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Fossil Fuel Rents: Who Initiates International Crises?

Bakaki, Z (2016) 'Fossil Fuel Rents: Who Initiates International Crises?' Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 22 (2). 173 - 190. ISSN 1079-2457

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Abstract

© 2016 by De Gruyter 2016. Existing research suggests that both natural resource abundance and scarcity are likely to increase the risk of interstate and domestic conflict. Two crucial aspects, however, have largely been neglected in the existing literature: (1) the analysis of international crises (i.e. non-violent conflicts) and (2) the effects of different market conditions of energy resources. Especially a growing number of market participants can affect the strategic value of natural resources and, thus, the incentives for international crisis initiation. It is argued that different market structures make countries to adopt either aggressive or more peaceful behavior towards other states, and this is why I empirically then disaggregate fossil fuels along with the market that they belong to. This study examines 179 countries at the monadic level since 1980. The results suggest variation on the incentives of crisis initiation along the different fossil fuels, while I also correct for potential endogeneity issues.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Zorzeta Bakaki
Date Deposited: 30 Aug 2016 08:44
Last Modified: 05 Feb 2019 18:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/17485

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