State repression, nonviolence, and protest mobilization

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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November 2015
Abstract of dissertation

This four article journal-based dissertation builds on Gene Sharp's framework of nonviolent direct action, along with Hess and Martin's repression backfire, in order to deepen our understanding of how state repression impacts protest mobilization and historical processes of social change. After initially problematizing Gene Sharp’s notions of power and consent with aid of political discourse theory, and two case studies of the 1905 Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre and the South African 1976 Soweto Massacre, the dissertation moves onto specifically explain the conditions under which protest mobilization is likely to continue after severe state repression. A causal process model underpins the logic of the dissertation. It identifies generalizable antecedent factors and conditions under which repression backfire is most likely to occur. Numerous mechanisms are also introduced that help explain the operation of this process across different historical eras and political systems. After applying this process model and its mechanisms to the 2013 Turkish Gezi protests, a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of 44 different historical massacres is presented in which repression backfired and increased protest in some cases, but not others. Repression backfire is a highly asymmetrical and nonlinear causal phenomenon. I conclude that nonviolent protest strategy has been a salient factor in historical cases of repression backfire and is also vital for the ability of protests to withstand state repression. However, the role of nonviolence is partial and to some degree inadequate in explaining repression backfire if it is not linked to other general factors which include protest diversity, protest threat level, and geographic terrain.
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Acknowledgements

Writing a doctoral dissertation is a task that once appeared to be office-based, sedentary and laborious. However, after my first year of conducting research in the Department of Government at the University of Essex, I realized that the years ahead would be full of excitement and a wide encompassing intellectual journey. The intellectual journey, I realized, would not be limited to the time spent writing draft papers or crafting bibliographies. Rather, this journey turned out to be one that included teaching, debating with colleagues, getting advice and critique from Professors, taking complex analytical training seminars, and going on long trips across Europe and the Atlantic to present research at international conferences. Throughout this journey, I received a great amount of advice from my supervisors, Professor Ward and Professor Howarth, both of whom I would like to thank for their consistent feedback and bold recommendations. I am grateful for the acceptance of two of the four papers of this dissertation for publication at academic journals. Above all, I am thankful for the personal and professional development that I gained during my time at Essex.
Introductory section

The central topic of this dissertation intersects between three main themes, those of state repression, nonviolence, and protest mobilization. Protest movements have repeatedly brought about transformative events in an array of social contexts over the last two centuries. Since the rise of the nation state, there have been an immense number of political conflicts that have manifested in the public act of a protest group attempting to obtain non-institutional reform and concessions from a government. While there is great variance in regards to the types of protests that have taken place over the last decades not to mention centuries, scholars would find themselves in a tough position to disagree that nonviolent protests have brought about powerful effects across different political, economic, and historical contexts. There is something extraordinary about nonviolent protest and the dynamics of nonviolence have led many to investigate the phenomenon both normatively and positively. Mahatma Gandhi was a pioneer activist of nonviolent direct action and he once said that, “Non-violence is the greatest force at the disposal of mankind. It is mightier than the mightiest weapon of destruction devised by the ingenuity of man” (Sharma 2007, 23).

Nonviolence is actively used and is present throughout daily life, but what turned my attention to the subject matter of nonviolence was an event that took place in November of 2011 at the University of California Davis Campus. Just a few short days before media attention was cast upon the Occupy Wall Street movement and its protest tactics at Zuccotti Park in New York City, there was a smaller-scale protest that occurred in response to ongoing tuition hikes in the University of California higher education system. Davis, California, a small town just south of the state capital of Sacramento was not the prime arena of interaction as New York City, yet a very compelling event occurred when students and other young members of the Occupy U.C.
Davis movement occupied the university campus in the middle of the day. University police were sent in to attempt to dismember the occupation which numbered in the thousands. Hundreds of more bystanders were standing in close proximity with their mobile phones out recording the interaction. The students chanted at the police, voicing their student-loan grievances in a highly enthusiastic manner. After about fifteen minutes of chants from the students, police began to threaten to arrest all who stood in their way. Then, strategically, a row of students lined up on their knees on the grass in order to block the police’s access to another portion of the meadow. A policeman took out his pepper spray canister and began to spray an orange infused toxin into the eyes of the kneeling students. Screams were heard throughout as dozens with hand-held cameras recorded the incident. The students were hospitalized afterwards and the incident went viral through domestic and international media as well as on globally accessed internet media channels.

Just days later, the central organization of Occupy Wall Street in New York City drew the greatest attention that it had up until that point in time. A mass nonviolent occupational force was now emergent. I wrote a Master of Arts dissertation on the U.C. Davis incident but the event itself was just the beginning of a research endeavor that led me on an investigative and theoretical journey having to do with the topics of nonviolence and state repression. What turned out to be striking about the U.C. Davis incident was that there have been countless of other cases involving nonviolent protests that also were repressed and transformative social change also ensued afterwards. Generally, there are many theoretical angles one can take when analyzing how nonviolent protests emerge, act, and fail. There is also a wide array of theoretical positions that can be adopted to investigate the effect that state repression has on mobilization of both nonviolent and violent sorts. The specific phenomenon under attention in this dissertation
involves state repression getting inflicted upon nonviolent protesters and social movements. To the best of my knowledge, there is no single unified theoretical framework that can adequately explain why state repression has backfired throughout different historical, political, and economic contexts.

What enables protesters to keep mobilizing and dissenting after being severely repressed by a governmental authority? Throughout this dissertation I will first develop and then account for the relationship between nonviolent protest mobilization and state repression. The contributions of this dissertation can be summarized by three major themes or points. First, I demonstrate that the most cited and wide encompassing framework on nonviolent direct action (Gene Sharp’s work on nonviolence), is deterministic in its nature. This is accomplished through the first two papers and case studies of this dissertation, 1905 Russia and 1976 South Africa. Specifically, Gene Sharp’s seminal work on nonviolent direct action (1973a; 1973b; 1973c; 1980; Sharp and Paulson 2005), contains what I explain to be a major problem of homogeneity. Sharp homogenizes what are referred to as citizen consent, the loci of power (political power), and ideology. With aid of political discourse theory, also known as Ideology and Discourse Analysis (IDA), this dissertation demonstrates that consent is qualitative, and the phenomenon of political jiu-jitsu is more contingent than previously assumed. In other words, when nonviolent protesters suffer from repression, Sharp’s framework of political jiu-jitsu fails to explain why some of the most historically salient cases of repression led to transformative historical change and political revolution, and on the other hand, why other cases failed to result in backfire and jiu-jitsu.

Second, after addressing the problems inherent to Sharp’s framework, this dissertation further builds on Hess and Martin’s (2006), notion of repression backfire, and specifically the two necessary conditions that were posited in their study. Through the introduction of a causal
process model, this dissertation adds to and improves upon Hess and Martin’s model of repression backfire. By theorizing then specifying repression backfire as a temporally sensitive causal process model, I introduce a number of antecedent conditions and mechanisms that are operative during repression backfire. The process model helps us to assess repression backfire as an event, and this event is one that tends to occur in early stages of political conflict. Specifically, the process of backfire is transformative and active mainly before major processes of social change such as political revolution and civil war get triggered. By applying this process model to a case of severe repression in 1905 Russia, and in 2013 Turkey, this dissertation presents new contributions into the social movement as well as repression-backfire literatures. Identified antecedent conditions disclose which factors are likely to influence the triggering of mechanisms. The mechanisms help to explain (and can be applied to) historical as well as contemporary incidents of repression backfire.

Third, the identified conditions and mechanisms in the process model are then utilized for theorization in the fourth paper. This helps to address the broad and popular question of whether state repression increases or decreases protest mobilization. Put differently, which observable conditions make it likely for protesters to keep mobilizing and dissenting after severe violent repression, and on the other hand, which conditions make it more likely that the state will succeed in deterring dissent? These questions encompass what is referred to as the repression-dissent nexus, or the repression-mobilization puzzle. To address these questions, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) is adopted, and then applied to investigate 44 different historical massacres. By testing the influence that six different causal conditions (variables), have on the outcome of increased mobilization/decreased mobilization, the fourth paper takes into consideration how nonlinear forms of causal interaction (via the conditions), influence repression
backfire in a variety of different political, economic, and social settings. Results reveal that the repression-dissent nexus can be explained by different configurations of conditions, and that on its own, no condition can account for the presence of the outcome. The relationship between state repression and mobilization is much more asymmetric, conjunctural and nonlinear than previously assumed in the literature. The condition of nonviolence is salient, yet also inadequate if it is not linked to other conditions which include protest threat, diversity, and geographic terrain.

I will refer to the four papers of this dissertation as papers, rather than chapters given they do not comprise a book but rather form a journal-based thesis. Before I get into the arguments of the four papers, it is worthwhile to highlight a major characteristic and theme of this dissertation, that of being multi-theoretical. The usage of certain theoretical frameworks such as discourse theory, causal process theory, and fuzzy-set theory (qualitative comparative analysis), may give the impression that there are contradictions within the intertwining of various concepts and the meanings of those concepts as they are applied in the papers of this thesis. Nevertheless, as it will become clear in the following sections, when complex social phenomena and causal relationships are a topic of analysis, there is rarely a single theoretical framework that can properly address them without leaving a minimal, (and in many cases substantial) amount of error when it comes to explanatory power. Subsequent sections of this introductory section will address important issues having to do with discourse theory and positivism. I will also explain why discourse theory was chosen as a primary starting point of social inquiry for this dissertation (in the first two papers), instead of other frameworks such as rational choice theory, the political-opportunity structure approach, and sociological frame theory/analysis.
The four papers of the dissertation are relevant to three literatures. One is the state repression literature while the other two are referred to as social movement/conflict studies and the subfield of nonviolence civilian resistance. The dissertation, as a whole, can be considered to be multidisciplinary as it intersects between political science and political sociology. The first paper of this dissertation is titled “The Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre of 1905: a discursive account of nonviolent transformation.” This paper is a theoretical, empirical, and historical case study on an incident of severe state repression that was inflicted on a nonviolent protest group in St. Petersburg in January of 1905. The second paper of this journal-based thesis is titled, “Repression and Identity under Apartheid: the 1976 Soweto Massacre,” which contains an analysis of another severe incident of state repression that was suffered by a student protest in the South African township of Soweto in 1976. The incident is also compared to six other cases possessing most similar and most different characteristics that took place during the apartheid era. In the third paper titled, “Repression, Spontaneity, and Collective Action: The 2013 Turkish Gezi Protests,” a more recent case of repression is analyzed. Here attention is given to a specific act of repression that was experienced by an environmentalist group that challenged a project of urban development in Istanbul, Turkey with nonviolent strategy. The fourth and final paper is the grand work of this dissertation as it contains an analysis of 44 political massacres that took place in the period of 1819-2014. It also puts on display accumulated knowledge that was gained throughout the time of researching, theorizing, hypothesizing, process tracing, and writing the first three papers. The fourth paper is titled “The Repression-Mobilization Puzzle: A Configurational Analysis of Political Massacres.” The study is based around fuzzy-set logic, or fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), and contains data on 44 cases of state repression compiled by the author.
Argument of the thesis

There are many questions that have to do with the concept of nonviolence. A great deal of topics have been addressed within the scope of social movement studies. Why are nonviolent movements more successful than violent? Why do some regimes succeed at repressing nonviolent protests and vice versa; why do some regimes fail at keeping nonviolent protests at bay? Why do some protests withstand state repression, while others decrease in activity? The central focus of this dissertation has to do with these questions, but attention is placed on a specific and temporally short empirical occurrence that fits into the larger topic of nonviolent protest success. In the literature, this has been referred to as “political jiu-jitsu” or “repression backfire.” As a causal process, repression backfire is not one that happens randomly or repeats itself every time an interaction involving a nonviolent protest and violent state occurs. Instead, the transformative effect of this process is very much reliant on and tied to the qualitative conditions in which a given act of repression takes place in.

Utilizing discourse theoretic concepts and a specific type of ontology of political and social relations, I critically investigate Gene Sharp’s framework of nonviolent direct action along with his model of political jiu-jitsu. Sharp’s models of nonviolent social transformation rely on ideas and concepts that are deterministic in their nature. Specifically, Sharp assumes that there exists a quantitatively encompassing concept of consent. Consent is shared between the population and its government. Consent is also spread throughout civil society, and it enables political leaders to stay in power. Without citizenry consent, governments will have a tough time functioning. Nonviolence, and nonviolent social movements in particular, are argued by Sharp to have the ability to withdraw consent. Political power, or governmental power is also assumed by Sharp to be dispersed throughout society in what are referred to as “loci.” Through the adoption of an
ontology which entails that political order and social structures are radically contingent (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), I show that Sharp’s notions of consent and political power are not only empirically and theoretically incorrect, but it is because of these faults that Sharp’s framework fails to account for and explain many historical cases and revolutions. The latter include 1905 Russia, 1989 Tiananmen, 2011 Egypt, 2013-4 Ukraine, among other noteworthy incidents.

I consider the concept of consent as a qualitative one that differs according to context. I specifically seek to assess how hegemonic regimes get to be established through a number of discourse theoretic concepts such as antagonism, equivalence, difference, myth, social imaginary, and then I assess how power and ideology shape social practices within qualitative settings. Through investigation of the period of 1860-1905 in Tsarist Russia, I demonstrate that Sharp’s accounts of this era, and specifically his above noted concepts, fail to capture the complexity inherent to political struggle during the first Russian revolution. Through the first two papers of the dissertation, I develop a principal theoretical argument, that state repression, when inflicted upon certain types of protest movements and under certain configurations of conditions, has the power to dislocate and rupture the structural totality of a given government. During hegemonic dislocations, identities get destabilized and individuals will be forced into new political terrains (Howarth 2000). By dislocation, I am referring to event-based social shocks that reveal political contingency and open up political terrains. Just as a social dislocation of economic crisis, famine, war, among others, the interaction between violent state forces and a nonviolent protest can also bring about a historically pivotal instance of social rupture.

A dislocation is likely to get triggered when certain types of social movements get repressed by agents of the state. This idea is developed through the cases of 1905 Russia and 1976 South Africa, wherein I utilize two discourse theoretic concepts, those of the logic of equivalence and
difference. When social movements get organized and established through a chain of equivalence, they possess a special propensity to withstand state repression and in turn, spur repression backfire. An equivalized political movement contains non-particularistic demands and is established through the forging of a common identity that is aimed at an external oppositional power. The oppositional power is usually the government itself, or a governmental policy which is threatening the equivalized and established common identity of the social movement (Howarth 2000, 107). Along these lines, I assume that political reality is comprised of hegemonic constructs as well as equivalized and differentiated elements which get articulated by power holding groups and social movement leaders. While groups of governing elites will articulate a chain of equivalence to make sense of their policies, ambitions of governance, and own identity, in the same time they will differentiate political opposition into disconnected social groups and identities.

A chain of equivalence, when articulated by a social movement, will enable the movement to unify once disconnected heterogeneous social demands into a common force. I argue that when such movements aim their cause through protesting against a government, their chances of surviving state repression will be much greater than a highly particularistic social movement which might contain unlinked demands and groups. A logic of equivalence enables a given social movement to antagonize the political arena and specifically focus attention on the ill-actions or ill-intent of their opponent. When equivalized political movements protest against the state with nonviolence and suffer from severe state repression, this can publicly reveal antagonisms that underpin the discursive structure of a regime, and pave way for immense transformative change. This explanation provides greater depth into Sharp’s political jiu-jitsu model as well as Hess and Martin’s repression backfire model. Along similar lines, when we
consider social and historical change with the backdrop of these concepts and a discourse theoretic ontology, it becomes clear why some cases of severe repression are apt to result in historical change, while others will not. It specifically becomes clear that the homogenizing character of Sharp’s framework and his treating of consent as well as power as being quantitatively identical across contexts, is problematic. This is especially so when it comes to accounting for cases of repression that did not result in political jiu-jitsu.

For historical change to arise and for repression backfire to be able to occur, a nonviolent movement must set aside heterogeneous differences and universalize social demands, while at the same time eliminate the differential constructions that are used by repressive governments to keep certain segments of a population at bay. Perhaps the most important aspect to consider here is that social movements, as part of their political project, must unify previously disconnected demands and at the same time exclude and antagonize the repressive apparatus of the state or a given principal-governor that they are challenging. This will enable publicly accessible prior knowledge to form regarding the intentions of future protest actions. During initial phases of social movement articulation and organization, a social movement's political discourse will permit messages to be cast on not only protest members, but also on potential observers and domestic media. Once the movement dissents by way of nonviolent direct action and gets repressed, the prior information that individuals hold regarding the movement will be updated and the state might find itself in a far worse off political position than previously conceivable.

The state repressing of "its people" (in the form of an equivalized force), is a highly contradictive act that undermines a given government's monopoly on violence. My definition of "transformative historical change," indicates that as a result of a given causal process and event, a structural totality (of a government) will undergo an assorted metamorphosis whether it be of
small-scale change such as individuals being morally outraged and angered at a regime, or a large-scale course of action in which the central myths and ideas underlying a given social order get ruptured and individuals get forced into new stages of political contestation. The event of state repression being inflicted upon a nonviolent protest is one that contains a predisposition to spur such effects. It can alter and destabilize the identities of individuals, change thoughts, it can spur emotional outrage, and propel individuals to carry out certain acts.

As has been noted thus far, nonviolent movements have been observed to have a superior capacity to be able to withstand severe state repression than violent movements (Sutton et al., 2014); and great attention has been paid to the various outcomes that may arise from nonviolent protests' interactions with coercive state forces (Sharp 1973; 1980; 2005; Hess and Martin 2006). In many studies, emphasis has been largely placed only on successful empirical cases and little comparative scope has been provided. In addition, a great deal of attention has also been aimed at assessing the costs that political leaders may face when choosing to repress political opposition or accommodate social demands. In the same vein, rational choice and collective action theorists emphasize that dissidents will not rebel after witnessing or experiencing severe repression due to high associated costs. Hess and Martin (2006), however, presented two very important advancements into the backfire literature by noting that for the phenomenon to occur there has to be communicational capability to spread information about the incident as well as an audience to consider the incident as "unjust." Up until the publication of their study, previous literature by and large did not provide adequate insight into the conditions that help explain the manner in which repression backfire has become a reoccurring transformative phenomenon in numerous historical eras and political contexts.
The identification of two conditions by Hess and Martin was a valuable contribution as it directly improved Sharp’s deterministic model of political jiu-jitsu. Hess and Martin’s two conditions, nevertheless, do not actually provide elucidation regarding why an act of repression sometimes gets to be perceived as unjust. Likewise, the condition of media presence is one that can be further theorized, especially with regards to its variance and geographic terrain. Specifically, there have been cases of repression committed on political opponents in areas with media capability and with audiences watching, yet such cases did not actually turn out to backfire. This entails that there are more forces and conditions at play. Throughout this dissertation, I argue that there exist qualitative conditions that can explain why repression backfires and if properly observed and taken into consideration, these conditions are possible to enumerate and quantify into general conditions that can apply to every single protest-state interaction involving state sponsored suppression of nonviolent protest. The intuition behind my argument stems to the theoretical backdrop of the first two papers.

While conducting researching and carrying out intensive historical analysis having to do with Tsarist Russia and South African apartheid, the utilization of discourse theoretic concepts helped me to develop a framework to understand repression backfire through the lens of a discourse theoretic ontology. After a variety of different investigations of significant historical cases, I discovered that when the state or government is responsible for massacring “the people” (in an equivalized force), that it exists to support, this nurtures immense contradictions. It reveals the antagonisms underlying a given government’s discourse. The findings introduced in the first two papers of this dissertation presented numerous implications for what I argue is the formal observation of general conditions and variables having to do with state repression and nonviolent protest mobilization which helped form the third and fourth papers. Along with nonviolence, I
hypothesized that a number of other significant factors or general conditions could compliment Hess and Martin’s two noted conditions. Tying these ideas in with quantitative literature on nonviolence and repression backfire was key to the further development of the arguments and third and fourth papers of this dissertation. In the most widely cited recent study of nonviolence, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), showed that nonviolent civilian resistance is strategically advantageous in comparison to violent protest. One of the central findings of their quantitative assessment is that nonviolent protests (large ongoing campaigns), had greater prospects in overcoming harsh state repression than violent protests.

I argue that in order to fully understand the causal nature of why nonviolent protests can overcome state repression to a greater extent than violent, a broad spectrum of factors, conditions, and cases has to be considered. I also argue that events of state repression must be conceptualized as a political process. The process has taken place across different social contexts. It involves state repression and governmental agents clashing with violent or nonviolent protesters. This process itself transpires very quickly, lasting no longer than one or two days. It has taken place over the course of nineteenth as well as twentieth century of political history, and continues to be influential in contemporary political struggles. A distinction of temporality formulates the basis of all papers of this dissertation, and by this I mean the causal effect of interest is isolated. This isolation, in turn, enables me to consider repression backfire’s place in a historically path-dependent chain of events. I show that there are varied outcomes that may arise after a given protest-state interaction such as increased mobilization, decreased mobilization, international condemnation, NGO shaming, civil war, military defection, and in some cases revolution.
I first develop a number of causal mechanisms that are linked to antecedent conditions in a process of repression backfire through the case of the 2013 Turkish Gezi Park protests (third paper), and a comparison of the 2013 protests to other similar cases. Importantly, in the third and fourth papers, I compare cases of repression that were experienced by protests in spontaneous as well as prolonged settings. Along these lines, this dissertation makes a number of new contributions into multidisciplinary literatures. It demonstrates, through the third and fourth papers, that the studies carried out by Chenoweth and Stephan, as well as by Sutton et al., (2014), were restricted in the sense that they only assessed quantitative data of nonviolent campaigns. This was not event-based data. Rather, to be included as an observation within their data, a social movement had to have existed for more than one year. Data of this sort do not permit us to consider counterfactual cases, such as those protests that did experience repression backfire but were not part of large ongoing campaigns.

Throughout the third and fourth papers of this dissertation, I demonstrate that there are particular and previously unidentified reasons behind why certain acts of state repression turn out to put repressive governments in worse off position than previously imaginable at various points in historical time. I also exhibit how different forces and mechanisms operate during these incidents. I argue that linear models cannot capture the asymmetric causative nature of repression backfire. Quantitative data (having to do with nonviolence), are often assessed with linear regression and statistical models which are essentially additive models. By additive modeling, I am referring to the technique of holding one variable at a constant, and then adding on other variables to assess their effect on the outcome/dependent variable. Such an approach cannot capture causal complexity and nonlinear forms of causation. This is crucial because repression backfire is a highly conjunctural process. This is due to not only the antecedent conditions that
underlie the process, but also to the meanings that get attached to certain acts of repression and not others by publics and observers.

To examine causal complexity in repression backfire, I first theorized, created, and then applied an extensive process model and its mechanisms to the case of 2013 Turkey. Afterwards, I compiled data on 44 massacres, and then analyzed these cases and their characteristics with aid of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Here six causal conditions are calibrated. Calibration is a technique of coding in which the researcher assigns meaningful values to observations. This was done attuned to six causal conditions that were observed across 44 different cases. By calibrating the six conditions according to a four-value scale, I was able to then assess how a number of different characteristics influence the outcome of either increased or decreased mobilization. The cases under attention include observations of protest-state interactions which took place throughout diverse historical epochs and social systems. The results produced by algorithms in the fourth paper reveal very important findings. First, no factor (condition) on its own can account for the presence of increased mobilization. What this means is that there are no sufficient or necessary conditions that can explain why increased mobilization ensued over a great number of historical and contemporary political massacres. Second, the results also provide original output containing configurations of conditions under which repression is likely to backfire. In other words, the second part of the results in the fourth paper is produced through the assessment of asymmetric interaction between conditions. The results reveal that the pathway or configuration of protest diversity, nonviolence, geographic terrain, and protest threat level is the most salient when it comes to why increased mobilization ensues after severe state repression.

This perspective adds a different dimension and contribution to the nonviolent civilian resistance and state repression literatures. By considering how nonlinear forms of causal interaction impact
whether mobilization ensues or decreases after severe state repression, the fourth paper contributes an entirely new finding to the literature. In addition, the fourth paper adds to a major implication of this dissertation which has to do with the notion of large nonviolent protest movements and their perceived success. It is not the case that large nonviolent movements simply have a greater chance at success as Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue, but rather, certain types of large movements do. In addition, it is also not the case that social movements which create their own communicational infrastructure will be able to indefinitely withstand repression across different historical eras (Sutton et al., 2014). There is greater complexity in the relationship between state repression and dissent than has thus far been admitted and theorized. The theoretical postulations, empirical observations, and qualitative comparative analysis presented in this dissertation help to not only explain historically significant cases of repression backfire, but also put forward a number of general conditions and factors that can account for the phenomenon across a variety of different settings and contexts.

In subsequent sections of this introductory section, a general definition of nonviolence will be provided along with a genealogical inquiry into its usage and implementation over the last two centuries. It is also necessary to consider the topic of state repression, its variance, and historical function. Afterwards, Gene Sharp’s framework will be overviewed, as well as Hess and Martin’s model and a number of other relevant studies having to do with statistical nonviolence, nonviolence success, the transnational dimension of nonviolence, and the repression-dissent nexus. Sections on case selection, choice of theory, and source selection will follow.

**Classical nonviolence**
Developments in the study of nonviolence have been rampant over the last decade, and in fact, since Mahatma Gandhi’s monumental and highly symbolic salt marches that took place in the 1930s in India, there has been a significant amount of attention cast on the role of nonviolence in political struggles. Non-violence, or nonviolence as I will refer to it throughout this dissertation, is considered to be either a verb, or an adjective or a noun, depending on definition. The Cambridge Dictionary labels nonviolence as a situation “in which someone avoids fighting or using physical force, especially when trying to make political change.” In the Oxford Dictionary, nonviolence is considered to be “the use of peaceful means, not force, to bring about political or social change.” Iain Atack (2012) defines nonviolence as "collective action outside the formal institutions or procedures of the state that avoids systematic or deliberate use of violence or armed force to achieve its political or social objectives" (Atack 2012, 8). The wonderful utility of Internet technology displayed below provides us with observations and analytics on how the term nonviolence has been used and mentioned in literary as well as academic texts over the last two centuries (since 1800). The following graph taken from Google’s NGRAM Viewer (Google Books - July 2015) illustrates the usage of “nonviolence” in books that are in the Google Books database ranging from the years 1800-2008:
It is appealing to view the static line bottoming out at near zero mentions all the way from 1800 to sometime around 1930 when Gandhi’s struggles in India made headlines. To little surprise, here the usage of nonviolence picks up greatly and increases. It then peaks near 1990 during the mass transitions that took place in Eastern Europe when a large amount of regional establishments transitioned from being members and satellites of the Soviet Union to being independent nation states with newly initiated capitalist market systems and courts. Indeed, some of these transitions for instance, Latvia and Lithuania, were much more nonviolent than others such as Romania. On the whole, the vast amount of transitions that took place in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War was more peaceful than many would have expected. As of 2015, according to the graph above as well as to the large amount of multidisciplinary academic research that is being conducted on the topic, nonviolence continues to be a highly influential theoretical concept in addition to being an empirical force of emancipation. Nonviolence need not only be political but is the human enactment of passive resistance to force.

The concept of nonviolence is frequently linked to ideas and notions from earlier historical eras and ideas such as Henry David Thoreau’s (1849), Civil Disobedience as well as Leo Tolstoy’s
wide array of works. Thoreau engaged in a noteworthy act of civil disobedience and nonviolence when he purposefully did not pay governmental taxes due to his belief that the U.S. government was engaged in highly unethical and unjust practices. Because of the existence of slavery, Thoreau declined to pay his taxes. On the other hand, Tolstoy's notions of nonviolence and civil disobedience were based around critiquing the existence of governments and states, rather than particular governmental policies. His particular book titled “The Kingdom of God is Within You” (1927) is based on a biblical interpretation of a concept of nonviolence which at that point was not yet defined as such. Tolstoy emphasizes Jesus Christ’s historical actions in a protest in a Jerusalem temple. This was the precise moment that caught the attention of Roman officials and eventually led to his persecution and crucifixion.

Tolstoy noted that, "Christ's whole teaching is a pointing out of the way of emancipation from the power of the world" (Tolstoy 1968, 268). Power is assumed to exist in the authority of the state and this authority for Tolstoy is highly unjust. The role of violence in daily life is boldly seen to operate within the capacity of the state whether it be the Roman state, the Tsarist state or a parliamentary state. For Tolstoy, the actions of a petty thief who commits violence for his own gain are not equivalent to those of state agents who commit violence on behalf of a given government. This is due to the fact that the individual does not defend his actions on the same moral and legal grounds as agents of the state do. For these reasons, Tolstoy argues we must always question how just and moral a government claims to be in its usage of force. For those who accept and follow Christ, love and compassion are the greatest weapons in battling against the power of the world argues Tolstoy and it is only this way that individuals can ever follow their own subjective paths to the kingdom of God (Tolstoy 1968). Furthermore, Tolstoy’s philosophical views spread into many parts and regions of the globe other than Russia but it was
in one area in particular that Tolstoy’s Christian-rooted anarchic ideas regarding nonviolence resonated into what is now considered to be a historical bond between two great thinkers and philosophers.

Mahatma Gandhi in his early years whilst in South Africa, became an avid reader and fan of Tolstoy. Tolstoy himself then engaged with Tarak Nath Das in his (1908) *A Letter to a Hindu*. The letter attracted Gandhi who translated it and enabled it to later diffuse into literary circles in India. Mahatma Gandhi was fond of the ideas he found in Tolstoy’s writings and implemented them into his greater world view of passive resistance and nonviolent direct action. Gandhi’s political actions were vast but his central purpose was to combat the immense suppression that the native population in India was facing under the occupying colonial British regime. Gandhi’s nonviolence was reliant on spiritual symbols referred to as Ahimsa (to avoid violence; not to injure). Gandhi labeled this as Satyagraha, the “soul-force” or "truth-force" (Sonnleitner 1989). Instead of battling state repression with force, Gandhi believes one should be polite, kind and to show love rather than engage with violent acts. Burrowes (1996) points out that Gandhi rejected both capitalism and socialism. His version of a just society was based on “a decentralized network of self-reliant and self-governing communities using property held in trust, with a weak central apparatus to perform residual functions” (Burrows 1996, 103). There is a significant parallel between these views when compared to Tolstoy’s Christian-influenced anarchic notion of nonviolence. The latter is also where the popular notion of “turning a cheek” to violent behavior originates from. Specifically, the prosecution of Christ as well as Christ's actions during his trial under Pontius Pilate (fifth prefect of the Roman province of Judaea AD 26–36), have functioned as bold historical frames that have influenced arguably the most prominent theorists and advocates of nonviolence such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King Junior.
For many experts of nonviolence and in popular culture, Gandhi holds a crown and this crown is one that made him one of the forefathers of nonviolent political action (King and Mayor 1999). Following Gandhi but in an entirely different contextual and historical period, Martin Luther King Jr. adopted strategies directly out of Gandhi’s playbook during the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1960s. King Jr. grew to be the leader of the civil rights movement and is widely regarded to be one of the most influential, if not most influential, non-governmental political leaders in U.S. history. In a compelling case, King was arrested by the state during the Birmingham Campaign in April of 1963. Nonviolent sit-ins along with protests were staged against racist discrimination in the highly segregated area of the U.S. South in the state of Alabama. King, along with several others were arrested and brought to a local jail. In that jail King wrote what is now a highly discussed essay titled, a Letter from Birmingham City Jail. Throughout the essay, King came to accept his labeling of a “radical.” He noted, “But as I continued to think about the matter I gradually gained a bit of satisfaction from being considered an extremist. Was not Jesus an extremist in love? “Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you” (King Jr 1992).

It was that same year in August (1963), when King led tens of thousands on a direct march to the nation’s capital, Washington D.C. and made his well-known “I have a Dream” speech. Five years later King was murdered but at that point the U.S. civil rights movement was already victorious. While King combated state force with love, compassion, and nonviolence, he was not treated the same way in return.

State repression

State repression is the enactment of coercion and violence by agents of the state, or in some cases, the direct actions of the government itself. Repression can be inflicted on individual
civilians or groups in soft or harsh forms. Max Weber (1946), is widely considered to have long ago conceptualized something referred to as governmental “monopoly on violence.” What the monopoly of violence entails is that a state will successfully legitimize the use of physical force over its jurisdictional control and territory. Some economists such as Acemoglu et al., (2013), correctly point out that states vary greatly in their capacity of force and monopoly of violence. Nonetheless, each state must possess a monopoly of violence in order to support a government, governmental institutions, and the rule of law. Repression is a central function of the state and part of its monopoly of violence. It is also important to consider that some states such as Iran and North Korea, have a much greater capacity to carry out repression and take measures of social control than others.

As Davenport (2007a) explains, state repression involves the actual physical sanctioning or threatened use of physical force within its jurisdiction or the territorial control of a state. Davenport also defines state repression in a manner that is arguably hegemonic: the physical sanctions imposed by the state on civilians are imposed precisely to incur costs on civilians and at the same time to remove threats from the governmental status quo and its institutions. This notion of imposing costs on civilians, groups or organizations is one that can be traced to Thomas Schelling (1960; 1980), who articulated the now widely used term of coercion in conflict studies. The utilization of this term in social science generally implies that coercion whether imposed by states, organizations or individuals, incurs costs upon a civilian (with threat or use of force), for the purposes of trying to change the behavior of that civilian.

The four papers of this dissertation are focused on incidents of severe state violence that transpired in times of protest-state interactions. In each case, principal-governors attempted to deter protest with severe means. Severe state violence indeed will incur costs upon civilians; it
will force them to seek medical treatment and other forms of aid that might not be available in sufficient capacity. It can also take bread earners away from a given family and create immense hardships for civilians living in states with insufficient public goods systems. Severe state violence can wipe out the organizational components of a given social movement and often times leaves many protesters with fewer resources and more grievances. For these reasons, state sponsored and initiated violence that gets witnessed by both domestic and international publics is a highly symbolic and meaningful phenomenon. But there is always another dynamic behind phenomena as broad as state repression or governmental violence.

While many in the literature have made the distinction of state repression empirically manifesting itself as both violent (harsh, killing, torture), and nonviolent (softer coercion; arrests), it is worth noting that physical violence is not the only type of violence that subsists in human life. Individuals are always subjugated to inevitable violence and in daily life, such violence often is “unnoticed,” and hidden when compared to more refined forms of violence (Berdyaev 1943, 64). Violence need not get manifested in physical form but also is highly psychological. For these reasons, state repression is not limited to the physical killing, beating, arresting or torturing of civilians, but also is active in everyday life. Having considered these differences, my interest in this dissertation indeed is not to delve into the philosophical underpinnings of the concept of state repression, but rather focus will be placed on the formal, observable, and public realm of state violence in the specific scope of protest-state interactions.

A great deal of researchers have spent decades attempting to seek out or discover general laws in the social world, yet finding a law in social reality is extremely difficult if not impossible according to some ontologies. However, in the historical era of the modern nation state, there may be a social law that can be considered to be persistent and operative across contexts. One of
the few consistent social events that can qualify as a law was pointed out by Davenport (2007b). Davenport's “law of coercive responsiveness,” is an extremely relevant historical observation. Regardless of a state’s repression capacity, it will indefinitely repress threatening protests. This has been one of the most consistent reoccurring events that has existed and transpired in the historical period of modern nation states. When dissent arises, the state will repress it by its various means for the purposes of upholding its status quo. The latter indeed gets manifested qualitatively attuned to political context and historical time. What also has to be considered is that in some instances, a highly powerful state will develop its own agencies in order to prevent large movements from forming.

Agents of the state can censor the communicational output of a given oppositional organization. They can arrest its members formally or informally. The latter includes night time and clandestine police activity. In the harshest of situations, agents of the state will beat protesters or political opposition. Agents of the state will shoot, hit, and launch deterring chemicals towards protesters. Additionally, as Sullivan (2015) notes, states will engage in preemptive repression and usually will end up repressing the most threatening of protests. Preemptive repression is a very important concept and facet of state repression to keep in mind. Preemptive repression is carried out by agents of the state in order to strategically keep a given protest movement from projecting its demands in the public sphere. It is used to prevent a major threat to a government or governmental policy from forming and getting manifested in public.

When a state severely represses political opposition however, this means that preemptive repression fundamentally did not work. Moreover, severe repression also can come about as the result of miscalculation or nervousness on the part of security agents. Political protests take place in very intense environments, and in some cases, agents of the state can fire live ammunition
towards a crowd of protesters even if they were told not to do so by their principals. A substantial amount of political scientists have pointed out that not all regimes repress in the same manner. Democracies on average, repress less than authoritative regimes (Poe and Tate 1994; Bueno de Mesquita 2010). These findings stem to the last half century of political history, but if broader historical contexts are considered, and then it becomes clear that over the last two centuries of domestic political struggles, both democracies and authoritative regimes have repressed opposition. In the fourth paper of this dissertation, severe cases of state repression that took place in England and the United States are assessed along with a large number of other cases that took place in different political systems. Every type of government, including ones that proclaimed to be socialist, communist, and democratic has repressed protests with severe means.

**Gene Sharp's theoretical framework of nonviolence**

The inspiration and political impact of Gandhi and King were already heavily discussed during the late 1960s, yet it was in 1973 when perhaps the first influential academic work on nonviolence was published. Just under a decade after Martin Luther King Jr’s death, a scholar by the name of Gene Sharp put forward a hefty three volume framework of nonviolent direction containing 198 different nonviolent direct action tactics. For Sharp, nonviolence is a tactic that a protest movement can use to coerce an opponent (impose costs upon a given government). Importantly, the implementation of nonviolence does not need to have a metaphysical or religious underpinning to be accepted by protesters. Nonviolence can be simply pragmatic. Sharp’s framework is considered to be the seminal reference point for the specific topic of nonviolence in the Western academic realm (Sharp, 1973, 1980, 1990, 2011). It has influenced a great number of scholars and protest leaders alike. Even into his later years, Sharp’s contribution to the study of protest led many to crown him as the “father of nonviolence,” due to his dozens of
books as well as direct involvement as an external actor and strategist of nonviolence in major political struggles.

His participation in mass protest campaigns includes various Eastern European transitions, the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising, the Serbian Otpor movement, and the recent case of Egypt during the 2011 Arab Spring. Even considering the age of Sharp’s theoretical framework, this base set of ideas is considerably relevant for modern day academics and policy makers alike (El-Din Haseeb 2011). Sharp's theory of nonviolence is supported by other elements referred to as power and consent. State power is assumed to be pluralistic and dispersed throughout a given society. Here Sharp relies on simple ruler-subject model that underpins his framework. What this model entails is that protest movements implementing nonviolent direct action (NVDA) have the ability to take away the consent of the general population which in turn will result in the falling of repressive regimes and an eventual form of democratic social transition. Such a view of political power is based upon a realist perspective and here it is assumed that political rulers possess a handful of resources and these resources are present in every type of state. For a ruling group to possess power, it must hold all or at least several of the following resources.

First come human resources which have to do with the actual elements that require human support for the upkeeping of various institutions. Then skills and knowledge cover the general competency of the population which must be at a level high enough to support the government’s political goals. Third are intangible factors which Sharp argues to include psychological and ideological components that help maintain the popular support of rulers. Fourth, mass material resources are said to be possessed by rulers which include the dominance of a variety of different economic and financial powers. The final of the political resources of power is the authority of a government to sanction and punish those who do not cooperate (Sharp 1990). Sharp, throughout
his vast amount of work, does not go into too much depth regarding what he labels as intangible powers, but he does note them to be "psychological" and "ideological" factors (Sharp 1980). My aim through the two case study papers of the dissertation is to argue that there is no such thing as an "ideological factor" but rather that the political dimension of social reality cannot exist outside of ideology and the various competing ideologies as well as discourses that subsist in a given context.

Ideology indeed is psychological, but it also manifests itself as a factual force in terms of being the necessary condition that drives and gives meaning to both political leaders' actions as well as to individual action. Instead of assuming that ideology is an intangible factor, my aim is to qualitatively investigate how ideological projects get established, then also assess how they get challenged and ruptured. Sharp on the other hand, believes that intangible factors such as ideology or psychological elements will simply get weakened or destroyed by a nonviolent movement. However, his perspective does not tell us anything about what type of nonviolent movement will accomplish this. Arguably, Sharp's framework or any framework that does not properly analyze the contextual qualitative attributes of a given regime and historical period will never be able to explain why certain social movements achieve the success that they do or fail in that single case context. A nonviolent movement can challenge the ideological aspects of a given regime, but this does not mean that it will indefinitely weaken the hegemonic grip that a ruling coalition has over its population just due to the movement’s nonviolent character. It also does not mean that all nonviolent movements articulate their own ideological platforms.

Perhaps the most important component of Sharp’s theoretical framework is that of consent. The relationship of rulers and the subjects which they govern depends on each individual’s obedience to their government. It is assumed that if the majority of a population withdraws its consent in
large enough numbers, for a sustained amount of time, a given government will fall. The withdrawal of popular and institutional cooperation by the citizenry results in the possible short-circuiting of availability of the sources of power on which all rulers depend. Without availability of those sources, the rulers’ power weakens and may eventually dissolve. The resources of power are once again, referred to as “loci” by Sharp and such loci range from non-state institutions to various associations present within civil society. All have the potential to disrupt the status quo during the process of withdrawal of consent if these loci stop serving the interests of those in power. Nonviolent movements are assumed by Sharp to be able to initiate a withdrawal of consent. The ways in which this empirically occurs according to Sharp is through a concept labeled as political jiu-jitsu. Jiu-jitsu can take place during a nonviolent protest’s interaction with violent state forces and here three different outcomes may arise: accommodation, conversion as well as nonviolent coercion. An accommodated protest will simply put, win some concessions from the state while the aspect of conversion means that a government will fully give in to the demands of the protest or in other words, change its mind. Nonviolent coercion on the other hand, entails that a state will continue repressing but only does so via un-severe and non-lethal forms (Sharp 1973c). Even though Sharp’s framework still serves as a starting reference point and foundation for researchers of nonviolence, its explanatory merit has been noted to have several issues. The idea of power operating through a fixed relationship between the rulers or a governing coalition within a state and with its subjects or the general population has been argued to miss out on key components of the patriarchal system and gender domination (McGuinness 1993). Brian Martin (1989), also has criticized Sharp on structural, bureaucratic, and technological grounds by noting the empirical inaccuracy of Sharp’s assumptions in all of these different aspects of affairs. Martin’s strongest point can be summarized by the following:
“Sharp argues that the use of nonviolent action tends to diffuse power: ‘Changes achieved by nonviolent action are therefore likely to be more lasting’ (1980, p. 62). Sharp's lack of structural analysis makes it difficult to say anything more than this vague claim. The practical results of nonviolent action depend on the political context, and a detailed analysis needs to be made to determine the role of nonviolent action” (Martin 1989, 220).

In addition, Martin notes that Sharp fails to give a proper reading of bureaucracy. Patterns of behavior differ across contexts within bureaucracies which is a factor that is decisive for the empirical study of social movements and their potential to bring about social change. This is due to the certainty that political struggles take place not only on the ground between nonviolent movements and security forces, but also at the top so to speak, between the many different types of governmental actors in a given state. This makes the “ruler-subject dichotomy” of limited value argues Martin (1989). With this in mind, Martin also applauded the ease of accessibility to Sharp's direct action strategies for the average protestor.

Furthermore, one of the major mistakes Sharp commits has to do with the assumption that a withdrawal of consent will hypothetically ensue as a result of a successful initiation of nonviolent civil resistance. A withdrawal of consent will not always lead to the setting aside or elimination of existent cleavages in a population whether those cleavages exist between governmental actors, political elites, or between segments of civil society. Consent is a grave misspecification when it comes to the complexity of political nature. The immediate result, or what happens after a nonviolent protest movement meets violent state forces will not always result in political jiu-jitsu. Sharp’s framework has significant explanatory deficiency when it comes to notable historical cases of nonviolent protest. For example, in 1989 Tiananmen, China a pro-democracy student movement that had links to unions occupied a highly central and symbolic square for nearly two months only to be met by an array of tanks. This took place in the
center of Beijing and a tipping point was reached when students attempted to stop oncoming tanks. Hundreds were killed. Even though protests continued to ensue the following days, the state was able to successfully kill and arrest many protesters even in the face of international condemnations and an array of international media attention. Another protest that Sharp advocated was the 2011 Egyptian case which took place during the “Arab Spring” of that same year. While hundreds of thousands occupied Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt for weeks, the end result was a bloody revolution rather than a nonviolent one. Egypt is still in political turmoil to this day and even in August of 2013, security forces killed over 800 civilians as they were occupying a public space in Cairo.

Sharp’s concept of political jiu-jitsu was a viable starting point with which to conceptualize general interactions of nonviolent protests with violent state forces, yet its historical inapplicability should render it outdated. Indeed, some protest movements get accommodated and in rare cases a government will change its mind and will seize to repress dissent at all. Above all, the phenomenon of nonviolent social transition is much more complex than many assume. A final case representative of an adverse withdrawal of consent or adverse political jiu-jitsu can be found in 2013-2014 Ukraine. In 2013, a protest by the name of Euromaidan emerged on the scene in Kiev, Ukraine calling for then President Viktor Yanukovych to step down after failing to initiate a European Union trade accord. The movement, representative of much of the population of Western Ukraine, adopted a diverse amount nonviolent direct action tactics as well as occupational methods to force a shutdown of the country’s capital for months. In February of 2014 after intermittent non-lethal clashes between protesters and security forces, over 70 civilians were shot dead and soon after Yanukovych fled the country as a regime transition ensued. Later in 2014, a civil war began between ethnic Russian separatists in the East of
Ukraine versus the intermittent new Ukrainian government. A strategic area of a Black Sea port in Crimea was also seized by the Russian state. As of 2015, the civil war in Ukraine is still ravaging on, claiming thousands of casualties.

The point here is that struggles for power during times of political contingency are highly complex and cannot be explained by a simple concept such as political jiu-jitsu or a deterministic framework of power and consent. The various outcomes which may arise due to the interaction of nonviolent protests with violent state forces are much more heterogeneous than assumed by Sharp. For this reason, the process model that is put forward in two of the papers of this dissertation (1905 Russia and 2013 Turkey), and also the conceptualization of a causal process that captures primary protest-state interactions is one that I specifically note to be temporally short. I do not seek to generalize the process onto longer durations and time periods that ensue after state violence is inflicted upon a given nonviolent protest movement. Rather, in all papers, I engage in a form of path-dependency analysis by tracing the causal effect brought about by the interaction of nonviolent protests with state forces and then examine how the incident's impact influenced later events. Sharp’s framework on the other hand, over-generalizes and even idealizes potential outcomes of protest-state interactions involving nonviolent protests. Possibly the most significant problem of Sharp’s concept of political jiu-jitsu is that it does not tell us anything about the conditions or circumstances under which a nonviolent protest movement will either get shut down, accommodated, or experience increased mobilization after repression. What's more, after one of these outcomes empirically occurs, there is no indication given as to why or how a given nonviolent protest will be able to seize Sharp's "loci" of power.

Below is a table illustrating sixteen different protests that got severely repressed by principal-sponsored security forces. These cases are 16 of the 44 examined in the fourth paper of the
dissertation and are presented here simply to illustrate the heterogeneous nature of protest-state interactional outcomes. The column on the left indicates if the protest experienced increased mobilization after repression or not, and the column on the right lists eventual outcomes that occurred after the incident of repression.

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increased Mobilization</th>
<th>Eventual Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1848 French Revolution</td>
<td>Revolution (&gt; 1 week)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905 Russia</td>
<td>Revolution (&gt; 5 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Sharpeville (SA)</td>
<td>International Condemnation; arrests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Mexico City</td>
<td>Long-term political struggle; condemnation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 Soweto (SA)</td>
<td>Hegemonic dislocation; arrests; torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Tiananmen (CH)</td>
<td>International Condemnation; censorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Guinea (GU)</td>
<td>Intl. Condem.; Domestic protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 Ukraine (UKR)</td>
<td>Regime transition; Civil war (&gt;2 months)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest Shut Down</th>
<th>Eventual Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844 Revolt (Prussia)</td>
<td>Arrests; later influence workers movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904 Romania (RO)</td>
<td>Little attention; small recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925 La Coruna (CH)</td>
<td>Arrests; President blamed military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961 Paris (FR)</td>
<td>State/International media censorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 Panzos (GU)</td>
<td>International news; later Genocide/War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Gwanju (S.KO)</td>
<td>No dissent; later political violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 Hama (Syria)</td>
<td>Defeat of opposition; leaders fled country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Guinea (GU)</td>
<td>International news; Arrests of Union head</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sixteen cases illustrated above are analyzed alongside 28 other cases in the fourth paper of this dissertation. Specific details of these cases are provided in the appendix of the fourth paper. In ten of the cases, varying levels of nonviolence were adopted by protesters during their meeting with state forces. The bold point here is that there is an assortment of different situations which may arise after the interaction of a protest movement with violent government agents. One of Sharp's outcomes of political jiu-jitsu which he refers to as "nonviolent repression," did ensue in
some of these cases, but it was not that the state was disabled from physically repressing opposition after a repressive act. Rather, protest was removed from public areas and movement organization became disfigured. In such cases, there was no transformative outcome but rather a shutting down of dissent. In addition, none of the cases resulted in accommodation and this brings me to the topic of repression backfire.

Nearly three decades after Sharp’s original framework of political jiu-jitsu and power and consent were put forward, Brian Martin along with David Hess (Hess and Martin 2006; Martin 2007) conceptualized the outcome of state violence experienced by nonviolent civilians as “repression backfire.” Here harsh and lesser forms of violence inflicted on groups or individuals were argued to be able to produce the effect of interest. Examples given by Martin range from the 1950s Rosa Parks incident to the 1990 Rodney King beating. Importantly, Hess and Martin posited two necessary conditions that have to be in place for backfire to occur. First, the incident has to be perceived as unjust by a given population. Second, information about the incident must be able to be communicated by media. After a given repressive act, cover-up mechanisms can be decisive by helping regimes to successfully deter and reframe the incident. Rulers are likely to attempt to calm things down by reducing public outrage, obscure the repressive action, reinterpret events through deceit, devalue the target protestors and use official channels by way of framing techniques (Hess and Martin 2006). The topic of censorship is one that was not heavily brought to attention or emphasized by Sharp, yet its relevance is highly tied to the outcomes of protest-state interactions. What also has to be considered here is that the effectiveness of censorship varies and it is only under certain domestic conditions when the state censoring of repressive acts will work. In the first and fourth papers of this dissertation, I explain how in most empirical cases that involve severe state violence resulting in civilian deaths,
censorship will not serve as a generally effective strategy. This is principally the case when a mass nonviolent and diverse protest experiences state repression.

The success of nonviolence and transnational support

The success and failure of nonviolent social movements has become an increasingly popular topic since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. At that point in time, one of history’s largest regimes crumbled, and millions across the globe witnessed how publics that were part of the periphery/satellite states of the USSR were protesting nonviolently in search of autonomy. Although this dissertation is not concerned with the broad topic of the success or failure of nonviolent/violent protests, it is worthwhile to overview some noteworthy studies in which scholars have attempted to explain why some nonviolent social movements succeed and why others fail. Transnational factors, as well as the actions of third party actors can have causal impact on the success of nonviolent protest movements. Domestically, high ranking members of the military can defect and turn their loyalty away from the government. Internationally, NGOs, human rights groups, foreign heads of state, foreign diaspora protest groups, economic institutions, economic sanctions, among other factors all can influence the chances for success or failure of a nonviolent social movement.

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler’s (1994), Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, developed an argument (similar to Sharp), which stated that the success of nonviolence depends on the choice of tactics and strategic planning by protest leaders. In their book, the authors focus on the role that pragmatic nonviolence (not principled), has had for nonviolent movements’ success and failures. While transnational factors are mentioned in their framework, the success of nonviolence depends on their twelve different principles, or guidelines that are observed
throughout a number of twentieth century nonviolent campaigns. These twelve principles are used by the authors to evaluate the impending success of nonviolence. They importantly are committed and carried out by the protesters themselves. The principles include the following: 1) Formulate functional objectives; 2) Develop organizational strength; 3) Secure access to critical material resources; 4) Cultivate external assistance; 5) Expand the repertoire of sanctions; 6) Attack the opponents’ strategy for consolidating control; 7) Mute the impact of the opponents' violent weapons; 8) Alienate opponents from expected bases of support; 9) Maintain nonviolent discipline; 10) Assess events and options in light of levels of strategic decision making; 11) Adjust offensive and defensive operations according to the relative vulnerabilities of the protagonists; 12) Sustain continuity between sanctions, mechanisms, and objectives.

Ackerman and Kruegler do note that NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in international politics. They also explain that the improvement of communication technology has also contributed to the overall capability of nonviolent movement to be able to coordinate. Most importantly, however, Ackerman and Kruegler’s argument tells us that commitment to the twelve principles is what drove nonviolent movements to success across the twentieth century.

Along similar lines, Gene Sharp, in one of his more recent works in Sharp and Paulson (2005), offers an updated account of his theory of nonviolent direct action with specific reference to nonviolent movements and their associations with internal and international third party actors. Sharp notes that nonviolent movements have a special ability to win over uncommitted third party actors which include international groups. This has to do with his earlier noted coercion outcome that was attributed to political jiu-jitsu. When nonviolent movements are violently repressed, members of the opponents’ “population” might question the usage of repression. Repression might be perceived to be excessive, or it may activate sympathy towards the
nonviolent movement. Sometimes this may even cause governmental members and the military to defect. Sharp makes the important distinction between what he conceptualizes to be internal and international actors. The former are generally thought to possess the agency to bring more immediate change to the prospects of the nonviolent movement, whereas the latter may “take considerable time to have an impact” (Sharp and Paulson 2005, 411). To understand how this all transpires empirically, Sharp, in concession, admits that individual analysis and case-by-case investigation is required. Above all, Sharp argues that third party and international support has only had limited historical use and effectiveness thus far (Sharp and Paulson 2005, 412).

Nonetheless, Sharp does hint that in the future, possibilities may arise for third party actors to have a greater influence in the success of nonviolent movements through outlets of support such as new literature, handbooks, printing facilities, radio broadcasting, among others.

Kurt Schock (2005), on the other hand, investigates how nonviolence influenced regime transition and historical change in nondemocratic settings throughout the cases of Burma, China, the Philippines, Thailand, and Nepal. Schock notes that while Ackerman and Kruegler do provide a tightly knitted analytical framework with which to assess the success of nonviolence, they also fail to consider or provide an adequate account of the political contexts in which their observations of nonviolent movements occurred in (Schock 2005, xxi). Although Schock’s book is on the short side (only 140 pages), it presents a very insightful examination of nonviolent campaigns because it incorporates nonviolence closer into formal social scientific discussions. Schock was one of the first scholars to launch a fully comparative analysis of nonviolent campaigns through his investigation of six different cases. He specifically argues that decentralization is a very important and hitherto unacknowledged factor that drives the success of nonviolent campaigns. If a social movement is very centralized and well organized, it will be
easy for highly repressive regimes to counteract its initiation of collective action. In exceedingly strong authoritarian states, a nonviolent movement must be well organized, but noncentralized, argues Schock.

Schock’s recommendations for success are not all too different from Kruegler and Ackerman. Nonviolent movements must be resilient in the face of state violence, and keep adhering to nonviolence. An important implication about Schock’s study to consider is that he does not “idealize” nonviolence and democracy in the way that Sharp does. Schock specifically notes that the democratic/nondemocratic dichotomy is more intricate than acknowledged in the nonviolence literature. Nonviolence is not a simple precursor to collective emancipation through electoral democracy. Rather, democracy and authoritarianism are the terrains where struggles between “domination and resistance are played out” (Schock 2005, xxvi). It is also important to consider that while Schock does investigate the context of South Africa, his analysis is limited to the time period of 1983-1990. This hampers his ability to be able to draw historical inferences about nonviolence with regards to this specific arena of apartheid. As will be demonstrated in the second paper of this dissertation, there were crucial events which took place before 1983 which helped to spark the 1980s struggle and international anti-apartheid movement.

In sum, scholars over the last decade have begun to emphasize that third party actors as well as transnational entities are becoming increasingly important for the success of nonviolent movements. This dissertation introduces a number of forces and mechanisms to help us understand how transnational factors can influence in the internal dynamics of repression backfire. Transnational forces, however, are in no way decisive when it comes to repression backfire. In the case of the 1905 Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre, when the Tsar ordered his security forces to fire upon unarmed women, children and workers while they were marching
towards his palace, news of the events went viral through a number of different international outlets. At that early point in the development of communicational history, publics around the world heard of the news. Most importantly, in the periphery of the Russian Empire, revolt also ensued as subjects became aware of the dislocation that arose from the massacre.

Transnational factors were also important for the formation of the anti-apartheid movement which began after the 1976 Soweto Massacre. In the second paper of this dissertation, specific information is provided regarding this case and its importance for the 1980s struggle against apartheid. In 2013 Turkey, transnationally oriented communicational tools (such as Twitter and Facebook), as well as transnationally situated diaspora groups, helped protesters on the ground in Istanbul to coordinate amongst themselves. Additionally, protesters themselves, during the 2013 Turkish Gezi Park uprisings, tweeted and wrote messages to international human rights groups and international news agencies about the repressive actions they were experiencing from state security forces in a period when there was immense state media censorship. Transnationality is a salient factor when it comes to protesters and their ability to overcome state repression, but it also has to interact and combine with other variables.

**Statistical nonviolence**

Scholars have observed and argued that nonviolent civic action has improved the durability of democracy over the latter half of the twentieth century (Johnstad and Grahl 2010). Along these lines, the effects of nonviolence are beginning to be theorized and investigated in a quantitative lens with aid of new statistical tools. The collection of a vast amount of data on nonviolent social movements also has begun in recent years. Quantitative researchers have observed that nonviolent movements are more likely to succeed than violent movements when it comes to
achieving their political ends (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), measured the success of nonviolent protest versus violent during the years 1940-2006. Here the conceptualization of a “campaign” was made which enabled a large amount of social movements to be observed over annual periods. This was labeled as the “Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes” or NAVCO 2.0 dataset. The central finding of their Large-N analysis was that nonviolent movements are much likelier to succeed in their objectives than violent; nonviolent movements experienced a 78% success rate in comparison to a 39% success rate for violent movements. In the same vein, other researchers have discovered that nonviolent protest is likelier to get accommodated into the democratic process (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013); whereas violent rebellion may lead to uncertainty, more repression, and possible civil war.

One study in particular investigated how campaign resources as communicational infrastructure influenced whether a social movement was likely to experience repression backfire, or increased mobilization after being repressed. Sutton et al., (2014) argue that the greater resources a campaign contributes to building communicational infrastructure, the more likely it will experience the fruits of repression backfiring after it faces state repression. Nonviolent and unarmed movements that engage in inter-campaign institutional building are likelier to experience increased mobilization after getting repressed (Sutton et al. 2014, 561). The latter of these findings is significant as it builds upon both Sharp’s and Hess and Martin’s studies by further specifying the conditions under which nonviolent movements will be able to withstand state repression. With this in mind, these findings are not without limitations. While campaign infrastructure in the form of communicational institutions surely will increase the likelihood that protest movements will be able to communicate with one another and groups in asymmetric areas, there have been plenty of instances in previous times when protest groups did not possess
digital means of communication. Before the creation of radio and television, protesters and social movement leaders had little other than physical tools such as canvasses, leaflets, and in some cases, only word of mouth. Repressive acts however, still backfired on regimes and led to greater dissent as well as other consequences. This occurred through the viral diffusing of incidents by domestic as well as international media outlets as was noted in the previous section through the example of 1905 Russia. A similar dynamic was at play even earlier in the 1819 English Peterloo Massacre.

Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) study was highly significant as it was the first to quantitatively assess the success of violent versus nonviolent campaigns. It also touched upon the topic of repression backfire. The NAVCO 2.0 data set is wide encompassing because it contains thousands of observations and dozens of variables that are relevant to nonviolence in relation to sociopolitical, domestic, as well as international factors. Chenoweth and Stephan briefly noted that nonviolent campaigns had overcome state repression more often than violent campaigns, and that nonviolence as a protest strategy made it more likely for protesters to keep dissenting after experiencing repression. However, there are two major issues inherent to the statistical study of nonviolence which thus far have limited its explanatory power. First, Chenoweth and Stephan, as well as Sutton and his co-authors, only were able to investigate nonviolence in the form of a large, on-going campaign or social movement. Event-based data were not analyzed, and hence, counterfactual cases were left out.

Another issue that the statistical study of nonviolence faces is elaborated upon in the fourth paper of this dissertation, but shortly put, thus far, the statistical studies that have been carried out on nonviolence, presume that the effect of repression on dissent is linear and continuous. The models that quantitative researchers have thus far put forward having to do with repression
backfire have not been able to capture asymmetric causal relationships. A major contribution of
the third and fourth papers of this dissertation reveals that the relationship between repression
and dissent is equifinal, asymmetric, and conjunctional. Another limitation in the above noted
studies has to do with the detail that thus far, nonviolence and violence have been conceptualized
by scholars as binary empirical phenomena. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), noted this was one
of the major limitations of their NAVCO 2.0 dataset. In the fourth paper of this dissertation, I
demonstrate and make a contribution to overcome the limitation of binary nonviolence through
the calibration of causal conditions. This is the first study that will test how varying (and non-
dichotomous) factors influence the repression-dissent nexus.

I adopt the method of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. There are several other reasons
for adopting this approach which are explained in greater depth in the paper itself, but shortly
put, I argue the chosen method provides an improvement and different viewpoint in comparison
to statistical studies that have tackled the question of whether repression increases dissent or
decreases it. Once again, in statistical analyses of the repression-dissent nexus it is assumed that
the effect state repression has on dissent is linear, or can be brought about by one or two
continuous factors such as nonviolent protest strategy or protest communicational institution
building. In addition, in regression analysis, if an independent variable is influential in only a
handful of cases, but in some cases indefinitely, this effect might be “invisible” in the output as it
will inflate variance and deflate coefficients, argues Barbara Vis (2012). The usage of QCA in
the fourth paper enables the overcoming of such hidden effects. In addition, QCA allows for
replication and it enables researches to corroborate or falsify results of their analysis, which is
significant for scientific inquiry (Rihoux 2006). The empirical results from the fourth paper of
this dissertation indicate that not all protests will experience increased dissent after being
repressed and in fact, for increased dissent to ensue after state repression there have to be certain configurational conditions or factors in place.

**The repression-dissent nexus**

Over the course of several decades, there have been many conflict scholars who have investigated how mobilization affects levels of state repression and vice versa, if state repression increases or decreases civilian mobilization. The diversity of these studies is vast and this literature is multidisciplinary (Tilly 1978; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Regan and Henderson 2002; Francisco 2004; Davenport 2007a; Carey 2010; Davenport et al., 2012; Sutton et al. 2014). Even with a substantial amount of scholarly attention, “after 40 years, we still know very little about how state repression influences political dissent” argued a scholar that is at the forefront of state repression literature: Davenport et al., (2012). Generally, research on the repression-dissent nexus or the repression-mobilization puzzle can be divided into two groups. In the first group, scholars conceptualize state repression as an independent variable in a given causal process with mobilization as the outcome. Another group of scholars does the reverse and conceptualizes mobilization as independent and repression as the dependent variable (Carey 2006; 2010). My focus in this dissertation is on the former matter concerning whether repression increases dissent or decreases it.

Sharp's concept of political jiu-jitsu has much to do with the repression-dissent nexus. It arguably serves as a precursor to this topic given Sharp was one of the first to emphasize the importance of nonviolent strategy in battling state suppression. With this in mind, there has been great inconclusiveness produced by a variety of studies regarding the repression-dissent puzzle. Hibbs (1973) observed that repression on the whole quarreled and shut down dissent whereas
Ziegenhagen (1986) argued repression increased dissent. Muller (1985), along with Regan and Henderson (2002), found that there was a U-Shaped relationship between repression and protest. In Ayoub’s (2010) study, state repression was investigated from the span of 1975-1989 in Western Europe and here the threat hypothesis was posited which tells us that protests that threaten a given state are most likely to be repressed. Earl (2003), on the other hand, posited that weak protests will get repressed while strong and threatening protests will get accommodated into a given government’s political formation.

Sabine Carey (2006; 2010) in two noteworthy studies, argued that the repression-dissent puzzle is highly reciprocal, i.e. that repression and dissent are empirically intertwined. This idea of reciprocality underpins many researchers' general intuition regarding protest-state interactions. An entire subfield of the protest-repression literature comprised of game theory and formal modeling (Moore 1998; Pierskalla 2010; Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2011; Shadmehr 2014) is based around the notion that there are repeated (tit-for-tat) interactions between protest and state which take place during times of civilian upheaval. Sharp’s political jiu-jitsu and the specific outcome of accommodation was emphasized (although not directly) by Lichbach (1987) and Moore (1998), who argued that when domestic dissent arises, states will either accommodate (accept the demands of opposition) or repress opposition. Lichbach’s (1987) study was based upon a choice theoretic approach in which he examined both state repression along with state accommodation and posited that when a given government uses consistent policies such as consistent repression or consistent accommodation, dissent will decrease. Conversely, inconsistency on the part of the government will send mixed messages to dissidents and will hence increase protest. Pierskalla (2010), adopting a similar but more complex logic in his
analysis, argued that governments which are strong enough to successfully repress are able to deter opposition from protesting while weak states will compromise with opposition.

Francisco (2004) argued that severe repression mostly increased dissent through analysis of 31 historical massacres that took place over the twentieth century (Francisco 2004, 120).

Considering all of these different studies and the wide array of inconclusiveness that exists regarding the repression-dissent nexus, there are only a few concrete notions which are generally accepted by scholars. First, the state or any principal governor will utilize coercive tactics to upkeep political stability and the status quo. This ties into the earlier mentioned popular concept of Davenport’s law of coercive responsiveness. If a protest or political threat arises and directly challenges the status quo, agents of the state respond back with coercion and repression in private and public areas. Another notion that is widely adopted by researchers in this literature entails that individuals are rational in the context of protest behavior. Protesters and observers will assess their chances of being successful against a state and rebel when it is least costly to do so. Social movement leaders must also provide selective incentives to active members and make sure a group does not get too big in order to be able to monitor members and keep other potential members from free riding. This was long ago argued by Olson (1965) to be one of the most important indicators of whether a social movement will succeed or not.

This line of thought is also prevalent in Sutton et al., (2014), as well as Francisco's (2004) studies in which emphasis is placed on dissident ability to communicate in the wake up state repression. A few shortcomings of the above noted approaches are worth noting. First, many studies that focus on the costs which may get assigned to repressing dissent or not by political leaders actually miss out on the changing nature of historical political struggle. They cannot tell us why it is that workers movements were heavily repressed in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century U.S. political history but still rebelled afterwards. Nor can they inform us of the highly coercive and repressive practices that were carried out in democratic countries, for example, when labor leaders and striking members were deported by severe means in 1917 in the United States (see the Bisbee Deportation; O'Neil 1993). There is still much to be discerned from analyzing historical cases of state repression. In many cases and studies noted above, political identity has been assumed to be static and unchanging. Scholars place great emphasis on the rational behavior of dissidents and often (whether directly or indirectly), imply that identities are unchanging. Most often, scholars simply do not focus on identity at all. In the first two papers of this dissertation, a different route is taken as I emphasize that dissent is most likely to ensue when political identities get destabilized from previous systems of meaning and individuals get forced into new political struggles. Utilizing discourse theoretic concepts, in the first two papers, I lay the groundwork for further social inquiry that is taken to address and make a contribution to the repression-dissent nexus in the fourth paper of the dissertation.

**Nonviolence and political discourse theory**

The first two papers specifically place the effect brought about by repression backfire into a larger historical path dependent chain of events. Discourse theory helps to overcome Sharp’s determinism and offer a new account of social change based around hegemony and historical contingency. Earlier I had mentioned that Hess and Martin argued that repression inflicted upon nonviolent actors can spur moral outrage and turn out to be “unjust,” but why is this so? How can such acts and events be related to the social structure of the context in which they take place in? In other words, why does political jiu-jitsu or repression backfire actually take place in some cases but not others? This section will reveal how a discourse theoretic can complement and add to nonviolence theory in a way that has yet to be realized in previous studies.
To answer these questions, I first adopt a discourse theoretic approach. Ideology and Discourse Analysis, Discourse Theory, or Political Discourse Theory as it is frequently referred to, draws heavily from Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Howarth (2000; 2013), Glynos and Howarth (2007), Foucault, Levi Strauss, Derrida, Gramsci, De Saussure, Wittgenstein and other prominent twentieth century figures. In this approach to social inquiry, ideology and identity are emphasized. The various theoretical rules applied by scholars need to be suited to the particular contexts in which we are applying them to given there is no single right or correct way to apply discourse theory argues David Howarth (Howarth 2013). There are numerous forms of discourse analysis and reviewing each type is far too great a task in regards to the capacity of this introductory section, yet it is worth noting that the discourse theoretic approach adopted here is not confined to text. Discourse is assumed to encompass all social relations, practices, and knowledge. At the same time, a discourse is radically contingent due to an ever-present condition of dislocation. A discourse is relational, with equivalized and differentiated elements formulating its entities. While these elements get stabilized and sedimented within a given discursive structure, ontologically they are always in a state of dislocation.

For these reasons, the objective formation of social reality was argued by Laclau and Mouffe to be theoretically impossible (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Discourses can be thought of as a limit and contingent enclosure of social relations. They are often viewed or assessed through the Gramscian notion of a “historical epoch” or bloc. In the first and second papers of this dissertation, I conceptualize Russian Tsarism as a historical bloc (1860-1905), as well as the discourse National Party apartheid as a historical bloc as well. An important assumption of this approach is that all practices and entities within a society are related to one another through the meaning human beings attribute to different forms of articulated social elements. Discourses are
also relational in nature and this assertion is linked to Saussure's structural linguistics framework (De Saussure 2011). The structure or discursive structure of a given system of social relations is comprised of relational and representational elements which give an order to social reality (Glynos et al. 2009).

The discursive system or system of social relations is a primary concept that enables the researcher to theorize and conceptualize the contextual elements of a hegemonic project. Indeed, there are often numerous discourses that operate within a given discursive totality, but this totality is the entity which encompasses the former. Each discursive structure is radically contingent as is political identity. It is always threatened by something outside it (Laclau 1990). Radical contingency entails that a social structure is never fully closed off and its completeness is theoretically impossible. The concepts of a nodal point, floating signifier, and empty signifier are theoretical tools used by discourse theorists that help to make sense of the elements within a given discursive structure or system. A nodal point can be thought of as a type of reference point that holds together a space for chains of signified elements to be articulated by political actors then get stabilized into a formation. While nodal points are full of already stabilized elements, another concept, that of a floating signifier helps to explain the subsistence of non-sedimented elements in a discourse. In addition, within a discursive system or any type of hegemonic formation, empty signifiers function as fairly open spaces for social elements to be articulated.

As explained by Howarth and Stavrakakis,

"the articulation of a political discourse can only take place around an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point…emptiness is now revealed as an essential quality of the nodal point, as an important condition of possibility for hegemonic success" (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 9).
Even though elements are always dislocated in a given discursive totality, empirically there may be certain systems of meaning that turn out to be stable for significant durations of time. For example, stability may be found in various historical social systems that endured for tens of decades such as Russian Tsarism. With this in mind, the political arena always has a chance of being disrupted by a dislocatory shock which may result in the revealing of the contingent nature of that discourse and a later hegemonic competition for the filling of floating signifiers. During periods of hegemonic dislocation, political agents articulate and make new sense of social demands and grievances. The greatest of social and historical change has arisen from either exogenous or endogenous shocks (i.e. dislocations), in which the radical contingency of social relations was revealed to publics. The utilization of this approach in this dissertation has enabled me to map out the qualitative structure of a given context of interest whether it be Tsarist Russia, the apartheid regime in South Africa, and then to analyze the logics underpinning the discursive totality of interest. This also has enabled me to get over the problem of homogeneity found in Sharp's framework in which social structures and political power are treated as largely the same across time and context. By focusing on the hegemonic elements found in a given discourse, I account for a wide array of dynamics that are relevant to the historical epoch in which they are a part of.

This latter tactic was precisely my research strategy in the first and second papers of this dissertation. I situate the concept of repression backfire and my conceptualization of a political process of repression backfire as an event that can take place and have an effect on larger path-dependent chains of historical occurrences. In other words, to account for historical change in the first two papers, I situate the dislocatory event of repression backfire alongside others dislocatory
events that may take place in a historical epoch such as war, economic crisis, famine, among others.

Methodologically, the logics of critical explanation (Glynos and Howarth 2007) aided me greatly throughout the research-intensive periods of the first two papers. The logics are a specific framework that extends from original discourse theoretic notions. They are focused on “logics” which are made up of three primary components - the social, political, and fantasmatic. All three of these logics are mutually inclusive and have discursive cohesion linked to the historical bloc in which they are a part of. Accounting for the logics that underpin regimes as well as accepting the ontological position of discourse theory which particularly states that social structures are radically contingent, enabled me to abandon the determinism found in Sharp’s theories of power and consent. The way in which I accomplished this is through giving attention to the concept of hegemony. Hegemony has many uses throughout social science but the specific line of thought which I am referring to originates back to Antonio Gramsci, and was elaborated upon by Laclau via his concepts of antagonism and dislocation. Hegemony does not necessitate that there be social domination but rather it is a necessary condition that must be in place for social agents to engage in politics and political articulation. It operates on different levels and is used by all forms of political coalitions in any type of government, ranging from repressive regimes, to democracies and even in small-scale settings of social movements. As Howarth (2010) puts it,

“On the one hand, hegemony is a kind of political practice that captures the making and breaking of political projects and discourse coalitions. But on the other hand it is also a form of rule or governance that speaks to the maintenance of the policies, practices and regimes that are formed by such forces” (Howarth 2010, 310).

Hegemony, argues Howarth, elucidates how a regime, practice, or policy “holds sway” over individuals (Howarth 2010, 317). This is a very important concept if we are to once again
consider Sharp’s notions of power and consent. For Sharp, nonviolent movements have the power to take away popular consent from a given regime, however this claim does not consider the qualitative differences between hegemonic configurations and power in different states. Sharp’s notions are largely underpinned by the idea that a nonviolent movement is a democratic emancipatory force. Consent, theoretically, will get withdrawn in the same ways across different historical contexts when nonviolent protests emerge onto the political scene and experience political jiu-jitsu. What Sharp fails to consider is that social reality is comprised of both homogeneous and heterogeneous elements, and most importantly, contextual differences are vital for not only overcoming state repression, but nonviolent protest success. By assuming that power and consent are homogeneously oriented concepts, Sharp’s framework can tell us little as to why some nonviolent protests are successful in overcoming state repression.

In the first two papers, I emphasize that a political discourse is not an objective entity or set of entities. In a given discourse of a social movement, nonviolence, whether in principled or pragmatic form, may take the place of just one floating signifier among other social constructions, actions, and practices. Political discourses get articulated to make sense of social reality. They help subjects make sense of their self-being, identities, as well as their cultural and historical sense of belonging. Indeed, many nonviolent social movements have sought greater electoral representation, civil rights, and goals aimed towards democracy. But whilst doing so, these social movements had to rearticulate social demands and elements into a form that antagonized the state or a governmental policy. While some goals of social movements have been very similar across different political and social contexts, their battles and discourses have been different. Before one can abstract away from the discursive and contextual elements
relevant to a given case of repression backfire, there has to be a thorough understanding of the
dynamics that are inherent to contextual political struggles. This will enable us to understand
why it is that some cases of severe state repression lead to immense political change, and why
others do not have such significant dislocatory impacts.

In the first and second papers of this dissertation, I utilize the discourse theoretic concept of
myth. A myth is an incomplete surface which helps subjects to fill new spaces of representation
during times of structural dislocation (Laclau 1990). A myth will only become successful if after
repeated processes of hegemonic articulation, it gets to take on a wide array of social elements
and eventually it can get transfused into a collective social imaginary. Both myths and social
imaginaries subside within the discursive totality of a given structure. A collective social
imaginary is the absolute limit or horizon that limits subjects’ intelligibility (Critchley and
Marchart 2004, 261). In the context of the Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre of 1905, I
categorize the Tsarist regime, its logics and myths dating back to the period of when serfs were
first emancipated (1861), all the way up until the 1905 Revolution. I demonstrate that popular
accounts that have highlighted the role of nonviolence in the 1905 massacre along with historical
accounts covering the incident have failed to consider the massacre’s effect on the social
structure of Tsarism and one of its central myths, that of the Tsar being a religious monarch and
“Father of the People.” Through in-depth analysis of the hegemonic relations between the Tsar,
his governmental agents, and heterogeneous sectors of the Russian public, I explain how the
massacre dislocated the Tsarist state to severe extent and in turn this forced new and old political
discourses to compete in a time of organic structural crisis.
Along similar lines, in the 1976 Soweto, South Africa paper, I argue that the central contradiction of apartheid was revealed during the Soweto massacre. The myths and social imaginaries of National Party discourse are categorized and explained throughout the paper, then special attention is given to the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), and its articulation of a nonviolent, antagonistic discourse that was aimed at white racism and the project of apartheid initiated by the ruling party. These antagonistic dynamics were exemplified in the 1976 Soweto Massacre when hundreds of children were gunned down by white police. The structural dislocation of Soweto helped pave way for the 1980s struggle against apartheid, as well as the development of the international anti-apartheid movement.

The difference between the contributions of these two papers is important to take into consideration. While the Russian case exemplifies how leadership in a nonviolent protest movement articulated a discourse that represented “the people,” in South Africa, the BCM articulated a discourse based around the “native” people which were the black population of South Africa (excluding Indians, Dutch, British, and other diaspora groups). Both discourses sought to emancipate their participants. Importantly however, each discourse and social movement was aimed at different hegemonic power dimensions of their opponents. In the Russian case, the myth that the Tsar was “Father of the People,” resulted in the opposition movement protesting towards the Tsar, and in the protest, people were asking for his help, his forgiveness and immediate action to help put an end to the immense exploitative practices that were going on in Russian factories. In the South African case, the BCM articulated a discourse that antagonized the project of the NP, and specifically sought to relieve the native population
from the suffering brought about by immense racial segregation and false anthropological classification.

Even though the power dynamics and discursive structures of the regimes were different, in both cases, when unarmed civilians were massacred by state forces, the central antagonisms of each discourse (Tsarist/National Party) were publicly revealed in grand form. As Ernesto Laclau frequently stated, social conflict and political change transpire around antagonisms. Antagonism is the natural condition of the political. In the scope of repression-backfire, the process itself can reveal antagonisms, and the first two papers of this dissertation help us to understand how different types of antagonisms got revealed during dislocatory shocks brought about by severe state repression and the interaction between violent state agents and nonviolent civilians.

**Choice of theory**

The decision to adopt a discourse theoretic approach in the first two papers has to be justified in light of the numerous frameworks that are available for social inquiry. Other than Schock’s (2005) study in which nonviolence was investigated with sociological theories, there has been little theoretical work conducted on nonviolence. When it comes to the study of social movements however, a popular sociological theory is that of frame theory, or frame analysis. Frame theory focuses on how actors and social movement leaders construct self-presentations for the purposes of drawing support from others, especially observers (Oliver and Johnston 2005, 186). Frames have thus far been conceptualized as entities that are fixed as well as emergent. Framing is used to explain different ways that actors make sense of their world. Frame theory,
however, is not based on any larger ontology of social reality, other than the notion that social and political struggles, specifically, are meaningful. Pamela Oliver argues that frames are individual cognitive structures that are located in a black box of mental life. The somewhat contradictory relationship between frames and ideology is of vast importance for frame theory. Some sociologists, such as Oliver, argue that frames are too often used uncritically in relation to ideology. In rebuttals, proponents of frame theory have argued that ideology is a cultural resource used for framing activity.

Frames refer to process, whereas ideology refers to content. These two empirically overlap. Framing is conducted with specific motives at the social movement organization (SMO) level. However, as Oliver notes, frames cannot function as a substitute for ideology. Specifically, in comparison to ideology, “frames are woefully incomplete: they offer too shallow a conception of what is involved in developing ideologies and a one dimensional view of how others adopt them.” In a defense of frame theory Snow and Benford (2005) argued that framing is an observable activity, while ideology is not. The “master frame” is a concept that is arguably the most popular in frame theory. It tells us that there are certain dominant or clustered rhetorical strategies that get enacted by social movements during episodes of contention (Snow and Benford 1992). However as Benford (1997) points out, by 1997 there were already dozens of frames that were identified by social movement scholars such as the “growth is good” frame, the “East-West conflict” frame, the “ideology of imperialism” master frame, the “identity politics” frame, the “law and order” frame, the “state terror” frame, the “doomsday” frame, among many others (Benford 1997, 414).
More recently, frame theorists also have investigated how governments engage in counterframing as a response to the frames cast by political opposition. Selina Gallo-Cruz (2012) investigated not only how framing shapes solidarity in a given movement, but how framing gets used by social movements to target opponents (governments and public policies). Governmental actors, on the other hand, engage in counterframing in response to social activism argues Gallo-Cruz. To explain how this occurs in the empirical world, Gallo-Cruz introduced the concept of a boundary negotiation. When boundary negotiation occurs, this entails that moral boundaries get negotiated between social movements and their opponents through various types of public interactions.

Frame theory is indeed an insightful and useful framework with which to study social movements. However, when it comes to nonviolence and repression backfire in particular, it is unclear whether frame theory can put forward a substantial explanatory account of the phenomenon. Since there have been over one hundred frames that have been identified by scholars (notes Oliver), it is unclear which frames are most effective, and once again, how frames empirically interact with ideology. Gauging the success of nonviolence through frame theory will entail that the researcher observe a number of frames. But here a dilemma arises. Hitherto, nonviolent social movements that have sought greater political representation, economic rights, civil rights, among others, did so with usage of nonviolent direct action as well as a number of their own articulated motives. The frames of “democratic representation,” or “justice,” can tell us very little about why a nonviolent movement will overcome state repression. When it comes to repression-backfire, the potential application of frame theory also runs into a bit of a dilemma. While protesters in some cases surely have notified third party actors, media,
and observers of their nonviolent intentions, it is unclear how the pragmatic usage of nonviolence can be considered to be a frame. The initiation of nonviolent direct action, and the clashing of a nonviolent protest with a violent state force is a spectacle that can result in increased mobilization and transformative social change regardless of whether nonviolence is framed towards observers or the protesters themselves. Indeed, as part of the articulation of a nonviolent strategy, on the organizational level, protesters and protest leaders need to boldly proclaim that nonviolence be the only strategy used. This is a strategical and physical choice having to do with protest, rather than a cognitive construct. In some instances, nonviolent protesters will be encouraged to purposely attempt to provoke police to initiate violence. None of these actions, however, are necessary or sufficient for a given act of repression to be able to backfire.

Another very important variable, campaign diversity, also is one that need not be previously articulated as a “frame,” but rather, social movement leadership physically organizes, networks, and gains support from heterogeneous segments of society that previously were not unified together as a force of collective action. When a nonviolent and diverse protest gets repressed by a state, observers, the public and international news agencies will view the incident not as if the protesters were “framing” themselves to be diverse, but the situation will be assessed according to physical components on the ground. Indeed, political elites will attempt to cover-up acts of repression, they will reinterpret information about the protest group as Hess and Martin (2006) demonstrated. The third paper of this dissertation sheds new light on why repression backfire may occur even in the face of severe state censorship and cover-up. It specifically demonstrates
that political elites, via cover-up, will antagonize and differentiate political opponents that are trying to protest against the government through noninstitutional means.

In sum, the primary reasons behind why the first two papers of this dissertation are based on discourse theory, and why the third and fourth papers of this dissertation do not contain frame analysis are due to the following: the first two papers seek to make claims about historical social change, discourse theory provides a much more comprehensive and rigorous framework with which to judge processes of social transformation as it contains an ontology of political action and social reality. When it comes to the third paper, here is where a fully scoped process model is developed based around antecedent conditions and mechanisms. Antecedent conditions have to do with a number of observable factors that are not limited to the cognitive beliefs of the protest group as an actor. In the fourth paper, qualitative comparative analysis is also geared towards fuzzy-set logic and the relationship between calibrated conditions and the outcome of increased/decreased mobilization. The six conditions investigated in paper four are meant to improve on earlier quantitative work on the topic of the repression-dissent nexus. Once again, here the conditions are not limited to the cognitive beliefs of the protest actor, but encompass a much wider array of observable characteristics having to do with protest-state interactions, environment, geography, and communicational system.

Another dominant sociological theory is that of the political opportunity structure. In the first as well as third papers of this dissertation, I introduce process models that help capture the causal characteristics of the phenomenon of repression backfire. My usage of a causal political process has to be ontologically justified in order to both understand why I adopted such a concept, how it
is in tune with a discourse theoretic approach, and also how it differs from the popular sociological notion of a political opportunity structure. For Charles Tilly (2001) a political process is frequently reoccurring in the empirical world (Tilly 2001, 26). I do not reject this claim as a major part of my theoretical intuition relies upon the notion that repression backfire or in other words, the interaction between violent governmental forces and nonviolent protests is a frequently and historically reoccurring phenomenon.

Political process models, however, have often been regarded to be synonymous and tantamount to the political opportunity framework. This dissertation does not compliment or adopt the political opportunity framework. As Meyer (2004) notes, the political opportunity framework is very broad and encompasses a lot of different elements. It emphasizes context dependency but also that exogenous factors either “enhance” or “inhibit” a social movement’s prospect for mobilization, cultivating alliances, and employing some protest strategies rather than others (Meyer 2004). This approach is indeed very broad, and it is because of its vagueness that it has received significant criticism. As Gamson and Meyer (1996) noted, the political opportunity structure is in danger of “becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment” (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 275). There is a significant amount of legitimacy to this claim. Political opportunity structures tell us nothing about how structure affects agency or how agents can affect structure. As a framework of social action, the only thing the political opportunity structure can indicate is whether an exogenous force enables a given social movement to engage in some form of action, and even this broad claim is often difficult to distinguish when implemented.
The important point to consider here having to do with the conceptualized causal process of repression backfire that is found in the first and third papers of this dissertation is that I do not conceive the political process to be exogenously influenced but rather, the causal process of repression backfire is endogenous and representative of the highest form of political struggle, a state supported massacre of mobilized political opposition.

**Discourse theory and positivism**

In traditional methodological debates, discourse theorists have quarreled with positive-minded scholars over a number of different issues. The subject of how discourse can complement the larger goal of social and political explanation needs to be addressed. By definition, positivism is a philosophical and epistemological standpoint which only recognizes phenomena that can be identified by our senses, and then scientifically verified through experimental testing. Positivism rejects theology and metaphysics, but more importantly, in the social sciences, positivist researchers seek to use methods from the natural sciences to study our social reality. Indeed, the combination of a number of different concepts from multi-theoretical outlets in this dissertation makes the four papers of the dissertation as a whole produce original insights into nonviolence, protest mobilization, and repression backfire. At the same time, this maneuver also raises methodological concerns.

Formally, I do not believe there is any reason as to why a discourse theoretic approach (such as the one adopted in part of this dissertation), cannot be used to explain frequently reoccurring and observable social events if those social events are observed in a similar context. I do however,
hold the position that any framework or theory that earns recognition and has to do with the social world is in the end, radically contingent. Any ontology of social reality and theoretical framework is historically contingent and always subject to contestation (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 154). If this were not the case, then we would be stuck in an unmovable state of determinism when it comes to our knowledge about the natural and social worlds. In the first paper of the dissertation I specifically utilize Glynos and Howarth’s (2007) *Logics of Critical Explanation*, which were created to function as an aid to the discourse theoretic approach. The logics approach is meant to put forward what Glynos and Howarth refer to as a “careful course,” between law-like explanations and thick descriptions.

The logics enable researchers to build critical explanations of regimes and social practices. Discourse theory, more broadly, helps us to account for the way “certain political projects or social practices remain or become hegemonic” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 5). Although the second paper of the dissertation does not contain an analysis based around the three logics of South African apartheid and National Party discourse, this is so because the logics of apartheid were already assessed and mapped out by Aletta Norval (1996). Hence, for the first two papers of the dissertation, the logics heavily underpin the 1905 Russian case, and even though they are not directly implemented in the second paper, the larger approach and ontological position remains the same. Assessing how hegemonic discourses get stabilized, accepted, and then ruptured was the initial goal of the first two papers. The special contribution of the first two papers is that they help us make sense of how repression backfire fits into a platter of other dislocatory events that have historically driven and shaped political struggles and social change. War, famine, draught, economic crises, and repression backfire all have had very profound
effects when it comes to affecting the stability of hegemonic discourses and governments. The first two papers illustrate the ways in which the event of severe state repression can rupture a hegemonic project and reveal the antagonisms that underpin it. Perhaps the most important aspect to consider here is that discourse theory in the first two papers of this dissertation is not utilized to generalize findings onto other cases, but rather, discourse theory helps to pinpoint the impact that repression backfire had for the hegemonic historical blocs under attention in each of the cases.

As will be shown in subsequent sections and precisely in the paper on the 1905 Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre, careful attention is given to the generalizability of the preliminary process model that is presented in this specific paper. This dissertation is one of the first, if not the first to conceptualize repression backfire as a causal process. But in the first paper, the process model is specifically meant to shed light on the case in which it is applied to. Later, in the third paper, I explain how a similar but more developed process model can be applied to any given incident that involves an interaction between a given nonviolent movement and violent state forces. The notion of social causation underpinning the process entails that an effect occurs after a cause, and that the effect subsists or takes place during short, but robust temporal periods of public interaction between state agents and a protest movement. In the first paper, instead of adopting the popular notion or concept of a causal mechanism, a concept of a discursive mechanism/force was included in the model. These forces operate contextually and are tied to qualitative meanings which are part of a given social system of relations. They are simple explanatory tools which help to demonstrate how dislocations to a social structure may empirically transpire. These mechanisms have the power to affect the sedimentation levels of nodal points and floating
signifiers. They help to capture and explain movement that transpires in quick temporal stages, which then leads to the revealing of political contingency.

Moreover, the adoption of discourse theory in the first two papers was complimented by research-intensive periods of inquiry. This provided me with a substantial amount intuition having to do with the nonviolence and state repression literatures. It specifically helped me to later conceptualize and hypothesize how protesters can overcome state repression through general factors. For example, in the South African paper, I assess the impact that seven political massacres of interest had on identity formation and mobilization against apartheid. I discover that of all incidents, the two most transformative cases (1960 Sharpeville and 1976 Soweto Massacres), occurred when the state massacred protests which contained the most diversity and had adhered to the boldest degree of nonviolent strategy when compared to the other cases. This leads me to conclude that protest and the use of nonviolence in 1980s in South Africa was driven by the destabilization of political identities in the hegemonic formation of apartheid discourse, the revealing of political contingency, and the emergence of processes of articulation on the parts of central players engaged in political struggle against the state.

Another potential issue that may be conveyed by a formally oriented political scientist or methodologist is that the first two parts of this dissertation do not provide counterfactuals to discourse. In light of such a concern, the above noted strategy carried out in the second paper of the dissertation (Soweto/apartheid massacres), provides the precise grounds in which counterfactuals can be considered. The manuscript is based around an analysis of very discursively oriented political movements that were massacred by the state, and it also compares the effect that state repression had on other movements that did not engage in the articulation of
their own discourse to challenge the state. Furthermore, possibly the issue of greatest importance to the relationship between discourse theory and positivism has to do with the ontology of human action and nature. The most dominant notion that is prevalent in the state repression literature entails that political leaders calculate costs when choosing to repress opposition. Along similar lines, protesters and individuals will calculate costs and attempt to maximize their utility when choosing to protest or not. Discourse theory provides an explanatory framework that stresses subjective political identity, and in this light, it differs from rational choice theory. Discourse theory stresses subjectivity and radical contingency, whereas the positivist-based rational choice theory entails that individuals are naturally rational beings.

Before widespread acknowledgment emerged concerning the empirical inaccuracy and determinism of Karl Marx’s framework of class warfare or proletariat action, many considered political upheavals to be irrational social processes argues Tarrow (Tarrow 2011). This all changed in the 1960s when Mancur Olson (1965), pointed out that successful protests are more rational than commonly acknowledged. Success was argued to be linked to the organizational components of protests as well as their ability to engage in selective incentive providing. If protest leaders do not provide selective incentives to their members and potential dissidents, it is likely that individuals will free ride and receive the benefits of the protest without contributing. This set the stage for the emergence of rational choice theory in the social sciences. Charles Tilly built upon Olson’s logic and stressed that interests, (political) opportunities, and organization were the key factors responsible for the success of protest and eventual political revolution. These are important ontological positions to reflect on here because the intuition of many collective action theorists tells us that after a severe act of state violence, protesters and potential
dissidents theoretically should not want to continue protesting as it is costlier to do so given the likelihood of facing severe repression (Francisco 2004).

While I do not seek to contend with the idea that a highly organized movement most likely will experience greater endurance and possible success than a non-organized movement, I do challenge a particular and common characteristic that is inherent to the various viewpoints noted above. This characteristic has to do with the topic of political identity. In many positivist as well as rational choice based frameworks of social change, the identity of protesters is assumed to be by and large static and unchanging during protest-state struggles. Although the idea that protesters weigh the costs of mobilization after witnessing or hearing about state repression might be accurate, there are also other factors that come into play during scenarios of this sort.

The assumption that individuals have fixed preferences and under some conditions, that individuals may update their preferences in response to stimuli and events is one that fits into the epistemological character of rational choice theory. This assumption however, cannot tell us why it is that sometimes under immense threat and chance of experiencing state violence, protesters continue to dissent, even after witnessing their friends, relatives, and in some cases family members get repressed or killed by agents of the state.

Case selection and sources

Since this dissertation investigates a number of cases (47 total), information regarding case selection has to be provided. In addition, the topic of source selection also has to be elaborated upon. While the first three papers of this dissertation are based on cases that took place in entirely different eras, political contexts, and social configurations, the event of repression
backfire operated in all three cases. Hague, Harrop, and Breslin (1992) mention a popular framework that helps researchers working in the field of comparative politics select and compare cases. Their idea of “focused comparison” entails that comparing few countries can be done through a certain degree of abstraction. In their framework, five types of cases are identified: representative, prototypical, deviant, crucial, and archetypal cases. The representative case type is arguably the most common. Here the researcher must find and investigate an example of the phenomena that is most representative of the research question and puzzle under attention. The prototypical case type in contrast, has to do with selecting a case that is not yet fully representative of the phenomenon of interest, but is hypothesized by the researcher to become very significant in times ahead.

Deviant cases are chosen to investigate either phenomena or contexts that may be considered to be outliers in their respective ways. Selecting a deviant case would entail that the researcher investigates a very untypical context in order to potentially discover previously omitted or unconsidered causal factors. Furthermore, the crucial case type is perhaps the rarest of all five in terms of implementation. Here the goal is for scholars to investigate how a given phenomenon of interest operates under conditions that are least likely to support and influence its operation. If the phenomenon of interest still occurs in a crucial case, then it probably will occur in other cases as well. The final case type is the archetypal case. Archetypal cases are empirically rare as they often symbolize a historically salient moment of a case that later goes onto exemplify the entire phenomenon of which it represents. The French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, or the Great Depression of the 1930s, would qualify as archetypal cases.

The strategy for case selection in the first three papers that I adopt can be classified as the representative case type. Each case of state repression that is under attention (1905 Russian
Bloody Sunday Massacre, 1976 Soweto Massacre, 2013 Turkish Gezi Park repression) is chosen to represent how repression backfire operated in three different historical time periods. Specific attention is given to different characteristics that are relevant to each historical time period such as communicational system development. The selection of cases in preliminary stages of writing this dissertation was done for the purpose of enabling me to understand how repression backfire fit into a chain of path-dependent events (dislocations), in very different political and historical contexts. On the other hand, in the fourth paper of the dissertation, I spent a substantial amount of time in engaging in historical inquiry through the creation of my own data set. By collecting and coding data on 44 different historical cases involving protest-state interactions in which protests were massacred by the state, I was able to capture how severe state repression impacted protest mobilization in nearly every possible contextual scenario and background.

What’s important to keep in mind is that while choosing representative cases, I also had the epistemological backdrop of discourse theory in mind. By this I am referring to the specific notion of a historical or hegemonic bloc. In the case of the 1905 Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre, I assessed the logics underpinning Tsarist discourse spanning from the historical periods of 1860-1905. A similar tactic was implemented with the National Party and its discourse of apartheid. Although the third paper does not formally contain an assessment of the logics of the contemporary AKP government in Turkey, sections of the paper are indeed influenced by the idea of a historical bloc. This is a very rewarding conceptualization to make especially with regards to case selection. Selecting a case that is representative of a given phenomenon or research question of interest is complimented well when it is possible to further assess how that representative case fits into an overall historical path-dependent chain of events.
In the fourth paper, a different route was taken. Instead of selecting cases that were only representative of repression backfire, I purposely gathered data on as many cases involving state repression in which some incidents resulted in increased mobilization (and backfired), while others did not. To have been included in the data, 15 civilian deaths had to have been discretely brought about in public settings due to state repression. The 44 cases span from 1819-2014. In the fourth paper, through in-depth qualitative analysis of the data at hand, I investigate the organizational campaigns and causal attributes of the cases, and then operationalize these characteristics into causal conditions through the coding technique known as calibration. All 44 chosen cases are extremely diverse in their independent characteristics (causal conditions), but at the same time, they all share one of the binary ends of the outcome of increased mobilization or decreased mobilization. This is formally classified as a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). The MDSD case selection process entails that very diverse and different cases are compared that share the same outcome/dependent variable. This enables me to consider a number of counterfactual conditions, and more importantly, how different combinations of conditions influence the presence/absence of the outcome of interest.

With regards to source selection, a wide range of techniques and search databases were utilized. Primary historical texts, academic journal articles, edited academic volumes, personal memoirs, historical newspapers, foreign language texts, nongovernmental organization reports, international governmental organization reports, among other sources were used for the writing of this dissertation. Preference was given to the most significant historical works having to do with the contexts and time periods under attention in the first three papers of the dissertation. In the third paper of the dissertation, specifically, a number of online sources were accessed such as the personal accounts of protest organizations that engaged in coordination on the networking
site of Twitter. In general, I conducted extensive browsing and physical examination of history,
regional, as well as social science sections at Essex University’s Albert Sloman Library. I would
like to thank the library administrators for also helping me to order a few hardcopy books to
view from other U.K. based libraries. The search tool LexisNexis was drawn upon as was
“GoogleScholar.” The classical platform of JSTOR was utilized in search for scanned academic
articles that were from the non-digital era.

At no point during the research intensive periods of writing this dissertation did a given source
get favored over another one. A balanced approach was taken, and more often than not, the
sources that were drawn upon were ones that are considered to be well known by area specialists
(for example early twentieth century Russian historians, or apartheid/South Africa experts). In
the fourth paper of the dissertation, a very diverse amount of sources was used due to the
historical breadth of the 44 cases.

The following sections of this dissertation include the four papers ordered from first to fourth:
1905 Russia; 1976 apartheid Soweto; 2013 Turkey; and the QCA analysis of 44 historical
massacres. The conclusion comes after the four papers (as well as appendix of paper four).
References


*Sociological Theory* 21 (1): 44-68.


The Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre of 1905: a Discursive Account of Nonviolent Transformation

Abstract

A mass nonviolent protest against the Tsarist autocracy in 1905 led to the Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre where Tsarist forces killed hundreds of civilians. This paper presents a new theoretical perspective of this incident and suggests that the effect of the massacre was of greater importance to both the First Russian Revolution and eventual downfall of the Tsarist Empire than has previously been considered by historians and theorists of nonviolence. The massacre dislocated the Tsarist state to a never before seen extent, enabling political movements to compete in a time of state crisis which arose after the Tsar was stripped of his title of “the Father of the People” and divine monarch. A political process model linked to discourse theoretic explanatory concepts is presented to explain how the Tsar’s contradictory ordering of the killing of his greatest supporters, the devout Orthodox peasantry, and workers was fatal for the existence of Tsarism as a political discourse. The model also captures a viral media effect that garnered large-scale domestic and international public sympathy for the St Petersburg social movement. This sheds light on how discursive forces having to do with identity and power play a role in transformative events brought about by nonviolent protest.
Introduction

The Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre of 1905 was an incident where a nonviolent social movement clashed with a monarchist government, resulting in what has been previously labeled as “political jiu-jitsu” or as a process of “backfire” by theorists of nonviolence (Sharp 1973, 2003; Martin 2005; Sharp and Paulson 2005; Hess and Martin 2006). Social movement leader and Orthodox priest Georgi Gapon conducted a well-planned organizational campaign where he recruited workers in the Putilov factory in St Petersburg. Gapon strategically articulated together a wide array of social and political demands into one equivalized political force that signified the representation of the entire working class and Russian Orthodox citizenry. The petition demanded shorter work days, an expansion of social welfare, and for the Tsar to shift back to his divine role of monarch and leader of Orthodox Russia (Gapon 1906). These demands then were put forward to the Tsar, yet the Tsar declined to respond to the mass movement. On 9 January 1905, hundreds of thousands marched to the Tsar’s Winter Palace in a movement that represented an accurate reflection of the “mentality” of the majority of workers throughout the empire (Kiryanov 1999). Here the Orthodox priest-led movement was met by repressive state forces, resulting in the deaths of hundreds (Botting 1958). This spurred a “viral” media effect domestically and internationally which sent the Tsarist regime into a political crisis. The famous mass strike movement of 1905 ensued where the Russian Empire experienced a higher total number of strikes in a single month than the entire number for the previous decade (Kiryanov 1999, 77). The previously held Banquet campaigns and the demands of the Liberal movement enabled an effective political project and discourse to be put into play later that year which in the end fostered a Tsarist concession of power via the
creation of a legislative Duma in October of 1905, commonly referred to as the First Russian Revolution (Rosenberg 1996).

The general intuition held by historians and theorists of nonviolence regarding this incident tells us that the massacre was either an extremely unjust act of repression that played a role in the development of the mass strike movement of 1905 (Lenin 1932; Luxemburg 1971; Trotsky 1959; Galai 1973; Sablinsky 1976; Ascher 2004) or the massacre’s causal effect in regard to the Revolution of 1905 has been noted alongside analyses that have looked at the greater historical time period containing the first and second Russian Revolutions (Harcave 1964; Kochan 1966; Sharp 1973; Sharp and Paulson 2005). Historians have particularly put emphasis on the roles of political parties and movements: the Liberal movement (and Zemstvos), the Marxist movement, the Bolsheviks, the Social Democrats (SDs), the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), the intelligentsia, the conservative movement, and the many workers’ movements all played varying roles in this crucial period of Russian modernity, beginning with the abolishment of serfdom in 1861 (Pushkarev 1968). Indeed, it was these movements (specifically the organizational tactics of the Liberal movement) and not the Gapon-led social movement that had greatest influence in the post-massacre period and eventual Revolution of 1905. This can be attributed to the effective organizational tactics of the Liberal movement that had articulated a political discourse centered on the advancement of Russia into its long phased journey of modernization. Here, the Liberal political project became an attractive alternative in comparison to the ruptured image and political discourse of Tsarism after the massacre as peasants and workers perceived an opportunity to gain greater political representation and the prospect of obtaining never before available legal representation (Galai 1973).
The intent of this paper is not to discredit any previous historical accounts that have mentioned the massacre or the roles of political factions and revolutionary parties in this period of Russian history. Rather, with the use of explanatory concepts taken from the Essex School of Ideology and Discourse Analysis (also known as political discourse theory) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Howarth 1997, 1998, 2000, 2010; Glynos and Howarth 2007), I explain how the Gapon-led nonviolent protest and massacre brought about a powerful transformative effect that was in the end fatal for the political discourse of Tsarism. This argument is presented while operating out of the logics of critical explanation in social and political theory framework. A logic designates “the purposes, rules and ontological presuppositions that render a practice or regime intelligible” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 10). Three logics: the social, political, and fantasmatic are used to categorize the Tsarist regime as a political discourse. Social reality under Tsarist Russia was unique. Here a sixteenth century doctrine foretold that the Russian Tsar would serve as the savior of Christianity and in turn humanity, being put onto earth by God himself to rule the empire and carry out the task of heading the “Third Rome” (Zernov 1971). The discourse of Tsarism relied on close ties to the Orthodox Church and was highly attractive among the greater whole of the population, that of the peasantry and workers. The average Russian viewed the Tsar as a God-Like ruler and representation of Christ. Tsarist state policy, however, encouraged rapid economic development and geographical expansion which came at the expense of human life and was highly paradoxical for his greatest supporters, the Orthodox peasant and workers. Using the concepts of fantasy and hegemony, I explain how subjects were gripped by Tsarist articulations of social reality which in turn helped the Tsarist regime to conceal its own contradictory practices along with the presence of ravaging and widespread economic hardship. The Tsar implemented a classical political tactic of differentiation that
pinned opposing political factions against each other while at the same time disconnected revolutionaries.

Those who opposed the Tsar were deemed to be terrorists and enemies of God himself yet after the Tsar’s violent response to the St Petersburg protest the public condemned him for his actions for the slaughtering of his own children. Whilst dissenting, Orthodox citizens were holding portraits of the Tsar and Tsarina on their march to the Tsar’s palace. The massacre and Tsar’s repressive response was nothing short of appalling for the Russian population which in the end stripped the Tsar of his role as the “Father of the People.” For the first time in the history of the Russian Empire, every segment of society became opposed against the Tsar and rallied around the contradictory and unjust nature of the killing of his own citizens. Denunciation arose from all political opponents, international audiences, and most importantly from the Tsar’s previously most devoted and “unbreakable” segment of support, the Orthodox peasantry and workers. The specific nonviolent component of this protest and its organizational features along with its discourse played a vital role in fostering the transformative effect the massacre brought about due to the protests’ composition. Here a logic of equivalence is used to explain how strategic political movements that articulate disconnected social demands into one force aimed at a given regime can bring about the conditions for hegemony and radical change (Laclau 1996, 2005). Such was the case of the Gapon-led movement which included workers, women, children, Jewish members, and students among many others in the form of one equilvalized power aimed at the Tsar. The above mentioned logics and social practices are linked to a process model which accounts for the dynamics behind the phenomenon of backfire in a differing way and method than previous frameworks put forward by theorists of nonviolence (Sharp and Paulson 2005; Hess and Martin 2006; Martin 2007). Taking into account historical
contingency, discourses, and logics enables deeper analyses into relations of power and identity that are at play in incidents of protest backfire and nonviolent social transformation.

The massacre

St Petersburg in the early years of the twentieth century was a major Northern industrial city containing a large amount of the urban workers of the Russian Empire. Petersburg served as the focal point of the Tsarist government and home of the Tsar Nicholas II. Along with the greater portion of the Russian Empire, this city was experiencing rapid political and social upheaval from workers and new migrants. During this time there were also heavy casualties and battle losses that had mounted up as a result of the Russo-Japanese war. On 2 January 1905 [20 December 1904 O.S.], Russia lost control of Port Arthur which was a substantial blow for the Tsarist regime and Russian military. An urgent telegraph sent directly to the Tsar by General Stessel reveals this shift as the General explained how consistent loss for 11 months in Port Arthur had drained the moral energy of many in the military apparatus of the empire (Novosti Dnya, 23 January [5 January O.S.], 1905). The Tsar faced greatest political opposition from the Liberal-led Zemstvo movement and Banquet campaigns that had established themselves in the organizing of peasants, urban workers, and the intelligentsia. In November of 1904, a key Liberal meeting demanded concessions from the Tsar and in turn new forms of banquets or formal dinners started to arise and functioned as places where members of the aristocracy could voice direct criticisms of the autocracy (Hamburg 1979). Alongside the Liberal oppositionists were revolutionaries but most importantly in the making at this time (1903–1904) was a state sponsored police unionism project created by Moscow police chief Zubatov. This project’s aim was to gain the support of industry workers throughout cities and it was early on in 1903 where a priest by the name of Georgi Gapon volunteered to represent the workers’ movement of St
Petersburg. Gapon provided the crucial Orthodox urban worker an attractive opportunity to express grievances and participate in social activities. This drew a wide sector of people from the Putilov metal factory to sympathize and support Gapon’s Orthodox inspired version of social reform and at the same time took away from the influence of radical revolutionaries who were calling for overthrowing the Tsarist autocracy altogether. Initially a limited workers’ movement, the Gapon organized social movement became a mass entity called the “Association of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg” where Gapon persuaded up to 85% of St Petersburg’s workers to join during the lead up to the massacre (Goncharov 1932). The families of the workers began attending Gapon’s meetings and speeches along with a substantial portion of St Petersburg’s Jewish population. A type of moral “sobor” (gathering) was created by Gapon that was easily identifiable for many workers and peasants. A list of demands was put together by the movement via a petition to the Tsar. When Gapon attempted to take this petition to the Tsar on 18 January [5 January O.S.], the minister of finance, Vladimir Kokovtsov, immediately declined to grant the workers their demands and told the Tsar they were unrealistic (1933). This petition demanded for a shorter working day, higher wages, and greater ethical treatment of workers by factory bosses (Surh 1981). Shortly after emerged the firing and laying off of workers in the Putilov factory. The entire industrial sector of St Petersburg had come to a near stop. Revolutionary parties of that time got note of the workers’ movement and the petition. The Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and SRs were inactive in this particular movement, yet they followed it closely. Elites such as Sergei Witte, chairman of the Committee of Ministers, and other prominent members of the autocracy did not think that the Gapon-led protest would result in bloodshed. In addition, the famous writer Maxim Gorky along with other members of the intelligentsia attempted to persuade the Tsar to not respond to the march with force (Lopukhin 1922).
On 9 January nearly 200,000 women, children, workers, the elderly, and students began their march toward the Tsar’s Winter Palace to directly voice their grievances with hope the Tsar would open up and respond to the mass movement. Once the protestors made it to the outer area of the palace, they were met by state cavalry and infantrymen. The Tsar’s forces (20,000 strong) warned the protestors not to converge onto palace grounds. At the same time, various dissidents, such as student groups, provoked the infantrymen. A tipping point was reached when infantrymen began firing continuous shots into the crowd further resulting in a long period of mayhem. Reports of the total death count have varied throughout historical accounts; yet, it is plausible to assume there were over 150 deaths. Gapon hid out in writer Maxim Gorky’s apartment, went into exile and eventually made his way back to Russia where he was assassinated. The end result of the protest was horror, bloodshed, and a diffusion of dissent. The massacre spurred a “viral” media effect and the Tsar was condemned by not only his own people but by the international community (New York Times, 30 January 1905). In the month of January alone there were widespread protests in 66 different cities throughout the Russian Empire along with a complete closure of the Russian rail network (Tropin 1966). Leaders of revolutionary parties along with the intelligentsia perceived a new political opening in the empire which had never before been seen in the history of the Russian state to such a grave extent. Unrest grew to such high levels that nearby regions such as Poland, Finland, Latvia, and Estonia begged for their independence as they experienced their own respective upheavals and crises. That May, over 300 Zemstvo municipalities sent their representatives to unite and ask for governmental representation. The Tsar was forced to concede his power via the creation of a legislative Duma in October that generally followed Liberal demands, resulting in the Russian Revolution of 1905 (Treadgold 1951).
Historical intuition

The massacre has been written about from a variety of perspectives and historical standpoints as scholars in both the Russian and English languages have explained its heinous nature and its causal role in the greater context of the mass strike movement that developed in 1905. Maureen Perrie argued that the significance of the Russian Revolution of 1905 lay in the fact that it represented, for the first time in Russian history, a simultaneous attack on autocracy from all levels of society sectors of the professional and commercial middle class, the radical and liberal intelligentsia, the urban workers and the peasants (1972). Nonviolence theorists such as Gene Sharp and Brian Martin have frequently referenced the massacre as a successful historical case of nonviolent civil resistance. These essentially are descriptive accounts of the massacre that suggest the post-massacre protests became so large that the state was in a position where it could not function and its repression became ineffective (Sharp and Paulson 2005). While effectively displaying the power of nonviolent social transformation, contextual sensitivity is left out of these analyses. Moreover, now historically famous revolutionaries of the early twentieth century produced widely read historical material from their own embedded perspectives: Lenin (1932), Trotsky (1959), and Luxemburg (1971) had emphasized a major turn that had occurred in early 1905. Historian Kochan (1966) has noted on how the massacre was among a variety of contributing factors that influenced the fall of Tsarism and revolution of 1917. Sidney Harcave argues that “If Russia had not become involved in the war with Japan in 1904, affairs might have taken a different turn; but the war came, and with it a situation immediately favourable to revolution” (1964, 35). Harcave attributes the cause of the Revolution of 1905 to four differing problems that were prevalent throughout the whole of the empire found in agrarianism, illiteracy, ethnic or religious divisions, and in urban work. Shmuel Galai in his account of the Liberation
movement notes how the massacre was a barbaric act on part of the Tsar and how it intensified discontent in the empire causing violent outbursts in the provinces of the empire. With this in mind there have been few direct analyses of Bloody Sunday other than Walter Sablinsky’s account of the incident. Sablinsky attributes the Tsarist regime’s failure to “recognize or understand the extent of the workers dissatisfaction” as the main cause of the buildup and occurrence of the massacre (1976, 287). While providing excellent descriptive work of the massacre itself, Sablinsky fails to reflect upon the historical vigor of this event and its direct relation to the fall of Tsarism and larger context of social transformation in this period of history. Another historical account by Ascher (2004) provides a contemporary analysis of the Russian Revolution of 1905 where Ascher correctly points out the ways in which the massacre led to the mass strike movement in 1905, yet he does not differentiate between the roles of nonviolent protest and violent protest. The failure to account for this key difference takes away from Ascher’s analysis as the Tsarist regime’s policy during periods of civil unrest was to repress citizen dissent through violence but Ascher does not offer a clue as to why the dozens of cases of Tsarist backed repression which occurred during this time period did not lead to any transformative social change but the massacre did. Lastly, Oskar Anweiler was a German historian who produced a great breadth of knowledge regarding Russia and the Soviets in his Die Rätebewegung in Russland (1958). Anweiler analyzes the rise of the Soviets and their role in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions. The massacre for Anweiler was a disturbance that also led to the mass strike movement along with the previous Tsarist loss in the Russo-Japanese War. Lastly, Marzec (2013) explores the massacre’s effects in a similar vein as this study but focus is centered on the political discourses and struggles at play in the 1905 Polish context and the hegemonic struggles brought about as a result of the massacre. On the whole, historical intuition regarding
the massacre and its surrounding events varies and there have been a great number of insightful
studies describing this incident. The purpose of this paper is not to discredit previous historical
accounts but instead to analyze the massacre from a new theoretical lens. This will help shed
light on how some acts of repression may spur extraordinary social change and put a given
repressor in a worse off political position than previously imaginable.

**Political discourse theory and the logics of Tsarism**

Throughout the social sciences the term “discourse” gets frequently used and there are numerous
forms of discourse analysis that have been developed over recent decades, gaining greater
d Sophistication and wider explanatory scope (Howarth 2000, 3). Each form of discourse theory is
rooted within its given ontological and epistemological configuration. The brand of discourse
theory adopted in this paper has to do with a post-structuralist mode of inquiry where social
structures are assumed to be incomplete and contingent systems of meaning that are made
meaningful by actors in a given context (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). A vital assumption held by
political discourse theorists has to do with meaning and its relation to society and human beings.
Meaning is never stable and is always contingent upon those actors and practices which enable it
to exist. Thus, the openness of the structure of the social (a human-based form of societal
organization) is filled by the discursive articulation of meaning by actors. Discourse theorist
Ernesto Laclau’s use of political contingency as described by Marchart (2004) relies on an
assumption that differential political positions can only relate to others by, in an equivalential
way, referring to something which they are not (Marchart 2004, 59). Radical contingency then is
a concept that has to do with antagonisms that exist in society between a given power and its
opponents and importantly this contingency is not random but gets revealed due to emergence of
threats of “incommensurable universality.” Such threats are assumed to present a total negative
common identity and can have the power to destabilize the dominant symbolic order within a given structure. As will be further explained, the Gapon-led protest turned out to be a force that accomplished this. Methodologically, I adopt the logics framework which was coined by Glynos and Howarth in attempt to incorporate post-structuralist discourse theory closer into the mainstream of social science with the goal being to retroductively and critically explain social phenomena in a manner relevant to both policy and academia. Here the logics of critical explanation are composed of a trio of theoretical classifications called the social, political, and fantasmatic logics which I use to categorize the political discourse of Tsarism. This method and its ontology help to explain how social change which may arise in the political arena is not given and static but rather relies upon historically assembled discourses.

The political discourse of Tsarism consists of the three specific components of the social, political, and fantasmatic which are linked to the political process model that is presented in the latter portion of this paper. Beginning with the social logic of the Tsarist Empire, this logic contains two important components: those of (1) rapid territorial expansion and industrialization along with (2) a well-articulated conception of Russian citizenship rooted in age old Orthodox Christian tradition. Beginning with the former it is important to first discuss the historically rooted aspects behind the Tsarist state and its problem of perpetual insecurity. This problem effected Russian rulers from the foundation of the initial “Rus” state where inhabitants of what later became the Russian Empire constantly faced hostile adversaries attacking from the East (Mongols), West (Germanics and French), South (Ottomans and Tatars), and North (Swedes and Finns) (Gumilev 1989). This led to an aggressive state policy of expansion that the Tsarist regime used to combat the perpetual insecurity the empire faced geographically stemming all the way to the Far East to Alaska. Geographical insecurity coupled in with harsh climate made for a
very tough life for the greater whole of the Russian people (Karamzin 1834). Now turning to the mid nineteenth century where this trend of combating perpetual insecurity was evident in the case of the Crimean War. Here a great deal of lost resources and money was spent by the Tsarist regime on financing this lost campaign of 1854–1856 versus the French, English, and Ottomans. Following this blunder, many knew that for the empire to compete globally and become a major industrial power there had to be a new form of industrial based economic policy put into place. Here finance ministers were given significant and extended power in terms of economic policy (Von Laue 1963). This aspect of the Tsarist state policy was highly problematic in that there were a large amount of failed economic policies that wreaked havoc, such as the peasant taxation of 1886 (Mironov 1985). A mass famine occurred in 1891 and a new finance minister was put in place by the Tsar named Sergei Witte. Witte historically turned out to be an important elite actor as he was one of the main advisors to the Tsar in the lead-up and post-massacre periods where he wrote the Tsar’s concessional October Manifesto and implemented a significant portion of policy having to do with the building and expansion of railways. The empire had 1000 miles of railways in 1860 which expanded to 40,000 miles in 1916 (Goldsmith 1961). Expansion and industrialization were carried out with a heavily favored new motive of encouraging foreign investment during this period of heavy industrialization (Owen 1985). Capital was brought in from abroad and invested in the many industries that the Tsarist government controlled and economic development was most concentrated in the steel, iron, and coal industries. Horrendous economic hardships and social contradictions arose in all forms of life for the Russian people. Tsarist response to famine was erroneous and problematic often resulting in some regions having surpluses of grain while others were in ravage and starvation due to policy that greatly encouraged foreign grain exportation for the purposes of rapid industrialization (Robbins 1975).
The Russian Tsars, powerful and despotic as historians claim, pushed forward their Orthodox influenced vision of Russia as the savior of humanity and as the Third Rome. Meanwhile, over half of the population was illiterate, extremely impoverished, and lived under traditional serfdom until 1861. Rapid economic development and industrialization in the Russian Empire came as an extreme hardship that fostered some of the most influential revolutionaries of history. Significant processes of suffrage and urbanization for peasants and new urban workers transpired yet as will be explained by the fantasmatic logic, the greater whole of the population was kept at bay due to the discursive sedimentation of the Tsar’s title and place in Russian society as Father of the People and the direct descendant of God himself. The social logic of Tsarism then was highly contradictory due to the failures of rapid economic development that came at the expense of human life and extreme social exploitation. Importantly, this logic contained the pivotal component or constructed view of just Russian citizenship which was rooted in the Orthodox Church and a vision of Moscow as the Christian savior or as a Third Rome. Here the piety of the Russian Orthodox worker, peasant, and average civilian was championed for the upkeeping of the Tsarist image as the ruler who was put on earth to serve his people by God. The ways in which this construction and Tsarist social logic was defended and challenged by political opponents can be explained by the political logic.

Political logics help capture how the social logic of a given regime or practice under examination gets contested by opposing political forces. As Glynos explains, these types of logics “attend to processes of institutionalization, contestation, restoration or deinstitutionalization. They can function so as to embed, challenge, disrupt, displace, reaffirm, consolidate, or restore social logics” (Glynos, Klimecki, and Willmott 2012, 303). How then did the Tsarist social logic of rapid expansion, contradictory economic development, and reliance on exploited citizens get
preserved among assassination attempts and the presence of revolutionaries? To answer this question I turn to the discourse theoretic concepts of difference and equivalence that have roots in the linguistic works of Saussure and his ideas of a signifier (term, object, image, etc.) and signified (its relational meaning), both of which make up the concept of a sign (De Saussure 2011). A discourse “consists of a system of signifiers without positive terms, in which the identity of each element depends on its differences with others” (Howarth 2000). The formal powers of the Tsar were vast and representative of that of a divine monarch given the Tsar had the ability to appoint all members of the ministerial council and nominate 36 members into the council of the state (Yerofyeev 1979). Even with such immense power the Tsar faced opposition from both revolutionary movements and political factions and in order to offset this dissent, a logic of difference was articulated by the Tsarist regime to keep political opponents at bay. Those who opposed the Tsarist social logic of expansion, industrialization, and the vision of a Russian Third Rome were considered terrorists, non-Christians, or enemies of the development of the Tsarist state. Indeed, this narrative lost significant ground during the year leading up to the massacre as the defeat against Japan and economic hardships enabled other political movements to influence segments of the population from rural populations to the gentry and intelligentsia. Nonetheless, the Tsar’s influence and place in the empire was still of great magnitude.

The Tsarist regime had faced a long standing battle against a Liberal influenced infiltration dating to earlier periods of Russian history. Take, for example, an uprising by liberal minded Army members that occurred in the early nineteenth century where dissenters earned the name of the “Dekabristi” (Decembrists) for attempting to overthrow the Tsar in late December of 1825 (Mazour 1961). Nicolas the First responded with trials followed by executions by way of hanging or exiling the Dekabristi to Eastern Siberia. Importantly, a signal was sent out to all
those in the empire who had any plans of revolting against the Tsar. Dissent continued on in sporadic instances but it was in as Bertram Wolfe notes, the early years of the pre-1905 revolutionary period where political movements gained most prominence and influence among urban and rural workers. The powerful Liberal movement sought to satisfy the material needs of workers and peasants and importantly the Liberal movement implemented effective organizational tactics along with its own political discourse. William G. Rosenberg explains how this movement effectively created many forms of discursive representations of workers and peasants through newspapers, discussions, debates, and various other forms of communicational outlets. Here Liberals represented workers in “direct ways” by including them as “delegates” and representatives to their municipal areas that for the first time saw the prospect of being able to communicate with the Tsar. Rosenberg notes the material and economic power of this articulation as it provided peasants with the prospects of commercial growth and industrial development that would arise along with greater individual liberties being granted to the average Russian peasant and worker. Western liberal democracies had already progressed through the stages of great industrialization and the Liberal movement had an effective model to draw from considering the heinous nature of the urban Russian work life at that time and the progress that had occurred in Western factories. The Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party was an attractive option for many in urban areas and there was considerable time spent by the Liberals in educating workers about the perils of factory life. The main Liberal legislative proposal that was put forward in 1905 resembles Western European models of similar type where professional unionism, workers’ rights, the legal standing of these rights, and an eight hour work day are common (Rosenberg 1996).
Importantly the Liberal movement had organized something referred to as a “Zemstvo” which basically is a village establishment focused around the concept of a “sobor.” Zemstvos encouraged their own self governance and were highly active throughout rural areas in the empire given there had been no previous existent form of political participation available to peasants. These associations gained traction with the passing of the 1864 Zemstvo Law following the crucial abolishing of serfdom in 1861. This enabled the construction of regional and district level institutions that created a unique type of local government to form (Emmons and Vucinich 1982). Zemstvos theoretically should have been responsible for the shifting and repositioning of political power yet as Galai notes, these village establishments were unequal and noble dominated from their creation with nobles being on executive boards and winning the once in three year elections at a rate 20 times higher than peasants and former serfs (Galai 1973, 7). Nonetheless, the presence of Zemstvos and these already established political connections with the peasantry gave Liberals an upper hand post-massacre. While the Liberal movement was attracting a great deal of support through its Zemstvo program, radical movements had also been at work seeking to gain support from workers in cities and peasants throughout the countryside (Wolfe 1948).

The SRs and the SDs were the two significant political movements that up took these roles. SRs attempted to spur revolutionary upheaval for the entire peasantry, while SDs were interested in urban workers and attempted to morph them into proletariats with the backdrop or influence of Marxism serving as principal. Radicals had long been attempting to incorporate the urban working class (especially in St Petersburg) into their vision of revolution. A major entity that had an influence in this case was the People’s Will Party (Narodnaia Volia) who were considered radical revolutionaries and facilitated a large amount of propaganda to workers in urban areas.
These radicals, as Deborah Pearl points out, wanted to overthrow the Tsarist autocracy and “destroying the myth of the Tsar” was a crucial goal for this organization in terms of winning over workers (Pearl 1996).

As will be further explained via the fantasmatic logic, the failure of this organization (and other radicals) was that they did not force the greater whole of workers out of the belief of the myth of the Holy Tsar as an inevitably just ruler who was simply suffering from the perils of poor governmental administration and military mishaps. During this period of great social dissent and instability, an interesting form of “police unionism” originated in the head of the Moscow Okhrana (secret police). S.V. Zubatov coined this entity and organizational power which was meant to benefit the average worker as he believed the workers did not need much more other than the improvement of their economic conditions (Galai 1973, 182). Police unionism then was a state-sponsored attempt to gain the sympathy of workers by enabling the creation of a form of legal union that did not exist beforehand. Beginning in various industries in Moscow, police unionism headed by Zubatov spread to other cities rapidly and specifically into the industries of those cities. Here is where a fascinating situation arose when Father Gapon “offered himself as a leader of the working class movement in St. Petersburg in 1903” (Wolfe 1948, 58). Gapon’s organizing skills were superb, a close ally of Gapon and protest leader himself, Karelin, noted in a personal memoir that “When Gapon used to come to various factories in St. Petersburg he had a subtle yet profound way of bringing together the different interests of various groups of people” (1922). Gapon represented the average man, the devout Christian with a Tolstoyan influenced view of human nature. The end effect of police unionism was limited given it was too closely tied with the interests and preferences of the Tsar; however, Gapon’s organizational power was key to the mass movement that formed in St Petersburg and eventually dislocated the
Tsarist state even though it arose as an extension to state sponsored unionism. Gapon’s nightly meetings were diverse and gracious where special activities, libraries, and games were the attraction and open for all who wished to attend. Here is where previously politically inactive workers were organized by Gapon and encouraged to express their opinions in a political space that other revolutionaries and social movement strategists could not provide. The metal workers in the Putilov factories who attended the Gapon’s meetings were of great importance as they represented a strong set of workers and their large families that lived in the urban housing developments in St Petersburg. The workers who joined the Gapon movement also were observed to be younger and of a different breed than other workers’ movements in St Petersburg during that time.

Reginald Zelnik (1986) has explained the complexity behind the forces that drove the peasant from the rural countryside and into the urban factory. This relationship between workers and political organizations is vital to take into account as many different factions were competing for the purpose of obtaining the mass support of workers and peasants. Zelnik chronicles a Russian peasant by the name of Kanatchikov who left the countryside early on in life to become a skilled worker and eventually formed into a revolutionary after attending many study groups and going through an array of political challenges and experiences. The point here is that the processes of peasantry and rural civilians moving into cities were nonlinear, varying, and highly influenced by the political discourses of competing factions. The Father Gapon political project was extremely effective in getting the attention and support of the average Russian worker and peasant. As noted earlier, the Tsarist regime differentiated opposing political movements over a great span of years. What Father Gapon did over the initial periods and buildup of the movement was to eliminate differences of the entire working population of St Petersburg by revealing the
antagonism between them and the Tsarist administration, employers, and factory owners. Prior differences and cleavages were set aside with Gapon enabling all, including the Jewish working population to participate in the protest. Gapon organized workers and their families regardless of their background or religious views (Kiryanov 2003). Even considering the Jewish population in the Russian Empire was never more than five million; this segment of citizenry took on much social burden and blame from the Russian people. Harcave argues that Jews had been considered a “special” type of citizenry. By including this portion of the population into the movement along with women, children, factory workers and elderly, a negative identity was constructed that was not formally represented by the Tsarist government. This created a powerful force representing “the workers” and more importantly the effectiveness of the movement laid in the fact it contained the crucial element of Orthodoxy that was more than clearly evident in its leader who drew a significant amount of attention and praise. Gapon built a movement that contained these other segments of the population that had yet to be aligned with a force as large and in as significant location as St Petersburg, in the Tsar’s home turf and backyard. This is what Ernesto Laclau referred to as a hegemonic presence or emergence of an act of political articulation. Evidently, this Gapon articulated vision of a movement was greatly successful in garnering support from many different segments of society. As Potolov notes, “the fact that women were brought into the movement was no small achievement” (1999, 109). A popular subject emerged out of the Gapon organization which represented a repressed and exploited worker that contained a new diversity of religion, gender, and age led by an Orthodox priest. The power of the Gapon movement lies in the fact that it enabled various social demands to be put forward in the representation of a universal worker and citizen.
The petition put forward by the Gapon movement to the Tsar demanded new forms of economic and social equality, a shortening of the work day and greater legal representation. Importantly, the petition did not entail that the Tsar was directly at fault which is representative of how the average worker and peasant did not hold the Tsar accountable for the many contradictory forces they or the empire experienced. Instead, the petition asked for the Tsar’s help in dealing with the failures of his own government. Here again the Tsar was framed to be a representative of the people in God’s name. The greater whole of the workers in the Gapon movement did not want to bring down the Tsar. Instead, the Tsar was argued by workers and Gapon to have failed to behave with virtuosity by letting his administration and factory owners exploit millions with agrarian crises constantly looming. When read out loud, this petition ignited great passion and enthusiasm from all who attended the gathering. Gapon was the peasant, the priest, the worker, the average man, and most importantly his movement was easily identifiable for the greater majority of the Russian population. Wolfe states that on the day of the massacre, “In keeping with Gapon’s guarantee, the few terrorists, hot-heads or police agents who had brought arms were searched by their ushers and their weapons taken from them” (1948, 60). The general composition of the Bloody Sunday protest was nonviolent. Wolfe also argues that the attentions of protesters were passive due to the fact that there were women and children present and it was also the appreciated day of Sunday. It is plausible to infer that Gapon’s nonviolent influences perhaps could have stemmed to Tolstoy and his writings on nonviolence and the Russian Orthodox scriptures on the subject of civil disobedience (Tolstoy 1968). While the Tsar’s logic of difference pinned against those who were anti-Tsarist was effective, the Tsar could not account for the Gapon-led protest, bringing us to the fantasmatic logic.
The fantasmatic logic helps to explain how a given regime conceals the radical contingency and incompleteness of its state structure (Laclau 1990): The role of fantasy in this context is not to set up an illusion that provides a subject with a false picture of the world, but to ensure that the radical contingency of social reality – and the political dimension of a practice more specifically – remains in the background. (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 145) Importantly, fantasy is not limited to a singular aspect or issue but instead fantasmatic logics are plural (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 147). The first aspect of fantasy at work in the political discourse of Tsarism is rooted back to the time of Tsar Peter the Great in the eighteenth century where Peter forced his empire into a fast paced process of Europeanization in order to deal away with a highly underdeveloped military apparatus as well as a dysfunctional administrative government. Peter the Great imported everything – from European styled clothing to Dutch ship building techniques (Mazurek 2002). With this import of Western values came drastic changes in the upper sectors of society. The gentry was affected, while the commercial class was faintly touched by the changes (Mirsky 1931). Clean shaven faces and German styled wardrobes became social norms for the upper classes. In a sense, the Europeanization of the Russian Empire split the actual population into two sections with those upper class men who were shaven, spoke French, and were interested in Western European fine art, and the regular population who possessed low levels of literacy and were devout Orthodox Christians. Western Liberalism infiltrated the aristocracy through arts, literature, and general ideals taken from the French Enlightenment (Ewington 2010). Catherine the Great had been documented to be an avid reader of Voltaire. In the same vein, members of the Decembrists uprising shared many newly imported liberal values. Dostoevsky’s famous novel The Brothers Karamazov puts on display many of these ideological rifts of Russian identity. While this new form of Europeanization entered the
Russian Empire with Peter the Great, it was not championed by all of the Tsars and Tsarinas who followed his rule. Specifically, the forces operating during the post-serfdom emancipation period all the way up until the massacre and first Revolution contain interesting elements that helped to Tsarist regime fight off this import of European values. Many combated this foreign ideological influx with the articulation of a new breed of conservatism centered on the constructed ideal of the Tsar and the Church ruling the empire for the good of humanity. These two entities built upon a new breed of nationalism that stressed Russia was more pious than Europe due to Europe’s failings in sustaining Christianity and moral righteousness. This logic of fantasy was highly effective in protecting and sustaining the peasantry’s devotion to the Tsar and in turn, the empire. The Russian Orthodox Church played an enormous role in relation to the state throughout the Russian Empire by way of centralized authority with the Tsar being the head of the Church. This authority put the Church in a unique position within society which can be compared to a governmental branch. The Russian idea of the individual was viewed much differently than in the Western liberal democratic sense (Kharkhordin 1998).

Sacrifice and submission for the greater good of others was seen as moral right. The concept of “sobornost” provides a good example of this. Its name originates from “sobor” that can be translated as “assembly.” Assemblies would be held throughout the empire and specifically were attractive to Zemstvo leaders. A distinctive type of civil necessity was forced upon individuals to admit or own up to their wrongdoings for the greater good of the “narod” (people). Taking these factors into account helps to reveal how Tsars in the latter half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century masked the great contradictions behind their geographically insecure and instable government from the greater whole of the population. Above all, while the greater portion of the population was illiterate and living in sub standard conditions by the criterion of
the time, most peasants viewed themselves as obedient Christians and worshiped the Tsar as the Father of the People. The image of a “saint-prince” dominated life in the early Russian Empire and at certain points in Russian history up to a third of ruling elites were backed by Orthodox supporters (Cherniavsky 1961). The arts and theatre in St Petersburg and other urban areas as described by Anthony Swift function as important exemplars of the Tsars fantasmatic influence on his supporters and the Russian people. Take, for example, the play Tsar Maksimilian that in 1896 was being staged by workers in factories (Swift 2002). Russian folk culture symbolizes the subject’s admiration and deep connection with the spiritual aspect of statehood and the Tsar. Protestors in the march to the Tsar’s palace were carrying signs and artistic displays of the Tsar and Tsarina, praising and at the same time representing their importance and holiness to the general public. The fantasmatic component behind the political discourse of Tsarism was vital for helping the Tsar upkeep his rule and importantly to justify the conditions that existed throughout the empire. Even if the empire was going through great ravage and military defeat, the Tsar directly was not at fault. Radical revolutionaries who wanted to bring down the Tsarist regime in total at that point could not gain full sympathy from the devout Orthodox civilian. Combating this fantasmatic construct of the Russian Third Rome, the Tsar as Father of the People and holy emperor proved very difficult up until the point when Tsarist hegemony was severely ruptured following the violence inflicted upon the nonviolent Gapon-led movement.

**Discursive process model of backfire**

When governments respond to nonviolent protests with repression, it may result in either a continuation of repression, dissolution of mobilization, an increase of mobilization, or in the most dramatic of cases repressive outlashes targeted at nonviolent protests may actually backfire and put the repressor in a worse off political position than previously imaginable. There have
been frameworks put forward that explain the different types of outcomes of repression that may arise across a variety of contexts and governmental systems (Koopmans 1997; Earl 2003; Hess and Martin 2006). The specific form of repression under examination in this paper is episodic and rooted in the concept of a transformative event. Such transformative events have occurred elsewhere in relevant periods of historical revolt such as the nineteenth century English Peterloo Massacre, the Gandhian 1930 Salt March, the 1960 South African Sharpsville Massacre, the 2011 Occupy University of California Davis Pepper Spray Incident, and the recent 2013 Turkish uprisings. All of these cases have caused profound transformative changes in their given contexts as was the case in the Bloody Sunday setting. Process models are popular throughout sociological research namely in the sphere of social movement studies (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003). George and Bennett (2005) praise the beneficial purpose of including a process-tracing form of methodological maneuver for those cases when “historical explanation is in the form of a sequential development over time, and not a single variable or cluster of variables at a given point in time” can explain the phenomenon under examination (231). The end goal here is to use process-tracing methods to arrive at a plausible causal chain that is highly consistent with the evidence. Below is the process model that I argue captures the phenomenon of backfire or political jiu-jitsu; the reason for labeling this process model as “discursive” is due to the application of this model specifically to the “discursive structure” of the Tsarist political discourse. As Laclau noted, “a discursive structure is not merely a cognitive or contemplative entity; it is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 96). The ways in which the Tsar’s articulation of social reality and most importantly Tsarist hegemony was dislocated is captured in Figure 1. Beginning with the first two segments of Figure 1: the interactive sequence between a given protest movement that
deploys nonviolent strategy and a state force makes up the first portion of the model. It is vital to understand that this first interactional sequence in the case of the Bloody Sunday Massacre involves the Gapon-led movement and Tsarist state forces who responded. Martin (2005) conducted an interesting case study of the backfire phenomenon in the Rodney King beatings in Los Angeles, California, that sparked great social upheaval in the form of regional riots. Backfire may occur from individual or group interactions with violent state forces. The conditions under which the initial encounter between nonviolent protestors and violent state forces occurs have to do with the observance of audiences on the sidelines, in asymmetric positions (international public opinion) and domestic publics not yet deciding to participate in collective action. The episodic component of protest is important here as well. A mass movement such as the Gapon protest is very likely to be followed and observed due to the sheer buildup of the movement, its organizational components, and the attention it attracts during its course of action. Following the interaction between nonviolent protestors (Gapon movement) and violent state forces (Tsarist forces), the process model moves to what is labeled as the “discursive forces” segment.
Figure 1. Dislocatory backfire.

The purpose of a discursive force is to precisely explain how transformative events and general social change may arise as a result of repression inflicted upon nonviolent civilians via the concept of dislocation. Here the goal is to analyze specifically (1) how the contingency and antagonistic relationships behind the political discourse of a given regime may get revealed to populations and (2) the ways in which the fantasmatic grip a regime has on its subject may weaken due to dislocation. This requires accounting for and mapping out the logics that underpin the regime under examination. The following three discursive forces help to explain specifically how the massacre dislocated the political discourse of the Tsarist regime: first, following the massacre there was a viral media response where the events of that day were sent out
internationally through the major outlets of the time including all formal newspapers and international observatories. The Tsar had a previous press ban but this ban on press was obliterated after his forces killed nonviolent protesters which fostered a “viral” response within the empire where newspapers were putting forward their story of the massacre and the total death count. News and moral outrage were spread and circulated through cables that were in turn sent by international diplomats to major diplomatic cities around the globe with emphasis placed on the heinous nature of the incident. Indeed, the technological advancement of that period of human history differs significantly from our contemporary digital age but the viral effect was still prevalent for the case of the massacre due to the fact that this protest contained hundreds of thousands of dissenters and was in a major city of the Russian Empire. These types of viral effects are crucial in episodes of backfire and have occurred in various points of history. The magnitude of the massacre was felt globally and served as an exemplar of the Tsar’s mishaps. A second discursive force has to do with elite updating where elites and social movement leaders change their political positions and strategies in response to the act of repression inflicted upon nonviolent protestors: Tobias and Woodhouse (1985) explain how the formal Jewish organization which was called the Jewish Bund saw the massacre as a new focal point with which to mobilize and call for a revolution. Lenin noted how the massacre set the Russian Empire into a revolutionary atmosphere. The nobility had already, as Hamburg describes, lost a great deal of faith in the Tsar due to a plethora of factors including ongoing agrarian crises, the peasant problem, and poor economic management. Haimson analyzes the role of the Mensheviks and other revolutionaries during the turbulent 1905 period and notes how the massacre forced these revolutionaries to rethink their position in response to this new mass workers’ movement (Haimson 1999, 157).
The Tsar’s already contradictory social and economic policies became exemplified after his sponsoring of the use of repression onto nonviolent civilians. This pushed already upset allies and foes further away from the regime and into a new arena of political crises. Most importantly, the previously organized Banquet Campaigns of the Liberal movement and its concrete political proposals that had been put forward at the Congresses were able to be expanded. Lastly is the discursive force of “public outrage” which is not a given term or predefined concept. Empirically the outrage expressed by audiences varies and relies on discursive factors. Analyses that treat public outrage as given and predefined miss out on its complex nature and specifically the forces and meanings that are attached to the civilians that had suffered from repression. There were dozens of cases of repression even in the month leading up until the massacre, yet none of these cases had the profound effect that the massacre did. The Tsar’s image as servant of God and the Father of the empire was damaged eternally after women, children, and the elderly were shot down. How could a father kill his own children? Wolfe has noted, “Tsarist minister Plehve considered the peasants as an ‘unshakeable rock of loyalty to the throne’ prior to the massacre” (1948, 54). However unbreakable, the peasants and workers were broken as a result of the massacre and the heinous response that the Tsar supported. Of all previous Tsarist-sponsored repressive responses to civilian unrest, the Tsar’s answer to the Gapon-led protest fostered a reaction throughout Russian civil society that never before had occurred to such a far-reaching extent. The status quo could not ensue and the millions of peasants in rural areas abandoned their support for the Tsar. Gapon, hiding out in a St Petersburg apartment, had few words to say other than, “There is no God anymore; there is no Tsar” (1906). These three discursive forces help to explain specifically how the massacre dislocated the Tsarist state and enabled organic political crisis to ensue. The organic crises segment contains further interactive sequences that include
greater elite and social movement leader maneuvering against the state and against one another. Following the massacre Gapon fled to Geneva and the Petersburg movement died down. It were the Liberals and Zemstvo heads who effectively organized and enacted their political motives into play later that year which were built off of years of organizing and the influence of the Banquet Campaigns.

Relating the above presented discursive process model to Gene Sharp and Brian Martin’s theoretical frameworks reveals the differences between this framework and the frameworks of nonviolence scholars. Gene Sharp has noted that the massacre caused the mass strike movement that become so widespread the Tsar simply could not keep his population bay which in the end resulted in a broad withdrawal of consent and the Revolution of 1905. This of course is part of Sharp’s bigger framework of nonviolent social transformation that is empirically weak. Sharp’s many accounts of nonviolent transformation miss out on the dynamics of why political jiu-jitsu actually occurs when it does and why it brings about the powerful transformative effect that it does. Consent for Sharp is the centerpiece of the power dynamic behind all regimes and their relationships with their subjects. Sharp argues that if all consent is withdrawn authoritarian rulers will lose their resources of power and eventually the regime will fall (1994). In the case of Tsarist Russia, consent had been long withdrawn by many (including many in the aristocracy) while others were still gripped by the Tsar’s holy presence. By viewing nonviolent transformative events through a framework such as Sharp’s, it is easy to miss out on the dynamics that are at play behind these complex and nonlinear episodes of nonviolent social transformation. Government repression can foster greater dissent, yet this does not tell us anything about the politics, power, and identity forces that are behind the outrage that influences the increase in that dissent. Brian Martin has conducted extensive research on incidents of
backfire (Hess and Martin 2006; Martin 2007). Here the assumption is that for backfire to occur
the following factors must be present: (1) a logistic capability of media to spread awareness of
the incident; and (2) for the incident to be perceived as unjust by a given audience (Hess and
Martin 2006). This of course is plausible and these two factors do play roles in processes of
backfire yet there have been a great deal of incidents where nonviolent protestors have been
violently dealt with by state-sponsored security forces. Martin’s framework has to do with the
mechanisms of cover-up where regimes are said to attempt to cover up mass injustices and
repressive acts. This framework misses out on the fact that many protest movements that are
large in numbers (such as the Gapon-led protest) are inevitably going to receive strong media
attention and that the covering up of repression onto these movements simply is not possible by a
given regime in many empirical cases, especially in our modern digital age of protest. In the end,
through the process model presented in this paper, I hope to have shown the complexity behind
the phenomenon of backfire and added to the study of this topic. The Tsar simply could not cover
up such mass injustice and his population never could reassert him back into his former role of
the Father of the People. The factors behind the massacre and its transformative effect are rooted
in the logics of the Tsarist state and the political discourses that were at play in its historical
epoch.

Conclusion

The Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre of 1905 is a historical case of great magnitude that has
received attention from a wide array of scholars and historians. The orthodox-priest-led
nonviolent protest that was met by violent Tsarist forces received international attention and
dislocated the Tsarist state to a never before seen extent at that point in Russian history. The
discursive forces underlying the massacre have been explained and illustrated throughout this
paper with intent to help put forward a larger discourse theoretic account of backfire and “political jiu-jitsu” through a new political process model. Such political processes are important to political and social change given their powerful transformative potential. When nonviolent protest movements contain what has previously been mentioned a logic of equivalence as was the case in the well organized Gapon-led movement, the potential for nonviolent social transformation may be greater considering such episodic protests have greater power to attract sympathy from the general public following bouts of repression. The antagonisms that exist between subject and ruler were fully revealed as a result of the massacre where a day prior the Russian Tsar was the father of the people, the savior of humanity, and the leader of one of the most powerful empires on earth. Following the massacre, every single segment of society became appalled and opposed to the Tsar sending workers and peasants to search for new identities. Never again did the political discourse of Tsarism get accepted as a viable social reality.
References


Repression and Identity Under Apartheid: the 1976 Soweto Massacre

Abstract

Social scientists emphasize that nonviolence was a principal causal factor in the downfall of the apartheid regime. Many have noted that an influx of resources during the 1980s fostered a major nonviolent cooperative force by lowering the costs of collective action. Utilizing an ideological theory of discourse, I argue that the 1976 Soweto Massacre along with the organizational campaign of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) were pivotal, yet overlooked historical factors that paved way for the formation of a revitalized opposition in the 1980s. The BCM and its articulation of an antagonistic discourse aimed at white racism helped the native population of South Africa to regain psychological self-belief in time of extreme state censorship, political terror, and subjugation. While the Soweto massacre led to the detainment of BCM leadership and the death of leader Steve Biko, the event of white police killing black unarmed students in June of 1976 revealed central antagonisms and contradictions underpinning the apartheid project. Only once political identities were dislocated did the possibility arise for a unified mass opposition movement to form. Along these lines, this study demonstrates that rather than weighing economic costs under threat of state repression, historical waves of protest mobilization are also influenced by the dislocation and unfixed nature of political identities.
Introduction

From 1948 to 1994, one of the twentieth century's most repressive regimes carried out a state project of systemic segregation called apartheid. The ruling National Party (NP) committed over 37,000 human rights abuses in order to upkeep a mass project of economic exploitation, support nationalistic myths, along with an idea of a “Volk” Race. Blacks were both formally and informally subjugated, and made into inferior citizens. They were institutionally and morally excluded away from formal political terrains while a ruling minority group controlled around one-third of the world’s gold deposits. When the status quo was challenged, the NP offset political opposition through severe repression of both armed and unarmed civilians. There has been a fairly large multidisciplinary literature explaining the dynamics behind the downfall of apartheid, yet many would agree that no single factor can be responsible for the demise of the NP. In popular historical and social scientific arguments, it is stressed that by the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the apartheid state consistently conceded its power to disallow a revolutionary overthrow (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). This concession began at some period in the late 1970s through structural reforms of the apartheid system.

Another popular argument is based upon the notion that large-scale nonviolent direct action in the 1980s enabled a mass campaign to be initiated against the National Party, and in turn, this stripped much legitimacy away from the project of apartheid (Zunes 1999). The influence of rent boycotts, mass nonviolent cooperative efforts, and the international anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s have frequently been mentioned alongside rational choice based explanations in which scholars have emphasized the role and importance of individual utility maximization and rational protest participation. For instance, in a widely noted study, Johan Olivier (1991) argued that labor market increases and surpluses in resources enabled protest to explode in South Africa by
the early 1980s. Similarly, Anthony Marx (1992) also stressed that it was the ability of the opposition to unionize itself with workers which had the most significant influence on the downfall of apartheid. These ideas and logics imply that it was less costly to protest for South Africans in the 1980s than in previous decades. However, in Olivier’s account and many of similar type there is no recollection given as to why and how the powerful apartheid state first started to get overthrown from within. Why did the 1980s end up experiencing a major anti-apartheid struggle and what forced the NP to begin restructuring its project of apartheid?

In this study, a multifaceted argument is introduced that offers a different interpretation of the highly discussed decade of the 1980s in the apartheid struggle. I first explain the origin and importance of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), which is then followed by an assessment of a dislocatory event in the 1976 Soweto massacre. Both of these factors shifted the historical formation of apartheid. By utilizing a discourse theoretic approach (Essex School of Ideology and Discourse Analysis), this study offers a critical historical viewpoint on highly debated topics such as nonviolence, the fall of apartheid as well as the influence of identity on collective action formation. The first part of the argument unveils how the BCM enabled a personal revitalization to occur for the native black population. By drawing upon the discourse theoretic concepts of equivalence and difference, I explain how the BCM articulated a logic that purposely brought together a dispirited native population not as colored people or apartheid-constructed ethnic races but as one black identity that was argued to have been blocked by white racism (Howarth 2000).

During the summer of 1976, when students organized by the BCM in the township of Soweto went to protest against a state policy that was set to change the language of school instruction from English to Afrikaans, they were gunned down by police. This historical event transformed
political consciousness in South Africa and dislocated the apartheid state to an extent that had yet to be experienced. The 1976 Soweto specifically revealed the central antagonisms underpinning apartheid order and NP discourse. The events of 1976 forced the ruling regime to forfeit a significant portion of its political power through the initiation of widespread political reforms. Soweto also spurred an immense transnational effect of public outrage. Subsequent sections of this manuscript contain a short comparative analysis of seven political protest massacres that took place during the apartheid. This helps to compare the powerful effect Soweto that had in comparison to other events and massacres which possess most similar and most different characteristics.

While popular accounts of this period of South African history indicate that individuals were weighing economic costs under threat of immense state terror during the 1980s, these numerous interpretations of the 1980s as well as downfall of the apartheid state consider protest participation to have come about due to either an influx of new resources, or due to spontaneous occurrences. In this study, a different explanation is presented that is supported by a discourse theoretic ontology. It suggests that protest in the 1980s was driven by destabilized political identities and a new hegemonic political struggle that took place in a dislocated arena of apartheid structure. Differently put, boycotts and a cooperative effort in the 1980s did not arise simply due to new access of resources for the opposition but rather they were made possible due two factors: the hegemonic dislocation of the 1976 Soweto massacre; and the organizational campaign that was initiated by the BCM proceeding up to that event.

**Rational choice explanations of apartheid**
Mass waves of protest took place during the 1980s in South Africa. During this time, an international anti-apartheid movement had come into full strength and daily events were being reported to audiences around the world through international news outlets. While explaining the formation and persistence of mass dissent, scholars often attribute this explosion of protest to the factor of resource availability and specifically, the perceived (lessening) of costliness of protest participation. For instance, Zunes argues that, “Only when the youthful rebels were able to effectively build an alliance with the black working class was real change possible.” In the same vein Zunes notes, “In short, the rioting Soweto youths only began to seriously challenge the white authorities when they stopped rioting, built alliances with workers in the townships, and organized a non-violent movement” (Zunes 1999, 166). Similar logics are echoed throughout a variety of different studies and books having to do with the struggle against apartheid, the decade of the 1980s and the downfall of the NP.

In a popular study Culverson (1996) argues that “The anti-apartheid movement emerged as a legitimate contender in the larger policy arena during the 1977-1984 period. Several factors account for this: more consistent international attention to the conflicts in Southern Africa; the development of movement allies in Congress and in the foreign policy bureaucracy; the gradual expansion of anti-apartheid activism at the state and local level” (Culverson 1996, 132). While not entirely incorrect, Culverson's analyses miss out on the fact that already in 1976 (for example, in June and July of that year), there was an immense amount of political support being cast for the victims of Soweto from not only whites in asymmetric areas abroad, but also by whites in the neighboring area of Johannesburg. In addition, what is lacking in these above noted arguments is in-depth analysis and explanation of subjectivities and identities that subsisted within apartheid. By failing to provide such an analysis, many historical and social scientific
accounts have been more descriptive than commonly admitted. Many studies of apartheid and the 1980s opposition movements embody a linear process of historical events.

Robinson et al., (1995), in their comparison of the BCM to the U.S. Black Power Movement, argue that the events at Soweto changed the historical landscape of South Africa. But, principally, Robinson et al. note,

“Less easy to calculate but nevertheless undeniable was the effect on black South Africans of the fact that their children had been willing to risk their lives by defying the regime on an issue that involved black pride and cultural identity” (Robinson et al. 1995, 309).

Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend that dissent in the 1980s was not driven by the calculation of economic costs or availability of greater resources if one does not consider qualitative and discursive elements that underpinned the apartheid regime. The aim of this study is to offer a differing explanation of protest mobilization and the downfall of apartheid based on political identity and hegemony rather than the popular notions of resource mobilization and rational utility maximization. Once again referring to Zunes’ argument: Zunes notes that a shift to a largely nonviolent method of dissent helped to “lure” white popular opinion away from continued white domination (Zunes 1999, 163). As will be explained in subsequent section of this study, the above noted historical explanations, as well as many of similar type, fail to address the question of why it is that these major transformative events started to occur after the late 1970s and not earlier.

While resources surely played a role in the protests of the 1980s, it is still unclear as to why millions were finally able to openly coordinate and engage themselves into political action. Studies that assume the identities of empirical agents are pre-determined tend to produce erroneous historical observations and conclusions. By comparing Soweto and the BCM to other
political massacres as well as movements (such as the African National Congress and 1960 Sharpeville), this study will present a critical explanation of major historical events, and shift focus onto the role that identity plays in historical struggles and the formation of collective action. This study will also demonstrate how a nonlinear and temporally varied process of events and factors ruptured the structure of NP discourse and the historical formation of apartheid.

**Theory and discourse**

The ontological assumptions of the approach adopted in this study differ from popular approaches used to explain social conflict such as rational choice theory as well as the political opportunity structure approach. Approaches of this sort entail that individuals are rational actors that engage in cost-benefit analysis when choosing to dissent or not according to opportunity structures (McAdam et al., 1996). A strict rational choice theory of collective action entails that individuals should only protest when the costs of doing so are low. The latter is usually gauged by the level of perceived repression one will face once out on the streets. Many scholars operating out of rational choice frameworks also assume that dissenting after a massacre is theoretically costly for potential protesters. My reasons for noting these differences is that such epistemological assumptions underpin the logic of many social scientific accounts of the apartheid regime. The suppositions I adopt in this paper differ. I implement a qualitative method of analysis that heavily focuses on political discourses and subjective identity. When I refer to discourse I assume that discourse captures both linguistic and non-linguistic practices along with both social and natural realities (Howarth 2013).

A given discourse is comprised of linguistic elements that encompass culture, institutions, rules, practices, and social subjectivities. Discourses are historically contingent due to their relational
nature and can be thought of as qualitative systems of meaning that are rooted in their own historical epochs or time periods. No discourse is ever fully closed off and within a given discourse exist floating signifiers that hold meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Society is impossible at its core, and thus there exist ongoing and continuous political projects in which actors engage in processes of articulation in order to secure and instill social practices as well as subjective identities. Furthermore, identity, just as discourse, is assumed to be negative and relational. It is always “threatened by something external to it” (Howarth 2000, 106). This conception of identity differs from the rational choice perspective in which human actions in social reality are dictated by individual utility maximization that is carried out in order to obtain the highest ranked preference. Rather than assuming that identity is frequently constant, predefined or empirically unchanged, I assume that identity is radically contingent and is an outcome of reoccurring discursive articulation. The concept of a subject position(s) enables us to account for 1) how subjects are positioned within a given discursive system and 2) how individuals may take up more than one of these positions according to a given time period. What this implies is that identity empirically takes qualitative forms and is not homogenous across time or even during a single time period of interest. A given “empirical agent at any given point may identify himself or be simultaneously be positioned” according to different social classifications such as “black” or “middle-class” or as “Christian” or “women” argues David Howarth (Howarth et al. 2000, 13). As will be demonstrated in subsequent sections, a social dislocation brought about by severe state repression has the power and causal propensity to shock the structure of a given discursive totality and in turn block or breed grounds for the establishing of new political subjectivities and identities.
In this study I emphasize that social conflict and political violence transpire around qualitatively rooted antagonisms which are inherent to a given epoch and contextual political order. As stated by Laclau, “antagonism does not occur within the relations of production, but between the latter and the social agent’s identity outside them” (Laclau 1990, 15). There are layers of antagonisms within a given discourse that get established specifically through the differentiating of political opposition via the construction of a relational “outside” or “other.” Importantly, a discourse can become hegemonic only through the establishing of a common “people” and the exclusion and antagonization of political opposition, an “other.” This relational view of social nature and political identity is linked to what has been referred to as a *constitutive outside*.

A constitutive outside is inherent to every discourse. It is needed to assure the existence of a given discursive structure. In turn, from this we can assume that there are no historical laws and concurrently, social change and conflict are more influenced by politics and hegemony rather than economic conditions and individual utility maximization. These are significant points to consider when theorizing about social causation and historical processes of change such as the downfall of the apartheid state. A discourse and our conception of political reality are not based on an objective formation, but are built upon crystallized myths and social imaginaries. By myth I am referring to a theoretically incomplete surface in which social demands can be inscribed in. Myths also, after continuous processes of hegemonic articulation and social sedimentation, can become distilled into social imaginaries. Both subside within the discursive totality of a given structure and were vital for the up keeping of apartheid social order.

**The establishing of apartheid**
The apartheid state was ruled by a regime that possessed substantial military capability and business ties with a number of world powers. The native population was racially categorized, segregated, and prohibited to leave designated areas which later were formalized by the state into blocked off provinces. All labor and work opportunities were purposely restricted to cities in which thousands would migrate to from nearby squatter camps or townships. The regime’s tools of repression included shooting, torturing, kidnapping, sending subjects into exile, stabbing, burning political opponents, among other brutal methods. Historically, political conflict had greatly affected this region dating back to the early eighteenth century. South Africa had experienced slave labor, colonization, and immense foreign supported mineral extraction (Callinicos and Rogers 1977). Shortly after the Anglo-Boer wars, an Afrikaner-led political faction by the name of the National Party (NP) was founded in 1914. The NP went on to officially establish a systemic project of segregation into a government in 1948 but before this could be accomplished, the formation of its discourse along with its social practices had to be made acceptable and intelligible (Norval 1996).

For discourse theorist Aletta Norval, the long standing apartheid regime did not simply arise at a given point in time or for one predetermined or structural economic reason. Instead, the possibility for a discourse of apartheid to be established came about as a result of the articulation of a special type of Afrikaner identity and social imaginary by ruling Afrikaner whites in times of severe dislocation. Such dislocations had occurred beginning with an unparalleled process of urbanization in the 1920s. The 1930s and 1940s in South Africa involved a great drought, depression, and the Second World War. Throughout these periods, great threat was perceived by some intellectual members of Afrikaner society. A Christian nationalistic element helped to construct an Afrikaner identity in which leaders sought to protect a mythical idea of a Volk
(volkseie) race. As Norval explains, Afrikaner nationalism was an “obsessional quest for a core authenticity which could, however, not be found” (Norval 1996, 95). Afrikaner nationalists and intellectuals articulated discursive imaginaries in attempt to equivarize and homogenize previously existent differences in the white population of South Africa. They specifically tried to spur shared agreement in the Afrikaner community and unity towards their own constructed idea of the purity or inclusiveness of the Afrikaner race. This was organized around the “homogeneous” protection of an equivalized Volk and thus other white members of South African society who did not want to conform to the articulations of Afrikaners were antagonized. The latter included well-known Jewish and British segments of the population. These groups were stigmatized to be either radical communists or factory exploiters of Afrikaner workers.

The discursive horizons articulated by Afrikaner nationalists forced these other white members of South African society to make sense of their history, even though such articulations were often highly contradictory. Many constructions were reformulated into policy following the Second World War. Apartheid was not simply a “black” versus “white” project but instead, the native white, black, colored and Indian populations were consistently negated and differentiated by the ruling Afrikaners in relation to their construction and subject position of a Volk myth. The Volk myth eventually was forged into a social imaginary when the Bantu Self-Government Bill was established (Norval 1996, 169). Apartheid rather than a “series of ad-hoc responses to pressing problems,” was forged into a full imaginary which contained a “complete, moral vision of social division,” argues Norval (Norval 1996, 171).

Once the NP successfully achieved its homogenous status among whites, it differentiated much of the native South African population from the formal political front in severe manners. In subsequent sections it will become clear as to why after Soweto, the cohesiveness of NP social
imaginary of the Volk was greatly loosened. Empirically, a course or process of regime
differentiation will strictly attempt to keep threatening elements and demands (including
identities), in autonomous and separate forms. Under apartheid, all people of color were
separated into different groups or peoples based on false anthropological theories (Glynos and
Howarth 2007, 138). These theories were considered to be objective realities for the NP. NP
discourse even contained the construction of artificial scientific facts. These facts manifested
themselves into concrete policy projects. Bantustans were set up to discriminate the native
populations into separate ethnic groups and were argued to be incompatible for the white
population to access.

While the regime used physical violence, it is also important to consider that human life is
comprised of “unnoticed, more refined forms of violence” (Berdyaev 1943, 64). Physical
suppression coincided alongside moral and personal subjugation. These policies impacted all
forms of social organization including private life and personal well-being. Associations linked
to Afrikaner nationalists included entities such as the Ossewabrandwag and the Broederbond
which were dogmatic Christian groups that had numbers stemming to the hundreds of thousands.
Take for example a 1948 pamphlet that was issued by an organization called Christian National
Education (CNE). In this pamphlet the following was stated: “The white South African’s duty to
the native is to Christianise him and help him on culturally,” further reading “its aim should be to
inculcate the white man’s way of life, especially that of the Boer nation” (Hirson 1979). The
project of segregation in South Africa was from its outset a systemic venture built upon the
exploitation of an entire native population as the NP defended its constructed identity through
ruthless exclusion of all political threats. Above all, the apartheid state was not a simple military
power or an economic hegemon. It was a distinct historical regime founded upon its own
qualitative myths. In order to understand why it is that the regime first started to crumble, these myths and apartheid antagonisms have to be taken into consideration.

**Opposition and articulation**

While power holders and elites differentiate opposition, social movement leaders can construct political discourses of their own to challenge state hegemony. There were a variety of oppositional parties during the apartheid era such as the South African Communist Party (SACP), the ANC, and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); all of which attempted to engage in apartheid politics in one form or another. Trade unions were also active during the apartheid era and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) played a pivotal organizational role in the 1980s. Beginning in late 1950s, the ANC formally received funding from the USSR who held strategic interest in the sea lanes off the coast of South Africa (Somerville 1984). The USSR also was engaged in Cold War conflicts in Africa more broadly. On the other hand, U.S. oil interests were heavily embedded in the region of Southern Africa.

By 1960, a strong challenge emerged to the NP regime’s anti-movement or anti-pass laws when a nationwide protest was organized. Here the massacring of protesters during the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 exposed the repressive force of apartheid and shortly thereafter, the ANC delved into violent conflict against the apartheid state. I will refer back to the specifics of 1960 Sharpeville in subsequent sections. Just a few years after Sharpeville, a medical student by the name of Steve Biko created the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). Also during this time period, and especially by the early 1970s, independent trade union organizations were on the rise. The ANC was engaged in full armed struggle against the state while the BCM on the other
hand, provided apartheid opposition and much of the youth of the South Africa with a new avenue and opportunity for self-realization.

The BCM project was vital for the native population. It encouraged the abandoning of violence and rejecting of NP discourse in all spheres of life. Its goal was to negate the fundamental antagonism between the racist white regime and the suppressed native black subject. This was done not for the purpose of strategically mobilizing resources as the resource-mobilization framework would entail; or out of creating grievances for potential participants. The BCM was a philosophical force that had a major aim of personal revitalization for a highly oppressed people. Biko once said, “Black Consciousness is an attitude of the mind and a way of life, the most positive call to emanate from the black world for a long time”. Further, Biko noted, “We have set out a true quest for humanity, and somewhere on the distant horizon we can see the glittering prize; let us march forth with courage and determination, drawing strength from our common plight and our brotherhood” (Mngxitama et al., 2008, 214)

The BCM was led by student intellectuals but the movement attracted a much wider following after years of clandestine organization. Biko once held that “The greatest weapon in the hand of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed.” He articulated a logic that sought to lessen differences in characteristics between the colored and native populations of South Africa and aimed those differences towards the white regime. In the same light, Biko made sure to formulate a platform which separated and made distinct the Anglo-Boer culture to that of native African culture. While the former was more physically “powerful” according to Biko, it also used an exploitative basis that was directed at “bestowing an inferior status to all cultural aspects of the indigenous people” (Biko 1978, 41). Reformation of the current system was out of the question for the BCM as this implied the accepting of and engaging in apartheid discourse. Biko
fought against “white liberalism” which he argued did not justly incorporate the black man into government institutions that were race-based and domimative. David Howarth (1997) notes in his analysis of the BCM movement,

'the affirmation of a Black identity transcended the imposed apartheid system of ethnic and racial difference, and its adumbration displayed a subtle imbrications of the universal and the particular. In so doing, Black Consciousness activists and intellectuals expanded the field of universals so as to include the categories of 'blackness' and 'a true humanity' denied by white racism' (Howarth 1997, 72).

In addition, Howarth explains how leaders of the BCM in their articulation of their ideology created a discursive floating signifier of 'blackness' which was contrasting to that of the NP of “whiteness”. This successfully fostered a new “racial political frontier” (Howarth 1997, 54). A floating signifier exists within the discursive totality of a given discourse and it is not fully sedimented in the way that a master signifier is. Floating signifiers get articulated with the purpose of attempting to hegemonize a given discourse. The BCM’s philosophical and social advocating put emphasis away from the state constructed narrative of separation along with ethnic divide and placed it onto spirituality, the self and one's relation to God. Only this way could Blacks achieve group pride and individual freedom by exploring what Biko referred to as natural surroundings. The BCM grew to be a political force of the opposition and by the early 1970s, a catchy phrase caught on amongst black students nationally that was something along the lines of “Black man, you are on your own.” Student organizations became the safest hubs of political activity during a period in which all oppositional political parties were banished. Biko's formation along with configuration of the South African Students’ Organization (SASO) in 1969 was pivotal. The SASO turned out to be a major establishment and hub of BCM ideology, helping to attract other students and their families throughout South Africa. Women were vital
for the strategy of the BCM but it is critical to consider that women experienced a twofold
difficulty in caring for and ensuring the survival of their young as well as in fighting state
oppression (Pohlandt-McCormick 2000). It is for these reasons that the symbolic image and role
of a young woman at the time was perceived to be less threatening than their male counterpart;
hence enabling women to clandestinely help with the organization of protest during the rise of
the BCM (Magaziner 2010). The question of gender and how it fits into the BCM platform is one
that has not gone without controversy due to the fact that the BCM championed the self-
realization and liberation of the black male. With this in mind, women participated in much of
the organization of the SASO at intricate times of its development (Ramphele 1991). Contrary to
criticisms, women were central for its networking strategies.

The BCM enabled spiritual realization to develop through its establishing of seminary networks
in the early 1970s. These networks differed from the state-sponsored versions of Christianity
advocated by the NP. The SASO had at least three theological seminaries in different regions of
South Africa. Former students would engage with communities and develop new forms of
spiritual and political action that had yet to be “imagined” (Denis 2010).

Nelson Mandela once wrote about Biko,

“history had called upon Steve Biko at a time when the political pulse of our people had been rendered faint by the
banning, imprisonment, exile, murder and banishment” (Charteris-Black 2006, 99).

The state was well aware of the BCM’s activities and hence it engaged in preemptive repression.
In 1974, nine leaders from the BCM were put on trial and accused of terrorism by the regime. As
Magaziner explains, this was the longest state trial of its kind (17 months) and the fascinating
aspect of this trial was that it was based around the historical figure of Jesus Christ (Magaziner
2010). State prosecutors were frustrated after long weeks of hearing the defendants' theological propositions that compared Christ's actions (against the Roman Empire) to their own, as rebels fighting against a dominant regime of unjustness (the NP’s white racism in their own case).

**The Soweto township in 1976**

Following the start of the earlier mentioned trials of student activists (in 1974), the NP changed the medium language of school instruction from English to the Dutch dialect of Afrikaans. Education under apartheid was centrally controlled and designed specifically for a policy of planned segregation that was in place to maintain the pureness of the Afrikaner race (Christie and Collins 1982). The physical organization of the Soweto protest involved the linking of BCM ideology to dozens of other groups such as the Black Parents, the Black Women's Federation (BWF), and the Federation of South African Women, among many others. What's more is that women both assisted with and were participants at the protest. Take, for example, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela (once wife of Nelson Mandela). As a young teen, Winnie Mandela at the scene of protest on June 16 “stepped forward when students rebelled to mediate them, their parents, and the authorities” (Pohlandt-McCormick 2000, 589). Winnie was later blamed by the NP to have organized the protest the night before in her house.

The BCM enabled large-scale underground networks to be established via Black community programs that were put in place to forge alliances between students and their elders. Once the dictation to change the medium language of instruction was formalized, movements such as the South Africans Students’ Movement (SASM) and the SASO, rallied to protest and called for the creation of political support organizations (Diseko 1992). Other associations participated including the National Youth Organization (NAYO) which was founded in 1973 to project
Biko’s views and ideological articulation further into practice and communities across apartheid (Maluleke 2008). Nonviolence and adhering to peaceful principles were encouraged by the BCM, and the epitome of the BCM message can be captured in Biko's own writings, “Black Consciousness seeks to give positivity in the outlook black people to their problems. It seeks to channel the pent-up forces the angry black masses to meaningful and directional opposition basing its entire struggle on the realities of the situation” (Biko 1978, 30).

Tshepo Moloi observed school locales during apartheid in an area where the BCM ideology had been advocated. In Bodibeng High School in Maokeng, Kroonstad (Northern Free State), Moloi found that those students who were influenced by the BCM ideology experienced a significant “behavioral change” (Moloi 2011). An additional organization that helped with the organization of the Soweto protest was “The Black Parents Association” (BPA), which was created prior to the massacre to assist and help plan the protest (Venter 2005). The coming together of a great deal of these forces transpired just outside of Johannesburg in the township of Soweto, on June 16, 1976. Over 10,000 students, children, boys and girls gathered early in the morning to protest the changing of the earlier mentioned language of instruction.

This mass gathering and protest was led by the Soweto Students' Representative Council (SSRC). The protest was peaceful and participants adopted an assortment of nonviolent direct action methods to dissent against the policy of the changing of school language instruction. The presence of children, women, and a great deal of students who had not been politically active prior took away the radical element of mass protest that was evident in the workers movements or the armed branches of rival political movements such as the ANC and the PAC. Even with highly aggressive police and anti-protest forces in and near Soweto in June of 1976, prior to the rally, it had to have been difficult for the thousands of children and students who were drawing
anti-Afrikaans language slogans to anticipate that they would be met by bullets and police dogs. In the heat of the moment, police intervened by setting dogs into the walking path of unarmed marching children. This coincided alongside shouting as police unloaded scores of rounds of gunfire. Rocks and stones were later thrown back from the unarmed crowd as dozens of children were fatally shot.

Soweto took the NP by surprise and fostered immense moral outrage on the part of domestic and international observers. “The front page of the news was shocking that day, it shocked the country and the world,” claims Sahm Venter in his book *Youth Day, June 16* (Venter 2005, 56). Soweto had a population of near one million and was one of the larger townships in South Africa. The township was geographically situated next to the major city of Johannesburg. Once police fatally shot dozens of children at Soweto, reports of the regime's violence started to go viral (Burns 1976). Neighboring African nations were notified and appalled at news of the apartheid regime’s killing of unarmed students while the apartheid state grew into the international child killers as presses worldwide picked up the incident. Opposition arose in all townships throughout South Africa and as Jamie Frueh notes, “Soweto forced people to notice and even question apartheid's political reality” (Frueh 2003, 87). Widespread mobilization exploded throughout all townships and while violent in some cases and nonviolent in others, the protests throughout were of new form given they were ethnically diverse, varied and not limited to a single group or political faction argues Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu (1998). A powerful account of the killings in Soweto is given in the autobiographical novel “Kaffir Boy,” in which a prominent black South African who was present at Soweto, recalls how police opened fire without warning and from all angles of the township, children were attempting to escape a heavily armed police force but continuously dropped down like “swatted flies” (Mathabane 1986).
The events from 1976 were the most shifting, potent, and transformative of any apartheid massacres. A particular image from Soweto went on to serve as an important symbol of the struggle against apartheid for domestic and international audiences. A local civilian photographer by the name of Sam Nzima took dozens of photos and one of them contained a dead 12 year old boy covered in blood named Hector Pieterson being carried by a sibling with a face full of traumatization with a devastated township looming in the background. As historian James Sanders notes, the photo of Pieterson first appeared on June 16, 1976 in a late edition of the press outlet *World*, but then on June 17 the photo was featured on the front page in the *Washington Post*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *Daily Mail*, the *Times* among others (Sanders 2011, 184). Pieterson's death went on to be celebrated every June 16 in annual gatherings across all of South Africa. Novelist and poet Solrha (Sol) Rachilo while only a young boy at the time, was present that day in Soweto and has since wrote poetry about Hector and also has recalled the emotional traumatism in which the events from 1976 brought about for many in the South African nation. Students that were photographed and filmed being shot and attacked by police drew great asymmetric support due to the fact the kids were not separate ethnic races that were argued by the state to be incompatible to live amongst one another and amongst whites. They also were not Soviet-funded radicals or foreign enemies that the NP had often inferred were operating in the underground confines of student organizations and the ANC. Instead, the students at Soweto embodied the BCM and served as the central signifying force of its ideological project. Every single June 16 after 1976 saw millions protest in remembrance of the Soweto uprisings and Hector Pieterson (Ndlovu 1998, 78).
Soweto’s international implications

On September 17, 1977 Steve Biko was murdered after suffering severe police torture whilst in custody, but at this point a population was revitalized. Greater protests continued to ensue. Nelson Mandela went on to later say of Biko; “They had to kill him to prolong the life of Apartheid.” Soweto set off a social dislocation. It specifically revealed the major contradiction and antagonism that up until that point, had underpinned the social order of apartheid and the discourse of the NP.

Soweto helped trigger the U.S. anti-apartheid movement and its formation in universities. This began in Oakland, California when a man by the name of Leo Robinson of the Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), initiated a boycott of the apartheid regime in July 1976 following what he perceived to be atrocious state repression in Soweto. For the next decade and a half, Robinson was active in national trade union caucuses mobilizing against the regime in an asymmetric effort of political support. By 1979, the neighboring city of Berkeley, California, just as it had been a symbol for social progression in previous social issues in the 1960s, once again sparked a progressive movement in the U.S. as it became the “first US city to opt for divestment, through a public ballot initiative spearheaded by Mayor Gus Newport” (Minter and Hill 2008, 779). U.S. universities that had shares in firms which did business in South Africa began to divest from those firms, which in turn put financial pressure on the firms for their cooperation with South African economic elites. Following Soweto, the NP’s political discourse was no longer a viable hegemonic project to both domestic and international observers.
The antagonisms between the ruling party and its suppressed population were exemplified in the violence at Soweto. Biko’s articulation of a logic of equivalence created one single black subject in the form of a complete negative identity. This antagonism was aimed at white racism and Afrikaner liberalism, and it was exemplified when white police shot black unarmed children and students in public setting. Shortly after 1976, the NP began to concede political power as it found itself in unforeseen and unanticipated territory. In consecutive years of 1976-1981, the following four provincial homelands: Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei were made independent from South Africa. By 1977 the NP issued the Community Councils of 1977 Act which enabled Black townships to gain greater autonomy and control (rather than being headed by white council members). Also during 1977 the United Nations Security Council forced an arms restriction on the regime. In 1978 the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Amendment Act stated that all blacks who were under “section 10” rights were now able to gain lease or rent property in townships. This still, nevertheless, prevented blacks from owning property in major areas.

By 1982 the Black Local Authorities Act extended was initiated to build on the 1977 Act, but here the difference was that the former provided community councils with more autonomy in local dealings. In 1979 the Industrial Conciliation Amendment (Act 94), was recommended by the Wiehahn Commission and what this specific piece of legislation did was to create an “Industrial Court” and hence, labor laws finally began to take shape. Just two years later, the Labor relations amendment act of 1981, enabled black trade unions to grow and expand. In 1983, a new constitution was passed which granted Indians and other (non-black) colored civilians greater political rights. This act still did not give blacks full representation even though the
previously all-white parliament was broken up. At this point in time, the state was attempting to reposition its discursive project by articulating a logic of difference which sought to disconnect opposition from forming into a “people.” The NP wanted to keep social demands autonomous after its discursive contradiction and fundamental antagonism were revealed in Soweto. Meanwhile, political upheaval was still rampant throughout townships. Major economic boycotts took South Africa by storm by 1984, then in 1985 the government issued a state of emergency. An international apartheid movement was already formed. It brought great attention to the unjust practices of apartheid. Many foreign investors left not only the state, but the continent. By 1990, the fall of the USSR was imminent. The 1960s ban on the ANC was lifted, Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and by 1994 a general election was held. The ANC won over a majority and Mandela became the country’s new political leader.

Repression and comparative dislocation

Soweto was not the only protest massacre that took place under the apartheid regime, nevertheless, in this section it will become clear as to why Soweto, when compared to six other cases of severe state repression, was an event that shifted political consciousness throughout South Africa. Here it is worthwhile to draw upon a theoretical framework in order to make the effect of 1976 Soweto intelligible. The phenomenon of severe state-led killing of unarmed civilians has been referred to as either political jiu-jitsu or repression backfire. Outcomes (or the dependent variable) of repression backfire have been conceptualized and measured differently, but generally these include: domestic and international public outrage, international condemnation, NGO shaming as well as the decisive component of increased domestic mobilization (Sharp 1973; 1980; Hess and Marin 2006). My reason for emphasizing the
phenomenon of repression backfire is that many scholars have argued that the organizational components of the social movement that gets massacred or repressed is a highly important for the eventual outcome of what happens after the act of repression. For example, Sutton et al. (2014) argue that “the likelihood of extreme repression backfiring against the government is a function of prior institution-building, especially institutions that facilitate communication and tactical adaptability” (Sutton et al. 2014, 561).

In the context under attention, the best organized oppositional movements were ones that were engaged in formal conflict with the state or were engaged in battles within the realms of apartheid discourse. The BCM, on the other hand, was not as tightly organized as say the ANC, but it did have an ideological message that was substantially different from other oppositional parties of the time. What needs to be considered by nonviolence theorists and conflict scholars is that the discursive and ideological composition of the protest that suffers from state repression is just as important, if not more important than its organizational components for outcomes of repression backfire. Once unarmed black students were suppressed by white police in public setting in June of 1976 Soweto, internal contradictions of apartheid structure were revealed to domestic and international audiences in grand form. The antagonisms between protesters and white police were not a new development for the political scene of South Africa but rather were the underpinnings of the regime’s discursive totality. They had yet to be revealed in such form. Soweto was a hegemonic dislocation that exposed the limits of NP discursive structure and the contingency of social reality. A dislocation is precisely the failure of a structure, according to Howarth, and this failure is what compels subjects to act in the political arena to assert anew political subjectivity (Howarth 2000, 13). Dislocations are not deterministic and also can be thought of with reference to variance in accordance to the context or phenomena under analysis.
Following a dislocation, new meanings get attached to empty signifiers in a given discursive totality.

The historian Fatton (1986) argues that the BCM helped to revive political opposition in a time of the banning of the PAC and the ANC. Also according to Fatton, the BCM created an alternative hegemony that could only be satisfied through the complete liberation of the black masses. Yet, what historians thus far have failed to contemplate is that sometimes it takes more than just the articulation of an ideology or for others, the organization of resources for radical political change to arise. In many cases, a shock (via dislocation), to the structural underpinnings of a given government has to transpire in order to reveal the contingent nature of social reality. Such was the case with the BCM and 1976 Soweto. When compared to other similar cases of violence, it was the subjective meanings that were attributed to the Soweto uprisings which fostered radical social change. A dislocation will threaten and disrupt previously sedimented identities, and at the same time it will breed the conditions for the establishing new ones.

Undeniably, there were many other severe acts of terror that had occurred in South Africa that did not involve a protest challenging the state such as a 1946 mining strike at Winterveld (12 casualties), or the Durban riots in 1949 (140+ casualties). Political violence and conflict plagued the years of 1948-1994 and even in the ending era of apartheid there was still great political violence in South African society such as the 1992 massacre in Boipatong (45 casualties), or the 1994 Shell House massacre (20+ casualties). Hence, it is worthwhile to engage in a form of comparative analysis to make sense of Soweto and its effect. The table below displays seven political massacres. The motive for choosing the specific incidents listed is due to the observed commonalities they share in being discrete acts of state repression that resulted in civilian casualties during moments when protest groups publicly challenged the apartheid state.
Conceptually, the dependent variable (or outcome of interest), here is increased domestic mobilization while the independent variables (or causal conditions), are severe state repression, protest organization, and protest ideological formation. Formally, this qualifies as a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). The column of increased mobilization indicates if there were greater protests after a given repressive act took place.

Table 1 (below)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Massacres</th>
<th>State Repression</th>
<th>Protest Tactic</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Increased Mob.</th>
<th>Protest Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976 Soweto (80 casualties)</td>
<td>Nonviolent March</td>
<td>June 16, 1976. 10,000+</td>
<td>80 casualties. BCM and SASO protest against state changing of schooling language.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 Mamelodi Killings (13 casualties)</td>
<td>Nonviolent gathering</td>
<td>Nov. 21, 1985. 50,000+</td>
<td>13 casualties. 13 killed in a protest against high rents. (Marschall 2008).</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Odi magistrate’s court Killings (11 casualties)</td>
<td>Violent March/petition</td>
<td>March 7, 1990.</td>
<td>11 casualties. Thousands of protesters from Garankuwa, Mabopane, Soshanguve met by police. Over 450 were injured. (Daily Report 1990)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Ciskei massacre (28 casualties)</td>
<td>Nonviolent demonstration</td>
<td>Sept. 7. 20,000 protested</td>
<td>28 casualties. 20,000 protested in a pro-democracy demonstration. 300 were wounded in addition to those killed. (Francisco 2004, 121).</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first of these massacres, 1960 Sharpeville, had a powerful effect that ensued when the state shot down striking miners during a widely organized protest against the anti-pass or movement laws. After Sharpeville the primary organizers of the protest, the ANC and the PAC were formally banned by the state and Nelson Mandela was imprisoned. Keep in mind, the SACP (Communist Party), had already been banned a decade earlier. Additionally, Sharpeville spurred the formation of the British Anti-Apartheid movement. It also radicalized many opposition members especially those in the ANC. As Fatton (1986) argues, after Sharpeville, African leaders “were forced to become revolutionaries” (Fatton 1986, 23). Fatton also notes that the choice of nonviolence in the Sharpeville protest was not for ethical reasons but was because the PAC was not yet ready to kill. Sharpeville fostered a new era of political struggle and the creation of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) which was a militant movement. International attention was cast onto the apartheid regime and Britain shortly thereafter condemned the NP only to see South Africa leave the Commonwealth one year later. The PAC aligned itself with the ANC even closer and both advocated a non-racial approach to their political struggle and this was evident through the white leadership in their hierarchy. Already by 1963, a great deal of ANC funding came from the external source of the Soviet Union via the SACP. This was to continue on until the late 1980s.

Sharpeville drew international attention given the severity of the killings that took place, nevertheless, the protest at Sharpeville contained links to the ANC and the PAC who were attempting to engage in the formal political terrain whereas the BCM reinvented a new political frontier and a change of consciousness for many young people and opposition. The BCM operated outside the realms of state discourse to forge a new sense of being for the native
population. In comparison to Sharpeville, Soweto exemplified the resistance of Black
Consciousness ideology and was comprised of a protest of women, children and various parents
who were nearby in the township.

What is fascinating is that after Soweto, even in the light of extreme state repression, thousands
if not millions were protesting in a period that surely was not a rational one to participate in
dissent considering the merciless violence which the state was willing (and did) initiate against
any political opponent. At this point, the discursive totality or structure of the NP was dislocated
and hegemonic articulation was in full swing on the part of oppositional factions. Here we also
once again have to consider the role of transnational dynamics. By 1976, the global
communicational industry was much more developed than in 1960. Processes of communication
and the spread of news events were much more extensively embedded in major urban areas of
the world. Reporters were secretly at Soweto taking photographs and reporting on the events. At
this point in history, more and more people had access to television as well which helped the
university divestment campaign to pick up immense momentum just a few years after Soweto.
Many of these factors were missing during Sharpeville.

Of all the massacres that took place after Sharpeville and Soweto, only the 1992 Ciskei massacre
contained a protest with comparable organizational components. None however, possessed the
same underpinning and ideological dexterity as the BCM-led Soweto protest. The 1984 Vaal
uprisings were a fairly spontaneous violent protest that was formed in reaction to rent increases.
Dozens were killed and there has since been noted to have been over 6 million USD in property
damage in the Vaal triangle townships as a result of that incident (Zuern 2011, 34). In 1985, the
NP issued a state of emergency and intriguingly, protests still ensued. Another case of severe repression took place in the 1985 Mamelodi killings when tens of thousands challenged high rents of a local black council. This incident of protest was not a direct threat to the policies of the NP regime as say the Sharpeville or Soweto protests. From 1984-88, notes Norval, there were over 35,000 SADF troops deployed to townships and 45,000 persons were detained (Norval 1996, 247).

Furthermore, in the Winterveld case, a large crowd gathered to protest police brutality in City Rocks stadium in Boththatswana. This was done specifically for the purposes of protesting “recent arrests of scores of youths from the squatter settlement” (Parks, LA Times 1986). Meanwhile, buses were burnt as unaffiliated dissidents joined into the interaction between protesters and police. This story was briefly picked up by Western newspapers as a highlight noted alongside the mass violence occurring in not only that township but in other parts of the country. The 1990 Odi killings, on the other hand, were an incident that involved a mass crowd of anywhere between 50,000 to 100,000, that began a protest/march at 6:30 a.m. according to newspaper reports. The protesters sent a demand to chief magistrate Mr. N.C. Greyling with the purpose of attempting to get re-incorporated into the homeland of South Africa proper (Daily Report 1990). Police opened fire and simultaneously, many fire and army trucks were set afire (South African Truth Commission Vol. 3 Ch. 6; section 104). After this incident, new civic organizations began to be set up that were aligned with the ANC.

The last of the seven massacres under attention is the 1992 Ciskei massacre which occurred in Bisho during a time when the ANC was already in negotiation with the NP to end the project of
apartheid. The ANC had demanded that de Klerk replace Gqozo to enable a chance of democratic governance emerge in the homeland. However, the President refused and claimed Ciskei was not under apartheid authority. Led by the ANC and SACP (Ronnie Kasrils and Steve Tshwete), protesters attempted to break through a wall of security forces. The Ciskei Defence Force soldiers shot 28 and wounded over 400.

A bold point to consider with regards to these numerous cases of severe state violence aimed at protest is that even though not all protests were successful in achieving their aims, every single case experienced increased mobilization after the incident of repression. Soweto and Sharpeville had the most profound of effects, whereas other cases seemed to add fuel to the fire that drove immense state-supported violence.

**Discussion**

Thus far I have argued that coupled in with the causal effect of 1976 Soweto, the BCM achieved a political triumph which was tied to personal and psychological empowerment. It was the precise message and symbol of the BCM that got exemplified in the causal process in 1976 Soweto. The dislocation brought about by Soweto revealed the contingent nature of social reality and contradictions of apartheid discourse. Above all, Soweto became the historical grounds for which new identities could be forged. The mass protests of the 1980s were driven by the combination and interaction of these two above noted factors.

In a state filled with extreme violence that was present in every level of public and private life, the encouragement of peaceful resistance by the BCM helped to negate apartheid's demoralizing
and violent status quo. The BCM carried out this negation prior to the point in which direct and pragmatic implementation of nonviolence was implemented by protesters in struggles of the 1980s. The BCM also helped subjects to regain confidence and psychological strength. Under the project of apartheid, decades of subjugation and repression eliminated all personal freedoms and rights of both the individual and community. Hence, personal freedom was to be obtained and won outside the realms of state, something Steve Biko was well aware of in his journey to transform the consciousness of the oppressed. Diana Taylor in her analysis of Foucault’s conceptions of political freedom provides some critical insight into notions of subjective political freedom. Taylor argues that “Foucault captures the idea that freedom is not simply a matter of being left alone but also a matter of re-making ourselves into what we would like to be: freedom for, not just freedom from” (Taylor 2014, 79). This subjective freedom based around the notion of the black native subject that was articulated by the BCM helped the native population immensely. Johann de Wet notes that Steve Biko was an existentialist communicator: “Biko may be regarded as a foremost existentialist communicator during apartheid South Africa, and that his thoughts on meaningful and authentic existence remain relevant for confronting the vexing challenges facing contemporary South African communities” (de Wet 2013, 297).

The embodiment of Biko’s message was exemplified in Soweto and the actions of the young students who went to protest for their linguistic rights even under immense threat of state repression.

Nelson Mandela held that Biko’s influence could not be underestimated,

“One of the greatest legacies of the struggle that Biko waged - and for which he died - was the explosion of pride among the victims of apartheid. The value that black consciousness placed on culture reverberated across our land;
in our prisons; and amongst the communities in exile. Our people, who were once enjoined to look to Europe and America for creative sustenance, turned their eyes to Africa” (Mandela 2011, 138)

The ideas and messages of the BCM and the protest at Soweto meant more than a simple challenging of the state. Rather, they exemplified central antagonisms underpinning apartheid discourse as well as an alternative mode of being. The popular arguments that tells us the arrangement of a mass cooperative nonviolent force in the 1980s brought down apartheid, and that it was more rational for individuals to protest during this decade due to a large influx of resources, certainly are important historical observations. However, as I have argued throughout this study, other factors preceded these developments. For the mass protests of the 1980s to have occurred, the formation of an international anti-apartheid had to have been in place. Additionally, the structural underpinning of the apartheid project needed to be discredited and abandoned. The creation of the international anti-apartheid movement was a response to brutal events at Soweto. Soweto was organized and influenced by the BCM. The BCM was principally responsible for the re-empowering of a highly suppressed population that had for decades, been told that they were second-rate in comparison to a ruling minority.

The hegemonic dislocation at Soweto occurred due to a number of factors including BCM leadership and ideology and nonviolence. These path-dependent processes and events introduced in this paper offer a new explanation with regards to the downfall of apartheid. It is not the case that it was simply more rational to protest in the 1980s and hence, there were greater protests for this reason. Rather, after Soweto the international apartheid movement began and apartheid contradictions and antagonisms became visible. In response, the NP initiated an immense amount of reforms in order to attempt to modify and save its discourse. Nonetheless, even with greater political rights and the addressing of a large proportion of citizen grievances, protests still
continued to ensue with large-scale reach. The NP had initiated a vast amount of reforms, nevertheless, protests were still ravaging on. Popular historical and social scientific explanations of the downfall of apartheid emphasize the strategic actions of dissidents in the 1980s, and highlight the role of pragmatic nonviolence in their struggle against the state. By this time, however, the apartheid state was already in a deep state of dislocation and the discourse of the NP had been revealed as contradictory and antagonistic both domestically and internationally.

In the 1980s, there were many processes and acts of articulation that were being carried out by new opposition movements. The Charterist movement (tied to the United Democratic Front), articulated then developed what can be considered as a principal signifier of “democracy” to purposefully include an array of demands in the form of a non-racialized democratic emancipatory force (Howarth 1997). A chain of equivalence was established, and a logic of difference was aimed at the repressive NP regime. An articulation of an equivalent force by political opposition will contain social demands that are fortified into shared aims in the form of a common identity in the form of the people. When this occurs, this enables opposition to construct their own antagonisms that usually get manifested between a hegemonic and objective reality containing “us” (democratic people) versus political enemies “them” (NP). Prior to this, Steve Biko articulated a logic of equivalence that first emancipated the native black population. After Soweto, and into the 1980s, a revitalized native population, along with all of the other segments of South African society were protesting together not as separate apartheid constructed races, but as a unified symbol representative of the people.
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This article is a forthcoming publication in the academic journal – *The Journal of Civil Society*, 2016

**Repression, Spontaneity, and Collective Action: the 2013 Turkish Gezi protests**

**Abstract**

Scholars have identified various conditions that influence the formation of spontaneous collective action. Certain types of opposition strategies and geographic conditions make it likelier for protesters to be able to overcome reactive repression and keep mobilizing after experiencing state violence. As such, it is still unclear why a small protest sometimes diffuses into an unforeseen mass wave of dissent. Through examination of Turkish civil society, this study introduces a framework to explain the emergence of the 2013 Gezi protest which was the largest in the AKP government-led era of Turkish politics. A sequence of mechanisms including viral diffusion, elite updating/cover-up, public outrage, and coordination are categorized and linked to previously identified antecedent conditions as well as Twitter activity of social movement organizations which partook in the protests. The framework advances our knowledge of repression backfire by identifying its causal mechanisms and classifying a configuration of conditions under which the phenomenon is likely to empirically take place in.
Introduction

The 2013 Gezi protests were the largest civilian uprisings in the last decade of Turkish politics. Beginning in late May and lasting until September 2013, upwards of 3.5 million protesters demonstrated in 79 different cities which amounts to nearly 5 percent of the 77 million inhabitants of Turkey. This wave of dissent took place just two years after the Arab Spring in a political era wherein neoliberalization and censorship have played key roles in boosting the electoral standing of the strong-handed AKP regime (Justice and Development Party/Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). Before this protest was triggered, an unanticipated scenario arose when activists occupied a historic urban Park in Istanbul to prevent its bulldozing and reconstruction. Adhering to nonviolent direct action, protesters suffered from police violence. Repression backfired when scenes from the Park began to go viral through domestic and international networks. In the following months, a mass anti-governmental movement formed. Security organs repressed non-institutional dissent by killing 11, injuring over 8,000, and arresting thousands.

The aim of this study is to provide an explanatory account of the 2013 Gezi Park protests through a process model based around antecedent conditions and a sequence of mechanisms. Social movement scholars in recent years have emphasized that spontaneity plays an underappreciated role in the dynamics of collective action. Spontaneous protest events usually transpire in contexts with little hierarchical organization and under certain ecological, spatial formations as well as conditions of uncertainty (Snow and Moss 2014). On the other hand, theorists of nonviolence have highlighted that repression backfire can occur when a nonviolent movement meets a repressive state (Sharp 1973). Quantitative research has revealed that nonviolent civil resistance provides protesters with greater odds of overcoming state repression than violent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Additionally, social movements that
engage in building media institutions that run parallel to state institutions also have a higher likelihood of experiencing repression backfire than those who do not (Sutton et al., 2014).

On the micro-level, scholars have argued that there are two necessary conditions which must be in place for repression to be able to backfire. First, there has to be an audience to perceive an act of state repression as unjust. Second, media/network capability has to be in place to circulate the act (Hess and Martin 2006). After a given public incident of repression, political leaders will try to cover-up the action and articulate attempts to justify governmental violence, and offset protesters (Martin 2007). While scholars of Turkish politics have been correct to point out that the Gezi protests were propelled due to an arrangement of factors including unlawful neoliberal appropriation of public property, state sanctioned violence, and complicity of media outlets (Ertür 2014), hitherto, it is still not clear why the biggest anti-governmental protest in AKP-led Turkish history arose when it did. Along these lines, why do some acts of repression turn out to spur not only greater spontaneous mobilization, but a mass wave of collective action?

The framework introduced in this study offers a comparative and theoretical grounding to help answer this question. While a significant amount of attention has been paid to preemptive and reactive repression being inflicted on large ongoing social movements and campaigns, less consideration has been given to the formation of spontaneous mass waves of dissent. The concept of backlash, if theorized as an empirical causal process of repression backfire can offer new insights into the dynamics of collective action and spontaneity.

The following sections contain a synopsis of previous studies covering protest and repression backlash. This is followed by an overview of various characteristics of Turkish civil society and the underlying motives behind the protests of Gezi Park. A process model is then introduced
along with a discussion of antecedent conditions. Antecedent conditions are linked to four mechanisms: viral, cover-up, moral/public outrage and coordination. These mechanisms and conditions are supported by information on events that took place during the protests and to the Twitter activity of activist groups. Counterfactual reasoning is then carried out with reference to three other cases in order to provide methodological soundness to the framework. This helps to elucidate why other interactions involving protests and repressive security forces in previous years did not result in the formation of a mass anti-governmental movement.

**Protest, spontaneity, and repression backlash**

Throughout this study, I will draw from concepts found in both sociological and political science-based studies of protest and repression. My aim here is to put forward a general framework that helps to explain how large anti-governmental demonstrations can form under spontaneous conditions in reaction to state repression. The emergence of a given social movement usually occurs due to the use of its disruptive tactics (McAdam 1993). For a movement to be able to survive, it must leverage and experiments with non-institutionalized protest or institutionalized power. Governments will also attempt to neutralize protest behaviors. These processes are referred to as tactical interaction by McAdam (1993). While I do not disagree that tactical innovation is a strong explanatory concept when it comes to general social conflict, this present study is concerned with protest-state events and the earlier temporal stages and dynamics of protest formation.

Put differently, my aim here is to investigate how endogenous factors influence the formation of spontaneous collective action specifically through the concept of repression backfire (Hess and Martin 2006; Sutton et al., 2014). Hence, I do not engage with the political opportunity structure
framework. Opportunity structures are changes (often exogenous), that take place in a given political environment which then are assumed to influence the chances of success for social movements. Repression backfire is a decidedly endogenous process that often leads to greater revolt, but it is also a contingent process in the sense that it does not determine the entire spectrum of social movement success. Additionally, repression in some instances, does not backfire but rather leads to a shutting down of dissent either temporarily or permanently for the involved activist group.

Social movement scholars have long held an interest in explaining why large anti-governmental movements form under what may appear to be unprompted scenarios. The concept of spontaneity, however, has not received a significant amount of consideration until recently. Snow and Moss (2014) argue that a central reason why spontaneity has not received as much attention as say, organization, is because social movement dynamics have been too often treated as binary in nature (organization versus spontaneity). In their study Snow and Moss contend that spontaneity is not a routine or random phenomenon when it comes to collective action. Rather, spontaneity is most likely to be influential under certain conditions which include: absence of protest/group hierarchy; presence of uncertain/ambiguous events; behavioral/emotional priming; and ecological/spatial contexts and constraints. These factors are not exhaustive and are argued to interact in the empirical world during protest-state events. Nonhierarchical protest association can foster spontaneity and strengthen the possibility for deliberative democratic processes to occur (Snow and Moss 2014, 1129). Nonhierarchical protests are often breeding grounds for the potential formation of further spontaneous collective action.

Uncertain and ambiguous events on the other hand, also make spontaneous collective action probable. For example, when a once negotiated-script breaks down and goes through dissolution,
ambiguities are associated with the result and spontaneous action can emerge. A negotiated script is a set of general guidelines that are understood by actors while in a public space. Once a script gets disrupted or goes through dissolution, ambiguity about whether an event has ended or is still open will arise, and this in turn can create a ripe base for spontaneity. A script can also dissolve and collective action can still occur during non-scripted square-offs such as in the aftermath of a given rally (Snow and Moss 2014, 1132). Furthermore, the condition of behavioral and emotional priming becomes salient during breakdowns and dissolutions of script. What occurs after scripts dissolve is not simply random argue Snow and Moss, but is dictated by prior priming experiences and preexisting sentiments. It is specifically noted that “priming refers to an increased sensitivity to certain stimuli due to prior experiences” (Snow and Moss 2014, 1134).

Protesters will often rely on previous master frames and ideas that were utilized or remembered from past experiences. The final factor of the four has to do with geography. The location of where protest events take place in is of great importance not only for the communicational possibilities of protesters, but due to the meanings that get attributed to popular historical areas by individuals. Spatial characteristics can influence mobilization especially when protests take place in well-known parts of an urban area. These four conditions contribute to the potential activation of spontaneous collective action. They can be influential at different points of time in the general activities of protests and social movements (Snow and Moss 2014, 1138). An important point here has to do with general spontaneous actions that get associated with ambiguity. When this occurs, there is a strong prospect that violence will break out. When violence does arise, it is imperative that dissidents adhere to nonviolent principles.

Gene Sharp (1973) was one of the first to emphasize the significance that nonviolence has for protesters to be able to withstand repressive state actions. In some cases, protesters that adhere to
nonviolence whilst facing state coercion (whether gun shots, pepper-spray, physical intimidation, beating, etc.) will trigger what Sharp referred to as a “political jiu-jitsu.” Hess and Martin (2006) revisited the concept of jiu-jitsu and articulated a “backfire” framework. Backfire was applied to general events involving government-agents, and episodes in which excessive force was exerted on citizens. The chief contribution of Hess and Martin’s study was the introduction and conceptualization of the two earlier noted necessary conditions (media presence to circulate repressive acts; audience to perceive act as unjust). Sutton et al., (2014) further examined backfire through statistical data. Here attention was focused on the question of whether social movements that build their own media-institutions have a higher likelihood of withstanding state repression than those who do not.

It was discovered that nonviolent protests which engage in the creation of their own media infrastructures do have a greater prospect of experiencing the fruits of repression backfire. This line of thinking is also prevalent in Francisco’s (2004) study in which 31 urban massacres were investigated. Francisco argued that protesters need to be able to have sufficient communication with one another in the wake of a state massacre. Moss (2014), along similar lines, through a case study of 2011 Jordan, observed that activists which experienced soft repression (discrimination, arrests, forceful closure of access to public areas), used events of this sort as chances to communicate with officials. More severe forms of repression on the other hand, were communicated via activist alliance networks which in turn led to the regime lessening its abuse of citizens. This resulted in eventual protest-state bargaining processes which Moss refers to as contained escalation. In 2013 Gezi Park, contained escalation never was established. A mass spontaneous formation of mass collective action was triggered. This occurred as a result of endogenous factors and under a specific configuration of conditions and mechanisms.
**Gezi Park, an unexpected uprising**

Gezi Park is in central Istanbul. Its large green trees stand nearby Taksim square which is not only historic, but also is one of the most symbolic areas of Turkey. In 2013, then prime minister (and now President of Turkey), Recep Erdoğan had vested interests in an urbanization project in Gezi. The aim was to turn the historic Park into a major business spectacle comprised of shopping sectors along with a Mosque. Transforming Taksim would heighten Erdoğan’s drive for political dominance and ascendance to Ottoman emperoresque power argues Navaro-Yashin (Navaro-Yashin 2013). Yet, during the attempt to urbanize and construct a shopping mall in Gezi, a spontaneous revolt ensued that brought together individuals from a variety of different backgrounds, classes, societies, and political affiliations. The protest of that summer grew to be the largest in the entire history of the AKP regime’s tenure in government (2002-present). Gezi Park became a focal point for a larger anti-government movement that attracted an “unprecedented” amount of groups such as nationalists, the radical left, Alevi, the LGBT community, anarchists, worker unions, student organizations, non-Muslim groups (Yıldırım 2013).

Events began on May 27, 2013 when word got out that trees would somehow be demolished in Gezi. A small group of dissidents attempted to save the forestry of the Park. During nighttime at around 23:00 on May 27, activists implemented nonviolent direct action to blockade the development project. This initial demonstration at Gezi was coordinated by a small environmental group called Taksim Solidarity (Taksim Dayanışma). It had mobilized light support in response to environmental grievances over the past year and a half leading up to Gezi. When activists gathered at the Park and saw that bulldozers were approaching, scripts became disfigured and ambiguity ensued. Early in the morning of May 28, additional nonviolent
dissidents gathered at Gezi. It was here when a critical event occurred. Police armed with water cannons, tear gas, and pepper spray charged in to disperse the protest crowd (NBC News 2013).

An environmental activist by the name of Ceyda Sungur was photographed being attacked by police: As was stated by the widely followed online resistance group’s (@showdiscontent) twitter profile, @showdiscontent, “the woman in red becomes the icon of the movement”. This image is widely accessible and can be found on any given internet search engine if one searches “woman in red pepper-sprayed.” The following morning, on May 28, people began to sit in the Park in attempt to stop the project from moving forward. Many civilians drew political demands on large sheets of paper as well as cloth banners. Hundreds were dancing and singing peacefully in a demonstration that was aimed at saving Gezi from governmental-led ideas of urbanization (Navaro-Yashin 2013). According to one Turkish scholar, “The uprisings that caught the AKP government off-guard brought together an unlikely body of people from all walks of life for the first time in recent memory” (Kuymulu 2013). By the third day following the repressive pepper-spraying of nonviolent activists, an urban uprising ensued in Istanbul and spread to other cities. Banners were being designed by protesters with representations of the pepper-spraying image (Sherlock 2013). As Basak Ertür argues,

“Gezi was quite legibly a revolt against a pillar of AKP’s “growth miracle”: recklessly unsustainable development enabled by arbitrary relaxation of environmental legislation and sometimes by outright non-implementation” (Ertür 2014, 2).

According to Taksim Solidarity, by the month of July, the movement grew to be comprised of 124 trade unions, political groups and community associations that sought to protect Gezi Park from untransparent redevelopment.
Urbanization and citizen discontent leading up to Gezi

State connected institutions are heavily infused into networks containing actors in local government throughout Turkey and especially in Istanbul. The latter have helped the AKP to oversee de-regulated urban projects. Members of the AKP over the last decade have frequently emphasized how their support of neoliberal economic development programs has improved the quality of life for Turks. As Recep Erdoğan noted in a party speech:

“Distinguished friends, We are talking about a well-appointed hospital with 167 rooms. I am asking for the love of Allah, did we have such hospitals and scenes in Turkey before? The quality of our public hospitals is also increasing” (AKP 2013).

The Mass Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) and Privatization Administration have supervised a significant amount of urban transformations (Türkün 2011). The TOKİ, with aid from the AKP, has engaged in acts of flattening and literally bulldozing entire underprivileged neighborhoods (Lovering and Türkmen 2011). Kadir Yildirim points out that Erdoğan has control over a discretionary fund called Ortulu Odenek in which money can be allocated to special programs with little oversight or checks and balancing from other governmental actors (Yildirim 2013).

Yildirim also notes that firms such as: Limak Holding AK, Cengiz Holding AS, Kolin Insaat, Mapa AS and Kalyon Group are all very closely tied to the AKP regime. This is highly significant due to the fact the latter of these groups (Kalyon) was the firm that was overseeing the proposed construction and transformation of Gezi Park into a large-scale shopping and business development project (Hurriyet Daily 2013). Gezi Park was set to be reconstructed and the Ataturk Cultural Center “would be demolished and a mosque would be built” (Eslen-Zyia and Erhart 2015, 476). Additionally, as Aslı Igsiz points out, recent changes in law abolished
numerous independent institutions by disabling an independent commission to oversee environmental projects. Here power was re-shifted into the Ministry of Environment and Urban planning. Similar tactics were used by the AKP in regards to independent scientific environmental institutions as well as institutions that have to do with the stock market (Ozkirimli 2014, 28).

**Causal process of repression backfire**

Throughout my time researching the Gezi protests and following live Twitter-based protest activity, I was able to draw upon real-time information regarding reactive state repression that was experienced by protesters throughout different parts of Istanbul and cities in Turkey. Additionally, by drawing upon a variety of scholarly articles, English/Turkish newspaper articles, NGO reports, and Twitter accounts, a precise ordering of information of the events at Gezi was compiled then incorporated into this study. For Twitter content that will be introduced in subsequent sections, I specifically utilized the Twitter analytics tool referred to as twitonomy (twitonomy.com). This tool provides a comprehensive database of every active Twitter profile that had tweeted information related to the protests in the specific time period which they took place in. Databases of personal (profile) tweets as well as retweets that were sent by a given protest group or influential activist were drawn upon.¹

This causal process of repression backfire is based on logic that compliments popular notions found in qualitative comparative analysis in which the presence (or absence) of certain causal conditions are assumed to account for whether a given outcome will occur in the empirical

¹ The website “showdiscontent.com” contains a recorded timeline of the first 19 days of dissent at Gezi. A comparable detailed timeline (and report) is accessible in the Amnesty International’s analysis of the protests (Amnesty, 2014, p. 54).
world. The outcome under attention here is repression backfire. Backlash occurs when governments fail to successfully repress political opposition in preemptive and reactive ways. Importantly, I do not seek to generalize this framework’s concepts and sequences onto the entire duration of a mass civilian uprising or potential later occurrences such as revolution, civil war, among others. The framework is created for the purposes of specifying dynamics relevant to protest-state interactions. Most of these interactions, will be small-scale exchanges that are experienced by protest groups in very early stages of social movement development or before a social movement develops at all. The model can be applied to instances involving soft state repression (arrests, pepper-spray, beatings), as well as severe repression such as blatant killing and the usage of live ammunition. In the contemporary era of protest, most cases will involve state security forces using softer forms of repression and coercion to disperse protests with aid of pepper-spray and tear gas. This does not mean however, that fatalities cannot result from say tear gas canisters being launched into crowds of activists.

The model is displayed in figure 1 below. On the left hand side, six antecedent conditions are identified (nonhierarchical protest; urban/spatiality; priming; event ambiguity; nonviolence; media institution building). When state repression is inflicted on protesters in public areas, under these antecedent conditions, repression backfire is likely to get triggered. Importantly, these conditions are not deterministic in the sense of one causal factor needing to be in place before another. All six conditions interact with one another within a given context and foster the grounds for the triggering of the following four mechanisms (viral; public outrage; elite updating; coordination). These mechanisms operate in an accelerated nonlinear progression. They shed light on the micro-dynamics of repression backfire by mapping the actions that protesters and government actors take during this process.
Nonhierarchy in a protest is one of six antecedent factors that make it probable for both soft and severe forms of state repression to backfire and lead to greater spontaneous collective actions. In late May of 2013, after the pepper-spraying of activists took place, the original movement of Taksim Solidarity openly diffused into a wide spectrum of participating sectors of society. By encouraging civic participation and nonviolence, Taksim Solidarity enabled thousands of protesters to create their own resistance circles and networks that were associated with saving the park and combating harsh state sponsored violence. In Gezi and throughout dozens of Turkish cities, dissidents emulated the actions of Taksim Solidarity by utilizing nonhierarchical forms of communication to demonstrate (in a leaderless form) against what Eslen-Zyia and Erhart explain to be a one-man “leadership model” of the ruling AKP party (Eslen-Zyia and Erhart 2015, 484).

The condition of urban geography is of great importance to the process of repression backfire. This condition builds upon Hess and Martin’s (2006) notion of media capability. The proximity of Gezi Park to Taksim is relevant given it is in a metropolitan city (Istanbul). The presence of communicational networks (including the internet) as well as journalistic outlets in areas of this sort is significant. They enable citizens to communicate with one another to greater extent than arguably any previous point of human history. When combined with the historical and symbolic importance of the spatial characteristic of Gezi Park itself, the urban factor was influential in propelling a small protest into a mass anti-governmental uprising. Gezi Park, for many citizens of Turkey, is a public space that is one of the most symbolically representative of the founding of the Republic of Turkey (Navaro-Yashin 2013).

The condition of event ambiguity is influenced by different types of script breakdowns and dissolutions. In Gezi, a script breakdown occurred when bulldozers were brought in during the middle of the night in attempt to tear down trees in the Park. At this point, protesters did not back
down, but rather increased in numbers and the operation was brought to a standstill. Immense ambiguity and for some, confusion emerged in regards to what was supposed to happen next as the resistance began to grow into the following morning. The twitter account of protest organization “@occupytaksim” sent the following tweet out on May 30, 2013: “More than 10,000 to save the last green space in Taksim. #geziParki #occupygezi #GeziyeGeziyeKazanacagiz @ayagakalktaksim #direngeziParki”. Saving the Park, indeed was an ambiguous motivation. There also was no formal political structure that was in place to dictate the actions of potential newcomers that joined the initial Gezi demonstration. Gestures of solidarity arose organically during script dissolution. Solidarity and collective action was also driven by priming.

The condition of priming has to do with preexisting experiences and feelings. Previous tensions may influence the actions of both protesters and police during future contact. For the activists at Gezi and those that joined in by the thousands in the following days after the pepper-spraying act, a few very important prior experiences and emotions were cogent. On May 1, 2013, the government banned the sale of alcohol after early-evening hours (BBC 2013). There also had recently been a formal naming of a newly constructed Bridge after a historical Ottoman ruler (Yavuz Sultan Selim), who oversaw the massacring of Alevi populations centuries ago. Additionally, on the 1 of May 2013, a protest took place in Taksim square for the purposes of memorializing “May Day” of 1977 when 30 civilians were killed in Taksim. In anticipation of the protest, security forces dispersed over 40,000 police to block access to the square (Sezer 2013).

The protest turned violent when firebombs and rocks were thrown by dissidents while water cannons as well as tear gas were used by police. Tensions leading up to Gezi were high in
regards to the general cognizance that civilians and protesters had concerning recent untransparent government actions, the mass presence of police in popular areas of the city, and potential for police brutality. Also, the events at Gezi encouraged the usage of techniques that were earlier implemented by civil society organizations. As Yasemin Ipek Can points out, in the last decade of Turkish politics, a number of civil society organizations (CSO) have manifested themselves in order to protect individuals from “social evils” (Gambetti and Godoy-Anativia 2013, 94). This is vital given the Turkish state historically has struggled to establish a positive environment of civil and political participation for its citizens (Sener 2014, 72).

CSOs (such as the Educational Volunteers Foundation of Turkey), argues Ipek Can, have enabled citizens to influence existent problems that are not adequately addressed by the state. This is crucial as discourses of accountability and modernization (which were originally heavily advocated by the state), started being advocated from below by the CSO. Many of the volunteers that Ipek Can interviewed in her ethnographic study were in a civil position that, “transcends the state” or in other words, a position viewed to be more superior (Gambetti and Godoy-Anativia 2013, 97). Gezi turned out to be a perfect outlet for the organic formation of new activity that resembled the actions of CSOs. Furthermore, when police charged into the Park, it was of great importance that protesters adhered to nonviolent direct action.

Nonviolence is becoming increasingly implemented as a protest strategy in the contemporary digital age of protest. This is especially so with regards to the tactics of nonviolent occupation. Iain Atack (2012) defines nonviolence as “collective action outside the formal institutions or procedures of the state that avoids systematic or deliberate use of violence or armed force to achieve its political or social objectives” (Atack 2012, 8).
Figure 1
Beginning with Taksim Solidarity and their usage of nonviolent occupational methods, potential protesters and outside observers that heard about activism at Gezi were aware that violence was not intended to be used by protesters. Once state repression did occur, protesters did not respond with violence but rather tried to make others aware of the cruelty that was being experienced by unarmed civilians. For example, the twitter account of “TaksimSldrty” specifically retweeted other users” tweets that had to do with the status of safety at central protest sites in Gezi Park and Taksim Square in late May and early June. One particular retweet on June 5 involved the retweeting of the pepper spraying image: “RT @nycjim: Woman in Red update: Officer continued spraying as she turned away. Full photo sequence.” On May 31 the following was tweeted: “Please pay attention to the police terrorism in #geziPark!! Police attacks anyone who is headin to #taksim #occupyGezi”. The peaceful messages and discursive frames of Taksim Solidarity were exemplified through the photograph that went viral displaying the woman in the red dress turning a cheek to state violence.

The final of six antecedent conditions which influence repression backfire and the triggering of mechanisms is media institution building. Recall the earlier noted study by Sutton et al., (2014), in which the creation of media institutions by campaigns (ongoing social movements) was analyzed. When activists create their own printing presses, leaflets, radio stations, and in recent years, online networking platforms, state controlled and influenced media channels are not as effective in censoring unjust acts of repression. Media/network capability indeed have to be in place in order to circulate information about a given act of repression, but importantly, there also have to be uncensored modes of communication available. Protests that create their own communicational infrastructures enable members and potential new activists to send unrestricted messages and information to a superior extent when compared to those that rely on traditional
modes of communication. This condition will be referred back to by way of the coordination mechanism in the following section.

**Mechanisms of repression backfire**

The causal complexity of this process model is certainly high and this is due to the connection and force that antecedent conditions have on the four mechanisms which emanate afterwards. Mechanisms interact with one another and lead to the outcome which is repression backfire and a mass wave of dissent. By mass I am referring to an anti-governmental protest that comprises numerous different sectors of a given civil society. Such a protest is undeniably heterogeneous. The triggering of the following four mechanisms is likely when protests are repressed under antecedent conditions displayed in Figure 1 above.

*Viral*

The viral mechanism captures the ways that traditional and nontraditional forms of media enable a given act of state repression to be circulated. This mechanism builds upon one of the factors identified by Hess and Martin (2006). An incident of repression is likely to go viral when civilians who get repressed are nonviolent, dissent in an urban area, and also have their own communicational outlets which they can use to spread word about the act. In contemporary Turkey, many of the major press and media outlets are owned by what Ozkirimli argues are “family holding companies and such companies frequently attempt to maximize their profits in other enterprises” (Ozkirimli 2014, 34). It is of little surprise that state censorship was immense during the initial protest at Gezi. Some news presses, such as CNN Turk were broadcasting a penguin documentary while hundreds of thousands were on the streets protesting against the state (Öktem 2013).
The events at Gezi went viral through internet networks as well as international newspaper presses. A report by New York University’s *Social Media and Political Participation* laboratory reveals that in the span of the Turkish uprisings, around 22 million tweets were tweeted with the hashtags of #occupygezi, #direngeziPark and #geziPark being the most frequently mentioned phrases. In addition, around two to three million tweets were sent within Turkey after the tear-gassing and pepper-spraying of the Gezi Park activists on May 28 (SMAPP 2013). In the entire first half of the month of June, especially in the first five days, millions of tweets were sent by dissidents and observers who heard of violence at Gezi. 90 percent of the tweets were coming from within Turkey and half from Istanbul. Human rights organizations (such as Amnesty International) were informed of adverse acts of state repression at Gezi by protesters themselves (via social media), and afterwards put out reports in which they shamed the AKP regime.

When dissent began to spread to nearby areas such as Taksim Square, small shop and store owners enabled their Wi-Fi networks to be publically accessed. Gathering hubs later would persist in hidden underground venues and basements; especially in urban areas where access to information regarding police brutality was made available to civilians (O’Mahoney 2013).

*Public outrage*

The public or moral outrage mechanism is one that arguably is the most multifaceted of all mechanisms in the process of repression backfire. It is directly associated with priming, the spatial factor of where the act of repression takes place in, and the type of protest strategy used by those who got repressed. Underlying this mechanism, there are qualitative and meso-level meanings that need to be deciphered and explained. Prior to Gezi, the experiences of women in Turkish society were complex. The Turkish government expects women to predominantly pursue
motherhood and to bear at least three children for the economic development of the Turkish nation (Eslen-Zyia and Erhart 2015, 474). Under the AKP, there also have been governmental attempts to restrict abortions.

In Turkey, there exist numerous civil society organizations that in recent years have advocated a woman-oriented and empowering approach to social life. Governmental organizations on the other hand, have promoted strong handed ideas of family orientation argue Eslen-Zyia and Erhart. A noteworthy portion of the protesters that took part in Gezi were women and these women faced an “authoritarian state by reclaiming the public sphere, questioning their so-called womanly duties and rejecting their roles as housewives” (Eslen-Zyia and Erhart 2015, 484). The state repressing a nonviolent woman in an image that went viral, and the location of the repressive act outraged many observers and fostered a sense of collective emotion that was cast around Gezi Park. When content turns into feeling and emotion, it can have a profound consequence in dictating the actions of human beings.

Many Turkish (as well as international observers) became outraged in response to the May 28 incident of state violence that was experienced by unarmed protesters in Gezi. At the same time, this is also precisely why of the Turkish population (such as AKP supporters), did not join the Gezi protests (and their offshoots in over 70 other cities). The subjective feelings of individuals differ and those that experienced outbursts of anger and indignation were individuals that possessed a multiplicity of feelings that related to previous subjective experiences linked to Gezi, prior tensions having to do with earlier police violence that took place in May, the nontransparent urbanization of Gezi, repression of nonviolent protesters, the state coercion of a woman, as well as un-transparent state supported reconstruction of a site of immense ecological and cultural heritage.
Elite updating

During a process of repression backfire, government actors will update and calculate their further political actions. Hess and Martin (2006) and Martin (2007) place emphasis on how political rulers will attempt to deviously not reveal information about acts of repression in order to keep them from backfiring. Here it is argued that repression will get covered up, reinterpreted, and the personal lives of victims may also be attacked. This was indeed the case at Gezi, however due to the presence of numerous antecedent conditions as well as the triggering of the viral and public outrage mechanisms, elite actions were not successful in defaming nonviolent activists. On June 3, just a few days after the pepper-spraying incident Erdoğan stated, “This protest is organized by extremist elements; we will not give away anything to those who live arm-in-arm with terrorism” (Altayli and Yackley 2013).

Another statement made by Erdoğan included the following: “They attacked daughters who wear headscarves. They entered Dolmabahce mosque with their beer bottles and their shoes” (Los Angeles Times, 2013). During the first full month of protests (June), Erdoğan was attempting to discredit and deprecate the increasing oppositional movement but greater public anger ensued. At this point in time, the AKP was dictating and exploiting its monopoly over violence, and hence, similar to many other semi-autocratic and authoritarian governments, the AKP attempted to cover-up its exploitation of force. After over a month of protests, the following statement was made by the AKP deputy chair Ali Sahan,

“I believe those who have started these protests and are giving them direction/leading them are aiming to overthrow the government and remove it from office. But the security services and the cautious approach by the government have prevented those harbouring this aim from achieving it. I don’t believe they will attempt to engage in such action anymore” (Amnesty 2013, 40).
The statement above indicates that there was a clear misrepresentation and reinterpretation of police action that was argued to have been taking place on the ground by the AKP political leadership. The government was attempting to cover up the actions of urban police forces that were shooting and killing protesters with tear gas canisters. Just one day after the statement above was made and then published by a news outlet, a celebrated columnist by the name of Can Dündar was fired from the daily *Milliyet* (Hurriyet Daily 2013). By June 15, Gezi Park was cleared out by police. Demonstrations then spread and continued to be suppressed until August. Government denial to civilian peaceful assembly coincided with little justification or acknowledgement from AKP members. On the 15th of June, the Turkish minister for EU relations stated the following:

“I am specifically calling on all our citizens who have been giving support to these protests. They should return to their homes. Unfortunately, at this stage the state will have to consider every individual there [Taksim] as members of terrorist organizations.”

Further, just over a week later on June 24, Erdoğan stated,

“We will not let circles who have been adversaries of Turkey or international and national media to wear down our police. I and my government congratulate our police wholeheartedly. On behalf of my country and nation, I would like to thank all my police siblings for standing up against incidents that have been going on for weeks, with sacrifice and patriotism” (Hurriyet Daily 2013).

Governmental cover-up in the end did not work as more and more civilians partook in collective action. Participation was fueled by outrage and the diffusion of unprompted coordination by protesters.
**Coordination**

The mechanism of coordination causes protesters and observers to spread information regarding dissent and repression through communicational infrastructures. It is also influenced by the antecedent condition of nonhierarchy. The level of outrage at Gezi was immense and it later was channeled by protesters in an informative and nonviolent manner throughout numerous social networking sites including Facebook, Twitter, and personal blogs of activists. As one activist at Gezi explained,

“Gezi broke down the wall of fear. For the first time, people were disappointed when they were not in the Park for a police crackdown. Everybody wanted to be there, and support everybody else” (Letsh 2014).

For this to have been made possible and then to endure, civilians needed to be able to effectively coordinate with one another as well as with groups in asymmetric areas during a period of state censorship. The nonhierarchical nature of the original protest group that occupied Gezi Park paved way for a mass expansion of collective solidarity to form. Sociologist Zeynep Tufekci who was at the scene of the protests in Istanbul, argues that the general diversity of protesters that turned out wouldn’t have been able to be achieved without the social networking sites of Twitter and Facebook (Tufekci 2013). These were the specific platforms with which Taksim Solidarity communicated their message to hundreds of thousands of observers.

**Table 1 (below)**
The table above contains a near comprehensive list of Twitter profiles that were set up throughout the duration of the protests by activists. The first account (@taksimdayanisma) is the Turkish name for Taksim Solidarity and was created in 2012. Taksim dayanisma has over twice as many followers than any other protest organization that partook in the protests and it also
created an English Twitter account on June 3. The greater whole of Twitter organizations that engaged in online coordination and communication were set up following the pepper-spraying image and its dislocatory effect. Occupy Wall Street themed educational tents arose enabling newcomers to collaborate. Hundreds of protesters in Gezi were expressing grievances via art and symbolic satire in the form of street signs, graffiti, and political slogans (Dağtas 2013). The open setting of Gezi set the stage for coordination and cooperation.

Even though there exists a historical trend of closure and lack of access to civic life in Turkey (Findley, 2010), by 2013, this closure was defied via Gezi Park, nonviolent direct action, and utilization of alternative modes of communication. New activist groups emerged and stemmed from the original Taksim Solidarity movement such as Occupy Gezi Park. Civic engagement and voluntary participation at Gezi enabled portable mini libraries, child care facilities, and home cooked food to be incorporated into the protest. Medical facilities were also set up to provide aid for civilians who were injured by police. Many of the Twitter profiles/associates shown above strategically tweeted to spread information and awareness of violence. Some of this information contained short commands while other portions contained links to non-state censored blog posts and media articles.

Activists using twitter also responded directly to the statements of political leaders in exchanges of discourse surrounding elite updating and attempts at cover-up. On June 6, Occupytaksim directly addressed the government’s attempt at cover up by tweeting the following link: “RT @qwertzloatl: Erdoğan says people protesting are a bunch of militants, which is far from truth. #24saatiçindeistifaet #occupygezi http:…” Furthermore, the Twitter profile “OccupyGeziNews” directed its tweets to international outlets. Major human rights organizations (Amnesty) as well as international news agencies were informed of what was happening on the ground by the
strategic communication of protesters. For example, in reference to the death of a young man on June 6, a tweet was sent to BBC, “@BBCBreaking: 22-year-old man confirmed dead following unrest in southern #Turkey city of Antakya – governor’s office”. Also on the same day a tweet was sent to Al Jazeera English: “@AJEnglish: Workers strike in support of Turkey protests”. On June 21, the following was tweeted, “Authoritarian response to mass protests has weakened the once all-powerful PM @istanbuldaneler #direngezi #occupygezi.”

The Twitter account “@penguinatgezi” is a fascinating instance of how protesters not only responded to the state media censorship but overcame direct state-sponsored media cover up. While there were hundreds of thousands on the streets of Istanbul, CNN Turk was broadcasting a penguin documentary. On June 5, the twitter account of @penguinatgezi” posted the following: “show your solidarity with the Turkish protestors, take a picture with penguins and a #direngeziParkı sign @TheBronxZoo @sandiegozoo”. This attracted solidarity from audiences in asymmetric areas, for example, “#ДАНСwithme Solidarity with Bulgaria from Turkey! You can do it! #direnBulgaristan #OccupyGezi #DirenGeziParkı Bulgarian direniyor, destek.”

Protests continued on until late August then simmered down in early September. Already by the 2 of July, a Turkish court issued a decree which would formally end the reconstruction project of Gezi Park (Jean Yackley 2013). The process model above sheds new light on how certain factors influenced the formation of a large anti-governmental uprising.

**Counterfactual reasoning**

In order to provide methodological soundness to this study and to the causal process model of repression backfire, counterfactual reasoning must be carried out. Counterfactual analysis or reasoning is a central tool used in qualitative thinking as well as in qualitative-comparative
analysis (QCA). In natural experiments, the control group is what constitutes the counterfactual (Patton 2014, 598). For much of the social sciences and qualitative-based social inquiry, counterfactual reasoning means that researchers will ask something along the lines of “what would have happened hypothetically, without the cause or intervention?” A goal here is to assess other cases that possess a condition or combination of conditions which differ from those introduced in one’s theoretical model. This may be accomplished through reference to most different cases or through hypothetical nonexistent phenomena.

Analyzing every protest that took place in recent Turkish history is not an intention of this study but rather, protests that share similar characteristics as well as differ in their characteristics such as protest hierarchy/organization, protest strategy, among others will be briefly investigated. The 2009 and 2011 Kurdish protests as well as the 2013 May-day protests were significant events that involved protesters being reactively repressed in public areas. In December of 2009, the Turkish constitutional court banned the DTP (Kurdish Democratic Society) political party. Protests then formed and endured for the course of a week. During the initial portion of these 2009 protests, specifically in the first five days, protesters threw rocks, molotov cocktails as well as other items at security forces throughout major urban areas in Turkey such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. Similar activity was occurring in southern regions of the country.

Hundreds of protesters were arrested and several were killed. The state however, was able clamp down on dissent rather effectively. In this case, the vital antecedent condition of nonviolence was absent as were the conditions of media institution building, nonhierarchical protest, and event ambiguity. The protest was connected to MPs which were part of the Kurdish political party who walked out of parliament in protest after their party was banned (Al Jazeera 2009). Additionally, after banishment there was very little ambiguity in regards to what would happen afterwards.
Further discrimination against the Kurdish portion of the Turkish population was evidently taking place. A study by Cenk Saraçoğlu shows that throughout western cities in Turkey, Kurds are considered to be scavengers, benefit seekers, and responsible for neighborhood disorder (Saraçoğlu 2010). This is the binary opposite of the hard working, AKP voter aimed at progressing oneself through material development.

In recent years, the Kurdish minority in Turkey have increasingly suffered from what Zeynep Gambetti explains to be violent responses (mob violence) cast on the Kurds by certain segments of the Turkish population (Gambetti and Godoy-Anativia 2013, 129). Social violence has broken out along state dictated ideological fault lines and most politicians, argues Gambetti, portray lynching as a justifiable outburst of anger (Gambetti and Godoy-Anativia 2013, 135).

Furthermore, the 2011 Kurdish protest contained different dynamics than the protest of 2009 due to the presence of exogenous forces, exogenous forces as well as political opportunity structures (Arab Spring). It occurred in March of 2011 during the height of the Arab Spring. Led by the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), tens of thousands protested against censorship and the government’s ill-tactic of affiliating the BDP with the PKK (another Kurdish party that is banned and labeled as a terrorist organization). A diffusion of dissent at this time was going on in much of the Middle East, but unlike Libya and Egypt, the government in Turkey was able to strategically plan a successful response to the BDP’s initiation of nonviolent direct action.

While protesters did use nonviolence, the 2011 Kurdish protests failed to attract a greater following from the Turkish population after dissidents interacted with police. Events began on March 24 when the Peace and Democratic Party (BDP) called for its members to adopt nonviolence and civil disobedience. The beginning act of dissent was set to take place in the South Eastern city of Diyarbakır (institutkunde 2011). Security forces were deployed along with
army affiliates. In this instance, a spontaneous burst of mass collective action did not ensue after police repressed protesters in Diyarbakır. This case was missing the antecedent conditions of nonhierarchical organization and event ambiguity. The protest differed from Gezi as there were no occupational methods implemented. The formal organization of the BDP did not allow impromptu contributions to be made by activists on the street. When impromptu actions and dynamics are encouraged in events, new participants have a greater prospect of engaging in informal calls to action (Snow and Moss 2014, 1128).

The above two protests certainly were linked to Kurdish issues and the larger Kurdish social cleavage in Turkey. The May day protest of 2013 however, was a demonstration that was not linked to the Kurdish issue. Here protesters suffered from coercion while attempting to commemorate a historical day of state repression. Over 3,000 protesters were denied access to Taksim square by armed security forces. In a heated exchange, protesters threw metal objects, homemade firebombs and rocks while police responded with tear-gas and rubber bullets. A civilian photographer (Nelson Klein) captured many images of protest-police clashes on his camera. Riot police also used water cannons to keep hundreds of protesters away from all entrances to Taksim. Reportedly 22 members of the police were injured. Dozens of civilians were also physically hurt as well as one AFP news agency photographer (Reuters 2013). Many of these clashes took place on small side streets near Taksim in which there was no symbolic or meaningful area for more than a handful of activists to gather and implement direct action or occupation strategies.

The protest tactics used by some of the dissidents during the May day demonstration did not provide potential protesters with proper avenues to come and join a peaceful demonstration. Importantly, the antecedent condition of event ambiguity was absent. Security forces were able
to plan for the May day protests by shutting off access to Taksim with a force of 40,000 geared urban police.

**Discussion**

While no immediate radical social change occurred, the demolishing of Gezi Park was cancelled at the height of the protests. Two years after during the 2015 general election, it at first appeared that a blow was dealt to the AKP as the first hung parliament emerged in Turkey since 1999. The AKP failed to secure a majority in parliament for the first time over its decade long electoral dominance. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) emerged and gained around 12 percent of the popular vote. The HDP is a party that claims to represent many affiliates that were involved at Gezi such as women groups, environmentalists, Alevis, among others. However, since the original June 2015 election produced a hung parliament, votes were later recast in November. In the November election, the AKP once again won a majority which principally wiped out the June result.

The AKP still has a significant amount of support and their platform of governance which is heavily reliant upon coercion, threats, and negative political discourse continues to be successful. Throughout this study, I have put forward a framework to help understand how mass collective action can form in response to repression backfire through focusing on mechanisms and the presence of a detailed configuration of antecedent conditions. The case of 2013 Gezi Park sheds light on the ways in which a seemingly small protest can turn into a large anti-governmental revolt within a civil society that subsists in oppressive and controlled urban settings.

An important implication of this study has to do with nonviolence and protest strategy adherence. A popular idea held by conflict scholars such as Lichbach (1987), has to do with the
hypothesis that protesters will turn to violence when they experience state repression that comes in consistent forms. The special aspect about the Gezi protests is that even when facing harsh state repression and numerous threats as well as police usage of tear gas, pepper spray, rubber bullets, and arrest, the greater whole of protesters still adhered to nonviolent direct action. When compared to the May 1, 2013 protest as well as the 2009 and 2011 Kurdish protests, the conditions underpinning Gezi significantly differed. By relating antecedent conditions which were present in Gezi, but not in these other cases, counterfactual cases have been considered.

This has shed light on the importance that previously identified variables in multidisciplinary literatures have in triggering the causal process of repression backfire and more broadly, for the potential for a mass anti-governmental revolt to form at any given moment featuring a protest-security force interaction. In all four cases, protesters were coerced and repressed either by pepper-spray, water cannons, rubber bullets, or tear gas. Only one of the cases nevertheless, resulted in the spontaneous formation of a mass wave of dissent. Gezi was influenced by a salient configuration of antecedent conditions which were in place when protesters were repressed by police. This triggered four mechanisms which have been categorized in the process model. The mechanisms advance our knowledge of why repression backfires. They also offer a more in-depth and methodologically strenuous explanation of repression backfire than previous literature but at the same time, this study in no way contradicts earlier work.

This study advances our knowledge and compliments the popular study put forward by Snow and Moss (2014), in which scholars recommended that we shift away from the popular binary classifications of spontaneity/organization, and instead turn our attention to the conditions under which spontaneous collective action is most likely to be form. The framework introduced in this study has shown that repression backfire is a complex and highly conjunctural causal process
that is influenced by a number of variables and mechanisms. This causal process, its mechanisms as well as various protest conditions warrant further empirical investigation. Specifically, scholars are encouraged to further investigate endogenous factors that underpin common protest-state events. The conditions and mechanisms introduced in this study will continue to be relevant theoretical factors for decades to come in the contemporary digital age of protest.
References


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The Repression-mobilization Puzzle: a Configurational Analysis of Political Massacres

Abstract

Under harsh circumstances, does political repression deter mobilization or increase it? In this study, fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is utilized to address the long stemming puzzle of the repression-dissent nexus. I argue that there exist historically salient factors which are responsible for whether a protest will experience increased mobilization after repression. Yet, hitherto scholars have failed to consider the temporal, asymmetric and conjunctural nature of causation in regards to the effect that repression has on protest mobilization. Through analysis of 44 severe cases of repression, this study reveals that single conditions are not sufficient or necessary in bringing about post-repression mobilization. Instead, there exist configurations of conditions which indicate that threatening protests which are also nonviolent, diverse, and take place in a metropolitan area are inclined to experience post-repression mobilization in comparison to protests that have most different characteristics. Counterfactual along with cross-case analyses give support to these findings and offer a new explanation in regards to the question of how protesters survive government repression.
Introduction

State repression has manifested itself through many forms in the last two centuries of social movement history. Government sponsored security forces ranging from cavalry to modern high-tech geared task forces have suppressed popular rebellions in public setting. In some cases, however, repression, instead of shutting down protest has backfired and led to unexpected consequences for the repressor. Scholars have referred to such phenomenon as "political jiu-jitsu" or "repression backfire" in both qualitative and quantitative nonviolence literatures (Sharp 1973; 2005; Francisco 2004; Hess and Martin 2006; Martin 2007; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Sutton et al. 2014). This article tackles the age old question (albeit with a new theoretical lens) of whether repression deters mobilization or increases it? Specifically, in short duration and on the micro and meso levels, does repression increase mobilization or deter it? Under what conditions is this most probable to occur? We know that when dissent arises, state-sponsored security forces are likely to repress opposition. This has been labeled as a “law of coercive-responsiveness” (Davenport 2007). We still do not know however what happens immediately after a severe act of repression.

These questions tie into what has been labeled as the repression-dissent nexus or the repression-mobilization puzzle. The repression-dissent nexus has been investigated with attention being paid to either short term outcomes (Francisco 2004; Hess and Martin 2006; Sutton et al. 2014), or longer durations and patterns of social movement mobilization (Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998; Regan and Henderson 2002). The latter, Lichbach (1987) argued that repression increases dissent if it comes in consistent forms and forces individuals to turn away from nonviolent direct action.
On the other hand, Francisco (2004) analyzed 31 historical massacres and found that repression generally increased civilian mobilization if dissidents could effectively communicate with one another in the wake of a massacre. Along similar lines, Hess and Martin (2006) explored the ways in which political rulers will attempt to cover up repression to keep it from backfiring. A recent study by Sutton et al. (2014) quantitatively tested the effects that social movement communicational infrastructures have on the outcomes of repression backfire. It was argued that when unarmed social movements engage in parallel media institutions building, this significantly increases the likelihood of repression backfiring (Sutton et al. 2014, 561). Even considering the amount of times repression has backfired throughout historical struggles, there have been inconsistent results produced by a variety of studies.

This might indicate that the relationship between repression and dissent is much more complex than commonly assumed. To unravel this causal complexity in this article I utilize fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), and investigate discrete political protest massacres that took place during the period 1819-2014. This Medium-N set of cases provides diversity in regards to economic system, political system, geographic terrain, protest strategy type, protest threat level along with organization components of protest. The intuition behind my argument is that there exist observable commonalities which underpin empirical interactions between protest and state. These commonalities are relevant to the question of whether repression leads to increased mobilization or decreased dissent. It is not that violent movements simply breed greater violence and protest, and vice versa, nonviolent movements with their own communicational institutions are not the only factors that have to be in place for there to be increased mobilization after severe repression. Nonviolence must be present alongside other

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2 A detailed description of each case is listed in numerical order by year in the appendix of this manuscript.
relevant factors and variables. Particularly, the effect of state repression on protest mobilization is one that is nonlinear and highly asymmetric. I do not assume that there is only one condition (variable) or set of conditions which may be causal in bringing about increased mobilization, but instead there are various causal recipes that generate outcomes throughout the data under attention. Hence, the logic that underpins this analysis is that across historical time there have been certain conditions which have been causal in the short-term dynamics underpinning the repression-dissent puzzle; however they have yet to be adequately theorized and identified.

While large-N studies have tested the relationship between repression and dissent, they have not been able to capture the interactional effects that underpin the micro-dynamics of the repression-dissent nexus. Some studies also have a limited temporal breadth, e.g. short historical periods (such as 1989-2011) have only been investigated and in turn, this has left out significant attributes that are relevant to historical periods of political upheaval. In this study, conceptually, a most different systems design (MDSD) is implemented which enables variation to be taken into consideration when testing the impact that causal conditions (independent variables in statistical terms) have on the outcome of interest. Six causal conditions are calibrated and tested both exclusively and jointly on the binary outcome of increased mobilization. These conditions are 1) level of nonviolence, 2) media network, 3) geographic terrain, 4) campaign diversity, 5) campaign organization, and 6) protest threat level. The selection and calibration of these causal conditions enables this study to take into consideration the role of heterogeneous oppositional actors as well as circumstances of protest. In many previous studies that investigated the relationship between repression and protest mobilization, opposition was treated as a
homogeneous actor and labeled as a "dissident sector" or simply "dissidents" (Moore 1998; 2012).

This is noteworthy due to the fact that throughout the last few centuries of political struggles, there have existed diverse types of oppositional actors. I hypothesize that outcomes of protest-state interactions are very much dependent on a number of factors, especially actor variance as well as the conditions in which a given protest-state interaction takes place in. The effect of nonviolence (and other relevant factors), on protest mobilization after repression is not simply continuous but might only be able be observed in combination with the presence of other sufficient conditions.

Empirical tests carried out with fsQCA support the logic of my argument. Of all causal conditions, none can be labeled as necessary or sufficient. The relationship between repression and increased civilian mobilization cannot be explained by a single factor. When tested jointly, there are two causal configurations which help to explain historically salient cases that resulted in increased civilian mobilization after experiencing severe state repression. The results reveal that a threatening, diverse, and fully nonviolent protest movement which gets repressed in an urban metropolitan area has the greatest propensity of experiencing post-repression mobilization when compared to a variety of other types of similar and most different protests. These findings exhibit the historical power and salience of nonviolence as a protest tactic but importantly, nonviolence on its own is not a sufficient causal factor required for there to be increased mobilization. The causal pathways tell us that nonviolence has to be linked with the factors of campaign diversity, protest threat level, and urban geographic terrain in order to bring about
increased protest mobilization. To verify the methodological soundness of this pathway, I reflect on counterfactuals and conduct both within-case and cross-case analyses.

**Conceptualizing repression and mobilization**

Whether repression increases mobilization is a question that has long interested scholars of social conflict. Can dissidents continue mobilizing after repression? Or will a social movement get disconnected, put down, and dissolved due to state-sponsored violence and coercion? Generally, interactions between protest movements and state forces have been examined by way of regression-analysis or through formal game theoretic modeling. An underlying assumption relevant to this literature is that a given government can either accept or decline the demands of a protest group which may lead to either accommodation into the formal political system or result in the further repressing of dissent. Along these lines, scholars have focused on the concepts of protest threat and weakness. Earl (2003) argued that when a state perceives a given protest challenge to be weak, it will repress the protest whereas strong and threatening protests will be accommodated into the political system at hand (Earl 2003). Others have posited that protests which pose major threats and adopt highly confrontational tactics to challenge the interests of ruling groups are likely to face repression. Ayoub (2010) argued that threat is the most powerful indicator of whether a movement gets repressed. Inconclusiveness is a major issue in this literature and there even is somewhat of a contradictory nature to the question of whether repression increases or decreases dissent. This question has largely been investigated through annual or even longer term patterns of mobilization. For example, Sullivan et al. (2012) inspect temporal sequencing in the context of 1968-1973 Ireland and argue that when repression occurs
after a period of little dissent, backlash will follow and dissent will increase afterwards. In the same vein, when there already exist high levels of mobilization and protests get repressed, dissidents will retreat (Sullivan et al. 2012, 427). A conceptualization made in this present study has to do with the weaving together of the phenomenon of “repression backfire” into the repression-dissent nexus (also referred to as the repression-mobilization puzzle). My interest is in analyzing the short-term dynamics between repression and dissent via the political massacre. The concept of repression backfire dates largely back to Sharp's "political jiu-jitsu" developed in his typology of nonviolent direct action (Sharp 1973; 1980; 2005). Sharp demonstrated that when protest movements adopt nonviolent direct action strategies and suffer from state violence, a process of jiu-jitsu may occur which will leave the repressor in worse off political position. The outcomes of repression backfire contain increased domestic mobilization, international condemnation, NGO shaming, and security force defection. The first of these (increased domestic mobilization) is the outcome under attention in this study. Furthermore, Francisco (2004), attributed dissident ability to be able to communicate as the primary factor that enables protesters to overcome severe state repression. Here 31 massacres were investigated, whereas Sutton et al. (2014) analyzed 46 cases inflicted upon unarmed civilians, 21 one of which occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (Sutton et al. 2014, 566). In a qualitative study, Hess and Martin (2006) emphasized the importance of 1) a media presence and 2) audience to perceive incidents of violence as unjust in order for acts of repression to be able to backfire. In the same vein, Martin (2007) called to attention the importance of political rulers and their methods of covering up repressive acts.
Analyzing what happens immediately after severe state repression can provide valuable insight into longer durations of state repression and their effect on mobilization. As Koopmans (1997) notes, "the confrontation between protesters and repressive authorities is the most visible, concrete, and spectacular form of state-movement interaction" (Koopmans 1997, 149). A political massacre is the point of attention in this study and importantly, it differs from a genocidal one. A political massacre contains dynamics which are highly relevant for understanding what happens in short-term sequences between protests and state. Political massacres also have served as defining points in many historical struggles involving protest movements over the last two centuries. I define a political massacre as a discrete state or governor-sponsored act of violence that is inflicted upon a civilian group or movement in public setting. It involves the explicit challenging of protesters against authority whether that authority is on the local, provincial or state level.

**Theoretical insight**

This study concentrates on a temporally short and key outcome of repression backfire in increased mobilization. Scholars have tended to place focus on long (annual-based) trends of state repression and hence the micro-dynamics and causal complexity behind the repression-dissent nexus has not been adequately addressed. I argue that in order to understand the causal relationship between repression and mobilization, sequences (or cycles/waves) of mobilization must be theoretically disaggregated from the popular annual observatory period into differentiated and detailed events including severe repression, soft repression and preemptive repression. My analysis is based around severe state repression as this specific discrete form of
violence is one that is likely to occur after other forms of repression fail to work. Governments will also use soft repression and preemptive repression (Sullivan 2015). Severe repression importantly, is likelier to occur after soft repression and preemptive repression fail to stop oppositional dissent. Hence, by focusing on severe repression and isolating events of severe repression committed upon oppositional movements (political massacres), a true test of mobilization under harsh circumstances can be conducted. I hypothesize that there have been certain commonalities (based around nonviolent protest strategy) which have been responsible for state repression backfiring and leading to greater dissent since the rise of observable protest whether under Kings, Dictators or Presidents. During previous phases of theorization, I explored a single case in the context of the early twentieth century Russian Tsarist regime. Here I presented a new political process-model with mechanisms (public outrage, viral diffusion) of repression backfire that explained an incident of severe repression which led to the Russian Revolution of 1905. When a large nonviolent movement that is highly diverse gets repressed, the above noted mechanisms might get triggered and lead to transformative social outcomes. In order for this to happen, a protest movement must organize itself in attempt to form a logic of equivalence (a unified repressed people representative of popular opinion). This will enable it to garner heterogeneous support from a large segment of a given population. It must also widely advocate nonviolent direct action, engage in a plan to protest at a central geographical point of a given government, and adhere to nonviolence throughout its duration of rebellion. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argued, nonviolent civilian resistance provides greater prospects for individuals to join into less costly and uncertain modes of collective action (in comparison to violent). Nonviolence is of extreme importance in regards to the repression-dissent puzzle as it must precede even organization during earlier periods of when social movement leaders engage
in processes of articulation. Leaders need to proclaim a nonviolent strategy, organize and carefully plan what might appear to be a non-threatening protest aimed at a governmental stronghold which they are challenging (usually in a capital-hub). With this in mind, nonviolence, on its own might be insufficient in explaining why mobilization has ensued after state repression in diverse economic, political, and historical contexts. A protest must also be diverse and plan accordingly. When previously differentiated heterogeneous social demands and groups get articulated into a common "we" versus the antagonized "them" (state or governmental policy); state repression committed on such protests will likely be ineffective and certain causal mechanisms (public outrage) will get triggered. In other words, when the government or any form of governmental agent publicly massacres the "people" that it is in office to support (or claims to support), mobilization as well as other transformative effects have great propensity to ensue. Likewise, this does not mean that diversity is on its own sufficient, but rather, nonviolence, geography and other factors such as protest threat have to be complimentary. Alternatively, a slightly violent or fully violent movement will have greater chances of suffering from pre-emptive repression. A violent movement is prone to delve into complete violent conflict against the state after being repressed or it will expand all of its resources in its violent charge and be shut down. Such was the case in the South Korean 1980 Gwanju uprising. What's more, a violent protest will also have a lesser likelihood of drawing sympathy and outrage from domestic as well as international publics or in other words, it will have less ability to bring about the above noted causal forces and mechanisms of viral diffusion and public outrage.³

³ The mechanism of viral diffusion is one that operates on both the individual and collective levels. Individuals include protesters as well as potential observers domestically and internationally; while the collective level will include media organizations as well as NGO and Human Rights groups.
To test some of these assumptions, I have chosen six conditions in this study in order to identify 1) whether each condition on its own can be responsible for increased mobilization, and 2) whether various conditions when combined with one another can qualify as robust factors that need to be in place for social movements to be able to experience increased mobilization after suffering from severe state repression. These conditions are selected among the many possible theoretical conceptualizations one can make due to the following reasons. First, as I had mentioned earlier, in the literature, the dominant operationalization of "opposition" has led many researchers to include observations of protest groups as dissidents with homogeneous characteristics. The calibrated conditions presented in this study enable me to consider how different types of protest actors interact with state forces under varying protest conditions. What such a maneuver does is provide new empirical clarity and depth by being able to slightly quantify certain elements that might not be covered in large-N data sets. The chosen conditions cover a large set of protest types and in general, there is great heterogeneity in characteristics of cases and data that are being investigated in this study. Even with possible limitations such as there being omitted variable bias, the six conditions that are tested in this study cover the greater whole of relevant factors that one can observe when analyzing the micro-dynamics of protest-state interactions. They enable me to consider different types of protest strategies, threat levels, levels of campaign diversity, infrastructure, and geographic terrains. They also share similarity with some well known statistical variables that have been used in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset, but importantly, the technique of calibration makes it possible to consider and test varying levels of nonviolence, protest threat, among other relevant variables instead of treating them as dichotomous. I will shortly refer back to these conditions after introducing the data as well as the method that will be utilized for empirical testing.
Data and case selection

In this study 44 cases of severe state violence are analyzed which formally qualifies this analysis into a medium-N classification. There were 28 cases which experienced increased mobilization after severe repression and 16 which did not. To meet the criteria of a massacre, a protest movement or group had to have had suffered at least 15 civilian casualties in a challenge against the state or principal governor. Severe political repression indeed can manifest itself in more than one form however, by including cases in which 15 or more civilian casualties had to have occurred, this analysis captures major acts of severe repression that took place in very relevant political struggles across different regions of the world. While collecting and gathering the data at hand, I did not aspire to capture every single political massacre that took place over the last two centuries of history due to the fact that the cases and their characteristics that have been chosen do encompass a great deal of political, economic, and historical contexts. QCA is well suitable to capture event-based protest data. In addition, QCA requires that the researcher possess in-depth knowledge of all cases, and this is especially important for being able to code and calibrate the characteristics of each case for empirical testing. The outcome of interest is increased mobilization which has been coded according to whether there was greater mobilization that ensued after a repressive act either the next day or the following days. In many cases, protest movements were shut down for substantial durations of time, while in others, greater revolt ensued in robust forms.

Justification for coding cases according to this outcome has to be provided in order to make the outcome both more understandable, and to explain how this outcome relates to the repression-
dissent nexus as well as the phenomenon of repression backfire more broadly. In a formal theoretic study, Moore (1998), also selected events (as outcomes), in which the government or its military took action toward a dissident group. In this present study, the defining characteristics of the outcome of increased mobilization have to do with the simple observation of whether or not protesters who were part of the repressed, or observers/new participants, went out on the streets the following day. Indeed, this outcome can only capture what I argue is a very short-term dynamic. It also cannot capture the variance that often ensues after increased mobilization. For example, Tiananmen 1989 and Egypt 2013 both experienced increased mobilization, but the latter turned into significant political upheaval while the former was contained. The 1989 Tiananmen massacre indeed led to compelling international outcomes such as NGO-based condemnations, foreign-public shaming, and a number of other occurrences. Domestically, following the Tiananmen massacre, dissent was present the day following but the protests were not as profound or extended as in 2013 Egypt. In this latter case, immense political violence ensued after protesters were massacred.

The ways in which variance that is inherent to post-repression protest across the 44 cases was observed and then coded can be summarized by the following factors. Since each case under attention in this paper is a case that has had significant historical and contemporary attention drawn towards it, information (specific page numbers), was available to draw on an investigate from a large number of sources. These sources, first-person accounts, primary historical texts, newspapers, NGO reports, memoirs, among other sources provided information that specifically included what materialized the following day/days after the severe act of repression. Throughout the course of researching over 40 cases and then coding their characteristics, I have come to the
conclusion that over the last two centuries of history, after a major act of public repression, historians, journalists, nongovernmental organizations tend to note, political elites, and public observers tend to either fully describe, or at least mention the circumstances that followed at the place of murder after a given political massacre had occurred. After a massacre, were protests nulled? What was going on in the streets the following days? Did relatives, friends and family members come to the place of murder to mourn their loved ones? Or were the streets clear of civilians? Outside (members not apart) of the primary actor group that suffered from state repression, were others demonstrating in support of the deceased?

The outcome was coded according to whether either the 1) primary actor group kept protesting; or if 2) non-affiliated members began protest in support of the deceased. These two guidelines were taken into consideration and were observed on the domestic level. To be precise, these two factors were observed in not only the exact place of massacre (such as a boulevard of a capitol city), but its surrounding streets, surrounding metropolitan provinces, and the whole of the domestic context of the state in which the act of repression occurred in. Take for example the 1819 English Peterloo Massacre. When hundreds of thousands of nonviolent women, children, and workers marched to an open field in Manchester, they were gunned down by cavalry. After one of the bloodiest massacres of the nineteenth century, protest was quarreled the following days in Manchester. However, in London, the day after the Peterloo Massacre, protesters were circulating new anti-governmental leaflets and picketing in the streets to voice their support for the victims of Peterloo.
If the outcome in this study was coded in non-binary form such as .1, .2, .3, .4, (.5 crossover point neither in nor out), .6, .7, .8, .9, 1.0, with greater mobilization being assigned to the higher values, the results produced by fuzzy-set algorithms would still be similar, if not exactly the same. In this respect, the 1989 Tiananmen massacre would most likely be assigned a .6 or .7 outcome value, whereas 2013 Egypt would likely be a .9 or .10 according to the extent and participatory size of the protests that were observed in the day following the severe act of repression. As will be revealed in subsequent sections, the .5 cross over point indicates whether a case or case characteristic/condition is either inside or outside of set-membership. This outcome specifically captures what occurred after an act of severe repression across 44 different historical cases. Along these lines, it is once again valuable to point out that the outcome under attention this paper does not seek cover the entire duration of a given civilian uprising such as Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011), outcome of “success” or “failure” of nonviolent campaigns. Increased/decreased mobilization is not comprehensive of long durations of political struggle and subsequent outcomes such as NGO shaming, civil war, regime transition, and military defection.

Although this outcome can only tell us if there was increased protest or decreased protest after a severe act of repression, I argue that this is a very valuable outcome to test and observe with regards to the repression-dissent nexus and to the phenomenon of repression backfire. There have hitherto been no analyses having to do with temporal dimensions in regards to these two popular phenomena. By conceptualizing the outcome in such form, it is possible to assess how six causal conditions that are observed across the contexts of 44 cases impact the temporally short outcome of increased/decreased mobilization. Indeed, in future research endeavors, it would be fruitful for scholars to also take into consideration temporal dimensions relevant to this
topic. This would be possible through investigating outcomes that arose (or failed to arise) after severe state repression such as military defections, regime transition, and NGO shaming.

Furthermore, the appendix contains detailed explanations of each case under attention. A benefit of analyzing the historical massacre over the time period under attention (1819-2014) is that this set of cases contains arguably all types of social systems that have existed over the past two turbulent centuries of political conflict. Monarchs, dictators, and presidents have repressed political opposition. Democracies and dictatorships also have repressed protest with severe methods in public setting. The events chosen do not dominate any specific region of the world or time period in history. A mixture of search databases was consulted whilst carrying out research for this study and where possible primary sources were consulted. The traditional LexisNexis search was used however a critical lens was attuned to newspaper accounts and their potential biases. The Gale Database archive was consulted along with half a dozen other historical newspaper archives. Academic sources were used and preference was given to scholarly ethnographic work, primary, and secondary historical sources. In the post-1980 period, human rights reports and NGO files were also utilized. The following table contains details of all 44 cases.

---

4 These include British newspapers from 1600-1950 quantitatively; they also include The Financial Times Historical Archive 1888-2010; the Economist Historical Archive 1843-2011; The Sunday Times Digital Archive 1822-2006; The Times Digital Archive. I have also consulted the New York Times historical database as well as the Lexis Nexus digital comprehensive database.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Massacre</th>
<th>Protest Tactic</th>
<th>Dissidents</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844 Weaver's Revolt (Prussia)</td>
<td>Riot/Direct Strike</td>
<td>4,000+</td>
<td>35 killed</td>
<td>Goldstein 1983; Sperber 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848 French Revolution</td>
<td>March, Direct Government Strike</td>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>50+ killed</td>
<td>Goldstein 1983; Singer &amp; Langdon 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892 Lodz Rebellion (Poland)</td>
<td>Labor Riot</td>
<td>40,000+</td>
<td>200 killed</td>
<td>Van Voss et al. 2010; Wachowska 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893 Caltavuturo (Italy)</td>
<td>Occupation/Demonstration</td>
<td>500+</td>
<td>15+ killed</td>
<td>Tilly 1979; Guglielmo 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897 Lattimer (U.S.)</td>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>400+</td>
<td>22 killed</td>
<td>The Standard 1898; Green 1968; Novak 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902 Barcelona (Spain)</td>
<td>General Strike</td>
<td>50-100</td>
<td>100+ killed</td>
<td>Smith 2002; Francisco 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904 Romania</td>
<td>Rebellion/Strike</td>
<td>500+</td>
<td>37 killed</td>
<td>Chirot &amp; Ragin 1975; Kurti 2001; Porteanu 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905 Bloody Sunday (Russia)</td>
<td>Direct March to Government</td>
<td>150,000+</td>
<td>200+ killed</td>
<td>Gapon 1906; Sharp 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 Moldavia (Romania)</td>
<td>Petition/Violent Seizure</td>
<td>5,000+</td>
<td>1,000+ killed</td>
<td>Eidelberg 1974; Fischer-Galati 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907 Santa Maria (Chile)</td>
<td>Occupation/Camp out</td>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>2000 killed</td>
<td>Frazier 2007; Barrios et al. 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909 Barcelona (Spain)</td>
<td>Violent charge</td>
<td>200+</td>
<td>1000+ killed</td>
<td>Arenas 2012; Herrerin 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912 Lena (Russia)</td>
<td>March/Demonstration</td>
<td>6,000+</td>
<td>200 killed</td>
<td>Zelnik 1972; Melancon 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914 Ludlow Colorado (U.S.)</td>
<td>Camp-out/March</td>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>20+ killed</td>
<td>Gitelman 1988; Appleyard1990; Walker 2003; DeStefanis 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919 Amristar (India)</td>
<td>Occupation/Symbolic Protest</td>
<td>15,000+</td>
<td>500+ killed</td>
<td>Sayer 1991; Lloyd 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925 La Coruna (Chile)</td>
<td>Direct Charge and Seize</td>
<td>1200+</td>
<td>2000+ killed</td>
<td>Barr-Melej 2001; Frazier 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927 Vienna (Austria)</td>
<td>Demonstration/Burn Building</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>80+ killed</td>
<td>Graham 1930; Alder 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928 Columbia</td>
<td>March/Demonstration</td>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>100+ killed</td>
<td>Guevara 2002; Bucheli 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932 La Matanza (El Salvador)</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>40,000+</td>
<td>20,000+ killed</td>
<td>Fuentes et al. 2007; Gould and Santiago 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944 Guatemala</td>
<td>Occupation/Demonstration</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>100+ killed</td>
<td>Sharp 2005; Agnew and Rosenzweig 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947 Taiwan 228 Incident</td>
<td>Occupation/Takeover of city</td>
<td>80,000+</td>
<td>20,000+ killed</td>
<td>Fleischauer 2007; Hsu 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Sharpeville (South Africa)</td>
<td>Planned March</td>
<td>200+</td>
<td>60+ killed</td>
<td>Frankel 2001; Lodge 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961 Paris Algerian Protest (France)</td>
<td>Planned March/Occupation</td>
<td>30,000+</td>
<td>200-300 killed</td>
<td>Masters 1997; House and MacMaster 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A primary feature of selecting cases for this analysis is that it is based upon a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). This entails that the researcher must purposely select cases that possess a similar outcome (increased mobilization/decreased dissent) but at the same time select
a wide variety of cases that possess different characteristics in their independent variables (conditions) in order to compare how those characteristics in turn influence the outcome of interest. Information on all 44 cases is widely accessible through historical books, encyclopedias, and human rights reports in the newer cases. It is worth mentioning that there may arise the criticism that only focusing on one form of state repression can result in the leaving out of valuable observations. Even with this critique in mind, the aim of this present study is to specify a temporally short duration of social conflict in the repression-dissent nexus and repression-backfire phenomenon. I do not aim to explain causal configurations that are relevant to longer temporal sequences such as revolutions, civil wars, among others. There are always trade-offs when making methodological choices to conduct a given empirical analysis. While limited diversity surely is a lingering issue for QCA ontology in general, the benefit of being able to analyze salient historical events and meso-level processes in a different manner (by way of comparative analysis) with aid of this framework provides a fruitful venue to pursue for new types of social research into political conflict.

Method

To investigate the research question of interest, I adopt the method of fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). Fuzzy set theory, as some refer to it, intersects between the crosshairs of being a theory and a method. QCA generally requires that the researcher possess in-depth knowledge of all cases. As I noted earlier, thus far, studies that have tackled the topic of the repression dissent nexus have been primarily based on statistical analyses, probability, and correlation. In regression analysis, variables or causal factors of interest are held constant at each factor’s average to weigh the effect each has on the dependent variable. Put differently, scholars
utilizing statistical analysis often weigh the net effects of single independent variables. While surely rigorous, such a method can be of limitation when we are dealing with complex social processes. In fact, net effects thinking entails an assumption that causality is uncomplex (Ragin 2008b, 177). Such assumptions mean that if a given variable or variables are associated with a theoretical set of thoughts and end up being the best predictors of a given outcome, then “this theory wins the contest” argues Charles Ragin (Ragin 2008b, 177). This is exemplified in the framework by Sutton et al. 2014 who builds upon Francisco’s (2004) study in which protest communicational capability is argued to be the greatest predictor of whether a protest will experience increased mobilization after repression. The fundamental problem with such an approach of net-effects is that it relies too heavily upon “model specification” (Ragin 2008b, 179). Model specification itself is highly linked to the data used to conduct the empirical test of interest. For example, the data used by Sutton et al. (2014), similar to the NAVCO 2.0 nonviolent conflict data, contain annual indicators in which a given protest campaign had to have suffered from 25 casualties or deaths in a calendar year to be included as an observation. Here multiple repressive events can be responsible for the total death count of 25 per year (Sutton et al. 2014, 564). Such observations while useful for spotting long-term trends, cannot tell us about the micro-dynamics and the interactional effect of conditions in cases that share the same outcome as well as different outcome. Nor can they enable the comparing of cases that do not match in the outcome, but match in their causal characteristics. QCA on the other hand asks which conditions (whether by themselves) or in amalgamation with others, are necessary or sufficient in bringing about the outcome of interest. This approach aligns itself upon within case analysis, cross-case comparison, and counterfactuals. QCA, I argue, is especially useful for analyzing political processes that are sensitive and considerate of the temporal dimension of
social causation. An important ontological underpinning of QCA is that causal relationships in
the social world are assumed to be highly complex and nonlinear. Additionally, in the social
world it is rare for single effects display their outcome on their own. Hence, scholars that
conduct empirical analysis with QCA rely on notions of conjunctural, complex, equifinal, and
asymmetric causation (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Equifinality is the ability to be able to
identify one or more combinations of conditions (or the absence of those combinations) that may
influence an outcome of interest.

**Calibration of conditions**

Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) differs from traditional crisp-set analysis
in which only binary conditions can be analyzed and calibrated. Calibrating fuzzy set data has
advantages and requires substantive theoretical knowledge rather than what Basurto and Speer
call the “arbitrary numeric representation of data” (Basurto and Speer 2012). A fuzzy-set takes
on values ranging from 0 to 1. Here the 0.5 point is a crossover point that indicates if a condition
is inside or outside a given value set. Earlier I had mentioned that focus needs to be placed on the
“micro-dynamics” of the repression-mobilization puzzle; fsQCA is a way to accomplish this due
to the diversity in ways in which a given causal condition can be calibrated. Rather than adopting
the crisp-set, the calibration technique adopted in this study is the 4 value fuzzy set where 1 =
fully in, .67 more in than out .33 more out, and 0= fully out. All six causal conditions take on this
4 value calibration. Choosing the six conditions (variables) under attention has been done with
theoretical insight and general consideration of multidisciplinary literature. I am specifically
interested in examining variables that arise in the existing literature such as nonviolence, protest
threat level, campaign diversity, and infrastructure, among others. The major limitation relevant to the nonviolent civilian resistance literature has to do with coding nonviolence/violence dichotomously. While much attention has been given to unarmed or nonviolent movements, there have yet to be any tests that have taken into consideration empirical observations of varying levels of nonviolent protest strategy. Similar binary conceptualizations exist in this literature regarding other empirical observations such as urban/rural, campaign infrastructure, and campaign diversity, among others. Labeling groups as “armed” or “unarmed” is actually a bit trickier than acknowledged. As empirical observances, nonviolent or violent protest strategy and urban or rural geography contain greater depth and variance than what can be captured via binary classification. A fuzzy-set membership captures and measures “continuous variation between qualitative poles” (Verkuilen 2005).

The six causal conditions presented in this study enabled me to observe event-based empirical phenomena by giving attention to the contextual characteristics of protest movements during their interactions with state security forces across 44 different cases. I relied on a classification made in Jay Verkuilen's (2005) typology of fuzzy-set membership calibration techniques. This typology includes three different modes of assignment: direct-membership assignment; membership by an in-direct scaling model; and membership by transformation. The first of these three techniques has been adopted in this paper. Direct-membership assignment entails that expert and subjective-based knowledge are used to assign membership scores to calibrated conditions and importantly, this has advantages over formal statistics, notes Verkuilen. The latter are sometimes biased and “soft”. A subjective scale for Verkuilen “might well be a better reflection of what is actually going on.” This is especially the case when “meaning differs across
contexts” argues Verkuilen (2005, 471). In addition, a theoretical underpinning of this present study relates to what Barbara Vis (2012) argues is a powerful benefit of fsQCA calibration. Calibration can enable similar maneuvers to be made as those used in formal modeling and Bayesian prior probability assignment in which scholars assign subjective probabilities whilst simultaneously modeling nature in a given setting of strategy. During the process of calibration, attention was paid to more than one source and in those instances where one source was only used, it was usually an academic source that contained in-depth information about the specific time frame in which the incident of political repression took place in. The calibrating of causal conditions in this study captures accurate empirical occurrences given that in each case, there is widely accessible information available regarding who the protesters were that went up against principal-governor agents; how the protest was organized, its membership as well as the type of protest and the location in which it occurred.

The following causal conditions are calibrated. These values are assigned based upon the qualitative characteristics of each case and protest prior and during its interaction with state forces.
The coded characteristics displayed above were all observed at the point in which protests interacted with state forces as well as prior to the interaction during the organizational period of protest build up.

A preliminary step of QCA is to compute the data at hand into a truth table in which all combinations of possible conditions are displayed through the software computing membership scores of causal conditions based on logarithmic odds. The truth table is provided in the appendix. A truth table provides us with a list of logically possible combinations that account for
the presence or absence of the outcome. It takes into consideration user-calibrated values and then formulates fuzzy-set scores on how each condition along with combination of conditions can influence the outcome of increased mobilization. Here the software computes and displays all conditions in a form that captures the greatest possible complexity of combinations of those conditions. Configurations or combinations of conditions get considered as sufficient when they bring about the outcome of interest (1 - increased mobilization) with a certain consistency threshold.

**Tests for necessity**

Even though the aim of this study is to explore equifinality and complex causal relations, QCA also requires single tests for necessary conditions. Each condition gets tested in order to see how it solely affects the outcome of interest. When running this set of computations and any computations in fsQCA more broadly, consistency thresholds have to be set. Here either a .90 or .80 threshold gets assigned (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 406). What also has to be considered is coverage points. The lower coverage of a given combination(s) implies that a condition or combination of conditions has lower empirical weight. Unique coverage on the other hand holds a specific importance as it tells us the amount of cases 1) uniquely explained by a recipe and 2) overlap between recipes. In other words, unique coverage will tell us what percentage of cases can be explained by a single causal recipe under attention.

**Table 3**
As displayed in the table above, no conditions are necessary. Nonviolence with a .75 consistency level is the most salient of all conditions with geographic terrain being the second most empirically influential condition. This tells us that the relationship between repression and dissent surely cannot be explained by a sole factor given no conditions are above the .90 consistency level needed to be classified as necessary. There are also no single sufficient conditions. On the other hand, the most salient condition in explaining decreased mobilization is campaign infrastructure. This brings an interesting dynamic to attention. A highly organized and hierarchical protest movement spends a significant amount of resources in a given protest against an oppressive governor or regime. In turn, after being repressed there might not be enough immediate resources to extend mobilization for that protest movement. Additionally, the protest might have been highly inclusive for not enabling individuals to free ride (i.e. monitoring agents as well as the contributions of members). Hence, potential new protest members might not find it as easy to jump along and join the movement in its blemished condition.
Configurational models of increased protest mobilization

In this section, I report results from Standard Analyses and in turn provide the relevant configurational pathways which help to explain both how and why increased mobilization ensues after severe state repression. I also test the six conditions on the negated outcome (decreased mobilization); these latter tests are provided in the appendix. The table below contains tests with consistency thresholds set at the .80 level. The parsimonious takes into consideration easy as well as difficult counterfactuals. The intermediate solution on the other hand, considers easy counterfactuals and the complex solution considers a minimal amount of counterfactuals and computes no simplifying assumptions.
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution Consistency</th>
<th>Configuration Raw Coverage</th>
<th>Unique Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model: $o = f (n, m, g, d, i, t)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(frequency cutoff 1.00 / consistency cutoff 0.800604)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Configurations – Complex Solution (solution coverage: 0.488929 - solution consistency: 0.892438) |
|                                                                                                   |
| Threat level * ~ Campaign Infrastructure * Geographic Terrain * Nonviolence (T * ~ I * G * N)      |
| 0.909589 0.237143 0.024286                                                                       |
| Threat level * Campaign Diversity * Geographic Terrain * Nonviolence (T * D * G * N)             |
| 0.879121 0.428571 0.215714                                                                       |

| Configurations – Parsimonious Solution (solution coverage: 0.536071 - solution consistency: 0.866628) |
|                                                                                                   |
| Nonviolence * ~ Campaign Infrastructure * Protest Threat Level (N * ~ I * T)                       |
| 0.920482 0.272857 0.047857                                                                       |
| Nonviolence * Geographic Terrain * Campaign Diversity (N * G * D)                                 |
| 0.855444 0.488214 0.263214                                                                       |

| Configurations – Intermediate Solution (solution coverage: 0.488929 - solution consistency: 0.892438) |
|                                                                                                   |
| Protest Threat Level * ~ Campaign Infrastructure * Geographic Terrain * Nonviolence (T * ~ I * G * N) |
| 0.917189 0.261071 0.036071                                                                       |
| Protest Threat Level * Campaign Diversity * Geographic Terrain * Nonviolence (T * D * G * N)        |
| 0.884857 0.452857 0.227857                                                                       |

The configuration of protest threat level, campaign diversity, geographic terrain and nonviolence (t * d * g * n) is very salient as it holds a unique coverage of .42 in the complex solution. This solution, however, only possesses .22 unique coverage in the intermediate solution which entails that under more stringent circumstances, its empirical salience (in explaining the data at hand) is not as large as we would like. This pathway tells us that a threatening, diverse, nonviolent protest
that gets repressed in a highly urban area is prone to experience increased mobilization after repression.

The following cases possess these explicit attributes of protests that were fully nonviolent, highly threatening, diverse and dissented in an urban metropolis:

1819 Peterloo; 1848 France; 1944 Guatemala.

In 1819 Manchester, England a fascinating scenario arose in a historical period after the Great Napoleonic Wars in which England fell into a volatile political crisis. Severe economic dislocations caused both famine and severe unemployment throughout the country. A crowd organized by Henry Hunt demanded greater political representation and gathered in St. Peters Field. It was so large in size that historians note the greater part of Manchester was empty. Adhering to nonviolent protest strategy, cavalry charged in and killed dozens as the incident diffused into the English press of the time. No radical social change emerged from Peterloo but protests did ensue both in Manchester and in London the following day (McPhillips 1977, 22). The state then censored stories and supported the army’s actions. More repressive legislation was introduced within a year. In 1848 Paris however, transformative social change ensued and this specific case also possesses the exact attributes of this combination of causal conditions. 1848 Paris was an extremely noteworthy incident that occurred during a time of immense political censorship. In the capital, many revolted after the government attempted to "ban political banquet" which was one of the few remaining forms of political gatherings that was allowed at that point (Goldstein 1983, 66). Thousands marched and expressed chants along the lines of, "down with the King". Security forces responded by killing dozens on the symbolic Boulevard des Capucines and greater mobilization ensued following the repressive act. Mobilization was so
extensive that it forced King Louis-Philippe to flee France while protesters stormed the palace. In Singer and Langdon (2008), it is noted that this incident turned into "actual revolution" (Singer and Langdon 2008, 81). Furthermore, 1944 Guatemala was an incident that led to a revolution via the ousting of a dictator. The process began when students petitioned and led a peaceful strike and shortly thereafter, over 300 prominent citizens of the capital asked the dictator to step down. In the nighttime on June 24, 1944, security forces shot over 200. Violence bred more violence the next day when the killing of a school teacher led to her becoming a symbol of resistance. Shortly thereafter millions stormed out onto the streets and revolution ensued (Sharp 2005; Agnew and Rosenzweig 2006, 435). This working class and broad movement ended up overthrowing the 13 year long reign of General Ubico.

The following cases can be explained by the causal solution of ($t \times d \times g \times n$). All cases experienced increased mobilization after repression. Put differently, every case exhibiting this configuration resulted in increased mobilization. Thus, there are no outlier cases in this combination that experienced decreased dissent after being repressed.

- 1819 Peterloo (Inspired later Chartist movement)
- 1848 Paris (Revolution)
- 1905 Bloody Sunday (led to Revolution)
- 1919 Amritsar (Inspired Gandhian nonviolent struggle)
- 1944 Guatemala (Revolution)
- 1987 Mendiola (mass public condemnation)
- 2009 Guinea (UN condemnation)
- 2011 Syria (NGO condemnation; later civil war)
- 2013 Egypt (NGO/Media condemnation)
- 2014 Ukraine (regime transition/later civil war)

What the solution above implies is that a protest movement which is highly diverse, threatening to a hegemonic authority, and adopts nonviolence in a highly urban area is prone to experience post-repression mobilization. It is also worthwhile nonetheless, to examine those cases in which
no mobilization ensued after repression and specifically those missing the characteristic of nonviolence. For example, on June 4, 1925 at a nitrate mine in La Coruna, Chile, a new constitution had recently been put in place that greatly expanded the power of the executive. Leading up to this incident over the years miners were being suppressed. Miners demanded better working conditions and a larger salary. During a protest a major altercation arose when dissidents heaved and strategically threw dynamite at police while others, including drunken workers also shot at them (Frazier 2007, 101). No increased mobilization occurred thereafter even with heavy civilian casualties. Another case involving violent direct action that did not result in increased mobilization was that of 1947 Taiwan. Taiwan had been under control of Japan from 1895 to 1945; then it was handed over to the Chiang (Chinese nationalist sympathetic government). Shortly thereafter however, protesters petitioned for greater autonomy but ended up violently chasing with police officers on February 28, 1947. Rebellion soon turned into a riot and civilians controlled major urban spaces with weaponry. 1300 were reported to have been killed at the time of the incident (Lai et al. 1991). Another example can be found in 1909 Barcelona, Spain. Here a government decision enabled wealthy members of society to avoid military conscription. Hundreds of Catalanians violently rebelled on July 25, 1909 (Arenas 2012). Anarchists along with other groups were severely repressed. Thousands were arrested and hundreds died (Arenas 2012, 66). Violence in this incident discouraged others from demonstrating against the government. Martial law ensued as the state was able to successfully clamp down on all opposition.

Out of 10 protests in which fully violent methods were utilized by dissidents, only 2 ended up experiencing increased mobilization after repression; these were 1907 Moldavia and 1984 South Africa (Vaal uprising). Reasons for this can be attributed to a number of different explanations.
First, a structural or hegemonic dislocation can ensue after severe state violence. During hegemonic dislocations, political identities get disconnected from previous systems of meaning and individuals are forced into new political terrains (Howarth 2013). Another explanation is more on the normative side, violence begets violence. In 1907 Moldavia, political upheaval was rampant in a violent governmental overthrow that took place in what is now North Eastern Romania (Botoșani). Thousands attacked the government along with antagonized wealthy Jewish land owners on March 3 (Eidelberg 1974). Over 2,000 were killed and upheaval spread to most parts of the country. A revolution occurred on March 13 and the government got overthrown. In the 1984 Vaal uprising which took place during the South African apartheid era, a violent protest was formed in reaction to rent increases. Dozens were killed and there has since been noted to have been over 6 million USD in property damage in the Vaal triangle townships (Zuern 2011, 34). Just under a year later, the apartheid ruling National Party issued a state of emergency due to immense political upheaval. What these findings regarding violent/nonviolent protest might entail is that in short temporal periods of social conflict between protest and the state, violent direct action may actually discourage rebellion rather than encourage it. Afterwards, some may get arrested, beaten, tortured or killed. Violent action against the state triggers different mechanisms and it specifically has a lesser propensity to bring about sympathetic public outrage on the part of potential observers as well as international publics.

The other salient causal pathway contains the following conditions: Nonviolence * Geographic Terrain * Campaign Diversity: (N * G * D). This solution holds a unique coverage of .26 which entails that it explains just over a fourth of the cases in which increased mobilization ensued after severe repression. Dissidents that organize a diverse protest, adopt a highly cohesive form of nonviolence and rebel in a metropolitan area are prone to experience increased mobilization after
being severely repressed. A powerful historical case that can be explained by this solution is the 1919 Amritsar, India massacre. During the epoch of British colonization, this particular year experienced little mobilization prior to a now historically infamous repressive act that took place after a spontaneous revolt. The Rowlatt Acts were passed by British Parliament which resulted in the extending of the colonizing power's repressive capacity in India. A decision was made to further restrict opportunities for local self-governance to Indians. In Jallianwala Bagh, thousands were gathering to participate in an annual Baisakhi celebration which coincided with the grievance of political restriction. This led to a large crowd forming and over 15,000 women, children and men gathered in a unified and peaceful demonstration. British military forces then blocked central exits to the center of the crowd and without warning began to shoot at the nonviolent demonstrators. Many were killed, outrage ensued and was followed by strikes. Even Churchill who at the time was overseeing matters related to war, condemned the attacks (Sayer, 1991). The incident inspired Gandhi's later nonviolent struggle. Conversely, a case possessing direct counterfactual characteristics which cannot be explained by this pathway is the 1982 Syrian Hama massacre. This incident involved what can be considered as a highly organized (but violent) group by the name of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that attacked state. Even though well organized, this group engaged in a violent struggle that in one incident saw hundreds die. Afterwards, the state was able to keep repressing meanwhile many opposition leaders of the MB fled the country. The Muslim Brotherhood was engaged in a significant 2+ year campaign against the Syrian State prior to the above noted act of severe repression.

Configurations, why some but not others?
Indeed, the solutions above do not explain all cases that experienced mobilization after being repressed. This however does not mean that the configurations above are contradictory or irrelevant but rather, it indicates that the causal relationship of interest is historically variant and highly complex. Throughout the historical era of nation states, many political protests experienced mobilization after being repressed and likewise, the state was successful in shutting down protests in a great deal of incidents. A valuable aspect to consider is that it is not that a given factor or set of factors will indefinitely lead to increased or decreased mobilization, but the question this study has sought to answer is whether certain conditions are the empirical grounds that must be in place for the outcome of interest to be brought about in broad historical, political, and economic contexts. The identified sufficient pathways indicate that the causal phenomenon of interest is complex. Likewise, the ontological assumptions of QCA have enabled the data generating process to get complimented by fuzzy-set logic and methodology. Nonviolence, on its own, cannot bring about the outcome of interest, but when nonviolence is linked to geography, threat level and campaign diversity, such a combination can explain highly salient historical cases. Recall that Hess and Martin (2006) argued that for repression to be able to backfire there has to be an audience to perceive the incident as unjust and media capability to circulate the story. The identified configuration that has been drawn from empirical analysis in this study adds a new dimension to the repression backfire phenomenon, as well as onto the repression dissent nexus more broadly. Nonviolent movements are likelier to spur third party support but nonviolence and geography still lack as explanatory factors if the protest at hand does not possess diversity. For example, in 1961 Paris, the French state massacred Algerian protesters in the center of an urban metropolis. As the above noted causal combination would entail, great diversity has to be represented in the protest movement that gets repressed and this was not the
scenario in 1961 Paris. The incident involved a homogenous march of protesters that comprised only a segment of the French population. Upwards of 30,000 Algerian workers were led by pro-FLN forces (Sajed 2013, 101). Over 200 were killed by a strategic police force. Had the protest been organized into a more diverse force, arguably, given it was in the capital and adopted a highly nonviolent method of dissent, the case of repression could have led to public outrage and some form of historical transformation. As I had noted earlier, when the government or any form of governmental agent publicly massacres the "people" that it is in office to support (or claims to support), mobilization as well as other transformative effects have great propensity to ensue. The protest in 1961 Paris, even though nonviolent, did not contain heterogeneous social demands. This does not mean that diversity is on its own sufficient, but rather, nonviolence, geography and threat have to compliment it which brings me to another point raised by Hess and Martin (2006). In their framework, the topic of censorship was stressed. Political leaders will censor incidents of repression in attempt to keep them from backfiring. They will devalue the targets among other tactics. Such was surely the case in 1961 Paris as this massacre is now widely acknowledged to have been covered up by French authorities (House and MacMaster 2006); later accounts indicate a probable count of 300 casualties. During the 1971 Mexican Corpus Christi massacre an incident of severe state violence was also successfully censored by the state. In this massacre, protesters from a variety of departments from the National University gathered thousands to march in search of political freedom from authoritative rule during an annual festival known as Catholic Feast Day (Espinosa 2014). A U.S. CIA trained Mexican-government security force team began spraying machine gun fire during a point when protesters were singing in their march. Dozens died and later protests formed in local areas but the incident was decidedly covered up which brings up the issue of censorship. Just a few years earlier there was a case of
similar type that occurred during the 1968 Mexico City massacre of student protesters but here authorities failed to censor the incident. In 1968 Mexico City, violence broke out days before the opening of the 1968 Summer Olympics. 100-300 protesters died in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in the center of the capital. The Olympic Games became "blood tainted" as a result of the incident (Espinosa 2014). The 1968 case was one of the biggest challenges to the Mexican regime at that point. Increased mobilization ensued in support of the killed and students even burned buses the day after by staging further strikes (Francisco 2004). The 1968 massacre was a defining moment in modern Mexico's history that created a generation of activists who sought to bring down the one-party state (Espinosa 2014, 119). Three years later the Corpus Christi massacre transpired also in the capital but was censored to greater success and extent.

The issue of censorship is one that needs greater attention as there exists clear variation in state capacity to censor. On the other hand, some may argue that censorship will not work in the contemporary age of digitalized communication. The final 5 cases of the 44 under attention in this study that transpired from 2009-2014 all experienced increased mobilization. What this may entail is that contemporary modes of communication and the rapid flow of news events have enabled dissidents to not only give each other greater chances of coordinating before and after repressive acts, but it has become very difficult for a regime to cover up a repressive act of violence in the age of mobile phones, mass social networks, and portable internet devices. After highly repressive acts, international backlash may ensue from other countries, their politicians, publics as well as human rights organizations. With this in mind, the influence and role of international media organizations, human rights groups and even international public opinion had a much weaker function in regards to endogenous processes of social change two or even one
century ago. Since technology and our general means of communication have been revolutionized (digitally), in our contemporary era of communication, it is difficult to imagine how a severe act of repression will be concealed in the presence of these exogenous forces. This has implications for social movements, and in turn should discourage political leaders (whether authoritative or democratic) from repressing political opposition by severe means.

Concluding discussion

This study has presented an analysis of the repression-mobilization with attention being placed on the political massacre. The calibration of six conditions and the testing of those conditions on the outcome of interest have yielded fruitful new insights into causal pathways that tie into both the phenomenon of repression backfire as well as the short-term effects of the repression-dissent nexus. The technique of calibration has enabled a new form precision to be cast into empirical observations such as violent or nonviolent protest strategy, protest threat level, campaign organization, and campaign diversity. This has provided a different lens with which to examine event-based protest-state interactions. The causal pathways capture and explain historically pivotal cases and provide new insight into the micro-dynamics of the repression-dissent puzzle. Single conditions often cannot show effects on their own but do so only when combined with others. This is precisely the case in terms of the phenomenon and interaction emphasized here. Furthermore, some scholars (such as Carey 2010) argue that the onset of state repression in response to certain modes of dissent will vary. Nonviolent protests and riots might not warrant a costly response. While such a claim might be relevant to some contexts and eras, it is not generalizable to historical interactions between protest and state. Whether it was in 1819
Manchester (Peterloo) Massacre or the 1897 Lattimer Massacre, nonviolent movements have been met with extreme force. In 1897 Lattimer, one of the most brutal, if not the most brutal, acts of violence in U.S. labor history ensued in 1897. Immigrant workers including ethnic Germans along with Croatians, Hungarians and Poles formed a strike. Unarmed, over 400 strikers marched on a day they voiced support for the formation of a new union (Novak 1996). On September 10, 1897 deputies led by the sheriff shot over 20 in the back and injured dozens more in what led to a massacre (The Standard 1898). Afterwards, membership in the UMWA (United Mine Workers) grew to more than 100,000. Immigrant workers had their place solidified (Green 1968). Three years after the union grew to gain greater rights. Deputies were later put on trial, convicted and eventually this was a major victory for the Labor movement. Severe acts of state repression in Guinea 2009 as well as Egypt 2013 also are bold examples.

Grander theoretical and empirical work must be conducted to investigate the specific responses publics have to some acts of repression including varying types of movements and their strategies as well as characteristics. In the end, the causal configuration provided by the results of this study enables a differing understanding to emerge on event-based data relevant to the topic of repression backfire and repression-dissent nexus. The study however is not without arguable limitations. The causal configurations produced do not explain all cases in which increased mobilization ensued after repression. This can be due to two possible reasons. First, omitted variables might disable full explanatory coverage in the data of certain cases. A different reason, and one that I believe to be the overarching factor at play in regards to historical state repression and protest mobilization, is that some of the conditions and explanatory factors in this study have evolved and changed over time. Thus, their single influence is not standardized across historical
time. Even though conditions capturing the strategy of nonviolence, protest threat level as well as campaign infrastructure have been generally similar over the last centuries, the factors of media networks as well as geographic terrain are significantly different in our contemporary age in comparison to times past. This might be why the configurations produced in this study cannot explain all cases of increased mobilization. Nonetheless, throughout this study, it has been demonstrated that there are insights waiting to be uncovered through the analysis of popular research questions in the protest literature by way of new methodological tools that differ than those used in most previous and current qualitative as well as quantitative studies.
References


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Appendix - Please contact me at aanisi@essex.ac.uk if there are any questions regarding the coding techniques and historical accuracy of explanations of cases.

This appendix contains information regarding 44 cases of political repression that are analyzed via fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). QCA requires an in-depth knowledge of the cases under attention. Throughout the duration of my time pursuing a doctorate degree I have accumulated a wide reach of historical knowledge regarding severe political repression in the specific realm of social movement interactions with governmental forces. The explanations of each case are purposefully kept to a minimum to enable time and space to be saved. Please send inquiries regarding historical accuracy to aanisi@essex.ac.uk. Moreover, coding conflict data is especially difficult when the actors under attention are clandestine. However, the positive aspect about gathering protest data is that all events and actors are publicly observable and these events have been major ones that have filled history books.

As recently noted by Idean Salehyan (2015), scholars have several choices to make when picking source material for consultation. When presenting sources, scholars need to be “cognizant of the potential advantages and disadvantages of particular source materials.” (Salehyan 2015, 107). Most importantly, other scholars and experts have to be able to “consult the same source material, use the same coding rules, and generate output that is as close to the original as possible” (Salehyan 2015, 106). A useful flowchart is presented by Salehyan along the lines of the following:

Event or unit attributes -> Source selection (Media, NGO, Government Agency, Historic texts) -> Information extraction (human coding/machine coding) -> data archiving -> data analysis.
Jay Verkuilen (2005) put forward a simple typology in which the assigning of fuzzy-set membership values was explained. Three different modes of assignment were noted, direct-membership assignment; membership by an indirect scaling model; and membership by transformation. The first of these three techniques has been adopted in this paper. Direct-membership assignment entails that expert and subjective-based knowledge is utilized to assign membership scores. This has advantages over formal statistics, notes Verkuilen, which are sometimes biased and “soft”. A subjective scale “might well be a better reflection of what is actually going on.” This is especially the case when “meaning differs across contexts” argues Verkuilen (2005, 471).

Below are the six causal conditions that are calibrated according to the contextual attributes of the 44 cases under attention. The calibrations are made attuned to a given massacre, the protest which got massacred and its underlying characteristics.

**Causal Condition 1 - Nonviolence**

To calibrate this condition I adopt a heuristic that stems to Gene Sharp's seminal typology of nonviolent direct action (1973). Sharp categorized 198 nonviolent direct action methods that nonviolent movements can use in struggles against the state (Sharp, 1973). Over the last decades tactics from this typology have been utilized by social movement leaders in a variety of contexts throughout the globe including a case in the data set under attention in this study (1989 China). Of the 198 tactics, they can be divided into a range of subgroups including *Formal statements* such as public speeches, signed public petitions, banners, slogans, pamphlets. *Symbolic acts* in the public sphere may include dissidents wearing certain badges, displaying portraits, and signs. *Public assemblies* have been widely influential in nonviolent campaigns and here exist protest
meetings, teach-ins, and occupations. *Psychological* intervention may include fasting and hunger strikes. For my purposes here, methods of *physical* intervention are heavily emphasized and these include nonviolent invasion, stay-in, pray-in, interjection, obstruction, and occupation. In the same vein, this calibration enables us to account for violent, as well as semi-violent, semi-nonviolent and fully nonviolent movements. In previous studies, conceptualizations and coding maneuvers were based around e either analyzed nonviolent/violent movements as binary observations or completely disregarded violent protests by focusing on the unarmed (e.g. Sutton et al. 2014; Francisco 2004).

**Coding Scheme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonviolence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Causal Condition 2 - Media Network** (4 value calibration)
After a protest movement suffers from repression in public setting (this is especially the situation if the act of repression is a massacre), word about the incident is likely to spread not only through personal social networks but also through communication channels. The reason for choosing media network rather than focusing on the extent to which a given campaign set up its own communication channel/institution is that media networks are what make possible communication channels. In other words, a capable media network is a necessary condition for there to be able to be communication channels set up. In a previous study I analyzed how repression backfired and led to the 1905 Russian Revolution (Anisin, 2014); I categorized three salient mechanisms and conceptualized repression backfire as a causal process. One of these mechanisms, the viral mechanism, captures how repressive events get diffused, even in the face of elite cover-up. Substantial network capability functions as the primary factor that enables dissidents to communicate after repression. Calibrating the media condition has to be done with consideration of the evolution of telecommunications since the onset of industrialization. By evolution I refer to both the long-stemming process of technological development as well as the creation of communicative instruments, for instance the internet. Moreover, it was only in the 1850s when telegraphic cables first started being used for the purposes of sending government messages across the Atlantic. Newspapers started being printed in Britain already at the start of the 18th century. By the 1920s radio emerged as a main mode of news communication. Following WWII, television gradually replaced radio and since we have witnessed the emergence of the 24/7 news cycle and the internet. As of 2015, mobile phone subscriptions in the world are in the billions and the internet is available on phones, televisions and even watches. Events get rapidly spread and diffuse.
Causal Condition 3 - Geographic Location (4 value calibration)

Only analyzing repressive state action that takes place in urban areas (such as Francisco 2004) misses out on factors relevant to the causal process of repression backfire. The problem with designating a location of protest as urban is that empirically there exist varying stratospheres of urban. Similar issues arise when we mention rural as well. For example, Francisco (2004) notes that “The most basic problem for a dissident entrepreneur who has survived a massacre is how to communicate the repression to other surviving dissidents” (Francisco 2004, 111). A capital of an empire such as St. Petersburg (classified as urban by Francisco) during the time of Russian Tsarism had an immense amount of foreign officials in the diplomatic realm as well as domestic newspapers. The capital of a given province around the same historical period in Northern Chile
(also would be classified as urban) might only have links to other cities of the state and few international networks. In order to fully understand the effect geographic location has on repression backfire, specification has to be given to what we precisely mean by geographic conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding Scheme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Causal Condition 4 - Campaign Diversity** (4 value calibration)

In the calibration scheme adopted here, a value of 0 is assigned to movements that contained little campaign diversity. By diversity I refer to the composition of the protest at the point of massacre. These are qualitative characteristics relevant to a given protest at its point of interaction with governmental security forces. For example, a student movement that does not reach out to different segments of the population and dissents only with the diversity of gender
(male and female participants) will be assigned a .33 (minor diversity) value. A movement that contains different stratospheres of the economic workforce such as architects, lawyers, bus drivers and students will be assigned .67 value. The full set membership value of 1 here contains the term equivalence which can be thought of as a movement with an organized and unified identity that is representative of popular opinion. Such movements might identify themselves with the "people" and democratic emancipation. The latter were significant in 1905 Russia as well as 1919 Amristar, India and in 1944 Guatemala. Previously I have theorized that a highly diverse protest that suffers from repression has a much greater ability to experience increased mobilization and the other outcomes of repression backfire such as moral outrage and international backlash. When the state or a given regime kills "the people" it can contradict one of its foundational purposes of existence.

**Coding Scheme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Diversity</th>
<th>No Diversity</th>
<th>Full homogeneity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Minor Diversity</td>
<td>Economic classes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>race; religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.33</td>
<td>Large Diversity</td>
<td>Gender; age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.67</td>
<td>Equivalence</td>
<td>Full heterogeneity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fifth condition of interest is campaign infrastructure. Calibrating this condition has been done with focus being placed on how well a given movement organizes itself. Below, a full set membership value of 1 is assigned if the massacred protest was observed to have been a political movement that had a hierarchical platform in which tightly planned monitoring of agents through networks had occurred. A value of .67 indicates the movement was well organized around a certain goal and contained physical solidarity. It is worth noting that in the NAVCO 2.0 data, the variable of “camp_structure” is coded as such: 0 = consensus-based participatory campaign structure; 1= hierarchical command and control campaign structure (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). In this present study I hope to bring greater specification to what is meant by infrastructure. Of the 44 cases under attention in this study, a substantial amount cases had well-organized protests, in fact there was only 1 fully spontaneous protest. Many incidents included protests that were organized by unions and hence have been assigned a full membership of 1. If major political organizations had organized the protest, the same categorization was made. The following calibrations contain varying levels of protest infrastructure including the spontaneous.
Causal Condition 6 – Protest Threat level (4 value calibration)

The last of six conditions is threat level. This captures the overall threat that the observed protest posed to the state prior to being massacred. Indeed, not all cases included protests that directly challenged a state. Some protests challenged a local governor, for example, in a rural area while others directly protested against a president or dictator. Hence, a maximum level of threat posed by a protest is calibrated according to who and what the protesters attuned their demands at. I theorize that the greater challenge to a head of state, the more likely a movement can experience increased mobilization after severe repression. There has been a significant amount of studies in
which the conditions under which states will repress civilian dissent are investigated. By introducing this causal condition into the analysis, it is possible to further specify the pertinent empirical factors needed to explain why movements experience increased mobilization after state repression. This also captures great diversity in regards to protest goals and type.

**Coding Scheme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat level</th>
<th>Local Governor</th>
<th>Township, county-level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Provincial governor</td>
<td>Larger district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.33</td>
<td>State Governor</td>
<td>Controls regional power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
<td>Tsar; King; President; Dictator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*List and explanation of 44 Cases:*

1. **The English Peterloo Massacre 1819**

After the Great Napoleonic Wars England fell into a volatile political crisis and experienced severe economic dislocations. The latter caused both famine and severe unemployment throughout the country. A crowd organized by Henry Hunt demanded greater political
representation and gathered in St. Peters Field so large in size that historians note the greater part of Manchester was empty. Cavalry charged in and killed dozens as the incident diffused into the English press of the time. No radical change emerged but protests did ensue both in Manchester and in London the following day (McPhillips 1977, 22). The state then censored stories and supported the army’s actions. More repressive legislation was introduced within a year.

2. **1844 Prussian Weaver's Revolt (Prussia)**

   During this time period, weavers would frequently launch violent direct action against merchants who were cutting their pay (Sperber 1992, 45). In 1844 in the Prussian province of Silesia which was the center of Prussian cloth manufacturing, workers violently revolted and 35 were massacred (Goldstein 1983). Regarding this incident, Karl Marx once asked something along the lines of, "is the revolt of workers less dangerous because it needs no army to suppress?" The Prussian incident occurred in times of economic distress and here this "weaver's revolt" involved violent workers that attacked officers, homes, machinery among other entities relevant to the textile industry. The attackers also placed demands for money from merchants. Some of the dissidents were arrested. The protest itself was not successful but did have a significant influence on the formation of the German labor movement years later.

3. **1848 French Revolution**
Economic depression wreaked havoc in France in the 1840s. Trust was low, laborers were paid poorly. Interestingly, the French Revolution was very much influenced by state repression. As Goldstein (1983) notes, the revolution was triggered in February of 1848 following the government's attempt to "ban political banquet" (Goldstein 1983, 66). Banquets took place as hubs for opposition to gather and these specific political events helped unite a diverse amount of political agents. Once the government banned the banquets, thousands stormed into the streets. The event of repression took place in the center of Paris on the symbolic Boulevard des Capucines when dozens were shot by police. Singer and Langdon also note how a riot turned into "actual revolution" (Singer and Langdon 2008, 81). More and more protesters seized the city as the King fled France. Percy Bolingbroke St. John said in 1848 that, “It is impossible to understand the events which have just occurred in Paris.”

4. **1892 Lodz Rebellion**

During this period of Polish history, poor factory conditions plagued workers as they failed to make ends meet in overpopulated urban cities. Poland also at this time was under Russian rule. Organized by “Polish Workers Association,” over 40,000 stopped working and went on strike (Wachowska 2010). The events led to the Russian army and Tsarist forces (Cossacks) slaughtering hundreds (Van Voss et al. 2010, 405). The Polish workers movement then gained great asymmetric support and sympathy afterwards. While the protest was not a success per se, this would be the largest uprising in Poland until the 1905 June rebellion and the protest made authorities “respect the workers” (Wachowska 2010).
5. **1893 Caltavuturo Massacre (Italy)**

Organized by the Fasci Siciliani dei Lavoratori (Sicilian Workers Leagues), peasants staged a symbolic occupation of communal land in attempt to gain back once historic territory. On their way home from the demonstration they began to throw rocks at police who then fired back (Guglielmo 2010, 35). The incident later gave a "Big impetus to urban socialists and Fascianti in their mission to the country side" (Tilly 1979, 234). No immediate change followed however.

6. **1897 Lattimer Mining Massacre (Pennsylvania)**

Under significant economic exploitation and in a time period referred to by many as “America’s melting pot” – this case was one of the most if not the most brutal acts of violence in U.S. labor history. Immigrant workers including ethnic Germans along with Croatians, Hungarians and Poles formed a strike. Unarmed, over 400 strikers marched on a day they voiced support for the formation of a new union (Novak 1996). On September 10, 1897 (Bloody Friday) local deputies led by the sheriff shot over 20 in the back and injured dozens more in what led to a massacre (The Standard 1898). Membership in the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) grew to more than 100,000. Immigrant workers had their place solidified (Green 1968). Three years after the union grew to gain greater rights. Deputies were later put on trial, convicted and eventually this was a major victory for the labor movement.

7. **1902 Barcelona Strike**
A small workers strike (refused to keep working) led to thousands protesting against the state for a shorter working day. Hundreds were killed but the incident led to greater protests (Francisco 2004). The constitution was suspended thereafter. Interestingly, before this time period, collective bargaining rights were not yet institutionalized in Catalonia (Smith 2002, 40). The incident enabled the general strike to enter into dominant political struggles for years to come in this region.

8. **1904 Aleșd Romanian Rebellion**

At the turn of the twentieth century, Southern European provinces were experiencing upheaval (Romania and the Balkans) and there was also significant ethnic conflict in what is now the contemporary state of Hungary. While Northern European workers movements gained rights and were accommodated over the nineteenth century (Goldstein 1983); in Romania urbanization did not take as strong of hold. As part of a decade long trade war, in 1904 a harsh tariff was introduced by the Austria-Hungary Empire and placed onto the Romanian provinces (Jelavich 1983, 27). It was not uncommon for peasants to seize land by force during this period. In the Northern Transylvanian town of Aleșd, violence broke out on March 28 (Kurti 2001, 28). 37 were killed in a clash between peasants and security forces that got little attention.

9. **1905 Russian Bloody Sunday Massacre**

Not long after significant military losses in the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian Tsar was facing arguably the greatest amount of political opposition of that period in Tsarist history. While there were dozens of revolutionary organizations, one specific
organizational campaign was led by an Orthodox priest named Georgi Gapon. He organized an equivalized movement in the capital of St Petersburg where over 150,000 Russians filled the streets on a march to the Tsar’s palace in search of better working conditions (Anisin 2014). Hundreds of nonviolent women, children and workers of all sorts were slaughtered in broad day. The incident ruptured the symbolic myth of Tsarism and dissent diffused into the whole of the Russian Empire. Not long after the first Russian Revolution occurred there was the issuing of the Tsarist October Manifesto.

10. 1907 Romanian Peasant Revolt

Considered an incident of mass violence, this case has received far greater attention than the earlier mentioned 1904 Aleșd. Here in what is now North Eastern Romania (Botoșani), thousands attacked the government and wealthy Jewish land owners on March 3 (Eidelberg 1974). Shortly thereafter unrest spread. Over 2,000 were killed as protest rampaged in most parts of the country. A revolution occurred on March 13 when the government was forced out.

11. 1907 Santa Maria School Massacre (Chile)

On December 20, 1907 nitrate workers and their families camped out in a school in Northern Chile to protest for higher wages and better working conditions (Barrios et al. 1998). An array of forces led by army generals opened fire. In the end this dampened prospects for the domestic labor movement and actually enabled the state to shut down dissent in this region (Frazier 2007, 117).
12. 1909 Setmana Tragica/Tragic Week (Barcelona)

In response to a government decision that enabled wealthy members of society to avoid military conscription, hundreds of Catalonians violently rebelled in Barcelona on July 25, 1909 (Arenas 2012). Here anarchists along with other groups were severely repressed. Thousands were arrested and hundreds died (Arenas 2012, 66). Violence discouraged others from demonstrating against the government. Martial law ensued as the government was able to successfully clamp down on all opposition.

13. 1912 Lena Massacre (Russia)

Just a year before the outbreak of WWI, in the east of Russia goldfield miners and workers were organizing against unfair wages and economic exploitation that they were experiencing under a gold mining firm that had interests near the Lena River in the province of Irkutsk (Melancon 2006). Aristocratic members of Russian society along with foreign investors had stock in the "Lena Gold Mining Joint Stock Company" and on the other side workers were organized by Central Strike Committee. Around April 17-18, Tsarist troops opened fire on a march by workers under the order of an army captain. The incident took place in a rural area that is over 1200 kilometers from Irkutsk (Bodaybo) however word got out about the nearly 300 casualties and over 300 wounded. Great mobilization ensued. Lenin noted the massacre's causal effect (Melancon 2006); not long after this massacre, similar demands were made during strikes in every major Russian city.
14. 1914 Ludlow Colorado Mining Massacre

The Colorado Fuel and Iron Corporation was owned by the Rockefellers and this specific establishment was a major exploiter of workers. In April of 1914, dissent arose and the protest was organized by the UMWA. Striking miners adopted nonviolent methods in a demonstration that immediately met violent security forces which included the Colorado National Guard as well as the specific agent of the Baldwin Felts Detective Agency. The miners’ families were nearby as well as children (Walker 2003). Dozens were killed as news spread quickly to the major city of Denver. The incident went on to significantly alter the purpose of the Rockefellers and after Ludlow a major philanthropic project was initiated by the capitalists that still exists until this day (Appleyard 1990).

15. 1919 Amristar (or Jallianwala Bagh Massacre) Punjab, India

Following a turbulent time of war, instead of political restrictions being eased, the Rowlatt Acts were passed by British Parliament which extended the colonizing power’s repressive scope in India. A decision was made not to provide local self-governance to Indians. Over 15,000 women, children and men nonviolently gathered and here a diverse nonviolent demonstration took place. There were also thousands of Sheiks, Hindus and Muslims that peacefully dissented. However British military then blocked central exits and without warning began to shoot at the nonviolent crowd. Outrage ensued and was followed by strikes. Even Churchill who at the time was overseeing matters related to war, condemned the attacks (Seyer 1991). The incident inspired Gandhi's later nonviolent struggle.
16. 1925 La Coruña Massacre (Chile)

This brutal act of violence occurred on June 4, 1925 at a nitrate mine. A new constitution recently was put in place that greatly expanded the power of the executive in Chile and leading up to this incident. Over the years miners were being suppressed. Some miners demanded better conditions, greater salary and livelihood. In a major altercation, dissidents heaved and strategically threw dynamite at police while others, including drunken workers also shot at them (Frazier 2007, 101). This took place near Huara, Chile. Then President Arturo Alessandri ordered the response but tried to have his military head Ibanez resign over the massacre over outrage. The latter refused to do so.

17. 1927 Vienna Black Friday (Austria)

Political turmoil was immense during this period and after a court acquitted individuals from a right-wing police group killing of a child, dissidents chose to protest the decision. On July 15, 1927 protesters attacked the building of the Social Democratic government headed by Ignaz Seipel (Alder 1983). Police men were killed as dissidents rampaged buildings and major portions of the city. Security forces then were sent in and shot down over eighty civilians (Graham 1930). Others note 100 were killed. Greater strikes formed thereafter but no transformative change ever emerged from the incident.

18. 1928 Columbia Banana Massacre
The United Fruit Company owned hundreds of thousands of acres of Columbian farmland in this period of history. On December of 1928, the firm requested that the Columbian government repress dissent in its plantations (Guevara 2002, 263).

A strike formed as workers called for better conditions, a shorter working day and week. Other political factions joined the workers including Socialist and Communist organizers. From rooftops, security forces shot at the demonstration. In the end, the strike and incident of repression failed to bring change to the disgruntled fruit workers (Bucheli 2005, 133). These atrocious events led to greater repression and a long decade of violence.

19. 1932 La Matanza (El Salvador)

A year after a military coup, discontent grew in the countryside in an unexpected incident that ended up with over 10,000 casualties. A peasant led revolt included both violent and nonviolent methods of dissent. Keep in mind the economic crisis that loomed in this period of history. In 1931, the Great Depression had begun to wreak havoc on countries such as Guatemala who were primarily coffee-exporters. Communist revolutionaries planned an attack on the state with aid of indigenous fighters. On January 22, 1932 hundreds were slaughtered (Gould 2009); as violence ensued and but no transformative change. The importance of this event is difficult to overstate for El Salvador's historical past (Fuentes et al. 2007).

20. 1944 Guatemala
Students petitioned and led a peaceful strike. Then over 300 prominent citizens of the capital asked the dictator to step down but he refused to do so. Hence a greater strike developed by students and in the nighttime on June 24, 1944 security forces shot over 200. The latter led to more violence the next day, to the killing of a school teacher, millions on the streets and eventual revolution (Sharp 2005; Agnew and Rosenzweig 2006, 435). This working class and broad movement ended up overthrowing the 13 year long reign of General Ubico.

21. 1947 Taiwanese 228 incident

Taiwan had been under control of Japan from 1895 to 1945 then it was handed over to the Chiang (Chinese nationalist sympathetic government). Shortly thereafter however, protesters petitioned for greater autonomy but ended up violently chasing with police officers on February 28, 1947. Protest soon turned into a riot and civilians controlled much of urban spaces with weaponry. 1300 were reported to have been killed at the time of the incident (Lai et al. 1991). The Chinese regime of that time destroyed documents regarding the incident (Hsu 2014, 212); however now it is known that tens of thousands were killed on that day.

22. 1960 Sharpeville Massacre

This fascinating case set the stage for arguably one of the most repressive decades of the twentieth century if we are to consider the apartheid state's response to dissent after Sharpeville. Organized by the Pan African Congress (PAC), anti-movement (pass laws)
were protested against by various groups throughout major townships in South Africa. In
the Transvaal province (North East) thousands protested a discriminatory law that
restricted the physical movement of blacks. The specific setting of a mining camp
involved police opening fire on a crowd leading to over 60 deaths and greater dissent.
Immense crackdown ensued for over a decade thereafter as well as international
condemnation.

23. **1961 Paris Algerian Protest Massacre**

This incident even though transpiring during the Algerian-French conflict, contained the
interesting dynamic of Algerians protesting publicly in Paris on October 17, 1961.
Upwards of 30,000 Algerian workers were led by pro-FLN forces in the evening after a
special call from leadership (Sajed 2013, 101). Over 200 were killed by a strategic police
force. The incident is now widely acknowledged to have been covered up by French
authorities. The killings were suppressed by the French (House and MacMaster 2006);
and importantly, later accounts indicate a probable count of 300 casualties (Masters
1997).

24. **1962 Novocherkassk Massacre (Soviet Union)**

Soviet dictator Khrushchev heightened the prices of certain products that are staples of
the Russian diet such as meat and various dairy during the early 1960s (Zubok and
Pleshakov 1997). A revolt arose as protesters (dozens) in the city of Novocherkassk were
killed by gunfire from security forces along with army personnel. Baron (2001) calls this
incident "Bloody Saturday". Yet, first official reports about the incident only were
released in 1989 as the state censored the incident.
25. 1968 Mexico Tlatelolco (Mexico City)

This incident is known as the Tlatelolco massacre (Night of Tlatelolco) and here repression resulted in 100-300 casualties when students were gunned down by the military and police in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Mexico City. This occurred just ten days before the opening of the 1968 Summer Olympics. The state and mainstream media at the time lied that the protesters were shooting as the Mexican government invested a significant amount of money in the games. Roughly 7 billion USD by today's terms. Great support was given to students from some other members of society (Doyle 2003). The Olympic Games became "blood tainted" as a result of the incident (Espinosa 2014). It was the defining moment in modern Mexico's history that created a generation of activists who sought to bring down the one-party state (Espinosa 2014, 119). The state however was able to keep repressing.

26. 1971 Corpus Christi Student Massacre (Mexico City)

On June 10, 1971 over 5,000 marched in search of freedom from authoritative rule. Protesters were mainly students from a variety of departments at the nearby National University. The incident took place during an annual festival known as Catholic Feast Day (Espinosa 2014). A CIA trained Mexican-government security force team called Halcones began spraying machine gun fire during the singing of the demonstrators. Students fled as greater violence broke out and journalists were attacked. Over 30 were killed and 100 wounded (Hodges and Gandy 2002, 143). Other than increased mobilization no transformative change ensued.
27. 1976 Soweto Uprisings (South Africa)

After a highly repressive decade in the 1960s, the 1970s were comprised of a newly formed struggle led by Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). The ruling National Party (apartheid state) passed a law that dictated the changing of the medium of school instruction in a majority of schools from English to Afrikaans. This enabled a significant organizing campaign to be undertaken by the BCM and on June 16, 1976, upwards of 10,000 students and young children marched in the township of Soweto only to be met by violent police and dogs. Over 70 were killed. Biko was later tortured and killed however the incident was highly transformative and took a significant amount of legitimacy away from the apartheid state.

28. 1978 Iranian Black Friday

During a period of intense political standoff, tens of thousands led a demonstration during a time of martial law in what is described by Wagner (2010) as a working class neighborhood. This took place in center of the capital on September 8, 1978 when nearly one hundred were shot as security forces headed by the Shah opened fire (Wagner 2010). Some note how this led to a point of no return, symbolized the fall of the regime, and soon after the revolution came. This case is particularly important due to the fact that the protest which formed was in response to a controversial article printed by the previous day by a governmental-affiliated press. Afterwards, much of the moderate Iranian population became radicalized.
29. **1978 Panzos Massacre (Guatemala)**

On May 24, 1978 upwards of 200 peasants that were part of the Kekchi Indian group gathered in a small village in order to send a direct message and petition to the mayor for greater autonomy of their land. Some say the peasants were nonviolent while others claim that some were throwing chili pepper and sticks at the incident (hence a .67 nonviolent strategy calibration). The mayor had been known to use peasant land for his own exploitative purposes. Severe repression was inflicted upon the peasants as security forces were sent into villages. Word got out about the incident into both domestic and international networks. While transformative change did not arise immediately, the massacre did bring international attention on the regime. Genocide and powerful right wing military dictatorships plagued Guatemala in the 1980s just years after the incident as the military led a scorched-earth campaign against rural peasants.

30. **1980 South Korean Gwanju Uprising**

What began as a nonviolent student led uprising, turned out to be violent as dissidents failed to maintain discipline. Dissent diffused after a student led pro-democracy movement attempted to bring down a military led dictatorship. Residents took up arms and great violence ensued after heavy repression was inflicted on a crowd on May 21. TV was cut off and radio was used as a mode of communication during the uprising (Kim and Han 2003). Revolt ensued for over a week as citizens formed a citizen "army." Political turmoil lasted over a decade. Opposition was not revived until 1983 as the regime continued to heavily repress (Choe 2006). Interestingly, Francisco includes this
case but dismisses the fact that this was a citizen armed uprising by assuming it to be a nonviolent demonstration.

31. 1982 Hama Massacre (Syria)

In this period of Syria's turbulent political history the main opposition group to the regime was Sunni Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (Human Rights Watch 2011). The group engaged in armed struggle against the state in 1981 and by 1982 launched a main offensive. Some report that anywhere from 5,000 to 25,000 died in the fight. Over 1,000 Syrian security force members also died. Afterwards, opposition was defeated and the regime attempted to censor much of the violence. Many from the armed group fled the country (Khatib 2011, 80).

32. 1984 Vaal Uprising (South Africa)

On November 3, 1984 the Vaal triangle revolted (Noonan 2003). During this period of political turmoil in South Africa, thousands began to violently revolt in a dispersed uprisings. This was sparked by an earlier September mandated rent increase. Violence led to deaths and thousands of burnt down homes (Chaskalson et al. 1987). That period of apartheid rule was comprised of death squads carrying out political attacks during times of state of emergency. There was over 6 million USD in property damage in the Vaal triangle townships (Zuern 2011, 34).

33. 1987 Mendiola Massacre (Philippines)
Not even a year had passed since the new Aquino government had come into power after a dictatorship was overthrown. During the week leading up to January 22, 1987, over 10,000 peasants from Tagalog and Luzon provinces camped out and occupied grounds next to the Presidential palace. Farmers, peasants and workers wanted more land or greater salaries (Rocamora 1991). The military massacred over a dozen farmers who were nonviolently marching among others in the protest. This shocked and outraged publics and some in government leading to retaliation.

34. **1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre (China)**

This now infamous case involves a student movement that took advice from nonviolence practitioner Gene Sharp to protest against the authoritative Chinese regime. The pro-democracy movement had links to unions but whilst adopting direct action, met an array of tanks. This took place occupying a highly symbolic historic site. Hundreds were killed and greater dissent arose in the days following.

35. **1991 Timor - "Santa Cruz" Massacre**

While a group was peacefully attending a funeral ceremony of a Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FReTiLIn) political member on November 12, Indonesian army troops stormed in and killed over 250 civilians. The fascinating aspect behind this incident is that Western journalists, including Amy Goodman (DemocracyNow host) were there to witness the killings. Hundreds died and images from that day went viral both domestically and internationally. At the same time, authorities engaged in numerous tactics in attempt to cover up the incident and take legitimacy away from and devalue the
protest group (Martin 2007). International condemnations were aimed at the regime afterwards.

36. 1995 Aguas Blancas Massacre (Mexico)

A portion of this gruesome incident was caught on film and is publicly available on the internet. On June 28, 1995, over a dozen of farmers were killed during a demonstration led by the Organizacion Campesina de la Sierra Sur. The protest's main demand was the release of a former activist. Police shot unarmed farmers, then planted weapons in their hands in attempt to deviate (Solomon et al. 1997). Afterwards, word slowly got out about the incident then international condemnation ensued (Schatz 2011, 204). Shortly thereafter, armed struggle was taken up in this rural area by peasants.

37. 1997 Ghulja Incident

In an autonomous region located in China, flyers were handed out and a significant organizational campaign formed. The following day, tens of thousands of women, children and workers protested for ethnic rights and cultural freedom in a remote region in the Northwest China. Here the Uyghur people dissented against the Chinese state yet were met with heavy violence. Post-massacre resulted in hundreds of executions and detainments (World Uyghur Congress 2013). The state successfully justified repression and even sent in troops to help censor the events. Chinese leadership frequently refers to protesting Uyghurs as terrorists (Rodríguez 2013).

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5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pXl-zl2SUAk; http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=798_1412834013
38. **2005 Shangwei Chinese Village Massacre**

In a highly censored and rural setting (near Dongzhou) the Chinese state sent in security forces to defend its interests in promoting and building electric power plants. Local villagers and residents in a largely spontaneous revolt retaliated and threw homemade bombs. On December 6 arguably the biggest civilian killing spree was committed by the Chinese state since the major 1989 incident (Sheridan 2005; French 2005). No immediate change ensued. Once again the state did everything in its power to censor the incident. The above reports mentioned that telephone lines were blocked and prevented individuals from making calls to major cities outside this rural area.

39. **2007 Guinea Strike**

It was only in 2006 when one of the most fraudulent states in Africa (ruled by Lansana Conté) loosened its monopoly on radio broadcasting. A strike was organized by the Union Syndicate of Guinean Workers (USTG) and by the National Confederation of Guinean Workers (CNTG) shortly thereafter (Tattersall and Samb 2007). In turn, the regime repressed street protests with tear gas and also censored union leaders' messages. On January 22, 2007 over 30,000 marched and violent clashes broke out in the capital. 20 were killed and 150 wounded. The incident drew great attention; however the state was able to arrest the leaders of both Unions (similar to the Steve Biko arrest in the Apartheid era).

40. **2009 Guinea Conakry-Stadium Massacre**
Just a year after a coup initiated by captain Moussa Dadis Camara, over 50,000 protested against his previous promise to not run for president in the next election. Keep in mind this state has a history of corruption in its institutions. A lieutenant Abubakar "Toumba" Diakité ordered the killings of tens of thousands when dissidents peacefully gathered in a nearby sports stadium called Conakry Stadium. Security forces charged in, raped women and killed many (BBC 2009). The incident has been labeled by the UN as a crime against humanity. Greater protests arose in days and months after. However a main union leader was arrested and the government blamed members of the military for the violence rather than taking account themselves. International condemnations were placed on the regime from a variety of countries.

41. 2011 Arab Spring Syria Protest Killings

Around the same time as revolts spread across much of the Arab world, on March 15, 2011 protests began in Syria. In the Southern region of the country in the city Daraa protesters peacefully marched and advocated new democratic reforms and for greater political representation. Over 20 were killed in the next two days and by March 28 over 70 were known to have been publicly murdered in different cities in Syria (Slackman 2011). Unfortunately, what began as protests that formed as part of a diffusion of revolt, ended up in a fully fledged civil war with the world powers (Russia, U.S.) arming the incumbent regime and opposition.

42. 2012 Marikana Massacre (South Africa)
This region of South Africa is known as the platinum belt as it is rich in this precious mineral. The act of state violence occurred at a London-owned platinum mining firm (Lonmin's Marikana). On August 16 over 200 dissidents went on strike, reports vary in terms of their motives but it is plausible to assume the protest contained violence. Police opened fire. More miners went on strike afterwards in different parts of the country. The president issued an apology and repayment to victims but there still remain many question marks in regards to accountability. Some note problems of inadequacy in the heavily armed security forces that responded to dissent (Baker 2014, 19). Strikers later got a pay raise.

43. **2013 Egypt Rabaa Massacre**

Human Rights Watch executive called this one of the largest killings of protesters in a single day in recent history (BBC News Agency 2013). In August, in the urban metropolis of Cairo, supporters of ousted president Morsi were gunned down and massacred in Rabaa Square. Police carried out raids to remove protesters and supporters at all costs. Greater violence and rebellion diffused across Egypt. The interim PM then defended the repression to international agencies even in the face of condemnation and criticism (Aljazeera 2013).

44. **2014 Euromaidan (Ukraine)**

Even though this set of events took place not in 2011 but in 2013-14, the Ukrainian Euromaidan protest shares many parallels with the 2011 Syrian case as now both countries are in stages of civil war. Months of occupation in the Kiev city centre eventually led to the February ousting of the President after dozens were shot by state
security forces. The Euromaidan protest was a widely formed and asymmetrically supported movement. A .67 value is given to the level of nonviolence adopted by the protest, as the weeks leading up to the February incident contained protesters that directly seized and burned government buildings.

Below is a list of the 44 cases and the calibrations of conditions for each case. The capital letters indicate the following: N= Nonviolence; M= Media Network; G= Geography; D= Campaign Diversity; I = Campaign Infrastructure; O = Increased Mobilization; T= Threat Level (The far right hand column indicates whether the case of interest experienced increased mobilization; YES/NO; coded as 1/0)
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As the chart above displays the calibration characteristics of the universe of cases, the following section presents truth table analysis. Furthermore, the general guideline of determining a causal effect is done via consistency. A .80 level of consistency indicates a sufficient condition while .90 indicates a necessary condition (Schneider and Wagemann (2010). In other words, a sufficient condition entails that X is a subset of Y; whereas a necessary condition entails that X is a superset of Y. Following truth table analysis, standard analyses is carried out. This provides the user with "complex, parsimonious, and intermediate solutions" (Ragin 2008b, 49). The Quine-McCluskey algorithm is used for the minimization of outcome solutions.

**Truth Table**

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The column labeled as "number" - indicates the total number of cases that can be explained by the configuration to the left.

**Standard Analyses**

During standard analyses, (fsQCA) provides three solutions in which relevant combinations of conditions are computed based upon the Quine-McCluskey algorithm. Neither of the solution types can be considered to be better than the other as they are logically equivalent to one another. They do however contain different assumptions. Usually the complex and intermediate solutions are reported, with emphasis being placed on the latter as it is based around counter-factuals (Ragin 2008b, 165-167).

![Complex Solution](image)

The Intermediate solution is identical to the complex solution shown above.
Below are the results for tests for the negated outcome:

Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

**COMPLEX SOLUTION**

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</table>

solution coverage: 0.416875  
solution consistency: 0.626880

The consistency cutoff level is .60 in this test on the negated outcome given all conditions are either way being tested on negative outcome.
References


http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/17/international/asia/17china.html?pagewanted=1and_r=2and


http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/20/ukraine-dead-protesters-police


Conclusion

Throughout this dissertation a wide array of different approaches have been reviewed and related to the nonviolent civilian resistance as well as the state repression literatures. I have investigated questions having to do with Gene Sharp's concept of political jiu-jitsu, Hess and Martin's repression backfire, and towards the latter portions of the dissertation the repression-dissent nexus was examined. In the end and primarily as explained via the fourth article of this dissertation, nonviolent protest has been a highly effective mode of dissent, but considering the role of nonviolence in processes of historical change has to be done alongside acknowledgement and analysis of other factors. These factors are in some cases highly theoretical and complex such as hegemony, discursive structure, myth, dislocation and antagonism. On the other hand, there exist directly observable characteristics of protest-state interactions which also are part of the puzzle behind the question of what enables protest movements to keep mobilizing after being severely repressed by governmental forces. Here I am specifically referring to historically robust factors that have been present in and are relevant to a wide array of protest-state interactions that have taken place throughout different political and economic settings. Examples include geographic terrain, protest diversity, protest threat level, and campaign diversity, among others.

I have also hinted that there is a certain historical moral element in the practice of nonviolence. The implementation of nonviolence as explained throughout this dissertation, has come in spiritual or physical forms and in some cases as a mixture of both. In the examples of the Black Consciousness Movement in apartheid South Africa or even the 1905 priest-led protest in St Petersburg, Russia, nonviolence was strategically interlinked with metaphysical notions of human existence. In other settings, nonviolence has been utilized as a direct action strategy and symbol of effective organization in the discourses of social movements that did not contain
reference to religion or universally oriented ethical principles. This latter type of empirical implementation has also been extensively successful.

While many scholars have recently emphasized the usage and success of nonviolent protest (in comparison to violent) over the second half of the twentieth century as a democratic force for social reform, I hope to have shown that the practice of nonviolence transcends boundaries of recent historical eras. Its historical relevance is not only confined to twentieth century democratic transition. Along these lines, popular notions (many of which are influenced by Gene Sharp's work), in which the direct usage of nonviolence is advocated as a pathway to democratic transition, contain more complexity than many have acknowledged. This is predominantly the case if the concepts of "political jiu-jitsu" or "repression backfire" are analyzed and related to other dislocatory events that take place within larger sequences of historical change. The meeting and clashing of a nonviolent protest with a repressive governmental force does not automatically entail that radical social change or democratic transition will ensue. Consent and the withdrawal of consent are deterministic concepts if they are not considered alongside and within the qualitative contexts in which they are investigated in. Additionally, the relationship between state repression and protest mobilization (regardless of whether mobilization is violent or nonviolent), is more complex and conjunctural than previously acknowledged.

Furthermore, throughout the introduction as well as in the four papers of this dissertation, I have not privileged structure over agency or agency over structure but rather have conceptualized the place of social structures and agent-action within qualitative discursive systems. Adopting a discursive approach enabled in-depth analysis to be conducted on the hegemonic formations of governmental discourses as well as competing discourses in numerous contexts of interest.

Social movements on the other hand, have been treated as potential agents of change due to their
ability to put together and articulate social demands via political discourse. Adopting a discourse theoretic approach has also enabled me to utilize an ontological position which entails that there exists a relational and differential nature of politics. A given regime will articulate a chain of equivalence to help make sense of the political sphere of social reality. And during this articulation, an inevitable antagonism will be instilled within its discourse. A regime will also attempt to articulate a logic of difference in order to keep heterogeneous groups at bay for the purpose of keeping opposition from engaging or forming into a unified collective force of action. Perhaps, the prevailing set of factors that can explain why repression backfire has been as historically transformative as it has can be summarized by the following.

When governmental forces massacre a protest that is in the form of an equivalized force which the state was attempting to keep disconnected, potential protesters, domestic publics and even in some cases international publics, are able to witness falsity in the positions and conditions of previously differentiated social groups that a regime once claimed to be objective manifestations of social reality. These positions turn out and get revealed to actually not be natural expressions of politics or civil society. Coupled in with the moral shock that arises from state violence being inflicted upon a nonviolent protest, the revealing of regime antagonisms and myths during repression backfire will continue to enable nonviolent protests to propel political struggles to new heights.

Both discourse theory as well as fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis have enabled me to consider political "opposition" not as a homogeneous actor across different historical and social contexts, but rather I have been able to take into consideration the much needed concept of variance. First, via discourse theory, I analyzed discourses that were articulated by protest movements in search of political and social emancipation. Social movement leaders that
articulate a political discourse based around nonviolence can enable gripping frames to be cast on protesters as well as observers. In highly turbulent and politically violent contexts, nonviolent mobilization provides a very attractive and in some cases, much needed outlet for suppressed populations to participate in practices of solidarity. Nonviolence helps to negate over abusive repressive practices that suppressive governments improperly exploit from their monopoly over violence.

The question of what makes nonviolent movements more successful than violent movements however, is one that cannot be answered within the scope of this dissertation, but as an implication drawn from the four papers presented here it is plausible to infer that there exist relevant conditions (some of which are highly tied to opposition variance/type) that must be in place for nonviolent movements to be able to succeed in overcoming state repression. The articulation of a chain of equivalized social demands based around a signifier of nonviolence can enable protest movements to gain a wide diversity of support and also side step state agents who engage in pre-emptive repression before a protest might take place. Under the right conditions (which have been theorized and empirically identified via the fourth paper of this dissertation), nonviolent protests and social movements more generally, will be able to withstand severe state repression and experience increased mobilization even after being repressed.

By utilizing qualitative methods, discourse theory and then qualitative comparative analysis, I have examined how certain hegemonic formations within states emerge, get established and endure. Here it has been possible to pinpoint, compare, and evaluate the effects of various social dislocations on those hegemonic formations. In the first three papers of the dissertation, repression backfire as a causal event has been weighed alongside other dislocatory events such as war, economic crisis, and famine. If viewed in this light, it should come as no surprise that
immense transformative change has ensued throughout different historical eras after some acts of severe state repression were inflicted upon nonviolent movements. With reference to the cases of Bloody Sunday and apartheid Soweto I have also demonstrated how state violence may spur a powerful effect and become a symbol of a new political struggle. It can reveal antagonisms which underlie discursive totalities and ones that specifically are attempted to be concealed by political leaders.

A compelling explanatory contribution of this dissertation entails that social dislocations brought about by repression backfire can rupture myths and reveal the contradictory nature of social imaginaries that underlie the discursive formations of ruling governments. This latter outcome is brought about due to the meanings that get attributed to some severe acts of repression and at the same time, due to the revealing or opening of contingency in a political terrain which is theoretically impossible to ever fully close off. The interactive effect of repression backfire surely plays a major role in the greater trend of nonviolent social movement success. This dissertation has put forward a theoretical and empirical explanation of the former. While in the first two papers I examine cases and the specific qualitative settings of regimes by placing repression backfire in a larger historical scope and path-dependent sequence of events, the empirical results drawn from qualitative comparative analysis in the fourth paper expand upon the first two papers by focusing on the specific outcome of increased mobilization. Here the fourth paper enables a new understanding to emerge regarding why it is that nonviolent protests can spur a highly debated outcome of the repression-dissent nexus which I have conceptualized alongside the short-term outcome of repression backfire.

The QCA paper has provided a powerful explanatory framework through the presentation of causal recipes of sufficient conditions which bring about the outcome of repression backfire. It
specifically demonstrated that the relationship between repression and mobilization is not simply linear but instead is highly equifinal and conjunctural. The combinations of conditions identified in the fourth paper of the dissertation however, are not meant to explain the duration of entire political struggles or longer historical sequences. This is precisely why I did not and still do not argue that repression backfire will inevitably lead to the success of a social movement. It surely plays a part, yet greater research has to be conducted in order to identify relevant sequences of social conflict that transpire after severe state repression. The latter will help to abandon some of the determinacy found in Sharp's work, and at the same time it will aid recent quantitative research (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), in which nonviolent civilian resistance campaigns have been observed to have a higher likelihood of being able to withstand state repression when compared to violent. By focusing on a temporally short outcome of interest (repression backfire), I have discovered that protest-state interactions lead to or result in much more heterogeneous outcomes than previously acknowledged by scholars in multidisciplinary literatures.

While many treat a given protest-state interaction as repeated, this claim is not empirically sound. Interactions between protests and state forces are not indefinitely repeated and should not be considered to be tit-for-tat interactions. The short-term outcomes of the repression-dissent nexus or in other words, what happens after a given protest movement gets severely repressed by governmental forces, is much more complex than a simple continuous tit for tat interaction. I have argued that immediate outcomes (increased/decreased dissent) are linked to the form and degree of strategy adopted by protesters, the level of protest threat, the amount of homogeneity in the composition of the protest as well as the presence of communicational networks. This is of significant importance given that previous frameworks, such as Sharp's political jiu-jitsu are
based upon assumptions which imply that nonviolent protests will be able to indefinitely spur large-scale shifting effects after they interact with violent governmental forces.

The fourth paper validates my hypothesis and claim that nonviolence on its own (as many in the literature believe) cannot be considered a sufficient condition that will bring about backfire in different historical, political, and economic contexts. What also has to be considered is that throughout this dissertation, various elements and explanatory tools have been adopted which from the outset, were not easy to adopt without undergoing serious theoretical conceptualization. A significant amount of attention has been paid to noteworthy regimes that possessed very strict historical arrangements. For example, Russian Tsarism was rooted in its own historical time, possessed its own myths and on the whole was a historical discourse that can never be replicated in the same way. A similar set of thoughts can apply to the apartheid state which was one of the most repressive regimes of the twentieth century, if not the most repressive. The ruling National Party attempted to make sense of its existence throughout half of a highly turbulent century of political conflict while also exploiting and imprisoning tens of thousands of its population. AKP led Turkey, on the other hand, is also a regime that is rooted in its own historical epoch. Early on, it was tricky to investigate major acts of severe repression in all of these different historical settings because there appeared at first to be an extensive amount of context sensitive events that had occurred alongside the protest-state interaction that I was seeking to explain.

As was noted in the introductory section, there are few social scientific frameworks that can take into consideration the wide array of factors that are at play during political struggles and especially during social movement interactions with state forces. It is particularly difficult to generalize one set of findings onto other historical eras. With evident differences, how can it be feasible to find commonalities of broad historical attributes that are relevant to protest-state
interactions across different contexts? Fortunately, the primary methods of dissent that had been popular two centuries ago for protesters such as picketing, marching, and other forms of direct action are still used today. Indeed, the concept and tactic of protest occupation was not as dominant in earlier times, but nonetheless, protest strategies have been similar across different historical and communicational eras. All protests and social movements that were examined in this dissertation took place in publicly observable areas and their organizational campaigns also have been documented in many different literary as well as historical outlets. To first understand how nonviolent protest and state repression interacted in one context, analyses of political discourses, hegemonic formations of regimes, and other concepts were implemented and only afterwards did it become feasible to be able to compare how certain social events changed the composition of those discourses and hegemonic formations by revealing their contingent nature. In the end, even with significant differences between qualitative contexts and historical eras, commonalities relevant to protest-government interactions were bold and substantial enough to enable comparative research to be conducted.

What also has been observed and learned is that political struggles between social movements and governments of all sorts have been immensely brutal and vicious over the last centuries. Political violence is not only limited to civil war, world war, or battles between separatist groups. Rather, state repression of popular protest has also been immensely violent. This type of violence (although not as prevalent in twenty first century developed countries), has actually been historically salient in the era of nation states. During violent periods of state repression, new social demands have been articulated and made into political discourses with their own antagonistic characteristics, myths and in some cases collective social imaginaries. As a causal event, the state repressing of certain nonviolent protests can severely dislocate the structure of a
hegemonic formation and reveal the deepest antagonisms that underpin the discursive structure of a given regime whether that regime is democratic, communist or fascist. This is precisely why some nonviolent protests will produce transformative effects in their interactions with state forces in comparison to violent protests. Across the last two centuries of historical time, nonviolent protests that adopted bold strategies of direct action, organized a diverse amount of sectors of their society and protested in focal points of governmental capitals were able to withstand state repression and continue to rebel the following day.

What transpired after those protest-state interactions however were not simple one-shot transitions to democratic forms of social organization or processes of political jiu-jitsu, but outcomes were extremely diverse. Severe state repression when inflicted upon protest movements can backfire on a government and lead to various outcomes including a protest getting shut down, being accommodated, experiencing increased mobilization, and in some instances revolution, civil war and other historically transformative outcomes may ensue. These topics surely deserve greater theorization and attention through future research endeavors. As a final point, and I have brought a similar point up in the concluding discussion of the fourth paper of this dissertation - protest activity is increasingly being followed from external and exogenous sources such as media organizations, NGOs, human rights groups, among others. For instance, each act of severe repression in the 2011 Arab Spring was made public and circulated into international media channels as well as social media outlets. The digital revolution, as some refer to it, has shifted dynamics that underlie the relationship between state repression and mobilization. Protests and especially social movements are now more visible and their organization structure is more accessible for observers. Acts of repression are much more difficult to cover up in the face of digitalized forms of communication for governments. Yet,
even with digital communication, if protest groups do not fully adhere to nonviolent strategy, organize a diverse base and plan their surges of collective action in an urban area, the role of digital media still might not be enough to enable mobilization to continue after severe state repression.