Population-centric Warfare: How Popular Support Determines Civil War Outcomes

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<u>Summary</u>

In recent years, the most technologically advanced militaries in the world have toiled against guerrilla forces. Counterinsurgent doctrine focuses on a government's lack of popular support to explain this. Academic literature, however, currently treats popular mobilisation as a dependent variable, rather than using it as a framework for understanding the dynamics and outcomes of civil wars.

This thesis represents a first step to address this disparity and incorporate popular support into the comparative study of civil war outcomes. I explore what popular support provides conflict actors, what determines population behaviour and how the ability of conflict actors to generate support determines the dynamics and outcome of a conflict. I conclude that popular support, or the battle for 'hearts and minds', is crucial to the power of conflict actors, but only when it is understood as a contribution, not shared preferences.

Based on this analysis I propose a framework for studying civil conflict that focuses on the regenerative capacity of the two belligerents. The key battleground in any civil war is rebel efforts to degrade the sovereign structures the government uses to generate support from the population. If rebels can achieve this, the government collapses and the rebels can win the war even if they are smaller or fail to score any battlefield successes.

I test this model using a quantitative analysis of 65 civil wars and four in-depth cases studies. Overall there is strong empirical support for the model of conflict developed in this thesis, raising a number of theoretical and practical implications. Most importantly, I find that strengthening institutions of governance, be they formal or informal, is the best method for governments to defeat rebel groups, while rebels win by undermining socioeconomic activity.

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Introduction

The recent Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen the most technologically advanced militaries in the world fail to eliminate bands of poorly-trained, poorly-armed guerrillas. Perhaps more vexingly, they failed to defeat them despite inflicting enormous damage on these militant groups on the battlefield. According to some sources, the Taliban had around 2,000 fighters in 2001. Somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 Taliban were killed between 2001 and 2014, not to mention the tens of thousands that were seriously injured, captured or reintegrated. Yet, in 2014, the Taliban reportedly numbered around 60,000 (Dawl, 2014). The Taliban's growth did not come from some hidden material power borne out of the use of asymmetric tactics (Thornton, 2006). Asymmetric tactics did not allow it to stand toe-to-toe with Western forces. It lost ten to fifteen times its original fighting force and one-third to a half of its final force; yet it grew throughout this period.

To explain this phenomenon the US has rewritten its counterinsurgency doctrine, focusing on securing the support of local populations (US Army, 2007). Billions of dollars have been invested in conflict zones on developing governance structures, providing basic services, securing local populations and direct payments to communities (Kilcullen, 2012). Western governments are not the only conflict actors that have expended resources on attempting to shape population behaviour. Rebel groups build governance structures and provide services (Mampilly, 2011). Both rebels and governments attack civilian targets (Eck and Hultman, 2007). ISIL produces enormous amounts of propaganda designed to influence populations. All of these resources could be spent on projecting military strength, but belligerents choose to use them instead to influence population behaviour. Clearly, conflict actors expect a return on this activity and must calculate it to be larger than if those same resources were used for military purposes.

Explaining these two inter-linked puzzles represents the objective of this thesis. Why do belligerents expend resources on shaping population behaviour that they

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could use on military activity? And, how does this explain small rebel groups defeating strong governments? This thesis will show that understanding the role popular support plays in determining civil war outcomes also offers an answer as to why small rebel groups are able to combat better-trained and more numerous forces, and in some cases defeat them.

I will argue that civil wars are best described as competitions to mobilise support and resources from the population. Through the course of the war, belligerents both seek to build resilient alliances with the population and degrade those of their opponent. After creating a resilient alliance with sections of the population, small rebel groups can use asymmetric tactics, such as guerrilla warfare or terrorism, to focus on degrading the ability of the government to generate support from the population. As government authority erodes, rebels generate more support from the population, which allows them to regenerate in the face of government efforts to wipe them out. Rebels select a military strategy – asymmetric or conventional – based on balancing expected losses against their regenerative capacity, and drag the government into a military stalemate. Eventually the costs of the war overwhelm the government and the rebels win without having to defeat the government directly. Governments can only prevent rebels from achieving this if they can break rebel capacity to mobilise support and replace resources expended on the battlefield.

Framing war in this way shows why belligerents expend resources on shaping population behaviour rather than military activity and why small rebel groups can defeat strong governments without winning on the battlefield.

The thesis also makes a significant contribution to both policy-making and academic debates in a broader sense. Despite the continued propensity for Western governments to intervene in civil wars overseas, comparative studies of how civil wars end remain limited, especially when compared to studies of civil war onset. Those studies there have been do not fit with the approach taken by practitioners of conflict, be they insurgent or government.

Western interventions in civil wars, both diplomatic and military, are taking place without political science comparatively testing the logic underpinning the strategies employed in these conflict zones. Policymakers rely principally on regional experts and qualitative doctrinal proscriptions when they do use academia to guide conflict intervention strategies. These proscriptions often come from those that failed to find solutions in the 'last' war (Mumford and Reis, 2013). As a consequence, analysts in Western capitals still struggle to predict and influence the dynamics and outcomes of civil wars.

This thesis will seek to redress this disconnect, bringing together existing theoretical and empirical studies to enrich our understanding of how the relationship between conflict actors and the population determines conflict outcomes. It will also create a framework for testing doctrinal and qualitative propositions driving Western interventions in civil wars. Counterinsurgency doctrine suggests that improvements in economic opportunities and the delivery of services, the strength of governance institutions and democratisation, as well as improving local security will correlate with governments either winning wars outright or at least surviving into the post-war period. For rebels, the opposite holds; undermining economic opportunities and services, weakening government institutions and destabilising society will correlate with insurgents defeating governments. The theory developed in this thesis will argue that changes in these variables determine civil war outcomes because they undermine the ability of the opposing belligerent to generate resources from the population, either leading it to collapse or gradually fade away as it uses up its resources on the battlefield.

The empirical section of the thesis offers strong support for these notions. A comparative study of sixty-five insurgencies shows that changes in these variables correlate with governments surviving or rebels winning as we would expect. Improvements in governance means governments are more likely to survive civil wars. In contrast, a decline in governance and socioeconomic conditions means rebels are likely to defeat governments. Four in-depth case studies reinforce these findings. The government in Burundi agreed to a range of

democratic reforms, which undermined the ability of the rebels to generate support from the population, forcing them to lay downs their weapons and engage with the political process. Rebels in Cambodia and Zimbabwe defeated incumbent governments by developing resilient relationships with the population and undermining the government's ability to provide economic benefits to the population in exchange for active support. Rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh and Zimbabwe created a climate of insecurity that led to the governments' constituent populations leaving afflicted areas and refusing to provide support to the government.

The theory and the cases also imply that alliances between conflict actors and populations are based on a range of factors such as violence, population displacement or informal patronage networks. While acknowledging this, the thesis below will mainly focus on formal national-level state-building as a mechanism for defeating rebels, and insurgent efforts to undermine these processes, as this still forms the core element of Western theories of intervention in civil wars (Petersen, 2011).

Exploring the tenets of counterinsurgency theory shows strong support for the importance of building formal institutions, and rebel efforts to undermine them, in determining the outcome of civil wars. However, it also shows that how delivering services, improving governance and securing the population work to defeat rebels needs to be better understood. Current Western interventions are focused on population acquiescence and legitimacy (JCS, 2013). Exploring how governance, development and security actually affect the outcome of civil wars, shows that their impact is better explained by looking at the behavioural contribution they induce from the population. Moreover, this contribution is driven by the local, individual and within-war incentives they create, not shared community preferences for the post-war environment.

Before laying out and testing this process, the first part of this thesis will survey the current literature on civil war outcomes and popular mobilisation in order to form a baseline for the rest of the study.

Comparative and quantitative literature

Comparative academic literature on civil war outcomes has historically ignored the role of the population. Instead, either explicitly or implicitly, it has adapted models drawn from the study of interstate conflict. Formal models of interstate conflict describe a two-player game in which differing expectations over an *ex ante* balance of power cause both players to believe they are better off paying the costs of engaging in military combat to achieve their goals, rather than accept the peace on offer (Blainey, 1988; Reiter, 2009; Slantchev, 2003). It assumes unitary actors with fixed power at the start of the conflict.

Dan Reiter (2009), building on Geoffrey Blainey's *On the Causes of War* (1988), argues that once war breaks out, battles reveal information that alter perceptions about the likelihood of winning and the costs that need to be expended to triumph. Providing the belligerents overcome credible commitment problems, as the true balance of power is revealed, both actors identify a settlement that divides the object in dispute without having to pay the costs of continuing the conflict. Both actors are better off than if they had fought the war to its conclusion. If they continue to disagree on the balance of power, the war resumes until there is another battle, revealing further information. Reiter's book is principally about interstate wars and he supports his hypothesis with a number of cases. Other scholars have also found strong theoretical and empirical support for this approach to the study of interstate conflict (Fearon, 1995; Ramsay, 2008; Slantchev, 2003).

Comparative literature on civil war endings

Reiter states this model can be applied to civil conflict as well, using the American Civil War as his example (2009). Many other scholars also tried to apply this model of conflict to explain civil war dynamics and outcomes.

DeRouen and Sobek claim "(t)he interactions of rebels and governments ultimately determine the course of events in a civil war" (DeRouen and Sobek,

2004; p304). Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan reinforced this notion; "the outcome and duration … (being) a function of the balance of the military capabilities between the state and rebels" (2009; p572).

Using this logic, scholars first examined the role of state capacity in shaping conflict dynamics and outcomes. Articles focusing on state capacity revealed interesting insights (Collier et al., 2004; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004; Fearon, 2004). However, by applying a static balance of power framework they failed to fully explain some of their empirical findings.

Scholars attempted to improve these models by adding variables measuring rebel strength. Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan argued that many of the above articles fail to fully capture civil war dynamics because they only look at the government (2009; p571). By presenting and analysing a dataset on the balance of power, they presented a number of interesting findings. Most pertinent for this thesis, they found that when rebel groups are larger they do better (p574).

Academics have tried to build on Cunningham et al.'s work by using year-on-year data of rebel numbers[1] (Clayton, 2013; Hultquist, 2013). Govinda Clayton and Philip Hultquist support Cunningham et al.'s observation that rebel groups being larger affects the outcome of civil wars. Tellingly, however, Hultquist finds that rebel groups being smaller does not predict a government victory, suggesting focusing on rebel numbers can only tell us so much (2013; p624).

Doctrinal perspectives

This is supported by many observations from practitioners of civil war. They pay scant attention to the relative sizes of the militaries in explaining the success or failure of rebel groups. Nor do they consider the military battlefield a crucial arena for determining the outcome of conflicts.

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[1] Cunningham et al. use a single measure of the balance of power taken at an arbitrary point in the conflict. In longer conflicts they do offer more than one measure.

Bard E. O'Neill, in *Insurgency and Terrorism*, claims the success of an insurgent is based not on military activity but rather political acumen. He argues observers see prominent revolutionaries such as Mao or Ho Chi Minh as political strategists rather than skillful on the battlefield (1990; p23).

The Russian military claims it did not lose one battle in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Braithwaite, 2011). Nonetheless, it failed to subdue the Mujahedeen. If battles work to reveal information about the true balance of power, it is unclear how rebels can win without winning a single battle. Timur Kuran even shows that rebel leaders do not engage in revolutionary activity with the expectation of immediately overthrowing governments. He cites Lenin in Russia and Khomenei in Iran as both being surprised they were immediately successful (Kuran, 1989).

Relative power is also ignored by many doctrinal writers. John Nagl (2005; p30) and David Galula (1964; p11) both point out how state capacity can be misleading as a predictor of counterinsurgent success. Rebel doctrine writers actually even advise against maximising total force numbers for insurgent groups. Mao Tse-Tung claims that if groups of insurgents make themselves too large they expose themselves to government targeting (2002).

Much of this logic has been borne out in comparative studies of conflict.

The US and UK governments have done a range of studies and conclude that the ratio of counterinsurgent to insurgent forces is only weakly related to conflict outcomes (Woodford, 2016). Jeffery A. Friedman found no correlation between relative force size and conflict outcomes (2011). Hultquist concedes that theories of relative power fail to explain the vast majority of civil wars; when there is a preponderance of forces in favour of the government (2013; p633). In the dataset Hultquist uses (from R.M. Wood, 2010), the mean balance of power favours the government by 12 to 1, and rebels only enjoy a three to one disadvantage or less in fewer than 25 percent of conflict years.

Moreover, how the balance of power shifts within a single conflict remains an unexplored area of study. Most comparative studies of civil war outcomes have measured power at an arbitrary point in the conflict, normally at the beginning (Collier, el al., 2004; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004; Fearon, 2004; Connable and Libicki, 2010). Many rebel groups start very small and grow throughout the conflict, but often maintain a significant negative ratio compared to government forces up to the point of victory. For example, in Zimbabwe, the rebels numbered in the hundreds in 1965, rising to a few thousand in the mid-1970s, before increasing to the tens of thousands as the conflict came to an end. Even then, government forces still outnumbered insurgents by four and a half to one (Kriger, 1991). The international community needs an effective way of measuring when this is likely to happen. By the time rebels have grown large in size it is often too late to implement effective intervention strategies.

Similar problems arise when scholars have tried to look at how activity on the battlefield affects the outcome. J. Michael Greig (2015) finds only a very small correlation between battlefield outcomes in terms of who wins the overall conflict. Greig shows that where battles are fought is more significant than who wins them (ibid.). Michael Findley (2013) finds that while military stalemates do bring people to the negotiating table, they do not increase the likelihood of a settlement, unlike in interstate conflicts (Ramsay, 2008). The difficulty using logic for interstate wars to explain civil war outcomes may offer one explanation as to why comparative studies of intrastate conflict endings remain small in number.

In order resolve some of these problems some scholars have tried to break wars down into different types (Greig, 2015; Hultquist, 2013). Philip Hultquist calls for breaking civil wars down into three categories; those that are more conventional, which behave like interstate conflict, and asymmetric and irregular symmetric conflicts, that do not fit theories of interstate war (2013; p625).

Taking this approach, however, causes further problems. For one, what balance of forces need to exist for a war to be classified as conventional or asymmetric?

Moreover, Hultquist's observation suggests a paradox for insurgent groups. It suggests some rebel groups actually fare better by remaining smaller and keeping the war in the 'asymmetric' category, rather than growing and creating an unfavourable 'conventional' balance of power. How do rebels benefit by sustaining a force that is actually lower than its full potential?

Just as challenging is that the fact that doctrine suggests wars transition between being more asymmetric in nature and more conventional and vice versa. US Special Operations doctrine (US Army, 2010), based on Mao's guide to building a revolutionary movement (2002), identifies three phases of successful insurgencies; the latent incipient phase, a guerrilla warfare stage and finally a transition to a conventional force that overcomes the government militarily. Broadly speaking the second and third phases correspond to asymmetric and conventional warfare, with the first representing the underground stage before conflict erupts.[2] During the first stage a rebel group will be focused on terrorism and building a political network. It is not wrong, therefore, to say there are three possible stages in a civil war; terrorism, insurgency and conventional conflict.[3] However, doctrine does not distinguish between these types of conflict. As US Special Operations doctrine points out, single wars witness a number of these stages both through time and space (2010). Insurgencies may be strong enough in one area to compete with the government on a conventional basis, but in another may only carry out terrorist or guerrilla activity. This makes categorising conflicts along these lines unhelpful.

Examining contemporary conflicts confirms this problem. ISIL in Syria, conducted a low-intensity insurgency against both the regime and other opposition groups from 2012 to the beginning of 2014. It then transitioned to a more conventional force and conquered territory across Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, ISIL still

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[2] I am not ignoring irregular symmetric conflict, the third of Hultquist's categories. However, this is a function of government strength as well as rebel strength, and, therefore, does not fit into current explanations of rebel strength focused on the three stages of revolutionary conflict. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter two.

[3] Stathis Kalyvas (2009) claims terrorism and civil war are different phenomena. Understanding violence as a function of the strength of a rebel group calls this into question. I do not, however, intend to engage with this question more during this thesis.

augmented conventional operations with terrorist and guerrilla activity in areas it was weaker, such as Baghdad or Damascus. How do we classify civil wars that bridge these categories through time and even more problematically through space? If rebels simultaneously carry out both types of activity, there must be a longer-term objective behind this activity, most obviously creating the conditions to strengthen the group.

The current comparative literature of civil war endings leaves a number of questions unanswered: Why is looking at the balance of power of limited value? Why do rebel groups change in size? And, why do conflicts transition between different phases? Understanding war as a competition to mobilise resources, in which rebels create opportunities to grow as a movement by undermining the government's ability to generate support offers a framework for answering many of these questions.

Insurgent alliances

Another, more recent body of work, has seen scholar focus on why insurgent alliances form and break apart and more closely mirrors the logic of civil war as a competition to mobilise support. This challenges the framework used in earlier studies on civil war outcomes because it assumes that power is not fixed at the beginning of the war. Instead, civil war is viewed as a competition between belligerents for the loyalty of various militia factions. As such, it begins to offer answers to some of the questions posed above. Stathis Kalyvas put it succinctly when he said:

> "Many individuals enter the war long after it has started, driven by incentives and constraints that are by-products of the war and the result of innovative and adaptive strategies devised by rival actors in the course of the war. Put otherwise, neither organisations nor preferences are given *ex ante* and fixed throughout the war. Change is synonymous with war" (2008; p1063).

Michael Findley and Peter Rudloff (2012) show that insurgent fragmentation is ubiquitous and must be accepted as part of the structure that underpins civil wars. Macro-level outcomes are decided by the micro-level decisions of conflict participants, which in turn are shaped by the ability of national level actors to affect those decisions as the war drags on.

According to Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman and Jacob N. Shapiro in *Testing the Surge* (2012), the progress made against Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2007 was based on tribes shifting allegiance from AQI to the government. The media have often framed the Anbar Awakening as a popular uprising against AQI's extreme form of governance. Biddle et al. show the majority of those involved in the awakening were, in fact, 'turned' insurgents who joined government and coalition militia programs for a variety of reasons. The key to the increasing power of the government was its ability to make a better offer to those factions previously fighting with AQI (2012). The relative power of the government and rebels then changed in favour of the government, allowing it to make gains on the ground.

A number of authors have analysed various factors that drive the formation and break up of these alliances. Stathis Kalyvas (2008) shows that ethnic defection is common in civil war and ethnicity is not a good predictor for how civil war factions will align. Fotini Christia (2012) demonstrates, based on research in Afghanistan, that factions switch sides back and forth based on the overall balance of power and to maximise their own power within their chosen faction. Paul Staniland (2012) argues that fratricidal violence predicts defections within alliances. William Reno (2007) makes the case that the ability of patrons to distribute resources dictates their ability to maintain alliances, and when they lose these resources armed factions seek alternative patrons. Many of these studies are based on single case studies and it is likely all of these processes are at work in different times and places. Kristian Bakke, Kathleen Cunningham and Lee Seymour have attempted to draw these studies together and operationalise rebel fragmentation in order to create a framework for measuring its impact on civil war dynamics (2012).

Both Stathis Kalyvas (2006) and Lee Seymour (2014) argue it is the ability of national-level actors to manage these processes and build alliances that dictates the outcomes of civil wars. Seymour (2014) looks at a number of factors that affect the capacity of leaders to build alliances in Sudan and shows the power of national leaders is based on their capacity to empower local armed groups to do their bidding. When no single actor can control the whole polity in this way, multiple armed factions are able to operate. What appears to be a military stalemate is actually a political equilibrium.

Limits of the 'insurgent alliance' approach

This approach to studying civil war has yielded interesting findings that have enriched our understanding of the processes that drive civil wars of all types. It still, however, falls short of offering a complete picture. For one, when these authors talk about micro-level decision-making what they mean is decisions being made by factional leaders. In spite of Kalyvas' assertion, this implies there is a fixed level of active participants in the conflict at its inception and how belligerents incentivise these participants to fight for them determines the outcome. There is still no explanation for why new participants from the population might join armed groups and how, therefore, armed groups grow in size without stealing fighters from their rivals. The growth of the Zimbabwean rebels did not come from fighters that had previously been fighting for the government. The rebels in Zimbabwe exploited conditions to bring in new conflict participants from within the broader population. Any study of alliance building in a civil war has to include the population more generally if it is to offer a complete theory of civil war dynamics and outcomes.

Secondly, these studies tend to only focus on irregular militant factions rather than governments or more organised rebel forces. While most rebel groups can be described as 'irregular' in nature, government forces normally take on a more outwardly organised form. Yet, individuals join government security forces for

the exact same reasons they join rebel groups.[4] Any theory of alliance building that wants to link macro-level outcomes and dynamics with micro-level population decision-making (and vice-versa) needs to explain this as well if it is to be a complete explanation.

Bringing in the population

Authors that have looked at populations often assume it to be a passive participant in civil war and focus on why rebels or governments carry out population-focused violence. A number of studies have looked at factors that affect belligerent interaction with the population (Beardsley and McQuinn, 2009; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2007). These works generally find that when rebels need more resources from the population they are more likely treat them well. They offer insight into the relationships between the population and civil war belligerents, but do not explore how this relationship affects the final outcome of conflicts.

There is also an extensive body of literature on popular mobilisation. However, these works normally attempt to explain mobilisation as the dependent variable, rather than use it as a framework for understanding the civil war process more generally. Ted Gurr focuses on grievances and relative deprivation (2012). Others have examined social networks and the structure of societies to understand why certain communities work with rebel groups (Migdal, 2015; Scott, 1977; Wolf, 1999). Samuel Popkin found that many peasants in South Vietnam worked with the Vietcong based on the perceived economic benefit (Popkin, 1979). Norma Kriger argues that insurgents offer individuals in the population opportunities to address local social and political conflicts (Kriger, 1991). Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher (2007) show how the use of violence can constrain the choices faced by civilians to not participate in conflicts. Elisabeth Wood shows how grievances interact with moral drivers, emotions and process-related

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[4] By this, I mean across the universe of cases. Within specific conflicts, members of the population may have very different reasons for joining either government or rebel forces.

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motivations to elicit participation in the insurgency in El Salvador (2010). As with the literature on insurgent alliances, it is likely that many of these processes are taking place simultaneously.

Mark Lichbach, in *The Rebel's Dilemma*, argues that revolution and counter-revolutionary activity are collective action problems, in that members of the population benefit from the outcome of a successful revolution (or its defeat) whether or not they contribute to its delivery. As such, individuals should choose not to support rebellious or counterinsurgent activity regardless of their broader political preferences even if they potentially benefit from defeating or the survival of the incumbent government. *The Rebel's Dilemma* explores the huge range of ways macro-level actors overcome this paradox (1998).

All of these works offer extremely interesting insights into how political actors, most often challengers to incumbent regimes, generate participation of various types from the population. Many of their insights will be explored in more detail below and added to findings from case studies to form the foundation of the theoretical model underpinning this thesis.

As in the rebel alliance literature, however, studies examining popular mobilisation or support for conflict actors tend to look only at rebels.[5] Moreover, most of the popular mobilisation literature treats it as a dependent variable. However, if these aspects of the conflict are key as Findley and Rudloff (2012) argue in terms of rebel fragmentation and Stathis Kalyvas shows in the case of popular support (2006), then the structure determining popular mobilisation should also offer a template for understanding civil war outcomes.

Most articles that have drawn inferences between belligerent and population interaction and macro-level dynamics, or vice versa, have focused on the use of violence against civilians. Lisa Hultman argues that rebel violence against civilians imposes political costs on governments, which offers rebels an

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[5] *The Rebel's Dilemma* represents an exception in this regard (Lichbach, 1998).

alternative way of inflicting costs on the government when it is struggling militarily (2007 and 2009). Reed Wood and Jacob Kathman show how the level of rebel violence has a curvilinear effect on civil war outcomes, with medium levels being the best predictor of a negotiated settlement (2014).

This exploration of how the use of violence can affect belligerent strength and civil war outcomes adds weight to the idea that understanding the relationship between belligerents and the population offers a fruitful avenue of research. However, we should be looking beyond violence to understand how other variables, such as governance or the economy, shape and constrain belligerents' capacities to mobilise support.

Stathis Kalyvas offers the most comprehensive framework for understanding how the relationship between belligerents and the population explain macro-level dynamics in *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (2006). Kalyvas' main thesis is that local participation in civil war is borne out of the desire of locals to settle and protect themselves in community-level feuds. The war itself becomes about governments and rebels building alliances with local communities – "the mechanism of alliance entails an exchange between the local and supra-local actors, whereby the latter offer the former military muscle so that it can prevail in local conflicts; in return local actors supply central ones with essential resources that can help them wage the war" (loc672). Kalyvas argues that studying this interaction is the key to understanding the dynamics of civil war (loc584).

These alliances are not solely based on pre-existing relationships but are endogenous to the conflict itself. Power comes from changes to the structural context within which the population makes decisions to augment the strength of macro-level actors. It is important, therefore, to understand violence against civilians not as a by-product of the conflict. Kalyvas quotes evidence from Africa to show that organised and regular units under direct control of belligerent leadership, not rogue militias, often carry out violence against civilians. Violence is, therefore, used to motivate a specific type of behaviour (2006; loc2131). For

this to be true, it implies that population behaviour is a strategic component of civil war.

One of Kalyvas' most important insights is to move away from understanding support as a preference for a particular belligerent winning the conflict. He argues that support must be described in behavioural terms. The population can behave in a way that strengthens the government or the rebels unintentionally or as a by-product of other behaviour. For Kalyvas, communities are motivated to provide behavioural support to conflict actors to strengthen their local power, not because they share a belligerent's national-level preferences (loc2670).

Kalyvas links this local micro-level decision-making to macro-level dynamics, namely the distribution of violence against civilians. He argues that the key variable for which actor is likely to be best placed to draw support from the population is the distribution of territorial control. There is likely to be less civilian-focused violence in areas where one actor retains absolute territorial control and more in contested areas as actors exploit local conflicts to suppress potential opposition. Kalyvas supports his hypotheses with primary evidence from the Greek civil war to show why civilians collaborated with communists, nationalists or Nazi occupiers and why violence erupted in specific areas (2006).

He also claims this framework serves as a baseline for understanding civil war outcomes (loc672). However, this quickly becomes problematic. If Kalyvas is correct, territory under the firm control of one actor should rarely change hands, as the population will always collaborate with the strongest local force. The conflict should become solely about inducing the collaboration of the population in contested areas. The simple fact, however, is that many areas can be peaceful at one point in the conflict, then become subsumed into it as the war drags on, precisely because the population increasingly disengage from the controlling-power. Moreover, as the analysis above has demonstrated, some conflicts are won by rebel groups that hold very limited territory. Beyond tactical astuteness, Kalyvas offers no compelling reasons for changes in the dynamics of collaboration between the population and conflict actors in these instances (loc3689). I suggest

this shortcoming comes not from the actual study itself, but in how he extrapolates his framework for understanding population-directed violence to a means for determining civil war outcomes. In order to do this, we have to focus on what governments and rebel forces do in the territory they control. How macro-level behaviours and structures, beyond the use of violence, affect belligerent mobilisation capacities remains an unexplored area of study and should offer an explanation for various types of civil war outcomes.

Despite the limits of *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Kalyvas's overall thesis that "civil war is, at its core, a process of integration and state building" (2006; loc672) makes it an extremely important step in studying civil war. The rest of this study expands on this logic and examines how governments and rebel groups integrate population support. In this light we will reframe civil war as a competition to shape the behaviour of the population, not just a military conflict.

Roger D. Petersen's study of emotions in the Balkans already partially fills this literature gap in that he links his framework to the outcome of Western interventions in the Balkans (2011). Petersen argues it is the presence of certain emotions that allows opponents to intervention to counter stronger actors' ability to deliver material benefits to local communities. The presence of these emotions is based on historical relationships between communities, political structures and inequalities or the use of violence. Petersen's book is mainly focused on variations in the success of Western interventions in the Balkans. He claims it is Western doctrine's narrow focus on rational incentives that leaves it open to exploitation by political entrepreneurs able to exploit the presence of emotional resources for generating population support. It is not clear how this applies in other cases with limited external intervention or where emotions are strong (or weak) on both sides. The framework developed in this thesis mainly focuses on and tests state-building activity in a similar manner to Peterson's focus on emotions. However, I also acknowledge the role of intangible incentives in mobilising support for conflict actors, making it complementary to Peterson's study. The case study of Nagorno-Karabakh, in particular, shows how emotions and entrenched identities interact heavily with tangible state-building activity.

Plan for rest of study

The rest of this thesis attempts to address many of the questions raised above. It will be divided into two main parts, a theory and an empirical section. The theory section will first discuss the concept of war as a mobilisation game, answering the first puzzle - why do belligerents dedicate resources to shaping population behaviour? The second chapter will show how this framework can be used to explain how small militant groups defeat strong governments. I will argue that the main element of the mobilisation competition is rebel efforts to degrade the structures governments use to generate support. Consequently, rebels do not need to match the government militarily to achieve their strategic aims.

Having established my theory, the thesis will test it empirically using a mixed-methods approach. The empirical sections of the thesis lend strong support to the theory. The model of war developed in this thesis, therefore, provides policymakers and strategic decision-makers a template for understanding wars around the world that has been tested with academic rigour across a wide variety of conflicts.

Definitions

Before proceeding it is necessary to define a number of terms that I use throughout the thesis, but can be ambiguous in nature.

Civil war

As pointed out by other scholars, the term civil war can be contentious (Kalyvas, 2009). Moreover, as highlighted above, scholars have begun trying to break civil wars down into different types (Hultquist, 2013). For the purpose of this study, however, I intend to use one definition that encompasses these different types. I borrow the definition from Stathis Kalyvas' chapter on civil war in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (2009).

> "Armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized
> (sic) sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority
> at the outset of the hostilities" (p417).

As Kalyvas points out, this definition rests upon there being a military challenge to the government from within the state from an organised force "with military equipment and full-time recruits" (ibid.).

Most of this thesis also assumes that the government remains a functioning entity. In some civil wars, such as Libya after the fall of Colonel Qadaffi, even the nominal government is represented by an alliance of irregular militias. While the logic of chapter one can be applied to all civil wars, many of the caveats developed in chapter two require there to be a functioning government. No such restriction is placed on the type of rebel force the government faces.

The population

How we define the population and separate it from conflict actors has significant theoretical implications, however, this will be treated in more detail in the next section. At this stage it is necessary to emphasise that the population is not a unitary actor. Individuals and communities respond differently to the same set of macro-level structures. When possible I try to clarify when referring to different sections of the population. Even then, some people within communities will lend support to conflict actors while others avoid any active involvement. Consequently, the term 'the population' refers not to the whole population, but to individuals contained within it. Conflict actors draw a certain amount of resources from the population, but it is only a proportion of that population that actually provides this support.

Rationality

The model of civil war proposed in this thesis involves three main decision-making groups; the two belligerents and the population. Hundreds of thousands of people make decisions that affect the war's outcome. To a large extent this thesis is designed to propose a logic for studying the general environment decision-makers respond to and the effect of those decisions. How decision-makers actually calculate the utility of particular behaviours does not change the main arguments. The model of war proposed in this thesis, however, has been borne out of an impression that civil war actors are not hyper-rational as is often assumed (Powell, 2002). I assume, instead, that decision-makers are boundedly-rational. Michael Laver compares hyper- and bounded-rationality:

> "Hyper-rational agents make choices by looking forward strategically, continuously solving and resolving in real time (a) dense system of equations… In contrast, adaptive agents *look backward and learn* from the past, developing simple rules of thumb that condition behaviour on the recent history of the system" (2005; p264).

Boundedly-rational agents are also assumed to make decisions using more localised information, rather than understanding the beliefs, behaviours and consequences of actors behaviours within the whole system (Gigerenzer, 2002). As the model proposed in this thesis means bringing in the population as a rational agent, this assumption is even more important. Stathis Kalyvas' work, for example, rests on the principle that communities determine their support based on local conflict dynamics, rather than the national picture.

Where appropriate, footnotes highlight areas where the logical implications of the analysis in this thesis differs if the assumption of rationality is altered.

State vs government

The terms government and state are often treated synonymously (Peters and Pierre, 2005). In this study, however, when referring to the state I mean the territorial area, recognised as a unit within the international system (Mampilly, 2011), within which a conflict is taking place. The government is one of the parties to that conflict.

Chapter one

War and the population

The first puzzle is why do conflict actors expend so much resources on shaping population behaviour in civil wars? Practitioners almost universally claim popular support is the key element in determining the outcome of intrastate conflict. (See, for example, the US military's field manual on counterinsurgency (2007); David Galula (1964); Mao Tse-Tung (2002); Bard O'Neill (1990); Robert Taber (2002); David Kilcullen (2009); John Nagl (2005)). Abraham Guillen defines revolutionary conflict as a battle for the support of the population (Guillen and Hodges, 1973; p232). Robert Taber argues rebels have to gain the cooperation of the population to overcome their capacity disadvantage (Taber, 2002). In turn, David Galula states that if a counterinsurgent can prevent this from happening, they can isolate rebel groups, making them easy to defeat (1964). Western counterinsurgency strategy rests on providing the population security, governance and development to create this isolation (US Army, 2007).

More importantly, qualitative evidence also demonstrates conflict actors putting this logic into practice. Both rebels and governments spend resources on governance, socioeconomic activity, violence against civilians and propaganda. Conflict actors must consider it more productive to use resources in this manner, than expending those same resources on military activity.

This chapter examines the nature of alliances between conflict actors and the population in an attempt to elucidate the reasons for this phenomenon. It will be broken down into two parts; firstly, examining what belligerents get from the population, before creating a framework for understanding how conflicts actors elicit contributions – or mobilise support. I propose that examining this relationship reveals a key variable that can be used as the basis for understanding the dynamics and likely outcomes of civil wars; a conflict actor's ability to mobilise resources through the course of the conflict - its regenerative capacity. By focusing on this variable we can frame civil war as a mobilisation competition,

with belligerents attempting to build sovereign structures that mobilise support from their constituent populations and degrade the capacity of their opponents to do the same.

Defining popular support

Observers of civil war divide popular support for conflict actors into active and passive. Bard E. O'Neill (1990) defines active supporters as:

> "(T)hose who... make sacrifices and risk personal harm either by joining the movement or by providing insurgents with intelligence, information, concealment, shelter, hiding places for arms and equipment, medical assistance, guides, and liaison agents" (p72).

He defines passive supporters as those "not apt to betray or otherwise impede insurgents" (p71). This amounts to not providing active support to government efforts at countering the rebellion. O'Neill quotes the Vietminh manual on guerrilla warfare to demonstrate the range of ways population behaviour can benefit an insurgency:

> "The population helps us fight the enemy by giving us information, suggesting ruses and plans, helping us to overcome difficulties due to lack of arms, and providing us with guides. It also supplies liaison agents, hides, and protects us, assists our actions near posts, feeds us and looks after our wounded... Cooperating with guerrillas, it has participated in sabotage acts, in diversionary actions, in encircling the enemy, in applying the scorched earth policy... On several occasions and in cooperation with guerrillas it has taken part in combat" (p72)

This list has two notable absentees, one of which O'Neill addresses in the first quote, the other which he does not. The first is actively joining the movement. People do not stop being part of the population once they join the army or a rebel

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force. They retain the option to desist from fighting or switch sides as outlined in the literature on insurgent alliances.

The second is financial support, either through direct funding or the paying of taxes. Zacharian Mampilly shows how rebel groups of different strengths across the world, from Sri Lanka to Sudan, collected taxes from the population (2011). Actively fighting for an insurgent group contributes more than a small financial contribution. Nevertheless, both actively strengthen the conflict actor.

In reality, the division of popular support between active and passive oversimplifies the situation. Two important nuances need to be added to this dichotomy. The first is to see support as a continuum of activities that conflict actors need to induce from the population; ranging from actively fighting, to more limited support such as paying a tax, to completely passive support by not offering active support to the opposing conflict actor. Research conducted in the 1960s on rebel groups in France, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Malaya, Greece, the Philippines and Palestine concluded conflict actors need increasing levels of support as its movement grows in size. For every active fighter belligerents need an unspecified multiple of people providing financial, material and logistical support. The authors showed that in some conflicts an insurgency's support network outnumbered fighters by as much as 27 to 1 (Molnar, 1966; p64).[6] Even this number will be a small percentage of the overall population. Thomas Greene suggests the average participation in active rebellions is around seven percent of the population (quoted in Lichbach, 1998; p18). This almost certainly does not include civilians paying taxes or other benign activities that do not appear directly related to the war effort, such as working in education or healthcare institutions under rebel control. Beyond this, rebels need an even larger number of people to remain passive and simply let the rebels function without assisting government efforts to target them. James Coleman argues that in Vietnam, guerrillas did not only seek to build active support from the population, but also to "immobilize

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[6] The average across all of the conflicts examined was seven to one (Molnar, 1966; p64).

(sic) it, to ensure through example that the population recognized (sic) that aid to the authorities would be swiftly and certainly punished" (1990; p481).

Mark Lichbach breaks participation down into five types:

- *"Constituents.* A rebel groups' social base or ... the one it claims to represent.
- *Sympathisers.* Those within the constituent group that agree with the aims of the rebel group but stop short of active participation.
- *Members.* Those that join formally join the group and support it in some material fashion.
- *Activists.* Members of the population that actively support the group some of the time.
- *Militants.* Those with a full-time commitment to the group." (1998; p17).

To this list, we should add *non-constituents*, who do not support a conflict actor, but do not support the other side either, creating freedom of activity. These people would be considered as providing passive support. Each of these categories involves an increasing contribution to the group and more demands on the individual. One might say the support a group needs follows a distribution akin to figure one. Categorising support as just active or passive, therefore, is insufficient for truly understanding the support conflict actors need. It is necessary, instead to work out what types of support different segments of the population are providing to belligerents.

Figure 1: Hypothetical distribution of support for rebel groups

The second nuance involves the definition of support. As Stathis Kalyvas showed, the amount of support a conflict actor draws from the population can be unrelated to popular association with its broader aims (2006). This logic applies to all sorts of support, including actively fighting. Kristine Eck has documented forced recruitment in a number of conflicts, including Liberia and Uganda (2014).

Using Mark Lichbach's typology, therefore, mischaracterises many participants in civil war. ISIL uses coercion to exploit the population under its control, forcing people to fill administrative functions or keep vital infrastructure running. Others carry out these roles simply to make a living rather than to support ISIL. Nevertheless, these activities still generate tax revenue for ISIL and facilitate vital military support functions such as transporting oil (Caris and Reynolds, 2014). Using Lichbach's categories, one could argue these people are members of ISIL in terms of their contribution to the strength of the group. They would probably deny this description. As such, the terms used in the graph above actually reflect the amount of support members of the population are providing to conflict actors rather than a commitment to the group. Popular support needs to be defined by

its tangible contribution to the strength of a group, not a shared preference with its ultimate aims.

Militants might be considered those making a significant to contribution to the strength of the group, while constituents might be those simply paying taxes. Those filling administrative functions would be somewhere in between. Non-constituent supporters, in turn, would be those providing passive support. Nevertheless, Lichbach's typology represents a useful delineation of the types of support belligerents need.

One final thing needs to be said about the nature of popular support if it is to be used as a basis for understanding conflict outcomes. An extensive literature has appeared over the last fifty years documenting the need for rebels to build popular support. Rarely, however, is the same logic applied to governments. Discussion over popular support for the government is often limited to undermining rebels (Galula, 1964; Kilcullen, 2009; O'Neill, 1990; US Army, 2007; JCS, 2013). While governments obviously benefit from achieving this, Mark Lichbach argues they also require exactly the same types of support as rebels (1998).

The government needs the population to join the security forces, to fill roles in the civilian bureaucracy that sustains the military, to engage in economic activity, to pay and collect taxes on that money, to produce food, to operate vital infrastructure, and all the other things that keep society functioning. Non-military activities, such as education and healthcare, are also important as they support socioeconomic activity. As far as I am aware no study has been done that gives an indication of how much support governments need in terms of manpower to sustain its military and keep vital services running. Moreover, the government needs to sustain a whole series of activities that rebels do not need to consider. It needs public sector workers and a much broader percentage of the population to pay taxes. It is likely the ratio of people it needs to provide more limited support to keep the state functioning compared to actively join security forces is even

greater than the 27 to one, or seven percent of the population, rebels have needed (Lichbach, 1998; Molnar, 1966).

Belligerents also generate support from external sources or tapping into criminal networks (Ross, 2004). It is highly unlikely that belligerents will be able to generate support from the population without access to resources from elsewhere, hence the focus they place on appealing to external patrons (Connable and Libicki, 2010). External support also affects what belligerents need to elicit from the population and how they go about realising it. For example, even a hypothetical conflict actor that meets all of its manpower, material and financial needs from external sources still needs to pacify potential supporters of its opponents. In reality, no such actor exists and belligerents use external support or control over natural resources to build an internal movement (Beardsley and McQuinn, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Mampilly, 2011; Ross, 2004; Weinstein, 2007). The quantity and type of support belligerents receive from other sources may, in turn, affect how they choose to build this movement (see for example (Beardsley and McQuinn, 2009; Mampilly, 2011; Weinstein, 2007)).[7]

The role of the population

The population provide conflict actors manpower, money, shelter, supplies and intelligence. In other words, the critical elements belligerents need to prosecute a war. If this support is removed entirely then a conflict actor will lose the war. Bard O'Neill argues that successful insurgencies, such as the Afghan Mujahedeen in the 1980s, elicited this support from the population on a long-term basis, while unsuccessful rebel groups, such as those in Bolivia and Guatemala in the 1960s, failed precisely because they failed to establish relations with the population (1990; p73). The population's preference for belligerents' respective war aims is probably a bell curve, with those actively seeking to support the conflict actors' aims at the extremes. The majority of the population remains in the middle and is influenced by a plethora of factors. In this light, civil war becomes a process of

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[7] This literature will be revisited in chapter three.

macro-actors shifting the behaviour of these people in the middle, in order to generate support.

One important implication for accepting the breadth of support populations provide conflict actors is it makes it extremely difficult to draw a clear line between the population and belligerents. Often, fighters or other active participants are judged as subsumed into a unitary decision-making entity (see, for example, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) and Cunningham et al. (2009)). This approach may seem attractive in that it simplifies the analysis of intrastate conflict. However, given how crucial the decision of the population is to the strength of conflict actors this assumes away a key variable.

Teresa Barnes puts it succinctly; "civil wars are not determined by the decisions of individual leaders, but by the thousands of decisions being taken by foot soldiers to participate in rebellions" (Bhebe and Ranger, 1995). Given the breadth of support belligerents get from the population, this can be expanded to include the tens of thousands providing support to belligerents through less-involved means. Barnes obviously oversimplifies the problem the other direction, in that she ignores how macro-level actors influence this decision. Nevertheless, it is a useful reminder that the role and motivations of most participants are absent from many studies of intrastate conflict.

Conceptually, the line between belligerents and the population is relatively clear; conflict actors make strategic decisions about the prosecution of the war and the population constitutes those responding to these decisions and choosing to assist one, both or neither conflict actor. Applying this concept in practice is much more complicated as there is no clear line in any organisation between those making decisions over its direction and those responding to them. It is clear, for example, that foot soldiers remain part of the population from this perspective, but it is not clear where local commanders or local government officials lie. For the purpose of this study, conflict actors constitute elites that sit at the top of this command hierarchy, with everyone else being a member of the population.

To provide support or to not provide support?

The previous section demonstrated the breadth and importance of population involvement in civil wars. The next stage in incorporating the population into a more complete model of intrastate conflict is understanding why members of the population choose to provide support to one, both or neither belligerent. I do not intend to list every possible reason an individual can have for supporting a conflict actor. These reasons can be tangible or intangible, psychological or material, objective or subjective. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) use evidence from Sierra Leone to show that motivations for individual participation in civil war vary significantly. These motivations will vary even further between conflicts. Instead, I will divide the population's incentives to provide support into four categories, with a number of real-life examples.

At an abstract level, every member of the population's decision is relatively simple. If the expected utility from providing a particular type of support is greater than zero, then an individual will provide that support. If it is less than zero, then it will not.

The population's ability to contribute also determines how much support a conflict actor can generate. As an obvious example, a member of the population cannot pay a tax if it has no money or provide food if it cannot grow crops. This logic applies to all types of material support members of the population provide to conflict actors. Individuals can even only provide a finite amount of fighting capacity. The case studies below will show that this is a crucial element of any civil war, and often even more important in determining the final outcome than the proportion of the population that support each belligerent.

Members of the population respond to incentives, both positive (benefits) and negative (costs), and decide accordingly whether to participate and at what level. These incentives are either selective for individual members of the population or collective and apply to broader communities. They will also be divided between those delivered immediately during the conflict and promises to be delivered

after the conflict is won. This allows us to divide the types of incentives the population respond to into four general types; selective and within-conflict, selective and post-conflict, collective and within-conflict, and collective and post-conflict (see table one). Each of these four types poses a different challenge to belligerents in terms of motivating the support they need.

Type of incentive	Within-conflict	Post-conflict
Selective (Individual)	Financial payment Social status Military targeting (cost)	Political power Employment Judicial punishment (cost)
Collective (Community)	Support in local conflicts Security Community-level violence (cost)	Political change Improved services Political exclusion (cost)

Table 1: Examples of the four types of incentives that affect population decision-making. Those with cost in brackets represent negative incentives.

Selective within-conflict incentives

This type of incentive is the most powerful at an individual level. It provides an immediate benefit or cost that is not dependent on the outcome of the conflict. As such, it becomes easy for those responding to these incentives to monitor its delivery and alter their behaviour if the payoff is not realised. From the individual's perspective these types of incentives are of both high value and high credibility.

The main drawback of this type of incentive for conflict actors is that it can be extremely difficult to provide it on a mass scale, especially for rebel groups that have limited resources. It may, therefore, be difficult to build a movement using selective within-conflict incentives alone.

Examples of this type of incentive include direct economic incentives. Samuel Popkin's, *The Rational Peasant,* explains peasant support for the Vietcong on the basis of individuals within the population responding to the economic incentives the insurgency offered (1979). Another selective within-conflict benefit may be the political or social standing that supporting a belligerent will provide the individual. David Lan argues that spirit mediums cooperated with the ZANU insurgency in Zimbabwe in order to reassert the political power they had lost during the period of white-rule (Lan, 1985).

An example of a selective within-conflict cost is the probability of being individually targeted for supporting a belligerent. In Afghanistan, the Taliban attempted to kill anyone involved in local government institutions as a means to prevent people from occupying these roles (Rashid, 2010).

Selective post-conflict incentives

Selective post-conflict incentives are much less powerful than within-conflict incentives as they depend upon beliefs over how the war will end. These types of incentives work best when one actor appears close to winning the war. Mark Lichbach (1998) suggests people will start supporting a belligerent that appears on the verge of victory to benefit from the potential spoils.

The drawback of this type of incentive is, therefore, relatively obvious; during the early stages of a war very few people will respond to it. While the pay-off may be high, it will be much less certain as the belligerent may ultimately be unable to provide it, as it may not win the war. Governments and rebels may also break promises after the conflict, lowering the credibility of any offer made during the war (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow, 2005).

Despite this, there is evidence of this type of incentive having some effect during civil wars. Fotini Christia (2012) outlined how faction leaders changed sides during the various Afghan wars based on their perceptions of the political power they would hold if their chosen coalition succeeded. Fotini's work also suggested

that the more people this offer is made to, the less credible it becomes. She found that as coalitions grew in size, less powerful members of the coalition would desert and offer support elsewhere.

Collective within-conflict incentives

Collective incentives apply to a whole community in exchange for support from individuals associated with that section of the population. If belligerents reach whole communities through collective incentives, they can expand exponentially the amount of support they generate.

Shaping population behaviour through collective incentives, however, represents a fundamental challenge. Individuals within communities will benefit from them regardless of whether or not they provide support in return. The paradox this creates is that the provision of the collective incentive requires input from a number of people. Once the good is provided it is enjoyed by the whole population regardless of whether or not an individual contributed. While individuals benefit from the provision of this good, their input involves a personal cost or risk and their individual contribution is unlikely to be decisive. As a result, the individual chooses not to participate; otherwise referred to as free-riding. Consequently, the good is not delivered, even though everyone would benefit from it. Economists call this the collective action problem (Sandler, 2004).[8]

As Mark Lichbach lays out, in spite of this challenge, armies are raised by both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces and communities do support these forces (1998). His book examines the plethora of ways belligerents overcome the collective action problem and mobilise support.[9]

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[8] The collective action is not as acute when people are assumed to be boundedly-rational, as they are likely to base their assessment on the likelihood of attaining the pay-off by the behaviour of those around them. As such, if political elites can more easily induce participation by creating a bandwagoning effect.

[9] Chapter three will examine how current doctrinal approaches to counterinsurgency perform against Lichbach's solutions.

In short, the collective action problem suggests that individuals are less likely to respond to community-based incentives than they are to selective incentives. However, collective incentives can often reach far more people than selective incentives and, therefore, do not have to be as successful at an individual level to generate more support in absolute terms, particularly less active types of participation, such as providing intelligence.

As with selective incentives, collective within-conflict incentives are likely to be more powerful than collective post-conflict incentives. Communities can accrue benefits or avoid costs at the same time as providing support, allowing individuals to withdraw their support if the payoff is not delivered.

The desire for community security is a collective within-conflict motivation. Stathis Kalyvas argues that many people join one side or another in a civil war based on their desire to protect their community (2006). One can see how this can be a collective action problem as security depends upon people joining militias or security forces in order to provide this security.

Belligerents also punish communities for the behaviour of individuals. Reed Wood and Jacob Kathman show how rebel groups often attack communities to stop them engaging in economic and social activity that benefits the government (2014).[10]

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[10] Collective costs are not as complicated as collective benefits, and will often be easier to deliver to the population than selective costs, which require comprehensive intelligence to identify those supporting a conflict actor's opponent. The challenge for belligerents is that those involved in supporting the other conflict actor may be well protected from indiscriminate violence, or consider that they will be punished regardless (Kalyvas, 2006). Consequently, they are still not as powerful as selective costs. As this thesis focuses mainly on positive incentives, it will not feature a discussion on the utility of choosing between various violent strategies at a theoretical level. That said, the case studies feature the use of violence to shape population behaviour and undermine support for the opposing belligerent. The implications of these specific strategies will, therefore, be treated in more detail during the empirical section of the thesis.

Collective post-conflict incentives

Collective post-conflict incentives suffer the same problem as all collective incentives. They are also highly uncertain for the same reason as selective post-conflict incentives, in that there is less probability that the incentive will actually be delivered.

Nevertheless, a number of scholars have proposed that some conflict actors have been able to generate support based on promises for the post-war order. Ted Gurr, in *Why Men Rebel* (2012), argues that relative political, social or economic deprivation is a key variable in inspiring people to participate in rebellious movements. James McPherson (1998) found that many soldiers in the American Civil War participated due to their ideological affinity with the goals of macro-level actors. One problem with this approach is that promises to address grievances or implement an ideological vision are collective and often post-war incentives.[11]

Consequently, only a small percentage of people may respond to these types of incentives with active support. That said, conflict actors may only need a small proportion of people to provide the most active types of support. The analysis above showed that a small group of ideologically committed or extremely aggrieved individuals may be enough to raise an armed force if there is a resilient network of people providing less costly types of support. Collective post-war incentives may also be sufficient to motivate people to provide less risky types of support, such as small financial contributions. Across a large population these smaller contributions may add up to significantly boost a conflict actor's overall

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[11] Despite the pervasive nature of grievances and ideologies, they have generally failed to explain conflict dynamics in national-level quantitative analysis of civil war. Stephen Brush (see Gurr, 2012; px), for example, examined a range of empirical studies and found there was no support for Tedd Gurr's theory of relative deprivation. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) suggest this is because studies focus on the wrong level of analysis and present a new dataset that focuses on local dynamics, which they claim does show support for political and economic grievances as a driver of civil war. Mark Lichbach also claims that subjective grievances are much more important than objective grievances when it comes to motivating participation in rebel groups (1998). It is the ability of political entrepreneurs to exploit grievances, to the point of even inventing them, that matters, not the objective existence of a grievance in the first place.

strength. Nevertheless, collective post-war incentives will be the weakest driver of behaviour at an individual level. For a conflict actor to generate the support it needs to win a war, collective post-war incentives will have to be combined with credible within-war benefits or costs, which will more powerful in shaping population behaviour.

Collective post-conflict incentives can also take the form of costs. Ethnic minorities across Syria and Iraq have fled territory rather than support efforts to resist ISIL's military advances (Smith, 2015). These civilians undoubtedly feared that ISIL would collectively punish non-Sunni Muslim communities under their control based on ISIL's activities elsewhere.

Type of incentive	Within-conflict	Post-conflict
Selective (Individual)	High payoff Lower uncertainty Limited reach	High payoff High uncertainty Limited reach
Collective (Community)	Low payoff Lower uncertainty Wider reach	Low payoff High uncertainty Wider reach

Table 2: Features of the four types of incentives

Supporting both sides

Table two summarises the different types of incentives. Based on a range of incentives, that will encompass all four of these quadrants, individuals within the population will provide the type of support to each belligerent that gives the biggest expected payoff to the individual. It may be that this equation leads some individuals to provide support to both actors. A member of a government civil service may be strongly motivated by the selective incentive of their wages to continue working for the government. However, they may also feel the political

aims of the rebels would benefit them in the longer term and, if the likelihood of punishment for doing so is low, may provide financial assistance to rebels or turn a blind eye to rebel activity within their community. In LTTE-held Sri Lanka, civil servants continued to work for the government, paying taxes to rebels and delivering services to populations that actively supported rebel groups (Mampilly, 2011). According to Lichbach's typology, this person could be a member of both the government and the rebels.

It is also worth noting that these incentives are always interacting. An individual may find the allure of democracy in the post-war environment appealing. They may also recognise that there is a low probability of it being realised and their individual contribution will make little difference. Nevertheless, they may consider joining a belligerent's military force for less money if they believe in the cause. Without both the selective within-war and collective post-war incentive they may not have provided support.

There is also the possibility that the equation individuals face for providing support to actors leads to them supporting neither side. In other words, the perceived utility of actively contributing to both sides is below zero. In this case, the population passively support both sides and falls into the non-constituent category for both groups. As the analysis above shows though, even small contributions, such as paying taxes, constitute active support. While many in the population may be indifferent to the outcome and support the strongest actor, as per Kalyvas's analysis (2006), their acquiescence should not be equated to passivity. These contributions may seem insignificant by themselves but when spread across tens of thousands of people may determine the ability of a conflict actor to operate.

Population support and regenerative capacity

The preceding analysis has described, in broad terms, the nature of the alliance between a conflict actor and the population during a civil war. The alliance has two main parts; the contribution of the population to the strength of a belligerent

and the ability to of a conflict actor to deliver incentives that elicit these contributions.

The first element describes what the population provides belligerents; active support in the form of manpower, finances, supplies or intelligence, and passive support in terms of not providing active support to the opposing conflict actor. The key point is that the range of support belligerents need to function is more complex than a simple active-passive dichotomy. Studies have shown that in many cases conflict actors need more people to provide the less-active types of support - providing a small financial contribution, for example - than actively participate in military options (Molnar, 1966). The role of popular support in determining the strength of a conflict actor, therefore, is much more multifaceted than whether the population considers a belligerent's goals or behaviour legitimate.

The second element of the alliance describes why the population provides this support. The literature on mobilisation suggests there is no silver bullet in answering this question in practical terms. However, theoretically, we should expect that an individual is more likely to provide support to a belligerent if the pay-off is immediate and selective, in that the individual can only realise the pay-off by actively providing support. Ultimately, the decision to support conflict actors is a strategic one, based on an expected return, which demonstrates how these two elements of the alliance between a belligerent and the population interact. Governments and rebel groups have to alter the calculations of the population if they are to emerge victorious. The aim is simple, increase the range of incentives to potential supporters in order to elicit more active contributions, moving members of the population across the continuum from constituents, to members, to activists. Belligerents also seek to maximise the amount of support their followers can provide.

They also attempt to decrease the utility to the population of providing support to their opponents, essentially pacifying them and moving them across the continuum from activists, to sympathisers, to non-constituents. Alternatively,

they will try to limit the amount of support their opponent's constituent population can generate.

The belligerent that achieves these objectives and monopolises its capacity to shape population behaviour and mobilise resources will win the war. This mirrors recent practitioner descriptions of civil war. David Kilcullen claims that "the side may win which best mobilizes (sic) and energizes (sic) its global, regional and local support base - and prevents its adversaries doing likewise" (2012; p140). Figure two shows this process visually.

Figure 2: Framework for war as a mobilisation competition.

This relationship is not static or based on a one-time mobilisation of resources at the beginning of the war. Governments and rebels are continuously mobilising resources and their capacity to do this shifts as the war goes on. In any given time period, conflict actors will have the ability to generate a certain amount of resources by eliciting contributions from the population. This ability will obviously also be augmented any external support governments or rebels are receiving. If one side loses the ability to mobilise support completely, then it will lose the war.

The ability to generate resources ultimately determines a conflict actors' strength and, as it is a dynamic process, I describe this ability as a belligerent's regenerative capacity. In the example given at the start of this thesis, the Taliban grew during the period of Western intervention in Afghanistan because its regenerative capacity increased at a greater rate than it was losing fighters, meaning it was able to increase its strength even in the face of heavy losses.

War as a state-building competition

The description of civil war as a process of alliance building offers an important insight into the basic process underpinning the dynamic and outcomes intrastate conflicts. It is particularly revealing that this description mirrors more general academic literature on how governments maintain control over the state.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. present a model of society in *The Logic of Political Survival* (2005), which illustrates how governments retain control. The authors divide societies into a 'winning coalition', the 'selectorate' and the 'disenfranchised'. The 'winning coalition' consists of those that make the decision on who leads the polity. The 'selectorate' have the theoretical capacity to choose leaders or gain access to the 'winning coalition' through the polity's existing institutional structures. The 'disenfranchised' cover the remaining 'residents' (chap. 2). These categories can be broadly mapped to the proposed types of support conflict actors need. Governments create reciprocal relations across these different sections of society to stay in power, raising taxes that it then spends on providing public and private benefits, which further motivates population behaviour that generates resources. These resources also allow the government to either minimise or suppress dissent from the disenfranchised or non-constituents (chap. 10). Based on this description, is easy to see how this reflects the alliance between conflict actors and the population laid out above.

Governments structure their relationships with the population in a wide variety of ways. Western liberal models of the state see the government as mediating conflict between various social groups and individuals (Peters and Pierre, 2005).

Autocratic governments are more likely to rely on the active support of a smaller section of the population, which it provides with selective incentives in exchange for assisting the government in suppressing the remainder of society (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Weaker governments may draw strength from building patronage networks across the state. Lee Seymour shows that in Sudan government power is enforced by local political elites, who incentivise their constituent population to participate in militias that provide security and police territory. In exchange, the government provides these elites with access to resources or territorial control (2014). It is not even necessary that the government exert complete control over its territory. In many less-developed states, the government may only effectively control one portion of the polity. Administration in the rest of the state is left to combinations of NGOs, traditional institutions such as tribes, religious groups or criminal networks (Mampilly, 2011). No group that has designs on formally controlling the state, or some part of it, is able to challenge these non-state actors for supremacy in an area and motivate enough support to confront the government.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue the range of potential polities is infinite in scope in terms of the balance between the size of the 'winning coalition', 'selectorate' and 'disenfranchised', and the types of incentives governments use to shape population behaviour and hold on to power (2005). The reality is that governments around the world control the state through a combination of methods. Even many democratic states maintain strong security forces that punish participation in rebellious activity.

Regardless of this balance, the basic description of the state as a system in which governments distribute resources to their constituent population in order to elicit behaviour that generates support clearly mirrors the mechanism of alliance between belligerents and the population during civil wars. The equivalency between Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s work and studies of rebel networks is also revealing.

Zacharian Mampilly shows that many scholars have drawn parallels between insurgent efforts to build effective shadow governance structures and the emergence of states (Kasfir, 2002; Kingston and Spears, 2004; Mampilly, 2011; Pegg, 1998). These scholars liken more extensive rebel efforts to build relations with the population to Mancur Olson (1993) and Charles Tilly's (1993) description of modern-state formation, where roving bandits transition to stationary bandits (Mampilly, 2011). The theory explains state formation as the result of bandits needing to draw support from the population to sustain military activity against each other. These bandits "move toward consensual accumulation strategies because the rewards offered through effective taxation of the population are much greater than the mere looting that the roving bandit previously relied upon" (Mampilly, 2011; loc1059).

It is clear that rebels face this calculation during civil wars. If they can establish permanent structures, that mirror Bueno de Mesquita et al's description of the state, they can draw far more support from the population, organise the population to maximise the amount of support each individual provides and prevent the government from interacting with those communities. Building shadow-governance structures becomes about more than demonstrating a credible alternative or seeking legitimacy (Podder, 2013). These structures form an integral part of the process through which rebels organise and generate support from the population.

Rebels of all types seek to build networks that provide them with manpower, funding, supplies and intelligence. Since the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a growing literature on how insurgencies create networks from which they draw the support they need to build and sustain a military force. Chad Serena (2014) looked at the Iraqi Sunni insurgency in the mid-2000s and shows its organisational network provided it with fighters, funding, supplies, intelligence, the ability to train new members, and punish government collaborators (2014). Paul Staniland provides a comparative analysis of insurgent networks across south Asia. Once the conflict begins, the insurgents need to broaden beyond their original social network and become

'integrated' to draw the support it needs to function and combat the government. They do this by developing links 'horizontally' between militant factions and 'vertically' into the population. The key is that these networks function to create a two-way flow of support between insurgents and the population (2014).

Staniland and Serena focus on smaller insurgent groups engaged in asymmetric-style conflicts. However, understanding these networks as the structures through which insurgencies draw support makes it clear they are the equivalent of the more complex institutions built by governments and many rebel groups that control territory, such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The smaller groups Staniland and Serena studied, only needed support to sustain asymmetric activities against vastly superior military forces. As such, they created clandestine networks out of the reach of their militarily powerful enemies. The LTTE was able to build a more conventional army and administer a shadow-state. It built more complex sovereign structures to generate the additional resources required, in the manner articulated by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005). Governments use their ministries, local administrations or patronage networks to do the same. These sovereign structures both deliver incentives to the population and generate resources back out of the population that the belligerent can use for military activity and delivering further incentives to the population.

Academic work has also shown that both governments and rebels can build these arrangements in parallel within a single state. Charles Tilly describes this situation as "dual sovereignty" (1977).[12] Multiple scholars have since drawn on

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[12] Applying Tilly's concept to the study of civil war, while extremely useful, does require a departure from traditional understandings of sovereignty. Tilly's description of 'dual sovereignty' is unrelated to the concept of *de jure* sovereignty. It fits much better when viewed through the prism of *de facto* sovereignty, which is more concerned with describing the actual level of control on the ground (Mampilly, 2011). Even here, the level of control rebel groups need to sustain low-level guerrilla activity may not meet the criteria for *de facto* sovereignty as it is described by some scholars, in that the insurgency does not control or actually govern territory (Mampilly, 2011). Zacharian Mampilly, for example, draws attention to the LRA in Uganda and the RPF in Rwanda who preferred to sustain only minimal contact with populations they could not control. Nevertheless, they generated enough support to sustain a militant movement (2011; loc 489). When drawing on Tilly's description of 'dual sovereigns' in this study, therefore, 'sovereignty' is simply defined as a reciprocal relationship between a macro-actor and some portion of the population that allows that macro-actor to sustain a military force. I do not suggest this to be a sensible definition of sovereignty in other contexts.

Tilly's work to show how two or more actors can exercise *de facto* sovereignty within one internationally recognised state (Kingston and Spears, 2004; Mampilly, 2011; Pegg, 1998; E. Wood, 2010). Belligerents compete to build sovereign structures that deliver incentives that shape population behaviour, and extract and organise the resources and support this behaviour grants the conflict actor. They then use these sovereign structures to build and support a military force. A state of 'multiple sovereignty' exists when two or more macro-actors achieve this, regardless of the relative size of their forces. Civil wars then become a competition between belligerents to extend these sovereign structures across the state and degrade those of their opponent. The side that is able to do this will be in a position to 'mobilise and energise its support-base and demobilise that of its opponent' (Kilcullen, 2012).

Conclusion

This chapter has developed a basic model for understanding the way belligerents build and use alliances with the population across the state. The conflict actor that monopolises its alliances across the polity will win the war. DeRouen and Sobek's (2004) statement about the central role of the government and rebel interaction in determining the outcome of civil war is, in fact, incorrect. Previous comparative studies of civil war outcomes, such as DeRouen and Sobek (2004), Cunningham et al. (2009), Fearon (2004) and Collier et al. (2004), treat civil war as a two-player game with belligerents interacting strategically with each other based on their perceptions of the balance of power.[13] Instead, when considering likely conflict outcomes, we should be applying a triadic model focusing on the interactions between the government, the rebel group **and** the population.

This shows why governments and rebels expend so much resources on shaping population behaviour rather than on military activity. Monopolising the ability to shape population behaviour ultimately defines winning a civil war. Military

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[13] These theories of war do not necessarily limit themselves to being two-player games as they all account for more than two macro-level actors. However, these actors still interact horizontally with each other.

activity will obviously play a role in determining each actor's ability to do this, but it is not the only means belligerents can use. The framework for understanding civil war developed in this chapter suggests we should be examining the strength and resilience of each actors' structures for mobilising support from the population. If they are strengthening, we can assume an actor is gaining ground in the conflict, if they are weakening, we can surmise a belligerent is losing. When only one belligerent's mobilisation structures remain intact, we can say they have won the war.

This framework, however, does not explain the second main puzzle of this thesis; why small rebel groups are able to win civil wars when they are out-numbered and out-gunned? If a belligerent's strength is determined by the strength of the sovereign structures it uses to mobilise support, then logic implies that the larger actor has stronger mobilisation structures. Strong actors should, therefore, still be more likely to win civil wars. The next chapter will focus on how viewing civil war as a mobilisation competition does proffer a solution to this question as well. Governments and rebels are fundamentally different types of actors and, therefore, need to generate different levels and types of support from the population. Understanding this caveat to the logic of war as a mobilisation competition offers a more complete explanation for the dynamics and outcomes of civil wars.

Chapter two

The art of insurgency

Chapter one laid out how civil wars work at their most basic level. This chapter will complete the theoretical model by adding two important caveats that make it possible to use the logic of civil war as a mobilisation competition to actually predict the likely dynamics and outcomes of civil wars. I will argue that the key element of this competition is rebel efforts to degrade the mobilisation capacity of governments and it is through exploring this dynamic we can explain why civil wars take the course they do.

The government's advantage - its starting position

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, once a war begins the logic driving the need for rebels to generate popular support can also be applied to governments. This also implies that in times of peace the government has solved this problem.

Figure 3: Nature of state before war starts.

At the same time, no potential rebels are able to induce enough support to build a military force. Mark Lichbach argues "social order in a state results from social disorder in dissident groups. Social disorder in a state results from social order in dissident groups" (1998; pxii). Rebel groups may exist, but only in an incipient phase, with a small number of core activists, and they lack the capacity to inflict meaningful damage on the government. Pre-war, the government has a monopoly (or near enough) on generating resources from the population.

For a war to begin, something has to change that creates an incentive for a portion of the population to begin providing support to rebels. Empirical studies lend support to this notion. Almost all studies of conflict onset describe a shift in the cost-benefit analysis faced by the population over whether to support challengers to the government.

Frances Stewart (2008) shows how the unequal distribution of resources between various groups within society correlates to civil war beginning. Cederman et al. (2010) argue that changes in the political status of ethnic groups will often precede the outbreak of conflict. One can conclude that disenfranchised groups will contain more individuals that, because they find it harder to secure work or access political power, will be more susceptible to rebel incentives.

Collier and Hoeffler maintain that civil wars are more likely in countries where rebels have the opportunity capture the trade of natural resources, such as diamonds, oil or timber (2004). This allows them to deliver selective within-war incentives to induce support. Fearon and Laitin demonstrated that states with large areas where government presence is weak are more likely to experience rebellion (2003). It is clearly not a cause of war by itself, but it creates opportunities for rebel leaders with political acumen or access to resources to build a movement to challenge the government. Zacharian Mampilly argues this is exactly what happened in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then Zaire) in 1996. The east of the country had long been ripe for an insurgent movement as it lacked any significant government presence. Laurent-Desire Kabila, with

Rwandan support, exploited this to build a movement and capture the state (2011).

This short overview is not comprehensive, but it does show that many empirical studies of conflict onset offer strong support for the idea that civil war is a mobilisation game. Wars can only begin when a challenger to the government develops the capacity to offer a range of incentives to the population in exchange for active types of support. By developing the capacity to draw support from the population, rebels transition from their incipient phase, mobilise a military force and a state of dual sovereignty emerges.

The distribution of sovereignty depends on the nature of the change in the state that allowed rebels to build a movement and rebel capacity to exploit this new context. In the most extreme cases, government authority is stripped away completely, no rebel group is strong enough to replace it and small militias emerge claiming to represent local communities.[14] While there may be thousands of people involved in the conflict, each militia is only able to incentivise limited support towards its specific goals. As an example, after NATO bombing forced Colonel Qadaffi from power in Libya there was no organised movement capable of replacing him and the country descended into factional violence.

At the other end of the scale, the government loses a significant portion of its control and a rebel movement with strong social reach into society or access to external resources builds a conventional army (Staniland, 2014). In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge exploited North Vietnamese support to mobilise a force that was capable of confronting government forces directly.

The division of sovereignty does not have to be territorial. Conflict actors can also share sovereignty across social spaces, exerting varying influences over different

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[14] If the rebels are able to generate enough support to build a strong movement, then the rebels quickly replace the government when it falls. One could easily argue this is the extreme scenario in immediate aftermath of the erosion of government authority. This is probably true. However, in this scenario the state does not descend into a civil war, as it immediately returns to having a 'single sovereign' power.

ethnic, class, social or religious groups that occupy the same physical territory. In Syria, Alawites, Christians and other minorities face a different set of incentives to the majority Sunni population when choosing to provide active support to the regime or rebel groups. Many minorities fear the advance of ISIL much more than Sunnis, who are more prone to fear regime violence. Consequently, Sunni communities have offered support to a range of opposition groups while many minority groups began offering increasing support to the regime (Mousa, 2016).

As discussed in the previous chapter, individuals in the population can also provide support to both the government and rebels. In this case, two or more sovereigns are exerting authority over single individuals. This latter scenario is extremely common, with rebels drawing support in the form of food, supplies, finance from communities that still live and work in government-controlled territory. Most insurgent strategists, including Mao Tse-Tung (2002) and Che Guevara (2008), speak of this type of situation early in conflicts.

As Philip Hultquist (2013) showed, in most cases, governments remain significantly stronger than rebels at the start of the conflict. The division of sovereignty, therefore, normally heavily favours the governments. The solution it had to controlling the state before the conflict began, often remains partially intact. Rebels, on the other hand, have to start building their mobilisation structures from an extremely low-base.

This challenges the framework of war as a simple mobilisation competition. Zacharian Mampilly brings out the contradiction. He points out that Olson and Tilly's theory of stationary bandits is based on European state formation in the seventeenth century. However, there is one major difference between the strategic context faced by these early state-builders and modern insurgent groups; the existence of a pre-existing government authority that already has strong reciprocal relations with the population and a standing army (2011).[15]

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[15] The conflict in Libya shows this is not always the case, and in wars where government power is stripped away almost completely then the logic of conflict a simple state-building exercise will hold. I come back to this briefly below.

Insurgent doctrine strongly reinforces this perspective. It basically proposes two possible strategies; facilitate the complete fall of the government and assume power, or eject the government from one part of the state, fill the political void and use it to build a military force capable of capturing the remainder of the polity (Guevara, 2008; Guillen and Hodges, 1973; Mampilly, 2011; Tse-Tung, 2002).

Either way, the primary objective of rebels is to erode government sovereign structures and this will form the key battleground of any civil war. For governments, civil war is about re-monopolising control by re-establishing its sovereign structures that manage its relationship with the population across the whole state. For rebels it is about further weakening government institutions, creating the space for the rebels to extend their sovereign structures across the rest of the polity.

The government's weakness - governments have to govern

The fact that governments often have pre-existing sovereign structures that it can draw on to prosecute the war, means it will often start conflicts from a position of strength. However, this advantage is balanced against the second caveat we need to add to the model of war as a mobilisation competition; governments have to generate a minimum level of support just to stay active. They have to retain control over key population centres and deliver a basic level of services to be considered a government (Mampilly, 2011). They have to provide services, law and order, and governance in areas not involved in the conflict. They have to raise and distribute a minimum level of resources to achieve this and stay in power, and this will extend well beyond simply prosecuting the war.[16] If the government's ability to raise resources falls below the level required to generate the incentives that keep it in power, then it is liable to collapse completely.

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[16] They can obviously do this through external sources rather than directly from the population, as was the case in Afghanistan. In these cases, rebels will almost certainly seek to target the external patron, as this relationship forms the basis of government control.

Rebels, in contrast, are not similarly constrained. Insurgent groups do not need to carry out governance or control territory, they will only do it if it is in their interests to do so. In other words, rebel groups can dedicate all of their resources to supporting their war effort, opting to reduce or increase activity as necessary. Insurgents can be large shadow-state like organisations, like the LTTE in Sri Lanka, or a small band of guerrillas looting rural communities, like the LRA in Uganda (Mampilly, 2011). Insurgencies have the flexibility to ensure that the level and type of activity they carry out reflects their ability to generate resources. Governments do not have this flexibility as they are constrained by the need to raise resources to carry out activity not directly related to the civil war it is fighting.

This demonstrates the two important caveats that need adding to any understanding of civil war as a competition to mobilise support. In total, there are three main components of civil war when the government remains functional:

- Civil war is a mobilisation competition, in which belligerents seek to generate resources from their constituent population and degrade the capacity of their opponents to do the same.
- Governments start with the structures that manage this mobilisation intact. Rebels have to degrade these structures before they can build their own.
- Governments have to mobilise a certain amount of support to keep the state functioning and hold onto power.

The rest of this chapter will show how understanding these three elements of civil war helps to explain conflict dynamics and outcomes.

Military interaction

By implication, during a civil war, rebels use military means to degrade government sovereign structures. Traditional models of conflict (eg Reiter, 2009)

imply that rebels are best served projecting as much military power as possible. Small rebel groups may not be able to win outright, but they can extract concessions, as the government seeks to avoid the costs of having to defeat them militarily. We have seen, however, that this does not stand up to scrutiny. Out-gunned rebel groups do win outright and rebels do not maximise their military force at any one time (Tse-Tung, 2002). Something else must be driving the logic of rebel military activity.

Much has been made of the asymmetric warfare employed by rebel forces in many parts of the world and how it enables weak rebel groups to defeat stronger governments. Explanations for why it works have focused on how low-cost and easily accessible technologies, such as IEDs (improvised explosive devices) or suicide bombers, redress the military imbalance (Thornton, 2006). By itself, this does not explain how rebels can *win* wars, only how they can inflict costs on governments while facing a massive material disadvantage. These technologies do not allow rebels to capture and hold territory against technologically superior foes, as would be required to win a war.

In *How the Weak Win Wars,* Ivan Arreguín-Toft offers a more strategic explanation for how weaker states defeat stronger powers in interstate conflicts. His premise is that small states use indirect warfare – guerrilla tactics or terrorism – to wear down the resolve of larger states (2005). The weaker force drags the larger power into a military stalemate, by selecting a strategy that prevents the larger force from scoring an outright victory. Ultimately, the cost to the larger state – both financial and psychological - of occupying the smaller state's territory becomes more than the value of the territory itself and the larger state withdraws. The smaller state wins the war despite not winning any direct military confrontations. Arreguín-Toft shows that weaker states have become increasingly adept at using this strategy to defeat stronger nations (2005).

Arreguín-Toft's model needs adapting before it can be applied to civil wars. For one, it assumes that the stronger power values the territory in dispute less than the smaller power (2005; p25). In the interstate conflicts Arreguín-Toft examines,

the larger state is occupying the homeland of the weaker power, for example, the Italians in Ethiopia in the 1930s (2005; pp109-143). The weaker force is fighting for its survival, while the larger power is not. The same logic does not work in a civil war. The larger power in an intrastate conflict, the government, is also fighting for its survival.[17] Arreguín-Toft's analysis might explain why governments surrender peripheral territory, but not why they collapse completely when holding a preponderance of military power.

Guerrilla warfare has, however, worked to defeat governments in a range of civil conflicts with limited external intervention, such as Cuba or Zimbabwe. Asymmetric warfare must function differently in a civil war context. Rebels do not use guerrilla warfare to make the costs for the government greater than the benefit it accrues from controlling the state as per Arreguín-Toft's model. Rebels are actually trying to drain the resources that the government uses to deliver incentives to its constituent population and suppress the rebel's support-base. Rebels are aiming to undermine the government's regenerative capacity and its solution for controlling the polity.

Rebels do this through two interacting methods: firstly, they undermine the government's ability to generate the resources that it uses to distribute benefits to its constituent population; secondly, they force the government to spend more resources on military activity that can no longer be spent on shaping population behaviour. When the government becomes unable to distribute the incentives – both positive and negative - that hold its alliances with the population together, the population withdraws its support, pushing the government past the point that it can raise the minimum level of resources to keep the state functioning. As the two main strands of insurgent doctrine argue, this may happen incrementally across the state, allowing rebels to move into vacated territory (Tse-Tung, 2002), or the government may fall altogether, giving the rebels the opportunity to assert power over the whole polity (Guillen and Hodges, 1973).

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[17] Government leaders can of course flee abroad. However, they would then no longer be 'the government' and would essentially be admitting defeat.

Rebel strategy selection

Rebels select a strategy in the same way as Arreguín-Toft's weaker powers. The aim is to drag the government into a military stalemate (2005). Rebels calculate their ability to generate support from the population based on the strength of the sovereign structures they built after the initial erosion of government authority. They add this to any support they are receiving from external sources, links into illicit networks or the trade of natural resources. This regenerative capacity is weighted against the relative military power of the government and its ability to inflict damage on rebel forces. Based on this, rebels identify the maximum level of activity they can carry out, but continually replace expected losses. This is what the Taliban managed to achieve in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014.

Should the rebels immediately develop a high regenerative capacity then they will challenge the government more conventionally in order to capture the state militarily. Rebels are likely to lose more personnel and expend more resources employing a conventional strategy, but they are also likely to place more pressure on the government. If rebel sovereign structures are resilient enough to replace these losses, then they can sustain an army even in the face of significant losses.

On the other hand, if the rebels have a more limited regenerative capacity they resort to an indirect strategy, such as guerrilla warfare. While engaging in guerrilla warfare, rebels are not trying to capture territory directly. They do not maximise the size of their force nor the amount of battlefield activity at any particular point in time, so as not to expose themselves to losses they cannot replace.

Mao suggests rebels should limit their force-size in order to minimise losses on the battlefield, rather than inflict as much military damage as possible on government forces (Tse-Tung, 2002). Hit and run tactics, a classic of guerrilla warfare, ensure government forces are always under pressure and having to defend as much territory as possible but result in minimal losses to rebel forces:

"Select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightening blow, seek a lightening decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws." (Tse-Tung, 2002; p46).

Rebels attempt to chip away at the government's military, continually forcing it to spread its forces and replace losses (Thornton, 2006).

Table three shows the likely dynamics of the conflict based on the relative distribution of power.

Strength	Strong government	Weak government
Strong rebels	**Quadrant 1** **Symmetric conflict – Conventional war** Example – Cambodia (post-1970)	
Weak rebels	**Quadrant 3** **Asymmetric conflict – Guerrilla warfare** Example – Zimbabwe	**Quadrant 4** **Irregular conflict - Militias** Example – Nagorno-Karabakh (1992)

Table 3: Rebel strategy depending on balance of power.

If the initial shock weakens the government sufficiently and the rebels are strong, then, in all likelihood, the government will fall immediately and the rebels will

assume control, hence why quadrant two remains empty.[18] If the government is significantly degraded, but the rebels remain weak then the war will become irregular in nature, as in Somalia or Libya. In this instance, civil war will become a more symmetric mobilisation competition as belligerents seek to bring the various militias into one force.

Assuming the government survives the initial emergence of the rebels then the war will settle into an apparent stalemate, be it along conventional or guerrilla lines, settling into quadrants one or three. Rebels will lose personnel, often more than the government, but as rebels select a strategy that continually allows them to regenerate to the same strength, military gains for either side are likely to be incremental.

Rebels use this military stalemate to drain the government's capacity to distribute benefits to its core support-base. Rebels attack soft economic and political targets in as many places as possible (Thornton, 2006). The government has to spread its forces across the state to keep vital infrastructure and local government institutions running in order to generate the resources that keep it in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Mampilly, 2011). Military defeats for rebels still represent a tactical victory if the government has to expend resources on minimising the effect of rebel activity, which can then no longer be provided to its constituency.

The amount and types of support the government needs from the population also increases. Before the war, most government supporters may have just been paying taxes, which the government recycled to deliver benefits to the population. Once rebels become active, the government will now be asking more of the population; to join the security services, report on rebel activity, resist rebel pressure to provide the insurgency support and contribute more financially to

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[18] If the government has external support then it may be able to hold on to power even if it is massively outnumbered. In this case, the war will be conventional in nature. For the purpose of this thesis, that scenario is essentially one form the war can take in quadrant one, with the external support the government receiving creating an artificial strength.

cover the increasing cost of military activity. The first three of these mean there is now a risk to life associated with supporting the government. Greater financial contributions will be dependent on the government's capacity to facilitate a functioning economy, made all the harder by rebel activity. A conflict actors' regenerative capacity is defined by its ability to mobilise resources by delivering incentives to the population and organise contributions in return. Civil wars clearly undermine a government's ability to do both of these things, thus threatening its solution for controlling the state even in areas not affected by rebel activity.

Eventually the government is no longer generating enough support from an area of the country to make it worthwhile maintaining a presence there and it withdraws, allowing rebels to move in and create their own sovereign structures. Rebels then have greater capacity to generate support and replace losses from military activity. As such, they can boost their overall force numbers, increase activity and create even more strain on the government.

Rebels that capture territory can monopolise interaction with the local population. Denying the government territory prevents it from drawing resources from these areas such as agriculture for feeding the population or revenue from natural resources. Rebels often target areas with limited government presence, normally in the periphery of the state, precisely because these are the areas the government has least interest in defending (Cunningham et al., 2009). Numerous rebel groups, from the LTTE in Sri Lanka to the LRA in Uganda, have followed this model (Mampilly, 2011).

As rebels widen the reach of their sovereign structures they are eventually able to build a more conventional-style force. The rebel's conventional force can then capture the remainder of the state. ISIL spent nearly two years of the Syrian conflict engaged in low-cost guerrilla activity. At the same time, it was developing structures across northwest Syria that created resilient relations with the population. It then used these structures to create a conventional force that captured more territory across Syria and Iraq.

There is, therefore, a feedback loop for rebels in winning a war. Rebels use their initial force numbers to undermine government capacity to generate resources from the population and key terrain. Rebels also increase the amount of support the government has to generate to stay in power. Eventually this weakens the government, forcing it to withdraw further into the core of the state, creating more space for rebels to build an ever-stronger force and create more strain on the government.

Almost all insurgency doctrinal writings follow this logic, with particular variations depending on the war they were developed in (Guevara, 2008; Guillen and Hodges, 1973; O'Neill, 1990; Taber, 2002; Tse-Tung, 2002). ISIL's doctrine, as articulated in the *Management of Savagery*, calls for its followers to sow instability and build support from communities amongst the chaos (Naji, 2004).

In essence, rebel doctrine suggests insurgencies need to push conflicts from asymmetric (quadrant three in table three) to conventional (quadrant one), to a situation where the rebels are strong and the government weak, allowing the rebels take over the state.

Many commentators that examine insurgent doctrine, describe it as a strategy of 'mobilisation' (Reed, 2007; p22). This, however, misses its vital component. Rebels actually employ a strategy of 'demobilisation'. They demobilise the government institutions that build and maintain its military force by draining the government's capacity to raise funds for these activities. Rebels then need to mobilise to a much smaller extent than if they confronted government forces in a more conventional manner at the beginning of the conflict.

The model of conflict in which rebels win by pushing the war through these phases represents an ideal type, based on insurgent and US counterinsurgency doctrine (US Army, 2010). As governments have to generate a minimum level of resource, however, they can lose at any point along this continuum.

When the government can no longer service those alliances that keep it in power, its constituent population withdraws its support and the government falls, regardless of how far the rebels have succeeded in pushing the war through its various phases. If the foundation of government control is weak then even low levels of military activity may undermine the government's solution for controlling the polity and it will collapse, allowing the rebels to take control of the whole state even if they had a smaller military force than the government.

Government counterstrategy

As alluded to above, rebels do not have to raise a minimum level of resources. If they are struggling to mobilise support then they can reduce activity to reflect this new reality. Both Mao Tse-Tung (2002) and Che Guevara (2008) advise reducing conventional-type activity if rebels come under military pressure. Chad Serena argues that AQI's changing strength throughout its battle with coalition and Iraqi government forces can be attributed its adaptability. It initially adapted quickly to structural changes, but failed to do so in 2007, which led to it being significantly degraded (2014).

If rebel strategy is judged appropriately, regardless, of its force size, prosecuting the war is always effectively cost-neutral, as expenditure is balanced against activities that generate those resources in the first place. Rebels may well lose tactical exchanges, but this is unlikely to add up to a strategic problem if their support-networks mean expended resources and lost personnel are always replaced.

All this creates a significant conundrum for governments. Governments have to defeat rebels on the battlefield in order to prevent them from capturing territory and undermining government ability to generate resources from the population. Targeted operations against rebel leadership or interdiction operations against insurgent supply routes may be necessary to prevent rebel gains (Staniland, 2014). Assuming rebels adapt their behaviour accordingly, however, military activity will never be enough to defeat an insurgency completely. Governments

will just chase rebels around the country, killing them or pushing them out of one place only for them to regenerate somewhere else. Eventually the cost of this will prove prohibitive and the government will fall.

Governments have to push the conflict the opposite direction to rebels. Moving it from conventional to asymmetric, until eventually the rebels can no longer sustain any activity. Governments are seeking to move the conflict the opposite way through table three, from quadrant one to quadrant three, before eliminating rebel activity altogether.

Governments have no shortcut that can push the conflict through these phases in the same way rebels do. As rebels can alter their activity to reflect any loss in power, they will not simply collapse. Governments must slowly eliminate a rebel group's sovereign structures before they can win. The government can only do this by affecting the choice of those in the population choosing to provide support to the rebels. Rebel leaders may only face costs that are offset against their capacity to generate resources in the first place. Members of the population, in contrast, may face higher costs or lose additional benefits from the government if they continue to support rebels. Governments need to expand their existing solution for controlling the state or identify a new arrangement. It can either broaden the part of the population it provides direct benefits to or ramp up the costs for those people supporting its rebel challengers. If it succeeds, then the polity will slowly return to its pre-war state.

The major danger for governments is that even if they are succeeding in degrading the rebel group, the costs of running the state may become prohibitive and the government could still collapse.

Defeating rebels on the battlefield means, at best, governments do not lose. For rebels, just fighting may represent a victory if it creates a strain on the government. This is why who wins and loses battles tells us little about the course of civil wars, but where battles are fought does (Greig, 2015). Rebels choose where, when and how to fight based on the effect they believe military activity

will have on the government's ability to generate support. Rebel military activity that stops an oil pipeline for a period of time, deters the population from visiting a market or terrorises the population in government territory will all be considered a success even if every rebel member dies in the attack. The closer this is to the government's heartland the greater the effect (Greig, 2015). Che Guevara calls this 'paralysing the state' (2008).

A civil war has a military battlefront, but it also has social, political and economic ones. A government can appear to be winning on the military battlefield, but still lose the conflict at any point if it is defeated in these other spheres (Guillen and Hodges, 1973). In other words, governments have to win on all these battlefields, the rebels only have to win one to break down the government's control over the state.

Rebels seek to strike the perfect balance between generating resources more quickly than they expend them, and forcing the government to exhaust its capacity to generate support. The larger the rebel force, the more pressure it will place on government sovereign structures, but smaller rebel forces can have the same effect over a longer time-span.[19] If the basis of government control is weak, insurgents do not have to control territory to have this effect, nor do they have to build a large military force.

There are multiple examples of rebel groups suffering significantly more casualties than the governments they are facing and failing to score battlefield victories, but eventually inflicting debilitating costs on the government.

The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and ZANU/ZAPU in Zimbabwe both had smaller forces and lost significantly more casualties than the governments they faced, yet ended up winning the war. The rebels won because their ability to incentivise participation in their forces was more resilient than the governments'. Rebel

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[19] As referenced in the introduction, Cunningham et al. observe that asymmetric conflicts are likely to be longer than their conventional counterparts (2009).

forces eventually wore down and demobilised the government.[20] Importantly, Cambodia represents a more conventional civil war, while Zimbabwe saw a more traditional insurgency, supporting the idea that rebels can win regardless of the phase in which the conflict finds itself. This is what Abraham Guillen meant when he said "in a revolutionary war that side wins which endures the longest: morally, politically and economically." (Guillen and Hodges, 1973; p233).

War endings

The idea that governments and rebels seek to push the conflict through these phases but that governments can collapse at any stage is supported in how wars end. Rebel victories normally involve a political or economic shock that pushes the government past a 'tipping point', after which it can no longer raise the support it needs. McCormick, Horton and Harrison (2007) show the end phase for governments is normally extremely quick and follows "an indicator that the final period of the struggle has begun" (p327). The loss of a core piece of territory, the removal of a political leader, the defection of an important powerbroker or significant military desertions create a negative bandwagon that sees government control quickly unravel (Connable and Libicki, 2010; p15). This can happen before rebels manage to build resilient structures across the whole polity.[21]

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[20] Commentators often put this type of phenomenon down to the ideological commitment of rebels, particularly in Vietnam. After the war a US negotiator boasted to a North Vietnamese representative that the US had won every battle. The North Vietnamese representative responded that this was irrelevant (Salsman, 2011). The US inflicted over a million casualties on North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. No accurate figure exists for the number of Vietcong soldiers, but the North Vietnamese Army reportedly numbered around 290,000, suggesting one million casualties should have eliminated it as a meaningful force (BACM Research, 2009). However, it still eventually defeated southern Vietnamese forces because it replenished manpower, supplies and finances expended on the battlefield, absorbing the effect of the million casualties it suffered. (Salsman, 2011). I find ideological commitment an unsatisfactory explanation in that the amount of casualties means it was not the same people at the start of the conflict as at the end. The North Vietnamese had to continually bring new actors into the conflict, rather than rely on the commitment of those mobilised at the beginning of the war. The same goes for the enduring strength of rebel groups in Zimbabwe and Cambodia as well as the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rebels endure by regenerating, not due to the greater commitment of their members.

[21] The extent of a rebel group's shadow governance structures will almost certainly have an impact on the post-war environment. Moreover, as described above, stronger rebels in this regard will probably create more strain on the government. Rebel sovereign structures are,

Governments win more slowly. According to McCormick, Horton and Harrison, most government victories follow a period in which violence tapers off gradually (2007). Governments need to strengthen the institutions that define their control over the state. Only then will rebels be unable to replace lost personnel and resources.[22] That said, the war may end some time after these institutions have strengthened, as rebel activity slowly fades away.

Ultimately, the process of victory is reversed for governments and rebels. Figures four and five lay out the different processes governments and rebels have to go through to win war, linking these to table three.

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therefore, extremely important in determining the dynamics of the conflict. The point here is that they are not *a necessary condition* for a government defeat.

[22] It is possible for the state to return to a context where the government does not control large parts of its territory. However, rebel groups will almost always seek to exploit this to their advantage and rebuild their movement, meaning the war is actually unlikely to end completely.

Figure 4: Rebel path to victory.

Pre-war

Government is only sovereign able to
draw population support
Rebels have no regenerative capacity

Guerrilla warfare

Quadrant three
Rebels create weak sovereign structures
– engage in guerrilla warfare, weakening
government capacity to control the state

Conventional conflict

Quadrant one
Rebels weaken government capacity to
generate support enough to create space
to build conventional force

**Pressure on government can cause
it to collapse regardless of where
rebels are in this process**

Rebel victory

Rebels build army strong enough to
capture state **or** government is
overwhelmed and collapses completely

Figure 5: Government path to victory.

This asymmetry between how rebels and governments win wars demonstrates
why weak rebel groups can defeat strong governments, despite them both
fighting for their survival. It also shows how rebels can win even if they are much
smaller, solving the second puzzle this thesis is seeking to answer. That is not say
military variables will not matter in determining the ability of rebels and
governments to push the conflict through these phases. Stronger rebels that win
battles will impose more costs on the government. However, it shows why
military elements of the conflict poorly predict outcomes across the universe of

cases (Greig, 2015; Hultquist, 2013). It is also the genesis of Henry Kissinger's famous saying: "A conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla army wins if he does not lose." (1969).

Significantly, understanding civil wars in this way calls into question categorising civil wars into symmetric, asymmetric and irregular (Hultquist, 2013). Rather than being distinct types of wars, they are part of one fluid process, with belligerents attempting to move the conflict opposite directions along this continuum. Most wars do not follow this process smoothly. The processes laid out above represent the ideal type. Most wars will jump between these phases as economic or political shocks affect the power of the belligerents. Nevertheless, moving the war through these distinct phases is the conflict strategy of all belligerents and governments cannot win unless they push rebels back through these phases. Relative power, therefore, is not revealed through the course of the conflict as maintained in traditional models of war (Reiter, 2009). Civil war is the process through which rebels attempts to boost their power relative to the government. Before the war, the rebels have no power, they develop a minimal level of power, use this to build ever more power and degrade government authority.

Rebels use their new ability to operate to further weaken government capacity to generate support from the population and grow their movement further. If political or economic horizontal inequalities get worse or government reach into the periphery of its territory reduces further, rebels will have even greater opportunities to build support. In contrast, if a government extends its institutions to cover areas previously outside of its purview, it will limit rebel opportunities to continue generating support. Variations during the course of the war in the very same macro-level structures that academics study when looking at conflict onset should offer an indication of how the relative strength of the two conflict actors is changing as the war plays out. If the start of the war is the result of increased opportunities to build a rebellious movement (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) or increased grievances (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013), so must the outcome be rooted in further changes to these features of the state.

Belligerent perceptions

Just as observers can assess the course of a conflict by looking at the changing strength of government sovereign structures, so too can belligerents.

Rebels measure success by how well the government is absorbing the costs of continued conflict. If the conflict is weakening government institutions, then rebels will believe that the government is going to collapse at some point in the future. The costs rebels have to pay to achieve this will play only a minimal role in their perceptions of success and failure as they adapt their strategy to reflect the amount of support they generate. Rebels will, therefore, base their decision to continue fighting solely on their belief over the likelihood the government will eventually collapse.

Governments, in contrast, pay significant costs even if they win. Resources spent on military operations cannot be spent on delivering incentives to the population. Dealing with a lengthy insurgent campaign may limit the amount of benefits a government can distribute to its core constituency more than negotiating a deal at an earlier point. Governments may consider making concessions to rebels to end a conflict, either sharing political power with rebel leaders or providing benefits to the rebel's constituency, even if they feel they can ultimately win. For governments, therefore, both beliefs over the probability of winning the conflict and the costs that will be required to win determine their behaviour, similar to actors in more traditional models of conflict (Reiter, 2009).[23]

Analysis of how a conflict is likely to proceed, therefore, should be rooted in a closer examination of a government's relations with the population. If the institutions that describe government control over the state - be they formal or informal - are continuing to generate support, then the government will feel it is

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[23] Arreguin-Toft observes that many stronger governments in asymmetric interstate conflict overestimate their chances of winning as they put too much stock in the material balance of power (2005; p35). The regime in Zimbabwe did the same, suggesting this may also hold true for strong governments facing weak rebel groups in civil wars. This, however, represents a case of miscalculation rather than a problem with the model of conflict proposed in this thesis.

in a strong position. If these institutions are breaking apart this will signal to both belligerents, and the population, that the government is struggling to absorb the costs of the conflict and that the rebels are likely to win. This leads to the main hypothesis of this thesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Governments that are strengthening institutions that manage its relations with the population are more likely to survive civil wars, while rebels that are degrading these institutions are more likely to defeat incumbent governments.*

Rebels that sustain even minor levels of military activity against the backdrop of a government losing its ability to generate support from the population will believe they are winning. In Afghanistan, the Taliban believed that the US withdrawal in 2014 would significantly degrade the Afghan government's capacity to hold on to power. Therefore, despite suffering significant military losses, it refused to negotiate (Dorronsoro, 2012).

If, on the other hand, government institutions are strengthening, then this reflects a government absorbing the costs of the conflict and limiting rebel capacity to generate support. Governments in this situation will feel they can defeat the rebels outright, although they may still make some concessions to speed up the war's end. In Malaya, British forces built stronger relations with the population through the course of the war and isolated the guerrillas from their support-base. Eventually, the rebels lost support entirely and guerrilla activity died away (Nagl, 2005).

A third scenario could see the rebels inflicting costs on a government, but not to the point that the state will collapse. At the same time, rebels are facing increasing difficulties mobilising the support. In this case the conflict is 'ripe' for intervention (Zartman, 2001).[24] In Mozambique, the government, FRELIMO, could not eliminate the rebels, RENAMO. RENAMO was able to maintain activity in rural

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[24] This is not to discount any problems there may be with credible commitment issues (Walter, 1997) or spoilers within both camps (Stedman, 2000). However, space precludes addressing the challenges these issues create using the framework proposed in this thesis.

areas, but was losing the capacity to target cities. As a result, both parties agreed to end the conflict (Zartman, 2001).

The final plausible situation is where rebels are too weak to inflict significant costs on the government, but retain the capacity to generate the support they need to function. If neither actor has any reason to believe this situation will change then a state of dual sovereignty may be a political equilibrium and the war can continue indefinitely. Cunningham et al. discuss the possibility that conflict actors have two features that determine their overall power; "the power to target (and) the power to resist" (2009; p574). They describe a situation where "rebels are too weak to extract concessions or obtain negotiated settlements, yet too secure to be easily eradicated by governments" (2009; p575).

The implication from Cunningham et al.'s description of rebels being too strong to be easily eradicated is that rebels can *avoid* government efforts to target them militarily (ibid.). This is reflected in other studies, which have chosen to focus on external support (Beardsley and McQuinn, 2009), external sanctuary (Salehyan, 2007), control over peripheral territory (Cunningham et al., 2009) or access to natural resources (Weinstein, 2007). These things all clearly play a role in making a rebel group more resilient, however, they cannot explain the situation in Afghanistan described in the first paragraph of this thesis. The rebels lost huge numbers of personnel and did not 'avoid' targeting. These studies miss a key element of rebel 'power to resist'; its regenerative capacity. The 'power to resist' in this sense comes not from avoiding military targeting, but the ability regenerate the losses sustained in military activity. Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe, where the rebels lost huge numbers of soldiers, yet remained resilient, suggests this element of a rebel group's power to resist is more important.

If both conflict actors' ability to 'resist' and regenerate resources is stronger than their opponent's capacity to degrade their sovereign structures then a state of 'dual sovereignty', or a non-hurting stalemate, can continue indefinitely. Benjamin Acosta uses this logic to show how militant organisations, such as

Hizbollah or Hamas can survive for such long periods of time, with neither the government nor the rebels having any realistic possibility of winning the broader conflict, but no incentive to negotiate (Acosta, 2014).[25]

Conclusion

Many observers use the word asymmetric to describe civil wars in terms of the tactics and strategies used by the belligerents (Thornton, 2006). However, the asymmetry runs much deeper. Governments and rebels are trying to achieve fundamentally different things through the course of the war. Rebels aim to bring down those institutions that keep the state functioning, while governments try to strengthen them. Changes in macro-structures that determine the government's ability to draw support from the population decide the outcome of the conflict. Rebel success or failure in degrading these institutions determines relative power as the war unfolds by pushing the war through guerrilla and conventional phases.

Stathis Kalyvas stated that "change was synonymous with war" (2008; p1063). The preceding analysis has articulated the change that rebels are attempting to induce; the weakening and eventual elimination of the government's sovereign power.

Viewing war in this way offers a solution to the second question posed in the introduction. Outnumbered rebels can win if they prise apart the government's relationship with the population by degrading the institutions the government uses to manage these alliances. Rebels can achieve this even when being outnumbered militarily because control over territory only forms one element of

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[25] This is the one part of this thesis that relies on the assumption that belligerents are boundedly-rational. If belligerents are hyper-rational then they, and the population, can anticipate all future changes to government capacity to absorb the costs of the conflict and make decisions about the benefits or costs of continuing the war or supporting belligerents accordingly. However, many changes will come from unpredictable political or economic shocks, often even exogenous to the conflict itself. The unanticipated fall of an external backer, for example, may lead to a belligerent losing external support, diminishing the capacity of a belligerent to generate support from the population. It is much more plausible, therefore, to assume conflict actors make decisions based on local and short-term dynamics. This offers a much better account for how so many wars end up in a non-hurting stalemate, which is impossible if war is the result information asymmetry or credible commitment problems (Powell, 2002).

the government's sovereign power. Using asymmetric tactics, rebels can weaken the political or economic basis of government control instead, forcing the government to collapse even if it remains strong militarily. The next chapter will explore specific elements of the alliance between belligerents and the population. This will allow us to identify empirical variables that can be tested to measure the utility of the model of civil war developed in the last two chapters.

Chapter three

How to generate support

Having developed a framework for understanding civil war, it becomes possible to explore what types of sovereign relationships enable governments to fend off rebel challengers. We can then generate sub-hypotheses to test alongside the main hypothesis articulated in the previous chapter and measure the theoretical model's general utility. The previous chapter suggested that the power of a variable should be determined primarily by the effect it has on government capacity to generate support from the population. This will indicate whether governments are losing control or reducing rebel capacity to replace losses from military activity.

We can now also examine, both theoretically and empirically, the main components of current counterinsurgency doctrine; development, governance and security (US Army, 2007). Each of these will be treated in turn, and examined according to how effectively they generate resources for belligerents.

Counterinsurgency doctrine

If civil war is a state-building competition, it is instructive that the three main components of counterinsurgency doctrine reflect what are "generally agreed upon as the three core functions of modern government, namely, security, welfare and representation" (Mampilly, 2011; loc1746). Population-centric counterinsurgent doctrine advises providing the population security, development and good governance to undermine rebel capacity to draw support from the population (US Army, 2007). Similarly, insurgent doctrine revolves around undermining government capacity to provide these three functions (O'Neill, 1990; Taber, 2002). Changes in macro-level measures of governance, socioeconomic and security conditions should, therefore, serve as a useful test of the overall utility of the theoretical model proposed in this thesis.

In order to expand the discussion, development, governance and security are treated more broadly to encapsulate three different types of incentives belligerents use to generate support; socioeconomic, political and security.

Socioeconomic incentives

Socioeconomic incentives include paying individuals directly for support, but they also include community-based financial inducements in the form of development and public services. Public services in this sense encompass a wide range of activities, such as critical infrastructure, water sanitation, energy, education, hospitals and markets. Current counterinsurgency doctrine works on the basis that providing services lessens the population's incentive to support rebel groups (US Army, 2007). The population calculates the provision of these services is being denied them by rebel activity and, therefore, refuses to support the insurgency. Emphasis is placed on providing support through NGOs, IGOs and host nation governments. As current doctrine acknowledges, this approach had limited effect on the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq (JCS, 2013; pVIII-20). The use of public services as a means to build population support for the governments of these nations failed for a number of reasons, some of which are well documented, such as systemic corruption (ibid.).

Nevertheless, attacking soft economic targets remains a core part of rebel activity across a variety of civil wars, suggesting rebels see significant utility in preventing the government from providing these benefits to the population (Mampilly, 2011). As well as implementation problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, this discrepancy can be explained by the fact that many current Western practitioners misdiagnosed how the provision of services help governments to defeat rebellions.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, public services were provided as an end in and of themselves. At a theoretical level, when services are funded and provided by NGOs, IGOs or external military forces they should have limited impact on an individual's calculation on whether to support the government. Hospitals, schools

and even wells and markets are ultimately collective incentives, and often post-war in that governments may refuse to embark on these projects in insecure environments (US Army, 2007). Moreover, it can create a situation akin to a development trap (Collier, 2007). Governments have limited incentive to stimulate economic growth, because finances, supplies and even manpower for its security forces are provided externally. As a consequence, development alone will not serve to defeat rebels or strengthen governments.[26]

The real reason public services work to curb violence is that they form part of a functioning economy, which creates strong within-war incentives for the population to generate resources for the actor facilitating this activity. More importantly, a functioning economy maximises how much support the population can provide in return. Public services, providing critical infrastructure and facilitating economic activity creates jobs. This, in turn, generates tax money for the belligerent facilitating this activity, which can be spent on paying people to join the military. It is an obvious way for a government to hold onto power within Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s framework (2005). Understanding the effect of development and a strong economy in this way also brings it in line with a number of Mark Lichbach's solutions (1998), such as 'providing private goods' (p49) and 'providing selective incentives' (p217). A strong economy, therefore, creates the basis of a reciprocal relationship between the population and the controlling-belligerent. It allows a belligerent to shape population behaviour and gives the population the capacity to deliver resources back to the government.

Given the government's starting position in most conflicts, it will be main belligerent shaping population behaviour in this regard. That said, Zacharian Mampilly documents a number of rebel groups providing various levels of

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[26] There are, of course, extremely important moral and humanitarian reasons for carrying this activity out regardless. My argument here is that it is unlikely to significantly contribute towards defeating insurgencies by itself. It also important to note that I do not meant to say service delivery must have a local face, as is often assumed (JCS, 2013). Host-nation governments delivering aid granted by NGOs or external patrons will suffer from the same problem. For it to assist in weakening insurgencies, the services must be a function of resilient and reciprocal sovereign institutions that condition the population to behave in a way that actually supports the delivery of these services in the first place.

services to the population (2011). If a rebel group establishes a strong economy in areas under its control, then they can build a larger military force, with which to challenge the government more conventionally. In many conflicts, however, rebels will devote more time to undermining the government's ability to keep the economy functioning. Rebels bomb critical infrastructure, markets, roads, schools and hospitals precisely for this reason. Attacks on 'soft targets' often make up a significant portion of a rebel group's military activity, as evidenced by how many civilians often die during civil wars. Iraq Body Count, an organisation dedicated to tracking casualties in Iraq, has found that, as of May 2016, 158,559-177,219 of 242,000 of those killed in Iraq since 2003 have been civilians (2016). Rebels conduct this type of activity because they believe it undermines the relationship between governments and the population.

As the economy unwinds, the government becomes less able to provide individuals with within-war incentives to induce participation in the security forces, forcing it to withdraw from certain areas and eventually leading to the army collapsing completely; this essentially 'pacifies' or demobilises the population. It moves the population across from militants, activists, members, sympathisers and constituents to being non-constituents in terms of the level of support it provides to the government. They no longer join the security forces, civil service or have money to pay taxes. The population may not become active supporters of the rebels, but this still increases the relative power of the rebels. Government military strength is reduced, allowing the rebels to transition to a more direct strategy to capture the remainder of the state.

The ongoing conflict in Syria represents an example of this process at work. In the summer of 2015, Russia intervened to support the flagging Syrian regime. Just months previously commentators had assessed that Bashar al-Assad was in the ascendency (Lucas, 2015). During the period preceding Russia's intervention, however, the regime had begun to feel more strongly the economic effects of the conflict. It was struggling to convince people to join the army and pay salaries. In total, the Syrian army declined from 250,000 personnel to around 125,000 during

the first four years of the war (Barnard et al., 2015). As a consequence, it could no longer spread its forces and ceded territory to rebel groups.

We can contrast this with ISIL's rise in the same period. ISIL captured oil fields, engaged in looting and facilitated economic activity, which then allowed it to pay potential recruits as well as workers in administrative functions and critical infrastructure. Many individuals responded to ISIL's financial inducements (Doyle, 2015). The respective increase and decrease in ISIL's and the regime's power can be directly traced to their ability to develop and sustain economic relationships with local communities.

Table four summarises the potential impact a particular type of socioeconomic activity has on a government's strength and the regenerative capacities of the two belligerents.

Type of activity	Type of incentive	Resource generation	Expected impact on conflict
Facilitate local commercial activity and trade	Selective Within-war Post-war	Taxes, food and supplies.	Significant: Effective in strengthening governments as selective and within-war incentive and generates significant support.
Deliver public services	Collective Within-war Post-war	Supports commercial activity.	Moderate: Partially effective in strengthening governments. Only a collective incentive but facilitates and supports broader socioeconomic activity.
Humanitarian development	Collective Within-war	None.	Limited: Population receive aid regardless of whether they support government or not and does not generate resources for governments.

Table 4: Summary of expected effects of different socioeconomic incentives.

In summary, governments boosting economic activity and improving public services should be better able to draw the support they need from the population to defeat rebellions. Rebel groups undermining government capacity to deliver these incentives to the population and, where possible, creating a shadow economy are more likely to grow in relative strength and emerge victorious. However, just providing services through NGOs or humanitarian groups is unlikely to be effective, as it does not lead to governments mobilising resources

in the same way as wider economic activity. These notions lead to the first sub-hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *Governments increasing economic activity and providing more public services are more likely to survive civil wars. Those overseeing a decline in socioeconomic activity are more likely to be defeated.*

Political incentives

Conflict actors also generate popular support by offering political incentives to the population, such as democracy, stronger institutions or informal power for local communities.

Current counterinsurgency doctrine emphasises improving governance as a core part of defeating insurgencies. It defines governance as "the rules, processes, and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society" (JCS, 2013; pxvii). Drawing on this definition, governance functions as the structures through which a conflict actor delivers incentives to the population. Socioeconomic incentives motivate a population to behave in a particular manner, effective governance is how these incentives are delivered. Civilians share this view. In general, they view political concepts, such as democracy, according to the general well-being they create (Uvin, 2008).

As with development aid, coalition forces struggled to build effective institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A large part of the problem was not theory, but implementation, with Iraqi and Afghan governments mired in corruption, nepotism and ethno-centric politics (Coleman, 2011; Whyte, 2007). However, governance also failed to stymie the rebellions for the same reason as development. It was seen as a way to undermine the legitimacy of the rebels and address grievances. The focus slipped from actually building strong institutions with national reach to selling the benefits if democracy was allowed to flourish, making it post-war in nature.

The real effect of functioning institution is that they both deliver within-war incentives to the population in a regular manner, and they allow conflict actors to draw more popular support back out of society. Governance manifests itself in the sovereign structures belligerents create. It includes the very basic networks sustained by incipient insurgent organisations, through to huge bureaucracies controlled by some governments facing down violent challengers. Without these structures, conflict actors are unable to deliver incentives to their constituent population. Nor can they continually draw the support they need from the population to man their armed forces in the face of the continual strain that a civil war places on them.

Many of Mark Lichbach's solutions for solving the collective mobilisation problem mirror the creation of formal or informal governance institutions. Most importantly, he argues that developing a governing structure allows for the delivery of many other solutions (1998; p132), including mutual exchange agreements, increasing the selective incentives that can be delivered to the population, and developing tit-for-tat arrangements (ibid.). It allows conflict actors to reorganise society to deliver incentives in a more routine manner, thus creating more trust on the part of the population that its support will be returned (p195). Governance structures form the very basis of how governments organise their solution for controlling the state in the manner articulated by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005).

These institutions do not have to be representative to be effective (Fukuyama, 2013). The *promise* of democracy in a post-war deal is a post-conflict incentive. Belligerents should, therefore, struggle to elicit mass support with just promises of increased democracy if they desist from supporting the other side. However, if belligerents base effective within-war governance structures along democratic lines then this should increase their ability to motivate popular support. For one, it extends the segment of the population that has a mutual relationship with the government. Democracy creates a monitoring and punishment mechanism for the population if a conflict actor is not fulfilling its promises (Lichbach, 1998; p210). It also establishes a tit-for-tat style relationship between a conflict actor

and a population as it grants the population a lower-cost way of punishing actors (p133). Rather than having to actively support the opposing conflict actor in order to pressure change, the population can remove elites through an electoral process if they do not deliver promised benefits.

As well as building formal or democratic institutions as a means to structure relations with the population, belligerents can also develop more informal alliances with sections of society (Seymour, 2014). In many cases, this is the default of counterinsurgency campaigns. David Kilcullen claims that, despite overtures towards formal governance and democracy, building alliances with local groups was actually the logic of the campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq (2012). Conflict actors often establish local defence forces that hold territory but are only nominally controlled by the macro-actor (Peic, 2014). Both governments and rebels offer benefits to communities across the state, such as tribes, religious groups or local villages. In Iraq, ISIL has a bureau for tribal affairs, which reaches out to tribal leaders and offers to empower them in exchange for providing manpower to ISIL's forces (Caris and Reynolds, 2014). At the same time, the Iraqi government has been trying to raise a Sunni tribal force, much like the Sunni Awakening in 2007, which significantly degraded ISIL's forerunner, AQI (Dettmer, 2015).

Establishing alliances through social groups is a powerful way for conflict actors to draw the support they need to build a military force. Stathis Kalyvas observed that many people support nationally-focused conflict actors in order to address local disputes (2006). Granting groups local control essentially turns a post-war promise of political change into a within-war incentive of political, economic or social power. It also turns a collective benefit into a selective one. Governments and rebels will locate political entrepreneurs (Lichbach, 1998; p168) within communities and empower these leaders in exchange for drawing support for their patron. These leaders, therefore, are individually motivated to support a conflict actor based on the local power they accrue immediately. They face their own collective mobilisation problem, but it is far less acute. Local leaders are better placed to exploit Mark Lichbach's 'community incentives'. They

understand the way the local population perceives the incentives it is being offered, both in terms of the expected payoff and its credibility. Local leaders tap into communal norms of behaviour and frame the ongoing conflict in this light. They can place the conflict into a social and local context that creates an intangible individual payoff to those actively participating (1998; p121). Individuals within communities will, therefore, feel social pressure to participate in the conflict.

Numerous scholars have observed that protest movements often emerge from social networks based around church, political, ethnic, social, geographic, school or university groups. James Scott (1977), Doug McAdam (1999), Roger Gould (1995) and Roger D. Peterson (2001) provide evidence of social networks being the basis for individual support for rebel groups and protest movements in southeast Asia, the USA, France and eastern Europe. Paul Staniland shows that many insurgencies in south Asia emerged out pre-existing political networks (2014). Lichbach's observations offer an appealing explanation as to why this is the case.

Belligerents have to tap into far more than one network if they are to create a sustainable military force. However, in all likelihood, this approach represents a far cheaper and less complex way for conflict actors to build an effective alliance with the population. It minimises organisational costs (Lichbach, 1998; p47) by exploiting already-organised communities (p141).

There is one major negative to this approach. Whereas the building of effective formal institutions decreases the autonomy of the population by making them more reliant on their relations with the conflict actor, delivering incentives to the population through local leaders can have the opposite effect.

After the 2007 Sunni Awakening, the Iraqi government tried to undermine the power it had given local tribal groups by arresting sheikhs and dismantling militias. By 2014, those excluded from the Awakening and many groups that had fought against AQI re-allied themselves with ISIL, helping it to take over and then administer territory (Caris and Reynolds, 2014). Macro-conflict actors always

face the prospect of the political benefits they grant local leaders being turned against them if the incentive structures change. Building effective local administrations can offer the best of both worlds. Governments can exploit the authority of local leaders, but keep them dependent on relations with the central government for the resources they use to maintain local power (Lichbach, 1998).

The effort rebel groups place on destroying both formal and informal governance institutions amply demonstrates their importance. Insurgents often employ violence against these institutions rather than directly attacking government forces. In Afghanistan, the Taliban attacked both the formal and informal relationships the government was trying to develop. It kidnapped and assassinated local government officials and tribal leaders in an attempt to increase the cost for individuals choosing to support the government (Rashid, 2010). This was designed to stop the government building effective institutions that, in turn, could have been used to draw support from the population. Rebels spend resources targeting governance structures because it degrades government capacity to generate resources and mobilise support, causing it to collapse and the rebels to take control of the state.

If a government strengthens its institutions and reaches more of society, then challengers will be unable to replace losses on the battlefield and rebel activity will reduce. In contrast, when the strain of civil war is degrading government institutions, it loses the ability to manage relations with society. Just as with socioeconomic incentives, if these networks are disintegrating then the population is less likely to actively engage with the government and will become increasingly passive. If rebels can degrade government institutions to the point that the government can no longer organise the population, then it can push the conflict from asymmetric to conventional or force the government to collapse completely.

As well as its failing economy, the weakening of the Syrian regime has undermined its ability to organise support from minority communities.

Type of activity	Type of incentive	Resource generation	Expected impact on conflict
Build formal governance institutions	Collective Within-war Post-war	Organises the collection of taxes, raising of supplies, recruitment into military and civil service. Crucial for delivering socioeconomic incentives and mobilising resources back out of the population.	Significant: Effective in strengthening governments as within-war incentive and fundamental for generating significant support.
Informal alliances	Selective Collective Within-war	Organises support direct from communities. Resources can end up in hands of intermediate powerbroker who uses them for own goals.	Significant: Efficient way of drawing support from population, but can be counterproductive if powerbroker uses resources against government or at expense of other communities.
Democratic governance institutions	Collective Within-war Post-war	Widens sections of society involved in state activity. Increases incentives of communities to engage with governance institutions given more responsive nature of government.	Moderate: Amplifies effect of building effective governance institutions (row one) as increases expectations that contribution will be rewarded and interests incorporated into government activity. Will make it difficult for rebels to offer alternative. Democracy alone, however, is a collective incentive, and even weaker if it is offered as reward for war being won.

Table 5: Summary of expected effects of political incentives.

Christians, Druze and Alawites formed a significant part of the Syrian regime's army, but the degrading of government institutions led these communities to question their alliance with Bashar al-Assad's regime. These communities still desired the defeat of Sunni rebels, but began refusing to join the army and travel to other parts of the country, choosing instead to form their own local militias (Balanche, 2015). The population in this case was not supporting the rebels, but were more passive in their support for the government.

Table five breaks down the discussion the potential role of political incentives and governance, leading to the next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *Governments strengthening institutions of governance are more likely to survive civil wars, while those overseeing a weakening of these institutions are more likely to be defeated.*

Security

Counterinsurgency doctrine identifies security as "the top consideration for the population" (JCS, 2013; pVIII-20). Stathis Kalyvas also identifies security as a key driver in securing cooperation between conflict actors and its constituent population (2006). Civil wars lead to significant disruption in local livelihoods and if the population believes a belligerent can bring an end to the war then this represents a clear incentive to provide support. On the surface, however, security is a collective incentive, suggesting it cannot generate the breadth of support needed to win civil wars. Avoiding death would appear to be a powerful lure but the nature of the collective action problem suggests it may not be enough to critically affect the progress of the war.

A belligerent's ability to provide security almost certainly has three other effects on its capacity to generate support. From the population's perspective the ability of a belligerent to secure a local area increases the likelihood that it will prevail (Lichbach, 1998; p66). Secondly, it decreases the potential costs of supporting a conflict actor (p41). If a belligerent can protect its supporters from retribution,

then the population is more likely to actively participate in economic activity, join local police forces and work in administrative roles.

Lastly, a conflict actor's ability to deliver socioeconomic incentives to the population and build governance institutions is greatly enhanced in a stable environment. Local government structures cannot deliver services and people cannot engage in economic activity if the population fear leaving their houses. State theorists allude to the interaction between these three pillars of the state. "Security constitutes a precondition for welfare and political participation, while welfare reduces conflict and political representation allows for non-violent resolution of conflicts" (Stokke, 2006; p5). This is why rebel forces seek to destabilise population centres as they can undermine political institutions and economic activity. The government becomes unable to interact with the population and draw the support it needs, which creates further opportunities for rebels to operate.

Counterinsurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq applied these notions using the 'inkspot' strategy, originally conceived by David Galula based on his experiences in Algeria (1964). The idea was to build security in one area, develop local government institutions and service delivery, before moving on to another location. James Russell (2013) and Douglas Porch (2013) argue this strategy failed to affect the course of those conflicts where it has been used, be it Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq. The problem was, it put too much emphasis on security in motivating population behaviour. While security is the most pressing concern for individuals, by itself it only incentivises passive support. If the government lacks the ability to facilitate socio-political and economic activity, then security will not be converted into active support. If services are delivered by NGOs or external forces rather than a functioning local government then the population may not actively resist the government, but nor will they behave in a manner that generates resources. Once the government moves onto the next area, insecurity returns. James Russell (2013) shows how this happened repeatedly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, just providing security is a costly activity for governments and limits its ability to divert resources elsewhere, allowing rebels

to keep fighting in other places. The inkspot strategy only works, therefore, if the government already has the national-level structures in place to deliver political and socioeconomic incentives locally and convert its control over an area into more active types of support.

Where governments have won wars, the end has been preceded not by the provision of security, but rather macro-political changes that weakened rebels. Douglas Porch argues that all civil wars won by governments through softer counterinsurgency methods fit one of two types; either the conditions were not conducive in the first place for rebels to seriously degrade government power, or broader changes in macro-social, -economic and –political structures undermined the mobilisation capacity of the rebels (2013). He draws reference to conflicts in Latin America, where land reforms weakened the rebels (p238) and Malaya, where the British made political concessions to weaken the insurgency (p256). During a civil war the three tenets of counterinsurgency – security, welfare and governance – are much more interactive than their current emphasis in the doctrine.

Despite this, the theoretical evidence suggests changes in a government's capacity to provide security should affect its capacity to draw support from the population, which is laid out in table six.

Type of activity	Type of incentive	Resource generation	Expected impact on conflict
Provide local security	Collective Within-war	By itself, security creates no resources and is costly activity, but can enhance building of governance institutions and socioeconomic activity.	Moderate: Provision of security can be important but depends on national-level political and economic structures being in place to elicit active support.

Table 6: Summary of expected effects of security incentives.

This leads to the hypothesis below. However, the effect of changes in the security environment may be more limited than changes in the strength of governance structures and the economy in determining the final outcome of a conflict.

Hypothesis 4: *Governments that are increasingly able to provide security are more likely to survive civil wars, while governments overseeing increasing instability are likely to be defeated.*

Counterinsurgency doctrine

The theoretical evidence suggests all three tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine should help governments to win civil wars. However, counterinsurgents have poorly understood why this is the case. Practitioners have treated security, governance and development as incentives in and of themselves. This has led to the mistaken belief that populations will support governments if they show themselves to be legitimate (US Army, 2007). The preceding analysis suggests, in contrast, that security, governance and development as ends are insufficient to generate the level of support governments need to defeat insurgencies.

Governments that are providing an increasingly stable environment, an improving economy and building effective institutions, however, will also be creating strong and resilient structures that deliver incentives directly to the population. Credibility is more important than legitimacy in shaping population behaviour.

More importantly, the effectiveness of these structures increases the contribution each individual in society can provide back to conflict actors. They organise and generate recruits for the security forces, civil service and tax revenue. Strong sovereign structures convert passive into active support, pushing the population across the spectrum from constituents to sympathisers to members to activists in terms of the amount of the support they generate for conflict actors. It is the strength of these structures and how they condition population behaviour that determines their resilience against the strains placed on them by the costs of

fighting a civil war. The strength of these structures determine a conflict actor's ability to mobilise support through the course of the war and, therefore, its regenerative capacity. Governments that extend their institutions across the polity will eliminate rebel capacity to generate support, and will win wars. Rebels that undermine these institutions will defeat incumbent governments.

Violence

Up to this point, this chapter has analysed the positive incentives belligerents use to generate popular support. An extensive literature, however, shows that belligerents attempt to punish communities for providing support to their opponent, most obviously through the use of discriminate and indiscriminate violence. Violence, in this sense, differs from insecurity in that it specifically targets the population. Direct violence constitutes one, often critical driver of population behaviour within conflict zones (Porch, 2013).

The use of violence has been extensively studied elsewhere and I only intend to cover it very briefly (see for example Downes, 2007; Eck, 2014, 2014; Eck and Hultman, 2007; Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007; R.M. Wood and Kathman, 2014).

The literature shows that violence works as a powerful selective and collective within-war incentive. However, many scholars have maintained that violence cannot work to control a whole population and has a number of negative effects for the actor employing it (Mampilly, 2011). Violence drives grievances against the perpetrator. If another belligerent protects civilians from the violence of their opponent then the population will have increased incentive to support them (Kalyvas, 2006). On this logic, violence only works strategically if the actor employing it can sustain its oppression in the face of its opponent's efforts to protect civilians. Alexander Downes examined when government violence is likely to work in defeating rebel groups in *Draining the sea by filling the graves* (2007). He found it works best when the target population is small and bounded geographically, as it is easier for the government to contain any potential fallout.

I suggest that violence has another impact on the likely outcome of conflicts that has not been previously identified. When employing violence, a conflict actor is not creating mutually reinforcing behaviour. Creating a secure environment, facilitating economic activity and developing effective governance structures incentivises the population to generate the resources – manpower, finances, food - that a belligerent can then use to sustain its military force. In contrast, belligerents often use violence to stifle the generation of these resources for their opponent. This explains why governments can win through repression when the target population is small as it can draw the support it needs to sustain this activity from elsewhere. If the oppressed population is large then a government may bankrupt itself by pursuing this strategy, undermining its ability to distribute benefits to its constituent population.

The case studies below will offer an opportunity to explore whether violence interacts with the ability of belligerents to mobilise resources. In other words, does the use of violence have secondary, as yet unexplored, effects on the regenerative capacity of belligerents.

Information operations

The above variables generally represent tangible elements of a conflict; governance structures, economic opportunities, or the likelihood of being afflicted by violence. Conflict actors also dedicate significant resources to distorting the choices populations face. Mark Lichbach argues this can significantly boost their ability to mobilise support (1998; p86). ISIL's propaganda tries to convince individuals that their contribution is necessary and that the only way to benefit from ISIL's success is to travel to the region.[27] Other groups, such as Peru's Shining Path, force fighters and populations through political education programs (Weinstein, 2007). These programs make a group's

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[27] A summary of ISIL's English-speaking magazine, *Dabiq,* can be found at The Clarion Project (2016).

ideology appear more coherent and desirable (Lichbach, 1998; p92), especially if they can be linked to local concerns (p231).

Conflict actors that carry out extremely effective 'misinformation' campaigns will have to provide less 'real' incentives to influence population behaviour. That said, information operations are more likely to be successful when they are grounded in reality. We should, therefore, be able to generate a general assessment on the choice faced by the population by looking at changes in objective indicators that can be measured and tested empirically.

Strategic choices

This chapter has explored a range of ways conflict actors shape population behaviour. It has not broached the subject of why conflict actors choose between different strategies for shaping population behaviour. The following section will briefly look at some of these factors.

The nature of the state will affect the behaviour of conflict actors. Jeremy Weinstein has shown how rebels that capture natural resources have less need to generate active support (2007). Their ability to raise funds through trade enables them to deliver selective incentives to potential supporters. Those without natural resources have to draw these resources from the population and, as such, need to develop broader relations with local communities. Weinstein, compares the NRA in Uganda and RENAMO in Mozambique, and shows how the latter's control over natural resources meant it was much more aggressive in its relations with the population (2007).

Geography also plays a role. If a state has peripheral areas that are difficult for governments to control, then it pays for rebels to focus their efforts in building support there. If not then they are more likely to prioritise weakening government control in the centre (Guillen and Hodges, 1973).

Any support conflict actors can generate externally limits the resources they need to raise internally. Consequently, belligerents will have greater regenerative capacity even if they cannot raise resources from the population. External support can significantly affect the nature of the alliance between a belligerent and the population. Nevertheless, the broader framework developed in this thesis still underpins all civil wars. Belligerents still need to distribute benefits to their constituents and impose costs on the potential supporters of their opponents. What will change is that they have less need to generate resources from society to fund these incentives in the first place. Kyle Beardsley and Brian McQuinn observed how rebels with external support often focus on pacifying potential resistance (2009). The same applies to governments, and offers one reason coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq failed to effectively eliminate insurgent forces.

External actors can also provide rebel forces with a sanctuary (Salehyan, 2007). Rebels with access to a sanctuary have less need to live amongst local communities and can instead focus on mobilising fighters and attacking government institutions. Rebels will then be harder for the government to eliminate completely, meaning the insurgency can strain government resources for longer.

Zacharian Mampilly also points out that international support can come with conditions, or even advice, which affects how conflict belligerents deal with the population (2011). He also reminds us not to forget the beliefs, ideology and expectations of those involved. Rebel and government leaders hold beliefs about the best way to build movements, which can affect their subsequent decisions to use violence or create more benign structures (2011; loc656).

The social breakdown of belligerents and broader society will also play a role in determining the strategies conflict actors pursue to build support from the population. Paul Staniland shows that whether an insurgency comes from a pre-existing social or political organisation will affect the type of movement it tries to construct (2014). Mampilly shows that if tribes, religious groups or local

community networks are strong, then belligerents will have to build support through them, rather than building more impersonal institutions (2011; loc656). Lastly, Alexander Downes (2007) showed that the ethnic breakdown of a country and how these social groups reflect the make-up of the government and the rebels can also affect conflict behaviour.

These variables affect conflict dynamics, precisely because they determine rebel capacity to undermine government relations with the population and build a militant force.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored elements of the government's sovereign structures that it uses to mobilise support, and the elements rebels target to 'paralyse the state' (Guevara, 2008). Socioeconomic-, political- and security-based incentives appear crucial to determining the outcome of civil wars, but not because the population desire these benefits. They work because the ability to deliver these incentives depends on conflict actors building sovereign structures that convert these constructs into within-war incentives. In turn, these structures organise the population and maximise the amount of resources conflict actors can draw from communities.

When services and local governance are working, the population pays taxes, produces agriculture, maintains infrastructure, innovates, joins the security force for employment, fills the civil service amongst many other things. This behaviour generates resources for the government that it uses to distribute these incentives back to the population. This is the essence of Bueno de Mesquita et al.'s description of government control over the state (2005).

Rebels that undermine the government's capacity to deliver these incentives will weaken the government's control over the state and eventually push the government to collapse completely. Governments that can extend these

structures across the whole of society will win the war by eliminating the political, social and economic opportunities rebels exploit to regenerate.

The rest of this thesis will look to test these assertions. Should they prove effective predictors for the outcomes of civil wars that have actually taken place, it will lend strong support to the general framework for studying civil wars developed in this thesis.

Chapter four

Methodological approach: mixed methods

The nature of this study lends itself to testing the hypotheses through a mixed method approach that combines the use of large-N quantitative analysis and in-depth case studies. Large-N analysis has the key advantage of ensuring a representative and broad sample. We can also be certain that the variables of interest objectively correlate across a variety of cases. However, the large-N quantitative approach only allows us to look at correlations between variables, not causal mechanisms. The main thrust of this thesis argues that civil war outcomes are determined by changes in the government's capacity to shape population behaviour. It is especially important to be sure about the causal mechanisms as that forms a core part of this thesis. Case study analysis is much better suited to testing hypotheses around causal mechanisms and, therefore, represents the logical choice for this thesis. Employing process-tracing allows the author to specifically focus on the causal path from changes in independent variables of interest to the observed outcome. In other words, we can examine how changes in macro-level behaviours and structures actually condition the ability of the government to mobilise resources from the population (Mampilly, 2011).

Case studies, however, also have a number of disadvantages. "Potential limitations of case studies, though not inherent in every one, include indeterminacy or inability to exclude all but one explanation, lack of independence of cases, and the impossibility of perfectly controlling case comparisons." (Bennett, 2004; p20). There is a severe danger of selection bias, with scholars choosing case studies that confirm hypotheses. It is also impossible to know whether results can be applied to cases in other contexts, as one cannot keep all other variables constant (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

Using a mixed method approach addresses these issues. The case studies in this thesis were chosen based on the results of a quantitative analysis, ensuring the

selection process was independent of any previous knowledge I had of particular wars. As the case studies follow from a large-N study, we also know whether the variables of interest I examine in the case studies correlate to civil war outcomes across a variety of contexts. A quantitative model, therefore, allows us to test whether the model of conflict proposed in this thesis is plausible when set against a wide variety of conflicts. Perhaps more importantly, it offers an objective method for selecting case studies to explicitly test the causal processes that form the main part of my theory.

Consequently, a mixed method approach offers the best of all worlds, drawing on the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative analysis and allowing me to test my main hypotheses, which revolve around *how* population support determines civil war outcomes.

Quantitative study

For the quantitative analysis I use a dataset adapted from the RAND study *How Insurgencies End* by Ben Connable and Martin Libicki (2010). Their dataset contains 89 completed and ongoing insurgencies that started between 1945 and 2006. My thesis has complete data for 65 of these conflicts, across 51 countries, all starting after 1960. 1960 represents the starting point of this study due to data availability of many of the independent variables I have added to the dataset.[28] As with most studies that look at the dynamics of civil war (eg Collier et al., 2004; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004), Connable and Libicki use time invariant variables measured at the beginning of the conflict. The problems this creates were detailed above. Rebel groups attempt to alter structural conditions in order to demobilise the government. As such, the nature of the state at the beginning of the conflict will only tell us so much. To overcome this problem, I have expanded the dataset to create 959 conflict-year observations, which means we can study changes in macro-level indicators through the course of the conflict.

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[28] Two conflicts, Laos and the Indian northwest territories, that started after 1960 had to be dropped due to a lack of data relating to either the state or the conflict.

The dependent variable, civil war outcomes, comes directly from Connable and Libicki's dataset. Outcomes are broken down into outright government victories, rebel victories and mixed outcomes, based on whether insurgents achieved their original aims, judged by experts in each war rather than the authors. This does result in some outcomes being different to other studies. For example, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) code South Africa as a negotiated agreement, while Connable and Libicki code it as a rebel victory given the political change the ANC effected. Mixed outcomes are characterised by the government surviving, but with certain political changes that are in line with the demands of the rebel group. Whether a treaty formalises these changes is deemed irrelevant, as is a settlement that is simply a surrender. This gives the dataset a significant advantage in that the outcomes are much more meaningful and widely distributed.

The major downside of using this dataset is that the results are not necessarily directly comparable to other comparative studies of civil war outcomes nor does it include some of the wars used in these studies.

The first issue, I believe is a necessary trade-off for enriching our understanding of conflicts. Policymakers need to not only understand when conflict actors are most likely to agree to a negotiated deal, but also what types of deals are most likely to be concluded. Not all political deals that bring wars to an end are equivalent, with participants making a wide variety and often unequal set of concessions. It is important, therefore, to move beyond understanding 'negotiated outcome' as a catch-all term. Instead we should categorise wars according to a more objective measure of whether a conflict actor's war aims have been achieved. This dataset allows us to do that and, therefore, should improve the usefulness of the findings for policymakers involved in trying to bring civil war participants to the negotiating table.

The smaller dataset is more problematic and has the potential to make the findings less robust. Connable and Libicki's dataset was adapted from James Fearon's and David Laitin's list of conflicts in *Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War* (2003). Fearon and Laitin's dataset covers 127 civil wars that started between

1945 and 1999. Connable and Libicki drop some cases, which they categorise as "countercoups and insurrections" rather than civil wars or insurgencies (2010; p158). They then added wars that started between 1999 and 2006, which, in total, led to the figure of 89 civil wars. However, not all of the wars that Connable and Libicki dropped would have been included in the dataset used in this study regardless. Many of the wars Connable and Libicki drop started before 1960 meaning there would not have been data available. In addition, this study focuses on changes in levels of governance, socioeconomic drivers and security, rather than looking at these variables in absolute terms. Consequently, a war has to cover at least a three-year period for these changes to become measureable.[29] Some of the conflicts missing in Connable and Libicki's dataset would not be included in this thesis anyway due to lasting less than three years. In total, Connable and Libicki drop only fifteen wars from Fearon and Laitin's dataset that would have met the criteria for inclusion in this study. [30]

While it would be ideal to include these wars to create a wider dataset, this was not realistic and would have violated the principles of independent data collection. Connable and Libicki used experts to determine whether governments or rebels achieved their conflict aims. To add the other fifteen conflicts would have required either contacting a similar set of experts to get assessments on how the war ended according to Connable and Libicki's criteria, or assessing the outcomes myself. The first of these options was not credible as I could not ensure the experts I used would judge conflicts as Connable and Libicki intended. The second was not realistic as I did not have the broad expertise to judge the outcomes of these conflicts objectively. While the independent variables for this thesis incorporate a wide variety of data sources, such as the World Bank or the

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[29] The way the data is constructed is outlined in more detail in the next chapter. In short, a war has to have taken place across a three-year period as I calculate year-on-year changes from the beginning of the conflict, but then lag these changes by one year to reduce any endogeneity caused by changes in the independent variables being the result of the war having ended during that year.

[30] The wars not included are: Haiti (91-95), Mali (89-94), Chad (94-98), Uganda (81-87), India Sikh (82-93), Bangladesh (76-97), Indonesia W Papua (65-ongoing), Xinjiang (91-ongoing), Brazil (65-72), Ethiopia (67-ongoing), Angola Cabinda (92-ongoing), Zimbabwe (83-87), Sudan (63-72), Iran Kurdistan (79-93), Turkey militias (77-80).

Correlates of War project, I also borrow two variables directly from Connable and Libicki's data. Collecting data for these independent variables on any conflicts added to the dataset would have caused exactly the same problems as judging the dependent variable. On balance, therefore, I focus only on those conflicts that were included in Connable and Libicki's study.

The trade-offs for using this smaller dataset are also more than negated by how influential Connable and Libicki's work has been in policy circles. Its conclusions and recommendations hold huge weight as RAND retains a strong relationship with the US government (RAND Corporation, 2014). Using RAND's dataset situates my conclusions and recommendation within their findings, which have helped to shape Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.

Case studies

I have chosen four case studies to illuminate how changes in the government's capacity to shape population behaviour determines civil war outcomes; Burundi, Cambodia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Zimbabwe. The case studies were chosen based on how the wars performed in the statistical model. I selected two of the better-predicted conflicts – 'typical' cases – and two of the least well predicted – 'deviant' cases.

Choosing 'typical cases' ensures the conflicts meet the criteria that the case is representative of the wider population (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). As the model explains these cases extremely well, the analysis focuses on whether the stipulated causal mechanism is validated by historical accounts of the conflict (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Process-tracing identifies whether the paths to the respective outcomes were dependent on changes in government capacity to shape population behaviour. The factors that define this relationship will help in developing a more inclusive theory of civil war. Burundi represents a 'typical' case of a mixed outcome, while Cambodia constitutes a 'typical' rebel victory.

The typical cases represent an attempt at theory confirmation over theory development. The best means to do the latter is to explore deviant cases that are poorly predicted by the quantitative model. These cases cannot be considered representative at the point of selection and the motivation for such case selection is exploratory in nature. These sorts of studies offer the opportunity to identify other causal factors that can be employed to produce a better model that reduces the 'deviancy' of these and other similar cases (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). If these additional factors work in a similar way to the hypothesised causal mechanism they can be said to lend support to the theoretical model. However, they will also expand our ability to identify macro-level indicators of a conflict's progress. It may, on the other hand, be that the ability of actors to generate population support played less of a role in these conflicts. It is possible that these conflicts followed a different path, which would challenge the theories presented in this thesis. The deviant cases are Nagorno-Karabakh, which ended as a mixed outcome, and Zimbabwe, where the rebels emerged victorious.

I have chosen not to study outright government victories due to a number of considerations. Firstly, time and space constraints. Obviously the more cases that can be studied the better for generalising causal paths. However, adding more cases would limit the space dedicated to each war and reduce my capacity to elucidate the precise causal mechanisms at work in these conflicts. The second reason comes from the theoretical implications borne out of previous chapters and the way the RAND dataset codes civil war outcomes. The previous sections suggested governments have two options for generating support from the population and undermining rebel strength; positive incentives - economic, political and security – or negative incentives – violence. If the government uses positive incentives it may do this through macro-level reform, such as increasing political participation, which will be factored into how the outcome is defined. Certain levels of political reform, which is a key variable of interest, will lead to a conflict being classified as a mixed outcome, rather than an outright government victory. Outright government victories are more likely to reflect instances where the government has relied on negative incentives to shape population behaviour. The use of repression to undermine rebellions has already been analysed in detail

by Alexander Downes (2007) and Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Kocher (2007). It is unclear, therefore, what more we could add to our understanding of these types of conflicts. In contrast, there is little scholarly analysis of how governments can end civil wars by offering positive incentives to the population in exchange for support. Nor has academia examined the idea that rebels defeat governments by demobilising governments and undermining the sovereign structures they use to shape population behaviour. Elaborating these two casual mechanisms should, therefore, produce more original insights.

The other major constraint I am under in applying case study analysis is my inability to do primary research. I require a conflict to be already sufficiently researched in order to examine the case to the necessary depth. Ultimately, however, this did not affect my choice of case studies, as all the cases I wanted to look at were well covered. Moreover, as I have to rely on existing literature covering the four conflicts, I cannot be accused of selectively collecting data to support my theories and hypotheses.

The four case studies also signify a range of conflict-types. We will, therefore, be able to assess how contextual variables interact with changes in our variables of interest. Of the four cases, three have an ethnic component, while Cambodia does not. In three of the conflicts, belligerents are seeking to capture the whole state, while in Nagorno-Karabakh the rebels have more limited territorial aims. The civil wars are spread across Africa, southeast and central Asia. The conflicts also have a broad spread in terms of overall length; three, nine, eleven and fifteen years. Moreover, each of the conflicts also offers points of comparison within themselves. While each war obviously only has one ending, they have distinct phases in which the belligerents' ability to shape behaviour changes. Employing process-tracing and using within-case analysis will allow me to assess population behaviour before and after changes in macro-level behaviour and structures, and test whether it responded as we would expect and for the reasons predicted.

Conclusion

A mixed method approach offers the best way to test the hypotheses developed in this thesis. We can analyse both whether macro-level structures correlate to civil war outcomes in the manner theorised and how these macro-variables shape population behaviour. It also ensures that the cases studied are representative and that the results can be generalised to shape future academic work and policy on civil war.

Chapter five

Statistical analysis

This chapter will test the validity of the model of conflict developed in this thesis by exploring correlations between changes in state-level indicators and civil war outcomes. A number of statistical models will be presented, which will test for correlations between changes in a government's relationship with the population and the outcomes of civil wars. The models will do this by using variables that proxy for governance, socioeconomic and security conditions. If improvements along these three lines correlate to governments faring better and diminutions correlate with governments being defeated, then we will be able to surmise that the theories developed in this thesis has validity across a comparative context. We will also be able to offer, for the first time using comparative techniques, insight into whether the tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine do allow governments to defeat insurgent challengers as proffered by its proponents.

Research design

Dependent variable

The dependent variable in all the main models developed below is the civil war's outcome as taken from the RAND dataset. Outcomes are coded as 1 for a government victory, 2 for a rebel victory or 3 for a mixed outcome. If the war does not end in a given year it is coded as 0. Table seven gives the basic details of the conflicts included.

Outcome	Total	Mean duration (yrs)
Government victory	18	16.7
Rebel victory	14	15.4
Mixed outcome	18	10.8
Unfinished	15	-
Total	65	14.2*

* excluding unfinished conflicts
Table 7: Summary of conflict outcomes.

It is clear that there is limited difference in the average outcomes of rebel and government victories. Government victories do appear to last slightly longer than rebel triumphs, but this difference is not statistically significant. This supports the notion that insurgent and counterinsurgent campaigns require a significant commitment of time and resources (Shinn, 2009). What it also suggests, however, is that neither side is more likely to win long wars. Mixed outcomes are clearly shorter that outright victories.[31] This would be expected if these type of outcomes reflect belligerents agreeing not to fight until one or other party collapses completely.

Method

Given the dependent variable is nominal rather than ordinal, I used a multinomial logit model to measure the correlation between the independent variables and the various outcomes. The dataset contains conflicts across 51 countries so the observations were clustered by country. I then used CLARIFY to simulate a variety of scenarios, setting variables at different levels of interest. We can, therefore, actually understand the substantive correlation between changes in macro-structures and particular conflict outcomes. CLARIFY requires a positive definite matrix to run the simulation. The number of variables must be less than the number of clusters divided by the number of non-zero outcomes, which in this case results in a maximum of sixteen independent variables.

Independent Variables

Most studies examining civil conflict look at its onset and the choice of variables is guided by comparing nations that witness war and those that do not. Independent variables are generally coded in absolute form (for example Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In this study, every nation, regardless of its starting macro-conditions, is already experiencing a war. Regardless of the broader context in

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[31] A two-sided t-test comparing the length of mixed outcomes compared to outright victories confirmed that the two datasets were different (Pr (T > t) = 0.06) and that outright victories were longer than mixed outcomes ((Pr (T > t) = 0.03).

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absolute terms, it enabled 'multiple sovereigns' to emerge. The question is how further changes correlate to specific outcomes. The best way to capture this is to measure changes in the value of key variables from one year to the next. The main explanatory time-varying variables are, therefore, presented in difference format. The difference measure used for each variable is based on how long it is judged for the effect to be felt by the population. Socioeconomic and governance changes are likely to take longer to filter down and affect population behaviour; as such, a cumulated change over a three-year period is recorded. The security environment is likely to be felt much quicker, so two-year changes are calculated. During the early years of the war, accumulated change is taken from the start of the insurgency.

Socioeconomic variables

Life expectancy is a good indicator of the standard of living within a nation and data is readily available from the World Bank (2011). If life expectancy is increasing it is a sign that the standard of living is improving and the government is delivering services more effectively.

The second variable I choose to capture the ability of a government to offer economic incentives to the population is GDP per capita in real terms based on 2004 prices. Data was gathered from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2009). GDP per capita in the countries examined ranges from US$29336 per capita to US$117, with a mean of US$3462. A US$100 increase or decrease is likely to have a much larger impact when GDP is low to begin with. To account for this, GDP is logged before recording changes so that changes from a low base carry equal weight.[32] GDP tells us little about how the government is providing services. However, it does proxy for overall economic activity, and, therefore, the government's capacity to deliver selective economic and collective incentives to the population during the war. If GDP is increasing, this suggests the government

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[32] The range for life expectancy is much smaller – 26 to 80. As such, there is no need to alter the variable.

has more capacity to deliver economic benefits as a means to shape population behaviour. Any missing data was replaced by extrapolating changes in the intervening period.

Political Variables

Two indicators of the political incentives governments are offering the population are used, one looking at the competitiveness of democracy and one looking at the political status of the rebel's constituent population. To model democratic reform I use the Polity IV dataset, which scores nations on their level of democratic freedom; -10 for the most autocratic through to 10 for the most democratic (Marshall et al., 2016). The polity2 variable in the dataset accounts for state collapse brought on by conflict, and replaces most missing data points from the main polity observation. Any remaining missing data was replaced with the last observed value, on the basis that the population would judge that a government victory would see a return to this level of democracy.

The second political variable looks specifically at the status of the social group associated with the insurgency. The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset lists the status of different ethnic groups in terms of their access to executive power defined as "control over the presidency, the cabinet, and senior posts in the administration, including top army posts" (Cederman et al., 2010; p99). Groups are coded as; having a monopoly, being dominant, a senior partner, a junior partner, having regional autonomy, having separatist autonomy, being powerless, or being discriminated against (pp100-101). Changes in a group's status are recorded based on how far up or down it has moved in this scale. For example, a group that goes from having regional autonomy to being a senior partner will score a two. This serves as a basis for describing the magnitude of the political incentives being offered to the population. Separatist autonomy is always coded zero as this does not reflect a choice by the government. Conflicts not covered in the EPR dataset are recorded as zero throughout the conflict. While this variable does not cover all conflicts, governments and insurgencies will normally have identifiably different core constituencies, be they ethnic, religious,

regional or urban-rural. The EPR dataset only accounts for the first of these, but it proxies for political concessions more generally.

These political variables address two factors of interest; governance and violence. Increasing democracy will reflect political reform and the use of political benefits to influence the population. In contrast, declining democracy may signify a government taking more repressive measures to undermine support for rebel groups, possibly to include the use of violence.

These variables focus on the inclusiveness of government institutions rather than describing actual government effectiveness. The latter would better fit parts of the theory developed in earlier chapters. However, data that covers government effectiveness more explicitly does not exist for all of the conflicts in the dataset. Nevertheless, against the smaller set of conflicts it corresponds to, I have run two regressions including changes in the government's political reach, from Kugler and Tamman's relative political performance dataset (2012).

We would expect changes in this variable to have a more significant impact than variables that measure democracy as it better captures the ability of governments to both deliver incentives to and generate resources from the population. In some ways, however, the role of democracy is more interesting theoretically in that it tests the central policy of Western interventions in many civil wars.

Security Variables

Two variables measure the security environment. The first is changes in the size of the military relative to the population, which counterinsurgency doctrine suggests should affect the ability of the government to provide security (Jones and Johnston, 2013). Governments could also use a larger military force to suppress the population (DeRouen and Sobek, 2004). Either way, an increase should represent a government better able to mobilise support and if it proves to be a key variable then how it works to end rebel activity can form the basis for investigation in the case studies. Military personnel per 1000 people in the

population was taken from the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset (Singer, 1988), with cumulated changes calculated. Where there is missing data based on a collapse of state capacity this was coded as zero military personnel. This is obviously not ideal as governments will clearly still have people fighting on their behalf or the war will have ended. However, these forces will probably be irregular in nature and, therefore, are less likely to be perceived by the population as representing a government in control. Consequently, a value of zero military personnel does tell us something about the relationship between a government and its population.

I also look at changes in the intensity of the conflict. If combat deaths are decreasing, we can assume the population feels more secure. Should combat deaths increase then this would suggest the rebels are destabilising society. Changes in battle deaths, therefore, should demonstrate how changes in the populations perception of security affect the government's ability to mobilise support.

Changes in battlefield deaths were taken from the UCDP battle deaths data (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2006). These figures include civilians, as well as combatants, but only those killed during battles between government and rebel forces. They do not include direct violence against the population, which we theorised would have a different effect. Given the way the dataset from this study has been put together some of the conflict-years do not have casualty figures in the UCDP data. A zero was entered for these conflict-years; this still has value as it demonstrates an extremely low-intensity insurgency.

Increasing deaths before a mixed outcome could also indicate that the emergence of a costly hurting stalemate predicts the end of a civil war. While the strength of government forces could also be indicator of increasing government power relative to rebel strength, as we are only looking at government forces it is

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impossible to make this judgement. To do this, we would have to include data on the size of rebel forces as well.[33]

A summary of the main independent variables can be found below.

Variable	Absolute values			Changes		
	mean/ median	std dev	min/max	mean/ median	std dev	min/max
Democracy	0.02/0	6.33	-9/10	0.35/0	3.13	-15/15
Group status*	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.33/0	0.31	-2/3
Life expectancy	55.99/ 56.69	10.6	26.4/ 80.15	0.99/0.98	1.22	-6.33/ 10.36
GDP per capita**	3491/ 2021	4604	117/ 28451	0.02/0.04	0.17	-1.45/0.92
Battle deaths	5014/ 700	17577	0/ 240287	318/0	8615	-62000/ 106662
Government military size	180/76	298	0/1900	4.09/0	32.53	-400/209

* Absolute values for group status are qualitative and do not have summary statistical values.
** The change values for GDP per capita refer to changes in the logged value of the absolute values presented here.
Table 8: Summary statistics of key independent variables.

Of interest, it is clear that there is a general improvement in governance and socioeconomic conditions in the countries covered in the dataset, despite the fact that they are experiencing conflict. This suggests that the baseline for changes

[33] Reed Wood (2010) presents a dataset that includes relative power of rebel and government forces. However, it only includes data from 1989 onwards, which means it does not correspond to most of the conflicts examined in this thesis.

socioeconomic development and changes in governance is a slight improvement, rather than no change.

Additional Variables

Aside from the independent variables of primary interest, a number of other contextual factors may impact conflict actors' ability to draw support from the population. The final section of chapter three went over some of the key variables discussed in literature on civil war. The list below represents those that can be easily coded for use in the statistical model. Any of these variables having a strong effect on conflict outcomes does not challenge the overall theories of this thesis if this effect is in conjunction with the expected role of the independent variables already outlined. However, if the model shows no correlation between the above population-focused variables and civil war outcomes, then this would represent a serious challenge to the main hypothesis of this thesis.

Insurgency use of Terror

The main variables of interest in this study proxy for changes in the relationship between the government and population. This tells us very little about the structures used by insurgents to generate support. Jeremy Weinstein (2007) argued the decision of how much rebel groups rely on the population for support often affects their propensity for violence. Rebels using terrorism are less likely to build shadow governance structures and provide rudimentary services to the population. If this behaviour effects the likelihood of a rebel victory then a dichotomous variable to account for rebel use of terror may correlate with one or more outcomes. Data on rebel use of terror is taken directly from Connable and Libicki's dataset. Twenty insurgencies used terrorism, while 45 did not.

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Sanctuary and internal safe-havens

Both quantitative studies (Connable and Libicki, 2010; Salehyan, 2007) and doctrine writers (Galula, 1964) discuss the value of internal and external sanctuary to insurgents.

Access to an external sanctuary lessens the support rebels need to generate support from the population as they do not have to live amongst local communities to evade government forces. They can focus their efforts on degrading government capacity to hold its alliances with the population together. The data on external sanctuaries comes from the Connable and Libicki dataset and is a dichotomous variable coded as one if the rebels have access to an external sanctuary and zero if they do not. Rebel groups had access to external sanctuaries in 44 of the conflicts covered in the dataset, showing how common it is for insurgencies to use foreign soil to stay out of reach of government forces.

To proxy for access to an internal safe-haven I use Fearon and Laitin's measure for 'rough terrain', which is the logged percentage of the country covered by mountains (2003; p81). They acknowledge this does not cover all types of terrain that insurgents might use, such as jungles or swamps, but in the absence of an all-encompassing measure of rough terrain they conclude this single measure is sufficient (ibid.).

Territorial conflict

Alexander Downes showed that the size of the rebel constituent population could affect whether harsher or softer counterinsurgency approaches were more appropriate (2007). To account for this I input a variable that indicates whether the aims of the rebels are limited to controlling a specific territorial area or the whole state. The data is coded one if the rebels have limited territorial aims and zero if they are trying to capture the central government. Twenty-six of the 65 conflicts covered in this study had insurgencies fighting with limited territorial aims.

External Intervention

Military support for either side should affect the outcome and how conflict actors seek to mobilise support from the population. I use a dichotomous variable of one if a belligerent is receiving direct external support in a given year, and zero if they do not. The data is taken from the merged 'International Military Intervention Data 1945-2005' (Pearson and Baumann, 1993; Pickering and Kisangani, 2009). It lists all state military interventions in other countries, their duration and who was being supported between 1945 and 2005. The variable does not include intervention not sanctioned by the state or economic support.

Overall, governments received support in 29 conflicts, spread across 131 conflict-year observations. Twelve of these interventions lasted for more than three years, while four lasted the entire duration of the conflict. Rebels received support in 20 civil wars, spread across 75 conflict-years. Of these, nine interventions lasted for over three years and five were permanent for the entire war.

Time

In order to ensure that the relative impact of certain variables are not being effected by any underlying time dependency I put time, time squared, and time cubed into the model as recommended by Carter and Signorino (2010). Of the wars that ended, the longest war was 37 years, while the minimum length was three years. The mean time of conflicts was fourteen years while the median was twelve.

All variables are lagged by one year to remove the possibility of a change in macro-level indicators being the result of a peace settlement.[34] The outcome of a conflict in 2000, for example, will be tested against macro-level changes between

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[34] Lagging variables and using difference measures means two observations are dropped for each conflict, which accounts for the disparity between the number of observations stated in the previous chapter and the observations in most of the models.

1996-1999 for socioeconomic and governance variables and 1997-1999 for security variables.

Results

To begin with, I examine each of the tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine in isolation, before bringing them together and adding the control variables.

Socioeconomic variables

	Model 1 - Changes in socioeconomic conditions		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in life expectancy	0.0209 (0.146)	-0.637*** (0.126)	0.075 (0.149)
Change in GDP	0.979 (1.190)	-3.167*** (1.227)	-2.644** (1.164)
Time	0.0639 (0.0827)	-0.0144 (0.153)	-0.467 (0.323)
Time squared	-0.00152 (0.00466)	0.00562 (0.00770)	0.0392* (0.0232)
Time cubed	2.53e-05 (8.17e-05)	-9.80e-05 (0.000113)	-0.000918* (0.000499)
Constant	-4.517*** (0.635)	-4.552*** (0.915)	-2.398* (1.284)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Number of obs	829
Wald chi2(15)	54.60
Prob > chi2	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.08

Table 9: Model one - changes in socioeconomic conditions.

Figure 6: Changing socioeconomic conditions and government victories.

Figure 7: Changing socioeconomic conditions and rebel victories.

Figure 8: Changing socioeconomic conditions and mixed outcomes.

Model one does not support the notion that governments do better by improving socioeconomic conditions, challenging hypothesis two. There is, however, a strong, statistically significant correlation between declining socioeconomic conditions and rebel victories as shown in figure seven. There is also some evidence that governments facing economic difficulties are more inclined to make concessions to end the war in a mixed outcome (figure eight). We would expect this result if socioeconomic conditions are an indication of a government more likely to be defeated, as per the second part of hypothesis two.

Overall the effect of a decline in life expectancy is much more pronounced than a drop in GDP per capita. Using CLARIFY, the model suggests that a five-year drop[35] in life expectancy correlates with a 27.5 percent increase in the likelihood of a rebel victory in the following year.[36] A 50 percent drop in GDP per capita in the

[35] All reported changes are over a three-year period unless otherwise stated.
[36] All reported changes are significant at p>0.05 unless otherwise stated.

same period increases the likelihood of a rebel victory by twelve percent and a mixed outcome by nine. Interestingly, the two variables interact quite heavily. The same drop in GDP per capita when life expectancy has also declined by five years increases the likelihood of a rebel victory by 43.6 percent. This is on top of the 27.5 percent impact that the drop in life expectancy has by itself. At this stage it is not possible to say why this should be the case, but we may be able to explore this in more detail in the case studies below.

The preceding chapters suggested that governments need to maintain socioeconomic activity in order to raise the revenue it uses to mobilise support from the population. These resources are vital for recruiting into its military and civil service, as well as tax revenue for the more general services governments provide to their people. If rebels undermine socioeconomic activity, then it limits a governments capacity to fund the institutions it uses to mobilise support, potentially leading to its collapse and allowing insurgents to take control of the state. The performance of socioeconomic variables in model one demonstrates support for this notion in a comparative setting.

Governance

	Model 2		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in democracy	-0.183*** (0.0501)	0.0702 (0.0588)	0.135** (0.0607)
Change in ethnic relations	0.389 (0.532)	-0.587 (0.394)	0.880** (0.446)
Time	0.0830 (0.0895)	-0.143 (0.162)	-0.532 (0.330)
Time squared	-0.00144 (0.00503)	0.00802 (0.00836)	0.0430* (0.0245)
Time cubed	1.67e-05 (8.90e-05)	-0.000101 (0.000120)	-0.00101* (0.000540)
Constant	1.67e-05 (8.90e-05)	-0.000101 (0.000120)	-0.00101* (0.000540)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of obs	829
Wald chi2(15)	42.40
Prob > chi2	0.002
Pseudo R2	0.0516

Table 10: Model two - changes in governance conditions

Figure 9: Changing democracy and government victories.

Figure 10: Changing democracy and rebel victories.

Figure 11: Changing democracy and mixed outcomes.

Where the effect of changes in socioeconomic conditions appeared to be most significant on the probability of governments being defeated, changes in levels of democracy tell us more about when governments do better. Model two suggests governments dragged into a civil war have two choices; increase repression or enact political reform. Figure nine shows that governments do better when they decrease levels of political participation. A decrease in a state's polity score by ten, correlates with a nine percent increase in the probability of an outright government victory. However, an increase in the polity score by ten improves the likelihood of a mixed outcome by five percent (figure 11). This second result is reinforced by changes in the ethnic status of groups associated with insurgencies, with an improvement by two positions in the scale proposed by Cederman et al. (2010) increasing the likelihood of a mixed outcome by ten percent.

Governments that offer political incentives, such as democracy, do appear to be able to stave off insurgent groups. Linking this back to the model of conflict developed in chapters one and two, model two supports the notion that democratisation widens the scope of those in the population receiving benefits from the government, reducing rebel capacity to generate support and replace resources expended on military activity. Model two shows that this idea can be replicated across a broad range of conflicts. We can, therefore, conclude that model two supports hypothesis three, at least the first part of it; governments strengthening governance structures, albeit either through democratisation or increasing repression, are more likely to survive civil wars.

Chapter three also discussed governance in terms of institutional strength. Model three incorporates a variable that accounts for changes in the political reach of the government across the polity. This variable should give a further indication of the role of governance in determining conflict outcomes, irrespective of whether this governance is democratic or not. Unfortunately, data for this variable does not exist for all of the conflicts in the dataset.

	Model 3		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in democracy	-0.200*** (0.0480)	0.125 (0.0821)	0.176** (0.0694)
Change in ethnic relations	0.412 (0.523)	-0.638 (0.439)	1.054** (0.438)
Change in political reach	3.159 (2.533)	-10.34*** (3.800)	-0.128 (5.230)
Time	0.0738 (0.0888)	-0.133 (0.169)	-0.481 (0.381)
Time squared	-0.00103 (0.00486)	0.00514 (0.00977)	0.0443 (0.0270)
Time cubed	9.86e-06 (8.43e-05)	-3.23e-05 (0.000147)	-0.00111* (0.000582)
Constant	-4.705*** (0.712)	-3.913*** (0.757)	-3.070* (1.595)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of obs	766
Wald chi2(18)	68.50
Prob > chi2	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.0831

Table 11: Model three - changes in governance with political reach added.

As with socioeconomic conditions, the key impact of changes in government reach is on rebel victories. A 25 percent decline in a government's reach across its state correlates with an 11 percent increase in the likelihood of a rebel victory. This supports the notion that rebels win by undermining government control over the state, both economically as in model one, and politically as in model three. Rebels use the socioeconomic and political opportunities this creates to build their own sovereign structures and create further strain on the government.

Model three lends support to the second part of hypothesis three. It also reinforces the results from model two, in that the effect of changes in the polity score and ethnic relations are robust to the addition of the additional variable. Models two and three, therefore, support hypothesis three in its totality; governments do better when they strengthen their institutions of governments, while they are more likely to lose if these institutions are weakening.

Security conditions

	Model 4		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in battle deaths	-2.98e-05 (2.16e-05)	-6.89e-05** (2.84e-05)	-5.37e-05** (2.73e-05)
Change in government military size	0.0111 (0.00790)	-0.00968* (0.00516)	-0.0138*** (0.00352)
Time	0.0693 (0.0873)	-0.125 (0.157)	-0.374 (0.271)
Time squared	-0.00159 (0.00497)	0.00696 (0.00826)	0.0308 (0.0192)
Time cubed	2.53e-05 (8.52e-05)	-8.42e-05 (0.000123)	-0.000723* (0.000410)
Constant	-4.624*** (0.592)	-3.753*** (0.853)	-2.579** (1.065)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of obs	829
Wald chi2(15)	46.81
Prob > chi2	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.0581

Table 12: Model four - changes in security conditions.

Figure 12: Changing security conditions and government victories.

Figure 13: Changing security conditions and rebel victories.

Figure 14: Changing security conditions and mixed outcomes.

Overall, the impact of changes in the number of battle deaths and the size of the government military are minimal compared to changes in socioeconomic and governance variables. Decreasing battle deaths statistically correlates with rebels doing better, contrary to what we would expect to see if increasing insecurity contributes to rebel victories. Even then, the effect is substantively small. There has to be a drop of 25,000 battle deaths in a two-year period for there to be an increase in the likelihood of a rebel victory of five percent.

A drop in the size of the government's military also correlates to a rebel victory and a mixed outcome. This lends some support to hypothesis four, but the substantive effect is also extremely small. A decrease in 75 military personnel per 100,000 in the population correlates with a four percent increase in the likelihood of a mixed outcome. Even at this level of change, there is no statistically significant correlation with a rebel victory. The model, therefore, supports other studies that

show the size of government forces does matter, but only to a very limited extent in substantive terms (Friedman, 2011).

There is no meaningful correlation between any of the outcomes and increases in either the number of battle deaths or the size of the government's military. Overall model four only offers limited support for hypothesis four. Taken together, therefore, models one to four do support the caveat appended to hypothesis four, that we would expect changes in socioeconomic and governance conditions to be more important in shaping conflict outcomes.

The distribution of the battle deaths data offers an interesting additional insight into how civil wars play out more generally. Declining levels of battlefield deaths increased the likelihood of wars ending across the board, albeit to a very limited extent substantively. This is in complete contrast to what we would expect to see if civil war agreements were preceded by a painful stalemate (Mooradian and Druckman, 1999). Instead, the way changes in the amount of deaths perform suggests that the ending of a war follows a decline in the ability of belligerents to carry out military activity. A decline in military activity almost certainly reflects a drop in capacity to replace losses on the battlefield, brought about by an inability to generate support. That said, the substantive and statistical effect of this variable is limited, meaning it is difficult to assert this with any great confidence. However, when put alongside the way socioeconomic and governance variables perform in models one to three, it lends further support for the idea that wars end following the demobilisation of fighting forces, rather than a crescendo of violence.

Interactive models

	Model 5		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in life expectancy	0.0239 (0.160)	-0.703*** (0.124)	0.0921 (0.159)
Change in GDP	0.837 (1.533)	-3.028** (1.340)	-2.429* (1.430)
Change in democracy	-0.183*** (0.0531)	0.0224 (0.0709)	0.127** (0.0621)
Change in ethnic relations	0.463 (0.548)	-0.624 (0.494)	0.973** (0.435)
Change in battle deaths	-3.16e-05 (2.43e-05)	-7.13e-05* (3.98e-05)	-4.96e-05 (3.11e-05)
Change in government military	0.0108 (0.00873)	-0.0100** (0.00495)	-0.0168*** (0.00478)
Time	0.0778 (0.100)	-0.00137 (0.161)	-0.457 (0.291)
Time squared	-0.00121 (0.00542)	0.00545 (0.00811)	0.0411* (0.0210)
Time cubed	1.45e-05 (9.14e-05)	-9.79e-05 (0.000124)	-0.00102** (0.000467)
Constant	-4.958*** (0.761)	-4.788*** (1.093)	-2.863** (1.260)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of obs	829
Wald chi2(27)	128.19
Prob > chi2	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1516

Table 13: Model five - Counterinsurgency variables combined.

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	Model 6		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in life expectancy	0.0681 (0.183)	-0.717*** (0.125)	0.278 (0.243)
Change in GDP	0.637 (1.272)	-2.547** (1.050)	-2.464* (1.404)
Change in democracy	-0.278*** (0.0740)	0.00694 (0.0669)	0.183** (0.0717)
Change in ethnic relations	-0.0902 (0.749)	-0.839 (0.780)	1.119*** (0.361)
Change in battle deaths	-3.38e-05** (1.52e-05)	-5.22e-05* (2.96e-05)	-4.18e-05 (2.87e-05)
Change in government military	0.0107 (0.0103)	-0.0145** (0.00625)	-0.0217*** (0.00610)
Rebels have external sanctuary	0.0565 (0.717)	2.356 (2.111)	1.362* (0.817)
Rough terrain	-0.414 (0.286)	0.0287 (0.321)	0.345 (0.246)
Rebels use terrorism against population	0.762 (0.664)	0.259 (0.730)	-1.285 (0.953)
Territorial aims	1.058 (0.718)	-1.050 (1.111)	1.135* (0.608)
External support for government	1.957** (0.967)	-0.589 (0.898)	1.477** (0.678)
External support for rebels	0.129 (1.185)	1.553*** (0.450)	0.875 (0.566)
Time	0.129 (0.119)	0.149 (0.362)	-0.469** (0.215)
Time squared	-0.00382 (0.00598)	-0.00155 (0.0174)	0.0457*** (0.0167)
Time cubed	7.97e-05 (9.35e-05)	2.33e-05 (0.000263)	-0.00115*** (0.000377)
Constant	-5.667*** (1.349)	-7.690* (4.501)	-6.137*** (1.205)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of obs	829
Wald chi2(45)	5316.63
Prob > chi2	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.2391

Table 14: Model six - Full model with counterinsurgency and control variables.

Models five and six shows the results above are robust to both combining the independent variables of interest into a single model and adding the control variables. The robustness of these results offers strong support for the notion that civil wars are determined by changes in sovereign structures that shape the

government's capacity to generate support from the population. That the key variables continue to perform exactly as expected shows the utility of this approach for examining the impact of the main tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine and how they interact with the broader geopolitical and geographical context. It also demonstrates the model's utility for selecting case studies to examine whether the hypothesised causal mechanisms lead to the various outcomes.

Using model six, we can now simulate a number of situations to see how the key explanatory variables of principle interest interact with the broader contextual variables.

Socioeconomic conditions

If rebels have external support and access to a sanctuary, then even a relatively minor decline in socioeconomic conditions has a dramatic effect on their likelihood of victory. A three-year drop in life expectancy and twenty percent drop in GDP increases the chance of a rebel victory by 49 percent, from an 11 percent baseline.[37] These numbers are well within the normal range of values and seem very small when set against the conditions we often see in conflicts like Syria (Butter, 2015).

Model six also allows for further examination of the potential impact of improving socioeconomic conditions. If other variables are artificially set in favour of a rebel victory,[38] then a relatively moderate improvement in socioeconomic conditions (three years for life expectancy and ten percent for GDP) can reduce the chance of a rebel victory from 28 to four percent. We can conclude that governments are less likely to lose wars if they are facilitating more economic activity and providing better public services. Boosting the economy and providing services does, therefore, serve a purpose for governments.

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[37] All reported simulation changes are significant to 95% confidence unless otherwise stated.
[38] Rebels have external support and sanctuary. The government's military has declined by 50 personnel per 1000 in the population and battlefield deaths have declined by 10000.

Political conditions

Simulating potential outcomes of interest lends further support to the power of political reform in bringing conflicts to an end. An improvement in the societal position of social groups associated with the rebels and a rise in the polity score by five increase the probability of a mixed outcome by as much as 42 percent depending on how we set other variables.[39] While changes in the polity score have a relatively small substantive effect by themselves, they do interact heavily with other variables, suggesting political reform needs to be made at the right time in the conflict.

The power of democratisation as a means to bring civil war to an end is demonstrated by the fact that there does not appear to be a simulation in which the probability of a mixed outcome climbs above approximately nineteen percent without any political reform.[40] Moreover, political reform also seems to correlate with governments getting themselves out of trouble. If variables, including a decline in GDP and life expectancy, are set in favour of rebels then political reform significantly reduces the probability of a rebel victory and increases the likelihood of a mixed outcome. This suggests that the economy acts as an early warning system for governments. If it is declining, then governments can react by increasing political incentives to undercut rebel capacity to operate.

Security

As discussed above, a drop in the size of the government military correlates with both a rebel victory and a mixed outcome. Setting the independent variables at levels of interest provides insight into which path is more likely. If we set the

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[39] I explored a range of scenarios, altering changes in the size of government forces, rebel and government external support, rebel access to an external sanctuary, and drops in GDP, with time always set at twelve years. Depending how these variables were set, improving governance increased the chance of a mixed outcome from as little as five percent, to the 41 percent quoted above.

[40] This represents an extreme scenario in which GDP has halved, deaths have declined by 10,000, the government's military has decreased by 50 personnel per 1000 in the population, the rebels have external sanctuary and external support, and the rebels have limited territorial aims.

independent variables in favour of a rebel victory then a drop in the size of government forces by 50 per 1000 people in the population increases the chance of a rebel victory by 14 percent.[41] Setting the variables in favour of a mixed outcome and simulating a decline in government forces by the same amount increases a mixed outcome by 12 percent,[42] but has no effect on a rebel victory. Governments that are struggling to mobilise their army and provide security appear, therefore, to have two choices; slide into defeat or broaden the segment of the population it offers benefits to, undermining rebel capacity to regenerate.

External intervention

External intervention for both governments and rebels increases their chances of victory. It is clear that belligerents with external support are going to be more resilient, allowing rebels to stay in the fight and undermine government power or giving governments greater capacity to absorb the costs of the conflict. Simulations show that external interventions also amplify the effect of socioeconomic and political change. The effect of decreasing democracy can be three times as much for governments that are receiving external support. One can easily surmise that external support grants governments the capacity to sacrifice its ability to generate resources from the section of the population on which it is focusing its repression.

Declining socioeconomic conditions can have two and half times the effect on a rebel victory if rebels have external support. Rebels receiving external support have less need to build their own mobilisation structures to create resilience and will be better placed to focus its efforts on demobilising the government. It is also likely that foreign forces are better trained and put more strain on government forces, meaning the government needs more support from the population to replenish manpower and supplies.

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[41] Variables in favour of rebels: Life expectancy decline of 3 years, GDP decline of 20%, rebels have access to external sanctuary and external support, time set to twelve years.
[42] Variables in favour of mixed outcome: Polity change of +5, status upgraded, GDP decline of 20%, rebels have access to an external sanctuary, rebels have territorial aims and government has external support.

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What is clear, is the importance of external interventions, explaining why rebels and governments spend so much time seeking international support alongside their efforts to build internal mobilisation networks (Connable and Libicki, 2010).

Sanctuary and safe-havens

External sanctuary plays an interesting role in the model. By itself it has limited effect, correlating statistically only with a mixed outcome, and having almost no substantive effect. It does, however, interact with other variables that correlate with a rebel victory. Socioeconomic decline can have two and half times the effect if a rebel group has external sanctuary. It is possible that sanctuary allows rebels to build mobilisation structures beyond the purview of government activity. Rebels can stay in the fight longer, and when governments get into trouble, insurgents are better positioned to convert this into an outright victory.

Internal safe-havens do not appear to have any impact. It is possible model six fails to capture the effect of rough terrain on a conflict. On the other hand, rough terrain may actually decrease the likelihood of a conflict ending in any outcome. Academics (Cunningham et al., 2009) and doctrine writers (Galula, 1964) point to inaccessible terrain being a key element of most insurgencies. It boosts rebel capacity to carve out a sovereign space and build structures to draw support from the population without being targeted by government forces. Rough terrain, however, does not tell us anything about a government's ability to absorb the costs of a counterinsurgency campaign. In other words, safe-havens may increase a rebel group's 'power to resist' but not its 'power to target' and defeat the government, precipitating a non-hurting stalemate. Ultimately, all rough terrain may do is increase the likelihood that two sovereign powers can co-exist in the same state.

Overall performance of the model

Figure 15: ROC curves of independent variables and each outcome.

Figure 15 shows the reported operator characteristic (ROC) curves for each of the outcomes.[43] The ROC curves are based on the ratio of correctly predicted outcomes compared to the number of false positives for every correctly predicted outcome. While a probability of over 50 percent represents an intuitive cutpoint, Ward et al. argue that models that predict outcomes with low probabilities are still powerful if they clearly differentiate between outcomes that actually occurred and those that did not (2010). At a cutpoint of ten percent, changes in these independent variables correctly predict eight out of 14 rebel victories (0.57) but falsely predict only 15 out of 814 (0.02). The model, therefore, gives a useful indication of governments that are struggling against insurgencies even at this low threshold. It also better allows us to put the simulated outcomes above

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[43] These were calculated by using three separate logit models with each of the outcomes as the dependent variables.

into context, as a change in five percent becomes far more meaningful if a ten percent threshold is considered a significant predictor of a likely outcome.[44]

The ROC curve is based on calculating the ratio between true and false positives at all possible cutpoints. The larger the area under this curve (known as the AUC) the more accurate the model is considered for predicting that particular outcome, as it strongly differentiates between true and false positives. The AUC score can range from 0.5 - models that have no predictive power and cannot differentiate between true and false positives - to 1, where all of the true outcomes are predicted with higher probability than any non-outcomes. Ward et al. claim that this AUC measure is now the best measure for determining the empirical utility of logistic regressions (2010). It is especially important to explore this aspect of the model, given the difficulties of building logistic regressions when the quantity of positive outcomes is low, which often leads to an underestimation of the substantive impact of variables of interest (King and Zeng, 2001).

The AUC scores for all three outcomes are high; 0.79 for government victories, 0.87 for rebel victories and 0.88 for mixed outcomes. Based on these scores, the variables used in the models above are slightly more useful for predicting rebel victories and mixed outcomes. This is further reinforced in table 15, which shows how the model fares at correctly predicting outcomes at different cutpoints.

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[44] At this stage I am not proposing a sensible threshold for predicting the outcome of civil wars. That would depend on a range of factors and comparisons with other models. The fact that the ROC curve scores are relatively high, however, does suggest that this model can be used at a level below 50 percent as a useful guide on the course of civil wars.

Cutpoint	Ratio	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
50%	True positive	0 (0)	0.07 (1)	0.17 (3)
	False positive	0 (0)	0.00 (1)	0 (0)
40%	True positive	0 (0)	0.14 (2)	0.17 (3)
	False positive	0 (0)	0.00 (2)	0 (0)
30%	True positive	0 (0)	0.36 (5)	0.17 (3)
	False positive	0 (0)	0.00 (2)	0.00 (1)
20%	True positive	0 (0)	0.5 (7)	0.28 (5)
	False positive	0.00 (2)	0.00 (7)	0.01 (5)
10%	True positive	0.39 (7)	0.57 (8)	0.39 (7)
	False positive	0.03 (26)	0.02 (15)	0.03 (22)

Table 15: Number of true and false positives at different thresholds.

Table 15 even underemphasises model six's capacity to predict rebel victories. Both the false positives over 30 percent actually ended as rebel victories within two years. The model predicted there was a 59 percent probability of the war in Cambodia ending in a rebel victory in 1974. The war ended a year later. The other false positive was the anti-Soviet insurgency in 1990, which the model suggested would end in a rebel victory with a 43 percent probability. That war did end two years later with the collapse of the communist regime.

Table 16 shows all of the predicted probabilities in the year the wars ended. It further reinforces that the model shows significant utility in predicting rebel victories and mixed outcomes, but is less powerful with outright government victories. This is unsurprising, however. The analysis in chapter three suggested that rebels win by undermining government ability to deliver and generate resources from the state, which was well captured in the models by GDP and life expectancy levels. It was also posited that governments will generally win in two ways; they can either expand their sovereign structures to deliver resources and generate resources from a broader cross-section of the population, or they can increase repression and limit the ability of the population to provide support to the insurgency. The former was captured in model six with variables looking at changes in democracy and is reflected in the mixed outcomes. The latter,

however, was less well incorporated. The performance of the polity variable, supported the idea that governments can defeat insurgencies through increased repression. However, it is likely that repression will often include the use of violence and the most violent, autocratic regimes have no need to become more exclusionary in institutional terms. Violence is not included in the model and, therefore, it is probable that a key explanatory variable for predicting outright government victories is missing. Its incorporation would also be useful for analysing when the use of violence against civilians favours governments and when it is likely to be self-defeating.

Despite this, the AUC scores and the predicted probabilities in table 16, show that the broader theoretical model developed in chapters one and two is an extremely useful framework for studying civil war dynamics and outcomes. Hypothesis one, therefore, is well supported - governments fend off rebels by strengthening institutions that define their relationship with the population, while rebels win by undermining these institutions. It also underlines the statistical model's utility for selecting case studies to explore how changes in the strength of government institutions that define its relationship with the population determine civil war outcomes.

Government victories	Pred.	Rebel victories	Pred.	Mixed outcomes	Pred.
Uruguay	0.179	**Cambodia**	**0.717**	**Burundi**	**0.776**
Angola (UNITA)	0.175	Rwanda	0.481	Chechnya I	0.77
Argentina	0.161	South Africa	0.343	Georgia/ Abkhazia	0.661
Congo/Katanga	0.129	Eritrea	0.322	Mozambique (RENAMO)	0.284
Iraq Kurdistan	0.108	South Vietnam	0.258	Bosnia	0.216
Northern Ireland	0.103	Afghanistan (anti-Soviet)	0.224	Nicaragua (Contras)	0.113
Sierra Leone	0.1	Afghanistan (post-Soviet)	0.151	Lebanese Civil War	0.106
Biafran Secession	0.093	Sudan (SPLA)	0.095	Congo (anti-Kabila)	0.086
Philippines	0.083	Namibia	0.072	East Timor	0.082
Guatemala	0.055	Somalia	0.048	Senegal	0.068
Balochistan	0.038	Liberia	0.023	Papua New Guinea	0.042
Indonesia (Aceh)	0.032	Afghanistan (Taliban)	0.017	Yemen	0.038
Turkey (PKK)	0.019	**Zimbabwe**	**0.008**	Tajikistan	0.035
Croatia	0.016	Moldova	0.000	**Nagorno-Karabakh**	**0.028**
Morocco	0.01			El Salvador	0.023
Algeria (GIA)	0.009			Nepal	0.017
Uganda (ADF)	0.006			Kosovo	0.017
Peru	0.004			Kampuchea	0.002

Table 16: Predicted probabilities at time of war ending.

Limitations

The lack of an accurate description on the use of violence against civilians probably represents the main shortcoming of the models above, but there are also a number of other limitations. The model fails to capture rebel relations with the population. The variable used to proxy for rebel behaviour, the use of terrorism, shows no statistical effect on any of the outcomes. The statistical model is still useful, largely because the theory underpinning this thesis suggests that the likely dynamics and outcomes of civil wars are embedded in changes to the macro-structures that define a government's relationship with the population. Nevertheless, the model could be improved by developing a better measure of rebel mobilisation structures.

A further limitation comes from the use of national political and economic indicators. It is feasible there were significant local changes in the relationship between the government and the population that were not reflected in national-level indicators. I do not consider this a major weakness as changes in national level indicators reflect the government's ability to prosecute war anywhere in its territory, regardless of whether the conflict itself causes those changes. For example, the first Chechen conflict between 1992 and 1994 is well predicted because the Russian army demobilised on such a large scale after the fall of the Soviet Union. The Chechen rebels did not cause this demobilisation, yet it almost certainly played a role in the conflict's outcome along with other broader political changes across the whole of Russia. That said, the inclusion of local data alongside national-level variables, such as those explored by Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug in *Inequality, Grievances and Civil War* (2013), may better reflect the capacity of belligerents to mobilise support in some conflicts.

Finally, as acknowledged in the theory section of the paper, this model of conflict assumes the state remains somewhat functional as the war begins. It is entirely possible that government sovereign structures are wiped away by the shock that starts the war and there is no rebel group organised enough to assume control of the state. In this instance, the war is more likely to be irregular in nature. This type of war is more likely to represent a simple state-building competition from a very low-base, which means different dynamics will probably be pertinent. The model tested in this chapter works on the basis that the state is functional and rebels are trying to undermine the institutions that keep it that way. Moreover, the model only tests government efforts to build and sustain alliances with the population through formal mechanisms of governance and economic activity. As multiple scholars have shown, governments often retain power through a system of informal or patronage-based alliances with different groups across the state (Reno, 2007; Seymour, 2014). The statistical model could be improved as a more general predictor of civil war outcomes if these two scenarios were better incorporated.

Robustness tests

To test the robustness of the findings I used different measures of variables, such as changes over less and more years. None of the findings change the results articulated above. I also created alternative models to check whether they altered the effect of the key variables. The key variables of interest are, in fact, much more robust than the other variables to changes in the parameters of the model.

The first major check for testing the robustness of the findings above was to add in the variable looking at government effectiveness into the full model. First and foremost, it changes none of the conclusions above, with all of the main socioeconomic and governance variables being robust to the addition of this variable. That said, an increase in life expectancy now correlates to a mixed outcome, offering tentative support for the idea that governments can induce rebels to sign political deals if socioeconomic conditions are improving.

	Model 7		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in life expectancy	0.359* (0.213)	-0.878*** (0.175)	1.009*** (0.360)
Change in GDP	0.927 (1.407)	-2.563** (1.021)	-2.325 (1.713)
Change in democracy	-0.323*** (0.0737)	-0.0306 (0.0668)	0.254*** (0.0977)
Change in ethnic relations	0.122 (0.743)	-1.793 (1.224)	1.430*** (0.486)
Change in political reach	5.274** (2.320)	-11.37*** (3.284)	0.527 (4.363)
Change in battle deaths	-2.29e-05 (3.53e-05)	8.68e-06 (1.91e-05)	-5.78e-05 (4.22e-05)
Change in government military	0.0166 (0.0116)	-0.0249*** (0.00546)	-0.0299*** (0.00719)
Rebels have external sanctuary	0.358 (0.677)	30.79*** (7.745)	1.563 (1.343)
Rough terrain	-0.579** (0.277)	0.468 (0.347)	0.220 (0.331)
Rebels use terrorism against population	1.102* (0.588)	0.884 (0.989)	-0.791 (1.123)
Territorial aims	0.708 (0.647)	-2.257*** (0.853)	1.067 (0.823)
External support for government	1.911** (0.937)	0.216 (1.297)	1.924** (0.902)
External support for rebels	1.015 (0.831)	1.804*** (0.471)	1.779* (0.978)
Time	0.150 (0.149)	1.251*** (0.449)	-0.761 (0.747)
Time squared	-0.00430 (0.00748)	-0.0738*** (0.0284)	0.0731 (0.0535)
Time cubed	8.29e-05 (0.000114)	0.00138** (0.000539)	-0.00179 (0.00110)
Constant	-5.959*** (1.401)	-42.83*** (9.422)	-7.298*** (2.230)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of obs	766
Wald chi2(39)	-
Prob > chi2	-
Pseudo R2	0.3354

Table 17: Model seven - Full model with changes in political reach added. [45]

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[45] Models seven and eight do not report Wald Chi2 calculations as these require a positive definite matrix, as with the use of CLARIFY (explained above). Model seven does not have a

Increasing political reach also now correlates with an outright government victory, while declining reach still strongly correlates with a rebel victory. Changes in political reach do not correlate with mixed outcomes, but increasing democracy continues to do so. I have to drop a number of wars from the model due to a lack of data, which means it is not possible to simulate outcomes and test how these variables interact. However, including a variable capturing political reach strongly supports the overall model of conflict proposed in this thesis and hypothesis three in particular. Even with a large number of control variables added to the model, when the government loses the ability to reach across the polity it fails to generate the resources it needs to hold onto power and retracts, signalling rebel growth and eventually victory. Alternatively, if it can reassert its sovereignty, then it can cut away at the rebel's capacity to generate support, eventually eliminating its ability to operate.

The second alternative model can be seen in table 18. It involved swapping outcomes with those from the UCDP conflict termination data, coding anything classified as ending in a peace settlement or a ceasefire as a mixed outcome (Kreutz, 2010).[46] The overall utility of the model was reduced, almost certainly because the range of outcomes was much more limited. That said, most of the variables correlated with the same outcomes in the same way. There were two slight changes to the variables of interest in this study.[47] Increases in the polity score no longer correlate with mixed outcomes, although changes in the status of ethnic groups continues to do so, meaning the model still supports the idea that governments do better when they broaden their relationships across different sections of the population. A decline in the polity score still correlates with an outright government victory. However, it now also correlates with a rebel victory,

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positive definite matrix as the number of independent variables has increased, while model eight fails to build a positive definite matrix as there are less non-zero outcomes.

[46] There were nine government victories, eight rebel victories and 24 mixed outcomes.

[47] There was one other change that is slightly outside the purview of this thesis. External support for the rebels now correlates to government victories, instead of rebel triumphs. It is possible this is because the rebellion only got started because the rebels had external support, and the conditions did not favour a successful insurgency. This represents an interesting avenue for future research.

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	Model 8		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in life expectancy	-0.217 (0.187)	-0.900*** (0.175)	0.251* (0.145)
Change in GDP	-0.00404 (1.875)	-4.287*** (1.266)	-3.220* (1.654)
Change in democracy	-0.223** (0.109)	-0.229** (0.0908)	0.0353 (0.0648)
Change in ethnic relations	-0.560 (0.393)	-0.0149 (0.710)	0.825** (0.384)
Change in battle deaths	-1.86e-05 (2.59e-05)	8.24e-07 (3.39e-05)	-2.48e-05** (1.21e-05)
Change in government military	0.0151 (0.0102)	0.00277 (0.0113)	-0.0151*** (0.00454)
Rebels have external sanctuary	0.345 (0.835)	-1.389 (1.601)	1.017 (0.635)
Rough terrain	-0.429 (0.460)	0.353 (0.289)	-0.0808 (0.209)
Rebels use terrorism against population	-0.270 (0.737)	-1.232 (0.789)	-1.091 (0.786)
Territorial aims	1.396* (0.815)	0.640 (0.831)	0.686 (0.495)
External support for government	-0.308 (0.941)	1.743 (1.547)	1.446** (0.621)
External support for rebels	1.990*** (0.662)	1.227 (1.611)	0.132 (0.863)
Time	-0.329 (0.338)	-0.143 (0.222)	-0.253 (0.181)
Time squared	0.0166 (0.0189)	0.0111 (0.0108)	0.0145 (0.00930)
Time cubed	-0.000225 (0.000275)	-0.000182 (0.000151)	-0.000183 (0.000147)
Constant	-3.100 (2.027)	-5.071*** (1.810)	-4.051*** (1.350)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of obs	751
Wald chi2(45)	-
Prob > chi2	-
Pseudo R2	0.2064

Table 18: Model eight - Full model using UCDP outcomes.

suggesting governments may face a backlash from the population if they seek to control the population through increased repression. The second change is that an increase in life expectancy now correlates to a mixed outcome, just as it does when the variable for government effectiveness is added. A decline in GDP,

however, still correlates to a mixed outcome as well, making it difficult to explain the correlation between changes in socioeconomic conditions and mixed outcomes in this particular model.

Another obvious next step would be to incorporate changes in rebel numbers into this quantitative model. Unfortunately data for rebel numbers and the balance of power only exists since 1989 (R.M. Wood, 2010). As such, introducing these variables into the current model negates the possibility of doing statistical analysis as it reduces the number of observations significantly. We can, however, use this data to test whether any of the independent variables correlate with changes in the balance of power or in the size of rebel forces. No variables correlate to the balance of power (model 10). Very few variables correlate with changes in rebel numbers and an improvement in the status of the ethnic group associated with conflict actually correlates an increase in rebel numbers. However, a drop in GDP, does correlate with an increase in rebel numbers. The model must be interpreted tentatively, as the sample is extremely small, with only 260 observations, but it may suggest there would be a feedback loop in model six if rebel numbers were introduced, exactly as predicted. Conducive socioeconomic conditions increase rebel numbers, which, in turn, induces further macro-change that enables the rebels to build more support. The theory of conflict developed in the previous chapters suggested this should be the case. This means adding a variable capturing rebel numbers could cause problems drawing firm statistical conclusions. Of course, leaving rebel numbers out altogether could lead to omitted variable bias. Until there is more comprehensive data on rebel numbers that corresponds with a proper range of outcomes, it will be impossible to know how the omission of rebel numbers affects the inferences made here.

The fact that changes in rebel numbers offers some insights, while the balance of power does not is also instructive. Rebels can select tactics that mitigate an unfavourable balance of power, meaning it should tell us little about how a war is likely to proceed. However, increases in rebel numbers almost certainly create more economic, social and political pressure on governments, regardless of the size of government forces. It is also likely to reflect a rebel group with better

mobilisation structures and the ability to generate more support from the population. This suggests we need to collect data on rebel mobilisation and shadow governance structures that we can test comparatively.

	Model 9	
	Changes in rebel numbers	Changes in balance of power
Change in democracy	-0.0912 (0.139)	-0.250 (0.349)
Change in ethnic relations	4.611*** (1.599)	-1.847 (1.752)
Change in life expectancy	0.0840 (0.269)	1.774 (1.890)
Change in GDP	-3.384** (1.491)	52.50 (55.54)
Change in battle deaths	0.000158 (9.72e-05)	5.42e-05 (0.000356)
Change in government military	-0.0124 (0.0102)	-0.102 (0.109)
Rebels have external sanctuary	1.587 (1.057)	-9.420 (9.855)
Rough terrain	0.745 (0.477)	-3.619 (3.590)
Rebels use terrorism against population	-0.760 (0.717)	2.284 (3.325)
Territorial aims	1.984** (0.945)	-8.575 (8.930)
External support for government	-2.888* (1.479)	17.05 (18.03)
External support for rebels	0.403 (3.069)	-2.129 (7.272)
Time	-0.167 (0.141)	2.825 (2.927)
Time squared	0.00435 (0.0103)	-0.227 (0.226)
Time cubed	2.48e-05 (0.000188)	0.00385 (0.00381)
Constant	-2.179 (2.154)	13.50 (14.72)
Observations	260	261
R-squared	0.161	0.012

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table 19: Model nine - OLS regression of changes in rebel numbers and balance of power.

Conclusion

The statistical models presented in this chapter represent a significant step forward in the study of civil war. We shifted the focus to variables that proxy for the relationship between the government and the population. The second major change was the use of difference variables, measuring how macro-political, -socioeconomic and –security conditions changed, rather than looking at their absolute values. The model supported Stathis Kalyvas's notion that change is fundamental part of the civil war process (2008).

The statistical analysis presented in this chapter, therefore, offers strong support for the model of civil war developed in chapters one and two. A decline in the institutions that define a government's relationship with the population suggest rebels are more likely to win. On the other hand, governments fare better when they are eliminating rebel capacity to regenerate support, either by offering positive incentives to a broader range of the population or increasing negative incentives for those that may be considering supporting rebels. The models show that focusing on the relationship between the government and the population is an effective way of predicting the course of civil wars. The relationship between governments and the population defines the regenerative capacity of both rebels and governments, which is why it is so key to the outcome of conflicts and why it is the focus of rebel military activity.

The statistical models also showed how this works in more specific terms. The most powerful predictor of rebel victories was a decline in socioeconomic conditions. Insurgents win when they are able to undermine the economy and the ability of the government to deliver basic services to the population. The government's socioeconomic relationship with the population clearly defines its capacity to raise resources that it then spends on its military and redistributing incentives back to the population. By degrading this relationship, insurgents reduce government capacity shape population behaviour, and further increase their own opportunities to mobilise resources. When governments are able to prevent this from happening, the model shows governments are much less likely

to lose to insurgent challengers. The statistical models presented in this chapter show this happening across a range of conflicts, strongly supporting hypothesis two.

The results above also show that governments tend to fare better when strengthening their institutions of governance and worse when these institutions are degraded, supporting hypothesis three. Models three and seven incorporated a measure of changes in government institutional reach. As a government's reach declines, rebels become more likely to win. Governments in this position have less capacity to distribute as a means to mobilise resources from the population, and leave space for rebels to create their own mobilisation structures. Models two, three and seven also showed that governments widening their reach are more likely to defeat rebel challengers.

The final element of counterinsurgency doctrine and hypothesis four, the role of security, finds less support. A drop in size of the government's military does suggest insurgencies are more likely to win, but the substantive effect is extremely small, suggesting it is a less useful indicator of a war's progress. Governments facing insurgencies almost certainly prioritise spending on their military and withdraw resources from other state activities first. The unravelling of a government's military, therefore, is more likely to be quick, as observed by McCormick et al. (2007). Declines in governance and socioeconomic conditions are likely to be slower, showing why they are more reliable long-term predictors of civil outcomes. The models support the observation in chapter three that the effect of changes in security is likely to be smaller than variations in governance and socioeconomic conditions.

The remaining chapters will examine four cases in more detail and show how to apply the model of war developed in this thesis for examining individual conflicts. How does the economic strain of fighting an insurgency undermine government ability to mobilise resources from its population, pushing it to collapse and allowing small rebel groups to defeat large government militaries? How does

political reform undermine insurgent regenerative capacity, weakening its capacity to replace resources expended on military activity?

The rationale for selecting these case studies is in table 16. Burundi and Cambodia were the best-predicted mixed outcome and rebel victory respectively. We know that changes in the variables of interest did occur in these conflicts and can examine whether it led to the outcomes for the reasons predicted. Nagorno-Karabakh and Zimbabwe were poorly predicted, offering an opportunity for exploring other variables that may lead to mixed outcomes or rebel victories.

Chapter six

A 'typical' mixed outcome: Burundi 1993-2003

Introduction

The statistical model in the previous chapter predicted a 78 percent chance of a mixed outcome in the Burundian civil war in 2003. The polity score had increased by three and the status of the Hutu ethnic group associated with the rebels had improved from powerless to senior partner. The government had external support and the rebels had access to external sanctuary. This explains the high probability of a mixed outcome. Only one variable performs contrary to expectations for the eventual outcome, with the size of government forces increasing slightly.

The changes in the political variables captured in the model reflects the Arusha Accords, signed in August 2000. The Accords overhauled Burundi's political system to bring the two ethnic groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus onto a more equal footing (Lemarchand, 2006). The Accords were in response to seven years of conflict, in which Hutu-centric rebel groups had fought with the Tutsi-dominant military for control over the state.[48] The Accords, therefore, allow us to divide the conflict into two distinct phases. The first, 1993-2000, saw the Tutsi military attempt to defeat the Hutu rebels by separating them from the population through the punishment of Hutu civilians. The second period, from 2001 onwards, saw an attempt to end the conflict through a political settlement, which invited insurgent groups to participate in popular elections. Eventually, the main rebel group, the CNDD-FDD, took advantage of this in 2003. At the same time, the military situation changed very little through the course of the conflict. As such, comparing population behaviour before and after 2001 allows us to examine how

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[48] As always in ethnic-based civil wars, the reality was more complex than a simple Hutu rebellion against their Tutsi masters. Some Tutsis fought with the rebels and the military government was able to secure support from some Hutu communities. However, the two ethnic groupings represented the core elements of the two belligerents and, for the purposes of this chapter, I assume that the Hutus were the rebel's constituent population, while the Tutsis were the government's.

a changing political context affects the decision of the population to provide support to belligerents, while the military situation holds relatively constant. Of particular interest is the fact that the CNDD-FDD played no role in the Arusha Accords. Nevertheless, it ultimately adhered to the Accords' principle components because it affected the behaviour of its support-base. We can, therefore, directly trace how this happened, without concerns that the political deal was shaped by the rebels to strengthen their own power. It also serves as an important lesson to policymakers working on civil wars; political solutions can be effective at undermining rebel support even if rebels are not involved in drawing them up.

Key actors

As in many civil wars there were a number of rebel factions. The rebel group in focus for this chapter will be 'The National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy' or the CNDD-FDD. The CNDD-FDD was the largest and most active rebel group and its agreement to follow the political process corresponds to the end of the conflict according to the RAND dataset (Connable and Libicki, 2010). While the National Forces of Liberation (FNL) continued to fight after 2003, it never had widespread support and was much less active (Watt, 2008).

Burundi represents an interesting challenge in that it is not straightforward to demarcate who represented the government during the civil war. For the purpose of this study, I define the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB) as the government. The FAB was only officially in power between 1996 and 2000, but it controlled government policy throughout the conflict, in particular, the prosecution of the war. The bi-ethnic government in power between 1993 and 1996 was just a front for the military and formed part of a decades-long effort to control the state. The relinquishing of power in 2001, back to a bi-ethnic government to oversee the transition to democracy, represented part of this strategy.

Plan for chapter

The rest of the chapter will look at how the CNDD-FDD and FAB sought to generate support from the two different segments of the population. The rebels drew almost all of their support from the Hutus, who made up 85 percent of the population. The government generated most of its support from the Tutsis who made up the remainder.[49]   I examine the conflict actors' behaviour before and after 2001 and how this shaped population behaviour during these two phases. I will then look at the nature of military interaction between the government and the rebels. Finally, I take the opportunity to look at how external factors shaped the behaviour of the conflict actors and their ability to generate support from the population.

As expected, this chapter offers strong support for the theories underpinning this thesis. The Arusha Accords did threaten to demobilise the CNDD-FDD exactly as predicted, pushing it to engage in the fledgling political process. Moreover, there is strong evidence that economic difficulties nearly caused the complete downfall of the government, forcing it into the political reforms that ended the war, exactly as we would expect based on the analysis in the previous chapters.

The state before 1993

A history of violence

After a Hutu prime minister was assassinated in 1965, Hutus violently punished the Tutsi population. This repression was facilitated, in no small part, by Hutus in the police and the army (Watt, 2008). The Tutsis in the government, many of whom had fled Hutu repression in Rwanda, were determined to ensure this could not happen again and filled the security forces with loyal Tutsis (Lemarchand, 2006). The Tutsi monarchy ignored the results of the 1965 election, where the

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[49] There was another smaller ethnic group, the Twa, constituting one percent of the total population. However, their role in the conflict, while of human-interest value, was minimal in determining the ultimate outcome. Therefore, they will not be discussed at length in this thesis.

Hutus once again secured a majority. A Hutu-led coup in response, led to the killing of scores of Hutu intellectuals and politicians (Krueger and Krueger, 2007). The Tutsi military then deposed the monarchy in 1966, effectively extinguishing any hope Hutus had of accessing political power. In 1972, an outbreak of violence, instigated by Hutus in the south of the country, led to the harshest crackdown yet. The Tutsi military murdered over 200,000 Hutus and forced 300,000 to flee Burundi, focusing particularly on educated Hutus (Krueger and Krueger, 2007).

During this period, the Tutsi-led government used violence to impose costs on anyone seeking to resist its control over the state. Moreover, by targeting intellectuals and Hutu elites, the government eliminated those people that were politically aware and able to convince the population to support activity against the government. While the subsequent sixteen years saw a number of coups, these all emerged out of infighting within the Tutsi-controlled military (Watt, 2008).

In 1988, violence began to erupt again between the military, the Hutu population and Tutsi hardliners. This time over 150,000 people were reported killed. In response, the military dictator Major Pierre Buyoya formed a commission to investigate the causes and develop a plan for a democratic transition. In 1991 a new constitution, 'the Charter of Unity', was approved and democratic elections were held in 1993. Melchior Ndadaye, the leader of the Front for Democracy in Burundi (Frodebu), became the first Hutu president (Lemarchand, 2009).

The FAB's main priority was not control over the state *per se*, but rather dominance of the security organs. It calculated this would protect Tutsis from Hutu efforts to wipe them out (Watt, 2008). After the 1988 outbreak of violence it appears Buyoya decided that political reform was the best way to ensure Tutsi control over the security institutions. It is not clear from the historical literature what exactly led the Tutsi military to move away from trying to control the population through violence to offering political reform. It is possible it was simply a case of a different man at the helm compared to previous outbreaks of violence. However, the nature of Burundian society had also changed.

After 1972, the Hutu political opposition organised itself abroad. Paliphetu (who would later become the FNL) spent twenty years in exile organising politically, spreading their message both domestically and internationally (Watt, 2008). At the same time a Hutu middle class began to re-emerge (Watt, 2008). Frodebu had also grown in strength, as evidenced by its victory in the 1993 elections. The Tutsi military, therefore, clearly faced a much more organised threat than in 1972 and it possibly recognised that controlling the population through violence may empower this opposition even further.

The outbreak of war

In the event, it quickly viewed this calculation as a mistake. Major Buyoya had originally believed he would win the election (Lemarchand, 2009). Moreover, once Frodebu took power they quickly set about security reform to create a more favourable ethnic balance in the police (Watt, 2008). The army feared the same thing was going to happen to the military and took the decision to reverse the democratic transition just three months after elections. President Ndadaye was assassinated, leading to nationwide violence from Hutu militias, who allegedly began to attack and kill Tutsis. The Tutsi Army cracked down on the militias, rounding up civilians and killing anyone suspected of being involved in the violence. In total 150,000 people are believed to have been killed following Ndadaye's assassination (Krueger and Krueger, 2007). According to Willy Nindonera, the Hutus organised themselves into community-based militias to protect themselves and fight back against Tutsi armed groups (2012). Nindonera goes onto to document how the external Hutu political networks and a splinter group from the deposed Frodebu, the CNDD-FDD, took control of these militias and created a more cohesive challenge to the Tutsi military. The CNDD-FDD, led by Leonard Nyangoma, also absorbed university groups, promising to pursue the political change they craved. In addition, it used its own patronage networks to exploit the power of local community leaders to identify potential supporters (Nindonera, 2012).

Both the rebels and the government now had the sovereign power to generate the support they needed to sustain military activity; Burundi transitioned into a state of war.

Rebel strategy before 2000

Relations with the Hutu population

Having taken up arms against the state, the theory developed in this thesis suggests the CNDD-FDD should have dedicated most of its efforts to undermining government power and building its own sovereign networks rather than directly confronting the FAB.

It only takes a cursory glance at reports of rebel activities in Burundi to see this was the case. Direct interaction between the FAB and the CNDD-FDD was minimal (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Instead, the CNDD-FDD invested heavily in building strong relations with the population. An interview with Jean-Maries Ngendhayo, a member of the CNDD-FDD, after the conflict shows the extent to which the rebel group valued political support for their cause; "the rebellion owed its existence, organisation and growing military and political effectiveness to the material and moral support from the country's largely Hutu peasant population" (Nindonera, 2012; p18). Nindonera claims this was the core part of Nyangoma's strategy for defeating the FAB (ibid.).

According to documentary studies of the CNDD-FDD, the first thing Nyangoma did, was mobilise the rising number of Hutu intellectuals and get them to spread the political message at home and abroad. These political representatives engaged with communities across Burundi, explaining the importance of supporting the rebellion (Nindonera, 2012). The military justified its control over the state by claiming it was maintaining national unity and preventing the institutions of the state becoming 'ethnicised' (Uvin, 2008). Given the government's use of violence, political entrepreneurs had a relatively simple task undermining this narrative.

It is particularly interesting that many fighters received no payment at all for joining the CNDD-FDD (Uvin, 2008; p173). This suggests selective economic incentives were not the prime factor in the CNDD-FDD's ability to build active support. Willy Nindonera argues that the political structures they created were almost certainly more important in incentivising popular support (2012). They delivered within-war benefits to the population and made post-war benefits appear more credible and desirable. The CNDD-FDD faced the same challenge as many rebel groups. The strength of the government meant they could not develop their own governance structures in the majority of the country. Nevertheless, even where government institutions continued to operate, the CNDD-FDD created shadow structures across the country (Nindonera, 2012). There was a provincial governor and an economic administrator in every area, charged with overseeing relations with the population and meeting needs that the rebels could service. Policy directors identified local concerns and showed how the CNDD-FDD planned to redress grievances if and when they took control. It set up a parallel police force across the country, even in areas where it had minimal presence, which it used to build support by protecting the population from government violence (Nindonera, 2012). The rebels also created networks of support in refugee camps (Southall and Bentley, 2005). The CNDD-FDD also tried to impose an internal discipline on its own troops, in order to ensure the benefits it was providing were not undermined by its own behaviour (Nindonera, 2012). Human Rights Watch reports conducted at various stages of the conflict call into question how successful they were (2004, 2003, 1998). However, the fact that it was part of its strategic dialogue shows the importance it placed on retaining positive relations with the population.

In areas where it had more control, the CNDD-FDD established multi-service administrations, including a police force and health services. They also provided education on how to mass-produce crops, such as watermelons, forcing civilians where necessary to farm land under their control (Human Rights Watch, 1998). The rebels then facilitated the trade of these crops, ensuring the population received financial benefits for working with them (Nindonera, 2012). The actions

of the CNDD-FDD show how effective governance can be turned into a within-war incentive if it provides the population with direct benefits.

The rebels were also not averse to using violence against Hutus when they considered it expedient. For example, they tried to leverage traditional structures of Burundian society, such as the *bashingantahe.* These were men, "selected on the basis of their wisdom, impartiality and wealth" (Uvin, 2008; p4), who advised communities and mediated local disputes. Peter Uvin argues they remain extremely influential in shaping popular perceptions of national political actors (2008). The CNDD-FDD, however, could not co-opt the *bashingantahe* and killed those that refused to offer support (Huyse and Salter, 2008). Reports examining the strength of the *bashingantahe* suggest CNDD-FDD violence significantly weakened the institution, eliminating a potential barrier the rebels faced in shaping population behaviour (ibid.).

Popular support for the CNDD-FDD

The CNDD-FDD shaped Hutu behaviour through a variety of political, economic, security and violence based incentives. The population, in return, provided the CNDD-FDD with a range of support. The political administrators of the CNDD-FDD identified those most likely to actively participate in the conflict. This ensured a steady supply of recruits, even in the face of FAB activities to undermine these efforts (Human Rights Watch, 2001a). Equally as important, the CNDD-FDD's political structures led to the supply of finances, food and other materials.

Every Hutu family in areas of rebel influence had to "contribute a fixed amount of food" (Nindonera, 2012; p18). The rebels also sold goods to the population, the latter using the money they earned through crop production and the trade of goods. The CNDD-FDD also taxed the trade they facilitated, generating significant financial revenue to fund military activity (ibid.). The political networks they set up in refugee camps in neighbouring countries allowed them to use these camps to regroup and launch attacks across the border (Watt, 2008). Refugees also proved a valuable boon materially, with each refugee family having to provide "a

kilo of beans or maize – or cattle", often out of their aid allotment (Nindonera, 2012; p18).

It is difficult to verify whether the population provided this support voluntarily or because they felt under pressure, as most of the evidence of civilian sentiment comes from CNDD-FDD fighters rather than the population. However, large numbers of the population chose to stay in areas of rebel control during this period and provide the rebels the support they needed. It is not clearly documented how much territory the CNDD-FDD controlled during the conflict, or how this changed during the conflict. Figure 16 shows a heat map of CNDD-FDD demobilisation numbers after the war. It seems sensible to suggest that areas under rebel control were focused in areas with the highest insurgent numbers after the war. Rebel strongholds represented a small proportion of the country overall.


Figure 16: CNDD-FDD demobilisation.

Regardless of all these caveats, the rebels shaped population behaviour to such an extent that they were able to continually regenerate resources expended on military activity against the government. Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo provided assistance and sanctuary to the CNDD-FDD (International Crisis Group, 2006). However, according to some commentators, the Hutu population provided the CNDD-FDD with a level of support that made it almost self-sufficient (Nindonera, 2012). The effectiveness of the CNDD-FDD's sovereign structures shows the tangible value rebels can accrue from building relations with the population, and reinforces why conflict actors divert so much attention to these types of activities.

Targeting non-constituents

While the CNDD-FDD had some Tutsi members (Nindonera, 2012), it did not make wholesale efforts to incorporate Tutsi communities. The CNDD-FDD made very little effort to capture land held by the Tutsi military (Human Rights Watch, 1998). Instead it used its forces to exacerbate ethnic tension as a means of increasing the Hutu population's incentive to support efforts to overthrow the FAB. Hutu forces targeted Tutsi civilians, knowing that the FAB and Tutsi militias would take revenge on the Hutu population (Human Rights Watch, 2003). It also targeted local politicians, regardless of ethnicity. The rebels did this to prevent the government from establishing 'bi-ethnic' local institutions, which the FAB created as a means to undermine rebel support (ibid.; p138). When the FAB could no longer staff local government institutions it controlled areas centrally. The FAB dealt with the population much more harshly when administering areas directly, creating propaganda opportunities for the CNDD-FDD to build support (ibid.).

Human Rights Watch also documented the CNDD-FDD punishing Hutus it accused of supporting the FAB (2001b). The FAB armed Hutu communities under a program called the 'Guardians of the Peace.' The CNDD-FDD would attack individuals and communities that participated in a bid to stop the program from working and reinforce its narrative that the government only represented Tutsis.

All told, CNDD-FDD used its military to target Tutsi civilians as a means to boost its mobilisation capacity. It drove increased violence from the military against Hutu communities, including, its wholesale relocation into internment camps. This made it much easier for the CNDD-FDD's political officer to portray the rebellion as the only way for Hutus to gain security and political representation, which could only be achieved if Hutus supported rebel activity. When put together, the combination of rebel governance structures, facilitation of economic activity, support networks in refugee camps and the use of violence succeeded in creating a resilient regenerative capacity. As the war dragged on it also began to have a demobilising effect on the government.

Government strategy before Arusha

Ultimately it was the government response to the rebellion that almost cost it the war. Before 2000, the FAB employed a dual strategy to undermine rebel capacity to mobilise support; political promises and violence.

A bi-ethnic government?

The FAB claimed it represented both Hutus and Tutsis and that the CNDD-FDD's war aims were meaningless. To support this claim it made attempts to make it appear as if Hutus and Tutsis shared power. In 1993, it reinstated a bi-ethnic front-government, with a Hutu president and a Tutsi prime minister. According the Stef Vandeginste, deposing and reinstating the bi-ethnic government had two aims. The first was to undermine the insurgency's narrative that the government represented Tutsi repression of Hutus. If believed by the population this would have made it harder for the rebels to sell the potential benefits of supporting them. The second aim was to signal that the military remaining under Tutsi control was a redline for the FAB. This would decrease the credibility of rebel claims that it could deliver the political incentives it was promising, again making it harder to generate population support (Vandeginste, 2010). Nevertheless, the FAB also set up a National Security Council to deal with the Hutu insurgency, which the military fully controlled. As the FAB now faced a more organised

rebellion than at any stage in the last thirty years, the CNDD-FDD was able to demonstrate this disparity to the population through its political networks. The Hutu population simply did not believe that Hutu politicians had any power (Nindonera, 2012). The front-government installed by the FAB, therefore, had a negligible impact on rebel strength. By 1996, the FAB feared the weakness of the government would prompt an international intervention (Southall and Bentley, 2005). As it had also failed as a strategy for demobilising support for the CNDD-FDD, the FAB reinstalled Pierre Buyoya as president.

Some Hutus were brought into the army, due to the need to quickly expand its size (Nindonera, 2012). However, Hutus remained subordinate to Tutsi commanders and their overall role was limited. Hutu communities, under the Guardians of the Peace program, were given light weapons, a little training and then used on the front lines to fight rebels (Human Rights Watch, 2001a). The government claimed that the population engaged with the process as a means to gain security (Human Rights Watch, 2001b). However, a Human Rights Watch report (2001b) suggests that the FAB forced many people to participate. Communities that refused to join were treated as if they supported the insurgents and given fines and imprisoned (p6). Former rebels were also recruited, often facing being tortured if they refused. As many as 75 percent of these militias in some areas were reported to be former rebels (p8). The government did offer some direct incentives to those that joined these militias. It did not pay them, but it provided medical care for both fighters and their families (p9). The FAB also allowed recruits to loot and enrich themselves when they operated in areas accused of supporting the rebels (p10). Reports documenting the activities of the Guardians of the Peace, however, suggest the primary motivation most individuals had for joining the program was to avoid government punishment (Human Rights Watch, 2001a, 2001b).

The same old violence

Aside from the transparent overtures in restoring a Hutu president and developing Hutu militias, the FAB largely continued with the violence it had

employed to squash Hutu resistance since the 1960s (Lemarchand, 1996). It almost always chose to direct its military force against the population, clearly with the intention of choking potential support for insurgency. Targeted killings focused on prominent Hutu civilians rather than rebel leaders, similar to the strategy followed in 1972 (International Crisis Group, 2000; p15).

NGO reports documenting the conflict highlight how even when presented with an opportunity to confront CNDD-FDD forces the FAB deliberately delayed arriving at a location, giving rebels time to flee the area. It would then carry out retribution on the civilian population (Human Rights Watch, 1998; p152). It intentionally drove the population from a town if there were any reports of violence (ibid.; p25).

By targeting segments of the population believed to be sympathetic to the insurgent cause it limited the opportunities for rebel groups to exploit the 'material and moral support' offered by the population. It also likely altered the cost-benefit calculus of civilians providing this support in the first place, knowing that it would result in violent retribution.

The final step in this strategy was the use of regroupment camps. The government rounded up Hutu communities it accused of supporting the rebels and forced them into camps. The government claimed these were simply internally displaced person (IDP) camps, no different from those used to provide shelter to Tutsis who had fled rebel-dominated areas. However, NGO reports showed this to be patently false; the key difference being that IDPs were free to come and go while those in regroupment camps were forced to assemble there and were unable to leave (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

The aim of the camps was to isolate the CNDD-FDD from the population. Anyone not in the camps, including women and children, was assumed to be a rebel (Human Rights Watch, 1998). After assembling in the camps, local towns were searched, then ransacked and destroyed to prevent them being used by insurgent groups. One military guard at a camp in Kayanza stated that before the camps

were set up, insurgents would simply blend into the population as soon as any FAB troops arrived. Once they used the camps they eliminated this option for rebel soldiers (p40). In addition, the population could not provide the material, financial and manpower support outlined above. If there was no population the rebels could not create the sovereign structures they used to generate the support that allowed them to replace personnel and resources expended on the battlefield. Statements by some members of the FAB affirm that the aim of the camps was to "isolate the FDD, to limit the ability of the Hutu population in rural areas to offer support to the FDD and other Hutu rebel groups, and bring the population under the strict scrutiny and control of the military" (p42).

Success or failure?

There are no exact numbers for those forced into regroupment camps across the whole country, but 350,000 people were forced to live in fifty-three camps in Bujumbura province alone. This represented 80 percent of the local population (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

These camps clearly represented the core part of government strategy to demobilise CNDD-FDD support structures. Secured in internment camps the population could not generate resources - in the form of manpower, finances, supplies – for the rebels, undermining its capacity to operate. While there is no data to test the success of this strategy, anecdotal evidence shows that in areas where the government set up regroupment camps rebel violence reduced dramatically (Human Rights Watch, 1998; p71). There is little evidence to suggest the CNDD-FDD was on the brink of collapse or seeking an end to the war, however, it had certainly stopped making progress (Lemarchand, 2006). This shows how a government can contain an aggrieved population through the use of violence, particularly if it can essentially 'imprison' the population and physically prevent it from providing support to rebel groups.

However, the FAB's strategy of choking support for the insurgency through the use of violence began to undermine government ability to continue drawing

support from the Tutsi population. Tutsi support for the FAB was predicated on two things; protection from rebel violence (Human Rights Watch, 2001b), but also direct payments for joining the military and civil service (Southall and Bentley, 2005). The side effect of moving the population into camps as a means to provide security was that rural production virtually came to a standstill. Burundi's economy went into serious decline and the government began to have difficulties paying the military and civil service (Krueger and Krueger, 2007). The FAB was also under international sanctions given its treatment of the Hutu population, which meant it could not replenish its coffers through external support (Southall and Bentley, 2005).

This highlights the choice governments face when employing violence to demobilise their opponents. In Burundi, Hutus represented a significant majority, suggesting violence as a strategy should be unsustainable (Downes, 2007), and so it proved to be the case. The FAB was in danger of no longer being able to provide selective within-war incentives to the Tutsi population to staff the military and the civil service. Losing the ability to do this would almost certainly lead to its collapse and a rebel victory, even though the rebels were failing to make military gains. The government needed international sanctions lifted, but this came with conditions; the FAB had to pursue political reform.

The Arusha Accords – shifting the game

In an effort to get sanctions lifted the FAB engaged more heavily in negotiations with other political factions and the international community (Southall and Bentley, 2005). In August 2000, the government and an array of political factions in Burundi, but not the CNDD-FDD, signed the 'Arusha Accords' in the presence of 25 heads of state. The deal included a three-year transition to democracy, to begin on 1st November 2001, a fifty-fifty split between Tutsis and Hutus in the army, the division of key ministries and the closure of the regroupment camps (Southall and Bentley, 2005). The international community agreed to resume international aid, which meant the government could continue paying its supporters and hold onto power. Buyoya was to continue leading the country for eighteen months

until 1st May 2003, with the Hutu FRODEBU leader Domitien Ndayizeye as his deputy. Ndayizeye was to take over the presidency on that date until elections in November 2004. A monitoring group was also set up, constituting the signatories to the agreement, members of the international community and leaders of civil society (Southall and Bentley, 2005).

A more representative government

The Arusha Accords were agreed after Nelson Mandela took over the mediation process, following the death of Julius Nyerere in 1999. According to Roger Southall and Kristina Bentley, Mandela's contribution was key because he forced the FAB to confront the main element of rebel mobilisation capacity; Tutsi repression of Hutus (2005). However, he did this by also limiting the FAB's capacity to demobilise rebel support through organised violence. Mandela visited the population directly at the start of the process. There is no documentary evidence of what he discussed. Southall and Bentley, however, claim that he did this to demonstrate to both the government and the rebels that he understood how the population viewed the conflict and that he had popular support in pursuing his path to peace (2005; p81).

Mandela forced the FAB to acknowledge the role of ethnicity in fuelling the conflict (Southall and Bentley, 2005). Mandela also created pressure on the FAB to adhere to the terms of the Accords. He got the international community to agree to provide the government financial and material support on the condition the FAB stuck to the terms of the deal and closed regroupment camps (International Crisis Group, 2002a). Up until this point, the camps had represented the core part of the FAB's counterinsurgency strategy. That the FAB sacrificed the main component of its strategy for demobilising rebel supporters in exchange for the money it needed to pay its own supporters shows the tightrope governments walk when expending resources to put down rebellions.

The FAB sacrificed its ability to use its default strategy for demobilising rebel forces. It was under less economic strain but it now faced a rebel group that had

external sanctuary in Tanzania and control over peripheral parts of the country. The government had to adhere to the political strategy outlined in the Accords if it was to pursue alternative means to demobilise the CNDD-FDD.

The Arusha Accords also addressed the concerns of the Tutsi population, ensuring spoilers did not scupper the deal. Multiple scholars agree that this was one of the keys to the success of the Arusha Accords (Cheeseman, 2011; Reyntjens, 2006; Sullivan, 2005). David Sullivan (2005) shows that when the Hutu government tried to reform the security sector in 1993 it could not credibly convince Tutsis that it did not intend to use the military to persecute the Tutsi population. The FAB then came under pressure to depose the Hutu-led government. In contrast, the Arusha Accords guaranteed the Tutsis retained representation in state structures, including security organs (ibid.). Nic Cheeseman argues this made the Tutsis more cohesive as a political-bloc, undermining the voice of hardliners that had deposed the government in 1993 (2011). Credible security guarantees and the offer of political representation was enough to ensure that the Tutsi elites and population supported the political reforms.

Demobilising the rebels

The Arusha Accords were signed in 2001, but it was a further two years before the CNDD-FDD officially signed the Pretoria Protocol that marked the end of the conflict. The protocol provided the CNDD-FDD with positions in the transitional administration, including its then leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, as Minister of State for Good Governance. He would be consulted on all matters and was officially third in rank in the government (Watt, 2008; p80). The protocol reiterated a fifty-fifty ethnic split in the army and police force, guaranteeing the CNDD-FDD a percentage of those positions. Elections would be held in 2005, with quotas for Tutsis far above the proportion of the population and many FAB leaders guaranteed to keep their positions in the government and military (Watt, 2008; p82). The CNDD-FDD essentially agreed to participate in elections, which it could

not be sure it would win, and would then have to share power with those it had been fighting.

In 2001 the rebels' position was that they would only come to the negotiating table if the military agreed to revert to the 1992 Constitution. They rejected the Arusha Accords, which they accused of institutionalising ethnicity (Watt, 2008; p76). The election results of 1993 showed that they expected, under this arrangement, to gain absolute control of the instruments of the state. In 2001, the CNDD-FDD clearly felt they could achieve this by continuing the conflict. Commentators at the time suggested this would mean the Arusha Accords could not succeed in ending the war (International Crisis Group, 2000). However, just two years later the CNDD-FDD agreed to participate in an electoral process, which it originally rejected and forced it to share power with those it had been fighting. It is possible this reflected battlefield developments. However, there is very little that one can point to that suggests this was the case. There was no real change in the military stalemate that characterised the previous seven years of conflict; offensives and counter offensives continued to cancel each other out (International Crisis Group, 2002b).

If anything, we might have expected Arusha to strengthen the CNDD-FDD. The FAB's closure of many regroupment camps meant Hutus communities returning to their towns, which the CNDD-FDD should have been able to exploit and strengthen their organisation. It should have boosted rebel access to the population and increased the material and financial support it could draw from these communities. The closing of the camps also disseminated thousands of young Hutus across the country, aggrieved at the Tutsi military for unjustly incarcerating them, all potential recruits for rebel forces (Lemarchand, 2009; p164).

Moreover, the military government was constrained in its capacity to ever reopen the regroupment camps due to its need to maintain international support. Viewed in this way the CNDD-FDD was in its strongest position of the war, reflected in their initial rejection of the Accords. By 2003, however, they did little more than

secure increased oversight over the Arusha process in the Pretoria Protocol, suggesting they were weaker in 2003 than in 2001.

We can trace why this happened by looking at the sources that examined popular responses to the Accords (Nindonera, 2012; Schraml, 2010; Southall and Bentley, 2005; Uvin, 2008; Vervisch and Titeca, 2010). The FAB's previous behaviour created scepticism amongst Hutus that it would adhere to the terms of Arusha. However, Mandela built in a number of mechanisms to ensure its progress could be effectively monitored. By insisting on a firm timeline for the political transition and creating the Implementation Monitoring Committee, Mandela gave both the rebels and the population a clear means of assessing the FAB's commitment to honouring the Accords (International Crisis Group, 2002b). Most importantly the 1st May date for transition of the presidency to a Hutu gave both the population and the rebel groups a clear trip wire against which to measure the Tutsi military's commitment to extending governance to disenfranchised Hutus (International Crisis Group, 2002b). This made it much harder for the FAB to cheat, which undermined the CNDD-FDD's message that force was the only means for Hutus to secure the political benefits the rebels were promising.

Mandela's aim of putting bottom-up pressure on the CNDD-FDD began, therefore, to bear fruit. Peter Uvin, in *Life after Violence*, conducted numerous interviews with civilians and showed that the population believed political elites had come up with a deal that addressed ethnic relations, meaning support for the rebels began to wane (2008). Carla Schraml documents a *bashingantahe*, in 2008, explaining his confusion as to why the FNL continued to fight after 2004. He describes it as a "Hutu rebellion against a Hutu government" (2010; p264), a rebellion that ultimately achieved few of its aims.

Willy Nindonera's interviews with former foot soldiers of the CNDD-FDD is even more illuminating in that it shows this having a direct effect on rebel strength. In many places, fighters actually began to lay down their arms and return to their communities. These fighters felt the political transition outlined in Arusha meant there was no longer any meaningful reason to fight (Nindonera, 2012). An

eagerness to engage in the new political system, combined with pressure from Tanzania, also led significant numbers of refugees to return home. Interviews with refugees at the time shows that they wanted to return, but only if the peace process showed signs of success (Southall and Bentley, 2005; p130). This weakened the CNDD-FDD's capacity to draw support from outside of the country and meant this part of the population now supported the government by endorsing the political process. Having developed extensive political links within the population, the CNDD-FDD assimilated the changing mood quickly and recognised that, in order to continue receiving the support of the population, they had to engage with the peace process (Nindonera, 2012). Actual rebel numbers seem to be less well documented than any of the other three conflicts in this thesis. However, the effect that the Arusha Accords had on rebel strength is backed up by the data on rebel numbers from Reed Wood's dataset (2010). In 2001, the rebels had 23,000 members, in 2002 this was cut to 13,000, as shown in figure 17.


Figure 17: Balance of power and force strengths from 1998. Data taken from Reed Wood's dataset (2010).[50] Numbers in bars represent thousands of troops.

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[50] Wood's dataset only has data on CNDD-FDD numbers from 1998.

This pressure explains why the CNDD-FDD made significant concessions in 2003, when in 2001 it had been determined to keep fighting. Political reform had the exact effect predicted by the theories underpinning this thesis. It undermined the ability of the CNDD-FDD to generate the support it needed to sustain military activity. As it was losing the ability to generate population support and recognised the government was now secure, having had economic sanctions removed, the CNDD-FDD clearly felt it had no choice but to take the political deal it had previously rejected. The civil war came to an end.

Battlefield dynamics

The analysis above demonstrates that the key dynamics of the conflict – the beginning, the decision of the FAB to implement political reform and the outcome – can all be explained by examining how key events affected the mobilisation capacities of the FAB and the CNDD-FDD. Equally, military interaction between the CNDD-FDD and the FAB fails to explain the outcome. Data on rebel numbers shows the CNDD-FDD was outnumbered throughout the conflict-years that data on rebel numbers is available (see figure 17), although they did reach an almost two-to-one disadvantage in 2001 (R.M. Wood, 2010). Direct CNDD-FDD attacks on the military were largely guerrilla in nature, and tended to focus on securing key facilitation routes rather than furthering territorial control (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

The CNDD-FDD chose its level of military activity not to directly defeat the FAB. Instead it chose a military strategy that exacerbated Hutu grievances against the Tutsi-dominated government, improving its capacity to generate support. There was no need to defeat the Tutsi-military directly to achieve this effect. The war drifted into a stalemate, with the rebels attempting to weaken the government economically and politically (International Crisis Group, 2002b). The economic strain and the political networks the CNDD-FDD created showed it was having the desired effect. Once its military activity ceased to have this effect, due to the shift in FAB strategy, it was forced to engage with the political process.

Similarly, the government almost exclusively used its military forces to shape population behaviour, rather than demobilise the CNDD-FDD directly. When this tactic led to the economic pressure that meant it was struggling to mobilise support from its constituent population, it was forced into political reform in exchange for the ending of international sanctions.

It is clear that in Burundi, belligerent perceptions about the progress of the war were shaped by changes in their capacity to generate population support as predicted in chapter two.

Post-2003

While this thesis is primarily concerned with how the war in Burundi ended, rather than how peace was maintained, the issues that threatened to derail the political transition are also illuminating.

Preparing for elections

Unlike in so many conflicts worldwide, the promised level of CNDD-FDD demobilisation caused few problems[51] (Reyntjens, 2006). As many rebel fighters did not receive a wage, and perceived their work to have been done, they simply returned to their communities (Uvin, 2008; p173). Overall, security considerations seem to have played only a limited role in potentially derailing the process. One would think that the rebels would be keen to neutralise the FAB's military force as quickly as possible, and vice versa. However, accounts of the transition do not suggest that subsequent delays in balancing the security forces threatened the process (International Crisis Group, 2004). The CNDD-FDD would have known that the international community was constraining the FAB's ability to violate agreements and re-pursue a policy of Hutu persecution. It is reasonable

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[51] That is not to say there were no problems. The CNDD-FDD, for example, deliberately swelled its ranks before demobilising in order to over-represent its strength (Nindonera, 2012). However, no accounts of the conflict seem to suggest that it was a major impediment to political transition.

to have expected some mistrust after years of the Tutsi military backtracking on promises of political reform (Nindonera, 2012). This mistrust manifested itself first and foremost in a reluctance by the CNDD-FDD to disband its political structures rather than its military forces (Uvin, 2008).

Most commentators have pointed out that the CNDD-FDD's political structures allowed it to mobilise electoral support (Lemarchand, 2009; Southall and Bentley, 2005; Uvin, 2008). It would also clearly give them the option of relaunching the insurgency if the FAB did exploit the political process to eliminate CNDD-FDD political leaders. To the CNDD-FDD these political networks allowed them to mobilise support as necessary, be it for elections or military activity, and this was the basis of the CNDD-FDD's power.

The CNDD-FDD was so successful on this front that interim President Ndayizeze considered delaying the elections (Reyntjens, 2006). He tried to speed up the demobilisation process and slowed the appointment of regional political officials (Southall and Bentley, 2005). He also tried to prevent refugees from returning in time to vote (ibid.). The CNDD-FDD threatened to quit the process at this point, but even went so far as to cite that security considerations were proceeding smoothly, to include military integration. However, they considered delays in appointing regional officials a threat to transition as it limited their links to the population (Southall and Bentley, 2005). Ultimately Ndayizeze was not powerful enough to make a play for power by himself and ceded to CNDD-FDD demands. Even during the political transition, the conflict continued to be fought through the population. Both sides recognised that the key to their power was the political structures they used to generate support from the population.

Democracy… or not?

One important lesson to take from Burundi is that it cannot be said to have transitioned to full democracy. Commentators have been extremely critical of the Burundian peace process for excluding civil society and institutionalising ethnicity (Daley, 2006a, 2006b; Vervisch and Titeca, 2010). The Tutsis retained

significantly more power proportionally compared to their numbers in the broader population. However, interviews with Burundians after the conflict show that their explicit demands were for improved societal cohesion, security and fair access to economic opportunities. This suggests that the population is unconcerned with specific details of the political processes, but reflect on the opportunities they think political deals are likely to offer. In Burundi, the Arusha Accords addressed ethnic access to instruments of the state and, therefore, convinced the population that their needs would be met (Uvin, 2008; p52). Addressing these concerns built support for the process, which, in turn, put pressure on both the FAB and the CNDD-FDD to work within its confines, ending the conflict. Whether this gives political elites in Burundi an incentive to build support by appealing to ethnicity, as suggested by Patricia Daley (2006a; p314), is another question.

Shaping strategy

The conflict in Burundi is also interesting in that it shows how a number of factors shape belligerents' strategies for shaping popular support.

External actors

The most obvious way external support altered the behaviour of the belligerents was the pressure the FAB came under in order to secure international aid to pay its military and civil service. International sanctions also contributed to the economic strain that forced the government to move away from containing the rebels by violently punishing its support-base (Krueger and Krueger, 2007). The FAB's external support was predicated on it attempting to shape population behaviour by offering it political benefits.

In contrast, the rebel's access to external support did not have the expected effect. The CNDD-FDD undoubtedly received crucial funding and supplies from their diaspora, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwandan armed groups. This also allowed them to establish bases across borders from which they

could launch attacks (Dilworth, 2006). It is difficult to measure the value of this support, but it almost certainly acted as a significant force multiplier. What it did not do, however, was shift their focus away from generating support from the population through creating sovereign structures that provided economic and political incentives to the population. Beardsley and McQuinn's finding that rebels with significant external support are more prone to violence as a means of drawing support from the population (2009) does not appear to find support in Burundi. Nor does it appear that external pressure pushed the rebels into agreeing to a ceasefire and participating in the political process. Tanzania did withdraw its support for the CNDD-FDD shortly before it chose to negotiate (Watt, 2008). However, this external support was replaced following regional tension involving the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, which meant rebel groups across the region could still access arms and supplies as required (International Crisis Group, 2006).

Personalities

A number of personalities also played a role in shaping the behaviour of the belligerents. Clearly Nelson Mandela's influence was crucial in creating bottom-up pressure on both belligerents to lay down their arms. Without Mandela's insights it is not clear that international pressure would have forced the FAB to behave in a way that simultaneously strengthened it and undermined support for the rebels. Mandela's role in the Burundi shows the importance of both exploiting ripe moments (Zartman, 2001) and astute mediation (Maresca, 1996).

Changes in leadership of the CNDD-FDD also altered its strategy through the conflict. According to Willy Nindonera, the CNDD-FDD became much more unified as a movement when Pierre Nkurunziza took over the leadership in 2001. He maintained much closer relations than his predecessor, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, with his foot soldiers, political networks and the population. Willy Nindonera believes this made the CNDD-FDD more likely to pursue negotiations because Nkurunziza was more responsive to the wishes of his

supporters and better able to bring the whole movement with him (2012; pp17-18).

Conclusion

The conflict in Burundi lends strong support to the main hypotheses of this thesis and the theoretical implications of the model developed in chapter two. Table 20 summarises the key findings along with the conflict dynamics. Both the government and rebels generated support by developing political networks that facilitated the delivery of direct within-war incentives, lending support to hypotheses three. The rebels built support in the first place by building networks that created reciprocal relations with the population. In return, the population provided the rebels manpower, food and finances. The FAB, however, undermined this support by delivering democratic reform, undermining the CNDD-FDD's capacity to generate support. This brought the conflict to an end in a mixed outcome, as both the rebels and the leaders of the FAB took positions in the government and control over security organs was shared. Changes in macro-political structures conditioned population behaviour exactly as expected, which, in turn, shaped the decisions of conflict actors exactly as predicted.

It is perhaps unsurprising that Burundi's civil war shows strong support for the role of democratic reform in ending civil wars, given it was selected as a 'typical case' in this regard. Burundi also, however, supports other insights implied by the theoretical model; albeit the effect of these variables was not enough to end the war. The FAB's use of violence and displacing the population into camps weakened the economy, creating such pressure on the FAB government that it came close to collapse. The population also supported the respective belligerents and engaged in the political process in order to secure protection.

In summary, the conflict in Burundi supports the model of war proposed in thesis extremely well. Rebel strength came from undermining government power, and their ability build support from the population. The costs of the conflict pushed the government close to collapse, forcing it to engage in political reform even

though it appeared comfortable on the battlefield. The reform brought economic relief, ending any chance of the government collapsing. It also undermined the CNDD-FDD's capacity to regenerate resources spent on the conflict. The rebels were forced to engage in a process they originally rejected, or face slowly fading away.

Date	Events	Conflict dynamics (table 3)	Key drivers of change	Rebel regenerative capacity	Government control over the state	Sub-hypotheses supported
1993-2001	Onset	Asymmetric warfare (Q3). No change in conflict dynamics.	Assassination of Hutu prime minister, Melchior Ndadaye, leads to ethnic violence between Hutus and Tutsis.	Community militias join rebel forces for protection and to combat political exclusion. Rebels shadow-political structures provide population ability to grow crops and trade, which is then taxed. Networks in refugee camps. External support. Government regroupment camps limit rebel capacity to interact with Hutu population.	Government no longer able to control rural areas. Government forces Hutus into regroupment camps to limit contact with insurgency. Government struggles to generate economic resources to pay military and civil service. Reportedly on brink of collapse in 2000.	2, 3 & 4
2001-2003	Arusha Accords Conflict ends - mixed outcome	Asymmetric warfare (Q3). Reduction in rebel power forces engagement in political process.	Government agrees to political reform in exchange for easing of economic sanctions.	Fighters starts laying down weapons and refugees return to Burundi to take advantage of political reform. Rebel capacity to generate support significantly reduced.	Lifting of economic sanctions enables government to deliver socioeconomic incentives to Tutsi population to mobilise support into civil service and military. No longer able to use violence to control Hutus, relies on promise of political reform instead.	2 & 3

Table 20: Summary of Burundi conflict dynamics and key findings.

Chapter seven

A 'typical' rebel victory: Cambodia 1968-1975[52]

Introduction

The statistical model suggests there was a 72 percent chance of a Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia in 1975, making it the best-predicted government defeat. Life expectancy had dropped by six years to 36 in the previous three years and GDP per capita had dropped 35 percent to US$704. The significant decline in socioeconomic conditions explains why the model forecasts a rebel victory with such high probability, despite other variables being contraindicated. The size of the military, for example, had actually increased by twenty people per thousand in the population in the years preceding 1975. Moreover, neither the rebels nor the government were receiving external support at the end of the war, although the USA and North Vietnam both played a significant role in the final outcome. Cambodia, therefore, offers the opportunity to explore why governments losing the capacity to deliver socioeconomic incentives to its population lose civil wars. The historical record shows that, as predicted, the population increasingly refused to support the government, facilitating its final collapse. In contrast, the Khmer Rouge created political structures that allowed it to continue generating support, despite being the smaller force and performing poorly on the battlefield.

Cambodia is a particularly interesting case for a number of reasons. Firstly, the population was extremely well segmented through most of the conflict, with rebel and government sovereignty clearly divided territorially. The Khmer Rouge, at least in the second phase of the conflict, did not have to compete with established government institutions to build relations with the population in the areas it was strongest. The clearer division of sovereignty resulted from the North Vietnamese intervention in the conflict on the side of the rebels, which was countered by the

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[52] The Cambodian war is normally recorded in datasets as starting in 1968 as this is when violence passed the threshold for inclusion in most datasets. However, most historians identify the Samlaut Rebellion in 1967 as the start of the conflict. Ben Kiernan (1982b), claims it took the Khmer Rouge a period of months to organise the initial outbreaks of violence into an organised insurgency.

US supporting the government. The nature of these interventions was decisive in the final outcome and demonstrates the importance of conflict actors exploiting external support to build resilient relations with the population. The Khmer Rouge used North Vietnamese support to build resilient sovereign structures, while the government assumed that external military support alone would win it the war.

The war can be broken down into two distinct phases; 1967 to 1970 and 1970 to 1975. The government changed in 1970, when General Lon Nol deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The latter then pledged his support to the rebels. Despite this I treat 'the government' as a single actor throughout the conflict. Lon Nol was prime minister from 1966 and directed the government's response to the conflict even before 1970 (Kiernan, 1982a). Equally, even after switching his support to the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk played no visible role in prosecuting the war. There were factions in the Khmer Rouge, which Pol Pot had to control at various times in the conflict. However, the Khmer Rouge was relatively cohesive and the internal dynamics of the group appear to have played a limited role in the final outcome (Kiernan, 1983). That is not to say that Prince Sihanouk did not have an important role in the conflict. His support for the government first, then the rebels did assist both parties in generating support. Neverthless, decision-making over the conflict lay with the government of Lon Nol and the Khmer Rouge, headed by Pol Pot.

The following chapter will start by outlining how changes in the period before 1967 created an opportunity for the Khmer Rouge to build support. The next section will examine how the belligerents sought to influence population behaviour in the period 1967 to 1970. In 1970, the war became internationalised as North Vietnam and the USA intervened, changing the capacity of both the government and the rebels to shape population behaviour. The next part of the chapter will analyse the war from 1970 to its conclusion and show how the final outcome can be directly attributed to belligerent relations with the population and their ability to generate support. The final parts will examine battlefield

interaction and explore what factors affected the conflict strategies of the two belligerents.

1967 – the beginning of the conflict

Norodom Sihanouk – last of the 'god-kings'

Before 1966, Norodom Sihanouk retained power by balancing and weakening potential political threats (Kiernan, 2004). Despite the appearance of a popular vote, in all elections before 1966, Sihanouk handpicked parliamentary candidates to balance positions in the Sangkum (Cambodian parliament) between left- and right-wing forces (Vickery, 1982). In trying to balance these forces, however, a significant urban-rural divide developed (Chindawongse, 1991). The urban elite lived the high-life, sustained by huge levels of corruption. The standard of living in the capital, Phnom Penh, improved significantly for many people during the early 1960s (Kiernan, 1982b). Life in rural areas, in contrast, became significantly harder. Many peasants relied on the government purchasing rice. In 1963, Sihanouk cut ties with the USA, believing that North Vietnam would soon take over South Vietnam (Heder, 1979). The resultant loss of aid reduced the price the government could afford to pay peasants for this rice (Chandler, 2012). A significant landless population emerged in many parts of the Cambodian state (Kiernan, 1982b).

Despite the decline in living standards, Sihanouk remained popular in rural areas and commentators described Cambodia as the oasis of peace in Indochina (Lancaster, 1972). Khmer Rouge leadership lamented Sihanouk's authority and saw it as the main obstacle to building revolutionary momentum (Kiernan, 2004; p191). Sihanouk was also clever at undermining communist rhetoric. The majority of the Cambodian populace was Buddhist and Sihanouk portrayed parties claiming to represent them, such as the Khmer Rouge, as anti-religious (Vickery, 1982). Moreover, observers remarked on the degree of political apathy within the peasantry, and that they had little understanding of national politics (Thion, 1983). While they lived in poverty compared to their urban cousins, they

did not necessarily recognise this, and despite the falling price in rice, most peasants made up the difference selling rice across the border to North Vietnamese forces fighting in South Vietnam (Heder, 1979). The Khmer Rouge themselves lamented this feature of Cambodian society. The official history of the Khmer Rouge points to this as a time of consolidation and creating internal cohesion. In practice, this translated into developing clandestine political networks in villages across rural Cambodia (Communist Party of Kampuchea, Eastern Region Military Political Service, 1973).

1966 – the rise of the right

By 1966, pressure from the right-wing on Sihanouk was becoming too much to bear. In a supposed bid to end corruption and rejuvenate the Cambodian economy after the loss of US aid, Sihanouk had nationalised major industries, including the banking sector. This just exacerbated corruption and further stagnated the economy (Short, 2005). Amongst the urban elite and army there were increasing calls for Sihanouk's removal (Lancaster, 1972). In order to undercut these ruminations, Sihanouk dropped his policy of fixing parliamentary candidates in 1966. He also focused state media on undermining leftist candidates. As a consequence of this campaign, combined with the right-wing's greater capacity to exploit the electoral system to corruptly assure victory, the right dominated the new parliament, winning 81 out of 84 seats (Lancaster, 1972). Sihanouk retained a position as nominal head of state and the ability to influence government policy. However, the right-wing now had much greater influence over governance. One could see this as a disaster for the Khmer Rouge; it gave its arch enemy much greater control of state apparatus to combat communist groups as well as allying the army with the government, as the new prime minister, Lon Nol, was a senior general (Osbourne, 2004). However, Philip Short, in his biography of Pol Pot, shows how Pot identified this event as a major boon. The policies of the new government gave the Khmer Rouge a new capacity to generate discontent amongst the peasantry and build support (Short, 2005; p164).

The new government forced the peasantry to sell rice to the government at extremely low prices (Heder, 1979). Members of left-wing groups were either forced out of Phnom Penh or chose to leave believing there was now limited chance of effecting political change through peaceful means (Vickery, 1982). The Khmer Rouge then began to use the clandestine networks it had developed in the countryside, bolstered by the influx of new intellectuals, to generate propaganda aimed at building support from the rural population. The rebels' point of reference for this propaganda was now Lon Nol, rather than Sihanouk. Whereas the pre-1966 period saw peasants live in significant hardship, the rural populace continued to believe that Sihanouk had its best interests at heart. Lon Nol held no such authority, meaning part of the population now perceived support for the rebels as offering a larger potential benefit (Short, 2005). The Khmer Rouge used a combination of incipient political networks it had established in rural areas, and political parties expelled from Phnom Penh to shape population behaviour in the rebel's favour. In 1967, small-scale violence erupted, in what was known as the 'Samlaut rebellion' (Kiernan, 1982a). The government retained control of a much larger army, but the rebels now had the ability to draw enough support to sustain limited military activity; a state of war and dual sovereignty prevailed.

1967-1970 – Limited violence

The Sangkum responds

The government first tried to undermine rebel ability to generate support through the use of violence. The government harshly repressed local outbreaks of violence, razing villages and murdering anyone suspected of supporting communist groups (Kiernan, 1982a). Sihanouk blamed urban political parties for the rising unrest. This led to a ramping up of security operations against left-wing parties and university groups in Phnom Penh, with large numbers arrested. Those members that had remained in the city after the victory of the right in 1966 began to link up with rebel leaders in the countryside (Vickery, 1982).

The new government's political and economic policy also further disenfranchised segments of the rural population. Lon Nol tried to improve the effectiveness of local government institutions but as a means to aid in suppressing opposition, not as an alternative to potential rebel supporters. Outposts were established in isolated regions to enforce the rice collection policy and prevent peasants from trading with North Vietnamese forces (Kiernan, 2004). The government replaced civilian administrators with military figures in areas afflicted by violence, who then employed their forces in destroying communities suspected of supporting rebellious activity (Kiernan, 2004).

For Lon Nol, the rural population was of secondary concern. Parliament's main aim was to signal to the urban population that it was addressing corruption, reforming the economy and protecting the urban population from left-wing violence (Tully, 2010). The rebels were still extremely weak at this stage and parliament remained well supported in urban areas throughout the initial phases of the conflict.

Sihanouk's counterinsurgency

In contrast to parliament, Sihanouk continued his attempts to balance Cambodia's political forces. He gave the Sangkum a free hand to pursue its violence-based approach to undermining support for the Khmer Rouge. However, he also tried to motivate popular support in rural areas through a combination of political and economic incentives (Henderson and Pike, 1971). He visited afflicted areas and provided the population with food, clothing and promised to build roads (Kiernan, 2004). He also raised counter-protests across the country. These stymied rebel efforts to build support in many areas as it signalled just how popular and powerful Sihanouk remained (Kiernan, 1982c).

The Khmer Rouge build a movement

It is not clear whether the Khmer Rouge even initiated the first outbreaks of violence. Its party history actually identifies 1968 as the start of its campaign

(1973). Ben Kiernan argues the Khmer Rouge supported rebelling community leaders in order to build a more organised movement. When the government responded harshly to local violence, the Khmer Rouge would incorporate communities into the movement with the offer of protection from future repression (1982b). The Khmer Rouge also built relations with social groups that had a history of resistance against the Cambodian government, such as the population in the mountainous north-eastern region (Deac and Summers Jr, 2000).

The Khmer Rouge began to evacuate population centres and resettle communities in more easily defendable areas. It then organised the provision of basic services to these areas (Short, 2005). Communities became dependent on the Khmer Rouge for their basic needs and protection from government forces. Population displacement also isolated communities from government influence, exposing them to Khmer Rouge political education programs; allowing the rebels to draw support from the individuals most susceptible to indoctrination and link the collective benefit of their proposed political reform to the individual grievances of specific villages (Osbourne, 2004). The main brunt of its strategy during this period focused on using its political networks to identify communities that were already anti-government and bringing these communities under its influence through a mix of security, economic and political incentives. Based on the success of this strategy, by 1968 the Khmer Rouge was leading most anti-government violence (Kiernan, 1982a).

The rebels did very little to build a movement in Phnom Penh itself. Ben Kiernan highlights how, almost counter-intuitively, the Khmer Rouge tried to empower the right-wing in urban areas in a bid to undermine Sihanouk. The Khmer Rouge hoped that by destabilising the countryside they could force the right-wing to remove Sihanouk as a means to take complete control of the counterinsurgent response (Short, 2005). Pol Pot hoped this would eliminate the political and economic incentives Sihanouk was offering the population in rural areas, leaving violence as the only means through which the government would seek to shape population behaviour (Kiernan, 2004). Clearly, Pol Pot felt this was a less

sustainable government strategy and would create further mobilisation opportunities for the Khmer Rouge.

The Khmer Rouge almost surrender

The rural population became more susceptible to rebel propaganda between 1967 and 1970 due to government activity (Kiernan, 2004; Osbourne, 2004; Short, 2005). Local community leaders assured that some villages did support the rebels with manpower, provisions and shelter from government forces (Kiernan, 1982a). Between 1967 and 1970 the movement grew from only a few hundred active fighters (ibid) to around 2,400 (Henderson and Pike, 1971). This increase coincided with no significant battlefield victories, suggesting that the population was not bandwagoning or responding to the military balance of power. Government forces numbered around 35,000 in the same period (Henderson and Pike, 1971). The increase in size of the Khmer Rouge can, therefore, be best put down to changes in the ability of the rebels to generate support from rural communities.

Pol Pot, however, began to recognise that Sihanouk remained too popular for the Khmer Rouge to build a movement strong enough to force the government to collapse. As a consequence, the communist central committee agreed to explore political options for improving relations with Sihanouk in the hope he could be persuaded to side with them (Kiernan, 2004).

Before this happened, however, the right-wing did depose Sihanouk and the political context shifted rapidly. Parliament became increasingly angered at the left-wing rebellion and the blind-eye Sihanouk was turning to North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory as a sanctuary for its fight in South Vietnam (Lancaster, 1972). It moved against Sihanouk and passed a vote of no-confidence. Sihanouk formed a government in-exile and threw his support behind the Khmer Rouge rebellion, which publically promised to return him to power. The coup in 1970 significantly changed the mobilisation capacity of both parties in a number

of ways and eventually allowed the rebels to transition to a more conventional strategy.

Immediate impact of the coup

Increased support for both sides

Both parties benefitted from the coup in absolute terms. Sihanouk choosing to support the rebels brought fighters to the side of the Khmer Rouge. Despite not formally controlling the army a number of commanders offered their soldiers to the communists (Deac and Summers Jr, 2000). Individuals from the rural population also volunteered in meaningful numbers to fight for the Khmer Rouge out of loyalty to Sihanouk (Vannak, 2003).

The coup also, however, had a mobilising effect for the government. US aid meant the new government, calling itself the Khmer Republic, could offer selective economic incentives to potential supporters and expand the army to 60,000 men. This compared to estimates of 10,000 Khmer Rouge rebels immediately after the coup (Girling, 1972). The new government was welcomed with open arms in Phnom Penh. Its attempts to build an army met no problems and the urban population volunteered to join the army in high numbers (Tully, 2010). It had grown weary of Sihanouk's corruption, thought the coup would yield a new dawn and was willing to fight to protect these benefits.

From this perspective, it appears Pol Pot miscalculated the coup's potential impact. Ben Kiernan feels ultimately the support of Sihanouk played a limited role in boosting the Khmer Rouge (1982c). There were some protests against Sihanouk's removal. However, these were much smaller in scale than the pro-Sihanouk protests organised in 1967-68 in response to the initial communist uprisings (Kiernan, 1982c). Huy Vannak, in his account of life as a Khmer Rouge soldier, argues that even those who claimed to be fighting for Sihanouk, were more motivated by protecting themselves from the repressive policies of the new government and seeking a way out of the rising poverty brought about its

economic policies (2003; p12). Perhaps the most significant change the coup effected from a population perspective was the transition from active to passive support for the government amongst the peasantry. In 1967, Sihanouk organised significant counter-protests against Khmer Rouge activity. In contrast the Khmer Republic government had no such ability, despite the passive support it is reported to have enjoyed (Heder, 1979). The government was, in effect, demobilised in rural areas without Sihanouk's influence over the region, giving the Khmer Rouge greater freedom of movement and space to mobilise more potential support.

Figure 18: Balance of power in Cambodia conflict. Numbers compiled from various sources (Kiernan, 1982a; Henderson and Pike, 1971; Sutsakhan, 1978).

Cambodia's war goes international

The new government invited US and South Vietnamese troops to pursue North Vietnamese soldiers taking sanctuary in Cambodia. North Vietnamese soldiers encroached further into Cambodia to avoid this targeting and ended up occupying nearly one quarter of Cambodian territory (Mosyakov, 2004). The US targeted North Vietnamese and rebel positions, but the North Vietnamese Army resisted

offensives by Khmer Republic forces. The war largely settled into a military stalemate for three years before these external backers withdrew the bulk of their military support. Historians and policymakers debate the relative importance of this intervention (Etcheson, 1984).[53] However, it is clear that it represented a three-year period of stasis in the fight between the indigenous participants. It gave them the chance to build sovereign relations with the population with a large weight of the military burden borne by their external supporter.

Immediately after the intervention commentators assessed that the Khmer Rouge represented only a minor threat to the government (Brown, 1972; Osbourne, 1972). The government had superior force numbers (Sutsakhan, 1978) and more popular support (Heder, 1979). Yet, when the US and North Vietnam withdrew their support in 1973, it took just two years for the Khmer Rouge to overcome a significantly larger government force. The explanation for this lies in the difference between rebel and government behaviour towards the population under the protection of their external backer. The Khmer Rouge developed integrated political structures that generated support from the population. In contrast, the Khmer Republic oversaw a humanitarian catastrophe, undermining its capacity to sustain its military forces. The government collapsed and the rebels captured the state.

The rural population

North Vietnamese shadow governance

The Khmer Rouge benefited from the North Vietnamese political strategy. In the areas under their control the North Vietnamese set up extensive shadow government structures. North Vietnamese forces only required passive support from the population, namely freedom of movement. Nevertheless, they offered the population political, security and socioeconomic incentives to elicit this

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[53] Craig Etcheson (1984) offers a useful rundown of the key arguments in this debate between Henry Kissinger and William Shawcross.

support (Brown, 1972). There were explicit instructions from Hanoi to treat the population well. They held local elections, making sure that local people stood and won. They provided services to the population. Moreover, they protected the population from South Vietnamese and government violence (Kiernan, 2004). The rational choice for the population became to stay in these zones and afford its support to the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge. The North Vietnamese recognised they could not stay in Cambodia forever, nor did it serve them to do so. The logical step was, therefore, to hand over governance to their Cambodian allies (Etcheson, 1984). With government forces powerless to reclaim territory from the North Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge was free to build sovereign structures with significant swathes of the population.

The Khmer Rouge reorganises society

The Khmer Rouge developed systematic control over the population. It completely restructured society in rural Cambodia in order to maximise the support it could generate from the population. How much of this effort was driven by ideology and how much by a pragmatic approach to the war is difficult to say. Regardless, according to Elizabeth Becker, the Khmer Rouge put its victory down to this restructuring of society, as it allowed it to raise and feed an army (1998; p149).

Under the protection of North Vietnamese troops, the Khmer Rouge sent armed propaganda teams into a village, killed government officials, then set up political indoctrination programs and rudimentary governance institutions (Henderson and Pike, 1971). These institutions oversaw a horizontal and vertical reorganisation of society. The rebels split people into groups of about ten or twelve families, who were answerable to district chiefs, who in turn were subordinate to a regional leader (Quinn, 1976). Leaders were selected by the Khmer Rouge based on loyalty; with the pool of leaders at one level making up the potential candidates when a space opened at the next level up. Candidates were generally appointed based on violent adherence to the Khmer Rouge. All orders and political direction went up and down this chain (ibid.).

The rebels also organised the population into functional groups. As well as soldiers, there were associations of farmers, males, females and children for example. According to Kenneth Quinn, the Khmer Rouge did this to make the administration of each group much easier to manage (ibid.). Rather than propagandising the whole of a polity with a general message the Khmer Rouge could tailor it depending on the audience. Leaders of groups were appointed from within and were accountable to the village chief (ibid.). Once society had been organised in this manner, villages were isolated from each other. The Khmer Rouge strictly forbade any travel (ibid.). This reduced the ability of any potential opposition to generate support across communities.

Village leaders then selected the role of the people under their control, including soldiers for the army. Village leaders were also responsible for the behaviour of the population in responding to key policies. They ensured populations offered no resistance to evacuations or rice collection plans. If there was any dissent the Khmer Rouge punished not only the perpetrator but also the village leader (Vannak, 2003). This turned collective behaviour into a selective incentive for the village leader. A dissenting villager would be responsible for the punishment of his whole village and specifically the village chief, with whom they likely had a family tie (ibid.). The Khmer Rouge ensured that there would be a high cost to individuals in the population that did not provide the support it was demanding.

It also used extensive political education sessions to further shape population behaviour. The main recipients of these sessions were the young. Teenagers would be taken away for two- to three-week indoctrination sessions. As part of these sessions Khmer Rouge leadership would identify who was best suited for each role in society, ensuring the most loyal filled important positions (Quinn, 1976). Most people would come back from these sessions highly supportive of the new social structures and would spy on their families to identify dissent (Shawcross, 1979). In the villages, political education was given as much importance as working the fields. People were forced to work during the day and endure political education sessions during the night (Quinn, 1976).

By developing this political structure and using indoctrination, the Khmer Rouge monopolised sovereignty over the population. Appointing loyal leaders, isolating villages and collectively punishing dissent allowed the Khmer Rouge to control the information that informed population behaviour. It was then able to control the delivery of security, socioeconomic and violence based incentives to the population as a means of drawing the support it needed to man, feed and supply its military. Using the support afforded it by the North Vietnamese, the Khmer Rouge created social structures that were tailor-made to support is military goals. This contrasts it with most groups that have to rely on building support through pre-existing social networks.

Violence

There is evidence there was genuine support for the Khmer Rouge in 1970. A US Defence Intelligence Agency assessment stated that the Khmer Rouge was sympathetic to the needs of the population (Kiernan, 2004; p322). It picked up where the North Vietnamese had left off in many places, eliminating corruption at the local level, helped out with farming and treated sick people. According to Philip Short the local people started to genuinely support the Khmer Rouge (2005). As a result, the Khmer Rouge's military was made up almost entirely of volunteers in the early 1970s (Vannak, 2003).

As the war dragged on, however, the Khmer Rouge deemed this 'soft' approach to the population unnecessary for defeating the government. Ben Kiernan believes Pol Pot calculated that the government was inept, and would eventually collapse under the pressure of the conflict (2004). The Khmer Rouge began to brutalise the population and use more coercive power to generate the support it needed.

The Khmer Rouge violently suppressed any hint of opposition in its territory. Even minimal dissent would mean a prison sentence. Prisons were infested with malaria, so even a short incarceration was effectively a death sentence (Vannak, 2003). Anyone perceived to have affiliation with the government was killed. The threat of collective punishment ensured individuals did not trust each other. As

an additional measure to enforce their writ, the Khmer Rouge always posted the majority of their armed cadres away from the frontline closer to the population so any acts of dissent could be punished (Kiernan, 1982d). This demonstrates that the Khmer Rouge considered controlling the population as important as military confrontation in determining their strength.

Socioeconomic policy

Khmer Rouge policies also reduced the autonomy of the rural population, making communities reliant on the Khmer Rouge for basic needs. The Khmer Rouge 'collectivised' agricultural production. While this was a central part of its communist doctrine (1973), it ensured the population provided all of its agricultural output to the Khmer Rouge. Whether the population genuinely supported the Khmer Rouge or not, the strength of rebel political structures forced communities to provide vital material support to the rebel group. Before the collectivisation of agriculture, farming communities continued to trade with whoever would buy goods, including the government (Short, 2005). Whether or not collectivisation increased overall agricultural production is impossible to assess. However, when combined with the Khmer Rouge's political structures, it left communities with no choice but to provide everything they did produce to the Khmer Rouge. In full control of agricultural output, the Khmer Rouge could then feed an army. Communities faced a simple choice, support the Khmer Rouge, starve to death, or risk fleeing to a government-controlled zone (Thion, 1983). Between choices one and two the decision is fairly obvious and was enough to ensure the Khmer Rouge received the support it needed. Many did flee, but this just undermined the government even further, as detailed below. Through collectivisation the Khmer Rouge essentially removed the ability of communities to remain 'passive' or provide resources to the Khmer Rouge's enemies.

The Khmer Rouge ended up being famous for their evacuation of Phnom Penh at the culmination of the war in 1975. However, they had been doing it in smaller population centres since the start of the conflict. This policy also significantly increased the Khmer Rouge's political control over the population and limited the

latter's ability to remain a passive participant in the conflict. When it captured a population centre they killed government workers then evacuated the population to communist-held areas (Kiernan, 2004). The rebels would then simply surrender the town back to government forces, demonstrating how they considered populations to be more important than territory. As Ben Kiernan has observed, this relocation took families away from their traditional support networks, which, in turn, made the population further reliant on the Khmer Rouge (1982b; p279). Pol Pot himself, in an interview with Yugoslavian journalists in 1978, described the intent of the evacuations as limiting interaction between the population and the government (Department of Press and Information. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Democratic Kampuchea, 1978). Once they evacuated the population, the Khmer Rouge organised it into the societal structures described above and forced it to participate in collective farms, ensuring they contributed to the strength of the Khmer Rouge. As these structures absorbed more people, the sovereign power of the rebels grew ever stronger, allowing them to create a more resilient military force.

Lon Nol's mysticism

The Lon Nol government made very little headway in signalling to the rural population that it offered a viable alternative to the suppressive policies of the Khmer Rouge. It did draw up plans to generate support from the rural population through the use of ethnic leaders and Buddhist groups (Henderson and Pike, 1971). According to General Sutsakhan it even had more ambitious plans of restructuring society to facilitate resistance not too dissimilar to those implemented by the Khmer Rouge (1978). However, these plans never reached the implementation stage. In the end, according to Elizabeth Becker, Lon Nol simply assumed that if he claimed to be a good Buddhist that would be enough to motivate support from the rural population (1998). However, without the authority of Prince Sihanouk, this appeal had no effect (Osbourne, 1972).

Military strategy in rural areas essentially drove the population under the control of the Khmer Rouge. South Vietnamese soldiers exacted atrocities on the

Cambodian people, forcing many to seek protection from the North Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge (Gordon, 1972). Many people also fled to zones under North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge control to gain better protection from US bombing runs. The US was indiscriminate in its bombing, dropping more bombs on Cambodia between 1970 and 1973 than on Japan during World War II (Shawcross, 1979). These bombing runs resulted in huge numbers of civilian casualties and effectively destroyed agricultural production in many areas (Becker, 1998).

In order to avoid the bombing and the ground troop invasion from South Vietnam the North Vietnamese moved west into more of Cambodia. The government was too weak to prevent this and it exposed more of the population to North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge shadow governance. To protect the population from US bombing, North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge soldiers would move populations away from their villages into forested areas (Tully, 2010). Consequently, they were in unfamiliar surroundings and more reliant on the sovereign structures of the Khmer Rouge. As North Vietnamese areas of control expanded, US bombing increased concomitantly to create further pressure. Eventually the bombing destroyed most of the major agricultural areas and fertile land, further limiting the capacity of the population to support itself without Khmer Rouge help (Deac and Summers Jr, 2000).

Support to the rebels became a matter of life and death for large parts of the population. Without the Khmer Rouge's protection, the rural population faced bombing and an inability to produce ample food. For this reason much of the population had no choice but to engage with the Khmer Rouge's political structures (Kiernan, 2008).

Khmer Rouge fighting capacity

As a function of its restructuring of society and the resettlement of communities into collective farms, the Khmer Rouge developed the capacity to build, supply and sustain an army, even in the face of enormous personnel losses.

The collective farming system controlled where food went once it had been produced. Military cadres received minimal rations of food but they did receive food, which was in stark contrast to their government equivalents (Becker, 1998). Pol Pot declared feeding his army as the most important part of revolutionary warfare (Becker, 1998). Without the forced resettlements, collectivisation and restructuring of society to ensure these policies took place smoothly it is difficult to see the Khmer Rouge achieving this.

The Khmer Rouge's ability to give the population no choice but to support them is also clear when it comes to recruitment and the organisation of rebel forces. The army was built from the bottom up; village militias were formed by the newly-selected village chiefs. The best fighters were then picked to work at the provincial level and the process was repeated until front-line forces were filled (Quinn, 1976). This structure allowed the Khmer Rouge to identify those who responded best to the individual incentives being offered to fight and in turn keep those with questionable loyalty from rising too far. Documentary accounts of life under the Khmer Rouge show how those who refused to carry out the duty selected for them were tortured, along with their families, and sent for hard labour (Vannak, 2003). This further lessened the incentive for individuals to resist serving in the Khmer Rouge forces.

The Khmer Rouge experienced huge losses throughout the conflict, both at the hands of US bombing and Khmer Republic forces. In some cases, it pursued almost suicidal tactics to make a political point. In 1973, it launched an offensive on Phnom Penh in the face of extensive US bombing, despite knowing that US bombing was due to finish a few months later (Mosyakov, 2004). Nevertheless, they never experienced a loss of manpower. Dead soldiers were always replaced quickly. Elizabeth Becker, a prominent journalist who covered the Khmer Rouge during the conflict, points out that the material and personnel losses the Khmer Rouge suffered had virtually no impact on the strength of the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge had developed an extremely resilient regenerative capacity, which allowed them to recoup losses quickly from within its constituent population

(Becker, 1998). Its power did not come from avoiding targeting, but rather its ability to continually replace those soldiers killed.

Despite the strength of rebel shadow governance structures, many in the rural population did risk fleeing rebel territory. The population of Phnom Penh doubled to one million (Becker, 1998). If the government could channel this support into an effective armed force it may well have still been able to absorb the costs of continuing the conflict given the much larger population from which it could draw support.

Urbanites – the Khmer Republic's constituents

The Khmer Rouge and the urban population

The Khmer Rouge's main focus throughout the conflict was building structures to mobilise its own target population. It did not expend effort trying to build urban resistance. However, it did dedicate resources to demobilising government support. It unleashed a propaganda campaign, tried to cut economic supply lines, swamped the city with refugees, and carried out sabotage, terrorist and assassination campaigns (Sutsakhan, 1978). It attacked rice supply routes and critical infrastructure. The inability of the government to bring food into the city sparked riots against the government, making it even more difficult for the Khmer Republic to sustain a functioning economy (Sutsakhan, 1978). Khmer Rouge activity, therefore, contributed to the debacle outlined below, which led to the government falling and the Khmer Rouge winning the war.

The Khmer Rouge also maintained a public alliance with Prince Sihanouk. Other than the initial boost in recruitment its alliance with Sihanouk gave the Khmer Rouge there is no evidence his support made any material difference. Equally, the Khmer Rouge gave Sihanouk no say in the prosecution of the war. Instead they used him as a propaganda tool, publically showing him with Khmer Rouge fighters (Kiernan, 2004). Elizabeth Becker claims this significantly affected the urban population's calculus over the potential consequences of a rebel victory.

Many people believed that Sihanouk would return to power and life after a rebel victory would see a return to the status quo before 1970 (1998).

The Khmer Republic – military over politics

In contrast to Pol Pot, Lon Nol did not recognise the importance of engaging with the population. Wilfried Deac, a French missionary living in Phnom Penh throughout the conflict, observed that Lon Nol thought US bombing would be enough to defeat the rebels (Deac and Summers Jr, 2000).

Lon Nol made no effort to improve the political system he inherited from Sihanouk. He had come to power on a wave of support from the urban population who hoped Lon Nol would end the corrupt nepotism of the Sihanouk era. However, he made very few changes at the top level of government and the urban population soon realised his government represented a continuation of the status quo (Osbourne, 1972). In the last two years of the conflict, the government almost stopped functioning. It passed one law after 1973 and this was authorising conscription, which it then failed to implement (Isaacs, 1998). Many well-trained government officials left Cambodia or were side-lined by the regime for representing a threat to Lon Nol. Many were aghast at Lon Nol's decision-making, which was based on superstition and the advice of monks rather than civilian administrators and realities on the ground (Kamm, 2011).

Lon Nol quickly dispensed with any attempt at democratic governance. He essentially ruled by presidential decree from 1971 and elections held in 1972 were heavily rigged (Short, 2005). Freedom of expression was written out of the constitution and acts of dissent, such as large-scale striking, were met with a security crackdown and widespread arrests (Shawcross, 1979). Lon Nol simply reverted back to the same practices as Sihanouk; appointing military and political figures based on corruption and nepotism (Deac and Summers Jr, 2000). Corruption became endemic, particularly in the military, as it was the only route to social advancement. Military commanders would syphon off funds rather than pay soldiers. They also supported organised crime through drug trafficking and

even selling arms provided by the US to the Khmer Rouge (Shawcross, 1979). The Khmer Rouge organised the population in areas it controlled to ensure all of its behaviour served the rebel's agenda. In contrast, the government failed to create a broad alliance with various sections of the population.

Economic decline

The Khmer Republic also delivered very limited within-war economic incentives to the population, either at a collective or selective level. In fact, areas under government control descended into a humanitarian catastrophe. The security situation contributed to worsening socioeconomic conditions and was exacerbated by rebel activities (Poole, 1972). However, government mismanagement appears to have been a far more significant factor (Etcheson, 1984).

On coming to power Lon Nol blamed the Vietnamese for the problems in Cambodia in order to justify the coup (Pouvatchy, 1986). He sanctioned violence against Vietnamese communities living in Cambodia, some of whom had been there for generations. The Vietnamese provided the skilled labour within the Cambodian economy and when they fled to avoid persecution, the Cambodian economy lost a large part of its functionality (Tully, 2010). US bombing wiped out agriculture and industrial production that could be accessed and the Khmer Rouge monopolised the remaining output (Deac and Summers Jr, 2000). The government simply had no way to feed its people and the economy sank, as picked up in the statistical model.

As the conflict wore on the population began to stop working and general strikes were common. The strikes were nearly always about the lack of food (Shawcross, 1979). This situation was made worse by the significant number of refugees that arrived in the cities after fleeing US bombing and Khmer Rouge repression (Becker, 1998). What should have been indicative of the fact that the government could still win the conflict, if it was able to draw support from the refugees, just further exacerbated the government's inability to provide for its people. The

result was mass starvation in Phnom Penh and other urban centres and the descent into poverty of the whole population barring political elites.

The government became totally reliant on humanitarian aid and external support to sustain its military. Aid, however, rarely reached its intended targets and its only real effect on the conflict was that it helped sustain corruption (Shawcross, 1979).

Anaemic military force

The historical record in Cambodia shows how the government's inability to sustain even a basic level of economic activity led to its defeat. It diminished the level of support it was able to generate from its constituent population. When this is compared to the manner in which the Khmer Rouge forced an originally passive population to provide them with an army and support for that army, the difference between the two belligerents becomes clear.

Quite simply, as Arnold Isaacs says "poverty diminished Khmer Republic soldiers will to fight" (Isaacs, 1998; p249). The government ceased to pay its army, so people stopped joining it and, in essence, stopped fighting on the government's behalf. After 1973, with general strikes raging across Phnom Penh, people began to refuse to join the army voluntarily, forcing the government to implement conscription (Shawcross, 1979). The government, however, was not strong enough to institute punishment to those who resisted and conscription failed completely. By the end of the conflict only one in three casualties were being replaced (Isaacs, 1998). Again this can be placed in stark contrast to the Khmer Rouge, who suffered far more casualties, but were always able to replace them.

Those already in the army began to desert. Desertion rose incrementally throughout the conflict and by the end of the conflict over three and a half thousand troops were deserting every month (Isaacs, 1998). The situation was exacerbated by the egregious corruption. Military commanders would take a slice of all their soldiers' wages, in many cases not paying them at all. This would force

soldiers to loot villages in the countryside in order to get basic subsistence, alienating the peasant population. It also meant soldiers had to take drastic measures to feed themselves and their families, which degraded the military's ability to carry out significant operations. Soldiers brought their families to the frontline with them, knowing they would probably starve if they left them behind. Other soldiers simply left their posts to tend to their farms or fish so they could meet their families' basic food needs (Shawcross, 1979). The government could not provide the within-war socioeconomic benefits the population craved, so the population had to attain these resources in other ways.

The wider population also began to refuse to carry out basic functions of government in protest at the squalor of Phnom Penh and the autocratic tendencies of the government (Deac and Summers Jr, 2000). All of this created a feedback effect where the government could not provide for its people, so the people further disengaged. In turn, the government had even less to provide its people, further limiting its capacity to generate support.

By 1975, most historical commentators document how the population hoped the Khmer Rouge would win and bring the conflict to an end (Poole, 1976). The population remained passive in this support. However, the contrast between historical reports of fervent support for the Khmer Republic in 1970 and the simple desire for the war to end in any way possible in 1975, shows how the sovereign power of the government changed during this period. This was the mirror image to rural areas, where the peasantry had increasingly provided active support to the Khmer Rouge.

Unfortunately, many people in the cities did not know the true nature of the Khmer Rouge, despite refugee stories, and believed propaganda that a rebel victory would see Sihanouk return to power (Etcheson, 1984). Arnold Isaacs remarked that by the end of the conflict the only people still fighting for the government were those who had lived under the Khmer Rouge (1998; p270). By maintaining Sihanouk as their public face, the Khmer Rouge had deliberately motivated this behaviour (Becker, 1998).

A group of army generals tried to recover the situation by deposing Lon Nol in April 1975 (Sutsakhan, 1978). However, the US announced a final end to any aid after the coup and many people in the army and civil service stopped working altogether. The new government originally thought it could still win the war based on the military situation, but it found it had no capacity to build that military in the first place (Sutsakhan, 1978). The government ceased to function, surrendered, and the Khmer Rouge strolled into the Phnom Penh, winning the war.

Despite being the end of the conflict, most observers seem to agree that the war itself was not the key factor in bringing down the Khmer Republic. Craig Etcheson, for example, states it is likely "it would have ended the same way for the Khmer Republic with or without the Khmer Rouge" (1984; p129). This demonstrates how the key variable in determining any war is the mobilisation capacity of the government, borne out through its ability to shape population behaviour. If the government loses this capacity, regardless of whether it is a result of rebel activity, it will lose the war.

Battlefield interaction

The preceding analysis shows how the dynamics and outcome of the Cambodian civil war were the result of belligerent behaviour towards the population. It also reveals insights into how rebels used military activity to boost their own mobilisation capacity and undermine government sovereign structures.

Rebel military activity in 1967 focussed on capturing weapons and providing activists with the ability to defend themselves when tracked down by government forces (Heder, 1979). When government forces did find rebel outposts, rebels simply fled (Etcheson, 1984). At no point during this period did they try to inflict significant losses on government forces (Kiernan, 2004). According to nearly all accounts of the conflict, the government won nearly every battle between 1967 and 1970 (eg Brown, 1972 and Osbourne, 1972). Despite this the rebels did grow

in size during this period as they developed resilient relationships with the population.

Even after 1970, the Khmer Rouge was heavily outnumbered (see figure 18). The Khmer Rouge used guerrilla tactics to mitigate its numerical disadvantage. During conventional battles, guerrilla fighters struck population zones behind government lines. This created the perception that Khmer Rouge forces were stronger than they actually were and forced the government to redirect troops to these areas, straining its capacity to mobilise enough troops to secure the population (Etcheson, 1984).

Government forces did perform badly on the battlefield, despite their numerical advantage. For one they put up no resistance against North Vietnamese encroachments (Quinn, 1976). Major offensives such as the two Chenla offensives early in the war brought little to no gains (Etcheson, 1984). However, the Khmer Rouge also showed extreme military naivety. They chose to attempt to capture Phnom Penh in 1973 under a barrage of US bombing, even though they knew US military support for the Khmer Republic would end in a few months (Etcheson, 1984). All told the Khmer Rouge lost significantly more troops during the conflict than government forces (Becker, 1998). Some reports suggest the Khmer Rouge could lose 25 percent of its force in one offensive, a figure that military strategists state should be devastating to morale and cause widespread desertion (Shawcross, 1979; p298). The Khmer Rouge appeared comfortable with this as their mobilisation structures were strong enough to continually replace these losses. Overall, the battle lines changed very little until the final months of the war and met all the criteria for a military stalemate (Etcheson, 1984). Under the cover of this stalemate, the rebels created a resilient political structure, while the government imploded. The Khmer Rouge were then able to ultimately take the capital unimpeded.

The conflict in Cambodia saw both asymmetric and conventional phases, transitioning between the two in 1970. 1970 saw the coup that deposed Norodom Sihanouk, which precipitated the North Vietnamese invasion and the collapse of

government control across large parts of the country. The Khmer Rouge used this context to build more resilient sovereign structures. The transition from insurgent activity to conventional style warfare on the part of the Khmer Rouge was clearly determined by its mobilisation capacity and ability to replace personnel and resources lost during military activity. Once the Khmer Rouge switched to a more conventional approach, however, it continued to use its military force to boost its own sovereign structures and demobilise the government rather than defeat it directly.

Its use of violence was always designed for political or economic effect. As an insurgent force it attacked the most unpopular government outposts to build support amongst the populations most affected by government efforts to collect rice (Kiernan, 2004). Strategically, it tried to foment instability to induce a coup in Phnom Penh. When it transitioned to a conventional force, it attacked supply routes and critical infrastructure, precisely because it diminished the government's ability to provide selective economic incentives to the population. Historical accounts of the conflict even show Pol Pot recognising in the early 1970s that the government would inevitably collapse if the Khmer Rouge could sustain the military stalemate (Kiernan, 2004).

Shaping strategy

External actors

The Khmer Rouge's victory can be explained by examining changes in the strength of government and rebel sovereign structures. However, external factors played a key role in these changes. Without North Vietnamese support the Khmer Rouge would have struggled to implement its political and socioeconomic policies, which it used to generate active support from the population. Commentators have observed that the Khmer Republic would have struggled to survive even if there had not been a war (Etcheson, 1984). However, the North Vietnamese intervention almost certainly accelerated this process. North Vietnam assisted the Khmer Rouge in overcoming perhaps the biggest challenge

faced by many rebel groups, securing territory to build sovereign structures. Most rebels have to rely on pre-existing social networks to build support, which creates competing loyalties for many in the population. North Vietnam allowed the Khmer Rouge to break down these pre-existing social networks and redesign society to serve its military needs. Without these sovereign structures the rebels would have found it much more difficult to capture power in 1975.

For the government, US support may well have facilitated its ultimate defeat. Aside from the effect its bombing had on the rural population, US military intervention created a classic aid trap. Lon Nol believed US military support would be sufficient to defeat the Khmer Rouge. As a result, he lacked the incentive to develop effective institutions to mobilise support from the population (Deac and Summers Jr, 2000). This represents an important lesson for external governments seeking to support allied nations; support has to be credibly contingent on the development of indigenous sovereign structures for shaping population behaviour. If an external actor provides the military force or pays recruits directly, this will lessen the short-term need for indigenous governments to develop mobilisation structures of their own, forcing external backers to continue providing support or see their allies defeated.

Personalities and ideology

The personalities of the key actors also played a role in the conflict. Pol Pot had spent years planning for this war and was systematic in the way he implemented plans to reorganise society and build a revolutionary army (Short, 2005). This also demonstrates an important additional role of ideology. The Khmer Rouge's doctrine provided a framework for building sovereign structures that were used to generate support from the population. Lon Nol, on the other hand, failed to understand the importance of building these alliances. This shows how important strategy remains in creating the conditions for building or undermining a conflict actors' ability to generate support from the population. Nothing is predetermined. The outcome of the conflict depends on the behaviour of the belligerents and their ability to build a broad alliance across the state.

Conclusion

Cambodia was the best-predicted rebel victory in the statistical model precisely because it witnessed damaging socioeconomic decline. The aim of this chapter was to test whether this decline lost the government the war because it undermined its capacity to draw support from the population. This is exactly what happened, lending strong support to both the overall theory of conflict proposed in this thesis, and the specific hypothesis related to the role of economic incentives. The government oversaw the development of absolute poverty, which led the population to refuse to fight on its behalf. The urban population decided it would rather face the consequences of a rebel victory than continue fighting.

In contrast, the Khmer Rouge used a mix of violence, socioeconomic and security based incentives to shape population behaviour. These incentives were delivered to the population through political structures that allowed the Khmer Rouge to draw a seemingly inexhaustible amount of the support from the population. As a result, the Khmer Rouge defeated the government militarily, despite the fact it controlled a smaller population, and had a smaller military force with inferior training and weaponry. Table 21, outlines the key phases the conflict went through.

In a similar vein to Burundi, the decline in socioeconomic conditions came as much through the actions of the government as a direct consequence of rebel activity. Declining socioeconomic conditions did not create more active support for the rebels, but it did create strain on the government and induced its collapse and, therefore, its defeat. This shows how to use the framework developed in chapters one to three to understand civil conflicts and lends further credence to the main message of this thesis; the outcome of civil wars is mainly rooted in changes to government mobilisation capacity. Rebels that win, do so because the institutions that the government uses to generate support from the population fall apart.

Date	Events	Conflict dynamics (table 3)	Key drivers of change	Rebel regenerative capacity	Government control over the state	Sub-hypotheses supported
1967-1970	Onset	Asymmetric warfare (Q3). Low-level of conflict, no change.	Left-wing suppressed and excluded from political process.	Urban left-wing networks relocate to rural areas. Rebels protect rural communities from government violence. Rebels fail to expand significantly, consider political engagement.	Government loses some control in rural areas, but still largely in control.	3 & 4
1970-1973	Coup ousts Prince Sihanouk External interventions	Conventional warfare (Q1). External support enables both rebels and government to develop conventional force, stalemate ensues.	Supporters of Sihanouk switch sides. External forces provide economic aid and military protection for patrons.	Rebels build extensive shadow-government structures, organising political and economic activity. Population engage to secure protection from bombing and government military activity. Khmer Rouge use extensive violence to generate support. Rebels create extremely resilient regenerative capacity.	Initial response to coup positive, government mobilise support into armed forces. Government incapable of challenging North Vietnamese forces to reclaim territory. Corruption and economic mismanagement become rife. External support initially protects government from effects of mismanagement.	2, 3 & 4
1973-1975	Conflict ends - rebel victory	-	Government collapses as cannot pay military or feed people.	Rebel shadow-government structures resilient enough to cope with loss of external support.	Without external support government is unable to mobilise resources from population to cover the costs of war and keeping state functioning.	2

Table 21: Summary of Cambodian conflict dynamics and key findings.

Chapter eight

An 'unexplained' mixed outcome: Nagorno-Karabakh

1992-1994

Introduction

The statistical model fails to explain the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Not only does it predict a mixed outcome with only a three percent probability, it suggests there was a 15 percent chance of an outright government victory. This is all the more interesting as the rebels made significant gains through the course of the conflict and achieved many of their aims.

The war in Nagorno-Karabakh involved the ethnic-Armenian population in the mountainous enclave fighting to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia. Armenians were a small minority of the overall population in Azerbaijan, about two percent, but a significant majority in Nagorno-Karabakh, outnumbering Azerbaijanis by about three to one at the end of the Soviet-era (Yamskov, 1991). The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh ended with a cessation of hostilities rather than a final peace settlement that renormalised societal and political relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, as happened in Burundi. The rebels have retained *de facto* control of the region ever since, with Azerbaijan still claiming control of the region.[54] Rebel and government forces still face each other along the line of contact and there have been periodic clashes ever since. The conflict has, therefore, never truly finished and is often described as a 'frozen conflict' (CFR, 2016). It represents a different type of mixed outcome to Burundi, explaining why the model fails to effectively predict its outcome. Nevertheless, the conflict is an extremely interesting case study for examining how macro-behaviours and structures determine the incentives that shape population support. Despite being poorly predicted, the conflict lends extremely strong

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[54] No international actor recognises Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. Even the Republic of Armenia does not recognise the Nagorno-Karabakh government, despite the military support it provides to the rebel government, which allows the latter to retain control of the enclave.

support to the main model of conflict proposed in this thesis; the rebels achieved their aims by undermining government sovereign power in the enclave and creating resilient mobilisation structures that enabled them to capture and control the region.

The polity score in Azerbaijan decreased between 1992 and 1993 from plus one to minus-three and the government had external support. This explains the model's prediction that there was a moderate chance of a government victory in 1994. Examining the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh offers the chance, therefore, to explore the utility of these variables for predicting conflict outcomes when we know they did not allow the government to generate population support in the manner expected.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has a number of other dynamics that makes it an interesting case study. Firstly, it reinforces the crucial role external interventions play in creating opportunities and disincentives for belligerents to build resilient mobilisation structures. Both sides had external support, but the rebels exploited support from the Republic of Armenia[55] to build sovereign structures, while the government's support simply reflected its inability to mobilise its own army.

Nagorno-Karabakh's war also highlights the role ethnic identity can play in determining the strength and weakness of military actors. Books such as *Transcaucasian Boundaries* (Wright et al., 1995) demonstrate some of the mutually exclusive narratives that feed into ethnic identity in Nagorno-Karabakh. The strength of ethnic identity on both sides led to conflict strategies focused around ethnic cleansing and the fact the rebels proved more successful at it goes a long way to explaining the final outcome. Ultimately, removing a community from a territory eliminates the capacity of conflict actors to draw support from that section of the population. By 1994, the government had no constituent

[55] For the purpose of this study the rebels from Nagorno-Karabakh will be referred to as Armenians. When specifically referencing actions by the state of Armenia extra clarification will be used.

population in Nagorno-Karabakh and could only recover its losses through what amounted to an external invasion, something made nearly impossible by the nature of the terrain.

The remainder of the chapter will compare the changing capacity of the rebels and the government to mobilise support in Nagorno-Karabakh, from the beginning of communal violence in 1988, to the escalation of the conflict in 1992 until the ceasefire that brought the conflict to an end in 1994.

Before 1992

Long memories

The government in Baku controlled the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh through coercion for many years before the level of military activity passed the threshold for it to be considered a civil war. Authorities had violently put down a rebellion in 1920, expelling the entire Armenian population from some areas (Kaufman, 1998).

When the Soviet Union absorbed Armenia and Azerbaijan, both claimed Nagorno-Karabakh. Josef Stalin, then head of nationalities, awarded the area to Azerbaijan, but granted Nagorno-Karabakh significant autonomy from Baku, with the region officially coming under control of the Soviet of the Mountainous Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO). This autonomy, however, meant little in the Soviet structure (Laitin and Suny, 1999). Armenians claim they experienced socioeconomic, political and cultural discrimination during the Soviet era. Azerbaijani authorities were accused of appointing leaders loyal to Baku in Nagorno-Karabakh's political, economic and law-enforcement bodies (Papazian, 2001) and rigging administrative elections (Geukjian, 2012). They imposed Azeri as the official language, prevented Armenian schools from teaching Armenian history and banned Armenian textbooks (Geukjian, 2012; p108). They were also

accused of closing Armenian churches,[56] arresting Armenian clerics and destroying Armenian cemeteries (Papazian, 2001). According to Ohannes Geukjian (2012; p111), Azerbaijani authorities focused economic projects in Azerbaijani towns and villages and ignored Armenian-dominated population centres. The validity of these claims is obviously in dispute. Audrey Aldstadt's analysis showed that there was no clear socioeconomic or cultural discrimination of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh (1994). That said, according to Thomas de Waal, while Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh were no worse off than their Azerbaijani neighbours, they were worse off than the population in Armenia, and for many this was their point of reference (2013). Nevertheless, it is clear from the historical analysis conducted by Armenian authors that Azerbaijani discrimination of Armenians was taken as fact by the Armenian population (Wright et al., 1995).

Perhaps, most damaging of all is the accusation that Azerbaijan adopted a policy of creating a favourable demographic shift in Nagorno-Karabakh (Papazian, 2001). In the 1920s, Armenians constituted 94.4 percent of the population in Nagorno-Karabakh. By 1988, this had dropped to 75 percent due to an increase in Azerbaijani settlements and emigration by Armenians seeking socioeconomic opportunities elsewhere in the Soviet Union (Yamskov, 1991). Armenians had seen a similar demographic shift in another autonomous region of Azerbaijan, Nakhchivan. Stalin granted Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan in the same decree in which he gave it Nagorno-Karabakh, despite it having no land border with Azerbaijan.[57] When it was granted to Azerbaijan in the 1920s, Armenians were 15 percent of the population. By 1979, this had shrunk to 1.4 percent (Geukjian, 2012). The Armenian population, therefore, received signals during the Soviet period from the Azerbaijani authorities, that at the first opportunity, the government would eject them from Nagorno-Karabakh.

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[56] Azerbaijanis are Shia Muslims, whereas Armenians practice orthodox Christianity. This divide appears to have only played a very limited role in the conflict and, as such, is not treated in any detail.

[57] Nakhchivan is surrounded by Armenia to the north, Iran to the south and has a small border with Turkey in its extreme northwest.

Glasnost

The Armenian intelligentsia pounced on President Gorbachev's increased tolerance of political protest to petition for Nagorno-Karabakh to be made part of the Armenian SSR. Moscow's decision to allow protests to take place emboldened activists even further and on 20th February 1988 the NKAO adopted a resolution calling for Nagorno-Karabakh to be transferred to Armenia. This was supported by mass protests in Yerevan, Armenia's capital. *Glasnost* had significantly reduced the costs to individuals seeking to challenge the government (Croissant, 1998). As Levon Chorbajian puts it , when comparing the potential costs of protesting before and after glasnost; "to be a participant in urban demonstrations and general strikes, one had to be a person who was willing to face martial law, curfews, and perhaps tear gas and a water cannon not torture, death and Siberian exile" (2001; p5). The costs for challenging the government had been lowered.

What followed remains a source of contention and sources differ over the exact order of events. It is clear that anti-Armenian violence began to spread in Azerbaijan in response to the protests. In an industrial town called Sumgait, with a population of around 223,000 and an Armenian minority of 15-20,000, violence led to 32 Armenians being killed according to Soviet sources (Cheterian, 2009). The Armenian population was effectively forced to flee Sumgait. Around this time, the main opposition to Soviet rule in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF), began to blockade Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian border. Eventually the Azerbaijani authorities (still within the Soviet Union at this time) enforced the blockade as well (Croissant, 1998).

Fearing expulsion from Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian population began to adopt violence as its principal means of challenging the Azerbaijani authorities. Armenian militias formed 'self-defence' forces based around a variety of relationships, from kinship, to universities, collective farms, industrial plants or criminal networks. Azerbaijani villages in Nagorno-Karabakh responded with local strong men building forces to challenge Armenian militias (Zurcher, 2007). Communal violence became a feature of daily life. Communities were drawn to

these militias as the only means to protect themselves. As the violence escalated the remaining Armenian population in other areas of Azerbaijan fled to Armenia (Croissant, 1998).

As Azerbaijan still formed part of the Soviet Union, the first efforts to end the violence came from Moscow. In 1989, Moscow offered a political compromise, imposing direct-rule from Moscow and the promise of socioeconomic development in Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for the two communities agreeing to stop fighting. Interestingly, this did have a positive effect on the conflict. 1989 saw the lowest amount of violence in the whole of the period of 1988-1994, with only 40 people being killed (Kaufman, 1998; p32).

The Soviet Union balanced these positive incentives with collective punishments. First it arrested prominent activists, who had organised themselves as the Karabakh Committee (de Waal, 2013). In addition, despite the partial success of its proposed political compromise, the Soviets became impatient with the rebels and returned administration of Nagorno-Karabakh to Baku (Zurcher, 2007). It then launched Operation Ring, a joint operation with Azerbaijani OMON (a special police unit) in 1991 in an attempt to disarm rebel militias (Human Rights Watch, 1994). The Soviets targeted Armenian communities accused of instigating violence. Any towns that offered resistance were subjected to artillery barrages until they submitted. In many instances the entire population was deported to either Stepanakert (the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh) or Armenia-proper. The population was then replaced by ethnic Azerbaijanis, many of whom had been expelled from Armenia in the previous three years (Human Rights Watch, 1994). Observers describe the operation as a form of collective punishment designed to undermine popular support for the rebels (Helsinki Watch, 1993; Human Rights Watch, 1992; Melander, 2001). While scholars are not in universal agreement,[58] Erik Melander claims the operation, combined with the effects of the economic blockade, undermined support for the rebels. Some Armenian political leaders

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[58] Ohannes Geukjian, for example, claims the operation hardened the population's resolve and strengthened the rebels (2012). The longer-term impact this had is discussed below.

considered accepting autonomy in Azerbaijan as part of a political settlement to end the violence (2001).

Ultimately, the Soviets called off the operation. The army was sent back to Moscow in response to the coup to remove President Gorbachev, which also signalled the final days of the Soviet Union. Shortly afterwards both Armenia and Azerbaijan declared independence, as did Nagorno-Karabakh. The break-up of the Soviet military also meant the two belligerents suddenly had access to more weaponry, both in terms of quantity of arms and its lethality (de Waal, 2013). Increased weaponry and the development of independent sovereign structures meant violence escalated and took an increasingly organised form, transitioning the enclave to a state of war. Violence, however, was still mainly communal in nature, with local militias making up the majority of armed personnel on both sides. The rebels had a burgeoning political structure, while the authorities in Baku now had control over the counterinsurgent response. Nagorno-Karabakh found itself in a straightforward state-building competition. The war would be won by the nascent political structure able to build effective sovereign structures across the territory and organise their militias and communities into a cohesive military force.

The rebels and the population

The rebel's strategic aim was to liberate Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijani control. The enduring perception of discrimination and more recent violence undertaken by the Baku authorities and Azerbaijani communities meant the whole Armenian population supported these aims (de Waal, 2013). The strength of Armenian identity almost certainly lessened the collective mobilisation problem by creating a shared perception of the benefits of a rebel victory. However, the promise of unification with Armenia is a collective and post-war benefit, which made it difficult for the rebels to mobilise support using this incentive alone. It had existed for over seventy years and had not been enough to base a movement around. For the rebels to build an effective force they would have to offer Armenian communities more immediate benefits. In the event, the

rebels delivered a range of incentives and converted the clear sentimental support they enjoyed into active behavioural support, allowing them to create effective political and military institutions.

A de facto government

The rebels created local governance structures in Nagorno-Karabakh when the pre-existing ones were dissolved by the Soviets in 1989. One of the main challenges faced by rebel groups is building sovereign structures that can compete with pre-existing government institutions. The Azerbaijani government was inadvertently demobilised by the Soviets, creating a significant opportunity for the rebels to develop mobilisation structures of their own.

It formed local councils that then elected a national council, which became the *de facto* government of Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh (Zurcher, 2007). According to Levon Abrahamian this was particularly effective as Karabakh society remained feudally structured, which the councils could be organised around. It was, therefore, possible for rebel authorities to communicate with the population through societal structures that were understood and respected (2001).

While the economic blockade created hardship in rebel-held regions, the rebels alleviated this suffering through the course of the conflict. Suzanne Goldenberg states that by the end of 1993, life in Nagorno-Karabakh had returned to a degree of normality (1994). The rebels achieved this through five main efforts.

Governance structures

In many conflict zones, nefarious actors exploit the law and order vacuum to establish a shadow economy. According to Human Rights Watch, the rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh controlled the 'war economy' and kept it focused on supporting their war aims (1994). Rebel governance structures were hierarchical and organised enough to prevent independent warlords from exploiting the

population. Human Rights Watch reports show that they ran a "highly centralised state" (1994; p27). They controlled the gas market, ensuring it was evenly distributed and affordable for the population. This was in contrast to even the Republic of Armenia, where the high price of gas, due to a rapacious black market, caused significant socioeconomic problems (Human Rights Watch, 1994). They also managed to keep basic services running, such as hospitals, and ensured most children could attend school (Cox and Eibner, 1993).

External support

There is little doubt that external support for the rebels was a key factor. Support from Armenia-proper allowed the rebels to shape population behaviour in two main ways. Firstly, it gave them a military force capable of capturing territory in the first place. By 1994, there were 10,000 people in the Nagorno-Karabakh Army, but 20,000 Republic of Armenia troops fighting on the rebel side (Zurcher, 2007; p175). Nagorno-Karabakh is highly mountainous and access in and out of the region is extremely difficult. Militarily this gives the defenders a significant advantage. Chorbajian, et al. claim attackers would need a ten-to-one numerical advantage in order to conquer the region (1994; p41). The military support provided by the Republic of Armenia helped the rebels capture this territory, creating a security blanket, which allowed the rebels to build effective sovereign structures.

The Republic of Armenia also provided significant economic aid, which the rebels distributed between military spending and the provision of supplies to the population (Lynch, 2002).

Military activity

The rebels also geared military activity around establishing a functioning state. Their first goal was to open supply lines to Armenia. Initially the rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh found themselves surrounded by Azerbaijan, but they managed to capture the town of Khojaly in early 1992, giving them an air bridge

to Armenia and partially alleviating the blockade on the region (Croissant, 1998). That same month, the rebels captured the Lachin corridor, an area outside of Nagorno-Karabakh, which gave them a land connection with Armenia, essentially breaking the blockade (Human Rights Watch, 1994). They continued to widen this corridor throughout the conflict, enabling them to fully exploit their external support.

The rebels also focused resources on capturing towns that had socioeconomic value. For example, the capture of Mardakert in 1993 secured access to the main reservoir and hydroelectric power station in Nagorno-Karabakh. Human Rights Watch claims this gave the rebels the capacity to provide basic services to rebel-held areas (1994). According to International Crisis Group reports, they chose to create settlements in places such as the Lachin corridor, which is key to supplying the enclave. In contrast, they left areas without political or economic value empty after ejecting the Azerbaijani population (2005).

In the summer of 1993, Armenian forces captured significant amounts of territory outside of Nagorno-Karabakh claiming it made them better able to defend their constituent population. These offensives included expanding the territory around the Lachin corridor, most notably the town of Kelbajar, which further facilitated economic and military support from Armenia (Human Rights Watch, 1994). This demonstrates how military activity is a crucial element of civil war. However, it needs to be examined to see what effect it has on a belligerent's capacity to shape population behaviour. In Nagorno-Karabakh, capturing specific territory was key to enabling the rebels to generate support by facilitating political and socioeconomic activity and stabilising life inside rebel-controlled areas.

Providing security

The rebels also demonstrated their ability to protect Armenian civilians. As Mary Kaldor shows, the Armenian population bore the brunt of Azerbaijani military activity (2007). Azerbaijani forces used villages and towns populated by ethnic Azerbaijanis to launch attacks on neighbouring Armenian communities. The

rebels clearly saw this as a genuine strategic threat. For one, they ensured Armenian populations did not flee despite pressure from Azerbaijani forces. Rebel political authorities forbade civilians from fleeing conflict areas. According to Vicken Cheterian this was because they recognised that once an area was depopulated it would be much more difficult to motivate forces to defend it (2009; p131). Rebels also focused military activity on Azerbaijani towns that were being used to launch attacks against Armenian communities. They would then depopulate these areas, ensuring the attacks ceased.

Expelling opposition

While the rebels offered the Armenian population a range of political, socioeconomic and security based incentives, they mainly used violence to shape the behaviour of ethnic Azerbaijanis. Human Rights Watch accused Armenian forces of deliberately targeting Azerbaijani villages with no military justification. It also accused rebels of imposing economic blockades on Azerbaijani villages, in a similar manner to those imposed by Azerbaijani forces on Armenian communities (Human Rights Watch, 1992).

Ultimately, the rebels expelled the whole Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh. OSCE reports from the time claim that the destruction of Azerbaijani towns was planned in Stepanakert (Human Rights Watch, 1994). In Khojaly, they killed a large number of civilians, which according to Vicken Cheterian was explicitly designed to send a message to other Azerbaijanis on the consequences of not fleeing (2009). According to a Human Rights Watch report, after Khojaly when they sieged a town they would leave a passage out of the area for civilians, incentivising the population to leave rather than stay and resist (1994). Those towns with no strategic value were then destroyed in order to make it difficult for the population to countenance returning (de Waal, 2013).

Rebels expelled Azerbaijani communities in lieu of being able to shape their behaviour through other means. In 1994, a rebel commander described the logic driving the expulsion of Azerbaijanis to Human Rights Watch; "(we) deported

civilians because (we) did not have enough forces to occupy land and pacify a hostile civilian population." (Human Rights Watch, 1994; p60). By the end of 1992, rebel forces had expelled nearly the entire Azerbaijani population (Helsinki Watch, 1993).

Political power creates military power

As a result of their governance activities, rebel leaders developed enormous authoritative power over the population (Zurcher, 2007). They channelled this support into the creation of an effective military force. The parliament of the self-declared state of Nagorno-Karabakh managed to subordinate all of the Armenian militias into a single force, known as the Popular Liberation of Artsukh[59] (Human Rights Watch, 1992). It organised local businesses to support the conflict effort, providing essential supplies to soldiers on the front line (de Waal, 2013). Similarly, Saideman and Ayres show how expelling Azerbaijani communities meant they did not have to drain resources pacifying a rebellious population (2008). As a consequence, all the resources that rebel leaders generated from the population and the Republic of Armenia were invested in creating a resilient armed force with a strong regenerative capacity. Few resources were needed to demobilise government support in the region from 1993 onwards.

Perhaps the most impressive feature of rebel ability to mobilise support was their conscription drives. Rebel authorities adopted a policy of conscription for all men between the age of eighteen and forty-five. They had no problem enforcing it and mobilised almost the entire able-bodied male population (Zurcher, 2007). Whenever Azerbaijani forces made gains, the rebels generated increased support from the population. In February 1994, after Azerbaijan launched a series of successful counterattacks, the rebels raised the conscription age to 50 and with these extra forces recaptured lost land[60] (Human Rights Watch, 1994).

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[59] The Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh
[60] The Republic of Armenia also often provided extra support in response to any gains by Azerbaijani forces (Human Rights Watch, 1994).

The rebels solved the collective mobilisation problem through the creation of hierarchical governance structures that fed into a unified war effort. These structures were based on rebel ability to provide effective governance, a functioning economy, basic public services and security to the Armenian population. While the Armenian population all agreed with the war aims of the rebels, it took building credible political structures to provide within-war benefits for this to be converted into an effective military force.

The government of Azerbaijan and the population

Reinforcing perceptions

Armenian perceptions of the Azerbaijani government were ingrained before the war started. Government behaviour throughout the conflict, however, only solidified these beliefs.

Many Armenian authors point to violence in Sumgait in 1988 and Baku in 1990, as demonstrating that Armenians were not safe living under Azerbaijani rule (Saideman and Ayres, 2008). Azerbaijan's strategy inside Nagorno-Karabakh further reinforced this perception. NGO reports from the beginning of the conflict show that Baku had almost no effective control in Nagorno-Karabakh from early in the conflict (Amnesty International, 1994; Helsinki Watch, 1993; Human Rights Watch, 1992 and 1994). This left them with only threats of force and the economic blockade as possible means to shape population behaviour (Halbach, 2013). Michael Croissant argues that Azerbaijan's strategy for defeating the Armenian rebels was to try to break the will of the Armenian population and increase the costs they would face if they supported rebel authorities (1998; p78). At no stage, did they offer the Armenian population direct benefits if they supported the government instead.

Operation Ring operated on a logic of collective punishment and the government continued indiscriminately targeting civilian communities throughout the conflict. Human Rights Watch accused the Azerbaijani government of using its air

force solely to demoralise Armenian civilians, targeting towns and villages that had no military value (1994). In the early stages of the conflict, when Azerbaijani militias still controlled large numbers of towns and villages they would indiscriminately launch artillery barrages against Armenian population centres, including Stepanakert (Maresca, 1996).

As well as using violence to affect population behaviour, Azerbaijani forces blockaded the region in an attempt to undermine rebel capacity to generate support. In the early years of the conflict this blockade did have an effect. Human Rights Watch reported in 1992 that Stepanakert was effectively at a standstill.

Emptying Nagorno-Karabakh

Vicken Cheterian argues the government learnt from Sumgait and tried to use this strategy in Nagorno-Karabakh to create larger swathes of territory it could control (2009; p151). In Sumgait, Azerbaijani pressure incited hundreds of thousands of Armenians to leave other parts of Azerbaijan after the troubles had begun in 1988. In 1990, as the conflict began to grow, it emptied numerous villages in northern Nagorno-Karabakh and during Operation Ring 10,000 people were deported (Cheterian, 2009). This was the centrepiece of the government's strategy to defeat rebel forces. It tried to eliminate rebel capacity to generate support and regenerate military losses by removing the population from rebellious areas.

Ultimately, however, the strategy was doomed to fail. The pre-existing ethnic balance in Nagorno-Karabakh and the ability of the population in the region to organise themselves into defensive militias made it impossible for the Azerbaijani authorities to completely purge the region (Cheterian, 2009).

Political dysfunction

In contrast to rebel ability to convert community-based militias into a functioning army, the government's campaign was undermined by its inability to build an

effective force in Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite sharing the government's desire to retain control over the region, Azerbaijani communities across the whole country did not provide the government behavioural support.

Many authors document how each Azerbaijani village had its own militia commanded by a local strong man with no central authority coordinating activity (Aldstadt, 1997; de Waal, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 1992 and 1994). The problem this created for Azerbaijan was that foot soldiers' loyalty was then directed towards the strong man, and his personal goals, rather than the broader war effort. For example, Colonel Suret Husseinov, grew in power through "his ability to keep his men well-fed and shod" (Goldenberg, 1994; p124). He also secured acclaim from the Azerbaijani population after some early military victories. Consequently, despite failing to score any further military success and with no officially appointed position, in 1993, he was effectively commanding the northern front of Azerbaijani forces (Aldstadt, 1997).

The first president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov, rather than organising these militias into one fighting force, attempted to disband them. He feared they were more likely to be used against him than against Armenian rebels (Kaldor, 2007). This weakened the Azerbaijani government's fighting capacity in the early period of the conflict as Azerbaijan lacked a functioning military (ibid.). NGO reports at the time show that there was a limited command and control relationship between the Azerbaijan central command and the militias fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh (Human Rights Watch, 1992). In June 1992, the leader of the APF, Albufaz Elchibey, succeeded Mutalibov as president. Elchibey also failed to unite the various fighting forces operating in Nagorno-Karabakh (Aldstadt, 1997; p136).

The impact of this inability to create a unified military force was most apparent in the fall of Keljabar in 1993, which secured the rebels land access to the Republic of Armenia. Upon coming under attack, Husseinov simply retreated from the town and left it to rebel forces (Goldenberg, 1994). Given their loyalty to Husseinov, his men followed him. The Human Rights Watch Report, *Seven Years*

of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (1994), shows this was standard practice for Azerbaijani forces throughout the conflict and the militias rarely stood and fought; surrendering Azerbaijani civilians to face the full force of Armenian advances.

After the fall of Keljabar, Elchibey tried to remove Husseinov from his commanding role. Husseinov took his men and marched on Baku demanding Elchibey's resignation. Eventually, Elchibey fled and Heydar Aliyev became the new president, with Husseinov as his prime minister.

While not by design, Azerbaijan ended up organising the population inside Nagorno-Karabakh through relations with militia leaders and local strong men. These people were well supported by the population. However, if the strong man switches allegiance, as Husseinov effectively did, then his fighters and the population go with him. Ultimately, commentators agree that during the early stages of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani political elites' primary focus was fighting amongst themselves for power in Baku, rather than fighting Armenian rebels (Aldstadt, 1997; de Waal, 2013). The government failed to assert any sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, allowing rebels a free hand to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Heydar Aliyev was the first figure powerful enough to somewhat unify the fighting forces towards a single goal (Helsinki Watch, 1993). Even then Aliyev could not get the population to actively support the armed conflict. Many people continued to avoid attempts to implement the draft (Laitin and Suny, 1999). "Press gang raids were a common occurrence, with youths being pulled off buses and stopped in public places for induction" (Human Rights Watch, 1994; p83). Aliyev was so concerned that Azerbaijani units would continue to desert in the face of Armenian action he would deploy two units in parallel; the first would fight Armenian forces, while the second unit would stand behind the first, with orders to shoot deserting soldiers (Chorbajian et al., 1994).

Insecurity

Despite the dysfunction in the capital, at the start of the conflict there remained an Azerbaijani population inside Nagorno-Karabakh that the government could have used to build support. Azerbaijanis still accounted for 25 percent of the region's population. However, government signals through the course of the conflict were that they were not interested in supporting their needs. For starters, the Azerbaijani government's lack of control forced the Azerbaijani population to seek protection from militias (Geukjian, 2012). Once the tide of the conflict turned against the Azerbaijanis, the only signal the population received was that the government would not protect it from rebel forces. When the government did offer to evacuate civilians, soldiers forced themselves onto helicopters and left civilians behind (Human Rights Watch, 1994). Thomas de Waal documents two visible impacts this perception had on the Azerbaijani population behaviour; civilians would flee cities being attacked (2013; loc3521) and then refuse to return to areas that government forces liberated (loc4377). This is in stark contrast to rebel ability to protect its constituent population and motivate it to stay in the region. The government could no longer generate manpower, supplies and finances, while the rebels had steady access to all different types of support.

How to lose a civil war

Everything the government did between 1992 and 1994, as well the years immediately preceding 1992, made it harder for it to generate support and easier for the rebels.

Commentators noted that Azerbaijan's strategy of targeting Armenian civilians and trying to make conditions in the territory unbearable had the opposite effect to that intended. Ohannes Geukjian argues Operation Ring forced the population under the protection of rebel militias (2012). Similarly, Caroline Cox and John Eibner argue the population responded to the rising number of civilian casualties at the hands of Azerbaijani forces by being more motivated to support Armenian rebels. It even motivated the Armenian population to support rebel efforts to

empty Azerbaijani villages and the targeting of Azerbaijani civilians (Cox and Eibner, 1993). Dov Lynch, writes that the economic blockade played into the rebel leaders' narrative that the Azerbaijani government was intent on destroying the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh (2002; p844). This, in turn, justified operations outside of Nagorno-Karabakh to alleviate the economic blockade and provide a security buffer to protect Armenian civilians.

The government's failure to protect Azerbaijani civilians meant it was completely demobilised inside the main battlefield. By the end of 1992, rebel forces had expelled nearly the whole Azerbaijani population from the region (Helsinki Watch, 1993). Vicken Cheterian shows how this further limited the motivation of Azerbaijani fighters (2009). Most importantly, the mountainous nature of Nagorno-Karabakh made control over territory paramount. Once Nagorno-Karabakh was completely under Armenian control it was extremely difficult for the Azerbaijanis to penetrate it and degrade support for the rebels.

In essence, the rebels were better at ethnic cleansing than the government, and this is what allowed them to create favourable conditions on the ground. After the rebels ethnically cleansed the region, as far as the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh was concerned, the Azerbaijani government became largely irrelevant; it had been demobilised.

The political chaos in Baku and its inability to bring Azerbaijani militias also contributed to the weakness of government military forces. Rebel forces made significant gains every time political infighting shifted political elites' focus from the war in Nagorno-Karabakh to power in Baku (Goldenberg, 1994). President Aliyev, stated in a speech on his defence reforms in November 1993, that the inability of previous governments to motivate soldiers to fight was the Azerbaijani government's key weakness in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

> "It must be noted that our defeats are due, on the one hand, to
> weakness and the Azerbaijani Army units' lack of fighting and skill...It
> is no secret that our soldiers and fighters in Jebrayil Raion and in

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Horadiz and elsewhere abandoned the civilians and fled the battle zones without putting up any fight....It would have been possible to create an army over two or three years and defend Azerbaijan. But this opportunity was lost, and Azerbaijan's defense (sic) has suffered rather than improved. Various groups and battalions fought independently of each other. They served various forces and goals and lacked an overall military strategy." (Human Rights Watch, 1994; pp82–83).

The ceasefire

The beginning of 1994 saw fresh Azerbaijani advances, making headway back into Nagorno-Karabakh. However, once again the rebels mobilised increased support and recaptured all the territory they had lost, in what was by far the bloodiest period of the conflict. Aliyev agreed to a Russian-mediated ceasefire. As figure 19 shows, combined forces from Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia now controlled nearly 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory, nine percent if Nagorno-Karabakh is discounted (de Waal, 2013).

Figure 19: Areas of Armenian rebel control at the end of the conflict.

The rebels made these gains as they mobilised their own constituent population and demobilised that of the government. They created political structures that converted popular sentiment into behavioural support. They expelled the Azerbaijani population, removing the government's capacity to generate resistance inside Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, the government failed to cohere local support into organised military activity, with local powerbrokers instead using their influence on the ground to boost their own political power.

However, the rebels failed to force the government to formally recognise these gains and, at the time of writing, Azerbaijan still refuses to recognise Nagorno-Karabakh. Given their relative strength, why did the rebels agree to a ceasefire without having achieved this recognition?

The ending of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has been held up as an example of a mutually hurting military stalemate inducing the parties to sign a ceasefire (Halbach, 2013; Mooradian and Druckman, 1999). Indeed, the dataset used in the statistical model shows a significant rise in battlefield deaths in the year preceding the ceasefire. This does not capture the months before the ceasefire in 1994, which according to reports also saw significant war deaths (Human Rights Watch, 1994). However, the model showed no correlation between an increase in battlefield deaths and the end of civil wars. The idea of a military hurting stalemate inducing a ceasefire either makes Nagorno-Karabakh an anomaly or it is not a complete explanation.

The government

For the government, the argument that its military losses induced it into signing the ceasefire holds some weight. Most of the military losses in 1993 and 1994 were Azerbaijani forces. Moreover, the inability of the government to make any lasting headway in capturing back land in Nagorno-Karabakh revealed the potential costs associated with reasserting control over the region. Mooradian and Druckman conducted interviews with Azerbaijani politicians, who they quote as saying they needed to avoid further bloodshed (1999). The government was

clearly 'hurting' and had realised the war could not be won militarily now that the rebels held the territorial advantage. However, Mooradian and Druckman also argue that previous mediations had been doomed to fail because both actors had divided militaries and weak political leaders (p726). Before the ceasefire was signed in 1994 this also changed in Azerbaijan. Losses in the conflict had already led to the fall of two Azerbaijani presidents in 1992 and 1993. The ascent of Heydar Aliyev brought a stronger leader to power. According to Carol Migdalovitz, Aliyev recognised that further losses would threaten his political power. However, in the early months of his reign he had the capacity to disband the militias that could threaten him (2001). In other words, Aliyev was able to impose an unpopular settlement on his constituents when it became clear the war could not be won. The previous two presidents faced similar costs for continuing the conflict, but any signs of weakness would have certainly led to their demise. Aliyev's ability to prevent opposition to a settlement, in other words to control the behaviour of his constituent population, was as key to his ability to sign the ceasefire as the heavily unfavourable military situation.

The rebels

From the rebel perspective, the hurting stalemate explains even less about the decision to agree to a cessation of hostilities. For one, the rebels had achieved as much as they could militarily. In contrast to the other three wars looked at in this study, where the conflict was about control over the state, the rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh only wanted to secure the secession of their region. When the ceasefire was signed, the rebels could sell it as a victory. A direct comparison can be made to 1991, when simply beginning an initiative to start negotiations resulted in the murder of its most active rebel supporter, Valery Grigoryan (Melander, 2001). A deal in 1991 would have made more sense in terms of the rebels 'hurting' and being forced into concessions. At this time rebel authorities were "reconsidering the feasibility of their struggle" given "the massive damage being inflicted on the Armenian population" by Operation Ring (Melander, 2001; p69). The population and the leadership, however, were divided on the issue, and the more militant faction won out.

In contrast, in 1994, the rebels were in the ascendency. In the Mooradian and Druckman article they refer to an interview with a senior Nagorno-Karabakh official who states "that freedom (was) worth the severe price that was paid" (1999; p723). This seems to suggest the Armenians thought they had secured their freedom and the ceasefire was not a significant concession. By April 1994, they had overturned nearly all of the territorial losses they had suffered in late 1993 and the humanitarian impact of the war had largely been brought under control. The population and the fledgling *de facto* state were no longer under threat and the rebels had monopolised sovereignty in Nagorno-Karabakh. From this perspective the rebels had little left to fight for militarily, so if the government was willing to agree to the ceasefire there was little for rebel authorities to lose. The rebels remaining goals would be international recognition and the lifting of the economic blockade.

As suggested in the theory section of this thesis, it appears the government calculated its decision to negotiate in a manner that better fits traditional models of civil war; balancing the probability of victory against the potential costs of winning. In contrast, the rebels only based their decision on whether to negotiate on their perceptions around the prospect of winning, only potentially mooting a ceasefire in 1991 when Operation Ring was increasingly threatening their ability to generate support.

Ultimately it was able to get the government to sign the ceasefire and create a sense of permanence precisely because it had dragged government forces into a hurting 'military stalemate'. As in the other two wars covered so far, this supports the notion that a military stalemate that then exerts socioeconomic and political pressure on the government, threatening the government's wider ability to function, is an effective modus operandi for rebel groups. Two governments fell in Baku because they failed to quell the rebellion. The fact that two governments fell and were replaced by actors in Baku suggests territorially-focused groups may face an extra difficulty when compared to rebels attempting to capture the whole state. In a war to capture the state, if the rebels can induce a government to collapse then they can fill that void themselves. In conflicts where rebel aims

are more limited territorially, the government is liable to reconstitute itself and keep battling the rebels, as happened in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Military factors

The rebels used their military to open up supply routes, protect the civilian population and eject Azerbaijani communities. The government tried to use its military to rid the region of Armenian communities, but was not as effective. Analysing the impact of military interaction through this lens yields more interesting insights than looking at in a more conventional manner.

For example, the balance of power always favoured the government as outlined in figure 20, suggesting by itself it reveals little about the likely course of the conflict.

Figure 20: Balance of power in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1992 and 1994[61] (Zurcher, 2007)

Territory was the key military aspect of the conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh is highly mountainous and access in and out of the region is extremely difficult. Militarily this gives defenders a significant advantage. Chorbajian et al. claim attackers would need a ten-to-one numerical advantage in order to conquer the region (1994; p41). By 1994, the rebels controlled the region, which gave them a significant military advantage, given the relatively balanced military numbers. However, just looking at the situation in 1994 does not tell the whole story. In 1992, at the beginning of the conflict, it was the government that should have benefitted from the hostile terrain. The border of Nagorno-Karabakh falls entirely inside Azerbaijan, with no contiguous border with Armenia. Christoph Zurcher documents how this essentially isolated the Armenian population from any

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[61] Rebel numbers include both local forces and those supplied by the Republic of Armenia. 13,000 of the 21,000 rebel troops in 1992 were volunteers from the Republic of Armenia. In 1994, Republic of Armenia support was more organised, with 20,000 Republic of Armenia troops augmenting the 10,000 strong Nagorno-Karabakh Army.

outside support (2007). It was very easy for Azerbaijan to impose the economic blockade on the region, undermining the rebels' access to both economic and military support from the Republic of Armenia. As such, while the territorial situation hugely favoured the rebels in 1994, in 1992 it made it much easier for the government to isolate the rebels. Territory, therefore, played a key role in the conflict, but only when one looks at how it affected the ability to the rebels to generate support from the population at various points in the conflict.

Battlefield outcomes

According to Mary Kaldor, military forces rarely ever confronted each other directly, with the principle military aim being to blockade a town until it surrendered. The invading forces would then expel the population and destroy the town (2007). Commentators unanimously agree that there was limited military logic to most of the military interaction, and military forces were used to affect the behaviour of populations (eg Human Rights Watch, 1994). The main logic of rebel and government military interaction can be found in the way it affected their ability to mobilise support from the population, as documented in more detail above.

Rebel leaders clearly did not choose to fight based on a belief that they had a stronger army that could defeat Azerbaijani forces directly in 1992. According to John Maresca, the head of the OSCE mediating mission, the Minsk Group, Azerbaijani assaults on Stepanakert at the end of 1991 could have theoretically created a 'ripe' moment for peace. He states it was known by all parties that the Azerbaijanis were stronger militarily in 1992; there were daily military assaults on Stepanakert and the rebels still did not have a supply line to Armenia (1996; p478). Moreover, at this time, none of the deficiencies of the Azerbaijani military had presented themselves. In his view the rebels should have calculated that their odds of victory were minimal and should have been seeking a potential peace deal. However, while some rebel leaders considered a peace offer, most were committed to pursuing the conflict to its conclusion (1996; p480). It is clear, therefore, that something other than hard military facts informed the rebel

leaders' perception of their strength and, as a consequence, their ability to ultimately force the Azerbaijani government into concessions by taking up arms. Most obviously, it was their perception of their ability to mobilise support that made them believe the war would be won.

Factors affecting strategy

External events

External support played an important role as in most wars, however, it was not the quantity, but the quality of support that made the difference. The Republic of Armenia's support gave the rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh the ability to generate internal support in a way they could have never achieved by themselves. In contrast, the majority of the meaningful support the government received from Turkey, Russia and mercenaries from Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union, was military in nature (de Waal, 2013). There is no evidence that this support caused the government to become complacent about its ability to win the conflict, as the Cambodian government had done. That they needed these forces, however, demonstrates Baku's inability to build its own force in the region. Before 1992, Azerbaijan relied on the Soviet Union to control the population in Nagorno-Karabakh. Once the Soviet Union fell, Azerbaijan could no longer maintain the same threat of violence to control the Armenian population (Cheterian, 2009). Essentially, the Republic of Armenia replaced the Soviet Union as the guarantors of security in Nagorno-Karabakh, allowing rebels to build sovereign structures and demobilise the government in the region.

History

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh also shows how history can play a role in shaping population behaviour. The legacy of ethnic relations between the two communities, and the Armenian narrative of persecution, shaped how both

communities perceived events as they were unfolding.[62] Armenian communities believed the costs of not supporting the rebel authorities would be their expulsion from the region (Cheterian, 2009). This made it easier for the rebels to generate support from the population. Moreover, the fact that the government had always succeeded in suppressing dissent in the region by punishing Armenians violently and removing rebellious populations meant this was its default strategy. However, the fall of the Soviet Union removed the extra military muscle the Azerbaijani authorities could rely on to execute this strategy and allowed the Republic of Armenia to support its ethnic brethren. The legacy of history and ethnic identity, therefore, cannot be discounted in shaping the strategy belligerents use to influence population behaviour.

Internal events

The final interesting factor that comes out of Nagorno-Karabakh is how events that were only tangentially related to the conflict affected the outcome. The level of democracy did decline in Baku, but not as a result of increased repression against the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh. In Burundi, the change in polity score and status of the Hutus reflected a change in their relationship with the government. The change for the better helped to demobilise support for the Hutu rebels and forced them to engage with the new political realities. In Azerbaijan, the changing polity score reflected Haydar Aliyev cementing control in Baku at the expense of his political rivals. This change had no impact on the government's relationship with the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh, which by then was shielded from government influence.

The ascent of Aliyev to power did, however, impact the government's strategy for dealing with the war. His increased power enabled him to refocus efforts away from a purely military strategy and double down on the economic and political

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[62] Many Armenian authors show how the population compared Azerbaijani attempts to deport Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh to the death of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915 as they were expelled from Turkey. An event that is often referred to as the 'Armenian genocide' (Cheterian, 2008).

strategy that the government has continued to employ since 1994 (Laitin and Suny, 1999). No previous leader could have achieved this without losing his position. Political dynamics not explicitly linked to the conflict in a state, therefore, also clearly play a role in the strategies conflict actors can employ.

Conclusion

Why is this a deviant case?

That Aliyev was able to agree to the cessation of hostilities because he had secured greater political control in Baku is also one of three explanations as to why Nagorno-Karabakh is a deviant case in the statistical model. The model suggested a decrease in democracy may proxy for the government punishing segments of the population for supporting rebel groups. However, the decrease in democracy in Azerbaijan actually reflected the government's relationship with its own constituent population. The same can be said for the increasing size of the Azerbaijani military. By the time these changes took effect the rebels had captured the region and created an impenetrable fortress, meaning the population inside Nagorno-Karabakh was largely unaffected. Most rebel groups are too weak to achieve this. This feature of the conflict probably represents an anomaly rather than something we can use to update the statistical model.

The first two chapters of this thesis implied that the likely dynamics and outcomes of wars can be predicted principally through the examination of relations between the government and the population. The rebels basically eliminated this relationship in Nagorno-Karabakh by ejecting Azerbaijani communities, something not captured in the statistical model. The importance of conflict actor's efforts to shift demographics in areas under their control cannot be understated and is an element of many civil wars, including those in Syria and Iraq. These demographic shifts clearly play a role in determining the outcome of conflicts and the strength of both governments and rebels, but were not captured in the statistical model. A complete model of civil will need to find a way to

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incorporate demographic shifts if it is to prove capable of comprehensively predicting a range of civil wars.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is also poorly predicted because it represents a different type of conflict compared to that which the model was testing against. Firstly, it was more irregular in nature at the beginning of conflict, which meant it was less about demobilising the government and more a straight competition to mobilise support in a political vacuum. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh is also a different type of mixed outcome to Burundi, where the government made democratic concessions that undermined the rebels' support base. Instead, the conflict ended in a stalemate, and to some extent remains unresolved. One would, therefore, expect different dynamics to have led to the ceasefire. Many people view the war as still on-going, with the current ceasefire representing a break in hostilities rather than the end of the conflict (CFR, 2016). It is not unreasonable to presume any model would have difficulty demonstrating commonalities between wars that ended so differently as those in Burundi and Nagorno-Karabakh. One solution would be to code frozen conflicts as a different type of ending. My dataset includes three conflicts that are traditionally described as frozen; Abkhazia in Georgia, Transinistra in Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh.[63] Recoding them as a different type of outcome does not work, as there are too few of them to conduct statistical analysis. However, removing them from the dataset improves the overall fit of the model and the effects of all the variables of interest are magnified. Moreover, the rebels having sanctuary and access to rough terrain both now correlate with a rebel victory, as many people have predicted it should (Galula, 1964). Rebels are also much less likely to win territorial conflicts in this new model (table 22). That the government can reconstitute itself to continue fighting despite collapsing, just as the government in Baku did, may offer one explanation as to why this is the case. Rebels aiming to secede territory have to

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[63] Abkhazia is coded as a mixed outcome, while Transinistra has been deemed a rebel victory. Abkhazia is actually extremely well predicted, given Georgia experienced a huge drop in GDP and reduced its military size in the year before the war ended. Without examining the conflict in more detail it is impossible to say whether the behaviour of these variables caused the conflict to become 'frozen' in the same way we would expect these conditions to bring about a more standard type of mixed outcome.

push the conflict through all of its phases and capture, protect and govern the territory under dispute. They do not benefit from the shortcut to victory enjoyed by most rebel groups.

Frozen conflicts can, therefore, be described as a different type of ending to other mixed outcomes and should be treated as such when examining civil wars comparatively. Removing these wars from the statistical model improves its utility. While this makes sense intuitively, using the model to guide the selection of case studies has demonstrated this empirically.

	Model 10		
	Government victory	Rebel victory	Mixed outcome
Change in democracy	-0.282*** (0.0765)	-0.0636 (0.0599)	0.199*** (0.0677)
Change in ethnic relations	-0.121 (0.763)	-1.570 (1.014)	1.129*** (0.356)
Change in life expectancy	0.0552 (0.190)	-0.823*** (0.191)	0.370 (0.254)
Change in GDP	0.599 (1.249)	-2.916*** (1.112)	-2.582 (1.615)
Change in battle deaths	-3.28e-05** (1.47e-05)	-4.13e-05 (3.08e-05)	-4.96e-05 (3.48e-05)
Change in government military	0.0103 (0.0104)	-0.0185* (0.0102)	-0.0239*** (0.00601)
Rebels have external sanctuary	0.0620 (0.712)	26.64*** (6.303)	1.473* (0.843)
Rough terrain	-0.403 (0.284)	0.420* (0.254)	0.333 (0.284)
Rebels use terrorism against population	0.791 (0.662)	1.165 (0.895)	-1.795 (1.230)
Territorial aims	1.119 (0.774)	-2.940*** (1.026)	0.751 (0.709)
External support for government	1.977** (0.969)	-1.123 (1.296)	1.234 (0.801)
External support for rebels	0.216 (1.219)	1.101** (0.439)	0.359 (0.779)
Time	0.123 (0.123)	1.200** (0.514)	-0.312* (0.167)
Time squared	-0.00365 (0.00616)	-0.0613** (0.0280)	0.0361*** (0.0122)
Time cubed	7.87e-05 (9.50e-05)	0.00106** (0.000488)	-0.000981*** (0.000291)
Constant	-5.685*** (1.360)	-38.21*** (8.279)	-6.727*** (1.348)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of obs	826
Wald chi2(45)	-
Prob > chi2	-

Table 22: Model ten - Full model with 'frozen conflicts' removed.

Support for hypotheses

Despite being a deviant case, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh offers strong support for the theories developed in this thesis. Nagorno-Karabakh reinforces the finding from Cambodia that popular support is only important when it is

translated into active participation. Armenian and Azerbaijani communities both strongly supported the aims of the rebels and government respectively. Only the rebels converted this into active support in the form of finance and manpower for its military force. In contrast, the government saw its constituent population respond to the fear of rebel violence and political opportunities to challenge the government in Baku. The Azerbaijani population chose to leave the region, eliminating government capacity to seriously threaten rebel control of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Table 23 summarises the conflict and key findings, which show strong support for all the hypotheses. The general theories of conflict developed in this thesis proves itself an extremely framework for explaining the dynamics and outcome of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The rebels monopolised sovereignty in the region, and demobilised the government by expelling its constituent population. The rebels could not have achieved this, however, without support from the Republic of Armenia, once again affirming the importance of external support.

Nagorno-Karabakh also highlights another element of conflict outside the scope of the thesis's main hypotheses. Without a constituent population it is very hard for conflict actors to generate the support they need to carry out military activity. Both the rebels and the government attempted to weaken the other by ejecting its constituent population from Nagorno-Karabakh. One of the main reasons the rebels in Nagorno-Karabkh achieved their conflict aims is that they won this battle. Belligerents in Cambodia and Burundi also attempted similar demographic shifts in order to strengthen their sovereign power or weaken that of their opponent, suggesting this is a common tactic in civil wars. Observers of civil wars need to examine ethnic cleansing, including genocide, in this context when exploring conflicts. While it represents a humanitarian crisis, it also significantly affects the strategic context by altering a conflict actor's mobilisation capacity in a specific area, explaining why these types of activities appear so ubiquitous across civil wars throughout history.

Date	Events	Conflict dynamics (table 3)	Key drivers of change	Rebel regenerative capacity	Government control over the state	Sub-hypotheses supported
1992	Onset	Irregular warfare (Q4). Government and rebels attempt to unify militias into coherent fighting force.	Dissolution of Soviet Union left communities free to confront each other.	Rebels bring communities together, protecting them from violence. Significant external support from Republic of Armenia.	Government unable to control community-based militias and cannot protect population from rebel efforts to expel them from Nagorno-Karabakh. Attempts to control Armenian population through violence.	3 & 4
1993 - 1994	Conflict ends - 'frozen conflict' (mixed outcome)	Conventional (Q1). Rebels capture territory and ceasefire agreed.	Rebels expel ethnic Azerbaijani communities.	Rebels build shadow-governance structures that protected population and facilitate economic activity, converting sentimental support into substantive resources.	Government has no influence left inside Nagorno-Karabakh and cannot win conventional war with rebel forces given the latter's external support and territorial advantage.	2, 3 & 4

Table 23: Summary of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict dynamics and key findings.

Chapter nine

An 'unexplained' rebel victory: Zimbabwe 1965-1979

Introduction

The conflict in Zimbabwe[64] represents an extremely interesting case study in the context of this broader piece of work. An African[65] nationalist insurgency defeated a much stronger government army run by the white settler community. The main challenge is that in many ways it fits the theoretical model of conflict proposed in this thesis almost perfectly. The insurgents won by undermining the government's ability to distribute benefits to its constituent population; yet, it is a deviant case in the statistical model in chapter five.

The model suggests the rebels had under a one percent chance of victory in 1979, while there was four percent chance of a government victory and a five percent chance of a mixed outcome. According to the model there was a 90 percent probability of the war continuing into 1980. Most of the key variables perform contrary to what the statistical model suggested we would expect to see for a rebel victory; life expectancy had risen by one year, no external power was intervening on the rebel's behalf, the government was receiving outside assistance, battlefield deaths had actually increased significantly and the government had increased the size of its military in the years preceding its defeat. Only GDP had decreased significantly, dropping US$91 to US$313 per capita in the three years before the end of the war, representing a decrease of 23 percent. The model of conflict proposed in chapter two suggested that the key element of

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[64] Rhodesia became Zimbabwe after the Lancaster House agreement that brought the war to an end. During 1979 it was also known as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as part of the Internal Settlement, an attempt by the white regime to end the war by dealing with moderate nationalists. This chapter will use Zimbabwe to describe the country itself, but will use the term Rhodesia when referencing government activity or institutions as that was how it self-identified. I will use Zimbabwe when talking about the rebels for the same reason.

[65] While the Zimbabwean insurgents were not the only African nationalist movement, and the population did not represent the whole of Africa, for the sake of brevity the term African will refer specifically to autochthonous population of Zimbabwe as it is often referred to in this way in historical accounts of the conflict. The terms settler, white and European community will be used to refer to the constituent population of the Rhodesian government.

civil war is rebel ability to demobilise the government. On this basis, we reasoned that a drop in GDP should indicate a government struggling to generate support from its constituent population, making a rebel victory more likely. The statistical model suggested this was true, but the substantive effect was small. In contrast, the wars Burundi and Cambodia showed the general economy was a key factor in determining the course of these wars. As all other variables are contraindicated, Zimbabwe, therefore, offers the opportunity to examine the reasons for this discrepancy.

The conflict in Zimbabwe is also instructive as it allows us to examine how rebels can win when facing a technically superior military force. While being outnumbered, both the Cambodian and Nagorno-Karabakh rebels faced dysfunctional government forces. The Rhodesian government's counterinsurgency tactics, in contrast, have been lauded over (J.R.T. Wood, 1997). Yet the government was defeated and the rebels grew in strength throughout the war. Zimbabwe, therefore, serves as a reminder that success on the battlefield is not determined by who wins in the conventional military sense.

The insurgency

The insurgency had two main factions; the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) with its military wing, the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA); and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), with a military wing known as the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). ZANU and ZAPU often fought each other, particularly after the ceasefire was signed. The reasons for these splits were numerous and have been discussed elsewhere (Henriques, 1977). Broadly speaking, however, they occupied similar positions throughout the conflict. They both began recruiting for guerrilla activities around 1963 and they both largely respected the Lancaster House agreement that brought the conflict to an end (Cilliers, 1986). Consequently, the majority of this chapter will

refer to these factions as a single actor.[66] ZANU and ZAPU did, however, pursue diverse strategies for building a military force and had different external backers; China and the Soviet Union respectively. This disparity will be briefly covered in the section examining how the belligerents selected their strategies.

Key dates

The conflict can be divided into four main parts, 1965-1968, 1968-1972, 1972-1976 and 1976-1979.

In 1965, the ruling party of Rhodesia, the Rhodesian Front, made its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain. Great Britain refused to recognise it and imposed economic sanctions, which were later endorsed by the United Nations. Small insurgent units then began to infiltrate into Zimbabwe from bases in Zambia, although, in general, government forces easily detected and destroyed them (de Boer, 2011). After persisting with this for two years, insurgent forces engaged in almost no military activity between 1968 and 1972.[67]

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[66] This is not to downplay the importance of insurgent cohesion in determining the outcome of the conflict in Zimbabwe as well as other conflicts. While I would argue it is less important than government unity, comparative studies have shown it to make a difference (Findlay and Rudloff, 2010). However, the conflict in Zimbabwe was fifteen years long, with many interesting features, and given the space constraints I am under it is not an element of the conflict I can analyse in more detail and situate within the context of the broader theory of conflict proposed in this thesis.

[67] The importance of this period for the final outcome also highlights the utility of the dataset used for this study. The RAND experts that documented the insurgency in Zimbabwe identify it as starting in 1965 and continuing to 1979. In contrast, the UCDP dataset of armed conflict has it briefly erupting between 1966 and 1968, before recommencing in 1973 (Gleditsch et al., 2002). This is because certain violent thresholds have to be met before an observation is recorded in the UCDP dataset, whereas the RAND dataset uses subjective observation to mark the beginning and end of insurgent activity. This thesis argues that civil war should not be measured solely in terms of amounts of violence, as the war is about building resilient structures that shape population behaviour. ZANU actively pursued insurgency in the period 1968-1973 through means other than violence and this played a significant role in its ultimate victory. Consequently, no analysis of civil war that includes Zimbabwe, be it a large-N study or a single case study, would be complete without incorporating this period. This is not to say that classifying a state as experiencing civil war according to levels of violence, as is the standard practice in most datasets, is not the most objective measure available. I do think, however, it is dangerous to see wars as being discrete events when there is a lull in violence between two time periods. As this conflict demonstrates, just because there is no violence does not mean that belligerents are not attempting to build movements and degrade the mobilisation capacities of their opponents. The same variables that affect their capacity to do this during the war remain important during periods of more limited violent activity. Whenever there is inactivity between two periods of violence, as was the case in Zimbabwe, effort should be made to treat that war in its totality.

Then, in 1972, a group of ZANU insurgents attacked the Altena farm, marking the start of the next stage of the conflict. Violence increased significantly as compared to 1965-1968. However, government forces still held the upper hand and kept insurgent activity to a minimum, preventing it from growing beyond a few hundred guerrillas. At the end of 1974, South Africa launched its policy of *Détente* to improve relations with its southern African neighbours. Part of this policy involved putting pressure on Ian Smith, the prime minister of Rhodesia, to agree to a ceasefire, free insurgent leaders from prison and seek a political solution. Smith reluctantly agreed, believing that the insurgents were close to defeat (Matthews, 1990).

Despite a drop in military activity, there was no real prospect of a political deal being reached and violence began to pick up again in 1976. By December 1979, the government had declared martial law across 90 percent of the country. The government entered negotiations with the rebel leaders; Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joseph Nkomo of ZAPU. At Lancaster House, it agreed to a ceasefire, elections in February 1980, a limit to the power of white politicians to veto legislation and an end to white control over the security forces. In return, the nationalists agreed to delay land reform and guarantee some civil service pensions and property rights. The amount of political change the deal represented means the war is classified as a rebel victory, a victory that took 15 years of war. The remainder of the chapter will analyse the ability of the belligerents to shape population behaviour and how it changed through these various phases of the conflict.

Background and causes

Before the war, the Rhodesian government[68] had different relationships with the African and settler population. The government systematically discriminated

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[68] Rhodesia was still formally part of the United Kingdom. The colony was granted self-rule in 1922, giving it the right to elect its own parliament and prime minister. Britain officially retained veto power over the government's relations with the native population and its foreign policy, but it failed to ever exercise this veto. The government of Rhodesia, therefore, is considered the counterinsurgent at all times in this conflict, unlike in Nagorno-Karabakh where the original response to rebel activity was led by the colonial power.

against Africans to condition behaviour that advanced the interests of the settler community. The most visible area it discriminated against Africans was in the distribution of land. The government's allocation of land and relocation policies left Africans unable to produce enough to support their families. This created a source of cheap labour for white farmers and businesses as Africans sought alternative employment (Lan, 1985).

There was a huge disparity in the economic status of the African and white populations. White settlers occupied the most high-skilled and high-paid jobs and denied Africans access to education and healthcare (Kriger, 1991). Meanwhile, Africans, despite providing 90 percent of wage labour, in 1962, the average wage for African workers was R$110 compared to R$1,186 for a European (ibid.; p56).

The Rhodesian government precluded reform by controlling access to political power. The electoral franchise was based on a combination of education, property ownership and salary. This ensured all whites could vote, but very few Africans could (Mlambo, 1972). By retaining legislative control, the regime could pass laws ensuring the African community remained poor and uneducated. Consequently, it could never gain the vote and threaten the legislative control of the settler community.

There was some African resistance before 1965, but it never seriously challenged the government (Ranger, 1985). The government used the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act of 1960 to put over 10,000 people in prison for nationalist activity (Henriques, 1977; p498). The government did explore repealing some of the most repressive land and political policies, but simply doing this lead to successive administrations falling (Martin and Johnson, 1981). In 1962, the Rhodesian Front came to power under the leadership of Ian Smith. Smith explicitly stated that he intended to further entrench the political and socioeconomic structures that privileged whites and subordinated the African population (Martin and Johnson, 1981; p58). This immediately led ZANU and ZAPU to begin recruiting and training guerrillas (Cilliers, 1986). However,

Mugabe himself stated insurgent strategy at this point was still to force Britain to intervene, rather than try to bring the government down directly (1983).

After Britain failed to intervene when the Rhodesian Front declared UDI. Many nationalists were now convinced that an armed struggle was the only means to effect political change (Mugabe, 1983). Small insurgent units began to infiltrate into Zimbabwe (de Boer, 2011). Even though they were easily detected and destroyed by government forces, a state of 'dual sovereignty' emerged and the war began.

Despite transitioning into a state of war, the military context still heavily favoured the government. The rebels had no meaningful networks inside Zimbabwe itself. The core of the insurgency was made up of a small group of exiles in Zambia (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006). The government still had a huge advantage in terms of force numbers and was able to project its power across almost the whole country (Cilliers, 1986). The strength of government forces meant it was highly unlikely the insurgency would ever defeat the government directly on the battlefield. For the rebels to win they would have to build a support base inside the country and undermine the government's control over the state.

The African population

Insurgents and the African population between 1965 and 1968

Between 1965 and 1968, the insurgents believed that African grievances against the government were so ingrained that the population would simply rise up and overthrow the settler regime (Martin and Johnson, 1981). It, therefore, made little effort to build reciprocal relations with civilians. In general, they would establish bases in unpopulated areas (Hoffman et al., 1991) and move groups of one hundred or so at a time into these regions (Cilliers, 1986). This made it easy for the government to identify insurgent positions and eliminate them (de Boer, 2011).

The insurgency failed to build relations with the population and found it difficult to recruit fighters. The promise of addressing African grievances was a collective post-war incentive, which meant it was unlikely to generate the level of popular participation rebels needed to challenge the government, especially when set against the risk of punishment for supporting the insurgency. During this period rebel numbers did not grow significantly. By 1968, 168 insurgents had been killed for the loss of only twelve members of government security forces and the rebels had failed to establish a permanent presence inside Zimbabwe (de Boer, 2011; p36).

A switch in strategy

Between 1968 and 1972 the insurgency engaged in almost no military activity (Cilliers, 1986). Instead, insurgents spent time developing networks of support that created reciprocal relations with the population (Kirk, 1975; Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 2008).

Primarily, this engagement was limited to the northeast of Zimbabwe, but as the conflict expanded from the mid-seventies onwards the rebels replicated this strategy across the country. Norma Kriger, in *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War* (1991), outlines how this worked. In each village the rebels would establish local committees whose sole purpose was to "meet (insurgent) logistical needs for resources – food, money, clothing, and intelligence about regime forces and informers" (p116). Sometimes posts on these committees were democratically elected, sometimes the rebels would ensure sympathetic villagers were appointed (p162).

Youths, or *mujibas*, acted as couriers for guerrillas and provided intelligence to the insurgents, both on government activity and the broader population (Alexander et al., 2000). The rebels used *mujibas* to give advance warning to villages of insurgent visits and what they needed in terms of supplies (Kriger, 1991; p119). Young people also transported arms between rebel camps, as the government was less likely to challenge youths, especially at the start of the

conflict (Martin and Johnson, 1981; p79). Martin and Johnson estimate that at the end of the conflict there were 50,000 *mujibas* working for the insurgency (ibid.), demonstrating the extent of the rebel's support networks throughout rural Zimbabwe.

While never really penetrating urban areas, insurgents obtained support from the cities by developing ties with businessmen. Bus companies would smuggle recruits out of urban areas to training camps in bordering countries. Missionaries and storekeepers provided food, clothing and medicine (Caute, 1983). Unemployed people were paid to inform on government activities (Martin and Johnson, 1981) and females supported ZANU by working as nurses and teachers in camps in Mozambique (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006).

These support networks demonstrate how the rebels structured their solutions to the collective mobilisation problem. Unlike the Khmer Rouge, who broke down society and rebuilt it from the bottom up, the Zimbabwean insurgents generally worked with pre-existing social structures. Only where current societal structures did not meet their needs, did they create new sections within society to meet a specific purpose; the creation of *mujibas* being the most obvious example.

Public outreach

To generate meaningful support, the insurgency still needed to incentivise popular participation in these structures. ZANU, in particular, pursued a number of techniques to establish reciprocal relations with the population.

The insurgents began by identifying influential figures in villages before they established a more visible presence. In practice this meant spirit mediums, tribal chiefs or headmen, Christian clergy, businessmen, teachers, powerful tribes and politically mobilised communities (McLaughlin, 1996; Preston, 2004a). Much has been made of ZANU's relationship with spirit mediums, which retained significant influence over the wider population (Lan, 1985). In many cases traditional chiefs

had lost most of their influence over local populations as they had become closely associated with the regime. Those tribal chiefs that had resisted the government were given positions at the head of committees, restoring their power and ensuring their support (Ranger, 1985). These influential individuals would then convince the wider population to participate in insurgent committees and organise political meetings, or *pungwes*, which gave the insurgents a platform to appeal for support.

The insurgent tactic of engaging with local figures, providing them with political and social power, contributed greatly to rebel strength, allowing the insurgency to mobilise support through local social networks.

Political meetings

Once they established access to a community, the insurgents attempted to politicise the population so it saw more benefit to providing support. Political meetings, or *pungwes*, were often the first exposure the population had with the insurgency. Upon entering an area the rebels would call a meeting for the whole community, attendance at which was compulsory (Lan, 1985). Meetings would then be held almost every night by a political commissar (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 2008). The meetings addressed local grievances such as land allocation, education, poverty, unemployment or repressive government behaviour (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006). This was another advantage of engaging local notables first, in that the rebels could identify these grievances before their first direct meeting with the population. The population, therefore, understood the political incentives the rebels were promising as tangible socioeconomic benefits rather than vague political constructs.

Exploiting social dynamics

Another way the rebels motivated active support was by exploiting social and local political dynamics. Norma Kriger even states most of those involved in the support structures that sustained the insurgency were motivated by the

immediate social and political power they felt supporting rebels would give them, rather than a desire to see the government defeated (1991; p8).

She lists a number of social cleavages that the insurgency exploited. She claims that many poor Africans saw association with the insurgency not only as financial opportunity, but also an chance to improve their personal standing (p187). People also used the insurgency to settle socio-political scores. Weaker tribes would support the rebels, knowing they could exploit the power that controlling village committees would give them over stronger tribes, in terms of accessing land and resources (p199). Communities would invite insurgents into their villages to rid them of unpopular headmen, regardless of whether they had a real connection to the government (p199). Young people saw the insurgency as a way to increase their influence within traditional family and tribal structures. Young people were subordinated to elders in African society and their role as the eyes and ears of insurgency in local villages gave them power to challenge this traditional authority (p150).

As predicted, the rebels used social cleavages not just at the national level but also at the local level to incentivise segments of the population to provide support.

Coercion

How much coercion the insurgency used to force the population to provide support is a source of contention amongst some commentators. However, given its prevalence in many accounts of the conflict it seems almost certain that the insurgency supplemented its positive incentives with the threat of force to ensure the population participated in insurgent support structures (Kriger, 1991). The insurgency forced the population to attend *pungwes* and executed people they accused of working for the government (Caute, 1983). They would also threaten to put companies out of business that refused to work with them (Alexander et al., 2000).

Refugee camps

The insurgency never held absolute authority over territory during the conflict and never, therefore, created state-like sovereign structures. The rebels did not, for example, provide rudimentary healthcare or education for the population in the manner of the Khmer Rouge (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006). The only place they provided services to the population was in refugee camps, mainly in Zambia and Mozambique. These camps were normally near military bases and were run by the insurgents. Many people chose to travel to these refugee camps to avoid government repression but also as it presented an opportunity to get an education (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006). The insurgency then used these refugee camps as a source of recruits and more general support.

I will not attempt to assess which of these various strands of rebel activity was most important. Scholars have argued this for over thirty years. Most of this disagreement can probably be put down to the different locations in which they conducted their primary research, with each community almost certainly experiencing the war differently. Commentators appear to unanimously agree, however, that active support was provided to the insurgency inside Zimbabwe. In reality, the rural population almost certainly responded to a combination of education, coercion, social advancement opportunities and influence from local leaders.

Undermining governance

As well as trying to build its own relations with the population, the rebels attempted to weaken the Rhodesian government's influence.

According to Moorcroft and McLaughlin (2008), insurgent military strategy explicitly revolved around putting pressure on local government institutions. It carried out acts of sabotage against offices for District Commissioners of African areas to pressure them to shut down (Kirk, 1975). It was selective in where it chose to target. J.K. Cilliers claims it is no coincidence that the northeast was the

centre for the insurgency in the early years of the conflict, as it had been neglected for years and had a very limited regime presence (1986).

The rebels also targeted African civilians associated with the regime. Before the conflict, the government appointed loyal chiefs to govern African areas. Chiefs were a key source of intelligence for the government during the late sixties. To counter this threat, the insurgency threatened chiefs unless they broke relations with the government, killing many that refused to comply. The result was that African civilians refused to work in local government councils, which then ceased to function in many areas (Kriger, 1991).

The rebels considered teachers as collaborators (Kriger, 1991) and tried to prevent African labourers working on white farms (Mtisi et al., 2009). Quite apart from the obvious effects this had on the white economy, it also removed economic relations between the government and the African population; reducing the former's ability to either financially sanction or reward the African population as a means to shape its behaviour. Rebels even targeted African populations relocated into Protected Villages, which the government used to try and prevent insurgent contact with the population (Cilliers, 1986).

Insurgent foot soldiers

Once the rebels had recruited people to their cause it worked hard to ensure they remained loyal. As many people participate in rebellions to pursue selective within-war benefits, insurgents need to create a cohesive force if they are to keep all their forces focused on defeating the government.

Insurgents used their training camps to ensure new recruits understood the grievances of local communities and how they were linked to the activities of the government (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 2008). Political training had equal billing to teaching guerrilla tactics, which itself focused on how to mobilise the population as much as how to directly engage government forces (Martin and Johnson, 1981).

Insurgent leaders tried to keep activity focused on national and strategic goals rather than on settling individual scores. Insurgents had to follow a code of conduct, which was drawn up in conjunction with spirit mediums to ensure the overall impact on the population of insurgent activity was minimised. They banned activities such as sex with locals, drinking alcohol and shooting wild animals (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006). They also deployed troops away from their homes, so that they would not get caught up in local disputes (Ranger, 1985). This did not preclude insurgent transgressions against the population, but it may have limited them and prevented insurgent bad behaviour becoming a strategic threat.

On the flip side, insurgent leaders let recruits settle personal scores as long as these would be well received by the population and fit within the context of the broader conflict. Sabotage and attacks on white farms almost exclusively focused on those that had a reputation for treating workers particularly badly. The same logic drove attacks against local African politicians, civil servants and tribal chiefs (Astrow, 1984). It is likely this engendered more loyalty from fighters keen to demonstrate to the population the immediate benefits of insurgent activity.

The African population and the government

Kenneth Good argues that even before 1972, government control over the African population was structurally weak. He predicted that it would not take much for the government to lose control (1974; p10). As the insurgency took hold, the government increasingly resorted to violence as its main means of shaping the African population's behaviour (Henriques, 1977).

Punishing cooperation

Commentators have accused the Rhodesian security forces of adopting an 'enemy-centric' counterinsurgency policy (Cilliers, 1986). The government was obsessed with kill-rates as a measure of success (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Rhodesian government also recognised the importance of controlling the

population to prevent the insurgency from growing. Rather than improving socioeconomic and governance conditions in African areas it chose to take a more punitive approach, attempting to raise the costs to the population of supporting the rebels.

The government imposed the death penalty on any individual suspected of cooperating with the rebels (Hoffman et al., 1991). Wounded or surrendering insurgents were often shot on sight (de Boer, 2011). Even denying knowledge of rebel activity became a criminal offence (ibid.). The government did not differentiate between African peasants that had been forced to comply with insurgent activity and those that had cooperated voluntarily, with judges explicitly stating that coercion was no excuse for cooperation (Kirk, 1975). When government security forces discovered *pungwes* they would target all the attendees, often killing far more civilians than insurgents (Caute, 1983). Whole villages would be burnt down if the government suspected an insurgent cell operated there (Godwin and Hancock, 1993). By the end of the conflict 7,790 African civilians had been killed compared to 10,450 rebels.[69] The government also often categorised many victims of security force activities as insurgents without due investigation and, according to David Caute, during many periods of the war it killed far more civilians than insurgents (1983; p102).

When the government suspected communities of supporting insurgents, District Commissioners imposed collective fines on villages (Ranger, 1985). The government passed the Emergency Powers Regulation in 1973, which further extended the power of local officials to confiscate cattle, land and money from communities they suspected of supporting insurgents (CIIR, 1976).

The government would shut down schools, hospitals, churches and African businesses in areas where insurgents were active; explicitly stating this was

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[69] This number includes African civilians killed by insurgents, so is not a true reflection of the insurgent to civilian casualty-rate caused by government military activity. It is, however, the only data I can find that compares civilian casualties to those killed during direct interaction between the belligerents.

punishment for supporting insurgents (Good, 1974). The government deliberately restricted supplies to African rural communities and burnt crops (Hove, 2012). The aim of this was to ensure that the villagers only had enough supplies to provide food for themselves, and had no surplus to give to insurgents (Astrow, 1984). It limited villagers to cooking once a day and killed peasants' cattle. In Sengwe, it killed as much as 80 percent of the locals' cattle stock without compensation (Hove, 2012). Government strategy was not designed to generate support from the African population, it was aimed at undermining the capacity of the population to provide meaningful support to the rebels.

Protected villages

The most systematic way the government attempted to prevent the African population from cooperating with the insurgency was moving them to so-called Protected Villages. By depopulating areas where insurgents were active the government hoped it could isolate them and make them easier targets (Cilliers, 1986).

The government marched communities to Protected Villages at gunpoint, often miles from their home locations (Caute, 1983). It then destroyed the villages left behind to ensure the population could not return and insurgents could not use the village infrastructure (CIIR, 1976). Many Africans were impoverished by the whole experience, as they had to leave their equipment and livestock behind. They were also too far from their land to farm it effectively (Hove, 2012). The government provided no services to Protected Villages and they lacked adequate sanitation (Cilliers, 1986). In 1977, there were over 200 Protected Villages containing 580,000 Africans (Astrow, 1984; p64).

Passing on the effects of the war to the African population

Until 1974, the government was able to almost exclusively pass on the economic costs of the conflict onto the African population (Preston, 2004a). Between 1965 and 1971 the average wage for Europeans rose from R$2,576 to R$3,387. In the

same period the African average wage rose from R$246 to R$315, representing a difference of R$2,330 at the start of the conflict and R$3,072 in 1971 (Good, 1974; p17). Rent and energy costs rose by around 70 percent for Africans. 50,000 Africans were leaving school each year and the government provided no jobs for them (Preston, 2004a; p70). The amount of Africans in employment declined from one million to 800,000 between 1975 and 1979 (Astrow, 1984; p65). This coincided with an African population explosion; the population rose from five million Africans in 1970 to 7.5 million in 1980. African tribal lands only produced 60 percent of the maize needed for basic subsistence (ibid.). As the Protected Villages also made it impossible for people to visit clinics or feed cattle properly, malnutrition became rife in rural African areas (Mushonga, 2005). The combination of Protected Villages and economic decline in African areas was clearly designed to prevent rebels from converting sentimental support from the population into behaviours that provided tangible resources.

Did violence work?

At first this strategy appeared to be working. In 1974, the government assessed there were only a few dozen insurgents operating inside the country (Kriger, 1991).

After agreeing to the South African proposed ceasefire in 1974, the government withdrew from many areas of the country, while the insurgency continued to build sovereign structures. J.K. Cilliers argues that the withdrawal of government forces eliminated the only type of interaction the regime had with the African population, namely coercion. This left the population open to rebel efforts to build sovereign structures (1986; p24). Hostilities resumed in 1975, but the rebels were now too strong for violence alone to undermine its ability to generate support. The insurgency then grew exponentially from 1976 onwards (Cilliers, 1986). The limited focus of the government on simply killing insurgents and punishing communities that supported the insurgency, rather than improving governance and socioeconomic opportunities for Africans, worked up until 1975 because the government only had to deploy it in small areas at a time. From 1976

it did not have the resources to coerce the population in all areas the rebels were active.

Moorcroft and McLaughlin put it succinctly when they argue that compared to the rebels, who lived amongst local communities, the only contact between the government and the population as the war dragged on was "passing patrols, punitive actions or escorting administrative officials" (2008; loc1996). As Matthew Preston (2004a) shows, growing African grievances around socioeconomic inequalities, weak governance and government repression created significant mobilisation opportunities for the insurgency. This increased the capacity of rebels to build relations with the population at the expense of the government and highlights the cyclical and exponential nature of insurgent growth if government actions prove counter-productive.

Peace talks and the Internal Settlement as a counterinsurgency tool

By 1978, the government found itself in a position where it decided offering the African population the opportunity to join the political process was the only way to end the war. While it had made some ruminations towards political reform in 1971 and 1974, commentators are agreed it did not offer any serious political concessions until 1978 (Godwin and Hancock, 1993).

The Internal Settlement

According to Sue Onslow (2006), once the war escalated again in 1976, Ian Smith quickly realised the government could not defeat the insurgents militarily. Smith entered into negotiations with Abel Muzerowa and Ndabaningi Sithole, two nationalist leaders that had been marginalised as the war had gone on. At the end of 1978 they agreed upon the Internal Settlement. Elections on a universal franchise took place in April 1979 with a 64 percent turnout (Mitchell, 1992). Muzerowa was victorious and became the new prime minister. However, white politicians retained veto power over constitutional changes as well as firm control over the security forces and, therefore, military operations. If the war had

ended there, it would probably be classified as a 'mixed outcome' similar to Burundi.

The Internal Settlement failed to end the war for a number of reasons. Some commentators point to the fact that it involved nationalist leaders with no real power. Muzerowa and Sithole saw the Internal Settlement as a chance to build a powerbase, rather than because there was bottom-up pressure on them from the population to find a resolution to the conflict (Matthews, 1990). This, however, should not have doomed the Internal Settlement to failure. Burundi showed that a well-implemented political settlement can undermine the capacity of rebel groups to mobilise support and sustain military activity even if the rebels are not involved in drawing it up.

More damaging was the fact that, despite now having an African face, the government did not implement promised political reforms. It still saw punishing the population as a viable means to weaken the insurgency. As such, there was no land reform, the government managed to block changes to the security forces and continued opening new Protected Villages (Caute, 1983; Matthews, 1990). Where it did shut Protected Villages, the government provided no compensation (Cilliers, 1986).

The Rhodesian Front still believed the Internal Settlement would be enough to defeat the insurgency (Godwin and Hancock, 1993) and there is some evidence that it was working. Robert Mugabe claimed it was harder to motivate fighters in the initial aftermath of the settlement (Cilliers, 1986; p209). Ultimately, however, the international community rejected the election results and refused to lift economic sanctions. As a result, very few insurgents laid down their weapons (Cilliers, 1986).

The Internal Settlement was probably the only major effort the government made to undermine support for the insurgency through positive political incentives. However, the government needed it to work too quickly. Growing economic pressure, underscored by the international community's decision not to lift sanctions, meant the government needed to achieve rapid progress in

undercutting active and popular support for the insurgency. In Burundi, the Arusha Accords were negotiated in conjunction with the international community and, therefore, resulted in an easing of international sanctions. Moreover, Burundi's government did implement reform and closed its version of Protected Villages. Hutus embraced the political process, forcing the insurgents to engage with it if they wanted to maintain the ability to generate support from the population. However, this did not happen overnight. It took two years between the signing of the Arusha Accords and the CNDD-FDD's decision to lay down its weapons. This highlights how changes at the macro-level take time to filter down and affect rebel ability to mobilise support from the population. The Rhodesian government simply did not have two years given the economic pressure it was under and by December 1979 the government was negotiating directly with ZANU and ZAPU to create a new political deal to end the war.

The settler community

The government and the white population

As the government did not want to reach out to the African population and allow it to access the benefits of the state, it had to rely on getting the most of its relationship with the white population.

Economic opportunities

Immigrants had been attracted to Rhodesia with promises of economic opportunities and an idyllic lifestyle. Even before the war, large numbers left the country each year, but this was outweighed by new immigrants (Marston, 1986). The country relied on immigrants to man the armed forces, but in order to sustain immigration the government needed to keep the economy growing.

The Rhodesian government's ability to facilitate economic activity in order to generate support from the white population would play a key role in the conflict. Examining insurgent military strategy highlights its importance. Robert Mugabe

stated that undermining the regime economically was the key element of the conflict, as this would weaken the foundations of the regime (1983). The main target of insurgent guerrilla activity was not government security forces, but farms, bridges, railway lines and roads (Martin and Johnson, 1981). According to Martin and Johnson, rebels attempted to stop the government using rural production and its infrastructure to sustain the economy (1981). At first the government managed to keep the economy growing and the direct effect of the conflict on most settlers was minimal. No white civilians died between 1967 and 1972 (Godwin and Hancock, 1993). The regime also managed to circumvent the economic damage caused by sanctions due to its good relations with South Africa and Portugal, which still controlled Mozambique until 1974.

Over time, however, rebel strategy began to have an impact by forcing the government to divert military resources to protecting infrastructure (Cilliers, 1986). In 1976, the government had to increase the defence budget by 40 percent as well raise other funds to start continually repairing infrastructure damaged by insurgent activity. To raise this money the government cut personal allowances for travel, and increased sales taxes (Godwin and Hancock, 1993). The economy began to contract significantly, shrinking by 7.4 percent in 1976. Overall, there was a 24 percent decline in real income for Europeans between 1975 and 1979 (Martin and Johnson, 1981; p294).[70]

White farmers bore the brunt of the insurgency. The government did not have the resources to protect all white farmlands (Cilliers, 1986). There were 1,053 insurgent incidents against white farmsteads between 1976 and 1978 and the insurgents killed 116 white farmers in 1978, and a further 80 in the final year of the conflict (Godwin and Hancock, 1993; p290). Despite government subsidies, over half of white farms had been abandoned completely or were not functioning properly by 1979. Money raised from the agricultural economy dried up

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[70] The state of the global economy contributed to this as well. Most commentators agree, however, that the costs of the war either directly caused Rhodesia's economic woes (Preston, 2004a) or undermined its capacity to protect its population from the global slump (Godwin and Hancock, 1993)

completely (ibid.). Farmers had also organised into local militias to confront insurgent forces, and their decision to quit an area often eliminated local government presence (ibid.). A perception of insecurity began to pervade the white population as 90 percent of the country came under martial law by the time of the Lancaster House agreement (Godwin and Hancock, 1993).

Conscription

As the war escalated, the government extended those eligible for conscription and the expected length of service. Conscription was eventually extended to include all men up to the age of 50 (Godwin and Hancock, 1993; p184). Godwin and Hancock claim this was extremely unpopular and many people attempted to avoid the draft (1993). In 1979, only 415 out of 1500 new white call-ups reported for duty (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 2008; loc3205).

The extent of conscription also affected the economy. The government refused to let companies hire African manpower to replace white workers, which meant production ground to a halt (Brownell, 2010). Companies often had as much as 60 percent of their work force on continuous call-ups (Godwin and Hancock, 1993). Ultimately the government had to balance the need to keep the economy functioning with its requirement to draw on manpower to secure areas from insurgent influence (Preston, 2004a). This shows how important less active types of support are to governments if they want to keep the state functioning and avoid defeat.

Migration

As the war intensified, emigration started to outstrip immigration for the first time. Between 1967 and 1969 net immigration into Zimbabwe was 13,000 (Godwin and Hancock, 1993; p17). However, after 1972 the levels of immigration dropped significantly and in September 1973 there was a net loss of 118 migrants; the first negative figure during the conflict (p137). When the war

escalated further in 1976, the monthly net departure figure was around 771 (p163). According to Josiah Brownell, emigration increased every time the government appealed for extra support from the population by expanding those eligible for conscription (Brownell, 2010). By the end of 1978, net emigration had reached around 1400 whites a month (Godwin and Hancock, 1993; p236). This meant that Rhodesia was losing around one percent of its white population every two months.

Increasing emigration weakened the economy. The construction industry lost nearly one quarter of its workforce in 1976 (Caute, 1983; p89). When white farmers emigrated the area was generally surrendered to the insurgents (ibid.). The government recognised the severe threat emigration posed but all attempts to boost immigration and make emigration harder failed (Godwin and Hancock, 1993). From this perspective it is easy to see that the relationship between the government and the white population was being broken by the conflict. The insurgents did not replace this relationship with one of their own, but as the European population was transitory in nature, it always had the option to simply leave and withdraw its support for the government. When the government could no longer offer the benefits of living in Rhodesia that the white population expected, that is exactly what it started doing. Ian Smith recognised that if emigration continued at the same pace, the economy was going to collapse and there would be no army to fight the insurgency (Brownell, 2010).

Political power leads to military control

The rebels increased ability to generate support from its constituent population and the equivalent decline in government ability to shape settler behaviour explains the increase in rebel strength and the eventual defeat of the government.

The rebels mobilise

ZANLA had as little as a dozen recruits in 1965 and still only had a few hundred in 1972, with most in external bases. Before 1968 most of these came from a

forced recruitment policy. By 1974, ZANLA had 3,000[71] recruits that were almost all volunteers (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006; p82). At the end of 1976, there were 5,000 insurgents operating inside Rhodesia, with many more in external camps (Cilliers, 1986; p83). When the war finally came to an end, best estimates suggest there were around 74,000 insurgents, with around 15,000 operating inside Rhodesia and other in reserve or training (p239). The increase in rebel numbers operating inside Zimbabwe is illustrated in figure 21.


Figure 21: Number of Zimbabwean insurgents (thousands) in country in latter stages of conflict (Preston, 2004b). This contrasts with around 60,000 government forces of various types.

Matthew Preston argues that four main factors contributed to the rise in guerrilla strength through the conflict; "attachment to the guerrilla cause, the declining rural economy, disruption by the war of rural services and Rhodesian policies themselves" (2004; p70). It is clear government policies further disenfranchised the rural African population and pushed them into the hands of the insurgency in three ways: driving them to leave the country and live in insurgent refugee camps; creating individual incentives for people to actively join the insurgency

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[71] Many of these recruits lived in external bases during this period, hence disparities between different sources on the strength of rebel forces.

given the lack of alternative income opportunities; and, most importantly, leaving a space for the insurgency to build structures to manage its relationship with population. These factors combined account for the growth in the insurgency throughout the 1970s. While the balance of power continued to favour the government, it is clear that the rebels were increasingly able to mobilise support as the war grew to a close, exactly as we would expect if the model of war as a mobilisation competition is a useful framework for studying civil wars.

Demobilising the government

The growth of the insurgency directly affected the government's capacity to raise its own security forces. From 1977 onwards, the economy was declining at such a rate that the government knew that sustaining its military was becoming impossible. Continuing to fight the insurgents meant the chances of the economy recovering were virtually nil, leading to even greater emigration (Preston, 2004a). Smith recognised that if emigration continued at its current pace the white regime would collapse completely (Brownell, 2010). Moreover, the government also realised it was too late even if it could resolve its economic difficulties; it had lost too much control in rural areas. Matthew Preston argues that even if the international community had lifted sanctions in 1977 it would not have made any difference. No amount of money could have now raised the manpower necessary to pacify the whole country given insurgent strength (2004). The government could not remonopolise sovereignty over its territory, as required to defeat the rebels, and its final collapse was a matter of time. The government was, in effect, being demobilised and this forced it to accept unfavourable peace terms, as predicted by the theories proposed in this thesis.

By the end of 1979 the government believed its last chance for Europeans to continue living in Zimbabwe at all was to surrender and assist in organising elections (Matthews, 1990).

Lancaster House and the limits of asymmetric warfare

While the war is coded as a rebel victory, there was still a political settlement. The Rhodesian Front government was willing to surrender political power and control over the security forces in exchange for guarantees over property rights and pensions for civil servants. The rapid rate the insurgency had grown after 1976 and level of control it now exerted suggested it did not even need to make minor concessions. However, commentators, and even insurgents themselves, argue that while the rebels had managed to undermine the government they had yet to develop effective governance structures.

David Caute describes the insurgency as only having "negative control" (1983; p332). The rebels never actually governed themselves, they just did enough in areas to demobilise government presence. In 1979, this problem was becoming critical. Mugabe himself recognised that the insurgency did not have a viable plan to develop more holistic governance structures (1983). These structures were necessary to facilitate the population providing the extra support the insurgents needed to transition the conflict into a more conventional phase. The insurgents started to need more from the population than it could provide. This led to insurgents employing more violence against the African population to extract the resources it needed, which in turn began to undermine its support (Maxwell, 1999). Moreover, while the rebels had freedom of movement across 90 percent of the country, 'liberated' territory only contained only around ten percent of the seven-million population (Preston, 2004a). Mozambique and Zambia did put pressure on ZANU and ZAPU to agree to the Lancaster House agreement, but it is also clear that the agreement offered ZANU a way to take power without solving the problem of extending its sovereign structures across Zimbabwe (Matthews, 1990).

This is in contrast to Nagorno-Karabakh and Cambodia where external support had allowed the rebels to develop rudimentary government structures, which they used to assert complete control over the population. Having this structure behind it also enabled the Khmer Rouge to immediately impose authority over

the population once it demobilised the government. While it is impossible to know with any certainty, it is possible that if the Rhodesian Front government had collapsed completely, ZANU may not have been able to assert control over the whole polity. That the government supported the transition might explain why it succeeded, at least in the short term.

ZANU's decision to make these concessions adds another element to the factors affecting rebel groups' decisions to engage in political settlements. In the theory section of this thesis, we suggested that rebels judge the progress of a conflict solely by their likelihood of success. The conflict in Zimbabwe showed that rebels also engage in political processes based on their ability to govern post-conflict. This may open up new opportunities for identifying 'ripe' moments for intervention in civil wars.

The battlefield

The favourable balance of power led the government to be overconfident that it could easily overcome the insurgency (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 2008). The government believed it only had to defeat the insurgents militarily to end the conflict, leading it to obsess over 'kill-rates' and tactical innovations. Academic observers also came to the same conclusion (Wilson, 1973). Kenneth Good's prediction in 1974, however, shows that it is possible to predict the course of conflict by focusing on the resilience of the government's relations with the population.

The clearest evidence that the military context fails to explain the conflict's dynamics and outcome, comes from the mouths of the rebels. Mugabe himself states they could not win the war quickly, because it was not about direct military confrontation (1983). Jeremy Brickhill argues that ZAPU fighters knew that guerrilla activity was designed to create the conditions for defeating the government, not a way of defeating the government by itself (1995). Instead the rebel's aim was to weaken government ability to control the African population, creating the opportunity for rebels to mobilise support (ibid.). Robert Matthews

claims this perception explains rebel leaders' refusal to negotiate even when government forces heavily outnumbered them in 1975 (1990). They believed the relations they had established with the population were resilient enough that they could continue to function regardless. The key for the rebels was whether they could continue to undermine government authority in the long term. Even as early as 1968, Mugabe's writings show he felt confident this was the case (1983).

Battlefield outcomes between the rebels and government forces is also insightful. According to Moorcroft and McLaughlin, "(t)he armed forces of Rhodesia won virtually every battle" (2008; loc808). Casualty numbers throughout the conflict support this notion. Between 1973 and 1978, the government killed 6,024 insurgents and injured or captured over 40,000 more. In the same period, only 686 government security forces lost their lives and a further 3,585 were injured (Cilliers, 1986; p242). Perhaps, most tellingly the ratio of casualties stayed at about ten to one throughout the whole conflict (ibid.). The rebels never gained the ascendency when the two forces engaged directly. Changing efficacy on the battlefield cannot account for the changing fortunes in the war more generally.

In reality, however, the insurgents never sought to heavily engage militarily. Rebel resources were focused on sabotaging government economic infrastructure, targeting civilian collaborators and hit and run tactics on government convoys. When faced with government security forces, rebels would simply flee (de Boer, 2011).

The dominance of regime forces on the battlefield has led to observers, both at the time and since, lauding over Rhodesian tactics (Bailey, 2010). J.R.T. Wood quotes a retired British and NATO General, Walter Walker, as stating that Rhodesian forces were the best in the world at counterinsurgency warfare (no date; p2). It seems strange that this is based on a campaign that suffered complete strategic failure.

It was quite possibly the government's obsession with achieving its version of tactical success that led to its downfall. Government tactics directly contributed to the spread of the insurgency, by further aggrieving African communities and forcing them into the hands of the insurgency. Many civilians were killed in operations and livelihoods were destroyed (Caute, 1983). So while Rhodesian forces may be famed for killing insurgents, the manner in which they went about it contributed to creating far more insurgents than they killed (Moorcroft and McLaughlin, 2008).

When one puts Rhodesian tactics into this context it is clear they were *tactically* as well as *strategically* counter-productive. This serves as a warning to those looking to use Rhodesian counterinsurgency tactics as an example to follow. The effect a belligerent's tactics have on a conflict actor's regenerative capacity should determine whether they are considered tactically successful. This also links tactics to strategy in a much clearer fashion than the current disjointed approach of Western militaries, which often leads to the conclusion that an operation was tactically successful, but a strategic failure (Constable, 2009). Rebel tactical activity in Zimbabwe increased its ability to mobilise support and demobilised the government, making it a tactical success. Government activity, in contrast, made it easier for the rebels to mobilise support; as such, it represents a tactical failure.

Selecting a strategy

The Rhodesian state

Ultimately the basis for the relationship between the government and the settler community made it impossible for the government to pursue any kind of engagement with the African population. The regime was built on segregation and, according to Roger Marston (1986), this is what attracted many immigrants. Simply talking with nationalist leaders undermined white morale, increasing draft-dodging and emigration (Godwin and Hancock, 1993). The idea of further political integration was unacceptable (Mlambo, 1972).

The government was, therefore, limited in the political and economic reform it could offer the African population. Even after it agreed to the Internal Settlement it could not institute equality in the security forces for fear of losing its own constituency. The Rhodesian Front ended up pushing Muzerowa to sack ANC politicians that pushed too hard for security force reform (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006).

Many settlers felt Africans were too uncultured to respond to political and socioeconomic opportunities (Cilliers, 1986). The government, therefore, refused to exploit the potential of African recruits willing to join the security forces (Stapleton, 2011). Many Africans did fight for the Rhodesian government throughout the conflict in the Royal African Rifles.[72] However, the government never truly implemented any plan to expand its African military force as an alternative for the African population to supporting the insurgency. Nor did it contemplate plans to employ African labour in many industries to boost the economy, despite many Africans seeking employment in Salisbury (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006).

The conflict in Zimbabwe shows how history and ideology can limit the options a government uses for shaping population behaviour. We can contrast this with Cambodia, where rebel ideology laid the framework for the reorganisation of society in a manner that significantly strengthened the rebels. A strong ideology is, therefore, neither a positive nor a negative thing by itself, but can be extremely important in determining the efficacy of a belligerent's conflict strategy.

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[72] Space constraints have precluded a more detailed examination of the Royal African Rifles, which numbered in the thousands (Stapleton, 2011). Moreover, many of these people then voted for ZANU-PF in the 1980 elections (Preston, 2004a), demonstrating how selective within-war incentives shape behaviour more sharply than post-war preferences. They are an extremely interesting feature of the conflict and, alongside the Fay Chung's observation about many African labourers seeking employment in Salisbury when job opportunities disappeared in the city, shows the outcome was not inevitable. The government could have defeated the insurgency if it had been willing to explore ways to offer meaningful within-war incentives to the African population.

External dynamics

Once again, external factors played a crucial role in determining belligerent behaviour. The government was pressured into the 1974 ceasefire by South Africa. This also coincided with Mozambique's independence, which expanded the amount of camps the rebels could establish outside of the country and the areas of Zimbabwe that the rebels could enter directly, as shown in figure 22 (Astrow, 1984). These factors proved crucial in allowing the rebels to expand to the point that the Rhodesian government could no longer shield its constituent population from the effects of the war or control the rebel's constituents through violence alone.


Figure 22: Insurgent infiltration routes into Zimbabwe (Friedman, 2006).

Additionally, both main rebel groups received crucial support from a range of regional and international backers in the form of external sanctuary, funding and weaponry (Cilliers, 1986). However, the difference in the support given to ZANU

and ZAPU is revealing. ZAPU received support from the Soviet Union, which tried to give ZAPU the means to build a conventional force (Brickhill, 1995). China, on the other hand, advised ZANU to build political networks amongst the population (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006). The differing success of these strategies is illuminating.

At the beginning of the conflict the majority of active fighters were affiliated with ZAPU (Chung and Kaarsholm, 2006). After 1968, ZANU came to the fore and Fay Chung claims this led to recruits defecting from ZAPU to ZANU (ibid; p83). Nevertheless, there remained only a few hundred recruits between the two groups in the early seventies. Both groups then exploited government activity to create more recruits. However, ZANU hoovered up many more of these potential recruits than ZAPU. By April 1979, ZAPU had 22,900 members inside Zimbabwe and in training camps outside Zimbabwe, while ZANU had 51,000 (Cilliers, 1986; p239)[73]. J.K. Cilliers also points out that ZANU had tens of thousands of other people actively working for it, while no similar structures existed for ZAPU (ibid.). All of this was most clearly highlighted in the election results in 1980, with Mugabe's ZANU-PF getting 63 percent of the vote and Joseph Nkomo's ZAPU getting 21 percent. In the end, another civil war was to follow during the 1980s, in which ZANU finally defeated ZAPU completely.

Other factors also clearly contributed to the disparity in the performance of these two groups. For example, ZANU was tied much more to the Shona people, which constitute about 82 percent of the African population. Much of ZAPU's support came, in contrast, from the much smaller Nbedele population (CIA, 2016). However, the fact that ZAPU was larger at the beginning of the conflict shows other dynamics must also explain the success of ZANU. The differing advice the two groups received from external patrons on building sovereign structures that

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[73] Many of these fighters were outside Zimbabwe and still in training, explaining the discrepancy between the numbers here and in figure 21. The fact that the insurgents kept such a large proportion of their fighters in reserve also shows how rebels select a force size to best exploit weakness in government control. In Zimbabwe, even though they had this large reserve force, it was still no match for Rhodesian forces on the battlefield. As such, to have projected as much force as possible and engage the government conventionally would have led to unsustainable losses for the insurgents for limited gains.

reached into the population offers a plausible explanation. Chinese support to ZANU serves as a reminder for nations seeking to influence the direction of civil wars; the most decisive way to affect the outcome of a civil war is to assist belligerents in building resilient mobilisation structures.

Conclusions

Why is it deviant?

The conflict in Rhodesia fits the theoretical model of conflict proposed in this thesis almost perfectly. The government lost its capacity to generate support from the white settler community, forcing it to surrender. Moreover, the government's inability to mobilise support from white communities can be directly traced to a decline in its ability to provide within-war socioeconomic incentives to its constituent population. The statistical model, however, showed GDP to have only a very limited, albeit statistically significant, effect on the likelihood of a rebel victory. A 23 percent drop between year eleven and fourteen of a conflict, as in Zimbabwe, only increases the odds of a rebel victory by two percent.

Are changes in GDP, therefore, an effective predictor of conflict outcomes? All else being equal the statistical model suggests not. But 13 out of 14 rebel victories show declines in GDP, compared to 12 out of 18 mixed outcomes and three out of 18 outright government victories. Moreover, a drop in GDP has a clear interactive effect with the other socioeconomic variable used in the model. If life expectancy is also declining by five years, the 23 percent GDP drop now has four times the effect.

The case studies suggest it is the secondary effects of declining GDP that are key to explaining the outcome of the conflict, not the loss of GDP itself. For example, in Cambodia the decline in GDP led to a humanitarian catastrophe, causing the population to withdraw its support for the government. This catastrophe was captured in the model and, therefore, Cambodia was well predicted. In Zimbabwe, the drop in GDP led to the emigration of white communities, who made up the

core of the government's fighting forces, but this was not accounted for in the model. Moreover, economic growth had been slowing significantly for a number of years before the end of the conflict. Up until the late 1970s the government was able to pass on the effects of this onto the African population. While this may have boosted the mobilisation capacity of the rebels, it did not make it more difficult for the government to draw support from its constituent population until later in the conflict.

Taken all together, this suggests a decline in GDP has to specifically affect the ability of the government to generate support from its own constituent population if it is to lead to a rebel victory. A comprehensive statistical model of civil war would have to capture the wide range of ways this could happen. This almost certainly explains why GDP is a key measure of a war's progress, but its substantive effect is small in the statistical model. Observers of single conflicts need to look at which segments of the population are most likely to be affected by any decline in GDP. Only if economic decline leads to a government losing the ability to generate support specifically from its own constituent population can we confidently assess that a rebel victory may be imminent. This may take some time from the moment the government starts to struggle economically, as it will likely cut spending in other areas first, before reducing the benefits it distributes to its constituent population. In this way, a drop in GDP becomes a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a rebel victory.

Hypotheses

Despite not fitting the statistical model, the conflict in Zimbabwe lends strong support for the theory of conflict proposed in this thesis. The rebels won because they built integrated networks with the population, from which they generated various types of support, from finances, to food, to manpower. The population participated in these structures due to the selective within-war incentives the rebels offered, which were political, socioeconomic and coercive in nature. The rebels also undermined the government's ability to generate support from its target population. This limited the economic benefits the white population

accrued from supporting the Rhodesian Front government. The population began to leave and the government recognised it was on the brink of collapse and sought favourable surrender terms.

Each of the turning points in the conflict can be explained with recourse to a change in the incentives the belligerents used to shape population behaviour as table 24 demonstrates. Eventually, the rebels were able to exert huge economic pressure on the government, which undermined the latter's capacity to deliver economic and security benefits to its constituent population. The government was pushed to the brink of collapse and forced to surrender. The government was put into this position even before the rebels had pushed the conflict through the phases of conflict laid out in chapter two, meaning the rebels did not need to build a conventional army to capture the state, exactly as predicted in the theoretical model.

Date	Events	Conflict dynamics (table three)	Key drivers of change	Rebel regenerative capacity	Government control over the state	Sub-hypotheses supported
1965-1968	Onset	Asymmetric warfare (Q3). Rebels begin recruiting and carrying out limited activity.	Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) makes rebels realise Britain will not intervene to support them.	Rebel capacity to build support extremely limited - relying on grievances against settler regime with limited effect.	Government has capacity to provide incentives to settler population and suppress African communities.	2, 3 & 4
1968-1972	-	Asymmetric warfare (Q3). Rebels focus on building networks.	Failure to build support forces rebels to change strategy.	Rebels begin to build networks in northeast of country.	Government still in control of state.	3 & 4
1972-1976	*Detente*	Asymmetric warfare (Q3). Rebels use networks to carry out insurgent-style violence.	Rebel networks begin to generate support.	Rebel networks provide them with manpower, finances and supplies. Still limited in capacity to operate across country	Government uses Protected Villages to control African population in areas affected by insurgency.	2 & 3
1976-1979	Conflict ends - rebel victory	Asymmetric warfare (Q3). Rebels escalate insurgent warfare.	Ceasefire in 1975 allows rebels to spread influence across country and create overwhelming economic pressure on the regime.	Rebel networks now extend across country, enabling activity in more and more places.	Pressure of conflict undermines economy and ability to attract migrants, eliminating government capacity to build armed forces and forcing it to surrender.	2 & 4

Table 24: Summary of Zimbabwe conflict dynamics and key findings

Conclusion

This thesis started by posing two questions: Why do conflict actors expend resources on shaping population behaviour rather than directly confronting opposition forces? And, why are small rebel groups able to compete with much stronger government forces and, in some cases, defeat them?

To answer these questions, I proposed we should describe civil war as a mobilisation competition, but one with asymmetric qualities. Governments and rebels attempt to mobilise resources from the population and degrade the capacity of their opponents to do the same. Relative power, therefore, is defined by belligerents' alliances with the population, explaining why they dedicate resources to shaping population behaviour. However, governments normally start the conflict with the institutions it uses to mobilise support intact, while rebels have to build them during the war. Governments also have to mobilise more resources than rebels as they have to carry out activities tangential to the conflict itself in order to retain control over the state. These two points mean rebels can concentrate on demobilising the government and still win the war even if they do not conquer the whole polity, explaining why weak insurgencies can defeat strong governments.

This framework suggests we should be able to predict the dynamics and outcome of a conflict by examining the government's ability to absorb the costs of the conflict and continue delivering the incentives across the population that keep it in power. When the institutions that the government uses to mobilise resources from the population are in decline, the rebels are likely to emerge victorious. When the government is able to re-establish its institutional reach across the whole polity, then it will defeat insurgent challengers. This thesis represents a first attempt to articulate this process and the empirical sections showed strong support for using this framework to understand the dynamics and outcomes of civil wars.

Demobilising the government

The cases studies demonstrated how rebels demobilise governments across a variety of contexts and that this was the key variable in determining the final outcomes of conflicts. Zimbabwean insurgents put the government under economic strain, which led white settlers, who had previously provided most of the active support to the government, to begin leaving Zimbabwe. The government of the Khmer Republic could not sustain even the basic functions of a state, and eventually collapsed completely. The Khmer Rouge then captured the capital. The rebels in Nagorno-Karabakh completely ejected the government's constituency from the region, eliminating government capacity to build any type of force to challenge rebel control. The conflict in Burundi undermined the government's capacity to generate the resources necessary to keep the organs of the state functioning, forcing it to engage in political reform to end the conflict.

Rebel mobilisation

The cases also showed how rebels build their own sovereign structures to create pressure on governments. Every rebel group featured in the case studies developed institutions that shaped population behaviour and drew resources from communities. The Zimbabwean rebels probably created the least comprehensive shadow governance, in that they did not provide services, facilitate economic activity or establish internal security forces. Nevertheless, ZANU and ZAPU achieved more through their mobilisation structures than the CNDD-FDD and the Nagorno-Karabakh rebels, in terms of the ultimate outcome of the war. The strength and nature of rebel mobilisation networks, therefore, was not as decisive as government capacity to absorb the costs of the conflict for determining whether rebel groups win outright, exactly as predicted when the two caveats are added to the logic of war as a mobilisation competition.

Based on the strength of their mobilisation structures, insurgents employ a military strategy that allows them to continually replace losses on the battlefield. This allows them to strain the government's capacity to raise the resources

necessary to hold onto power. Relatively weaker groups, such as the insurgents in Zimbabwe and Burundi, use guerrilla-style warfare. The strain this created in these conflicts had a much slower effect on the government than the more conventional-style operations the Khmer Rouge employed after 1970. Nevertheless, the Zimbabwean rebels won the war in the same way; by undermining the very basis of government control over the state.

Rebel groups that build stronger armies may be able to demobilise the government more quickly. They can capture economically and politically important targets, boosting their own mobilisation capacity and weakening the government in large steps. The Nagorno-Karabakh rebels captured territory that opened up supply routes to the Republic of Armenia, better enabling them to draw support from their external patron and facilitate internal state-building activity. The Zimbabwean rebels, in contrast, chipped away at minor economic and political targets, such as local government institutions, roads, agricultural production and infrastructure, undermining the capacity of the government to facilitate the life the white settler community demanded. These types of rebel groups must place more emphasis on demobilising the government's economic and political institutions compared to relatively stronger rebel groups. Stronger rebels can capture territory directly and create much more comprehensive mobilisation structures, as the rebels managed in Nagorno-Karabakh and Cambodia. These structures can be used to create so much strain on the government that it collapses completely, as in Cambodia, or they can be used to build a more conventional force that can capture and hold territory, as in Nagorno-Karabakh. Asymmetric and conventional conflicts, therefore, are not fundamentally different. They represent parts of a single process that the rebels are trying to force the conflict through.

The empirical work in this thesis showed how both strong and weak rebel groups win. The challenge for rebel groups is to understand the resilience of their support-base, the foundation of government control, and select a strategy accordingly. If they succeed, rebels can win without ever having to push the

conflict through all the phases identified in the ideal-type, as demonstrated in Zimbabwe.

Demobilising rebels

Governments, if they are to fend off the challenges of organised rebel forces, cannot blast them off the battlefield, as demonstrated by the Rhodesian government. Governments win when they demobilise rebels through undercutting their capacity to generate popular support. Whether a rebel group is 1,000 or 100,000 strong is less relevant than its ability to replace those personnel. It is this regenerative capacity that determines its freedom to act and drain government resources in the longer term. In Burundi, the government used political reform to undercut the CNDD-FDD's ability to mobilise support, forcing the insurgency to embrace the newly formed democratic structures it had previously rejected.

Conflict as an iterative process

Framing civil war as an asymmetric mobilisation competition turns it into a continuous process of alliance building and breaking between conflict actors and the population, exactly as described by Stathis Kalyvas (2006). Belligerent behaviour during the conflict itself determines changes in their mobilisation capacities and their ability to demobilise their opponent. Academics and government analysts need to look at how events in the conflict affect the mobilisation capacities of the belligerents. This would allow them to better predict the dynamics of ongoing and future wars and speak about civil war in the same terms; a battle to generate support from the population.

Counterinsurgency doctrine

This thesis also represented a first attempt to comparatively test the tenets of current counterinsurgency doctrine; development, governance and security. These three areas do correspond to many of the facets that determined the

strength of belligerents in the case studies. However, the way development, governance and security shaped population behaviour differed to how it is currently described in doctrine (JCS, 2013).

Development

Both the statistical analysis and case studies reinforced the importance of socioeconomic incentives. The model showed strong support for the idea that a government losing the capacity to facilitate socioeconomic activity and deliver basic services is more likely to lose a civil war. The quantitative analysis also found some support for the idea that governments benefit from improving the economy.

Governments in Burundi, Cambodia and Zimbabwe lost control because they could not generate the economic incentives to motivate participation in the military and civil service. The government in Burundi took steps to redress this, implementing political reform in exchange for external economic aid. The Rhodesian and Cambodian governments could not find a way to overcome this problem and surrendered power. The evidence from the case studies and the statistical model is that a decline in the government's ability to facilitate socioeconomic activity is the most effective predictor that a government is going to be defeated.

The declining economy in Zimbabwe and Cambodia led to an inability to generate support from the government's constituent population. However, it happened in two contrasting fashions. In Cambodia, it induced a humanitarian catastrophe that caused the population to disengage. In Zimbabwe, it led the white settler community to emigrate in order to avoid conscription. The cases also showed that governments can lessen the effect of a drop in GDP by drawing support from external sources, as in Burundi, or by passing negative effects onto non-constituent communities, as the Rhodesian government managed for a number of years.

These two features of the case studies explain why GDP appeared to have a small substantive effect on civil war outcomes in the statistical model. A drop in GDP is significant for a government, but it only leads to it losing the war when it translates into an inability to specifically build support from its constituent population. Analysts looking at specific wars need to examine how a decline in overall economic output affects a government's relationship with its own constituent population if they want to understand how the war is likely to proceed.

The case studies showed that rebel ability to facilitate socioeconomic activity can also play a role in determining the strength of rebel groups. Rebel groups in Cambodia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Burundi all built effective shadow economies that enabled them to generate support. The structures these rebels created showed the importance of socioeconomic activity beyond just incentivising popular support. Economic activity generates resources, such as finances and food, which belligerents then use to build and sustain armed forces. How conflict actors maximise the support they generate from the population, in terms of tangible resources, is often overlooked. When a conflict actor fails to sustain socioeconomic activity it is normally only analysed in terms of whether it will induce popular opposition (Lund, 2015). This thesis shows that this misses out a key variable for understanding the dynamics and outcomes of civil wars. Analysts need to examine the resources belligerents are generating from the population. The ability of an actor to do this determines its 'popular support', not whether the population identify with its goals.

Governance

The statistical model implied that political incentives are key to the ability of governments to generate support. The government in Burundi showed itself to be adhering to the new political order it had promised. This motivated refugees to return to the country rather than support the CNDD-FDD. It also led to fighters laying down their weapons on the basis they had achieved their aims.

Equally, rebels generated support by creating effective political structures and undermining government institutions. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, however, showed that it was not the post-war vision of governance that mattered, but creating credible structures that conditioned population behaviour during the war. It was the rebels' ability to exploit a changing context and build effective sovereign structures that enabled them to generate the behavioural support it needed to build an army. These political structures delivered the socioeconomic and security benefits that shaped population behaviour. The rebels in Cambodia and Burundi used shadow governance to improve agricultural production so the population could eat and trade. Once these structures started functioning they generated resources that the rebels used to sustain military activity. All the rebel groups covered in this thesis used the structures they created to organise recruitment and generate finances, food and other types of supplies. Without these structures there would have been no war.

The flipside of this is that when governance breaks down a belligerent loses the capacity to shape behaviour. Government institutions were degraded across large parts of the state in Burundi, Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe and Cambodia. As a result, the governments surrendered their ability to shape population behaviour in these areas.

Governance structures are, by definition, the means through which belligerents draw support back out from the population in the form of manpower, finances and supplies. If rebels undermine government institutions, then the government can no longer generate and distribute the resources that keep it in power. Building and destroying sovereign structures for generating support, therefore, becomes a key element of any conflict and is why counterinsurgency theorists, such as Bard O'Neill, describe civil wars as political, rather than military in nature (1990).

Security

Providing security to the population has primacy in current counterinsurgency doctrine (JCS, 2013). In the case studies, insecurity drove local communities to support militias in Burundi, Cambodia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Insecurity also pushed many white settlers to leave Zimbabwe, undermining the economy and the government's ability to mobilise a force to confront the insurgency. Populations clearly seek to avoid insecurity and will withdraw support from actors that cannot bring stability, just as the white settler community did in Zimbabwe or the Azerbaijani population did in Nagorno-Karabakh. The security cover that the North Vietnamese and Armenian armies provided the Khmer Rouge and Nagorno-Karabakh rebels respectively also proved crucial in enabling the rebels to build shadow governance structures that mobilised resources from the population.

The evidence from the case studies and the statistical model showed, however, that governments and rebels have to do more than provide security to generate the support they need to win wars. Insecurity is far more important than security. In Nagorno-Karabakh and Zimbabwe populations fled insecure areas, essentially demobilising the government completely in these parts of the state. Security is, therefore, important in that it facilitates the economic and socio-political behaviour that generates resources for the government. If governments are too weak to stimulate this type of activity regardless, then the provision of security may well be moot. Only resilient political, social and economic structures shape population behaviour on a large enough scale to significantly weaken rebel groups, as evidenced in Burundi, where security followed political reform.

Other variables

Violence

The introduction showed the extent of the current literature on how belligerents use violence to shape population behaviour. The case studies reiterated the

central role of population-focused violence in shaping conflict outcomes. We also uncovered an additional reason as to why violence may fail to stymie rebel groups.

The governments in Burundi and Zimbabwe contributed to their own economic problems by coercing the population into stopping agricultural activity in many areas for fear that the output was being used to support rebel groups. Violence can induce a population to provide passive support, but cannot generate the level of resources of a mutually beneficial relationship. Violence works, therefore, when governments can afford to pacify the rebel's constituent population over the long term. It cannot create effective, resource-generating sovereign-structures, be they informal rebel networks or government institutions. While I hope the use of violence against civilian populations is not an area from which Western governments are seeking to take lessons, the need to make relations with the population mutually productive remains pertinent. A similar logic explains why simply providing local security is not enough to defeat insurgencies.

Shaping strategies

Population support, when framed as a behavioural contribution rather than sentiment, is the key element of any war. Other factors, however, dictate how much support belligerents need to raise internally, whether they can rely on passive support alone as well as how conflict actors choose to generate support. These variables are often crucial in determining the war's outcome and the ability of belligerents to build resilient mobilisation structures that sustain military activity. I do not intend to revisit every outside factor raised through this thesis. Two factors, however, are worth recounting given how often they come up in policy debates.

External support had a positive effect for most belligerents, both in the statistical model and across the case studies. This challenges the current notion that external forces cannot defeat local rebellions (Jones, 2008). External support in the statistical model explicitly meant 'boots on the ground' and the rebels in

Cambodia and Nagorno-Karabakh could not have won without direct intervention from North Vietnamese and Republic of Armenia forces respectively.

External support, up to and including 'boots on the ground', does, therefore, work. However, it has to be used by a conflict actor to build credible institutions for asserting sovereign control across the state. The Khmer Republic government received as much support as the Khmer Rouge, yet it only employed this assistance militarily, and once it was withdrawn the government quickly fell. If external actors cannot find a way of ensuring support is used effectively, it creates an aid trap with governments believing their patron will keep them in power indefinitely. Both Afghanistan and Iraq followed this pattern and they continue to struggle to overcome the rebel forces that Western militaries and indigenous populations paid such a significant human and financial cost to contain. External patrons need to find a credible means of ensuring the security assistance they provide is used to create effective sovereign structures. Failure to do this is what leads to external forces getting sucked into conflicts they cannot win against small bands of guerrilla forces. Based on the logic of asymmetric conflict, as originally proposed by Ivan Arreguín-Toft (2005), there will always be a strategy that allows rebels to induce a military stalemate. What happens politically and economically behind this stalemate determines the outcome of the conflict even when it involves the most advanced militaries in the world.

This thesis has also shed light on the importance of ideology in shaping belligerent behaviour. Much has been made of ISIL's ideological appeal as a recruitment tool (G. Wood, 2015). This, however, misses a key role of ideology. Ideology, particularly in the case of the Khmer Rouge, helped the rebels to win because it provided a ready-made framework for building a shadow-state. Rebels that have a clear vision for the post-war state, such as ISIL, may well be more powerful, but not just because their vision is appealing. Their power comes from their mobilisation structures, which are, whether by design or not, grounded in a broader ideology. This makes them more effective than less-ideologically motivated rebel groups.

The role of ideology can, however, swing both ways. The government's support in Zimbabwe rested strongly on the belief that whites were superior to African communities. The regime could not countenance opening up electoral participation to Africans, nor could it expand the army to include them. An ideology can provide a framework for drawing broad support from the population, but it can also constrain a belligerent's capacity to build relationships across different communities. Conflict observers need to understand whether a belligerent's ideology provides a framework for broadening or constraining its capacity to generate support beyond its hard-core group of supporters. Treating ideology in this way provides a better framework for assessing its long-term importance in particular conflicts compared to current debates, which solely focus on whether an ideology really is appealing to a mass audience (Dagli, 2015).[74]

Recommendations

A number of recommendations fall out of this thesis, both for academics and practitioners.

Academia

The first implication of this thesis is how academia should be using comparative data on rebel numbers and the balance of power. Stronger rebel groups inevitably create greater pressure on governments than smaller ones. By the time a rebel group has grown in size, however, it is often too late for the policy community to take appropriate action. Rebel groups explicitly use civil war to grow in power and demobilise the government. Decision-makers need help understanding when rebel groups are likely to grow in size and when governments are likely to struggle to cope with them. Rebel numbers and the balance of power should become dependent variables for academic study.

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[74] The referenced article explicitly responds to the Graeme Wood article cited in the previous paragraph. This sort of debate is common in magazines such as *The Atlantic*, which often then feeds into policy discussions.

Both comparative and single-conflict analysis should be examining government capacity to absorb the costs of the conflict and rebel capacity to inflict those costs, both in the short and long term. This study represents a first step, but there are many ways it can be improved. I have chosen, for a number of reasons, to focus on the first part of this equation; government capacity to absorb the costs of the conflict. However, we also need to collect comparable data on rebel sovereign structures. Comparable data on rebel funding, shadow economies, governance structures and rudimentary services would offer enormous insights into what types of rebel groups represent the most significant challenge to governments. We would then be in a better position to directly compare the resilience of government and rebel mobilisation capacities and generate a more powerful model of civil war outcomes.

I have also focused on a very narrow element of government relations with the population, namely formal political and economic institutions. As William Reno (2007) and Lee Seymour (2014) show, many states are held together by looser networks of informal patronage-based alliances. Partly through its own mismanagement, this was the situation the coalition found itself in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The policy and military communities need studies that explore what works in these types of situations. As Mark Duffield points out, the ability of local actors to exploit Western interventions for their own ends has, in many cases, just further entrenched the social, political and economic drivers of these wars (2005). The broader framework developed in this thesis offers a sensible template for exploring this phenomenon.

Policymakers

Analysts in governments around the world need to look at the resilience and adaptability of the mobilisation structures governments and rebels are using to generate support. We need to understand what phase the war is in – irregular, asymmetric or conventional – and assess the capacity of the belligerents to transition the conflict through these phases by increasing their regenerative capacity and degrading that of their opponent. Looking at conflicts through this

lens will allow us to get ahead of the game and properly inform decision-makers on how wars are likely to proceed. The overall resilience of a government's control over its state will be the key to its ability to survive a civil war, not just the size of its army.

At any given point in time a rebel group's power to regenerate will be at 100 percent, because it will choose its level of activity to reflect its regenerative capacity.[75] We need to understand what determines its regenerative capacity and focus activity accordingly. Targeting a group's regenerative capacity will have far more impact than 'direct' targeting, as a rebel group will base its activity around a perceived ability to absorb these losses. Cambodian and Zimbabwe rebels suffered enormous casualties but no loss in operational capacity.

The need to focus on a rebel group's regenerative capacity applies just as much to kinetic targeting, as it does political and development activities. Undermining its regenerative capacity will force a rebel group to adapt its behaviour and reduce its level of activity, much more than the killing of insurgents, thus creating less strain on the government. Rebel groups will adapt to pressure on their mobilisation capacities and policymakers and military strategists will need to be flexible in response. Effective intervention strategies that weaken an insurgency's mobilisation capacity, however, will gradually eliminate rebel capacity to operate.

That said, there is no quick fix for defeating rebel groups. They can only be slowly degraded as improving political and socioeconomic conditions eliminate rebel capacity to regenerate. We must recognise that overseas interventions are likely to require a long-term commitment of economic, political and military resources if they are to have any chance of success. If this cannot be assured, then interventions will fail to create a lasting solution. If host-nation governments do not use external military support to develop effective political and socioeconomic

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[75] Rebels can, of course, miscalculate their regenerative capacity. However, I would suggest this is a dangerous assumption to make.

institutions, then no amount of military commitment will be enough, as demonstrated by the limited effect of the enormous US commitment in Cambodia.

We need to better define what constitutes a tactical effect in civil war by examining wars where governments survived, not Zimbabwe. Counterinsurgency differentiates between direct and indirect targeting (JCS, 2013). This creates a false dichotomy in that it implies direct targeting to be affecting the root of the problem. However, as Zimbabwe shows, it is direct targeting that is tangential to the main battleground of the conflict. Former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, uses the term "insurgent math" to describe rebel efforts to induce government retaliation; "for every innocent local the incumbent's forces kill, they create ten new insurgents" (Dreyfuss, 2013). The same logic should be applied to all government activity. If it does not undermine rebel capacity to generate support, then it has no utility, regardless of how many insurgents have been taken off the battlefield. It is tempting to assess that people will be deterred from joining rebel groups if they face significant casualties or that rebels cannot replace experienced commanders. While this may be true in isolated cases, the figures from Afghanistan, Cambodia and Zimbabwe, show this is not the norm. We must assume killed insurgents were on the battlefield because they could be replaced; this applies to those in leadership positions just as much as foot soldiers. Undermining a rebel group's regenerative capacity is the only way to 'directly' target and weaken it, as the government in Burundi managed.

Practitioners also need to steer away from understanding popular support as largely dependent on legitimacy. Stathis Kalyvas presented the idea that support needs to be understood as a behaviour, not an opinion (2006). This thesis strongly reinforces that notion and takes it further by urging analysts to view it as a contribution to the strength of a group. When examining sovereign structures, be they clandestine networks or formal institutions, we need to focus on their effectiveness at creating the desired behavioural effect, not just whether they accord with cultural norms.

Final words

Regardless of whether an analyst is from academia or the policy community, this thesis demonstrates the utility of viewing civil war as an asymmetric mobilisation competition. The explanation for the beginning, middle and end of civil wars, past, present and future, will be found in changes to the mobilisation capacities of conflict actors. Civil war is about controlling the state, which means building resilient sovereign alliances across the population in order to create a resilient regeneration capacity. Governments need to assert sovereignty across the whole state, while rebels seek to undermine their solution for achieving this, inducing the government to collapse. Regenerative capacity is determined by the ability of a conflict to generate popular support; understood as a behaviour not sentiment. This is how popular support determines the outcome of conflicts and explains how small rebel groups are able to frustrate the most powerful military forces in the world.

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