Elites and carbon offsetting in Brazil: A critique of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Mato Grosso

Lauren A H Crabb

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University of Essex

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Abstract

Major sporting competitions, such as the Football World Cup and the Olympic Games have become global events. For the organisers of such events, they are much more than a short-term competition, they present the opportunity to 're-imagineer' nations and cities. Scholars have discussed the commercialisation and financial opportunities of such sporting events, and their links to neoliberalism. But recent official claims about the social benefits and carbon neutrality have received much less attention. This thesis addresses this under-researched area. It documents and analyses the social and environmental claims made in the context of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, and explores how these played out in the rural state of Mato Grosso.

This study is primarily based on documentary research and ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Mato Grosso. It is informed by a critical management studies perspective and draws specifically on a neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance. This enabled me to go behind the environmental discourse in Mato Grosso and understand the realities on the ground. The findings illustrate how regional elites co-opted environmental governance mechanisms and appropriated the socio-economic benefits of the FIFA World Cup. I focus particularly on a carbon offsetting project which was supposed to plant 1. 4 million trees along the Cuiabá River in order offset the CO emissions generated by the construction of the new Pantanal football Stadium. As I show, this project was organised by an NGO manufactured by Mato Grosso based agro-industrial elites, who used it as a vehicle to further their interests at the expense of local subsistence fishing communities and the environment.

Keywords: Elites, carbon-offsetting, environmental governance

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List of abbreviations

APP	Area of Permanent Preservation
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CER	Certified Emission Reduction
CIPEM	Centro dos Industrias Produtoras e Exportadores da Madeira de Mato Grosso Centre of Madeira Producing Industries and Exporters of Mato Grosso
EDF	Environmental Defence Fund
FEMA	Fundo Estadual de Meio Ambiente State Fund for the Environment
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GHG	Green House Gas
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOC	International Olympic Committee
LEED	Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
OSCIP	Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público Civil Society Organisation of Public Interest
PSBD	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira The Brazilian Social Democracy Party
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores The Worker's Party
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
Secopa	Secretaria Estadual para Assuntos da Copa do Mundo da FIFA Brasil 2014 State secretary for the Organisation of the 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil
SEMA	Seretaria de Estado do Meio Ambiente Environment Ministry

TAC	Termo de Ajuste de Conduta Terms of Adjusted Conduct
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
VLT	Veículo Leve sobre Trilhos Light Railway System

-Chapter I -

Introduction

On the 30th October 2007 in Zurich, Switzerland, Brazil was awarded the right to host the 2014 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. A mix of political and footballing elites were present, including then Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 'Lula', Brazilian Football Confederation president Ricardo Teixeira, Brazilian Sports Minister Orlando Silva, national team coach Dunga and retired striker, and now politician, Romario. On the day, Lula is reported to have said 'soccer is not only a sport for us, it's more than that. Soccer for us is a passion, a national passion.' Ricardo Teixeira is reported to have declared that 'over the next few years we will have a consistent influx of investments. The 2014 World Cup will enable Brazil to have a modern infrastructure…In social terms it will be very beneficial…Our objective is to make Brazil become more visible in global arenas…The World Cup goes far beyond a mere sporting event. It's going to be an interesting tool to promote social transformation' (CNN, 2007). By 2012 these claims of social benefits were complemented by a declaration from the then FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, that the 2014 World Cup would be the 'greenest ever'. This would be achieved through a combination of waste management and recycling, certified green stadiums and carbon offsetting programmes (FIFA, 2011b).

This thesis is about these social and environmental claims. It documents and analyses the policies and measures agreed by FIFA and the Brazilian government in order to achieve them, and provides a critical case study of how they were implemented in the host state of Mato Grosso. The Mato Grosso bid was based on an infrastructure programme that would 're-imagineer' the state capital, Cuiabá , as a green city with a brand new football stadium, light railway system and state-of-the-art airport. In doing so,

they would make a valuable social contribution to life in Cuiabá and put the city on the tourist map. Moreover, once the host city status was secured, in line with FIFA requirements, the emissions generated from the construction of the new stadium would be offset by an ambitious reforestation project to plant 1.4 million trees along the River Cuiabá which feeds into the world famous Pantanal wetlands.

1.1: Sports mega-events as neoliberal vehicles

Academics and politicians alike have long acknowledged the high profile position of FIFA and the positive benefits of being associated with the institution. Other than being admitted to the United Nations, joining FIFA or the International Olympic Committee (IOC) can be part of a wider political strategy by governments to be accepted as a nation state. Becoming part of the 'FIFA family' and receiving associated financial benefits has meant that it has historically been part of some nations development plans. Conversely, being removed from the 'FIFA family' has clear political and economic consequences (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002, Death, 2011). However, the effects are not always positive. Some African football federations are dependent on FIFA money to be financially viable, therefore they are likely to accommodate FIFA and their 'family' on some occasions in ways which are detrimental (Giulianotti and Robertson, 2009). Nonetheless, the World Cup has been a firm fixture in the sporting calendar since the inaugural tournament in 1930. Hosting mega-events is widely regarded as an opportunity to achieve global exposure, for example, the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games were seen as a celebration of Hitler's ideals and the 1995 Rugby World Cup in South Africa was seen by many as a way to welcome South Africa back into the global economy after the fall of apartheid. Since the 1980s sports mega-events have experienced massive change and today, they are largely influenced by the commercial opportunities available in contemporary professional sport.

It was the commercial and political opportunities which influenced the Brazilian government's decision to bid to host the 2014 tournament. The story of how Brazil became World Cup hosts can be traced back to the bidding process of the 2006 World Cup. Officially, the hosting of a FIFA World Cup event is decided by a vote system which grants each representative of a FIFA federation one vote. In the final vote for hosting of the 2006 World Cup on Thursday 6th July 2000, South Africa were beaten by Germany by 11 votes to 12. The president of Oceania's Football Association, Charles Dempsey, abstained from voting after he was reportedly pressurised into voting for South Africa by his colleagues after his favourite, England, were eliminated from the process. South Africa, angered by the lost opportunity, appealed this vote and prepared to take FIFA to the High Court. The case was settled out-of-court when South Africa were financially compensated and a continental rotation policy was introduced which would ensure the 2010 World Cup would be held on the African continent and 2014 in South America (Bolsmann, 2012, Tomlinson, 2014).[1]

The 2014 bidding process was less controversial; in 2006 the South American countries Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Brazil expressed interest in bidding for the event. But by early 2007 all three of Brazil's opponents had withdrawn citing austerity and financial instability in the global economy as preventing them from holding the tournament. Scholars were also beginning to challenge social benefit claims to hosting sports mega-events. As the only country not to withdraw their application, Brazil was declared winner on the 30th October 2007. The rhetoric of the economic and social benefits associated with hosting the World Cup were prominent for several decades. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the President of the Brazilian Football Federation, Ricardo Teixeira, made the claims he did as described in the opening of this chapter.

[1] In 2015, as part of the CIA investigation into FIFA corruption, it was exposed that the South African Football Association lost the vote to Morocco to host the 2010 World Cup. A reported US$10million was paid in bribes to Jack Warner, the then president of the Caribbean Confederation which ensured South Africa won a second vote and were declared as host (Withnall, 2015).

For Brazilian decision makers, hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup could potentially bring substantial economic and social benefits, they were keen to showcase Brazil, and its major cities, as world players in a neoliberal economy. Neoliberalism is an economic strategy that seeks to have a heavier reliance on the use of market forces to control accumulation and distribution. It spread from the USA and UK around the globe through economic reforms that attempted to 're-scale accumulation opportunities through bilateral, regional and global trade and investment agreements, state restructuring, privatisation and the use of monetary policy and enhanced capital mobility' (Newell, 2012a:19). Peck and Tickell (2002) suggests this led to the 'rolling back of the state', where the state had less control over trade, capital and people. Harvey (2005) proposes that neoliberal capitalism should not be seen as an economic approach, but a political project that seeks to change class power to capitalist elites.

As a political project capitalist neoliberalism seeks hegemony. According to Simon (1991), hegemony is the relation of consent gained through political and ideological leadership. Political leadership is achieved through gaining authority in the political sector, actors in this sphere can defend their position through coercive institutions and their methods. These institutions include the justice system and military institutions with methods such as laws, prisons, the police and armed forces (Wittneben et al., 2012). Ideological leadership is contested in civil society and occurs when the ideals of the ruling class become accepted as 'common sense' by other subordinate classes. This is achieved through institutions such as the church, schools, media and trade unions (Simon, 1991, Okereke et al., 2009, McNally and Schwarzmantel, 2009, Wittneben et al., 2012, Levy and Egan, 2003). The actors who contest these positions and seek to become the dominant actor are elites. Elites operate on a number of scales, from transnational global elites whose power crosses national boundaries (Cox, 1993, Cox, 1981), to local elites who have a disproportionate access to resources on a smaller scale (Woods, 1998).

1.2: Brazilian environmental policy, neoliberalism and ecological modernisation

In the years after World War II, the environment was viewed as an externality in the global capitalist economy. However, scientific evidence pointing towards climate change has grown since the 1970s and has changed how political elites view the environment. Brazil's role on the international market as a commodity exporter was unchanged over this period and continued under the neoliberal regime (Munck, 2013). The large amount of land and intensive agricultural processes needed to export commodities meant that Brazil had to deforest large areas. This became an international issue when in 1987 the United Nations commissioned the Brundtland report that suggested an environmental crisis was underway. Deforestation, among other agents, were blamed as the causes of the crisis. In 1992 a World Summit was held where governments discussed how to address these problems. In 1997 international political leaders reacted by creating the first ever global environmental legislation- the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol only affected developed countries and as such, Brazil was not required to reduce emissions. Today, Brazil's economic profile has changed and it is considered as a middle income country (BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The exploitation of mineral reserves, large infrastructure programmes and the conversion of savannah and rainforest to agricultural land have had large environmental impacts in Brazil. The Brazilian government are therefore now playing an increasing role in global environmental governance as the scientific evidence pointing towards anthropogenic climate change and public pressure to act increases.

Mato Grosso is a key state in Brazilian economics, and at the time Morton et al. (2006) published their study, it was producing one fifth of the world's soya beans. Part of the Amazon rainforest is in northern Mato Grosso and as such Mato Grosso has received intensive international criticism for its deforestation rates. The link between deforestation and soya cultivation was first made by Myers (1981). He illustrated how soya beans grown in deforested areas of the Amazon region were used to feed cattle which were exported to the USA and Europe and labelled this the hamburger connection. International

environmental NGOs have also been critical of this connection and Greenpeace produced a report which linked international brands to Amazonian deforestation (GreenPeace, 2006). This exposure to environmental criticism has been key in Mato Grosso decision makers developing climate change policies.

The challenge for elites at both the national and state level is to maintain their social relations in a neoliberal economy whilst reacting to pressure from civil society on their environmental actions. *'*Climate change touches more or less every aspect of economic life, and goes to the literal engine of the industrial economy-energy use' (Newell and Paterson, 2010:94) and as such provides a complex challenge for decision makers. The preferred view of elites who support the neoliberal paradigm is to view environmental issues through the ecological modernisation paradigm. Ecological modernisation assumes there can be a mutually beneficial relationship between economic development and positive environmental outcomes through market mechanisms and technological innovation (Hayer, 1995, Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000, Mol, 2003, Mol and Spaargaren, 1993, Fisher and Freudenburg, 2001). For many who view the environment in this way, they feel that 'without some kind of proper financial compensation, short-term economic needs will take precedence over long-term stability' (Porritt, 2007:155). For this reason, the ideology that nature has to have a price tag in order to be saved became popular in both elite circles and public discourse. Publications such as the Stern report (Stern, 2007) which addressed environmental issues from an economic perspective became influential in helping to stabilise a financial approach to environmental governance as the 'only' approach (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004, Castree, 2008, Robertson, 2004).

The ecological modernisation paradigm is exemplified by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; the first international legally binding legislation on climate change. The methods for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) under the Kyoto Protocol all relied on technology, had considerable financial compensation attached and did not challenge the existing political, economic and social institutions (Bailey, Gouldson and Newell, 2011).

Emissions trading was one of these approaches and gave each high carbon emitting country an allocated amount of carbon credits. Those countries with surplus carbon credits gained through reducing carbon emissions could trade with those with a deficit. This market mechanism approach was assumed to create emission reductions as financial incentive would encourage efficient reductions. The European Union Emission Trading System is one example of this (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007). Another market trading mechanism was developed under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM allowed a developed country to invest in an emissions saving project in a developing country through the purchase of carbon credits, only the states that were subject to the Kyoto Protocol could purchase the certified emission reductions associated with this type of project (UNFCCC, 2013). This approach to climate change was seen as successful by elites and in response to demand from both civil society and the corporate sector, a voluntary carbon market was established to support polluting organisations wishing to offset their emissions (Newell, 2012b, Sutter and Parreño, 2007, Alexeew et al., 2010). These moves have occurred on a number of different scales, at different times and with different results. This thesis studies these relations and unearths how the environment is used as a tool to enhance the interests of elites.

1.3: Challenging ecological modernisation

In order to unpack the consequences of ecological modernisation and in particular, carbon offsetting in Mato Grosso, I need to use an approach which challenges the ecological modernisation paradigm. Some scholars believe that the ecological modernisation paradigm does not adequately address environmental issues and acts as a vehicle for some elites to further their own agenda (Lohmann, 2012). In addition, they argue the social relations that are continued through ecological modernisation mechanisms such as carbon offsetting, can be 'decisive in terms of how benefits of resource extraction and burdens of human induced environmental change are globally distributed' (Newell, 2010:17).

These scholars broadly fit into a group who use neo-Gramscian concepts to understand how elites manipulate relationships to maintain power through the environmental movement (Newell, 2008). This view has most predominantly been used in the 21st century and is born from Marxist environmental scholars such as Benton (1998), O'Connor (1988) and Foster (2000). A Neo-Gramscian analysis is helpful to fully understand the dynamics of power and control. The framework is based on the concepts of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and predominantly his concept of hegemony, which focuses on power relations between actors from the state, corporate and civil society sectors on a number of scales (Schwarzmantel, 2009:10, Wittneben et al., 2012). This has then been applied to the environmental governance literature (Levy and Egan, 2003).

One such example of this, Newell and Levy (2002) argue, is environmental accreditation and certification schemes created by civil society actors. They argue these have 'created a space where corporate elites can re-create their dominance through environmental stewardship' (Newell and Levy, 2002: 93). Their study of environmental governance through the neo-Gramscian lens allowed for a clear articulation and analysis of how social relations of environmental issues recreated power relations.

Although there is a large amount of literature on how hegemony is created and maintained through the appropriation of environmental governance, there remains little theorisations surrounding how hegemony is achieved on different scales. Within organisation and management studies there has been a focus on secondary data and theorisations, instead of unearthing how hegemony works on the ground (Böhm et al., 2008, Spicer and Böhm, 2007). Therefore, insights from the geography and Development literature are useful for the theorisation of scales and how actors can manipulate scales to secure power. Turner (1997) suggested that too often scholars dichotomise the local and regional and they should be seen as interconnected. Brenner (2001) furthered this, suggesting the political economy, culture, and ecology all exist and operate simultaneously at a range of scales. The local scale is inextricably embedded in the global scale which in turn is produced by various local scales. Swyngedouw (2004) further argues that these transitions occur through layers of 'nodes and linkages, which are

interconnected in proliferating networks and flows of money, information, commodities and people' (Ibid: 32). It is this theorisation of scales and the agency of actors that are central to this neo-Gramscian understanding of environmental governance. This was achieved through pro-longed period of fieldwork on the ground to understand the realities of carbon offsetting.

1.4: Situating elites in Mato Grosso

Mato Grosso is in the Centre-West of Brazil and has parts of both the Amazon and Pantanal habitats. These two biomes are considered of global importance are both protected by being a UNESCO world heritage site (Ioris, 2013). The Pantanal, although less famous than the Amazon, is one of the most biodiverse biomes in the world. It is known for its variety of bird species and also has an abundance of Caimans, Jaguars, Giant Otters and Capybaras. In addition to these natural characteristics, Mato Grosso has experienced extensive in-migration through a Federal programme to 'fill empty spaces' and develop an agricultural industry. These agricultural lands form part of the 'soya belt' in Centre-West Brazil and are of strategic importance to the Brazilian economy.

Mato Grosso is an interesting case due to the tensions between the ecological and agricultural systems. Deforestation in the upper basin of the Pantanal has led to sedimentation problems further south. The expansion of the agricultural industry has pushed cattle farmers further into the Pantanal and Amazon regions, further propagating the clashes between the natural and human realms. Environmental governance is essential in Mato Grosso and the ways in which the environment is protected by local elites is an important issue. This becomes even more apparent when understanding the civil society sector in Mato Grosso. Unlike other rural states, there is not a large Landless Movement and the civil society sector is said to be weak (Jesus 2006).

Those outside of Mato Grosso view Mato Grosso in a particular way. Whilst in Rio de Janeiro I often spoke to people about my research in Mato Grosso. Most residents of Rio de Janeiro who I spoke to had never been to Mato Grosso and viewed it as a 'backwards' state. They would often refer to it as 'hill-billy' country and claim it was ruled by corrupt elites. Tourists from other areas of the country who I met in Mato Grosso thought it was 'cute' and 'simple'. The organisers of the World Cup in Mato Grosso thought these opinions would change as a new infrastructure programme would 're-imagineer' Cuiabá into a green city with state-of-the-art infrastructure.

1.5: Aims of the thesis

This case study of a carbon offsetting project explores how local elites have co-opted the environmental governance mechanisms in Mato Grosso to further their own agenda, enabled by the global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism. My research is based on documents of a reforestation project in rural Mato Grosso and exposes the strategic relationships elite actors on a number of scales were able to secure through the 'green claims' of the FIFA World Cup. In exposing these ties and relationships I illustrate how environmental concerns surrounding the World Cup were used by elites to maintain and enhance hegemonic relations in Mato Grosso at the expense of the local communities and environment. These relations in Mato Grosso fed by the agency of some actors were used at a regional level to secure a favourable political climate for export-led industry. Again, through the agency of elite actors at the regional scale, the national project of development through exports was advanced. It is shown there is a dialectical relationship between the hegemonic projects at work at different scales through the agency of elite actors at these scales.

The methods used to collect the data were important as there were no qualitative studies of carbon offsetting projects used in the World Cup previously. Initially, documentary analysis was performed on several official FIFA and Brazilian government documents which all claim the sustainability goals of the 2014 FIFA World Cup were met. The originality of this thesis is that it goes behind these claims to

understand the process of how FIFA and local elites were able come to these conclusions and the benefits they received from this. In turn, this thesis then unpacks how hegemony is maintained and enhanced through the FIFA World Cup. My research was guided by an overall aim and research questions.

My overarching research aim is to analyse and understand how environmental governance is used as a vehicle to maintain or enhance the position of local elites through carbon offsetting in Mato Grosso, Brazil. This is achieved by addressing the following research questions:

- What are the political, social and economic contexts within which the Green River Project operates?
- What was the process in which the carbon offsetting project was established and implemented?
- How have actors on different scales been affected by the project?

1.6: Thesis contributions

This thesis uses a neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance with scalar theory and a specific focus on elite agency to offer a case study which explicitly illustrates how claims made by elites are not matched by events on the ground. This is achieved by using a carbon offsetting project in the context of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. In order to develop an understanding of the realities on the ground I conducted fieldwork over a pro-longed period of time. Through this understanding a theoretical framework which uses hegemony as the core concept was developed. In doing so, this thesis makes a contribution to existing literature in five ways.

First, this case study gives empirical weight to Newell's (2008) argument that there is evidence which suggests private actors assume public functions with regard to environmental governance. He called for further investigation into the relations between civil society and the corporate sector, this thesis

responds to this call. The call for empirical work is also complemented by the literature which highlights the flaws in the notion that NGOs are 'unchallengably good actors' (Holmes, 2010). The development literature has long questioned the influential role of the state in regard to NGOs (Tvedt, 1998, Foweraker, 2001). Recently, studies of environmental NGOs have begun to question the role of the corporate sector and in particular how private funding can influence the actions of environmental NGOs (Klein, 2015, Sapinski, 2015). This literature argues that some decision makers in environmental NGOs have corporate, not environmental experience, and therefore decisions can be made within the environmental NGO which works for corporate, not environmental outcomes. This case furthers the argument in illustrating how the private sector can legitimately create an environmental NGO to work for the interest of the private sector. It shows how corporate elites in Mato Grosso were able to gain power and decision making capabilities through the creation of the environmental NGO, the NGO was then able to receive funding and carry out an environmental project which had little environmental benefit.

Second, this thesis also contributes to the critical carbon offsetting literature. This literature challenges the ecological modernisation paradigm seen in contemporary environmental politics by arguing through various cases that commodifying nature will not save it (Bohm 2009, Bumpus and Liveramn 2008, Gilbertson 2009). Environmental governance seen through ecological modernisation has been open to academic critique since it began (Bailey et al., 2011). However, little action has been taken in political agreements to change how global decision makers deal with the environmental crisis. Case studies which critically engage with carbon offsetting are plentiful (Narain, 2009, Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009, Böhm and Dabhi, 2009), I add another case study to this literature through using a reforestation project used at a sports mega-event.

Third, in addition to contributing to the carbon offsetting critique, I also add that within the reforestation project itself, there were some organisational problems. The NGO organising the project did not ensure equal benefit distribution for project participants, this was because the NGO was not

accountable. These arguments contribute to the discussion within the REDD+ literature surrounding equitable benefit distribution (Iversen et al., 2006, Mathur et al., 2014, Sommerville et al., 2010). I contribute to these arguments as previous studies have been written from practitioners within the project, or with the intended audience of policy makers. This thesis comes from a critical perspective and does not problematise the issues encountered in the same way.

Fourth, this case study contributes to the small amount of critical literature on environmental claims and sports mega events. It directly speaks to Reis and DaCosta (2012) who suggest there is a gap in knowledge between what elites claim in terms of environmental sporting events and what occurs on the ground. The thesis shows how through hegemonic relations, unsubstantiated claims can be made and go unchallenged which results in the maintenance of the status quo. Reis and DaCosta (2012) took a documentary analysis approach to assess the environmental commitment of the Brazilian government to the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. This thesis furthers this argument by using ethnographic methods to understand the commitments and realities of hosting an environmentally sustainable event.

Fifth, this thesis also makes a contribution to the literature through the theoretical development of neo-Gramscian approaches to environmental governance (Levy and Egan, 2003, Levy and Newell, 2002). I develop this theory by focusing on elite agency (Zanotti, 2011) and the use of scalar theory (Swyngedouw, 2004) to enable a deeper understanding of how strategic relationships on a number of scales further the global hegemonic project on a local level. This case study analyses how the carbon offsetting project has been used as a tool by elites to further their hegemonic project on three scales. I shall explain each in turn.

The transnational capitalist class, those that have created power at an international level (Cox, 1981), have been able to maintain the status quo by claiming the carbon neutrality of not only the football stadium in Cuiabá, but also the World Cup as a whole. These claims work towards entrenching the FIFA

World Cup as a sustainable event. It also ensures that neoliberal ideology is accepted as part of sporting culture. Neoliberal sports events have massive profit potential for both FIFA and their corporate sponsors. It is therefore in their interests to ensure the World Cup is viewed as sustainable. By claiming the 'green' impacts of the World Cup through projects, official documentation and public relations, civil society actors were less likely to challenge the consequences of hosting an event. The ecological modernisation paradigm was effectively used to make these claims which also maintain the pre-existing power relations and social order. The thesis then contributes to the claim that carbon offsetting projects encourage the wider public, especially in the Global North, to continue their consumption lifestyles as it is assumed carbon offsetting can neutralise their activities (Lohmann, 2009a).

At the regional scale, the regional elite, referred to as *ruralistas* throughout the thesis are a group of Mato Grosso based agri-business elites. The majority of this group were part of the Federal Programme to relocate farmers from the South of the country to the Amazon region to fill 'empty spaces'. They have some influence at the national scale on agricultural organisations and some individual actors have political positions. This group contribute to the Brazilian commodity export market and therefore are also important to national economics. Through the Green River Project, the *ruralistas* were able to deflect unwanted international environmental criticism. The legal boundaries of the Amazon and Pantanal biomes are situated within Mato Grosso, a state that provides over one fifth of the World's soya beans. Nature and industry conflicts have drawn significant international attention and the Green River Project contributed to other environmental projects which claimed Mato Grosso to be an environmental steward.

At the local level, the rural poor population were exposed to short-term developmental projects which further entrenched previously existing power relations. A previous project aimed at providing the villages with a sustainable source of income was stopped to accommodate the new reforestation project, this in turn has now stopped and has not produced an adequate income for the community as the

hegemonic relations in the village have continued. Previous critiques of development projects are reflected in this investigation (Ferguson, 1990, Pieterse, 2010).

1.7: Thesis structure

In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this thesis has seven chapters. The next chapter summarises the available literature on environmental and social benefit claims at the World Cup. Although some scholars have questioned the social benefit claims, there remains little literature on carbon offsetting at these events. Those that do discuss such projects are often quantitative and written within the ecological modernisation paradigm. To support this literature from a qualitative perspective the critical carbon offsetting literature is used. This literature explores concepts from the wider carbon trading mechanism and problems found in individual projects. Literature which discusses the role of NGOs is also consulted as NGOs have been seen to have a prominent role in carbon offsetting. This literature identifies how not all NGOs are progressive and some work to further the agenda of elite actors. This literature is supported by scholars who wrote about a supposed post-neoliberal turn in Latin America. This literature is important as it contextualises a policy created by the then President Lula to give progressive NGOs a greater voice in Brazilian politics. This understanding then lays the context for the following chapters. These chapters fill the gap of a study that is qualitatively driven, with a critical approach to a carbon offsetting programme at a sports mega-event.

The third chapter in the thesis describes the process of collecting data. I describe the methods and approach taken to ensure I collected reliable data. As an inexperienced researcher who had never visited Brazil, the preparations for fieldwork were essential. However, not all the problems and challenges I encountered on fieldwork were prepared for and I critically reflect on how I met those challenges. Each of the data collection methods are described in turn and I discuss how I then began to

analyse the data. The chapter finishes with a section which discusses the ethics of conducting a cross-cultural ethnography.

The World Cup can be seen as one vehicle which hegemonic elites use to stabilise the hegemonic project, in turn FIFA as a civil society actor sympathetic to the neoliberal ideal, work to further entrench neoliberal relations. Development is seen as being inextricably linked to neoliberal capitalism and FIFA, like other neoliberal institutions have a 'development' programme which builds a defence against counter-hegemonic movements. Perhaps the movement which provides the greatest threat to neoliberal capitalism is the environmental crisis. Global hegemonic elites have tried to incorporate environmental concerns through the ecological modernisation paradigm. In turn, FIFA through the 'green goal' programme at the World Cup have viewed the environmental crisis in the same paradigm and have tried to use mechanisms to support this. In the literature on environmental and developmental projects at the World Cup there are no studies that are critically embedded. The gap is identified in the context of carbon offsetting at the World Cup and I justify my thesis by addressing this gap.

The first data chapter discusses how the global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism is played out at the national level through the World Cup. There was a significant counter-hegemonic movement in June/July 2013 when over 1 million Brazilians protested against the World Cup and associated public spending. The contestations around the World Cup and how it was organised proved challenging for the state who used military force as a coercive method to control the population. Throughout the chapter the links between the global hegemonic project and Brazil's role within this is explored. Additionally, how the ecological modernisation paradigm was compatible within both Brazilian politics and FIFA was seen as essential in the organisation of the World Cup.

Chapter five charts how the World Cup was experienced in Mato Grosso. The World Cup offered the opportunity to 're-imagineer' Cuiabá as a green city. However, impunity, profiteering and organisational corruption meant that the infrastructure programmes were unfinished or structurally unsound. This is

contextualised by the history of Mato Grosso. It was seen how clientalism and a close relationship between the political and economic sectors mean power was focused to an elite group. Although this group has changed over time, there are some common characteristics which can be found in contemporary Mato Grosso. One such example, the local media, is explored. Elite control of the media, a key civil society actor, can be seen to help secure the elite agenda in public discourse and ensure their social relations are stable.

Chapter six focuses on the organisation of the carbon offsetting project. Under FIFA instructions, the Brazilian government ordered all new stadiums to be certified with Leadership in Environmental and Ecological Design (LEED) accreditation, a sustainable construction award. One aspect of this award is carbon neutrality which the Pantanal Stadium was certified by the Green River Project. This project was to plant 1.4 million trees to offset 711,000t of carbon dioxide. The organisational structure of the NGO as well as the project claims are exposed in this section. The project did not meet its initial claims and was able to change the methodologies used to certify the stadium as carbon neutral in time for the World Cup. This chapter highlights how the Green Action Institute is an example of corporate manufactured civil society.

Chapter seven explores the Green River Project from the perspective of the local communities. It shows how consent was forced through coercion at the regional level. A legally binding behaviour order was issued to the residents which forced them to participate in the project, after it was initially met with passive resistance by the affected villages. The behaviour order was applied differently in the different villages and those in the tourist village were able to rely on personal contacts to negotiate the terms. Others in the villages of lower socio-economic status had to comply with the behavioural order explicitly. The final section of this chapter looks in further detail at the Payment for Ecosystem Services promised to the communities. Again, it is documented how these promises were not kept.

The discussion chapter aims to link these levels together through an analysis of elite agency and hegemony. It is seen how the hegemonic project at different scales is linked to the global neoliberal

capitalism project. The actors at different scales have various roles to play in securing hegemony and achieve this through different methods. The Green Action Institute is seen as one mechanism to legitimately gain consent. The concept of hegemony is used to understand how and why actors are able to achieve their positions of power whilst scale theory is used to understand how local actors are linked to transnational actors.

The conclusion ties these arguments together and presents the main findings from the thesis. The implications of the empirical data discussed throughout the data chapters are first discuss. Then the chapter moves on to give on overview of the theoretical contributions this chapter has made. I explain explicitly how I have furthered debates in key areas. The limitations of this study are discussed and finally, I suggest how this investigation could be furthered in the future.

-Chapter II –

Literature review

The role of sport to encourage citizenship, increase population health and even unite communities after warfare has been acknowledged by the United Nations (Levermore, 2011). The integral role sport plays in society was further acknowledged when in 2001 the role of Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace was created and sport was used a vehicle to achieve the Millennium Development Goals through peace (Beutler, 2008). In 2005 this relationship became part of the UN agenda when 2005 was named as the United Nations Year of Development and Peace through Sport and Physical Education (Taylor, 2004, Jennings, 2007, Levermore, 2011).

Sport should then not be underestimated as a tool for actors to further their agenda. This literature review seeks to illustrate the literature available on the social and environmental claims made at sports mega-events. Mega-events are the focus of this thesis because, as we will see in the following section, they are commonly organised with billions of pounds available and used for political and economic gain. They therefore provide a diverse terrain in which to study. The first section of this chapter introduces the sport mega-event as a neoliberal event. The following subsections provide a review of the literature available surrounding the social and environmental claims made at such events. The second section of this chapter engages with the critical carbon offsetting literature. This is necessary as currently there is

not any literature which qualitatively engages with carbon offsetting at a sports mega-event. The third section of the literature review introduces the literature which suggests that not all NGOs are progressive. This supports literature from the carbon offsetting section which is cautious over the potential influence that state and corporate actors have over NGOs in the carbon offsetting mechanism. It also provides context for the fourth section which explores a moment in Latin American political history which gave extra opportunities for civil society actors to engage with political decision making. The fifth section of this chapter presents literature that acknowledges the potential of environmental governance projects to further entrench social relations. This literature, labelled under the neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance, will set the foundations for the understanding of how elite agency can influence environmental projects. However, this literature is weak when discussing the relationship between project claims and actions on the ground. The scalar theory is then discussed in the final section which links the actions of elites at the national scale to elites at the local scale.

2.1: Sports mega-events as reflecting the neoliberal ideal

Although international institutions such as the UN advocate the use of sport for positive social change, some scholars have been more critical on the linkage between sport and global political and economic structures. For example, the link between sport and neoliberalism has been discussed widely (Hall, 2006, Andrews and Silk, 2012, Coakley, 2011, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006a). Coakley (2011) suggests neoliberalism closely associates with elite, organised, competitive and commercial forms of sport. He further argues that these sports then work to reaffirm and reproduce the neoliberal ideal through sport culture. Whereas sports that do not fundamentally reflect neoliberal ideas, such as football or the Olympic Games, have changed recently to become more suited to the neoliberal project. This process occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s when both the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games were turned into commercial events (Horne, 2000).

Eick (2010) suggests that it was João Havelange, FIFA president from 1974 until 1998, who is widely regarded as the actor who turned FIFA into a neoliberal institution (Eick, 2010). During this time FIFA's workforce changed from 12 to over 120 (FIFA, n.d). According to Eick (2010), these changes at the institutional level were also accompanied by changes that saw football players transformed into entrepreneurial athletes, creating a space where large corporations are able to promote a consumer lifestyle through exposure in sports environments.

Both the Football World Cup and Olympic Games are viewed as sports mega-events, and scholars have discussed how both events reflect the interests of capital and neoliberal ideals (Coakley, 2011, Andrews and Silk, 2012, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006b). Coakley (2011) argues the FIFA World Cup is characterised by intense competition, consumerist lifestyle and freedom of the markets and therefore is inextricably linked to the foundations of neoliberal capitalism. In a similar vein, but with a focus on host cities, Eisenhauer et al. (2014) discusses how the World Cup offers the opportunity for host cities to develop infrastructure programmes and become more globally competitive. This is because host cities are expected to offer shopping, elite tourism and other services for the wealthy, which, Hall (2012) suggests, is reflective of neoliberal ideals. In addition to the World Cup and Olympic Games bringing benefits for the elites who would enjoy the new infrastructure, FIFA, perspective host countries and the IOC have long cited the social and environmental benefits that hosting these sports mega-events can bring (FIFA, 2014a, Grix, 2012, Cornelissen, 2011, Ozanian, 2014). I will now present these in turn.

Sports mega-events and social benefit claims

Hosting the World Cup and Olympic Games frequently demands the construction of new stadia and services for elites who are able to spectate the tournament. In response to pressure from commentators who suggested that the local populations do not benefit from the World Cup, FIFA began to highlight ways in which local populations can benefit (Lee and Taylor, 2005). 'Football for Hope' is FIFA's social

programme, and, although it has projects that fall outside the World Cup, it is central to the social benefit claims that World Cup organisers and FIFA make.

However, within the sports mega-event literature there is an established body of literature that challenges the social benefit claims made by FIFA, the IOC and the host countries. Some scholars have argued that some groups do not receive either the financial or social benefits claimed and can be left disadvantaged from hosting the event (Tilley, 2006, Hagn and Maennig, 2009, Mol, 2010, Chalip, 2006, Hall, 2012, Whitson and Horne, 2006, Whitson et al., 2006, Black and Van Der Westhuizen, 2004, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006a, Roche, 2000, Roche, 1992). Particular social issues that have been addressed by the literature include: the gentrification of urban areas in Beijing (Mol, 2010), South Africa (Tilley, 2006) and London (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006b); 'hiding' unsightly parts of the city in Rio de Janeiro (Curi et al., 2011); urban regeneration projects which have not delivered in Atlanta (Andranovich et al., 2001) and Sydney (Waitt, 2003); and a lack of economic benefit to local communities (Pillay and Bass, 2008, Humphreys and Prokopowicz, 2007, Ugra, 2013), including access to sporting facilities (Whitson et al., 2006, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004). These studies are largely quantitative or are written to influence policy.

There is a wider body of literature that claims hosting sports mega-events can act as a catalyst for achieving political goals, sometimes with social benefit outcomes. These have been argued to have a legacy far longer than the sports event itself (Cornelissen and Swart, 2006, Hargreaves, 2002, Scambler, 2005, Hayes and Karamichas, 2012, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006b, Horne, 2007, Roche, 2000). The opportunity for local elites to re-frame dominant narratives (Black, 2007, Finlay and Xin, 2010, Fan, 2006), attract foreign investment (Cornelissen, 2008) or further political ideologies (Close et al., 2007) are all perceived as potential political outcomes of hosting a sports mega-event. Scholars have also argued it presents an opportunity for host nations and cities to align with neoliberalism and

modernisation by speeding up urban development projects (Levermore and Beacom, 2009, Levermore, 2011, Pillay and Bass, 2008).

Developing the argument from Black (2007), sports mega-events can be said to provide an opportunity for local elites to improve, change, re-frame or create a new image of their location (Finlay and Xin, 2010, Black, 2007). A common starting point of this body of literature is the marketing perspective. In a marketing context, Fan (2006) describes how a nation has a brand image with or without nation branding. Sports mega-events can be seen as one mechanism to employ nation branding with the intention to change a country's international image. Referring to national branding, rather than regional or local, Fan (2006) further describes how it 'concerns a country's whole image, covering political, economic, historical and cultural dimensions. The concept is at the nation level, multidimensional and context-dependent' (ibid: 8). In the neoliberal context a good image is important to ensure trade, tourism and foreign investment (Harvey, 2005).

In the sports sociology literature, this has been interpreted as image leveraging (Chalip, 2006). This literature is mainly focused on the identification of image leveraging mechanisms and quantifying their impact (Bob and Swart, 2009, Grix, 2012, O'Brien and Chalip, 2007, Ferrari and Guala, 2015, Beesley and Chalip, 2011). Whilst this is a respected and important line of enquiry, it falls short in relation to my thesis, as it does not address the qualitative impacts of changing an image of a host city. Grix (2012) goes some way to identify this trend when he suggests the literature is mainly focused on post-event analysis and is quantitative. In reference to the recent trend of developing countries hosting an event, Corneilsson (2010) argues that sports mega-events are seen as a key political 'imagineering' of the governments. According to her, it allows governments to showcase the type of society and state they want to create, with an ultimate aim to re-position them in the international order (Panagiotopoulou, 2012, Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002).

Pillay and Bass (2008) suggests South Africa, the hosts of the 2010 World Cup, are a good example of this. The local organising committee in South Africa cited economic development targets as one of the fundamental reasons for hosting the tournament. Cornelissen (2011) discusses specifically how the ideals of neoliberal development, urbanisation and industrialisation were matched by both FIFA and South African policies, which enabled 're-imagineering' through an extensive infrastructure programme. Donaldson and van der Westhuizen (2011) focus on one infrastructure programme, the Gautrain, a high-speed train linking different areas of Johannesburg. The train was argued to allow Johannesburg to compete as a 'world city'. Linking back to neoliberalism, Van Der Westhuizen (2007) claims that the symbolism of a new local infrastructure programme has global consequences and further entrenched the neoliberal ideology in South Africa. The demand of sports mega-events usually sees an increase in infrastructure development programmes, these programmes are seen as essential to 're-imagineer' a space or place.

Within the literature on the use of sports mega-events to 're-imagineer', there is little qualitative literature that explores specific projects. The emergence of developing countries hosting sports-mega events is another dimension to this literature that has yet to be fully addressed. To date, there are no studies that engage with the social benefit claims, and in particular infrastructure projects, associated with the World Cup in Brazil.

Sport mega-events and environmental claims

As we have seen, there is a substantial body of literature which explores the social benefit claims of sports mega-events. In contrast, the environmental concerns surrounding sports mega-events have a relatively short history. Environmental concerns first arose in the 1992 Winter Olympics in Albertville and mainstream media considered this event an environmental disaster. Chappelet (2008) suggests the Winter Olympics were more susceptible to environmental criticism as they are largely located on

mountain resorts and therefore are 'close' to nature. Therefore, it was the pressure from commentators concerned by the Winter Olympics which started the Olympic movement toward environmental considerations. Nevertheless, the following Winter Olympics were held in 1994 in Lillehammer, without a centralised environmental programme. The Olympic organisers in Lillehammer did have an environmental agenda, although this was locally organised and perhaps more influenced by global politics. The main author of the newly released, UN commissioned, Brundtland report, Gro Harlem Brundtland, was Norwegian and provided impetus for the Norwegian government to become a global leader in environmental protection. The first Winter Olympics to have an IOC driven environmental programme was the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan (Leonardsen, 2007, Mallen et al., 2011, Schmidt, 2006, Cantelon, 2000). At the time, the IOC had been tarnished by accusations of corruption and drug use, adopting a new 'green' paradigm therefore was seen by some as a tool to reduce public pressure (Hayes and Karamichas, 2012). Since this first environmentally focused event, the environment has been embraced as the third pillar to the Olympic movement to complement the existing pillars, sport and culture (Schmidt, 2006).

Arguably, due to the urban location of the World Cup, FIFA were slower to develop an environmental charter. Their response was the 'Green Goal' programme which aims to push the green agenda onto organisers of FIFA's World Cup event and is created on the premise that the World Cup tournament can be environmentally neutral, if not friendly (Mander and Roberts, 2010, Mol, 2010, O'Brien and Chalip, 2008). This is based on the assumption that technological innovation can overcome environmental problems (Fisher and Freudenburg, 2001, Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000, Mol and Spaargaren, 1993) and was created within the ecological modernisation paradigm.

Today, organising committees of both the FIFA World Cup and Olympic Games are required to address environmental impacts as part of the bidding process, but to the extent these environmental projects are implemented is a contested issue. Preuss (2013) points to the time pressures associated with

hosting a sports mega-event. He argues it is often a matter of four years between hosts being selected and staging the event, therefore, environmental projects can be abandoned in favour of construction and infrastructure projects. Reis and DaCosta (2012: 60) also claim that 'there is still a significant gap between the written commitment of host governments and organizing committees, and the actual implementation of environmentally responsible events'.

Reis and DaCosta's (2012) assertion has little support in the academic literature on the Olympic Games. The majority of this literature is quantitative in nature and within the ecological modernisation paradigm (Andranovich et al., 2001, Essex and Chalkley, 1998, Malfas et al., 2004, Mol, 2010, Paquette et al., 2011, Samuel and Stubbs, 2012, Tomlinson and Young, 2006, Tian and Brimblecombe, 2008, Waitt, 2003). Hollins (2013) doctoral thesis is perhaps the only publication which studies the economy, environment and locality in relation to the 2012 London Olympics. Although Reis and DaCosta (2012) suggest there is a gap between what is said and achieved, there is no literature which explicitly addresses this gap. This trend in literature is similar to that which covers the World Cup.

Germany was the first FIFA host to systematically incorporate the 'Green Goal' into its planning for the 2006 tournament, resulting in a pledge to stage a carbon neutral event (Schmidt, 2006). The 'Green Goal' forms part of the wider 'Football for the Planet' programme which was also created within the ecological modernisation paradigm. Central to these claims is carbon offsetting, as it is assumed emitting behaviours can be offset through emissions savings elsewhere (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). Both Germany and South Africa had carbon offsetting projects as part of their 'Green Goal' programme, which are now explored further.

There are three academic articles and one official document produced by the Local Organising Committee that explicitly address carbon offsetting at the World Cup in Germany. Subsequent articles have discussed the results of these four key publications. Dolles and Söderman (2010) published in the 'Journal of Management and Organisation', Mitchell (2007) published in 'Sustainable Development, Law

and Policy' and Schmidt (2006) published in 'Environmental Health Perspectives'. These three publications came from management and policy level journals, which, by nature, would not address the socio-political implications of sustainability.

These publications did not question the claims made in the name of these projects; that is, they did not study how they have been implemented on the ground. For example, Mitchell (2007) summarises the claimed achievements of the project, not the results. Writing on a bio-gas project, he argues that 'not only will the eco-friendly biogas protect the local forests and decrease global greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions, but it will reduce the number of respiratory illnesses associated with traditional wood and kerosene-burning stoves' (Ibid:5). Schmidt (2006:287) is vague and outlines the claims of the project organisers: 'organizers of the 2006 World Cup…are striving for "climate neutrality" (i.e., zero impact), which they hope to achieve by offsetting the expected 100,000 tons of greenhouse gas emissions with investments in renewable energy and energy-efficient technology.' A fourth article produced by Stahl et al. (2004) is the official document of the Local Organising Committee, hence providing the claims made by project officials. They describe one of three projects used to offset emissions that delivered cooking stoves to rural families: The 'Family Clean Energy Packages' project in Tamil Nadu, India, will 'ensure an environmentally compatible and secure energy source for several thousand villagers...in addition, needy families are also given cows' (Stahl et al., 2004:90). Being very descriptive, these publications do not engage qualitatively or critically with the offsetting projects and their implications.

The only publication to criticise the offsetting projects is Hayes and Karamichas (2012). Their main argument centres on the methodology for calculating the emissions from the World Cup and how many tonnes of carbon would be needed to offset these emissions. They do hint at decentralisation of the projects: 'it is evident that national and transnational environmental NGO's have been instrumental in establishing and legitimising such schemes, and in measuring carbon offsets' (Ibid:12). They also hint at

some project issues: ‘local land-use conflicts are common’ (Ibid:12). However, they do not detail these potential problems.

The ‘Green Goal’ initiative for the South Africa World Cup was organised by individual host cities. Unlike Germany, South Africa did not incorporate the ‘Green Goal’ principles into centralised plans. Instead, each host city assumed responsibility for their projects and funding was privately sourced. Death (2011) and Ozinsky (2010) suggested this led to many projects that failed to complete, or did not even start. This is also acknowledged in the official literature of the World Cup organisers (Mokua, 2012:22). Scholars have tended to consider these implications more than the offsetting programmes (Death, 2011, Ozinsky, 2010).

One of the carbon offsetting projects used to offset emissions from the 2010 World Cup in South Africa was the ‘Buffelsdraai Landfill Site Community Reforestation’ project in eThekwini municipality. Mander and Roberts (2010) produced an official document for the eThekwini municipality on the project and describes the project aim to ‘sequester some of the carbon emissions associated with hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup’ in Durban (Ibid:23). Throughout the publication it is not quantified how much carbon will be sequestered. Ozinsky (2010), in a conference paper, suggests that the eThekwini project has the potential to offset 12,000 CO_2e over 20 years by planting 650ha of trees. He then describes the number of project participants, both employed and voluntary, but gives no qualitative analysis of participants’ experiences. Witt and Loots (2011) produce an academic article on the project from a gender studies perspective, focusing on analysing the roles of men and women. For example, the ‘local community members have been trained how to collect seeds, plant trees and how to maintain them….men were selected for the digging of holes and women for the bagging of trees in the nursery’ (Ibid:132).

Perhaps the most engaged description of these projects is made by Diederichs and Roberts (2015). They suggest the Buffelsdraai Landfill site project had a focus on community benefits and created 81

permanent jobs. Project participants also received credits for planting trees and are said to have been exchanged for school fees, driving lessons, food and clothing in 'tree shops'. At the time of the publication, the total value of trades was reported to be more than US $293,000. Finally, they claimed the landfill project would sequester 61,008 tonnes CO_2e over a 20 year period, which was 20% of Durban's calculated carbon footprint from the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The only critical reflections from Diederichs and Roberts (2015) are that they suggest that not all carbon offsetting projects are synonymous with sustainability. This a reflection of Durban's failed attempt to find a suitable offsetting project for the UNFCCC-COP17 meeting. Second, that participants and spectators of sports mega-events do not see themselves financially responsible for contributing to their carbon footprint offset. This was in relation to a comparison between participation of the COP 17 offsetting programme where participants were asked to pay US$11 and the London 2012 offset programme, which was free (Diederichs and Roberts, 2015).

Common characteristics of the publications that cover carbon offsetting at the World Cup can be identified. First, the authors who produce these publications work within the ecological modernisation paradigm. Second, they do not question power relations or qualitatively investigate the claims project elites make. Hence, the gap I wish to address in this body of literature is by providing an independent, qualitatively embedded, critical analysis of claims surrounding a carbon offsetting project associated with a sports mega-event.

2.2: Carbon offsetting

The literature that explores carbon offsetting at the World Cup has been shown to be relatively thin and lacking a critically engaged, qualitative investigation. I therefore now draw from the critical carbon literature to complement the literature on sports mega-events and support such an investigation.

Scholarly debates on carbon markets have been addressed by those who are supportive of the mechanism (Newell, 2012b, Newell, 2012a, Newell and Paterson, 2010) and those who question the fundamental principles of a market to reduce emissions (Böhm and Dhabi, 2011; Böhm *et al.*, 2011; Lohmann, 2009; Lohmann, 2011). Bachram (2004) is largely cited as the first scholar to critically engage with the carbon trading mechanism and since this publication critiques have covered many issues. Wittneben et al. (2012) use Gramscian concepts to show how inequality is a fundamental characteristic of the carbon market. They argue that this market has been developed by elites as a mechanism to maintain their hegemonic position through alliances between elite corporate, state and civil society actors, mainly formed at the UNFCCC meetings. Those in opposition to such markets have been given little platform or opportunity to voice their concerns, and, as a result, the hegemonic project has been stabilised.

Using this concept in the wider context, some argue elites are able to further entrench their social relations through the assumptions of the carbon market. For example, Gilbertson and Reyes (2009) argue that by buying credits, Northern countries are allowed to continue their polluting trends and procrastinate in 'greening' their economies, whereas Southern countries have to change their development strategies to accommodate the emissions of Northern countries. For example, Northern governments are able to develop chemical factories and coal fired power stations whilst Southern countries cannot (Alarcón, 2009, Smith, 2008, Bello, 2009, Lohmann, 2012). This then propagates global inequality and as a result the existing social relations between the global North and South are continued. Moreover, other critical scholars have argued these projects would not be necessary if Northern countries reduced their emissions at the source and moved their capitalist societies away from fossil fuel use (Gilbertson and Reyes, 2009; Böhm and Dabhi, 2009; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). These arguments form the basis of the stance which suggests the fundamental mechanisms of the carbon market increase inequality and work in the interests of economic and social elites.

Another critical argument of carbon trading is the conflict of interest inherent within the carbon trading mechanism (Smith, 2008, Lohmann, 2009b, Newell, 2012b). This is because inequality is produced and maintained through soft forms of power by actors with vested interest. Bumpus and Liverman (2008) go so far as to label some of the vested interest within the mechanism, such as institutional corruption. At a national level, they argue that conflicts of interest frequently lead to capital gains for Southern elites whilst the Southern poor are left isolated. Thus, this then contributes to the argument that the carbon offsetting mechanism increases inequality (Lohmann and Böhm, 2011, Böhm et al., 2011).

Political elites are perhaps the group who have the power to challenge the vested interests of corporate actors within the carbon market, although to date they have been reluctant to do so. One argument suggests that the short-term economic gains available through the carbon market, compared to long-term climate friendly solutions is more preferable for the voting cycle. Checker (2009), Narain (2009) and Gilbertson and Reyes (2009) all write about their concern that the inaction of political elites has led to an increased presence of corporate actors on the trading mechanism. This, coupled with the potential economic benefit for political and civil society actors, has led some to conclude that the market has manifested into a disincentive to actually reduce emissions.

Böhm and Dabhi (2009), Cabello (2009), Lang (2009) and Reyes (2012) all suggest the nature of market trading means that pollution has the potential to make money, and is used as such, instead of an environmental mechanism. Trading games seen on the financial markets have been observed on the carbon market and accountancy methods which falsely state reduction claims have been found. These actions further support the arguments that the carbon trading mechanism works in the interest of the elite, not the environment (Böhm and Dabhi, 2009, Lovell and MacKenzie, 2011, Bailey et al., 2011). Bachram (2004) argues that when the mechanism was developed, most funding was directed to the market mechanism itself with little funding for regulation and monitoring. She further warns that the

market is ‘dangerously reliant upon the integrity of corporations to file accurate reports of emissions levels, and reductions. In practice, corporations such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers are acting as both accountants for and consultants to polluting firms, and as verifiers of emission reduction projects’ (Ibid:8). This then developed an opportunity for ‘corporate-led self-monitoring; and entrepreneurial verification schemes by consulting firms’ (Ibid:9).

These arguments provide a broad overview of the general arguments within the critical carbon offsetting literature. There are several different types of carbon sequestration projects which can sell carbon credits to the market. One such type is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), a programme developed by the United Nations to allow access onto the carbon markets for forested countries. It is assumed the financial incentive derived from carbon market participation would encourage them to keep their forests intact. This is seen as an important strategy to combat climate change as deforestation and forest degradation is thought to account for 15-17% of total global greenhouse gas emissions (Sukhdev et al., 2012).

REDD+ works on the assumption that trees absorb carbon dioxide, which can then be quantified and sold as carbon credits. Supporters of this mechanism suggest there are a multitude of secondary benefits associated with REDD+ projects, including: biodiversity conservation, water management, employment and food security (Watson et al., 2013). However, similarly to carbon markets, there are some concerns that forest based carbon offsetting projects do not always achieve the claims they make. Gutiérrez (2011) also claims the fundamental organisation of these projects has changed since their inception on the market. She described how initially REDD+ projects were focused on small land owners but over time an increase in bureaucracy and transition fees has culminated in small landowners being isolated from the mechanism, replaced by large mono-crop plantations usually owned by large companies (Gutiérrez, 2011).

As REDD+ is a recent mechanism, empirical studies of individual projects are beginning to gain in number. Issues highlighted in the REDD+ literature include inequality of benefit distribution (Luintel et al., 2013, Gebara, 2013, Hayes and Persha, 2010) and issues of a lack of local participation (Tadesse et al., 2014, Luttrell et al., 2014, Resosudarmo et al., 2012, Mwape and Gumbo, 2010, Leggett and Lovell, 2012). These articles are all written by those working within the ecological modernisation paradigm and although they are critical of their studied projects, they tend to be observational and written for the target audience of policy decision makers, giving them recommendations for future policy development or projects (Adgar and Jordan, 2009). Literature that fundamentally questions the role of forestry carbon and does not work within the ecological modernisation paradigm, instead questioning power and cultural dynamics, are still relatively few in numbers (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2002:90).

Similarly to the carbon trading literature, the carbon forestry literature suggests that forestry projects on the carbon trading mechanism can compound long standing exploitative relationships and enhance pre-existing power relations (Böhm and Dabhi, 2009, Corbera, 2012). In Bachram's (2004) paper, she suggests that marginalised populations in rural Brazil were removed from their land during the drive to claim plantation land and include it within the carbon trading mechanism. This process was argued to conflate the position of the subordinated rural poor population.

An empirical study by Iversen et al. (2006), which was written within the ecological modernisation paradigm on a carbon forestry project in Nepal, found that weak institutions allowed benefits to be appropriated by local elites. They point to inadequate institutional control that enabled elites to gain substantial shares from sales of forestry services to the detriment of the local, affected community. In another publication by Mathur et al. (2014) institutional control was seen as essential. They suggest institutions in their study ensured equity to host communities who have a lack of power relative to other actors. Both of these publications suggest that strong institutions and NGOs work to promote equity. There is an assumption that all NGOs and institutions within carbon forestry projects work for

the interest of local populations and the environment. It can be said there is little literature that explores the concerns of Böhm and Dabhi (2009) and Corbera (2012) that carbon trading can compound land standing exploitative relationships.

A second issue in carbon forestry projects is the payment of participants. Gebara (2013) suggests that unequal distribution of benefits was present in the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve in Amazonas, Brazil. The conclusion to her investigation was that local participation is key to equitable benefit distribution. One reason she gives is that the local population have the ability to define what a benefit is. Sommerville et al. (2010) in their case study from Menabe, Madagascar, show that the distribution of payment for the community was unequal. They conclude that poor governance and particularly the vested interest of elite actors was the main reason for unequal distribution of benefits. Gross-Camp et al. (2012) report that in their observations of a project in Nyungwe National Park, Rwanda, project officials expressed concern about the impact of cash payments in poor, rural locations. Local elites and project officials feared that direct payments of money might be poorly used. They also reported that project elites had concerns with actually paying project participants, in this case, participants would be paid to not break the law.

Aside from these problemisations of the carbon market and carbon forestry projects, there has also been concern regarding the governance of projects. Bailey et al. (2011) maintain that emissions trading reflects the organisational characteristics of neoliberalism, in that increased market reliance and little state interference is seen as the most efficient economic strategy. In environmental governance, this is labelled as 'climate capitalism' by Newell and Paterson (2010), and emission trading is seen to reflect this logic as pollution is quantified and traded on markets. According to the market logic, this would result in the most efficient way to cut greenhouse gas emissions. In opposition to this stance, Childs (2011) suggested carbon trading is the 'tragedy of the commons' of our generation. This suggests that

actors working independently, by nature, would work in their own interest. This could be contradictory to the common good of wider society as these individuals deplete resources through collective action.

In addition to carbon markets reflecting neoliberal marketization strategies, it also entails the increased role of civil society. The spaces or voids which appear in the organisation of a project, due to the changing role of the state, are filled by civil society actors (Peck and Tickle, 1997 and Harvey 2005). This has been reported as a concern for Bachram (2004), but has had little attention in the carbon offsetting literature. In order to unpack this claim, literature from wider environmental governance field and development studies is now presented.

2.3: NGOs

The role of civil society actors, and particularly NGOs, in decision making has become more prominent as there has been a global shift from government towards governance. However, some scholars have argued that not all NGOs work in the interest of the groups they represent (Tvedt, 1998, Hodgson, 2006). Ford (2003) recommends that civil society actors should be observed as individual actors and analysed in relation to the 'hegemonic constellation' (Ford, 2003:129). He argues this is essential if it is to be established if the actor is challenging or acting to preserve the status quo. This is an argument echoed by Okereke et al. (2009) who fear that some civil society actors can be working to complement the transnational hegemonic classes within environmental governance.

Choudry and Kapoor (2013) and Klein (2014) claim that some international environmental NGOs have played a role in facilitating the 'green-washing' of corporations. They argue joint initiatives between the corporate sector and international environmental NGOs often end in the corporate sector gaining more from the venture. Whilst there is argued to be some international environmental NGOs who have

entered into these agreements naively, some have entered strategically. Klein (2015) discusses the strategy of the environmental movement of the late 1970s and labels them professional environmentalists. This group of actors were 'insiders' who had access to the political elites, as a result they were able to lobby for tough legislation and commence legal procedures against polluting organisations (Ibid:203). In this respect, corporate actors saw environmentalists as a real threat and began to forge relationships with them to suppress their threat. During this period, Klein (2015) suggests the Environment Defence Fund (EDF), an environmental NGO based in the USA, was particularly sympathetic to corporations and formed relations with the corporate sector.

Klein (2015) uses a contemporary example of EDF's relationship with Walmart to illustrate how this relationship can become problematic. Between 2009 and 2013 the EDF received US$65 million in funding from the Walton Family Foundation, controlled by the founding family of Walmart. This amount of funding, and sustaining this relationship with the foundation, could have been influential to the actions of EDF when lobbying the state. In addition, EDF was also in partnership with Walmart, and at the time it received regular funding from the Walton Family Foundation, it was also delivering a sustainability programme for Walmart (Klein, 2015:209). Klein uses this and numerous other examples to illustrate how strategic relations have developed between corporate and some civil society actors within the environmental movement.

Other research into the relationship between environmental NGOs and corporate actors has yielded similar results. Sapinski (2015) identifies members of boards on international environmental NGOs and what he calls the G500, the 500 largest transnational companies. When a board member was on both the international environmental NGO and a G500 company, he labels this as 'interlocking'. 'Interlocking' is said to be favourable for corporate actors because it creates 'greater cohesion among corporate elites' (Sapinski, 2015:269).

Similarly to the environmental governance literature, the development literature has long discussed the role of NGOs. According to Holmes (2010), NGOs have historically been seen as 'unchallengeably good actors' (Holmes, 2010:629) who act in the interest of the public good, usually against the state or private sector. There is now a growing body of literature which suggests that elites can co-opt civil society actors to deliver projects which further the elite agenda.

However, it is not only elites in the corporate or state sector who form strategic relations; NGOs have also been seen to form strategic relationships to further their agenda. One such strategic relationship is through partnerships with state actors (Banerjee, 2011, Klein, 2015). Foweraker writing in 2001 develops this point further and suggests alliances between NGOs and the state can be seen as a strategy to ensure the longevity of the NGO. Although this has its benefits, he is explicit about the drawbacks. He argues:

> 'they enjoy funding, credit, training and technical assistance, but only at the cost of their own vision and voice. The consequence is less grassroots mobilisation and less capacity to criticise government policy or pursue alternative solutions' (Foweraker, 2001:853).

In this circumstance, Foweraker (2001) suggests that state sector elites have the potential to further their ideologies in civil society by funding NGO actors, through what Hodgson (2004) calls 'manufactured civil society'. One of the first to discuss this phenomenon was Tvedt (1998) who argues development NGOs could be seen as 'transmission belts' of the state's ideas. NGOs can become tightly linked to the state, and as such they become a belt for transferring information and legitimisation from the core, the state, to the periphery, the population, or from developed countries to developing countries (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013).

For some NGOs this is a desired outcome and competition between NGOs become stronger as more funding becomes available. Mercer (2003) argues that it is often international NGOs that are able to gain

significant power from this process, as when working in a host country, international NGOs are able to choose elite NGOs in the host state which best reflects their ideology. These elite NGOs in the host country then become professionalised into the Western discourse, this in turn isolates other civil society actors in the host country, if they do not share the same developmental view. In this sense the hegemonic ideology of neoliberal development then becomes further entrenched.

The long-term consequences of this are inaction or inappropriate solutions to complex problems. According to Choudry and Kapoor (2013), 'NGOs frequently undermine local and international movements for social change and environmental justice…in complicity with state and private-sector interests' (Ibid:2). Through this system of funding the ideology of the hegemonic class is further engrained in civil society through relations of power. Or as Srinivas (2009) suggests:

> 'Whom NGOs serve may be less determined by the needs of clients and those they are meant to serve, and more by who funds them, to whom they are financially accountable and who ensures the resources needed for their activities' (Srinivas, 2009:618).

These arguments are undoubtedly paralleled in the critical development literature. Where the management of some contemporary development projects have been said to maintain and enhance particular forms of relationships (Cooke, 2010) and pose new opportunities for elites to further their agenda (Cooke and Kothari, 2001, Taylor, 2004). To explore this set of literature in any further detail falls outside the remit of this thesis, but it is important to understand the link between neoliberal capitalism and poverty has been widely discussed by these scholars (Escobar, 2010, Levermore and Beacom, 2009, Boas and McNeill, 2004)

2.4: Post-neoliberalism in Brazil

An opportunity for NGOs to become further involved in governance in Brazil was created by a particular moment in Brazilian political history. This was part of a wider movement in Latin America which saw 11 left-leaning governments elected into office in 2005 and 2006. Some scholars at the time labelled this as a post-neoliberal turn in Latin America (Webber and Carr, 2013, Navia, 2009, Burges, 2009, Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2009, Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012, Escobar, 2010) and were hopeful that these governments would attempt to re-embed social principles in the market (Munck, 2013).

The supposed post-neoliberal turn was seen as a reaction to a neoliberal project, which at the time, after 'two decades of Washington Consensus policies, ha[d] left legacies of uneven growth, inequality, social conflicts and lacklustre democracy' Grugel and Riggirozzi (2009:8). Grugel and Riggirozzi (2009) further argue that like other peripheral countries, Brazil was exposed to the neoliberal project through instruments such as the 'structural adjustment programmes' of the World Bank in the 1980s. The structural adjustment programmes in these peripheral countries were deemed necessary as inflation rates became unmanageable. For example, in 1986 Brazil had an inflation rate of 65% and over the proceeding eight years, six of these had rates of over 1000% (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2009, Oxhorn, 2009). According to Hoffman French (2009), the 'structural adjustment programme' in Brazil saw state monopolies on gas and petroleum eliminated and policies were created which opened the economy to foreign investment. This project began with the first democratically elected President Fernando Collor de Mello and was furthered by the succeeding President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002).

The election of the left-leaning governments created a set of literature at the time that attempted to theorise the potential impacts social policies would have on neoliberal economies (Geddes, 2014, Castañeda and Morales, 2009, Munck, 2013). Some common characteristics were identified and included a fundamental aim to deepen democracy and to promote the ideals of social justice and equality (Navia, 2009). Others thought a post-neoliberal society would become more responsive to local traditions and communities (Grugel and Riggirozzo, 2012, 2007) mainly through the implementation of

small policies with grass roots participation (Wylde, 2012, Burges, 2009). Yates and Bakker (2014) defined post-neoliberalism as 'reviving citizenship via a new politics of participation and alliances across sociocultural sectors and groups' (Ibid:3). Further, they suggested it would be achieved through 'establishing greater autonomy and self-governance through processes of cultural self-determination at a variety of scales' (Yates and Bakker 2013:9).

Under the Presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 'Lula' (2003-2011), it has been argued that some Brazilian policies were implemented that had these post-neoliberal characteristics. In the early stages of his Presidency Lula created policies which were designed to stabilise the economy to attract foreign investment, whilst also provide services for the absolute poor. Grugel and Riggirozzi (2012) acknowledge that although the policies were still within the neoliberal economy, the specific wealth distribution projects which provided services to the poor, such as the 'bolsa de familia' and 'bolsa de scholar', were post-neoliberal. To the extent they have been successful has been argued, Saad-Filho (2007) suggest they only solve the symptoms of poverty and paternalistic programmes do nothing to address the fundamental structure of poverty. In addition, and applying the argument of Grugel and Riggirozzi (2007 and 2012), they also do not respond to local traditions by considering localities.

In addition to the wealth distribution, scholars at the time saw policies which sought to develop participation in politics as post-neoliberal. This was important in wider global institutions as decision making through public participation was seen by many, including the United Nations, as a safe guard of democracy (Pateman, 2012, Pearce, 1997, Baiocchi et al., 2008, Avritzer, 2009). The presence of civil society, and in particular NGOs, in developing countries were seen as indicators of a deep democracy that could help promote good governance and effective policy (Rahman, 2006). This was essential to Brazilian decision makers in the socio-political environment of a post-dictatorship.

In Brazil, *Organização da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público* (Organisation of civil society of public interest, OSCIP) are non-profit, civil society led organisations developed to increase public participation within state-led projects, whilst simultaneously filling the void left by the rolling back of the state (Giddens, 2013a, Bradley, 2005). It can be seen was Lula's attempt to allow progressive NGOs a voice in decision making. An OSCIP can only become legally recognised when it enters into a partnership with a state department to deliver a project. It also has to demonstrate that the project could not be implemented by the state alone and could cover health, environmental or social issues (Lemos et al., 2006, Peci et al., 2011, Grangeia, 2011, Albuquerque and Cavalcante, 2007, Koga, 2004, Alves, 2004).

Brazil was not the only country to implement this type of policy. Countries in the global North, especially the UK, also experimented with giving NGOs more power and opportunities to deliver projects. An OSCIP could then be argued to follow a similar critique of the UK policies as discussed by Hodgson (2004). He argues that an NGO and state partnership could create a 'manufactured civil society' whereby the NGO loses its autonomy as the state funds and organises the NGO (Hodgson, 2004). There is the chance, from this perspective, that the NGO delivers the state's goals and builds on government failure, rather than ensuring citizen rights and public participation (Giddens, 2013b, Giddens, 2013a, Foweraker, 2001). This argument mirrors the argument from the NGO literature above.

These concepts identified by the literature show that carbon offsetting and the role of NGOs in Brazil y are contested. They provide critical and qualitative support to the literature which suggests that not all sports mega-events deliver on their environmental and social benefit claims. This literature review now moves from the content of these arguments to the way in which scholars understand the problems they discuss.

2.5: Neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance

Scholars who write on the current environmental crisis can be separated by the paradigm in which they view the crisis. Those who align with ecological modernisation believe that the environmental crisis can be solved through technological innovation within a neoliberal economy. As the previous literature described, this can be problematic as these scholars are not critically engaged. Viewing the social and environmental claims from the World Cup within this paradigm would disregard the concepts discussed by scholars writing on carbon offsetting and NGOs.

Other scholars, who were largely inspired by Marxist ecology literature (Foster, 2000, O'Connor, 1988 and Benton, 1998), propose the capitalist system contributes to the current ecological crisis. In developing the ideas from Marxist ecology, Levy and Newell (2002) suggested scholars studying environmental governance at the time did not give enough attention to the role of the corporate sector and focused too heavily on state-society analysis. They then proposed a new approach, a political economy of global environmental governance which drew key concepts from Antonio Gramsci's work. Noting the influence of other work from a variety of disciplines, they named this a neo-Gramscian approach (Levy and Newell, 2002). Central to their analysis was the role of hegemony. They proposed that elite actors working within environmental governance were able to secure their interest through a network of alliances which all contributed to maintaining the current social relations (Simon, 1991).

The environmental NGO and carbon offsetting literature highlighted the role the corporate sector can play and, therefore, a neo-Gramscian approach which acknowledges this is seen as appropriate. This is further supported by Newell (2008) who, speaking of wider environmental governance problems suggests there is 'increasing evidence of private actors assuming public functions of regulation and stewardship with regard to natural resources' (Ibid:510). This framework has the ability to incorporate the issues presented in the previous sections. Newell (2008) further suggests the neo-Gramscian

approach to environmental governance addresses 'the fact that global environmental governance cannot be understood separately from broader shifts in authority in global politics' (Ibid:513). Therefore, the neo-Gramscian approach also would account for the historical moment when NGOs in Brazil were given more authority.

The neo-Gramscian approach posits that the relations that build a system of elite alliances and connections allow the hegemonic class to produce ideological leadership in civil society and political leadership in the political sector (Daldal, 2014, Morton, 2007). Further, although these elite alliance may have divergent interests, but are all furthered by the overall hegemonic project (Simon, 1991, Gill, 1993).

This approach to understanding environmental governance is growing in popularity. Levy and Egan (2003) were among the first to apply this analysis on an empirical study. They investigated how the USA and European automobile and oil organisations reacted in response to climate change. They argued that these elites were able to secure their social position by lobbying political elites to work in their favour. They argue this would not have been possible without the role civil society played in legitimising their case, by doing so, hegemonic relations were secured by the automobile and oil organisations. Banerjee (2011) alluded to the neo-Gramscian conceptualisation in his paper which looked at internal colonialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Throughout his paper, and using different examples he argues how the lines between state and market authority are becoming increasingly blurred. He falls short of applying neo-Gramscian analysis, however, alludes to the dominance of the different actors within the state, corporate and civil society sectors and explores how relationships of dominance defines their power. In a smaller context, the neo-Gramscain analysis was also implemented by Dimitrov (2010) to analyse the UN Climate Change negotiations. He highlighted the power relationships and struggles that have led to poor performance by state actors in the climate change negotiations. Using a neo-Gramscian analysis he concluded that the hegemonic class did not want a globally binding contract and used their relations of

dominance to ensure the hegemonic project was not challenged. Smaller scale actors working outside the hegemonic project, then had to shift policy efforts 'to national, bilateral and regional initiatives' (Dimitrov, 2010:22) as the hegemonic elite dominated. Moog et al. (2014) once again reiterated the importance of civil society as the site where hegemonic ideology is produced and used the neo-Gramscian analysis to problematize the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).

The above studies took the neo-Gramscian conceptualisation and applied it to global scale environmental political analysis. These multi-national, large scale studies unearthed the relations of domination between the elite class and other actors associated with global environmental problems. They highlighted the legitimisation role of civil society in creating hegemony, also suggesting that civil society is the place where resistance manifests. The use of this conceptual framework has also been applied within the management and organisational literature, but on a much smaller scale. The application of this analysis commenced in 2007 with a study of how management hegemony is challenged through agency in organisations (Spicer and Böhm, 2007). Böhm et al. (2008) challenged a labour process theory stance that hegemony is produced only in the economic realm and argued it occurs in all three sectors, the economy, state and civil society. They also argue that within these sectors are formal and informal resistance. These studies show that the neo-Gramscian approach can also be applied on smaller scales. However, the neo-Gramscian approach is weakened by the inability to link these larger scale studies with smaller scale phenomena. To study the organisation of the carbon offsetting project would require an understanding of small scale organisation practices and the appreciation of how this fits into a wider hegemonic project. This thesis takes the view that this can be linked through studying the agency of elites at these different scales.

2.6: Scalar theory

Elites can be seen to have the ability to transform spatially as well as temporally (Swyngedouw, 2004) and therefore are able to create new alliances to ensure their interests are served. Swyngedouw (2004) further argues that these transitions occur through layers of 'nodes and linkages, which are interconnected in proliferating networks and flows of money, information, commodities and people' (Ibid: 32). In changing these alliances at different scales, elites have the ability to secure their interests. At this point, it is perhaps important to identify the conflation of the terms scales and levels. Neumann (2009) suggests that Blaikie (1985) and Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) were clear when they described 'geographic scales' as spatial and 'hierarchies of socioeconomic organizations' as levels. Sayre (2008) suggests households and cities are levels of social organization not scales. This thesis focuses on 'geographical scales' and therefore from here on in, scale describes geographical scale.

The different linkages described by Swyngedouw (2004) can be analysed through different geographical scales, first discussed by Neil Smith in 1992 (Smith, 1992). The process to analysing different geographical scales has been seen as an important concept to contemporary political ecologists who believe that each scale is 'inseparably tied to the other, but the particular way they are related is open to social production' (Brown and Purcell, 2005:609). This is developed from cultural ecology which Brown and Purcell (2005) argued saw the local scale as a closed system. Using scalar theory, the linkages of the wider political economy to lower scales can be used to analyse a phenomena. Brenner (2001) suggests the cultural ecology perspective misses that the political economy, culture, and ecology all exist and operate simultaneously at a range of scales. The local scale is inextricably embedded in the global scale which in turn is produced by various local scales. Turner (1997) labelled the thinking of the time as dichotomization of the local and regional. These scales are important as recent political ecology work has identified a trend which sees elites moving between these scales to secure their interests.

Ramutsindela and Noe (2012) argue in their study of conservation in southeast Tanzania that although the conservation agenda is globally decided upon it is the local scale from which it is implemented and

the natural resource rights and benefits are contested. It is the actors who can work at different scales that have the powerful position at the local scale. Zanotti (2011) suggests that in the Brazilian Amazon, indigenous groups have struggled to gain power at the local scale and have created strategic ties with state and non-state actors at different scales in order to leverage their power at the local scale. They argue these ties have been forged through increased access to information and increased networking ability through building of logistical infrastructure. It is the ability of the elites then who are able to secure alliances at different levels that are important in how decisions at the national scale are implemented at the local scale. This phenomena is not new, Smith (1993) first discussed this notion of 'jumping scales', a political strategy to challenge the structure of scale. Groups who are disadvantaged at one scale strategically create relations or pursue aims at a different scale. This 'alters relative power positions as inter-local cooperation is replaced by inter-local competition. This increases the power of those that can 'jump scales' vertically or horizontally at the expense of those whose command of scale is more limited' (Swyngedouw, 2004:41). Chernela (2005) working in the Brazilian Amazon argued that those who can actively scale the different geographical scales, named as an interlocutor, actively works in creating 'the local' culture and values. It is argued this then creates circumstances where elites manipulate ideology to suit their agenda.

Scholars working in this tradition agree that scales are socially constructed (Neumann, 2009: Swyngedouw, 2004; Turner, 1997). According to Brown and Purcell (2005:610) 'the social and ecological outcomes of any particular scalar arrangement are the result of the political strategies of particular actors, not the inherent qualities of particular scales'. It is the politics of the scales that provide insight into the power struggles and interests of the elite at each scale. As scale is socially constructed through political struggle they are fluid and constantly being created and re-created (Swyngedouw, 1997; Brown and Purcell, 2005; Neumann, 2009). However, Brown and Purcell (2005) also argue that these structures can be relatively stable and under hegemonic processes can become semi-permeant. For

example, sovereign nations can be a semi-permanent scale, although another political project may see this differently and change the scale of the nation state into their interest.

In order to understand this political contestation, it is essential to analyse the relationships among the scales. Brown and Purcell (2005) suggest that researchers cannot focus on a single scale alone as it forgoes the contestations between the different scales and how the relations among scales are socially produced. This, according to Neumann (2009:7) is particularly useful for political ecologists, as it 'highlights power relations and a dialectical approach toward nature-society relations'. Neumann (2009) advises that studies of scale should concentrate on the scalar practices of social actors rather than scale itself. The networks that actors have within and between scales is reliant on their relative power (Neumann, 2009: 2).

The theory of scales is helpful when understanding the mechanisms elites use to maintain their social position and manipulate relations to serve their interest. This is particularly important in a context outlined above where the carbon offsetting mechanism is rife with inequalities. The neo-Gramscian approach provides a theoretical framework to analyse the concepts presented in the first sections of the chapter.

2.7: Conclusions

This chapter gave an overview of the current arguments in the sports mega-event literature. Claims surrounding the social and environmental benefits that organisers made are starting to be questioned by scholars, particularly the social benefits. However, it was found these investigations have predominantly been quantitative in approach and were written within the ecological modernisation paradigm with the aim to improve policy. This is problematic when using the concepts highlighted in the

supporting literature which not only questions the appropriateness of carbon offsetting, but the intentions of the actors within the mechanism.

I drew from wider critical development and environmental governance literature because these literatures are more established and allow for a deeper understanding of key concepts that can then be applied to my studied case. Key arguments, such as the role of NGOs and the maintenance of existing hegemonic relationships through the carbon market are central to this thesis.

This phenomenon will be studied through a neo-Gramscian approach. This approach is critical of social hierarchies and relationships which allow for inaction or inappropriate action with regard to climate change. It also opposes the stance of ecological modernisation, that environmental protection and economic development are compatible through policy and technological innovation.

A gap has been highlighted in mega-events literature which critically engages with a carbon offsetting project at the FIFA World Cup. This thesis aims to fill this gap in literature content.

-Chapter III -

Methods and fieldwork

This thesis is based on qualitative research and ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 2013 and 2016 and the main aim of this chapter is to chart the process of collecting and analysing data used in the following chapters. The first section describes the preliminary research undertaken and how I selected the case, then I discuss the methods I used in collecting the data during fieldwork. After a consideration of some of the challenges and dilemmas that arose using these methods I document how I analysed the data and the ethical issues and challenges I encountered during fieldwork. Before going into the details of the research process it is important to briefly describe the approach that informed this critical ethnographic case study.

My approach was generally informed by critical management studies. To critical management theorists, mainstream theory is neutral and expects impartial management practice (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992, Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). In contrast, critical approaches question 'established social orders, dominating practices, ideologies, discourses, and institutions' (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000:x). Taking a critical approach in this thesis allowed me to explore the ideologies and networks of actors which enabled the green claims surrounding the FIFA World Cup in Mato Grosso.

However, my approach was also more specifically informed by the neo-Gramscian approaches to environmental governance. In this tradition most empirical studies have taken a case-study approach using primary and secondary data to inform their analysis (Moog et al., 2014, Levy and Egan, 2003, Levy and Newell, 2002, Wittneben et al., 2012). I follow in this tradition, however, I also incorporated an ethnographic fieldwork element in order to understand the realities on the ground (Creswell, 2013). By using observation, participant observation and creating relationships with participants I had the opportunity to fully investigate the claims FIFA made whilst also understanding the environmental and political struggles of participants (Bryant and Bailey, 1997, Bryant, 1997, Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003, Benjaminsen and Ba, 2009, Phuc, 2009, Zaidi, 2012). Moreover, as Neumann emphasises, ethnography has the ability to highlight 'the differing and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the environment and environmental problems held among various actors operating at local, regional and global scales' (Neumann, 2014:6).

Finally, it is important to note that like most scholars working within the neo-Gramscian tradition, this study is underpinned by a critical realist epistemology. Critical realism can be described as an alternative both to a positivist approach, where there is an object truth that only neutral researchers can obtain; and is also distinguished from relativist, interpretivist approaches, which suggest there is no object truth (Sayer, 2004). In contrast, critical realism posits there is an existence of one real and actual world, but people know this world differently. Different interpretations of the same phenomena can lead one statement to be closer to the objective truth than the other. It is the role of the researcher to explore the historical and contemporary, social and political factors, which may have influenced these interpretations (Sayer, 2000) in order to get as close to the objective truth as possible. Moreover, as Reed (2005: 1623) emphasises in relation to organisational studies, critical realism is used as a 'meta-theoretical paradigm' which seeks to explain the social relations that are reproduced and transformed through agency (Reed, 2005).

3.1: Preliminary Documentary Research and Selecting the Case

When I first started my PhD, I was planning to study carbon-offsetting in mangroves in Indonesia which I had visited during a module on my MSc in Environmental Governance. However, during my preliminary bibliographic research on carbon-offsetting, I discovered that major sporting events were starting to use carbon-offsetting to counter criticisms of their environmental impacts. I have always enjoyed sports, especially football, and when I found out that FIFA had incorporated carbon-offsetting into its environmental strategy, I knew that I had found my research topic. My preliminary online searches in late 2012 and early 2013 revealed that FIFA had released a sustainability concept document (Addiechi et al., 2012) for the 2014 tournament in Brazil, and that the Brazilian government was planning to make it 'the greenest World Cup ever'.

This preliminary documentary research allowed me to develop a research proposal to investigate environmental governance and the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The documents were all available online and were free to access. The FIFA documents were only available in English but the Brazilian Organising Committee releases were also available in Portuguese. From this data I was able to then build an overall picture of the sustainability claims and it became apparent carbon offsetting was a significant part of the programme. One of these projects was to offset the emissions from the whole tournament. The Brazilian Organising Committee had negotiated with BP Carbon Neutral to produce a portfolio of Brazilian based projects which were used to offset the emissions for hosting the tournament (Lopes, 2011a, Secopa, 2012a, Noticias, no date)[2].

In addition to this large offsetting project, my preliminary documentary research showed that host cities would be responsible for carrying out carbon offsetting projects to offset the emissions of new stadiums. It also revealed that the Estadio Nacional Mane Garrincha in Brasilia and the Pantanal Stadium in Cuiabá

[2] The details of the projects were not announced until early 2014, therefore it did not allow enough time to prepare a valid research proposal within the academic confinements of a PhD.

, Mato Grosso were the only two stadiums that had publically available data on the offsetting aspect of their construction programmes[3]. In Brasilia, the plan was to achieve carbon neutrality through purchasing carbon credits on the international carbon market, which would have made the credits more difficult to trace. In contrast, the new Pantanal Stadium in Cuiaba was to achieve carbon neutrality through purchasing carbon credits from a local reforestation programme called the Green River Project. This project, it seemed, would make a feasible case study as the carbon credits were to be purchased directly and therefore the key actors and claims would be easily available.

In order to develop a research and fieldwork plan for investigating this case, I conducted further documentary research into the project. Throughout this time I obtained documents from Secopa (Zanetti, 2013, Secopa, 2012b) and local news outlets (Grosso, 2012, Neuman, 2003, Lumsden, 2009) which were invaluable in understanding the case. I understood the Green River Project was a bi-lateral agreement between the state government, Secopa, the construction company of the Arena Pantanal and the Green Action Institute. The project's stated aim was to plant 1.4 million trees to offset 711,000 tonnes of carbon, based on a method of planting seven trees to offset one tonne of carbon. The Green Action Institute also posted documents on their website, which gave more details than the press releases. They provided names of contacts and gave me a clearer understanding of the project (Neuman, 2003). I tried contacting the Green Action Institute several times through the website but did not receive a response.

[3] FIFA published a press release in 2011 which highlighted the Pantanal Stadium's environmental claims. With these claims I was able to produce a research proposal in 2012.



Figure 1: Location of Baixada Cuiabána in Southern Mato Grosso. My study sites were in the municipality of Santo Antonio de Leverger in South East Baixada Cuiabána, source: adapted from (CGMA, 2015)

Once I had selected this case, I also started collecting further information on state and regional which were available through online media outlets. The local newspaper, *Diario de Cuiabá* , had feature articles and short news reports editorial which were helpful for getting a sense of local issues, and sometimes were directly relevant to my research. A feature article on the health of the River Cuiabá (de Melo Resende, 2012) was particularly useful, for example. Finding accurate maps however, was more tricky (Fig 1). At the time when I left for Brazil in May 2014, the three communities participating in the Green River Project, where I planned to do most of my fieldwork, Barranco Alto I and II, and Barra de Arica were not documented on Google Maps. Moreover, the hotel where I planned to work was placed in Santo Antonio do Leverger, 23km further South than its actual location in Pesquerio Florida.

3.2: Fieldwork

The ethnographic research for this project was carried out in two phases: from May to September 2014 and from June 2015 to September 2015. The first period was planned to coincide with the tournament itself (June-July 2014) and enabled me to observe both the preparations for and excitement around the actual tournament. The second period was important for documenting the legacies of the World Cup once the media attention and excitement had died down, as well as further interviews with villagers and key actors.

Before my first fieldwork trip, I was fully aware that I had to make thorough preparations. I had never visited Brasil, spoke no Portuguese, and was an inexperienced researcher. I also had many pre-conceptions about undertaking research in Brazil. In terms of practical preparation, my first task was to learn to speak Portuguese. I sought contact with Portuguese speakers in Colchester and used Duolingo self-education tools and apps. These apps proved very helpful and I continued to use them once I started fieldwork. By the time I arrived in Brazil, I had some basic phrases at my disposal. However it took about a month before I could begin to have conversations. The second main practical preparation was to start making contacts with academics and key actors in Cuiabá and finding possible places to stay close to the villages involved in the Green River Project.

In terms of academic preparations, in addition to more focused bibliographic research, I had extensive discussions with my supervisors about ethics, safety and the practicalities of doing fieldwork. I was particularly worried about my impact as a Western researcher in the field. Riach (2009) suggests that as a researcher my research is influenced by my gender, class, national and racial attributes. Other 'confessional tales' by ethnographers who had ethical issues in relation to their impact in the field (Bryman and Bell, 2011, Neuman, 2003, Liamputtong, 2010) made me conscious of my potential impact on research participants. However, these concerns proved to be largely unfounded. When I arrived in Brazil, I soon realised that the deeply engrained social inequalities were much more significant than the

North/South divide, and my presence in some circumstances actually broke down social barriers. I was also aware of being a single female in the field. This was perhaps the biggest struggle and something I had underestimated. Before my fieldwork, I had not experienced a patriarchal society and did not appreciate how I might react to being treated as having a prescribed gender role. In this sense, being in the field had a greater impact on me as a researcher than the research participants.

Once I arrived in Brazil I spent one month travelling around, in preparation for going to the villages in rural Mato Grosso. During this time I went to Brasilia and stayed in a European back-packers hostel and Mato Grosso do Sul where I visited local tourist sights. Then I spent two weeks in Cuiabá with a Brazilian middle-class family who could speak English. This initial period of fieldwork was important to understand Brazilian society in general. I enjoyed evenings discussing politics and reading newspapers. The time in Cuiabá was especially important as I was able to experience both the middle-class and peasant life, which enabled me to fully appreciate the social and economic divides in Brazil.

During this month of acclimatising, I met Dr Carla Valentini, a college teacher in Cuiabá . I first made contact with her in 2013 when researching academics working in the Northern Pantanal region. Although she could not speak English she was very keen to meet and help me when I arrived in Cuiabá . Within the first week I had accompanied her on a college trip to the Pantanal where she led a tour of an eco-hotel, and she also took me to Barranco Alto so that I could begin to map the region. Carla became very interested in my project and was intrigued that such a small, rural project could have caught the attention of UK researchers. She claimed that although she lived in the city, her heart belonged in the *mata* (countryside). It was a sore subject that both of her teenage daughters hated spending time in the countryside and both had ambitions to move to the *chique* (fashionable) USA. Carla later went to great lengths to arrange my interviews with the Green Action Institute, the Mato Grosso public prosecutor, and tried to arrange interviews with Secopa and took time out to accompany when I carried them out.

After my two weeks in Cuiabá , I travelled to the Pousada Itaicy, a small hotel in Pesquerio Florida, which is one of the communities involved in the Green River Project. While preparing for fieldwork, I had

made contact the hotel owner Robson, through a search of hotels near Barranco Alto. I had emailed over 10 hotels and Robson was the only one to reply. He was keen for me to stay at the hotel as he spoke no English and had English-speaking guests arriving to stay during the World Cup. So we had provisionally arranged that I would look after these guests in return for board and lodgings. Although I was rather apprehensive about this provisional arrangement, once I arrived and met Robson I was reassured and working at the hotel proved invaluable for my fieldwork. It was close to the fishing villages of Barranco Alto I and II, and also facilitated access to key elite actors.

The Pousada Itiacy runs weekend and five day fishing packages for elite tourists from around Mato Groso and other parts of Brazil, as the River Cuiabá is famous among fisherman for Dourado, Piraputanga and Pintado. It had eight rooms when I arrived which grew to eleven by the time I left the field. The rooms were simple in design and furniture but had access to satellite TV and air conditioning. A paved walkway towards the river led to the restaurant and covered seating area on the river bank. The restaurant was built by Robson and his late father and had wooden furniture- a luxury in Santo Antonio do Leverger. It cost R$750 (£170) for one person to stay overnight with two fishing trips, meals and drinks. Due to this reason it was only the elite classes who could afford to stay. To the outside, the hotel seemed a paradise in such a rural location, Robson would often profess to having the best Wi-Fi in Brazil as it was a great feat to get Wi-Fi in the area.

Due to the rural location of the hotel I stayed on the premises as did other workers, this closeness meant I created relationships very quickly with the other workers. However, my closeness to the hotel owner's wife meant that gaining their full trust was difficult. I shared my room with other workers who generally did not stay longer than two or three months before moving onto other jobs. During my second stay in 2015 Robson carried out renovations on the hotel and workers' rooms. Throughout most of this period of fieldwork I slept in the hotel owner's apartment on the floor, but occasionally shared a hammock with another female worker, and on some occasions we were given a guest bedroom.

3.3: Data Collection Methods

Observations

During initial stages of my data collection I used observation to become an 'instrument that absorbs all sources of data' (Neuman, 2003:381). I then used this knowledge to begin to filter the information that was necessary to my research and that which was not. This was particularly useful when in Mato Grosso du Sol, Brasilia and when I first arrived in Cuiabá . In addition to these observations I made visits to observe key objects in my research. Observations were used to understand the World Cup in different areas in Brazil and verify claims made by research participants and in documentary sources. My first observation was of the Estádio Nacional Mané Garrincha, the national stadium in Brasilia in April 2014; I later observed the stadium in September 2014. I observed the Maracanã, the football stadium used for the World Cup in Rio de Janeiro in July 2014 and September 2015. The Pantanal stadium in Cuiabá was observed in May, June and September 2014 and September 2015. Finally, the tree nursery in Barranco Alto was observed in May 2014, July 2014 and September 2015.

The prolonged period of observations of the Pantanal Stadium, and in particular the shrubs and grounds were used to challenge claims made by Secopa. The observation in May 2014 suggested the shrubs in the car park were being planted that day and construction work was ongoing. The next observation in September 2015 reported the surroundings of the stadium were effectively crumbling. The claims surrounding recycled water, pond, plants and exercise area were able to be challenged based on observations. Observations of the tree nursery in Barranco Alto were also used to challenge claims made project organisers. Claims made by the Green Action Institute about their current activities were challenged in 2014 by the observations from the nursery. In 2015 when it was not possible to talk to the Green Action Institute, observations of the nursery confirmed the interviews with a SEMA employee (interview S8) and local residents (interviews PP 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) that the project had stopped.

Participant observations

Participant observation was a particularly important method at the start of my fieldwork. I spoke very little Portuguese and relied heavily on the patience of Robson's wife, Lunira, to communicate. So it was unrealistic to conduct interviews in the early phase of my fieldwork. However, participant observation allowed me to understand the social realities of the field. For example, through observation I was able to identify nuances in the vocabulary of the hotel owner's wife. Any male guest staying at the hotel, regardless of age was addressed as *senhor* (sir) by her, whereas any male who worked at the hotel, supplied goods to the hotel or was an obvious lower social class was referred to as *menino* (boy). It was due to these participant observations that I began to question my understanding of the social relations and realities of the field; consequently, this led me to refine my research agenda to be more aware of these relations. One consequence of this was that I chose my guide in the villages more carefully. Initially I had accepted offers from both Carla and Luinra to accompany me when conducting interviews in Barranco Alto I and II. However, it soon became obvious that their presence would affect the way the much poorer people in the villages would communicate with me. So, I asked Chacho, a fishing guide who had grown up in one of the villages to be my guide instead.

Participant observation was carried out on a daily basis at the hotel. Due to financial constraints I agreed with the hotel owner, Robson, I would stay at the hotel from May until Mid July 2014- the end of the World Cup. I stayed for free in return for translating and hosting international tourists who could not speak Portuguese. By the end of my first stay at the hotel I was running the restaurant and typically working for 10 hours a day. After the World Cup I returned to the hotel and worked until October, during this time Robson paid for me to go on holiday with his wife and mother-in-law in Porto de Galinhas in North-East Brazil. In my second period of fieldwork, the following year I ran the front of house of the hotel and restaurant and set up databases to track fishing guides' use of petrol and bait as well as the amount spent on washing linen per month. I received a monthly wage, which was 3x the minimum wage--the price of a single person staying at the hotel for one night. I was frequently working

over 12 hours a day. Throughout this time I was also conducting fieldwork, observing and analysing my surroundings.

In addition to the Porto de Galhinas trip I also spent time in Rio de Janeiro half way through my fieldwork in 2014 and again at the end of my field work is 2015. On the first visit I was accompanied by a friend during the World Cup semi-finals and finals where we watched the matches on Copacabana beach. It was during this time that I observed the protests in Rio de Janeiro following Brazil's defeat by Germany. On the second visit I was accompanied by my brother, who also returned to Mato Grosso with me for two weeks. Having these people with me at these key stages of my field work proved invaluable. On both occasions I was suffering from fieldwork fatigue where the stress of learning the language, working and conducting research were taking its toll. Their enthusiasm and curiosity about my fieldwork and even my ability to speak Portuguese gave me the confidence and energy boost I needed.

Interviews

During my two fieldwork trips I conducted 61 formal interviews and numerous informal interviews. My formal interviews were in structured and semi-structured formats depending on the participants profiles. The length of interviews varied from ten minutes to several hours, although not all parts of interviews were recorded.

Informal interviews are described as having no pre-determined themes (Neuman, 2003). In my case they usually started by casual conversations with hotel guests while I was working at the hotel. If relevant, I recorded these informal interviews afterwards in my field note diary. I found they were a good way of identifying general patterns and discovering if individual guests had knowledge or experiences that I could explore further in a semi-structured interview. Through these informal interviews I identified one guest as being the author of a scientific paper I had read on Barranco Alto. After we had arranged a formal interview he then put me in touch with a worker from SEMA who had a large impact on my data collection. Not all informal interviewees gave consent as is discussed in section.

Semi-Structured Formal Interviews

I conducted 37 semi-structured formal interviews with residents in the three communities involved in the Green River Project, Barranco Alto I and II, Pesquisa Florida, as well as the neighbouring village of Barra de Arica. I prepared for semi-structured interviews by having a loose list of themes or discussion points to cover. The interviewee did not know these themes beforehand and were allowed to leave the intended subjects if they felt appropriate (Barbour, 2014, Hennink et al., 2011, Jenner et al., 2004). I recorded the interview in my notes after it was conducted and I wore casual clothes, usually denim shorts and t-shirt with flip-flops. Conversely, structured interviews were used when conducting interviews with participants with a professional or elite background. The questions for these interviews were pre-prepared based on my own research which I gave to the interviewee before the interview (Harvey, 2011, Richards, 1996). These were typically conducted in the participant's offices and used both a voice recorder and paper and pen. In addition, I dressed in office wear to make the process in line with their everyday activities (Harvey, 2011, Creswell, 2013).

In view of considerations about personal safety, I did not conduct interviews alone.. As previously discussed choosing an appropriate guide for these interviews was essential in light of the local social relations and I decided to turn down the offers of Lunira and Carla Valentini. I felt having these white, middle-class women with me would prevent participants from engaging fully in my research or could even prevent me from gaining access. Gaining access to the research participants was a continual process of negotiation between myself, the participants and the gate keepers (Lumsden, 2009) and as such it was important both myself and the participants could trust the gatekeepers. It was on these grounds, that I accepted Chacho's offer to be my guide.

Chacho is a fishing guide at the Pousada Itaicy who grew up and still lives in Barra de Arica. He was a favoured guide at the hotel and on his days off he would come to the hotel to hang out. He had never met a foreigner and was almost as intrigued about my life as I was about his. Most of his family

continued to live in the communities along the river bank and after I told him about my research project, he was very keen to help out. His out-going personality meant he was well-known and liked in the villages. Newly single after his wife left him for a man from 'the city', he was also keen to restore his pride and viewed being seen out and about with a *gringa* (foreigner) as a help. But this friendship worked well for me too. As in many places, a single woman was seen as a threat to many of the married women (Liamputtong, 2010) and being accompanied by a man was helpful in breaking down initial barriers. As an outsider, I also felt safer walking around the villages with someone who was well-known. Chacho was particularly patient with me and enjoyed explaining the local dialect, he would also tell participants to slow down and speak 'proper Portuguese' so I could understand, instead of the regional dialect.

Access to research participants from Barranco Alto I and II largely took the form of snowball sampling led by Chacho. The villages were small and everyone knew each other. The news that a *gringa* was conducting research in the area created curiosity and when I first visited people already knew about my arrival. Although people knew my presence, my only participants were those introduced to me by Chacho or who approached us when they saw me. One problem related to conducting interviews in the villages was negotiating the time off for myself and Chacho to go the villages. Chacho was employed at the hotel as a day worker, and could only go when no-one needed a guide; and I was contracted to work six days a week but could only take breaks when there were no guests. When the opportunity to go to the villages arose I would pay for the petrol for his boat and typically bought him lunch as a good will gesture for accompanying me. I bought the fuel from Robson who bought fuel at the local petrol station. Negotiating with Robson over this fuel was sometimes tricky when he did not want his petrol used, or did not want to go and collect it.

I also gained access to participants through connections with the hotel workers. One of the first semi-structured interviews I conducted was with the grandfather of one of the hotel workers who was from Barra de Arica (PP15). During this interview our cultural differences were exposed and it reinforced my worries about being a Western researcher. This experience led me to change my approach to recording interviews with people in the villages. Recording interviews cross culturally can create some issues (Liamputtong, 2010) and Mangen (1999:117) specifically warns that 'recording can inhibit respondents or cause them to decline to participate: some cultures are not attuned to non-official interviews at all, especially when they are being recorded.'

I was keen to do this interview because the man formerly worked at the Usina Itaici, a sugar mill that was in operation in the area from the late C19th until the 1950s, and he still lives in the community he was born in. He had a great wealth of knowledge on the history of the village and the change in living conditions over time and I felt he could provide extensive details on the realities of life in Barra do Aricá and the region. However, this interview was paralysed by my use of recording equipment. The interviewee had never met a foreigner before and I used my iPhone 4 to record the interview. For me, the iPhone 4 was two models out of date and handed down from my step-father when he bought the newest model. In contrast, the interviewee he had never seen a smart phone before, neither had the people surrounding us at the table wanting to watch the interview. As I was setting up the equipment to record it was obvious he felt intimidated by the phone, whereas everyone else was fascinated. Throughout the interview he kept looking at the phone as it was laid on the table between us. The phone became a symbol of our cultural differences and as a result, the interview was much shorter and less informative than I had hoped.

This interview occurred early on in my fieldwork, and was a catalyst for changing how I recorded interviews with residents from the villages. Chacho and I would collate the information and I then would write down the interview afterwards. This has been advocated by other ethnographers such as Poulin

(2007) who suggests that conversational interviews are common in ethnography and are routinely recorded after. This method worked better than recording the interview on my phone, although some minor problems occurred. Chacho was functionally illiterate and was uncomfortable sitting , watching me write down our conversation; again this was a cultural barrier between myself and him. To counter this, we discussed the interview and I wrote key notes. After I had returned to hotel and when I was alone, I would then make longer notes. This three stage process to recording the interview was labour intensive, but an effective way of negotiating barriers between myself and research participants which ultimately led to richer data.

As I gained confidence as an interviewer, I began to use prompts in the later stages of my first field trip (Taylor, 2011). Due to the language and cultural barriers, I found prompts a good tool to help participants focus. In particular the pamphlet produced by the Green Action Institute, which outlined the results of the Green River Project, was useful for beginning a dialogue. The participant could then reflect on the photos and claims made by in the pamphlet instead of answering my direct questions. The photos in the pamphlet also jolted the memory of some participants about their interactions with the Green Action Institute and SEMA. For example one participant in Barranco Alto II (PP11) after seeing the photo of the resident signing the TAC in SEMA's office in Cuiabá , remembered the hardship of travelling 60km to sign his TAC (see chapter 7 for details).

In addition to using prompts when conducting informal interviews in the villages, I tried to ensure each interview was with an individual participant. Inspired by the work of Liamputtong (2010) and Scheyvens and Leslie (2000) I specifically wanted to consult women. Scheyvens and Leslie (2000) suggest it can be:

> 'very difficult for the researcher to gain access to women, partly because women are extremely busy, and time to sit and talk may be restricted to late evenings when it may not be appropriate or practical, for a researcher to visit women's homes. In addition to this, women are rarely given roles as official spokesperson for a community thus they are not the first people outsiders are likely to encounter' (Ibid:119).

Throughout my research I found this to be true. Initial relationships whilst at the hotel were formed with workers, the women typically worked as cleaners and cooks who were, to me, always busy and had few

rest periods. The male fishing guides and groundskeeper were free when I was- typically a two hour gap when clients took their afternoon nap. Because of this, I made key relationships with the fishermen, such as Chacho.

I also encountered difficulties trying to interview women when in the villages. It would not have been appropriate, especially with married couples (interview PP8) to ask for individual interviews. When it was possible I tried to interview people individually. Sometimes this meant Chacho and I accompanying them as they went about their daily activities. On some occasions we went to the bar in the village where we could sit over refreshment. I was keen to interview individuals alone as I did not trust my language skills to identify and understand the nuances in answers from interviewees who were apprehensive about the presence of others. I was also unsure Chacho would understand my reservations and aid me in studying this. Overall, I was able to interview two women alone in the villages, significantly they were both workers in a bar and were only alone due to their job. Additionally, I was able to interview female workers in the hotel and although they did not contribute to the data collection they were key in developing my understanding of the realities of the field from a female perspective. All other women were interviewed with their husbands or partners present.

Structured Formal Interviews

In addition to my interviews with residents in the communities, I carried out 24 structured formal interviews with key actors associated with the Green River carbon-offsetting project. These included journalists, researchers from the state University, politicians, representatives from government departments, and the Green Action Institute (see the appendix 1 for more details). All of these interviewees were given an interview schedule ahead of time. This had three purposes: to allow participants to prepare answers and perhaps increase their willingness to participate, and help me to feel more relaxed interviewing (Harvey, 2011, Creswell, 2013, Stephens, 2009). I recorded these interviews in Portuguese with a Dictaphone and transcribed and translated them afterwards. This group could be divided into two groups, elites I met in the hotel and professionals based in Cuiabá .

As already noted my gatekeeper for the interviews with professionals in Cuiabá was Dr Carla Valentini, but I also had access to local elites at the hotel, where Robson was effectively the gatekeeper. In the data I obtained from most of these interviews, there was very little personal opinion and for the most part, the information provided went little beyond data I found in documentary research. Interviewees were typically only available for one interview, and significantly I was unable to obtain a follow-up interview with the Green Action Institute. The only follow up interview I had was with the former head of Secopa who frequently visited the hotel. Overall, gaining access to this group was harder than the semi-structured formal interviews.

Qualitative text books often discuss formal interviews as the researcher in the position of relative power (Pile, 1991, Barbour, 2014, Creswell, 2013, Hennink et al., 2011, Jenner et al., 2004, Mangen, 1999, Stephens, 2009). However, recently, increasing attention has been given to elites within both human geography and organisational studies (Harvey, 2011) and there is now some discussion around the challenges involved (Welch et al., 2002, Smith, 2006, Richards, 1996). McDowell (1998) for example, discusses how in her research in the city of London she took on a number of roles depending on the interviewee, from 'playing dumb' for older figures to 'brusquely efficient' with older women (Ibid:2138), and Smith (2006) found that in her experience some respondents from a less senior position wanted to exert authority over her during the interview.

I experienced two main types of response from professional and elite participants. The first was that I was seen as in danger and in need of nurturing. Interviewees (CS1, 6 and 7) commented on how brave I was to come to Brazil alone when I did not speak the language or know anyone. They would then ask what my mother thought of me being in Brazil, one (CS7) asked why I did not have my boyfriend with me, not even asking if I had one. In other cases, I was seen as a young, educated middle-class student who had left leaning political beliefs due to my 'protected' upbringing. This was particularly evident in a conversation between Robson, the former head of Secopa and Blairo Maggi. They were discussing the protests surrounding the World Cup and blamed the ideologies of young people; as I fitted this category

they were happy to suggest that living with poor people at the hotel would educate me in the political and economic system and then I would understand why the poor should not receive our attention.

Perhaps the most difficult interview was with the Green Action Institute. During the interview the manager, technician and secretary all answered my questions. The following extract from my field notes explores the body language and tensions evident in this interview:

> 'The manager was about 5ft 5 but had total control of the room, she strode into the office in black patent stiletto heels and a tight, figure hugging dress. Her hair was dyed a platinum blonde and wouldn't have been out of place walking around Canary Wharf, yet she was an environmental technician in Cuiabá. She was cool in her body language and gave an impression of fierceness which I would not like to challenge, her speech was fast and abrupt. Her fingers were littered with gold rings, I counted three individual gold rings on one finger! Her iPhone 5 was constantly bleeping as we were talking and when she wasn't checking her phone I felt she made an uncomfortable amount of eye contact with me particularly.
>
> The second woman wore flat sandals and jeans. Her loose fitting bright orange top was plain as were her hands. The woman was more welcoming than the manager and gave the impression, to me at least, that she wanted to talk. Whenever she spoke she had a habit of looking towards the manager as if to ensure she was saying the right thing.' (Extract from field notes: reflections on interviews 21/5/14).

Among the elite actors interviewed through contacts at the hotel, the most significant was with the former governor of Mato Grosso and current Agriculture Minister, Blairo Maggi. This interview was arranged by the former head of Secopa, who had previously worked for the Maggi group and the two were good friends. He invited Blairo Maggi to fish at the hotel and to discuss Robson's idea for a new fly fishing business at Maggi's new 5* resort. Given this context, I had conflicting roles. Blairo Maggi does not conduct many interviews with the media and is very wary of environmental researchers. In 2005 he received the 'golden chainsaw' from Greenpeace due to the damaging impact of his agri-businesses and had an international reputation for his anti-environmental stance. Mikecz (2012) suggests constructing a barrier between an elite and the media is common with elite actors and therefore it was quite a coup to secure this interview. However, I had arranged my accommodation with Robson, and my relationship with him was key to my fieldwork. If I asked questions that were deemed inappropriate, I would have

jeopardised Robson's potential business plan, and my relationship with Robson, and possibly my research project.

In effect, as Mikecz (2012) warns, this elite interview was little more than a public relations exercise for Blairo Maggi, who did not stray from available official versions. My questions were non-probing and neutral and I collected little new data. One striking feature, however, was the way Blairo Maggi took an interest in my personal background throughout the interview, and towards the end our roles almost reversed and I became the interviewee (Harvey, 2011). The questions I asked him about conservation and the Pantanal were answered quickly and then he reversed the question and asked my opinion. Given the context, I almost certainly responded with a very watered down critique of neoliberal conservation. Although this interview did not contribute much new data it did have other consequences. Afterwards Blairo added me as friend on his personal Facebook account and asked me to stay in touch. More significantly, Robson and Blairo Maggi discussed the business plan and they now run a fly fishing business from Blairo's new resort. Later Robson bought me a bottle of wine and said that Blairo Maggi would not have been so open to the idea of creating the business if he had not enjoyed his day, which was partly because of my interview. Due to this 'symbolic' interview I had contributed to the creation of enhanced networks of elites within Mato Grosso!

While most of the key actors, accessed through gatekeepers stuck to their organisational scripts and narratives. I did make some contacts independently as a result of serendipity (Baxter and Chua, 1998) and these often proved invaluable. The following is an extract from my field notes and recounts how I met Marcelo, the mayor of Barrão de Magaço. At the time, my brother was visiting me during my second fieldwork trip and I had taken him to the town of Barrão de Magaço :

> 'Arriving on the river bank, the shops and avenue were as I remembered from last year; even the fish restaurant with the loud music was as busy as I remembered. The freshly caught fish being served to a great mixture of families, extended families, couples and friends. Then, Conor [my brother] starts laughing hysterically. 'Lauren, look at that bloke, what an idiot, he forgot to tie his boat up and its drifting down the river!'.

> Marcio, one of the 5 garcons and the most colourful character from last year was the man in the river. Still laughing, I tried explaining to Conor that I know him and maybe he'll take us out on the boat. 'Of course I can Lauren, just give me a little while and I'll come back. I need to go upstream, but I'll come back and we can catch some Crocodiles' was Marcio's response when I asked.
>
> Excitedly me and Conor sat down to lunch, discussing what we would actually do if Marcio caught a crocodile. After 2 ½ hours, it was becoming increasingly clearer that Marcio wasn't coming back. Whilst both of us are used to being stared at by now, the lack of sleep and the heat was making us more irritable. This was not helped by an old man 'who looks like he should be on the cover of a National Geographic magazine' – according to Conor, sat beside us and kept trying to talk to us. Conor, not understanding and myself, understanding very little due to his accent, tried to talk to him politely.
>
> '*Oi, oi, vem ca. Conversa com os touristas'* the old man shouted to a very white, very well dressed middle-aged man passing on the other side of the street. 'Oh no! not again' I thought silently, I just want to have a conversation with my brother. It was one of the very few times we had been alone. '*Oi, boa tarde*' said the man, 'my name is Marcelo, I am the *profeitura* (mayor) of Barrão de Magaço' (extract from field notes. 18th August 2015).

Although I met Marcelo late in my fieldwork, he became an important informant. He was able to confirm residents' accounts of the Green River Project that residents in Barranco Alto I and II gave me. He was particularly well placed to do this as he had a holiday home in Barranco Alto as well as Barrão de Magaço. In addition he provided information regarding the small-scale agricultural processing projects in Barranco Alto and Barra do Aricá, described in chapter 5.

3.4: Data analysis and Triangulation

As I began to develop my understanding of the field site, my data collection began to become more focused. As Scott Jones and Watt (2010:163) emphasise data analysis begins in the field as 'ethnographers let data emerge from the field setting'. My initial fieldwork plan primarily aimed to understand how communities involved in the Green River Project were affected by the carbon offsetting project. This changed when I understood how the Green Action Institute was created. A second fact was that I also realised that Pesquisa Florida, which was misleadingly referred to as Barra de Arica in the Institute's documents, was actually very different from the other villages affected by the Green River

Project. Whereas Barra de Arica, Barranco Alto I and II are communities of peasants and fishermen, Pesquisa Florida is a small tourist village comprising two hotels and about 40 holiday homes, all owned by prosperous outsiders. The following two life stories illustrate these differences.

Robson the hotel owner in Pesquerio Florida was was born in 1974 in Altas Garcas, a wealthy frontier town in the soy producing area in Northern Mato Groso. His mother was originally from Goiás and his father from Sao Paulo and they migrated to Altas Garcas to better themselves, although neither were farmers. Robson went to the local public school in the town, which he emphasised was of a better standard than most public schools in the country. Aged 18, he then studied business administration at the State University in Cuiabá, but left after two years because 'I wanted to stop learning how to make money and actually make money'. He began working for John Deere, farming machinery manufacturer, first as a sales rep, but quickly worked his way up to the position of sales manager in Mato Grosso. At the age of 26 Robson quit his job with enough money to purchase five plots of adjoining land in Pesquiero Florida, where he built the hotel. Over the nine years he has owned the hotel he continues to invest his profits, he expanded the hotel and built a new apartment for his family, as well as a restaurant, kitchen, land staff living quarters. His family has private medical care and use of three vehicles, including a multi-purpose vehicle. He has also used his wealth to act as a guarantor for the purchase of eight boats, six of which are now owned by fishing guides who work at the hotel.

Carlito's story in contrast, exemplifies the lives and profiles of people in Barranco Alto I and II and Barra do Aricá where he was born 56 years ago. His grandfather worked at Usina Itaici as a factory operative. His father was working at the Usina when it shut in the late 1950s and he starting fishing to make ends meet. Carlito's grandfather taught him to fish and now he makes his living as a fishing guide. He attended primary school in Santo Antônio do Leverger, as there was no school in the village then, but left after fourth grade to help his mother and younger siblings. Today he is functionally illiterate. His intentions were to always live in the community, even though his three children live with their mother in Cuiabá he hopes they will one day move back and have their children here. His house in Barra do Aricá

was built on his grandfather's land by his father and uncle, and his brother has the official land rights to the plot now, which has five houses on it, housing various members of the family. He bought a motorised boat which he purchased on credit from his employer and receives the 'bolsa de familia' and R$30 a month for each child that attends school. Carlito is seen as a successful person in the village as he also has a car. He told me that he is often teased about his work ethic as he has had full time employment for most of his working life--, whereas most people in the village are employed on short-term contracts. Today, his brothers and sisters have moved away. One sister lives in Barrão de Melgaço with her husband, whilst his brothers all live in Cuiabá, working in construction or retail. He has aunts and uncles in the village, who make living by growing vegetables on the beaches of the river Cuiabá and Aricá-mirim and selling them to restaurants; or survive on the money from the government.

Once I started to grasp the history of the Green Action Institute and these contrasts between the communities involved in the Green River Project, the wider political and social relations of elite actors in the area had a much more prominent part in the data collection. I also paid much more attention to researching the histories of the state, the villages and the Green River Project. After extending the scope of my research, simultaneous data collection and analysis meant that themes of power and relations of dominance became much more prominent. Drawing from data analysis techniques from grounded theory, my data analysis was influenced by Strauss and Corbin (1994) in that it was a process used simultaneously with data collection. Their approach to data analysis had three main steps: deconstruction which initially examines the field for concepts; construction which builds the concepts into a framework of five components: casual conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, interactional strategies and consequences; and finally confirmation which checks the hypothesis. The final stage will result in 'a story, a descriptive narrative about the central phenomenon of the study' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990:116).

An example of the early deconstruction phase of my research during the first period of fieldwork, is the way I began to filter information obtained from participant observations by grouping research

participants. In my fieldwork proposal I had categorised participants into two main categories: residents of the affected villages and key actors involved in designing and implementing the project (e.g. from Secopa, the Green Action Institute, etc.). However, once I arrived in Pesquerio Florida I had to modify these categories take into account data generated through my interactions in the hotel. Initially, I categorised the participants I saw every day into three distinct groups: workers, guests, and the hotel owners. Each of these three groups provided very different data as the following extracts highlight:

> Doctor from Cuiabá (HP2) discussing the riverine communities along the river Cuiabá. Pousada Itiacy 27th July 2015. 'These people who live here on the river, they are simple people. They do not want to read or write, they do not want cars; but more obviously they do not want to work. They are happy to do nothing, they just live off what the government gives them. I mean, it is not a lot of money, but they are happy with that.'

> Fishing guide (HP1) to me after overhearing part of an interview (S2) with a retired judge from Cuiabá who has a holiday home in Barranco Alto, August 2014. 'What he said is not true. He reckons he has lived there for 30 years, but he knows nothing about the community. He says he has friends there, but it is not a friendship if one thinks he is better than the other. He doesn't know anything, I promise.'

Categorising participants this way helped me to start building a picture of social relations and corresponding perspectives as well as identify commonalities among particular sets of actors. In particular, it allowed me to capture different class perspectives on the social world (in line with the principles of critical realism), to code and analyse the data in a systematic way, and to triangulate different perspectives with other sources.

After my first period of fieldwork, I spent several months towards the end of 2014 processing the data I had collected. This involved transcribing interviews, coding all the data, and trying to build a preliminary picture from my initial findings. It was during this phase that the neo-Gramscian framework proved particularly valuable for my data analysis. Insights from Newell and Levy—who argue that one way elites preserve their hegemonic position is by co-opting environmental governance and creating new networks that further their agenda— were crucial for helping me to make sense of the role of elites in creating the Green Action Institute and shaping the Green River carbon-offsetting project. Additionally, as ethnography goes beyond the collection of data and involves the writing, conceptualisation and

representation of the studied phenomenon (Marchetti et al., 2013), a heuristic model used by my supervisor Steffen Boehm was very useful. This model highlights the potential interactions between state, the corporate sector and civil society in the construction of hegemony. It enabled me to conceptualise the relations between different actors, get to grips with the realities that I had encountered on the ground in the project area, and link these to wider processes.

This period of data processing and analysis set me up for my second period of fieldwork from June to September 2015. During this second phase I was then able to focus on the legacies of the World Cup in Mato Grosso and the region, and carry out further interviews to address any missing data. This was important to ensure the reliability of the data and the accuracy of the representation that I present in this thesis.

Finally, due to the nature of the data collected, triangulation was a very important part during data collection and analysis, and in the writing of this thesis. My research objective was to explore the claims made by organisers of the World Cup in Mato Grosso. Their claims publicised in documents and media reports and were mainly challenged through observation and interviews. But there were often contradictions between the versions of events offered by different actors, whether in documentary sources or interviews. The following example from Chapter 7, which explores the villagers interactions with the carbon offsetting project, illustrates this. The Green Action Institute claimed that the wells supplied to the villages as an ecosystem payment were chosen by the communities in a democratic, public participation process that involved several meetings. Counter-claims made by project participants, SEMA and observations challenged this. It took a lot of work triangulating these different sources to check the validity of different claims (Jenner et al., 2004, Jones, 1987, Esposito, 2001) and the reliability of different actors, before I made an evidence-based decision that this decision had been taken without consultation.

3.5: Ethics and challenges

My ethical considerations in the field were based on the four principles identified by Diener and Crandall (1978): ensuring no harm to participants, ensuring there is informed consent, no invasion of privacy and no deception. I also considered the British Sociological Association and the University of Essex ethics codes and obtained approval before starting fieldwork.

Informed consent implies the interviewees and other participants were aware of my research agenda and have an appreciation of the facts, implications and future consequences of their participation. Consent for interviews was obtained according to the profiles of participants. Professional and elite participants gave consent in a written consent form (which I had produced before starting fieldwork). Villagers were first approached by my guide who explained my research, and if the person agreed to talk to me, I again explained my role and the purpose of my research and gave them the opportunity to decline. Initially I planned to record consent audio-visually as advocated by Benitez et al. (2002). However as highlighted in an earlier section, the use of technological devices was inappropriate.

Ensuring no deception was involved was important in my research and I had to take a pragmatic approach given the fact, that I entered the lives of most of the people I met at the hotel in my role as a worker. Tindana et al. (2006) suggest that in some contexts it can at times be inappropriate to gain informed consent from participants when they do not have a direct impact on the research. In my case it was impractical to explain to every guest my role and gain consent regardless of their position in my research. So I only gained consent of individual participants who directly contributed to my data collection. Invasion of privacy was also considered in the context of data collection in the hotel. There were obvious problems of disrupting interviews with participants whilst I had to complete tasks for my job, also the difficulty of switching between client/research participant roles.

Storing data and guaranteeing confidentiality were also important considerations. So I took care to store my data on a password protected memory stick, which I kept in a safe and on returning from fieldwork the data was stored in a locked cupboard at my University. The names of the villagers have been changed to protect them, however, the elite actors have not been changed. These actors gave permission to be named and anyone who is familiar with the area would be able to identify them in any case.

I have already discussed some of the challenges involved in my data collection. But it is important to note that the biggest challenge I faced during fieldwork was navigating my relationship with Robson. Robson was influential in whom I researched and there were several occasions when he did not approve of either the participant, or their views as the following entry from my fieldwork diary shows:

> Robson (C2) to me about fishing guides. Pousada Itaicy 4th September 2014. 'I do not know why you talk to these people. They do not know anything useful. If you need to know anything, just ask me I will help. These people will do nothing to improve your life, so why waste your time with them?'

This particular incident occurred when I was collecting information on the history of the villages. I tried to collect as many different histories and opinions as possible in order to obtain rich data. But Robson clearly felt that this was a waste of my time.

Reeves (2010) also acknowledges difficulties with gatekeepers in Organizational studies. In her study of a Probation hostel for sex offenders in the UK she found the manager had the ability to open and close access routes for participants as well as be involved with the research process. The manager was also able to enhance his power by controlling the researcher as well as the researched.

> 'As the manager also ensured contact with me on a daily basis while the fieldwork was being undertaken, his control of the transmission of information to both higher and lower strata of organisational levels of staff meant that his power was enhanced and maintained during the fieldwork period.' (Malloy, 1976:317)

There are some commonalities between her research and mine. In addition to the availability of petrol, and the interview with Blairo Maggi previously discussed, I had to continually negotiate over my dual roles. There were times, when collecting life stories that tensions would arise between my responsibility

to the participant and my duties as an employee. Life stories were particularly difficult as it often involved participants reflecting on difficult times in their life. Scholars have discussed the issues associated with the researcher finishing an interview having collected the data they need and leaving interviewees to pick themselves up again. I tried to mitigate against this as much as I could by continuing a conversation after the formalities of interviews were over (Oliveira, 2010b), although this was sometimes compromised by my other duty as a worker.

Dona Maria de Souza, a hotel guest, was one such example. Over the two periods of fieldwork I met her 16 times in total. She became interested in my research and I approached her to conduct formal life histories. She belonged to the *ruralistas* class and as a woman had a different story to those frequently documented. Unfortunately, towards the end of the my first fieldwork stay her husband died in a car accident- which immediately brought to an end our interviews and our relationship returned to that of client/hotel worker. She then approached me during the second field trip in order to finish her life story. In this circumstance, and in line with other critical management scholars who have used oral history methods I ensured Maria was able to set 'the conditions and terms on which the interview took place' (Śliwa, 2013: 196). Although the whole of her story was not all used in this thesis, she found recalling her life therapeutic after her recent and tragic loss, stating it was something she felt compelled to do. Switching between researcher and hotel worker was a particular dilemma in this case, as I had responsibility for her well-being but also had to attend other guests.

3.6: Conclusions

This chapter has described the main phases of the research that underpins this thesis. It started by discussing the reasons for selecting this case, before describing the initial stage of documentary research and the preparations I made before starting my first period of fieldwork. I then moved on to describe my data-collection methods, and how the focus of my research widened as I started to understand the relations between elite actors and local people. As is common in ethnography, data

analysis occurred simultaneously with data collection. However, I also emphasised the period between my fieldwork trip was very important for making sense of my findings. It gave me an opportunity to think more deeply about the implications of the neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance and its relevance to my case study. As a result, in my second period of fieldwork, I had a much more focused sense of the gaps in my data, and was able to ensure that I followed these up in a systematic way in order to ensure reliability and accuracy in the way I present my findings. In the final section of the chapter, I also discussed ethics and some of the ethical and practical dilemmas I faced in combining my role working in the hotel and carrying out research.

Finally, it is important to note that in the course of the chapter I have also sought to discuss how I overcame some of the challenges of doing fieldwork. These included how I negotiated the issues arising from my initial lack of fluency in Portuguese, recording and gaining consent from participants who are not literate, as well as the relationship with gatekeepers. Throughout the chapter I also referred to some of the challenges that arose from being an outsider, and a young single woman in a patriarchal society. More time in the field might have allowed me to collect further data, but this was not feasible within the time constraints of a PhD. Moreover, it is unlikely to have enabled me to gain access to key informants such as those at the Green Action Institute who refused to respond to my requests for a second interview. Nor would it have enabled me to access documents on how the contracts and infrastructure projects in Mato Groso were organised, which unavailable in the public domain. Overall the limitations have been acknowledged, turned into an advantage whenever appropriate to create a concise case study that contributes to the neo-Gramscian literature on environmental governance.

-Chapter IV -

Environmental and social benefit claims at the 2014 FIFA World Cup

International media images of Brazil usually include a tropical beach setting with beautiful and scantily dressed women dancing to Samba whilst men play football on long, white beaches. These common images of Brazil contribute to Bellos' (2003) claim that for most Brazilians, football is their religion. *Futebol está no meu sangue* (football is in my blood) is a common expression when discussing football and was documented from participants as diverse as a 64 year old retired Judge who lives in Cuiabá, to a 17 year old student in the town of Santo Antonio do Leverger. For the 2014 World Cup organisers, passionate Brazilians would be able to celebrate the global footballing event in their country for the first time since 1950. The organisers also promised fans would be able to participate knowing that they would benefit socially through infrastructure improvements, in addition to environmentally friendly practices which would lead to an ecological neutral event. Sustainability promises of social benefit and ecological neutrality were common in the planning stages, the event itself and in the reports around the legacies of the tournament. This chapter outlines these promises and how they were challenged.

The first section of this chapter explores the FIFA discourse of an environmentally neutral event with social benefits. I document how the sustainability theme was evident in official documents, the opening ceremony and the choice of mascot. Aside from discourse, FIFA and the Brazilian organising committee made claims surrounding the outcomes of what an environmentally friendly tournament with social benefits would mean. These were first published in a sustainability concept document which is discussed at the end of the section.

The second section explores the environmental claims that were made. These were all based in the ecological modernisation paradigm. I focus on carbon offsetting as it exemplifies mechanisms typical of the ecological modernisation paradigm and is one of three strategies FIFA advocate to host a sustainable tournament. I also argue, these ecological modernisation practices had to sit within the domestic policies of climate change and I chart how a conservative faction in domestic climate change politics were able to gain a controlling voice which led to the reliance of ecological modernisation practices.

The third section of the chapter focuses on the social benefit aspects of the World Cup. FIFA, through their 'Football for Hope' programme, aimed to help alleviate poverty through football, these programmes are outlined before the focus moves on to how the social benefit claims of the World Cup organisers were challenged in the June/July mobilisations of 2013. In turn, the Brazilian government tried to quash these protests through the coercive methods of the military police. This mechanism to control the population is documented through witness statements. Finally, I explore grass-roots experiences of the protests in Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro and Cuiabá during the World Cup itself.

4.1: Sustainability claims of the 2014 FIFA World Cup: Defending the environment and empowering youth in underprivileged communities

On the 12th June 2014, the FIFA World Cup began with an official opening ceremony in Sao Paulo. The opening ceremony aimed to introduce the Brazilian people and nature to the world and also welcome travelling football fans. President Dilma in her speech to the capacity crowd declared the FIFA World Cup as the 'cup of all cups' (Tzanelli, 2015). The official version of the 2014 tournament is a positive environmental legacy left by increased attention to waste and recycling, green stadiums and carbon offsetting. Further, FIFA and the Brazilian organising committee also claimed a positive social legacy was left with youth empowerment and actions against poverty. This section shows how these claims were made.

The opening ceremony of the tournment in Sao Paulo acknowledged both the people and environment of Brazil through a celebration of Brazil's biodiversity (Fig 2), 600 dancers dressed in various costumes designed to depict Brazilian wildlife (BBC, 2014). Themes of unity with each other, and the environment, were evident in the banners around the stadium reading *juntos num só ritmo* (all in one rhythm) (Arruda, 2015).

Figure 2: The opening ceremony of the FIFA World Cup, Brazil's biodiversity was celebrated (Cavalcanti, 2014)

One example of FIFA and the Brazilian government's commitment to staging a 'green' games was the selection of the mascot. Mascots were first introduced in the 1966 World Cup and are used by World Cup (and Olympic) hosts to represent the theme of the tournament and national identity (Griggs et al., 2012, Melo et al., 2014, Freeman et al., 2006, Knight et al., 2014). The mascot for Germany in 2006 was a life sized lion named 'Goleo' without an environmental theme. Weszka (2011) suggested that the lack of affiliation with Germany resulted in poor sales of toy versions of the mascot. Learning from this, the 2010 World Cup developed a mascot with strong links between the hosts and the tournament. The mascot was a football playing leopard named 'Zakumi'. According to van der Westhuizen and Swart (2011), 'ZA' represents South Africa and 'kumi' is the number ten in various languages across South Africa. The choice of mascot in Brazil highlighted Brazil's environmental importance and could be said to serve two main purposes. First, Fuleco, the name of the mascot is a combination of the Portuguese for football and ecology and therefore symbolised a connection between the two (Fig 3). Second, the selection of the animal, a three-banded armadillo was said to increase awareness of different Brazilian biomes. The three-banded armadillo is an endangered species in the Caatinga habitat in the east of the country. Although species in the more famous Amazon may have been more well known, the choice of the armadillo was said to draw attention to Brazil's diversity (Melo et al., 2014). Through the mascot the tournaments 'green' theme was continually reinforced. The mascot appeared at all matches, on official merchandise and was part of the marketing programme. It therefore contributed to the 'green' ethos of the tournament.

Figure 3: Fuleco the 2014 FIFA World Cup Mascot, the name comes from the Portuguese for 'football' and 'ecology' (Segalla, 2013)

The first official document which stated Brazil's 'green' potential was the 'Sustainability Concept' document released in 2012 by FIFA (Addiechi et al., 2012). It described how FIFA expected the Brazilian government to incorporate sustainability themes into the tournament. The graphics running throughout the document (Fig 4) can also be seen to develop green themes; trees, hills, oceans and rivers can be interpreted and visualised in the graphic, which appear in harmony with the cogs of industrialisation. This graphic works to reiterate that the environment and economic development are compatible. The 'Sustainability Concept' was part of a wider environmental and social strategy by FIFA which is officially organised through the 'Football for the Planet' programme and 'Football for Hope' respectively.

The 'Football for the Planet' programme suggests the environmental strategy of a FIFA World Cup should be organised around three main themes: monitoring and compensation for greenhouse gases emissions resulting from the activities, certified green stadiums and waste management and recycling

(Birth, 2014). The 'Football for Hope' programme suggests the World Cup can be used as a tool for sustainable development through social inclusion and practising citizenship (FIFA, 2016).

Both the Brazilian Government and FIFA claimed to have achieved this for the 2014 World Cup. In 2015 a sustainability report of the 2014 World Cup was released (FIFA, 2015). In a prologue, the then FIFA President Sepp Blatter wrote:

> 'from waste management and carbon offsetting to capacity-building and inclusivity, the implementation of our sustainability strategy has led to many achievements that we are proud of. I am convinced that our experience in Brazil leaves us well placed to further integrate sustainability considerations in our future FIFA World Cup operations'(FIFA, 2015:5).

Figure 3: The design of the FIFA World Cup which appears on all official documentation has 'green' themes (Addiechi et al., 2012)

The official version of the FIFA World Cup presented by these documents is a successful tournament with multiple benefits for both the environment and local populations. In order for this to have been achieved, FIFA's ideas had to align with the Brazilian Governments. The following extract from the 'Sustainability Concept' document (Fig 5) (Addiechi et al., 2012) illustrates how FIFA thought the Brazilian Presidential directives and FIFA's sustainability principles align.

The 13 directives that outline the Brazilian Government's policy agenda, adapted from Addiechi et al. (2012), are summarised below:

1. Expand and strengthen democracy
2. Increase economic growth
3. Implement a large-scale and long-term economic development project
4. Defend the environment and guarantee sustainable development
5. Eradicate poverty and decrease inequality
6. Improve working conditions and facilitate access to formal employment for youth
7. Guarantee access to quality education and vocational training
8. Transform Brazil into a scientific and technological power
9. Improve access to quality health care
10. Provide citizens with basic necessities such as accommodation, sanitation and transportation
11. Promote Brazilian culture and dialogue with other cultures
12. Guarantee civil security and combat organised crime
13. Defend national sovereignty through an active and proud presence of Brazil in the world

The FIFA World Cup and the FIFA World Cup Sustainability Strategy will contribute to the achievement of many of these directives. A few examples to illustrate this are listed below:

• Directive 4: The aim of FIFA and the LOC to minimise and reduce the negative impact of the FIFA World Cup on the environment is in line with the Government's efforts to defend the environment and promote sustainability.

• Directive 5: Through Football for Hope, FIFA will support programmes in Brazil that combine football and social development, thereby empowering youth in underprivileged communities in their fight against poverty and unequal access to opportunities.

• Directives 6 & 7: Through specially designed capacity-building programmes for a number of groups involved in the World Cup, FIFA and the LOC will support their pursuance of long-term employment.

• Directive 6: The Ministry of Sports and the Ministry of Labour estimate that the FIFA World Cup will generate 710,000 jobs. Of these, it is expected that 330,000 will be permanent jobs, while 380,000 will be temporary positions.

• Directive 10: The 12 Host Cities are investing considerably more in public transportation than would be the case without the FIFA World Cup. These investments will positively impact on the quality of life of citizens, thereby leaving a lasting legacy.

Figure 5: Presidential Directives and FIFA's interpretation (Addiechi et al., 2012).

As this extract shows directive four and five speak directly to the sustainability claims. The Brazilian government were keen to host a 'green' event as it provided them with the opportunity to 're-imagineer' Brazil into a safe country to invest in after the 2008 financial crisis. It would also contribute to the attempt to change dominant narratives around deforestation in Brazil, particularly of the Amazon. Finally, it would show that Brazil can develop economically in harmony with the natural environment, aligning with the ecological modernisation paradigm. I first explore how the effort to defend the

environment and promote sustainability was played out in the preparations for the World Cup. Second I explore the 'Football for Hope' programme and the contribution this made to eradicate poverty in Brazil.

4.2: Directive Four

In order to reduce the negative impact of the FIFA World Cup on the environment, FIFA claimed in their sustainability report the 2.7 million tonnes CO_2 were compensated through carbon offsetting (FIFA, 2015). Carbon offsetting is the focus of this section as I explore the political context in Brazil and why carbon offsetting was viewed as an ideal mechanism to reduce environmental impact.

To offset the calculated emissions, the corporate social responsibility arm of British Petroleum (BP), Target Neutral, were consulted. They are the non-profit branch of oil giant BP and strongly advocate the use of carbon offsetting to achieve carbon neutrality[4]. Carbon offsetting was one again used by BP Target Neutral who chose five Brazilian based projects, which were already accepted onto the CDM, which FIFA then purchased carbon credits from (Fig 7). These carbon credits would be used to offset the travel and accommodation of all staff, officials, teams, volunteers and guests. It also included pre-World Cup activities such as the Confederations Cup in 2013 and the ceremonial team draws in 2011. FIFA reported that those emissions that were not under the direct control of FIFA, such as travel and accommodation for ticket holders, production of food, beverages and merchandise and construction of new stadiums were not offset under the FIFA programme (FIFA, 2011b). As we will see in the next chapter, all stadiums wishing to offset their emissions had to do so individually.

[4] BP Target Neutral also work as consultants and purchase carbon credits through projects approved by them and other certification organisations (Murray and Dey, 2009). They also provide consultancy work for mega-events and devised the offsetting strategy for the 2012 Olympic Games which BP co-sponsored.

The carbon offsetting projects used to offset FIFA's emissions from the 2014 World Cup.

1- Energia in Amazonas was a project based in a saw mill which used Forest Stewardship Council certified timber. Saw dust and other waste products were then given to a local power plant and they claimed to supply 80,000 local residents with 56,000MWk of energy per year. This project has reportedly also been approved by Greenpeace (BPTargetNeutral, 2014).
2- A fuel switching project in Kitambar, Pernambuco was a ceramic factory and changed the fuel to power its kilns from native wood species to a mix of wood residues from nearby sustainable plantations. The company also claim to provide flu vaccinations, dental care, health insurance plans and basic food baskets to its employees.
3- The third project which offset emissions from the 2014 FIFA World Cup was another ceramic factory. In the Millennium ceramic fuel switch, locally sourced rice husk replaced logged local trees from the Cerrado. It claimed that 30,000m3 of native woodland was saved annually by this project. In addition to this, the company also claim to support a local female football team, provide guidance on registering for a formal bank account for its employees and provide injury and life insurance.
4- The Itabira and Santa Isabel ceramics project in the state of Rio de Janeiro, was another ceramic industry fuel switching project. They claim two factories previously used oil and now use wood residues from the paper and pulp industry to fuel their kilns. Similarly to other projects, they also claim to deliver educational, health and food supply services to the local community.
5- The final project is the Amazon based forestry programme Purus. The Purus project reportedly preserved 36,000 hectares of 'pristine' rainforest. In addition to this, they suggest that 18 communities living along the river benefit from carbon credits, training on sustainable agricultural techniques and environmental education (FIFA, 2014).

Figure 5: Five carbon offsetting projects used in the World Cup

However, independent organisations have begun to raise serious problems and inaccuracies in the results to some of the projects. On behalf of the World Rainforest Movement, the Centro de Memoria das Lutas e Movimentos Socias da Amazonia (2013) (Memory Centre of Struggles and Movements) conducted an investigation into the Purus project. They exposed problems relating to BP Target Neutral's claims. They suggested there are 18 families within the project boundary, not 18 communities as BP Target Neutral claimed. They further suggest that these families are subsistence farmers, not deforest agents again claimed by BP Target Neutral. As the Purus project now prevents access to the rainforest, the 18 families have had their livelihood taken from them. Another problem they highlight was the construction of a five classroom school to cater for the 18 families and a health centre, of which

the maintenance and employment of staff were under the responsibility of the local state. When the state actors were questioned they reportedly responded that they were not informed about these constructions and could not afford to maintain them.

Another environmental project that received criticism was the programme which saw the Brazilian Local Organising Committee asked Brazilian companies to donate Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), carbon offsets that companies had brought on the international carbon market. This had three purposes: a free way for FIFA to offset emissions; good public press for the donating companies; and a reduction of available CERs on the market- which was hoped to contribute to an increased demand and thus price (Darby, 2014, King, 2014, Nuttall, 2014, Secretariat, 2014). The success of the Brazilian Organising Committee in delivering a carbon neutral event through this mechanism was acknowledged by the then head of Corporate Social Responsibility at FIFA, Federico Addiechi. He suggested FIFA will continue to offset emissions in this manner and are already looking into programmes for the 2018 World Cup in Russia (FIFA.com, 2014b)[5]. Criticisms of this project were made by Darby (2014) who calculated that the voluntary donations were a token effort by all concerned parties. Officially the final result was 550,000 tonnes of donated credits, only 19% of total overall emissions of the tournament. Darby (2014) also noted that during this period the price of CERs were around €0.50/t, which makes biggest donor, Tractebel Energia's 105,000 tonne donation worth only €50,000. He concluded this was minimal compared to the company's €1.7 billion turnover in 2013.

Brazilian approaches to climate change governance

In order for these carbon offsetting programmes to be successful and to further project the green narrative, the Brazilian organising committee for the World Cup also had to sit within the domestic

[5] However, he has since left his post due to the 2015 CIA investigation.

climate change debates in Brazilian politics. Ecological modernisation is the dominant paradigm in Brazilian environmental politics and according to Ames and Keck (1997) there is history of a strong ethos of appropriation of the country's vast natural potential by human enterprise. This can be said to date back to the dictatorships of the 60s and 70s. During the Cardoso Presidency (1995-2003) some commentators suggested the state environmental agencies were largely subordinated to those institutions who could promote economic growth and attract foreign investment (Hochstetler, 2002). Scarcello (2003) suggested this had a negative effect on environmental protection as although there were many environmental agencies and regulations, they were largely toothless, lacking power and capacity. Environmentally sympathetic political elites and NGOs who did not support the ecological modernisation paradigm such as Marina Silva had little voice under Cardoso, but had a larger role in Lula's government (Kasa, 2013).

It was in the Lula government (2003-2011) Brazil won the bid to hold the 2014 FIFA World Cup. It was also throughout this period that the supposedly post-neoliberal governments of Latin America began to implement their policies. Many grass-roots movements had hoped domestic climate change policies would move to the political left with less focus on economic exploitation of natural resources. To some, what occurred was part of a new-developmentalism programme which saw the Brazilian state take a more active role in the economy including road building, dams, airports and anti-poverty programmes funded by commodity exports (Ban, 2013). The World Cup could be seen within this programme to develop infrastructure within Brazil and create competitive world cities; thereby, further entrenching neoliberal capitalism into the Brazilian economy. With the reliance on commodity exports to fund this programme, the release of a Greenpeace report in 2006 had potentially devastating impacts for the Brazilian economy. The report exposed the links between deforestation in the Amazon for soy bean production and animal feed to China and Europe which helped to produce products from international brands such as McDonalds (GreenPeace, 2006). The report suggested in 2005 1.2 million hectares of soya was planted within the legal boundaries of the Brazilian Amazon. This had major public relations

implications for the involved Trans-National Corporations and also for the Brazilian export market. As a result, the Brazilian government responded quickly in order to maintain their existing relations and all the major soya traders operating in Brazil, and with support from the Federal Government, announced a moratorium on trading soya from newly deforested lands in the Amazon, effective as of July 2006 (Kuper, 2009). This appeared to satisfy the wider media and Brazilian exports of soya are still of global importance, a political win for the Lula government. However, scholars have suggested the pressure to deforest then moved onto cattle ranchers as soya farmers bought up ranches; pushing the cattle further into the forest (Kasa 2013).

In another response to this report and with increased attention to the environment as a result of the UNFCCC process the Lula government created the Committee on Climate Change in 2007. This has had mixed success over the last 10 years. The committee also represented a response to international pressure to create working groups which developed national climate change plans. The Committee on Climate Change included 17 ministries, some state agencies and the Brazilian Forum on Climate Change- an organisation comprised of NGOs, businesses and state actors. There were two factions with opposing ideologies within the committee and as a power struggle ensued between the two it compromised the effectiveness of some climate change policies.

The first faction is the conservative faction and was aligned with natural resource extraction industry interests in Brazil. They can be characterised by their support of large infrastructure programmes and international funding. This group are wary of international involvement in climate change discussions and are particularly keen on the Amazon rainforest being managed by national interests. Members of this group include the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Ministry of Agriculture, Military sectors and the national energy company Petrobas. Also included are various individuals that form the elites of these groups (Viera, 2013). The second faction has a more global outlook on climate change and feels Brazil should be part of a global effort to tackle climate change. In theory, this group supports regions such as

the Amazon being protected by international effort. It is formed by the Ministry of the Environment, most of the scientific community, governors of some states, the ethanol lobby in the Brazilian Congress, renewable energy producers, some multinational corporations based in Brazil, local business associations, and international/domestic environmental NGOs (Vieira, 2013).

In addition to the soya moratorium and setting up the climate change committee, President Lula gave high profile roles to the environment advocates formally isolated under Cardoso. Most notably appointing Marina Silva, an environmental activist from a community of rubber tappers in Manaus, as the Environment Minister. Although her strong environmental agenda was supported by Lula, her policies clashed directly with the conservative faction on the Committee on Climate Change. This group lobbied for large infrastructure programmes and reduced restrictions on agricultural advancement which Silva staunchly opposed in her campaign. The opposition was so strong in challenging Silver's policies that she resigned in 2008 (Kasa, 2013).

The Lula Presidency strategy on climate change was influenced by international pressure through the UNFCCC and the Greenpeace report. Under President Dilma (2008-2016), the commodification of nature as a climate change mitigation policy could best summarise the domestic environmental strategy at the time. This could be symbolised by the political rise of Blairo Maggi, as we will see in the next chapter. The resignation of Marina Silva in 2008 allowed the conservative faction to become the leading voice in environmental conservation. The rise of conservative politicians acted as a re-deployment of hegemonic relations and under Dilma were able to deepen ecological modernisation in Brazil by achieving 'green' through market mechanisms. This in turn further entrenched neoliberal capitalism into the Brazilian economy as the huge infrastructure programmes were approved by the conservative elite.

One such ecological modernisation mechanism which relies on markets, REDD+, changed the political and corporate opinion of the Amazon region greatly, as now rainforests could be seen as a financial

investment. Landed elites now had the opportunity to gain financially from having forested areas intact (Kasa, 2013) and REDD+ inspired projects were developed throughout the Amazon. Experiments with other Payment for Ecosystem Service mechanisms, such as biodiversity payments, were also aided by the development of national and state policies which aimed to create a platform for Payment for Ecosystem Services projects. These policies have been developed through the Committee on Climate Change and have had consequences for its members. Blairo Maggi and his land owning colleagues have been seen to change their opinion on the Amazon, but critics could perhaps argue that this is a move to preserve him and his colleagues as the landed elite of Mato Grosso and other agricultural areas. The *ruralistas*, as a group of elites have prospered from the neoliberal economy and have some representatives in prominent positions in State and Federal government. These individuals now have the opportunity to manipulate their stance in order to preserve their power as landed elites and potentially gain financially. Through the ecological modernisation paradigm, Dilma continued the neoliberal project and cemented ecological modernisation as the dominant conservation narrative in Brazil with help from the conservative faction of the Committee on Climate Change (Igoe, 2004).

The differing policies of Lula and Dilma can be seen to reflect the political environment at the time. The Dilma government were able to further embed ecological modernisation into Brazilian environmental politics through the conservative faction of the climate change committee gaining the controlling voice. This allowed for the environmental policy of the World Cup to fit relatively easy within the domestic climate change policies. Brazil was already favourable to carbon offsetting and the projects selected by BP Neutral for the World Cup were based in Brazil. These Brazilian based projects therefore ensured Brazil was at the forefront of carbon offsetting, something no other World Cup had been able to achieve, as Germany outsourced and South Africa had numerous problems with their projects. This led to the environmental discourse of the 2014 World Cup to be relatively unchallenged at both the global and national scale. This is in stark contrast to the social programmes led by FIFA.

4.3: Directive Five

Similarly to the environmental claims in the build-up to the tournament, the World Cup in Brazil was claimed to bring positive benefits to the local population through economic and social development programmes. As discussed in the Introduction chapter, Ricardo Teixeira suggested the World Cup would bring social transformation through infrastructure programmes and social development (CNN, 2007). Social development was claimed to be achieved through 'Football for Hope', FIFA's social programme. It was developed in 2006 alongside the for-profit organisation 'Street Football World' (Levermore,2011). In 2016 they claimed 139 organisations in 58 countries which ran football-based development programmes were supported by FIFA (FIFA, 2016). The programme for the 2014 World Cup had three projects which are explained below.

The 'Football for Hope' forum was held on the 26-29th June 2013 in Belo Horizonte. The event was designed to expose best practice to as many organisations as possible through: presentations, panel discussions and workshops led representatives from: grassroots organisations, sports bodies, global corporations and development institutions. It covered the contribution football can make to social development in Brazil and abroad and had 193 registered participants from 134 organisations based in 43 different countries (FIFA, 2015:56).

A 'Football for Hope' festival was held in June 2014 in Caju, Rio de Janeiro and saw '192 young people in 32 delegations from 26 countries together in Brazil to enjoy a unique intercultural experience' (FIFA, 2015:58). Young people involved in the project organised a football tournament which was thought to exchange cultural knowledge, leading to greater cohesion in the international community.

A wider project was developed over the year 2014 to increase the 'Football for Hope' programme in Brazil. This is explained in the sustainability report document: 'between 2007 and 2013, five Brazilian NGOs executing football-based community programmes for social development were supported by

FIFA's Football for Hope initiative. With the 2014 FIFA World Cup taking place in Brazil, the geographical focus of Football for Hope was logically on Brazil, with the aim of supporting more community-based organisations in the country, thereby contributing to social development' (FIFA, 2015:61).

FIFA claimed these social development projects were enough to accomplish directive five in the 'Sustainability Concept' document and were the main social programmes held in Brazil. Perhaps working in opposition to these social programmes was the legal document produced by FIFA which stated the laws Brazil had to obey in order to hold the event. These rules can be seen to be heavily in favour of FIFA and the 'FIFA family' ensuring they maximise their profit from the event and protect their brand (Fig 8).

The legal requirements set out by FIFA for the Brazilian government (Krasnov, 2013:24)

1) Unconditional entry into and exit from Brazil for all FIFA delegates, commercial and operational partners, ticket- holding spectators.
2) Unconditional issue of work permits to foreigners and suspension of any legislation that might restrict any FIFA members from carrying out their FIFA-related activities.
3) Guarantee that import and export of goods necessary for the event will be allowed and be exempt from any taxes.
4) General exemption from taxes for FIFA and its commercial and operating partners
5) All necessary steps will be taken to guarantee the safety of the Copa and all people involved with it
6) Guarantee the uninhibited entry and exit of foreign currency along with unrestricted exchange of US Dollars, Euros and Swiss Francs for FIFA, its commercial and operational partners (Resolução do Conselho Monetário Nacional No. 3.568/2008; Decree: 42.820/1957; Law: 9.069.
7) Guarantee priority treatment in immigration, customs and check-in for members and management of FIFA, match officials and players (Estatuto do Estrangeiro Law: 6.815/1980)
8) Protection and exploitation of commercial rights related to events including registration of brands, ambush marketing, intellectual property etc (Lei Geral da Copa).
9) Guarantee that all national anthems of participating countries will be played before each of their games and flags will be raised (Law 9.615/98 – "Lei Pele")
10) Guarantee that all necessary measures will be taken to ensure compensation to FIFA resulting from the organisation and realisation of the event (Lei Geral a Copa).
11) Guarantee availability to FIFA and other users of a telecommunications network which meets FIFA's requirements and uses the most advanced technology in the field (Lei Geral de Telecomunicações – Law: 9.472/1997)

Figure 6: The legal requirements from FIFA (Krasnov, 2013)

In particular, number three, the removal of protectionist policies to allow unrestricted entry for necessary goods, in addition to the tax exemption of these products, is clearly in favour of corporate actors. The revenue of official merchandise is also exempt from tax and goes directly to FIFA, who as a NGO in Switzerland, pay minimal tax. In rural Brazil where personal bank accounts are still uncommon; the clause which allows Visa to have a monopoly on ticket sales as supporters can only buy a FIFA ticket with a Visa card, allows for entry into new markets. VISA were guaranteed new customers through this policy and was further entrenched through a social programme run by FIFA which gave local residents discount prices for tickets, in addition, VISA did not pay tax. The general rule 11, which ensures the latest telecommunications technology must be available for FIFA and the broadcasters determines that the Brazilian government must pay for the supply. This would again entail the import of services and products, therefore giving access to the market for technology companies in a tax free environment.

The contract signed between host governments and FIFA further entrenched neoliberal economic logic into the host nation economy. Contracts with Trans-National Corporations gave them competitive advantage and contract stipulations which allowed favourable trade, at the expense of revenue for the host country, can be seen to further the neoliberal agenda. The FIFA World Cup can then be seen at the global scale to be a mechanism which furthers the neoliberal hegemonic project through strategic relations between FIFA an NGO, state actors and the corporate sector. Some corporate sector actors have a strong relationship with FIFA and were able to assert their authority over state actors, creating and embedding relations in their interest.

Mobilisations against the World Cup

The social development programmes run by FIFA and these laws implemented by FIFA were largely unreported by the media in the build-up to the World Cup. However, the official version of the social

impact of the World Cup was challenged by a social movement which exposed divisions between the political elite and the general population in Brazil. In 2013 this culminated in mobilisations which occurred at the same time as the Confederation's Cup, FIFA's warm up tournament to the World Cup, which was held on the 15th- 30th June 2013. The mobilisations began as a student protest by *Movimento Passe Livro* (Free Transport Movement), who campaign for free transport for students, over a twenty centavo increase in public transport on 6th June in Sao Paulo (Saad-Filho, 2013). But it developed into the largest mobilization since 3 million public workers went on strike in 1979 (Neuhouser, 1998). The largest protest took place on June 17th 2013 when an estimated 250,000 people participated nationwide, with 100,000 alone in Rio de Janeiro. The protests included a wide range of grievances, the main themes were public spending on the World Cup, government corruption, lack of healthcare and education. In the eyes of the protestors, the World Cup brought into focus unnecessary public spending which they thought would be better spent on social schemes (Saad-Filho, 2013).

These mobilisations capitalised on the increased international media presence and Ugra (2013) argued they represented a 'huge symbolic gesture to the government' (Ugra, 2013). He argued that football, a sport synonymous with Brazilian culture had been placed 'firmly behind what eventually matters more: education, jobs, health services, security' (Ugra, 2013). For the Brazilian government, winning the right to host the World Cup would allow Brazilian elites to showcase Brazil as a united and prosperous country, ready for increasing international trade. Instead, it highlighted discontent about inadequate public services for a growing middle class and the majority impoverished poor (de Sousa, unpublished). Official reports suggest the Brazilian government spent US$15 billion to hold the tournament whilst FIFA had spent US$2 billion and earned US$4.8 billion in revenue (FIFA, 2014a). US$1.7 billion alone of this profit was from the sale of TV rights (Ozanian, 2014). It is reported that US$11.3 billion was spent in stadiums alone when in 2011 Orlando Silva, the then Sports Minister, declared that no World Cup stadiums would be built using tax payers money (Reuters, 2015).

Throughout these mobilisations the media played an integral role in the organisation and reporting of the events, social media in particular played an important role in spreading grass roots experiences. Mainstream media in Brazil is predominantly controlled by eight media outlets, sympathetic to right-wing and middle-class beliefs (Pelli, 2013). During the initial stages of the mobilisations in Brazil these outlets took an anti-protest stance. TV Globo, Brazil's state controlled media outlet first criticised the mobilizations for causing congestion during rush hour. It was only after the mobilizations in Sao Paulo on June 13th and Rio de Janiero on the 14th, where military police fired rubber bullets at protesters and journalists, did the mainstream press begin to change its position (Salbuchi, 2013). These pictures of police violence were further spread through social media as activists shared comments, photos and videos. In response, and by the middle of June, Globo had blanket coverage of the protests and 'one of Brazil's best known presenters taught mothers how to help their children manufacture tasteful placards for their next demonstration' (Saad-Filho, 2013:658).

The mobilisations were largely organised by, and consisted of, young, middle-class adults who would generally have access to social media and smart phones. According to Ling and Horst (2011) in 2010, 8.6 million Brazilians, around 23% of the population used Twitter and 9 million had Facebook accounts. Brazil also has the largest mobile phone industry in Latin America and sixth largest in the world, with 140 million mobile phone users in 2008 (Horst, 2011). Ibope a Brazilian research institute reported that during the June 2013 mobilizations, 91% of the protesters learnt of the movement through the internet, 77% of which used Facebook (Pelli, 2013). According to de Sousa (unpublished), these protests were different to historical protests in Brazil which were organised by trade unions and political organisations. The 2013 protests differed in that organisers were not political activists and organised groups, but individuals who organised through social media (Benski et al., 2013). A student from Brasilia describes his experience:

> 'In the beginning, I really remember it was more like a support to those protesters in Sao Paulo who got hurt by the Police. And then, it began to be a 'let's change this country', you know? And people began to start to create events, like on Facebook, calling everyone to

> attend to these protests. And people would actually go. It's crazy, and every time you see people on protests on the TV, the next one was bigger' (Interview SC9)

Throughout the June/July period, two slogans were used on social media in relation to the protests. *Vem pra rua* and *O gigante acordou* were both in the top 10 worldwide trends on Twitter during June and July (Pearson, 2013). *Vem pra rua* (come to the street) was used in a Fiat commercial leading up to the Confederations Cup. In the TV advertisement Brazilian football fans celebrate on the street after a World Cup victory, ironically the song lyrics translate as 'come to the street, because the street is the biggest football stand in Brazil' (YouTube, 2013). *O gigante acordou* (the giant has woken) was part of a longer running campaign starting in 2011 for Johnnie Walker. Again, it is a TV advertisement which depicts the rocks at the bottom of Sugar Loaf Mountain coming to life. This symbolises Brazil's industrial growth and national pride (YouTube, 2011). Costa (2013) has suggested the use of these slogans by protesters symbolises the Brazilian population's wider alienation from politics. Commercial slogans have replaced political slogans as young Brazilians have no political allegiance, and can only express themselves through commercialism. Other sources have a different perspective and report that both *vem pra rua* and *O gigante acordou* have been used in political movements historically. A commentator at the end of an article by Pearson (2013) suggests that *vem pra rua* was used in the 1960's as a way of calling observers to the streets as protesters passed them. It was further used by the teachers and students during their strike in the 1990's as a call for support. *O gigante acordou* is said to be a combination of two lines of the Brazilian national anthem and a source of national pride after the State reintroduced singing the national anthem in schools. Whichever is more accurate is perhaps irrelevant but undoubtedly these slogans trending on Twitter and published on Facebook walls helped to spread the message of the popular movements to a younger audience in Brazil who would have otherwise perhaps not engaged with politics. These digital channels were more efficient than traditional methods of popular political movements and also by-passed the right-wing mainstream media. It allowed for official versions of the protests to be challenged in a similar way to the 'Arab Spring' movement.

The military police are a subject of contention within Brazilian society, they are tasked with keeping civilian peace, but have historically been accused of violent crimes against poorer civilians, particularly during the dictatorship. The deployment of the military police divides Brazilian popular opinion and was once again divided during the 2013/4 protests. The coercive force of the military police is apparent in the following extract of a protestor from Brasilia:

> 'It was the first game of the Confederations Cup (15th June). I heard many other scary stories you know. On that day the '*choque*' (military police) was in the city. There is the media version of what happened, that the protesters were trying to break into the stadium, which was not true. So I wasn't there, but the thing is, there is a video of the moment the Police came, everything was calm, everyone was in their place, yelling some things. People were recording, and then at some point the fight began. Gas came flying in the air and those things falling in the crowd, people were screaming, yelling. Very, you know, I'm pretty sure they (Police) were just waiting for some order and someone said 'okay, take them out there' and that is what happened. All of a sudden there is a dictatorship again. You can't protest in front of the stadium? That is absurd. Then people spread out, to get away. There is this friend of mine, she is only 17 years old she was close to the TV tower. She told me, she was sitting on the grass talking to her friend, and she's a 17 years old girl, so, skinny and very small. They came and throwing gas, and she ran, because you know, there is a bunch of Policemen with gas, and what else are you going to do? Just run. And he ran after her, they put her on the ground. Face on the ground and took her to the car, the police car. And she told me they kept threatening her, saying she was going to die, and stuff like that. They took her to the Police department, it was more like to scare her, they didn't mean it, but it was something very bad you know. And they kept accusing her of throwing a bottle at their car. What these people do is actually bad things, I don't remember exactly if she had something. They just. They just let her go, they didn't have anything against her. That was her first experience with the Police… The Police are good for the rich people. Like this friend of mine, she's black. She has very curly hair, she's not black black, but she's more black than white... If it was a blonde girl with light eyes, I doubt very much they would have said these things to her.'(interview CS9)

The stories of police intimidation during the protests were available all over social media. On the same day as the excerpt above, June 15th, the first day of the Confederations Cup, protests also occurred in Cuiabá, although these were not as intense. An extract from an interview with Patricyia, a 22 year old law student from Cuiabá, highlights the characteristics of the protest in Cuiabá :

> 'I only went to one protest, the big one. I do not know why I didn't go to others, they were not of interest to me. I drove to the start of the protest, I never walk anywhere, it is too hot and dangerous. There was not many people and it was really hot.
> The protest started at 6 and ended at 11, I think I was home by 9pm after I had dropped my friends off. It was not like the big ones in the big cities. We walked for a little bit with the crowd, but where they were going was dangerous. Once I got home I heard some people

> had some trouble with the Police, but, this happens all the time. As far as I was aware the protest was not about the World Cup in Cuiabá' (interview SC10).

The demonstrations were less intense in Cuiabá compared to other capital cities. An excerpt from an interview with a biology teacher who lives in Cuiabá suggests one reason why the protests may not have been as intense in Cuiabá:

> 'Mato Grosso is young, when my parents arrived here there was nothing. My parents were revolutionists and part of the protests that brought down the dictatorship, so I think protesting is great. Very important. But we need to be patient here, there are not so many people in Cuiabá, 500,000 people or something, so we cannot have it all. It takes time. We have the new stadium now, so we can have things we didn't have before, concerts and things. Things are improving here so I didn't protest and I actually think the World Cup is good. Well, I don't like football so I will not be going to the games, but I like to see the tourists and the new roads, these are good, I think this is good.' (interview CS2, July 2014).

At the height of the mobilisations, the government's method of using the military police to control the mobilisations was failing. Further attempts to squash the mobilisations came from both civil society actors and the state. Famous footballing stars were used by elites of the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic movements to legitimise their ideologies. This became apparent when Pele, arguably the most famous and greatest Brazilian footballer, spoke out against the popular movement. He aligned with nationalist ideologies by suggesting the Brazilian population should 'forget all of this mayhem that's happening in Brazil, all of these protests, and let's remember that the national team is our country, our blood' (Leahy, 2013). This mix of football and politics is not unusual in Brazil, Pele has had a political career himself, and was appointed as Sports Minister in 1995 by the then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Socrates famously stood up against the military dictatorship and Romario is a career politician and currently senator of Rio de Janeiro. Current footballers also offered their opinions on the protests. Neymar Jr is reported to have said that Brazil 'has already lost off the pitch. Now we have to hope and pray we do well on it' (Phillips, 2014).

The protests in the build-up to the World Cup beamed an image of civil discontent around the world (Fig 6), not the desired imagine of a forward thinking, neoliberal country ready for international trade as the elites had been keen to depict. There was an uneasy truce between the government and the population from the Confederations Cup and the World Cup a year later. The cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo retracted their price increase in public transport and it appeared the demands of the protesters were beginning to be listened to. During the 2014 World Cup there were small protests in the major cities (Fig 9 and 10). Unfortunately for Neymar Jr, and the Brazilian population, the national team did not do well on the pitch. They lost in an embarrassing 7-1 semi-final defeat to Germany in which Neymar Jr was injured early on in the game. In the days after the matches the conversations surrounding the defeat were focused on Brazil hosting the World Cup and the themes from the mobilisations of the year before were again discussed. This was reflected in smaller, but perhaps more focused, protests, such as on Copacabana beach (Fig. 7). Although they were not on the same scale, they continued a feeling of anger towards the government which continued after the impeachment of the President.



Figure 7: Protests in Maracana underground station and station, author photo 12/7/14

Figure 8: Protest at Copacabana beach on the day of semi-final match. The banner reads 'Governors, business men and FIFA. We are not blind' author photo 8/7/14

4.4: Conclusion

This chapter aimed to explore the official version of FIFA's environmental and social claims surrounding the 2014 World Cup. FIFA aligned their strategy with the Presidential commitments of the Brazilian government and found consensus between environmental protection and poverty alleviation. These two directives were explored in turn.

The official version of the environmental aspects of the World Cup was portrayed in the opening ceremony, official documents and through the mascot. The images of a compatibility with football and ecological neutrality were beamed around the globe. These claims were relatively unchallenged due to the domestic policies on climate change. This saw the ecological modernisation become stronger as radicals lost their voice to conservative actors in the Climate Change Committee and mechanisms such

as offsetting were legitimised. Through the World Cup ecological modernisation was further entrenched as the dominant paradigm to environmental protection in Brazil.

However, the official versions of the social benefits of the World Cup were challenged through the June/July protests in 2013. Protestors challenged the FIFA rhetoric and realities on the ground. The state reacted through the coercive methods by deploying the military police. Additionally civil society actors such as footballing celebrities were used to try and quash the social movements. Social media helped to disperse the protestors images and videos of police violence and can be attributed to the spread of the mobilisations. This was further aided by social media as individual organisers used social media to raise awareness of the next protest.

Overall, this chapter aimed to illustrate the sustainability claims of the World Cup at the national level. These claims were contested at different stages by different groups, the most successful was the June/July 2013 mobilisations.

-Chapter V –

Regional elites, contracts and the social benefit legacies of the World Cup in Mato Grosso

FIFA stipulates that a minimum of eight host cities is required at a FIFA World Cup event. In order to maximise access to the potential benefits, the Brazilian Organising Committee, with the aim of showcasing cities outside the traditional tourist route, chose 12 cities as hosts. Cuiabá , as a peripheral city was one of the chosen cities set to benefit most from the extensive infrastructure modernisation programmes. This included a new stadium that would gain international environmental construction accreditation, a modernisation and extension of the existing airport and a new light railway system linking strategic areas of the city. The 're-imagineering' project would work to secure Cuiabá as the commodity export hub of the Centre-West and put Cuiabá on the tourist map.

As I will show the bid was secured by political manoeuvring and the implementation of the new infrastructure was a disaster. With Cuiabá as a host, elites in Mato Grosso were able to co-opt the sustainability discourses of the World Cup to further their own agenda. They profiteered through institutional corruption and impunity based on a political organisation of cronyism and clientalism. In order to understand how the green agenda was appropriated, it is first important to understand a little more about Mato Grosso elites. A brief history of Mato Grosso is given to show that the patterns of social relations developed during the colonisation period are still continuing today, albeit under new

frames and with different actors. Cronyism and clientalism were key features of Mato Grosso political history and are evident today in the activities of the current ruling class, the *ruralistas.* Additionally, the powerful elites are able to control civil society, one such example, of the local media is explored.

The following section of the chapter explores the 're-imagineering' projects in Mato Grosso. It shows instances of systematic corruption throughout the construction of infrastructure projects. The Pantanal Stadium is structurally unsound and not eligible for LEED accreditation. The companies responsible were never brought to account for unfinished work. Profiteering and impunity are evident in the contracts and construction of the public transport projects, including the unfinished VLT. I argue, these instances led to the re-distribution of wealth upwards, from tax payers to elites in Mato Grosso.

5.1: Elites and civil society in Mato Grosso

Mato Grosso for the past three decades has been ruled by conservative elites. This started with the election of José Fragelli in 1970 who represented the now defunct, National Democratic Union and was stopped by the election of José Pedro Gonçalves Taques in 2014 who represents the workers party.

Due to the isolation of Mato Grosso, in respect to the cities on the coast, some have argued Mato Grosso is an extreme case in studies of political and elite family history (Frank, 2001). Mato Grosso lies in central Southern America, it has the Amazon rainforest to the North and the Pantanal wetlands to the West and South. During the early colonial period access to Mato Grosso was only possible by river, a journey from Rio de Janeiro took two months, passing through Paraguay and Argentina. Such was the isolation it reportedly took three weeks of the news of Brazil being declared a republic to reach Mato Grosso (Franz, 2001). This isolation has influenced the way political and social relations in Mato Grosso are organised and controlled, where power and politics are linked through the reciprocal relations of clientalism. In the early colonial period, Mato Grosso exported frontier commodities such as Paraguayan tea, rubber and cattle products. The state developed under a dependency of the revenue of these

products, an economic strategy which continues today. Power during this early colonisation period, and running until the second military dictatorship, was held by elite families. Political dynasties formed where families held power for prolonged periods of time[6]. For example, the Corrêa de Costa family held influential positions from 1822 until 1966, throughout this period the elite maintained clientalism ties through marriage (Arruda, 2014).

During the military dictatorship (1964-1985) state and federal institutions began to have a greater influence on life in Mato Grosso. The Federal mineral programme allowed extractive industries to enter 'empty spaces' within the state and begin industrial activities. Migrants were aided by subsidies and infrastructure was built to serve them. The success of this, and demand for agriculture and timber products, lead to 'Operation Amazon' in 1967. Large areas of the Amazon and Cerrado regions were cleared for industrial uses under this policy, which was an extension of 'The Land Statute, Mining Code'. This provided tax incentives and complemented the basic infrastructure built by the state government to encourage the settlement of migrants. These state policies and laws privileged the concentration of land, and further alienated small land holders (Oliveira, 2010a). During the 1970s, modernisation of agricultural techniques, large land ownership and a favourable climate were contributing factors to Mato Grosso becoming a key global supplier for soya, cotton and coffee. These were further supported by federal and state policies of road and port construction. These policies, favouring export-led growth and production further restricted the contribution of small-holder farmers to the economy (Ban, 2013). Over time small land holders became isolated by those practices and were engulfed by larger land owners, the smallholders then became temporary wage labourers or moved to urban centres (Pignatti and Castro, 2008).

[6] 'Antônio Corrêa da Costa and their sons: Antônio, Pedro Celestino, Luís and Jonas took several positions at the state Executive and Federal Legislative. Together, Antônio (father and son) were five times as president of the province during the Empire. In the Republic, Antônio (son) was state president from 1895 to 1898. Celestino Pedro Corrêa da Costa was president from 1908 to 1911 and again from 1922 to 1924. Luis Adolfo, his cousin, was senator. The third generation of politicians consisted of Mario Corrêa da Costa, who ruled from 1926 to 1930 and from 1935 to 1937. Fernando Corrêa da Costa, son of Pedro Celestino, ruled from 1951 to 1956 and from 1961 to 1966' (Arruda, 2014:9).

The farmers and their families who arrived in Mato Grosso in the late 60s and 70s now constitute the Mato Grosso elite. The economic wealth achieved through agriculture or associated industries in the 1980s has secured their position of power today. This wealth also funded political campaigns for actors sympathetic to their ideology or members of their own group, and secured political positions of power in Mato Grosso and the Federal level. The following is the life story of Maria de Souza. She is typical of the migrant population from the 1970s and 1980s who now form part of the *ruralistas*. Her life story was collected over several interviews, as discussed in chapter three, and collated to form this piece:

> 'I came to Mato Grosso from Rio Grande de Sol in 1976; I was newly married at the time and saw the opportunity in Mato Grosso as a great adventure. My family, as I was growing up, worked in coffee, so I had a little experience in agriculture… But nothing prepared me for what there was when I arrived. There was nothing. I remember saying to my husband for the first weeks, 'I want to go back'. Everywhere was forest and trees and shrubs and mess... In some places the forest was so thick we just left it. We had to do everything from scratch, buy the machinery, bring it to the land, clear the trees. This sounds easy, but imagine trying to bring machinery to a place with no roads. What do you do? Campo Grande had nothing at that time either. After several years, a hospital, schools and shops began to appear as well as a tarmacked road linking Campo Grande to Cuiabá… That was when life became a lot easier. To this day I still have cattle, but I like to grow regional fruits for sale at local markets. My children now have children and after the death of my husband last year from a car accident, I am ready to relax a little... I get my joy from my grandchildren- Natalia, my second grandchild has just come back from California, she has been to high school in America to learn English. When I think about how far my family have come from the days when we started here in Mato Grosso, I am so proud' (interview HP4).

In terms of political power, the *ruralistas* are personified by Blairo Maggi. Maggi was born in 1956 to soy farmers in Rio Grande du Sol and he studied Agronomy at the Federal University in Parana. In 1973 he opened Seeds Maggi which would eventually become known as the Angre Maggi Group based in Itiquira, Mato Grosso (blairomaggi.com, nd). According to FORBES, the family business is now worth an estimated US$3 billion (Geromel, 2013). In Brazil, Blairo Maggi is a name synonymous with soya production and agricultural modernisation and more recently politics. He entered into the political arena in 2002 as the Governor of Mato Grosso, a position he held until 2010. Throughout his early political career Blairo Maggi staunchly opposed environmental protection, instead favouring the Mining Code policies to open 'empty spaces' to agricultural and mining production. Nonetheless, he was an

active member of the conservative faction of the Committee on Climate Change and was made Minister for the Environment in 2015. After the impeachment of President Dilma he was made the Minister for Agriculture.

Smith (1993) discussed the notion of 'jumping scales', a political strategy to challenge the structure of scale. Actors at one scale can re-establish, entrench or challenge their position through agency at a different scale (Swynedouw, 2004). Contemporary examples of how the national and regional elites have a dialectic relationship are abundant and have given the *ruralistas* in Mato Grosso a strategic advantage. Blairo Maggi is a prominent example of an individual who has influence on the national scale and regional. His role as Minister of Agriculture has undoubted benefits to his *ruralista* colleagues in Mato Grosso. Another example is Deputado Nilson Leitão who represents the PSDB party in parliament. He is a member of the Agricultural Parliamentary Front and was able to vote in the amendment of the Forest Law, which resulted in policies to aid the *ruralistas* (ruralistas, 2016). These relations have enabled the *ruralista* class to be able to create strategic relations and nodes of influence in different realms in order to maintain their social relations in Mato Grosso.

Historically, oligarchic rule based on clientalism was seen to be the basis of political power in Mato Grosso. This has developed in contemporary politics whereby the *ruralistas* have individuals who obtained significant positions of power in state politics. Some of these individuals were able to then gain positions of power at the national level. The development of the *ruralistas* was supported by Federal programmes which encouraged national export-led development logic; in Mato Grosso this resulted in the accumulation of individual wealth which excluded peasant smallholders from the benefits.

Elite control of a weak civil society in Mato Grosso has been key to the *ruralistas* maintaining their social relations. One such alliance, with local media can be seen to be a key feature of their strategy. Exploring all elite alliances with all civil society organisations falls outside the remit of this thesis, the following

example is indicative of the violent and manipulative power elites have on civil society actors. The Diario de Cuiabá and Folha de Estado are newspapers that cover the state of Mato Grosso.

Domingos Savio Brandão Lima Junior was a media entrepreneur, the Brandão group bought Radio City Cuiabá in 1992 and created the newspaper Folha de Estado in 1994. Brandão also owned a successful construction company based in Cuiabá and was a member of the elites in Mato Grosso. Brandão was particularly interested in reporting organised crime in Mato Grosso and using his newspaper to increase public pressure on state authorities. His newspaper continually reported on a hydro-electric dam which was to be built on indigenous lands in the state. This dam would have been owned by João Arcanjo Ribeiro, who was known to Brandão as an organised crime leader operating in Mato Grosso. Domingos Savio Brandão Lima Júnior was shot and killed in 2002 alongside Rivelino Jacques Brunini in Cuiabá by gunmen hired by João Arcanjo Ribeiro, business partner of Rivelino Jacques Brunini. In another scheme, the pair were planning to illegally sell slot machines in Mato Grosso . Rivelino Jacques Brunini was thought to have given information to Domingos Savio Brandão Lima Júnior which allowed him to publish articles on the activities of João Arcanjo Ribeiro. The apparent continued targeting of João Arcanjo Ribeiro led him to threaten both men and eventually hire Celio Alves, a former corporal in the military police, to organise the murders. This event led to the collapse of the newspaper as the readership and circulation reduced to under 500 copies in Mato Grosso (Martins, 2013). The fortunes of Folha de Estado were further weakened when on the 8th June 2016 the newspaper was printed for the final time. The newspaper now only runs digitally through their website, the owner and widow, Isabela Brandão blamed increased printing costs of the failure, although Martins (2013) suggested readers felt they could not trust the newspaper.

The Diario de Cuiabá is another newspaper which covers Mato Grosso. In 2003 the newspaper was experiencing reduced readership and was bankrupt, Gustavo Capilé de Oliveira took over as editor in chief. Gustavo Capilé de Oliveira comes from a family of regional elites and was able to exploit his position and relationships to further the newspaper. His grandfather João Augusto Capilé Junior was born in 1916 and originally from Rio Brilhante in Mato Grosso do Sul and was an important political

figure in dividing Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul; he also founded the city of Itaporã and after he moved to Mato Grosso in 1961 he created two municipalities in the Cáceres region of the state. He also had business interests and was the CEO of Telemat, a Cuiabá based telephone company, through this company he introduced direct dialling to the state. He also created the Bank of the State of Mato Grosso and was known for his ability to play the guitar (Arruda, 2015).

Gustavo Capilé de Oliveira was the son of João's eldest daughter and grew up on a small farm outside Cuiabá , through these family ties he found allies in the politicians of Mato Grosso who financially supported the newspaper in return for complementary coverage. For example, Gustavo Capilé de Oliveira backed Blairo Maggi to be Governor of Mato Grosso in Blairo's first venture into politics and supported him throughout his two terms. These relationships were exposed by a telephone interception from the Federal Police between Gustavo Capilé and businessman Fernando Mendonça, who was funding the campaign of Pedro Taques to become State Governor in 2016 (Cavalcanti, 2014). The legal proceedings are still currently being organised by the state prosecutors, although it appears there is a long history of financial help from state and corporate actors.

Some actors in civil society are controlled by powerful elites. The examples of the local media show how opposition has been violently removed or coercively controlled through financial reliance. These established methods are used by the elite used to maintain dominant relations in Mato Grosso. These methods were exploited by elites during the World Cup and eventually led them to profiteer through redistribution of wealth upwards. Some of these are documented in the following section and illustrate how the World Cup in Mato Grosso contributed to the maintenance of elite dominance.

5.2: Securing Cuiabá as host to the World Cup

Cuiabá faced considerable competition in securing the right to host the World Cup. Altogether 18 cities bid to be hosts: Belo Horizonte, Florianopolis, Campo Grande, Goiania, Rio Branco, Belem, Maceio,

Brasilia, Cuiabá , Curitiba, Fortaleza, Manaus, Natal, Porto Alegre, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Sao Paulo. FIFA released a bid inspection report on 20th October 2007 (FIFA, 2007) which evaluated current infrastructure and amenities in the country and stipulated that Campo Grande, Cuiabá , Florianopolis, Maceio, Natal and Rio Branco did not have sufficient infrastructure to become host cities. Nevertheless after a confidential process between Secopa and FIFA, the host cities were announced on the 31st May 2009 during FIFA's annual congress in Nassau, Bahamas.



Figure 9: Brazilian states. Mato Grosso do Sul was seen as too close to Sao Paulo to be a World Cup host. Source: (Brazil-help.com, 2012)

Cuiabá is the capital of Mato grosso and it is the power base of the *ruralisats.* It was selected as a host city and although a relatively small capital city with a population of 500,000, it is of central importance to the agricultural sector of mid-West Brazil. My personal experiences with tourists and residents in Rio de Janeiro, when learning of my residence in Mato Grosso, were always derogatory. One football fan from Argentina said that Mato Grosso was cowboy country and no one cared about football, he also thought the people there were backward. Arguably, Cuiabá's main rival was Campo Grande, the state

capital of Mato Grosso do Sul which has a population of over a million. On the Pantanal tourist route, Cuiabá is the gateway to the Northern Pantanal, whilst Campo Grande is seen as the entrance to the Southern Pantanal. With Mato Grosso du Sol's close proximity to Sao Paulo (Fig 12), established transport infrastructure to the coastal cities and professional top flight football team and Campo Grande was perhaps a more likely candidate for a World Cup host city. Despite the feasibility report, Cuiabá was chosen as the host city, mainly due to political manoeuvring. In 2009 Blairo Maggi was the Governor of Mato Grosso, and also a large fundraiser for President Dilma's Workers Party (PT), commentators accused him of playing political games and have questioned the legitimacy of the bidding process (WIlson, 2014, Savarese, 2013). An interview with Blairo Maggi from Luiz Acosta Da Redação, on behalf of MidiaNews, reveals how he secured host city status through personal networks. Clientalism is exemplified in the following excerpt:

> **Maggi-**In 2007 I went to Zurich, Switzerland, [as part of Brazil's bid to host the World Cup], after Brazil was chosen as the World Cup host country for 2014, we held a meeting between the 10 or 11 governors who were there. After we had another meeting with the president, the president of the CBF, Ricardo Teixeira, and FIFA president Joseph Blatter and told them we wanted the World Cup to show a little more than people are used to seeing, not just Rio-São Paulo-Minas Gerais, carnaval and football. **MidiaNews** - and that was the decision to decentralize the biggest event in world football? **Maggi** - Yes. We said we should use football to show that we have the Amazon, the Pantanal, the Northeast, which has good cities and who want to show their potential. This was the winning thesis of the time and, therefore, FIFA chose 12 cities and established that the North, the Midwest and the Northeast, South and Southeast would be represented in this Cup. Well this was the decision and practically it was decided that one of the venues of the World Cup would be in Cuiabá or Campo Grande so we could show the Pantanal. I called Yuri [Bastos Jorge] at the Department of Tourism, and Yuri began working professionally around this project. We knew Cuiabá was a weaker city and we had little chance to convince the Brazilian Organising Committee to select Cuiabá . Anyway, we knew there was someone who could positively influence the decision makers and we planned to go back. **MidiaNews** - it was then that entered the figure of Agripino Bonilha Filho, the connection he has with former FIFA president Joao Havelange? **Maggi** - Exactly. For those who still do not know, Bonilha, lived in Cuiabá for many years and has provided numerous services to the state and Cuiabá, and is a childhood friend of João Havelange, who in turn is the father-in-law of the president of the CBF (Brazilian Football Federation), Ricardo Teixeira. So we went there personally, I, Yuri and Bonilha, to talk to Ricardo Teixeira and asked for his support for this endeavour. This is just one example. We did this with several people who had some kind of relationship or knew someone connected to the CBF and FIFA. We were doing a siege, a political job very well done, well-articulated and which culminated in Cuiabá chosen as one of the venues of the World Cup in 2014. Mato Grosso do Sul only woke up to the situation on the day that the FIFA announced the cities.

it was not only the politics of the decision making which was the subject of criticism. One blogger for a Russian travel site wrote 'there is virtually nothing to see in Cuiabá. Today, the city is one big construction site' (Krasnov, 2013). The public spending needed to build the infrastructure led a doctor from Cuiabá to suggest:

> 'It is sad because Cuiabá will gain immensely from the World Cup, however, this is at the detriment of the surrounding rural communities. The money for the communities has been taken from them and given to the city, or worse, given to the greedy companies' (interview HP2).

Blogger and journalist Mauricio Savarese said:

> 'Of course people worry about stadia, but the stadium is going to be there anyway. But if you think about the surroundings and how the structure was prepared Cuiabá is by far the least prepared out of all of them' (interview CS8).

However, the stadium was not seen as a bad thing by all:

> 'it is better to have the stadium than not have it. At least we now have the potential for big games and concerts here, before we had no chance. We would never have anything here, but now, maybe, we could have more events in Cuiabá ' (interview C4).

The host bid package was prepared by Mato Grosso based architectural firm Castro Mello who were also contracted by the Mato Grosso government to produce architectural drawings for the new stadium. The three main infrastructure projects which formed part of the bid package was characterised by impunity from the start and will now be explored. The bid package is not publically available; the data gathered in this section is from secondary media outlets and interviews with local residents.

5.3: The Pantanal Stadium

The story of the construction of the Pantanal Stadium shows systematic corruption to Cuiabá based organisations. It first began with the drawings of the stadium and continued into paying construction workers, delivery of the seats and the accreditation of the stadium as environmentally friendly.

The architectural drawings of the stadium by Castro Mello were never produced and pressure from civil society including a local newspaper for the company to repay the state government R$500,000 (£117,361) developed. Castro Mello is reported to have released a statement reporting the money had been spent, and they could not return it even if they wanted to (Bess, 2013). Despite this, the state government did not pursue them and the Pantanal Stadium was eventually designed by GCP architects based in Sao Paulo who specialise in urban design. It was built by Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior, a Cuiabá based Construction Company. This was not the end of contractual problems.

The Pantanal Stadium was built on the same site as the replaced Estádio José Fragelli stadium, which had neither the facilities nor capacity to meet FIFA regulations. Construction started in 2010 by Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior Architects who won the bid to construct the stadium for R$342million (£80,274,961). The project was funded entirely through public funds: R$330 million (£77,458,296) by the Brazilian National Development Bank and R$12 million (£2,816,665) from the State Government. In November 2010 the construction of the stadium was temporarily suspended after Mato Grosso state auditors prevented funding from the state Government. They found irregularities in the project timetable and assessment of the foundations (Tavares, 2011). Construction recommenced in 2012 but was beset with problems. One worker, 32 year old Muhammad 'Ali Maciel Afonso, died after he was electrocuted and fell from the upper tier. There was also a fire in the outer casing of the stadium which threatened the success of a safety inspection by FIFA. Nonetheless, the stadium was cleared to be used in the FIFA World Cup.

In line with global, FIFA and national environmental norms, the stadium was built to Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard. Gaining LEED accreditation was also part of the contract with the Brazilian National Development Bank which stipulated the State government would have to pay an annual fine of 1% of the total R$330 million (£77,458,296) if the LEED accreditation was not achieved (Globo, 2016a). LEED is an internationally recognised certificate for 'green' construction (Botta et al., 2011). These standards are based on technology and innovation and operate within the

ecological modernisation paradigm. The key elements included using materials from the previous stadium for the foundations, using recycled rainwater throughout the stadium and solar panel photovoltaics.

The seats at the Pantanal Stadium are another example of how the World Cup provided another opportunity for local elites to benefit financially from contracts. The contract to supply the seats was won in July 2013 by a Cuiabá based company, Kango. They were to supply 44,500 seats at a cost of R$19.4 million (£4,553,608) or R$436.50 (£102.46) each. An investigation by the civil prosecution service, advised Secopa to cancel the contract as they found Kango supplied the National Stadium in Brasilia at R$175 (£39.14) each. The contract with the Mato Grosso government meant they had to pay an extra R$700,000 (£164,305) for their seats. As a result of this investigation Kango lost the contract to another company, Desk, who quoted the state government R$150 (£35.21) per seat. On the 20th October 2013, Desk officially expressed interest in supplying the Pantanal Stadium seats. But due to irregularities related to another contract in Sao Paulo, the company were not permitted to hold a contract with a government based enterprise for five years. At this point, the original company, Kango, had their contract reinstated after they offered their original contract at a 6% discount. A new contract was then drawn between Secopa and Kango which stated the seats would be installed by 2015. If Secopa wanted the seats delivered before this date they would have to pay a premium (Segalla, 2013).

By the end of May 2014, the Pantanal Stadium was open to the public for the first time and held its first, and only, test match between Cuiabá based Mixto and Santos from Sao Paulo state. But, on match day only 20,000 tickets were available due to a failure in the delivery of seats. During the match, several of the installed seats became loose and broke off. The car park was also unfinished and spectators arriving by car had to park over 2km away, without a bus service transporting them to the arena (Birth, 2014). Despite these initial problems, the stadium was ready in time for the World Cup and was decorated with plants and posters for the four matches at the Pantanal Stadium.

During the duration of the World Cup the only reported problem was the leaking roof in the VIP section due to unfinished tiling (Fig. 14). On September 1st 2014, the Pantanal Stadium played host to Sao Paulo based team, Corinthians. The Pantanal Stadium was at full capacity for this match, with over 44,000 live spectators, more than ever achieved in the four World Cup matches.

Figure 10: VIP area at the Arena Pantanal during the World Cup. Unfinished roof led to leaking during match days, author photo 16/6/14

In addition to under use, problems with the construction have continued in the two years since the World Cup. The stadium was closed in January 2015 due to flooding caused by wet season rain. By October 2015 access to one upper tier stand was prohibited due to safety fears resulting from the 2014 fire and by 2016 the official capacity of the stadium was reduced to 10,000 (Pablo, 2016). On the 15th July 2016 the Mato Grosso government blocked R$28 million (£6,572,219) to the construction company Santa Barbara and Mendes Junior after they had not completed the agreed works and the stadium could

not be accredited the LEED certification (Pablo, 2016). The condition of the plants surrounding the pitch are symbolic of the environmental considerations for the stadium. They were full, green and healthy when the cameras were on during the World Cup, but brown and wilting just one year after (Fig 15).

Figure 11: Planted trees in the corners of the stadium. This was part of the theme of sustainability in the stadium, author photo 16/6/14 and 7/9/15

After the World Cup there was a fear that the stadium would become a 'white elephant' a term used to describe sporting stadiums that have little use after the event (Downie, 2010) and would become a burden on the state tax payer. The monthly cost to the state government for maintaining the stadium is reported at R$500,000 (£117,361), although this has increased as the state government paid for minor repairs (Pablo, 2016). The manager of the stadium described how 'one year after the World Cup it is difficult to fill the stadium. We have been half full three times this year' (interview C9). After the initial full stadium it appears that usage of the Pantanal Stadium has decreased.

In Salvador and Recife civil society pressure forced a FIFA law to change but the elites in Mato Grosso did nothing to help small-scale local traders. A FIFA commitment introduced at the state level gave FIFA control over the movement of people and goods within a 2km radius of each host venue. This particular commitment inspired a grass-roots movement led by local, and eventually, national media. One ramification of the commitment was only FIFA endorsed products could be sold within this zone.

Independent street vendors and local traders who usually trade within the zone would be prohibited from trading, during the tournament, resulting in the local economy losing custom to global brands (Fairclough, 2003, v-brazil.com, 2012). The movement gained significantly as the local organising committees in Salvador and Recife to allowed selected local vendors within the stadium. International football spectators in these cities were able to purchase the local dishes of Acarajé in Salvador and Tapioca in Recife (Sandy, 2014). Elites in Mato Grosso did not lobby for this change and no local vendors were available in Cuiabá .

Another commitment which changed some state laws, including Mato Grosso, was the sale of alcohol within the stadium. Alcohol within sporting arenas is banned in some states but this was relaxed to allow Budweiser and Brahma beer to be sold (Lopes and Verloni, 2012). It is important to note, that under these amendments the Federal Government would have been held accountable and assume civil liability over any safety related incident or accident at the tournament resulting from alcohol (Amaral and Viana, 2013). This commitment has many implications. FIFA have forced the Brazilian government to change laws which are designed to protect the Brazilian population. Yet, in the event that a change in these laws would cause an accident or incident, FIFA would not take responsibility. FIFA and their corporate partners colluded in their relations of dominance to lobby the Brazilian government. These relationships were able to ensure elite actors found preferable circumstances in which to conduct their business.

It was also claimed that the construction of the Pantanal Stadium would bring additional trading and recreational opportunities for the local community after the World Cup. Therefore delivering further social benefits. In the months following the World Cup small businesses had begun to operate within the Pantanal Stadium grounds. At dusk, residents could be seen to walk, skateboard and cycle around the stadium; businesses renting bikes and stakes as well as those selling refreshments had been created. However, the concrete surface surrounding the stadium had developed several dangerous sections

where it had disintegrated (Fig 16). This example illustrates that the Pantanal Stadium cannot be seen as a social benefit for the community.



Figure 12: The Arena Pantanal in 2016, businesses rent out skateboards, bikes and roller skates but the surface is beginning to disintegrate, author photo 17/9/15

The Pantanal Stadium was only one element of the programme to improve the infrastructure in Cuiabá.

5.4: Transport infrastructure

In direct correlation to Directive 12 from the 'Sustainability Concept' document, the World Cup in Cuiabá aimed to speed up planned infrastructure works. The cities of Cuiabá and Verzae Grande are

separated by the river Cuiabá and the Marechal Rondon airport which is located in Verzae Grande was refurbished at a cost of R$88 million (£20,660,000). The runway was lengthened to allow larger planes to land, the passenger terminal was upgraded, and access routes and parking were expanded to meet the expected increase in demand. Works started on the refurbishment in 2012 and were due to be complete in early 2014 (Tavares, 2011). However, by May 2014 the works were still not finished a baggage handler working at the airport described 'chaos':

> 'Nothing is going to be ready, there is building work everywhere, it is a mess, no one knows what is going on. Some days there are people everywhere, other days there is no one.' (interview HP3).

When I visited the airport during the world cup, there was a beautiful marble atrium. However, behind the posters of Jaguars and flooded plains, was the noisy and dusty construction works .By the time the World Cup was held in June 2014, the airport was not fully functioning and metal barriers with posters of the Pantanal and Cuiabá were erected to hide the construction site from tourists. The then Governor of Mato Grosso, Silval Barbosa, visited the airport in June 2014 and described his frustration at the airport not being ready for incoming tourists (Milliken, 2014).

Another feature of the Cuiabá bid package that failed to meet its claims was the light railway system (VLT). Blairo Maggi's state government discussed installing the VLT in the city, but instead he eventually decided it was too expensive planned an express bus route linking the airport, city centre and stadium and an extension of the main artery road, Mario Andrezza, at a cost of R$488.8million (£114,732,167) (interview S1). The funds for this project were secured in 2011 and were to be financed by the Federal Government in an agreement which saw the State government pay R$34.1 million (£8,004,023) for the design process. However, disregarding the money already spent on researching options, the change of the Mato Grosso State government in 2011 changed these plans. Members of the newly elected government visited Porto, Portugal, in May 2011, which has a VLT system and they decided to return to

the initial VLT plans. It was thought the VLT would promote Cuiabá as a modern city, similarly to the train in Johannesburg for the 2010 World Cup (Farinha, 2011).

By the start of the World Cup in June 2014 however, the VLT system was not in place. The VLT station at the airport had undergone a 'make-over' to make it more attractive for arriving tourists. But with no track or trains, the station became a standing joke among local people and various news outlets, including the local TV news and Reuters UK, who produced features revealing the issue. The widened roads, ready for the VLT installation were also unfinished and large stretches of road with high fencing were still in place throughout the tournament (Fig. 7).

Figure 13: The VLT railway in Cuiabá, an unfinished infrastructure programme associated with the World Cup, author photo 20/6/14 and 21/8/15

Work stopped on the VLT in December 2014 around the same time as elections for the new mayor of Cuiabá. All the candidates expressed their disapproval of the VLT system and stated that they were reluctant to invest more money into the project. The elected governor Mauro Mendes Ferreira, has since stood by this stance. By the summer of 2015 it seemed that work had almost permanently stopped on the VLT. In some places track had been laid, but the vast majority of land was derelict.

The VLT project came under review in June 2016 when the state government were able to secure a further R$200 million (£46,944,421) from the Brazilian bank Caixa to finish the works. The work was initially set to cost R$1.477 billion (£346,684,555), and had already cost R$1.06 billion. A company contracted by the state government to assess the cost of finishing the project suggested R$602 million (£141,302,709) would be needed. In contrast the consortium, responsible for the construction of the train line requested R$1.3 billion (£305,138,742) (Globo, 2016b). A college teacher from Verzae Grande who works in Cuiabá described the impact of these delays for residents in the following terms:

> 'what has happened is not good for the environment. There are many road closures and diversions, and these are not environmentally friendly. Whilst the works are going on, they have not made diversions which work well, traffic is terrible, increasing pollution and more cars on the road increasing heat. The drainage of the roads is also terrible, roads get blocked because too much rain is on the roads. What the international community see and hear about is good, however, what we as locals see and experience is not good. They do not care about us, what we have to do, what we have to see every day. They only care about the international community' (interview CS2).

The World Cup presented numerous opportunities for Cuiabá based companies to profit from contracts. These works were often unfinished or poorly executed and resulted in tax payers losing the social benefits promised to them.

5.5: Conclusion

This chapter illustrated how elites appropriated the social benefits of the World Cup in Mato Grosso. Major roads, the airport and VLT were all unfinished when the World Cup commenced. Those responsible were not held accountable and were able to profiteer from the large contracts available. In September 2016 the only actor bought to account for these actions has been the then Governor, Silval Barbosa. It may be other actors will be prosecuted at a later date, or that Silval Barbosa is used as a scapegoat. Silval Barbosa signed off different companies responsible for the unfinished projects and released funds to them. He was at the centre of a corruption investigation in June 2014 where he was initially arrested but released on bail. He was arrested again in September 2015 and put in prison where

he is to date along with some of his business partners. He was arrested as part of the police investigation 'Sodom' which sought to uncover the claims by a whistle-blower which saw three government departments- finance, civil house and trade and industry involved in a programme to defraud the state government by falsely claiming federal grants. The kickbacks and funds were then split between Silval Barbosa and his allies. Other claims under investigation involve contracts won for the World Cup and the laundering of 'bolsa de familia' funds. Barbosa is said to have endorsed 34 contracts as Governor of Mato Grosso whilst Secopa functioned, including RS1.4 billion (£328,610,953) for the VLT, of which, R$500 million (£117,361,054) was said to be distributed to his PSDB party and its members (Dioz, 2016a).

This network of elite actors operating in Mato Grosso had developed over a long period of time and is entrenched in Mato Grosso politics and economics. The World Cup provided an opportunity to further entrench these relations. The result was profiteering and impunity for the elites whilst the population were left with unfinished infrastructure projects and debts.

Through historical analysis this was seen to be manifested through a political history of clientalism and cronyism in the state. Federal programmes to advance commodity export led to the accumulation of individual wealth by the *ruralistas.* They secured their dominance through strategic alliances, one such example of the local media was then explored. Those in the local media who were in opposition to the elites were stopped. In the case of the editor of one newspaper, he was killed. The other newspaper had to be financialy supported by elite investments to remain viable. In order to ensure the longevity of these investments the newspaper had to be supportive of the elites in their coverage. The agency of these elites also enabled Cuiabá to initially host the World Cup as documented in the interview with Blairo Maggi. He described how his political manoeuvring and personal connections helped to secure Cuiabá as a host city.

The construction of the Pantanal Stadium, VLT and airport are key examples of how undelivered promises were made and companies were not brought to account. The state has started to challenge these contracts and the former Governor has been incarcerated for his involvement with illegal contracts and kickbacks.

Overall, this chapter demonstrated how powerful elite agency and alliances were central to the appropriation of the sustainability discourse of the World Cup in Mato Grosso.

-Chapter VI -

The Green Action Institute and carbon offsetting

In contrast to the claims that the World Cup would bring social benefits to the people of Mato Grosso, the previous chapter showed how elites were able to profiteer with impunity. This chapter focuses on the carbon offsetting aspect of the Pantanal Stadium and how it was implemented. It shows how local corporate and agricultural elites were able to take advantage of a Federal programme to give progressive NGOs more voice, and create an NGO which claimed to offset the Pantanal Stadium.

A network of elite alliances appears to have controlled this project from the beginning, ensuring financial benefit for themselves and failing to deliver social or environmental benefit. The NGO was created to contribute to the deflection of international commentators claims over poor environmental practices in the state. The result was an NGO which works for elite interest, rather than environmental and social benefit.

In order to unpack the nuances of this organisation the first section if this chapter outlines the history and organisational structure of the Green Action Institute and the Green River Project. I look in further detail at the selection of location for the project. It is argued that the project was not necessary in the villages and was used to divert action from the landed elites in the north of the state to where land is less economically valuable in the Pantanal region. The Green Action Institute also made public participation claims which is challenged by resident accounts and documents which suggest the project was imposed on local people through coercion.

The following section focuses on the carbon offsetting aspect of the project and uncovers how the methodology was changed to reduce the amount of trees needed to planted from 1.4 million to 70,000. The certification of these offsets is then questioned as cronyism is exposed between the organisation certifying the offsets and the Green Action Institute. The final section of this chapter then explores the future plans of the Green Action Institute and the Green River Project.

6.1: The Green Action Institute and Green River Project

The Green Action Institute describes itself as 'combining the pillars [of] education and action' with an aim to promote 'the recovery and preservation of degraded areas on the banks of Mato Grosso rivers, contributing to the strengthening of environmental education process and its consolidation as a state policy' (PNBSAE/MT, 2012, Verde, 2014).

The Green Action Institute is an environmental NGO based in Cuiabá , it was founded in 2007 as an OSCIP, the policy created by Lula to deepen democracy. As I discussed in chapter two the OSCIP mechanism was used to deepen civil society participation and therefore democracy in Brazil. There was a need for environmental NGOs in the region as policies such as the 'Mining Code' were linked to deforestation, a particularly important issue in the years preceding 2007 as Mato Grosso experienced the highest deforestation rates of all Brazilian Amazonian states (Ioris, 2013, Fearnside and Barbosa, 2003, Fearnside et al., 2009, Morton et al., 2006). In 2005 Blairo Maggi received Greenpeace's 'Golden Chainsaw' in recognition of the damaging impacts of his company's actions on deforestation and his subsequent activities as Governor of Mato Grosso. This apparently had led him to change his ways. He was reported to have said 'Mato Grosso was the State with the largest deforestation rate of the country when I came into power… therefore the governor of this state received the prize Golden Chainsaw Award. Such a symbolism made me realize I should focus on showing that we would do things differently' (Geromel, 2013). For Blairo Maggi and President Dilma, 'showing we could do things

differently' was encouraged by the development of market mechanisms to conserve the environment through the UNFCCC process, and the increased international attention on the Amazon region as globally important in the fight against climate change.

The director of the Green Action Institute Paul Borges is reported as saying in 2008, 'since NGO's are coming here to talk about what we are doing wrong, we will create an NGO to show what we are doing well' (Galvão and El-Jaick, 2010). The Green Action Institute was developed by the following actors: the Association of Soy Producers of Mato Grosso, the Breeders Association of Mato Grosso, the Union of Sugar and Alcohol Industries of Mato Grosso, the Center of Producers and Exporters of Wood and the Union of Construction, Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electricity and Gas in the State of Mato Grosso. These groups were all prominent industrial groups which had contributed to the deforestation and environmental damage of the state

The influence the founding organisations have over the NGO can be seen through the organisational structure. The CEO of the OSCIP is Carlos Avalone Junior, he ran for deputy Governor of Mato Grosso in the 2014 elections. This bid failed and he now is the President of the PSBD party in Mato Grosso. Mauro Mendes Ferreira a director of the Green Action Institute has a number of other roles. He is former director of the Association of Industry in Mato Grosso, currently the Mayor of Cuiabá and additionally, owner of a Cuiabá based steel company, BiMetal.. The second Vice President of the Green Action Institute is the financial director of the *Centro das Industrias Produtoras e Exportadores de Madeira do Estado de Mato Grosso* (Center for Producing and Exporting Industry of Timber in Mato Grosso). These directors with little or no experience of conservation, forestry or education are now controlling an organisation and projects that have a formal remit to do just that. The hierarchy of the organisation is then based on industrial, not conservation, elites. All of these actors also have prominent positions within the founding organisations. The only trained environmental technicians in the NGO are at the project level. The Green Action Institute currently employs one project manager and three technicians,

they are all environmental engineers and received degrees from the Mato Grosso State University in Cuiabá. Moreover, the strategic decisions from the Green Action Institute can then be said to be heavily influenced and driven by the founding members, rather than those working at the project level.

The organisation of the Green Action Institute is questionable in itself. This is further deepened when one looks into how the carbon offsets the Green Action Institute are verified. As part of international guidelines on carbon offsetting, in order for carbon credits to be verified they need to be assessed by an independent body. In the case of the Green Action Institute it appears the verification happened within the organisation by a platform managed by the Green Action Institute. In July, 2010, the Mato Grosso Unit of Environmental and Ecosystem Goods and Services (UBSAE/MT) was created by the Federation of Industries of the State of Mato Grosso and the Federation of Agriculture and Livestock of Mato Grosso, the same industrial organisations who created the Green Action Institute. The aim of UBSAE/MT is to 'promote issues regarding payment for ecosystem services (PES), and positioning the industry, agriculture, farming and forestry sectors with the state regarding the theme' (PNBSAE/MT, 2012).

The UBSAE/MT subsequently saw the need to install a platform in Mato Grosso which would allow for the trading of ecosystem services credits and certification of these credits. The Business Platform in Environmental Goods and Services and Ecosystem Mato Grosso (PNBSAE) was then established to fulfil this role. In effect, PNBSAE is the operational branch of the UBSAE. Their aim is 'to promote the balance between the environment, social welfare and primary productive activity in Mato Grosso, acting in fostering, implementation and certification' (PNBSAE, 2012:1). The long-term goal of this organisation is to incorporate water and biodiversity credits into the already existing carbon offsetting programme. According to them:

> It is expected that the green infrastructure of the Green River Project will provide for a more resilient and adapted ecosystem, able to face climate change and the threats posed by a loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services (PNBSAE/MT, 2012).

Although it appears to be a separate organisation, it is actually run by the Green Action Institute. At the time the PNBSAE needed to be housed and run by an organisation, the Green Action Institute took up this role and were then responsible for the development, implementation, verification, certification and monitoring of the carbon credits (PNBSAE/MT, 2012, PNBSAE/MT, 2008). The Federation of Industries of the State of Mato Grosso and the Federation of Agriculture and Livestock of Mato Grosso have used legitimate state and federal policies to create an environmental NGO. This NGO then produced carbon credits which an organisation developed by them verified which was then bought by the organisations.

The ability of the corporate sector actors to legitimately establish, own and control civil society actors was influential in the Green River Project becoming a reality. How this project was implemented was also influenced by these actors as we shall now see.

Project history and selection of the site

The Green River Project became the Green Action Institute's flagship project and offset the emissions from the Pantanal Stadium. However, this project was not created by them. It was developed in 2006 as a conservation programme organised by the state ministry for the environment (SEMA). A SEMA representative explains the initial period of the project:

> 'This project really began a long time ago. There was a study by the Federal State University of Mato Grosso in Cuiabá which found that about 70% of sediment in the River Cuiabá finished in the Pantanal. Because of this the Pantanal is getting clogged up with sediment. Although this is a natural process, they argued that this process is occurring increasingly rapidly by the cutting of trees and use of land up to the river banks. Because there are no trees of the river banks, there are no trees to catch the sediment as it moves past, so it all goes straight into the Pantanal' (interview S8)

SEMA began working on the Green River Project in 2006 to evaluate the compliance with land owners along the banks of the River Cuiabá to the 1996 Federal Environmental Law. This law states it is illegal to build within a boundary of the river margins[7]. It states all rivers are to be protected by a forested river

[7] The law is an element of the 'Forest Code' passed during the Vargas dictatorship of 1934 and revised during the military rule of 1965.

margin, the size of which was in direct relation to the width of the river. In the case of the River Cuiabá 'the river, is 150 feet width on average and so the permanent preservation area is 100 meters from each edge, right and left' (Galvão and El-Jaick, 2010).

SEMA's first actions were to conduct a preliminary survey between Santo Antonio do Leverger and Barão de Melgaço to document degraded land. Using satellite images in conjunction with field work they suggest that 2,500 hectares designated as an Area of Permanent Preservation were degraded or built on. An ecologist from SEMA describes their initial strategy as follows:

> It is SEMA's responsibility to preserve the environment and this is what we do. In 2006 we did a big survey, not those ones of the houses you have already seen, but we did a general survey. We noted there was degradation of the river banks and they needed to be conserved. After the initial survey the project was born and from there we began a bigger survey to document all land ownership on the river margins between Santo Antonio de Leverger and Barra do Aricá.…There were five of us working on the project, one biologist, three forest engineers and me, I am an ecologist. SEMA worked on this survey, myself and my colleagues, we spent six months along this stretch of river documenting everything.…So the documents you have seen, about each house, well we have made about 500 of them. This document measures the house, any other buildings and if there are any signs of river bank erosion' (Interview S8).

Although SEMA carried out and paid for the survey, press reports that covered the project never mentioned this fact. The project was always attributed to the Green Action Institute.

All the evidence shows that the Green Action Institute only became involved in the Green River project in 2009. This is when decisions were taken that they would use the project to sell carbon credits to local businesses. From the start there seem to have been irregularities around its involvement. Press reports at this time always referred to it as a Green Action Institute project and suggested it was the Green Action Institute who carried out the survey. Not only this, it seemed that the Green Action Institute received money for a survey they did not complete. Olhardireto (2009) declared that a Mato Grosso based supermarket chain, Modelo, had begun a partnership with the Green Action Institute. Modelo donated funds to the Green Action Institute to allow them to conduct a survey on the environmental and economic conditions of the River Cuiabá. It was not in the public domain how much was invested. However, as we have already

seen, SEMA have also claimed to have undertaken this study. Additionally, Olhardireto (2009) claimed the Green Action Institute would conduct the survey in the municipalities of Santo Antonio do Leverger, Cuiabá , Barrao de Malgaco and Pocone. Whilst visiting the Green Action Institute's office, I was given access to these survey reports. I only saw properties from the communities between Santo Antonio do Leverger and Barra do Aricá. This reflects the statement of the SEMA employee, that the survey was only conducted on this stretch of river. Whatever the case, the reforestation project began in 2010 in Barranco Alto I.

The location of the project is also a contested issue, the choice of site was supposedly based on the preliminary survey but may have also been influenced by other factors. According to the Green Action Institute the project began in Barranco Alto because this area was seen as having high levels of degraded land (interview CS3). An alternative argument could be given in response to my interview with the former Mato Grosso State Governor, Blairo Maggi. The MT 040 highway, linking Cuiabá to Barão de Melgaço was tarmacked under the leadership of Maggi. When asked why this road was chosen his response was:

> 'We decided to put asphalt on the 040 for a number of reasons. But most important was the potential this area has for tourism. The road connects Cuiabá to the tourist areas here [Santo Antonio] and further down to Barão de Melgaço, where there is the Pantanal. This connection has the potential to greatly increase the tourism here. So when we did the asphalting people always say we did the farming roads first. Yes this is true, because the farmers pay for some of the work. It is very difficult and very expensive to asphalt the roads, so to do the roads that will be all publically funded is difficult. We need to choose roads which are strategically good. For us, the 040 was best because it has a great deal of tourism potential.' (interview S5)

The MT-040 was already recognised by elites for its tourism potential. Reforesting this area would undeniably increase the aesthetic appeal of the area and would ultimately contribute to the growing tourist economy. Within the communities along the river bank, tourism is seen as an elite industry, mainly due to the large initial start-up costs, and favourable locations on the outskirts of the village away from their homes (interview PP 11, 12, 13, 14). If tourism potential was an influencing factor in the

decision to locate the Green River Project in Barranco Alto, it is not part of the official documents. Another potential influence on the location of the project not discussed by SEMA or the Green Action Institute is the communities affected by this project are peasant smallholders. The Greenpeace report criticised deforestation by large farm owners in the Amazon and Cerrado region. The project took place in the Pantanal region of Mato Grosso (Fig 18) an area with much less economic worth, mainly due to the flooding cycle. The founding associations of the Green Action Institute all have their activities outside the Pantanal region, therefore their interests would be protected by the project location being located away from their lands.



Figure 14: Mato Grosso (MT) and other states in Brazil's Centre-West. The Green River Project occurred in the less economically valuable region of the Pantanal.

By 2010 the Green Action Institute had begun to sell carbon credits. It was only in 2011 they formally developed a relationship with Secopa and became involved in the offsetting of the Pantanal Stadium. In

the original agreement with Secopa 177,000t of CO_2 was calculated to be released into the atmosphere and 1.4 million trees would be planted to offset the stadium. In addition to the carbon offsetting, the Green Action Institute also made social benefit claims and suggested the local population would receive Payment for Ecosystem Services. To deliver this, the Green Action Institute would receive an extra R$4,000,000 (£938,888) from the state government in 2012.

Ensuring compliance in the villages

The ability of the Green Action Institute to sell carbon credits (and the subsequently offset the Pantanal stadium) hinged on the compliance of villagers living within the project boundaries. In order to convince villagers to plant the trees SEMA and the Green Action Institute entered the villages of Barranco Alto I, II and Pesqueiro Florida in 2009. However, according to all accounts the villagers showed little interest in getting involved in the project. This lack of interest is hardly surprising because it would mean planting trees on the land where they currently gained their livelihood, as we will see in the next chapter. This lack of interest was despite the fact there were five public meetings (interview S1). By 2010 the urgency of compliance to the project was further felt by the Green Action Institute as by this time they were liaising with Secopa. It was at this point the Green Action Institute resorted to legal action to force compliance.

In early 2010 the Green Action Institute took SEMA's original socio-economic surveys to the Public Prosecutors to show the population's non-compliance with the Federal law (interview S9) (Institute, 2012). In response, the public prosecutors signed the technical cooperation agreement for river reforestation, or Terms of Adjusted Conduct (TAC) (Green Action Institute, 2011). This coercive device ensured legal compliance to the Green River Project. This fact was sidestepped by the manager of the Green Action Institute during my interview. She was keen for observers to think the project was based on a public consultation project:

> 'The length of the river we wanted to recover is 40km, with this objective we started to sensitise the people who lived in the region. This started with a few people, other people who saw the work became interested and asked about entering in the project. It was also in this moment when other groups became interested, like SEMA, Secopa …the project is in an isolated place, because of this we need the local community on our side. To do this we donated trees, labour and infrastructure. We have visited the communities many times to convince the people how good this project is' (Interview CS4, manager of Green Action Institute).

At a different time in the same interview and when the manager was not present, a technician from the Green Action Institute explained why the TAC was needed:

> 'This was not a process of agreement, the pubic ministry became involved because the villagers did not accept the project. SEMA tried to punish people because they did not stick to the project properly, but this did not work. The public ministry entered and forced the participants with the TAC, the villagers were afraid of them. The village received many TACs, they either had to pay a fine or sign the TAC about reforestation.' (interview S8)

The villagers, SEMA and the public prosecutor all agreed with the technician in that land owners were legally coerced into planting trees on their land. When I interviewed him, one of the two public prosecutors, Domingo Savio, defended the use of the TAC in the following terms:

> 'The public prosecution became involved because basically no one in the community wanted to participate. And they have to, they should, because it is the law. But you see, SEMA does not have any authority, they cannot make people comply. But we can, so we did. We decided to issue TACs, we can fine the population and SEMA cant. So we thought this would work well, and it has. As you can see in these photos, the villagers came here and signed the TAC. It was no problem' (Interview S9)

Far from complying with established norms of carbon offsetting and informed consent, the elite alliances between SEMA, the Green Action Institute and the public prosecutors was essential in imposing the carbon offsetting project in the effected villages.

6.2: Carbon offsetting

After the TAC was issued villagers began to plant the required trees and although the numbers of trees that were planted were vague, the verification body manged by the Green Action Institute, issued certificates. 18 certificates were awarded to companies at a ceremony on the 15th December 2010. The companies certified included: Unimed Cuiabá , Graphic Watchtower, Plastibrás , Federation of

Agriculture and Livestock Federation of Mato Grosso, Federation of Industries of the State of Mato Grosso, National Industrial Apprenticeship Service and the Association of Soy Producers state and were all certified as carbon neutral. It is interesting to note here that the Federation of Agriculture and Livestock Federation of Mato Grosso, Federation of Industries of the State of Mato Grosso and the Association of Soy Producers are all founding associations of the Green Action Institute. Also at this event four representatives of the communities of Barranco Alto I and II, Santa Clara and San Jose received a symbolic cheque for R$25,925.46 (£6,085) in relation the their Payment for Ecosystem Services (FIEMT, 2010).

There is no public record of how many carbon credits were bought by each company or how much a carbon credit cost; and even the information regarding how many trees were planted in this period is misleading. Olhardireto (2009) suggested planting began in Barranco Alto in March 2009. This is in direct contrast to a newspaper report from the Cuiabá regional newspaper, Diario de Cuiabá. They suggested that 38,000 seedlings had been planted in January and February of 2009, with 80,000 planted by March. By the end of the year it was expected that 200,000 would be planted (Diario de Cuiabá, 2009) . Unimed Cuiabá, one of the buyers of carbon credits claimed in their News Bulletin that in 2009 185,000 trees were planted (Comunicação, 2010). Already in 2009 it is clear to see misinformation and mixed reporting of this project.

Carbon offsetting the Pantanal Stadium

Secopa began their involvement with the Green River Project in June 2011, two years after Cuiabá was chosen as a World Cup host city. FIFA (2011a) and Agecopa (2011), the initial name of Secopa, announced the project through press releases on their website. FIFA reported that this agreement meant 3,000 'river-dwelling' families would benefit from R$710,000 (£166,652) which would be 'allocated in the form of payments for ecosystem services to bankside municipalities'. In order to receive this benefit, the communities had to plant 1.4 million native trees. Secopa suggested the 88 households had already planted 50,000 trees (Ascom, 2011, de Cassia, 2011). The project would be paid for by the

State government as part of the LEED accreditation application for the Pantanal Stadium. The former head of Secopa in Mato Grosso, Adilton Satchetti, explained in an interview with me why Secopa became involved in the carbon offsetting scheme:

> 'The Green River Project looked like a good project for us. We were thinking of buying carbon credits from the international market, but hoped for something from Brazil. Then we came across this project and it fitted perfectly, we could keep everything in Mato Grosso. This was fantastic, to keep everything in Mato Grosso really sold the idea that Mato Grosso has everything. And it does' (interview S1)

It is possible to see how the Green River Project contributed to the 're-imaginnering' of Mato Grosso being a forward thinking, environmentally friendly state. Purchasing the carbon credits within Mato Grosso gave a message that the state was prepared, able and willing to be environmentally friendly and did not need to look outside of the state to offset its activities.

On the 20th December 2011 the Green Action Institute held another event where companies were presented with their carbon neutrality certificates. At this event, Secopa were presented with a certificate, verified by the organisation managed by the Green Action Institute, that 24,000 tons of carbon were neutralised by the planting of 171,500 trees in Santo Antonio de Leverger after 19 months of work (Globesport, 2011). In TopNews (2011) this figure was reported as 23,819.92 tonnes of carbon sequestered by planting 171,504 trees. During the ceremony, representatives from the affected villages also received a symbolic cheque for R$86,800 (£20,373) (Fig 15).

Figure 15: Presentation ceremony of Green Action 20/12/11. A- Registrar of Secopa, Eder Moraes receives certificate from Carlos Avalone, President of Green Action. B- Residents of Barranco Alto I and II receive a cheque for R$86,800 Source: (Lopes, 2011b)

With the offsetting of 24,000 tonnes, the Green Action Institute were well on the way to offsetting the required 44,000 tonnes. However, in 2012 they approached the state government and received an extra R$3,400,000 (£798,055) (Rodrigues Stocco et al., 2012:263). Carlos Avalone, director of the Green Action Institute said at the time 'the program originally encompassed only the Pantanal stadium but now

includes compensation for all works agreed with FIFA in Cuiabá' (Vargas, 2013). This is in direct contrast to my interview with the manager of the Green Action Institute:

> 'LC: The offsetting programme is just for the Pantanal stadium?
> Manager: Yes, just the stadium
> LC: And only the trees in Barranco Alto I and II are planted to offset the Pantanal stadium?
> Manager: Yes, all the trees in Barranco Alto I and II are for the Pantanal stadium and nothing else' (Interview CS4).

Tracing transactions, payments and costs of all aspects of this project is difficult as project documents are not in the public domain and undoubtedly as the former head of Secopa explained there are costs involved:

> 'Academics always criticise these types of projects, but they do not understand how it works. You have to buy the signs, pay for the petrol of the people going back and forth to the villages. You need the meeting spaces, you need to buy the wood. This all costs money and academics do not understand this' (interview S4).

But it could be argued that the Green Action Institute received an extra R$3,400,000 (£798,055) of State money to do nothing, the original amount of R$1,000,000 paid to the Green Action Institute included offsetting the agreeed 117,000t.

Double counting?

In 2012, the same year as the Green Action Institute received R$3,400,000 (£798,055) from the State Government of Mato Grosso, TecnoMapas was hired. They supplied a 'monitoring system where satellite imagery is used to access to information such as registered houses and visualization of rural properties' (Technomapas, 2014). This system (Fig 16) was used by the Green Action Institute to highlight the boundaries of properties in Barranco Alto I and II. Interestingly, during the interview the Green Action Institute representative (CS4) they did not know how many families were in Barranco Alto I and II, but had instant access to the information via this technology.



Figure 16: Software used by Green Action as supplied by Tecnomapas. A- Barranco Alto I, B- Barranco Alto II, author photo 17/5/14

The services of TecnoMapas is also used by another company Unimed; they claim to be carbon neutral through buying carbon credits from the Green Action Institute. Their website has a link to a database

which shows seven properties in the communities of Barranco Alto I and II, Sao Sebestian and Santa Clara which have planted trees and offset Unimed's emissions. Their website explains 'in 2012 through the Green Action Institute, 1,933 acres were reclaimed and 718.5 tons of co2 offset were recorded. In a summation of the years 2010 and 2011 there was 6,300 seedlings planted and 875 tonnes of carbon dioxide neutralized' (Unimed, 2012).



Figure 17: Screenshot from the Unimed carbon neutral webpage. Location of trees are in Barranco Alto 1, 355t co2 eq said to be offset 6002 m in this database. This information is different to the information on their webpage.

One of the properties (Fig 17) belongs to Senhor Jacinto. His house and grounds is the subject of the TAC and monitoring report used in the following chapter. Unimed claim that the trees planted on his land offset their emissions. The database here describes 65 trees planted on 12th February 2009 and 54 trees planted on his property on 28th June 2011. There were a total of 17 different species of tree planted on the property. The previous section showed how the manager of the Green Action Institute claimed only the Pantanal Stadium was offset from trees planted in Barranco Alto I and II.

Changes in methodology

In spite of the potential double counting, the Pantanal Stadium still needed more trees planted in order to be certified as carbon neutral. In 2013, two years after the commencement of the project, Vargas (2013) reported 270,000 seedlings had been planted, only 19% of the 1.4 million needed by 2014. With the World Cup looming this could have been a problem for the Green Action Institute. As it turned out, the Green Action Institute were able to dodge this problem by changing the methodology for calculating CO_2 offsetting and substantially reducing the number of trees that needed to be planted. As the manager of the Green Action Institute explained:

> 'It was like when we first did the study to see if compensating was feasible. In the beginning we talked about 117,000 tonnes of carbon would be released into the atmosphere due to the Pantanal Stadium. There existed this initial 177,000t because there existed a calculation basis…There are several mathematics they used to make the compensation calculation. For us 177,000 fell to 45,000tonnes because nowadays we here in Brazil, we have a base calculation and before we were using international bases to do this. There are a lot of things that they put here to give 117,000 which are not necessary because the compensation is only for direct [emissions]. So what is direct and indirect? Workers, the trucks that carry the materials, the folks that clean up are all direct. The formation of concrete, lights of the building at night (when people are working) those are bright lights right? Well this is indirect. So 117,000t dropped to 45,000. Sorry this is called methodology, I forgot the word- but this is called methodology- we changed this, we restructured this to know the base- how much we needed to offset to reach the target' (Interview CS3).

The change in methodology enabled the Green Action Institute to plant fewer trees and still get the Pantanal Stadium certified as carbon neutral. The shift from one methodology to the other was possible due to the 'interlocking' between the Green Action Institute and the verification body.

There was only one press report which challenged the claims of the Green Action Institute. Assunção (2013), on behalf of the Centro-Oeste Popular newspaper, conducted an investigation into the nursery which produced the seedlings. The results found the seedlings were paid for by Empaer, an action unit of the State Ministry for Rural Development and Family Agriculture. The news report then suggested that the state government paid the Green Action Institute for reforestation with seedlings produced by the state itself. The actual planting of the seedlings was carried out by the property owners. So, the Green Action Institute, in effect, were only paying for the three staff members in the nursery- and according to Assunção (2013) this was also part funded by Empaer.

Perhaps the most alarming press report is the most recent, which was published the day before the start of the World Cup. Globo, Brazil's biggest news outlet, suggested that 41,000 tons of CO2 had been released due to the construction of the Arena Pantanal, and 75,000 native trees had been planted over 6 years (Globo, 2014). This report ties in with the interview with Green Action Institute. However, it puts into doubt all the other press reports which have gone before this. No mention was given to the other companies who have also offset their emissions through this project.

6.4: The future

For SEMA, the Green River Project was deemed a success. The pamphlet (2014) (appendix 2) which is available in SEMA's building shows how the reforestation project worked alongside other smaller projects such as the organisation of fishing platforms and distribution of litter bins. These outcomes are said to have made a contribution to the conservation of the river Cuiabá. Properties are now only allowed one fishing platform and commercial properties have to apply for a license to have more. Previously platforms contributed to over-fishing on the river, whereas now, the monitoring of platforms and fisheries contributes to the stabilisation of fish stocks in the River Cuiabá. In interview S8 the SEMA representative described the future of the project for SEMA:

> 'For SEMA the project here is over. We are responsible for the initial reports and construction of the wooden platforms and the supply of the wood. The Green Action Institute are responsible for the monitoring of the project, and I guess the carbon offsetting, but I know nothing about that. The future for us, I think is to continue this project in other areas.
>
> The new state secretary for the environment is Dr Ana Luiza Peterlini de Souza, so as you know she was the public prosecutor before. She supports this project a lot as she was involved with this from the start. So I think, we will continue to be funded, but we will move our project to another area.
>
> I think if anywhere, it will be further upstream, further North of Cuiabá. In this area there is a lot of farmers and the land is less segmented. I think it will be easier to implement there, and you know, the farmers are educated. They know they need to do some things for the environment. The future for Green Action Institute? I do not know, as far as I am aware, I do not know if we will continue to

> work together. But I don't think so. They are meant to be monitoring the project in the villages, but we have done 49 monitoring, they have done 5. This is not fair.
>
> When we started this they agreed to monitor the planting afterwards. They then became interested in the carbon offsetting. For us, we did what we wanted and now the project is over' (Interview S8).

The Green Action Institute were less confident of their involvement in the future of this project. The manager of the Green Action Institute explained they were due to have a meeting at the end of the World Cup in 2014 to discuss the future of the NGO. It was not apparent if they could continue functioning as an OSCIP if they did not have the project which linked the NGO to the state. My field visits in 2014 suggested the nursery was closed, although one man remains employed on a part-time basis. Returning in August 2015 the nursery was derelict (Fig 18).

Figure 18: The abandoned nursery, author photo 18/8/15

Although the project is over and the future of the Green Action Institute is in doubt, the project can be seen from their perspective as a success. The involvement of Secopa ensured further investment and

made the national press. This project was also used by FIFA in their 2015 sustainability report, and on their website as an example of how Brazil was ensuring a 'green' World Cup (FIFA, 2014b). In terms of negative press about the carbon offsetting aspect of this project, there has been only one media report. This report failed to make any inroads into the project discourse. The Green Action Institute were able to use this project to push the image of Mato Grosso being 'green'. By co-opting the conservation aspect of this project and turning it into a carbon offsetting project they were able to secure funds from a variety of corporate sectors in the state. They were able to conduct the carbon offsetting as they created the organisation to validate the offsets and certify the Pantanal stadium as carbon neutral. Due to their hegemonic positions the elite were able to co-opt a conservation project and re-engineer it through the ecological modernisation logic where the environment was quantified and given an economic role in the local economy. For both SEMA and the Green Action Institute the reforestation project, in this area at least, appears to have finished, but both organisations have different opinions of the outcomes.

6.5: Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the elite who hold positions of power in politics and economics in Mato Grosso have been able to create a NGO to control an important part of civil society. This worked to ensure the 'green' narrative in Mato Grosso was implemented without it adversely affecting their elite economic activities. Instead, the subordinate class had to surrender their land and livelihood in the name of environmental sustainability. The Green River Project then reinforced social relations as the decision makers formed an alliance which resulted in difficulty challenging the project.

The Green Action Institute was created by elite corporate associations in Mato Grosso. They have been seen to work in the interests of their founders, rather than their stated aims. The organisational structure of the NGO favours decision makers with corporate, not environmental backgrounds and resulted in a corporate facing NGO.

The organisation of the Green River Project can also be seen to favour the corporate elite. The project fulfilled the aims of the elites in Mato Grosso, to show through ecological modernisation that the World Cup in Mato Grosso could be environmentally sustainable. In addition, they were able to develop the infrastructure of the carbon credit issuing body to enhance the potential for ecological modernisation practices in the future.

In short, the Green Action Institute was legitimately created by actors at the regional level to gain new and legitimate ways to control the population at the local scale. This has occurred within a historical context of social relations and projects which serve the interest of the elite.

-Chapter VII-

The local impacts of the Green River Project

The previous chapters illustrated the agency of elite actors. In contrast, this chapter charts the Green River Project through the experiences of the local population. First a brief history of the studied villages is given to understand the socio-economic characteristics of the region. Similarly to the previous chapter, it illustrates that political alliances are built on clientialism. This section also describes how the villages that are part of the Green River Project were formed. In more recent years, these villages, Barranco Alto I and II and Barra do Arica were the subject of an anti-poverty project designed to enhance agricultural processing. This project was never completed and illustrates how the social benefit project did not deliver on its claims.

These sections lay the context for the following sections which focus on the Green River Project specifically. The Green River Project was initially designed to prevent erosion of the river banks. The placement of this project in the villages of Barranco Alto I and II can be questioned by accounts from the villages who suggest erosion is not an issue in their villages. Erosion is a bigger issue in the village of Pesquiero Florida which has different socio-economic characteristics, the placement of the project in

these villages can perhaps be seen to favour the elite who use this stretch of river recreationally. It is the elites who have motorised boats and have built on the river bank who were responsible for the erosion.

The following section argues the Green River Project was imposed on the local population through a TAC. This was a legally binding behavioural order which eradicated instances of passive resistance from the villages. The way in which the TAC was enforced also changed between the villages of Barranco Alto I and II and Pesquiero Florida. It was found that alliances between the state prosecutors and land owners allowed for compromises to be made in Pesquiero Florida, whilst there were no opportunities for this in the peasant villages.

The final section explores the Payment for Ecosystem Services claim of the project organisers. Again wealth redistribution upwards can be seen as the benefits for the villages were incomplete or not functioning. This even occurred after an increase in investment from the state tax payer. The Green River Project can then be seen as a project which speaks to the global north making unsubstantiated claims in order for the World Cup to be seen as environmentally sustainable with social benefits for the local, impoverished population (Fig 19).

Figure 19: A young girl in traditional dress planting trees as part of the Green River Project, Source: FIFA, 2011.

7.1: The socio-economic characteristics of the villages affected by the Green River Project

In the official documents of the Green River Project the people living in the villages affected by the project are all described as a 'traditional riverine population'. This replicates how local elites and scholars alike have described the population (Silva, 2010, de Mello Amorozo, 2002, dos Santos Guarim, 2002, Lachowisk et al., 2014, Valentini et al., 2011) who have variously characterised them as having their own dialect (Dettoni, 2003), their own regional dances (Almeida, 2004 and Jesus, 2006) and engaged in subsistence livelihoods (Ferreira, 2010 and Silva, 2002). As scholars such as Sachs (1997) and Ferguson (1994) argue, labelling the communities this way has influenced the way in which elite decision-makers rationalise their choices. The following statement by a SEMA ecologist exemplifies this attitude:

> 'These people, they are different from us, you know? They do not want new cars or nice clothes. Their life is slow and backwards, very *simples*. It is sad because now the young do not want this life. The younger people do not see the attraction in farm work, the girls want to live in the city- they do not want husbands who are fishermen- this is not *chique* (fashionable)' (Interview S8).

In fact, the three villages affected by the Green River Project, Barranco Alto I and II and Pesqueiro Florida, have very different histories and socio-economic characteristics. The majority of the population in Barranco Alto I and II are subsistence farmers and fishermen. They are descendants of migrant workers who moved to the area in the 19th century to work on the sugar plantations which thrived between the late 1880 and the 1950s (Novaczyk, 2005, Marchetti et al., 2013, Siqueira, 2002, Oliveira, 2010b). The current social relations in the area are born a history of clientalism which dominated the sugar plantations during this time (appendix 3). When the plantations closed, the workers stayed in the area and became subsistence farmers and fishermen in the villages now known as Barranco Alto I and II and Barra do Arica. Senor João, an 83 year old man living in Barra do Aricá recalls his experience of working on the plantations:

> ‘I was there when the Usina (sugar mill) closed in 1957. My parents worked there and their parents before that, the Usina Itaici was famous because of the history, but when I was there it was not good. Those days were different, you know? It was hard work- the earnings were not enough to buy what we needed. They gave us money, I suppose money, but we could only use it there [at the Usina Itaci]. I think it was good that it went. Now I think my grandchildren can do many different things’ (interview PP15).

Pesqueiro Florida is the third village affected by the project and is primarily a tourist village. It was created in the 1980s when a farmer sold his land. He portioned 18 plots running adjacent to the river which were bought by wealthy people for recreational purposes. These plots have been bought and sold by various people during this time. In 2015 there was a marina which housed 40 motor boats owned by residents of Cuiabá . There were also two hotels, including the Pousada Itaicy were I stayed and about 10 holiday homes owned by residents in Cuiabá and other cities. In addition to the owners, today, the village is also inhabited by caretakers and servants who look after these holiday houses. The official documentation of the Green River Project names this village as Barra do Arica. Barra do Arica, in fact lies on the River Barra do Arica de Mim and is on the opposing side of the MT-040 highway to Pesqueiro Florida. Barra do Arica is comprised of descendants of sugar workers and has similar socio-economic characteristics to that of Barranco Alto. Labelling Pequeiro Florida as Barra do Arica allowed the project organisers to claim social benefit for a larger population.

7.2: Small scale agricultural processing projects in Barranco Alto

Because of the very different characteristics of Barranco Alto I and II on the one hand, and Pesqueiro Florida on the other, the Green River Project was experienced in very different ways. In the case of Barranco Alto I and II and according to accounts of the villagers, the Green River Project arrived out of the blue when they were already engaged in another state project, designed to encourage economic diversification through sugar based products.

This project formed part of the Lula governments attempt to redistribute wealth and was part of the wider '*zero fome'* (zero hunger) programme, a Federal programme to eradicate hunger in rural Brazil. Baixada Cuiabá na was identified as the location of a pilot project due to the 2000 census illustrating they had high levels of rural deprivation (Jesus, 2006). These projects were run by the *Profeitura* (mayor's office) in Santo Antonio do Leverger, funded by the Mato Grosso state department *trabalho, emprego, cidadania e assistencia social* (labor, employment , citizenship and social assistance), and managed by Blairo Maggi's wife. The project, *projeto agregação de valor a produção através da agro industrialização* (added value production through processing agricultural project). It aimed to improve the socio-economic conditions of families in Baixada Cuiabána by increasing the output value of activities already undertaken in rural villages (Fig 20) (Schimanoski, 2007).

The project in Barranco Alto I and II was to develop sugar processing and secondary products. The project organisers supplied a building to house a presser and an adjoining facility for the processing of sugar cane were installed in 2007. According to Alves (2012) over R$700,000 (£164,305) of public funds was used to construct these buildings. Products that could be made in the facility and sold from this venture included: alcohol, cachaça (an alcoholic spirit), sugar, rapadura (a dessert product), melado, garaba and bagaça de cana- two types of sweet, watery drink. Additionally the population had to contribute to the cost of the machinery, the President of Barranco Alto II informed me this figure was R$108,000 (£25,349) which would be paid by the community in instalments after they began to earn an income.

This project was effectively stopped by the Green River Project. Although this project was underway when SEMA started the survey of the river banks, there appears to be no coordination between different state agencies. As part of the sugar project, villagers were encouraged to plant sugarcane on the river bank, the most fertile land. This project was well underway when villagers learnt about the Green River Project. Infrastructure was built and some village participants had begun to produce

products from this venture. However, once these villages were identified as part of the Green River Project, they were forced to abandon the sugar project as the river bank became an Area of Permanent Preservation (APP). Some informants have suggested the community could move the plantations to behind their houses and continue to grow cane. However, this land is swamp for eight months of the year and would require drainage at further expense to the community.

Figure 20: The factory in Barranco Alto which was made as the industrialisation programme in Cuiabána Baixada. The engine in the top right was purchased by the community, the presser in the bottom left crushes the sugar cane, author photo 20/9

From the perspective of the villagers, the Green River Project was an illogical imposition which disrupted a valuable income generating project. The following quote from the President of Barranco Alto II exemplifies this view:

> 'We had the sugar industry, we had to pay R$108,000 (£25,349) for the engine. Empear paid for the building, that was good, but the community had to raise the funds for the engine. As you can imagine this took a lot of time. But we wanted this to work. Many of our young people are leaving. The primary school shut here because there are not enough children, so we needed this industry to make people stay. And now they say we can't plant sugar cane. All that time wasted, and we will not get our money back. It is a waste. We now have the tree planting, but I cannot see the benefits for us. Two projects and what? Nothing' (interview CS5).

7.3: Causes of Erosion on the River Cuiabá

As we saw in the previous chapter, the Green River Project was first developed as a SEMA conservation project to prevent erosion and silting up of the Pantanal. It was subsequently used as a carbon offsetting project by the Green Action Institute. The Green Action Institute suggested the Green River Project would restore and preserve the riparian areas of the major rivers and would 'bring benefits not only to the local ecosystem, but also the state's population' (Institute, 2012). As we saw in the previous chapter, the villages seemed to be chosen for political reasons. Nonetheless, effectively in the implementation of the project, the villagers were effectively treated as if they were the cause of the erosion and were required to change their practices accordingly. In Barranco Alto I and II everyone who was interviewed disagreed that they had caused the erosion. As the President of the village assembly in Barranco Alto II stated:

> 'we have lived with erosion for over 100 years, it is not more of a problem now than it was 100 years ago. We know not to build on the river bank. We plant on the river bank and graize our animals. Erosion in Barranco Alto is not a problem, we know how to deal with it' (Interview S3).

This view from the villagers in Barranco Alto I and II is supported by a scientific paper produced by academics from Mato Grosso's state University (de Lucena Madruga et al., unpublished). They suggested that although erosion of the river bank is a natural process, it has been accelerated by tourism, motorised boat use, and the construction of holiday homes.

These all seem to have been accelerated since the MT-040 highway linking Cuiabá to Barão de Melgaço was asphalted in 2002. This road runs parallel to the River Cuiabá all the way from Cuiabá , past Santo Antonio de Leverger, Barranco Alto I and II before reaching and the main tourist centres of Pesqueiro Florida to Barão de Melgaço. As a result the road is heavily used, especially by day tourists from Cuiabá, who can now travel by car.

These tourists commonly use the studied stretch of river for recreational fishing purposes. The increase of wealth in the state has also increased the use of motor boats. As noted earlier, the marina in Pesqueiro Florida has berths 40 private boats and also offers boats for day rental. The expansion of the hotel industry, particularly for fishing tourists has also increased motorised boat activity. Another factor is the increased construction of holiday homes built along the river bank, in Pesqueiro Florida and Barranco Alto. They are typically owned by residents of Cuiabá, who usually own their a speed boat (Fig 21) (de Lucena Madruga et al., unpublished).

Figure 21: River erosion causing danger to buildings on the river edge, author photo 6/5/14

According to de Lucena Madruga et al. (unpublished) the continual wave action on the banks produced by the motorised boats causes bank erosion. This causes more damage on deforested river banks as there are no trees to absorb the waves. The deforested banks are weakened and ultimately collapse, sending sediment further downstream. This is accepted by some boat owners. For example, Robson, the hotel owner in Pesqueiro Florida commented:

> 'Yes, the boats increase the erosion, but it is only a small part of the problem. It is not the only thing that erodes the river bank. But what am I supposed to do? The fish in this part of the river are small, we are too close to the city (Santo Antonio), if I want my clients to be happy and return here they want to catch big fish. The bigger fish are further down the river, I have no choice but to use speed boats' (Interview C5).

The third factor identified by de Lucena Madruga et al., was the construction of holiday homes. The homes I observed in Barranco Alto I and II were all over 50 metres from the river bank, corroborating the President's assertion that people in the these two villages know how to avoid causing erosion. In contrast, the holiday homes I observed in Pesqueiro Florida, and other tourist areas, were typically built very close (2 or 3 metres) to the river bank. This includes the two hotels whose restaurants overlooked the river. Further, according to de Lucena Madruga et al., these

constructions cause stress on the river bank which can lead to collapse. They observed how some residents in Pesqueiro Florida had made efforts to protect against river bank erosion by using concrete, wood, straw and tyres (de Lucena Madruga et al., unpublished).

The increased tourism and the associated increase in the use of motorised boats were not addressed as causes of erosion by the Green River Project. As part of their conservation project SEMA did address the direct erosion caused by building close to the bank in Pesqueiro Florida (Interview S8)—following a report by Taveres Slamao et al (2012) which emphasised that erosion was most acute on this section of the river. They built and paid for a large gabion to secure the bank- effectively subsidising the property owners for their disregard for ecological processes and the damage caused (Fig 22). Additionally, SEMA also paid for the relocation of a road in Pesqueiro Florida which was in danger of collapse, thereby ensuring access for the MPVs and lorries that supply the two hotels. As the bottom photos in figure 30 show, the gabion was already collapsing in 2015.



Figure 22: From top to bottom: Diagram from Ximenes de Tavares Salmao et al. (2011) showing erosion in Pesquisa Florida at the confluence of the River Arica and River Cuiabá. Photo of Gabion in eroded area in 2014. Two bottom photos show the collapsed Gabion in 2015.

From these accounts it is possible to determine that the residents in Barranco Alto I and II did not feel their river banks needed protection. Those in Pesqueiro Florida had a very real need for the erosion prevention mechanism and also received gabion and road relocation, much more capital intensive programmes than the tree planting.

7.4: Questioning the need for trees

As the previous section showed, the villagers in Barranco Alto I and II felt they did not contribute to the erosion of the river. They also could not see the benefit of planting trees for addressing the problem of erosion. For the households in these villages, the Green River Project meant abandoning planting sugarcane in the fertile strip between their houses and the river, and complying with the requirement that they plant trees instead. These trees were to be planted no more than 2m apart, within the stipulated 50m strip along the river bank. As the following quote from the president of Barranco Alto II shows, most people thought the tree planting was for political and economic reasons, rather than environmental.

> They [Green Action Institute and SEMA] came to the village one day and we had a meeting. They told us what they were going to do. They were going to plant trees to stop erosion of the river bank and to provide carbon offsetting for FIFA. Well, we do not have a problem with river bank erosion here. But, they just plant trees for FIFA, not for us or for the river. They come here just for one day. One day, they come here and tell us what to do. They do not know what is best, we have lived here for 100 years. We know what to do, for one day they think they know better than us?' (interview CS5)

In addition to the thoughts of the population of Barranco Alto II, de Lucena Madruga et al's publication suggests planting trees may not be the most effective way of controlling erosion. They experimented with the suitability of using Vetiver Grass Technolog and planted grass on a bank in Barranco Alto II in 2011 and continuing observations until 2013. This technology has been successful in controlling erosion in African and Asian contexts. Their conclusions suggest that this is a low cost strategy and is more

effective at stabilising the river bank than planting trees. In our interview the lead author of this paper Elder de Lucena Madruga discussed why the grass technology was not chosen by the Green Action Institute or SEMA:

> 'We conducted an experiment on the river Cuiabá using a new grass technology. This grass does not germinate so does not spread and when it is inundated with water, it still lives. So for us, it was a success when we planted it near Barranco Alto. We think this approach is good because it is cheap and it works, if you go to the place where we did the experiment[…] you will see the grass […] above and below the grass it has clearly eroded, when you see where our grass is, it has not eroded.
>
> This is a good option, but the question to ask is what actually do the people want? It is true that it is a natural process for the river to move, but now people want the river to stay where it is. If this is all people want I think the grass is a suitable option. A gabion [stone embankment] is another option, they have this downstream, but this is expensive and you could never have gabion going all along the river.

In our interview he went on to state they carried out their work at the same time as the Green Action Institute. In fact, the Green Action Institute even allowed them to grow the grass at the nursery. He was therefore very familiar with the Green River Project and argued strongly that planting trees would not prevent erosion of the river because even when there was trees, the river changed course all the time. He also went on to add that local people had told him that trees close to the river bank contribute to this process.

> 'When a tree grows the branches grow up and then fall into the water, growing outwards into the river. Well this slows the velocity of the river a little. The sediment then gets caught on these branches and seeds grow within the branches. The bank grows into the river- as the new trees grow further into the river channel. Well, then, the river is thinner and has more energy and goes and erodes on the other side of the bank or further downstream, so not preserving the river bank at all. For this reason, I don't think trees will help preserve the bank.
>
> If you ask my personal opinion, and this is just mine- the objective of Green Action Institute, I think, is to do this project to collect money and keep for themselves. I do not know a lot about them, but in my opinion, this is what they do. For some reason they want to plant trees. OK, there is law- you can't cut trees within 100m of the river- so if you do, you need to replant. I understand this, it keeps the birds here, have lots of animals, fine, this is good. But to prevent erosion on the river bank, I don't think so' (Interview CS6)

This expert informant had clearly spoken to the villagers and had a deep understanding of river ecology, in contrast to the engineers at Green Action Institute.

7.5: Coercing participation through the TAC

Due to the sugarcane project being taken from them, and their thoughts that they were not to blame for the erosion, it is unsurprising that the residents were initially reluctant to participate in the project.

As was established in the previous chapter, the Green Action Institute claimed that participation of the local community was important to them interview (CS4, full quote page 103). They claim they went to each individual property and performed a socio-economic evaluation in the hope they could convince people to participate disseminating information through social media. In fact, as shown in chapter 6, this claim was contradicted by SEMA:

> 'We had meetings with the communities, there were 5 in total. But these meetings were not to ask the community what they wanted, we had already decided on the project before we entered the village. We only had the meetings to tell them what was going to happen and what they had to do' (Interview S8)

Then in an interview in 2010, the director of the Green Action Institute, Paul Borges, attributed the initial poor participation by residents to their lack of education, moreover he stated 'their levels of environmental consciousness is very low' (Galvão and El-Jaick, 2010). In the same interview he says the Green Action Institute do not want to enforce the environmental law and use fines as this 'would not conserve the environment and would do nothing to help sustainability'. Nonetheless, this is exactly what they proceeded to do. In order to overcome villager's passive resistance the Green Action Institute took the socio-environmental assessments to the Public Prosecutors in 2010 and asked them to issue a Terms of Adjusted Conducted (TAC) to ensure compliance.

Subsequently, in my interview, the Green Action Institute claimed this benefitted many people in Barranco Alto I and II as most did not have documentation of their land ownership. Moreover, he claimed at this time some villagers were under pressure from residents in Cuiabá who wanted to buy land.

The TAC is a document compiling the information collected during the socio-economic survey of the land and has guidelines for future actions. Copies of the TAC were stored in the offices of the Green Action Institute, SEMA and the public prosecutor, these were very detailed. The TAC document I viewed in the Green Action Institute office contained detailed drawings, photos, annotations and comments of roughly 40 pages. In contrast, residents were given a more concise summary.

Most villagers had heard about the TAC at the village assembly and had to travel to Cuiabá to sign it. Senhor Rodrigo recalled the hardship of going to the building. At the time he did not have access to a boat and had to pay a neighbour to take him 35km by river to Santo Antonio do Leverger, he then had to get a bus to Cuiabá where he changed to another bus to get to SEMA's office. Inside he was made to wait for a technician to become available who then read the TAC to him. He is functionally illiterate and he remembered not being given time to think about the TAC or discuss it, he was just told to sign it and leave. He then had the repeated journey home where he had to wait for another neighbour to pick him up in Santo Antonio do Leverger, he recalled this as taking all day (PP 7).

The two TACs I saw were in the communities were both very similar. One was from Pesqueiro Florida, the other from Barranco Alto I. The TAC issued to Jacinto Pinto Tapajos in Barranco Alto I, exemplifies the document. As he told me, he had lived in Barranco Alto is whole life and like most people he found out about the TAC at the village assembly meetings (interview PP3).

Senhor Tapajos's TAC was signed in December 2011 by SEMA and himself. Significantly, the TAC opens by stated that Mr Tapajos was contributing to river bank erosion. It then gave clear, detailed instructions of what his necessary actions were to comply with the law:

- Isolate 27 metres of APP (up to the road) along the 33m length of land running parallel to the river. This is to prevent access of people, domestic animals and cars. A fence is to constructed by only using the specified materials, this is to allow the free movement of wild animals.

- Access to river is allowed by wooden walkway only, a maximum of 2 metres in diameter. This should also be suspended above the river bank to prevent stepping directly onto the slope.
- Plant seedlings of native species with maximum spacing of 2x2m, more dense on the slope of the river bank. For three years maintain and monitor the seedlings, including pest control, irrigation, fertilization and replanting.
- Not clean the understory of the trees and do not plant vegetables and exotic species such as mango, banana and lemon.
- Currently he does not have a floating fishing platform, if he wants to install one at a later date he must register with SEMA before installation.
- His house is 108m2 and built 51m from the embankment with the river, he cannot increase the size of his house.
- Use the rubbish bins provided for waste
- Adopt preventative measures to stop fires during the drought period if necessary.

In March 2013 SEMA returned to the village to verify whether residents had complied with the TAC. The monitoring report for Senhor Tapajos stated that although he had planted trees the density was not adequate; he had created a walkway as the TAC demanded, however, it was not a wooden structure, but a cleaned area of vegetation; he had also put wooden stakes into the soil but did not have the wire in place to form a fence. It also noted cattle on the boundary of the APP but conceded this was allowed because of the lack of wire. The TAC went on to conclude senhor Tapahos had 30 days to comply with the TAC or face a fine. It was not stipulated how much this fine would be. In our 2014 interview, senhor Tapajos confirmed that SEMA had never returned to verify if he had completed the required actions. The experience of senhor Tapajos is typical of Barranco Alto I and II where residents had to take similar actions to comply with the TAC.

While most residents were unhappy at planting their most fertile land with threes, they were also frustrated about other terms of the TAC which they felt was unreasonable. Perhaps the requirement they were most upset about was the fact that the TAC prohibits 'cleaning' under the trees in the APP. 'Cleaning' is the clearance of shrubs and cutting the grass between the trees. The President of Barranco Alto I described why they felt this was unreasonable:

> They came and said we couldn't cut under the trees that we have to leave it to be natural. But I have two young children and the front of my house is in front of the APP. It is not safe for them, the long grass is where snakes are. How can I let my children play here with snakes? If they are bitten who will pay for a doctor? I bet it will not be them (the Green Action Institute) (interview CS8).

Dona Matilia spoke of the impact of not 'cleaning' on her property. She told me that wild animals were able to hide in the dense vegetation and take her livestock. After this, fearing for own safety, she resumed cutting under the trees (interview PP24). The danger of dense vegetation (Fig 23) within the village gathered a mixed response.

Figure 23. Reforestation left naturally to the left and a cleaned area to the right, author photo 21/7/14

While many residents did not comply with the TAC, in some instances it was due to the Green Action Institute failing to supply material. An example of this is the fence at Dona Nancy's property (Fig 24):

> 'The TAC we have says we need a fence with wooden posts and wire. The Green Action Institute are supposed to supply us with the wood and wire, they are also to give us wood to make the walkway to the river…The fence is so cows cannot go in the APP but wild animals can. This is fine, so far I have wooden stakes for the fence and no wire' (interview PP6).

This corresponds with the monitoring report in Mr Japatos's property, which suggests cows were found on the APP boundary because the fencing did not have wire.

Figure 24: Example of a typical boundary in Barranco Alto I, author photo 21/7/14

In contrast to the residents of Barranco Alto I and II, the residents of Pesqueiro Florida experienced the TAC as a nuisance. For these much wealthier land owners, it did not impinge on their lives or livelihoods in a significant way. In some cases, these wealthy property owners were able to mobilise personal connections to negotiate better terms. This is exemplified by the way Robson responded to the TAC:

> 'Other residents along the river here were hostile towards them. But that's not how I do things. I invited them in, told them [SEMA representatives] to sit down at my table- gave them drinks and said 'what is it you want me to do?' There were some things that were impossible, I had to say no. But plant some trees and pay a little fine. Sure, we can discuss this. But I was lucky, I had to pay a fine just for the bathrooms, not the restaurant. So it was fine. I think also, I know the manager of Dr Ana so perhaps this helped me a little too. But we paid the fine, and planted those trees. Actually, they wanted us to remove the Bamboo and Lemon trees here and plant native trees instead. I told them this is ridiculous, the Bamboo is so big and strong, it is basically holding the whole bank together. But we agreed that I could leave the Bamboo and Lemon trees and plant some native trees elsewhere…I remember the Public Prosecutor coming here. For me, it was lucky we had Dr Ana, if we had Domingo things would be different. We do not get along. But Dr Ana came, with two

more people, they were from the Green Action Institute or SEMA, I do not know. But it was fine' (interview C2).

Robson had to pay a fine of R$6,000 (£1,408) which was paid over three months, after this, he heard nothing more from the Green Action Institute. Other residents in Pesqueiro Florida had different dealings with the TAC. The owner of the other hotel in Pesqueiro Florida refused to allow the SEMA representatives on his property which resulted in him being fined significantly more. Additionally, some residents were absent when the TAC was issued. The owner of one holiday home in Pesqueiro Florida, lives in Sao Paulo. As he recounted when I interviewed him, he only visits his property in Pesqueiro Florida once every two months. He was away when the TAC was issued and did not have the opportunity to negotiate the terms. He also alluded to the fact that as he was from Sao Paulo he did not have the personal connections to do so. Although he felt aggrieved at having to pay the fine, nonetheless, the amount was insignificant in relation to his income.

7.6: Payment for ecosystem services

For the residents of Barranco Alto I and II participation in the Green River Project and compliance with the TAC supposedly meant they would receive financial benefit through the Payment for Ecosystem Services system. In 2011 both FIFA (2011) and Secopa (AGECOPA, 2011) separately reported that residents of the two communities were receiving these payments. According to Secopa, this amount was worth R$710,000 (£166,652) (Ascom, 2011, de Cassia, 2011). In 2011, FIFA and Secopa both reported the payment of the credits to the communities could have been either transferred in yearly instalments to the community as a whole, or to individual producers of carbon credits. The reports then go on to discuss how Barranco Alto chose to use the payment for community benefit and purchased two wells and two water tanks (FIFA, 2011a, Agecopa, 2011). All the respondents I interviewed in Barranco Alto I and II contest this official version of what happened around the ecosystem services payment.

As noted in chapter six, these reports seem to refer to the symbolic cheque presented to the communities at the carbon offsetting ceremony. This symbolic gesture was repeated in 2012 when the communities were presented with another cheque, this time worth R$86,800 (£20,373). According to the President of Barranco Alto I, the residents chose to receive monetary payments, which they have not received. He further describes his experience:

> 'We have meetings once a month, or whenever it is needed. Usually there is about 50 people in our group, but only 15 regularly attend the meetings. Everyone knows their President talks a lot and no one wants to listen!...The Green Action Institute came here to a meeting once, they told us we would be receiving money for planting the trees. They said we could do with it what we wanted. To this day I have not received any money. We had a meeting in Santa Clara (a nearby village) yesterday (August 10th 2014), they said the money had run out. I know they have more money, I have received two [symbolic] cheques in ceremonies, but I have received no money in my pocket. I know where the money is, I know they have it' (interview CS8).

In some accounts of village negotiations, some villagers mention that at an early meeting about ecosystem payments they asked for a health centre and a computer room and they were disappointed that nothing had happened about this. However, nobody I interviewed mentioned asking for a well. This decision seems to have been taken by the Green Action Institute without any consultation with the villagers, and in the case of Barranco Alto II, which already had a well, without any discussion or verification of their needs.

The first well was installed in Barranco Alto I on the 22nd May 2014 (Fig 25). But no tank ever arrived and the well initially had problems which the village had to pay to rectify. The main problem seems to have been with the original pump. The President of Barranco Alto I described how the pump did not work:

> The pump was installed by the Green Action Institute, but we have to pay for the electricity, this is about R$15 (£3.52) per month per household, and I collect this. This is not so much money. Any money left then goes into savings for servicing the pump. We had some trouble with the pump when it was first installed. It rarely worked and it was not powerful enough to pump to every house. The Green Action Institute, and the company which installed the pump would not pay for a new one, so we had to pay for one. This cost R$4,000 (£938) and works very well. I just worry if it breaks, no one knows how to fix it and we will have to take everything to Cuiabá to get it fixed' (Interview CS8).

Figure 25: Commemorative plaque on the well in Barranco Alto I, author photo 21/7/14

The manager of the Green Action Institute described how the well had a two year warranty but 'it could well be the pump is not included. I do not know' (interview CS4). During the period that there were problems with the pump, some households had to draw water from the river to their homes using a hose (Fig 26). One resident described this as an essential back-up:

> 'I use this water for when the pump is not working…I do not have any choice, when the well is not working I need water, it is polluted and nasty but we need to clean. They (the Green Action Institute) said we should buy mineral water to drink and not drink the water from the well, but what choice do I have? I am poor, I cannot afford to buy mineral water' (interview PP5).

Figure 26: Hose from river to a house which is used when the well does not work, author photo 21/7/14

Although the water well in Barranco Alto I was beset with problems at the beginning, by the end of fieldwork in September 2015 the well was working consistently and was providing all houses in Barranco Alto I with water. By this time, some residents had recognised the benefits this had brought. A professional fisherman in Barranco Alto I was among a 3 people who described that the well had brought some benefits: 'before the well there was lots of health problems. The quality of the river water is very bad and it was making us sick. Now the well is here things are better' (Interview PP16).

In Barranco Alto II however, the decision to provide a well was completely unnecessary as the village already had a well which was installed in 2001 by the mayor and was fully functioning. Despite the

existence of this well, the Green Action Institute installed the well at the same time as the well in Barranco Alto I. The President of Barranco Alto II described his experience with the Green Action Institute in the following way:

> 'I have met the Green Action Institute to discuss our payment, a well was never mentioned to me. They brought the well here one day and that was it, but this well does not work and never has done. They say there are issues with the water quality and it was built too near to the river. We do not need a well, we already have one (Fig 27), it was built in 2001 and works fine' (interview CS5).

The two wells that were installed by the Green Action Institute, cost R$30,000 (£7,041) a fraction of the R$710,000 (£166,652) promised for the Payment for Ecosystem Services associated with the Secopa project. This is notwithstanding the money due for the offsets from previous companies.

Figure 27: Plaque next to the water well in Barranco Alto II. It was installed in 2001 by the President of the community, not by Green Action Institute, author photo 21/7/14

The villagers I spoke to seemed to be resigned to this impunity: 'in Brazil this happens all the time, the political men come here promising things but leave with more money. It is not fair but there is nothing

we can do' (HP 7). A resident in Barranco Alto I also reflected on the projects 'for the young people there is nothing here. The best they can do is get an education and get out of here. We have been promised many things many times, better schools, better roads, but nothing comes. No one cares for us here, we are on our own' (PP 5).

7.7: Conclusion

This chapter explored the Green River Project from the perspective of the local community.

The first section explored the history of the studied villages, from their formation to contemporary poverty alleviation projects. This set the context for the rest of the chapter which sought to highlight how the Green River Project fit into the social relations of the area. This was demonstrated with the location where the project began. Two academic studies which inform this piece suggest that erosion is concentrated on particular areas. This was confirmed through interviews which suggested that Barranco Alto I and II does not have a specific issue with river bank erosion, it was in fact Pesquiero Florida which suffered from extreme bank erosion. Nevertheless, the residents of Barranco Alto I and II were pressurised into accepting legal responsibility for erosion on their land. The placement of the project in Barranco Alto I and II therefore had political, not ecological influence.

The third section explored the claims of public consultation by the Green Action Institute more thoroughly. Participation did not form any part of SEMA's initial plans for the project and it was the Green Action Institute which made these claims. After passive resistance where the community did not make the required changes, the TAC was created as a coercive method to ensure participation. The communities were therefore not part of the planning process.

The application of the TAC was then discussed using two examples, one from Barranco Ato I and the other from Pesqueiro Florida. The TAC of the peasant from Barranco Alto I was administered very differently to the TAC by the hotel owner in Pesquiero Florida. Personal connections allowed for

negotiation in Pesquiero Florida which resulted in trees not being planted on the river bank. The result of this project for the wealthy in Pesqueiro Florida was an inconvenience. However, for those in Barranco Alto I and II the project removed their livelihood and they lost considerable financial investment.

Finally the Payment for Ecosystem Services associated with the project was suggested to be much less than what was pledged in 2012. The two wells which were supplied to the community were not part of a negotiation process and are now not under warranty. One of the wells was dug too close to the river bank and was not finished, moreover, this well was not needed as Barranco Alto II already had a well. The economic development claims made by project organisers then also have very little impact on the villages.

Overall, this chapter focused on the carbon offsetting project from the community perspective.

-Discussion –

The 2014 FIFA World Cup as a vehicle to enhance and entrench the elite agenda

A critical management approach which questions 'established social orders, dominating practices, ideologies, discourses, and institutions' (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000:x) has allowed me to investigate the environmental and social claims surrounding the 2014 World Cup in Mato Grosso. As I have shown in Chapters 4-7 established orders and dominating practices are evident in the way the regional elites were able to subvert the mechanisms of environmental governance. They achieved this though clientalism, impunity, profiteering and institutional corruption to ensure a re-distribution of wealth upwards. As Chapters 6 and 7 highlighted, the Pantanal Stadium was offset through a project which did not plant the required trees, was organised and verified by the same decision makers and did not deliver on social benefits for the affected communities.

As I have argued, these events in Mato Grosso occurred within a neoliberal sporting event which gave emphasis to intense competition, consumerist lifestyle and freedom of the markets (Coakley, 2011). Some characteristics of the neoliberal sporting event were observed in Brazil and Mato Grosso. In Chapter 4, the monopoly that corporations who sponsor FIFA had in regard to access to the markets was

exposed. VISA were able to enter new markets when match tickets were only available to buy with a VISA card, and Budweiser gained access by the Brazilian state's changing laws regarding the sale of alcohol in the stadiums. In Chapter 5 exposed how contracts were won through cronyism and institutional corruption, therefore preventing competition. These instances worked in the favour of elites who were able to ensure, through different mechanisms, that they maximised their profits. The transnational corporations were able to prevent competition through sponsoring FIFA, whereas the regional elites in Mato Grosso used personal connections.

This chapter explores the findings from the data chapters in relation to the concepts and theoretical framework as discussed in Chapter two. First, my results are discussed in relation to the literature, which discusses social benefit and environmental claims at sport mega-events. The second section then focuses on the critical arguments of the carbon offsetting literature and explores the case of the Green River Project. The third section discusses the organisation of the Green Action Institute in light of the NGO literature, which suggests not all NGO are progressive. Special acknowledgement is given to the time in which the Green Action Institute was created, when NGOs were given more decision making capabilities in Brazilian governance. The Fourth section then explores the theoretical implications of these findings. I discuss the role the Green Action Institute had in securing hegemonic relations and the furthering hegemonic project in Mato Grosso which was instigated by a global process, implemented at the regional scale.

8.1: Sports mega-events and social benefit claims

Ricardo Texieria, the then head of the Brazilian Football Association, was reported to have declared 'over the next few years we will have a consistent influx of investments. The 2014 World Cup will enable Brazil to have a modern infrastructure…In social terms will be very beneficial…Our objective is to make Brazil become more visible in global arenas…The World Cup goes far beyond a mere sporting event. It's

going to be an interesting tool to promote social transformation' (CNN, 2007). This declaration, on the day FIFA announced Brazil was host to the 2014 tournament, did not match the realities on the ground, as I have shown throughout the previous data chapters.

The World Cup provided an opportunity for Brazilian elites to 're-imagineer' Brazil into a modern and open country through an extensive infrastructure development programme. Corneilsson (2010), Panagiotopoulou (2012) and Sugden and Tomlinson (2002) all suggest that 're-imagineering' through sports mega-events is a particularly useful tool for developing countries, as they are able to showcase the type of country and society they want to create. Throughout the World Cup in Brazil this was evident on all scales.

The 2008 financial crisis left the Brazilian economy relatively unscathed (Cull and Peria, 2013). This provided impetus for the Brazilian government to 're-imagineer' Brazil as a prosperous country, ready for investment and trade. This process also had to reflect the contemporary global political economy, as Brazil wanted to be perceived as an environmentally concerned nation with a cohesive social fabric. The choice of mascot, the opening ceremony and graphics in the official documentation all built an image of cohesion between the economy, the environment and the Brazilian people. This 're-imagineering' effort failed when over a million people took to the streets in June and July 2013 to challenge the ruling classes.

As Chapter 4 showed, the mobilisations directly challenged the vision of the elites and in an attempt to squash these protests, the Brazilian government deployed the military police. Videos and photos displaying the military police's violent methods were spread through social media, and eventually mainstream media, when journalists were injured whilst covering the protests. This conflated the feeling of anger towards the government and the protests intensified. Thus, the deployment of military police did not aid the 're-imagineering' project of Brazilian elites, instead, drew comparisons from some protestors about the similarities to the previous dictatorships. Pablo, a student from Brasilia was

particularly vocal in this, calling the deployment of the military police outside the football stadium in Brasilia as 'absurd' (Chapter 4).

In addition, the social unrest did not reflect well on FIFA and their corporate partners. They attempted to distance themselves from the grievances from the protestors by releasing a FAQ document described in Chapter Three (FIFA, 2014a). This was the first time FIFA defended its position and actions in relation to the World Cup. These mobilisations were the first large scale protests against hosting the World Cup, and, for the first time, the themes that scholars discussed in the literature were evident on protest placards (Tilley, 2006, Hagn and Maennig, 2009, Mol, 2010, Chalip, 2006, Hall, 2012, Whitson and Horne, 2006, Whitson et al., 2006, Roche, 2000, Roche, 2002).

The 're-imagineering' project in Mato Grosso was even more of a failure. Mato Grosso is viewed by those outside Mato Grosso as a backward, rural state with only soya fields run by corrupt elites. Internationally, there was also the 'hamburger connection' (Myers, 1981), which blamed deforestation on the production of commodity exports. The 're-imagineering' project and in particular, the infrastructure programme in Cuiabá , was thought to present Cuiabá as a forward thinking, environmentally friendly and innovative capital city. The airport renovations, new stadium and new railway system infrastructure projects all failed, and in fact, reinforced the images of corruption, ineptitude and backwardness. I will now discuss each in turn.

First, as described in Chapter 5, the VLT could be viewed as similar to the Gautrain in Johannesburg (Van Der Westhuizen, 2007, van der Westhuizen and Swart, 2011) and was thought to enable Cuiabá to compete as a 'world city'. However, the institutional corruption, profiteering and kickbacks to elites resulted in an unfinished project. For the residents of Cuiabá it now acts as a daily reminder of corruption. This view is exemplified by the view of a college teacher from Verzae Grande: 'what the international community see and hear about is good, however, what we as locals see and experience is

not good. They do not care about us, what we have to do, what we have to see every day. They only care about the international community' (Chapter 5). The supposed environmentally friendly construction of the Pantanal Stadium would also make it a globally competitive stadium. However, Chapter 5 again illuminated the cronyism and impunity associated with the contracts, this led the stadium to have structural problems and it fell short on the criteria to be certified LEED standard. Again, the stadium does not deliver the social benefit claims made for the residents of Cuiabá. Third, again as Chapter 5 illustrated the airport renovations would enable visitors to arrive in Cuiabá at a modern and beautiful airport. This was important as the airport is often the first experience visitors would have of Cuiabá. However, for the World Cup, the renovations were incomplete and signage was hung around the airport to hide unfinished work. The first impressions of visitors during the World Cup would have been of a construction zone. This is in line with to Curi et al. (2011) who discuss how 'unsightly' Favelas that were visible from the roadside between the international airport and hotels on Copacabana beach in Rio de Janeiro were hidden by advertising boards during the Pan-America Games in 2007. These short-term measures contribute to the 're-imagineering' of a place by physically hiding the truth from visitors. However, in the case of the airport renovations, the dust and noise from the construction work was not hidden by the posters. As I have shown throughout Chapter 5, the 're-imagineering' project in Cuiabá had dramatically failed. This is an exemplary case where corruption and impunity prevented the successful 're-imagineering' of a place.

These three infrastructure programmes, in addition to the contribution to 're-imagineering', were also supposed to leave a social benefit for the residents of Cuiabá . These social benefits were negated by corruption or appropriated by elites through large contracts. As shown in Chapter 5, the Pantanal Stadium is a 'white-elephant'. Even though the official capacity of stadium was reduced from 44,000 to 10,000 after construction concerns, there is no demand for it. The exterior of the stadium, which was meant to provide a safe route for runners and cyclists, is cracked and unfit for use. It has turned into a burden on tax payers as the state paid for repairs and seeks to prosecute contractors who have not

finished work. This speaks to those scholars who suggest that the sporting facilities after a sports mega-event are either not publically available, or are inappropriate (Whitson et al., 2006, Horne and Manzenreiter, 2004). The VLT which promised to solve traffic issues and over-crowding on local buses instead exacerbated these problems.

Had the infrastructure programmes worked, the social benefits would have been shared by both the residents and elites. However, the short-term view of the elites, by appropriating these benefits and re-distributing wealth upwards, has resulted in an infrastructure programme which worked to reconfirm the view that most outside of Mato Grosso has of the state. The residents of Cuiabá are left with old and over-crowded buses that contribute to heavy traffic in the city.

8.2: Sport mega-events and environmental claims

In addition to the social benefits that elites claim, the FIFA World Cup is also claimed to provide environmental neutrality. FIFA created the 'Football for the Planet' programme to ensure the World Cup can be environmentally friendly through focusing on three areas: monitoring and compensation for greenhouse gases emissions resulting from the activities, certified green stadiums and waste management and recycling (FIFA, 2011b). However, Reis and DaCosta (2012) argued that there is often a gap between what elites claim to have achieved in environmental programmes at sports mega-events, and what actually happens on the ground. Those that have discussed the aims of environmental programmes at sports mega-events have not investigated the claims (Diederichs and Roberts, 2015, Witt and Loots, 2011). This thesis then addresses this gap by providing a critically informed, qualitative analysis of these claims. The investigation draws from the concepts of the critical carbon offsetting literature (Bachram, 2004, Bailey et al., 2011, Bello, 2009, Bumpus and Liverman, 2008, Cabello, 2009). I therefore draw from these studies to discuss carbon offsetting in the context of the FIFA World Cup.

My findings throughout the thesis constructed an overview of the mechanisms used by elites to co-opt environmental governance. At the national level, FIFAs approach to host a carbon neutral event was supporting by domestic climate change politics. It was found that politicians who supported a more radical view of environmental protection were isolated under a power struggle between two opposing factions in the Climate Change Committee. The conservative faction, who supported financial mechanisms and in turn, the neoliberalisation of nature, were able to develop policies to reflect this. Both the FIFA and Brazilian government approach to environmental protection was then approached through the ecological modernisation paradigm and enabled for a clear programme to be established which was reliant on technological innovation and offsetting. This included certified green stadiums and a carbon offsetting programme (FIFA, 2011c).

Specifically, it is the findings in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 which speaks to the assertion of Reis and DaCosta (2012) that there is usually a gap between what organisers claims by the way of environmental programmes and the reality on the ground. The Pantanal Stadium was supposed to be a green stadium and contribute to the World Cup being environmentally neutral. However, as Chapter 5 illustrated, the unfinished construction works meant that it is yet to gain LEED accreditation. The problems with construction, including the leaking roof, were attributed to the management of the construction process itself. The state did not act to reprimand unfinished work and have since paid for the maintenance charges. This financial commitment is in addition to the fine payable to the Federal Development Bank as a consequence of not attaining the LEED accreditation. To date, the failure of the Pantanal Stadium to gain green certification questions the environmental claims of the green World Cup in Cuiabá .

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Carbon offsetting

The carbon offsetting programme which was claimed to offset the Pantanal Stadium was the Green River Project in Barranco Alto I and II. FIFA claimed in 2011 that 3,000 families would receive direct Payment for Ecosystem Services by planting 1.4 million trees (FIFA, 2011). Secopa also claimed in 2011 that R$710,000 (£166,652) would be 'allocated in the form of payments for ecosystem services to bankside municipalities' (Ascom, 2011, de Cassia, 2011). As Chapters 6 and 7 showed, these claims were not implemented on the ground. The NGO who organised the offsetting project, the Green Action Institute, also controlled the organisation that verified the emission reductions. As I demonstrate in Chapter 6, the Green Action Institute were allowed to abuse this position, changing the methodology used to calculate the emissions. This saw the number of trees needed to be planted fall from 1.4 million to 70,000. However, Chapter 6 also illustrated how no new trees were planted for the offsetting of the Pantanal Stadium. Instead, the Green Action Institute used trees already assigned credits to other Mato Grosso based organisations who had previously purchased credits.

This case aligns with arguments found in the critical carbon offsetting literature. In particular, it aligns with Bumpus and Liverman (2008), Böhm et al., (2011) and Lohmann (2009) who fundamentally question the appropriateness of carbon offsetting as a climate change mitigation tool. Through offsetting the construction of the Pantanal Stadium, elite classes were able to spectate the football matches in what they were led to believe was an environmentally friendly stadium. This is supported by the notion of Gilbertson and Reyes (2009) and Bumpus and Liverman (2008) that carbon offsetting allows the global North to continue their high emission lifestyle at the expense of the global South. The Green River Project was a small scale carbon offsetting project which encouraged global football fans to travel to Cuiabá and watch the football matches, under the illusion of a carbon neutral stadium. To those fans, not only would the stadium be carbon neutral, but local poor communities would receive

benefits. However, as Chapters 6 and 7 illustrated the local population were detrimentally affected. First, Chapter 6 showed how the Green Action Institute fraudulently sold the carbon offsets from the trees twice, with no repercussions. This speaks to Bachram (2004) who suggests that the market is 'dangerously reliant upon the integrity of corporations to file accurate reports of emissions levels and reductions' (Ibid:8). Second, Chapter 7 illustrated that the local community had their livelihoods taken from them and had to surrender a valuable part of their land in the name of conservation. Again, Bachram (2004) cautioned how peasants in Amazonia were removed from their land to make way for carbon offsetting. For these reasons, the global North were able to continue their high emissions lifestyle by travelling to the Pantanal Stadium so the false presumption the stadium was environmentally friendly.

Referring back to organisational integrity (Bachram, 2004: see above), the integrity of the Green Action Institute was also questioned by the SEMA ecologist as problematized in Chapter 6. She explained how the Green Action Institute was supposed to monitor the compliance of the project participants and continue working with the communities. However, in 2015 the nursery in Barranco Alto I was abandoned and, in March 2016, the Green Action Institute's website had changed. The previous homepage had several articles and photos relating to the Green River Project, however this was replaced with new projects in Cuiabá (Green Action Institute, 2016). Monitoring and evaluation of such projects are said to be essential for the success of a project (UN REDD+, 2012), but the critical carbon offsetting literature suggests the conflict of interest inherent in the system has led to a lack of funding into monitoring of the carbon trading mechanism (Boas, 2011). It is perhaps the conflict of interest that led to a lack of monitoring of the Green River Project. The project could be seen to work in the interests of trade and elite tourism. As I have shown in Chapter 7 it had little to do with environmental protection, and therefore the monitoring of the project was not in the interest of the Green Action Institute.

The literature also suggests that carbon offsetting can lead to the entrenchment of pre-existing power relations. However, these arguments were made without empirical evidence and based at the international level where the Global South were suppressed by the Global North (Lohmann and Böhm, 2011, Böhm et al., 2011). This argument can be seen empirically in the case of the Green River Project on a regional and local scale. In Chapter 6, the *ruralistas* maintained their hegemonic social relations and even furthered their presence in the less economically important areas of South-West Mato Grosso. The Green Action Institute developed activities in areas which were not of economic importance to the elites. At the regional scale, it contributed to the actions to 're-imagineer' Mato Grosso as environmentally friendly. The actions in South-West Mato Grosso then had positive benefits for those agri-industrial actors in other areas of the state. This was thought to deflect and pre-empt further international environmental criticism of the state. They were even able to create new alliances with SEMA. This further secured their social relations in the area.

The organisation of the project, in addition to the project itself, was seen to also contribute to entrenching social relations. The location of the project is one such example of this. According to the logic of carbon offsetting, the project could have occurred in any location (Lohmann, 2012). It was placed in a strategically important area for the *ruralistas.* Chapter 6 discussed how the asphalting of the MT-040 highway has increased the potential of tourism in the area. Infrastructures needed to host these tourists are also becoming more common on the river bank. The project then could be seen to increase the aesthetic appeal of the area and cater for tourist ideals. In reality, the project could have occurred on the ranches of the landed elite, instead it was in peasant and tourist communities that would not directly impinge on the activities of the *ruralistas.* In Chapter 7, it was shown how at the local scale the local residents lost their investments in a new income generating activity and had to turn over their most fertile land to conservation. The Green River Project then furthered the interest of elites whilst the local population were detrimentally impacted, further entrenching the current social relations. This case can then be said to support the arguments of Lovell and MacKenzie (2011) and Bailey et al., (2011) that

the carbon trading mechanism works in the interest of the elite, not the environment. This then adds to the sports mega-event literature which until now has assumed carbon offsetting brings environmental benefit. It opens a new area of literature which critically engages with the claims.

Moving onto the literature which addresses carbon forestry projects, the Green River Project reflects several of the arguments previously identified in the literature and was empirical evidence was presented in Chapter 7. The residents of Barranco Alto I and II received payments for planting the trees on their land. This was supposedly two wells and two water tanks, although the water tanks were not delivered (FIFA, 2011). The first well in Barranco Alto I worked after replacing the pump. The second well in Barranco Alto II was not constructed as the pit was dug too close to the river bank and the quality of water produced from the well was not deemed adequate. It was also inappropriate for them as they already had a functioning well supplied by the mayor of Santo Antonio do Leverger in 2001.

Iversen et al. (2006)'s work in Nepal illustrate how weak institutions allow local elites to appropriate benefits. Mathur et al. (2014) then call for institutional control to ensure equal payments to all participants. However, in the case of the Green Action Institute, it is the institutional actor who appropriates the benefits. A total of R$5,000,000 (£1,173,610) was paid to the Green Action Institute by the state government for the carbon offsets of the stadium. Chapter 7 illustrated that these trees were never planted and questions the benefits the residents of Barranco Alto I and II received. The communities received two water wells which cost R$30,000 (£7,041), a small percentage of the R$710,000 (£166,652) promised by Secopa. It is clear to see, that just from this one instance of Secopa purchasing carbon credits (it was reported over 18 companies brought carbon credits) that there has been unequal benefit distribution. The call for stronger institutions is not applicable to all cases, as in the case of the Green River project, it was the NGO that appropriated the benefits.

The well was also chosen by the Green Action Institute, even though other benefits, and direct cash payments, were requested by the residents. Gross-Camp et al. (2012) suggest in their study direct cash payments were also not supported by project elites as they thought the community would 'waste' the money. Although this was not directly said by the Green Action Institute, they admitted they did ask the community what they wanted, but ignored this and chose what they thought was a suitable payment. As Chapter 7 illustrated, according to them, direct payments were never a possibility. The trail of money is also not in the public domain, making any transactions impossible to trace. It has become apparent that the institutional elites have appropriated some proportion of the money collected for carbon credits and used the remainder to deliver inappropriate benefits.

In summary, the empirical evidence presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 contributed and extended key arguments in the critical carbon offsetting literature. It also opened new areas of investigation in the sports mega-event literature which had not previously engaged with carbon offsetting.

8.3: NGOs

As I discussed in the previous section, and in addition to the specific problems associated with carbon forestry projects, the governance of projects can also be problematic. The following section explores the role of the NGO, the Green Action Institute, in the carbon offsetting project.

Unlike other rural states, Mato Grosso does not have a large Landless Workers Movement, *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra* (MST), and the civil society sector is generally viewed as weak (Jesus, 2006). This has allowed for elite actors to control some areas of civil society. The local media is one example of an important civil society actor that is controlled by elite interests. When the *Folha de*

Estado newspaper published articles that opposed the activities of some elite actors, the editor-in-chief was shot dead. Similarly, *Diario de Cuiabá* was only viable through the personal connections of the editor and the publication of articles which furthered the agenda of the elites (Martins, 2013). Thus these cases illustrated how some aspects of civil society were already controlled by elites. The Green Action Institute has another example of how elites were able to manipulate a weak civil society (Jesus, 2006) to further their own interests.

However the OSCIP mechanism created a different mechanism for which elites could secure control in civil society. As discussed in Chapter 2, the OSCIP mechanism in Brazil was designed to give progressive NGOs more voice. This was in the hope that a more active civil society sector would encourage participation in politics and therefore deepen democracy. However, Chapter 6 illustrated how in Mato Grosso it created another space for elite control. The founding industrial organisations control all decision making at the Green Action Institute, and, hence, instead of deepening democracy in Mato Grosso, the OSCIP acted as a vehicle for elites to maintain their social relations.

Foweraker (2001) suggested that alliances can form between the state and NGOs. Under the OSCIP mechanism, these alliances are legitimate as an NGO can only become accredited OSCIP status if it works together with a state agency. It could be argued that this alliance could lead to the state manufacturing civil society, as proposed by Hodgson (2004). However, as we have seen in the case of the Green Action Institute, the NGO was actually manufactured by the elite corporate associations of Mato Grosso. In addition, the argument of Tvedt (1998) can also be furthered. Initially, it could be argued the Green Action Institute did start as a 'transmission belt' of ideas from the state. The Green River project was created by SEMA and therefore by joining with SEMA, the Green Action Institute supported their ideas. As the SEMA ecologist described in Chapter 7, SEMA already had planned the project before the Green Action Institute became involved. However, as the project developed, the Green Action Institute sought external sources of funding through carbon offsetting, thus changing the

relationship between the state actor and the NGO. The corporate elites, through the development of the carbon offsetting project were able to use the Green Action Institute as a 'transmission belt' for their ideas. The power changed from the state actors to the corporate actors who controlled the NGO.

The role of the corporate sector in influencing NGO behaviour in the environmental sector has recently been addressed (Klein, 2015, Choudry and Kapoor, 2013, Sapinski, 2015). These studies, as previously noted, focused on corporate actors influencing NGOs through funding. This thesis develops the argument to show how some elite actors have been able to manufacture a civil society actor in their interests. Control of the NGO did not come from the dependency of the corporate sectors financial contributions, but instead, from the corporate actors who formed the board of directors of the NGO.

These elite actors were able to ensure the 'transmission belt' of their ideas to the NGO was consistent through 'interlocking'. Sapinski (2015) names 'interlocking' as the phenomenon of when a board member has a seat in both a G500 company, 500 of the largest transnational corporations, and an international environmental NGO. This, he argues, creates 'greater cohesion among corporate elites' (Ibid: 269), which further secures their social relations. 'Interlocking' can be found in the case of the Green Action Institute (as discussed in Chapter 6), as the board members also all had prominent positions in the corporate founding institutions.

Tvedt (1998) argues that some NGOs do not act in their own interests. The Green Action Institute could be argued to be working to a different agenda. The aim of the Green Action Institute, as displayed on their website, was to further educate the population about their environmental awareness and create employment for the local community through a reforestation project (Green Action Institute, 2012). The aim was challenged by the evidence I provided in Chapters 6 and 7. Perhaps the aims of the NGO are more aligned to that of the then director, Paul Borges, who reportedly said 'since NGOs are coming here to talk about what we are doing wrong, we will create an NGO to show what we are doing good' (Galvão

and El-Jaick, 2010). In this sense then, the NGO works to deflect international environmental criticism and contribute to the hegemonic project of the *ruralistas* in Mato Grosso.

From this case, it can be suggested that the corporate sector have found new ways to ensure their ideology is the dominant one in civil society. Previously, the state and corporate sector had influenced already established civil society actors through partnerships and funding. However, the OSCIP mechanism presented a new opportunity for elites and allowed them to legitimately create their own civil society actor with an environmental guise. The elites could then make decisions on the actions and aims of the NGO. This control was further secured by the organisational structure which was an example of 'interlocking' (Sapinski, 2015).

8.4: Neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance

The data presented in Chapters 5,6, and 7 has shown that elites in Mato Grosso were able to use personal connections to further their own agenda and profiteer with impunity. This section explains these elite dynamics through a neo-Gramscian frame of analysis. Central to this understanding is the concept of 'hegemony', whereby social relations are secured through alliances. The corporate, state and civil society sectors all contribute to the maintenance and enhancement of these relations (Simon, 1991).

As I have argued in Chapter 1 and 2, the global hegemonic project can be seen as neoliberal capitalism with the FIFA World Cup firmly positioned within it. Challenges to the neoliberal project include environmental concerns and wealth inequalities. FIFA's attempts to respond to these challenges are programmes such as 'Football for the Planet' and 'Football for Hope'. The 'Football for the Planet' programme works within the ecological modernisation paradigm, which suggests the World Cup can be environmentally friendly through offsetting emissions, constructing green stadiums and managing waste and recycling (FIFA 2011c, Chapter 4). As it is assumed these actions lead to an environmentally friendly

tournament, environmental criticism is deflected. The 'Football for Hope' programme works to help alleviate poverty through creating projects that work with young people. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have shown that the assumptions of FIFA do not necessarily lead to an environmentally friendly and socially beneficial event. The neo-Gramscian lens helps to explain how these power relations help to build and maintain hegemonic social relations that benefit the elites. The next section unpacks this further in regard to the elites of Mato Grosso.

The hegemonic project of the ruralistas

As discussed in Chapter 5, the *ruralistas* hegemonic project is to ensure the economic and social conditions for a commodity focused export economy. This project fits with the national hegemonic project of export-led growth, which in turn fits into the global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism. The *ruralistas* of Mato Grosso and other surrounding states have an important role in Brazilian society as it is believed their income has helped to fund national development programmes (Ban, 2013). The *ruralistas* are the agro-business elites and their associated networks who migrated from Southern Brazilian states in the 1960s and 1970s under a Federal programme, this was discussed in Chapter 5. They are predominantly white, upper-class rural land owners (Trevathan, 2015), an example of one such farmer, Dona Maria was given in Chapter 5. Through agricultural modernisation techniques they were able to quickly gain control of the Mato Grosso economy and have since secured positions of power in nearly every level of the state government. This has resulted in them becoming the ruling class of Mato Grosso and they have been able to secure their power base at the regional scale through various social relations. The control of the local media was one example of this.

The ability of this class to 'jump scales' (Smith, 1992) means they are gaining control at the national level. Representatives from political institutions and civil society groups, such as the agricultural lobby, are able to influence policy at the national scale. The appointment of Blairo Maggi as first the Environmental Minister, then Agricultural Minister, is a further example of how the *ruralistas* are able to

develop a power base at the national level. This power at the national level works to secure their social relations at the regional scale as they can work to ensure their interests are further entrenched in national policy.

With a secure power base at the regional level and developing influence at the national scale, the *ruralistas* have absolute power at the local scale. As discussed in Chapter 7, the local residents do not have an alliance at the regional or national scale and therefore were unable to 'jump scales' and challenge the project. These actions work in opposition to the emancipatory view of scholars writing on empirical instances of jumping scales. Zanotti (2011) described how the subordinated class were able to obtain leverage by creating alliances on the higher scale, an indigenous group in the Amazon were able to challenge elite actors by forming a network with sympathetic actors at the regional and international level. This group were able to successfully defend their land. However, the residents of Barranco Alto I and II had their livelihoods and investments taken from them in the name of conservation. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the location of the project meant it did not encroach on elite interest, in fact, it worked to strengthen their elite leisure activities. The carbon offsetting project could have been located on the land of the agri-businesses, however, peasant small holders bore the brunt of offsetting a project they had no part in.

Further, naming Pesqueiro Florida as a 'traditional village' in the project documents can be seen to further the interest of the elite and help to legitimise the carbon offsetting project. Recent carbon sequestration projects, and in particular REDD+, have advocated the idea that carbon offsetting can also help achieve sustainable development goals (Leggett and Lovell, 2012, Sukhdev et al., 2012, Watson et al., 2013). These goals, including poverty alleviation, are foundational to many projects seeking to achieve entry onto the carbon markets. Therefore, by the documents suggesting Pesqueiro Florida was in fact Barra do Aricá, a peasant community, makes the project appear to be working towards sustainable development.

At the micro level, it was only the residents of Pesqueiro Florida who benefitted from the project. They received a gabion to prevent river erosion, although this was part of SEMA's project, not the carbon offsetting aspect. These residents were also elites and many of the properties were holiday homes for residents in other cities in Mato Grosso (Chapter 7). The project then worked to entrench elite, local level interest and reproduce social relations in line with the hegemonic project. The carbon offsetting project did not work for environmental protection and erosion of the river bank, instead it worked for elite tourism and trade of mega crops. The elites who use this stretch of river for recreational fishing are able to enjoy an aesthetically pleasing tree-lined river bank. A wider implication of this project is that it did not affect the agri-business elites and they were able to continue their economic activities. This is in stark relation to the residents of Barranco Alto I and II. One of the mechanisms the elite had at their disposal was the network of alliances between the civil society and state sectors, an integral state (Simon, 1991).

The integral state and coercion

Levy and Egan (2003), Banerjee (2011) and Dimitrov (2010) in their investigations all discuss how civil society legitimises the ideology of the elite class. The Green Action Institute, through the guise of environmental protection, were able to legitimise the ideology of the *ruralistas* in the civil society sector. These relations were further strengthened by the integral state formed between the Green Action institute, SEMA and the public prosecutors. As Chapter 7 illustrated, the initial passive resistance to the Green River Project by participants, by not planting the trees, was met with legally binding contracts, a coercive method drawn by the state prosecution. In effect, the integral state of the NGO and the state actors created an 'amour of coercion' (Simon, 1991:73) which prevented residents challenging the project without legal consequences. They therefore conformed to the project although consent was not given willingly.

Other forms of coercion can be seen throughout the thesis. At the national scale, the anti-World Cup mobilisations were coercively controlled through the military police. This method was not as successful

as the TAC at the local scale, as social media spread images of the police using violent force on protestors which further strengthened the mobilisations.

The methods available to elite actors to control society can be seen to be different, at different scales. Although arguably both had the desired effect – to coercively control the population into consenting to the hegemonic project – they were achieved in different ways, and to different degrees of success. The consent of the project participants at the local scale was won immediately with the issuing of the TAC and the Green Action Institute could begin to sell the carbon. Chapter 4 discussed the coercive control of the military police at the national scale during the mobilisations was further challenged by the intensification of the mobilisations organised through social media. This added to general ill-feeling towards the government which continued into the economic recession and subsequent government corruption investigation.

At the regional scale coercion was not needed as assumed impunity for elite actors led to the consent of the hegemonic project. The impunity is not absolute as was highlighted by the arrest of the former governor, Silval Barbosa. This could indicate that the hegemonic relations, who for so long ruled Mato Grosso, are starting to become destabilised. From this empirical evidence, it can then be seen how the tool on an integral state was essential to the elites maintaining their powerful positions. This evidence supports literature which suggests alliances form between elite actors (Taylor, 2004, Levy and Newell, 2002) but shows explicitly how it is achieved. Namely, by manufacturing civil society elites were able to co-opt the environmental projects of the World Cup in Cuiabá and further their agenda. Through these hegemonic relations the residents in the villages were coerced into participating into a project which forced them to surrender their livelihoods (Chapter 7).

8.5: The World Cup and sustainability

This thesis has shown that through the appropriation of the green discourse of the FIFA World Cup, elites were able to work to further their own agenda. The infrastructure programmes in Mato Grosso did not provide residents with sustainable, public infrastructure. Instead, they were an example of re-distribution of wealth upwards through impunity. The carbon offsetting project failed to have any significant environmental benefits for the construction of the Pantanal Stadium. Instead, it coerced residents into taking responsbility for river bank erosion and emissions which they did not create. This acceptance of responsibility meant that the residents had to change land use from the sugarcane project to planting trees (Chapter 7). This essentially removed their livelihood and has the potential to impact the affected communties into the future.

As shown in Chapter 7, the President of Barranco Alto I suggested that young people are migrating out of the villages and he saw the sugarcane project as the answer to ensuring a viable community. The Green River project essentially prevented this project and has reduced the opportunities for young people in the villages. The long-term impacts of this small scale project are important as it is the legacy of a global event, which claims to bring social benefits to the residents of host countries.

This thesis reacted to the claim of Reis and DaCosta and supports their assertion that there is a gap between what elites claim and what happens on the ground in relation to environmental claims at the World Cup. Further research into the long-term effects of this project and research into environmental claims at different sports mega-events will further develop the understanding of how elites appropriate the green agenda to further their own interests.

8.6: Conclusion

This discussion chapter aimed to explore the results of my empirical research in relation to the literature presented in Chapter 2. The conceptual arguments of 'greening' sports mega-events, carbon offsetting

as a climate change mitigation tool, and the role of NGOs have all been taken forward. The actions of the elites in Mato Grosso were understood through the neo-Gramscian framework which saw how their agency was affected by their ability to 'jump scales'.

The social benefit claims of many host nations and cities have been challenged in academic literature (Roche, 2000, Roche, 1992). However, the 2014 FIFA World Cup was the first which saw a large mobilisation against hosting the event. Central to many social benefit claims is the 're-imagineering' of host cities. It was found the 're-imagineering' project in Mato Grosso and Cuiabá yielded greater benefits for local elites than the local population. The unfinished and sub-standard infrastructure programmes gave elites the opportunity to profiteer through contracts whilst the local population have increased traffic problems and inadequate public transport. Chapter 5 was central to this argument which explores the national claims at the regional level.

The understanding of the role of corporate actors and their influence on NGOs was significantly furthered in this discussion chapter. This study illustrated that corporate actors have now developed their sphere of influence to actually create a NGO which serves in their interests. The *ruralistas* were able to legitimately create an NGO through the OSCIP mechanism, this NGO, with the façade of environmental sustainability was able to co-opt a project which served to re-image Mato Grosso as an environmentally friendly state. Previous studies had linked corporate actors and NGOs through direct or indirect funding, but this is the first study to identify an environmental NGO which was created by corporate elites. The role of the NGO, the Green Action Institute in organising the implementation of the carbon offsetting project was investigated in Chapter 6. This provided a unique case where it was seen the NGO was manufactured by corporate elites. The organisation of the NGO then lent itself to 'interlocking' as all directors of the NGO were employees of the industrial associations which formed the NGO. The conflict of interest of the NGO was further exacerbated but the Green Action Institute controlling the organisation which verified the carbon offsets (Chapter 6).

The mechanisms of control that the elite used were viewed through a neo-Gramscian approach. This enabled an understanding in how elite actors were able to configure their social relations to further their interest. Of particular importance was the role of the integral state. The relationship between the Green Action Institute and SEMA and the public prosecutors meant challenging the project was difficult.

-Conclusion -

The current global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism has contributed to the rise and intensification of many global issues. The environmental crisis is just one example of a global problem that neoliberal capitalism has addressed by incorporating it into the organisation of capitalism. Through the ecological modernisation paradigm the environmental crisis was thought to be well on the way to being solved when the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997. However, after 19 years the earth continues to warm and the transnational capitalist class continue to earn.

This thesis illustrated how the ecological modernisation paradigm enables an impasse on environmental action as it allows mechanisms which assume environmental protection and economic growth are compatible. In particular, this thesis focused on carbon offsetting.

Carbon offsetting has caught the attention of a range of scholars from different disciplines. Scholarly debate in the social sciences has been divided by those who believe that carbon offsetting provides an opportunity to mitigate against GHG emissions whilst industries adapt to carbon neutral energy sources; and those who fundamentally disagree with the assumptions of the market. In both sets of literature concerns over benefit distribution, land tenure, hegemonic relations in addition to questioning the environmental impact of these projects can be found. This has led some scholars to suggest carbon offsetting is not an appropriate mechanism to fight climate change (Bohm, 2008, Lohmann 2012, Bumpus and Livermann, 2008). Nonetheless, carbon offsetting, particularly from forestry is gaining in

importance in the international climate change discourse. It has been accepted by the UNFCCC as an appropriate mechanism to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in COP 20.

The overall aim of my thesis was to explore a carbon offsetting project on the ground, however, the data led me to explore how the environmental discourse had been co-opted by rural elites in Mato Grosso. Environmental awareness had increased in Mato Grosso, primarily due to increased international attention to the Amazon rainforest and international NGO campaigns such as the publication of the 2006 Greenpeace report. Over time, the elites in Mato Grosso worked to change the image to an environmentally forward thinking state. The FIFA World Cup held in Brazil 2014 provided a vehicle to showcase Mato Grosso as an environmental friendly state, and the green agenda was subsequently pushed through various infrastructure programmes. The new football stadium in Cuiabá aimed to obtain an international accreditation standard, LEED, which acknowledged the ecologically aware construction methods. As part of this programme, unavoidable emissions were offset through a reforestation programme which was located in the South West of the state.

The case was chosen as the subject of the thesis as there was a lack of literature on carbon offsetting at sports mega-events, and the overall agenda of staging a 'green' event. The Pantanal Stadium was a bi-lateral project between a Mato Grosso based construction company, a Mato Grosso based NGO and the Mato Grosso World Cup organising committee. This therefore allowed for an analysis of scales to be applied. In addition, to investigate the hegemonic relations among government departments, corporations and NGOs within the distinctive empirical setting of rural Mato Grosso this thesis has argued for a neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance. The neo-Gramscian approach was advocated as the current ecological modernisation paradigm seen in contemporary environmental decision making neglects the concept of power and strives toward maintaining the status quo. The emancipatory theoretical framework of the neo-Gramscian approach encourages an investigation of the relations of power and identifies potential for counter-hegemonic movements in civil society. This

framework then directly challenges ecological modernisation and seeks to disrupt the powerful elite in their quest to secure hegemony. It also challenges the increasingly ubiquitous ideology that ecological modernisation is the only option in the global fight against climate change.

Neo-Gramcian approaches incorporate multiple actors from the state, civil society and corporate sectors in their understanding of governance (Simon, 1991). The organisation of governance in Mato Grosso was unique as regional elites can be found in powerful positions in all sectors. The relationships between actors are enhanced and maintained through events such as the World Cup. The neo-Gramscian approach in this thesis was applied in a new context, previously studies have concentrated on policy level projects on a global scale. The scalar theorisation therefore allowed this analysis at a local scale. Additionally, new methods were introduced in this framework, previously it had been reliant on case studies and ethnography allowed the researcher to gain access to the field and understand the realities on the ground.

The methods used in the fieldwork phase of the research enabled a new perspective on how hegemony is contested at the local level. I undertook eleven months of ethnographic research in 2014 and 2015. Ethnographic research was important for the thesis as previous studies using the neo-Gramscian approach had not addressed the claims elites had made and their results on the ground. Due to the nature of the investigation, and my position as an 'outsider', it was essential to develop long-term relationships with the participants and build their trust. Formal interviews, semi-structured interviews, participant observations, observations and documentary analysis were used to triangulate the claims of project elites against accounts from the local community. Documentary analysis was used at the national and regional scale, complemented with interviews to understand the dialectic relationship of the scales.

The use of scales in this thesis was particularly important when exploring the role of NGOs. Civil society actors have a prominent role to play in the carbon trading mechanism through roles including monitoring and evaluation (Bachram, 2004). The role civil society actors have means there is increased

potential for corporate and state actors to influence the actions of civil society. Civil society actors, particularly NGOs have a long history of being influenced, co-opted and funded by both state and corporate actors (Tvedt, 1998, Foweraker, 2001, Klein, 2015). To further the understanding of NGOs within the carbon trading mechanism then has value, the scale approach allowed for an understanding of how the NGO legitimately created the project. Although the NGO actions at the local scale were questionable, the actions were legitimised through actions at the regional scale.

This conclusion chapter aims to consolidate the arguments and outline the unique contribution to knowledge this thesis made. I first discuss the empirical findings in relation to my research questions, second I analyse the theoretical implications of my empirical data, recommendations for future research are given in the context of these implications and finally the limitations of this study are explored. This chapter finishes by suggesting that further understanding of the governance of carbon offsetting projects need to be understood in order to prevent further impasse on climate change action.

9.1: Empirical findings

This section synthesises the empirical findings in relation to the research questions. My research was guided by the following research questions:

- What are the political, social and economic contexts within which the Green River Project operates?
- What was the process in which the carbon offsetting project was established and implemented?
- How have actors on different scales been affected by the project?

Research question one

What are the political, social and economic contexts within which the Green River Project operates?

This question was answered on all three scales by contextualising the project into historic, and contemporary, socio-political events. First, the global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism was identified as the over-arching phenomena guiding the actions. A national elite were identified in chapter 4 which wanted to create a 'green' discourse around the World Cup. In the current environmental crisis Brazil are in a unique position as owners of the majority of the world's largest rainforest. They stand on the line between protecting the rainforest for global good or developing the area for private and national economic wealth. A green agenda at the World Cup was thought to enhance the international 'green' reputation of Brazil. This was seen as especially important during the neoliberal era where competition for direct foreign investment and trade is high (Harvey, 2005).

In the national context of Brazil, the Brazilian economy consented to this project by being a major exporter of commodities, this directly fitted with Mato Grosso at the regional scale who are the largest commodity exporters in Brazil. At the local scale, peasant small holders are continually and strategically isolated from the export industry. These different scales dialectically formed the context of the Green River Project.

On a regional scale, Mato Grosso was seen as a key area to challenge the negative associations that Brazil has to environmental issues. The legal boundary of the Amazon falls within Mato Grosso and it is also home to the North Western section of the Pantanal biome. These two ecosystems are habitats for an array of endangered flora and fauna and are both UNESCO biome reserves. The Cerrado region and increasingly the Amazon and Pantanal, are of national importance for soya and cotton cultivation, important export commodities for Brazil. Mato Grosso is therefore at the heart of Brazil's quest for economic development whilst ensuring environmental protection.

On a local scale it was seen how the population of Baixada Cuiabána is diverse and economic inequality is high. The indigenous population were displaced or killed during the colonisation period then wage labourers were brought to work in the sugar plantations. These workers were left in-situ when the sugar industry demised in the early 20th century. Throughout this period, political organisation was based on oligarchic relationships. This has developed into a regional elite of corporate and political actors who are tightly networked. The peasant population are left isolated from decision making and have experienced numerous projects that are incomplete or do little to improve the standard of living.

In terms of decision making this led to the creation of the *projeto agregação de valor a produção através da agro industrialização* (added value production through agro industrialization) it was designed to increase the industrial output of the villages. The project in Barra do Aricá was never implemented due to organisational issues within the village and by the project organisers. The second project in Barranco Alto effectively stopped when the Green River Project began as it used the APP, an area which is prohibited to cultivate. The failure of these projects highlights how they were not created with the full participation from the community. As in many other areas of the world this population experience one development project after another, all in the name of rural development (Ferguson, 1990).

The elites in all of these scales can be seen to further their own agenda whilst contributing to the global hegemonic project of neoliberal capitalism. The hegemonic class at the national scale used coercion through the military police to quash the popular movements and coercion through the passing of the new law to ensure project participation at the local scale. Subtler forms of coercion such as tax breaks and contracts were used at the regional scale to stabilise the hegemonic project. These coercive methods were different at the different scales but were influential in ensuring the project continued at all scales.

However, this was not stable. The political relations strained at the regional scale to the extent the former governor of Mato Grosso is now in jail. The contracts and kickbacks he endorsed were found to be illegal, the World Cup infrastructure in Mato Grosso was seen to be part of the illegal activities. The

Pantanal Stadium and VLT were the two largest infrastructure programmes in Cuiabá. Both were said to have environmental benefits and furthered the 'green' agenda of elites in Mato Grosso. However, the infrastructure for the residents has also not been successful. After only one year from the construction of the stadium, the Arena Pantanal can be seen to have numerous problems. The VLT run over budget and became financially unviable, large tracts of road which were made for the VLT now lay unused increasing traffic and air pollution in the city. Cuiabá has been show cased in several FIFA outlets as an example of a 'green' city, therefore the hegemonic class in Mato Grosso succeeded in their aim, to the detriment of the local population and wider environment.

At the local level, the co-optation of the civil society sector by the rural elites ensured relations of domination which was legitimised coercively through SEMA and the public ministry. This domination meant there was no space for the local population to challenge the Green Action Institute and there was a broad acceptance that there would be no more money for the community. Once again the local population were isolated from the project benefits whilst the local elites could capitalise.

The context of the carbon offsetting project and other infrastructure projects around Cuiabá can then be seen to have elites on a number of scales working to create a 'green' discourse surrounding Mato Grosso. The hegemonic class have been able to prevent civil unrest through coercive means and relations of domination on all scales. This resulted in several actors gaining from the project and the local population and environment becoming disadvantaged.

Research question two

What was the process in which the carbon offsetting project was established and implemented?

Although data chapters four and five provide context, this research question was the main focus of chapters six and seven.

The Green River Project was found to initially be a conservation project implemented by SEMA; this was in response to an academic paper which suggested the Pantanal was being silted up by human induced erosion on river beds. In 2007 they were joined in the project by a local NGO named the Green Action Institute. This partnership was legitimised through a federal initiative, the OSCIP mechanism, which aimed to deepen democracy in Brazil by encouraging civil society actors to create partnerships with state agencies. The project was also created legitimately to enforce a federal environmental law which prohibits construction on river beds. These two legitimate forces, the project acting in response to a federal law, and the link between the NGO and the state department meant there was little opposition to the project at the local level. As Simon (1991) describes, the NGO and state had built an 'amour of coercion' which was impenetrable to the local population.

In addition to the legitimate relationship between the NGO and the state, the Green Action Institute also had links with the corporate sector. It was found that members on the board of the NGO 'interlocked' with boards of corporations in Mato Grosso. Sapinski (2015) used this term to describe when a director of an international environmental NGO was also a director of a G500 organisation, one of the biggest 500 companies in the world. In the case of the Green Action Institute all decision makes were found to be 'interlocking' with other institutes or organisations in Mato Grosso. This was due to the organisational structure of the NGO which sees one director from each of the founding institutions as a member of the board of the NGO. Their environmental expertise was also questioned, as none of them had a background in environmental management. At the regional scale it could be seen how relationships between the elite of the political and corporate sectors had the ability to control the civil society sector.

As a result of the power at the regional scale, the project was implemented in a top-down fashion. Those at the local scale were found to have little ability to influence the decision makers who were active at the regional scale. An ecologist from SEMA described how the project was already planned before they entered the villages and had little time for public participation. As a conservation project,

their primary focus was the conservation of the river bank, not sustainable development. This only changed when the Green Action Institute wanted to use the project for Payment for Ecosystem Services. The placement of the project was also of interest as it began in villages with little economic importance. It was not on land in an area of high agricultural significance, the areas which had previously been subject to international criticism. Therefore the agricultural elite could continue to use their land at the expense of the rural poor population. Once again, the rural poor population had to make sacrifices for the regional hegemonic project which places Mato Grosso as a leader in producing commodities for export.

In order to ensure the hegemonic project at the regional scale was successful, coercive methods were used at the local scale. Passive resistance to the project occurred when the population did not voluntarily remove their cultivated crops and replace them with native vegetation. Project organisations then went to the public prosecutors to ensure participation in the project; again this furthered the top-down implementation of the project. The public ministry passed a TAC which would make non-participation in the project a criminal offense. This undemocratic approach to project implementation is not supported by international recommendations for carbon offsetting projects, yet the project was still able to award the Pantanal Stadium carbon neutral status.

The official number of trees planted was 70,000, less than the claimed 1.4million trees at the beginning of the project. The project organisers at the regional scale were able to change the methodology used to calculate the carbon emissions and 70,000 trees was enough to certify the Pantanal Stadium as carbon neutral. The methodology used originally was an international guideline, however, the project organisers claimed to then change to a national guideline which made many indirect emissions invalid. This reduced the amount of carbon sequestration needed. However, further investigation also found that the trees claimed to be used to offset the Pantanal Stadium were also used to offset emissions from other organisations in Mato Grosso whom had purchased the carbon credits. One case could be proven

to be double counted, however, it cannot be proven that all trees in Barranco Alto I and II were double counted.

The Payment for Ecosystem Services was also seen to be short of what the organisers had promised the villagers. The payment coincided with international recommendations for carbon offsetting projects and outwardly made similar claims to REDD+ projects in that the local population would benefit from education, payment and sustainable development. However the initial sum of R$700,000 (£166,652) was reduced to an estimated R$30,000 (£7041) without any explanation from project organsiers.

The Green River Project can then be argued to have been implemented with the agenda of furthering the elites who created the NGO, rather than the conservation on the Cuiabá river bank. This project was established to implement the federal law but had been co-opted by corporate actors who created an NGO which had the support and financial means to influence the project from the very beginning.

Research question three

How have actors on different scales been affected by the project?

This question was answered in all data chapters due to the dialectical relationship between the local and global hegemonic projects, although those actors at the local level were more directly affected than those at the national level.

The *ruralistas* of Mato Grosso were found to be the main protagonists of the project. They gained from creating kudos associated with hosting the 'green' World Cup. The World Cup acted as a vehicle for them to re-frame the narrative of Mato Grosso into an environmentally friendly state. This was seen as important in a global environment where trade and investment is competitive. They then further

strengthened their position in the national scale as a supplier of commodities, which in turn was able to stabilise Brazil's placement in the global economy. The Green River Project worked in conjunction with a number of other projects at the regional and national scale to stabilise the hegemonic project. This stabilisation at the regional level also helped the actors at the national level who were also keen to host a 'green' World Cup. A 'green' World Cup would contribute to continuing efforts for Brazil to gain control over its own environmental issues whilst contributing to the global effort to reduce the threat of global warming.

As well as national and regional elites there are a number of actors with smaller levels of responsibility who also were affected by this project. The Environment Ministry of Mato Grosso are one such example. The involvement of the Green Action Institute in the Green River Project undoubtedly changed the characteristics of the project significantly. In their leaflet which outlines the project outcomes they remove themselves from the carbon offsetting aspect. They also do not focus on the numbers of trees planted, but instead on the other impacts the project has had, such as the fishing points and litter collection. From their perspective the project was a success as they reforested the river banks in line with Federal Government laws. The development and environmental claims that were made the Green Action Institute are absent from the official documentation of SEMA. Their aims were different from the Green Action Institute and they were able to, for them, successfully complete their project. The involvement of the Green Action Institute brought financial stability to the project, but this was at the expense of some of the projects aims. Under OSCIP regulations, the state organisation has to show the project would not be able to function without the NGO, however, in this case, it appears the project had already started before the NGO became involved. The balance of power then shifted from SEMA to the Green Action Institute as they were able to make claims which were unfounded.

The local populations in the villagers were also affected in different ways. The population in Pesquiero Florida were fined; the amount of this fine varied among households and was dependent on the relationship between the land owner and the public prosecutors. The socio-economic characteristics of

the land owners in this village are different to that of Barranco Alto I and II. These land owners usually had another house either in Cuiabá or in cities further afield. Arguably the population here were in a position that they could afford to not comply with the project and pay the fine. In the example of Robson in chapter 7 this was seen to be the case where he was able to negotiate a fine and the location of the trees he planted. Whereas the population in Barranco Alto had their livelihoods removed as a result of this project. Field observations from previous scholars had suggested the inhabitants were subsistence farmers and used this area of land to grow crops. The Green River Project effectively stopped this as the APP prevented cultivation. It also stopped an agro-industry project which was already active in the village and prevented this development project from increasing the economic development of the villages.

From this it is possible to see that the rural peasant population were most severely adversely affected, whilst the *ruralistas* were the group which gained the most from the project. In terms of the environmental outcomes of the project, it could be seen these were negligible. On a global scale, this project has severe weaknesses in the offsetting verification. Cases of double counting and change in the methodology suggests the emissions from the stadium were not adequately offset. This then indirectly adds to the overall global GHG in the atmosphere and has not had the desired climate change effect. The local environment could have had marginal improvement, although the long-term benefit of this is yet to be seen, and the Green Action Institute have not continued their verification project, the health of the planted trees is left to the responsibility of the individual land owner. A wildlife corridor along the river Cuiabá would be beneficial for local fauna and flora.

9.2: Theoretical implications

This thesis made five key contributions to the literature. These are explored below in light of the empirical evidence presented in the data chapters.

The literature highlighted a historical belief within mainstream institutions, such as the UN, that NGOs are 'unchallengeably good actors' (Holmes, 2010). The development discipline has long questioned the role the state has in funding NGOs and suggested development NGOs can become a conveyor belt of the state's ideals (Tvedt, 1998). More recently, the private sector have been identified as having an influential role in environment NGOs (Klein, 2015). Newell (2008) called for further investigation into the relations between civil society and the corporate sector. This thesis answered this call.

The Green Action Institute as a civil society organisation was seen to be founded by a number of alliances of corporate actors. These corporate actors were then able to put themselves in a decision making position within the NGO. The example of the Green Action Institute extends the argument of Klein (2015), that corporate actors can influence civil society through funding by showing that the corporate sector has learnt how to create an NGO to further their own agendas. Once they had created the NGO they then ensured control though 'interlocking' (Saplinski, 2015) where the members of the board of the NGO are also elite corporate actors. This was achieved legitimately through the OSCIP mechanism, created by Lula in an effort to deepen democracy. It can be argued through this thesis that the notion of NGOs being 'unchallengeably good actors' (Holmes, 2010) led to the creation of an organisation which worked in opposition to the OSCIP agenda, to deepen democracy.

By exposing the relationship between the Green Action Institute and its founders and decision makers it has led to further understanding of environmental governance. In a time when the state is taking on new roles and other actors are beginning to be involved in the governance structure it is important to understand and acknowledge the interests of each actor. The Green Action Institute acted as a green veneer for the commodity export elites of Mato Grosso. In doing so, they enabled the elite agricultural actors to continue their environmentally destructive practices. This case represents a first step in understanding the relations between the corporate, state and civil society sectors in relation to contemporary environmental governance.

The commodification of nature as a means to save it has been the preferred environmental protection strategy at the global scale. Some scholars have long argued that selling nature will not save it (Lohmann, 2009, Bumpus and Livermann, 2008). As critique grew, the international decision making community made social benefit claims in order to legitimise this approach (UNFCCC, 2013). Carbon offsetting is one such mechanism. Critiques have pointed to the assumption that actors in the global North can continue their polluting lifestyles as those in the global South will act to compensate it (Bohm and Dabhi, 2009).

This can be seen in the case of the Green River Project as transnational elites who travelled to watch matches in the Pantanal Stadium could do so thinking the construction had little ecological impact. FIFA were able to make green claims and there was little evidence of actors in the global North questioning these claims. The Green River Project case illustrated that not only did the Pantanal Stadium not offset all its emissions but evidence points strongly that the trees were already used to offset previous activities. In addition, the social benefit claimed by the project organisers can also be seen to be miss-leading as project participants claimed their benefit was never delivered. In this case, this can be seen how actors in the global North were encouraged to continue their high emissions lifestyle under the pretence their actions are minimalized through carbon offsetting. This case also contributes to the growing amount of literature which questions carbon offsetting as a suitable climate change mitigation mechanism. This carbon offsetting project is an example of how the ecological modernisation paradigm fails to act to prevent fossil fuel emissions and in fact contributes to the impasse on appropriate climate change action. This study therefore contributes to these scholars who continue to critique the UNFCCC's approach to climate change action (Lohmann, 2009, Bohm and Badhi, 2009).

In addition to contributing to the general literature which critiques carbon offsetting, I have also contributed to the empirical literature which problematizes some carbon forestry practices. A qualitative critical approach within studies of carbon offsetting is not a new phenomenon (Gilbertson, 2009), however, the context of a forestry project associated with the FIFA World Cup is new. Equitable benefit distribution has been discussed in the literature as a particular problem within forestry carbon

offsetting projects. Some advocated strong institutions, others suggested strong institutions did not contribute to equitable distribution (Iversen et al., 2006, Mathur et al., 2014, Sommerville et al., 2010) . These publications were all written by scholars who were part of a professional organisation implementing the project. They also come from a normative philosophical background and do not engage with power or elites as concepts.

This thesis approached the data as a critical scholar without any professional association to the project. As with other critical scholars, power and elites were seen as key concepts and central to the understanding of the project (Escobar, 1992). In doing so, I was able to identify the social relations which enabled the completion of this project. These social relations, particularly the relations of the Green Action Institute, the organisation controlling the project, saw unequal benefit distribution. It was the powerful position of the NGO over the local population, and the relations to state actors which enabled the NGO to gain to the detriment of the local population. In the case of the Green River Project, the benefit for the local population was two wells, one of which was never built and the other which worked after investment from the local community. The initial sum of the benefit was released to the press but did not reflect the evidence collected in the villages. Due to these power relations, the local population could not challenge the benefit. Although tracing money through the Green Action Institute was not possible, the financial and reputational benefits brought to the Institute through this project was illustrated throughout the thesis.

This thesis also contributed to the small amount of literature which questions environmental and developmental claims made by sports mega-event organisers. Reis and DaCosta (2012) suggested there is a gap in knowledge between what elites claim in terms of environmental sporting events and what occurs on the ground. Additionally, Fan (2006) suggested sports mega-events often make developmental claims when hosting a sports mega-event. Using the case of the Green River Project and the infrastructure improvement programme in Cuiabá it is possible to argue that organisers for the World Cup in Cuiabá made unsubstantiated claims. In order to understand the claims made by the

organisers, documentary analysis was undertaken on a number of official documents and media reports. These claims were then investigated through ethnographic research which resulted in questioning the claims made. The organisers claimed the new stadium would provide new leisure infrastructure for the city, a social benefit, however, there are still ongoing structural issues with the stadium which has reduced capacity from 44,000 to 10,000. In addition, the Pantanal Stadium has been unable to gain LEED accreditation, a green claim made by the local organising committee. The new VLT was a public transport project which claimed to be green through reducing the need for car usage in Cuiabá and running on electricity; it also made social benefit claims through being an accessible way for commuters to travel around the city. In October 2016, the VLT was still incomplete and diversions for cars due to the construction have increased traffic congestion in the city. Ethnography allowed for these claims to be investigated and extend the current literature which frequently uses documentary analysis and quantitative approaches (Death, 2011, Hall, 2012).

Finally, this thesis extended the application of the neo-Gramscian approach to environmental governance (Levy and Egan, 2003, Levy and Newell, 2002). In the case of the Green River Project, hegemony was stabilised through relations of domination and power at different geographical scales. The theory of scales was then applied to understand how elites made and maintained these relations (Zanotti, 2011, Swyngedouw, 2004). It was seen that although the Green River Project was implemented at the local scale, it was at the regional scale where it was created and legitimised. This enabled the Green Action Institute, an actor at the regional and local scale to have a powerful voice at the local scale. As project participants at the local scale did not have the ability to 'jump scales' in the same way the Green Action Institute did, the result was a project which worked in favour of the Green Action Institute. This was understood through using the neo-Gramscian approach to question power relations in governance and applied with the use of scalar theory to understand elite agency at a number of scales. The result of these actions by elite actors was the Green River Project contributed to the maintenance of the ecological modernisation paradigm when viewing environmental protection at sports mega-events.

9.3: Recommendation for future research

The use of the neo-Gramscian approach could prove to be particularly effective as current trends indicate scholarly activity associated with governance is becoming more popular. Although this is a small scale investigation the relations of dominance on all scales created many more questions than answers. The intertwining of hegemonic relations from all perspectives and to all scales is worth of proper investigation, therefore a larger scale investigation looking at ecological modernisation in Mato Grosso could unearth further investigation of hegemony.

At the local scale, the livelihood of the villagers in Barranco Alto has changed since the first field reports of Guarim (2000). The impact of wealth distribution programmes such as 'bolsa de familia' and 'bolsa de scholar' in the community, coupled with increased outward migration would be of particular interest to me. The changing fortunes of the communities are intertwined with the rhythms of the Pantanal and I feel is worthy of investigation.

At a national scale the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro were held under a deep economic recession where public money was carefully spent. An investigation of the environmental projects associated with the Olympic Games would add a temporal perspective to this study.

Finally, from a theoretical perspective, I would like to further the use of scales in the study of hegemony to see further how the dialectic relationship between global policies such as the Kyoto Protocol and local projects are played out.

9.4: Limitation of the study

The limitations of this study mainly lay around my own ability in the field. It took a long time to acclimatise to the research setting and develop my Portuguese language skills to a degree that I could begin collecting research.

The translation of all interviews was done by myself and therefore there is a possibility of some interviews not being accurately translated. Due to the nature of the data collection, particularly in the villages, interviews were conducted informally and written up after. It could be therefore that some information was forgotten or miss-interpreted. This was mitigated as much as possible by discussing the interview with my guide immediately after the interview and allowed for a collation of the information.

Theoretically, a limitation proved itself in the understanding of the mechanisms elites used to maintain their social relations. In the environmental governance literature these theorisations are underdeveloped. Perhaps the future will see an increased number of similar studies of hegemony 'on the ground' and further understanding of theories will help us unpack how elites maintain their power.

As a case study, this thesis only provides one example in a bounded time-scale. It would be strengthened by other case studies which illustrate other instances of carbon offsetting at sports mega-events. Again, the future may see a development in this field as FIFA have continued to use carbon offsetting as a mechanism to claim a carbon neutral event for the next World Cup.

9.5: Conclusion

This thesis began as an investigation into the local experiences of a carbon offsetting project used as part of a mega-sports event. It developed into an investigation of how local elites were able to co-opt a conservation project to further their own agenda. In doing so, this thesis highlighted how the ecological modernisation paradigm is used by decision makers at a range of scales and neglects to confront the relations of power which strives to ensure the status quo. The power relations which ran through this

project allowed unsubstantiated claims to be made at a regional scale which further entrenched social relations at the local scale.

This investigation used the neo-Gramscain approach to environmental governance to highlight how the environmental project, through governance strategies can be co-opted and work in the favour of local and regional elites. It provides a sound case study to question the current ecological modernisation paradigm and contributes to the neo-Gramscian environmental governance literature. This thesis also contributes to the literature which questions carbon offsetting as a climate change mitigation tool.

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Appendix 1: Sources

In addition to the secondary data presented in the references list, there are a number of other sources I used to obtain information.

Interviews:

The following list refers to recorded interviews which were conducted by arranged appointment. The length of the interview varied from 10 minutes to several hours, although not all parts of the interview were recorded. The usual length was approximately one hour. Many interviewees also gave additional information in informal conversations over the duration of the fieldwork. Hotel participants were not recorded as these were wholly informal conversations but were implicit in my orientation to local society.

Civil Society Actors

CS1	Carla Valentini	Teacher	Cuiabá	27th April 2014
CS2	Fernanda	Teacher	Cuiabá	28th April 2014
CS3	Technician	GAI	Cuiabá	18th May 2014
CS4	Manager	GAI	Cuiabá	18th May 2014
CS5	Sr Amelo	President of BAII	BA II	20th August 2014
CS6	Elder	Researcher	Pousada Itaicy	15th June 2015
CS8	Antonio	President of BAI	BA I	25th May 2014
CS8	Maurice Servasse	Journalist	Skype	1st May 2014
SC9	Paul	Student	Brasilia	April 2014
SC10	Patriciya	Student	Cuiabá	2nd October 2014

State Actors

S1	Sr Addilton	Retired sustainability manager at Maggi		20th May 2014
S2	Sr Sequirra	Retired Judge	St Antonio	20th August 2014
S3	Antonio Kata Jr	Health care worker	BAII	20th August 2014
S4	Sr Addilton	Deputy Govonor MG		9th September 2014
S5	Blairo Maggi	Senate	Pousada Itaicy	9th September 2014
S6	Joao	Profeitura of Santo Antonio		25th September 2015
S7	Marcelo	Profeitura of Barrao	Barrao de Malgaco	Sep-15

S8	Ecologist	SEMA	Cuiabá	23rd June 2015
S9	Domingo Savio	Public Prosecutor	Cuiabá	3rd July 2014

Corporate Actors

C1	Rodrigo	BBQ restaurant owner		Cuiabá
C2	Robson de Brito	Hotel owner	Various informal interviews from May- August 2014	
C3	Lunira	Hotel owner	St Antonio	Various informal interviews from May- August 2014
C4	Luniel	Hotel manager	St Antonio	Various dates July 2014
C5	Sr Galas	Hotel owner	St Antonio	8th August 2014
C6	Pousada Arica	Hotel owner	St Antonio	8th August 2014
C7	Fishing group Campo Grande	Tourist	St Antonio	August 20th 2014
C8	Robelo	Owner of Jaguar camp	Porto Jeoffre	16th September 2015
C9	Henry	Manager of Arena Pantanal	Cuiabá	24th September 2015
C10	Patrycia	Holiday Home Owner	Pousada Itaicy	1st June 2015

Project participants

PP1	Lo	Fisherman	St Antonio	June 10th 2014
PP2	Tata	Fisherman	Barao	June 10th 2014
PP3	Sr Jaquinta	retired	BA I	25th May 2014
PP4	Sr Germane	None	BA I	25th May 2014
PP5	Dona Elizabeth	Bar owner	BA I	25th May 2014
PP6	Dona Nancy	retired	BA I	25th May 2014
PP7	Sr Rodrigo	retired	BA I	25th May 2014
PP8	Sr and Snr Romildo	Nona	BA I	25th May 2014
PP9	Sr Goncalo	Pastel shop worker	BA I	25th May 2014
PP10	Dona Monica	Pastel shop worker	BA I	25th May 2014
PP11	Sr Jackson	Bar owner	BA II	20th August 2014

PP12	Dinho	Fisherman	Pousada Itaicy	Various	September 2014
PP13	Nilza	Cook	Pousada Itaicy	Various	September 2014
PP14	John Pedro	Student	BA1		October 2nd 2014
PP15	Snr João	Retired	Barra de Arica		27th September 2014
PP16	Chacho	Fisherman	BAI		2nd October 2014
PP18	Chacho	Fisherman	Pousada Itaicy	Various	June-September 2015
PP19	Carlinhos	Fisherman	Pousada Itaicy		Sep-14
PP21	Dona Sandra	Retired	BAI		24th September 2015
PP22	People at the bar	various	BAI		24th September 2015
PP23	Dona Nancy	Bar owner	BAII		24th September 2015
PP24	Dona Elizabeth	Retired	BAI		24th September 2015
PP25	Luiz Henrique	Student	Pousada Itaicy	Various	July/ August/ September 2014

Hotel Participants

HP1	Dinho	Fisherman	Pousada Itaicy	Various	June-September 2015
HP2	Robson Doctor		Pousada Itaicy		27th July 2015
HP3	Fernandas partner, Joao	Airport Handler	Pousada Itaicy		May-14
HP4	Dona Maria	Farmer	Pousada Itaicy	Various	2014/2015
HP5	Alinelia	Hotel worker	Pousada Itaicy	Throughout	August 2014
HP6	Carol	Hotel worker	Pousada Itaicy	Throughout	August 2014
HP7	Adilo	Fisherman	Pousada Itaicy		

Observations:

Observations were used to verify or challenge claims made by different actors at various points throughout my fieldwork.

Estádio Nacional de Brasília Mané Garrincha, Brasilia, 4-7th May 2014 and 29th September 2014

Maracanã, Rio de Janeiro, 7-10th July 2014 and 20th September 2015

Arena Pantanal, Cuiabá , 10th May 2014, 13th, 17th, 21st, 24th June 2014, 15th September 2015, 18th September 2015

Tree nursery, Barranco Alto, 10th May 2014, 16th July 2014, 14th September 2015

Media outlets consulted:

BBC News

The Guardian

The New York Post

Globo

Diário de Cuiabá

Websites consulted:

www.fifa.com

www.acaoverde.org.br

Appendix 2: Green River Project pamphlet from SEMA

Projeto Verde Rio

Formado por diversos órgãos públicos e entidades, dentre os quais o Ministério Público, a OSCIP Instituto Ação Verde e a Secretaria de Estado de Meio Ambiente, que reunidos pelo Termo de Cooperação Técnica 09/2012, objetivam:



Metodologia

- Levantamento com Imagens de Satélite;
- Cadastramento das propriedades desmatadas e identificação dos responsáveis;
- Produção de mudas;
- Vistoria técnica e levantamento da situação atual da APP;
- Medidas de adequação ambiental e recuperação;
- Notificação/auto de infração/embargo;
- Termo de ajustamento de conduta (TAC);
- Sistema de monitoramento dos TACs.

Medidas Exigidas no TAC

- Isolamento da APP para recuperação;
- Plantio/regeneração da vegetação;
- Adequação de trilhas, escadas e tablados;
- Licenciamento das atividades (pesqueiros, pousadas, etc..);
- Retirada de construções irregulares em área de APP;
- Contenção de erosões;
- Adequação de estradas.



Appendix 3: A short history of the Usina Itaici

Prior to the sugar industry in Mato Grosso there was a gold mining industry in the north and central areas of the state. The Baxaida Cuiabá na region was not industrialised until the late 1880s. The Usina Itaici was built in 1886 and was one of 13 sugar mills constructed along the River Cuiabá. It was economically and politically the most important sugar mill in the region. Located 40km south of Santo Antonio do Leverger, 4km south of Pesquerio Florida, the Usina Itaici acted as the economic and political base for oligarchical relations in Mato Grosso for over 50 years, at its height of productivity the mill and surrounding plantation is said to have housed over five thousand people, most of whom were migrants from Sao Paulo state (Novaczyk, 2005, Marchetti et al., 2013). The workers who lived in the central mill complex had a variety of services. Aside from the mill, this area also had social and cultural facilities such as: a pharmacy, chapel, school, music classes for children and its own currency an unique organisation at the time (Novaczyk, 2005). The economic success of the mill meant the owners were able to invest in technology and became the first location in Mato Grosso to have electricity. It was also the first mill in Mato Grosso to have a motorised engine to power the sugar processors (Siqueira, 2002). Although the Usina Itaici never used slave labour, Eisenberg (1972) suggested conditions of wage labourers in the mill and plantations were similar to that of slaves, and were heavily dependent on plantation owners (Engerman, 1983). At the Usina Itaici, Siqueira (2002) and de Oliveira and Marta (2014) suggested that 12 hour working days, 7 days a week were common, in addition, due to its isolation there was a lack of opportunity to leave the plantation.

Although the working and living conditions of the workers was tough, the economic success of the plantation meant the owners lived a prosperous life. In spite of the plantation being in an isolated area in Brazil, it was a key component in the power struggle of elites in Cuiabá. Weak political institutions and clientalistic relations during this period resulted in a sporadic violence and the time of the Usina Itaici's

economic dominance was a particularly violent period which altered the political landscape of the region.

The military had a strong presence in Mato Grosso politics and the economy and a military coup in 1892 saw General Ponce lead 400 men into Cuiabá to overthrow the state Governor. A military selected governance regime then remained and Manural Mutinho became the state Governor. In 1901, the then state Governor, Alvez de Barros, faced a threat from a group of men gathered at a farm in Pocone. As the previous military coup was still fresh in his mind, this gathering caused him great concern. The owner of the farm was the brother of Toto Paes de Barros- the then owner of the economically booming Usina Itaici. Under threat from Alvez de Barros, Toto sent several letters asking his brother to disperse his men, a request which was unheeded. After several months, Alvez de Barros sent armed forces to arrest the men and bring them to Cuiabá. On the journey back to Cuiabá, the 17 prisoners were killed in what is known as 'The Massacre of Baia do Garcez'. The men sent to arrest them disappeared and the massacre was only exposed when the river retreated the following year and exposed the bodies. The perpetrators of this crime were never identified; Frank (2001) suggested Toto Paes may have been involved to further his political career.

Toto Paes de Barros' political career reached a high in 1903 when he became President of Mato Grosso, his economic standing within the region allowed him to create clientalistic relations with individuals who then supported his Presidency. Toto Peas served until 1906 when he was murdered in a violent attack led once again by General Ponce and Manuel Mutinho. The two men led this attack fuelled by the popular belief it was Toto Peas de Barros whom ordered the massacre of the prisoners. Mutinho returned to his previous position of Governor of Mato Grosso and also took control of the Usina Itaici, refusing to acknowledge the heirs of Toto Paes de Barros (Frank, 2001, Siqueira, 2002). Power and control within Mato Grosso in this time was won through violent means as the law and police were weak. Civil society was also under developed and prevented legitimate, organised opposition.

The relationship between the wage labourer and owners at the Usina Itaici was oligarchic in nature as was common throughout Latin American in the 18th and 19th centuries. Oligarchic relations are maintained by dominance and dependency, or clientalist relationships (Malloy, 1976), where services for the poor are often given in exchange for votes or loyalty. Ferguson (2006) suggests that the services offered by the Usina Itaici should not be thought of as services to serve the population, but instead as 'services which serve to govern' (Ibid:253). The Usina Itaici provided workers with services so they did not need to leave the site, the owners believed that if the workers were on site, they would be more likely to work and easier to control. The services also fulfilled the needs of the workforce which kept them at the Usina Itaici and prevented them from having to leave to find work elsewhere. These relations therefore then won the ideology of the masses and consent was created through clientalism. The lack of care for employees was exposed when the Usina shut in 1957 leaving the population without work or services. When the capitalist class left, the peasant population were left and became subsistence farmers and fishermen in the villages now known as Barranco Alto and Barra de Arica.