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Can Fregeans have 'I'-thoughts?

Billon, A and Guillot, M (2014) 'Can Fregeans have 'I'-thoughts?' Revista de Filosof�a de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 53 (136). pp. 97-105.

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We examine how Frege?s contrast between identity judgments of the forms ?a=a? vs. ?a=b? would fare in the special case where ?a? and ?b? are complex mental representations, and ?a? stands for an introspected ?I?-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call ?one-shot thoughts?: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the ?a=a? form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let alone a priori true. This further reinforces Glezakos?s objections against the set-up of Frege?s puzzle, while also raising what we think is an acute problem for Fregeans, insofar as I-thought (and indexical thinking more generally), understood in their way, turns out to be incompatible with some basic features of rationality.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: This is an Open Access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons Atribuci�n-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 Costa Rica Licence (
Uncontrolled Keywords: I-thoughts; Token-reflexivity; One-shot thoughts; Paradox; Rationality
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Humanities
Faculty of Humanities > Philosophy and Art History, School of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 28 Jun 2017 15:17
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2022 01:15

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