Mercier, H and Rolison, JJ and Stragà, M and Ferrante, D and Walsh, CR and Girotto, V (2017) 'Questioning the preparatory function of counterfactual thinking.' Memory and Cognition, 45 (2). 261 - 269. ISSN 0090-502X

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Abstract

Why do individuals mentally modify reality (e.g., “If it hadn’t rained, we would have won the game”)? According to the dominant view, counterfactuals primarily serve to prepare future performance. In fact, individuals who have just failed a task tend to modify the uncontrollable features of their attempt (e.g., “If the rules of the game were different, I would have won it”), generating counterfactuals that are unlikely to play any preparatory role. By contrast, they generate prefactuals that focus on the controllable features of their ensuing behavior (e.g., “If I concentrate more, I will win the next game”). Here, we test whether this tendency is robust and general. Studies 1a and 1b replicate this tendency and show that it occurs regardless of whether individuals think about their failures or their successes. Study 2 shows that individuals generate relatively few controllable counterfactuals, unless explicitly prompted to do so. These results raise some questions regarding the generality of the dominant view according to which counterfactuals mainly serve a preparatory function.

Item Type:	Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Science and Health > Psychology, Department of
Depositing User:	Jonathan Rolison
Date Deposited:	22 Dec 2016 14:43
Last Modified:	07 Apr 2021 10:16
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/18598

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