Hate Begets Hate; Violence Begets Violence:

The Case of Domestic Terrorism on Behalf of Ethnic Groups

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Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the main factors leading to terrorism, the connections between terrorism and civil wars and how terrorism and civil war can affect each other. For the theoretical clarity, I decided to deal only with ethnically motivated domestic terrorism since I argue that ethnic component as well as domestic focus significantly affect mobilization and targeting strategy. For the purpose of the PhD research, the Database Ethnically Motivated Terrorist Attacks (DEMTA) is built using the Ethnic Power Relationship (EPR) dataset, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), information from the Terrorist Organizations Profiles (TOPs) and other sources. The first chapter introduces the concept of ethnically motivated terrorism and a newly built database providing information on terrorist attacks committed on behalf of ethnic groups. The chapter connects theories on causes of terrorism and ethnic violence to build a complex theory on causes of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism which is empirically tested. The second chapter explores the relationship between terrorism and civil war. Studies on terrorism show that intensity of terrorist incidents varies over time. A closer look on data on ethnically motivated terrorism shows that frequency of terrorist incidents is higher in post-war period than in pre-war periods. I explain the increase in the number of terrorist attacks by radicalization of the ordinary people which is caused by exposure to a systematic violence. The third chapter adds the concept of the lethality of terrorism to the classic explanation of motivation and capabilities as the main factors affecting the likelihood of of civil war. Motivation and capability are not enough to explain the occurrence of civil war as while they might address the potential for action they do not address the resolve to use this potential. The

main findings of this thesis show that political exclusion leads to mobilization often resulting to civil war which radicalizes people. Subsequently, radicalized people are more prone to the use of violence, including terrorism. Lethal terrorism further mobilizes people and increases likelihood of civil war.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Terrorism is a phenomena, frightening societies in many countries. Acts of terrorism spread fear and weaken regimes. Terrorism has also the power to catch attention of media worldwide while only a handful of people with little resources are needed to carry out a horrifying attack. Due to this power and despite it's low resources need, terrorism is often considered to be a weapon of the weak.

This thesis focuses on the main factors leading to terrorism, the connections between terrorism and civil wars and how terrorism and civil war can affect each other. For the theoretical clarity, I decided to deal only with ethnically motivated domestic terrorism since I argue that ethnic component as well as domestic focus significantly affect mobilization and targeting strategy.

However, terrorism is not very demanding when it comes to financing and personnel (Crenshaw 1990), it can prove to be very costly for the perpetrators (O'Neill 2006). Terrorism is considered to be unacceptable since its primary targets are civilians (Asal et al. 2012). It is important to keep in mind that terrorists need to receive some support from the ordinary people, especially in case of a more intensive terrorist campaign. Terrorists are more likely to meet with a neutral or

even positive reaction if the local people are radicalized since radicalization is an important prerequisite for terrorism (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009).

The main argument of the thesis can be sum up with the sentence:

"Hate begets hate, violence begets violence, ..." This is a famous quote of Dr Martin Luther King, Jr. used in many of his speeches on equality and civil right of the black minority in the US (Luther 1958, p. 74). I argue that discrimination leads to terrorism, civil war leads to terrorism and terrorism leads to civil war. In other words, violence or hate, produces more hate and violence since people in fear or those who have been subjected to violence on their own often become radicalized and radicalized people tend more to the use of violence.

The idea that violence can produce more violence is not new and is more or less established in psychology. There is plenty of studies on how victims of domestic violence and abuse can become perpetrators themselves (Coxe & Holmes 2002, Dodge et al. 1990, Widom et al. 2001). Of course, only small proportion of people who have experienced domestic violence become abusers. These individuals are more prone to become abusers than the general population under certain conditions. Therefore, many studies are focused on the breaking the circle of violence (Agerbak 1996, Egeland et al. 1988).

In the case of individuals, violence can increase the probability of revenge; therefore, produce more violence. In the case of groups' behavior, we can find many examples supporting this statement. For instance, some clans and ethnic groups have been engaged in blood feuds for years or even decades. Often, an act of violence of one group triggers another act of violence by the targeted group (Tishkov 2004). Also, fear caused by discrimination increases the likelihood of violence.

Vast political psychology literature taught us about important changes in so-

ciety which are exposed to longer periods of violence. People tend to have a black and white vision of the reality they live in. To be able to cope with stressful situations, they portray themselves as innocent victims and the enemy is dehumanized. In this environment, the use of violence tends to be less shocking and perceived as less extreme (Bar-Tal 1998, 2013).

The intention of this research is to test the idea that fear of discrimination and violence produces more violence in the case of the relationship between government and ethnic groups with a special focus on terrorism and civil wars.

1.1 Specifics of Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism

As written above the thesis focuses only on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism. It is assumed that ethnic identity factor and domestic characteristic of terrorist attacks have an important effect on mobilization of potential supporters and targeting of the enemy. Domestic terrorism is considered to be primarily a homegrown issue; therefore, motivations of perpetrators are very probably rooted in domestic agenda and conditions. According to Enders et al. (2011), domestic terrorism has to meet two important conditions. First, victims has to have the same nationality as perpetrators. Second, victims and perpetrators have to be nationals of the state where the terrorist attack has occurred. Since domestic terrorism is considered to be a homegrown issue, one of the factor affecting the occurrence of domestic terrorism can be presence of a discriminated minority or an ethnic conflict as showed many qualitative and theoretical studies (Tishkov 1997, Wolff 2006, Felbab-Brown 2010). For the purpose of this research, ethnically motivated terrorism is defined as "... *deliberate violence by a sub-national*

ethnic group to advance its cause." The purpose of this violence is mostly the creation of an independent state or improvement of the status of the ethnic group (Byman 1998, p. 151).

This research focuses on ethnic groups and violence committed on their behalf due to data availability and clearer literature to build on in comparison to other groups, for instance left-wing organization and religious groups. Ethnic identities and emotional thinking of ethnic groups members can be manipulated for political purposes. Threat or opportunity can change ethnicity in political issue or inter-ethnic conflict. Esman defines ethnic identity as "... something that has roots in a group's culture, and historical experiences and traditions, but that is also dependent upon contemporary opportunities that can be a useful instrument for mobilizing people for social, political, or economic purposes that may or may not be related directly to their ethnic origins" (Esman 1994, p. 15). This approach to ethnic identity can be labeled as instrumentalism (Varshney 2000, p. 27).

Instrumentalism considers ethnicity as an instrumental value which "... can serve as focal point facilitating convergence of individual expectations" (Varshney 2000, p. 29-30). Therefore, ethnicity can be very useful mobilization strategy. In other words, ethnic groups can be seen as interest groups united along ethnic lines to achieve goals and gain political or economical goods (Hempel 2009, p. 462).

1.2   Database of Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism (DEMTA)

As explained above, I decided to focus on ethnic groups as a unit of analysis. Unfortunately, the existing databases do not provide information on whether a terrorist attack was committed on behalf of an ethnic group to elevate political

status of the group. Similarly, the databases provide little or no help to determine whether a terrorist incident was an act of domestic terrorism. Therefore, I decided to build the Database of Ethnically Motivated Terrorist Attacks (DEMTA) for the purpose of my PhD research. This section introduces the newly built database and decisions and their justifications which had to be made in the process of creating the database.

1.2.1 Definition of Terrorism

The first necessary step is to define the phenomenon of terrorism. As terrorism is a very complex set of phenomena dealing with a huge number of groups differing not only in origins but also in motives, and goals, researchers have failed to agree on one definition of terrorism (Bjorgo 2005, p. 1-2). See also Schmid (2011). For the purpose of this research, terrorism is defined as "*deliberate and violent targeting civilians for political purposes*" (Richardson 2007, p. 20).

Several points are important to add to this definition to highlight some key features of terrorism. First, terrorism is different from other crimes as terrorism can be defined as deliberate and violent targeting of civilians for socio-political purposes. Thus, terrorists' goals are politically or ideologically motivated and involve either the overthrow of a government or a change in status quo (Richardson 2007, p. 20). On the other hand, the motivation of groups of organized crime is purely economic. Nevertheless, both terrorists and criminals use violence or threat of violence to reach their particular goals. They have similar tactics and sometimes goals but they have different motivations (Schmid 2005, p. 3-4).

Second, terrorist attack can be perceived as a message sent by terrorists to the government. Victims and targets are often symbolic as audience of the message differs from victims (Richardson 2007, p. 4-5). Terrorists attack civilians to spread

fear that often results in "personalization of the attack." People think that they can be the victims of the next terrorist attack as only coincidence saved them from the first attack. The "personalization of the attack" makes terrorism more powerful and destructive (Ganor 2005, p. 6).

Third, terrorism is a serious crime committed by sub-state actors. To maintain analytical clarity, it is necessary to exclude intentional attacks against civilians committed by states[1] as these serious crimes have very different dynamic and features (Richardson 2007, p. 5). To sum up, terrorism is defined as an intentional act of violence targeting civilians which is committed by a non-state actor.

However the definition presented above provides us with the main characteristic features of terrorism, it might not be sufficient for identification of terrorist incidents while looking at specific violent events. There are two main approaches towards tackling the problem of terrorism identification, namely actor-based and action-based approach. Before proceeding further, I discuss these two approaches and their implications for data collections.

First, the actor-based approach distinguishes terrorists from guerrilla fighters on the base of level of asymmetry. Terrorists are weak relative to the government in that they are not able to control and seize a territory. Based on this approach, we identify a violent event as an act of terrorism only if the attack is carried out by a group without any territory (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009). The serious weakness of this approach lies in the fact that many groups behave as terrorist groups as well as guerrillas. For instance, the Taliban, the Tamil Tigers or various Chechen groups control a territory as well as carry out terrorist attacks outside of their territory if they wish to target their government in more indirect way. The main implication of this approach is that many examples of

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[1]e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes

violent events considered as terrorist attacks would become guerrilla attacks. For instance, in October 2002, several Chechen rebels seized the Dubrovka theater in Moscow and threatened to kill everybody unless the Russian forces withdraw from Chechnya. Similarly, the Beslan tragedy in 2004 would not be considered as an act of terrorism since the Chechen rebels still controlled some territory.

Second, the action-based approach deals with the problem described above. Instead of defining an organization as a terrorist group, it defines an incident as a terrorist attack based on following criteria. Terrorist attacks primarily target non-combatants (civilians and those who are no longer involved in fighting) and aim to spread fear. The target of violence thus differs from the target audience (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009). However, these criteria are very vague and it can be complicated to apply them in the situation of civil war. They much better suit the reality than the actor-based approach as many insurgent groups use terrorism as well as guerrilla warfare, for example Sendero Luminoso, the Taliban and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Fortna 2011). This approach is mainly criticize for its focus on the targeting of civilians as its main identification criterion. The criticism points out that civilians are targeted also in civil wars, genocides etc. (Asal et al. 2012). Nevertheless, this criticism can be easily refuted if we treat terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare (Stepanova 2008). For example, genocides are usually multi-event acts of horror while a terrorist attack is a single event which can be a part of genocide. Similarly, terrorism can be used during civil wars to terrorize population to submit to insurgency or to force the enemy government to capitulate.

Comparing these two approaches from the perspective of data collection and events coding, the actor-based approach might lead to underestimation of terrorist attacks and the action-based approach might lead to overestimation of terrorist

events since also acts of criminal violence can be mistakenly considered as terrorism (Asal et al. 2012). Since I believe that terrorism is a tactic and targeting civilians is one of the main features of this tactic, I decided to use the action-based approach in my research.

1.2.2 Data Sources

After defining terrorism and making decision on the approach to identification of terrorist acts, it is necessary to chose relevant sources of data on terrorism. I decided to use an existing database on terrorist attacks since it would not be realistic to collect data on terrorist attacks worldwide during my PhD study.

However there are several databases[2] providing information on terrorist attacks, only the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) accommodates the following requirements:

- Data on domestic terrorism;
- Data collected for a period of several decades;
- Data collected for most states in the world;
- Suitable definition of terrorism.

The GTD (2012) collects data on international as well as domestic terrorist incidents from 1970 and does not limit its coverage only to a specific region. Moreover, the definition of terrorism suits the purpose of this research. The GTD (2012), defines terrorism as "*...an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor*". Furthermore, other three criteria are added. "*The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal as well as the violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey*

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[2]ITERATE and RAND databases collected data only on international terrorism and WITS database provides information on Western Europe only.

some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and the violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law."

However the GTD (2012) enables users not to apply all those criteria, I decided to do so as I want to be sure that the data I use are as close as possible to my definition of terrorism. For the reasons explained bellow, I decided to use data on terrorist attacks for the period 1970-2007. Only 13 993 out of 15 097 terrorist attacks from this period fulfill the three criteria set by the GTD (2012). Also, I decided to discard all incidents where the primary targets were not civilians or civilian properties. Those targets are police, military and terrorists. After the target restriction, we are left with the final 11 223 terrorist attacks.

1.2.3 Identification of Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism

The GTD (2012) provided the list of terrorist attacks corresponding to the criteria of definition of terrorism. The next step is to identify those terrorist incidents which are domestic and ethnically motivated. An ethnically motivated domestic terrorist attack has to fulfill the the following criteria:

- The ideology of the perpetrator of a terrorist attack is focused on advancing a cause of a specific ethnic group;
- The perpetrator of a terrorist attack mobilizes and recruits primarily among the members of the ethnic group;
- The perpetrator of a terrorist attack has to have an agenda and more or less permanent presence in a country where the ethnic groups resides.

The criteria for classification of a terrorist attack as domestic terrorism do not

strictly follow the definition of Enders et al. (2011) which says that perpetrators and victims have to be nationals of the state where the terrorist attack was perpetrated. There are three main reasons for the deviation from the Enders' definition. First, however the GTD (2012) has information on the nationality of the victims and perpetrators, a closer look at the data shows that the information is often missing. Second, the victims of a domestic terrorism are not always the nationals of the state where the terrorist attack happened. Many terrorist groups target tourists to embarrass government or hinder the income from tourism. Third, some ethnic groups are spread across several states, for instance Kurds, and the terrorist groups acting on their behalf can be active in more than one state. To overcome those problems, the third criterion ensures that perpetrators and their acts are closely related to the country where they commit the acts of terrorism. In other words, their acts of violence are a home-grown issue. The first and second criteria link perpetrators and their acts to a specific ethnic group.

The list of ethnic groups is taken from The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR 2013). The main source of information of ideology of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks is the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs 2012). The Database of Ethnically Motivated Terrorist Attacks is constructed in two steps. Firstly, a database of terrorist groups fighting on behalf of ethnic groups was created by coding of relevant information from the The Terrorist Organization Profiles website TOPs (2012). The TOPs (2012) website allows us to identify terrorist groups with nationalist or separatist goals as well as ethnic groups who are related to these terrorist groups. Secondly, this newly created list of terrorist groups is used to identify terrorist attacks from the GTD (2012) committed on behalf of the ethnic groups included in the GTD (2012). Unfortunately, the GTD (2012) includes also attacks perpetrated by groups which are not listed the TOPs (2012), thus,

other open sources are used to code the rest of terrorist incidents. Fig. 3.2 shows development of ethnically motivated terrorist attacks over time. Note, the GTD (2012) lost most of the records for the year 1993. This years is treated as missing in the analysis. Summary statistics of the newly created database show that one third of terrorist attacks were committed by domestic terrorists on behalf of ethnic groups (Tab. 1.1). The term Other terrorism represents terrorist attacks which are not ethnically motivated as well as international terrorist attacks (including international terrorist attacks on behalf of ethnic groups).

Tab. 1.1: Total number of terrorist attacks 1970-2007

	Total	
	Freq.	%
Ethnically motivated domestic terrorism	15097	35.18
Other terrorism	25612	59.67
Uknown	2212	5.15
Total	42921	100.00

The GTD (2012) includes many terrorist attacks where the perpetrator is not a specific terrorist group but an ethnic group. For instance Chechen and Kurdish rebels. Given the fact that the focus of this PhD research is on ethnic groups, the unit of analysis (ethnic group per state per year) allows us to include these attacks too. Other studies dealing with terrorist or rebel groups as a unit of analysis omit these attacks as it is not possible to link them to a concrete terrorist group (Polo & Gleditsch 2014).

Given the way how the database is built, it is easy to link the information on ethnically motivated terrorist attacks to the EPR (2013) to get information on the characteristics of ethnic groups as well as other databases using state per year as a unit of analysis, for instance PolityVI (2012), UCDP Georeferenced Event

Fig. 1.1: Ethnically motivated domestic terrorism (1970-2007)

Dataset (Sundberg & Melander 2013) and Political Instability Task Force (Bates et al. 2003).

1.2.4   Coding Examples

To fully explain the coding of events of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism, it is important to demonstrate it on some examples of complicated cases. Bavarian Liberation Army operating in Romania on behalf of the German minority living in Romania represents a clear-cut example of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism. The group intends to improve the rights of Germans in Romania, recruiting among the Germans and perpetrates acts of violence or threat of violence in the territory of Romania. Nevertheless, most of the cases are more complicated.

Some ethnic groups can be found in more than one state, for instance Kurds.

Similarly, terrorist groups acting on their behalf operate in several states; therefore, the claim on domestic character of terrorist events might be problematic. In such a situation, the main criterion is whether the perpetrator of terrorist attacks claims to act on behalf of an ethnic group living within territory of the state where these acts of terrorism where committed.

Some terrorist groups act on behalf of more than one ethnic group. For example, Dagestani rebels fighting for independence on the Russian Federation claim to represent several ethnic groups (Kumyks, Dargins, Avars, Lezgins and Laks). In such a situation, terrorist attacks are assigned to all these ethnic groups. On the other hand, there are terrorist groups representing only a subgroup of an ethnic group. This is the case of many actors in Somalia who claim to act on behalf of a specific clan. The acts of these actors are assigned to the ethnic group to which the clan belongs. This is not an ideal solution, however, the DEMTA does not allow for disaggregation beyond ethnic groups.

Not all terrorist groups claim to be motivated purely by elevation of a status of an ethnic group. Religion or Marxism often plays an important role in their decision to take up arms against their governments. Terrorist acts of these groups are considered as ethnically motivated terrorist attacks only if the motivation to elevate status of a certain ethnic group represents the main goal, for instance Kurdish PKK or Dagestani Shari'ah Jammat. On the other hand, acts of terrorism committed by the Taliban are not included in the DEMTA since the main motivation lies in radical Islam although the Taliban recruits predominantly among the Pashtuns. Also, the main goal of this group is not to elevate status of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan but to create an Islamic government.

As mentioned above, many perpetrators in the GTD (2012) have very generic names, for instance rebels, gunmen, Islamists, Chechen rebels and Kurdish insur-

gents. If a clear link to an ethnic group can be made, terrorist attacks of these perpetrators are included. Therefore, attacks committed by Chechen rebels or Kurdish insurgents are included in the DEMTA and assigned to Chechens and Kurds[3], respectively. However, attacks committed by not specified perpetrators, for example, insurgents, gunmen or Islamists, are not.

1.2.5 Weaknesses of the Database

The newly built database shares many weaknesses of the sources which are used for its construction. The database extracts terrorist attack from the GTD (2012). However this source has plenty of advantages comparing to other sources, it is not flawless. The GTD (2012) is based on open sources, in other words media reporting, which can lead to very problematic media bias and inaccurate information (Asal et al. 2012). I identify three main problems related to the fact that the GTD (2012) relies on media sources.

First of all, not all regions and states have the same media coverage. If we take a closer look at the number of terrorist attacks in totalitarian states like North Korea, we find only one terrorist attack in 1994 (GTD 2012). Similarly, almost no terrorist attacks are reported from other autocracies with strong control over media. Based on this information, we can make three conclusions. First, there are almost no terrorist attacks in autocratic countries since repressions of autocratic governments destroy any sign of resistance in its early stages. Second, autocratic governments usually apply a very tight control over media and do not allow to leak any information which could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Third, the

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[3]The list of ethnic group is taken from the EPR (2013) database which has several Kurdish ethnic groups (in Iraq, Turkey and Iran). A terrorist attack is assigned to Kurds in a given country based on where the attack was committed. Thus, if the attack was committed in Iraq, it is assigned to Kurds in Iraq.

low number of terrorist attacks in non-democratic countries can be simply result of the both, lack of active and violent resistance and tight control of media. The study of **?** shows that there is indeed media bias which leads to underreporting of terrorist attacks in less democratic countries. To deal with the bias, I decided to control for the value of Polity IV score in all models using terrorism or number of terrorist attacks as dependent variable.

Second, media in states which suffer from intensive violence for a longer period simply do not report about every small explosion. For example, a car bomb in Kandahar in Afghanistan or in Basra in Iraq not killing anyone does not have the same probability to get to the national news as a same incident in Cardiff in UK. In other words, media are less sensitive to violence in countries where violent incidents happen on a daily basis. To mitigate the effect of this bias, most of the presented models using terrorism or number of terrorist attacks as dependent variable control for war or exposure to violence.

Third, some media reports can be simply written in languages which are not understood by any of the analysts working for the GTD (2012) despite the fact that the teams collecting information on terrorist incidents around the world are multilingual (Asal et al. 2012). To sum up, the media bias can lead to overestimation of the events happening in democratic countries which are not in war; therefore, the estimates of effects of the independent variables can be bias. To address these problems, I control for level of democracy and exposure to violence.

Another source of weakness is the use of the TOPs (2012). However the TOPs (2012) is an invaluable source of information on terrorist groups, it has some limitations. First, the TOPs (2012) ended its data collection in 2007 which means that any relevant terrorist organization active after the year 2007 is missing. Due to this fact, I decided to stop my data collection in 2007 as well. A second problem

arises while combining information from the TOPs (2012) with the GTD (2012). Not all perpetrators listed in the GTD (2012) can be found in the TOPs (2012). This problem is overcome by consulting other open sources to identify ideology and motivation of terrorist organizations. Third, it can be argued that the use of database providing the information on terrorist organization can be problematic since the research adopts the action-based approach for identification of terrorist attacks. It is important to note that the TOPs (2012) helps only to identify ideology of terrorist groups which is one of the criterion of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism. The fact that a terrorist organization has ideology focused on elevation of status of an ethnic group does not mean that all violent acts of this organization are necessary terrorist attacks.

Last but not least, the use of action-based approach can lead to overestimation of terrorist attacks. The other option would be the use of actor-based approach. However this approach is not compatible with the proposed definition of this research since it disregards targeting civilians as one of the defining criteria of terrorism.

1.3   Overview of Chapters and Findings

The first chapter introduces the concept of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism and explores which characteristics of ethnic groups make them more likely to use terrorism as a tactic of fight. The proposition of this chapter is built on theories on ethnic violence and Martha Crenshaw's claim that terrorism is a weapon of the weak. However, the fact that terrorism is less demanding if it comes to resources explains the use of the tactic but not the decision to take an action against the government. I argue that it is important to explore first the motiva-

tion of ethnic groups to act against their governments which is strongly affected by discriminatory policies and unequal treatment according to the theories on ethnic violence. If there is a motivation for action, opportunity factors will dictate the type of tactic. Based, on the Crenshaw's claim, weak groups are more prone to terrorism. Weakness of ethnic groups is defines as territorial patterns, namely dispersion and low level of urbanization, and small group size.

To satisfy the conditional character of the proposition, occurrence of terrorism is modeled as interaction between political exclusion and weakness of an ethnic group. Results on exclusion are in the line with the theories on ethnic conflict and show that politically excluded ethnic groups are more prone to the use of terrorism. On the other hand, weak ethnic groups do not tend to terrorism more than strong ethnic groups. Based on the data analysis, more numerous and politically excluded groups are more likely to use terrorism as a tactic.

The second chapter explores the relationship between ethnically motivated domestic terrorism and ethnic civil wars. The chapter focuses on explanation why we observe more terrorist attacks in post-war periods than in pre-war periods. I argue that the exposure to a systematic violence (civil war) leads to radicalization of the local population which instigate support or at least neutral attitude towards terrorism. Also terrorists need at least some support, especially in case of a longer campaign. Thus, it is important not only to distinguish between war and peace periods but also between pre-war and post-war periods which are qualitatively different due to the changes caused by the exposure to violence. The exposure to violence is modeled in two ways. First, the main explanatory variable is operationalized as an experience of a civil war to capture the significant shift which exposed an ethnic group to a systematic violence and disruption. Second, the exposure to violence is operationalized as a total number of previous conflict

years in which the given ethnic group was involved.

The first part of the analysis examines whether war creates a structural break. Given the fact that the breaking point is known (war years), I use the Chow test. Second part of the analysis explores the effect of prolonged conflict. Assumed structural break in data implies different effect of independent variables across conflict stages. To address three different period, namely pre-war, war and post-war, we would need to interact all independent variables with the dummy variables for each period. Such a model would be too complicated and not easy to interpret. Therefore, the original sample is divided according to the periods as estimation of these sub-samples gives the same results as inclusion of the interaction terms.

The results show that war creates a structural break in coefficients; therefore, it is important to distinguish not only between war and peace but also between pre-war and post-war periods. Also, more years an ethnic group has spent in a conflict, the more terrorist attacks are committed on the behalf of the group. In other words, exposure lead to radicalization which increases the number of terrorist attacks.

The third chapter aims to use the knowledge on terrorism gained from the previous two chapters and advance research on civil wars. The chapter explores how a specific use of terrorism can be related to mobilization and the likelihood of civil war. Most of the current research on causes of civil wars explains an outbreak of a civil war by opportunity and motivation factors. Lack of democracy or political exclusion of a particular ethnic group is usually interpreted as a motivation for civil war. Opportunity factors usually determine whether an ethnic group is capable to organize itself effectively enough to challenge the government. This classic approach focuses on potential of action rather than actual resolve since political exclusion does not have the same effect on all excluded groups.

I argue that by adding terrorist attacks, more specifically lethality of terrorist attacks, to the explanatory variables of civil war, we can learn more on causes of civil wars. Terrorism as a mobilization strategy also send signals to the government about the resolve of perpetrators and to the potential supporters of the violent campaign against government. It is assumed that violent campaign would attract only those who agree with violence, and more specifically terrorism, as means of action. In other words, high lethality of terrorist attacks shows the resolve and capability of rebels to fight and the presence of the support of ordinary people for the rebels and their cause.

I carry out a two stage empirical analysis, focusing first on the initial mobilization of ethnic groups and linked terrorist attacks, and then on the role of terrorism in the subsequent escalation to civil war. Sequential logit results show that lethal terrorist attacks carried out on behalf of ethnic groups have a robust and positive effect on the likelihood of subsequent civil wars. Interestingly, political exclusion, which is often considered to be a crucial predictor of civil wars, affects the initial mobilization of ethnic groups and has no clear effect on the outbreak of a civil war.

1.4 Outline of the PhD Thesis

The next three chapters provide three independent empirical studies on ethnically motivated terrorism and its connection to civil wars. The first chapter introduces the concept of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism and identifies key characteristics of ethnic group increasing the likelihood of terrorism occurrence. The second chapter explores the connection between terrorism and civil war. More specifically, it analyzes the effect of exposure to violence on terrorism. The third

chapter introduces a new two-stage approach to modeling civil wars while using lethality of terrorism as a main explanatory variable. Finally, the last chapter of the thesis provides discussion of the implications of my findings and set some recommendations for the future research.

Chapter 2

Ethnic Groups and Domestic

Terrorism

Abstract

International terrorist attacks usually get massive media coverage, and almost two thirds of terrorist attacks are ethnically motivated domestic attacks. In other words, the majority of terrorists attacks are carried out on behalf of certain ethnic groups to elevate the status of these groups in the country where there live. This paper focuses on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism and tests the well-known assumption of Martha Crenshaw that terrorism is a weapon of the weak. Weakness is defined as political discrimination, territorial dispersion and the small size of the ethnic groups. This paper deals with ethnic groups as a unit of analysis to directly link politically discriminated ethnic groups to particular terrorist groups who have committed ethnically motivated terrorist attacks. For the purpose of this study, a database of ethnically motivated domestic terrorist incidents was generated using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and information from the Terrorist Organizations Profiles (TOPs). Data on ethnic groups' access to power are gained from the Ethnic Power Relationship (EPR) dataset.

2.1   Introduction

This paper examines the question of which characteristics of ethnic groups make them more likely to use terrorism. According to Crenshaw (1990), terrorism is considered to be a weapon of weak groups which are not able challenge their governments in a more direct way. This statement, based on numerous case studies, is often repeated and taking for granted despite the fact that it has never been empirically tested. This paper attempts to test Martha Crenshaw's famous claim empirically in case of ethnic groups and terrorist attacks committed on their behalf. Geographic dispersion and size of ethnic groups are identified as main features of weakness.

It is important to note that empirical studies on effects of ethnic groups' characteristics and political status on terrorism are rather rare. As an example, I can mention two interesting studies written by Piazza (2011, 2012) look at the relationship between the discrimination of ethnic groups and the occurrence of terrorism. However, this research is problematic for two main reasons. First, Piazza does not distinguish between types of terrorism. He includes all terrorist incidents regardless the motivation of the perpetrators. Second, he does not directly link discrimination of ethnic groups to terrorism. Piazza theoretically assumes that state-led discrimination of ethnic groups leads these groups to terrorism but he includes all types of terrorism, and not just attacks which are ethically motivated.

Piazza's approach towards exploring the relationship between the discrimination of ethnic groups and terrorism does not therefore seem to be appropriate, mainly because the unit of analysis is country-year. Due to this disadvantage, Piazza's test of the relationship between the discrimination of ethnic groups and terrorism may be inaccurate. Based on Piazza's causal mechanism, discrimination

of an ethnic group can lead to terrorist attacks in the name of Marxism.

To overcome these problems, I decided to use ethnic groups instead of the state as a unit of analysis. This disaggregation enables me to link ethnic groups with concrete terrorist attacks committed on their behalf. Since the Global Terrorist Database (GTD 2012), the only source providing data on domestic as well as international terrorism worldwide, does not distinguish between domestic and international terrorist incidents and does not give information on motives of terrorists, I built a new Database of Ethnically Motivated Terrorism (DEMTA) for the purpose of this research. To sum up, the main contribution of this paper lies not only in a more accurate analysis of the causes of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism but also in the creation of the new database of this special type of terrorism.

Crenshaw (1981) suggests that the lower level of resources a group has, the higher the probability that the group will use terrorism as a tactic. Lack of resources can explain the choice of a tactic which is less demanding in this respect. I argue that, first, it is necessary to explore groups' motivation for taking an action against government and then focus on the groups' decisions about the tactic. In other words, convincing and comprehensive models of the causes of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism must not only of comprise of opportunity factors, for example the resources of the group, but also their motivations (Boix 2008, p. 204, 216). To sum up, groups' decisions about taking an action against government precedes the decision about the type of tactic. Factors in influencing both decisions must be included in the model looking at the causes of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism.

The paper proceeds by a brief overview of the current main theories on ethnically motivated violence and terrorism. Afterwards, the suggested causal theory

is explained. The following section provides information on data collected for the purpose of this study and introduces the analysis carried out to test the argument about terrorism as the weapon of weak ethnic groups. The paper concludes with a presentation and discussion of its empirical findings.

2.2 Ethnic Groups, Fear and Violence

One possible explanation for an outbreak of violence can be fear or a feeling of insecurity. According to the psychology of danger, people tend to exaggerate threats to justify pre-emptive attack on those who are supposed to be the cause of the threat (Pinker 2011, p. 391). Similarly, the Hobbesian trap explains that distrust between groups can lead to a spiral of fear and violence. As safety is to be found in numbers, family ties can help to create coalitions for protection. On the other hand, danger also comes in numbers as neighbors can feel to be threatened by becoming outnumbered. As a matter of fact, people tend to be patrilocal (Pinker 2005, p. 322-323), so many conflict coalitions are based on shared identities, very often ethnic identities. Therefore, ethnic identity plays a very important role in explaining outbreaks of violence.

Ethnic groups are defined by Max Weber as "*a subjective belief in common descent... whether or not an objective blood relationship exists*" (Roth G. 1968, p. 389). Expanding on this conception, Esman (1994, p. 15) defines ethnic identity as "*... something that has roots in a group's culture, and historical experiences and traditions, but that is also dependent upon contemporary opportunities that can be an useful instrument for mobilizing people for social, political, or economic purposes that may or may not be related directly to their ethnic origins*". This approach to ethnic identity considers ethnicity as an instrumental value which

"*... can serve as focal point facilitating convergence of individual expectations*" (Varshney 2000, p. 29-30). In other words, ethnic identity serves as a useful tool for the mobilization of individuals. Due to this reason, ethnic groups and their characteristics should be taken seriously by research dealing with causes of ethnically motivated violence, including terrorism.

Two major theories explain inter-ethnic violence. First, rational choice theory assumes that decisions are dependent on cost-benefit calculation as individuals are driven by profit. Conflicts are therefore considered to be the results of calculation that attack is the best defense against another threatening group. Second, the social-psychological approach explains violence as a consequence of severe inequalities between ethnic groups. Severe inequalities can be perceived as a very serious threat, thus the decision to take up arms can be considered as the only possible solution. The decision is based on expectation that the violent change will be beneficial (profitable) in the end for the ethnic group (Cordell & Wolff 2009, p. 16-17). To sum up, explanations of the causes of ethnic conflicts provided by the rational choice theory and social-psychological theory do not contain serious contradictions.

Inequalities, which are often a powerful source of threat for ethnic groups can be rooted in material as well as non-material conditions. This paper argues that non-material conditions are superior to the material ones as non-material inequalities usually lead to material inequalities. Unequal development is related to the political exclusion of an ethnic group since ethnic groups included in political decision process can change unsatisfactory economic conditions via the political system. Material inequalities can thus be rectified if non-material conditions are equal.

Non-material approaches to ethnic violence argue that individuals can be mo-

bilized to protect their identity (Toft 2010, p. 7-8)[1]. The fact that unequal economic development can cause a serious threat to survival of the group speaks in favor of the non-material approach, as the real mobilizing factor is fear and not the material conditions of the group. Moreover, if economic discrimination targets individuals belonging only to a certain ethnic group, then members of this group mobilize along ethnic lines.

One of non-materialistic approach explaining ethnic violence is the security dilemma. According to this concept, fear drives ethnic groups to violence. The decline of central authority in multinational states leads to a power vacuum which means that minorities are no longer protected by this authority (Posen 1993, p. 34). In this situation ethnic groups start to compete to seize control over the state to establish a regime which would be able to protect their interests. The main motivation behind such an aggressive behavior is the fact that ethnic groups fear widespread discrimination which can even lead to the elimination of the group (Toft 2010, p. 8). I argue that this fear of ethnic groups from widespread discrimination can be observed not only in cases of failing or failed states, but also in strong states where some ethnic groups are excluded from political decision making.

Why can be fear from discrimination be such a strong motivation for action against government? The reason is that the group's worth, prestige and self-respect are entirely derived from the worth, prestige and self-respect of the other groups living in the same country. Discrimination again an ethnic group by the state or other groups can thus seriously endanger the group's status. To overcome this fear of marginalization, ethnic groups seek public affirmation of their status

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[1]On the other hand, material approach argues that individuals tend to mobilize because of material well-being and economic security.

relative to the status of other groups. Such a demand can lead to tensions and potentially to conflict as the status affirmation of one group can threaten rank of other groups. In order to ensure their status, groups lay claims to territory, language, religion, and power sharing, etc. (Horowitz 1985, p. 185, 216).

Relative deprivation provides motivation whereas potential for mobilization can change this motivation into violent action (Gurr 1993). Various studies on conflict support the assumption that unequal treatment is positively correlated with intra-state violence. For instance, Cederman et al. (2010) confirmed that exclusion of ethnic groups from political decision-making is associated with civil wars. Similarly, Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008) showed that power-sharing institutions supporting inclusivist demands, for instance proportional voting system, and decrease the likelihood of civil war in democratic regimes.

To be able to successfully demand public affirmation of a group's status and avoid relative deprivation, the group needs to be powerful enough to make claims on language policy, territory, the distribution of public goods, etc. (Horowitz 1985, p. 216, 219, 222). Based on the previously mentioned literature, the power of ethnic groups is affected by three important factors, namely access to power, settlement patterns and the size of the group. First, access to power protects the group's members from state-led discrimination and helps to maintain the group's identity. Second, the question of whether ethnic group has a territory, which can be considered as a homeland, and can serve as a defining attribute of a group's identity, as well as provide with resources. Similarly, urbanized groups have higher capabilities due to more dense networks, access to money, and media, etc. Thus, concentrated and urbanized groups are relatively efficient mobilizers (Toft 2010, p. 19, 22). Third, according to psychology of danger, safety comes in numbers (Pinker 2005, p. 322) thus size of ethnic groups affects their power as well. Large

group can basically demand more.

2.3   Terrorism as a Weapon of the Weak

Terrorism is defined as *"deliberate and violent targeting civilians for political pur-poses"* (Richardson 2007, p. 6). To maintain analytical clarity, it is important to exclude intentional attacks against civilians committed by states[2] as these serious crimes have very different dynamic and features (Richardson 2007, p. 5).

According to theories of ethnic conflict, fear, as a motivation seems to be one of the most important factors encouraging ethnic groups to fight for the change of the status quo. The key question is why some ethnic groups use terrorism while other groups do not. Explanations can be found in examination of the opportunities of ethnic groups rather than in their motivations. The literature on civil wars shows that ethnic groups carrying out an insurgency need to have a certain level organizational capability, for instance geo-graphical concentration and a sufficient number of members (Toft 2010). See also Cederman et al. (2010) and Gurr (2000).

According to Moore et al. (2011), the use of more violent tactic can serve as a demonstration of power, commitment to a goal, and a willingness to reach the goal. A terrorist attack can thus serve as a manifestation of group's power. Keeping in mind Crenshaw's claim that terrorism is a weapon of the weak (Crenshaw 1981, p. 387), the argument about the necessity of the opportunity factor for violent but non-terror tactics can be used in reverse in the case of terrorism. If terrorism is really a weapon of weak opponents of governments, it can be assumed that terrorism is primarily used by weak ethnic groups to demonstrate their power for

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[2]e.g. genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes

the purpose of their protection against government or other groups.

According to Stepanova (2008, p. 23), terrorism as an extreme example of asymmetric warfare is usually used by groups who cannot challenge government directly as they are too weak. Thus, terrorism can be an effective response for ethnic groups whose crucial values, such as political rights, language, religion, culture and status are perceived to be seriously threatened. Naturally, the perception of a threat can be triggered by unequal treatment (Crenshaw 1990, p. 10).

This does not mean that terrorism is used as a sole tactic. Terrorism is often use simultaneously with other violent and non-violent tactics. The limited scope of this paper enables a focus on terrorism alone, and not on terrorism and its interactions with other complementary tactics.

2.3.1   Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism

Domestic terrorism is considered to be primarily a homegrown issue; the motivations of the perpetrators are therefore mostly rooted in domestic issues. Owing to this fact, it is important to distinguish between transnational and domestic terrorism in an analysis of the causes of terrorism. For the purpose of this research, I use the following definition of domestic terrorism: The perpetrator of a terrorist attack has to have an agenda and more or less permanent presence in a country where the ethnic groups resides.

Ethnically motivated terrorism, as a type of domestic terrorism, is defined as *"... deliberate violence by a sub-national ethnic group to advance its cause."* The purpose of this violence is often creation of an independent state or improvement of the status of the group (Byman 1998, p. 151). This motivation can be found in many statements of terrorist groups acting on behalf of Palestinians in Israel, Chechens in Russia, as well as Muslims in Kashmir, etc.

As the frequency of terrorist attacks in conflicts is high, it is clear that many groups opposing governments use more than one type of tactic, for example guerrilla warfare, terrorism and riots (Ganor 2002, p. 297). According to Merari (1993) terrorism is a useful tool which can help insurgents to maintain or trigger insurgency when the group challenging government is weak and needs more supporters. See also Kydd & Walter (2006).

Due to the reasons mentioned above, it is hard to distinguish guerrilla attacks from terrorist incidents. To overcome this identification problem, an action-based approach defining terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare is appropriate. According to this approach, the main criterion is whether civilians are the main target of the terrorist attack.

Similarly, Stepanova (2008, p. 23) suggests that guerrilla warfare, as well as terrorism, are the tactics of sub-state actors in asymmetric conflicts. However, terrorism is more asymmetric than guerrilla warfare as terrorist attacks are exceptional in their lethality and immorality due to the deliberate targeting of civilians. One example are the Chechen commanders fighting against the Russian Federation for independence who decide to use the tactic of terrorism for certain types of operations. For instance, Shamil Basajev led many guerrilla campaigns against Russian troops as well as organizing several terrorist attacks (eg. Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002) (Hughes 2007).

2.3.2   Efficiency of Terrorism

As mentioned above, terrorism is not so capacity-demanding (finance and personnel) yet can be very efficient. Although terrorists often choose their targets carefully, terrorism can be considered as a type of indiscriminate violence as terrorists' targets are mostly very symbolic. Terrorism as indiscriminate violence

very efficiently causes panic due to its indirectness. It also creates massive emotional damage which is often highly disproportional to the damage caused in lives and properties (Pinker 2011, p. 416).

The logic behind the use of indiscriminate violence is based on the lack of capabilities of perpetrators to target those who are believed to be guilty, for example politicians, soldiers and a state apparatus. Civilians are associated with the political system as they pay taxes which means that they support government in eyes of many terrorists. It is easier to attack civilians who are somehow related to the guilty because it does not require the precise identification, location and elimination of concrete enemies. In other words, indiscriminate violence does not need to be costly and use complex infrastructure. It is assumed by the attackers either that civilians will persuade the government to meet the terrorists' conditions or government will comply with these conditions in order to protect innocent people (Kalyvas 2006, p. 150).

2.4   Hypotheses

Why do some ethnic groups decide to use such a drastic tactic as terrorism? The main argument of this paper is that an ethnic group decides to use terrorism as a tactic against their governments if they feel desperate enough about the group's situation[3]. This means that an ethnic group has a serious fear about its future, as well as too low a capacity to solve the current unfavorable situation by other means.

The group's motivation to change the status quo is so strong because the current situation is perceived to be a threat to group's well-being or physical

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[3]Author does not consider terrorism as an acceptable instrument under any circumstances.

existence, or the situation does not enable the salient group to fully express its identity. Simultaneously, the group thinks it does not have any other option than terrorism to improve their situation. This concept of *"feeling desperate"* combines motivation as well as opportunity factors.

Ethnic groups which are included in the political decision making process can change their position using mechanisms within the political regime of the country they live in. However, politically excluded groups lacks this option. In addition, excluded groups often suffer from limited legal protection from the state and are often the targets of state repression. According to Moore et al. (2011), opposition groups have three basic options to reach their goals, namely non-violent but not necessary legal activities (protests, strikes, participation in elections, etc.), violent non-terror tactic (coup d'etat, guerrilla warfare, etc.) and violent terror tactics (terrorism).

The important question is, what is the difference between non-terror violent tactics, for instance guerrilla warfare and coup d'etat, and terrorism. The explanation can be found in examining the opportunities of ethnic groups rather than in their motivations. Literature on civil wars shows that ethnic groups carrying out insurgency need to have certain level of organizational capacity, for instance geographical concentration and a sufficient amount number of members (Toft 2010). See also Cederman et al. (2010) and Gurr (2000).

Keeping in mind the the famous claim of Crenshaw (1990) that terrorism is a weapon of the weak, the argument about the necessity of certain level of capacity for violent but non-terror tactics can be used in reverse in case of terrorism. If terrorism is really weapon of weak opponents of governments, it can be assumed that terrorism is primarily used by weak ethnic groups suffering from the lack of territorial compactness and low number of members. Thus, these weak ethnic

groups use terrorism to demonstrate their power and disprove their weakness for the purpose of their protection against government or other groups.

The main argument of this paper is that the decision to use terrorism as a tactic is, in the case of ethnic groups, a two stage decision. Firstly, ethnic groups need to have the motivation to take action against their government. As we saw in the previous section, fear is the main driver for mobilization along the ethnic lines. Fear can be caused by discriminatory state policy. Second, ethnic groups need to decide about the type of their response. Such a decision is strategic as it is based on capabilities of the group and the power of the government. An ethnic group thus decides on terrorism if the group is not strong enough to challenge its government in a more direct way.

Although most terrorist attacks are related to civil wars or intra-state conflicts Findley & Young (2012), the crucial factor affecting groups' decisions to use terrorism as a tactic is a steep power imbalance between an ethnic group and government that causes fear about the groups' future. An ethnic group might be able to launch insurgency or may be too weak to challenge government by conventional means. Terrorism thus serves as an additional tactic for very weak groups. The concept of *"feeling desperate"* therefore works in as well as outside conflicts.

To sum up, ethnic groups need to be desperate enough to settle on terrorism. This feeling of desperation is generated by fear caused by exclusion from political power and the perception that there is no other opportunity to change the situation. It is thus assumed that politically excluded as well as weak groups are more prone to terrorism. As mentioned above, two main factors can significantly affect the weakness of ethnic groups. First, the size of the ethnic group matters as it can influence the level of resources available, for example combatants, media, political and economic networks. Second, the settlement patterns of ethnic group also play

important role. Territory is crucial not only for a group's identity but also for its resources. If the majority of a group lives in one territory, mobilization of this group is easier. Similarly, high level of urbanization increases the effectiveness of mobilization (Toft 2010, p. 22).

Fig. 2.1: Causal mechanism

As discussed above, groups do not have motivation to fight their government without exclusion from political decision making. Political exclusion is assumed to be a necessary but not sufficient condition of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism. Exclusion thus has to be a conditional factor. On the other hand, weakness can make terrorism more favorable than other tactics.

H1: The effect of group size on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism is positive if groups are excluded.

H2: The effect of group dispersion on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism is positive if groups are excluded.

H3: The effect of group level of urbanization on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism is positive if groups are excluded.

2.5   Data

This study includes all politically relevant ethnic groups across the world within the time period 1970 - 2007. The unit of analysis is ethnic group per country per year as the theory examines how the characteristics of ethnic groups influence occurrence ethnically motivated domestic incidents.

2.5.1   Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is defined as an occurrence of domestic terrorism committed by a terrorist group representing the interests or demands of an ethnic group. The data for the dependent variable are taken the newly built Database of Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorist Attacks (DEMTA).

Given the unit of analysis is defined as ethnic group per country per year, data on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism are translated to a dummy variable indicating the occurrences of terrorism per ethnic group per year. The dependent variable is operationalized in four ways to capture potential underreporting and overreporting of terrorist attacks. The presence of terrorism is define as at least one terrorist attack, at least 5 terrorist attacks, at least 10 terrorist attacks and terrorist attack(s) which caused at least 10 casualties. This way of operationalization of the dependent variable helps us to get more robust results.

2.5.2   Independent Variables

This research explores whether the claim that terrorism is a weapon of the weak also holds in the case of ethnic groups. Based on theories on terrorism and ethnic conflicts, I argue that to use terrorism as a tactic, groups must have motivation to act against their government as well as being weak. Motivation is defined as

Tab. 2.1: Summary statistics of the dependent variable (Presence of terrorism per ethnic group per year)

Dependent variable		Freq.	%
1 or more terrorist attacks	0	18,908	86.19
	1	3,029	13.81
5 or more terrorist attacks	0	21,383	97.47
	1	554	2.53
10 or more terrorist attacks	0	21,610	98.51
	1	327	1.49
10 or more casualties caused by terrorism	0	21,640	98.65
	1	297	1.35
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS		21,937	100.00

political exclusion and the level of weakness is given by the group's size and a measure of its dispersion. Based on the theory presented above, I intended to also include a level of urbanization. However, there is only a very small variation so I decided not to include urbanization in my empirical analysis.

To operationalize the political exclusion of ethnic groups, a dummy variable giving information on whether an ethnic group is included in political decision making process is is used. Settlement patterns, namely dispersion, of ethnic groups are coded as a dummy variable. Size of the ethnic group is used to test whether the number of people belonging to the same ethnicity plays an important role. As the group population size does not have a linear relationship with the dependent variable, the size of the ethnic group is measured as natural log of absolute size. Data for these variables are gained from the EPR (2013).

Natural log of gross domestic product per capita is included in all models to control for effect of economic development which might have an effect on presence of terrorism. Similarly, score of the PolityVI (2012) is incorporated in all models (Bjorgo 2005). To account for the time dependency, cubic polynomials of the

number of years since the last period with a terrorist attack are used to deal with time dependency instead of the lag dependent variable Beck et al. (2000). Data for these controls are gained from PolityVI (2012) and Gleditsch & Ward (1999).

Tab. 2.2: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Excluded lag	0.608	0.488	0	1	20528
Dispersed lag	0.12	0.324	0	1	20528
Group size (log) lag	-3.173	2.139	-9.210	-0.02	20524
Polity 2 (sq.) lag	52.132	28.726	0	100	17557
GDP per cap. (log) lag	0.008	0.001	0.005	0.013	20396
Ethnic war	0.016	0.125	0	1	21937
Yrs since terr.att.	10.89	10.863	0	37	21937
Yrs since terr.att.(#5)	14.709	10.788	0	37	21937
Yrs since terr.att.(#10)	15.488	10.839	0	37	21937
Yrs since terr.att.(10 killed)	15.495	10.783	0	37	21937

Tab. 2.3: Independent variables description

Variable Name	Variable Description	Values	Values Description	Source
Excluded	Variable indicating whether an ethnic group is excluded from political decision making or not, variable $STATUS\_EXCL$ in the EPR (2013)	0	Group is included	EPR: Cederman et al. (2010)
		1	Group is excluded	
Group size	Absolute number of group's population	N		EPR: Cederman et al. (2010), Gleditsch & Ward (1999)
Group size log	Natural logarithm of Group size	N		
Dispersed	Group's settlement pattern	0	Majority of group lives concentrated in a region	EPR: Cederman et al. (2010)
		1	Groups not concentrated in any specific region and national groups living across a state	
Years since terrorist attack	Number of years since the last terrorist attack	N		
Years since terrorist attack sq.	Number of years*Number of years	N		
Years since terrorist attack cub.	Number of years*Number of years*Number of years	N		
Years since terrorist attack log	Natural logarithm of Number of years	N		
Regime type	Value of Polity2 + 10 (20 = democracy, 0 = autocracy)	N		PolityVI (2012)
GDP per cap. (log)	Log of GDP per capita in US Dollar (2000)	N		Cederman et al. (2010) and Gleditsch (2002)
Ethnic war	Variable indicating whether an ethnic group is involved in a war	0	Group is not involved in a war	EPR: Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), Cunningham et al. (2009) and Gleditsch et al. (2002)
		1	Group is involved in a war	

2.6 Analysis

This study includes all politically relevant ethnic groups across the world within the time period 1970 - 2007. As mentioned above, the unit of analysis is ethnic group per country per year as the theory examines how the characteristics of ethnic groups affect the probability of the occurrence of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism. The cross-sectional time-series data are analyzed by logistic regression since the dependent variable is coded as a dummy variable.

Suggested causal mechanism (Fig. 2.1) has two steps, namely motivation (fear) and opportunity (weakness). It is assumed that the group's motivation for an action is a necessary but not a sufficient condition; nevertheless, exclusion together with the weakness of an ethnic group increases the likelihood of the group engaging in terrorism. Based on this theory, weak groups which are not politically excluded do not tend to terrorism. To satisfy the conditional hypotheses derived from the causal mechanism, interactions between motivation and opportunity factors are included (Clark et al. 2006). Values of the Akaike Information Criterion show that models with interaction terms perform better than those without. The results of the likelihood-ratio test also confirm that it is reasonable to include interaction terms.

It is also important to address potential problems with endogeneity, namely selection bias and reversed causality. Since this paper aims to test whether weak and politically excluded ethnic groups are likely to use terrorism, it is important not to exclude small ethnic groups. The EPR (2013) is used as a main source providing list and information on characteristics on ethnic groups since it is the most complete list. Contrary to the Minorities at Risk Project, the EPR (2013) includes not only minorities but also ethnic groups which are majorities and form

ruling elites, for instance, Germans in Germany and Swedes in Sweden (Cederman et al. 2013).

However the EPR (2013) is the most complete available, many small ethnic groups can be missing since the data set includes politically relevant ethnic groups having more than 500 000 inhabitants. Thus the results might be driven by omitting ethnic groups below 500 000 members. Nevertheless, some limitations of minimal size of ethnic groups has to be set simply for the purpose of clear definition of ethnic group and data collection. In other words, if we accept that one of the definitional criterion of ethnic groups is minimum of 500 000 inhabitants, the presented results do not from selection bias.

Second possible source of endogeneity can be reversed causality. Focusing on the main explanatory variables, we can rule out problems with size of ethnic groups and geographical dispersion since acts of terrorism simply do not lead to more or less imminent changes of geographical settlement patterns or groups' population. The changes in these two groups' characteristics are rather slow and result of complex mix of factors. On the other hand, the effect of terrorism on political exclusion of ethnic groups seems to be plausible.

However, Cederman et al. (2013) argue that political exclusion is usually result of long lasting decisions that are primarily ideological and only indirectly security related. It means that political exclusion is rarely motivated by violent acts of ethnic groups against their governments. Also, the study of Wucherpfennig et al. (2015) using instrumental variable approach shows that distorting effect of endogeneity in the case of exclusion and civil war has been understated. Governments do not react to security threats posing by ethnic groups by politically excluding these groups. Since terrorism as well as civil war represent security threat to government, I believe that my results are not seriously threatened by reversed

causality. In addition, all independent variables are lagged by one year to ensure the correct direction of the relationship between terrorism and the independent variables.

2.7 Results

Since inclusion of all constitutive terms (exclusion, group size and dispersion) increases multicollinearity and standard errors, regression coefficients of interaction terms are less likely to be statistically significant and raw coefficients can be interpreted only in terms of directions (Brambor et al. 2006). To see whether the effect of the main explanatory variables is statistically significant, marginal effects of each variable are calculated. The interpretation of the results is; therefore, is focused on marginal effects. Raw regression coefficients can be found in the Appendix (Tab. 6.3).

Tab. 2.4 presents the results (marginal effects) of the empirical analysis using four different types dependent variable indicating the occurrence of terrorism. The dependent variable is defined as an occurrence of at least one, five, or ten terrorist incidences per group per year and at least ten people killed by terrorism on behalf of a given ethnic group in a given year. Different operationalization of the dependent variable across the presented models adds more robustness to the results as the interpretation of these results is less sensitive to specific definitions of the dependent variable and the underreporting or overreporting of terrorist incidents.

The results show that political exclusion has a positive effect on the occurrence of terrorism. Dispersion, as a one of the measures of the weakness of ethnic groups, seems to have a negative effect across all models except model 1. Group size has

Tab. 2.4: Logit - Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism (Marginal Effects)

	(1) Terrorism	(2) Terrorism (#5)	(3) Terrorism (#10)	(4) Terrorism (10†)
Excluded lag	0.0287*** (0.00837)	0.0210*** (0.00547)	0.0119* (0.00468)	0.00872* (0.00401)
Dispersed lag	-0.00101 (0.0109)	-0.00964* (0.00484)	-0.00908** (0.00308)	-0.00434 (0.00456)
Group size (log) lag	0.00953*** (0.00176)	0.00424*** (0.000834)	0.00281*** (0.000608)	0.00350*** (0.000611)
Polity 2 sq. lag	-0.0000911 (0.000120)	0.0000550 (0.0000759)	0.0000766 (0.0000597)	0.0000881 (0.0000616)
GDP per cap. log lag	13.40*** (4.057)	9.014*** (1.958)	5.895*** (1.312)	1.264 (1.442)
Ethnic war	0.0487** (0.0184)	0.0317*** (0.00619)	0.0205*** (0.00482)	0.0180*** (0.00382)
Yrs since terr.att.	-0.0540*** (0.00297)			
Yrs since terr.att. sq	0.00260*** (0.000297)			
Yrs since terr.att. cub	-0.0000419*** (0.00000727)			
Yrs since terr.att.(5)		-0.0205*** (0.00295)		
Yrs since terr.att.(5) sq		0.00137*** (0.000257)		
Yrs since terr.att.(5) cub		-0.0000266*** (0.00000611)		
Yrs since terr.att.(10)			-0.0133*** (0.00243)	
Yrs since terr.att.(10) sq			0.000810*** (0.000190)	
Yrs since terr.att.(10) cub			-0.0000143*** (0.00000411)	
Yrs since terr.att.(10 killed)				-0.0164*** (0.00253)
Yrs since terr.att.(10 killed) sq				0.00105*** (0.000200)
Yrs since terr.att.(10 killed) cub				-0.0000186*** (0.00000435)
Observations	17546	17546	17546	17546

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

a positive impact on incidents of terrorism. Not surprisingly, terrorism is more likely to be present in cases of war periods rather than in cases of peace periods.

Fig. 2.2: Average Marginal Effects with level(95)% CIs

Given the fact that the models includes interaction terms, it is important to interpret marginal effects rather raw coefficients of the variables in models 1-4. Fig. 2.2 shows results for the average marginal effects (with 95% confidence interval) of the main explanatory variables. Political exclusion has positive and statistically significant effect ranging from 1% to 3%. Dispersion impacts terrorism significantly only in case of the models 2 and 3. Based on the results, dispersion decreases terrorism occurrence by 1%. Size of ethnic groups is significant and positive across all the models.

To asses impact of the interaction terms, predictive margins are plotted in Fig. 2.3 and Fig. 2.4. As mentioned above, political exclusion clearly increases

the likelihood of terrorism. Based on the results, excluded and not dispersed groups have a higher probability of terrorism than excluded groups which are not dispersed. While exclusion increases the probability of terrorism in the case of dispersed and not dispersed groups, dispersion seems to lower the chance of terrorism. Therefore, results on dispersion do not support the claim in hypothesis 2.

Similar to dispersion, the results of the effect of group size on the likelihood of terrorism in case of the excluded groups do not support the claim of hypothesis 1. More numerous ethnic groups are more likely to engage in terrorism then the less numerous ethnic groups. Again, political exclusion increases the probability of terrorism occurring.

Fig. 2.3: Predicted Marginal Effects with level(95)% CIs: Excluded # Dispersed

2.8 Discussion

The previous results of the marginal effects demonstrate that weakness does not make ethnic groups more prone to use of terrorism. Calculation of the predicted probabilities of ethnically motivated terrorism also shows that terrorism is not necessarily a weapon of the weak since politically excluded but not dispersed

groups are 2.6 times more likely to use terrorism as a tactic of fight than excluded and dispersed groups. On the other hand, the assumption about necessity of motivation holds. Groups which are not allowed to participate in political decision making are 2.4 times more likely to commit terrorist attacks[4].

Fig. 2.4: Predicted Marginal Effects with level(95)% CIs: Excluded # Group size (log)

According to the hypotheses stated above, dispersed groups without access to power should have the highest probability of terrorism. Similarly, groups living concentrated in one region and having access to power should have the lowest probability of engaging in terrorism. Nevertheless, the calculated probabilities showed that the lowest probability is found in dispersed groups with access to power while the highest probability of terrorism is found in cases of excluded groups living concentrated in one region. Similarly, small groups without access to power do not tend to terrorism more than bigger groups participating in the state political system. Contrary to the suggestions of the causal mechanism, calculated probabilities show that more numerous groups are more prone to terrorism.

Terrorism is considered as a very asymmetric type of tactic; therefore, it is assumed that is used by weak actors who suffer from a lack of personnel and material. The results of this study show that the weakness of ethnic groups, defined

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[4]These calculations are base on model 2 in Tab. 6.3

as dispersion and smaller size, does not make ethnic groups more prone to terrorism. Contrary to the proposed hypotheses, the results show that stronger ethnic groups are more likely to get involved in terrorism. This means that political exclusion as a motivation makes ethnic groups more prone to terrorism; however, opportunity factors do not have the expected effect. Based on the data used in this study, opportunity factors, especially the size of ethnic groups, have a robust effect which is in contradiction with the assumption of terrorism as a weapon of the weak.

One explanation for this result might be the fact that even for such an asymmetric tactic as terrorism, a certain strength is needed. The other explanation could be that dispersion and the smaller size of ethnic groups does not represent weakness in terms of material and personnel, but rather a weak identity which can lower motivation. Since the sense of group's identity is weak, the effect of political exclusion might not be strong enough; therefore, the likelihood of any action against government is lower.

2.9 Conclusion

This paper puts together theories on the causes of ethnic violence and terrorism and builds a proposition of the causes of ethnically motivated violence. Most studies on ethnic conflict agree that one of the most important factor leading to ethnically motivated violence is discrimination against ethnic groups. Terrorism is often considered to be a weapon of the weak since this tactic requires less resources than other types of conventional warfare. Discrimination provides a motivation for action while weakness impacts the choice of tactic. To test this proposition, the Database of Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism (DEMTA) was used.

The DEMTA was built for the purpose of this PhD research.

As the results showed, the political exclusion of ethnic groups increases the probability of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism regardless of the presence of other factors. This finding does not differ from findings on causes of ethnic conflicts stating that discriminated ethnic groups are more prone to violence.

On the other hand, weakness, defined as a low number of members and territorial dispersion of an ethnic group, actually has a reducing effect on terrorist incidents related to ethnic groups. Owing to these facts, terrorism should not be labeled as a tactic of the weak, at least not in the case of ethnic groups. Even an asymmetric tactic such as terrorism requires a certain level of organizational capabilities. The smaller and more territorially dispersed groups are probably too weak, in term of resources or strength, and less motivated due to the weaker identity, to challenge their governments even in this very indirect way.

According to (Toft 2010), dispersed ethnic groups suffer from lower organizational capabilities as their social, political and economic networks have lower density and are thus they less effective. However, this cannot be the only explanation for the reducing effect of dispersion on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism. Groups which are not concentrated in one territory do not usually have, or do not control, their homeland. Keeping in mind that a homeland or own land can be a very important constitutive factor of ethnic identity, dispersed groups might not have strong common ties. Incentives to fight for better well-being and more power thus might not be strong enough for members of such groups due to a lower level of sense of community. Therefore, future research on causes of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism will focus on other definitions of weakness, including identity ties, and the seriousness of the motivation for action against government.

To conclude, the newly built Database of Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism enables the direct link of perpetrators of terrorist attacks with concrete ethnic groups in order to obtain more accurate results on the causes of ethnically motivated terrorism. Results showed that exclusion as a motivation matters, while weakness as an opportunity factor does not increase likelihood of terrorism. Smaller and dispersed ethnic groups are less prone to the use of terrorism; Martha Crenshaw's famous claims is thus not supported in the case of ethnic groups.

Chapter 3

Terrorism in Ethnic Conflicts: Effect of the Exposure to Violence on Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between ethnically motivated terrorism and civil wars. More specifically, it addresses the question of whether exposure to violence can lead to a higher number of terrorist attacks committed on behalf of ethnic groups. According to Finley and Young (2012), roughly half, or more, of terrorist attacks are war related. Whereas current literature mainly examines the causes of the terrorist attacks, the variation in the number of attacks during different stages of conflicts is left unexplained. The current study seeks to explain the intensity of terrorist attacks before, during and after civil wars. The specific periods are modeled separately, which allows for the assessment of the effects of political exclusion, groups' size and exposure to violence for each period separately. Thus, the main aim and contribution of this study is to establish whether the impact of these factors differs across the three substantively different civil war stages, namely pre-war, war and post-war. The unit of analysis is ethnic group per country per year, in order to directly link ethnic group and actual terrorist attacks committed on their behalf. For the purpose of this paper, a database of ethnically motivated domestic terrorist incidents was generated using the Ethnic Power Relationship (EPR) dataset, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), information from the Terrorist Organizations Profiles (TOPs) and other sources. The dependent variable is modeled as number of terrorist attacks.

3.1   Introduction

According to Findley & Young (2012, p. 290), more than half of all terrorist attacks occur during civil wars. However, a closer examination of data on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism does not show support for their findings. First, the majority of terrorist attacks are committed by groups which have never engaged in any civil war. Second, the number of terrorist attacks in post-war periods is higher than in pre-war periods (see fig.3.1). This paper aims to explain the relationship between domestic terrorism and ethnic civil wars. More specifically it is focused on the effect of the war experience on the magnitude of terrorism. I argue that exposure to systematic violence, such as a civil war, causes the radicalization of the local population which ultimately leads to support or at least a neutral attitude towards extreme violence such as terrorism. Keeping in mind that even terrorists need at least limited support to carry out an intensive terrorist campaign (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009, p. 33), exposure to violence seems to be a plausible explanation for the increase of terrorist incidents in the post-war periods. In technical terms, experience of war works as a structural break as societies involved in war are changed by this exposure to violence.

This approach implies that it is crucially important to distinguish not only be-tween war and peace but also between pre-war and post-war periods. The political psychology literature suggests that these periods are very distinct, and data on ethnically motivated domestic terrorism support this claim. The current quantitative studies on frequency of terrorism do not usually distinguish between periods of war and periods without war (Asal & Rethemeyer 2008, Piazza 2011, 2012, Polo & Gleditsch 2014) or focus on war only (Fortna 2011). The only exception is the study by Findley & Young (2012) which deals with purpose of

terrorism in different stages of conflict.

Sambanis (2001) showed the importance of differentiation between identity and non-identity civil wars since they are caused by different factors. Similarly, I assume the importance of the distinction between ethnically motivated and other type terrorism is important. We can find many reasons for this assumption. First, state-led discrimination is often aimed at groups with a salient identity, for instance, ethnic and religious minorities. Second, mobilization and radicalization along ethnic lines take place differently due to the shared identity and strong role of "othering". Terrorists claiming that they are fighting on behalf of ethnic groups have relatively strong ties with the local people due to a shared identity and not only due to the same or similar goals. Thus, governments facing terrorist attacks often apply collective punishment on civilians from the (potential) terrorist organisation's constituency to deter these civilians from supporting violent actions against the state.

Current studies on terrorism mostly focus on a state level or an organisation level analysis. Given the fact that this paper aims to explain the effect of exposure of ethnic groups to violence, the organization level of analysis, while very useful for the explanation of the effect of capabilities, does not seem to be reasonable since organizations represent only specific parts of the society. I, on the other hand, am interested in ethnic groups. Similarly, the state level analysis cannot provide accurate results for ethnically motivated terrorism as the characteristics of the whole country do not usually apply to the actors of the civil war, usually the government of the country and insurgents. Therefore, ethnic groups as a unit of analysis seem to be the most appropriate for this type of research. Due to the lack of data on the motivation of terrorist attacks, a new dataset of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism is built. The new dataset enables information on

Fig. 3.1: Ethnically motivated domestic terrorist attacks by specific stages of conflict

the characteristics of an ethnic group and the data on terrorist attacks that are committed on behalf of the given ethnic group to be linked. This approach provides more accurate results, not only on the effect of the exposure to violence on terrorism in general but also on terrorism in different periods, namely pre-war, war and post-war period.

This study fills the gap in the current literature as it examines a distinctive type of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism and explores the effect of the war experience on this type of terrorism. Due to this newly built dataset, more accurate results are obtained.

The paper proceeds with a brief overview of the current literature on terrorism and civil wars. The main argument is then introduced. The subsequent section provides information on data used in this study and explains the analysis carried

out to test the argument about the effect of the exposure to violence. The paper concludes with the presentation and discussion of empirical findings.

3.2 Uniqueness of Terrorism as a Tactic of Asymmetric Warfare

Terrorism as a complex phenomenon is very hard to define. Especially in case of civil wars, it is difficult to distinguish between guerrilla warfare and terrorism as the borders between these phenomena can be blurry. For the purpose of this research I use the following definition: Terrorism is defined as *"deliberate and violent targeting civilians for political purposes"* (Richardson 2007, p. 4). In addition, only sub-state actors are considered to be perpetrators of terrorist attacks as states targeting civilians commit genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Richardson 2007, p. 5).

Ethnically motivated terrorism differs from other types of terrorism mainly because of the strong identity factor which plays an important role in motivation and recruitment, as well as on the effects on the community on whose behalf terrorist attacks committed. Ethnically motivated terrorism fights against the proposed state identity and its institutionalization by government. Thus the typical goals of ethnically motivated terrorists are elevation of the group's status or establishment of the separate state as the group's identity is preferred. In terms of recruitment, this type of terrorism usually has strong barriers to entry as members are normally almost exclusively those who belong to the ethnic group. This is also due to the fact that ethnically motivated terrorism is focused on change for an ethnic group and recruitment is focused on effects on the group itself. It thus strengthen group's identity by increasing the awareness about the cause. Therefore, ethni-

cally motivated terrorism together with government violence makes the salience of the ethnic group using terrorism and the rest of the country much sharper (Byman 1998). In other words, the feeling of otherness is strengthen (Pinker 2005).

Terrorism is one out of many tactics which might be used by insurgents fighting their government in civil wars. According to Findley & Young (2012), more than half of terrorist incidents are conflict related. See also Fortna (2011). This means that terrorism is a quite common type of tactic used in civil wars. As mentioned above, the border between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is very blurry, especially in the context of civil war. Definitions of terrorism are also conceptually problematic and complicated because of the very negative connotations of labeling someone as a terrorist or something as an act of terrorism.

There are two main approaches towards tackling the problem of terrorism identification. First, the actor based approach distinguishes terrorists from guerrilla fighters on the base of level of asymmetry. Terrorists are weak relative to the government in that they are not able to control and seize a territory. On the other hand, guerrillas are capable of controlling territory, creating institutions in this territory, and providing public goods to people living under their control. According to this approach, we can observe terrorism only if the attack is carry out by a group without any territory (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009). The problematic part of this approach is the fact that many groups behave as terrorist groups as well as guerrillas. For instance, the Taliban, the Tamil Tigers or various Chechen groups control a territory as well as carrying out terrorist attacks outside of their territory if they wish to target their government in more indirect way. This approach also says that stronger groups tend to be guerrillas while the weaker ones (those which are not able to control a territory) tend to terrorism.

Second, the action-based approach deals with the problem described above.

Instead of defining an organization as a terrorist group, it defines an incident as a terrorist attack based on following criteria. Terrorist attacks primarily target non-combatants (civilians and those who are no longer involved in fighting) and aim to spread fear. The target of violence thus differs from the target audience (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009). However, these criteria are very vague and it can be complicated to apply them in the situation of civil war. They much better suit the reality than the actor-based approach as many insurgent groups use terrorism as well as guerrilla warfare, for example Sendero Luminoso, the Taliban and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Fortna 2011).

Terrorism is often considered as a weapon of the weak since the nature of this strategy enables an enemy to be challenged in a very indirect way (Stepanova 2008). In general, the success of a terrorist attack is not strictly dependent on the number of casualties caused or the material damage, but on the message which is communicated via horrific violence against civilians (Crenshaw 1981). Terrorism as a type of a very asymmetric violence is not only very cheap tactic in term of resources but also it makes perpetrators and the cause very visible (Kalyvas 2006, p. 147). Terrorism effectively advertises the cause within the state and abroad. In addition, the lethality and brutality of attacks also signals the commitment and resolve of the group to achieve their goals (Moore et al. 2011), a message which is communicated via the fear spread by terrorist attacks (Pinker 2011, p. 416). Thus, it can be sufficient to blackmail governments by a credible threat of terrorist attacks. Also, this tactic is very effective as only a small group of people with relatively limited financial sources can cause serious damage by carrying out a terrorist attack (Crenshaw 1990).

However, while terrorism might be seen as very useful for insurgents lacking personnel, financial resources or visibility, this tactic also imposes high costs on

perpetrators in terms of the potential loss of support. Terrorism can create strong opposition as targeting civilians is viewed as unacceptable. This unacceptability of such extreme violence can create opposition, not only against the ethnic group on whose behalf the terrorist attacks were committed, but also within the ethnic group itself. Strong opposition within the group can mean a loss of support. Although terrorists need much less support for their actions than other groups fighting government, they still need at least limited support, especially if, in order to make their threats credible and signal their strength, they want to carry out an intensive terrorist campaign consisting of many attacks. In general, insurgents are less constrained in choice of their violent tactics if a population is already radicalized as radicalized people tend to respond less negatively to violence carried out against enemies (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009, p. 43-45).

On the other hand, strong emotional reaction which is often triggered by terrorist attacks (Kalyvas 2006, p. 153-154) allows government to use greater means to eradicate terrorists and can change the perception of people that used to be considered freedom fighters before a terrorist incident. In other words, the use of terrorism very often delegitimized the cause of insurgents due to the fact that the victims of terrorist attacks (predominantly civilians) are considered to be innocent., Terrorism can therefore lead to a loss of support.

According to Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle (2009, p. 38), terrorism can be used by insurgents as armed propaganda or as armed pressure in the struggle with government. Terrorism can serve as an instrument of propaganda to get visibility for insurgents' activities and their cause and gain more supporters. Terrorist attacks do not only advertise the cause but also show commitment, capability and resolve to fight the government. This demonstration of power often attracts more supporters. See also Byman (1998).

Insurgents do not use terrorism only to raise awareness about their cause but also to persuade more moderate supporters that the enemy is evil and cannot be trusted, and that this type of violence is thus not only inevitable but also deserved because of the vicious character of the enemy. Terrorist attacks serve as a provocation of government in to aggressive counter actions. Government's punishment of terrorists can be indiscriminate, which means that innocent citizens are targeted because of their vague association to the terrorists. This unjust punishment, as well as the actions of undisciplined security forces, can radicalize moderates and result in a broader acceptance of the use of terrorism against the enemy (Kydd & Walter 2006, p. 70). See also Lake (2002) and McCauley & Moskalenko (2008).

A successful example of provocation which led to the radicalization of a moderate leader can be seen in the case of Aslan Maskhadov, president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 1995-2007. Aslan Maskhadov used to be one of those moderate leaders who aimed for a compromise agreement with the Russians after the first Chechen war. He was always strictly against terrorist attacks carried out by Chechen radicals, for instance Shamil Basayev. Nevertheless, during the second Chechen war, Maskhadov took a position in the Chechen Madjlis Shura [1] established by Basayev to resist the Russian army (Hughes 2007, p. 115). As Basayev and his men did not hesitate to use terrorism against Russian civilians, the fact that Maskhadov joined the Shura established by Basayev can be interpreted as approval, or at least tolerance, of the use of terrorism.

Terrorism does not necessarily only serve the purpose of propaganda, but also as armed pressure to coerce government to change the status quo in favor of the insurgent group by imposing heavy costs. For instance, insurgents can choose an

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[1]War Council

attrition strategy which aims to demonstrate to the enemy that the insurgents are strong and prepared to cause serious loses to reach their goal, even at the cost of violence against civilians. Similarly, terrorist attacks can aim to intimidate the government's supporters and persuade them that they can be attacked at any time and their government is not willing or able to protect them (Kydd & Walter 2006, p.66).

3.3 Terrorism in Different Stages of Armed Conflict

The previous section explored the uniqueness and purpose of the use of terrorism as a form of asymmetric warfare. However, the previously mentioned studies do not suggest that there should be differences in the use of terrorism in the different stages of conflict. In other words, they do not account for the potential effect of exposure to violence on terrorism. In case of ethnic conflict, we can identify three distinctively different stages, namely pre-war, war, and post-war. The main focus of this research is on the effect of the experience of systematic violence on the frequency of terrorist incidents.

I argue that the history of the relationship between an ethnic group and government affects the frequency of terrorist attacks. There are currently no studies exploring the time dimension and the relationship between terrorism and armed conflict simultaneously. Most of the studies on civil wars deal with terrorism and civil wars as different forms of organized violence. More specifically, most of the quantitative studies on the onset and duration of civil wars barely mention or do not mention terrorism at all (Fearon & Laitin 2003, Li 2005, Collier & Hoeffler 2004, Collier et al. 2004, Karl et al. 2004, Sambanis 2001, Cederman et al. 2010,

2013).

Similarly, studies on terrorism usually focus on the explanation of the number of terrorist attacks and civil war does not even appear as a control variable (Piazza 2011, 2012). The only exception is the research of Findley & Young (2012) who investigate the prevalent purposes of terrorism in the pre-war, war, and post-war periods. Their study, focused on three countries, shows substantial differences in the use of terrorism in different periods. On the other hand, qualitative and theoretical studies usually deal with terrorism and civil wars as phenomena which occur often together and are interrelated (Kydd & Walter 2006, Hughes 2007, Felbab-Brown 2010).

Kydd & Walter (2006), in their conceptual study, point out that the reasoning behind the use of terrorism varies in different stages of conflict. In the pre-war period, some radicalized members of an ethnic group use terrorism as a mobilization strategy to raise awareness about their cause, as well as to provoke government into excessive and indiscriminate violence in reaction to terrorist attacks. This type of reaction can persuade even moderate members of the ethnic group to join the violent struggle against their government. Nevertheless, terrorism as a provocation tactic seems not to be very effective in the case of democratic states as democracies are more reluctant to use indiscriminate violence against their own citizens. During war periods, terrorism is not a rare phenomenon. Many insurgents groups use terrorism as a tactic for special operations and as a part of an attrition strategy (Kydd & Walter 2006, p. 59-60, 70-71).

Terrorism after war is usually used by extremists who are not satisfied with the result of the war. Most of insurgents in ethnic civil wars fight for elevation of their group's status. This usually means independence, autonomy, or at least the end of unjust discrimination. After war, insurgents can get what they want, therefore

losing motivation to fight against the government, or they end up defeated without any change in the status quo. In the latter situation, some extremists usually resist surrender and try to trigger a new insurgency, or at least weaken the government's position by terrorist attacks. This tactic is called spoiling according to Kydd & Walter (2006, p. 72-73). The new terrorist campaign can again serve as an advertisement for recruitment and mobilization, but also as a demonstration of power.

However, the purpose of the use of terrorism in each stage seems to be the same. In all stages, terrorism ultimately serves to mobilize supporters and advertise a case. It therefore does not account for the experience of war. Also, it does not explain why we observe higher numbers of terrorist attacks in post-war rather than pre-war periods.

3.4 Theory

The paper aims to investigate the effect of the exposure to violence on terrorism, more specifically on the frequency of terrorist attacks. As mentioned above, the current literature exploring favorable conditions for terrorism does not distinguish between pre-war, war, and post-war periods and views these periods as the same. To fill this gap, I aim to distinguish between different stages of ethnic conflicts while analyzing the factors leading to a higher number of terrorist attacks.

I argue that exposure to systematic violence, such as war, leads to an increase in terrorist attacks since experiences of war lead to radicalization of (at least) a part of the society. Radicalized people often hold hateful and demeaning feelings towards their enemy. Furthermore, some of them express this hatred by support for, or at least tolerance of, terrorist attacks purportedly carried out on their

behalf. It is important to keep in mind that even terrorists need some support from ordinary people to carry out an extensive campaign (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009, p. 33, 43). Therefore, radicalization caused by war experience leads to increase of terrorist attacks.

The proposed theory relies on the assumption that terrorism is a very extreme type of violence which is considered to be unacceptable due to the victims of terrorism predominantly being civilians. Nevertheless, exposure to systematic violence, such as a war, leads to radicalization. Radicalized people perceive violence and their enemy differently, and terrorism thus often becomes more acceptable in post-war societies.

The paper now proceeds with an explanation of each of the three steps – namely exposure to violence, radicalization, and support for terrorism – leading to an increased number of terrorist attacks.

3.4.1   Exposure to Violence

Experience of violence, for instance a war, impacts not only individuals but also societies. Long conflicts usually lead to changes in people's perception of violence and dehumanization of the enemy. Such a change manifests itself in a society in many forms. For example, traits of the conflict-related violence will be embedded in movies, music and literature. This intensifies the effect of the violence and normalizes its presence. This development can be interpreted as the creation of a coping mechanism which helps people survive where conflict (even latent conflict) is ongoing or threatening (Bar-Tal 2000, p. 352).

Political psychology literature provide us with descriptions of the effects of violence on society and the identity of groups involved in long violent conflicts, for instance Bar-Tal (2013). Many ethnic conflicts are viewed by both sides as a

total conflicts which means that these conflicts are perceived as existential since both sides fight over important goals, values and interests which are crucial for each group's survival. In some cases, even a strong fear of extinction appears (Horowitz 1985, p. 176). These goals, values and interests are often related to important parts of a group's identity, for instance territory, self-determination, autonomy or cultural and religious freedom. In addition, many ethnic conflicts are central which means that these conflicts are an integral part of the society, not only in political but also in economic and cultural dimension (Bar-Tal 2000, 2013, Louis Kriesberg 1989, Bar-Tal 1998). This means that these conflicts are present as an inherent part of the daily life.

The features described above have serious consequence as they force people to create beliefs regarding the conflict in order to be able to cope with life under a constant threat. These beliefs are usually based on selective information and biased interpretations in order to get control over the situation by reducing complexity and uncertainty. Such a reaction is absolutely necessary to survive longer conflicts. Bar-Tal (2000, p. 352-353) describes eight societal beliefs which construct society members' perceptions of the conflict, and motivate them to support a society and act against the enemy.

The societal beliefs help society to deal with the conflict but they can also prolong it. One of those beliefs is, for example, an emphasis on national security and its priority. Similarly, belief of justness of one's own goals together with positive self-image and one's own victimization creates a dangerous mix which allows people to overlook their own mistakes and engage in unjust behavior towards the enemy. As one of the consequences of societal beliefs, we can observe delegitimization of the enemy which often leads to a denial of the opponent's humanity. In other words, all the opponent's acts are aimed at harm, while one's own acts

aim to revenge this harm (Bar-Tal 2000, p. 354). Therefore, it is very hard to establish and bring reconciliation, even when rebels are defeated, because some members of the ethnic group will not be willing to accept the defeat and may carry on fighting in hope of starting a new insurgency, or at least harming the government.

The time dimension is very important in the case of conflicts as new causes of conflict are produced over time. Simply, the longer the conflict is, more conflicting issues can be created. Also, ethnic conflicts tend to enhance and manifest the salient identity of ethnic groups. Long identity conflicts constantly demand individual as well as group sacrifices, for example the loss of loved ones, properties, jobs or freedom. Due to such sacrifices, the conflict is viewed in terms of symbols and principles rather than interests, and thus reconciliation is almost impossible as the conflict has led to massive sacrifices which must to be justified by some gains (Agnew 1989).

From an individual-focused perspective, war creates a great deal of injustice at the individual as a well as the group level. In the case of a defeated ethnic group which did not reach its goals in the war, revenge is practically impossible due to the defeat. The war is over and the group is significantly weakened. This situation often leads to frustration with the status reached after the war or armed conflict ends. According to the frustration-aggression theory on causes of political violence, frustration produces anger which can be expressed by individuals through violent actions. In other words, frustration can lead to violence committed by those who are frustrated (Gurr 2015, p. 14- 15).

3.4.2 Radicalization

The previous section shows that experience of war can create anger, contempt and fear. These feelings form a solid base for the hatred which is considered to be one of the most important signs of radicalization (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008).

Before we proceed to an explanation of how radicalization can actually affect the number of terrorist attacks, it is important to define radicalization itself. According to Wilner & Dubouloz (2010, p. 38), *"...radicalization is a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behavior."*

There are various theories on the predisposing factors leading to radicalization. Many of them emphasize individual characteristics while other attribute radicalization to situational factors (King & Taylor 2011).I focus only on situational factors. This is for two main reasons. First, this study examines the behavior of ethnic groups, not individuals; therefore, we can assume that distribution of various personal characteristics should be more or less the same across all ethnic groups. I thus disregard the effects of personal traits as these effects should be more or less the same given the distribution. Second, the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of exposure to violence on terrorism, keeping in mind that radicalization is an important prerequisite of terrorism. Clearly, a case of civil war is an example of a situational factor.

Different models of radicalization often share some common factors in terms of predisposition to radicalization and, later, to terrorist activity. For example, relative deprivation and identity crises. Relative deprivation is often discarded as

much empirical data shows that terrorists usually have a higher socio-economic status than other people in their communities (Krueger & Maleckova 2002). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that group-based feelings of injustice lead to collective action rather than individual feelings of deprivation (Van Zomeren et al. 2008). Therefore, we often see that people from deprived communities with relatively high socio-economic status become terrorists as they are driven by their group's deprivation rather than their individual deprivation (King & Taylor 2011).

The other factor, often mentioned as important on the path to radicalization, is identity crisis, which is mostly related to the phenomenon of home-grown terrorists in Western Europe. These individuals are usually 2nd or 3rd generation immigrants who are integrated to the mainstream popular culture, yet still face discrimination. According to Choudhury (2007), individuals going through the process of radicalization often face an identity crisis which is related to a dissatisfaction with old answers and belief systems and a desire for new answers based on new beliefs.

Experience of violence such as war often changes people's opinions. As Getmansky & Zeitzoff (2014) show, violence or a threat of violence can lead to support for more radical solutions. Some changes can be so drastic that they lead to an identity crisis as the old belief system no longer provides satisfactory answers. If we explore personal stories of terrorists we often see that they describe the feeling of victimization and a need for change as important factors. According to Bartlett et al. (2010), radicalization is a necessary prerequisite step for terrorism. The radicalization of individuals and society as such creates an environment in which terrorist attacks are more likely to occur.

At an individual level, we find plenty of examples in which extreme experiences with violence led to an acceptance of terrorism as a legitimate fighting strategy.

Many terrorists used to be activists or guerrilla fighters before they joined a terrorist group (Crenshaw 1981, p. 390). For instance, Shamil Basayev's decision to carry out terrorist attacks against Russian targets is often explained through his motivation due to the death of his wife and children who were killed by Russian forces during the bombings in the first Chechen war (Souleimanov 2007). In addition, Basayev argued that the Russian government also committed many horrific crimes. He thus justified his decision to target Russian civilians since these civilians were complicit by virtue of paying taxes, meaning that they give approval to their government (Richardson 2007, p. 6). Similarly, the greatest increase in al Qaeda's support happened after the US invasion of Iraq (Kydd & Walter 2006, p. 71-72). These two examples show that exposure to violence can lead to an increasing acceptance, or even the popularity, of terrorists or terrorism due to the radicalization of the society experiencing violence or facing a threat of violence.

3.4.3   Support of Terrorism

According to (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009, p. 33, 43) terrorists need at least some support from ordinary people, mostly on voluntary basis, to be able to carry out terrorist attacks. In case of an intense terrorist campaign, this support becomes essential. We know that some terrorist organizations deliberately avoid causing any deaths out of fear of losing the support of ordinary people who are not radicalized. For instance, current terrorist organizations acting on behalf of the Catalans often issue a warning before an explosion in order to protect civilians. Also, these organization tend to target military and police officers instead of civilians[2]. The level support of the local people is dependent on the level of radi-

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[2]Attacks targeting primarily military are not included in the data set Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism. For the purpose of this research only attacks which deliberately target civilians are considered to be terrorist attacks.

calization of these people. It is logical to assume that exposure to violence causes radicalization, which leads to an increase in support for, or at least a tolerance of, terrorism. It means that higher numbers of terrorist attacks can be a sign of society's radicalization. We can thus conclude that experiences of war cause an important difference between the post-war and pre-war periods.

Before war, extreme violence is usually used only undertaken by a small number of extremist and the general public usually opposes these barbaric acts. For instance, Chechen opposition to Shamil Basayev and his terrorist attacks before the second Chechen War. On the other hand, ethnic groups which have experienced a war, especially a long or recurrent conflict, tend to change their judgment of the situation and their enemy. Security and survival of the group becomes a priority and the enemy is perceived as evil (the enemy is dehumanized). In addition, the group's perception of themselves is positive and all mistakes or human rights violation and mistreatment of their enemy is overlooked, as criticism of one's own kin is perceived to be betrayal (Bar-Tal 2000, p. 353). Thus any type of violence against the dehumanized enemy becomes more acceptable for ordinary people and not only for extremists.

At this point it is important to ask why terrorism might be the preferred tactic. When war officially ends, due to the signing of a peace agreement or a defeat of one of the parties, not all individuals are satisfied by the post-war settlement. As discussed above, war generates a great many injustices which are not always resolved by the end of the war. While mobilization of a larger group immediately after the end of the war might not be an option, smaller groups of dissatisfied radicals often act to spoil the peace or to seek to get power. Furthermore, post-war societies often suffer from a high availability of weapons and explosives as a relic of widespread fighting. Keeping in mind that the radicalization of population

is a permissive factor for extreme violence, terrorism seems to be a very convenient tactic as it does not require large mobilization.

3.4.4 Hypothesis

Experiences of war leads to the radicalization of society. Given the fact that radicalization is a prerequisite of terrorism, such changes in a society lead to increased support for violence against an enemy. An event as disruptive as a war shakes society up from the bottom to the top. Wars do not only cause anger and hatred, but also destroy infrastructure, and social and economic order. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between pre-war and post-war periods.

H1: Experience of war creates a structural break between pre-war and post-war periods.
Based on the theory above, longer conflicts create more conflicting issues which can lead to radicalization of the wider population.

H2: Longer exposure of an ethnic group to violence leads to higher number of terrorist attacks.

3.5 Data and Research Design

This study includes all politically relevant ethnic groups across the world within the time period 1970 – 2007. The unit of analysis is ethnic group per country per year, as the theory examines how characteristics of ethnic groups and their position within the state and involvement in an ethnic conflict with their governments influence the frequency of ethnically motivated domestic incidents. The unit of

analysis enables more precise results on ethnically motivated terrorism as terrorist attacks are linked to the actual ethnic group on whose behalf the attacks were committed. This approach is unique in the field of terrorism research as no data on ethnically motivated terrorism exists. Therefore, a new Database of Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism (DEMTA) linking ethnic groups with concrete terrorist attacks is built for the purpose of this research.

3.5.1   The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is defined as the number of domestic terrorist attacks committed by a terrorist group representing the interests or demands of an ethnic group. Terrorist acts thus have to be committed by terrorist groups having separatist or nationalist goals clearly related to a certain ethnic group. Data for the dependent variable are taken from the DEMTA.

Fig. 3.2: Ethnically motivated domestic terrorism (1970-2007)

3.5.2 Explanatory and Control Variables

Exposure to violence is modeled in two ways. First, the main explanatory variable is operationalized as an experience of a civil war in order to capture the significant shift undergone by an ethnic group exposed to systematic violence and disruption. Second, the exposure to violence is operationalized as the total number of previous conflict years in which the given ethnic group was involved. Conflict years are chosen rather than war years as they better capture the exposure of society to lower levels of violence which can be a constant reminder of the potential threat of a new war. Political psychology and sociology studies show that prolonged long intensity conflicts can have a devastating effect on societies.

Fig. 3.3 shows the development of the Chechen conflict which started as a minor conflict in 1994 and intensified to the level of civil war in the years 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2004 and 2007. The definitions of minor conflict and civil war are based on the *UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia* (2015). An armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties with the following intensity levels:
Minor conflict results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.
Civil war results in at least 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year.

Fig. 3.3: Development of the Chechen conflict

Political exclusion means that an ethnic group is not included in political decision making at national level. Previous studies on terrorism often refer to

political discrimination as a driving force of terrorism (Piazza 2011, 2012) or political violence in general (Cederman et al. 2013, 2010, Gurr 2015, 1993). Data on exclusion of ethnic groups are gained from the EPR (2013).

The purpose of terrorism is usually advertising a cause and the mobilization of supporters to trigger a wider rebellion to change a status quo which is perceived as unjust. After war, the relationship between government and insurgents can be logically changed by the elevation of the group's status. For instance, in the case of the Moro ethnic group in Philippines we can see a rapid decrease in terrorist attacks in 1976 when Moros were granted autonomy. Nevertheless, the worsening of their status in 1989 was followed by increase of the number of terrorist attacks committed by Moro terrorist groups. See Fig. 3.4.

Fig. 3.4: Ethnically motivated domestic terrorism by the Moros)

The number of terrorist attacks per ethnic group per year can be very significantly affected by the size of the ethnic group; therefore, the logged value of

absolute size of ethnic groups is included.

Owing to the fact that the GTD (2012) relies on open source information, for instance newspapers, the number of terrorist incidents in countries with poor or biased media coverage, for instance North Korea and Turkmenistan, can be underestimated (Sambanis 2008). On the other hand, the number of terrorist attacks in democratic countries might be overestimated due to media freedom and a higher sensitivity to violence. Polity scores deal with this problem, at least partially, as they correct for the effect of the regime type on the availability of information on terrorist attacks.

Gross domestic product per capita is also included in all models to control for the effect of economic development since poverty is, according to some studies, positively associated with terrorism (Li & Schaub 2004, Burgoon 2006).

Duration of peace is modeled as a number of years since the last war. Various measures of time (t, t^2 and t^3) are included in models to capture the potential non-linear effect of time since the last war (Beck et al. 2000). Given the fact that data used for this research are time-series cross-section, it is important to address time dependency. Therefore, lag dependent variable ($t-1$) is included in all models.

Tab. 3.1: Independent variables description

Variable Name	Variable Description	Values	Values Description	Source
Exclusion	Variable indicating whether an ethnic group is excluded from political decision making or not, variable $STATUS\_EXCL$ in the EPR (2013)	0	Group is included	Cederman et al. (2010)
		1	Group is excluded	
One-sided violence lag	Variable indicating whether an ethnic group experiences an act of one-sided violence perpetrated by a government	0	No one-sided violence	Cederman et al. (2010)
		1	One-sided violence	*UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia* (2015)
Group size log	Natural logarithm of the absolute group size	N		Cederman et al. (2010) and Gleditsch (2002)
Peace years	Number of years since the last war	N		Cederman et al. (2010)
Peace years sq.	Number of years since the last war*Number of years since the last war	N		
Peace years cub.	Number of years since the last war*Number of years since the last war*Number of years since the last war	N		
Polity 2	Value of Polity2	N	(-10:10)	PolityVI (2012)
GDP per cap. (log)	Log of real GDP per capita, 2005 prices	N		Gleditsch (2002)
Ethnic war	Variable indicating whether an ethnic group is involved in a war	0	Group is not involved in a war	Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), Cunningham et al. (2009) and Gleditsch et al. (2002)
		1	Group is involved in a war	
Conflict duration	Number of years of the current conflict	N		Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), Cunningham et al. (2009) and Gleditsch et al. (2002)
N of previous conflict years	Number of years spent in a conflict	N		Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), Cunningham et al. (2009) and Gleditsch et al. (2002)
N of terrorist attacks lag.	N of terrorist attacks in $t-1$	N		

Tab. 3.2: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
N of t.attacks	0.803	6.219	0	244	21937
Exclusion	0.607	0.488	0	1	21937
Group size (log)	6.923	2.006	-0.367	13.506	21604
Ethnic war	0.016	0.125	0	1	21937
Democracy	0.466	0.499	0	1	21937
Polity 2 (sq.)	51.884	28.832	0	100	18815
GDP per cap. log	0.008	0.001	0.005	0.013	21609
Peace yrs	17.085	11.086	0	37	21937
Peace yrs (sq.)	414.779	415.698	0	1369	21937
Peace yrs (cub.)	11533.618	14606.987	0	50653	21937

3.5.3 Analysis

This paper tests the assumption that experience of war (exposure to violence) leads to radicalization, something which has a significant effect on people's perception of violence and their enemy. Pre-war and post-war period are considered to be very different since people are more radicalized in the post-war period. This means it is not enough to only control for the presence of war in time t by using a binary variable (0 no war, 1 war) as we would have two types of $0s$, namely pre-war and post-war periods which are qualitatively very different.

The analysis is divided into two parts. First, the paper examines whether war creates a structural break. Given the fact that I assume the breaking point is known, I used the Chow test to see whether war causes a break in regression coefficients. The pooled regression model assuming no difference between pre-war and post-war period is expressed as:

$$y = \alpha + \beta x + \varepsilon, \tag{3.1}$$

where α, β and ε are intercept (constant), slope and error term, respectively.

Since we assume that we have two distinctive sets of data, namely pre-war and post-war data, we can write two separate models for each group:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Pre-war:} \qquad y_1 &= \alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_1 + \varepsilon_1 \\
\text{Post-war:} \qquad y_2 &= \alpha_2 + \beta_2 x_2 + \varepsilon_2
\end{aligned}
\tag{3.2}
$$

where $\alpha_1 \neq \alpha_2$, $\beta_1 \neq \beta_1$ and $\varepsilon_1 \neq \varepsilon_1$.

The combined model for pre-war and post-war is expressed as:

$$
y = \alpha_1 G_1 + \beta_1(x_1 G_1) + \varepsilon_1 G_1 + \alpha_2 G_2 + \beta_2(x_2 G_2) + \varepsilon_2 G_2
\tag{3.3}
$$

where G_1 and G_2 are dummy variables indicating pre-war and post-war period, respectively. The (3.3) lacks constant as it combines two models from the (3.2) with their own constants. It is important to note that that all periods after war are considered as post-war period as is shown in Tab. 3.3.

Tab. 3.3: Stages of ethnic conflicts - all periods after a war are considered to be post-war periods

Second, the effect of prolonged conflict is explored. The assumed structural break in the data implies different effects of independent variables across conflict stages. By controlling for the different stages, we only allow the intercept to

vary in the models. On the other hand, the interaction term allows the variation of the intercept as well as slope which would satisfy the assumption of different effects of variables across the conflict stages. To address three different periods, namely pre-war, war and post-war, we would need to interact all independent variables with the dummy variables for each period. Such a model would be too complicated to interpret. Therefore, the original sample is divided according to the periods, as estimation of these sub-samples gives the same results as inclusion of the interaction terms.

The sample of ethnic groups which have ever experienced a war is divided into three sub-samples accordingly: pre-war period (sample 4), war period (sample 5) and post-war period (sample 6). All three samples are estimated separately to see changes in the effects of different variables. For comparison, the whole sample is estimated as sample 1. Sample 2 presents results for a sub-sample including only ethnic groups which have never experienced a war and, finally, sample 3 represents those groups which have experienced at least one year of war. The number of observations in each sample is in Tab. 3.6.

Tab. 3.4: Samples

Sample 1:			
All groups, all years			
17 728 observations			
100%			
764 ethnic groups			
Sample 2:		**Sample 3:**	
Groups without a war experience, all years		*Groups with a war experience, all years*	
16 151 observations		1 577 observations	
91.01%		8.90%	
704 ethnic groups		60 ethnic groups	
	Sample 4:	**Sample 5:**	**Sample 6:**
	Pre-war period	*War period*	*Post-war period*
	548 observations	306 observations	723 observations
	3.09%	1.73%	4.08%

Splitting the data into several samples for separate estimations can lead to

sample selection bias; therefore, threaten the findings. Selection bias depends on the research question which is asked. First, I ask whether experience of war acts as a structural break. To answer this question, the Chow test is carried out on sample of ethnic groups which have experienced a civil war. In this case, the selection to the sample does not create any selection bias. The Chow test examines changes in coefficients before and after war, thus inclusion of ethnic groups without experience of any civil war would not make any sense.

The second question I ask is whether there is an effect the number of conflict years on the number of terrorist attacks. Since conflict can be experienced also by ethnic groups which have never experience war, all ethnic groups should be included. Nevertheless, my intention is to show differences between pre-war and post war periods so I decided to estimate these samples separately. In this case, my results can suffer from sample selection bias. Ethnic groups which have experienced a civil war tend to be larger, live in non-democratic states and be more likely politically excluded. Thus the results can be driven by these differences. For instance, results obtained from the sample with groups without civil war experience should be fairly similar to those obtained from the pre-war sample but they are not. Similarly comparing the results from the sample of ethnic groups without war experience and with war experience can be problematic due to selection bias. Therefore, I refrain from any serious comparison of these samples in this paper.

Comparison between pre-war and post-war period can also suffer from sample selection however I do not see it as a serious problem in this case. If the bias leads to different results, it only supports my claim on exposure to violence and war as a structural break. In other words, if groups act differently before and after war, war experience indeed acts as a structural break.

For the reasons explained above, splitting the sample into several subsamples

is good enough to demonstrate significant differences between pre-war and post war periods. However future research should focus on finding more research design overcoming the problems with sample selection.

Since the dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks, negative binomial regression is used for estimation. Due to the over-dispersion (variance of the dependent variable is higher than the mean), negative binomial regression is preferred to Poisson regression. The Vuong test in case of all models indicates that negative binomial regression is more appropriate than zero-inflated negative binomial regression (Long 1997). In addition, robust standard errors are calculated instead of standard errors to deal with potential misspecification of the models (Scott & Freese 2006). Estimates of all models are clustered by ethnic group.

3.6   Results

Based on the data used in this paper, the greatest number of terrorist attacks is committed on behalf of ethnic groups which have never experienced war. Given the fact that only 60 out of 764 ethnic groups in the dataset have ever been engaged in a war, it is important to look at a relative measure of the intensity of terrorism. Tab. 3.5 shows that the highest frequency is naturally observed during war. In line with the theory regarding exposure to violence, the post-war period shows more terrorist incidents per observation than the pre-war period. Not surprisingly, the lowest intensity of terrorism is observed in case of the groups without any experience of war.

Tab. 3.5: Terrorist attacks in different stages of conflict

Conflict stage	N observations	Total N of terrorist attacks	N of terrorist attacks per observation
No war experience	20 035	12 515	0.625
Pre-war	695	1 732	1.694
War	351	1 117	4.934
Post-war	858	2 202	2.566

3.6.1   War as a Structural Break

To test whether this interesting variation between the different conflict periods is caused by a structural break (war), a set of Chow tests is carried out. The purpose of the test is to explore whether war creates a break in coefficients of the independent variables. First, a negative binomial regression is fit according to the equation 3.3[3]. Second, the null hypothesis that variable coefficients for pre-war and post war are equal.

[3]At this stage only sample 4 and sample 6 are used

Tab. 6.6 shows the results of the first step. For comparison, the first model represents a pooled regression where pre-war and post-war periods are modelled as the same. Second, a model is based on the assumption that we can see a structural break only in case of the main explanatory variable. The third model tests presence of a structural break in case of coefficients of the number of previous conflict years and political exclusion. The fourth model assumes a break in case of the all the group specific variables. Finally the last models tests the break in coefficients of all variables.

In the second step, it is tested whether there is a statistically significant difference between coefficients for pre-war and post-war periods in a given variable. If a model includes more than one variable with an assumed break, all variables are jointly tested. All tests reject the null hypothesis with a 99% confidence interval. To sum up, war creates a structural break in all coefficients; therefore, it is important to model pre-war and post-war period separately.

3.6.2 Differences among Pre-war, War and Post-war Periods

Tab. 3.6 reports the effects of variables in terms of coefficients in different stages of ethnic conflict. Exposure to violence operationalized as a number of previous conflict years has a positive and significant effect on the number of terrorist incidents in case of all conflict stages except the war period (model 10).

Surprisingly, exclusion from political decision making has a positive and statistically significant effect only in case of models 6, 7, and 10. These results suggest that exclusion does not always matter in case of ethnically motivated terrorism and this contradicts previous findings on discrimination as a positive and a robust

factor in the case of domestic terrorism, for instance Piazza (2012)[4].

The effect of the number of terrorist incidents in the previous year is statistically significant and positive but only in models 6, 7 and 8. Also, the results show that bigger groups tend to commit more terrorist attacks across all models except during the pre-war period.

The comparison of model 6, which includes observations from all periods (pre-war, war and post-war period) as well as all politically relevant ethnic groups, with models 9, 10 and 11 focused only on one of these periods shows important differences supporting the results of the Chow test described above. Model 7 representing ethnic groups with no war experience and model 9 representing the pre-war period should be similar in the sense that there is not any shock in the form of war present. However, the model of the pre-war period shows that the only exposure to violence has positive and statistically significant effects on the number of terrorist attacks, contrary to model 7 where all controls have positive and statistically significant effects on the number of terrorist attacks. Keeping in mind that the P-value can be affected by the number of observations, it might be argued that the P-value in model 7 could be driven by the high number of observations compared to the number of observations in model 9.

The comparison of the models for pre-war and post-war period provides also some interesting findings supporting the importance of a separate estimation of these samples. Group size seems to be a crucial factor in the case of the pre-war period, however it does not seem to have any significant effect after war. On the other hand, exposure to violence plays an important role in both periods.

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[4]It is important to note that Piazza (2012) carried out a country level analysis on causes of domestic terrorism. It means that he linked state discrimination of an ethnic group with a domestic attack. Thus, in his research discrimination of the Roma people can be linked with a terrorist attacks committed by anarchist or animal rights activists

Tab. 3.6: Different samples: Ethnically motivated domestic terrorism 1970-2007 (Negative binomial regression)

	(6) All	(7) No war exp.	(8) War exp.	(9) Pre-w.	(10) War	(11) Post-w.
N of prev. conf. yrs	0.0664***	0.103***	0.0317*	0.239*	-0.0306	0.0759***
	(0.0103)	(0.0234)	(0.0133)	(0.105)	(0.0227)	(0.0183)
Exclusion	0.657***	0.614***	0.389	-0.117	1.803*	0.450
	(0.132)	(0.144)	(0.205)	(0.344)	(0.748)	(0.611)
Group size (log)	0.115***	0.0732*	0.431**	0.238	0.856***	0.464***
	(0.0311)	(0.0317)	(0.136)	(0.203)	(0.226)	(0.127)
N of terr.att. lag	0.178***	0.190***	0.111*	0.189	0.0608	0.0571
	(0.0266)	(0.0348)	(0.0455)	(0.110)	(0.0367)	(0.0345)
Ethnic war	0.176		0.321			
	(0.298)		(0.239)			
Polity 2	0.0399***	0.0309***	0.0442	0.0281	0.119**	0.0329
	(0.00889)	(0.00921)	(0.0264)	(0.0319)	(0.0437)	(0.0251)
GDP per cap. log	224.2***	254.4***	341.9*	174.5	167.9	562.8**
	(60.58)	(64.89)	(154.2)	(156.2)	(293.9)	(206.8)
Peace yrs	0.0653*		0.0671		0.421**	-0.114
	(0.0300)		(0.0663)		(0.144)	(0.0822)
Peace yrs (sq.)	-0.00455*		-0.00201		-0.0284*	0.00458
	(0.00193)		(0.00534)		(0.0120)	(0.00585)
Peace yrs (cub.)	0.0000697*		0.00000867		0.000454	-0.0000371
	(0.0000347)		(0.000117)		(0.000275)	(0.000128)
Constant	-4.529***	-4.462***	-7.249***	-3.969*	-9.567**	-8.970***
	(0.585)	(0.615)	(1.603)	(1.958)	(3.260)	(2.004)
lnalpha						
Constant	2.064***	2.163***	1.447***	1.593***	1.475***	0.908***
	(0.0879)	(0.0972)	(0.193)	(0.321)	(0.315)	(0.239)
Observations	17728	16151	1577	548	306	723

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

To see the change of the effect of the key explanatory variables, the percentage change in the expected count for a unit change increase in an explanatory variable is calculated. The values in the bold font are statistically significant. The effect of exposure to violence seems to be relatively stable across all models except during the war period. Interestingly, the effect of political exclusion varies across samples. The number of terrorist attacks in the previous year seems to matter only in cases of the model with a high number of observations (models 6 and 7). Group size positively effects the number of terrorist attacks across all models except during the pre-war period. We can see a much higher percentage effect in the case of groups who have experienced a war. For more details, see Tab. 3.7.

Tab. 3.7: Percent change in the expected count for a unit change increase in an explanatory variable

Variable	6: All	7: No w.exp.	8: War exp.	9: Pre-w.	10: War	11: Post-w.
N of prev. conf. yrs.	**6.9%**	**10.8%**	**3.2%**	**27.0%**	-3.0%	**7.9%**
Exclusion	**92.9%**	**84.7%**	47.5%	-11.1%	**507.0%**	56.8%
Group size (log)	**12.2%**	**7.6%**	**53.8%**	26.8%	**135.3%**	**59.1%**
N of terr. att. lag	**19.5%**	**20.9%**	**11.7%**	20.8%	6.3%	5.9%
Polity 2	**4.1%**	**3.1%**	4.5%	2.9%	**12.6%**	3.3%
Peace yrs	**6.7%**		6.9%		**52.3%**	-10.8%

To sum up, results in tables Tab. 6.6, 7 and 8 suggest that it is not only reasonable but also important to estimate different periods of ethnic conflicts, namely per-war, war and post-war, separately. This way of estimation gives us more accurate results as exposure to violence, operationalized as war experience, seems to be a structural break changing the value of the coefficients. Also, exposure to violence, expressed as number previous conflict years, is a very important factor in case of all models except during the war period. Based on the data, this factor is more important than political discrimination which appears to be

influential only if the number of observations is very high.

3.7 Discussion

The previous section showed the importance of the effect of exposure to violence. First, experience of war causes a structural break in coefficients. Second, the number of previous conflict years has a positive and substantial effect on the frequency of terrorist incidents. Previous studies on the frequency of terrorist attacks do not control for conflict stage. This study shows that it is crucial to distinguish not only between war and peace, but also between pre-war and post-war periods.

Exposure to violence has never been systematically studied in relation to terrorist attacks or other types of political violence. Nevertheless, political psychology and sociology work with this situational factor as one those factors leading to further violence. The results of this study show that post-war societies suffer from a higher frequency of terrorist incidents than societies before war. Also, the longer the groups spend in a conflict, the higher the intensity of terrorist attacks.

Societies experiencing long conflicts usually create a coping mechanism which enables them to survive a constant exposure to violence or the threat of violence. A part of this mechanism is a strong belief of one's own justness and the unquestionable legitimacy of one's own actions. On the other hand, the enemy is pictured in a demeaning, even dehumanizing way. Therefore, extreme violence, for instance terrorism, becomes more acceptable.

Another indicator related to violence, the number of terrorist attacks in $t-1$, seems to affect the number of terrorist attacks only in the case of the pooled models 6, 7 and 8. This can mean that experience of war makes the effect of previous

terrorist attacks irrelevant as exposure to violence radicalizes people; therefore, it is not that surprising if extremists use terrorism. The other explanation can simply be the fact that division of the pre-war, war and post-war periods takes the effect of terrorism away.

Political exclusion is often emphasized as a crucial factor leading to violence. Based on the results of this study, political discrimination seems to be an important motivation for committing terrorist attacks only if a stronger factor is not present. In other words, exclusion has a positive effect on the frequency of terrorist incidents in the case of ethnic groups which have never experienced war. However, the pre-war period is similar to this category, political exclusion does not have a significant effect in this case. It could be caused by the fact that ethnic groups which have war experience, including during the pre-war period, tend to experience more conflict years.

Another interesting finding is the strong effect of exclusion during the war period. This result can be explained by the fact that in more than 90% of cases ethnic groups during the war period are politically excluded. We can often see that conflict escalation between an ethnic group and government leads to various types of discrimination to limit any political activities in the state of war. Therefore, higher levels of exclusion in the war period can be seen as a by-product of the war situation.

3.8   Conclusion

This paper examines the relationship between ethnically motivated terrorism and exposure to violence. However, while terrorism might be seen as a very common tactic in case of insurgents fighting against their governments, the frequency of terrorist attacks across ethnic conflicts varies. Numerous case studies show that the intensity of terrorist campaigns changes over time with the change in the conflict's characteristics. To explain this variation, the effect of exposure to violence and other important factors on the three stages of ethnic conflicts, namely pre-war, war and post-war, is examined. It is shown that the effect of these factors differs over these periods since war acts as a structural break.

Terrorism is considered to be a very extreme form of violence. Keeping in mind the fact that even terrorists need a degree of support, or at least neutrality, high a number of ethnically motivated terrorist attacks has to be linked with an accepting or at least neutral attitude of the ethnic group on whose behalf these terrorist attacks are carried out. It is argued that this is caused by the radicalization of the ethnic group due to exposure to violence as a long and repeated conflict can result in two very important changes, namely violence is perceived as a standard part of the life of the society and the enemy is dehumanized and delegitimized due to government's violent actions directed against the ethnic group. Both factors lead to a wider acceptance of extreme forms of violence such as terrorism.

IIn the pre-war period, terrorism is mostly used to mobilize supporters and provoke the government in to the type of retaliation which would lead to the radicalization of ordinary members of the ethnic group. In the post-war period the rationale behind the use of terrorism is very similar. However, people are already radicalized due to their exposure to violence (war) in the past. Results based on

a negative binomial regression show a positive and robust effect of exposure to violence across all models except during the war period. Interestingly, exclusion from political power does not have a statistically significant effect on the number of terrorist attacks except in the case of the pooled regression (models 6 and 7) and during the war period.

The results of the series of the Chow test show that dividing the sample into sub-samples by conflict stages, namely pre-war, war and post-war is reasonable since the differences between coefficients for the pre-war and post-war periods are statistically significant at 99%. The model estimation of all these periods together, while controlling for war and the number of previous conflict years, does not provide us with these important differences.

The main contribution of this paper lies in the introduction of the new concept exposure to violence, which has a robust and positive effect on the frequency of terrorist attacks. This paper shows that it is important to not only distinguish between war and peace, but also between pre-war and post-war periods, since post-war societies reacts to violence and their enemy differently due to the radicalization caused by war.

Chapter 4

Terrorism Signalling Civil Wars: Effect of Terrorism on Mobilization and likelihood of Civil Wars

Abstract

Most current research on civil wars highlights largely time invariant features related to the underlying opportunity and motivation. I argue that attention to terrorism can help to improve civil war prediction understanding as patterns of terrorist attacks and their severity can capture more dynamic factors as a costly signal of resolve and commitment. I argue that ethnic groups likely to mobilize to civil wars against a governments are much more likely to undertake very lethal terrorist attacks as the lethality of the attacks can be seen as a proxy for the group's capability and motivation. I conduct a two stage empirical analysis, focusing first on the initial mobilization of ethnic groups and linked terrorist attacks, and then on the role of terrorism in the subsequent escalation to civil war. Sequential logit results show that lethal terrorist attacks carried out on behalf of ethnic groups have a robust and positive effect on the likelihood of subsequent civil wars. Also, political exclusion, which is often considered to be a crucial predictor of civil wars, primarily affects the initial mobilization of ethnic groups and has no clear effect on the outbreak of a civil war.

4.1   Introduction

The aim of this paper is to use knowledge on terrorism to advance research on causes of civil wars. From a theoretical perspective, the paper intends to provide a greater understanding of how a specific use of terrorism can be related to mobilization and the likelihood of a civil war. Most research on civil wars explains the outbreak of a civil war by opportunity and motivation factors. I argue that knowledge of terrorism can help to improve an understanding of civil wars since the patterns of terrorist attacks can capture more dynamic information than the usual time invariant motivation and capability factors.

Motivation for civil war is usually understood in terms of a lack of democracy or the political exclusion of a particular group. These factors then lead those politically disadvantaged groups to violence as other options are closed due to the non-democratic character of the regime or the political situation of the excluded group. Protesters against government oppression have a reason to act against the government in a violent way. On the other hand, opportunity factors determine whether there is a chance for the disadvantaged group to organize effectively enough to start an insurgency against the government.

The approach described above does not address the strength of the motivation or resolve to violent rebellion. In other words, it shows where there is potential for action but not the resolve to use this potential. Political exclusion does not have the same effect on all excluded groups and perception of their strength also varies across groups. Some groups might be reluctant to use violence against their enemies due to their historical experiences, cultural norms or because they do not feel strongly enough about their disadvantaged position.

We can also observe interesting examples of the different behavior of ethnic

groups living in the same state and having very similar motivation and opportunities. For instance, Chechens decided to fight against the Russian government in the 1990s to get their independence while Tatars did not. However, Tatar political elites were also seeking independence (Treisman 1997, p. 214). A closer examination of both cases shows that the Chechens had not only a stronger determination for independence, but also that their culture seems to have a positive attitude towards violence against their historical enemy, Russia, and their myths and literature portray as heroes those who seek revenge for their nation against this enemy (Moore 2006). Traditional Tatar culture seems to lack such strong negative attitudes towards Russians as, contrary to the Chechens, the Tatars do not have a long tradition of fighting with Russia. Also, the independence of Tatarstan from the Russian Federation was not so strongly linked to survival as in the case of the Chechens (Toft 2001, p. 33-34). Nevertheless, by assessing these two cases according to factors usually used to explain civil wars or rebellions, we would not be able to see these differences. However, if we look at the record of the lethality of terrorist attacks committed on behalf these two groups, we can spot a striking difference. The Chechens carried out several lethal terrorist attacks, while the Tatars committed only a few terrorist attacks without any fatalities.

I argue that by adding terrorist attacks, and especially the lethality of these attacks, to the equation, we can obtain a more precise prediction of civil war since terrorism does not serve only as a mobilization strategy for insurgency but also as a signal of intentions and of the resolve of the perpetrators. This signal is not only sent to the government but also to the potential supporters of the insurgency. Logically, a violent mobilization strategy would attract only those who are willing to accept and use such violent means of actions against the enemy.

This paper focuses only on ethnically motivated civil wars as causes of identity

and non-identity civil war are different (Sambanis 2001). The factor of ethnic identity has a strong effect on motivation, recruitment and targeting of an enemy. For instance, the link has been shown between the political exclusion of an ethnic group and the higher likelihood of civil war (Gurr 1993, 2000, Cederman et al. 2010, 2013).

For the purpose of this research, a new dataset on ethnically motivated terrorism has been built. This database merges information from the GTD (2012) on terrorist attacks with EPR (2013) data on the characteristics of ethnic groups; therefore, it provides not only information on how many terrorist attacks were committed on behalf of a certain ethnic group and how lethal they were, but also on the characteristics and political power of the given ethnic group.

The paper proceeds with a brief overview of the main research on causes of civil wars. Subsequently, the specifics of ethnically motivated terrorism and differences in the brutality of terrorist groups are described. The following section introduces the causal mechanism. First, a strong connection between insurgency and terrorism as an asymmetric tactic which plays a major role in mobilization is established. More specifically, it is described how the use of terrorism can help to build a strong insurgency movement which can challenge a government. I argue that several lethal terrorist attacks signal not only the resolve of those who carry out the attacks but also the support of the ordinary people of the given ethnic group on whose behalf the attacks were committed. Second, the importance of the active support of regular people for terrorism is explained. The following sections clarify the reasoning behind the use of the sequential model. The paper concludes with the presentation and discussion of the obtained results.

4.2 Factors Leading to Civil Wars

The current empirical literature on the causes of civil wars often shapes its explanation by way of a debate regarding motivation and opportunity. In other words, many studies often use time-invariant variables to model civil war, a particularly rare event.

Collier & Hoeffler (2004) examine the causes of civil wars from the perspective of 'greed' and 'grievance'. The 'greed' model assumes that civil wars are more likely to occur in countries having the financial sources for rebellion, while the 'grievance' model considers inequalities, political oppressions, ethnic and religious division as the main causes of civil wars. The results show that the 'greed' model better ex- plains the intra-state conflict. The factors making countries more prone to civil wars are abundant natural resources, large diaspora supporting rebellion, and mountainous terrain making guerrilla warfare more favorable. Also, developing countries and countries recently having experienced a war are more likely to suffer from civil war. Ethnic and religious diversity decreases the likelihood of war as diversity is interpreted as a constraint to recruitment. Fearon & Laitin (2003) focus on the conditions favoring insurgency. They conclude that weak governments make their countries more prone to the insurgency. They also find that ethnic diversity does not increase the likelihood of an insurgency.

Contrary to the previous two studies, Sambanis (2001) shows the importance of the distinction between identity and non-identity wars. In line with the previously mentioned studies, ethnic diversity does not matter, but only in the case of non-identity wars. On the other hand, it seems to have a positive effect on the likelihood of identity civil wars. The theoretical reasoning for such a distinction is drawn from Horowitz (1985) on ethnically motivated violence, the ethnic security

dilemma (Posen 1993), and the instrumental use of ethnic identities by elites.

Some studies argue that a regime type has an impact on the likelihood of an outbreak of civil war. Hegre (2004) found that weak democracies and weak autocracies are significantly more prone to civil wars than strong democracies and harsh autocracies. Schneider & Wiesehomeier (2008) emphasize that the role of democracy needs to be assessed with regard to ethnic heterogeneity and the type of democratic system. Their results show that autocracies with one dominant group are less prone to civil war than autocracies with two equally powerful groups. In the case of democratic regimes, power-sharing institutions like a proportional voting system decrease the likelihood of civil war.

The Political Instability Task Force develops a global model for forecasting political instability which is based on four key predictors, namely infant mortality (a proxy for the level of economic development), regime type, conflict-ridden neighborhoods and state-led discrimination. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that their outcome variable is defined as various types of political instability (adverse regime change, genocide/politicide, revolutionary and ethnic war). Contrary to previous studies, the outcome variable is not only a civil war but also one-sided violence (genocide/politicide) and significant regime change (Goldstone et al. 2010).

As we can see, different studies emphasize different factors leading to civil wars. The only factors having the same effect across all studies is large population and low GDP per capita. Hegre & Sambanis (2006) carry out a sensitivity analysis to find out whether different results are mainly caused by small changes in models or samples. They claim that they find some other factors having robust relationships with civil war, namely recent political instability, inconsistent democratic institutions, rough terrain, war-prone and undemocratic regimes. It is

important to note that these factors, except regime changes, barely change over time.

Previous studies explore the causes of civil wars by using a state-level analysis. Some researchers have chosen to look at civil wars from the perspective of the insurgency and their level of analysis is thus the ethnic group. This approach allows the incorporation of the characteristics of ethnic groups and identifies those who are most likely to rebel. Again, the debate is centered on the motivation and opportunities for ethnic groups.

Gurr (1993) assumes that the involvement of ethnic groups in rebellions and protests is driven by the group's potential for mobilization and by the group's relative deprivation which is caused by unjust discrimination (political, economic, cultural and religious). Relative deprivation provides motivation for political or violent action, whereas the potential for mobilization can change this motivation into rebellion or protest. The group's identity is considered to be used as an instrumental response to the government.

Gurr (2000) finds that the key factors making rebellions and protests more likely are the strong identity of a group, the group's sense of grievance and domestic, as well as international, opportunities for collective action. A strong identity is given by territorial concentration, a higher level of group organization, as well as persistent protests or conflicts in the previous decade. The sense of grievance can be triggered by economic and political discrimination as well as cultural and religious restrictions. Domestic and international opportunities for collective action are defined as support from abroad, for instance by a foreign state or a kindred group, and as specific characteristics causing the weakness of the state, for example, partial democracy or autocracy as a regime type. Similar to Gurr (2000), Toft (2010) finds that a group's concentration in one territory is

a major factor making civil war more likely. On the other hand, dispersed and urbanized groups tend less towards violent struggle.

As discussed above, many studies use factors that barely change over time. Cederman et al. (2013) add more dynamic element to the studies as they not only focus on ethnic groups instead of a state-level analysis, but also disaggregate motivation factors into different levels of ethnic groups' access to political power. The main argument of Cederman et al. (2010) is that state is not considered as a neutral actor from the perspective of ethnic groups living within the borders of the state. Ethnic groups compete to successfully pursue their goals. The group's political status therefore has a significant impact on the likelihood of civil war. Cederman et al. (2013) argue that exclusion from political decision-making is one of the main factors leading to civil wars. Their findings also support the capability argument as bigger ethnic groups make the state more prone to an outbreak of civil war.

4.3 Effect of Ethnically Motivated Terrorism and Brutality

Terrorism is a complex phenomenon and thus very hard to define. Especially in the case of civil wars, it is difficult to distinguish between guerrilla warfare and terrorism as the borders between these two phenomena are blurred. For the purpose of this research I use the following definition: Terrorism is defined as *"deliberate and violent targeting civilians for political purposes"* (Richardson 2007, p. 20). In addition, only sub-state actors are considered to be perpetrators of terrorist attacks as states targeting civilians commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (Richardson 2007). For the purpose of this paper,

terrorism is considered to be a tactic of non-state actors.

From various studies on terrorism, we know that this asymmetric tactic can serve many purposes, for instance, blackmail, the demonstration of power, and provocation. This tactic has proven to be an effective mobilization strategy used by many anti-government groups to advertise their case and find potential supporters. Terrorism spreads fear very effectively which means that it can bring the desired attention and publicity to the cause of the ethnic group (Pinker 2011, p.416) but also sharpen the "us and them" distinction and foster "black and white thinking". We can observe these changes not only due to the brutality of terrorist attacks but often also due to the retaliation carried out by the government which might be violent or even indiscriminate, especially in the case of non-democratic regimes (Byman 1998).

In the case of ethnically motivated terrorism, there is an important effect of this tactic which can be described as a fostering of a group's salient identity often leading to ethnic mobilization (Byman 1998). Ethnically motivated terrorism can help to create a salient identity of the group by fostering the "othering" and "black and white" narrative of the conflict which can lead to the mobilization of other members of the ethnic group. In general, violence is often used as an instrument for mobilization. A terrorist attack against a government does not only show the vulnerability of the regime but also the strength and commitment of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, terrorist attacks targeting civilians do not always encourage potential supporters to join the insurgency and actively fight the government due to their brutality against the innocent. Therefore, some terrorist organizations avoid indiscriminate attacks causing the death and suffering of civilians as these type of attacks can lead to a loss of support if the population is not radicalized (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009, p. 33).

While terrorism is usually associated with a brutal killing of innocent civilians, not all terrorist attacks are intended to kill. The proportion of lethal and non-lethal terrorist attacks is rather surprising given the impression which most people have about terrorism. Data from a study by Asal & Rethemeyer (2008) shows that more than 60% of the studied terrorist organizations did not kill during the period 1998-2005. The authors state that ideology and size of terrorist organizations are among the most important factors affecting their propensity to kill. Specifically, organizations having religious and ethnoreligious ideology are the most likely to kill. On the other hand, ethnonationalist and leftist organizations are less likely to kill than the previously mentioned categories but more likely to kill than anarchist and environmentalist groups.

Based on the data collected for this study, an interesting variance in the lethality of terrorist attacks can be observed within the category of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism[1].

4.4   Causal Mechanism

Terrorism, as a tactic, is considered to be a costly signaling of intentions and resolve directed towards two audiences, namely to the enemy and their potential supporters to the enemy government (Kydd & Walter 2006). Given the fact that we see differences in the lethality of terrorist attacks, we can argue that these differences tell us more about the intentions and resolve of their perpetrators. In other words, the lethality of terrorist attacks can provide us with information regarding how far rebels are willing to go to reach their goals and how much the population is radicalized. This information can be very valuable for understanding

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[1]This category is not the same as the ethnoreligious and ethnonationalist categories in the study. For more details, see section 4.6 Data.

the outbreak of civil wars.

Keeping in mind that terrorism is often used as a mobilization strategy and terrorist organizations rely more on voluntary cooperation than coercion (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009, p. 43), we can argue that terrorist attacks and the level of their brutality can be considered as a kind of advertisement for potential supporters as violent actions are only likely to attract those who agree with such a use of violence against the government.

Some lethal terrorist attacks are too brutal and lead to a loss of support for the perpetrators as the population is not radicalized enough to accept the use of such violence to elevate the status of their ethnic group. In short, terrorist attacks, especially their lethality, provide us with information not only on the resolve of the insurgents but also on the support for violence from the general population of the given ethnic group. Before proceeding further, it is important to examine how proto-insurgency movement can generate support from ordinary people and become full-blown insurgencies, and what role terrorism plays in this process.

Given the fact that, "...not all terrorist groups are insurgencies, but almost every insurgent group uses terrorism (O'Neill 2006, p.168)," terrorism is widely used by insurgencies even when they are weak to grow bigger and stronger. Terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric warfare can prove to be useful for proto-insurgencies in many ways. Byman (2008) lists the following conditions which need to be met to establish a full-blown insurgency. First, an insurgent movement needs to represent a group with a salient political identity. As mentioned above, ethnically motivated terrorism can help to promote and maintain such a politically salient identity based on ethnic antagonism (Byman 1998).

Second, a compelling cause for insurgency, such as government's mistreatment of the ethnic group, is needed. For example, political exclusion, repression and

use of excessive violence (Byman 2008). Terrorist attacks cause a government's reaction which can often have the form of harsh indiscriminate violence or collective punishment of the ethnic group in question. Therefore, terrorism might be used to provoke the government into repression, something which would then demonstrate that the use of violence against such a brutal enemy (government) is acceptable (Kydd & Walter 2006). For instance, ETA used terrorism to provoke the Spanish government with some success, referring to this tactic as the "action-reaction spiral" (Llera et al. 1993). Solidarity between insurgents and ordinary people causes an increase in support of the insurgency in many cases. For instance, the Tamil and the Afghan insurgencies in the 1980s and the Chechen insurgency in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, a government's military excesses can also lead to the opposite effect. For example, American air attacks which were provoked by the Vietcong firing on US aircraft caused the death of many civilians yet were often blamed on the Vietcong (O'Neill 2006).

Third, terrorism can help to defeat other insurgent groups which are considered to be rivals. Terrorism might not only help to destroy the opponents physically but also show resolve and strength. It is a known fact that people in crisis often look for a hawkish rather than a dovish leader. Kydd & Walter (2006) call this strategy outbidding, and the fight between Fatah and Hamas can serve as a good example of the use of this strategy.

Fourth, proto-insurgencies need to secure a safe haven to be able to develop into a full-blown insurgency. Such a no-go zone seems to be crucial for insurgency survival. In a sanctuary, insurgents can not only hide from the government's forces but also plan and recruit without being pursued by military or the police. In cases where the insurgents do not have popular support, they can use terrorism

as a coercion method to make local people cooperate with them (Kydd & Walter 2006). However, this strategy is not always successful, as we saw in the case of the Anbar Uprising in Iraq in 2004 which significantly helped to weaken the position of al Qaeda in Iraq (Kagan 2007).

As discussed above, support from the general public is crucial in the process of insurgency formation. Distinguishing between different types of support is important. Based on Paul (2009), we should discriminate between actual (often material) support and feelings of sympathy. However, while the latter might be strongly present, especially in the case of discriminated ethnic groups, it does not necessarily mean that people express sympathy to the cause of terrorists and/or their means, nor would they necessarily want to actively participate in insurgency or be willing to sacrifice their well-being and safety: "The critical question is not whether Muslims sympathize with bin Laden's rhetoric of victimhood but if they are ready to shed blood to support it" (Gerges 2009, p. 233). Therefore, financial and material aid, arranging transport and safe houses, or passive consent (not reporting suspicious activities), can be considered as support (Paul 2009, p. 115). On the other hand, feelings of sympathy that usually take the form of verbal expressions show up in surveys but do not add much to the strength and fighting capacity of insurgents.

If we look at success or failure of particular proto-insurgencies, it is essential to distinguish between those people who are sympathetic and those who are supportive. The success of Hizballah in Lebanon and the failure of Islamist terrorism in Egypt in the 1990s can serve as examples. However, while Islamism was relatively well established in Egypt in the 90s, the brutal terrorist attack in 1997 at the Luxor Temple which 58 killed tourists alienated many people who were previously supporters of the Islamists. Due to this, and the lack of a safe haven

combined with a strong government, Islamists in Egypt did not grow into a full-blown insurgency. On the other hand, Hizballah's brutal terrorist attacks against Israeli targets served as an excellent recruiting strategy. Hizballah, contrary to the Islamists in Egypt, did not face a strong government and enjoyed popular support as it managed to build a strong case for their fight, a struggle against Israel which was shared by ordinary people (Byman 2008).

Given the cases above, we can see that sympathizing with Islamists did not lead to greater support after the terrorist attack in 1997. On the other hand, terrorism worked very well for the Hizballah. To see whether terrorism can be a useful and successful tool, we need to explore the level of radicalization of ordinary people. According to Bartlett et al. (2010), radicalization is a necessary prerequisite step for terrorism; therefore, the radicalization of individuals and society creates an environment in which terrorist attacks are more likely to occur.

To examine the level of radicalization of the population and their approval level for terrorism, surveys among communities at risk of war would need to be carried out. However, it is not possible in many cases. I therefore assume that the high lethality of terrorist attacks gives us information on the resolve and capability of rebels but also on the level of radicalization and resolve to fight within the ordinary members of the given ethnic groups as series of terrorist attacks cannot be carried out without the support of the local people. By the support, people express not only their attitude towards government but also violence. Therefore, information on the lethality of terrorist attacks is crucial for the understanding of civil wars as current models mostly look only at opportunity and motivation factors. In addition, the opportunity factors are primarily focused only on the potential for mobilization but not on the actual intention of how to use this mobilization potential. Furthermore, motivation factors do not tell us about the

strength of this motivation. The strength of motivation might be affected by specific experiences as we could see in the cases of Chechnya and Tatarstan. I argue that the lethality of terrorist attacks can give us information on how the rebels intend to use their potential and whether they have support for their agenda within the population.

The advantage of this approach is not only in getting an additional measure of resolve to fight but also in addressing changes in a more dynamic way. Motivation, expressed as a regime type or political exclusion, and opportunity, expressed as the group's population, change only rarely over the time.

H: High lethality of the terrorist attacks committed on behalf of an ethnic group increases the likelihood of involvement of this group in civil war.

4.5 Analysis

As discussed above, terrorism, especially outside of war, can serve as a mobilization strategy. The main argument of this paper is that violent mobilization signals an upcoming civil war. More concretely, high lethality of terrorist attacks shows the resolve and capability of rebels to fight and the presence of the support of ordinary people for the rebels and their cause.

This paper aims to add the indicator of the resolve to use violence to the equation of the causes of civil war. Based on the theory expressed above, resolve to fight by an ethnic group can be expressed by the high lethality of terrorist attacks. It is assumed that successful mobilization using brutal violence against civilians signals an upcoming civil war.

The unit of analysis of this study is ethnic group per country per year. The

study focuses only on ethnic civil wars[2]. It is assumed that ethnic civil wars are very different from other wars since ethnic identity can play a critical role in the motivation and capability of the belligerent parties. Logically, the factor of ethnicity is missing in case of non-ethnic wars. Due to the significant role of ethnic identity, it is important to add behavior, characteristics and political status of ethnic groups to the analysis.

In general, quantitative studies on civil wars suffer from low variation in the dependent variable since the events of civil wars are very rare. In the sample used for this study, events are observed in the case of 351 observations which is only 1.6%. Studies on the causes of civil wars usually use the onset of civil wars instead of the full sample for the analysis. Nevertheless, the number of events drastically decreases to 88 which represents only 0.41%. It is important to note that such a small number of events can lead to biased estimates (King & Zeng 2001).

A closer look at the sample used in this study shows that most of the ethnic groups have never experienced any civil war. Similarly, most of the terrorist attacks are committed on behalf of a relatively small number of ethnic groups. Due to extensive media coverage, terrorist attacks are often perceived as very frequent and widespread incidents, yet ethnically motivated domestic terrorism is only present in the case of some ethnic groups and during some time periods. In other words, the involvement of some ethnic groups in the civil war as well as terrorism is very unlikely.

The theory outlined above suggests that a lethal terrorist campaign precedes a civil war. This means that there is no civil war without a terrorist campaign in the past. Due to the low variation in the dependent variable and sequential character of the causal mechanism, sequential logit is used for the analysis. This model is

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[2]Ethnic groups are at least one of the belligerent party in these type of wars.

also known as continuation ratio logit (Agresti 2002) or sequential response model (Maddala 1986). Sequential logit allows us not only to work with two or more stages and see the effect of the independent variables across all the stages (Buis 2010)) but also to carry out a sensitivity analysis for the investigation of potential unobserved variables (Buis 2011). See fig.4.1.

It is assumed that categories of the dependent variables can be reached only consequently. Also, all observations in a category r are not in this category with the same certainty. Similarly to other regression models with binary or ordinal outcomes, the concept of a latent variable proves to be useful. It is assumed that the latent variable y^* has a linear relationship to the observed x which can be expressed as

$$y_i^* = x_i\beta + \varepsilon_i, \tag{4.1}$$

where ε_i is a random variable with distribution function D.

The relationship between the latent y^* and the observable y is expressed in the following response mechanism

$$y = 1 \text{ if } y^* \leq \theta_1, \tag{4.2}$$

where θ_1 is a threshold parameter for the first transition.

If y^* is larger than threshold parameter θ_1, the process continues as follows

$$y = 2 \text{ given } y \geq 2 \text{ if } y^* \leq \theta_2 \tag{4.3}$$

In general, the process of transition from category r to category $r+1$ is given by

$$y = r \text{ given } y \geq 2 \text{ if } y^* \leq \theta_r, \tag{4.4}$$

where $z = 1, ..., n - 1$.

Based on the previous, the basic sequential model is expressed as

$$
\begin{aligned}
Pr(y = r | y \geq r, x) &= Pr(y^* \leq \theta_r | x) \\
&= Pr(y = r | y \geq r, x) \\
&= D(\theta_r - x\beta)
\end{aligned}
\tag{4.5}
$$

Buis (2010) proposed a decomposition of the effect of an explanatory variable on the outcome variable into the contribution of each of the transitions. The decision of passing a transition is considered to be independent; therefore, effects of the explanatory variables on each transition can be calculated by running a logistic regression for each transition on the relevant subsample. The probabilities are given by

$$
\begin{aligned}
Pr(pass_{1,i} = 1 | x_{1i}, x_i) &= \Lambda(\gamma_{01} + \gamma_{11}x_{1i} + \gamma_{21}x_{2i}) \\
Pr(pass_{2,i} = 1 | x_{1i}, x_i, pass_1) &= \Lambda(\gamma_{02} + \gamma_{12}x_{1i} + \gamma_{22}x_{2i}) \text{ if } pass_{1i} = 1,
\end{aligned}
\tag{4.6}
$$

where the function Λ is logistic regression function as $\Lambda = (\cdot) = \frac{exp(\cdot)}{1 + exp(cdot)}$.

Due to the decomposition, we can estimate not only effect sizes, for instance in terms of marginal effects, of each variable on each transition. Also, it is possible to calculate weights expressing the impact of the effect sizes for each transition on the total effect of the given variable to see how the impact of a given variable develops across the stages.

$$Weight_k = Risk_k \times Variance_k \times Gain_k, \tag{4.7}$$

where $Risk_k$ is a proportion of observations at risk of passing transition k, $Gain_k$ is how many observations is expected to pass transition k and $Variance_k$ is the variance of the dependent variable for the transition k. The $Variance_k$ can be also rewritten as $Pr_k(1 - Pr_k)$.

Combining the equations (4.6) and (4.8), the relationship between total size effect, weights and size effect of a given variable on a specific transition is expressed as

$$\gamma = \sum_{k=1} Weight_k \times \gamma_k, \tag{4.8}$$

where γ is the total effect of a given explanatory variable on the dependent variable and γ_k is the size effect of the given variable on transition k.

First stage is set as a dichotomy between mobilization and no mobilization. Mobilization is observed if there is a minor conflict[3] where one side is represented by a government and the other by an ethnic group. The probability of mobilization is then used for calculation of probability of civil war outcome. Also, only those observations which can pass the threshold θ_1 for mobilization are used for estimation of the second stage.

The other option to analyze these two stages together would be using a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979). Unfortunately, this model is very sensitive to its selection criteria, and even a small change in selection can substantively change estimation of the outcome of interest. Also, for the correct use of the Heckman selection model, it is crucial to use substantively different predictors for

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[3]at least 25 battle-related deaths on both sides within a year.

Fig. 4.1: Two stages of the sequential logit

both stages (Brandt & Schneider 2007). I also assume that mobilization, as well as civil war, are affected by the same factors, however the effect of these factors may differ depending on the stage which is reached. For the reasons listed above, sequential logit seems to be more suitable as it allows us to use the same predictors for both stages.

It is important to note that sequential logit has also some disadvantages. Cameron & Heckman (1998) pointed out that sequential model can suffer from problematic selection on unobserved variable which leads to bias estimates and wrong probabilities of passing $transition_k$. In other words, values of estimates can be effected by a variable which we do not observe but has an important effect on probability of passing $transition_k$. Buis (2011) developed a sensitivity test for unobserved variable which examines whether sequential logit suffers from unobserved heterogeneity effecting transition from one stage to another.

I simulate the presence of unobserved variable to see whether my estimates can be trusted. The size effect of the unobserved variable can be thought as an effect of a standardized variable. The aim of the sensitivity test is to push model till the main explanatory variable, in this case, the lethality of terrorism, loses its effect on the outcome variable (Buis 2011). If the value of the standardized

unobserved variable needs to be much larger than the other explanatory variables to break the model, it means that the model is not very sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity.

The highest standardized value of explanatory variables in the model is 0.0681 (total effect of the odd ratio of exclusion). Based on the graph fig.4.2, the lethality of terrorism loses its effect only when unobserved variable reaches value 4 which is many times higher value than the highest standardized effect of any other independent variable in the model. Therefore, I can conclude that my estimates can be trusted.

Fig. 4.2: Effect of unobserved variable on statistical significance of lethality of terrorism

Another problem with the sequential model might be reversed or simultaneous causality. Selection of ethnic groups at the first transition (mobilization) can result in a correlation between the error term and the observed variables. It means that the value of estimated coefficients can be wrong. Therefore, results of the selection

models cannot be causally interpreted (Mare 1980, Cameron & Heckman 1998). From theoretical perspective, it is very plausible to assume that mobilization or civil war can increase the number of killed people by terrorist attacks. Thus, in this paper, I do not argue that higher number causes mobilization or civil war but I claim that high number of killed people caused by terrorism signals upcoming civil war. Also, to limit the problematic effect of simultaneous causality, all independent variables are lagged one year.

4.6 Data

This study includes all politically relevant ethnic groups across the world during the period 1970 - 2007. The unit of analysis is ethnic group per year.

The dependent variable is defined as a civil war in which an ethnic group is involved as a belligerent party. Mobilization is operationalized as a minor conflict which means that the ethnic group participated in a conflict with their government which caused at least 25 battle-related deaths on both warring sides. This way of operationalization captures the fact that rebels from the ethnic group as well as the government are engaged in organized violence. It is important to note that the civilians killed by terrorist attacks are not counted in the number of battle-related deaths. In addition, only terrorist attacks against civilian targets are included in this study. Data on civil war and mobilization are taken from Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), Cunningham et al. (2009) and Gleditsch et al. (2002).

4.6.1 Ethnically Motivated Terrorist Attacks

The main independent variable is defined as a number of killed people by domestic terrorist attacks committed by a terrorist group representing interests or demands

of an ethnic group. Terrorist acts have to be perpetrated by terrorist groups having separatist or nationalist goals clearly related to an ethnic group.

4.6.2 Control Variables

The models includes some other important control variables. A number of terrorist incidents are included to see whether results on the lethality of terrorism are driven by the number of terrorist attacks.

Political discrimination is often mentioned as one of the main factors leading to civil wars as it provides motivation to fight (Cederman et al. 2013, Gurr 2000). Data on political exclusion are taken from the EPR (2013).

Size of an ethnic group is usually considered as an important indicator of capability (Toft 2010)therefore, I control for the logged as well as squared value of the absolute size of ethnic groups to capture the potential non-linear relationship between the size of an ethnic group and its involvement in the civil war. Data on size of ethnic groups are gained from Cederman et al. (2010) and Gleditsch (2002).

Also, gross domestic product per capita (logged) is included in all models as a measure of economic performance (Gleditsch 2002). Similarly, regime type is added to all models. Regime type is operationalized as Polity IV squared and as a dummy variable, democracy and non-democracy[4] (PolityVI 2012).

Lastly, the variable called peace years is included to control for the time which has passed since the last civil war. This variable gets the value 0 if an ethnic group is involved in civil war or the war ended in the previous year. Therefore, the variable also controls for an ongoing civil war which at least partially outweighs

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[4]All political regimes which score 6 and higher in the Polity IV are considered as democracies and coded as 1. The rest of political regimes is coded as 0.

Fig. 4.3: Number of ethnically motivated domestic terrorist attacks across the world, 1970-2007

Fig. 4.4: Lethality ethnically motivated domestic terrorist attacks across the world, 1970-2007

Fig. 4.5: Distribution of the dependent variable, number of the observation per each outcome (unit of analysis is ethnic group per year)

the fact the full sample is used instead of the onset of civil wars only. Data on peace years are gained from Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), Cunningham et al. (2009) and Gleditsch et al. (2002).

Tab. 4.1: Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Civil war	0.016	0.125	0	1	21937
Mobilization	0.047	0.212	0	1	21937
N of killed lag	0.941	15.036	0	888	21937
N of terr.att. lag	0.772	5.867	0	163	20701
Excluded lag	0.608	0.488	0	1	20528
Exclusion lag	1.272	1.186	0	4	20528
Group size (log) lag	6.923	2.003	-0.367	13.501	20219
Group size (sq.) lag	1069683094.806	16462083161.455	0	532627456000	20223
Peace yrs	17.085	11.086	0	37	21937
Democracy lag	0.463	0.499	0	1	20528
Polity sq lag	52.042	28.72	0	100	17718
GDP per cap. log lag	0.008	0.001	0.005	0.013	20396
Population (log) lag	10.108	1.946	5.391	14.071	20223

4.7 Results

Tab. 4.2 reports the main results obtained from the sequential logit models. These models consist of 2 stages. Coefficients in the first stage show the effect of the independent variables on mobilization while the coefficients in the second stage provide the effects of variables on war but only for those observations which get

to the stage of mobilization. Distribution of the dependent variable is described in Fig. 4.5. The sequential logit models enable us to separate the effect on mobilization from the effect on war for those cases which experienced mobilization. The effect of lethality of terrorist attacks is therefore only estimated in cases where we observe a mobilization.

As Fig. 4.5 shows, events of mobilization and civil wars are very rare if we look at the distribution of the dependent variable in case of the whole sample. Nevertheless, the same cannot be said about events of the civil war in case of the sample taking into consideration only the cases which passed the first stage. The sequential model used for the analysis enables us to separate the effect of lethality of terrorist attacks and the other control variables on mobilization from the effect on the civil war. Simple logit would not only be able of this distinction but also it would likely suffer from biased estimated due to the low of variation in the dependent variable.

The analysis supports the claim of the hypothesis since the lethality of terrorist attacks increases the likelihood of civil war. On the other hand, it seems it not to have any significant effect on mobilization. The frequency of terrorist incidents, without taking into account the lethality, is positively associated with mobilization while results show no association with civil war.

Given the fact that the main explanatory variable is lethality of terrorist attacks, it is necessary to control for the actual number of terrorist attacks. It appears that a higher number of terrorist incidents increases the probability of mobilization. Interestingly, the effect is lost in the second stage. The coefficients are not only insignificant but also very unstable.

Exclusion from political power seems to have a positive effect mobilization, but there is no effect on the war. A closer look at disaggregated measure of exclusion

Tab. 4.2: Sequential logit, ethnic civil wars, 1970-2007

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1st stage: MOBILIZATION					
N of killed lag	0.00754	0.00772	0.00729	0.00676	0.00747
	(0.00954)	(0.0102)	(0.00987)	(0.00805)	(0.0111)
N of terr.att. lag	0.0590***	0.0612***	0.0611***	0.0598***	0.0664***
	(0.0101)	(0.0103)	(0.0104)	(0.0101)	(0.0108)
Excluded lag	2.766***	2.378***	1.934***		1.603***
	(0.457)	(0.365)	(0.399)		(0.318)
Group size (log) lag	0.295***	0.335***		0.278***	
	(0.0705)	(0.0732)		(0.0710)	
Group size (sq.) lag			-1.43e-09*		-6.61e-10
			(6.10e-10)		(3.85e-10)
Peace yrs	-0.0922***	-0.0861***	-0.0931***	-0.0907***	-0.0848***
	(0.0150)	(0.0131)	(0.0151)	(0.0155)	(0.0132)
Polity (sq.) lag	-0.00621		-0.00568	-0.00566	
	(0.00470)		(0.00478)	(0.00480)	
GDP per cap. (log) lag	-523.1***	-610.5***	-565.2***	-474.7***	-692.1***
	(124.8)	(116.3)	(127.7)	(118.3)	(120.0)
Population (log) lag	0.0620	0.00291	0.235***	0.106	0.178***
	(0.0630)	(0.0685)	(0.0468)	(0.0681)	(0.0501)
Democracy lag		-0.0885			-0.207
		(0.214)			(0.210)
Discrimination lag				3.123***	
				(0.476)	
Powerless lag				2.256***	
				(0.464)	
Regional autonomy lag				2.518***	
				(0.590)	
Separatist autonomy				4.069***	
				(0.566)	
Constant	-2.345*	-1.453	-0.959	-3.051*	0.439
	(1.119)	(0.968)	(1.006)	(1.208)	(0.847)
2nd stage: CIVIL WAR					
N of killed lag	0.00426*	0.00470**	0.00435*	0.00411 °	0.00448**
	(0.00182)	(0.00162)	(0.00175)	(0.00231)	(0.00154)
N of terr.att. lag	0.00295	-0.00389	0.00448	0.000588	-0.00391
	(0.00870)	(0.00898)	(0.00825)	(0.00985)	(0.00891)
Excluded lag	-0.501	-0.337	-0.572		-0.215
	(0.834)	(0.598)	(0.790)		(0.543)
Group size (log) lag	-0.134	-0.128		0.115	
	(0.149)	(0.135)		(0.140)	
Group size (sq.) lag			-4.48e-09		6.79e-11
			(2.62e-09)		(4.06e-10)
Peace yrs	-0.160***	-0.155***	-0.158***	-0.154***	-0.156***
	(0.0235)	(0.0206)	(0.0227)	(0.0197)	(0.0207)
Polity (sq.) lag	-0.00889		-0.00989	-0.00994	
	(0.00591)		(0.00581)	(0.00701)	
GDP per cap. log lag	-573.5**	-544.8**	-573.6**	-563.2**	-537.3**
	(176.5)	(171.1)	(180.1)	(216.2)	(172.9)
Population (log) lag	-0.0919	-0.183	-0.101	-0.201	-0.223
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.126)	(0.152)	(0.129)
Democracy lag		0.294			0.256
		(0.356)			(0.351)
Discriminated				-0.880	
				(0.801)	
Powerless				1.011	
				(0.713)	
Regional autonomy				-0.495	
				(0.922)	
Separatist autonomy				-1.739*	
				(0.823)	
Constant	7.327**	7.425***	6.613**	6.390*	6.743***
	(2.266)	(2.074)	(2.185)	(2.623)	(2.045)
Observations	17546	20219	17550	17546	20223

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups
° $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Tab. 4.3: Changes in the probability of a civil war

Variable	Value change	Change of probability of civil war
N of killed people	0 vs. 25	0.5%
by terr. attacks	0 vs. 50	1.3%
	0 vs. 75	2.0%
	0 vs. 100	2.8%
	0 vs. 150	4.7%
	0 vs. 200	6.9%
	0 vs. 250	9.4%
	0 vs. 300	12.4%
Exclusion	0 vs. 1	-2.3%
Group size	1st vs. 25th percentile	-4.3%
Group size	1st vs. 50th percentile	-4.4%
Group size	1st vs. 75th percentile	-5.3%

(different types of exclusion), shows that there is not much difference between the types of exclusion in the case of mobilization. Nevertheless, groups having separatist autonomy tend to resort less often to civil war. The latter results seem intuitive as having the status of separatist autonomy practically means that the group, with respect to power distribution, is separated from the state.

The size of an ethnic group is usually considered an important factor when it comes to civil as it gives us information on the potential capability of the group. Based on previous studies, bigger groups are more likely to take up arms against their government. The results in Tab. 4.2 suggest that size of ethnic groups seems to matter but does not support the claim that bigger groups tend more towards civil war. More numerous groups are more likely to take part in mobilization however not in mobilization civil war.

The rest of the control variables have a similar effect as shown in many other studies on the causes of civil war. Economic performance operationalized as GDP per capita decreases the probability of civil war as a well as mobilization. The role of regime type seems not to matter since the models account for the individual political position of ethnic groups. The effect of democracy is negative in the

case of mobilization but not statistically significant. Indicator Polity IV squared accounts for strong regimes, democratic as well as non-democratic, and weak regimes, weak autocracies and weak democracies . Intuitively, stronger regimes are less likely to experience a civil war or mobilization. Nevertheless, the results do not support the widely believed claim. In the case of civil war, the effect of state regime is statistically significant.

Sequential logit allows us to see the effect of independent variables across the stages as well as the weight of these variables in a given stage. Also, it is possible to predict the probability of mobilization (stage 1) and civil war (stage 2) given different scenarios [5]. A closer look at weights and effect of lethality of terrorist attacks on mobilization shows that there is not much consistency. The effect of lethality of terrorist attacks is always positive but not statistically significant. Also, the values of weights for the first stage are rather unstable. On the other hand, the positive and statistically significant effect on civil war seems to be stable and increases with the higher number of killed people by terrorists. For instance, 50 killed people by terrorists enhances the probability of war by 1.5% while keeping all other variables at their means. If the lethality reaches 100, 200 and 300 killed people, the likelihood of war increases by 2.8%, 6.9% and 12.4%, respectively. Also, the higher lethality of terrorism gives this variable higher weight in relation to the calculation of the total effect on the predicted final outcome. For more details, see Tab. 4.3[6].

Keeping all variables at their means; political exclusion increases the probabil-

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[5]The following calculations are base on the model 1 in Tab. 4.2

[6]1st percentile: 11 000 population
25th percentile: 258 000 population
50th percentile: 1 100 000 population
75th percentile: 3 583 000 population

ity of mobilization by 2.3% and decreases the likelihood of civil war by 4.2%. The effect of the important control variable, the size of the ethnic group, on civil war is negative; this therefore causes a decrease in the probability of civil war. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the effect of groups' size is neither statistically significant nor stable in case of the second stage.

4.8 Discussion

4.8.1 Comparison of the sequential model with other models

The aim of this paper is to add to our knowledge of terrorism. More specifically, the effect of the lethality of terrorist attacks in our understanding of civil wars. Sequential logit is used for the analysis since it successfully deals with the problematic low variation in the dependent variable as well as reflecting the sequential character of the causal mechanism. As robustness checks, several logit and Heckman selection probit models are run to see whether the results of these models differ significantly from the results obtained from the sequential models.

First set of logit models in Tab. 6.7 shows the full sample where the dependent variable is defined as civil war. Contrary to the sequential model, mobilization is completely omitted from the model specification. Civil war occurrence represents only 312 out of 21937 observations. Closer examination of the models in Tab. 6.7 shows that the results often mirror the result of the first stage (mobilization) of the sequential model in Tab. 4.2. More specifically, the effect of political exclusion, group size and the frequency of terrorist attacks is positive and significant as in the case of mobilization. Similarly, the direction of the effect of lethality of terrorism

is same as in case of the second stage of the sequential models; however, the size of the effect seems to be overestimated. This overestimation could be a result of the low variance in the dependent variable.

Comparing the results of the sequential logit models in Tab. 4.2 with the result of the logit models in Tab. 6.7, it is possible to conclude that the logit models might capture some results of the mobilization stage in the sequential logit models given the distribution of the dependent variable (Fig. 4.5). This seems to be the case of the effect of exclusion on civil war as all the logit models in Tab. 6.7 show positive coefficients contrary to the sequential logit models. This statement is supported by the distribution of the excluded groups in different stages. As fig.4.6 shows, 60.79% of all groups are excluded in the whole sample. We can see a very similar distribution in the case of the groups which do not mobilize. On the other hand, groups in mobilization are mostly excluded. If we move to the second stage, the dichotomy of civil war and no civil war, we can see that the distribution of the excluded groups is very similar to in the category mobilization. This means that political exclusion does not provide a substantial distinction, after we account for mobilization, between those ethnic groups which got involved in civil war and those which did not.

The second set of logit models in Tab. 6.8 presents results on mobilization only. presents results on mobilization only. The dependent variable is defined as mobilization which means that all cases of civil war are considered as occurrences of mobilization. The dependent variable represents 992 out of 21937 observations. The results almost perfectly mirror the results of the first stage of the sequential models. Similarly, the models in Tab. 6.9mirror the results in the second stage of the sequential model. In this third set of logit models, only 992 observations are used since the dependent variable is defined as a dichotomy between mobilization

Fig. 4.6: Distribution of the excluded groups based on the dependent variable

and civil war. Based on the results above, it could be argued that the third set of logit models can be used for estimation of the civil war instead of the sequential model. However, this method can lead to selection bias since only observations experiencing mobilization are included.

The other way how to deal with potential selection bias is using the Heckman selection correction. The results of Heckman selection probit models are presented in Tab. 6.10.Political exclusion is chosen as the selection criterion since the selection equation has to differ from the main equation. However, from a theoretical point of view, it is more fitting to use the same variables for both parts of the Heckman model. Also, a Wald test indicates that ρ, the correlation between error terms in the two equations is not statistically significant in all models in Tab. 6.10. It leads us to the conclusion that the Heckman selection probit is not an appropriate for the analysis.

Based on the technical explanation provided above, the sequential model seems to be the most suitable for the analysis. The model solves not only the problem with low variation in the dependent variable and selection bias, but also provides us with very similar results to the logit and Heckman selection models. Therefore,

I can state with confidence that results of the sequential models are robust and do not substantially change based on the estimation technique used.

Cameron & Heckman (1998) point out a serious weakness of sequential models. This weakness is sensitivity to unobserved variables which can have an impact on the estimated outcome. The unobserved variables are not included in models since, by definition, they cannot be observed. Buis (2011) developed a method which allows adding a hypothetical unobserved variable. The result of the sensitivity test is shown in the Analysis section. All the tests are based on the model 1 from Tab. 4.2. Results suggest that unobserved heterogeneity does not have a substantive impact on the results of the main explanatory variable.

4.8.2 Effect of Lethality of Terrorism and Political Exclusion

Recent literature on ethnic civil wars highlights political exclusion or discrimination as a very important factor affecting the likelihood of civil war (Cederman et al. 2013, Gurr 2015). The results of this study do not disprove this importance since political exclusion leads to mobilization and approximately one-third of all cases (observations) of mobilization have experienced civil war. In other words, political exclusion indirectly increases the chances of civil war as it increases the likelihood of mobilization which is a necessary initial stage of civil war.

The results suggest that the lethality of terrorism is the main distinction between those ethnic groups which only mobilize and those who mobilize and get involved in civil war. Lethal terrorist attacks as a part of a mobilization strategy signal such a potential to get involved in civil war. As explained above, lethal terrorist incidents represent not only the resolve and capability of a small group of

radicals but also the attitude of the ordinary members of the ethnic group towards the use of violence since terrorist campaigns cannot be led without the support of local people. I believe the lethality of terrorist attacks captures the temporal readiness, of a given ethnic group, for civil war. Lethal terrorist incidents do not automatically lead to civil war; however; they substantively increase the likelihood of civil war.

Based on the calculations, 100 people killed by ethnically motivated terrorism enhances the probability of civil war by 2.8%. Excluded groups are 2.3% more likely to mobilize. The 100 people killed by terrorist attacks per year might seem like a very high number. However, there are unfortunately many examples of even higher death tolls. For instance, Chechen terrorists committed 44 terrorist attacks which caused the death of 201 people in 2003. Similarly, terrorists acting on behalf of the Moros in the Philippines killed 164 people in 84 terrorist incidents. Therefore, I would suggest that the effect of the lethality of terrorist attacks, alongside political exclusion, is a substantively important factor affecting the likelihood of civil war.

4.9 Conclusion

The paper intends to add the concept of the lethality of terrorism to the classic scheme of motivation and capabilities as the main factors affecting the likelihood of an outbreak of civil war. I argue that motivation and capability are not enough to explain the occurrence of civil war as while they might address the potential for action they do not address the resolve to use this potential, something which

might be influenced by historical experience or cultural specifics. I believe that the lethality of terrorism can capture these particularities.

I model resolve as the level of lethality of terrorist attacks for two main reasons. First, terrorism is considered to be a costly signaling of intentions and resolve directed towards two audiences, namely to the enemy government and potential supporters (Kydd & Walter 2006). Given the fact that we see differences in the lethality of terrorist attacks, we can argue that these differences can tell us more about intentions and resolve of their perpetrators. Second, terrorism is often used as a mobilization strategy, and terrorist organizations rely more on voluntary cooperation than coercion (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009, p. 43). Therefore, we can argue that terrorist attacks and the level of their brutality can be considered as a kind of advertisement for potential supporters as violent actions would attract only those who agree with the use of violence against the government.

Keeping in mind that a terrorist campaign cannot be successfully led without the support of at least some parts of society (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle 2009, p. 33), the lethality of terrorism expresses, to a certain extent, the attitude of the given ethnic group to the use of violence. Such positive attitudes means a higher risk of civil war. Given the fact that only handful of ethnic groups have experienced civil war or engaged in terrorism, it is reasonable to restrict the sample of ethnic groups only to those who have a realistic chance of experiencing civil war or terrorism in order to avoid problems caused by low variance in the dependent variable. Sequential logit provides such a solution as it allows us to estimate civil war in two stages. The first stage is defined as mobilization and the second stage as a civil war. The probability of mobilization has an impact on likelihood of civil war while the effect of different variables on mobilization and civil war can be

separated.

Results show that lethal terrorist attacks lead to an increase of the likelihood of civil war. On the other hand, the often used predictor of civil war, namely groups' access to power, seems have a positive effect only on mobilization but not civil war. This study does not disregard the effect of political exclusion on civil war. However, I argue that the impact of exclusion can be rather indirect. In other words, political exclusion is a strong predictor of mobilization which precedes any civil war. Nevertheless, not all ethnic groups which have mobilized against their government engage in civil war. The results of this study show that ethnic groups on whose behalf lethal terrorist attacks are carried out are more prone to civil war.

This paper contributes to the current debate on civil wars and terrorism by establishing a relationship between the lethality of terrorist attacks and the likelihood of civil war since lethal terrorist attacks can be considered as a signal of groups' resolve to engage in violence. Furthermore, the use of sequential logit offers an alternative solution for data suffering from low variation independent variables, and Heckman selection probit is not appropriate due to its sensitivity selection criteria or insignificant correlation of the error terms.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The thesis explores ethnically motivated domestic terrorism and its connection to civil wars. Terrorism, especially used by rebel groups, can cause destabilization of countries and lead to the suffering of many. The PhD thesis explores causes of terrorism, civil wars and their connections leading to a vicious cycle of violence. Given the non-existence of the data on terrorism committed on behalf of ethnic groups, I built the Database of Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorist Attacks (DEMTA) to carry out empirical analysis and fill the gap in the literature.

The first chapter introduces the concept of ethnically motivated terrorism and a newly built database providing information on terrorist attacks committed on behalf of ethnic groups. The chapter connects theories on causes of terrorism and ethnic violence to build a complex theory on causes of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism which is empirically tested. I argue that political exclusion provides a discriminated ethnic group with a motivation for action against the government while the opportunity factors determine the tactic. Based on the claim of Martha Crenshaw that terrorism is a weapon of the weak, I propose that politically excluded and weak ethnic groups are more prone to the use of terrorism.

The weakness of ethnic groups is defined as a territorial dispersion and smaller population of an ethnic group.

The analysis of the data on the occurrence of terrorism shows that politically excluded groups are in fact more likely to be involved in terrorist incidents. However, weakness does not increase a likelihood of terrorism. Results on motivation are in line with the findings on ethnic conflicts and support the idea that unequal treatment leads to a violent reaction. Weak groups are less likely to engage in terrorism. Based on the results, it seems that there is a need of a certain strength to carry out terrorist attacks. Dispersed and small ethnic groups are too weak to challenge their governments even in such an indirect way.

The main findings of the first chapter challenge the accepted claim that terrorism is the weapon of the weak at least if it comes to ethnic groups. Also, it can be argued that weak groups do not challenge governments since they do not believe in a realistic chance of success. Also, territorial dispersion an ethnic group can weaken the power of ethnic identity as an instrument for mobilization. Dispersed groups usually do not hold their own ancestral territory which is a crucial constitutive factor of ethnic identity. Thus, the need to mobilize and take a violent action against the government can be weakened.

The main contribution of the first chapter lies in the creation of the Database on Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism (DEMTA) which allows advancing empirical knowledge on terrorism and ethnic groups. The chapter provides empirical analysis on the likelihood of terrorism on behalf of ethnic groups. The findings are in line with the theories on ethnic conflict but challenge the widely accepted claim that terrorism is the weapon of the weak.

The main weakness of the paper lies in its definition of weakness of ethnic groups. However, definition relies on literature on civil wars and ethnic groups,

different definition of weakness might give different results. Also, the paper works with the weakness of ethnic groups in absolute terms. Given the theories of (Horowitz 1985), it might be worth looking at relative weakness. In other words, comparison of a position of ethnic groups within a state and identify as weak those which are at the bottom of the ranking. Therefore, the future research should focus on other definitions of the weakness of ethnic groups, for instance, relative measure of weakness and motivation. Also, more investigation of geographical patterns of settlement could explain why results on the effect of dispersion are rather inconclusive.

Also, the first paper focuses only on terrorism but it might be interesting to look at the relationship between terrorism and other types of tactic to see under which conditions terrorism is a preferred (or predominant) tactic over other violent and non-violent tactics. For the future research, I would also suggest to examine ethnically motivated domestic terrorism from a perspective of a tactic choice and interaction between various tactics.

From the perspective of policy recommendation, I can suggest that inclusion of all ethnic groups can lead to decrease of probability of terrorism. This might be especially relevant in the case of ethnic groups which live concentrated in a specific region and have larger population. Thanks to the political inclusion, ethnic groups can use legal political channels to express their needs and demands instead of violent actions. Also, proper inclusion of ethnic groups' elites in decision making process can lead to moderation of formally radical actors since the ownership of the state might not be perceived as a domain of one or only few groups. In other words, the state or other ethnic groups cease to be a threat, therefore, motivation for violent action.

The second chapter explores the relationship between terrorism and civil war.

Studies on terrorism show that intensity of terrorist incidents varies over time. A closer look at data on ethnically motivated terrorism shows that frequency of terrorist incidents is higher in post-war period than in pre-war periods. I explain the increase in the number of terrorist attacks by radicalization of the ordinary people which is caused by exposure to a systematic violence. Society exposed to violence undergoes two main changes. First, violence is considered as a standard or at least less shocking part of life of the society. Second, the enemy is perceived as dehumanized and delegitimized. Both factors cause higher acceptance of extreme forms of violence, including terrorism. Due to the radicalization effect, pre-war and post-war period are considered to be very different.

The Chow test, carried out to see whether war causes a structural change in the society, shows that estimation of all conflict stages, namely pre-war, war and post-war periods in a pooled regression cannot be justified since the effects of the crucial factors on the number of terrorist attacks differs across the conflict stages. For instance, the more years an ethnic group has spent in a violent conflict, the most terrorist attacks on behalf of the given ethnic group we observe. Similarly, group's size has a positive and substantive effect on the number of terrorist incidents in war and post-war period while it does not make any substantial difference in the pre-war period.

The second chapter contributes by introducing the concept exposure to violence which has a robust and positive effect on the frequency of terrorist attacks. The chapter emphasizes the importance to distinguish not only between war and peace periods but also between pre-war and post-war periods while the frequency of terrorist attacks is estimated. This is a very new approach since the most of the current quantitative on terrorism focuses only on periods of civil war or do not distinguish between peace and war periods.

However the paper has several important contributions, it also suffers from several weaknesses. First, the link between exposure to violence, radicalization and support of terrorism might be weak. From theoretical perspective, there might be some underling factors not observed or considered as important which can affect the increase of terrorism in societies after war or after many years of conflict. Second, the operationalization of exposure to violence might be contested since it does not take into account crime level. Also, not all conflict years have a constant impact on all regions where ethnic groups involved in the conflict live. Third, coding of war and conflict might be viewed problematic. For instance, if a war or conflict ends in January 2010, the year 2010 is considered as a war or conflict year. This might not be problematic for the structural break test however it can affect results of the effect of exposure to violence operationalized as the number of conflict years. Fourth, the research might suffer from sample selection bias due to splitting the original sample into separated sub samples.

The future research should focus on the effect of different types of violence, for instance, one-sided violence. Also, type of war ending from the perspective of the rebels can bring more insight on the effect of the exposure to violence. I assume that elevation of the political status of an ethnic group after the end of war can mitigate the effect of radicalization. I would also suggest that future research should model all the stages of conflict together while accounting for the differences of the conflict stages.

The main policy recommendation resulting from this paper is the necessity to deal with political and social cleavages in societies which have experienced any systematic and long term violence in different way than in societies without serious violence experience. The grievance, hate for the enemy and permissive attitude towards violence can hinder post-conflict reconstruction, peace-making

as well as peace-keeping. It seems that more years of conflict and violence a society experience, deeper is the sense of black-and-white judgment. To tackle terrorism and decrease the number of terrorist attacks, it is necessary to deal with the causes of conflict as such and not only with terrorism since terrorism is a by-product of that conflict.

The third chapter adds the concept of the lethality of terrorism to the classic explanation of motivation and capabilities as the main factors affecting the likelihood of civil war. Motivation and capability are not enough to explain the occurrence of civil war. While they might address the potential for action they do not address the resolve to use this potential. Resolve to an organized violent action against government can be affected by historical experience or cultural specifics. As an example can serve a comparison between Tatars and Chechens and their endeavor to gain independence on the Russian Federation. Traditional Tatar culture lacks strong negative attitudes towards Russians as, contrary to the Chechens, the Tatars do not have a long tradition of fighting with Russia.

I argue that the lethality of terrorism help to capture these particularities since it expresses the resolve of an ethnic group to fight the government due to two main reasons. First, terrorism is considered to be a costly signaling of intentions and resolve directed towards potential supporters as well as the enemy government. Second, terrorism can serve as a mobilization strategy. Therefore, we can argue that terrorist attacks and the level of their brutality can be considered as a kind of advertisement for potential supporters to join the cause. It is important to keep in mind that intensive terrorist campaign is not possible without at least some support from the ordinary people. It means that lethal terrorist attacks can signal strong resolve of the given ethnic group to fight.

I carry out a two-stage empirical analysis using sequential logit. The first

stage focuses on mobilization of ethnic groups while the second stage analyzes the role of lethality of terrorism in the subsequent escalation of civil war. Two stage-empirical analysis not only solves the problem with the low variation in the dependent variable (civil war) but also provides us with the more detailed picture of the role of terrorism in the mobilization and subsequent escalation to civil war.

The results show that lethal terrorist attacks lead to an increase in the likelihood of civil war. On the other hand, the often used predictor of civil war, namely groups' access to power, seems have a positive effect only on mobilization but not escalation to civil war. It does not mean that political exclusion does not an impact on the likelihood of civil war. I argue that the impact of exclusion can be rather indirect. Political exclusion is a strong predictor of mobilization which precedes any civil war. Nevertheless, not all ethnic groups which have mobilized against their government engage in civil war.

Based on the results, I argue that the lethality of terrorism provides us with the main distinction between those ethnic groups which only mobilize and those who mobilize and get involved in civil war. Lethal terrorist attacks as a part of a mobilization strategy signal such a potential to get involved in civil war.

This chapter contributes to the current debate on civil wars and terrorism by explaining the relationship between the lethality of terrorist attacks and the likelihood of civil war since lethal terrorist attacks can be considered as a signal of groups' resolve to engage in violence. The use of sequential logit offers an alternative solution for the estimation of data suffering from low variation independent variables. Also, this estimation techniques allows us to work with two or more stages and see how the effect of the independent variables changes across the stages.

I believe that the operationalization of mobilization, the difference between

mobilization and civil war and the problem with simultaneous causality are the main weaknesses of the third paper. Ideally, mobilization should be operationalized based on some data on groups' political and violent activities. There are are no such data; therefore, I operationalize mobilization simply as a low intensity conflict and civil war as a high intensity conflict. The low intensity conflict serves as a proxy of a violent activity of government as well as rebels. However, low intensity conflict requires at least 25 battle related deaths within one year from both sides of the conflict, it might not always signal mobilization of an ethnic group.

I see another problem in the fact that mobilization becomes a civil war if there is at least 1 000 battle related deaths within a year. From a theoretical perspective, civil war can be perceived just as a more intensive mobilization since more people have died. In other words, the main difference between operationalization of civil war and mobilization is simply the number of battle related deaths.

Last weakness of this paper is simultaneous causality. From a theoretical perspective, it is very likely that mobilization and civil war not only precede casualties of terrorism but also lead to the increase of the number of killed people by terrorist attacks. To mitigate the problem, all independent variables are lagged one year. Also, the results are not causally interpreted. I do not argue that higher number causes mobilization or civil war but I claim that high number of killed people caused by terrorism signals upcoming civil war.

The main policy recommendation resulting from the third paper is to monitor lethality of terrorist attacks and address the potential causes of a developing conflict as soon as possible. It is important to understand that lethality of terrorism does not only signal resolve of the perpetrators who commit the terrorist attacks but also resolve of the wider public. A longer and intensive terrorist campaign

needs to have some kind of support from the ordinary people. It means that destruction of an active terrorist or rebel group does not solve the problem. It rather increases the grievances towards the government and its policy. Again, eradication of terrorism itself cannot be successful. Instead the causes of conflict has to be tackled since terrorism is a by product of that conflict.

Before the concluding remark, I would like to highlight that the thesis deals with the operationalization of terrorism in three ways, namely presence of terrorism, frequency of terrorist attacks and lethality of terrorism. I believe that future research should not look at frequency or lethality of terrorism separately. Combining information on frequency as well as lethality of terrorist attack can provide us with better understanding of intentions and capabilities of the perpetrators.

My future research project builds on my PhD research and aims to identify key patterns preceding intensive use of violence against civilians by states as well as non-state actors to gain better knowledge on factors forthcoming genocides, crimes against humanity and intensive terrorist campaign. The main argument of this research is that level of violence against civilians can be mainly explained by the level of violence in the region and in the past since people, who are systematically exposed to violence, tend to perceive violence in less shocking way. In this project, I model violence as time as well as space dependent. In future, I also plan to expand my Database on Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism and include also acts committed by religious groups.

To conclude, the findings of the thesis show that violence cannot be solved by using more violence. Based on my research, this is not only a moral imperative but also a pragmatic approach to discrimination and violence, especially in post-war societies. Political inclusion of ethnic groups builds trust and enables to overcome radicalization caused by exposure to violence or at least not to produce more

radicalization. As the findings of this thesis show, political exclusion leads to mobilization often resulting to civil war which radicalizes people. Subsequently, radicalized people are more prone to the use of violence, including terrorism. Lethal terrorism further mobilizes people and increases the likelihood of civil war.

Chapter 6

Appendix

6.1 Definition of the Key Terms

Ethnic group is defined as psychological communities having common identity
and interests; therefore, members of such a group share historical experience
and some culture characteristics like belief, language, customs, values and
homeland (Gurr & Harff 1994, p. 5). For the purpose of this proposed
research, data of the Minorities at Risk Project of the Maryland University
are used meaning that only politically relevant national and minority peoples
of more than 100 000 members living in countries with more than one million
inhabitants are chosen for the observation (Gurr 1998, p. 15). These ethnic
groups are listed in the Appendix 3.

Terrorism is defined, according to (GTD 2012), as "...*an intentional act of vio-
lence or threat of violence by a non-state actor*". Furthermore, other three
criteria are added as follow. "*The violent act was aimed at attaining a po-
litical, economic, religious, or social goal as well as the violent act included*

evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and the violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law." (GTD 2012).

Domestic terrorism is considered to be a "homegrown" issue as perpetrators as well as targets are from the same country (Enders et al. 2011, p. 321).

Ethnically motivated terrorism as a type of domestic terrorism, is defined as *"... deliberate violence by a sub-national ethnic group to advance its cause."* The purpose of this violence is often creation of an independent state or improvement of the status of the group (Byman 1998, p. 151).

Tab. 6.1: Coding details of cases of ethnically motivated domestic terrorism

Problematic cases	Description and examples	Included	Excluded
No specific name of terrorist group	Chechen rebels, Kurdish insurgents, gunmen	Specifically related to an ethnic group (Chechen rebels etc.)	Link to an ethnic group not clear (Muslims, gunmen, Islamic extremists)
Disputed territory	1 ethnic group living in 2 or more states (Kurds, Irish Catholics), some of terrorist groups have base in more than one state so it is hard to say whether they are domestic or international terrorists	Irish Catholics, Kurds	Terrorist groups of Kasmiri Muslims having base in Pakistan (no such an ethnic group in Pakistan according to the EPR (2013))
Many ethnic groups	Terrorist groups acting on behalf of more than one ethnic group, for example Dagestani rebels and terrorist groups represent more than ethnic group as Dagestani nation consists of at least 4 main ethnic groups)	All ethnic groups related to the "umbrella identity"	
Subgroups	Terrorists act on behalf of an subgroup of an ethnic group, for example tribes Africa and scheduled groups in Asia	"Umbrela" ethnic group is included	
Mixed ideology	Some terrorist groups do not have only nationalist or separatist ideology but also religious or communist	Groups for which are separatists or nationalist goals are important (Kurdish PKK)	Groups with prevalent ideology and goals other than separatist or nationalist (FARC, Taliban etc.)

6.2   List of Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Organisation	Country	Ethnic Group
Abkhazian Separatists	Georgia	Abkhazians
Abkhazian guerrillas	Georgia	Abkhazians
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	Philippines	Moro
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Actiefront Nationalistisch Nederland	Netherlands	Dutch
Adivasi National Liberation Army (ANLA)	Nepal	Adivasi/Janajati
Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front	Ethiopia	Afar
Afar rebels	Djibouti	Afar
African National Congress (South Africa)	South Africa	Blacks
Afridi Tribe	Pakistan	Pashtuns
Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB)	South Africa	Afrikaners
Air and Azawak Liberation Front	Niger	Tuareg
Akali Dal Party	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Al Barq	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Al Faran	India	Kashmiri Muslims

Al Hadid	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Al-Arifeen	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Al-Badr	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Al-Fatah	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Al-Madina	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Al-Mansoorian	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin	Yemen	Northern Zaydis
Al-Zaidi Tribe - Mareb	Yemen	Northern Zaydis
Albanian National Army (ANA)	Macedonia	Albanians
Albanian Separatists	Yugoslavia	Albanians
Albanians	Macedonia	Albanians
Albanians	Yugoslavia	Albanians
All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP)	Ethiopia	Amhara
All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)	India	Indigenous Tripuri
Allah's Tigers	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Amal	Lebanon	Shi'a Muslims (Arab)
American Indian Movement	United States of America	American Indians

Americans for a Competent Federal Judicial System	United States of America	Whites
Amhara tribal group	Ethiopia	Amhara
Anonima Sequestri	Italy	Sardinians
Ansar al-Islam	Iraq	Sunni Arabs
Anti-terrorism ETA (ATE)	Spain	Spanish
Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL)	France	French
Anya-Nya II Militia	Sudan	Nuer
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Arab Separatists	Iran	Arabs
Arab Youth Group (Militant)	Iran	Arabs
Arabs	United States of America	Arab Americans
Arabs	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Arabs	Iran	Arabs
Arbav Martyrs of Khuzestan	Iran	Arabs
Ariska Brodraskapet (Aryan Brotherhood)	Sweden	Swedes
Armata Corsa	France	Corsicans
Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN)	France	Corsicans
Armed Falange	Italy	Italians

Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	Russia	Chechens
Armenian Extremists	Russia	Armenians
Armenian Guerrillas	Azerbaijan	Armenians
Armenian Guerrillas	Russia	Armenians
Armenian Guerrillas	Armenia	Armenians
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia	Iran	Armenians
Armenian militants	Russia	Armenians
Armenian paramilitary group	Russia	Armenians
Armenians	Russia	Armenians
Armenians	Iran	Armenians
Army for Freeing Scotland	United Kingdom	Scots
Army of Islam	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Army of the Republic of Ilirida	Macedonia	Albanians
Ashuar Tribe	Ecuador	Indigenous peoples
Autonomy-Seeking Arabs	Iran	Arabs
Awami League	Bangladesh	Bengali Hindus
Awami League	Bangladesh	Bengali Muslims
Awami League	Bangladesh	Bengali Muslims
Awami League	Bangladesh	Bengali Hindus
Azania People's Organization (AZAPO)	South Africa	Blacks
Azerbaijan Guerrillas	Azerbaijan	Azeri

Babbar Khalsa	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Badr Brigades	Iraq	Shi'a Arabs
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	Pakistan	Baluchis
Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) - Pakistan	Pakistan	Baluchis
Baloch Nationalists	Pakistan	Baluchis
Baloch Republican Army (BRA)	Pakistan	Baluchis
Balochistan Liberation United Front (BLUF)	Pakistan	Baluchis
Baluchistan National Army	Pakistan	Baluchis
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	Bangladesh	Bengali Muslims
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	Bangladesh	Bengali Hindus
Banyamulenge rebels	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Tutsi-Banyamulenge
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)	Thailand	Malay Muslims
Barzani Guerrillas	Iraq	Kurds
Basque Country Autonomous Self-Defense Group	Spain	Basques

Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	Spain	Basques
Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA)	France	Basques
Basque Justice	France	Basques
Basque Rectitudes	France	Basques
Basque Refugee Support Group	Spain	Basques
Basque Separatists	Spain	Basques
Basque Separatists	Spain	Basques
Basque guerrillas	Spain	Basques
Basque terrorists	Spain	Basques
Bavarian Liberation Army	Romania	Germans
Beja Congress	Sudan	Beja
Bengali Tiger Force (BTF)	India	Bengali (non-SC/ST)
Bersatu	Thailand	Malay Muslims
Bharatiya Janata Party	India	Hindi (Non SC/ST/OBCs)
Bhinderanwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTHK)	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Bihar People's Party (Hindu militants)	India	Hindi (Non SC/ST/OBCs)

Bihar People's Party (Hindu militants)	India	Hindi (Non SC/ST/OBCs)
Black Afro Militant Movement	United States of America	African Americans
Black Liberation Army	United States of America	African Americans
Black Nationalists	Zimbabwe	Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)
Black Nationalists	United States of America	African Americans
Black Nationalists	Zimbabwe	Shona
Black Panther Group (Palestinian)	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Black Panthers	United States of America	African Americans
Black September	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Black Tigers	Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils
Black Widows	Russia	Chechens
Blacks	South Africa	Blacks
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT)	India	Bodo
Bodo Militants	India	Bodo
Bodo People's Front (BPF)	India	Bodo
Bosnian Croats	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats

Bosnian Serbs	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs
Brigades of Iman Hassan-al-Basri	Iraq	Shi'a Arabs
Brigades of Palestinian National Resistance	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Casamance Separatists	Senegal	Diola
Catalan Liberation Front (FAC)	Spain	Catalans
Catalan Militia	Spain	Catalans
Catalan independence group	Spain	Catalans
Catholic Reaction Force (CRF)	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Catholic Reaction Force (CRF)	Ireland	Irish
Caucasus Emirate	Russia	Chechens
Charles Martel Group	France	French
Chechen Lone Wolf Group	Russia	Chechens
Chechen Lone Wolf Group	Russia	Chechens
Chechen Rebels	Russia	Chechens
Chicano Liberation Front	United States of America	Latinos
Chicano Radicals	United States of America	Latinos
Chin National Army	Myanmar	Zomis (Chins)
Chinese Illegal Immigrant	Taiwan	Mainland Chinese
Civil Defense Force (CDF)	Sierra Leone	Mende

Colonel Karuna Faction	Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils
Commander Abdul Khalim Saidullayev	Russia	Chechens
Commander Abu Omar al-Saif	Russia	Chechens
Commander Amir Abdu-Sabur	Russia	Chechens
Commander Amir Abdulla	Russia	Chechens
Commander Arbi Barayev	Russia	Chechens
Commander Askhab Bidayev	Russia	Chechens
Commander Aslan Maskhadov	Russia	Chechens
Commander Doku Umarov	Russia	Chechens
Commander Ibn al-Khattab	Russia	Chechens
Commander Islam Khasukhanov	Russia	Chechens
Commander Mamatsuyev	Russia	Chechens
Commander Movladi Udugov	Russia	Chechens
Commander Movsar Barayev	Russia	Chechens
Commander Ramzan Akhmad	Russia	Chechens
Commander Ramzan Akhmadov	Russia	Chechens
Commander Rapani Khalilov, under the command of Abu al-Walid	Russia	Chechens
Commander Rustam Surguev	Russia	Chechens
Commander Salman Raduyev	Russia	Chechens
Commander Shamil Basayev	Russia	Chechens

Commander Suleyman Imurzayev, under the command of Shamil Basayev	Russia	Chechens
Commander Usman Muntsigov	Russia	Chechens
Commander Yakub	Russia	Chechens
Commander Zelimkhan Akmadov	Russia	Chechens
Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East Political Prisoners (CSPPA)	Lebanon	Shi'a Muslims (Arab)
Congress of Kabardian People	Russia	Kabardins
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)	Ireland	Irish
Contras	Nicaragua	Miskitos
Corsican Farmers' Front	France	Corsicans
Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC)	France	Corsicans
Corsican National Liberation Front- Historic Channel	France	Corsicans
Corsican Nationalists	France	Corsicans
Corsican Revolutionary Brigade	France	Corsicans
Corsican Separatists	France	Corsicans
Croatian Militia	Croatia	Croats

Croatian Nationalists	Yugoslavia	Croats
Croatians	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats
Croatians	Yugoslavia	Croats
Cuncolta Naziunalista	France	Corsicans
Cyprus Turkish People's Movement	Cyprus	Turks
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat	Russia	Kumyks
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat	Russia	Dargins
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat	Russia	Avars
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat	Russia	Lezgins
Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat	Russia	Laks
Dayak gang	Indonesia	Dayak
Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR)	Niger	Toubou
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)	Rwanda	Hutu
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)	Thailand	Kayin (Karens)
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)	Myanmar	Kayin (Karens)

Democratic Movement for the Liberation of the Eritrean Kunamas (DMLEK)	Eritrea	Kunama
Dima Halao Daoga (DHD)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Dioulas tribal group	Senegal	Diola
Direct Action Against Drugs (DADD)	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Dishmish Regiment	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Dnester region guerrilas	Moldova	Russian speakers
Dnestr Rebels	Moldova	Russian speakers
Dnestr Republic Separatists	Moldova	Russian speakers
Druzes	Lebanon	Druze
Dukhta-ran-e-Millat	India	Kashmiri Muslims
E. Timorese Youths	Indonesia	East Timorese
Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution	Lebanon	Palestinians (Arab)
East Asia Anti Japanese Armed Front	Japan	Ainu
East Timorese Activists	Indonesia	East Timorese

East Turkistan Liberation Organization	China	Uyghur
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	China	Uyghur
Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)	Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils
Egbema National Front	Nigeria	Ijaw
Egbesu Youths of the Bayelsa	Nigeria	Ijaw
Ein Tyrol (One Tyrol)	Italy	German speakers (Austrians)
Eritrean Liberation Front	Ethiopia	Muslim Eritreans
Eritrean Liberation Front	Ethiopia	Christian Eritreans
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front	Ethiopia	Christian Eritreans
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front	Ethiopia	Muslim Eritreans
Ethnic Russian Separatists	Moldova	Russian speakers
Etnocacerista Movement	Peru	Quechua
Fatah Hawks	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Fatah Uprising	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Fedayeen	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Fighters of Democratic Latvia	Latvia	Russians
Force 17	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD)	Burundi	Hutu

Fourth Reich Skinheads	United States of America	Whites
Fred Hampton Unit of the People's Forces	United States of America	African Americans
Free Aceh Movement (GAM)	Indonesia	Achinese
Free Fatherland Youth Guerrilla Army	Spain	Galicians
Free Papua Movement (OPM-Organisasi Papua Merdeka)	Indonesia	Papua
French Basque Nationalists	France	Basques
Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ)	Canada	French speakers
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)	Angola	Cabindan Mayombe
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC)	Angola	Cabindan Mayombe
Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy	Djibouti	Afar
Front of Resistance and National Liberation of Albanians	Yugoslavia	Albanians
Fuerza Nueva	Spain	Spanish
Future movement (Lebanon)	Lebanon	Sunnis (Arab)
Garo National Liberation Army	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Gazteriak	France	Corsicans

Georgian Militants	Georgia	Georgians
Georgian Sabotage Group	Georgia	Georgians
Georgian guerrillas	Georgia	Georgians
Georgian rebels	Georgia	Georgians
German Speaking Separatists	Italy	German speakers (Austrians)
Gilad Shalhevet Brigades	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Gilad Shalhevet Brigades	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Gilad Shalhevet Brigades	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
God's Army	Thailand	Kayin (Karens)
God's Army	Myanmar	Kayin (Karens)
Great Japan Patriotic Party	Japan	Japanese
Greek National Socialist Organization	Greece	Greeks
Grey Wolves	Turkey	Turkish
Guajajara Tribe	Brazil	Indigenous peoples
Guaycaipuro Indians	Brazil	Indigenous peoples
Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF)	India	Other Backward Classes/Castes
HPG	Turkey	Kurds
Haika	Spain	Basques
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)	Israel	Palestinian Arabs

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM)	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Harkat ul Ansar	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Hasmoneans (Jewish Settler Group)	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Hasmoneans (Jewish Settler Group)	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Hasmoneans (Jewish Settler Group)	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Hazaras
Hill Students Council	Bangladesh	Tribal-Buddhists
Hindu Group	India	Hindi (Non SC/ST/OBCs)
Hizballah	Lebanon	Shi'a Muslims (Arab)
Hizballah	Kuwait	Kuwaiti Shi'a (Arab)
Hizballah Palestine	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Hmar People's Convention-Democracy (HPC-D)	India	Mizo
Hungarian Skin Head Group	Hungary	Hungarians
Huthis	Yemen Arab Republic	Zaydis

Hutus	Burundi	Hutu
Hutus	Rwanda	Hutu
Igbo tribal group	Nigeria	Igbo
Ijaw militants	Nigeria	Ijaw
Ikhwan Jammu and Kashmir	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Imam Hussein Brigade	Iraq	Shi'a Arabs
Indians	Mexico	Indigenous peoples
Indigenous People's Federal Army (IPFA)	Philippines	Indigenous
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)	South Africa	Zulu
Interahamwe Militia	Rwanda	Hutu
Intifada Martyrs	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Iparretarrak (IK)	France	Basques
Irian Jaya Rebels	Indonesia	Papua
Irianese Tribesmen	Indonesia	Papua
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	Ireland	Irish
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO)	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Irish Republican Army (IRA)	Ireland	Irish

Irish Republican Army (IRA)	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Irish Republican Extremists	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIAA)	Mali	Tuareg
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (IFLP)	Jordan	Palestinian Arabs
Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)	Russia	Chechens
Israel Militant	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Israel Militant	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Israel Militant	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Israeli Extremists	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Israeli Extremists	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Israeli Extremists	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Israeli Settler	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Israeli Settler	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Israeli Settler	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Israeli Terrorist Group	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Israeli Terrorist Group	Israel	Russians (Jewish)

Israeli Terrorist Group	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Italian Combatents for Alto Adige	Italy	German speakers (Austrians)
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)	Nepal	Madhesi
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM)	Nepal	Madhesi
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Bisphot Singh (JTMM-B)	Nepal	Madhesi
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Bisphot Singh (JTMM-B)	Nepal	Madhesi
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Goit (JTMM-G)	Nepal	Madhesi
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Goit (JTMM-G)	Nepal	Madhesi
Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha-Jwala Singh (JTMM-J)	Nepal	Madhesi
Janjaweed	Sudan	Zaghawa

Janjaweed	Sudan	Other Arab groups
Janjaweed	Sudan	Rashaida
Jarrai	Spain	Basques
Jatav Caste	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Jenin Martyrs Brigades	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Jewish Extremists	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Jewish Extremists	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Jewish Extremists	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Jewish Fighting Organization (Eyal)	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Jewish Fighting Organization (Eyal)	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Jewish Fighting Organization (Eyal)	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Jewish Terror	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Jewish Terror	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Jewish Terror	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Justice Army for Defenseless Peoples	Mexico	Indigenous peoples
Kach	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)

Kach	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Kach	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Kachin Independence Army (KIA)	Myanmar	Kachins
Kachin Insurgents	Myanmar	Kachins
Kahane Chai	Israel	Mizrahim (Jewsih)
Kahane Chai	Israel	Russians (Jewish)
Kahane Chai	Israel	Ashkenazim (Jewish)
Kaingang Indians	Brazil	Indigenous peoples
Kaka-Tribesmen	Baluchis	Baluchis
Kamajor Hunters	Sierra Leone	Mende
Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO)	India	Bodo
Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL)	India	Manipuri
Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP)	India	Manipuri
Karamojong Warriors	Uganda	Karamojong
Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Karbi Longri North Cachar Liberation Front (KLNLF)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes

Karbi National Volunteers (KNV)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Karbi Tribe	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Karen Insurgents	Myanmar	Kayin (Karens)
Karen National Liberation Army	Myanmar	Kayin (Karens)
Karen National Liberation Army	Thailand	Kayin (Karens)
Karen National Union	Thailand	Kayin (Karens)
Karen National Union	Myanmar	Kayin (Karens)
Karenni National Progressive Party	Myanmar	Karenni (Red Karens)
Kashmir Freedom Force	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Kashmiri Hizballah	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Kashmiri Militants	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Kata'ib al-Khoul	Russia	Ossetes
Khalistan Commando Force	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Khalistan Liberation Force	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Khalistan Zindabad (Long Live Khalistan)	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)

Khalistan Zindabad (Long Live Khalistan)	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Khun Sa Guerrillas	Myanmar	Shan
Kongra-Gel	Turkey	Kurds
Koreans	China	Koreans
Korubo Tribe	Brazil	Indigenous peoples
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	Yugoslavia	Albanians
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	Macedonia	Albanians
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	Montenegro	Albanians
Ku Klux Klan	United States of America	Whites
Kuki Liberation Army (KLA)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Kuki National Army (KNA)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Kuki National Front (KNF)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Kuki Tribal Militants	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes

Kuki tribesmen	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
Kuna Indians	Panama	Kuna
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP)	Iraq	Kurds
Kurdish Islamic Unity Party	Turkey	Kurds
Kurdish Marxist Separatists	Turkey	Kurds
Kurdish Militants	Turkey	Kurds
Kurdish Oppositionists	Iran	Kurds
Kurdish Peshmerga Guerrillas	Iraq	Kurds
Kurdish Rebels	Turkey	Kurds
Kurdish Separatists	Turkey	Kurds
Kurdish guerrillas	Iran	Kurds
Kurdish guerrillas	Turkey	Kurds
Kurdistan Free Life Party	Iran	Kurds
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	Iraq	Kurds
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	Turkey	Kurds
Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)	Iran	Kurds
Kurdistan National Union	Iraq	Kurds
Kurdistan People's Liberation Army (Military Wing)	Turkey	Kurds

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Turkey	Kurds
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Syria	Kurds
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Iraq	Kurds
Kurds	Turkey	Kurds
Kurds	Iraq	Kurds
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Pakistan	Punjabi
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Liberation Army for Presevo Medvedja and Bujanovac (Ushtria ?lirimtare e Preshev?s Medvegj?s dhe Bujanocit – UCPMB) Yugoslavia Albanians	Yugoslavia	Albanians
Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (Ushtria Clirimtare e Presheves, Medvegjes dhe Bujanocit - UCPMB)	Kosovo	Albanians
Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac (Ushtria Clirimtare e Presheves, Medvegjes dhe Bujanocit - UCPMB)	Yugoslavia	Albanians
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils
Liberia Peace Council	Liberia	Krahn (Guere)
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)	Liberia	Krahn (Guere)

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)	Liberia	Mandingo
Loyalist Action Force	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF)	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Macedonian nationalists	Macedonia	Macedonians
Madhesi Mukti Tigers (MMT)	Nepal	Madhesi
Madhesi People?s Rights Forum (MPRF)	Nepal	Madhesi
Manipur People's Army (MPA)	India	Manipuri
Manipur Peoples Army	India	Manipuri
Maori	New Zealand	Maori
Mazari Tribesmen	Pakistan	Baluchis
Meibion Glyndwr	United Kingdom	Welsh
Meitei extremists	India	Manipuri
Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists	Russia	Russians
Miskito Indian Organization	Miskitos	Nicaragua
Misurasata Indian Organization	Miskitos	Nicaragua
Mizo National Front	Mizo	India
Mohajir National Movement	Mohajirs	Pakistan
Mon Guerrillas	Mons	Myanmar
Mon Insurgents	Mons	Myanmar

Mong Thai Army (MTA)	Shan	Thailand
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)	Philippines	Moro
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)	Philippines	Moro
Moro National Liberation Front Splinter group	Philippines	Moro
Moslem Janbaz Force	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Moslem Paramilitary Group	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosniaks/Muslims
Movement for Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	Nigeria	Igbo
Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)	Chad	Toubou
Movement for Self-Determination	France	Corsicans
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	Nigeria	Ijaw
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance	Senegal	Diola
Movement of Niger People for Justice (MNJ)	Niger	Tuareg
Mujahideen Kashmir	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Mungiki Sect	Kenya	Kikuyu-Meru-Emb
Muslim Extremists	Thailand	Malay Muslims

Muslim Guerrillas	Thailand	Malay Muslims
Muslim Militants	Thailand	Malay Muslims
Muslim Militants	Sri Lanka	Moors (Muslims)
Muslim Separatists	Philippines	Moro
Muslim Separatists	Thailand	Malay Muslims
Muslims	Thailand	Malay Muslims
Muslims	Sri Lanka	Moors (Muslims)
Muttahida Qami Movement (MQM)	Pakistan	Mohajirs
Naga People	India	Naga
Naga Students Federation	India	Naga
Nandi Tribe	Kenya	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu
National Committee to Combat Fascism	United States of America	African Americans
National Council for Defense of Democracy (NCDD)	Burundi	Hutu
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)	India	Bodo
National Front Against Tigers (NFAT)	Sri Lanka	Sinhalese
National Liberation Army (NLA) (Macedonia)	Macedonia	Albanians

National Liberation Front (FNL) (Burundi)	Burundi	Hutu
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)	India	Indigenous Tripuri
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)	Cyprus	Greeks
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)	Liberia	Gio
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)	Liberia	Mano
National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND)	Rwanda	Hutu
National Revolutionary Front	Thailand	Malay Muslims
National Socialist Council of Nagaland	India	Naga
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)	India	Naga
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K)	India	Naga

Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)	Honduras	Indigenous peoples (Lenca- Maya- Chorti-Miskito- Tawahka-Sumu- Xicaque-Nahua)
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN)	Nicaragua	Miskitos
Nicaraguan Resistance	Honduras	Indigenous peoples (Lenca- Maya- Chorti-Miskito- Tawahka-Sumu- Xicaque-Nahua)
Nicaraguan Resistance	Nicaragua	Miskitos
Niger Delta Freedom Fighters (NDDF)	Nigeria	Ijaw
Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF)	Nigeria	Ijaw
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV)	Nigeria	Ijaw
Ninjas	Congo	Bakongo
Ninth of June Organzation	Iran	Armenians
Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC)	Nigeria	Yoruba
Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA)	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	Ethiopia	Somali (Ogaden)

Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	Somalia	Somali
Omar Bin Khattab Group	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Orange Order	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Orange Volunteers (OV)	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Oromo Liberation Front	Ethiopia	Oroma
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	Lebanon	Palestinians (Arab)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	Lebanon	Palestinians (Arab)
Palestinians	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Palestinians	Lebanon	Palestinians (Arab)
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) – Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Tribal-Buddhists
Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU)	Burundi	Hutu
Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO)	Thailand	Malay Muslims
People's Liberation Army (India)	India	Manipuri
People's Liberation Army (Northern Ireland)	Ireland	Irish

People's Liberation Army (PLA)	India	Manipuri
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam	Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils
People's Militia of Dagestan	Russia	Kumyks
People's Militia of Dagestan	Russia	Dargins
People's Militia of Dagestan	Russia	Laks
People's Militia of Dagestan	Russia	Lezgins
People's Militia of Dagestan	Russia	Avars
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	India	Manipuri
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)	India	Manipuri
People's Tamil Organization	Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils
Phalange	Lebanon	Maronite Christians
Phillipine Moslems	Philippines	Moro
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	Lebanon	Palestinians (Arab)
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda	Angola	Bakongo
Popular Resistance Committees	Israel	Palestinian Arabs

Prisoner's Action Force	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP)	Lebanon	Druze
Protestant Action Group	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Protestant Extremists	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Provisional Irish Republican Army	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Quebec Separatists	Canada	French speakers
Quintin Lame	Colombia	Indigenous peoples
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh	India	Hindi (Non SC/ST/OBCs)
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	Ireland	Irish
Real Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) - Northern Ireland	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Rebel Armed Forces of Guatemala (FAR)	Guatemala	Mayas
Red Army for the Liberation of Catalonia	Spain	Catalans
Red Hand Commandos	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland

Red Hand Defenders (RHD)	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Republic of New Afrika	United States of America	African Americans
Republican Action Force	United Kingdom	Catholics In N. Ireland
Resistenza Corsa	France	Corsicans
Revolutionary Eelam Organization (EROS)	Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)	Indonesia	East Timorese
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)	East Timor	East Timorese
Revolutionary Security Apparatus	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs	Russia	Chechens
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs	Russia	Chechens
Robin Garcia Student Front	Guatemala	Mayas
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK)	Thailand	Malay Muslims
Russian Militia	Moldova	Russian speakers
Russian separatists	Moldova	Russian speakers

Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)	Rwanda	Tutsi
Rwenzururu Rebels	Uganda	South-Westerners (Ankole Banyoro Toro)
Sabaot Land Defense Force (SLDF)	Kenya	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu
Sabaot Tribe	Kenya	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu
Sabaot tribesmen	Kenya	Kalenjin-Masai-Turkana-Samburu
Saffron Tigers	India	Hindi (Non SC/ST/OBCs)
Saharan Revolutionary Armed Front (FARS)	Niger	Tuareg
Sandval (union) Movement	Azerbaijan	Lezgins
Sandval (union) Movement	Azerbaijan	Lezgins
Saor Eire (Irish Republican Group)	Ireland	Irish
Saor Eire (Irish Republican Group)	Ireland	Irish
Sardinian Autonomy Movement	Italy	Sardinians
Save Kashmir Movement	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Scottish National Liberation Army	United Kingdom	Scots
Scottish Nationalists	United Kingdom	Scots

Scottish Nationalists	United Kingdom	Scots
Scottish Socialist Republican League	United Kingdom	Scots
Scottish Socialist Republican League	United Kingdom	Scots
Separatist Arab Guerrillas	Iran	Arabs
Serb Radical Party	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs
Serbian Militants	Croatia	Serbs
Serbian Militants	Yugoslavia	Serbs
Serbian Nationalists	Croatia	Serbs
Serbian Nationalists	Yugoslavia	Serbs
Serbian guerrillas	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs
Serbian guerrillas	Yugoslavia	Serbs
Serbian guerrillas	Croatia	Serbs
Serbian irregulars	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs
Serbian rebels	Yugoslavia	Serbs
Serbs	Croatia	Serbs
Serbs	Yugoslavia	Serbs
Serbs	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs
Shan Insurgents	Myanmar	Shan

Shan State Army	Myanmar	Shan
Shan United Revolutionary Army	Myanmar	Shan
Shanti Bahini - Peace Force	Bangladesh	Tribal-Buddhists
Shiite Muslims	Lebanon	Shi'a Muslims (Arab)
Shiite Muslims	Iraq	Sunni Arabs
Sikh Extremists	India	Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
Sindhi nationalists	Pakistan	Sindhi
Sinhalese Extremists	Sri Lanka	Sinhalese
Sinhalese Insurgents	Sri Lanka	Sinhalese
Sinhalese Militants	Sri Lanka	Sinhalese
South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV)	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
South Ossetian Separatists	Georgia	Ossetians (South)
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist)	Spain	Basques
Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) (rightist)	France	Basques
Spanish Falange	Spain	Spanish
Spanish National Action	Spain	Spanish
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)	Russia	Chechens

Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)	Iraq	Shi'a Arabs
Supreme Islamic Council	Iraq	Shi'a Arabs
Sword of Islam	Russia	Chechens
Tajik Rebels	Tajikistan	Tajiks
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO)	Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils
Tamil Liberation Army	India	Tamil (non-SC/ST)
Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP)	Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils
Tamil Nadu Liberation Army	India	Tamil (non-SC/ST)
Tamils	India	Tamil (non-SC/ST)
Tamils	Sri Lanka	Indian Tamils
Tanzim	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Tehrik al-Mojahedin	India	Kashmiri Muslims
Terai Army	Nepal	Madhesi
Terai Cobra	Nepal	Madhesi
Terena Indians	Brazil	Indigenous peoples
Terra Lliure	Spain	Catalans
Thai Islamic Militants	Thailand	Thai

The Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave – Renewed (FLEC)	Angola	Bakongo
Timorese Students	Indonesia	East Timorese
Timorese guerrillas	Indonesia	East Timorese
Tripura National Volunteers (TNV)	India	Indigenous Tripuri
Tripura Nationalists	India	Indigenous Tripuri
Tripura Separatists	India	Indigenous Tripuri
Tuareg rebels	Mali	Tuareg
Tuaregs	Mali	Tuareg
Tuaregs	Niger	Tuareg
Turkestan Islamic Party	China	Uyghur
Turkish Revenge Brigade	Turkey	Turkish
Turks	Greece	Muslims
Turks	Bulgaria	Turkish
Turks of Western Thrace	Greece	Muslims
Tyrol Separatists	Italy	German speakers (Austrians)
Tyrolean Defense League	Italy	German speakers (Austrians)
Uighur Liberation Organization	Kazakhstan	Uighur
Uighur Separatists	China	Uyghur
Ujjan Tribe	Pakistan	Sindhi

Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	United Kingdom	Protestants In N. Ireland
Umar al-Mukhtar Martyr Forces	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
Unified Kurdish Socialist Party	Iraq	Kurds
Union Du People Corse	France	Corsicans
Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC)	France	Corsicans
United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF)	India	Bengali (non-SC/ST)
United Democratic Terai Liberation Front (UDTLF)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
United Jihad Council	India	Kashmiri Muslims
United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) – India	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)	India	Assamese (non-SC/ST/OBCs)
United National Liberation Front (UNLF)	India	Manipuri
United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) – Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Tribal-Buddhists
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)	India	Scheduled Castes & Tribes
United Somali Congress	Kenya	Somali

Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)	India	Hindi (Non SC/ST/OBCs)
Welsh Extremists	United Kingdom	Welsh
Welsh nationalists	United Kingdom	Welsh
White Legion (Georgia)	Georgia	Georgians
White Wolves	Namibia	Whites
Xhosa Tribal Workers	South Africa	Xhosa
Young Liberators of Pattani	Thailand	Thai
Youth	France	Corsicans
Youth Action Group	France	French
Zaghawa ethnic group	Chad	Zaghawa
Zaydi Rebels	Yemen Arab Republic	Zaydis
Zebra killers	United States of America	African Americans
Zulu Militants	South Africa	Zulu
al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front	Iran	Arabs
al-Da'wah Party	Iraq	Shi'a Arabs
al-Quds Brigades	Israel	Palestinian Arabs
al-Quds Brigades	Lebanon	Palestinians (Arab)

6.3 Appendix: Ethnic Groups and Domestic Terrorism

6.3.1 Raw Regression Coefficients

Tab. 6.3: Logit - Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism (1970-2007)

	(1) Terrorism	(2) Terrorism (#5)	(3) Terrorism (#10)	(4) Terrorism (10†)
Excluded lag	0.269 (0.311)	1.634 (1.141)	0.769 (1.564)	0.121 (1.326)
Dispersed lag	0.196 (0.169)	-1.049** (0.391)	-0.931 (0.643)	-0.682 (0.605)
Excluded lag × Dispersed lag	-0.330 (0.198)	0.639 (0.440)	-0.0293 (0.680)	0.342 (0.446)
Group size (log) lag	0.0956*** (0.0283)	0.262* (0.104)	0.203 (0.143)	0.254* (0.120)
Excluded lag × Group size (log) lag	0.0140 (0.0388)	-0.0737 (0.116)	0.0437 (0.156)	0.0817 (0.128)
Polity 2 sq. lag	-0.001000 (0.00132)	0.00265 (0.00367)	0.00650 (0.00527)	0.00787 (0.00564)
GDP per cap. log lag	147.1** (45.21)	434.3*** (95.79)	499.8*** (109.0)	112.8 (127.6)
Ethnic war	0.535** (0.203)	1.527*** (0.296)	1.735*** (0.419)	1.609*** (0.354)
Yrs since terr.att.	-0.593*** (0.0359)			
Yrs since terr.att.(sq.)	0.0285*** (0.00342)			
Yrs since terr.att.(cub.)	-0.000460*** (0.0000821)			
Yrs since terr.att.#5		-0.989*** (0.126)		
Yrs since terr.att.#5 (sq.)		0.0658*** (0.0116)		
Yrs since terr.att.#5 (cub.)		-0.00128*** (0.000283)		
Yrs since terr.att. #10			-1.124*** (0.163)	
Yrs since terr.att.#10 (sq.)			0.0687*** (0.0140)	
Yrs since terr.att.#10 (cub.)			-0.00121*** (0.000316)	
Yrs since terr.att. 10†				-1.463*** (0.170)
Yrs since terr.att. 10† (sq.)				0.0934*** (0.0150)
Yrs since terr.att. 10† (cub.)				-0.00166*** (0.000346)
Constant	-2.191*** (0.462)	-7.211*** (1.450)	-7.705*** (2.086)	-4.293* (1.768)
Observations	17546	17546	17546	17546

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

6.3.2 Adding Interaction Term

Tab. 6.4: Logit - Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism

	(1) Terrorism	(2) Terrorism	(3) Terrorism	(4) Terr. #5	(5) Terr. #5	(6) Terr. #5
Excluded lag	0.324*** (0.0957)			1.096** (0.339)		
Dispersed lag	0.0112 (0.122)			-0.583* (0.297)		
Group size (log) lag	0.106*** (0.0195)	0.104*** (0.0194)	0.0956*** (0.0283)	0.203*** (0.0412)	0.207*** (0.0406)	0.262* (0.104)
Polity 2 sq. lag	-0.000879 (0.00133)	-0.00104 (0.00132)	-0.001000 (0.00132)	0.00276 (0.00385)	0.00286 (0.00382)	0.00265 (0.00367)
GDP per cap. log lag	145.7** (45.73)	146.7** (45.20)	147.1** (45.21)	431.5*** (95.95)	434.5*** (95.70)	434.3*** (95.79)
Ethnic war	0.544** (0.203)	0.538** (0.203)	0.535** (0.203)	1.531*** (0.298)	1.528*** (0.296)	1.527*** (0.296)
Excluded lag		0.374*** (0.103)	0.269 (0.311)		1.033** (0.357)	1.634 (1.141)
Dispersed lag		0.196 (0.170)	0.196 (0.169)		-1.001* (0.400)	-1.049** (0.391)
Excluded lag × Dispersed lag		-0.333 (0.199)	-0.330 (0.198)		0.594 (0.449)	0.639 (0.440)
Excluded lag × Group size(log) lag			0.0140 (0.0388)			-0.0737 (0.116)
Constant	-2.234*** (0.444)	-2.251*** (0.437)	-2.191*** (0.462)	-6.746*** (1.054)	-6.747*** (1.043)	-7.211*** (1.450)
Observations	17546	17546	17546	17546	17546	17546
AIC	10186.0	10182.6	10181.3	2886.7	2886.6	2885.4

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups
Cubic polynomials for controlling for time dependency included
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Tab. 6.5: Logit - Ethnically Motivated Domestic Terrorism II

|	(7) Terr.#10	(8) Terr.#10	(9) Terr.#10	(10) Terr.10killed	(11) Terr.10killed	(12) Terr.10killed
Excluded lag	1.119* (0.514)			0.834* (0.409)		
Dispersed lag	-0.954* (0.391)			-0.473 (0.510)		
Group size (log) lag	0.236*** (0.0566)	0.234*** (0.0460)	0.343** (0.112)	0.305*** (0.0615)	0.305*** (0.0612)	0.254* (0.120)
Polity 2 sq. lag	0.00636 (0.00562)	0.00180 (0.00432)	0.00145 (0.00418)	0.00736 (0.00612)	0.00746 (0.00604)	0.00787 (0.00564)
GDP per cap. log lag	500.8*** (109.6)	485.6*** (108.2)	487.5*** (108.2)	114.7 (128.2)	116.8 (128.4)	112.8 (127.6)
Ethnic war	1.733*** (0.420)	1.522*** (0.316)	1.522*** (0.316)	1.608*** (0.351)	1.602*** (0.354)	1.609*** (0.354)
Excluded lag		1.179** (0.367)	2.332 (1.222)		0.796 (0.432)	0.121 (1.326)
Dispersed lag		-0.841 (0.461)	-0.909* (0.438)		-0.709 (0.628)	-0.682 (0.605)
Excluded lag × Dispersed lag		0.315 (0.548)	0.382 (0.526)		0.382 (0.473)	0.342 (0.446)
Excluded lag × Group size(log) lag			-0.141 (0.125)			0.0817 (0.128)
Constant	-7.982*** (1.531)	-7.517*** (1.099)	-8.442*** (1.601)	-4.763*** (1.355)	-4.758*** (1.356)	-4.293* (1.768)
Observations	17546	17546	17546	17546	17546	17546
AIC	3218.6	3218.2	3215.7	1605.3	1604.2	1602.7

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups
Cubic polynomials for controlling for time dependency included
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

6.4 Appendix: Terrorism in Ethnic Conflicts:

Fig. 6.1: Odds ratio comparison for the models in Tab. 7

Tab. 6.6: Chow test: Ethnically motivated domestic terrorism 1970-2007 in pre-war and post-war periods only (Negative binomial regression)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
N of prev. conf. yrs	0.0432**				
	(0.0134)				
Exclusion	0.129	0.0784			
	(0.219)	(0.245)			
Group size (log)	0.349**	0.327*	0.321*		
	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.127)		
N of terr.att. lag	0.129*	0.101	0.100		
	(0.0643)	(0.0639)	(0.0651)		
Polity 2	0.0315	0.0292	0.0310	0.0337	
	(0.0299)	(0.0253)	(0.0277)	(0.0237)	
GDP per cap. log	340.6*	328.6*	316.1*	331.7*	
	(151.3)	(135.7)	(134.3)	(131.6)	
Peace yrs	-0.00917	-0.0621	-0.0604	-0.0893	
	(0.0751)	(0.0888)	(0.0886)	(0.0740)	
Peace yrs (sq.)	0.00325	0.00578	0.00543	0.00717	
	(0.00544)	(0.00603)	(0.00589)	(0.00547)	
Peace yrs (cub.)	-0.0000846	-0.000115	-0.000105	-0.000134	
	(0.000111)	(0.000120)	(0.000117)	(0.000117)	
Pre-war		-5.710***	-5.483***	-4.691**	-4.719**
		(1.421)	(1.335)	(1.679)	(1.773)
Post-war		-6.389***	-6.390***	-7.635***	-9.151***
		(1.323)	(1.364)	(1.717)	(2.051)
N of prev.confl.yrs (pre-w.)		0.307**	0.313**	0.231*	0.257**
		(0.101)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.0940)
N of prev.confl.yrs (post-w.)		0.0788***	0.0779***	0.0814***	0.0768***
		(0.0177)	(0.0174)	(0.0178)	(0.0190)
Exclusion (pre-w.)			-0.0300	-0.118	-0.0701
			(0.400)	(0.338)	(0.299)
Exclusion (post-w.)			0.264	0.467	0.399
			(0.547)	(0.518)	(0.594)
Group size log (pre-w.)				0.208	0.199
				(0.195)	(0.188)
Group size log (post-w.)				0.464***	0.476***
				(0.136)	(0.133)
N of terr. att. lag (pre-w.)				0.170	0.159
				(0.101)	(0.0899)
N of terr. att. lag (post-w.)				0.0744	0.0598
				(0.0382)	(0.0363)
Polity 2 sq. (pre-w.)					0.0278
					(0.0354)
Polity 2 sq. (post-w.)					0.0291
					(0.0251)
GDP percap. log (pre-w.)					235.3
					(153.6)
GDP percap. log (post-w.)					573.4**
					(209.2)
Peace yrs (pre-war)					0.0476
					(0.145)
Peace yrs (post-war)					-0.107
					(0.0837)
Peace yrs sq.(pre-war)					0.00195
					(0.0103)
Peace yrs sq.(post-war)					0.00418
					(0.00603)
Peace yrs cub.(pre-war)					-0.0000838
					(0.000220)
Peace yrs cub.(post-war)					-0.0000319
					(0.000131)
Constant	-6.367***				
	(1.396)				
lnalpha					
Constant	1.347***	1.254***	1.250***	1.227***	1.177***
	(0.222)	(0.250)	(0.256)	(0.217)	(0.220)
Observations	1271	1271	1271	1271	1271

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

6.5 Appendix: Terrorism Signalling Civil Wars

Tab. 6.7: Logit, ethnic civil wars (full sample), 1970-2007

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
N of killed lag	0.00921***	0.00925***	0.00844**	0.00948***	0.00886***
	(0.00264)	(0.00205)	(0.00271)	(0.00243)	(0.00230)
N of terr.att. lag	0.0243*	0.0267**	0.0285*	0.0275*	0.0310***
	(0.0120)	(0.00907)	(0.0115)	(0.0113)	(0.00871)
Excluded lag	2.841***	2.314***	1.922***		1.704***
	(0.503)	(0.419)	(0.448)		(0.386)
Group size (log) lag	0.221*	0.248*		0.239*	
	(0.102)	(0.105)		(0.0972)	
Peace yrs	-0.348***	-0.325***	-0.359***	-0.354***	-0.336***
	(0.0447)	(0.0401)	(0.0460)	(0.0439)	(0.0413)
Polity (sq.) lag	-0.0172***		-0.0172***	-0.0184***	
	(0.00380)		(0.00370)	(0.00398)	
GDP per cap. (log) lag	-835.1***	-823.5***	-886.7***	-904.5***	-894.0***
	(128.9)	(123.6)	(133.5)	(159.8)	(123.6)
Population (log) lag	0.191***	0.0914	0.344***	0.188**	0.227***
	(0.0566)	(0.0631)	(0.0451)	(0.0585)	(0.0473)
Democracy lag		-0.551*			-0.688**
		(0.228)			(0.212)
Group size (sq.) lag			-3.83e-09*		-2.77e-10
			(1.76e-09)		(5.04e-10)
Discriminated lag				2.530***	
				(0.519)	
Powerless lag				3.219***	
				(0.542)	
Regional autonomy lag				2.614***	
				(0.741)	
Separatist autonomy lag				2.190***	
				(0.609)	
Constant	-0.337	0.0791	0.979	0.0855	1.577
	(1.246)	(1.138)	(1.073)	(1.411)	(0.909)
Observations	17546	20219	17550	17546	20223

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Tab. 6.8: Logit, ethnic mobilization, 1970-2007

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
N of killed lag	0.00739	0.00709	0.00680	0.00679	0.00642
	(0.00988)	(0.00997)	(0.0103)	(0.00789)	(0.0109)
N of terr.att. lag	0.0551***	0.0583***	0.0568***	0.0578***	0.0628***
	(0.00934)	(0.00955)	(0.00948)	(0.00995)	(0.00989)
Excluded lag	2.587***	2.253***	1.800***		1.462***
	(0.516)	(0.428)	(0.466)		(0.385)
Group size (log) lag	0.293***	0.338***		0.264**	
	(0.0816)	(0.0852)		(0.0852)	
Peace yrs	-0.0505***	-0.0464***	-0.0502***	-0.0458***	-0.0435***
	(0.0141)	(0.0119)	(0.0142)	(0.0138)	(0.0118)
Polity (sq.) lag	-0.00129		-0.000606	0.000565	
	(0.00569)		(0.00583)	(0.00601)	
GDP per cap. (log) lag	-429.8**	-493.6***	-468.1**	-337.3*	-571.8***
	(146.6)	(133.2)	(146.3)	(141.9)	(134.8)
Population (log) lag	0.0464	0.00290	0.213***	0.154	0.180**
	(0.0772)	(0.0874)	(0.0543)	(0.100)	(0.0632)
Democracy lag		0.0325			-0.0711
		(0.256)			(0.259)
Group size (sq.) lag			-1.14e-09*		-7.01e-10
			(5.32e-10)		(4.18e-10)
Discrimination lag				3.234***	
				(0.531)	
Powerless lag				1.498**	
				(0.525)	
Regional autonomy lag				2.087**	
				(0.695)	
Separatist autonomy lag				4.275***	
				(0.627)	
Constant	-3.807**	-3.141**	-2.471*	-5.558***	-1.282
	(1.211)	(1.054)	(1.077)	(1.556)	(0.934)
Observations	17238	19891	17239	17238	19892

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Tab. 6.9: Logit, ethnic civil wars, 1970-2007

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
N of killed lag	0.00426*	0.00470**	0.00435*	0.00411	0.00449**
	(0.00183)	(0.00163)	(0.00175)	(0.00231)	(0.00155)
N of terr.att. lag	0.00295	-0.00389	0.00448	0.000586	-0.00391
	(0.00874)	(0.00901)	(0.00829)	(0.00988)	(0.00894)
Excluded lag	-0.501	-0.337	-0.572		-0.215
	(0.837)	(0.600)	(0.793)		(0.545)
Group size (log) lag	-0.134	-0.128		0.115	
	(0.149)	(0.135)		(0.141)	
Peace yrs	-0.160***	-0.155***	-0.158***	-0.154***	-0.156***
	(0.0236)	(0.0207)	(0.0227)	(0.0197)	(0.0208)
Polity (sq.) lag	-0.00889		-0.00989	-0.00994	
	(0.00593)		(0.00583)	(0.00704)	
GDP per cap. (log) lag	-573.5**	-544.8**	-573.6**	-563.2**	-537.3**
	(177.2)	(171.7)	(180.8)	(217.1)	(173.5)
Population (log) lag	-0.0919	-0.183	-0.101	-0.201	-0.223
	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.126)	(0.153)	(0.130)
Democracy lag		0.294			0.256
		(0.357)			(0.352)
Group size (sq.) lag			-4.48e-09		6.79e-11
			(2.63e-09)		(4.07e-10)
Discrimination lag				-0.880	
				(0.804)	
Powerless lag				1.011	
				(0.716)	
Regional autonomy lag				-0.495	
				(0.925)	
Separatist autonomy				-1.739*	
				(0.826)	
Constant	7.327**	7.425***	6.613**	6.390*	6.743**
	(2.275)	(2.082)	(2.194)	(2.633)	(2.052)
Observations	911	968	915	911	972

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Tab. 6.10: Heckman selection probit, ethnic civil wars, 1970-2007

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CIVIL WAR:				
N of killed lag	0.00316*	0.00314**	0.00316*	0.00305**
	(0.00128)	(0.00103)	(0.00128)	(0.00110)
N of terr.att. lag	0.0104	0.00298	0.0104	0.00418
	(0.00569)	(0.00578)	(0.00569)	(0.00625)
Groupsize (sq.) lag	-2.91e-09*		-2.91e-09*	-1.15e-10
	(1.35e-09)		(1.35e-09)	(3.02e-10)
Peace yrs	-0.0891***	-0.0855***	-0.0891***	-0.0861***
	(0.0101)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)	(0.00970)
Polity sq lag	-0.00616*		-0.00616*	
	(0.00287)		(0.00287)	
GDP per cap. (log) lag	-398.8***	-366.6***	-398.8***	-378.1***
	(91.81)	(93.65)	(91.81)	(94.75)
Population (log) lag	-0.000283	-0.103	-0.000283	-0.0984
	(0.0716)	(0.0757)	(0.0716)	(0.0779)
Group size (log) lag		-0.0353		
		(0.0762)		
Democracy lag		0.156		0.120
		(0.202)		(0.197)
Constant	2.716*	3.687**	2.716*	3.394**
	(1.338)	(1.298)	(1.338)	(1.276)
MOBILIZATION				
N of killed lag	0.00307	0.00334	0.00307	0.00305
	(0.00262)	(0.00271)	(0.00262)	(0.00277)
N of terr.att. lag	0.0303***	0.0302***	0.0303***	0.0323***
	(0.00353)	(0.00330)	(0.00353)	(0.00351)
Excluded lag	0.818***	1.045***	0.818***	0.695***
	(0.165)	(0.158)	(0.165)	(0.135)
Group size (sq.) lag	-7.14e-10*		-7.14e-10*	-2.98e-10
	(2.88e-10)		(2.88e-10)	(1.52e-10)
Peace yrs	-0.0394***	-0.0351***	-0.0394***	-0.0351***
	(0.00612)	(0.00542)	(0.00612)	(0.00531)
Polity (sq.) lag	-0.00257		-0.00257	
	(0.00226)		(0.00226)	
GDP per cap. log lag	-280.7***	-300.0***	-280.7***	-330.6***
	(59.37)	(52.45)	(59.37)	(54.61)
Population (log) lag	0.122***	0.00132	0.122***	0.0875***
	(0.0265)	(0.0332)	(0.0265)	(0.0264)
Group size (log) lag		0.157***		
		(0.0350)		
Democracy lag		-0.0290		-0.0798
		(0.0981)		(0.0971)
Constant	-0.637	-0.794	-0.637	-0.0226
	(0.460)	(0.437)	(0.460)	(0.396)
ρ	0.552	0.336	0.552	0.392
	(0.483)	(0.285)	(0.483)	(0.343)
Observations	17550	20219	17550	20223

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on ethnic groups
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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