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Policy, Office and Votes: The Electoral Value of Ministerial Office

Martin, Shane (2016) 'Policy, Office and Votes: The Electoral Value of Ministerial Office.' British Journal of Political Science, 46 (2). 281 - 296. ISSN 0007-1234

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Abstract

<jats:p>Parties are not unitary actors, and legislators within the same party may have divergent interests, which complicates the understanding of parties’ motivations and behaviour. This article argues that holding a ministerial portfolio confers an electoral advantage, and so, in contrast to their co-partisans, politicians who are ministers simultaneously maximize policy, office and votes. New data on Irish elections over a thirty-year period show that ministers are insulated from the electoral cost of governing compared with their co-partisans. Differentiating between ministers and their co-partisans helps to resolve the puzzle of political parties’ choosing to enter government despite the evident electoral costs they will encounter. Moreover, previously overlooked electoral benefits of ministerial office help explain their desirability, and thus their ability to incentivize legislative behaviour in parliamentary regimes.</jats:p>

Item Type: Article
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Jim Jamieson
Date Deposited: 06 Dec 2016 13:16
Last Modified: 03 May 2019 09:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/18279

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