here ought to be a theodidact. Now, Haufniensis highlights that it is only by way of God’s grace that one can make this movement by continually noting that the cases of the ‘demonic’ (i.e. anxiety about the good) in the Bible stress that as one in anxiety about the good is “approached by Christ”, one here fails to accept this help:

The demonic therefore manifests itself clearly only when it is in contact with the good, which comes to its boundary from the outside. For this reason, it is noteworthy that the demonic in the New Testament first appears when it is approached by Christ. (CA 119)
A demoniac in the New Testament therefore says to Christ when he approaches: τί ἐμοί καὶ σοί [What have I to do with you], and he continues by suggesting that Christ has come to destroy him (anxiety about the good). (CA 124)

Therefore anxiety about the good is a botching of making the movement of faith, of regaining absorption in the same shared world in such a way that one is no longer ensnared, which only God can grant one – anxiety about the good is a mis-springing off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy.

Now, most significantly, Haufniensis details that the failure of this movement, this botching of faith, is a type of defiant willing. For I have been reiterating that this movement is only something one can achieve by way of a receptivity in God – that is, one cannot, merely with one’s own willpower come to make this movement, but this movement can only be made by way of this receptivity. Thus since this movement is that which can only be made by way of a receptivity in God, botching this movement is thus a maintaining a defiant willing against that which one ought to be receptive towards – that is, is a defiant rejection of God’s grace when one ought to receive it. For Haufniensis spells out this botched movement in terms of a willing of the individual, a willing to hold off faith which God offers (this “willing” is what Haufniensis calls the “category” of anxiety about the good) (CA 127, 128, 135).

Now here we can see the perpetuum mobile that is in play in this aspect of misused anxiety alone. For here one indeed knows that one ought to allow God to grant one that absorption – and indeed one deceptively “wish[es]” (CA 135) for this to happen – yet at the same time one defiantly wills against this and indeed in such a way that the will is stronger than the wish:

He has, that is to say, two wills, one subordinate and impotent that wills revelation and one stronger that wills inclosing reserve, but the fact that this will is the stronger indicates that he is essentially demonic (CA 129)

the demonic, according to his stronger will (the will of unfreedom), wants to get away from it, while the weaker will in him wants to go on to it. (CA 143)

Therefore there is a constant struggle going on in this aspect of misused anxiety, in this botched movement. In this aspect of anxiety, one is continually struggling with oppositional tendencies: for the antipathetic sympathy discloses that one indeed ought to receive God’s grace and receptively make the movement – and indeed one wishes for this – yet one perpetually counters this wish with the stronger will which defiantly rejects this help. If the movement of faith is not made, then one is continually deliberating, continually spinning, in willful defiance.

I have now given voice to the perpetuum mobile inherent in mis-springing off the sympathetic antipathy and mis-springing off the antipathetic sympathy, each in their own right. The former is continually maintaining a cowardly weakness where one ought to exhibit a courageous willpower and in this way is in constant motion; the latter is continually maintaining a defiant willing against what God offers where one ought to exhibit a receptivity towards this and in this way is also in constant motion.
However, I now bring these two aspects together in their interrelation to bring the *perpetuum mobile* to its uttermost. For anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy go to make up the phenomenon of anxiety, and thus in the inclosing reserve – cut off from the shared world (a distinction which is always one of a relativity for the sinner) – the individual in strict sin is continually and simultaneously botching both movements, is continually and simultaneously mis-springing off both aspects of anxiety. And, the uttermost perpetuum mobile is shown when I now detail something which Haufniensis subtly implies: *that the botched movement of infinite resignation is ultimately due to the botched movement of faith, and vice versa; that the mis-spring off the sympathetic antipathy is ultimately due to the mis-spring off the antipathetic sympathy, and vice versa.*

For properly making the movement of infinite resignation is only possible if one simultaneously gets back that which one loses by way of the second movement, faith: properly springing off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy is only possible if one simultaneously properly springs off the antipathetic sympathy. (For I have explained in the appendix above that one can indeed make the movement of infinite resignation without therewith making the movement of faith, but in that case the living death of the first movement is not sacrifice, but is suicide – that is, it initiates *psychosis*. Therefore, one can only make the first movement if one simultaneously makes the second – lest one become psychotic.) Thus one can only properly make the first movement if one simultaneously makes the second. And thus, the reason why one botches the spring off the sympathetic antipathy, the reason why one, in cowardly weakness, fails to make the movement of infinite resignation is, ultimately, *because* one, in defiant willing, is failing to get back the finite world in faith. The cowardly weakness of the botched first movement is ultimately due to the defiant willing of the botched second movement: the mis-spring off the sympathetic antipathy is ultimately due to the mis-spring off the antipathetic sympathy.

Likewise the movement of faith in which one gets one’s concern for the finite world back in such a way that one is no longer ensnared in it is possible only once one has made and is continually making the movement of infinite resignation. For I have been reiterating that a prerequisite for making the second movement is making the first movement: for one can only receive God’s grace and receive back the finite world such that one is no longer entangled in it, if one is simultaneously and continuously disentangling oneself from the finite by way of the first movement. Thus one can only make the second movement of faith if one simultaneously makes the first. And thus, the reason why one botches the spring off the antipathetic sympathy, the reason why one, in defiant willing, refuses to get back the finite world in faith is, ultimately, *because* one, in cowardly weakness, is failing to make the movement of infinite resignation. The defiant willing of the botched second movement is ultimately due to the cowardly weakness of the botched first movement: the mis-spring off the antipathetic sympathy is ultimately due to the mis-spring off the sympathetic antipathy.
Thus not only is there a perpetual motion in regards to each botched movement considered by themselves – not only is there an incessant motion in anxiety about evil in which one uses eloquent sophism to perpetually skirt the movement of infinite resignation; and not only is there an incessant motion in anxiety about the good in which one perpetually overrides one’s deceptive wish for faith by way of the stronger will – but this perpetual motion, this incessant deliberation, is brought to its uttermost because of the way the failure of the one is ultimately due to the failure of the other. For the mis-springing off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy is a cowardly weakness ultimately due to the defiant willing; and the mis-springing off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy is a defiant willing ultimately due to the cowardly weakness.

The continuity that inclosing reserve has can best be compared with the dizziness a spinning top must have, which constantly revolves upon its own pivot. (*CA* 130)

The deliberation is thus intensified while the individual, locked up from others in its inclosing reserve, conscious of its normative orientation towards good and evil and perpetually deliberating, yet never able to find the ground of its failures, perpetually mis-springing (mis-leaping) off the elastic springboard of the sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy and into the dialectic of strict sin, is spiralling in *perpetuum mobile*.

*The Sickness Unto Death*

While *Anxiety* is the centrepiece for my Kierkegaard interpretation, I am using Anti-Climacus’ *Sickness* to develop and clarify key concepts in Haufniensis’ *Anxiety*. In particular as I hold that *Sickness* gives us the most developed account of sin in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, I use *Sickness* to develop and clarify the account of sin we find in *Anxiety*, without, however, adding anything that is not already in *Anxiety* in a subtle manner. Thus whereas last section I showed how *Sickness* clarifies and develops the ‘dialectic of sin’ we find in *Anxiety* – that sin is always a relative admixture of unconscious spiritlessness and conscious strict sin in which anxiety is manifest – in this section I now show how *Sickness* clarifies and develops the ‘dialectic of strict sin’ in *Anxiety* which I have just drawn out.

Whereas in my first treatment of *Sickness* I showed how despair at its most general level has the dialectic – part unconscious despair in which one is absorbed in the shared world, part conscious despair in inclosing reserve in which one is conscious of one’s normative orientation towards sin and faith – I now show how Anti-Climacus homes in on conscious despair, strict despair, detailing that this despair itself has a particular dialectic. Now, before I can explain this dialectic, I stress that Anti-Climacus reiterates that strict despair is the “opposite” (*SD* 82, 131) of faith. This will thus be the path to strict
despair: I will explain Anti-Climacus’ notion of faith, so that I can then show how strict despair is the opposite of this.

Anti-Climacus, however, does not flesh out his account of faith in much detail at all, he only makes a few passing references to this concept. However, I hold that his underdeveloped account of faith harmonizes with the account given to us by Haufniensis (and de silentio), which I explained above.

Writing of the process of becoming a self – which I take to mean the process of achieving faith – Anti-Climacus holds,

Consequently, the progress of the becoming must be an infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing of the self, and an infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing process. (...) Yet every moment that a self exists, it is in a process of becoming, for the self (...) [in potentiality] does not actually exist, is simply that which ought to come into existence. Insofar, then, as the self does not become itself, it is (...) precisely despair. (SD 30)

Faith is a potentiality which “ought to come into existence” and faith is made up of the double-movement: on the one hand there is the movement of infinite resignation of the finite world, the totality of the finite world – “an infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing”; and on the other hand there is the movement of faith in which one gains back the totality of the finite world – “an infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing process”. This interpretation is given support when Anti-Climacus tells us that the “thoroughfare to faith” (SD 67) is such that “[t]he self has the courage to lose itself in order to win itself.” (SD 67) And indeed the first movement is something which one can achieve with one’s own willpower – for in this sense it requires “courage”; while the second movement is not something one can achieve merely with one’s willpower, but is something that only God can grant one – “[a]t this point, then salvation is, humanly speaking, utterly impossible; but for God everything is possible! This is the battle of faith” (SD 38), and thus Anti-Climacus reiterates that faith is a resting transparently in God (SD 14).

Therefore while Anti-Climacus does not develop his account of faith in much detail, the sparse comments which he does give us shows that his account harmonizes with the one in Anxiety (and Fear and Trembling) – that is, faith is that which ought to be achieved, and is the double-movement of, on the one hand, infinite resignation of the finite world which can be done with one’s own willpower; and on the other hand, regaining that same finite world such that one is no longer ensnared in it, which can only be done by way of a receptivity in God.

Now, in inclosing reserve, the despairing one is conscious of their normative orientation towards sin and faith – one knows that one is in despair, and that one ought to root this out and achieve faith. That is, faith – the double-movement – is always disclosed in this inclosing reserve as a potentiality which one ought to achieve, and yet insofar as one does not achieve it, one is in despair. But how is this despair ‘opposite’ to faith? Right at the outset of ‘Part One’ Anti-Climacus tells us that there are “two forms of despair in the strict sense”: “not to will to be oneself” and “to will to be oneself” (SD 14). And indeed in
Anti-Climacus’ section on conscious, strict despair – ‘The Despair that is Conscious’ (SD 47) – he treats these two forms of despair in his two subsections: ‘In Despair Not to Will to Be Oneself: Despair in Weakness’ (SD 49) and ‘In Despair to Will to Be Oneself: Defiance’ (SD 67). Now it is clear that these two modes of strict despair mark different ways that an individual is failing to achieve faith – however, in what way do they go together such that strict despair is the opposite of faith? I have a systematic answer. As faith is the double-movement of willful infinite resignation and receptive faith, strict despair is the opposite of this, I hold, in that despair in weakness and despair in defiance make up the particular dialectic: ‘despair in weakness (not willing to be oneself)’ is the botching of the first movement of faith insofar as one, in cowardly weakness, does not will infinite resignation where one can and indeed ought to; and ‘despair in defiance (willing to be oneself)’ is the botching of the second movement of faith insofar as one, in willful defiance, rejects what God is offering to one, whereas one ought to receive it. I will now detail each form of strict despair in turn, and conclude by bringing these two forms together in their interrelation – and in doing so I will show how Anti-Climacus’ account of the dialectic of strict despair develops and clarifies Haufniensis’ account of the dialectic of strict sin.

‘In Despair Not to Will to Be Oneself: Despair in Weakness’ is that aspects of “inclosing reserve” (SD 63) which is continually botching the movement of infinite resignation, the movement of ‘courageously losing itself’ in ‘an infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing’ (Haufniensis calls this ‘anxiety about evil’). What is at issue here is primarily the past, the fact that one has hitherto and indeed is dwelling in unconscious despair such that one is ambiguously ensnared in the finite world, and that one ought to wrench oneself out of this entanglement by way of infinite resignation. In this inclosing reserve, cut off from the shared world (yet always relative to one’s absorption in it), it is disclosed that one ought to resign absolutely all of one’s concern for the finite world – not resign merely more and yet more of one’s concern, but utterly all of it. And thus Anti-Climacus first stresses that one’s despair in this aspect is not “despair over something earthly (the particular)” (SD 60) – is not despair over this or that particular finite thing; but is rather “despair over the earthly (the category of totality)” (SD 60) – is rather despair over the totality of the finite world. For what is at issue here is the possibility of infinite resignation, and thus Anti-Climacus stresses that in this aspect of inclosing reserve one despairs over “the world in toto; that is, the category of totality inheres in and belongs to the despairing person.” (SD 60)

For the sympathetic antipathy discloses that one ought to achieve infinite resignation since one has hitherto been entangled in this finite world – one has hitherto been dwelling ambiguously in unconscious despair in one’s absorption in the finite world. And thus the way to wrench oneself out of this ensnared absorption, this unconscious despair, is to make the movement of infinite resignation which utterly collapses one’s absorption in the finite world. However, in strict despair one botches this movement. For while anxiety discloses this possibility as that which one can achieve with one’s own
willpower, in despair one, in weakness, does not make this movement, does not will this movement. For while anxiety discloses the possibility of infinite resignation which one ought to make since one has been unconsciously ensnared in the finite world, one in a cowardly weakness merely sorrows over the fact that they have and are dwelling in this unconscious despair and in this way does not will the movement:

this is despair over his weakness, while still remaining within the category: despair in weakness as distinct from despair in defiance (...) here the consciousness (...) rises to a new consciousness – that of his weakness. The person in despair himself understands that it is weakness to make the earthly so important, that it is weakness to despair. But now (...) he entrenches himself in despair and despairs over his weakness. (SD 61)

For this mode of strict despair exhibits a type of eloquent sophism in which its very weakness is the vehicle by which it fails to achieve what it ought to achieve – infinite resignation. For in a self-deception it sorrows over the fact that it is entangled in this manner, it perhaps laments over its bondage to this being ensnared, and yet it is this very sorrowing that indeed maintains one in their entanglement.

It is often the case when a lover curses the one he detests (his beloved) that it does not help very much; it captivates his almost more – and so it goes with the despairing self in regard to itself. (SD 62-63)

In this aspect of inclosing reserve the individual knows that they ought to proceed with the ‘infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing’, the ‘courageous losing itself’, that is, the resignation of the world in toto – anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy discloses this – and yet, with an eloquent sophism, one fails to make this movement, one indeed maintains one’s entanglement by way of sorrowing over their illusory bondage. And since the movement of infinite resignation is that which one can achieve with one’s own willpower, botching this movement in the way described is a cowardly not willing of this movement, is the despair of ‘not willing to be oneself: despair in weakness’.

‘In Despair to Will to Be Oneself: Defiance’ is that aspect of “inclosing reserve” (SD 72) which is continually botching the movement of faith, the movement of ‘winning itself’ back in an infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing process’ (Haufniensis calls this ‘anxiety about the good’). What is at issue here is primarily the future, the future possibility of regaining the earthly in toto in faith such that one is no longer ensnared in this finite world. Now, at the outset of ‘Part One’ Anti-Climacus stressed that this aspect of strict despair – defiance – is only possible because spirit has a certain relationship towards God such that one can only “arrive at” oneself by way of relating oneself to God:

This second formulation [in despair to will to be oneself] is specifically the expression for the complete dependence of the relation (of the self), the expression for the inability of the self to arrive at or to be in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only, in relating itself to itself, by relating itself to that which has established the entire relation. (SD 14)

Why does Anti-Climacus stress that precisely this aspect of despair – defiance – somehow expresses the complete dependence on God regarding ‘arriving at oneself’? My systematic account
provides the answer. For the antipathetic sympathy discloses that one ought to achieve faith (arrive back at oneself), which can only be done by way of a receptivity in God. For one cannot merely with one’s own willpower gain back one’s concern for the finite world which one is infinitely resigning, yet for God all things are possible. And thus *botching* this movement of faith is precisely *rejecting* what God is offering to one, and in this way defiance is that aspect of strict despair which finds its possibility in one’s relation to God.

As anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy discloses the possibility of gaining back all of one’s concern for the finite world, and gaining it back such that one is no longer entangled in it, it is also disclosed that this can only be achieved by way of a receptivity in God. However, when one, in strict despair, botches this movement, this takes the form of a *defiance*, a defiant rejection of what God is offering – “[h]ope in the possibility of help (...) no, that he does not want.” (*SD* 71) And indeed as this is an act of defiance, this botching the movement of faith in strict despair is a *willing*, a defiant willing against what God is offering to one and which one indeed should receive.

Now, at this point Anti-Climacus gives us a detailed account of this defiant willing (which develops Haufniensis’ account). For Anti-Climacus elaborates that in this aspect of strict despair one does not only will *against* what God is offering – i.e. regaining the very same absorption in the finite world which one already had – but *wills to create a new and different absorption, to create a new and different finite world*. Anti-Climacus fleshes out this type of willing by intimating that in despair in defiance one not only rejects what God is offering to one but also rejects God – “severing the self from any relation to a power that has established it, or severing it from the idea that there is such a power” (*SD* 68) – and in turn one oneself wants to become God so that one can create one’s own finite world of one’s own choosing that it will absorb itself in:

His concrete self or his concretion certainly has necessity and limitations, is this very specific being with these natural capacities, predispositions, etc. in this specific concretion of relations etc. But (...) he wants first of all to take upon himself the transformation of all this in order to fashion out of it a self such as he wants (...) and in this way he wills to be himself. In other words, he wants to begin a little earlier than do other men, not at and with the beginning, but “in the beginning”; he does not want to put on his own self, does not want to see his given self as his task – he himself wants to compose his self (*SD* 68)

Faced with the possibility of receiving back precisely the very world it is absorbed in – *this* finite world – and indeed faced with this possibility such that one knows that one ought to achieve it, and achieve it by way of a receptivity in God (for only God is able to grant one this), one defiantly rejects this offering and indeed rejects God and, in an attempt to become God (“begin (...) “in the beginning””), wills to create one’s own finite world of one’s choosing. This, however, cannot be done, it is doomed to failure, and no matter how much one in defiance wills one’s own finite world of one’s choosing, this is never achieved and is perpetually undermined. One is here lost in “imagination” or the “fantastic” (*SD* 30-32)
and no matter how much one wills to create this, this construction will perpetually be crumbling – “[i]n despair the self wants to have the honor of this poetic, masterly construction (...) And yet (...) in the very moment when it seems that the self is closest to having the building completed, it can arbitrarily dissolve the whole thing into nothing.” (SD 69-70)

In this aspect of inclosing reserve the individual knows that they ought to proceed with the ‘infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing process’, the ‘winning itself’ back in faith, that is, the gaining back of the very same finite world it is already absorbed in – anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy discloses this – and yet, with a fantastic defiance, one fails to make this movement, and does so by rejecting God and indeed wanting to be God. But since the movement of faith is that which one can only achieve by way of a receptivity in God, botching this movement in the way described is a defiant willing against this movement, is the despair of ‘willing to be oneself: despair in defiance’.

Now, as the dialectic of faith is such that is made up of the two simultaneous and continual movements – the ‘infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing’ (infinite resignation), and the ‘infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing’ (faith) – and as strict despair is the opposite of this dialectic, this means that the dialectic of strict despair is such the botched first movement (despair in weakness) and the botched second movement (despair in defiance) are, in the despairing inclosing reserve, continually made in simultaneity. Or again, as the dialectic of anxiety is such that, in despairing inclosing reserve, there are two simultaneous springboards – the sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy – so too the mis-springing off this anxiety gives rise to a dialectic of despair such that one is continually and simultaneously in despair of not willing to be oneself, and in despair of willing to be oneself:

Thus the opposites are only relative. No despair is entirely free of defiance (...) On the other hand, even despair’s most extreme defiance is never really free of some weakness. So the distinction is only relative. (SD 49)

As I have been suggesting that the first movement of faith is a willful movement, while the second is a receptive movement, and as strict despair is the opposite of faith, the dialectic of strict despair is such that it is part cowardly weakness (where it ought to be willful), part willful defiance (where it ought to be receptive). The point of the matter is that these two forms are simultaneous – neither form is “free of” the other – are two continual aspects which go to make up one and the same mode, strict despair.

And finally, I will conclude by detailing the interrelation between these two continual and simultaneous aspects of strict despair – and in doing so, strengthen my account of the perpetuum mobile inherent in Haufniensis’ dialectic of strict sin. For I noted that Haufniensis only subtly implies that ‘anxiety about evil’ and ‘anxiety about the good’ are ultimately traced back to one another, yet Anti-Climacus is much clearer on this point. For while the two aspects of strict despair are simultaneous in
inclosing reserve, Anti-Climacus explicitly highlights that these two aspects stand in a dialectical relationship such that the one is indeed ultimately grounded in the other.

*Despair in weakness is ultimately grounded in despair in defiance*. For one can only properly make the first movement of faith, one can only properly courageously lose oneself in infinite resignation, if one simultaneously gains back that same absorption by way of the second movement of faith. (For I have shown in my above appendix that one can indeed make the movement of infinite resignation without therewith achieving the second movement of faith, but in that case the living death of the first movement is not sacrifice but is *suicide* – that is, psychosis is initiated. But I now wish to show that Anti-Climacus is himself on board with this account. For as the despairing inclosing reserve is always relative to one’s absorption, one can resign more and yet more of one’s concern, therewith increasing one’s inclosing reserve more and yet more. However, if one indeed makes the movement of infinite resignation without therewith getting one’s concern back by way of the second movement, then this inclosing reserve thus reaches its *maximum* point: the despairing inclosing reserve is thus maintained *absolutely* – one has achieved the living death. But, in maintaining this absolute inclosing reserve, without therewith achieving the second movement, this living death is thus understood as *suicide*, which I interpreted in my appendix as the initiation of psychosis. But I hold that Anti-Climacus is on board with this account – for at the very end of his section on despair in weakness (for as Haufniensis told us, the danger lies at the beginning of the education, i.e. with the first movement) he writes,

If this inclosing reserve is maintained completely [*absolut*], *omnibus numeris absoluta* [completely in every respect], then his greatest danger is suicide [*Selvmord*]. (...) The danger, then, for the completely [*absolut*] inclosed person is suicide [*Selvmord*]. But if he opens up to one single person, he probably will become so relaxed, or so let down, that suicide [*Selvmordet*] will not result from inclosing reserve. Such a person of inclosing reserve with one confidant is moderated by one whole tone in comparison with one who is fully [*absolut*] inclosed. Presumably he will avoid suicide [*Selvmordet*]. (*SD* 66)

Here again the “danger” of “suicide” inherent in the first movement crops up. Now, I take Anti-Climacus to be intimating the following. The dark danger inherent in the first movement is achieving the living death (achieving infinite resignation) without therewith achieving the second movement of faith. For if this occurs then one’s inclosing reserve has been maintained absolutely – “*omnibus numeris absoluta*” – one has infinitely resigned all of one’s concern for the finite world, without getting that concern back. And this danger is dubbed – ‘suicide’. Now, if an individual has the slightest remnant of concern for the finite – “if he opens up to one single person” – then inclosing reserve is not being maintained *omnibus numeris absoluta* and thus suicide is avoided. And thus even the slightest remnant of concern for the finite marks a sharp divide – “one whole tone” – between spirit and suicide. And what is suicide? Anti-Climacus has already dismissed the commonsense notion of suicide here: “[I]literally speaking, there is not the slightest possibility that anyone will die from this sickness [despair] or that it
will end in physical death.” (SD 17-18) Therefore the suicide of the inclosing reserve which is maintained *omnibus numeris absoluta* does not mark death in its commonsense notion, but, as I have been holding, marks the onset of *psychosis*. For spirit is always at least partially absorbed in the finite world, and thus if it ever absolutely resigns this without getting it back, then it is in a strong sense no longer spirit, it has committed suicide, become psychotic.

But this possibility of psychosis sheds light on the central terminology of Anti-Climacus’ book. For despair is the ‘sickness unto death’ – but I now ask: what death? For the first aspect of despair (despair in weakness) is grappling with the movement of infinite resignation, which if accomplished achieves the living death, but yet this living death has two forms: either *sacrifice* in which what is resigned is gotten back; or *suicide* in which one enters psychosis. Thus despair is the sickness unto death: perpetually grappling with the possibility of the living death, perpetually juggling the fact that as one moves closer to sacrifice one is to the same degree moving towards suicide. And thus one can only make the first movement of faith, in sacrifice, if one simultaneously makes the second – lest one, in suicide, become psychotic.)

So then, one can only properly make the first movement of faith if one simultaneously makes the second. But this means that the reason why one, in despair in weakness, is failing to properly make the movement of infinite resignation, is, ultimately, *because* one is, in willful defiance, failing to make the second movement of faith:

this second form of despair (in despair to will to be oneself) is so far from designating merely a distinctive kind of despair that, on the contrary, all despair ultimately can be traced back to and be resolved in it. (SD 14)

And thus despair in weakness is ultimately grounded in – “traced back to” – despair in defiance. That is, the reason why one, in the weakness of merely sorrowing, is failing to make the first movement, is *because* one is, in a defiance, willfully rejecting the second movement.

*But despair in defiance is ultimately grounded in despair in weakness.* For one can only make the second movement of faith, one can only gain back one’s absorption in the finite world such that one is no longer ensnared in it, if one *simultaneously* utterly wrenches oneself out of this entanglement by way of achieving infinite resignation. It is in this sense that the first movement is a prerequisite for the second movement. But this means that the reason why one, in despair in defiance, is failing to make the second movement of faith, is, ultimately, *because* one is, in weakness, failing to make the movement of infinite resignation:

the other form of despair, in despair to will to be oneself, can be traced back to the first, in despair not to will to be oneself, just as we previously resolved the form, in despair not to will to be oneself, into the form, in despair to will to be oneself. (SD 20)
Thus despair in defiance is ultimately grounded in – “traced back to” – despair in weakness. That is, the reason why one, in the defiance of rejecting God’s help, is failing to make the second movement, is because one is, in a weakness, is merely sorrowing over one’s illusory bondage and failing to make the first movement.

And thus the individual struggles with this sickness unto death: shut off from others in inclosing reserve, tormented by strict despair yet unable to find the ground of the failure, perpetually mis-springing off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy by way of a weakness traced back to the willful-defiance and simultaneously and perpetually mis-springing off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy by way of a defiance traced back to the cowardly-weakness (and all the while grappling with its movement unto the living death such that approaching sacrifice to the same degree approaches suicide), the individual struggles with the dialectic of this sickness like “a mortally ill person when he lies struggling with death and yet cannot die” (SD 18).

I believe that I have now shown that Anti-Climacus’ account of the dialectic of strict despair not only harmonizes with but also develops Haufniensis’ account of the dialectic of strict sin. For while Haufniensis gives us a detailed account of ambiguous anxiety – the sympathetic antipathy and the antipathetic sympathy – which underlies the dialectic of sin, Anti-Climacus gives us the most developed account of that dialectic. I believe that I have shown how Anti-Climacus’ account of despair in weakness harmonizes with and develops Haufniensis’ account of anxiety about evil, the mis-spring off the sympathetic antipathy; how Anti-Climacus’ account of despair in defiance harmonizes with and develops Haufniensis’ account of anxiety about the good, the mis-spring off the antipathetic sympathy; and finally how Anti-Climacus’ account of the interrelation between these two forms of strict despair – such that the one is traced back to the other – develops and clarifies Haufniensis’ notion of the perpetuum mobile inherent in ambiguous anxiety misused.

Secondary Literature

In this section I believe to have shown that one of the upshots of detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in Kierkegaard (i.e. detailing the sympathetic and antipathetic aspects) is that it leads to an account of the type of agency involved in strict sin as being composed of part a cowardly weakness (a passivity) and part a defiant willfulness (an activity). For in detailing that anxiety’s antipathetic aspect is the springboard for making the first movement of infinite resignation, which is something one can achieve with one’s own willpower, and in detailing that anxiety’s sympathetic aspect is the springboard for making the second movement of faith, which is something one can only achieve by way of a receptivity in God, we were in a position to detail the strange agency in strict sin. For insofar as one is in
strict sin, one is failing to make both movements, one is mis-springing off both the antipathy and the sympathy, and in this section I detailed the agency involved in this mis-springing into strict sin. I showed how since the antipathy discloses that which can be achieved with one’s own willpower if only one musters the courage, failing to make this movement is a cowardly weakness of not willing that which one can indeed will. And I showed how since the sympathy discloses that which can only be achieved by way of receptivity in what God offers, failing to make this movement is a defiant willing against what God offers. And in this way detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity led to an account of the agency involved in strict sin as part passive (cowardly weakness), part active (willful defiance).

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, when we look at the secondary literature on the topic of the agency involved in strict sin (in particular, commentators writing about Anxiety and Sickness), what we find in general are two groups. The first group holds that in strict sin the agency is either one of passivity, or one of willful defiance, but does not stress that the agency is understood as a combination of both. This group sets up an either/or model in which the sinner is either sinning by way of passivity, or by way of activity, and indeed, as I will show, some in this group hold that there is a type of linear development in agency in which one is first sinning by way of weakness until, at some point, one switches over to the defiant variety. The second group wants to reduce the agency involved in strict sin to only one of the types of agency. That is, some authors in this group claim that the agency involved in strict sin is only a type of cowardly weakness and cases which seem like willful defiance are actually cases of weakness; and some authors in this group make the inverse reduction. Now what all of the above authors have in common is that they do not hold that the agency involved in strict sin is a strange one made up of part weakness, part defiance. Of course this is one of the upshots of my dissertation, and of course the way I arrived at this was by detailing anxiety’s ambiguity (something which, in general, these authors do not focus on). But let me go through these two groups in more detail now.

The first group sets up an either/or when it comes to the agency involved in strict sin: either the mode of agency is that of a cowardly weakness, or it is one of willful defiance. This group has two subgroups: the first subgroup simply holds this either/or, the second subgroup goes further and holds that there is a type of linear progression of agency involved. I will first focus on the first subgroup.

Sylvia Walsh, in ‘On “Feminine” and “Masculine” Forms of Despair’44, holds that Kierkegaard held that, as a general rule, the type of agency involved in strict sin will depend on one’s gender. Walsh holds that Kierkegaard held that, as a general rule, the agency involved in strict sin for women is a cowardly weakness, while the agency involved in strict sin for men is a defiant willfulness: “[t]he distinction (…) corresponds on the whole with the ways despair is generally experienced in human life.

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Women are more apt to manifest despair in weakness, while men are more prone to despair in defiance.” (p. 122) N.J. Cappelørn, in ‘Spleen Essentially Canceled – yet a Little Spleen Retained”⁴⁵, does not link weakness and defiance with one’s gender, but does write of the distinction as if we are speaking about different “individuals”, and holds that one is “either” in the mode of weakness, “or” the mode of defiance (p. 140).

Gordon Marino, in ‘Anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety’⁴⁶, also sets up the distinction as if it is one between two different individuals. For as I hope to have shown in this section that anxiety about evil is a type of cowardly weakness, while anxiety about the good is a defiant willfulness, Marino writes: “Häufniensis tells us that here are two kinds of sinners: those who are anxious about the good and those who are anxious about sin” (p. 322). Ronald Hall, in ‘Language and Freedom: Kierkegaard’s Analysis of the Demonic in The Concept of Anxiety’⁴⁷, likewise writes of the distinction between anxiety about sin and anxiety about the good as if it were a distinction between two different individuals – “the individual in the bondage of sin is anxious about (...) sin. The demonic individual, on the other hand, is anxious about the good” (p. 159) – and thus is also implying that the distinction between the types of agency, weakness or defiance, is a distinction between different individuals. Jamie Ferreira, in Kierkegaard⁴⁸, tells us that a sinner has two options: “[t]he person who has sinned has two options. He can, acknowledging his sin, experience “anxiety about evil” (...) [a]lternatively, the one who is conscious that he has sinned may, whether our of stubborn pride or rebelliousness, be anxious “about the good”” (p. 86). Ferreira is thus implying that the agency involved for this sinner is either one of weakness or one of defiance. And Sylvia Walsh, in Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode⁴⁹, also explicitly sets up an either/or between anxiety about the good and anxiety about evil for an individual - “the anxiety of sinfulness manifests itself either as an anxiety about evil (...) or as anxiety about the good” (p. 95) – and thus also implies that weakness and defiance are understood as an either/or for the sinner.⁵⁰

While this first subgroup within the first group indeed holds that the mode of agency for the sinner is, generally or as a rule, an either/or between weakness and defiance, the second subgroup holds

⁵⁰ And there are many other commentators who take this same line, who, in writing of either Anxiety or Sickness, hold that the agency involved for the sinner is either that of weakness, or that of defiance: e.g., Kosch in Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard (Oxford University Press: Oxford 2006), p. 208; McCarthy in The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1978), pp. 96-100; Sheil in Starting With Kierkegaard (Continuum International Publishing Group: London, 2011), pp. 92-101; and Evans in Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009), pp. 174-180.
the same yet adds the specification that there is a type of linear development or progression in the sinner’s agency such that the sinner is *firstly* in the mode of weakness, and *then* at some point switches over to the mode of defiance. This subgroup also sometimes explicitly compares Kierkegaard’s account here with Hegel.

Jon Stewart, in *Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered*[^51], explicitly takes the line that, for Kierkegaard, a sinner is “first” in the despair of weakness, until, at some point, they are “then” in the despair of defiance (p. 581). Stewart writes, “There seems to be a determinate linear progression, and the order of the stages cannot be changed or revised (…) this dialectical movement has striking similarities with the dialectic of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.” (p. 581). Daniel Dahlstrom, in ‘Freedom Through Despair’[^52], likewise takes the line that there is a linear progression for one in sin, in which one is first in the “stage” of weakness until at some point one is in the “stage” of defiance (p. 69). Dahlstrom holds that this progression from weakness to defiance is a movement towards realizing one’s freedom “Kierkegaard distinguishes two general forms of conscious despair, (a) a weak and (b) a defiant form of despair (…) each form as well as the development from one to the next is the work of a developing self-reflective freedom” (p. 69).

Stephan Dunning, in ‘Kierkegaard’s Systematic Analysis of Anxiety’[^53], in a similar vein to Stewart and Dahlstrom, argues that the sinner must make the “path” from anxiety about evil to anxiety about the good, to finally arrive at faith (pp. 29-30). Dunning thus also holds a linear progression from anxiety about evil to anxiety about the good, and implies that the agency involved here is a progression from weakness to defiance – Stewart, writes that the “first moment” is anxiety about evil, and the “next moment introduces the demonic” (pp. 24-25). And, like Stewart, Dunning explicitly compares Kierkegaard’s account here – of the two ‘moments’ which need to be passed through to arrive the third – to Hegel (pp. 8, 29-30, 32-33).

Thus both of the above subgroups agree on one thing: that the agency involved in strict sin for Kierkegaard is *not* essentially made up of part weakness and part defiance. For the first subgroup marks an either/or between the two, while the second subgroup specifies a linear progression from one to the next. Now, I of course argued in this section that the agency involved in strict sin is essentially made up of part willful defiance, part cowardly weakness, and the way that we arrived at this was by first detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity (i.e. its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects). It is no surprise that none of the above commentaries (nor any of the commentaries which I will investigate below) detail the

structure of anxiety’s ambiguity as I do – i.e. detail that the antipathy discloses the possibility of the first movement, infinite resignation, while the sympathy discloses the possibility of the second movement, faith – and perhaps it is because of this that these commentaries are not led to an account of the strange agency in strict sin which I have argued for.

But let us now move on to the second group that we find in the secondary literature concerning the agency involved in strict sin. While the first group, as just detailed, holds that the agency is either one of defiance or one of weakness (perhaps progressing from one to the other), the second group, as I will now detail, holds that there is only one type of agency involved in strict sin. That is, some in this second group hold that the agency involved in strict sin is ultimately a cowardly weakness, and cases which seem to be willful defiance can be reduced to weakness. Others in this group maintain the inverse reduction, and hold that the agency is ultimately always a willful defiance. Let us look in more detail.

Michael Theunissen, in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Despair54, holds the former, that is, reduces the agency involved in strict sin to weakness. Indeed the main purpose of his book is to “attempt to derive Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair from a single premise” (p. 3), and the premise that Theunissen finds is that all despair is the despair of not willing to be oneself, that is, is despair of weakness (p. 5). Now, Theunissen does note that this is not Kierkegaard’s expressed view, but Theunissen holds that Kierkegaard has made errors in his conceptualization of despair, and Theunissen is providing “a cautious correction of [Kierkegaard’s] conceptualization.” (p.1) While Kierkegaard seems to express that despair has two modes – weakness and defiance – such that the one is “merely a part, limited by its opposite” (p. 10), this is an error of Kierkegaard, Theunissen holds, and properly conceived all despair is reduced to despair in weakness. Theunissen argues that it is always the case that one despairs in defiance because one is despairing in weakness, whereas the opposite explanation does not always hold: “That we will to be what we are not [despair in defiance] because we do not want to be what we are [despair in weakness] is always the case. On the other hand, it is by no means always and necessarily the case that we do not will to be what we are [despair in weakness] because we will to be what we are not [despair in defiance].” (p. 13) And thus Theunissen holds that the “original form of despair” (p. 13) is despair of weakness, and despair in defiance can ultimately be reduced to this weakness.

Alastair Hannay, in ‘Basic Despair’55, makes the inverse reduction. Hannay’s article is in response to Theunissen’s book, and Hannay, explicitly referencing Theunissen (p. 78), holds the opposite of Theunissen: Hannay holds that the agency involved in despair is ultimately understood as defiance, and cases which seem like weakness can be reduced to defiance, where the inverse reduction cannot be made.

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Hannay argues that cases of despair which seem like weakness, a not willing, are actually ultimately cases of defiance: “[t]here is, in the idea of not wanting something [despair in weakness], already a hint of defiance, an active stance against something of which one has a premonition”, and “a premonition of it could be enough for one’s way of life to acquire features answering to the model of defiance.” (p. 86)

And as what seems to be weakness is ultimately a hidden defiance against what one has a premonition of (and as the inverse reduction does not hold) Hannay holds that despair in defiance is the ‘basic’ form of despair, and weakness is ultimately reduced to it.

Kresten Nordentoft, in *Kierkegaard’s Psychology*, makes a similar move to Hannay.

Nordentoft, in the section ‘The Formula for All Despair’ (pp.178-187), holds that anxiety about the good is the formula for all despair, and anxiety about evil can ultimately be reduced it. And, as I hope to have shown, anxiety about the good is a despair in defiance, while anxiety about evil is a despair in weakness, Nordentoft is also implying that the formula for the agency of despair is ultimately defiance, and weakness can be reduced to it. Nordentoft compares Kierkegaard’s notion of anxiety about the good with Freud’s notion of ‘resistance to recovery’ (pp. 178-180). On Freud’s account, while there will be various neurotic content the patient may experience, the ultimate reason for sickness is the patient’s (unconscious) resistance to recovery. In a similar vein, Nordentoft holds that, for Kierkegaard “anxiety about evil [is a] partial, descriptive definition of content, while “anxiety about the good” is the diagnostic formula which encompasses [it]” (p. 181). As Hannay held that weakness can be reduced to defiance since weakness is always explained by an underlying defiance against what one may only have a premonition of, Nordentoft makes a similar move, but rather than speaking of what the one in despair may or may not have a premonition of, he refers to what the psychologist can diagnose, even though it may be unconscious for the one in despair: that sickness is ultimately due to resistance to recovery, weakness is ultimately due to defiance. And as Nordentoft reduces weakness to defiance, and does not make the inverse reduction, Nordentoft likewise holds that “‘anxiety about the good’ is a central and dominant formula for Kierkegaard’s concept of despair, both in The Concept of Anxiety and in The Sickness Unto Death.” (p. 180).

And thus we see how authors in this second group claim that ultimately there is only one type of agency involved in strict sin. For while Theunissen argues that all despair can be reduced to weakness, Hannay and Nordentoft make the inverse claim and hold that all despair can be reduced to defiance. In short these authors, like the authors in the first group, do not hold that the agency involved is one of part defiance, part weakness. Now I of course make this claim and, as I have been reiterating, the way that I detailed it was by first detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity: that the antipathy discloses the possibility of the first movement, infinite resignation, which one can achieve with one’s own will power;

while the sympathy discloses the possibility of the second movement, faith, which can only be achieved by a receptivity in God. And after we detailed this account of anxiety’s ambiguity, we were able to detail how the agency involved in *failing* to make the double movement is one of part weakness, part defiance: miss-springing off the antipathy is maintaining a cowardly weakness where one ought to exhibit a courageous will; miss-springing off the sympathy is a defiant willing against God where one ought to be receptive. I want to be clear that none of the above commentators, nor any commentator I am aware of, have understood the despair in weakness as failing to make the first movement of infinite resignation, and the despair in defiance as failing to make the second movement of faith. But I hope to have shown precisely this – by way of my focusing on the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity (detailing its antipathy and sympathy) – and in turn I hope to have also shown how the agency in strict sin, in mis-springing off ambiguous anxiety, is made up of part cowardly weakness, part willful defiance.
I am interpreting anxiety in Kierkegaard retrogressively, so let us proceed with this movement. I am after an interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard – arguing that anxiety has an ambiguous structure – and I hold that, while there are three different encounters which spirit may have with this anxiety, to understand this anxiety we must track the movement through the three encounters showing the interrelation therein. In this part of the dissertation we are tracking the movement retrogressively – away-from the telos. In §A I explained the absurd telos, that is, anxiety rightly used, and how here one springs into faith; in §B I highlighted how, insofar as this telos is not achieved, one is in sin such that the dialectic of sin is a relative admixture between part inherited sinfulness of the shared world, part strict sin of the individual. In §C we homed in on the sin of the individual, detailing here how anxiety is encountered such that it is manifest yet misused in inclosing reserve giving rise to the dialectic of strict sin. But let us now conclude the retrogressive movement by homing in on the way anxiety shows up in spiritless absorption in the shared world – anxiety is here latent, and thus only shows up in disguise.

In sinful spiritless absorption in the shared world one is not conscious of one’s anxiety, and thus if anxiety shows up within this world, it must indeed show up in disguise. For while there is the carnival of ambiguous anxiety in constant movement inside the enclosure of inclosing reserve (for one’s spiritless absorption is always relative to that inclosed sphere), this very anxiety (misused anxiety) leaks out, as it were, of the enclosure just a bit, leaks out and shows itself – visible to all in the shared world, yet not visible as it truly is, but nevertheless an experienced observer recognizes this as a disguise for that which is not visible – in a deformed expression within spiritlessness itself, within the shared world itself. I have already detailed manifest misused ambiguous (antipathetic and sympathetic) anxiety in inclosing reserve, and this will help us grasp disguised anxiety insofar as the latter is a privation of the former. For the most part, spiritless sinful absorption in the shared world is constituted by a secure tranquillity, an ambiguous happiness, nevertheless there are intermittent moments in which anxiety shows itself in this world in a deformed disguise, disrupting the happy tranquillity – and indeed as we will see, the disguise is such that the sympathetic aspect of anxiety is completely hidden, while the antipathetic aspect partially shows itself. And when we now explain this disguised anxiety in spiritlessness we will have reached the end point of our movement, for disguised anxiety is thus the furthest removed from the telos.

Συμπαρανεκρόμενοι
I am using A’s three Συμπαϱανεϰϱώμενοι lectures from Either/Or I by understanding them as giving us aesthetic representations of central concepts in Anxiety with which I am concerned. In this section, §D, I am after the way anxiety shows up in disguise in sinful spiritless absorption in the shared world, and my central text for this concept of disguised anxiety is of course Anxiety. Thus here I use yet another of A’s three lectures to give an aesthetic representation of this disguised anxiety, and what is central to this concept, an aesthetic representation of how it requires an experienced observer to recognize this disguise for what it truly is. After I have detailed this aesthetic representation in A, I will then deal directly with the concept itself as it is in Anxiety.

In this regard I will now use primarily the second of A’s set of three lectures – ‘Silhouettes’ (EOI 165). As I have been holding, there is a continuity between all three of A’s lectures. I first detailed the first lecture – ‘The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama’ – showing how tragic guilt is made up of a relative admixture of the guiltlessness of the shared world, and the guilt of the individual in inclosing reserve. I then detailed how the third lecture – ‘The Unhappiest One’ – homes in on that inclosed sphere, showing how here the individual, amidst manifest anxiety, grapples with the dialectic of unhappiness by spinning in constant motion. And as I will now show, it is in the second lecture – ‘Silhouettes’ – that A gives us the most developed account of how that anxious perpetual motion within the sphere of inclosing reserve leaks out of its enclosure, and shows itself in disguise within the sphere of the shared world.

A’s lectures are aesthetic treatises and thus the first lecture details the nature of tragic guilt, and the third details the state of unhappiness (using tragic hero’s as examples). Accordingly, the second lecture, which details this leakage just mentioned, gets its guiding thread by way of highlighting the distinction between fine art and poetry:

Since the time when Lessing defined the boundaries between poetry and art in his celebrated treatise Laokoon, it no doubt may be regarded as a conclusion unanimously recognized by all estheticians that the distinction between them is that art is in the category of space, poetry in the category of time, that art depicts repose, poetry motion. (EOI 169)

By ‘art’ A means the fine arts of e.g. painting and sculpture as they existed in Kierkegaard’s time and before. That is, ‘art’ here means the fine arts of the realist style, before the abstraction of modernism and postmodernism. A tells us that art is in the category of “space” – he later reiterates that this is the category of the ‘outer’ or ‘exterior’ – and that it depicts “repose”. Recalling my earlier interpretations of A’s lectures, I interpret the above to mean: art is concerned with the sphere of the shared world, and art depicts one’s tranquil absorption in this shared world, one’s happiness. This sphere is best suited to be expressed by fine art.

Contrariwise, ‘poetry’, A tells us, is in the category of “time” – he later reiterates that this is the category of the ‘inner’ or ‘interior’ – and it depicts “motion”. Recalling my earlier interpretations of A’s
lectures, I interpret this to mean: poetry is concerned with the solipsistic sphere of inclosing reserve – in which one is spiralling with time – and poetry depicts this perpetual motion of the spiralling, it depicts one’s isolated manifest anxiety. This sphere, and its perpetual motion, is best suited to be expressed by poetry – indeed A emphasizes that art cannot depict this inclosed anxiety:

This (...) cannot be depicted artistically, for it (...) is constantly in motion; (...) the motion itself is nevertheless the essential. Like a squirrel in its cage, it turns around in itself (...) with a continual alternation in the combination of the interior elements (...) Like the pendulum in a clock, it swings back and forth and cannot find rest. It continually begins from the beginning and deliberates anew (...) but is never finished. (EOI 170)

Whereas art can depict the sphere of the shared world – and is indeed best suited to do so – since in the shared world one is absorbed with the finite such that one reposes in a tranquillity, a happiness, and thus is not engaged in some perpetual spiralling with time; whereas art can and is best suited to express this, art cannot, however, express the sphere of inclosing reserve in which anxiety is manifest. For in this latter sphere one is indeed anxious about the past such that one is not present in it and anxious about the future such that one is not present in it, and these two are traced back to one another (“a continual alternation in the combination of the interior elements”, “continually begins from the beginning and deliberates anew”), giving rise to the perpetuum mobile of inclosing reserve – and this motion is indeed ‘the essential’ aspect of this inclosed anxiety. Only poetry can express this sphere of inclosing reserve with its anxiety.

With this distinction between fine art and poetry we can now turn to what I am centrally concerned with in this lecture. Namely, A tells us that while there is a strict distinction between the ‘outer’ and the ‘inner’ – between the shared world and the anxious inclosing reserve – nevertheless it is indeed possible for the spiralling anxiety within inclosing reserve to, at intermittent moments, leak out of its inclosed sphere and show itself within the sphere of the shared world therewith disrupting the tranquillity. However, when this happens this anxiety cannot show itself as it truly is – for it only truly is what it is within the solipsistic enclosure – but shows itself in some form of disguise. For A tells us that when this spiralling anxiety leaks and shows itself in the ‘outer’ it shows itself as “at most only a suggestion” (EOI 170) of what it is; merely as a “secret hint” (EOI 173), an “indication” (EOI 175), or a “sign” (EOI 174) of what it truly is; shows itself only as a “telegraphic report” (EOI 174) of what is spiralling in the ‘inner’. These disguised manifestations can take on a myriad of forms:

by chance a look, a word, a sigh, a tone in the voice, a hint in the eyes, a trembling of the lips, or a blunder in the handshake treacherously betrays what has been carefully concealed. (EOI 175)

In the sphere of the shared world anxiety is not manifest and one is absorbed in the finite such that one reposes in a tranquil happiness. However, enclosed in the tomb there spirals manifest anxiety, and this very anxiety can leak out and show itself in disguise within that shared world – a glance, a
slipped word, a certain tone, a squint, a tremble, a blunder – all of these can be disguised expressions of the carnival of anxiety that is enclosed in the sphere of solipsism.

But now, as art is suited to express the outer, and poetry is suited to express the inner (and indeed art cannot express the inner) what discipline is thus suited to express this disguised leakage of the inner into the outer? And also, what discipline is able to even recognize this disguised leakage for what it truly is? But A intimates that it is the poet who is able to recognize this disguise for what it is, and in turn is also suited to express it – “the exterior does indeed have significance for [the poet], but not as a manifestation of the interior, but rather as a telegraphic report that there is something hidden deep within.” (EOI 174) And why is the poet able to recognize this disguise for what it is? Because the poet has an understanding of the spiralling anxiety within the enclosed sphere, and from this vantage point is thus able to recognize the disguise for what it is: a privation of that anxiety.

Let me give an example. An artist is painting a portrait of someone in the realist style – that person is sitting for the artist. The tranquillity of absorption in the shared world is the domain of art, and this tranquillity is expressing itself in repose on the persons face. However, suddenly there is some leakage from deep within the inner, suddenly the face takes on an “ambiguity”, but only “fleeting[ly]” does the repose of the face shape-shift signalling a hidden and tormented carnival of perpetuum mobile.

When one looks long and attentively at a face, sometimes another face, as it were, is discovered within the face on sees. Ordinarily this is an unmistakable sign that the soul is hiding an emigrant who has withdrawn from the exterior face in order to watch over a buried treasure. (...) The face, which usually is the mirror of the soul, here takes on an ambiguity that cannot be artistically portrayed and that usually lasts only for a fleeting moment. It takes a special eye to see it (EOI 174-175)

This is only a momentary leakage from the inner and the artist cannot depict this on his canvas, indeed the artist does not even recognize that disguise for what it is – the artist goes back to painting the tranquilly reposed face. However, the poet, understanding that carnival of anxiety in inclosing reserve is, as A reiterates, an ‘experienced observer’ of this anxiety and thus is able – from the vantage point of an experienced observer who grasps the inclosed anxiety – to recognize the disguise for what it is, to recognize that this momentary leakage is a telegraphic report of the spiralling anxiety enclosed in the tomb of solipsism – “[o]nly the experienced observer suspects that deep within that one’s head resides a lodger who has nothing to do with the world but lives out his solitary life” (EOI 174).

And thus A’s title of this lecture crystallizes this concept of the poet being an experienced observer of inclosed anxiety who, from that vantage point, can recognize the disguised leakage for what it is. For he compares the poet’s observation of disguised anxiety with one observing a ‘silhouette’:

I call them silhouettes [Skyggerids], partly to suggest at once by the name that I draw them from the dark side of life and partly because, like silhouettes, they are not immediately visible. If I pick up a silhouette, I have no impression of it, cannot arrive at an actual conception of it; only when I
hold it up toward the wall and do not look at it directly but at what appears on the wall, only then do I see it. (EOI 172-173)

The artist has no impression of the source of the disguised leakage, views the disguise directly as it expresses itself in the shared world, and thus does not read it as a sign or indication of anything else. However, the poet, being an experienced observer of the dark side of life – the inclosed anxiety which rambles in its constant motion – is able to look through the disguised manifestation and recognize what this is indeed signalling, is able to hold up this disguise and understand it as telegraphic report for the carnival of anxiety which is enclosed in the tomb.

The Concept of Anxiety

I turned to Α’s Συμπαρανεκβομενοι lecture – which details not only the way inclosed anxiety may intermittently leak out of its enclosure and show itself in disguise in the shared world, but also details how only the experienced observer of this anxiety, the poet, can recognize this disguise for what it truly is – in order to give us an aesthetic representation of what I am after in this section: disguised anxiety. I am of course using Anxiety as the centrepiece for my interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard, and now that I have detailed the aesthetic representation, I turn to Anxiety to spell out this disguised anxiety. In particular I now show how Α’s account of the disguised leakage from the ‘inner’ which can only be recognized by the poet serves as an aesthetic representation of what Haufniensis calls “disguised” anxiety (CA 96) which can only be properly diagnosed by an experienced psychological observer.

As I have been reiterating, for Haufniensis the sinner is always made up of a relative admixture of part hereditary sin of the race (sinful spiritless absorption in the shared world such that one, in ambiguity, is not conscious of one’s normative orientation, and neither is anxiety manifest), part strict sin of the individual (the suddenness of the leap amidst manifest anxiety and a conscious normative orientation). Last section we homed in on this inclosed sphere in which anxiety is manifest yet misused, in which the suddenness of the leap is perpetually springing, explaining the perpetuum mobile of this – that one’s cowardly weakness (anxiety about evil) is traced back to one’s defiance (anxiety about the good), and vice versa. But now we home in on that sphere of spiritless absorption in the shared world, showing how that very enclosed anxiety can leak out of its enclosure, and show itself within the shared world in disguise.

For spiritlessness is of course the ‘absence of the consciousness of sin’, as well as the absence of the consciousness of the good; it is the mode of existence of the sinner, absorbed in the race’s world, the shared world – such that what is at issue are particular finite things, and the totality of the finite is not what is at issue – which has no conscious normative orientation towards good (faith) and evil (sin), and
which indeed anxiety is merely latent. Accordingly, Haufniensis poetically characterizes spiritlessness with metaphors which emphasize a lack of consciousness: “a brook running murmuring through life” (CA 94); “a talking machine” (CA 95). But with this unconsciousness comes a particular security, tranquillity, and indeed a happiness. For, as I have highlighted, in spiritlessness one indeed has fallen victim to hereditary sin (sinfulness), and the security, happiness, can be understood in the manner of concupiscentia, which, as Augustine in his Confessions is continually noting, is characterized precisely by an alluring pleasure. Here one is prey to hereditary sin, and is indeed entangled in the finite, and yet one experiences this as a pleasure. Therefore sinful spiritlessness is dominated by a particular ambiguity: dwelling in this unconsciousness (not comprehending that one is a sinner and not comprehending that one ought to root this out and achieve faith, and indeed here anxiety is latent), one takes oneself to be living the good life, when indeed one is ensnared in the finite – “[t]he lostness of spiritlessness, as well as its security, consists in its understanding nothing spiritually and comprehending nothing as a task” (CA 95).

Now, this sphere of sinful absorption in the shared world – an ambiguous secure tranquillity – is always counterbalanced by the sphere of inclosed conscious anxiety in perpetual motion: the distinction is one of relativity for the sinner. However, Haufniensis highlights how this sphere of ambiguous secure tranquillity is tempting to one, for one may perhaps want to rid oneself of one’s conscious inclosing reserve, one may want to escape the carnival of conscious anxiety. Therefore one is tempted to flee ever more into the ambiguous tranquillity of the shared world. And thus one flees. But the distinction between the two spheres is always a matter of relativity – the sinner always exists in both spheres simultaneously, yet neither one completely – and thus one is never able to completely flee that inclosed sphere, that carnival of anxiety; one is never able to completely absorb oneself in the sinfulness of the race and liquidate the solipsism. Therefore what one can do in fleeing is absorb oneself more and yet more (relatively decreasing one’s consciousness), and yet one is never able to completely eradicate that inclosed sphere. Therefore no matter how much one is sinfully absorbed in the shared world in spiritlessness, there is always, to a certain degree, that inclosed conscious anxiety spiralling within the solipsism.

But now I come to what is central for this section. Namely, while there is for the sinner always that reservoir of inclosed anxiety – no matter to what degree sinful spiritlessness has gained a preponderance – at intermittent moments that anxiety leaks out of its reservoir and shows itself within spiritlessness itself, within absorption in the shared world, disrupting the tranquillity. However, as anxiety is merely latent in this sphere, when it shows itself here it must show itself in disguise: “anxiety is also present in spiritlessness, but it is hidden and disguised” (CA 96). Haufniensis explicitly addresses this
leakage of anxiety, leaking out of the enclosure, giving it a technical term: “[i]nclosing reserve is involuntary disclosure” (CA 129), or the “unfreely disclosed” (CA 123). That is, when anxiety leaks out of inclosing reserve and shows up in disguise in spiritlessness, this is not something the individual intended to do – rather, this is an involuntary leakage. Indeed the individual may be attempting to flee from this enclosed sphere, and yet in absorbing itself more and more in the shared world the very anxiety which it attempts to escape now shows up (in disguise) within its sanctuary.

Haufniensis gives us a myriad of examples of the manifestation of disguised anxiety, of this involuntary “ventriloquism”:

The ventriloquism itself may be forthrightly declarative or indirect, as when an insane man betrays his insanity by pointing to another, saying: He is most disagreeable to me; he is no doubt insane. The disclosure may declare itself in words, as when the unhappy man ends by thrusting his concealed secret upon every one. It may declare itself in facial expression, in a glance, because there is a glance by which one involuntarily reveals what is concealed. There is an accusing glance that reveals what one is almost afraid to understand, a dejected, imploring glance that does not exactly tempt curiosity to gaze into the involuntary telegraphy. (CA 129)

And thus within the secure happiness of spiritlessness there are intermittent moments of “involuntary telegraphy” in which the perpetuum mobile of inclosed anxiety shows itself within the sphere of absorption in the shared world, that is, shows up in disguise. For this anxiety may show itself in the shared world by way of one accusing another of suffering this anxiety, may show itself hidden in one’s words, in a facial expression, a glance. But what all these manifestations have in common is that they are disguised manifestations of that inclosed anxiety – and thus Haufniensis characterizes these very manifestations themselves as “involuntary anxiety.” (CA 129)

But in more detail – what is the nature of the disguise when anxiety shows up in the shared world? Undisguised anxiety in inclosing reserve, as I have shown, relates to the category of totality and is made up of a manifest antipathetic aspect (the possibility of infinite resignation, of renouncing the totality of the finite) and sympathetic aspect (the possibility of faith, of regaining the totality of the finite) which intertwine together into the ambiguous springboard. Haufniensis strongly suggests that when this anxiety shows up in the world in disguise, this disguise is such that the sympathetic aspect is completely covered over, while the antipathetic aspect still partially shows itself. For Haufniensis is continually referring to disguised anxiety as merely terrifying, horrific – and indeed this disguised anxiety disrupts the happiness – and his descriptions of the involuntary telegraphy above all have merely some type of antipathetic colouring. And while disguised anxiety is thus dominated by some sort of antipathy, this antipathy does not, however, disclose the possibility of infinite resignation. In this sense, while, in disguised anxiety, the sympathetic aspect of anxiety is completely covered over, the antipathetic aspect shows itself, but only partially. For while undisguised anxiety relates to the category of totality, and while in spiritless absorption in the shared world what is at issue are particular finite things, this means that when anxiety
shows up within the world in disguise it will in some way be reversed from the category of totality to the category of the particular. (However, we must wait until my treatment of Sickness, below, to flesh out in more detail the nature of this disguise.)

Now, as the above citations have been implying, it takes a special eye to recognize these disguised manifestations for what they are. It takes a special eye to understand these as “premonitions of what dwells within” (CA 118), it takes a special eye to “gaze into the involuntary telegraphy” such that one understands their source. Indeed in his subsection titled ‘The Anxiety of Spiritlessness’ (CA 91) Haufniensis emphasizes that only an experienced observer of anxiety – that is, an observer of anxiety who understands its conscious forms – is able to understand these disguised manifestations for what they truly are:

Viewed from the standpoint of spirit, anxiety is also present in spiritlessness, but it is hidden and disguised. Even observation shudders at the sight of it because just as the figure of anxiety – if the imagination is allowed to form such a figure – is appalling and terrifying to look at, so the figure will terrify still more when it finds it necessary to disguise itself in order not to appear as what it is, even though it nevertheless is what it is. (CA 96)

The experienced observer of anxiety will be able to recognize that involuntary telegraphy within spiritlessness as a disguised manifestation of the anxiety in inclosing reserve. It is only when “viewed from the standpoint of spirit” – that is, viewed from an understanding of conscious undisguised anxiety – that one understands this ventriloquism as disguised anxiety, understands it as conscious anxiety which is not appearing “as what it is, even though it nevertheless is what it is.” Comparing conscious anxiety with the figure of death, Haufniensis continues,

When death appears in it true form as the lean and dismal reaper, one does not look at it without a terror; however, when it appears disguised in order to mock the men who fancy they can mock death, when the observer sees that the unknown figure (...) is death, then he is seized by a profound terror. (CA 96)

Only the experienced “observer” of anxiety – one who understands its conscious forms – is able to see the disguise for what it is, is able to understand those involuntary disclosures as disguised leakages from out of the reservoir of spiralling enclosed anxiety.

And finally, Haufniensis of course considers himself to be such an experienced observer of anxiety. Haufniensis intimates that he considers himself to be “[o]ne who has properly occupied himself with psychology and psychological observation” (CA 54), considers himself to be a true “psychological observer” (CA 54) of anxiety. For in the retrogressive interpretation of Anxiety I have of course detailed how Haufniensis has an understanding of conscious anxiety (as ambiguously constituted by the antipathy and the sympathy) – both anxiety rightly used (the dialectical spring into faith), as well as the privation of this, anxiety misused (the perpetuum mobile of strict sin). But it is precisely from this vantage point – the vantage point of an experienced observer of anxiety: the vantage point of understanding both conscious
ambiguous anxiety rightly used, and the privation of this, conscious ambiguous anxiety misused – that Haufniensis is able to recognize the involuntary telegraphy that disrupts the happy tranquillity of spiritlessness with merely some type of antipathy as a disguised manifestation of the spiralling ambiguous anxiety in the sphere of solipsism, as a privation of this.

The Sickness Unto Death

*Anxiety* is the centrepiece for my Kierkegaard interpretation of anxiety, and I use *Sickness* to develop and clarify certain key concepts from *Anxiety*. I hold that Anti-Climacus’ *Sickness* gives us the most developed account of sin in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, and I thus use *Sickness* to clarify that account of sin which we find in *Anxiety*. In particular whereas I just detailed how Haufniensis gives us an account of how misused anxiety in inclosing reserve shows itself in disguise within the sphere of sinful spiritless absorption in the shared world – such that it merely shows itself with a disguised antipathy, while the sympathy is completely hidden – I now detail how Anti-Climacus gives us an account of how the despair of inclosing reserve leaks out and shows itself within the sphere of absorption in the shared world. And, as I will show, with this specification Anti-Climacus provides us with the details concerning how the antipathetic aspect merely shows itself in disguise while the sympathetic aspect remains completely hidden in disguised anxiety, provides us with the details concerning how anxiety is reversed from the category of totality to that of the particular. Further, as Haufniensis details how disguised anxiety can only be recognized by an experienced observer of anxiety, Anti-Climacus details how disguised despair can only be recognized by an experienced observer of despair.

I have of course been holding that, for Anti-Climacus, one’s despair is always made up of a relative admixture of, on the one hand unconscious despair in which one is not conscious of one’s normative orientation (spiritless absorption in the shared world); and on the other hand conscious despair in which one is conscious that one is in despair and that one ought to root this out by achieving faith (inclosing reserve). Last section we homed in that conscious despair, detailing the dialectic of strict despair, in which one grapples with the sickness unto death. In this section we now home in on unconscious despair – that is home in on one’s spiritless absorption in the shared world – detailing how that very strict despair which rambles in the enclosure of solipsism leaks out of that enclosure, showing itself in the world itself, not showing itself as it is, but showing itself in disguise.

Spiritlessness of course marks the fact that in the sphere of the shared world one is *not* conscious of the fact that one is in despair, and one is not aware that one ought to root out this despair by achieving faith (and neither is one’s anxiety here conscious). This despair is thus characterized as unconscious despair. Here is one is absorbed in the shared world, and as this unconsciousness prevails, one
experiences this despair rather by way of a secure tranquillity, a happiness, which is nevertheless an ambiguous security insofar as one indeed is in despair yet just not conscious of this fact. Now, this spiritlessness, this unconscious despair is of course always counterbalanced by one’s conscious despair – in which there rambles the dialectic of strict despair in constant motion: weakness traced back to defiant despair, and defiance traced back to despair of weakness – for the distinction between unconscious and conscious despair is one of a relative admixture. However, Anti-Climacus highlights that one may indeed want to flee this conscious despair, for perhaps this carnival of perpetual motion, this sickness unto death, is too intense for one. One perhaps wants to escape this solipsistic enclosure (in which anxiety is manifest) – and to where does one flee? One makes one’s escape by trying to plunge oneself ever more into that spiritless mode, into that unconscious absorption in the shared world. For this unconsciousness is characterized precisely as a secure happiness, and thus one makes one’s escape ever more into that sphere of ambiguous happiness, which is thus a sanctuary from that anxious spiralling in consciousness. One escapes that solipsistic sphere by plunging ever more into the shared world; one escapes consciousness by plunging ever more into unconsciousness.

However, the dialectic of despair is such that one can never completely liquidate the former sphere into the latter, for despair is precisely a relative admixture of the two such that the despairing one always inhabits both modes, yet neither one completely. And thus while one can indeed flee into unconscious despair more and yet more – thereby decreasing one’s conscious strict despair to the same degree – one can never completely eradicate one’s conscious despair. No matter how much one flees into the sanctuary of ambiguous happiness, this mode is always counterbalanced by one’s conscious despair amidst manifest anxiety, however dim the latter may grow:

To be sure, it is happiness, but happiness is not a qualification of spirit, and deep, deep within the most secret hiding place of happiness there dwells also anxiety, which is despair; it very much wishes to be allowed to remain there, because for despair the most cherished and desirable place to live is in the heart of happiness. (SD 25)

This brings us to the central point. Namely, that as this ambiguous happiness is always relative to conscious despair in anxiety – no matter how much of a preponderance the former may have over the latter – that very inclosing reserve serves as a reservoir from which the conscious despair may intermittently leak out, leaking into the sphere of the shared world, showing itself in a horrific disguise, thereby disrupting the happiness. This leakage is involuntary, for it is precisely this conscious despair that one wants to escape by fleeing into the unconsciousness of absorption in the shared world – and yet now this very conscious despair that one is fleeing rears its head, wearing a horrific disguise, within one’s very sanctuary. However this conscious despair must indeed show up in disguise in this sphere, for unconscious despair is constituted precisely by an unconsciousness of one’s normative orientation, and
thus when this conscious despair shows up in unconscious despair, it must disguise that very normative orientation.

first, not to recognize the horrifying, and then, implicit in this, to shrink from what is not horrifying. (...) he is ignorant of what is truly horrifying, yet is not thereby liberated from shuddering and shrinking – no, he shrinks from that which is not horrifying. (SD 8)

Therefore when conscious despair shows up in the shared world it must show itself such that the conscious normative orientation is still not manifest, yet at the same time there is something horrifying about the very disguise itself – such that one shudders and shrinks from the disguised manifestation itself. What then are the details of this – how does conscious despair show itself in the world in disguise, and why is this disguise horrifying? Anti-Climacus continually speaks of the disguise of strict despair in terms of a ‘reversal’ – “he despairs – that is, in a strange reversal (...) he calls it despairing.” (SD 51) Anti-Climacus intimates that disguised despair is related to undisguised conscious despair, somewhat as one suffering from dizziness speaks in nervous delusion of a weight on his head or of something that has fallen down on him, etc., a weight and a pressure that nevertheless are not something external but a reverse reflection of the internal (SD 14)

What is this reversal? How does conscious despair ‘reverse’ itself when it leaks out of inclosing reserve (the “internal”) and shows itself in spiritlessness (the “external”) in the horrific disguise? We must recall that the dialectic of strict despair is such that one is, in weakness, despairing over losing the world in toto (botching the movement of infinite resignation) – mis-springing off anxiety’s antipathy; while one also is, in defiance, despairing over gaining back the world in toto (botching the movement of faith) – mis-springing off anxiety’s sympathy. What is at issue in strict despair is losing and gaining the earthly in toto (‘the category of totality’) – indeed this is the possibility which anxiety discloses: the possibility of both losing (the antipathy) and gaining back (the sympathy) the world in toto.

Now, the ‘reversal’ of disguised despair is such that, rather than despairing over the world in toto, one despairs over an earthly thing, despairs over the particular – reversed disguised despair is “despair over something earthly (the particular)” (SD 60). For it is precisely in the sphere of spiritless absorption in the shared world that the world in toto is not what is at issue, but rather, in this spiritless absorption what is at issue is this or that intraworldly thing – “[t]he earthly and the temporal as such are precisely that which falls apart or disintegrates into particulars, into some particular thing.” (SD 60) And more specifically, the ‘reversal’ of disguised despair is such that it, absorbed in the finite world with a consciousness of this or that intraworldly thing, despairs over losing a particular worldly thing: “to lose the things of this world (...) this is what he talks about, and this is what he calls despairing.” (SD 51) This is thus the reversal, this is the disguise: whereas in strict despair the antipathetic possibility of infinite resignation of the world in toto is disclosed yet botched, and the sympathetic possibility of regaining the world in toto is disclosed yet botched; in disguised despair the sympathetic possibility is
completely hidden, whereas the antipathetic possibility is reversed from the terror of losing the totality of the finite to the terror of losing a particular finite thing.

Thus when conscious despair leaks into spiritlessness, disrupting the happy tranquillity with a horrifying despair – which is disguised despair insofar as the sympathetic possibility is covered over and the antipathetic possibility of losing the earthly in toto has been reversed to the possibility of losing a particular thing of the world – and when spiritlessness points to this appalling disguise, shuddering and shrinking from it, in a certain sense spiritlessness is right that there is despair (for there is indeed conscious despair in inclosing reserve), but yet what it is calling despair is disguised despair:

In a certain sense, what he says is true, but not in the way he understands it; he is conversely situated, and what he says must be interpreted conversely: he stands and points to what he calls despair but is not despair, and in the meantime, sure enough, despair is right there behind him without his realizing it. It is as if someone facing away from the town hall and courthouse pointed straight ahead and said: There is the town hall and courthouse. He is correct, it is there – if he turns around. (SD 51-52)

Now, as the above citation specifies, it takes an experienced observer of despair to be able to properly interpret this disguised manifestation of despair for what it truly is – it takes an experienced observer of strict despair – the conscious despair grappling with the possibility of losing and gaining back the world in toto – in order properly diagnose the disguised manifestations – despairing over the possible loss of a worldly thing – for what they are signalling (the hidden inclosed despair).

Indeed Anti-Climacus very clearly situates himself as such an experienced observer. For Anti-Climacus considers himself to be a “physician of the soul” (SD 23, 24), and indeed in his ‘Preface’ he notes that his book will have “in its presentation a resemblance to the way a physician speaks at the sickbed (...) it must never be forgotten that the situation is the bedside of a sick person.” (SD 5) The sickness in question is the sickness unto death, strict despair, and thus Anti-Climacus, the physician of the soul, is the physician of despair. This means that from his vantage point of an experienced observer, he understands not only strict conscious despair, but also “health” (faith). For with an understanding of health comes an understanding of strict despair, and it is from the vantage point of an understanding of both faith and strict despair that Anti-Climacus is able to diagnose disguised despair for what it truly is, is able to properly diagnose the disguised manifestation within the shared world for what it truly is:

But the physician has a different view of sickness. Why? Because the physician has a defined and developed conception of what it is to be healthy and ascertains a man’s condition accordingly. (...) A physician’s task is (...) first and foremost, to identify the sickness (...) Such is also the relation of the physician of the soul to despair. He knows what despair is; he recognizes it (SD 23)

For in the retrogressive interpretation I have of course detailed how Anti-Climacus has a developed conception of what it is to be healthy – I have shown how Anti-Climacus’ account of faith
harmonizes with the one given us by Haufniensis (and de silentio); and Anti-Climacus also therefore
knows what strict despair is – for strict despair is a privation of health, is the ‘opposite’ of faith. And it is
precisely from this vantage point of the ‘physician of the soul’ – the vantage point of understanding health
(faith), and the opposite of this, sickness (strict despair) – that Anti-Climacus is able to recognize the
disguised despair that shows up in the world disrupting the ambiguous happiness as ‘reversed’ strict
despair, as a privation of this.

I believe that I have now shown how Anti-Climacus’ account of disguised despair develops and
clarifies Haufniensis’ account of disguised anxiety. For Haufniensis specified that manifest ambiguous
anxiety (antipathetic and sympathetic) may leak out of its enclosed solipsistic sphere and show itself in
disguise in the shared world – the disguise consisting of completely hiding the sympathetic aspect, while
the antipathetic aspect partly shows itself, partly hides itself. But Anti-Climacus’ account of disguised
despair clarifies the nature of this disguise. For when anxiety leaks from its enclosure, showing itself in
disguise in the shared world, this consists of a shift from the category of totality to the category of the
particular; it consists of completely covering over the grappling with the sympathetic possibility of the
second movement, while the grappling with the antipathetic possibility of the first movement is reversed
from grappling with the horrific possibility of infinite resignation, to the horrific possibility of losing a
particular intraworldly thing. And indeed, as both Haufniensis and Anti-Climacus specify, only an
experienced observer of anxiety and despair – one who understands rightly used and misused anxiety –
will be able to diagnose the disguise for what it truly is.

And thus we have now completed the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard (that
is, in Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre, using Anxiety as the centrepiece, Fear and Trembling,
Either/Or I, and Sickness as supplements). I wanted to show that anxiety in Kierkegaard’s writings has an
ambiguous structure – that is, is constituted by an antipathetic and sympathetic aspect. And as there are
three different encounters which spirit may have with this anxiety, I held that to thus give a detailed
interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard, we must track the movement through the three different
encounters, explaining in detail the interrelation between them. In this part of the dissertation we tracked
this movement retrogressively. That is, we started by detailing manifest ambiguous anxiety rightly used
which gives rise to faith (the telos) – showing how here anxiety’s antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are
manifest and are sprung off from into the dialectic of faith; we proceeded to detail misused manifest
ambiguous anxiety which gives rise to strict sin – showing how here the antipathetic and sympathetic
aspects are manifest yet are mis-sprung off from into the dialectic of strict sin; and we finally arrived at
detailing disguised ambiguous anxiety in spiritlessness – showing how here the sympathetic aspect of
anxiety is completely hidden while the antipathetic aspect partially shows itself. In this part of the dissertation we tracked the retrogressive movement, the movement away-from the *telos*.

However, we should not forget that the interpretation of Kierkegaard in this part was always implicitly done through Heidegger’s lens. For in accordance with my methodology I am harmonizing my account of anxiety in Kierkegaard, which I laid out in this part, with my account of anxiety in Heidegger, which I lay out in part II of this dissertation – that is, I am always implicitly interpreting the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens. We should not forget that the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in this part, the movement away-from the *telos*, is always implicitly guided by the progressive interpretation of anxiety in part II, the movement towards the *telos*.
HEIDEGGER: ANXIETY INTERPRETED PROGRESSIVELY
In this part of the dissertation I am after a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger. I want to show that anxiety, in Heidegger’s writings, has an ambiguous structure – that is, that it is made up of an antipathetic and sympathetic aspect. I hold that there are three different encounters which Dasein may have with this ambiguous anxiety. Also, I hold that in order to give a detailed account of anxiety in Heidegger we must track the movement through the three encounters of it, showing in detail the interrelation between them. In this part of the dissertation we track this movement progressively – we track the movement towards the telos. That is, while I will show that for Heidegger Dasein has three existentiell modes of existence – the undifferentiated mode, the strictly inauthentic mode, and the authentic mode – localized within these three different modes are three different encounters with ambiguous anxiety. For in the undifferentiated mode Dasein encounters anxiety heavily in disguise, while in the strictly inauthentic mode Dasein encounters manifest anxiety yet misuses it, and while in the authentic mode Dasein encounters manifest anxiety such that it uses it rightly (the telos). And thus in this part, as we track the movement through anxiety progressively, this means that we will start by detailing the encounter with disguised ambiguous anxiety in the undifferentiated mode, then detail the encounter with manifest yet misused ambiguous anxiety in inauthenticity, ultimately detailing the encounter with ambiguous anxiety such that it is rightly used in authenticity.

I hold that the concept of anxiety is at the core of Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time. I noted that anxiety is the central concept at the both the end of ‘Division One’ and the beginning of ‘Division Two’ of Being and Time, and thus also marks the divide. And in writing of Heidegger in this dissertation, I am essentially referring to Being and Time. However, I will briefly supplement my reading of Being and Time by two other works of Heidegger from around the same period. Namely, Heidegger’s lecture course entitled The Phenomenology of Religious Life57, and Heidegger’s lecture ‘What is Metaphysics?’58. Now, in using these other texts as supplements I will not be adding anything that is not already in Being and Time, but I will rather be developing certain line’s of thought from Being and Time which may stand a bit underdeveloped in that text. In particular, I will briefly use Religious Life to help flesh out Heidegger’s concept of the undifferentiated mode of existence, and I will briefly use ‘What is Metaphysics?’ to help flesh out Heidegger’s account of the details of how one comes to achieve authenticity. But by and large this part of the dissertation offers an interpretation of anxiety from Being and Time, and this interpretation is only briefly supplemented in the above way.

Thus the scope of this part of the dissertation is laid out: I want to show that for Heidegger anxiety is ambiguous, and further that there are three different existentiell encounters which Dasein may

have with this anxiety. In order to thus understand this anxiety in detail we must track the movement through these three encounters, detailing the interrelation between them. And while anxiety used rightly such that it gives rise to authenticity is the telos which Dasein ought to achieve, when in this part of the dissertation we track the movement forward through the encounters moving ultimately towards anxiety rightly used, this means that this part interprets anxiety progressively. This part begins its interpretation by detailing the way anxiety shows up in disguise in the undifferentiated mode; then proceeds to detail the way anxiety is manifest yet misused which gives rise to strict inauthenticity; and finally details the way anxiety is manifest and rightly used which gives rise to authenticity – and again, in proceeding progressively in this way I detail the interrelation between each of the encounters. This part of the dissertation tracks the progressive movement: an attraction towards the telos.

However, we should keep in mind that this progressive interpretation of Heidegger is always implicitly being interpreted by way of the interpretation of Kierkegaard which I spell out in part I. For not only do I want to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, but ultimately I also want to pull out a systematic interpretation of anxiety from both Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Thus the account of anxiety in Heidegger which I lay out in this part will harmonize with the account of anxiety which I draw from Kierkegaard in the previous part. Indeed we will see that all the key concepts from this part will perfectly mirror the key concepts from the previous part – for in accordance with my methodology I am always interpreting the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. We should keep in mind that the progressive interpretation of anxiety in part II is always implicitly guided by way of the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in part I.
Before we can begin the progressive interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, I must sketch an overview of the dialectic of inauthenticity at the most general level. For as I will show, Dasein’s inauthenticity at the most general level is made up of a particular dialectic between the undifferentiated mode of existence and the strictly inauthentic mode of existence. In this section I must first sketch an overview of this dialectic, before we can then proceed in the sections which follow to detail the way anxiety is encountered within each of these modes of existence – that is, before we can proceed with the progressive interpretation of anxiety. For it is only after I have, in §A, sketched an overview of the dialectic between undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity, that we will then be able to home in on each, showing the way anxiety in encountered in each. That is, it is only once I have sketched this overview that we will be able to, in §B, home in on the way anxiety shows up in disguise within the undifferentiated mode; and, in §C, home in on the way anxiety shows up in strict inauthenticity such that it is manifest yet misused.

As I will show in this section, the undifferentiated mode of existence is a mode in which Dasein has no awareness of its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity and indeed here anxiety is latent. This mode of existence is inauthentic, yet not inauthentic in the strict sense, for Dasein has no awareness that it is indeed inauthentic. Being absorbed in the with-world Dasein is lost in ambiguity such that it thinks it is living a good life when indeed it is living inauthentically – but again this is not strict inauthenticity, for Dasein is not aware of its possibilities of inauthenticity and authenticity. This undifferentiated inauthenticity is a type of suffering, a suffering inauthenticity which Dasein finds itself thrown into. Contrariwise, and as I will also show in this section, the strictly inauthentic mode of existence is a mode in which Dasein precisely has awareness of its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity, and here anxiety is also manifest. This mode of existence is thus strict inauthenticity since Dasein, in anxiety, has an awareness of the possibilities of inauthenticity and authenticity, yet actively chooses inauthenticity – what Heidegger calls fleeing in the face of anxiety. Thus strict inauthenticity is an activity on the part of Dasein, an active fleeing into inauthenticity amidst anxiety and an awareness of its normative orientation. Now, how do we understand the dialectic between undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity, between the suffering and the active fleeing?

Are we to understand this distinction such that these two modes are understood as mutually exclusive states? I do not go this route. Rather, in this section I argue that the way to understand the dialectic between the undifferentiated mode and the strictly inauthentic mode is that of a relative
admixture between the two: that is, inauthentic Dasein is always existing in both of these modes, but neither completely, such that the more it exists in one mode, the less it exists in the other – indeed the more of the one, the less of the other to the same degree. In this section I detail my case.

The inauthenticity of the undifferentiated mode is characterized by a lack of awareness of one’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity, this is inauthenticity not in the strict sense, and here anxiety is merely latent. In more detail, I will show that the inauthenticity of the undifferentiated mode is localized in one’s absorption in the world, a world shared with others (a with-world); because of this absorption Dasein is subject to das Man – that is, the threefold snare of idle-talk, curiosity, and ambiguity; and inauthentic Dasein indeed becomes entangled in this snare, which tranquillizes anxiety and alienates Dasein from its awareness of its normative orientation. Non-strict inauthenticity is thus characterized by a tranquillity (for here anxiety is tranquilized) and indeed an ambiguity such that in this tranquillity one thinks that things are in the best of order, but this indeed closes off the possibility of authenticity. This mode of inauthenticity is a suffering, for in an important respect Dasein finds itself thrown into it, has inherited it. Contrariwise, inauthenticity in the strict sense is characterized by an awareness of one’s normative orientation, by an awareness that one is indeed inauthentic and that one ought to become authentic, and here anxiety is manifest. In more detail, and as I will also show, strict inauthenticity is localized in a sphere in which Dasein is not absorbed in the world, for its absorption in the world is here collapsed, and thus neither is it entangled in the threefold snare of das Man, nor is anxiety tranquilized, nor is it alienated from its normative orientation. Here, in the midst of the collapse, anxiety is manifest as a springboard from which one can achieve authenticity, yet it is continually misused in such a way that Dasein actively remains in inauthenticity, actively flees from the authenticity which it is aware it ought to achieve. This strict mode of inauthenticity is a deed that an individualized Dasein is perpetually committing.

But again, I hold that undifferentiated inauthenticity in which Dasein is absorbed in the with-world (such that anxiety is latent), and strict inauthenticity in which the world is collapsed (such that anxiety is manifest), are not mutually exclusive states but are the two aspects of inauthenticity which are always co-present, such that while inauthentic Dasein always dwells in both, it doesn’t dwell in either completely: the more of the one the less of the other, and vice versa – the distinction is relative. Another way of saying this is that inauthentic Dasein is always both being-with and individualized, yet neither one completely. This means that inauthentic Dasein is always both partially undifferentiated, absorbed in the with-world and ensnared in das Man such that anxiety is latent and it is not aware of its normative orientation; and partially individualized such that absorption is collapsed and thus is actively maintaining inauthenticity in the light of manifest anxiety and an awareness of its normative orientation. Inauthentic Dasein is never totally one or the other, but is always a relative admixture between the two. Dasein’s
inauthenticity is never completely a suffering under inheritance, nor completely an active fleeing, but is always a blend of the two. The distinction is relative: the more undifferentiatedness, the less awareness, and vice versa; the more anxiety is latent, the less is it manifest, and vice versa. But I will now detail each aspect by itself for the sake of clarity, remembering, however, that an inauthentic Dasein is always made up of a relative admixture of both aspects, such that the more of the one, the less of the other.

Undifferentiated inauthenticity is that inauthenticity which is localized in one’s absorption in the world which Dasein shares with others, such that Dasein is prey to the tendencies of das Man and anxiety is latent. First off, Dasein is here absorbed in the world – this means that each intraworldly entity has an ‘involvement’ such that it ‘refers’ to all other intraworldly entities, and this reference of each entity to the next makes up a network of involvements (the ‘referential context of significance’) which is all anchored in the particular existentiell possibility (‘for-the-sake-of-which’) which Dasein is projecting (SZ 83-88).

Heidegger gives us an example: the hammer refers to the nail, the nail refers to the wall, and all of these are anchored in the possibility of Dasein’s building a shelter for itself (SZ 84). Heidegger highlights two types of intraworldly entities here: ‘ready to hand’ equipment which Dasein encounters with ‘concern’ (SZ 57), and other Daseins which Dasein encounters with ‘solicitude’ (SZ 121). Thus Dasein is absorbed in the world: it has dealings with intraworldly entities (concern with the ready to hand, solicitude with other Daseins), and each intraworldly entity refers to the next, making up the referential context of significance (anchored by a particular for-the-sake-of-which), in which Dasein is absorbed. Now, at this point Heidegger stresses what he calls Dasein’s ‘Being-with Others’ – and this comes to mean primarily that the world which Dasein is absorbed in is a world that is shared with others: the world is a with-world.

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Thus one aspect of inauthentic Dasein, we might say, is being-with – that is, one aspect is absorption in the with-world. Indeed as Heidegger continually reiterates, Dasein’s Being is ‘Being-in-the-world’ which means that Dasein will always be, to a certain degree, absorbed in the with-world.

Now, encapsulated within this being-with, encapsulated within absorption in the with-world, is that aspect of inauthenticity which Heidegger das Man. Das Man is comprised of a three-fold inauthentic tendency – we might call this a three-fold snare: ‘idle-talk’, ‘curiosity’, and ‘ambiguity’. What these three aspects have in common is that they all go together to ‘uproot’ Dasein from its possible authenticity. Let me sketch how this is the case. Idle-talk is a tendency, a snare, within ‘discourse’ – a tendency which is encapsulated in absorption in the with-world – towards becoming fixated on ‘what is said’ and therewith closing off ‘what the discourse is about’ (for while all discourse has these two structural items, idle talk tends towards a mere fixation on the former) (SZ 167-170). Curiosity is a tendency, a snare, within ‘sight’
– a tendency encapsulated in absorption in the with-world – towards seeking distraction by tending towards kaleidoscopic perceptual encounters (for while Dasein’s sight gives Dasein the right opportunity to manipulate an intraworldly entity, curiosity seeks distraction) (SZ 170-173). These two aspects, Heidegger tells us, “drags the other one with it” (SZ 173), and the way these two are interrelated Heidegger calls ‘ambiguity’. That is, while absorbed in the with-world, inauthentic Dasein is prey to the snare towards fixating on ‘what is said’, and is prey to the snare towards distraction through seeking kaleidoscopic perceptual encounters, both of which close Dasein off from its possible authenticity in such a way that Dasein ambiguously considers itself to be living a ‘full and genuine life’ in which things are ‘in the best of order’ (SZ 173-175).

To get a grasp on where Heidegger is coming from here, we pause to take a look at his Phenomenology of Religious Life – a lecture course Heidegger gave six years before the publication of Being and Time – and it will become clear that his account of das Man is an appropriation of Augustine’s account of concupiscencia, from the latter’s Confessions. In Religious Life Heidegger’s lecture ‘Augustine and Neo-Platonism’ interprets Augustine’s Confessions, and it is primarily an interpretation of ‘Book Ten’ of Confessions – the section in which Augustine lays out his account of concupiscencia. Heidegger first quotes Augustine, “absorbed in the dispersion (...) life is really nothing but a constant temptation” (PRL 151), and proceeds to investigates how Augustine’s account of concupiscencia spells out this temptation. Heidegger notes that Augustine details two types of concupiscencia – “[t]he first form of tentatio: concupiscencia carnis” (PRL 155); “[t]he second form of tentatio: concupiscencia oculorum” (PRL 165) – and emphasizes that both of these types of concupiscencia are encapsulated in the with-world:

1. The dealing-with that enjoys; 2. the curious looking-about-oneself that only wishes to get to know. These experiential relations aim at something that has to do essentially with the surrounding world, and not with the self. For (...) in (1) as well as in (2), something communal-worldly [Mitweltliches] – these or other human beings in this or other situations – is the object of dealing-with, or primarily the object of looking-about-oneself, of the curious wanting-to-get-to-know (PRL 170)

Thus, according to Heidegger, the constant temptation inherent in being absorbed in the dispersion is spelled out by the two forms of concupiscencia – concupiscencia carnis as the “dealing-with that enjoys”, concupiscencia oculorum as the “curious looking-about-oneself” – which themselves are

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59 For two articles which briefly note that Augustine’s account of temptation from Confessions re-appears in Being and time, see: Fritsch, M., ‘Cura et Casus: Heidegger and Augustine on the Care of the Self’, in C. J. N. de Paulo (ed.), The Influence of Augustine on Heidegger: The Emergence of an Augustinian Phenomenology (The Edwin Mellen Press: New York, 2006); Smith, J., ‘Confessions of an Existentialist: Reading Augustine after Heidegger’, in C. J. N. de Paulo (ed.), The Influence of Augustine on Heidegger: The Emergence of an Augustinian Phenomenology (The Edwin Mellen Press: New York, 2006). These essays do not, however, make the distinction between non-strict and strict inauthenticity in Being and Time, which I am making, and thus neither do they localize this Augustinian influence to the non-strict variety.
encapsulated in the with-world (Mitwelt). Now, Heidegger also emphasizes that the temptations of *concupiscientia* are always a ‘how’ which is experienced as an ‘alluring pleasure’. There is something ambiguous about these intraworldly temptations (which indeed give them their strength) such that although they are the temptations which, inherited from ‘Adam’, close off Augustine from his proper relation to God, they are ambiguously experienced as alluring and pleasurable. Turning back to *Being and Time* we can see how Heidegger’s account of *das Man*, as that inauthentic tendency which is encapsulated in absorption in the with-world, and which is ambiguously experienced as living the good life when it in fact closes one off from authenticity, is an appropriation of Augustine’s *concupiscientia*. Indeed, it is particularly clear that Heidegger’s account of curiosity (the seeking of kaleidoscopic perceptual encounters) is an appropriation of Augustine’s account of *concupiscientia oculorum*; and in *Being and Time* Heidegger explicitly acknowledges this indebtedness – Heidegger writes at the beginning of his section on curiosity, “[t]he remarkable priority of ‘seeing’ was noticed particularly by Augustine, in connection with his Interpretation of *concupiscientia* (...) Augustine, *Confessions*, X, 35” (SZ 171).

Finally, Heidegger goes on to specify what he calls the ‘movement’ inherent in *das Man* – he calls this ‘falling’ (SZ 175-180). Falling accounts for the fact that, absorbed in the with-world, prey to *das Man*, Dasein tends towards becoming ‘tranquilized’ such that anxiety is latent, and Dasein tends towards becoming ‘alienated’ from its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity (SZ 177-178). Here Heidegger emphasizes that this undifferentiated inauthenticity is a suffering. For here Dasein tends towards becoming alienated from its awareness of its normative orientation such that anxiety is tranquilized (latent), and Dasein, prey to *das Man (concupiscientia)*, tends towards ambiguously considering itself to be living the good life in which things are in the best of order – but here Dasein has not “consciously” (SZ 169) chosen these snares, but finds itself thrown into them, and in this sense has inherited them. And thus Heidegger’s descriptions of falling are all non-agential, they are all causal descriptions: falling “forces it into its inauthenticity” (SZ 178); falling “has a kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities (…) the understanding is thus constantly torn away from authenticity” (SZ 178); in falling Dasein “is sucked into the turbulence of *das Man* inauthenticity” (SZ 179). Falling, which is the movement of *das Man*, encapsulated in being-with’s with-world, is a suffering of Dasein: Dasein is torn away from authenticity, Dasein is perpetually sucked into the turbulence of *Das Man*.

It ‘was’ always *das Man* who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been ‘no one’. In Dasein’s everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that “it was no one”. (SZ 127)

And while undifferentiated inauthenticity marks the three-fold tendency of *das Man* (and the force of falling), insofar as Dasein is not authentic Dasein indeed falls victim to this tendency (this force) – that
is, insofar as Dasein is not authentic it is indeed ensnared or entangled in this three-fold tendency of *das Man*, which as I have been highlighting, is encapsulated precisely in one’s absorption in the with-world. It is important to emphasize that here – in one’s entangled absorption in the with-world – what is at issue for Dasein is the category of the *particular*: what is at issue for Dasein are particular intraworldly entities. That is, here what is at issue is *not* the totality of Dasein’s dealings with the intraworldly, and in this respect undifferentiated inauthenticity is distinguished from strict inauthenticity.

**Strict inauthenticity**, on the other hand, is that inauthenticity which is localized in ‘individualized’ Dasein, in which absorption in the world is collapsed, anxiety is manifest (yet misused), and Dasein’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is also manifest yet Dasein remains inauthentic – this is active *fleeing*. Strict inauthenticity is encapsulated in individualized Dasein and here, in individualization in which anxiety is manifest, Dasein’s absorption in the world is collapsed:

Here the totality of involvements of the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand discovered within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance. (*SZ* 186)

Thus in anxious individualization Dasein is precisely *not* absorbed in the world, here Dasein is *not* dealing with this or that particular intraworldly entity such that this entity refers to the next and so on, making up the referential context of significance. But since Dasein is, in this aspect, not absorbed in the world, not absorbed in being-with’s with-world, this means that here Dasein is *not* prey to the three-fold snare of *das Man* (falling). For as I have been highlighting above, *das Man* (falling) is encapsulated precisely in one’s absorption in the with-world, and thus since in anxious individualization Dasein’s absorption in the world is collapsed, this means that *das Man* (falling) here is not applicable:

The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of Others. (...) Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted. (...) indeed (...) individualized in individualization. (*SZ* 187-188)

Thus here, in individualization, *das Man* (falling) is not applicable, and this means that the tranquilization of anxiety and alienation from an awareness of its normative orientation is not applicable. And thus as *das Man* (falling) is not applicable, here, in individualization, Dasein’s anxiety is indeed manifest and Dasein’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is indeed manifest:

This individualization brings Dasein back from its falling, and makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its Being. These basic possibilities of Dasein (and Dasein is in each case mine) show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves – undisguised by entities within-the-world (*SZ* 191)

Thus in that aspect of inauthentic Dasein – individualization in which anxiety is manifest – Dasein is separated off from others, that is, separated off from being-with’s with-world. Dasein here exists in the sphere of an “existential ‘solipsism’”, a “*solus ipse*” (*SZ* 188). In an existential solipsism, separated off
from others (being-with’s with-world), Dasein is grappling, in the midst of its manifest anxiety, with its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity – as I will show, in this existential solipsism, in which anxiety and Dasein’s normative orientation is manifest, what is at issue for Dasein is precisely the category of *totality*, the totality of Dasein’s dealings with the intraworldly; and this distinguishes it from undifferentiated inauthenticity. And this enclosure in which Dasein grapples in anxiety, cut off from others, Heidegger calls ‘uncanniness’. For while absorption in the with-world, in which Dasein is prey to *das Man*, Heidegger calls Dasein ‘Being-at-home’, this enclosure in which individualized Dasein grapples with its normative orientation in manifest anxiety Heidegger calls the ‘not-at-home’, that is, ‘uncanniness’:

Being-in was defined as “residing-alongside. . .”, “Being-familiar with. . .” This character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness of *das Man*, which brings tranquillized self-assurance – ‘Being-at-home’, with all its obviousness – into the average everydayness of Dasein. On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the ‘world’. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential ‘mode’ of the “not-at-home”. Nothing else is meant by our talk about ‘uncanniness’. (SZ 188-189)

And finally, closed off from others in the enclosure of uncanniness, amidst the collapse of absorption and collapse of *das Man* such that anxiety and the normative orientation is manifest, Dasein misuses this manifest anxiety in such a way that it actively remains inauthentic, actively resists achieving authenticity. That is, Dasein actively ‘flees’ in the face of its uncanniness. For anxiety discloses authenticity as a possibility, is indeed the springboard from which Dasein can spring into authenticity, yet Dasein resists this by actively fleeing. Indeed Heidegger notes that this manifest anxiety in individualized uncanniness, in which Dasein grapples with its normative orientation, Dasein perhaps does not want to experience, would perhaps prefer to reduce this manifest anxiety into pure latent anxiety, would prefer to reduce this individualization into pure absorption in the with-world:

By this time we can see phenomenally what (...) fleeing, flees in the face of. It does not flee in the face of entities within-the-world; these are precisely what it flees towards – as entities alongside which our concern (...) can dwell in tranquilized familiarity. (...) we flee in the face of the “not-at-home”; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein – in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being. (SZ 189)

However, while Dasein actively remains in inauthenticity by fleeing, and indeed wants to reduce this manifest individualized anxiety into pure latent anxiety, reduce this uncanniness to pure absorption in the with-world, this is not possible. For individualized manifest anxiety in uncanniness is one aspect of inauthentic Dasein which can never by completely eradicated, and thus no matter how much Dasein may try to eradicate this aspect by fleeing ever more into entangled absorption in the with-world it can never completely liquidate it – “[t]hat in the face of which Dasein flees, is precisely what Dasein comes up ‘behind’” (SZ 184).
I have now sketched the two aspects of the dialectic of inauthenticity – undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity – detailing them each in isolation. On the one hand Dasein is absorbed in the with-world and is thus prey to the inauthentic three-fold snare of \( \text{das Man} \) (in the manner of concupiscientia) which tends to close off Dasein from its possible authenticity. Dasein suffers under this, for this movement (falling) sucks Dasein into the mode in which it exists in such a way that it is alienated from its awareness of its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity and anxiety is tranquilized. And insofar as Dasein is not authentic, it indeed falls victim to this force, is indeed entangled in the snares of \( \text{das Man} \) – and what is at issue here for Dasein is the category of the particular, particular intraworldly entities. On the other hand, individualized in the enclosure of uncanniness, Dasein’s absorption in the world is collapsed and thus here Dasein is not prey to the snares of \( \text{das Man} \) and the force of falling – and, as I will show, here in uncanniness what is at issue for Dasein is the category of totality, the totality of its concern for the intraworldly. Here anxiety is manifest and Dasein’s awareness of its normative orientation is manifest, yet here Dasein actively retains inauthenticity, actively refuses authenticity, by fleeing in the face of uncanniness. In the former Dasein is absorbed in being-with’s with-world, and ‘is not itself’; in the latter Dasein is individualized in an ‘existential solipsism’. But Dasein is both being-with and individualized. For what it is of upmost importance to my interpretation is that these two modes of inauthenticity are not mutually exclusive states but these two aspects are always co-present such that while inauthentic Dasein always exists in both, it never exists in either one completely: the more of one, the less of the other, and vice versa. This dialectic is a matter of relativity. Thus the more Dasein is absorbed in the world in undifferentiatedness, unaware of its normative orientation, and suffering the inauthenticity of \( \text{das Man} \); the less Dasein’s absorption in the world is collapsed, in which it is aware of this normative orientation yet actively retaining its inauthenticity – and vice versa. The more anxiety is latent, the less it is manifest, and vice versa.

I want to note that, in this account of the relative admixture of undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity, I am not holding that there some type of vacillation back and forth between undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity for inauthentic Dasein. Rather, I am holding that inauthentic Dasein is always inhabiting both undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity simultaneously. But how does this make sense? How can inauthentic Dasein be both absorbed in \( \text{das Man} \) and the with-world unaware of its normative orientation, and at the same time enclosed in an existential solipsism in which anxiety is manifest and one is aware of that normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity? I have been stressing two points which help answer this. Firstly, while Dasein inhabits both modes, it inhabits neither one completely: this means that while inauthentic Dasein is always absorbed in the with-world and \( \text{das Man} \) to a certain degree, unaware of its normative orientation, this absorption is always undermined by a certain degree by one’s simultaneous isolated
anxiety; and likewise this means that while inauthentic Dasein is always dwelling in anxiety, aware of its normative orientation, to a certain degree, at the same time this is undermined by a certain degree by its simultaneous absorption. Therefore the above descriptions of undifferentiated inauthenticity, and strict inauthenticity, which I described in isolation from one another are something of pure cases which help our understanding, yet which a Dasein never experiences in that purity, since inauthentic Dasein indeed never dwells in either one completely, but always both partially. Secondly, the ‘object’ differs in undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity for Dasein. In undifferentiated inauthenticity what is at issue for Dasein is the category of the particular (e.g. particular intraworldly entities), whereas in strict inauthenticity what is at issue for Dasein is the category of totality, the totality of one’s concern for the intraworldly (in a later section I will detail that in strict inauthenticity, in which anxiety is manifest, anxiety’s ‘object’ is ‘nothing’ which means that in this anxiety what is at issue is the totality of one’s concern). Taking these two points together, the ‘relative admixture’ means that Dasein’s absorption in the with-world, entangled in Das Man unaware of its normative orientation, in which what is at issue is the particular, is always undermined to a certain degree by its isolated anxiety in which it is aware of its normative orientation and in which what is at issue is the totality of that concern, and vice versa.
B
DISGUISED ANXIETY

Now that I have laid out an overview of the dialectic of inauthenticity at the most general level – that inauthentic Dasein is always made up of a relative admixture of both being partially absorbed in the with-world and das Man such that it is unaware of its normative orientation and anxiety is latent, and partially not being absorbed in the with-world but being in an existential solipsism (uncanniness) in which it grapples with its normative orientation amidst manifest anxiety – we can now begin the progressive interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger. For in this part of the dissertation I am interpreting anxiety in Heidegger progressively, which means that I will highlight, step by step, the three encounters of anxiety (disguised, misused, rightly used) which are localized in the three modes of existence (undifferentiated, strict inauthenticity, authenticity), showing the interrelation between each encounter – that is, we are tracking the progressive movement through anxiety. We are tracking this movement because while I am after an interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger – I want to show that anxiety has an ambiguous structure in Heidegger (part antipathetic, part sympathetic) – and while there are these three encounters which an existence may have with this anxiety, I hold that to properly understand anxiety we must track the movement through the three encounters, detailing the interrelation between them, and in this part of the dissertation we track the movement towards the telos (anxiety rightly used in authenticity).

Now that I have sketched the dialectic between undifferentiatedness and strict inauthenticity in §A, I am in position to detail the way anxiety is encountered in both of these two modes. That is, in §B I will now highlight the way anxiety is encountered in the undifferentiated mode such that it is disguised, and in §C I will highlight the way anxiety is encountered in strict inauthenticity such that it is manifest yet misused. But let us never forget what I stressed last section, that the distinction between undifferentiatedness and strict inauthenticity is only relative, that inauthentic Dasein is always a relative admixture of the two.

Keeping this in mind we now home in on the undifferentiated mode and detail the way anxiety shows up in this mode. As I have been saying, in this mode anxiety is precisely latent, for inauthentic Dasein in this mode is, in its absorption in the with-world, perpetually falling prey to the snares of das Man (in the manner of concupiscentia), which means that, in its absorption, it is ensnared in a tranquillity such that anxiety is indeed tranquilized, and is entangled in an alienation from an awareness of its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity. But while in this mode anxiety is indeed latent (tranquilized), nevertheless at intermittent moments anxiety leaks out, as it were, of the solipsism of uncanniness, and leaks into the undifferentiated mode, leaks into the with-world. But since in
undifferentiated inauthenticity anxiety is indeed latent (tranquilized), this means that when anxiety leaks out of uncanniness and shows itself in the world, at these intermittent moments anxiety shows itself not as it is, but shows itself in disguise. In particular true anxiety, as I will show later, discloses ‘nothing’ – which, as I will show, means that what is at issue for Dasein in anxiety is the category of totality, the totality of Dasein’s concern for the intraworldly – and true anxiety relates to this nothing in an ambiguous fashion, in a partly antipathetic, partly sympathetic manner. Furthermore, true anxiety only shows itself undisguised to inauthentic Dasein in that sphere of uncanniness in which it is not absorbed in the world. But when anxiety shows up in the mode of undifferentiatedness, showing up in disguise, the disguise, as I will show, is such that the sympathetic aspect of anxiety lies completely hidden while the antipathetic aspect of anxiety shows itself partially; and further, the disguise is such that Dasein’s relation to the category of totality is reversed to a relation to the category of the particular. And finally, only an experienced observer of anxiety – one who has an understanding of the ambiguous anxiety in uncanniness – will be able to understand this disguise for what it truly is. I will now detail this encounter with disguised anxiety in this section, so that we can use this as the starting point for the progressive interpretation of anxiety – that is, so that we can then proceed on towards the telos.

Heidegger himself begins his interrogation of Dasein by focusing on the undifferentiated mode of existence – “at the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein (...) should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part.” (SZ 43) The undifferentiated mode is of course that aspect of Dasein which is absorbed in the with-world and in which das Man (in the manner of concupiscientia) is localized (and thus Heidegger here again, at the beginning of his interrogation of Dasein, quotes Augustine’s Confessions, ‘Book Ten’, regarding the struggle of trying to get a grip on this undifferentiated mode in which das Man (in the manner of concupiscientia) is localized (SZ 44)). Thus Heidegger begins with undifferentiatedness. Here Dasein is absorbed in the world such that each intraworldly entity has an involvement with the next, making up the referential context of significance, all grounded in a particular existentiell for-the-sake-of-which; here Dasein is entangled in the snares of das Man which close off Dasein from its possible authenticity; here Dasein is sucked into the turbulence of das Man by the movement of falling such that Dasein is alienated from an awareness of its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity; here Dasein ambiguously experiences this as a tranquillity in which things are in the best of order; here anxiety is merely latent (tranquilized); for here Dasein is closed off from manifest anxiety by way of the ‘thin wall’ which separates uncanniness from tranquillity – “that thin wall by which das Man is separated, as it were, from the uncanniness of its Being.” (SZ 278)

For Dasein’s inauthenticity is always a relative admixture of part undifferentiated absorption in the world, prey to das Man, without an awareness of its normative orientation; part uncanniness in which
Dasein is not absorbed in the world and in which, amidst manifest anxiety, it grapples with its normative orientation – the more of the one, the less of the other. However, perhaps Dasein does not want to face its manifest anxiety and normative orientation in uncanniness, perhaps Dasein wants to escape this awareness. And how does it escape? I have already highlighted this above: it escapes by precisely fleeing ever more into its undifferentiated inauthentic absorption. But as inauthentic Dasein is always made up the relative admixture, this fleeing into inauthentic absorption can never be completely accomplished – for no matter how much Dasein flees more and yet more into inauthentic absorption, therewith, and to the same degree, escaping more and yet more of that sphere of uncanniness, there will always be, however dim it may grow, that uncanny sphere with its manifest anxiety. And thus one can indeed flee one’s uncanniness – but this amounts to increasing ever more one’s inauthentic absorption, and, to the same degree, decreasing ever more that sphere of uncanniness, without however eradicating the latter.

But this brings me to the central point. As that sphere of uncanniness with its manifest anxiety is always in play for inauthentic Dasein – no matter how much Dasein flees; no matter how much inauthentic absorption, entangled in das Man, has gained a preponderance over uncanniness – that uncanniness remains a reservoir from which the manifest anxiety can indeed leak. That is, while absorbed in the world, while dealing with intraworldly entities each with their own involvement, at times the anxiety which is closed off in uncanniness leaks out, as it were, from its enclosure, and shows itself within undifferentiatedness, within absorption in the world, but shows itself not as it truly is, that is, it shows itself shrouded in disguise. And this disguised anxiety which shows up in absorption in the world, disrupting the tranquillity with an “alarm”, a “dread”, and/or a “terror” (SZ 142), Heidegger calls ‘fear’.

Now, whereas an inexperienced observer of anxiety will not recognize fear as a disguised manifestation of anxiety, Heidegger positions himself as something of an experienced observer, and thus Heidegger seems to have the standpoint – i.e. a proper understanding of anxiety – from which to diagnose fear as a mere disguised manifestation of anxiety. And thus Heidegger begins his section on fear by noting that “[l]ater (Cf. Section 40) we shall provide an Interpretation of anxiety (…) with this is view, we shall now illustrate (…) fear” (SZ 140) – thus implying at the outset that fear will, firstly, only be able to be fully understood as disguised anxiety by one with a proper grasp on undisguised anxiety, and secondly, will help with the progressive movement of tracking towards undisguised anxiety. And it is when Heidegger ultimately details undisguised anxiety in section ‘40’ that he explicitly holds that what he has been referring to as ‘fear’ hitherto is actually a disguised manifestation of anxiety:

only because anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world, can such Being-in-the-world, as Being which is alongside the ‘world’ and which is concernful in its state-of-mind, ever be afraid. Fear is anxiety, fallen into the ‘world’, inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself. (SZ 189)
Thus in the undifferentiated mode Dasein is absorbed in the world, dealing with intraworldly entities in its concern and solicitude, entangled in *das Man* (falling), unaware of its normative orientation, ambiguously tranquil, where anxiety is latent (for manifest anxiety is closed off in uncanniness – that reservoir which may grow dim but is never eradicated); and yet at intermittent moments anxiety leaks out of uncanniness and shows itself within absorption in the world, within undifferentiatedness, but shows itself in disguise – a disguised manifestation which disrupts the tranquillity with an alarming dread or horror – that is, shows itself as fear, which Heidegger, an experienced observer of anxiety, can recognize precisely as a disguised manifestation. And, as Heidegger intimates when he begins his section on fear, he is going to illustrate fear, illustrate disguised anxiety, so that he may use this illustration to track towards manifest undisguised anxiety. With this in view I now explicate Heidegger’s account of fear.

Fear, Heidegger tells us, has a ‘general structure’ which is a tripartite structure. Fear, disguised anxiety, is comprised of the *Wovor*, fearing, and the *Worum*:

There are three points of view from which the phenomenon of fear may be considered. We shall analyse: (1) that in the face of which [*Wovor* we fear], (2) fearing, and (3) that about which [*Worum* we fear]. (SZ 140)

Now, ‘fearing’ is distinguished from the *Wovor* and *Worum* in that these last two items have particular disclosures, whereas fearing accounts for the fact that these disclosures ‘matter’ to Dasein in some particular manner (SZ 141). I will now explain the particular disclosures of the *Wovor* and *Worum* in disguised anxiety, in fear, before we conclude by considering fearing itself.

The disclosure of fear’s *Wovor* is, firstly, an intraworldly entity which has ‘involvement’. But with this specification of fear’s *Wovor* we can see how anxiety when it is shrouded in the disguise of fear, shows up precisely within the undifferentiated mode of existence. For in undifferentiatedness, Dasein is precisely absorbed in the world such that each intraworldly entity has involvement with the next (Dasein is absorbed in its concern with the ready-to-hand, and solicitude with other Daseins), and this means that what is at issue for Dasein here is the category of the particular. And thus when anxiety shows itself in disguise, shows itself in fear, part of this means that the *Wovor* discloses precisely an intraworldly entity (i.e. a ready-to-hand entity, another Dasein in their ‘Dasein-with’) with involvement:

*That in the face of which* [*Wovor* we fear] (…) *is in every case something which we encounter within-the-world and which may have either readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being. (…) It shows itself within a context of involvements. (SZ 140)*

Secondly, that intraworldly entity which has an involvement, and shows up in the referential context of significance which Dasein is absorbed in, shows up in such a way that it is threatening to Dasein – “[t]hat in the face of which we fear can be characterized as threatening.” (SZ 140) Fear’s *Wovor* discloses an intraworldly entity which shows up in the world that Dasein is absorbed in, and this entity threatens. Thus, thirdly, this threatening intraworldly entity motivates Dasein to flee in the face of it, to
flee into a different region of the world, to shrink back and get away from that threatening intraworldly entity – “[s]hrinking back in the face of what fear discloses – in the face of something threatening – is founded upon fear; and this shrinking back has the character of fleeing.” (SZ 185) These three aspects make up the disclosure of fear’s Wovor.

The disclosure of fear’s Worum is Dasein itself. More particularly, fear’s Worum discloses to Dasein, in a particular manner, its ‘existence’. Dasein’s existence is its relation to itself and to Being – its comportment towards its own Being and Being in general – and Heidegger continually refers to this existence as Dasein’s Being ‘being an issue for it’. Now, fear’s Worum discloses this existence in a certain way.

That which fear fears about [Worum] is that very entity which is afraid – Dasein. Only an entity for which in its Being this very Being is an issue, can be afraid. (SZ 141)

Here this existence is disclosed, however, in a disguised manner – for while fear’s Worum discloses Dasein’s existence, “it does so in varying degrees of explicitness” (SZ 141). When this existence is disclosed to Dasein manifest and undisguised, with this disclosure, as we will see, comes an awareness of Dasein’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity. But here, in the undifferentiated mode, Dasein is unaware of its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity, and thus its existence can only show itself in disguise – that is, can only show itself in such a way that its normative orientation is disguised. Therefore when fear’s Worum discloses Dasein’s existence, it does so in an undifferentiated way such that what is at issue in the Worum is not a grappling with the manifest possibilities of inauthenticity and authenticity. What is at issue in fear’s Worum is rather – again, in accordance with the fact that what is at issue in undifferentiated inauthenticity is the category of the particular – losing something within the world: for example, losing one’s “house and home” (SZ 141) or losing another Dasein – “one’s Being-with with the Other, who might be torn away from one” (SZ 142). This is the disclosure of fear’s Worum.

And finally, as I have been noting, whereas the first two items of fear – the Wovor and Worum – have particular disclosures (as detailed above), it is the third structural item of fear, fearing, which accounts for the fact that these disclosures matter to Dasein in some particular manner. But we can now note that it is fearing which accounts for the fact that the disclosure’s of fear’s Wovor and Worum together matter to Dasein in an antipathetic manner without a sympathetic side. For while fear’s Wovor indeed discloses an intraworldly entity as threatening which Dasein is motivated to flee in the face of; and in this threat fear’s Worum discloses Dasein’s concern with losing something within the world; it is fearing which indeed accounts for the fact that these disclosures matter to Dasein in a particular way, that is, in an antipathetic manner.
This then—fear—is the way anxiety leaks out of the enclosure of uncanniness and shows itself within the undifferentiated mode of existence, showing itself not as it truly is, but showing itself in disguise. For in the undifferentiated mode Dasein is absorbed in the world such that each intraworldly has involvement and refers to the next, making up a network of involvements. Localized in this with-world is das Man, with its three fold snare (in the manner of concupiscentia), and Dasein is sucked into this turbulence by way of falling. Dasein, here absorbed, entangled in das Man and not itself, ambiguously experiences this tranquillity as the good life. Indeed Dasein is tempted to flee ever more into this ambiguous absorption, escaping ever more its sphere of solipsism. However, this fleeing can never be complete, and behind the thin wall which separates this absorption from uncanniness, there rambles manifest anxiety, which acts as a reservoir which can, at intermittent moments, leak out of this enclosure and show itself within absorption, within undifferentiatedness, disrupting the tranquillity with an alarming dread and horror which Dasein shrinks from. This is fear. Anxiety’s disguise, which only an experienced observer can recognize as a disguise, is such that fear’s Wovor discloses a threatening intraworldly entity, showing up in the network of involvements, which Dasein is motivated to flee in the face of; fear’s Worum discloses Dasein’s existence in such a way that Dasein is not aware of its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity, but is rather concerned with losing something of the intraworldly; and fearing accounts for the fact that fear’s Wovor and Worum matter to Dasein is such a way that they are antipathetic, without a sympathetic side.

Now, I illustrated fear, illustrated disguised anxiety in undifferentiatedness, so that we may use this to track towards the anxiety which lies in uncanniness and which is misused in strict inauthenticity. Heidegger’s starting point is indeed undifferentiatedness, and regarding anxiety, his starting point is fear—but he moves from fear in undifferentiatedness towards undisguised anxiety. Likewise we will do the same. In particular we will move from disguised anxiety—which shows itself such that there is no sympathetic aspect and such that the antipathetic aspect refers to the intraworldly; to undisguised ambiguous anxiety in uncanniness—in which anxiety is manifest, showing its antipathetic and sympathetic aspects undisguised, yet misused. For I am interpreting anxiety progressively.
C

ANXIETY MISUSED: THE DIALECTIC OF STRICT INAUTHENTICITY

I am interpreting anxiety in Heidegger progressively, which means that while I am after an interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger – showing that this anxiety has an ambiguous structure (part antipathetic, part sympathetic) – and while there are three encounters which Dasein can have with this anxiety, which correspond to three modes of its existence, I hold that to understand this anxiety we must track the movement through the encounters, showing the interrelation between them, and in this part of the dissertation we are doing this progressively. After first, in §A, giving an overview of the dialectic of inauthenticity at the most general level – partly undifferentiatedness, partly strict inauthenticity, such that the distinction is one of a relative admixture – we then began the progressive interpretation of anxiety by, §B, homing in on the undifferentiated absorbed mode detailing how anxiety is encountered in that mode: in disguise. I now use that disguised anxiety to proceed in the progressive interpretation, and I now detail, §C, the way anxiety is encountered in strict inauthenticity such that it is manifest yet misused – remembering, however, the relative admixture. I have already briefly sketched that in strict inauthenticity Dasein’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is manifest along with anxiety, while Dasein exists in an existential solipsism (uncanniness). But now I will detail this – we now home in on that sphere of uncanniness with its manifest misused anxiety – drawing from what I laid out regarding disguised anxiety. For disguised anxiety is a privation of undisguised anxiety, and thus we use this privation in order to move on towards what it is a privation of, the manifest yet misused anxiety in uncanniness. And after I have, in this section, detailed manifest yet misused anxiety, we will finally be in a position to, in §D, arrive at the telos, manifest anxiety rightly used. For I am interpreting anxiety progressively – that is, tracking the movement towards the telos.

Whereas last section I showed that disguised anxiety is such that it relates to the category of the particular, and therewith Dasein’s normative orientation towards its inauthenticity and authenticity is not revealed, in this section I show how undisguised anxiety is such that its discloses nothing (the category of totality) and therewith Dasein’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is indeed revealed. Furthermore, whereas last section I showed that disguised anxiety is such that it is antipathetic without a sympathetic side, in this section I will begin to show that undisguised anxiety is such that it is ambiguous: partly antipathetic, partly sympathetic. Indeed, in showing how undisguised anxiety is ambiguous we will in turn provide details concerning how fear, disguised anxiety, partially reveals partially conceals anxiety’s antipathy, while anxiety’s sympathy is completely covered over in fear. And thus in this section – in moving from disguised anxiety in undifferentiatedness to undisguised anxiety in
uncanniness – I will show how undisguised manifest anxiety is such that its object is nothing, it relates to this nothing by way of an antipathy and a sympathy, and Dasein’s normative orientation is manifest. But further, we are now also homing in on that mode of existence, strict inauthenticity, and thus I will show in detail how this undisguised anxiety is misused such that it acts as a springboard from which Dasein is perpetually springing into the dialectic of strict inauthenticity.

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Now, as mentioned in the Introduction of this dissertation, one of the upshots of detailing the ambiguous structure of Heidegger’s anxiety (i.e. detailing how this anxiety is made up of an antipathy and sympathy) is that this will lead to show how the agency involved in strict inauthenticity is a strange one made up of part activity and part passivity. For in this section I will now show how – as ambiguous anxiety is the springboard which springs Dasein either into inauthenticity or authenticity – when Dasein springs off this anxiety into strict inauthenticity, the agency involved here is one of part cowardly weakness (passivity) and part willful defiance (activity). But again, it is by way of detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety that will lead us to this account of the agency involved in strict inauthenticity.

In part I of this dissertation I showed how the structure of Kierkegaard’s anxiety is ambiguous in that its antipathy discloses the possibility of the first movement, infinite resignation, while the sympathy discloses the possibility of the second movement, faith. In this section I will now argue that Heidegger’s anxiety shares a similar ambiguous structure: that is, I will now argue that Heidegger’s anxiety, on the one hand discloses the antipathetic possibility of utterly losing all of one’s concern for the intraworldly, and on the other hand, also discloses the sympathetic possibility of gaining back that very concern for the intraworldly. In this way Heidegger’s anxiety, like Kierkegaard’s, is structurally composed of an antipathy and a sympathy. And similar to how I, in part I, showed how the ambiguous structure of anxiety in Kierkegaard leads to an account of the agency involved in strict sin as made up of part cowardly weakness, part willful defiance, I will now show how detailing this ambiguous structure in Heidegger will in turn lead to detail how the agency involved in strict inauthenticity is made up of part cowardly weakness, part willful defiance. For in this section I will detail how the antipathetic possibility which Heidegger’s anxiety discloses can be achieved completely with one’s own willpower if only one musters the courage, and that the agency involved in failing to achieve it is that of a passive weakness, a not willing what one can indeed will; and I will also detail how the sympathetic possibility which Heidegger’s anxiety discloses can only be achieved by way of a receptivity towards something in a sense above one, and that the agency involved in failing to achieve it is that of a willful defiance against what
one is summoned towards. And thus in this section I will detail the ambiguous structure of anxiety in Heidegger, and this will in turn lead to show how the agency involved in mis-springing off this anxiety into strict inauthenticity is made up of part a cowardly weakness, part a willful defiance.

Now, after arguing in detail in this section that Heidegger’s anxiety is ambiguous in a similar manner to Kierkegaard’s, at the end of this section I will show that the secondary literature on Heidegger on this point tends to miss this similarity, and holds rather that Heidegger’s anxiety is only composed of an antipathetic side, with no sympathetic side. As I will show, one author explicitly contrasts Heidegger to Kierkegaard on this point, and this in turn has led author commentators to take a similar line. Thus, firstly, I hope to detail how, contrary to lines which we find either explicitly or implicitly in the secondary literature, the structure of Heidegger’s anxiety is ambiguous in a similar manner to Kierkegaard’s.

And, following from the above, after arguing in detail in this section that the agency involved in springing into strict inauthenticity is made up of part cowardly weakness, part willful defiance, in a similar manner to the agency involved in Kierkegaard’s strict sin, at the end of this section I will also show that the secondary literature on Heidegger on this point tends to miss this similarity, and holds rather that the agency involved in Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity is underdeveloped in that it does not contain both an active and passive aspect. Thus, secondly, and following from the first point, in this section I hope to detail how, contrary to the line which we find explicitly in the secondary literature, the agency involved in strict inauthenticity in Heidegger is, in a similar manner to the agency involved in strict sin in Kierkegaard, made up of part a passivity and part an activity.

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Fear, as has been shown, is made up of the three structural items: the Wovor, Worum, and fearfulness. The first two items have particular disclosures and the third item accounts for the fact that these disclosures matter in some particular manner, as I have shown. When Heidegger first details undisguised anxiety (section ‘40’), again he specifies that anxiety is made up of three structural items: the Wovor, Worum, and anxiousness – and again the first two have particular disclosures, whereas the third accounts for the fact that these disclosures matter to Dasein in some particular manner. Now, as fear is indeed disguised anxiety, this means in detail that fear’s three items are disguised manifestations of anxiety’s three items: that is, the disclosures of fear’s Wovor is a disguised disclosure of anxiety’s Wovor; the disclosure of fear’s Worum is a disguised disclosure of anxiety anxiety’s Worum; and fear’s fearing is a disguised disclosure of anxiety’s anxiousness. I will show how this is the case for each of the three items, and in doing so we are of course proceeding from the undifferentiated absorption towards uncanniness.
Fear’s *Wovor* discloses an intraworldly entity that has involvement – for here Dasein is absorbed in the world, and each intraworldly entity has an involvement which refers to the next; here what is at issue for Dasein is the particular. This intraworldly entity with involvement threatens Dasein, and Dasein is motivated to flee in the face of it. This disclosure is a disguise of the disclosure of anxiety’s *Wovor* – that is, it partly hides, partly reveals anxiety’s *Wovor*. Now, the latter two aspects are in part true of anxiety’s *Wovor*, namely, there is something ‘threatening’ about the disclosure of anxiety, and indeed, as I have been noting, Dasein is motivated to flee in the face of this anxiety. However, in uncanniness Dasein is individualized in existential solipsism, and here Dasein is precisely not absorbed in the world, here intraworldly entities precisely do not have involvement – absorption is here collapsed revealing the insignificance of intraworldly entities. Thus what is threatening, and what Dasein flees in the face of in anxiety’s *Wovor* is precisely *not* an intraworldly entity with involvement. Thus Heidegger refers to anxiety’s disclosure, that which is threatening and which Dasein flees in the face of, in the *Wovor* as ‘nothing’, but clarifies that this ‘nothing’ which is disclosed means that the “worldhood” of the world is disclosed, or the “possibility of the ready-to-hand in general” is disclosed:

That in the face of which [*Wovor*] one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world. Thus it is essentially incapable of having an involvement. (…) on the basis of this insignificance of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obstructs itself. (…) it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general (…) The “nothing” of readiness-to-hand is grounded in the most primordial ‘something’ – in the world. (…) the “nothing” – that is, the world as such – exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety (SZ 186-187)

Heidegger has here undisguised fear’s *Wovor*, proceeding to disclose anxiety’s *Wovor*. For the disclosure of anxiety is indeed in part threatening, and indeed motivates Dasein to flee in the face of it, but that which threatens and which Dasein flees away from is not an intraworldly with involvement. Rather, anxiety’s *Wovor* discloses ‘nothing’, that is, discloses worldhood, the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general: anxiety’s *Wovor* relates to the category of totality, the totality of Dasein’s dealings with the intraworldly. In moving from fear’s *Wovor* to anxiety’s *Wovor* there is shift from the category of the particular (an intraworldly entity) to totality (worldhood). This is the disclosure of undisguised anxiety’s *Wovor*.

Fear’s *Worum* discloses Dasein’s existence – Dasein’s relation towards its own Being, Dasein’s Being being an issue for it – but does so in a disguised manner. For when this existence is manifest and undisguised, therewith Dasein’s awareness of its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is manifest. However, in fear, Dasein is absorbed in the world and, entangled in *das Man*, is undifferentiated such that it is unaware of its normative orientation. Indeed in fear’s *Worum* Dasein’s existence is disclosed such that it is concerned with losing something of the intraworldly, the particular. But this disclosure of fear’s *Worum* is a disguise of the disclosure of anxiety’s *Worum* – that is, it partly
hides, partly reveals anxiety’s *Worum*. For fear’s *Wovor* does indeed disclose Dasein’s existence – however, does so in the disguise such that the normative orientation is not manifest – but in anxiety’s *Worum* Dasein’s existence, Dasein’s relation towards its own Being (Dasein’s Being being an issue for it), is manifest such that, therewith, its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity are manifest:

Therefore, with that which it is anxious about [*Worum*], anxiety (…) makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. (SZ 187-188)

Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue. (…) Being-free for one’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and therewith for the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity, is shown, with a primordial concreteness, in anxiety. (SZ 191)

Heidegger has here undisguised fear’s *Worum*, proceeding to disclose anxiety’s *Worum*. For in anxiety’s *Worum* Dasein’s existence is not disclosed such that it is merely concerned with losing this or that intraworldly thing, but rather, is disclosed in such a way that its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is indeed manifest. Whereas in undifferentiated inauthenticity Dasein is entangled in *das Man* such that it is alienated from its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity, in individualized uncanniness *das Man* is not applicable, and anxiety’s *Worum* indeed discloses this normative orientation – as cited above “[t]hese basic possibilities of Dasein (...) show themselves in anxiety as they are in themselves – undisguised by entities within-the-world” (SZ 191) This is thus the disclosure of undisguised anxiety’s *Worum*.

I have now shown how fear’s *Wovor* and *Worum* are a disguised manifestation of anxiety’s *Wovor* and *Worum*. Fear’s *Wovor* discloses some threatening intraworldly entity, which shows up in the network of involvements Dasein is absorbed in – this is a disguise of anxiety’s *Wovor*, for anxiety’s *Wovor* discloses ‘nothing’, that is, not a particular intraworldly entity, but rather the worldhood of the world. Fear’s *Worum* discloses Dasein’s existence, that is, its relation towards itself, yet in fear this relation is such that Dasein is merely concerned with losing the intraworldly, and Dasein’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is not manifest – this is a disguise of anxiety’s *Worum*, for anxiety’s *Worum* discloses Dasein’s existence in such a way that Dasein’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is indeed manifest. But I now wish to show that the third structural item of fear, *fearing*, is a disguise of the third structural item of anxiety, *anxiousness*.

*Fearing* accounts for the fact that fear’s *Wovor* and *Worum* matter to Dasein is some particular manner: that is, matters to Dasein in a purely *antipathetic* manner. For while fear’s *Wovor* discloses a particular intraworldly entity as threatening, and fear’s *Worum* discloses Dasein’s existence such that it is concerned with losing something of the intraworldly, *fearing* is what accounts for the fact that these disclosures matter to Dasein in their *antipathetic* manner. But fearing is, I hold, a disguised manifestation
of anxiousness on Heidegger’s account. For while fearing is such that fear’s Wovor and Worum matter to Dasein in a purely antipathetic manner, anxiousness is, I will show, such that anxiety’s Wovor and Worum matter to Dasein in a partly antipathetic, partly sympathetic manner – anxiety’s anxiousness marks the fact that anxiety is ambiguous (part antipathetic, part sympathetic). That is, I wish to now show that while anxiety’s Wovor discloses ‘nothing’, that is, the worldhood of the world; and anxiety’s Worum discloses Dasein’s existence such that its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is manifest; anxiousness, for Heidegger, is such that the disclosures of anxiety’s Wovor and Worum matter to Dasein in an ambiguous fashion such that they matter to Dasein in a partly antipathetic, partly sympathetic manner. (And furthermore, as I will also show, while the disguise of fear is such that it completely covers over the sympathetic aspect of anxiety, it only shows the antipathetic aspect partially – that is, it partially reveals, partially conceals the antipathetic aspect itself.)

Heidegger tells us that undisguised anxiety has yet two more aspects: what I will call death-anxiety and conscience-anxiety. Heidegger tells us that “Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety” (SZ 266) and he also writes of the “fact of the anxiety of conscience” (SZ 296). Now, while these mark yet a further two aspects of undisguised anxiety, this means, as I will show, that they are both constituted by anxiety’s Wovor and Worum – that is, they both disclose, by way of the Wovor, the ‘nothing’ (worldhood of the world); and they both disclose, by way of the Worum, Dasein’s existence such that its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is manifest. However, as I will show, the disclosures of the Wovor and Worum matter to Dasein in different ways in death-anxiety and conscience-anxiety – and it is anxiousness which accounts for this. In particular, I will show that in death-anxiety the Wovor and Worum matter in an antipathetic manner (they repel), while in conscience-anxiety the Wovor and Worum matter in a sympathetic manner (they attract). In this way I will begin to demonstrate that anxiety, for Heidegger, is ambiguous.

Now, this section – ‘anxiety misused: the dialectic of strict inauthenticity’ – gives an account of the encounter of anxiety such that it is misused and gives rise to the dialectic of strict inauthenticity. Thus when I now go on to detail anxiety’s ambiguity – antipathetic death-anxiety, and sympathetic conscience-anxiety – I will at the same time be stressing how this ambiguous anxiety is misused such that it gives rise to the dialectic of strict inauthenticity. But I will now detail each in turn: first antipathetic death-anxiety misused, then sympathetic conscience-anxiety misused, and conclude by showing the interrelation between the two which explains the dialectic of strict inauthenticity. And of course, as we proceed we should keep in mind that the distinction between undifferentiated inauthenticity (in which Dasein is absorbed in the world and entangled in das Man), and strict inauthenticity (in which absorption in the world is collapsed and ambiguous anxiety is manifest yet misused), is not one of mutually exclusive states, but is one of a relative admixture – the more of the one the less of the other.
As mentioned, Heidegger tells us that “Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety”, and I hold that death-anxiety makes up one of two aspects of Heidegger’s anxiety: it marks anxiety’s antipathy. That is, death-anxiety is made up of anxiety’s Wovor and Worum, yet here these disclosures matter to Dasein in an antipathetic manner, they repel.

As my interpretation stresses, undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity are not mutually exclusive states, and thus co-present with inauthentic absorption – behind the thin wall of uncanniness, in which the world is collapsed and Dasein is individualized – there rambles manifest death-anxiety:

Death does not just ‘belong’ to one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death (...) individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a way in which the ‘there’ is disclosed for existence. It makes manifest that all Being-alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all Being-with Others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-Being is the issue. (SZ 263)

Thus co-present with inauthentic Dasein’s absorption in the with-world, is also manifest anxiety in which Dasein’s absorption is collapsed – and of course this distinction is always relative. Now, part of this anxiety is death-anxiety, and Heidegger tells us that death-anxiety disclose the “possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein” (SZ 250). What does this mean? To get at what this means I will detail both the Wovor and the Worum of death-anxiety.

Structurally, anxiety’s Wovor discloses ‘nothing’ (the worldhood of the world; the category of totality), and Heidegger tells us, as cited below, that death-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the nothing. In particular, what is at issue in death-anxiety’s Wovor is the possibility of the utter collapse of one’s absorption in the world. At the outset I note that I do not understand death-anxiety to signify the possibility of ‘death’ in its common understanding – that is, that which, when it strikes, necessarily annihilates Dasein, and which, before it strikes, thus marks Dasein’s mortality. I hold rather that death-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the threatening fact that Dasein is thrown into the impending impossibility of all absorption in the world, the impending collapse of absolutely all involvements of intraworldly entities, the totality of involvements.

Another way of saying this is by saying that death-anxiety, on my account, discloses the possibility of losing utterly all of one’s concern for the world, opposed to losing the world. We might say that for the commonsense understanding of death – as that which, when it strikes necessarily annihilates Dasein – what is lost is the world. For in this understanding of death, when death strikes Dasein is indeed annihilated, and this death marks Dasein’s mortality. But on my account of death, what is at issue, I hold,
is something of a living death – a death in which utterly all absorption, all concern, has indeed collapsed, but yet in which Dasein is still alive. In this sense we might say that with the commonsense understanding of death (as that which necessarily annihilates) death-anxiety disclose the possibility of losing the world, whereas with the understanding of death which I am after death-anxiety discloses the possibility of utterly losing all of one’s concern for the world.60

To further flesh this out, I must note what death-anxiety’s Worum discloses. Structurally, anxiety’s Worum discloses Dasein’s existence in such a way that its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is manifest. Now, the disclosure of death-anxiety’s Worum discloses Dasein’s existence in such a way that it presents the possibility of existing in the midst of the utter collapse of all involvements, of all absorption, and indeed discloses it as that which Dasein ought to achieve. This possibility presented in the Worum – the possibility of existing amidst the utter collapse of all absorption, a living death – is, I hold, anticipation:

But the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety. In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face [vor] with the “nothing” of the possible impossibility of its existence. Anxiety is anxiety about [um] the potentiality-for-Being of the entity so destined, and in this way it discloses the uttermost possibility. (SZ 265-266)

60 My account of death-anxiety is inspired by William Blattner’s account of death which he has held over the years – most clearly expressed in his ‘The concept of death in Being and Time’, in H. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall (eds.), Heidegger Reexamined: Volume I Dasein, Authenticity, and Death (Routledge: London, 2002). Blattner notes that Heidegger holds that death is the “possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there” (SZ 250), and Blattner stresses that while death is thus a possibility, ‘possibility’ is a technical term in Being and Time which, when applied to Dasein, signifies “a possible way to be Dasein” (p. 50). This leads Blattner to the argument: “(a) Death is a possibility for Dasein. (b) Dasein’s possibilities are possible ways to be Dasein. (c) So, death is a possible way to be Dasein! (…) (d) Death is a possible way to be Dasein, one in which Dasein is not able to be!” (p. 50)

With this formulation Blattner is stressing that death in Being and Time is not used in its literal commonsensical signification, that is, as “having passed away, for that state is not a possible way to be Dasein, but rather a way not to be at all.” (p. 57) Blattner’s account stresses that Heidegger’s concept of death is indeed a possible way to be Dasein, but one in which Dasein is not able to be (d). This seems contradictory, but Blattner stresses that this is only an apparent contradiction. The way out of the contradiction, Blattner argues, is to distinguish between what he calls a ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ sense of Dasein’s Being. The thin sense of Dasein’s Being is “its being being at issue for it, there being a question, Who am I?” (p. 62), while the thick sense of Dasein’s Being is “being able-to-be someone by throwing oneself into some definite possibility” (p. 62). In the thick sense, Dasein answers the question – e.g. I am a teacher (an existentiell for-the-sake-of-which) – and answers it by way of undertaking subsidiary tasks – e.g. writing a lecture – and wielding the paraphernalia involved – e.g. pen and paper (p. 59). Now, with this distinction between the thick and thin sense of Dasein’s Being, Blattner argues that we are able to show that (d) is not contradictory. For death is, Blattner argues, a possible way to be Dasein, but only in the thin sense of Dasein’s Being being an issue for it; while in death Dasein is not able to be in the thick sense, Dasein is not able to throw itself into some definite possibility. That is, in death Dasein’s Being is pressingly an issue for it – who am I? – yet Dasein is not able to answer this question – is not able to take up an existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, is not able to undertake the tasks involved, and is not able to use the paraphernalia involved.

I am inspired by Blattner’s notion of a, as I put it, living death, and all of my interpretations of ‘anticipation’ from here on signal one form or another of living death. However, besides the inspiration, and thus sharing in some sense an account of living death, my account is different from Blattner’s – a point which I will highlight in detail at the end of this section, and the end of following two sections.
Taking manifest death-anxiety’s Wovor and Worum together, we get the following. Death-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the nothing, that is, the impending impossibility of any and all absorption, the impending collapse of all involvement (thus here what is at issue is the category of totality, the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general, the worldhood of the world); Death-anxiety’s Worum discloses Dasein’s existence such it present the possibility of existing in the midst of this utter and total collapse, which it indeed ought to achieve, and this “uttermost possibility” is anticipation. Thus taken together manifest death-anxiety discloses the possibility (Worum) of the impossibility (Wovor) of any and all absorption – it discloses the possibility of an utter loss of all absorption. (For, we must remember that inauthentic Dasein’s anxiety in uncanniness is always relative to its absorption in the with-world, and thus in anxiety – e.g. death-anxiety – inauthentic Dasein is also absorbed. Therefore we must always keep in mind this relative admixture to understand how death-anxiety can present the possibility of the impossibility of utterly all absorption in the world.)

Now, this possibility that death-anxiety presents is thus an antipathetic possibility – it is threatening to Dasein – and it is anxiousness which accounts for this. As Heidegger notes above, death-anxiety discloses “the utter and constant threat to itself”, and indeed later reiterates and specifies that in death anxiety, “Dasein opens itself to a constant threat arising out of its own “there”. In this very threat Being-towards-the-end must maintain itself. So little can it tone this down” (SZ 265). Death-anxiety is an antipathetic disclosure. This aspect of anxiety colours the Wovor and Worum of anxiety in an utterly threatening manner: the possibility of utterly collapsing all absorption is threatening to Dasein. (And here I note how fear, disguised anxiety, is such that it partly reveals and partly conceals anxiety’s antipathetic aspect itself. For I have now specified that in anxiety what is antipathetic is in relation to the category of the totality of the worldhood of the world, that is, what is antipathetic is the possibility of the utter collapse of any and all absorption; whereas in fear, in disguised anxiety, while an antipathetic element does show itself, it is reversed from the category of totality to that of the particular – in fear what is antipathetic is always in relation to the intraworldly. And thus in fear, in disguised anxiety, while the sympathetic aspect is completely covered over, the antipathetic aspect itself is partially revealed, partially concealed.)

This then is the antipathetic disclosure of manifest death-anxiety: behind the thin wall of uncanniness, in which absorption is collapsed (but not absolutely, as inauthentic Dasein is also partly absorbed in the undifferentiated mode) Dasein is individualized in an existential solipsism, death-anxiety is manifest and it discloses the utterly threatening, antipathetic, possibility of the utter impossibility of any and all absorption, of any and all involvements. Heidegger highlights this by referring to any involvement as something ‘actual’. He writes,
The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual. The more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all. Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’, nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing. In the anticipation of this possibility it becomes ‘greater and greater’; that is to say, the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, no more or less, but signifies the possibility of measureless impossibility of existence. (SZ 262)

The antipathetic disclosure of death-anxiety is the possibility of the utter impossibility of existence, is the possibility of existing in such a way that absolutely all involvements are collapsed – it “gives Dasein nothing to be ‘actualized’”. Thus this antipathetic disclosure discloses not the possibility of merely collapsing this or that involvement, but utterly all involvement. Now, in this citation Heidegger notes that there are different degrees of collapsing one’s involvements: “the more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it”. Thus Heidegger is suggesting that Dasein in uncanniness can indeed collapse more and yet more of its absorption – and indeed the more absorption is collapsed, the “close[r]” one gets towards anticipation. For inauthentic Dasein’s death-anxiety is such that it is always relative to its absorption – the more of the one, the less of the other – and thus in one’s movement towards anticipation one can collapse more and yet more of one’s absorption, and therewith acquire more and yet more undisguised anxiety. However, the point of the matter is that while one can proceed towards anticipation by collapsing more and yet more of one’s involvements, anticipation is only actually achieved once utterly all of one’s absorption has been collapsed: “anticipation (...) reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, no more or less, but signifies the possibility of measureless impossibility of existence.”

Now, while death-anxiety is the antipathy which is the springboard for achieving anticipation, achieving the utter loss of all involvements, Heidegger specifies that Dasein can, and indeed should, achieve this, can and indeed should spring off this springboard with its own willpower. For Heidegger tells us that anticipation, the utter collapse, “must be cultivated as a possibility” (SZ 261) by Dasein, and must be cultivated with its own willpower – Heidegger tells us that Dasein “makes this possible for itself of its own accord” (SZ 263), and again with italics stresses that “Dasein makes this possibility possible for itself” (SZ 264). Thus amidst the antipathetic springboard which is death-anxiety, Dasein can, and indeed ought to, with its own willpower, achieve anticipation, the possibility of impossibility, the utter loss of all involvements – “[i]n its death, Dasein must simply ‘take back’ everything.” (SZ 308)

Now why ought Dasein make this movement? Dasein ought to make this movement because in utterly collapsing all involvements it therewith completely disentangles itself from the three-fold inauthentic snare of das Man (falling). For as I have been careful to show, das Man (falling) is
encapsulated precisely in absorption in the with-world, in absorption in the world, and thus when Dasein absolutely collapses its absorption by way of anticipation, it therewith absolutely wrenches itself out of the snares of das Man – when it has achieved anticipation it “has been released from the Illusions of das Man” (SZ 266). Therefore, from the antipathetic springboard which is manifest death-anxiety Dasein not only can achieve anticipation with its own willpower, by its own accord, but indeed ought to, if only it can muster the “courage” (SZ 254).

*However, in strict inauthenticity Dasein botches this movement,* Dasein fails to willfully cultivate and achieve anticipation, which it can and ought to. For while the antipathetic springboard presents Dasein with the possibility of the impossibility of existence, presents Dasein with the possibility of the utter collapse, and thus presents Dasein with the possibility of willfully wrenching itself completely out of the snares of das Man, which it ought to do, inauthentic Dasein botches this movement – inauthentic Dasein does not wrench itself out of the snares of das Man, does not will this, even though it knows that it can and ought to:

Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from das Man. This means that in anticipation any Dasein can have wrenched itself away from das Man already. But when one understands that this is something which Dasein ‘can’ have done, this only reveals its factical lostness in the everydayness of the they-self. (SZ 263)

Thus inauthentic Dasein, botching the movement of anticipation which antipathetic death-anxiety discloses, botches this movement by way of a cowardliness – a not doing what one can and ought do. For while in undifferentiated absorption, entangled in das Man, anxiety shows up in the disguise of fear, behind the thin wall of uncanniness individualized Dasein grapples with the possibility of anticipation amidst manifest death-anxiety, grapples with the possibility of the utter impossibility, which it knows it ought to achieve yet it in a cowardliness does not will that which it can and ought to:

Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety. This is attested unmistakably, though ‘only’ indirectly, by Being-towards-death as we have described it, when it perverts anxiety into cowardly fear and, in surmounting this fear, only makes known its own cowardliness in the face of anxiety. (SZ 266)

In strict inauthenticity Dasein continually mis-springs off the antipathetic springboard by way of a weakness – Dasein may indeed feel trapped in the bondage of inauthenticity, knowing that it can and ought to wrench itself out of absorption and thus out of the snares of das Man with its own willpower, yet in a weakness it merely sorrows over its own cowardliness of not having done that which it can and ought to do.

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As mentioned, Heidegger writes of the “fact of the anxiety of conscience” and I hold that conscience-anxiety makes up the second of the two aspects of Heidegger’s anxiety: it marks anxiety’s sympathy. That is, conscience-anxiety is made up of anxiety’s Wovor and Worum, yet here these disclosures matter to Dasein in a sympathetic manner, they attract.

In his chapter on conscience, Heidegger first tells us that the ‘call of conscience’ is a mode of discourse, and as all modes of discourse include the two structural aspects – ‘what is said in the talk’, and ‘what the talk is about’ (SZ 161-162) – Heidegger tells us that in the call of conscience, what is said is “nothing” (indeed the call calls in the mode of silence) and what the discourse is about is “Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (SZ 272-273).

Now, as my interpretation stresses, undifferentiated inauthenticity and strict inauthenticity are not mutually exclusive states, and thus co-present with inauthentic absorption – behind the thin wall of uncanniness, in which the world is collapsed and Dasein is individualized – there rambles manifest anxiety (which grapples with guilt – more on guilt below):

Conscience attests not by making something known in an undifferentiated manner, but by calling forth and summoning us to Being-guilty. (SZ 295)

For in uncanniness, individualized Dasein’s absorption in the world is collapsed, and therewith Dasein is here not entangled in das Man – for since das Man is localized in absorption in the world, the with-world, and since this absorption is collapsed, so too das Man is collapsed. And this means for conscience-anxiety that in uncanniness the call of conscience-anxiety is manifest such that das Man (e.g. ambiguity, curiosity) is collapsed – “the call must do its calling without any hubbub and unambiguously, leaving no foothold for curiosity” (SZ 271); “das Man collapses (...) into insignificance.” (SZ 273)

Heidegger specifies that conscience-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the calls ‘what is said’: that is, nothing. Structurally, anxiety’s Wovor discloses nothing, that is, worldhood (the category of totality), and in conscience-anxiety’s Wovor the call’s what is said is precisely this disclosure, for what is said is nothing. And conscience-anxiety’s Worum discloses what the call’s discourse is ‘about’: that is, Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Structurally, anxiety’s Worum discloses Dasein’s existence, and therewith its normative orientation towards authenticity and inauthenticity, and in conscience-anxiety’s Worum what the call is about is precisely this disclosure, for it makes manifest its existence and therewith its normative orientation. Taking these two together then, Heidegger writes:

Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety; and, as the most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed, it puts Dasein’s Being-in-the-world face to face [vor] with the “nothing” of the world; in the face of this “nothing”, Dasein is anxiety with anxiety about [um] its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. (...) The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the ‘not-at-home: - the bare ‘that-it-is’ is the “nothing” of the world. (...) But what is Dasein even to report from the uncanniness of its thrown Being? What else remains for it than its own potentiality-for-Being as revealed in anxiety?
How else is “it” to call than by summoning Dasein towards this potentiality-for-Being, which alone is the issue? (SZ 276-277)

Conscience-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the call’s ‘what is said’ – nothing, worldhood, the category of totality. But in conscience-anxiety’s Wovor a particular feature of this worldhood is disclosed: it discloses what Heidegger calls the Nichtigkeit – or ‘Being-guilty’ – of thrownness. The Nichtigkeit, the guilt, that is disclosed in conscience-anxiety’s Wovor is this: that there are particular aspects of Dasein, which Dasein indeed is, but which it did not create and did not choose, and neither can it ever choose and/or create them. There are some aspects which Dasein can thus never have power over, and Dasein is burdened by this fact:

Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its “there”, but not of its own accord. (...) it never comes back behind its thrownness in such a way that it might first release this ‘that-it-is-and-has-to-be’ from its Being-its Self (...) as long as Dasein is, Dasein (...) is constantly its ‘that-it-is’. (...) Although it has not laid this basis itself, it reposes in the weight of it, which is made manifest to it as a burden by Dasein’s mood. (...) Thus “Being-a-basis” means never to have power over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up. This “not” belongs to the existential meaning of “thrownness”. It itself, being a basis, is a nullity of itself. (SZ 284)

Now, as the Wovor discloses worldhood, the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general (nothing, which is what is said in the call), the Nichtigkeit here comes to mean that the network of involvements which Dasein absorbs itself in is such that Dasein cannot choose this network, cannot create this network, never has the power to do this, but simply finds itself always already thrown into this or that particular network. This is the burden. Conscience-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the Nichtigkeit of the nothing.

Conscience-anxiety’s Worum discloses what the call is about – manifest existence, and therewith Dasein’s normative orientation towards authenticity and inauthenticity. Conscience-anxiety’s Worum discloses the possibility of resoluteness. Resoluteness, when it is achieved, includes an authentic absorption in the world – and thus the Worum here presents Dasein with the possibility of authentic absorption in the world. I have been highlighting that in inauthentic absorption Dasein is ensnared in das Man, entangled in the three fold inauthentic snare, and Heidegger here highlights that authentic absorption in resoluteness is such that Dasein, while absorbed, is thus not ensnared in das Man – “das Man (...) cannot impugn resolute existence.” (SZ 299) Thus the call summons Dasein to this resoluteness, which of course includes absorption, that is, includes concern with the ready-to-hand and solicitude with others – “[t]he appeal (...) signifies summoning one’s ownmost Self to its potentiality-for-Being, and of course as Dasein – that is, as concernful Being-in-the-world and Being with Others” (SZ 280) – yet includes absorption such that Dasein is no longer ensnared in das Man. And thus Heidegger stresses that in achieving resoluteness, which includes authentic absorption, Dasein is thus authentically absorbed in concern and solicitude:
Resoluteness, as authentic Being-one’s-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating “I”. And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is authentically nothing else than being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others. (SZ 298)

Now, taking conscience-anxiety’s Wovor and Worum together, we get the following. Conscience-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the Nichtigkeit of the nothing (what is said in the call) – i.e. it discloses that the network of involvement which Dasein absorbs itself in cannot be chosen/created by Dasein, it discloses that Dasein is always already thrown into this network. Conscience-anxiety’s Worum discloses the possibility of resoluteness (what the call is about) – that is, it discloses the possibility of an authentic absorption in the world. But taking these together this means that conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of authentic absorption such that it also discloses the fact that the particular network of involvements that it will be absorbed in cannot be chosen/created by Dasein, but that it will be authentically absorbed in the same network of involvements that it is always already absorbed in. And thus Heidegger highlights that when resoluteness is achieved, when authentic absorption is achieved, although absorption will be “modifie[d]” insofar as now Dasein is no longer ensnared in das Man while absorbed, the network of involvements which Dasein will be absorbed in will be the same that they always already were:

This authentic disclosedness modifies with equal primordiality both the way in which the ‘world’ is discovered (...) and the way in which the Dasein-with of Others is disclosed. The ‘world’ which is ready-to-hand does not become another one ‘in its content’, nor does the circle of Others get exchanged for a new one (SZ 298)

This then is the disclosure of manifest conscience-anxiety: the Wovor (what is said) discloses the Nichtigkeit of the nothing; the Worum (what the call is about) discloses the possibility of resoluteness, the possibility of authentic absorption. Taken together this mean that manifest conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of an authentic absorption in the world, an authentic absorption in the same world it is already absorbed in, yet modified such that Dasein is not ensnared in das Man.

This possibility of conscience-anxiety is a sympathetic possibility – and it is anxiousness which accounts for this. For Heidegger tells us that the possibility of being absorbed in the very same world one is already absorbed in, yet being absorbed such that one is not ensnared in das Man – such that one is free from das Man (e.g. curiosity) – gives Dasein an unshakable joy:

Nor does wanting-to-have-a-conscience (...) signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather, it brings one without illusions into the resoluteness of ‘taking action’. (...) Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakable joy in this possibility. In it Dasein becomes free from the entertaining ‘incidentals’ with which busy curiosity keeps providing itself (SZ 310)
Thus conscience-anxiety is the sympathetic springboard from which Dasein can achieve resoluteness, achieve an absorption in the same world is it already absorbed in yet become absorbed now such that it is free from das Man. Behind the thin wall of uncanniness which separates manifest conscience anxiety from inauthentic absorption in undifferentiatedness, Dasein is individualized in an existential solipsism, and conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of authentic absorption and this possibility brings Dasein an unshakable joy.

This sympathetic springboard not only presents resoluteness as a possibility, but indeed presents it such that Dasein ought to achieve it – for as Heidegger continually reiterates, the call of conscience is an “appeal” and a “summon[s]” (SZ 269, 273, 279) to resoluteness. Heidegger also continually reiterates that while conscience-anxiety summons Dasein to resoluteness, such that Dasein ought to achieve it, achieving it is not an act which is accomplished mere by Dasein’s own willpower, but is, as Heidegger stresses, a receptive ‘letting’. It is a “letting” (SZ 299) the call call one into an authentic absorption (‘taking action’) in the world one is already absorbed in (in accordance with guilt) – “[i]n understanding the call, Dasein lets its ownmost Self take action in itself” (SZ 288); “[b]y “resoluteness” we mean “letting oneself be called forth to one’s ownmost Being-guilty”.” (SZ 305)

Because the sympathetic springboard which is conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of resoluteness such that this can be achieved only by a receptive letting the call call one into that which the call is summoning one towards, Heidegger tells us that the call is a ‘push’ towards resoluteness, a push with its own momentum that is felt by Dasein – “[i]n the tendency to disclosure which belongs to the call, lies the momentum of a push – of an abrupt arousal.” (SZ 271) What this is emphasizing is that achieving resoluteness is not a completely “voluntar[y]” act which Dasein accomplishes merely with its own “will”, but is indeed a receptive ‘letting’:

Indeed the call is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ calls, against our expectations and even against our will. (SZ 275)

Thus conscience-anxiety is the sympathetic springboard for achieving resoluteness, for achieving authentic absorption in the very world one is already inauthentically absorbed in, and achieving this is not something that Dasein can do merely with its own voluntary will, but this can only be achieved by a receptive letting the call bring one into that which the call is calling one towards in the appeal – authentic absorption.

However, in strict inauthenticity Dasein botches this movement – in strict inauthenticity Dasein continually mis-springs off the sympathetic springboard and into inauthenticity. For in uncanniness in which absorption is collapsed, separated off from inauthentic absorption, anxiety is manifest and conscience-anxiety is the sympathetic springboard for achieving resoluteness, yet in strict inauthenticity
one does not allow this authentic absorption – in strict inauthenticity resoluteness remains only a mere possibility which Dasein continually grapples with:

But just as little does anxiety imply that one has already taken over one’s existence into one’s resolution (...) Anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution. (...) But anxiety can mount authentically only in a Dasein which is resolute. (SZ 343-344)

For in strict inauthenticity anxiety has not “mount[ed] authentically”, which means that the springboard of sympathetic conscience-anxiety is misused such that Dasein continually mis-springs off it into inauthenticity. And since resoluteness can only be achieved by a receptive letting the call call one into authentic absorption, this means that the mis-springing is characterized by a defiant refusal to allow the call to call one into resoluteness. For the call of conscience appeals inauthentic Dasein against its will: and when Dasein does not let the call call it, it is defiantly willing to refuse this possibility – it is defiantly rejecting this. And why would Dasein will to refuse this? One central reason has to do with the Nichtigkeit. For the call of conscience is calling one into the very same world one is already inauthentically absorbed in since the Nichtigkeit discloses the fact that one cannot choose, cannot create this network, that Dasein does not have power in this regard. But Dasein, perhaps, does not want to accept this, does not want the very same world it is absorbed in, Dasein, perhaps, defiantly refuses to accept this Nichtigkeit of the nothing. In a defiant willing against the summons of the call Dasein, perhaps, wants precisely to create its own network in which it will be absorbed; in a willful defiance against the call of conscience Dasein wants to have the power to create its own network.

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In this section, after first showing how undisguised anxiety is made up of a Wovor and Worum, I then went on to detail anxiousness, that is, show how this anxiety is made up of two aspects and is thus ambiguous: antipathetic death-anxiety, and sympathetic conscience-anxiety. In showing these two aspects I have also detailed how death-anxiety – that is, anxiety’s antipathy – is misused in strict inauthenticity; and I have also shown how conscience-anxiety – that is, anxiety’s sympathy – is misused in strict inauthenticity. And thus I have sketched what I call ‘anxiety misused’ which gives rise to the ‘dialectic of strict inauthenticity’.

But let me recap this, recapping death-anxiety and conscience-anxiety in isolation from one another (recapping how each aspect in their own right are wrongly used in strict inauthenticity) so that I can conclude this section by showing the way misused death-anxiety and misused conscience-anxiety are interrelated – and therewith detail the dialectic of strict inauthenticity, anxiety misused. For after first recapping how misused death and conscience-anxiety each, considered in isolation from one another,
consist of perpetual motion, a continual mis-springing, I will then conclude by showing how, when we consider how misused death and conscience-anxiety are interrelated, the perpetual motion of strict inauthenticity will be brought to its uttermost.

Regarding death-anxiety I have shown how Heidegger details manifest death-anxiety’s *Wovor* and *Worum*. For in uncanniness, in which absorption is collapsed for individualized inauthentic Dasein (yet this collapse is always relative to its co-present inauthentic absorption), death-anxiety is manifest – and its *Wovor* discloses the impending nothing, the impending impossibility, that is, the impending utter collapse of any and all absorption, of any and all involvement; while the *Worum* discloses the possibility of existing in the midst of this utter collapse, that is, the possibility of *anticipation*. Taken together, manifest death-anxiety discloses the possibility of the impossibility. But this disclosure is utterly threatening to Dasein: the possibility of the utter impossibility is an antipathetic disclosure – which is what anxiousness accounts for. Thus death-anxiety is the antipathetic springboard from which Dasein can spring and achieve anticipation, achieve the utter loss which is threatening. Indeed, springing off this springboard and achieving anticipation is something that an individual Dasein can do of its own accord, that is, with its own willpower. And not only can Dasein achieve this with its own willpower, but it ought to – it ought to achieve the utter collapse of absorption because when it does this it will have wrenched itself out of its entanglement in *das Man*. For *das Man* is localized in absorption in the with-world, and thus if Dasein completely collapses its absorption in the world, in the with-world, it will have therewith utterly wrenched itself out of its entanglement in *das Man*.

However, while individualized Dasein may indeed spring off the antipathetic springboard which is death-anxiety, and do so with its own willpower and indeed ought to do so, in strict inauthenticity Dasein botches this movement. In strict inauthenticity Dasein continually mis-springs off the antipathetic springboard, into strict inauthenticity. And because Dasein can only properly spring off this springboard by willing to utterly collapse all absorption and thus completely wrench itself out of the snares of *das Man*, Dasein’s mis-springing into inauthenticity is thus a perpetual cowardly not willing to do what one can and indeed ought do with its own power. This constant mis-springing, this perpetual cowardliness, takes the form of a continual deliberation concerning the fact that one ‘can have wrenched itself away from *das Man*’, and in this deliberation Dasein is precisely not wrenching itself utterly out of the snares of *das Man*. Perhaps Dasein here mis-springs by collapsing more and yet more involvement, and in this way collapses more and yet more entanglement in *das Man*, but this only marks a mere increase, and anticipation is never achieved in this way since the possibility of the utter impossibility ‘knows no measure at all, no more or less’, but is the *utter* collapse, the utter loss of all involvement. This continual cowardliness is thus a weakness of Dasein, a not willing that which it can and ought to do – for while anticipation is indeed an antipathetic possibility, Dasein knows that it ought to achieve it with its own
power, if it can only muster the courage, and thus constantly deliberating and not making this movement, Dasein ‘only makes known its own cowardliness in the face of anxiety’. With a cowardly weakness Dasein may feel trapped in the bondage of inauthenticity, yet what is actually going on here is a perpetual deliberation, perhaps a collapsing of more and more involvement, yet, by way of a weakness, never achieving the utter collapse, never achieving the possibility of the utter impossibility of all involvements.

Regarding conscience-anxiety I have shown how Heidegger details manifest conscience-anxiety’s Wovor and Worum. In uncanniness inauthentic Dasein is individualized, and in this existential solipsism its absorption is collapsed (yet this collapse is always relative to its co-present inauthentic absorption) and conscience-anxiety is manifest. The call of conscience-anxiety is a mode of discourse and ‘what is said’ is nothing, which is disclosed in the Wovor, while what the discourse is about is Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is disclosed in the Worum. More specifically, conscience-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the Nichtigkeit of the nothing, i.e. the fact that Dasein cannot choose/create the network of involvements it is absorbed in, indeed never can; while conscience-anxiety’s Worum discloses the possibility of authentic absorption in the world (such that Dasein will be absorbed and yet precisely not entangled in das Man), that is, the possibility of resoluteness. Taken together manifest conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of an authentic absorption in the very same network of involvements one is already absorbed in. This disclosure brings Dasein an unshakable joy: the possibility of resoluteness is a sympathetic disclosure – which is what anxiousness accounts for. Thus conscience-anxiety is the sympathetic springboard from which Dasein can spring and achieve resoluteness, achieve a joyful authentic absorption in the very same world it is inauthentically absorbed in. However, springing off this springboard and achieving resoluteness is not something that Dasein can achieve merely with its own willpower, for the call ‘abruptly’ pulls one ‘against one’s will’, and thus achieving resoluteness is a receptive ‘letting’ the call call one into that which it is summoning. Thus the call of conscience calls Dasein towards resoluteness, and achieving this resoluteness, which Dasein knows it ought to do, is a receptive letting the call call it into authentic absorption.

However, while Dasein in uncanniness may indeed spring off the sympathetic springboard which is conscience-anxiety, and do so by way of receptively letting the call summon it, in strict inauthenticity Dasein botches this movement. For in strict inauthenticity, Dasein is continually mis-springing off the sympathetic springboard and into inauthenticity. But because Dasein can only properly spring off this springboard by receptively letting the call call it into an authentic absorption in the world, this means Dasein is mis-springing into inauthenticity by way of a perpetual defiant willing against the summons of the call. For the call of conscience is a summons and an appeal towards resoluteness such that it ‘abruptly’ pulls Dasein ‘against Dasein’s will’. Thus the constant mis-springing takes the form of a willing against the summons, a willful defiance against the call of conscience. While this call is indeed a
sympathetic one, perhaps Dasein does not want to accept the Nichtigkeit of the nothing. For as the Nichtigkeit of the nothing reveals that Dasein can never choose/create the network that it will be absorbed in, the call calls Dasein into an authentic absorption in the very same world it is already inauthentically absorbed in. But Dasein does not want to accept this Nichtigkeit, does not want to accept its powerlessness here, but indeed wants to create its own network that it will be authentically absorbed in. But since the call summons Dasein precisely towards this particular network, Dasein defiantly rejects this call since it wants to create its own network. In a willful defiance against the call of conscience it wants to reject the Nichtigkeit of the nothing and create its own network. This of course is an impossibility, and thus Dasein is here in a continuous struggle – in perpetual motion Dasein wills against the summons of the call, defiantly wills to create its own network, which, continually, turns out to be impossible.

Thus in both misused manifest death-anxiety and misused manifest conscience-anxiety – considered each in isolation – Dasein is engaged in a constant struggle: the former is a continual cowardliness in relation to what it ought to be courageously willing, the latter is a continual defiant willing against what one ought be receptive towards. In both anxiety’s antipathy and anxiety’s sympathy – considered in isolation – inauthentic Dasein is continually mis-springing: thus the perpetual motion of both aspects of misused anxiety have been shown in isolation. However I will now bring the misuse of antipathetic death-anxiety and sympathetic conscience-anxiety together, and, in considering them in their interrelation, the perpetual motion of the mis-springing will be brought to its uttermost. For we will see that, at its deepest level, the failure of the one movement is due to the failure of the other –inauthentic Dasein continuously mis-springs off the sympathy because it has failed to make the antipathetic movement; and Dasein continuously mis-springs off the antipathy because it has failed to make the sympathetic movement.

Regarding misused death-anxiety, Heidegger concludes his chapter on death by noting that, in this stage of his analysis, anticipation is nothing but a “fantastical exaction”. That is, he concludes that, in this stage of his analysis, Dasein’s achieving the utter collapse of any and all involvements, achieving the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein, and thus wrenching itself utterly out of entanglement in das Man is a fantastical exaction:

The existential projection in which anticipation has been delimited, has made visible the ontological possibility of an existentiell Being-towards-death which is authentic. (...) Nevertheless, this existentially ‘possible’ Being-towards-death remains, from the existentiell point of view, a fantastical exaction. The fact that an authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole is ontologically possible for Dasein, signifies nothing, so long as a corresponding ontical potentiality-for-Being has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself. (SZ 266)

For when considered in isolation I noted that Dasein is continuously mis-springing off antipathetic death-anxiety by way of a cowardly not willing that which it can will – the utter loss of all
involvement, anticipation. Considered in isolation Dasein is perpetually deliberating in a cowardly weakness concerning what it ‘can have done’ (utterly wrench itself out of the snares of das Man) – that is, what it can do with its own will, and indeed ought to do. However, Heidegger concludes this chapter on death by noting that achieving anticipation is a fantastical exaction, “so long as a corresponding ontical potentiality-for-Being has not been demonstrated in Dasein itself”. What I take Heidegger to mean here is that properly achieving anticipation is a fantasy, so long as Dasein does not simultaneously achieve resoluteness. For as Heidegger continually reiterates, Dasein is always to a certain degree absorbed in the world of its concern – Dasein’s Being is Being-in-the-world – and thus to achieve anticipation, to utterly collapse all involvements such that Dasein is utterly not absorbed, without getting absorption back by way of resoluteness is fantastical. (Indeed as I will show in a later section, ‘Dasein’ can indeed make the first movement without simultaneously making the second, it can lose all involvement of the intraworldly without getting it back, but then this is no longer ‘Dasein’: this is psychosis.) Dasein can properly achieve anticipation only if it simultaneously achieves resoluteness (lest it become psychotic). Thus, at its deepest level, the reason why Dasein is failing to properly make the movement of anticipation is because it is failing to simultaneously make the movement of resoluteness. That is, the cowardly weakness of not achieving anticipation, of not achieving the utter collapse of all involvements, is, at its deepest level, due to the willful defiance of not allowing the call of conscience to call it into its resoluteness. Dasein, in a cowardly weakness, is continuously mis-springing off the antipathetic springboard (death-anxiety) because it is, in a willful defiance, continuously mis-springing off the sympathetic springboard (conscience-anxiety).

And regarding misused conscience-anxiety, Heidegger notes that Dasein ‘can’ achieve resoluteness only if it simultaneously achieves anticipation:

only as anticipating does resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Only when it ‘qualifies’ itself as Being-towards-death does resoluteness understand the ‘can’ of its potentiality-for-Being-guilty’ (SZ 306)

For when considered in isolation, I noted that Dasein’s continuous mis-springing off sympathetic conscience-anxiety is an willful defiance against the call of conscience – a willful refusal to receptively ‘let’ the call call one into authentic absorption in the world. Considered in isolation, Dasein is perpetually defiantly willing against the call towards authentic absorption in the very same world it is already absorbed in since it refuses to accept the Nichtigkeit of the nothing. However, Heidegger notes that Dasein can achieve resoluteness only when it simultaneously “qualifies” itself as anticipation. For in resoluteness Dasein is indeed absorbed in the world authentically, and this means that it is absorbed such that it is precisely not entangled in das Man. However, Dasein, in inauthenticity, is indeed absorbed in the world such that it is entangled in das Man, and thus in order to achieve authentic absorption such that it is
not so entangled, it is necessary for it to utterly wrench itself out of its entanglement in *das Man* – that is, it is necessary for it to achieve anticipation. Thus to achieve authentic absorption such that it is not entangled in *das Man* without wrenching itself out of its entanglement in *das Man* by way of anticipation is not possible. Dasein can achieve resoluteness only when it simultaneously achieves anticipation. Thus at its deepest level, the reason why Dasein is failing to make the movement of resoluteness is because it is simultaneously failing to make the movement of anticipation. That is, the defiance against the summons of the call, of willfully rejecting authentic absorption in the very same network, is, at its deepest level, due to the cowardliness of not utterly collapsing absorption in the world. *Dasein, in willful defiance, is continuously mis-springing off the sympathetic springboard (conscience-anxiety) because it is, in a cowardly weakness, continually mis-springing off the antipathetic springboard (death-anxiety).*

And thus the reason why Dasein botches the one movement is traced back to the botching of the other movement. For Dasein can only properly achieve the willful utter collapse of all absorption (anticipation) if it simultaneously achieves authentic absorption (resoluteness); and Dasein can only achieve absorption such that it is not entangled in *das Man* (resoluteness) if it simultaneously utterly wrenches itself out of this entanglement (anticipation). But in strict inauthenticity Dasein botches the movement of anticipation and thus resoluteness is not possible because of this; and it botches the movement of resoluteness and thus properly achieving anticipation is not possibility because of this. In uncanniness inauthentic Dasein is enclosed by the thin wall which separates absorption and entanglement in *das Man* (undifferentiated inauthenticity) from manifest anxiety in which its normative orientation is manifest (strict inauthenticity): and in this existential solipsism Dasein is continually mis-grappling with this normative orientation, continually mis-springing off anxiety’s antipathetic death-anxiety and sympathetic conscience-anxiety and into the dialectic of inauthenticity. For it perpetually mis-springs off the antipathy by way of cowardly weakness when it should be courageously willful, and perpetually mis-springs off the sympathy by way of a willful defiance when it should be receptive; and yet the cowardly mis-spring off the antipathy finds its roots in the mis-spring off the sympathy, and the defiant mis-spring off the sympathy is rooted in the mis-spring off the antipathy: Dasein, individualized in uncanniness, continually mis-springing off the anxious springboard and into inauthenticity, is spinning in perpetual motion.

*Secondary Literature*

As mentioned in my Introduction, one of the upshots of detailing the ambiguous structure of Heidegger’s anxiety (i.e. detailing the antipathetic and sympathetic aspects) is that this will lead to an account of the strange agency involved in strict inauthenticity as made up of part a cowardly weakness
(passivity) and part a willful defiance (activity). I hope to have now shown this in detail. For, firstly, in this section I showed how Heidegger’s anxiety has two ‘forms’ – death-anxiety and conscience-anxiety – and I argued that death-anxiety is anxiety’s antipathy, while conscience-anxiety is anxiety’s sympathy. For I argued that death-anxiety discloses the antipathetic possibility of utterly collapsing all of one’s concern for the intraworldly, while conscience-anxiety discloses the sympathetic possibility gaining back that very same concern. But this led to detailing how the agency involved in springing from this anxiety into strict inauthenticity is made up of part passivity, part activity. For I showed how the possibility which death-anxiety discloses can be achieved completely with one’s own willpower if one musters the courage, and that the agency involved in failing to achieve it is understood as a cowardly weakness; and I showed how the possibility which conscience-anxiety discloses can only be achieved by way of letting the call call one into that which it summons, and that the agency involved in failing to achieve it is understood as a willful defiance. This is thus the upshot.

Now, my account of the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in Heidegger of course harmonizes with my account of the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in Kierkegaard, and likewise my account of the agency involved in strict inauthenticity in Heidegger harmonizes with my account of the agency involved in strict sin in Kierkegaard. For as I detailed in part I, Kierkegaard’s anxiety is ambiguous (i.e. made up of an antipathy and a sympathy), and Kierkegaard’s account of the agency involved in misusing this anxiety, of springing into strict sin, is that it is part a cowardly weakness, part a willful defiance. I now wish to show how my work in this section relates to the secondary literature which also, either explicitly or implicitly, deals with the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship on both the topic of anxiety’s ambiguity, as well as the topic of agency. What we find is that commentators dealing with the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship in general have missed both of these similarities: that is, what we find is that commentators here tend to hold that Heidegger’s anxiety is, unlike Kierkegaard’s, only antipathetic, with no sympathetic side; and we also find that it is held that the agency involved in Heidegger’s account of inauthenticity, unlike Kierkegaard’s account of sin, is underdeveloped in that it does not contain both an active and passive aspect. Let us first deal with the former.

Hubert Dreyfus, in Being-in-the-World, explicitly deals with the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship and holds that whereas Kierkegaard’s anxiety is made up of an antipathy (a repulsion) and a sympathy (an attraction), Heidegger, in his account of anxiety, only takes over the antipathy, and drops the sympathy. Dreyfus writes: “Heidegger (…) take[s] up and incorporates[s] the “antipathetic” half of Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety as a “sympathetic antipathy”’” (p. 304); “having dropped the sympathy, [Heidegger] (…) holds on to the antipathy.” (p. 335) On Dreyfus’ account Heidegger’s anxiety only

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consists of a repulsion away from it, with nothing that attracts one towards it. More specifically, Dreyfus goes on to give an account of both anxiety of death and anxiety of conscience. Dreyfus holds that anxiety of conscience discloses that “Dasein has no possibilities of its own” (p. 305), and holds that that the anxiety of death discloses to Dasein “that it can never acquire any” (p. 305). Taken together, this is, Dreyfus holds, what Heidegger’s anxiety discloses, and this disclosure only consists of an antipathy relating to a total loss – that Dasein has no possibilities of its own, and that it can never acquire any – without any attraction relating to gaining anything.

Dreyfus’ above account of Heidegger’s anxiety – as merely antipathetic – seems to have been influential on William Blattner’s account. For while Blattner (one of Dreyfus’ students) does not explicitly deal with the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship, his account of Heidegger’s anxiety seems also to suggest that this anxiety is only antipathetic. In *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*62 Blattner holds that “[a]nxiety is the condition in which Dasein is indifferent to everything” (p. 78); “[a]nxiety is the condition in which nothing matters.” (p. 80). Likewise in Blattner’s ‘The concept of death in Being and Time’63, he holds that “[a]nxiety is the condition in which nothing matters” (p. 62); “[g]lobal indifference to my possibilities is anxiety.” (p. 62) And further, in Blattner’s *Heidegger’ Being and Time*64, he specifies that this condition in which nothing matters, in which we are indifferent to everything is fruitfully compared to depression: “some of the core phenomena of what Heidegger calls “anxiety” are characteristic of what we today call depression.” (p. 142). Blattner further specifies, however, that this anxiety or depression also contains a “threat” (p. 142) which one responds to, and thus this anxiety may be what we call “agitated depression” (p. 142). Blattner’s account of anxiety, like Dreyfus’, seems to suggest that anxiety is merely related to a total loss which one wants to avoid, without being related to gaining anything which one may be attracted towards.

Finally, Mathew Ratcliffe, in ‘Why Mood Matters’65, explicitly follows Blattner and holds that Heidegger’s anxiety is fruitfully compared to depression, and worries that Heidegger has not distinguished anxiety from depression in any way (p. 172). Ratcliffe notes that “both depression and Heideggerian anxiety involve not only a loss of possibilities, but also a conspicuous awareness that something has been lost.” (p. 172) Ratcliffe concludes that Heidegger “fails to acknowledge sufficiently the diversity and subtle differences” (p. 172) between different moods. Again Ratcliffe, like Dreyfus and Blattner, seems to be suggesting that Heidegger’s anxiety is only constituted by an antipathy – relating to

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a total loss which one wants to avoid – without any sympathy, without gaining anything which one is attracted to.

Thus we find this thread in the secondary literature on Heidegger’s anxiety which holds – either explicitly or implicitly – that Heidegger’s anxiety is merely antipathetic, is merely related to a total loss which one wants to avoid, and is in no way related to gaining back anything, which one may be attracted to. I, of course, have argued in detail in the above section that Heidegger’s anxiety is structurally similar to Kierkegaard’s in that it is constituted by both an antipathy and a sympathy. For I argued above that death-anxiety – which discloses the possibility of the utter loss of all concern – is the antipathetic disclosure of anxiety; while conscience-anxiety – which discloses the possibility of gaining back all that one loses – is the sympathetic disclosure. But let us move on to the second point.

For not only has my account of anxiety’s ambiguity in Heidegger harmonized with my account in Kierkegaard, but also my account of the strange agency involved in strict inauthenticity in Heidegger has harmonized with my account of the strange agency involved in strict sin in Kierkegaard. That is, whereas in part I of this dissertation I detailed how the agency involved in strict sin is a combination of part cowardly weakness, part willful defiance, in the above section I have now detailed how, for Heidegger, the agency involved in strict inauthenticity is made up of part cowardly weakness, part willful defiance. Indeed it was by detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety which led to this demonstration of the strange agency. But when we now look at some of the prevalent secondary literature which explicitly deals with the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship on this topic of agency, what we find is that this similarity between the two authors is generally missed.

As briefly mentioned in my Introduction, Dan Magurshak, in ‘The Concept of Anxiety: The Keystone of the Kierkegaard-Heidegger Relationship’66, argues that Heidegger’s account of anxiety is indebted to Kierkegaard’s, and notes how one’s response to this anxiety can involve springing into sin in Kierkegaard or inauthenticity in Heidegger. However, Magurshak does not deal with whether or not Heidegger took over Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety’s ambiguity. What is important for us now is how Magurshak deals with the agency involved in springing into sin in Kierkegaard and inauthenticity in Heidegger. Firstly, Magurshak does not explicitly raise this question of agency, but we can piece together his implied view. For he notes that while on Kierkegaard’s account the sinner experiences both ‘anxiety about evil’ and ‘anxiety about the good’, Magurshak holds that Heidegger only took over Kierkegaard’s account of anxiety about the good. Magurshak holds that Heidegger’s “analysis seems to be rooted in Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety about the good” (p. 183), and holds that Heidegger’s analysis “is

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exactly parallel to anxiety about the good.” (p. 184). Now, as mentioned Magurshak does not explicitly raise the question of agency here, but if we follow my analysis that Kierkegaard’s anxiety about evil is a type of weakness, while anxiety about the good is a willful defiance, than, Magurshak would be saying that Heidegger’s account of the agency involved in strict inauthenticity is that merely of defiance. In short, Magurshak seems to miss the strange agency involved in Heidegger’s analysis.

Now, as also mentioned briefly in my Introduction, Magurshak, in ‘Despair and Everydayness: Kierkegaard’s Corrective Contribution to Heidegger’s Notion of Fallen Everydayness’, explicitly raises this question of the agency involved in both despair in Kierkegaard and inauthenticity in Heidegger. Here Magurshak details how despair for Kierkegaard is made up both a passive weakness and active defiance, and the main point of this article is to argue that Heidegger, in his account of the agency involved in inauthenticity, failed to grasp the nuances of this agency, and instead Heidegger’s account is merely that of a weakness (thus Magurshak seems to here shift his position, compared with his above article), and indeed Magurshak holds that Heidegger’s account of mere weakness is not even as developed as Kierkegaard’s account of weakness (pp. 228-229). Let us now look at this criticism in detail.

Firstly, Magurshak sketches Kierkegaard’s account of despair in weakness, noting in what sense the agency involved here is indeed one of weakness. Magurshak then explicitly holds that Heidegger does not have an account as developed as Kierkegaard’s in his account of inauthenticity. Magurshak then proceeds to detail what such a developed account of inauthenticity of weakness would look like if it were in Being and Time. I quote Magurshak here at some length because what he says is not in Being and Time is very close what I hope to have shown is indeed in Being and Time: “[h]ad Being and Time discussed this existential possibility, it might have described it as follows: In the summons to his unique potential for lucidly appropriating his thrown, mortal, and limited freedom, Dasein becomes aware that he has evaded himself and may do so again. He then takes a wrong turn; instead of becoming authentic, he despairs over his weakness. (…) He is obsessed with having fled his mortal freedom in the past and that he may do so again. In such a case, a person is indeed individualized from the crowd, but his individualization allows for yet another mode of not-being-oneself.” (p. 229) In this section I believe that I have shown that while death-anxiety discloses the possibility of anticipation, in strict inauthenticity one indeed is aware that one has been hitherto entangled in das Man, and that one should wrench oneself out of das Man by way of anticipation, yet one merely sorrows over the fact that one has been hitherto cowardly so entangled. For, in this regard I referenced often overlooked citations from Being and Time which suggest just this – i.e. the citation which holds that in botched anticipation Dasein realizes that it

‘can’ have wrenched itself out of *das Man*, but this only reveals its lostness in *das Man* (SZ 263); and the citation which holds that in anxiety Dasein makes known its own cowardliness (SZ 266).

Secondly, Magurshak sketches Kierkegaard’s account of despair in defiance, nothing in what sense the agency here is indeed one of defiance. Magurshak then explicitly holds that Heidegger does not have a similar account of this defiant agency involved in inauthenticity. Again Magurshak then details what such an account would be like if it were in *Being and Time*, and I quote this at length because I hold that what he says is not in *Being and Time* actually is: “[i]f one attempts to describe such a life in the language of *Being and Time*, it might read as follows: A person living in defiant despair has certainly been individualized from the crowd. He is lucidly aware of his ownmost potentiality for becoming burdened, that is, for realizing himself in limited, situated freedom. (…) Nonetheless, he refuse to acknowledge the power of his imitations. (…) His life is a deliberate refusal to appropriate certain aspects of his concrete existence on the basis of his capacity for infinite abstraction, a capacity he interprets as one of total self-creation.” (pp. 232-233) In this section I also believe that I have shown that while conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of resoluteness, which involves taking up the concern for the very same intraworldly which one resigns, in strict inauthenticity one does not want to face up to these limitations, but indeed in an act of defiance, wants to create its own network of involvements that it will absorb itself in. In this regard I of course referenced how conscience-anxiety discloses the *Nichtigkeit* (SZ 284) – one’s ‘finite limitations’ – and also how anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution (SZ 343-344), which means that while conscience-anxiety discloses these limitations, Dasein may indeed, in strict inauthenticity, defiantly reject acknowledging them.

Therefore, I believe that I have shown, contra Magurshak, that as Kierkegaard’s account of strict sin is that of both a cowardly weakness and a willful defiance, we find in Heidegger in a very similar fashion that strict inauthenticity is likewise made up of both a cowardly weakness and a willful defiance.

Now in this section I have been holding that one of the upshots in detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety in Heidegger is that this will lead to an account of the strange agency involved in strict inauthenticity, as part active part passive. I hope to have shown this in this section, and I hope to have also shown how some of the secondary literature on the Kierkegaard-Heidegger relationship has missed this. For we saw how in the literature it is held that Heidegger’s anxiety is *merely* antipathetic, with no sympathetic side; and we also saw how in this literature it is held that Heidegger’s account of the agency involved in strict inauthenticity is underdeveloped, and does not contain both an active and passive side. However, I believe that I have shown how neither of these claims are accurate and that Heidegger is similar to Kierkegaard in both respects: that is, I detailed how death-anxiety is the antipathetic disclosure of anticipation which can be achieved with one’s own willpower; how conscience-anxiety is the sympathetic disclosure of resoluteness which can only be achieved through a receptivity to
the call; and, following from this account of ambiguous anxiety, how thus springing off this anxiety into strict inauthenticity is a combination of, in weakness, failing to do what one can do if only one musters the courage, and, in defiance, failing to receptively receive the call by way of a willful defiance against it.
I am interpreting anxiety in Heidegger progressively – that is, we are proceeding from the encounter with disguised anxiety in the undifferentiated mode, on to manifest yet misused anxiety in strict inauthenticity, and ultimately to rightly used manifest anxiety which is co-present with authenticity (the telos). For I am after an interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, holding that this anxiety is ambiguous (part antipathetic, part sympathetic), and as there are these three different encounters which Dasein may have with this anxiety, I hold that to properly understand this anxiety we must track the movement through the three encounters, detailing the interrelation between them. We are tracking this movement progressively – towards the telos.

We began, in §A, by sketching the dialectic of inauthenticity at its most general level, showing that inauthentic Dasein is always made up a relative admixture of undifferentiatedness – in which Dasein is absorbed in the world, entangled in das Man, and in which its normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity is not manifest; and strict inauthenticity – in which Dasein, individualized in uncanniness, not absorbed, grapples with its normative orientation. We then began the progressive movement. For we started, in §B, by detailing the way anxiety shows up in disguise as fear in the undifferentiated mode, in the world. We then, in §C, proceeded to strip away the disguise of this anxiety and detail how it shows up in uncanniness, where Dasein is not absorbed, such that it is manifest yet misused, giving rise to the dialectic of strict inauthenticity. I showed that when undisguised, anxiety’s object is nothing, and anxiety relates to this nothing in two ways – an antipathy (death-anxiety) and a sympathy (conscience-anxiety) – and I showed how when this ambiguous anxiety is misused Dasein is perpetually springing into inauthenticity, spinning in perpetual motion. But now we are in a position to, §D, proceed on to the final encounter of anxiety: manifest anxiety rightly used such that it gives rise to authenticity. For I have shown in detail how manifest anxiety in strict inauthenticity is misused, and thus I have sketched how it is a privation of rightly used anxiety. But we can use this privation to track towards the telos – rightly used anxiety which springs Dasein into authenticity. Once I now explain manifest anxiety rightly used, we will have reached the goal of the progressive interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger – for after having begun with the encounter furthest removed from the telos, disguised anxiety, we will have tracked in detail the movement through each of the three encounters, showing the interrelation therein, and will have finally arrived at the telos.
As mentioned in my Introduction, there are two upshots, in relation to Heidegger’s account of authenticity, which we achieve by way of detailing the ambiguous structure of Heidegger’s anxiety (i.e. detailing anxiety’s antipathetic and sympathetic aspects). The first upshot concerns the way the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity leads to an account of the agency involved in authenticity. By detailing that anxiety’s antipathy discloses the possibility of utterly collapsing all concern for the intraworldly (anticipation), and that anxiety’s sympathy discloses the possibility of gaining back all of that concern (resoluteness), I will now show in detail how, when used rightly, this ambiguous anxiety acts as the springboard to spring Dasein into authenticity, anticipatory resoluteness. More specifically, in this section I will show in further detail that while anxiety’s antipathy discloses anticipation as a possibility which Dasein may achieve with its own will power if it musters the courage, this means that the agency involved in achieving this possibility, achieving anticipation, is that of a courageous willpower (for here I will raise a puzzle about the details of this willing). And in this section I will show in further detail that while anxiety’s sympathy discloses resoluteness as a possibility which Dasein can only achieve by way of a receptivity towards the call of conscience, this means that the agency involved in achieving resoluteness is that of a receptivity (for here I will also deal with a puzzle regarding the details of this receptivity). In this way detailing anxiety’s ambiguity leads to an account of the agency involved in authenticity as one of part courageous willpower (activity), part receptivity (passivity). For authenticity, anticipatory resoluteness, is only achieved when Dasein properly springs off anxiety’s antipathy and sympathy, and by detailing these aspects we will arrive at a full account of the agency involved in authenticity.

Now, the second upshot, in relation to Heidegger’s account of authenticity, which we achieve by detailing the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity in Heidegger is that it brings one’s relation to the concept of authenticity to the fore in a particularly pressing manner. As I will show in this section, detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety in Heidegger, detailing the antipathetic and sympathetic aspects, leads to show that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is absurd in a similar manner to Kierkegaard’s account of faith. Now, this is not to say that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is, regarding its content, the same as Kierkegaard’s account of faith, but it is to say that the structure of the absurdity in Kierkegaard’s account of faith – as the simultaneous and seemingly incompossible two movements – is similar to the structure which we find in Heidegger’s account of authenticity. In this section I will detail in what sense I mean that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is absurd. But what is the point of arguing that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is indeed absurd? I think that the point of this is that it, as I say, brings the reader’s relation to the concept to the fore in a pressing manner. For as I detailed in part I how the absurd plays a role in Kierkegaard’s writings such that it tends to force the reader to make a decision for themselves regarding how they stand in relation to the concept – to either
give up on this concept of faith as an ideal; or to consider faith to be the highest spiritual task which they will attempt to achieve – I also think that this is upshot of detailing the absurdity of Heidegger’s account of authenticity; that this absurdity will tend to force the reader to make a decision for themselves where they stand in relation to this concept, either to give it up, or to strive after it.

And in this section I will show how detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety in Heidegger leads to the conclusion that Heidegger’s authenticity is indeed absurd. And finally, at the end of this section I will home in on some of the prevalent secondary literature which deals with Heidegger’s account of authenticity, and I will show the way this literature tends to avoid the conclusion that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is absurd. However I will also be detailing in this section the textual evidence for my conclusion, and thus not only do I think that this literature overlooks the textual evidence, but in doing so it also misses the way the reader’s relation to the concept of authenticity is brought to the fore due to its absurdity.

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I have shown how manifest anxiety, structurally, is comprised of the Wovor and the Worum: the Wovor discloses ‘nothing’, that is, the worldhood of the world, the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general (the category of totality); the Worum discloses Dasein’s existence and therewith discloses Dasein’s normative orientation towards inauthenticity and authenticity. I have gone on to show that anxiety has two aspects: death-anxiety and conscience-anxiety – and in spelling these out I have explained anxiousness. For anxiousness accounts for the way the disclosures of anxiety’s Wovor and Worum matter, and I have shown how while both death-anxiety and conscience-anxiety express the essential structure of anxiety – they are both comprised of the Wovor and Worum – death-anxiety expresses this structure such that it matters in an antipathetic manner, while conscience-anxiety expresses this structure such that it matters in a sympathetic manner. That is, anxiety is ambiguous. But let me spell this out in more detail.

While anxiety’s Wovor discloses, structurally, nothing, that is, the worldhood of the world, the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general (the category of totality), death-anxiety’s Wovor discloses the impending utter impossibility of any and all absorption, that is, the impending utter collapse of any and all concern with the ready-to-hand, and solicitude with Dasein-with – and therewith the utter collapse of entanglement in das Man. And while anxiety’s Worum discloses, structurally, Dasein’s existence and normative orientation, death-anxiety’s Worum discloses the possibility of existing amidst the utter collapse of absorption in the world and collapse of das Man, which it ought to achieve, discloses the possibility of anticipation. Taken together death-anxiety discloses the possibility (Worum) of
impossibility (*Wovor*), which it ought to achieve: and this disclosure matters to Dasein such that it is utterly threatening (*anxiousness*). Death-anxiety is thus the antipathetic aspect of anxiety, it is the antipathetic springboard from which anticipation can be achieved.

And while anxiety’s *Wovor* discloses, structurally, nothing, worldhood (the category of totality), conscience-anxiety’s *Wovor* discloses the *Nichtigkeit* (guilt) of the nothing, that is, discloses the fact that Dasein is thrown such that it cannot choose/create the network of involvements to absorb itself in, but is always already thrown into it. And while anxiety’s *Worum* discloses, structurally, existence and Dasein’s normative orientation, conscience-anxiety’s *Worum* discloses the possibility of authentic absorption in the world such Dasein is not entangled in *das Man*, which Dasein indeed ought to achieve. Taken together conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of authentic absorption (*Worum*) in the very same world one is already absorbed in (*Wovor*), which one ought to achieve: and this disclosure matters to Dasein such that it brings Dasein an unshakable joy (*anxiousness*). Conscience-anxiety is thus the sympathetic aspect of anxiety, it is the sympathetic springboard from which resoluteness can be achieved.

But I stress now that these two aspects of anxiety – antipathetic death-anxiety, and sympathetic conscience-anxiety – are always co-present in manifest anxiety, for they indeed are two aspects of one and the same phenomenon, manifest anxiety. Manifest antipathetic death-anxiety therefore simultaneously reveals manifest sympathetic conscience-anxiety; and manifest conscience-anxiety simultaneously reveals manifest death-anxiety. Indeed Heidegger stresses this point:

The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety. But this primordial anxiety strives to exact resoluteness of itself. It moves out of the way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein has been abandoned to itself. The “nothing” with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] by which Dasein, in its very *basis* is defined; and this basis itself is as thrownness into death. (SZ 308)

Here Heidegger notes that manifest death-anxiety “strives to exact resoluteness of itself”. But since the possibility of resoluteness is what is disclosed in conscience-anxiety, this means that death-anxiety is unveiling conscience-anxiety. That is, death-anxiety, which discloses the utter ‘nothing’, the possibility of the utter impossibility, unveils conscience anxiety, which discloses the *Nichtigkeit* of the nothing: “[t]he “nothing” with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] by which Dasein in its very *basis* is defined; and this basis itself is as thrownness into death.” The same can be said about conscience-anxiety – conscience-anxiety reveals death-anxiety. Thus antipathetic death-anxiety simultaneously reveals sympathetic conscience-anxiety, and vice versa.

The reason why anxiety’s antipathetic springboard (death-anxiety) always unveils anxiety’s sympathetic springboard (conscience-anxiety), and vice versa, is because these two springboards only make sense in relation to one another. For the antipathetic springboard can only properly launch Dasein into anticipation, if, at the same time, the sympathetic springboard launches Dasein into resoluteness; and
vice versa. The antipathetic springboard (death-anxiety) only makes sense in relation to the sympathetic springboard, and indeed always reveals that sympathy: thus, to stress this I specify that the antipathetic springboard is the *sympathetic antipathy*. And since the sympathetic springboard (conscience-anxiety) only makes sense in relation to the antipathetic springboard, and indeed always unveils that antipathy, I stress this by specifying that the sympathetic springboard is the *antipathetic sympathy*. The sympathetic springboard is always intertwined with the antipathetic springboard, and the antipathetic springboard always intertwines the sympathetic springboard: the sympathy and the antipathy have an elasticity such they are intertwining one another. And thus, considering undisguised ambiguous anxiety in its totality, the elastic antipathy and the elastic sympathy intertwine together making up a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy and this intertwined elasticity is the springboard from which Dasein springs.

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Now that I have explained manifest anxiety in more detail, I will detail how when this anxiety is used rightly it is co-present with authenticity. For I have shown how in strict inauthenticity Dasein is continually mis-springing off the springboard in its perpetual motion – and I have noted that here anxiety has not ‘mounted authentically’. But when this elastic intertwined springboard is used rightly, when Dasein springs off this correctly, here anxiety will have ‘mounted authentically’, for here Dasein will be springing into authenticity. This of course means that when this elastic springboard is sprung off from correctly, Dasein will *simultaneously achieve both anticipation and resoluteness*: that is, Dasein will correctly spring off the *sympathetic antipathy* (death-anxiety) such that it will achieve the possibility of impossibility, the utter collapse of any and all involvement; and Dasein will simultaneously correctly spring off the *antipathetic sympathy* (conscience-anxiety) such that it will achieve resoluteness, an authentic absorption in the very same world it was always already absorbed in. When Dasein thus uses the springboard correctly and simultaneously achieves anticipation and resoluteness, these two go together making up *anticipatory resoluteness*. This, anticipatory resoluteness, is Dasein’s authenticity which is co-present with anxiety used rightly: for when Dasein properly springs off the elastic springboard of anxiety, it springs into anticipatory resoluteness.

But before I explain in more detail this anticipatory resoluteness, and how this is achieved by using anxiety rightly, I now highlight something which is perhaps alarming: the concept of anticipatory resoluteness is *absurd*. There are two points which will specify what I mean when I call anticipatory resoluteness ‘absurd’. Firstly, the absurdity is shown when I highlight that in anticipatory resoluteness, both of the movements of anticipation and resoluteness are made *continually in simultaneity*. That is, authenticity is such that one is, on the one hand, continually utterly collapsing all involvements with the
intraworldly (achieving the utter living death), and yet, on the other hand, one is continually gaining back that very same absorption, those very same involvements with the intraworldly – indeed such that these two movements are made continually in simultaneity. Heidegger writes,

Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of death (…) Nor does wanting-have-a-conscience, which has been made determinate as Being-towards-death, signify a kind of seclusion in which one flees the world; rather, it brings one (…) into the resoluteness of ‘taking action’. (SZ 310)

On the one hand authenticity is such that it is not the case that one achieves resoluteness without anticipation – authenticity does not “overcome” death, but rather, in resoluteness one is simultaneously engaged in the continual living death. And on the other hand authenticity is such that it is not the case that one achieves anticipation without resoluteness – authenticity does not “flee the world”, but rather, in anticipation, in living death, one simultaneously takes up an existentiell for-the-sake-of-which and continually absorbs oneself in the world. Authenticity is the simultaneous double-movement of anticipatory resoluteness, of both continually achieving the utter collapse of any and all absorption and simultaneously continually achieving the very same absorption which one is utterly collapsing. By juxtaposing these two movements in their simultaneity we have reached the first step in highlighting the absurdity of authenticity.

This leads to the second point in specifying the absurdity of anticipatory resoluteness. Namely, Heidegger seems to suggest that this concept of anticipatory resoluteness – as the continual and simultaneous double-movement of both utterly collapsing one’s absorption and gaining back that same absorption – will tend to appear to be an incompossible mode of existence for Dasein. That is, the two movements of continually collapsing all absorption, and yet continually gaining back that same absorption, will tend to appear to be not mutually possible, tend to appear to be incompatible, if they are to be made simultaneously. Thus Heidegger asks,

How are these two phenomena of anticipation and resoluteness to be brought together? Has not our ontological projection of the authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole led us into a dimension of Dasein which lies far from the phenomenon of resoluteness? What can death and the ‘concrete Situation’ of taking action have in common? (SZ 302)

Indeed, how can anticipation – the utter collapse of all absorption, ‘taking everything back’ – and resoluteness – gaining authentic absorption, “taking action” – be “brought together”? Here Heidegger seems to be implying that his account of anticipatory resoluteness – which I specify is absurd – will tend to appear to be an incompossible mode of existence. And thus while the first specification of the absurdity of authenticity is that anticipation and resoluteness are both to made continually in simultaneity, the second specification of this absurdity is that this mode of existence will tend to appear to be an incompossible mode of existence. But nevertheless, even though this simultaneous double-movement
may appear to be incompossible, this is still the telos which Dasein ought to achieve – and this means that this telos is absurd. But I will now explain the details of this absurd telos, and in doing so detail certain key aspects of the absurd dialectical spring which I have hitherto passed over.

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Anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy – death-anxiety – is the springboard from which, when rightly used, Dasein springs into anticipation. Death-anxiety discloses the possibility of impossibility, the possibility of the utter collapse of all absorption, and this possibility matters to Dasein such that it is utterly threatening. However, death-anxiety discloses this threatening possibility to Dasein as that which it ought to achieve – for when Dasein utterly collapses all absorption, it therewith utterly wrenches itself out of its entanglement in das Man since das Man is localized in absorption – and discloses this possibility as something which Dasein can achieve on its own accord, that is, with its own willpower. Therefore when Dasein springs off the sympathetic antipathy properly, it does so by willfully utterly collapsing any and all absorption, and therewith willfully utterly wrenching itself out of its entanglement in das Man – when rightly used, Dasein does not, in a cowardly weakness, sorrow over its inauthenticity, perhaps collapsing this or that involvement, collapsing merely more and yet more absorption, but, when rightly used, Dasein courageously collapses utterly all absorption with its own will and therewith utterly collapses its entanglement in das Man. By way of properly springing off this threatening springboard, Dasein willfully achieves anticipation – the possibility of impossibility – and when this is achieved Dasein has disentangled itself from the snares of das Man (idle-talk, curiosity, ambiguity).

Now, in order to complete my account of properly springing off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy, here I must add a specification about achieving anticipation which I have hitherto passed over – that is, I must specify the details of the willful nature of this springing. For I have continually been noting that achieving anticipation – achieving the possibility of the utter impossibility – is something that Dasein can do of its own accord, that is, can do with its own willpower. For Dasein ought to do so, and if it musters the courage, it can indeed achieve anticipation with its own willpower. However there might be something of a puzzle about how this is supposed to work – how can Dasein utterly collapse all of the involvements of the intraworldly with its own willpower? To answer this we need to recall what I have been reiterating: that the involvements of intraworldly entities – the involvements of the ready-to-hand, the involvements of other Daseins in their Dasein-with – are each referring to the next, making up the referential context of significance, and this network of involvements is anchored in the existentiell for-the-sake-of-which which Dasein is projecting into. That is, all of the involvements of the intraworldly entities, each referring to the next, are ultimately grounded in the particular existentiell for-the-sake-of-
which which Dasein is projecting, such that these involvements branch out, as it were, from that particular for-the-sake-of-which. But this thus means that *if that particular for-the-sake-of-which is given up by Dasein, therewith all the involvements of the intraworldly that branch out of that for-the-sake-of-which likewise collapse.* And this thus is the answer to the puzzle: Dasein with its *own willpower* can give up its existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, and if it musters the courage to do this, then therewith all absorption in the world collapses, therewith anticipation is achieved.

Now here I must detail this view a bit. For is it the case that Dasein only has *one* existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, which, in turn, anchors all of the involvement of the intraworldly? Whereas Heidegger may indeed imply this throughout *Being and Time*, we do not necessarily need to adopt this view. For perhaps Dasein has a variety of existentiell for-the-sakes-of-which, and each different one gives different intraworldly entities their involvement, or indeed, gives more and yet more absorbed involvement to each. And indeed if I take this line then I can make sense of the idea, which Heidegger intimates, that Dasein can, in its movement towards anticipation, collapse more and yet more of its absorption, more and yet more of intraworldly involvement: for if Dasein with a variety of for-the-sakes-of-which gives up one or some of these, without giving them all up, then more and yet more of its absorption is collapsed, more and yet more of intraworldly involvement is collapsed (and more and yet more anxiety in uncanniness is, relatively, achieved). On this line, then, achieving anticipation can be accomplished by Dasein, with its own willpower, by giving up all of its existentiell for-the-sakes-of-which, which in turn will collapse utterly all absorption.

And finally, a way to incorporate both of the above options (that Dasein only has *one* existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, or that Dasein has multiple) would be the following. Dasein indeed has multiple existentiell for-the-sakes-of-which, but ultimately there is one *leading* existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, which all the other for-the-sakes-of-which branch out of, as it were. This line, then, would give us the benefits of both of the above lines. For on this line Dasein indeed has a variety of existentiell for-the-sakes-of-which, and thus Dasein can make the movement towards anticipation by, with its own willpower, giving up more and yet more of its for-the-sakes-of-which, thereby collapsing more and yet more of its absorption (achieving, relatively, more and yet more anxiety in uncanniness); but also, on this line, anticipation is only achieved, the utter collapse of all absorption is only achieved, once Dasein gives up its *leading* existentiell for-the-sake-of-which — for once this leading-for-the-sake-of-which is given up, therewith all the other for-the-sakes-of-which which branch out of this leading one thereby collapse, and therewith utterly all absorption thereby collapses. I thus take this line in this dissertation. Dasein, with its *own willpower*, collapses utterly all of its absorption in the world by giving up its leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, which thereby undercuts all secondary ones, and utterly collapses all of its absorption.
Thus we now have a full account of properly springing off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy – off death-anxiety. In death-anxiety the possibility of the impossibility, the possibility of the utter collapse of all absorption is disclosed. This is a threatening possibility, and yet this is disclosed as that which Dasein ought to courageously achieve. This possibility is thus achieved by way of a willing on Dasein’s part to give up its leading existentiell for-the sake-of-which, undercutting all others – when rightly used, Dasein willfully collapses utterly all of its absorption in the world.

However, Dasein is always absorbed in the world, and thus willfully collapsing all of its absorption – the utter collapse – is only possible if Dasein simultaneously gains an authentic absorption by way of resoluteness (lest it become psychotic, as I detail next section). This is what Heidegger is indicating when he writes,

Does Dasein ever factically throw itself into such a Being-towards-death? Does Dasein demand, even by reason of its ownmost Being, an authentic potentiality-for-Being determined by anticipation? (...) we must investigate whether to any extent and in any way Dasein gives testimony, from its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, as to a possible authenticity of its existence, so that it not only makes known that in an existentiell manner such authenticity is possible, but demands this of itself. (SZ 266-267)

For I noted last section that the notion of an utter collapse of absorption in which Dasein does not simultaneously achieve an authentic absorption by way of resoluteness is ‘fantastical’ – since Dasein is, indeed, always absorbed in the world. Therefore, when Dasein properly springs off the sympathetic antipathy (death-anxiety), and willfully and courageously achieves anticipation, it is simultaneously and continually properly springing off the antipathetic sympathy (conscience-anxiety) and achieving resoluteness. That is, when Dasein properly springs off the sympathetic antipathy and achieves the utter collapse of all absorption, it is simultaneously and continually gaining back that very absorption – which, of course, is absurd.

Anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy – conscience-anxiety – is the springboard from which, when rightly used, Dasein springs into resoluteness. Conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of an authentic absorption in the very same world one is always already absorbed in (in accordance with the Nichtigkeit (guilt) of the nothing) – which also means receiving back that very same leading existentiell for-the sake-of-which which has been anchoring that absorption. This possibility matters to Dasein such that it brings an unshakable joy. Conscience-anxiety discloses this joyful possibility to Dasein as that which it ought to achieve, for the call of conscience summons and appeals to Dasein, even against Dasein’s will, to resoluteness. Thus this possibility which ought to be achieved is indeed achieved by way of a receptive letting the call of conscience call one into authentic absorption with the same leading for-the sake-of-which – when rightly used, Dasein does not, in a willful defiance, refuse the call (motivated perhaps by a refusal to accept the Nichtigkeit of the nothing, a defiant wanting to create its own network and wanting to
create a new existentiell for-the-sake-of-which), but rather when rightly used Dasein receptively allows the call to call it into an authentic absorption in the very same world, and receive the very same leading for-the-sake-of-which. By way of properly springing off this joyful springboard, Dasein receptively achieves resoluteness – authentic absorption.

Now, in order to complete my account of properly springing off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy, here I should add a specification about the call of conscience which I have hitherto passed over – that is, I should specify the details of the receptive nature of this springing. For in this regard there is perhaps something of a puzzle about where the call of conscience is ‘coming from’. For I have stressed hitherto that the call silently calls ‘against Dasein’s will’ and receiving the silent call is a receptive ‘letting’ – but now I ask: where then does the call ‘come from’? Heidegger is clear that the call does not come from another Dasein within the world – and this makes sense insofar as the call issues apparently from Dasein’s own uncanniness, in which the world is collapsed. So then, Dasein, from its own uncanniness, call itself? We cannot altogether accept this view either, for Heidegger stresses that the call calls ‘abruptly’ ‘against Dasein’s will’, and thus seems to be coming, while not from another Dasein, neither entirely from one’s own Dasein either. But this strange phenomenon is the very one which Heidegger wants to capture, for he stresses: “the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me.” (SZ 275) How do we make sense of this? What is the “‘It’” (SZ 275) which does the calling? I suggest we take a page from Heidegger’s ‘What is Metaphysics?’ – a lecture that Heidegger gave two years after the publication of Being and Time – to help answer this.

For in ‘What is Metaphysics?’ Heidegger revisits his account of anxiety and in general this account of anxiety is compatible with his account given in Being and Time. Without going over the details of this lecture, I want to point out that Heidegger, in this lecture, refers to the ‘call’ which is attuned by anxiety, and this call, I hold, is compatible with the call of conscience in Being and Time. However, in ‘What is Metaphysics?’ Heidegger makes a specification regarding this call that is not made in Being and Time, yet which is indeed compatible with the account given to us in Being and Time. Namely, in ‘What is Metaphysics?’ Heidegger holds that the ‘voice’ which ‘calls’ by way of silence and is attuned by anxiety – “anxiety, as the mood attuned by that voice” (WM 233) – is the voice of Being: “the silent* voice (...) *Being” (carrying out) as the silent voice” (WM 233). Thus, Heidegger tells us here, the human being (Dasein) is called by the silent voice of Being, which is attuned by anxiety:

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68 Mulhall in his Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), pp. 272-284, and Heidegger and Being and Time (Routledge: London, 1996), pp. 125-136, gives his own account of how to make sense of this ‘It’ which does the calling. Mulhall holds that, contrary to what Heidegger writes, the call indeed comes from another Dasein, an authentic other (Mulhall gives a reason why Heidegger flatly denies this possibility: he holds that that Heidegger wanted to appear as if his authentic work, Being and Time, came solely from himself). Here I give my own account of the ‘It’.
Of all beings, only the human being, [is] called upon by the voice of being and into the attunement coming from this voice (WM 234)

Turning back to Being and Time I think that we have the resources to specify the puzzling idea that the call of conscience comes both from Dasein and yet from beyond Dasein in conscience-anxiety. I think we have the resources to answer the question as to what the ‘It’ is which does the calling: "Being itself is the caller of the call of conscience."

This solution, I think, nicely fits the description of the ‘It’ which Heidegger specifies in Being and Time. For as Being is the caller, the caller is thus not another Dasein in the world; and, as Being is the caller, the call comes both from Dasein, and yet from beyond it. For while there is a distinction between Being itself and Dasein’s Being, nevertheless Dasein’s Being is grounded in Being itself. And thus the call, coming from Being itself, issues in a certain sense from Dasein’s own Being insofar as Dasein’s Being is grounded in Being itself (in this sense the call comes “from me”); yet at the same time in a certain sense the call does not come from Dasein’s own Being insofar as Being itself is indeed distinguished from Dasein’s Being (in this sense the call comes “from beyond me and over me”), and thus also is experienced by Dasein as calling abruptly, and against its will. And thus, in Being and Time, the “voice of conscience” (SZ 268), on my account, is none other than the ‘voice of Being’. As stated, this account of the ‘It’ is not clearly expressed in Being and Time, yet it is indeed a possible interpretation. Expanding the meaning of Heidegger’s own words, I might say about this interpretation: “[n]othing speaks against this; but all those phenomena which we have hitherto set forth in characterizing the caller and its calling speak for it.” (SZ 276)

John Caputo, in his book The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought (Ohio University Press: Ohio, 1978), shows in much detail how in Heidegger’s writings after Being and Time the Being-Dasein relation is structurally analogous to the mystics’ God-soul relation: as Caputo continually reiterates, ‘God : soul :: Being : Dasein’. Caputo gives an illuminating comparison between Heidegger’s ‘What is Metaphysics?’ and Meister Eckhart’s On Detachment (see Caputo’s chapter I, pp. 1-46). Caputo stresses that this analogy is one of a structural similarity, not of content – God is not equivalent to Being, and neither is the soul equivalent to Dasein (for the disanalogy in this regard see Caputo’s chapter V, pp. 218-270), but the relation between Being and Dasein in Heidegger is structurally analogous to the relation between God and the soul in the mystic (pp. 143-144). The structural analogy comes most clearly into view when Caputo gives a detailed comparison of Heidegger’s concept of Gelassenheit with Eckhart’s concept of the same name (for Heidegger borrowed this word from Eckhart) (see Caputo’s chapter IV, pp. 140-217).

Caputo argues that Gelassenheit, for both Eckhart and Heidegger, involves two ‘moments’. The first is the moment of detachment (another word Heidegger borrowed from Eckhart) which is a detachment from beings, and which, Caputo stresses, involves a willing on Dasein’s, or the soul’s, part (a willing to not will). Caputo also notes that in the German “there is an overtone in this phrase of a mystical death by which Dasein dies to beings (…) Dasein seeks to free itself from concern with beings” (p. 178). Thus the first moment of Gelassenheit is detachment – that is, a willing by Dasein or the soul in which it dies to beings, actively cuts itself off from concern with beings. The second moment of Gelassenheit is turned towards Being itself or God Himself. This moment, Caputo argues, is entirely outside of the sphere of willing – for Heidegger “every “trace” of willing has been eliminated in favor of a simple openness which “lets Being be”” (pp. 178-179), and for Eckhart this lies outside of willing as a “letting God be God” (p. 179). Thus whereas the first moment of Gelassenheit, for Eckhart and Heidegger, involves a willing by Dasein or the soul in which it dies to beings, the second moment involves a not-willing, a ‘letting’ Being be Being or God be God.
Thus we now have a full account of properly springing off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy – off conscience-anxiety. In conscience-anxiety the voice of Being calls Dasein, against Dasein’s own will, towards resoluteness, that is, towards an authentic absorption in the world it is already absorbed in with the very same leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which. This is a joyful possibility, and this is disclosed to Dasein as what it ought to allow. This possibility which ought to be achieved is indeed achieved by way of a receptive letting the call of Being call one into authentic absorption – when rightly used, Dasein receptively allows the call of Being to call it into an authentic absorption in the very same world.

However, as has been noted, ‘authentic absorption’ is spelled out as ‘absorbed in the world such that Dasein is not entangled in das Man’. But Dasein only utterly wrenches itself out of the snares of das Man when it achieves anticipation. This means that achieving resoluteness is only possible if Dasein simultaneously achieves anticipation. Thus Heidegger writes about resoluteness,

But this understanding is made possible only in so far as Dasein discloses to itself its potentiality-for-Being, and discloses it ‘right to its end’. (...) As Being-towards-the-end which understands – that is to say, as anticipation of death – resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. (SZ 305)

I noted above that achieving resoluteness is not possible if Dasein does not simultaneously utterly wrench itself out of the snares of das Man by way of anticipation. For authentic absorption is such that Dasein is absorbed in such a way that it is not entangled in das Man, and therefore anticipation (which utterly wrenches Dasein out of das Man) is required. Therefore, when Dasein properly springs off the antipathetic sympathy (conscience-anxiety), and receptively achieves resoluteness by way of letting the voice of Being call it, it is simultaneously and continually properly springing off the sympathetic antipathy (death-anxiety) and achieving anticipation. That is, when Dasein properly springs off the antipathetic sympathy achieving this absorption, it is therewith simultaneously and continually utterly collapsing this very same absorption – which is, of course, absurd.

And thus taking the detailed account of manifest anxiety together with the way in which this is rightly used in authenticity, we have the following. Anxiety is made up of antipathetic death-anxiety and sympathetic conscience-anxiety. But I stressed that these are two aspects of one phenomenon – anxiety. This means that the antipathy always unveils the sympathy and vice versa, and to stress this I called death-anxiety the sympathetic antipathy, and conscience-anxiety the antipathetic sympathy. In total the sympathetic and antipathetic aspects of anxiety have an elasticity which intertwine together making up a

Whereas Caputo argues that his account here is not applicable to authenticity in Being and Time – since Caputo holds that achieving authenticity in Being and Time is purely an expression of the will – I disagree with Caputo on this point, and I hold in this dissertation that what Caputo calls the ‘mystical element’ in Heidegger is also in play in the account of authenticity given to us in Being and Time: the first movement – anticipation – is a willing by Dasein to achieve living death; the second movement – resoluteness – is not a willing by Dasein, but a receptive ‘letting’ the voice of Being call one.
sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy, and this intertwined elasticity is the springboard from which Dasein springs. When Dasein properly springs off the sympathetic antipathy (death-anxiety) it, with a willful courage, achieves the possibility of utter impossibility, utterly collapses all of its absorption, by way of giving up its leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, and therewith utterly wrenches itself out of its entanglement in das Man – that is, it achieves anticipation. But properly achieving anticipation is only possible if Dasein simultaneously gains an authentic absorption and gains back the very same existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, that is gains resoluteness – “[a]uthentic ‘thinking about death’ is a wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which has become transparent to itself in an existentiell manner.” (SZ 309) That is, when Dasein properly achieves anticipation it is therewith achieving anticipatory resoluteness. And when Dasein properly springs off the antipathetic sympathy (conscience-anxiety) it, with a receptivity towards the call of Being, achieves its authentic absorption in the same world it was already absorbed in and gains back the very same for-the-sake-of-which, yet now such that it is not entangled in das Man – that is, it achieves resoluteness. But achieving resoluteness is only possible if Dasein simultaneously utterly loses all of its absorption by giving up its leading for-the-sake-of-which, that is gains anticipation – “[r]esoluteness is authentically and wholly what it can be, only as anticipatory resoluteness.” (SZ 309) Thus when Dasein achieves resoluteness it is therewith achieving anticipatory resoluteness. Thus, all taken together, ambiguous anxiety is the intertwined elasticity – the sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy, relating to nothing (the category of totality) – and when Dasein uses this springboard rightly it perpetually springs into anticipatory resoluteness.

But this telos – rightly used anxiety – is absurd. This means firstly that the two movements are both made continually in simultaneity. That is, in achieving this telos Dasein continually properly springs off anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy, and yet also continually properly springs off anxiety’s antipathetic sympathy: on the one hand Dasein continually achieves anticipation, which means that Dasein continually achieves a mode of existence in which it has utterly collapsed any and all absorption (by way of collapsing its leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which) – has utterly lost all involvement; and on the other hand Dasein continually achieves resoluteness, which means that Dasein continually achieves a mode of existence in which it gains an absorption in the world and a for-the-sake-of-which, and not a different world and different for-the-sake-of-which, but the very leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which and the very world it is utterly collapsing by way of anticipation. That these two movements are made continually in simultaneity highlights the absurdity of this telos (and indeed it is by way of this absurdity that Dasein is wrenched out of its entanglement in das Man, and yet Dasein is also absorbed in the world). But secondly, the absurdity means that this concept will appear to be an incompossible mode of existence – for it will tend to appear to be not mutually possible to make both of these movements in simultaneity. Nevertheless, no matter how it appears, this double-movement is indeed the telos which Dasein ought to
achieve – that is, using anxiety rightly such that one properly springs off the sympathetic antipathy continually achieving anticipation, and simultaneously springs off the antipathetic sympathy continually achieving resoluteness, is the absurd telos.

**Secondary Literature**

I hope to have now shown how detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety in Heidegger (i.e. detailing the antipathetic and sympathetic aspects) has led to two upshots regarding Heidegger’s account of authenticity. Firstly, detailing this ambiguity led to an account of the strange agency involved in authenticity as one of part courageous willpower, part receptivity. For I showed that while anxiety’s antipathy – death-anxiety – discloses the possibility of utterly renouncing all of one’s concern for the intraworldly (anticipation), which can be achieved if one musters the courage to renounce one’s leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which, this means that the agency involved in properly springing off this antipathy is a courageous willpower. And I showed that while anxiety’s sympathy – conscience-anxiety – discloses the possibility of gaining back all of one’s concern (resoluteness), which can only be achieved by way of a receptivity in the call of Being, this means that the agency involved in properly springing off the sympathy is a receptivity. In this way the structure of anxiety’s ambiguity led to an account of the agency involved in authenticity – anticipatory resoluteness – as one of part willpower, part receptivity.

Secondly, detailing this ambiguity also led to an account of the absurdity of authenticity (similar to the absurdity of faith in Kierkegaard), which, in turn, I think tends to bring one’s relation to the concept of authenticity to the fore in a pressing manner. For I highlighted how, in anticipatory resoluteness – in properly springing off ambiguous anxiety – Dasein must be simultaneously and continually achieving both anticipation and resoluteness, and I have shown how this seems to be an incompossible mode of existence. In this sense authenticity is absurd – that anticipation, losing all one’s concern, and resoluteness, gaining back that very same concern, are both made simultaneously and continually, which seems to be an incompossible mode of existence. Now, as I have argued, I believe that I have strong textual evidence for this view. For – following Blattner – I believe I have strong evidence that when Heidegger speaks of death, he is speaking of something of what I call a ‘living death’: the collapse of all concern. But in more detail I believe that I have cited strong evidence which shows that this collapse of concern, this living death, is what Heidegger calls anticipation (something Blattner does not do, as I will highlight below). And I believe I have also cited strong textual evidence that resoluteness consists of taking back up the same concern one already had (the same for-the-sake-of-which and the same network of involvements). And as authenticity is made up of anticipation and resoluteness, I believe I have strong
evidence that it is absurd in the sense that in authenticity Dasein is simultaneously and continually collapsing and gaining back its concern, which indeed seems to be an incompossible mode of existence.

Now, the upshot of this – detailing this absurdity – is that I think that it brings the reader’s relation to the concept of authenticity to the fore in a pressing manner. That is, as the absurdity in Kierkegaard’s account of faith is intended to force the reader to make a decision regarding where they stand in relation to this concept – either to give it up as a lost concept, or to strive after it as the highest spiritual state – so too I think this same type of ‘spurring’ of the reader is in play in Heidegger’s account of authenticity. I am of course not saying that Heidegger’s authenticity is identical to Kierkegaard’s faith, but rather that the absurdity involved in each plays a similar role. The explicit recognition that Heidegger’s concept of authenticity is absurd will perhaps force the reader to consider where they stand in relation to this concept, will perhaps spur the reader to make a decision for themselves to either give up the concept as lost or to strive after it.

However, no secondary literature on Heidegger’s account of authenticity, to my knowledge, holds that Heidegger’s account of anticipatory resoluteness is absurd in the manner of Kierkegaard. For example, it is commonly held that anticipatory resoluteness consists in some transformation in how one relates to the world, resigning one relationship, and gaining a different one – and there is nothing absurd about this. Here I would like to treat in some detail some of the prevalent interpretations of authenticity in Heidegger, showing how these accounts avoid the conclusion that this authenticity is absurd. Now, none of these accounts explicitly refer to the absurdity of faith in Kierkegaard, so another way of saying this is that I will show how these accounts avoid the conclusion that authenticity is made up of a simultaneous and continual double-movement of both losing all of one’s concern, and gaining it back. However, I will at the same time be arguing why I think that my interpretation of anticipatory resoluteness – as absurd in a similar manner to Kierkegaard’s – is indeed to be preferred.

Mulhall, in a number of different sources, holds that the first movement of authenticity – anticipation – includes a recognition of our ‘mortality’, and that the ‘possibility of the impossibility’ of Dasein is a possibility that indeed cannot be actualized since Dasein will not be around to experience it once it strikes (for Dasein will be annihilated when it strikes). Mulhall, in ‘Human Mortality’70, holds that “no Dasein can directly apprehend or encounter its own death” (p. 303), and that strictly speaking the ‘possibility of death’ “is an impossible possibility” (p. 304) since no Dasein can ever actualize that possibility. But while death can never be actualized, in anticipation of death, death as possibility “indirectly” casts a light on Dasein’s life, marking that life “mortal” (p. 305). Likewise, in Heidegger and

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Mulhall holds that “death is not an event in one’s life” (p. 114) since the possibility of death can never be actualized, but nevertheless, in anticipation, this impossible possibility casts a “non-actual shadow” onto “every actual moment” (p. 118), thereby marking Dasein as “mortal” (p. 117). Finally, in *Inheritance and Originality* Mulhall also holds that anticipation amounts to a recognition of one’s “mortality” (p. 275).

Mulhall gives the clearest reading of understanding the first movement not as a ‘living death’, as I have done, but rather as a possibility that can never be actualized – since when it strikes Dasein is necessarily annihilated – and which marks our mortality. Thus anticipatory resoluteness for Mulhall includes existing with a lucid awareness of our own mortality in the light of the ‘impossible possibility’ of death, impossible because it can never be actualized – impossible because it is not a state which Dasein can achieve. Now, while Mulhall’s reading is the most convincing account of existential death in the secondary literature which takes this sort of line – i.e. understanding the possibility of death as a possibility that can never be actualized by Dasein, or achieved by Dasein – there is one weak point to this interpretation. Namely this reading of death does not read Heidegger’s use of ‘possibility’ in a systematic way throughout *Being and Time*. For (as Blattner points out, as mentioned earlier) earlier in *Being and Time* Heidegger specifies that a ‘possibility’, when the term is applied to Dasein, signifies a possible way to be Dasein. And thus when Mulhall reads the possibility of death to signify an ‘impossible possibility’ – i.e. a possibility which is not a way to be Dasein, since Dasein can never actualize it, achieve it – he thus seems to be reading ‘possibility’ here in a way contrary to the way Heidegger originally defined it. And while there is something important which Mulhall’s reading of death here emphasizes (see the end of the next section, in which I pull out what I feel is important in Mulhall’s reading), I note that a shortcoming of Mulhall’s reading of death, including how it plays into his account of anticipation and authenticity, is that he does not include the signification of ‘possibility’ as Heidegger originally defined it.

Guignon, in his ‘Authenticity, moral values, and psychotherapy’, holds that anticipatory resoluteness is a mode of existence in which one is given a sense of a ‘narrative’ of one’s life ‘from birth to death’. Here the idea is that authenticity is a mode of existence in which one has an awareness of a complete narrative of one’s life, which gives one’s life a coherent whole: the “narrativist mode” Guignon speaks of holds that authenticity is such that “life is lived as a coherent story”, which achieves a “narrative continuity” (p. 230). This reading has been heavily criticized – e.g. by Dreyfus and Carmen – and Guignon’s critics argue that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is not concerned with any type of

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narrative. Here I can add that Guignon seems to be reading Heidegger’s use of ‘birth’ and ‘death’ all too literally. For while Heidegger indeed refers to ‘birth’ and ‘death’ in relation to authenticity, I do not think that he is referring to these terms in their normal signification. For I of course hold that by death Heidegger is referring to the ‘living death’, but also I think that by ‘birth’ Heidegger is not referring to the literal beginning of one’s life, but is rather referring to the disclosure of conscience-anxiety – i.e. that in authenticity Dasein takes up precisely the for-the-sake-of-which which it already had, and absorbs itself in the same world it was already absorbed in. Thus we might say that Guignon was led to his narrative account of authenticity by his understanding ‘birth’ and ‘death’ in an all too literal manner, whereas I hold rather that by ‘birth’ Heidegger is referring to the disclosure of conscience-anxiety, and by ‘death’ Heidegger is referring to the disclosure of death-anxiety.

Carmen, in his *Heidegger’s Analytic*, holds that the first movement of authenticity – anticipation – is a lucid awareness of the ‘fragility’ of one’s projects. Here the idea is that as one projects into the future, possibilities which were in fact possible at one point become impossible. For example, when one chooses an existentiell for-the-sake-of-which one is therewith not choosing others, and indeed at some point these others, which were once possible become impossible – and thus Carmen refers to death as the ‘constant closing down of possibilities’ (p. 276), and anticipation is a lucid awareness of this. Thus, on Carmen’s account, as one projects upon one possibility, other possibilities therewith become impossible, and authenticity includes an awareness of this fact: “[f]orerunning [anticipation] means projecting willingly or wholeheartedly into the double aspect of possibility and impossibility that constitutes an essential structure of existence.” (p. 297) However here we might criticize Carmen’s account of anticipation by noting that what he calls anticipation is already included in Heidegger’s account of resoluteness – in other words, what Carmen attributes to existential death is already included in Heidegger’s account of existential guilt. For Heidegger very clearly holds, in his account of the Nichtigkeit of guilt, that when Dasein projects upon one possibility, it is therewith not projecting onto other possibilities – and Heidegger is very clear that this is an aspect of existential guilt, not death. Therefore, for Heidegger, included in resoluteness is the fact that as one projects onto one possibility others become impossible – this is not included in anticipation for Heidegger. Thus we might criticize Carmen’s account of death and anticipation by noting that his account seems to not add much that is not already included in guilt and resoluteness.

Now, my account of authenticity is distinguished from the above three in that I do not hold that death marks our mortality, as does Mulhall, nor that it helps give us an overarching narrative, as does Guignon, nor that it marks the fragility of our possibilities in that as we project upon one others become

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impossible, as in Carmen. Rather, I hold that anticipation marks the mode in which absolutely all of Dasein’s possibilities have indeed become impossible, which is a ‘living death’. As mentioned earlier, my account of death is inspired by Blattner’s account of death which he has held over the years – most clearly expressed in his seminal article ‘The concept of death in *Being and Time*’\(^75\). For Blattner holds that death is something of a ‘living death’ in which Dasein exists, yet it has no possibilities (as I detailed in a footnote above). However here I will note in detail the way my account of authenticity differs from Blattner’s, and indeed other commentators who take a similar line to that of Blattner.

The basic difference is that Blattner, and those with similar lines, while conceiving of death as the living death, as I call it, do not conceive of *anticipation* as the living death. I, however, have argued that it is precisely anticipation which is the living death: anticipation, as I believe to have argued with strong textual evidence, is the mode in which all of Dasein’s possibilities have become impossible, or in other words, is the mode in which all concern for the intraworldly has been lost. But rather than conceive of anticipation as the living death, Blattner, and others who take a similar line, hold that death as the living death is something of a *temporary antecedent* state to anticipatory resoluteness, and thus anticipation is not the living death, but marks an awareness of the fact that living death can befall one (and further, Blattner and others hold that when living death does befall one, this normally signals that one needs to take up a *different* for-the-sake-of-which than the one which has now become impossible).

In Blattner’s recent article ‘Authenticity and Resoluteness’\(^76\), he, while noting that he understands death as he formulated it in his seminal paper, gives us his account of authenticity. Here Blattner explicitly does not equate anticipation with death, living death, but rather understands anticipation as the recognition that our for-the-sakes-of-which are “vulnerable” to *becoming* impossible (pp. 325-326). And thus his account of anticipatory resoluteness is such that while one takes up a for-the-sake-of-which and deals with the inherent paraphernalia of intraworldly entities, one also acknowledges that that for-the-sake-of-which is vulnerable to become, at some point, impossible (and indeed if one’s for-the-sake-of-which does indeed become impossible, then a *different* for-the-sake-of-which is required to be taken up (p. 333)).

Iain Thomson, in his recent article ‘Death and Demise in *Being and Time*’\(^77\) (citing Blattner’s 1994 article as the seminal essay of his reading (p. 283)) follows Blattner’s account of death as living death, and makes a move similar to Blattner regarding authenticity. Namely, while Thomson understands death as the possibility in which all for-the-sakes-of-which are *impossible*, and yet in which Dasein Being


is still an issue for it, Thompson disassociates this living death from anticipatory resoluteness. For
Thomson reiterates that living death is a “temporary” (p. 271) state that precedes gaining back one’s for-
the-sake-of-which and intraworldly entities’ involvements in anticipatory resoluteness; Thomson holds
that living death is an antecedent state to anticipatory resoluteness which may recur occasionally in
authenticity, but need not recur (pp. 288-289).

Joseph Schear, in his recent article ‘Historical Finitude’78 seems to follow Blattner’s account of
death as living death, and makes a similar move as Blattner regarding authenticity. While Schear
understands death as the possibility in which one’s form of life and with this all making sense of entities
comprehensively breaks down (p. 365), he disassociates this living death from anticipatory resoluteness.
For Schear holds that anticipatory resoluteness involves a recognition of the “fragility” (p. 375) of one’s
forms of life and making sense in that it involves a “standing readiness” (p. 375) for that possible
comprehensive breakdown – that is, a standing readiness for the living death (and indeed Schear implies
that if this comprehensive breakdown comes to pass, then a “new form of life” (p. 377) will be required).

In short, Blattner himself, and those who take a similar line on death, conceive of the relationship
between living death and authenticity in a similar manner. Namely, they disassociate the living death
from anticipatory resoluteness, and hold rather that anticipatory resoluteness is such that one is aware that
the living death can at some point befall one, or indeed has, at some previous point, befallen one. But this
is precisely where my line differs from Blattner and others with a similar line. Namely, I do not
disassociate the living death from anticipation, but I hold rather that anticipation precisely is the living
death. Now I believe that I have shown with strong textual evidence that this is the case – that is, if we
understand existential death as living death, then I believe the textual evidence strongly suggests that
anticipation precisely is this living death. But if the textual evidence strongly suggests this, then why do
Blattner, and others with similar lines, not take the line I am suggesting, why do they not equate
anticipation with the living death?

I speculate that the reason why they do not make this move is because they saw that once we hold
that anticipation is precisely the living death, and then note that anticipation is the first movement of
authenticity, this means that included within authenticity is living death. However, the second movement
of authenticity, resoluteness, is precisely projecting upon a possibility (indeed, as I have stressed, upon
the very same possibility which is impossible – something Blattner and those in his camp tend to
overlook), and this thus means that authenticity is such that it is both a mode in which all possibilities are
impossible, and a mode in which Dasein takes up a possibility (indeed the same possibility). That is, it
would turn out that authenticity is made up of the continual and simultaneous movements of both utterly

78 Schear, J., ‘Historical Finitude’, in M. A. Wrathall (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s Being and
collapsing all absorption and yet gaining back precisely what one has collapsed, and this indeed appears
to be an incompossible mode of existence – that is, it would turn out that authenticity is absurd. And thus
I speculate that at this point they interpreted anticipation such that it itself is not the living death but is
something of an awareness that living death can at some point befall one – in short, they avoided the
absurdity of authenticity.

In total, I think Blattner and those with similar lines are on to something right in their
interpretation of death in Heidegger (and are thus in a certain sense to be preferred over Mulhall’s,
Guignon’s, and Carmen’s). I think they are right in thinking that the possibility of death is somehow
related to a living death in which all concern is collapsed. In this way, as Blattner points out, they are
reading ‘possibility’ consistently throughout Being and Time. I thus follow Blattner here. But where I
think these accounts fall short is in not holding that this living death is precisely anticipation. But as they
do not hold this, they in turn avoid the conclusion that anticipatory resoluteness consists of the
simultaneous and continual collapse of all concern (anticipation) and gaining back of that concern
(resoluteness), that is, that it is absurd. For I think that once we hold that anticipation is itself the living
death, then what follows is that anticipatory resoluteness is indeed absurd.

But in avoiding the absurdity of authenticity I think that commentators miss out on the upshot
which I am after: bringing the way one relates to the concept of authenticity to the fore. For as I detailed
last part on Kierkegaard, the absurdity of faith plays a particular role – it forces the reader to make a
decision where they stand in relation to this concept. And I think that a similar role is also in play in
Heidegger’s account of authenticity: an explicit recognition of the absurdity of authenticity will tend to
force the reader to make a decision concerning where they stand in relation to that concept. And of course
the way I was led to this account of the absurdity of authenticity was by detailing the structure of
anxiety’s ambiguity, that is, detailing antipathetic death-anxiety (which discloses the possibility of
anticipation as the utter collapse of concern) and sympathetic conscience-anxiety (which discloses the
possibility of resoluteness as gaining back the same concern), and detailing the way in which Dasein
properly springs off this ambiguous anxiety.
APPENDIX
THE PSYCHOTIC TELOS

While we have reached the end point of the progressive interpretation of anxiety in *Being and Time* – the absurd *telos* – we now take a side step in this appendix to investigate a peripheral state that is indeed possible, yet in which Dasein becomes no longer Dasein in a strong sense. That is, in this appendix I now explain a mode of springing off anxiety which springs Dasein out of existence in a strong sense – such that Dasein is no longer Dasein but enters a fantastical state: I call this state psychosis (and explaining this mode is important insofar as its possibility has played a significant role for how I understand the perpetual motion of anxiety misused, which I detailed above).

Here I ask if it is possible to make merely one of the two movements which I have been detailing – anticipation, resoluteness – *without* therewith simultaneously making the other. I have reiterated above that Dasein cannot make the movement of resoluteness without simultaneously making the movement of anticipation. For on my reading the movement of anticipation is a prerequisite to making the movement of resoluteness – for while resoluteness is the mode in which Dasein gets back its absorption in the world (by way of a receptivity to the call of Being) and gets it back such that it is *not entangled in das Man*, it is only by way of the first movement of anticipation that Dasein wrenches itself out of its entanglement in *das Man*. Thus in order for Dasein to achieve resoluteness, in which it is not entangled in *das Man*, Dasein must simultaneously be achieving anticipation, that is, wrenching itself out of the snares *das Man*.

Heidegger most clearly holds this – that resoluteness cannot be achieved on its own, but only if one simultaneously achieves anticipation – in section ‘62’, where he shows in detail how a prerequisite for achieving resoluteness is that Dasein also therewith achieve anticipation. I have already noted some of these citations above, but here I list them again:

*As Being-towards-death which understands* – that is to say, as anticipation of death – resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. (SZ 305)

only *as anticipating* does resoluteness become a primordial Being towards Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-for-Being. (SZ 306)

Resoluteness is authentically and wholly what it can be, only *as anticipatory resoluteness*. (SZ 309)

And the reason why, as I have been maintaining, anticipation is a prerequisite for Dasein to achieve resoluteness is that anticipation is the movement in which Dasein loses all of its absorption in the with-world, and therewith wrenches itself out of the snares of *das Man* – since *das Man* is localized in this world. And thus only once anticipation is achieved is resoluteness – in which Dasein gets back this
lost absorption and gets it back such that Dasein is no longer ensnared in *das Man* – achievable. Resoluteness can only be achieved if Dasein therewith achieves anticipation.

But while Heidegger stresses in this section that resoluteness can only be achieved if anticipation is simultaneously achieved, I note that in this section Heidegger does not emphasize the inverse: he does not hold that anticipation can only be achieved if Dasein simultaneously achieves resoluteness. That is, Heidegger (indeed throughout *Being and Time*) leaves open the possibility that Dasein can indeed achieve anticipation without therewith simultaneously achieving resoluteness. Indeed according to my account, this makes perfect sense. For while resoluteness can only get back absorption free from the snares of *das Man* if it simultaneously wrenches itself out of its entanglement in *das Man* – and thus resoluteness can only be achieved by way of anticipatory resoluteness – the inverse is not true: that is, Dasein may indeed achieve the utter collapse of all absorption by way of anticipation, and this movement is not dependent on getting this absorption back by way of resoluteness. That is, anticipation can be achieved even if resoluteness is not simultaneously achieved. However, as I have been noting, there will be something fantastical about this.

Here I must be careful and must immediately specify this view. Strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say that *Dasein* can exist in the mode of mere anticipation in which resoluteness has not also been achieved. This is because, as I have been reiterating, Dasein is necessarily always absorbed in the with-world to a certain degree – Dasein’s Being is ‘Being-in-the-world’. Thus if Dasein achieves anticipation – the utter collapse of all absorption by way of anticipation, and this movement is not dependent on getting this absorption back by way of resoluteness, then Dasein is no longer *Dasein*. Thus while Dasein may bring about, with its own willpower, mere anticipation without resoluteness, what results is a state where there is no Dasein left: what results is a state in which all absorption in the with-world has been collapsed and has not been gotten back. I call this state *psychosis*.

This thus sheds an interesting light on the subtleties of both Being-towards-death and anticipation. This means that there are two possible modes of anticipation (death), both of which are achieved by way of springing off anxiety, and yet hitherto I have only detailed one of these modes: for on the one hand there is the mode of anticipation in which resoluteness is simultaneously achieved (this is authenticity – anticipatory resoluteness – which I have detailed last section); and yet on the other hand there is the mode of anticipation in which resoluteness is not simultaneously achieved (this is psychosis, which I will now detail). We might call the former mode of death sacrifice: for in this mode Dasein has with its own will snapped itself out of the with-world, and wrenched itself out of the snares of *das Man*, but has, simultaneously, gotten back this very same absorption that it is sacrificing by way of allowing the call of Being to bring it back into the with-world. We might call the latter mode of death self-murder, that is, existential suicide: for in this mode Dasein has, with its own will, snapped itself out of its absorption in
the with-world, not getting it back, and therewith has committed suicide on its own Dasein, bringing about psychosis.

And thus Being-towards-death itself, which is, as I have explained, ‘essentially anxiety’ – for it is anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy, the possibility of achieving the living death (anticipation) – expresses these two modes, that is, expresses the possibility of these two modes. For anxiety’s sympathetic antipathy is a being towards death – but ‘death’ has two significations. Thus being towards death refers to both the possibility of sacrifice, as well as the possibility of suicide – and indeed as Dasein makes the movement towards sacrifice, it is, to the same degree, making the movement towards suicide.

And thus we can see that achieving the absurd telos (anticipatory resoluteness) is no safe venture, but is forever flirting with a grave danger, the danger of psychosis. For to achieve anticipatory resoluteness one must of course achieve anticipation – one must, with one’s own willpower courageously bring about the utter collapse of all absorption, one must achieve the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein: the living death – and yet I have now specified that there are two different modes of anticipation (death). For anticipation can be achieved such that Dasein sacrifices its absorption and therewith gains back precisely the same absorption by way of the receptive resoluteness; or anticipation can be achieved such that it is existential suicide, such, that is, that Dasein collapses all of its absorption in the with-world and does not get it back, which results in psychosis. Therefore in attempting to achieve the former Dasein is forever flirting with the darkness of psychosis.

But besides this necessary flirtation, Dasein might indeed want to bring psychosis upon itself. For while psychosis might be thought to be something which happens involuntarily to one, I understand it as something Dasein might bring upon itself, as an end in itself. For perhaps Dasein does not want to be Dasein anymore, in particular, perhaps Dasein does not want absorption in the with-world to be an aspect of itself any longer. Perhaps Dasein wants to commit self-murder to escape this with-world. Then existential suicide is an end in itself – it achieves the psychotic telos.

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*Being and Time* is of course an analytic of Dasein, and for this reason a state which Dasein can achieve in which it is no longer Dasein will be outside of the purview of this treatise. For Dasein’s Being is ‘Being-in-the-world’ which means that Dasein will always to a certain degree be absorbed in the world, which is a with-world, such that intraworldly entities show up with significance, each referring to the next, all grounded in the existentiell for-the-sake-of-which which Dasein has taken up. And thus if Dasein ever achieves anticipation without resoluteness, that is, if Dasein utterly collapses its absorption in the with-world such that no intraworldly entity has significance, and does this by way of collapsing its
leading for-the-sake-of-which – and achieves this anticipation *without* getting that absorption and significance back by way of resoluteness – then Dasein is no longer Dasein, but has entered the state of psychosis. Therefore in *Being and Time* Heidegger does not spell out in detail this state of psychosis, but merely marks the border, marks the dark danger that Dasein must flirt with in its movement towards anticipatory resoluteness. For Dasein is always absorbed in the with-world – an absorption which is, on my account of inauthentic Dasein, always relative to Dasein’s manifest anxiety in uncanniness: the more absorption in the with-world, the less anxiety, and vice versa. Now in the movement towards anticipatory resoluteness Dasein may become more and more anxious, and thus less and less absorbed in the with-world, and this is indeed a movement towards anticipatory resoluteness. For Dasein must ultimately *utterly* collapse its absorption in anticipation to be able to simultaneously get it back by way of resoluteness. But if in this movement towards the absurd *telos* Dasein ultimately indeed collapses its absorption, and yet does not get it back, then this Dasein is no longer Dasein, that is, it has become psychotic. And therefore this state is outside the purview of *Being and Time*.

Here in the appendix, however, I would like to pause to flesh out in detail what this state of psychosis might look like in a particular case. We thus here turn – as we did in my part I of this dissertation – to Schreber’s famous *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* and take it as a case-study of psychosis to not only flesh out what a particular case of psychosis might look like in accordance with Heidegger’s system, but also to defend the claim in general that psychosis can be understood as a state in which Dasein has made the movement of what Heidegger calls anticipation without therewith allowing what Heidegger calls the call of conscience to call it into what Heidegger calls resoluteness. My assumption in this section is that in cases of psychosis – or at least in Schreber’s case – the ‘psychotic system’ which psychotics obsess over actually *expresses the truth of their situation, yet expresses it in a highly poetic form*, and thus with subtle interpretation of that poetic expression one can lay bare that situation. For we will find that in Schreber’s psychotic system – i.e. what Schreber calls his ‘entirely new religious system’ – there are two main threads of poetic thought which stand out which I take to express: that on the one hand Schreber made the movement of anticipation, yet on the other hand was unable to allow the call of conscience to call him into resoluteness.

Now, before I use the Schreber case to illuminate Heidegger in the way suggested above, I will first say a few words defending my strategy of bringing in Schreber here. As I considered in part I of this dissertation in relation to Kierkegaard, here again I note that it might be wondered what right I have to claim that Schreber’s psychotic system expresses the truth of his situation which my interpretation will lay bare, and what right I have in thinking that Schreber’s case can help illuminate Heidegger – here again I consider if I am merely romanticizing Schreber’s mental illness (i.e. pulling out a rational interpretation which we simply do not find in his madness). In part I of this dissertation, I turned to a well known
psychiatrist – Laing – to help me answer these questions. I showed how Laing makes a distinction between two ways of viewing psychotics: one can either view them from the objective clinical viewpoint which interprets their actions on the model of quanta of energy in an energy system, or one can view them from the existential-phenomenological viewpoint which interprets their actions in a way to understand their subjective experience. Laing of course places himself in the second group, and also notes his indebtedness to Kierkegaard and Heidegger.

Now, another well known psychiatrist, who, as I will now show, makes a similar move as Laing is Ludwig Binswanger. In his ‘The Case of Ellen West’79 Binswanger notes how there can be two ways of viewing people: the first he calls the psychoanalytic conception, the second he calls the existential-analytic conception. According to Binswanger, the psychoanalytic conception reduces others to objects such that it interprets their actions on the model of genetic processes and instinctual forces; the existential-analytic conception on the other hand views people more subjectively, attempting to understand their experience and the way they relate to their world: “whereas existential analysis penetrates into the meaning and content of the verbal speech and other phenomena of expression and interprets from them the world and the being-in-the-world (…) psychoanalysis changes (…) the existence into an object, (…) a genetic developmental process (…) of instinctual forces, and so on.” (p. 330)

Binswanger understands himself to be in the camp of the existential-analytic conception, and also explicitly notes his indebtedness to Heidegger. That is, Binswanger emphasizes that while his existential analysis stays more on the existentiell level, it relies upon the ontology which Heidegger lays out: “[e]xistential analysis (Daseinsanalyse, as we speak of it) must not be confused with Heidegger’s analytic of existence (Daseinsanalytik). (…) The similarity of the expressions is justified by the fact that the anthropological or existential analysis relies throughout on that structure of existence as being-in-the-world which was first worked out by the analytic of existence.” (p. 270) Now, when we look in more detail at Binswanger’s relation to Heidegger we see that he is doing something similar to what I am going to do in this chapter. That is, Binswanger uses a case-study of psychosis to illuminate Heidegger – or we might also say, Binswanger uses Heidegger’s account of anxiety to illuminate his account of psychosis.

For Binswanger’s interpretation of the psychosis of Ellen West emphasizes the way anxiety (pp. 280-297) is dominating her life, and goes in to some detail concerning the nature of this anxiety. In a Heideggerian vein Binswanger emphasizes how Ellen West is absorbed in the “world” (pp. 269-288) and also how when anxiety (or dread) makes its appearance, this “dread is a dread of being-in-the-world as such” (p. 282). Again in a Heideggerian vein Binswanger notes how in this anxiety one becomes isolated, “existential dread isolates the existence and discloses it, in Heidegger’s words, as solus ipse” (p. 284).

And this isolation, for Binswanger, is related to the ‘Nothingness’ inherent in anxiety – again another Heideggerian concept – “when the existence bases itself on or rests upon Nothingness (...) it stands not only in existential dread but, also – which is the same thing – in absolute isolation. The positiveness of Nothingness, and an existence in the sense of being a complete isolate, represent existential-analytically one and the same thing.” (p. 297) For Binswanger, Ellen’s psychosis is intimately related to this anxiety, in particular Binswanger holds that in the grip of this anxiety Ellen is becoming ever more isolated, as her absorption in the world becomes ever more narrowed and leveled, what Binswanger calls “the narrowing and leveling of the significance of the world” (p. 306).

Thus we can see that Binswanger is doing something with Heidegger similar to what I am about to do with Heidegger, and in this way Binswanger’s work helps support my own. For I am of course now going to interpret Schreber’s psychosis in a Heideggerian vein, and like Binswanger, emphasize the role of Heideggerian anxiety therein – and thus my strategy of bringing in a case of psychosis to illuminate Heidegger is supported and preceded by Binswanger’s work. And, more generally, as Binswanger places himself in the existential-analytic group which attempts to understand the psychotic’s existence, as opposed to the psychoanalytic group which views others as objects and understands their actions on the model of instinctual forces, my interpretation of Schreber operates in a similar fashion (and indeed, in a footnote at the end of my treatment of the Schreber case I will deal in length with my critique of Freud’s famous psychoanalytic account of Schreber).

_Memoirs of My Nervous Illness_

When Schreber was ‘healthy’ – as he says in _Memoirs_ – he was Dasein. That is, before the outbreak of his ‘nervous illness’ (as he calls it) in 1893, Schreber’s Being was Being-in-the-world such that he had a leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which (either his role as a husband, or his role as a distinguished jurist – which one is the leading one, I do not here decide) which anchored his absorption in the with-world such that all intraworldly entities showed up as having significance, that is, involvement: each one referring to the next making up the network of involvements which Schreber was absorbed in. This absorption was always relative to his anxiety in his uncanniness – the more of the one, the less of the other – yet, being Dasein, Schreber was always indeed absorbed to some degree. However, in the build up to the outbreak of his illness Schreber documents a steady increase in his anxiety (MNI 48-52). This increase of anxiety was such that Schreber was finding it difficult to manage any ‘occupation’, such that he indeed had to give up any effort after a short time (MNI 52). That is, while Schreber was here still absorbed in the with-world, this absorption was decreasing – in accordance with the simultaneous
increase in uncanniness – to such a degree that it was almost utterly collapsed. Indeed Schreber had an
intimation of the looming utter collapse amidst his intensifying anxiety (MNI 52).

Then comes the outbreak of Schreber’s nervous illness, that is, the outbreak of his psychosis. Schreber attributes the outbreak of his illness to a “soul murder” (MNI 34) being committed on him. Thus central here is the idea that the outbreak of his psychosis is equivalent to Schreber being dead – that is, murdered – but a death which itself is a state that Schreber lives, a living death. Furthermore, Schreber himself suspects that he was the one guilty of the soul-murder, which I take to express the fact that Schreber himself, with his own willpower, committed soul-murder on himself, that is, existential suicide: out of the intensifying anxiety, Schreber ultimately utterly collapsed all of his absorption in the with-world.

Schreber goes on to elaborate on his experience of his psychosis, which links his psychosis with a living death – for shortly after the outbreak of his illness he read in a newspaper of his own obituary:

I recollect that about the middle of March 1894 when communication with supernatural powers was well under way, a newspaper was put in front of me in which something like my own obituary notice could be read; I took this as a hint that I could no longer count on any possibility of a return to human society. (...) if this and other occurrences really were visions, there was method in them, i.e. that they were connected in a certain way which enabled me to realize what one had in store for me. (MNI 85)

The outbreak of Schreber’s psychosis is expressed as his soul being murdered, and indeed Schreber shortly thereafter reads of his own obituary. Schreber is dead, yet is alive, this is a living death. Schreber connects this living death with the idea that he “could no longer count on any possibility of a return to human society”. I take this to express that Schreber’s soul-murder (existential suicide), Schreber’s living death, means that Schreber’s absorption in the with-world has utterly collapsed, and has collapsed with no sign of any return. (Indeed In a moment of sober reflection Schreber himself notes that his ‘visions’ may have had a ‘method’ such that they had a deeper meaning.) This idea – that Schreber’s soul has been murdered, and that he is dead, signifying that Schreber’s absorption in the with-world is collapsed – links with what Schreber calls the “end of the world” (MNI 75). For a central idea in Schreber’s psychotic system is that the outbreak of his illness coincided with the ‘end of the world’ – that is, that all other human beings and the world itself has perished. In another one of his “visions” (MNI 78), Schreber expresses in an imaginative way this collapse of the with-world (end of the world):

it was as though I were sitting in a railway carriage or in a lift driving into the depths of the earth
and I recapitulated, as it were, the whole history of mankind or of the earth in reverse order; in the upper regions there were still forests of leafy trees; in the nether regions it became progressively darker and blacker. When temporarily I left the vehicle, I walked as though across a large cemetery where, coming upon the place where Leipzig’s inhabitants lay buried, I crossed my own wife’s grave. (...) On the return drive the shaft collapsed behind me, continually endangering a “sun deity” who was in it too. In this connection it was said that there had been two shafts (...);
when news came that the second shaft had also collapsed, it was thought that everything was lost. (MNI 78-79)

This vision has a method, we might say, in that it expresses some of the details of the collapse of the with-world (end of the world) in an imaginative way. Riding in the railway carriage or the lift and driving into the depths of the earth, recapitulating the history of mankind in reverse order, signifies going deeper and deeper into anxious uncanniness, giving up more and yet more concern, until, ultimately, the utter collapse of all absorption in the with-world is achieved. For as Schreber goes deeper and deeper the regions became darker and blacker – that is, more and more of Schreber’s absorption was collapsed until ultimately utterly all of it was lost. For ultimately Schreber reaches a large cemetery where not only all of Leipzig’s inhabitants were buried, but also where his own wife was buried. Thus the ‘end of the world’ has come to pass for Schreber – i.e. all human beings and the world have perished, which expresses the fact that Schreber’s absorption in the with-world has utterly collapsed. Now, as in the above vision Schreber’s own death was such that he could not return to human society, this vision too expresses that the end of the world is such that Schreber cannot return to human society. For “on the return drive the shaft collapsed”, signifying that Schreber is stuck amidst the utter collapse of the world. (Another key point in this vision which I will come back to below is the fact that there were two shafts which collapsed, and in one there was a ‘sun deity’ which was thus also stranded with Schreber.)

Now, I noted that before Schreber’s illness he was Dasein in that he had a leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which which anchored his absorption in the with-world such that all intraworldly entities had involvement. I noted that either his role as a loving husband for his wife, or his role as a distinguished jurist was that leading for-the-sake-of-which. And as a leading for-the-sake-of-which anchors all concern for the intraworldly such that all significance for the intraworldly branches out of it, when this leading for-the-sake-of-which is given up, therewith all other significance for the intraworldly collapses. This means in Schreber’s case that the end of the world – the collapse of all absorption – was brought about by his leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which collapsing.

The pursuit of my previous profession which I loved wholeheartedly, every other aim of manly ambition, and every other use of my intellectual powers in the service of mankind, are now all closed to me through the way circumstances have developed; even communication with my wife and relatives is denied me (MNI 165)

Whichever the leading for-the-sake-of-which was – profession or marital role – both of these have indeed collapsed for Schreber with the outbreak of his illness. Indeed in the penultimate paragraph of Memoirs Schreber reiterates his “[l]oss of an honourable professional position, [and] a happy marriage practically dissolved” (MNI 258). Indeed this latter point of his happy marriage dissolving has a deeper significance, for with the end of the world all human beings have perished and the human forms which show up for Schreber are mere ‘fleeting-improvised-men’ created by miracle simply for play, which in
time simply *dissolve*. Schreber thus notes that during his illness he considered his wife dead (a point which shows up in his above vision as seeing her grave), and when she visited him at the asylum he considered her merely fleetingly improvised, a miraculously created puppet, who indeed *dissolves* (*MNI* 53, 157) once she is outside of Schreber’s view.

And thus as Schreber’s leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which has collapsed, therewith utterly all concern for the intraworldly (which branch out of this leading role), is therewith collapsed. Now, admittedly this detail – that the collapse of all concern was brought about by Schreber resigning his leading for-the-sake-of-which – is the least supported by *Memoirs*. For in *Memoirs* we have evidence that Schreber indeed lost his main for-the-sakes-of-which, but we don’t have a clear suggestion that this is what brought about the utter collapse of concern. Thus this detail concerning the role of giving up the leading for-the-sake is not very well supported in the text. However, this is only a minor detail in my interpretation, and, as I hope to show, the two main points – that Schreber made the movement of what Heidegger calls anticipation, and that Schreber did not make the movement of what Heidegger calls resoluteness – I believe are strongly supported by the text of *Memoirs*.

Moving on, whereas previously while Schreber was healthy the entities within the with-world had significance for Schreber – that is, showed up such that each referred to the next in its involvement, all anchored by the leading for-the-sake-of-which – once Schreber’s psychosis broke out, therewith the entities within the with-world no longer showed up with significance, no longer showed up each referring to the next making up the referential context of significance. For with the outbreak of his illness Schreber was simply not absorbed any longer in the with-world. And thus at what can be considered the height of Schreber’s illness – while at his third asylum, what Schreber called ‘devil’s castle’ – Schreber documents an utterly paralyzed state:

> My outward life was extremely *monotonous* during that time (...) I mainly sat *motionless* the whole day on a chair at my table (...) even in the garden I preferred to remain seated always in the same spot (...) the main reason for my immobility was not so much the actual lack of means of occupation but that I considered absolute passivity almost a religious duty. (...) Thus arose the almost monstrous demand that I should behave continually as if I myself were a corpse (*MNI* 134-135)

In other words entities within the with-world do not show up for Schreber with any significance during his psychosis, for Schreber has utterly collapsed his absorption. Schreber even specifies here that his paralysis was “not so much the actual lack of means of occupation but (...) almost a religious duty” – and I take this to express that Schreber himself, with his own will, collapsed his leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which and brought upon his paralysis as an end in itself. And finally here too Schreber links this paralysed state with behaving as if he were a *corpse*, that is, dead – and indeed throughout *Memoirs* Schreber reiterates that “[God] was accustomed to dealing only with corpses” (*MNI* 135).
Now, I take this thread from *Memoirs* – the living death amidst the ‘end of the world’ – as a poetic expression of the fact that Schreber had *made the first movement of anticipation, and yet had not made the second movement of resoluteness*. When anticipation is achieved and resoluteness is not therewith achieved, this is death in which one collapses one’s absorption in the with-world and thus commits suicide on one’s own Dasein. And we found this movement imaginatively spelled out in Schreber’s psychotic system. For it was out of the intensified anxiety that Schreber’s absorption began to collapse and it was out of this anxiety that soul-murder was committed on Schreber. I took this to mean that Schreber himself committed existential suicide by collapsing his leading for-the-sake-of-which and therewith utterly collapsing all absorption in the with-world. This fact came across to Schreber in the visions of reading his own obituary (and feeling like a corpse), and also of travelling in the railcar to the cemetery where he saw all of Leipzig, including his wife, buried – at which point he was stranded. Thus having merely achieved anticipation, without resoluteness, the end of the world was achieved, that is, the utter collapse of the with-world – most clearly expressed in Schreber’s state of paralysis at ‘devil’s castle’. But now I must complete the case-study of Schreber and show that, indeed, while Schreber achieved anticipation, he was not able to allow the call of conscience to call him into resoluteness.

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In the above vision in which Schreber rode in the railway carriage into the darkness ultimately arriving at the cemetery (which signified the end of the world), I noted that when the two shafts collapsed (collapse of the with-world), Schreber was stranded along with a ‘sun deity’. Inherent in Schreber’s psychotic system is the idea that God is made up of divine rays, and along with this there is a lower God (Ariman) – which Schreber identifies with the sun – as well as an upper God (Ormuzd) which is normally at a great distance behind the sun (*MNI* 91). I take the fact that there were two shafts to signify the two Gods, and indeed Schreber notes that in the shaft in which he was riding there was the sun deity (Ariman), and I conclude that in the other shaft there was Ormuzd. Thus inherent in this vision is the idea that with the collapse of the world, Schreber was stranded with God (in both forms). This interpretation harmonizes with a central theme of the *Memoirs*, that with the end of the world an indissoluble connection between Schreber and God was set up (*MNI* 75) – Schreber explains this connection as a mutual attraction between himself and the divine rays (issuing out of the sun (Ariman)) (*MNI* 40). Indeed, Schreber expresses this connection quite dramatically when he writes of how the divine rays issuing out of the sun stream into his head across the sky spiralling in the motion of a parabola (*MNI* 276).

Now, it was at the above mentioned ‘devil’s castle’ – the third asylum – that Schreber had his purest experience of this connection with God, that is, the purest experience of the power of the divine
rays which were streaming into his head – “I may say that at that time and at that time only, I saw God’s omnipotence in its complete purity.” (MNI 131) This was the time of what I called the height of Schreber’s illness, in which he was also completely paralyzed. Schreber writes of his experience with God at this time,

During the night (...) the lower God (Ariman) appeared. The radiant picture of his rays became visible to my inner eye (...) while I was lying in bed not sleeping but awake (...) Simultaneously I heard his voice; but it was not a soft whisper – as the talk of the voices always was before and after that time – it resounded in a might bass as if directly in front of my bedroom windows. (...) On the following day and perhaps on one or two more days (in fact in day-time while I was in the garden) I saw the upper God (Ormuzd), this time not with my mind’s eye but with my bodily eye. It was the sun, although not the sun in her usual appearance as known to every human being, but surrounded by a silver sea of rays which covered a 6th or 8th part of the sky (MNI 131-132)

Whereas normally for Schreber the lower God, Ariman, was the sun itself, while the upper God, Ormuzd, was at a great distance behind the sun, during this experience at devil’s castle a shift took place in which both forms of God came a step closer to Schreber, as it were. For Ariman actually appeared to Schreber at night outside his window, and in the following days Ormuzd now took the place of the sun. But with this shift the sun took on a brilliant appearance and now the divine rays streaming out of the sun “occupied almost a 1/6th to an 1/8th part of the sky” (MNI 39) appearing as a “silver sea of rays”. This “phenomena of light” was one of “overwhelming brilliance” (MNI 39) for Schreber, and indeed it was the only time that the upper God was shown in such purity.

Now, I am highlighting this experience of Schreber’s at devil’s castle to highlight that along with the end of the world – the utter collapse of the with-world – Schreber also had a connection with what he called God – that is, a mutual attraction between himself and the divine rays. But let me further flesh out this connection. In particular the divine rays which streamed into Schreber’s head – in the motion of a parabola issuing from the sun – were filaments which functioned as carriers for particular ‘voices’ which were perpetually speaking to Schreber – “the filaments (...) function as carriers for the voices” (MNI 276). Schreber explains,

It is presumably a phenomenon like telephoning; the filaments of rays spun out towards my head act like telephone wires; the weak sound (...) coming from an apparently vast distance is received only by me in the same way as telephonic communication can only be heard by a person who is on the telephone (MNI 277)

Of course the end of the world has come to pass for Schreber, which means that Schreber considers all human beings to have perished – yet even if there were other human beings still alive, this discourse which is carried on the stream of divine rays to Schreber is such that it cannot be heard by anyone else. Schreber further elaborates on why this is the case: he tells us that the discourse which is carried along the filaments of divine rays is actually not saying anything, but is rather a type of language which is given in silence. For Schreber has an elaborate theory of so called “nerve-language” in which
God can speak to Schreber by way of the stream of divine rays, not by actually saying anything, but simply by vibrating Schreber’s nerves in a particular manner – and thus the silent discourse seems both to emanate from Schreber’s own nerves, and yet at the same time from beyond and above Schreber insofar as Schreber himself is not the one initiating the vibrations:

Apart from normal human language there is also a kind of nerve-language of which, as a rule, the healthy human being is not aware. (...) The words are repeated silently (as in a silent prayer to which the congregation is called from the pulpit), that is to say a human being causes his nerves to vibrate in the way which corresponds to the use of the words concerned, but the real organs of speech (lips, tongue, teeth, etc.) are (...) not set in motion (...) In my case, however, since my nervous illness took the above-mentioned critical turn, my nerves have been set in motion from without incessantly and without any respite.

Divine rays above all have the power of influencing the nerves of a human being in this manner (MNI 54-55)

Thus to bring these elements together we get the following picture on Schreber’s account. Amidst the end of the world – in which all human kind and the world has perished – and in which Schreber is utterly paralyzed, an indissoluble connection with God has been set up. This takes the form of divine rays streaming out of the sun, across the sky with an overwhelming brilliance, and into Schreber’s head. These divine rays are filaments which function as the carriers of the discourse of nerve language, a discourse which says nothing, but discourses in the mode of silence, vibrating Schreber’s nerves in a particular manner (such that the silent discourse seems to both come from Schreber himself, as well as from above Schreber). And finally, what is the silent message that the divine rays are communicating to Schreber?

Throughout Memoirs all of this nerve-language seems to revolve around one central issue: that Schreber is to be unmanned (transformed into a woman) so that he can be impregnated by the divine rays in order to give birth to a new human race. And indeed, at the height of Schreber’s illness at devil’s castle, amidst total paralysation and the purest display of God’s power Schreber writes,

If the influx of God’s pure rays had lasted unhindered, as in the days described above and the nights following, I am certain that in a short time (...) I would have been unmanned and simultaneously impregnated. (MNI 133-134)

However, even at the point of the purest experience of God – i.e. connection with divine rays – Schreber does not manage to be unmanned, nor impregnated, nor does he give birth to the new race. Indeed, Schreber is never able to answer the discourse which silently streams on the parabola of divine rays into Schreber’s head, which demands Schreber’s unmanning – Schreber is never able to be unmanned. And as unmanning is the prerequisite for fertilization and birth, Schreber is also never able to achieve these latter two.

Now, in a Heideggerian vein I interpret this thread of Memoirs in the following way. Schreber’s account of his connection with God, and how the divine rays stream into his head, carrying the silent discourse, poetically expresses the call of conscience issuing from Being. For on Heidegger’s account, the
call of conscience calls in the mode of silence, that is, it says nothing, and I have concluded that the ‘It’ which does the calling is Being itself (such that the call is experienced as both coming from one’s own Dasein as well as coming from above and beyond one). In Schreber’s psychotic system this takes the form of God issuing nerve-language to Schreber by way of silence, that is, saying nothing (such that this discourse is experienced as both coming from Schreber’s own nerves, as well as coming from above Schreber) – and indeed Schreber compares this discourse from the divine rays with being telephoned, that is, intuitively compares it to being called. Further, on Heidegger’s account, the call of conscience, which discourses by way of keeping silent, is an appeal or summons to Dasein to achieve resoluteness, that is, to re-absorb itself in the with-world, such that intraworldly entities have significance. In Schreber’s psychotic system the silent discourse which travels on the divine rays demands that Schreber be fertilized by these divine rays so that he can give birth to the new human race – this expresses, in psychotic fashion, the demand to become re-absorbed in the with-world. And finally, on Heidegger’s account, re-absorbing oneself in the with-world is not something Dasein can achieve merely with its own willpower, but is achieved by way of a receptivity in the call of Being, a letting the call call it into resoluteness – this is a receptivity (whereas achieving anticipation is a willing). In Schreber’s psychotic system the silent discourse demands that Schreber be unmanned (transformed into a woman) before he can then be fertilized by the divine rays – this expresses that answering the demand of the discourse involves a receptivity. And thus in this way, this thread of Memoirs is expressing what Heidegger calls the call of conscience, which I concluded issues from Being itself.

However, Schreber was not able to answer the call which travels on the divine rays, for Schreber was never able to be unmanned, however close he came at moments. I thus take this to poetically express that Schreber was never able to make the movement of a receptivity to the call of conscience. And because Schreber was never able to make this receptive movement, he was thus never able to become re-absorbed in the with-world – in Schreber’s psychotic system, he was never able to be fertilized and give birth to the new race.

We entered into this appendix in order to defend my claim that psychosis is a state in which Dasein makes the first movement of anticipation (giving up its leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which initiating the utter collapse of with-world) without therewith simultaneously making the second movement of resoluteness (getting back absorption in the same with-world, with the same for-the-sake-of-which), as well as to flesh out what a particular case of psychosis may look like (and indeed we took this sidestep from the progressive interpretation because the possibility of psychosis has played a pivotal role in how I understand the perpetual motion of anxiety misused, from my earlier section). For Heidegger’s treatise is an analytic of Dasein, and thus a state in which one has committed suicide on one’s Dasein lies outside of Heidegger’s purview. However, Heidegger’s treatise allows for the possibility of this concept
of existential suicide (achieving anticipation without resoluteness), and thus we turned to *Memoirs* to give a case-study of psychosis, for the above two reasons. I have assumed that Schreber’s psychotic system actually expresses the truth of his situation, yet expresses it in highly poetic form. Now, taking the two poetic threads from *Memoirs* which I have subtly interpreted in this appendix together, I believe I have achieved my aim and shown that Schreber’s psychosis is, in its fundamentals, such that he has made the movement of anticipation, without therewith achieving resoluteness.

For it was out of the intensifying anxiety in which Schreber, with his own willpower, collapsed his leading existentiell for-the-sake-of-which and therewith utterly collapsed all of his absorption in the with-world, that is, achieved anticipation (committed soul murder on himself, and therewith entered into the end of the world in which all human beings and the world had perished). This was expressed in Schreber’s visions of seeing his own obituary, and travelling in the railcar to the cemetery in which human kind, and his wife, lay buried. Schreber thus entered into a paralyzed state in which no entity within the with-world showed up with significance for Schreber. But whereas anticipation was achieved, resoluteness was not. For while the silent call of conscience issuing from Being itself (the silent nerve-language carried from the filaments of divine rays issuing from God) was demanding Schreber to re-absorb himself in the with-world (demanded his unmanning, fertilization, and birth of the new race), Schreber could not successfully answer this call. For Schreber was not able to make the receptive movement of letting the call call himself into resoluteness (was not able to become unmanned – transformed into a woman – which is a prerequisite for fertilization and birth).80

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80 Here I will defend my interpretation of Schreber’s *Memoirs* by contrasting it with the most famous interpretation of *Memoirs* – Freud’s 70 page case-study of Schreber: *The Schreber Case*, trans. A. Webber (Penguin Group Inc: New York, 2003) – and highlighting what I consider to be the weak points of Freud’s account, which my account overcomes. And we will see in what way Binswanger, as I noted above, is right concerning the psychoanalytic approach: we will see that Freud, as Binswanger holds, wants to explain Schreber’s psychosis in terms of genetic processes and instinctual forces.

I argued in detail that Schreber’s famous psychosis can be understood in the Heideggerian terms of making the willful movement of anticipation (expressed by Schreber as the soul murder which initiated the end of the world), without therewith simultaneously making the receptive movement of letting the call call one into resoluteness (expressed by Schreber as not being able to be unmanned, impregnated by God’s divine rays, and give birth to the new race). Now, put briefly, *Freud* holds that the underlying cause of Schreber’s psychosis is a strong homosexual impulse which, when repressed, initiated the outbreak of the psychosis; and further, the content of the psychotic system itself expresses a disguised form of the repressed homosexual impulse – that which was repressed returns by way of an elaborate psychotic system. Let me flesh this out.

Freud holds that Schreber had a strong, unconscious, homosexual impulse directed at Fleschig (the lead doctor at Schreber’s first asylum) whom Schreber had known eight years prior to the outbreak of his psychosis (for Schreber had a short stay at Fleschig’s asylum eight years before the outbreak). Schreber who, consciously, considered himself heterosexual and happily married would have been appalled at his own homosexual unconscious desire and thus never let it become conscious, and indeed his actively *repressing* this desire, when there a was a strong “surge” (p. 33), is what caused the outbreak of his psychosis (p. 33) according to Freud.

Here Freud gives an interesting account of repression: “the real process of repression” (p. 60), in this instance for Schreber, consists of withdrawing all of his “libidinal investment” from people and indeed the world at large: “The patient has withdrawn the libidinal investment hitherto lodged with them from the people around him and
from the world outside as a whole; everything has thus become indifferent and unrelated to him and has to be explained through a secondary rationalization as ‘miracled up, fleetingly improvised’. The end of the world is a projection of this internal catastrophe; his subjective world has come to an end since he withdrew his love from it.” (p. 59) Thus, according to Freud, the way Schreber repressed his homosexual urge directed at Fleschig was to withdraw all of his libidinal investment from every person and the world at large – which brings about the so called ‘end of the world’.

But after this repression comes the return of the repressed on Freud’s account. For Freud holds that Schreber’s psychotic system is an expression of Schreber attempting to re-establish, re-construct, his libidinal interest which has been withdrawn (p. 60). However, Schreber must do so in such a way that will appease his conscious mind, and thus Schreber must re-establish his homosexual impulse towards Fleschig in some disguised manner. Thus Schreber creates the psychotic system which holds that God (a disguised expression of Fleschig himself, according to Freud) demands Schreber’s unmanning, and Schreber is demanded to be unmanned so that God (Fleschig) can impregnate Schreber. And thus the content of the homosexual desire which was repressed now returns as the content of the psychotic system (p. 37).

But I will now highlight what I consider three weak points in Freud’s account, weak points which my account overcomes. Firstly it seems that Freud has overly sexualized his interpretation – holding that Schreber’s illness was caused by repressing a homosexual impulse directed at Fleschig – without much textual evidence providing support. For Schreber never holds that he had any homosexual affection for Fleschig, and indeed Freud himself raises the related objection: “I can imagine how unpalatable the supposition must seem that a man’s feeling of affection for a doctor can suddenly break out with new intensity eight years later, and that it can serve as the cause of such a severe mental disturbance.” (p. 36) But Freud’s response to this objection is, I hold, very weak. For he holds that this alleged sudden outbreak of homosexual desire for Fleschig is grounded in Schreber’s relationship with his father, and that Schreber had a homosexual desire for his father, and through “transference”, Fleschig takes the place of the father for Schreber (pp. 36-37). Freud considers this to answer his own objection (p. 37), yet I think that he has not done this. The entire account of a homosexual urge directed to his father, then transferred to Fleschig who takes the role of his father, seems entirely without textual evidence. I feel Freud has over sexualized his account in this manner.

The two other weak points in Freud’s interpretation concern the way in which his interpretations of the two central poetic-religious threads in Memoirs fail, or are at least very weak. Firstly concerning the way he interprets the divine rays and the sun. Schreber holds that God is made up of divine rays and the sun is the portal through which these divine rays are sent to earth (indeed the lower God, Ariman, is equated with the sun). Now, for Schreber it is only when the end of the world has come to pass that an indissoluble connection with the divine rays (God) is set up – experienced as a stream of divine rays, issuing from the sun, into Schreber’s head. On Freud’s interpretation, God in Memoirs is a disguised expression for Fleschig, which in turn means Schreber’s own father; and thus the sun in Memoirs is understood by Freud as a disguised expression of Fleschig, which ultimately means the sun is a disguise of Schreber’s own father – “the sun, in its turn, is nothing other than a sublimated symbol of the father.” (p. 42) Now, Freud concludes his study with the claim that the rays streaming into Schreber’s head, amidst the end of the world, signify a state of absolute “narcissism” (p. 51) in which Schreber’s libidinal interest has been withdrawn from others and the world and redirected back onto himself (p. 66). But here lies the problem for Freud. Freud had already equated the sun with Fleschig/ Schreber’s father and yet on Freud’s account the divine rays should not be issuing from the sun (Fleschig/ Schreber’s father), the rays should be issuing from Schreber himself, back to himself. Thus here Freud has problems. He wants the end of the world, in which the stream of rays from the sun is set up, to signify a total collapse of all libidinal interest in others, and yet since he identifies the sun (God) with Fleschig/ Schreber’s father, it follows that he is holding that there is some type of libidinal interest set up between Schreber and Fleschig/ Schreber’s father at the same time. This is no small matter, for this poetic symbol in Memoirs – the end of the world, the sun and the divine rays – is of central significance.

Freud’s problem is, I hold, that he fails to acknowledge any religious (or quasi-religious) aspect of Memoirs. For rather than equating the sun with another person – Fleschig or the father – if we equate the sun with God, as does Schreber, then the issue is resolved. For God is distinguished from any person or intraworldly entity, and thus there is no conflict in a direct relationship (e.g. a libidinal one) with God co-present with the end of the world (collapse of interest with others and the world). And the same holds with my interpretation of Memoirs in this section – that the sun, God, is an expression of Being (a quasi-religious expression of God). For there is an ontological difference between Being and beings, and thus there is no conflict in holding that Schreber gave up all of his concern for others and all intraworldly entities, and yet co-present with this had a relationship with Being (the silent call of Being calling him into resoluteness). And thus I can account for the central poetic thread in Memoirs.
Secondary Literature

As mentioned in the Introduction of this dissertation, one of the upshots of detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety in Heidegger is that it leads to an account of psychosis in Heidegger, or at least helps begin or develop the dialogue regarding this. I hope to have now shown how this is the case. For while I have of course detailed how anxiety’s antipathy acts as the springboard for the first movement of anticipation (the living death in which concern for the intraworldly is utterly renounced), while anxiety’s sympathy acts as the springboard for the second movement of resoluteness, I hope to have shown how if Dasein springs off the antipathy achieving the living death of anticipation, without therewith springing off the sympathy achieving resoluteness, then psychosis is initiated. And I hope to have also shown how the Schreber case-study helps to defend and flesh out this account of psychosis.

Now, there seems to be something of a gap in the secondary literature on Heidegger – and in particular Being and Time – concerning an account of psychosis. This is understandable, since, as mentioned, psychosis seems to be outside the purview of Heidegger’s Being and Time. Nevertheless, one author who does do something similar to what I do, and who does use Being and Time (and in particular, which intimately connects the end of the world with the setting up of the direct connection with the divine rays by way of the sun, whereas Freud cannot.

The second central poetic theme in Memoirs that Freud is unable to adequately deal with, I hold, is Schreber’s repeated insistence that he was to be unmanned in order to be fertilized by the divine rays and give birth to the new race. Freud begins his study by noting that Schreber’s insistence regarding giving birth to the new race represents a religious “redeemer” quality in Memoirs, and indeed notes that in many cases of psychosis this redeemer quality is at the core (p. 10). However, whereas Freud notes that Schreber’s doctors viewed Schreber’s unmanning to be a means to the end of being a redeemer (giving birth to the new race) – which indeed I hold as well – Freud holds rather that being unmanned is an end in itself, and thus radically downplays the redeemer thread in Memoirs (p. 11). The reason Freud does this is of course because his account of Schreber’s psychosis is that it was caused by the homosexual impulse directed at Fleschig (and his father) being repressed, and subsequently returning in disguised form as the content of the psychotic system: as needing to be unmanned so that God (Fleschig) may impregnate him. Thus having reduced the content of the psychotic system to a disguised expression of the homosexual impulse (Schreber ought to be fertilized by God), Freud thus has no strong account of the redeemer aspect of Memoirs (the giving birth to the new race), and thus drastically downplays it.

However, I take this to be a weakness on Freud’s account – for the redeemer aspect (giving birth to the new race) is such a central poetic theme in Memoirs that I think it should be as central in one’s interpretation of Memoirs. And not only this, but as Freud himself notes, the ‘redeemer’ aspect is prevalent in many cases of psychosis, and thus this only makes the need to interpret this aspect more pressing – for the question is not only why Schreber has this redeemer aspect central to his system, but indeed why this is central to many cases of psychosis. But I believe my account answers this question. For I hold that Schreber’s unmanning was the means to the end to be fertilized and give birth to the new race – in other words, the receptive movement of allowing the call of Being to call one (being unmanned), is the means to the end of re-absorbing oneself in the with-world such that intraworldly entities gain back their concern for one (giving birth to the new race). In this way I give an account of the redeemer aspect central to Memoirs, and indeed, as the redeemer aspect is central to many cases of psychosis, I also give an account of this redeemer aspect in these other cases: that is, that one ought to re-absorb oneself in the world.

Thus considering the three above points – that Freud over sexualizes his interpretation, and that Freud’s interpretations of the two poetic threads in Memoirs exhibit a weakness which my account overcomes – I believe that I have shown how my interpretation of Memoirs has a certain strength over that of Freud’s.
the concept of anxiety) to help give an account of psychosis is, as mentioned above, Binswanger. However, I believe that my account helps develop Binswanger’s, and for the following reasons. Firstly Binswanger does not give an account of anxiety’s ambiguity as I have done, and thus neither does he understand psychosis as having made the first antipathetic movement (renouncing all concern for the intraworldly) without making the second sympathetic movement. But since he does not make this move, it is perhaps hard to understand, on Binswanger’s account, what distinguishes a non-psychotic use of anxiety, with a psychotic one. For on Binswanger’s account – at least in his ‘The Case of Ellen West’ – a psychotic use of anxiety is one in which this significance fades more and more, becomes more and more narrowed (p. 306) – but we might ask: in what way then is this psychotic use of anxiety distinguished from the non-psychotic use? On my account there is a clear distinction – the psychotic makes the antipathetic movement, and does not make the sympathetic one – but Binswanger, not having an account of anxiety’s ambiguity, also seems not to have a clear distinction regarding this question. In this way my account perhaps develops Binswanger’s.

Now, while I have not found much other literature which deals explicitly with psychosis in Heidegger’s Being and Time, my work on this section on psychosis will also, I believe, help to resolve a split in the secondary literature which we find concerning Heidegger’s account of anticipation. Thomson, in his ‘Death and Demise in Being and Time’81, helpfully marks what he calls a “radically polarized” (p. 260) divide in the scholarship on death in Being and Time: on one side there are a group of authors – notably Mulhall, as highlighted above – who, as Thomson writes, “adopt the straightforward view that, by “death” Heidegger must mean the same sort of things that we normally mean when we talk about “death”” (p. 263), e.g. that which marks our mortality, and when it strikes it annihilates Dasein; on the other side there are a group of authors – notably Blattner, as highlighted above – who adopt the view that by death, as Thomson writes, “Heidegger means something like the global collapse of significance” (p. 263) of the world, a living death (as I call it) which, when it strikes, does not annihilate Dasein, for Dasein lives through it. Thomson places himself in the second group, and refers to the first group as a ‘commonsensical misreading’ of death insofar as it conflates Heidegger’s conception of death with what Heidegger calls ‘demise’. I, however, believe that both groups are on to something important, and the problem is that hitherto no one has been able to include both of these readings into one coherent view. But now I will argue that my above work on psychosis helps to overcome this divide in that my account of anticipation indeed incorporates both interpretations of death, albeit each one is given a new spin in my account.

For recall that in this appendix I explained how ‘anticipation’ (which I understand as the utter collapse of absorption, the living death) comes to have two meanings in my account: if Dasein, in achieving anticipation, therewith simultaneously achieves resoluteness (getting back all absorption that is simultaneously lost), then the death of anticipation is sacrifice, which initiates authenticity (as detailed last section); however if Dasein, in achieving anticipation, does not simultaneously achieve resoluteness, then the death of anticipation is existential suicide, which initiates psychosis (as detailed in this section). But these two possibilities of anticipation are my spin on the two understanding of death in the secondary literature, which supposedly stand radically polarized.

Regarding the group which holds that death is the global collapse of significance in which Dasein is not annihilated (e.g. Blattner) – I believe that there is something important about this line, for it acknowledges that Heidegger had earlier defined possibility as ‘a possible way for Dasein to be’, and thus reads this use of ‘possibility’ systematically into Heidegger’s account of death. My spin on this line is that Dasein is not annihilated in death insofar as it simultaneously gets back the very same absorption it is continually collapsing, gets it back by way of resoluteness: and thus anticipation here is sacrifice. This group does not hold the details of this interpretation (as noted last section) since it is indeed absurd to lose all absorption and simultaneously get it back, and commentators have presumably wanted to avoid this absurdity. But in any case this is my spin on this line in the secondary literature – anticipation, when it is sacrifice, is indeed a state in which Dasein is not annihilated, for it gets its absorption back by way of resoluteness.

Regarding the group which holds that death is such that when it strikes it annihilates Dasein (e.g. Mulhall) – I believe that there is something important about this line, for it stresses the danger involved in death, which the previous line perhaps seems to downplay. My spin on this line is that Dasein is annihilated in death insofar as it does not simultaneously get back the absorption that it loses. For Dasein is always to a certain degree absorbed in the world, and thus when it merely achieves anticipation, without resoluteness, it is no longer Dasein – and thus here anticipation is suicide. This group does not hold the details of this interpretation (or at least does not explicitly hold them ) for this group understands death as marking our mortality, whereas I am understanding this annihilation of Dasein, this death, not as marking our mortality, but as marking the danger of psychosis. And thus this is my spin on this line in the secondary literature – anticipation, when it is suicide, is indeed a state in which Dasein is annihilated, for Dasein here does not get its absorption back by way of resoluteness, and thus in a strong sense is no longer Dasein, but is psychotic.

Therefore I believe that not only has my account of psychosis in Being and Time begun to fill a gap in the secondary literature on this topic – for I have not found much secondary literature on this topic – but further, I believe that my account of anticipation, as consisting of two possibilities (sacrifice,
suicide), which I explained in this section, overcomes a sharp divide in the secondary literature on the topic of death. Namely, as it stands in the secondary literature there is a sharp divide regarding how to understand Heidegger on existential death: on one side there are the group of authors who conceive of existential death such that when it strikes it annihilates Dasein, on the other side there are the group of authors who conceive of existential death such that when it strikes Dasein is not annihilated, but indeed Dasein lives through it. And my account of anticipation, as consisting of two possibilities (suicide, sacrifice) incorporates, albeit with a new spin on each, both of these interpretations – for my account of anticipation as suicide incorporates the former, and my account of anticipation as sacrifice incorporates the latter. And of course it was by way of detailing anxiety’s ambiguity – antipathetic death-anxiety and sympathetic conscience-anxiety – and the way one may spring off it, that led to this account of psychosis.

And thus we have now fully completed the progressive interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger (that is, in Being and Time, using Religious Life and ‘What is Metaphysics?’ as supplements). I wanted to show that anxiety in Heidegger has an ambiguous structure – that is, is constituted by an antipathetic and sympathetic aspect. And as there are three different encounters which Dasein can have with this anxiety, I held that to thus give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, we must track the movement through the three different encounters, explaining in detail the interrelation between them. In this part of the dissertation we tracked this movement progressively. That is, we started by detailing the way ambiguous anxiety shows up in disguise in the undifferentiated mode – showing how here the sympathetic aspect of anxiety is completely covered over while the antipathetic aspect partially shows itself; we proceeded to detail manifest ambiguous anxiety misused which gives rise to strict inauthenticity – showing how here anxiety’s antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest yet mis-used such that one springs into the dialectic of strict inauthenticity; and we finally arrived at detailing manifest ambiguous anxiety rightly used which gives rise to authenticity (the telos) – showing how here the antipathetic and sympathetic aspects are manifest and sprung off from into authenticity. In this part of the dissertation we tracked the progressive movement, the movement towards the telos.

However, let us not forget that the interpretation of Heidegger in this part was always implicitly done through Kierkegaard’s lens. For in accordance with my methodology I am harmonizing my account of anxiety in Heidegger, which I laid out in this part, with my account of anxiety in Kierkegaard, which I lay out in part I of this dissertation – that is, I am always implicitly interpreting the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. Let us not forget that the progressive interpretation of anxiety in this part, the movement towards the telos, was always implicitly guided by way of the retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in part I, the movement away-from the telos.
CONCLUSION

The aim of this dissertation was to produce a systematic account of anxiety, and do so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by Kierkegaard and Heidegger, two authors to whom anxiety is central to their work. The methodology of this dissertation was such that I interpreted the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and yet also interpreted the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. Through this methodology I attempted to produce an interpretation of the anxiety in Kierkegaard which harmonizes with my interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger, and I attempted to produce an interpretation of the anxiety in Heidegger which harmonizes with my interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard. It is by way of this double interpretation that I attempted to produce a systematic account of anxiety, drawing from Kierkegaard and Heidegger.

In part I of this dissertation I interpreted the anxiety in Kierkegaard. As noted, I held that the concept of anxiety is central to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous oeuvre. I noted Kierkegaard’s main text on anxiety is Haufniensis’ Anxiety, and I used this text as my centrepiece and yet I also continually supplemented this text with various of the other relevant pseudonymous texts – in particular, de silentio’s Fear and Trembling, A’s Either/Or I, and Anti-Climacus’ Sickness. I argued that within Kierkegaard’s texts themselves anxiety has an ambiguous structure. And as there are three different encounters which spirit may have with anxiety, I held that to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard we must make a movement through the three encounters, showing in detail the interrelation between them. Part I of this dissertation tracked the movement through anxiety retrogressively – that is, we began by highlighting manifest ambiguous anxiety rightly used which gives rise to faith (the telos), we then highlighted manifest ambiguous anxiety misused which gives rise to strict sin, and we concluded by highlighting disguised ambiguous anxiety which shows up in spiritlessness – all the while showing in detail the interrelation between the three encounters. In this part of the dissertation we tracked the retrogressive movement through anxiety’s three encounters, that is, we tracked the repulsion away-from the telos. We can call this repulsive movement of part I an antipathetic movement.

In part II of this dissertation I interpreted the anxiety in Heidegger. As also noted, I held that the concept of anxiety is central to Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time. I used the concept of anxiety in Being and Time as my centrepiece, and I also supplemented my interpretation of this with Heidegger’s Religious Life and ‘What is Metaphysics?’. I argued that for Heidegger anxiety has an ambiguous structure. And as there are three different encounters which Dasein can have with anxiety, I held that to give a detailed interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger we must make a movement through the three encounters, explaining in detail the interrelation between them. Part II of this dissertation tracked this
movement through anxiety *progressively* – we began by highlighting the way ambiguous anxiety shows up in *disguise* in undifferentiatedness, we then highlighted *misused* manifest ambiguous anxiety which gives rise to strict inauthenticity, and we concluded by highlighting manifest ambiguous anxiety *rightly used* which gives rise to authenticity (the *telos*) – detailing the interrelation between the three encounters. In this part of the dissertation we tracked the progressive movement through anxiety, that is, we tracked the *attraction* towards the *telos*. We can call this attractive movement of part II a *sympathetic* movement.

In accordance with my methodology, part I on Kierkegaard – the antipathetic movement – was always implicitly interpreted through Heidegger; and part II on Heidegger – the sympathetic movement – was always implicitly interpreted through Kierkegaard. This can be seen very clearly in the fact that the two parts are a mirror image of one another: namely, all of the key concepts from each part perfectly mirror one another, and their respective movements are inverted. But because all the key concepts perfectly mirror one another this shows that the implicit interpretation, from each author to the other, from each part of the dissertation to the other, was always in action. The antipathetic movement of part I was always implicitly guided by way of the sympathetic movement, while the sympathetic movement of part II was always implicitly guided by way of the antipathetic movement. Thus keeping in mind the methodology in play, we can say that the movement of part I is not only an antipathetic movement but is what we can call a *sympathetic antipathy*, while the movement of part II is not only a sympathetic movement but is what we can call an *antipathetic sympathy*. And it is in this way that I have used Kierkegaard and Heidegger in order to draw out a systematic account of anxiety. For not only have I given a detailed retrogressive interpretation of anxiety in Kierkegaard in part I, and have given a detailed progressive interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger in part II, but, by way of my methodology, and taking the two parts of this dissertation together, I have attempted to produce a systematic account of ambiguous anxiety drawing from both authors.

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But now that I have completed my dissertation and have harmonized the accounts of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger into a systematic account, I will conclude by taking a critical stance towards my own dissertation. For I noted in the Introduction that there may be a risk involved in this dissertation: namely, in interpreting Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and in interpreting Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens, is this dissertation not at risk of forcing an interpretation onto one or both of these authors in an objectionable manner? That is, while I have completed my dissertation and harmonized Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s accounts of anxiety into one systematic account, have I not fallen victim to, at least at certain key points, objectionably forcing a Heideggerian interpretation onto Kierkegaard
and/or forcing a Kierkegaardian interpretation onto Heidegger? I want to firstly point out here what I have pointed out in the Introduction, and have continued to reiterate: while this dissertation indeed details the structural similarity of anxiety’s ambiguity in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and while I hold that ambiguous anxiety acts as a springboard for sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and, similarly, inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger, I am not arguing that sin is the same as inauthenticity, nor that faith is the same as authenticity. Rather, in focusing on the structural similarity of anxiety in both authors I am in turn showing how anxiety plays a similar role in sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and in inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger.

But now that I have completed my double interpretation we are in a position to address this question in more detail. Here I will address certain central moments of the interpretation in this dissertation – key moments in my Kierkegaard interpretation as well as in my Heidegger interpretation – that may strike the reader as objectionable, and indeed as objectionably forcing a Heideggerian interpretation onto Kierkegaard, or forcing a Kierkegaardian interpretation onto Heidegger. I will start with the former.

Have I objectionably forced a Heideggerian reading onto Kierkegaard? There are two key points here which seem to stand out. Firstly, in part I of this dissertation I have tried to flesh out the meaning of Haufniensis’ claim that any spirit is both himself and the race, and I localized two encounters of anxiety within these two spheres – the manifest yet misused anxiety of inclosing reserve, and the disguised anxiety which shows up in the race’s world. Indeed I fleshed out what Haufniensis calls the ‘race’ as: the shared world. Now here is a point in which my reading Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens comes to the fore. For while the idea of the shared world is a central idea to Heidegger, Haufniensis never uses the term ‘shared world’ and thus here I might be at risk of forcing a Heideggerian interpretation onto Kierkegaard. However, here I believe that my interpretation of Haufniensis is not forced, but is rather emphasizing something that Haufniensis suggests, yet does not develop in much detail. For as I noted in part I, when Haufniensis writes of the ‘race’ he subtly yet systematically links this with the ‘world’, and indeed writes of this world as a ‘historical nexus’. While these are only subtle suggestions, I do not think I am forcing an objectionable reading onto Haufniensis when I understand this ‘historical nexus’ on the Heideggerian model of being absorbed in the shared world (and indeed Anti-Climacus, as I pointed out, goes on to use the terminology of being ‘absorbed’ in this world). This interpretive move is, I think, merely developing Haufniensis’ subtle suggestions about the ‘race’ in a Heideggerian vein, and indeed helping to clarify them.

But there is another related central interpretation in part I of this dissertation which may strike the reader as objectionably forcing a Heideggerian reading onto Kierkegaard. This has to do with my account of psychosis. Psychosis, as I have it in my dissertation, is the state in which one utterly wrenches oneself
out of one’s concern with the shared world, out of one’s absorption, and does not get that concern back. On my account I hold that this is psychosis since in this state one is, in a strong sense, no longer spirit/Dasein. Now, in regards to Heidegger, I believe I have strong reasons to make the claim that if one utterly wrenches oneself out of one’s concern for the shared world then one is no longer Dasein but is psychotic. For Heidegger is continually reiterating in Being and Time that Dasein’s Being is Being-in-the-world which means that Dasein is always absorbed in the world, Dasein always has some concern for the intraworldly. And indeed since Dasein is always absorbed in the world to a certain degree, and since Being and Time is an analysis of Dasein, Heidegger never gives us an account of that state in which one has utterly wrenched oneself out of one’s absorption in the world. Therefore I believe I have strong reasons for thinking that, for Heidegger, Dasein will always be to some degree absorbed in the shared world, and that if Dasein indeed utterly wrenches itself out of this absorption it will no longer be Dasein, but will be, as I call it, psychotic.

Now using this lens to interpret psychosis in Kierkegaard I held that spirit for Haufniensis will also always be to some degree absorbed in the shared world, have concern for that world, and if spirit ever utterly wrenches itself out of this concern then one has entered a state in which one is no longer spirit, but is psychotic. But is this forcing a Heideggerian reading onto Kierkegaard? Firstly we have Haufniensis’ central claim that what is essential to any existence (spirit) is that one is ‘both himself and the race’. Now as I have already interpreted the ‘race’ here to mean absorption in the shared world, we have good reasons to think that Haufniensis is holding that any spirit will always be to some degree absorbed in this shared world, and furthermore if it utterly wrenches itself out of this concern then it is no longer spirit. And indeed it is in these terms that I interpreted Haufniensis’ citation on ‘complete insanity’ – namely, that if spirit ever utterly wrenches itself out of the shared world, it has become psychotic. Therefore at first glance it seems that I am not guilty here of objectionably forcing a Heideggerian reading onto Kierkegaard – namely, forcing the idea that spirit will always be to some degree absorbed in the shared world, and if it is not, then it is no longer spirit.

However, here I must note a dissimilarity between Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s texts which may bring back the worry. Namely, Heidegger in Being and Time, after arguing that Dasein’s Being is Being-in-the-world and thus that Dasein will always be absorbed in the world and if one wrenches oneself out of the world then one is no longer Dasein, never concerns himself with explaining the state of one who indeed wrenches oneself out of this world. This is outside of Heidegger’s purview, and this allows me to interpret this state as that of psychosis. However, this is not the case for Kierkegaard. That is, while Haufniensis holds that spirit will always be part himself and part the race, thus giving us reason to believe that if one ever utterly wrenches oneself out of the race’s world one has gained ‘complete insanity’, nevertheless de silentio in Fear and Trembling does go on to speak a bit about what such a state would be
like. Recall that on my account wrenching oneself out of the race’s world is called ‘infinite resignation’ for Kierkegaard, while the movement of getting that concern back is ‘faith’. Thus I am holding that the state in which infinite resignation is achieved, without faith, results in psychosis. However, when de silentio writes of this state – in which infinite resignation is achieved without faith – he labels one who has achieved such a state a ‘knight of infinite resignation’, and goes on to describe the state this ‘knight’ has achieved as if it may indeed be a valuable state to achieve. This seems to suggest that for de silentio this state is not necessarily that of psychosis, but indeed there may be something inherently valuable to it.

Therefore there is a dissimilarity between Kierkegaard and Heidegger on this point. Heidegger holds that Dasein will always be to some degree absorbed in the shared world and remains silent on what such a state in which one has utterly collapsed that absorption without getting it back would be – thus giving me room to call it psychosis. Kierkegaard on the other hand has something of a tension between Haufniensis and de silentio on this point: Haufniensis seems to suggest that spirit will no longer be spirit if one utterly wrenches oneself out of one’s concern for the shared world, but will indeed be completely insane; de silentio seems to suggest that by way of wrenching oneself out one can become a ‘knight’, something perhaps inherently valuable. Of course the way I resolved this tension in this dissertation was by reading Kierkegaard here through Heidegger’s lens and simply holding that such a state will lead to the collapse of spirit and onset of psychosis. But is this a forced reading considering what I have now brought to light? Perhaps I ought to have held that for Kierkegaard one does not necessarily become psychotic if one makes the movement of infinite resignation without faith, but rather that psychosis is merely one possible result? This, I think, is a point that requires further research and which I will not answer one way or the other here. For I believe that this particular point lies outside of the central purview of this dissertation – for indeed my accounts of psychosis in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger lay outside of the central purview of this dissertation since this dissertation is centrally concerned with the three encounters which spirit/Dasein may have with anxiety (rightly used, misused, and disguised) whereas psychosis is a peripheral danger. And indeed, for this reason I have been careful to place both of my sections on psychosis in the appendixes. And thus, as these considerations lead us outside the central purview of this dissertation, I leave the question of whether I have objectionably forced a Heideggerian reading onto Kierkegaard here unanswered, as a matter for further research, but I believe we can say that I have at least helped to develop the investigation into this concept.

But have I objectionably forced a Kierkegaardian reading onto Heidegger in this dissertation? Namely have I, in my account of anticipatory resoluteness, objectionably forced a Kierkegaardian reading onto Heidegger? I held that the anxiety in *Being and Time* discloses the possibility of, on the one hand anticipation, and on the other hand resoluteness. And thus Heidegger’s anxiety discloses the possibility of anticipatory resoluteness. Now, the way that I interpreted this was of course through Kierkegaard’s lens.
That is, as for Kierkegaard ambiguous anxiety discloses the antipathetic possibility of, on the one hand, utterly wrenching oneself out of one’s concern for the shared world – infinite resignation – and, on the other hand, the sympathetic possibility of gaining back that concern in a transformed manner – faith – I used this lens to interpret Heidegger’s account of how anxiety discloses anticipatory resoluteness: that is, that antipathetic death-anxiety discloses the possibility of anticipation, and sympathetic conscience-anxiety discloses the possibility of resoluteness. Now, at the general level I do not think that I am guilty of objectionably forcing an interpretation onto Heidegger here. For reading Heidegger’s account of anticipation as a living death in which Dasein utterly wrenches itself out of its concern for the world is something that I drew from the secondary literature on Heidegger. As I have been noting, the account of death as a living death in Heidegger is something that is quite common in the secondary literature. What is not common is to equate ‘anticipation’ with this living death. But I believe that there is strong textual evidence for this equation. Therefore using Kierkegaard’s account of infinite resignation, a living death, as my key to reading Heidegger’s account of anticipation is, I feel, at the general level not guilty of objectionably forcing a Kierkegaardian interpretation – for the seeds of this interpretation already existed in the Heideggerian secondary literature, and I merely took these seeds and developed them with textual evidence.

The same applies, at the general level, with the way I interpreted Heidegger’s account of resoluteness. Namely, I held that resoluteness in Heidegger is that mode of getting back that concern for the world which one utterly loses, and getting this back in a transformed mode (transformed such that one is no longer entangled in das Man). This in itself is not guilty of forcing an interpretation I believe – for it is quite common to hold that resoluteness includes absorbing oneself in the world in a transformed manner. And finally, bringing my interpretation of anticipation and resoluteness together – which I was led to by way of detailing antipathetic death-anxiety and sympathetic conscience-anxiety – I feel that I am not guilty of forcing an interpretation here. I simply made the move that it seems others have not wanted to make because of the absurdity of the result – namely the absurdity that in anticipatory resoluteness Dasein is both utterly wrenching itself out of concern for the world, and at the same time getting that concern back. However, Heidegger’s text lends itself to this interpretation, and reading this text through Kierkegaard’s lens only brings this interpretation to light. Thus at the general level I do not feel that my account of anxiety in Heidegger – as disclosing the antipathetic possibility of anticipation and sympathetic possibility resoluteness – is guilty of forcing a Kierkegaardian reading onto Heidegger. It simply highlights something which has strong textual support and yet which has been perhaps avoided in the secondary literature: namely that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is absurd. And this of course means not only that authenticity is made up of the continual and simultaneous double-movement of both utterly collapsing all absorption and existentiell for-the-sakes-of-which, and also getting that same
absorption and those same for-the-sakes-of-which back, but also means that this double-movement will appear to be an incompossible mode of existence for Dasein. And indeed it is this latter point which perhaps has led commentators to suppress the simultaneity of the double-movement.

And thus while I do not believe I am guilty of forcing a Kierkegaardian interpretation onto Heidegger, generally speaking, in my account of anticipatory resoluteness, there is one peripheral detail here which I should address. Namely, my interpretation that it is ‘Being’ itself which calls Dasein into resoluteness sounds very similar to the Kierkegaardian notion that it is God who helps one achieve faith. I highlighted that the details of Kierkegaard’s account of the second movement, faith, are as follows. Spirit can achieve infinite resignation with its own willpower, if only it can muster the courage, but the second movement, gaining back the concern which one is infinitely renouncing, is not something that spirit can achieve merely with its own willpower. Rather, this can only be achieved by way of a receptivity in God, by way of allowing God to give back to one that which one is infinitely renouncing. Now, in regards to Heidegger’s account of resoluteness, I have shown that Heidegger is clear that resoluteness is achieved by Dasein by way of Dasein answering the call of conscience. It is clear that this call to resoluteness is experienced by Dasein as an abrupt call, calling Dasein even against its own will. And it is also clear that answering this call is done by Dasein by way of a receptive ‘letting’ the call call it into resoluteness. Therefore it is clear that I am not forcing a Kierkegaardian interpretation onto Heidegger when I note the harmonization between the two accounts regarding the fact that properly springing off anxiety’s sympathy and achieving faith in Kierkegaard or resoluteness in Heidegger is not something that one achieves merely with one’s own willpower, but is achieved by way of a receptivity in something beyond one’s own willpower.

Now, as mentioned, on Kierkegaard’s account it is God who helps one achieve faith; yet on Heidegger’s account it is not at all clear ‘who’ does the calling – that is, it is not clear who is calling Dasein, even against Dasein’s own will, to resoluteness. I raised this as a puzzle in my dissertation, noting that Heidegger holds that the call in a sense comes from Dasein, and yet also from beyond it, and I took a page from ‘What is Metaphysics?’ to help resolve the puzzle. Namely, I held that it is Being itself which calls Dasein to resoluteness. And therefore I held that in this way Dasein experiences the call as calling against its will, and in this way Dasein achieves resoluteness by way of a receptive letting the call call it into resoluteness. In this way I read the role of Being in a similar fashion to the role of God in Kierkegaard. But am I guilty of objectionably forcing a Kierkegaardian interpretation onto Heidegger on this point? The problem comes down to that of secularization. What problems emerge when I replace God with Being in my interpretation of Heidegger. Does it make sense to think of Being in the manner of God? For example, does it make sense to think of Being as some agency who calls to Dasein, offering help to Dasein to achieve resoluteness? And furthermore, on the side of Dasein, does it make sense for
Dasein to have trust in Being, to have trust that Being itself will help it receive back that which it is utterly renouncing? For normally we think of God as loving and as one who we can put our trust in. But does the same hold for Being? Does the comparison break down here?

I think that these types of questions require further research and I will not answer them in one way or the other here. For ultimately, I believe that these details lay outside of the purview of this dissertation. For this dissertation is centrally concerned with the structure of anxiety, showing the structural similarities of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and is concerned with pulling out a systematic account of anxiety from Kierkegaard and Heidegger. And indeed I think that all this dissertation ultimately needs, on the point of how resoluteness is achieved, is to hold that resoluteness is achieved by way of one springing off anxiety in such a way that not only does anxiety disclose this possibility as that which ought to be achieved, but further that one indeed achieves it by way of a receptivity in that which is beyond one’s own willpower (and also such that if this is not achieved this is due to a defiance against that which one should have a receptivity towards). As mentioned, I believe that it is not objectionable to hold that for Heidegger one indeed achieves resoluteness by way of a receptivity in something over one’s own willpower (and I also think that it is not objectionable to hold that not achieving it is due to a defiance against this), and therefore, this is the central point which I believe I have established. For all of this is related to one of the upshots which I detailed in this dissertation: that focusing on the structural similarities of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger leads us to show the strange agency involved in sin and faith, and inauthenticity and authenticity, as one of part activity, part passivity – and this is why I feel all this dissertation needs is to specify the agency involved here (for this concerns one of the upshots this dissertation was after), while further comparisons between God and Being lay outside of its purview. I therefore conclude that the details of ‘who’ does the calling – which I have localized as Being itself – indeed lie outside the central purview of this dissertation. And thus, as these considerations lead us outside the central purview of this dissertation, I leave the question of whether I have objectionably forced a Heideggerian reading onto Kierkegaard by replacing God with Being unanswered, as a matter for further research.

Thus I have now noted various key places in this dissertation where my method of reading Kierkegaard through Heidegger and Heidegger through Kierkegaard may be at risk of objectionably forcing an interpretation one way or the other. Regarding my reading of Kierkegaard I noted that I may be at risk of forcing a reading of the shared world – a concept prevalent in Heidegger – into Kierkegaard. Connected with this I also noted that I may be at risk of forcing a reading of psychosis – as a state in which one utterly collapses one’s concern with the shared world without getting it back – into Kierkegaard which may not necessarily apply. Regarding my reading of Heidegger I noted that my account of anticipatory resoluteness – similar to Kierkegaard’s account of infinite resignation and faith –
may be at risk of forcing a Kierkegaardian interpretation. In particular I noted that my reading of Being as the caller of conscience may be at risk of forcing Kierkegaard’s notion of God as the one who helps one achieve faith.

However, I have also concluded that most of the above readings do not force an interpretation, but indeed I have argued that, for most, reading Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens, actually helps produce a fruitful reading of both authors. But I have also noted that some of the above points require further research to conclude one way or the other whether I have objectionably forced an interpretation. But ultimately, with these points I concluded that this further work lies outside of the purview of this dissertation.

For as I have been reiterating, this dissertation is concerned with pulling out a systematic account of anxiety from both Kierkegaard and Heidegger – that is, detailing the structural similarity of anxiety’s ambiguity in both authors (detailing the antipathy and the sympathy), and in this way producing a systematic account of ambiguous anxiety by way of these two authors. And, further, this structural comparison has, I hope to have shown, had various upshots. While ambiguous anxiety acts as a springboard for sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger, I do not equate sin with inauthenticity, nor faith with authenticity, but am focused on showing how anxiety plays a similar role in sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger. In particular, by focusing on the ambiguous nature of anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and by showing how anxiety’s plays a similar role in sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger, there were three upshots – all of which, as I showed, tend to be overlooked in the secondary literature on Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Firstly, detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety led me to show in detail how the agency involved in both sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger, is a strange one made up of part activity, part passivity. For as anxiety is the springboard for sin and faith in Kierkegaard, and inauthenticity and authenticity in Heidegger – and while I did not equate sin with inauthenticity, nor faith with authenticity – the structural similarity of anxiety’s ambiguity in both authors led me to show how the agency involved in this springing for both authors is one of part activity, part passivity. Secondly, detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety in both authors also led me to bring one’s relation to the concept of faith in Kierkegaard, and authenticity in Heidegger, to the fore in a particularly pressing manner. Again – without equating faith with authenticity – it was the structural similarity of anxiety’s ambiguity in both authors which led me to detail how anxiety rightly used in both authors is absurd, which in turn brings to the fore the question of how one relates to these concepts. And finally, detailing the ambiguous structure of anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger helped to develop the investigation into the nature of psychosis in both authors.


Poole, R., Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication (University of Virginia Press: Virginia, 1993).


