

Introduction

- Waszczuk and Savary (2015) (W&S) describe how the syntax of MWEs can be analysed using the descriptive apparatus of LFG.
- But they say nothing about the semantics.
- The goal of this poster is to extend W&S's treatment by providing the semantics of idioms like *kick the bucket*, using the standard apparatus of LFG (so called 'glue' logic).

Syntax

- W&S's approach to idioms like *kick the bucket* ('die') associates constraints with the head word, for *kick the bucket* these might be as in (1):

$$(1) \text{kick} : V : (\uparrow \text{OBJ PRED FN}) =_c \text{'bucket'} \quad (\uparrow \text{OBJ DEF}) = + \\ (\uparrow \text{OBJ NUM}) = \text{sg} \quad \neg (\uparrow \text{OBJ SPEC})$$

This is a specialisation of the normal entry for *kick*, whose direct object is required to be (a) headed by *bucket*; (b) definite; (c) singular; and to have no specifier (d) – hence only *the* is permitted, an alternative would be $(\uparrow \text{OBJ SPEC FN}) = \text{'the'}$.

- This captures the key syntactic constraints, explaining why the idiomatic interpretation disappears if any of these constraints is violated:

- (2) a. #Sam kicked the pail.
- b. #Sam kicked a bucket.
- c. #They kicked the buckets.
- d. #Sam kicked her bucket.

- But it gives no account of the semantics of the idiom, and leaves unexplained the impossibility of clefting, relative clause formation, or pronominalisation:

- (3) a. #It was the bucket that Sam kicked.
- b. #What Sam kicked was the bucket.
- c. #The bucket that Sam kicked (was unfortunate).
- d. #Sam kicked the bucket, but Kim didn't kick it.

- This poster is intended to remedy this.

Literal Semantics

- In the standard version of LFG the syntax-semantics interface is handled by so-called 'glue logic' (e.g. Dalrymple, 2001).
- This involves associating pieces of syntactic structure with semantic 'resources'.
- Resources consist of a left-hand-side, which is a conventional semantic representation, and a right-hand-side, which is an expression indicating the combinatory possibilities.

For example, the literal semantics of *kick*:

$$(4) \text{Conventional Semantics : Combinatorial Possibilities} \\ \lambda y. \lambda x. \exists e. \text{kick}(e, y, x) : (\uparrow \text{SUBJ})_{\sigma} \rightarrow (\uparrow \text{OBJ})_{\sigma} \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma} \\ \text{Abbreviation} \quad \quad \quad s_{\sigma} \rightarrow o_{\sigma} \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}$$

- Intuitively, the 'glue' expression here says: to produce the semantics associated with the f-structure where *kick* appears (i.e. the clause), consume the semantics of the SUBJECT and the OBJECT, in that order.

- The 'resource sensitivity' is a way of capturing the same intuition as compositionality in semantics, but without requiring a binary structure.

- The literal interpretation of *Sam kicked the bucket* can be derived as in (5) – ignoring the derivation of *the bucket*.

- In (5) the resource associated with *the bucket* consumes that of the verb (this is standard, if *the* is associated with quantificational semantics. The $\forall H$ etc. means 'for any H ', and will allow for scope interaction with other quantifiers, as in *Everyone_i kicked the bucket she_i was filling* vs. *Everyone_i kicked the bucket Sam was filling*).

- To understand the mechanics of (5), note that $o_{\sigma} \rightarrow H$ in the resource for *the bucket* matches the resource that results from combining *Sam* and *kick*, $o_{\sigma} \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}$. (It is not in any way essential that the verb should combine first with its subject in this way, but it makes for a shorter proof).

$$(5) \frac{\lambda y. \lambda x. \exists e. \text{kick}(e, y, x) : s_{\sigma} \rightarrow o_{\sigma} \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma} \quad \text{Sam} : s_{\sigma}}{\lambda x. \exists e. \text{kick}(e, \text{Sam}, x) : o_{\sigma} \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}} \quad \frac{\lambda P. \text{the}(b, \text{bucket}(b), P(b)) : \forall H. [o_{\sigma} \rightarrow H] \rightarrow H}{\text{the}(b, \text{bucket}(b), \exists e. \text{kick}(e, \text{Sam}, b)) : \uparrow_{\sigma}}$$

Idiomatic Semantics

- To obtain the idiomatic interpretation, we can associate the idiomatic reading of *kick* with a 'manager' resource which essentially discards the meaning associated with *the bucket*. This involves changing the glue type of *kick* so that it consumes the subject, and then consumes the resource associated with the object (rather than the other way round, as in the literal case):

$$(6) \lambda y. \lambda Q. \exists e. \text{die}(e, y) : s_{\sigma} \rightarrow [[o_{\sigma} \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}] \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}] \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}$$

- The idiomatic interpretation can be derived as in (7)

$$(7) \frac{\lambda y. \lambda Q. \exists e. \text{die}(e, y) : s_{\sigma} \rightarrow [[o_{\sigma} \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}] \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}] \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma} \quad \text{Sam} : s_{\sigma}}{\lambda Q. \exists e. \text{die}(e, \text{Sam}) : [[o_{\sigma} \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}] \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}] \rightarrow \uparrow_{\sigma}} \quad \frac{\lambda P. \text{the}(b, \text{bucket}(b), P(b)) : \forall H. [o_{\sigma} \rightarrow H] \rightarrow H}{\exists e. \text{die}(e, \text{Sam}) : \uparrow_{\sigma}}$$

- This explains why the examples in (3) lack an idiomatic interpretation – they all involve some kind of discourse referent associated with *the bucket*, which the idiomatic reading does not supply.

Further Issues

- It does not explain why the idiomatic sense of *bucket* resists modification – why, e.g. *kick the unfortunate bucket* or *kick the bucket that awaits us all* cannot be interpreted as meaning 'die'. The idiomatic meaning is derived by simply discarding the interpretation of the object, and there is nothing to stop this being arbitrarily complex. W&S suggest adding the constraint in (8), which simply forbids the object of *kick* to have adjuncts:

$$(8) \neg (\uparrow \text{OBJ ADJ})$$

But this will not do, since certain modifiers of *bucket* are compatible with the idiomatic sense, notable 'emotives' like *bloody* and 'metalinguistic' 'manner of speech' adjectives like *idiomatic* and *proverbial*:

$$(9) \text{So that's that [...]} \text{ Another year or two and I'll [kick the bloody bucket].}$$

$$(10) \text{Think of all the things that you want to do before you [kick the proverbial bucket].}$$

- However, it is reasonable to assume that emotive and 'manner of speech' adjectives do not have the same semantic type as normal attributive modifiers (which are $\langle et, et \rangle$). Following Potts (2005), emotives might have any type which 'ends in t ' – the idea being that the emotional attitude they convey can be associated with, e.g. the whole proposition (type t) or the VP (type $\langle e, t \rangle$). Thus, we can exclude normal modifiers and allow these special types by making specific reference to the semantic type:

$$(11) \neg (\uparrow \text{OBJ ADJ})_{\sigma} \langle et, et \rangle$$

Remaining Questions

- It remains to explain why *kick the bucket* and similar idioms appear to resist passive, and why, despite meaning 'die' it does not accept modifiers like *slowly and painfully*:

- (12) a. #The bucket has been kicked (by Sam).
- b. #Sam kicked the bucket slowly and painfully. (cf. 'died slowly and painfully')

- Intuitively, the second issue seems straightforward – both idiomatic and non-idiomatic senses of *kick* should have some indication of 'instantaneousness' as part of their semantics; the challenge is to capture this formally;

- The issue of passive is more problematic. Notice, for example, that non-referential objects, such as expletive *it* in (13), can be passivised:

- (13) a. People consider it polite to remove your shoes when inside.
- b. It is considered polite to remove your shoes when inside.

- W&S assume that actives and passives simply have separate lexical entries, but this is controversial, and potentially problematic.

- It also remains to be seen how far the approach can be extended to syntactically more flexible idioms (e.g. *spill the beans*), where the semantics of the object cannot be simply discarded, and other issues raised in (e.g.) Bargmann and Sailer (2015).

References

- Bargmann, Sascha and Sailer, Manfred. 2015. The Syntactic Flexibility of Non-decomposable Idioms. Poster presented at the PARSEME 4th general meeting, 19-20 March 2015, Valletta, Malta.
- Dalrymple, Mary. 2001. *Lexical Functional Grammar*, volume 34 of *Syntax and Semantics*. New York: Academic Press.
- Potts, Christopher. 2005. *The Logic of Conventional Implicatures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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