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Repeated Nash Implementation

Mezzettti, Claudio and Renou, Ludovic (2017) 'Repeated Nash Implementation.' Theoretical Economics. ISSN 1933-6837

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Abstract

We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but non-trivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is "large" or "small."

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Dynamic Monotonicity, Nash Implementation, Maskin Monotonicity, Repeated Implementation, Repeated Games
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Ludovic Renou
Date Deposited: 10 Feb 2016 12:03
Last Modified: 12 Sep 2018 11:17
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/16033

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