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Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission

Argenziano, Rossella and Severinov, Sergei and Squintani, Francesco (2016) 'Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission.' American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (3). 119 - 155. ISSN 1945-7669

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Abstract

This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's advice may be more precise than when information is directly acquired by the decision maker, even if the expert is not more efficient than the decision maker at acquiring information. This result bears important implications for organization design. Communication by an expert to a decision maker may often outperform delegation of the decision-making authority to the expert, as well as centralization by the decision maker of both information acquisition and decision-making authority.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Rossella Argenziano
Date Deposited: 25 Aug 2016 13:05
Last Modified: 11 Apr 2019 11:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/17459

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