Arena, Philip and Nicoletti, Nicholas P (2014) 'Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision.' International Theory, 6 (03). pp. 391-416. ISSN 1752-9719

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Abstract

We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory, while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less appropriate. We argue for a revised version of selectorate theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning coalition, yet we believe it provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics.

Item Type:	Article
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User:	Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited:	10 Aug 2016 12:02
Last Modified:	10 Aug 2016 12:02
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/17400

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