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Approval voting and scoring rules with common values

Ahn, DS and Oliveros, S (2016) 'Approval voting and scoring rules with common values.' Journal of Economic Theory, 166. pp. 304-310. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

We compare approval voting with other scoring rules for environments with common values and private information. For finite electorates, the best equilibrium under approval voting is superior to plurality rule or negative voting. For large electorates, if any scoring rule yields a sequence of equilibria that efficiently aggregates information, then approval voting must do so as well.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Approval voting; Scoring rule; Plurality rule; Information aggregation
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 19 Nov 2016 14:18
Last Modified: 06 Jan 2022 14:41
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/18077

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