Heidegger’s Late Marburg Project:

Being, Entities, and Schematisation

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to provide a novel interpretation of Heidegger's project in the late twenties and of its breakdown and transformation around the turn of the decade. I argue that Heidegger develops a unified project in the late Marburg period that is constructed around the question of the unity of the concept of being in light of its regional multiplicity. Furthermore, I argue that Heidegger's conception of the framework of this project is highly influenced by his reception of Kant in this same period. Specifically, I identify the elements of the Kantian framework that Heidegger retains and appropriates for his project, as well as those elements that he rejects. In the former case, Heidegger takes up primarily Kant's framework of a priori transcendental conditions that are to make empirical experience possible, which Heidegger reformulates in terms of the pre-understanding of being that makes possible the apprehension of entities. In the latter case, I isolate two primary criticisms that will serve as desiderata for the execution of Heidegger's project, namely: that the categories have an excessively subjectivistic status, and that they are based solely on logical functions of judgement. The former constitutes a problem because the location of the categories on the subject side makes difficult their applicability to the objective realm, and lead Heidegger to reject both the quid juris form of posing the question as well as the results of the transcendental deduction in general. The latter, though closely connected, points to a different set of problems, and targets not the applicability claim but the exhaustiveness claim of the metaphysical deduction. In articulating a theory of categories based on logical functions of
judgments, Kant's resulting theory of possible objects of experience is limited merely to objects of explicit judgement, roughly the objects of the natural sciences, at the expense of other kinds of objects. Paradigmatic of these ‘other kinds of objects’, for Heidegger, are ready-to-hand entities, which are neither spatio-temporally individuated, nor fit into the Kantian conditions for what it would be to count as an object of possible experience. I argue that Heidegger develops his late Marburg project as a development of the Kantian-inspired framework of pre-understanding of being in a manner that responds to the two above problems. Specifically, Heidegger seeks to ground the understanding of being in temporal schemata rather than in logical functions of judgement, which is intended to provide both a wider range of possible objects and to provide a unified backdrop against which the subject can apprehend objects. I end with an assessment of Heidegger's project, arguing that while it is ultimately unsuccessful in its aims, it nonetheless represents a philosophically interesting and innovative post-Kantian project that sheds exegetical light both on Heidegger's middle period as well as on his later works.
Abbreviations and Referencing

Heidegger references are to the *Gesamtausgabe* edition (1975-, Frankfurt: Klostermann), abbreviated as GA followed by volume number and page number. The exception is *Being and Time*, where I use the standard text (1957, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer), with references abbreviated as SZ followed by page number.

Kant references are to the *Gesammelte Schriften* (1900-, Berlin: de Gruyter), abbreviated AK followed by volume number and page number. For the *Critique of Pure Reason*, however, I cite KrV followed by the standard A/B pagination.
Preface

As is likely the case for many PhD theses, the questions motivating the present work have developed over a relatively long period. Consequently, one of the best ways of gaining an understanding of the aims of the final form that this work takes is through an exploration of the way that the questions and problems behind the particular aims have developed. To begin with a biographical note, much unlike the experience that many others have had, the first Heidegger work that strongly captured my interest was not *Being and Time* but the 1935 lecture course *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Whatever else this says about my philosophical interests in general, specifically it meant that I re-read the earlier works including *Being and Time* in light of questions and themes from the 1935 course, which is a work that is often taken to be representative of Heidegger’s so-called *Kehre* and to be one of the first characteristic exemplars of the late Heidegger works. This raised my interest in three questions that were on the intersection of the late and early works. Firstly, and most obviously, I was interested in the question of the nature of the continuity between the early- and late-Heidegger. Secondly, I was interested in the question of metaphysics that appears in the title of the course and in Heidegger’s apparently changing attitude toward the latter between the early and the late works. Thirdly and finally, I was interested in the question of idealism that appears to lurk behind many of Heidegger’s later reflections on the apparent priority of language over things.
As it happens, all three of the above themes have been the subject of much debate in the secondary literature. On the question of the unity of the project there is the recently published collection of essays edited by Braver (2015) entitled *Division III of Heidegger's Being and Time: The Unanswered Question of Being*, all containing interesting and at times contradictory answers to the question of why (or even whether) Heidegger did not carry through the *Being and Time* project to completion. The volume continues a debate that reaches as far back as the beginnings of Anglophone Heidegger scholarship (viz. for example William J. Richardson’s 1963 classic *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (2013)). On the question of Metaphysics there are those such as Grondin (2003) that highlight the positive role of metaphysics in Heidegger's thought and those such as Crowell (2001) that take a deflationary view. Likewise, in the question of Heidegger's alleged idealism, there is a standoff between a realist camp (e.g. Carman 2003 and Golob 2014) and an idealist camp (Blattner 1994, 1999 or Lafont 2000) with little consensus reached on the issue.

All three of the above debates received a significant impulse from the publication of Cristina Lafont’s *Heidegger, Language, and World Disclosure* in 2000, which aimed at providing a solution to all three questions in one swoop, so to speak (for the follow-up debate see the special issue of *Inquiry* in 2002, 45(2)). The twin argumentative pillars of the book rest on two claims. The first is that Heidegger is a linguistic idealist, in the sense that he subscribes to the theses a) that meaning determines reference and b) that meaning is local and not revisable through experience. The second is that this semantic theory constitutes the unity between the so-called late and early Heidegger. The thesis was
provocative because it meant that early texts from Heidegger emphasising praxis and lived-experience were just as guilty of a linguistic idealism as Heidegger's later texts that seem to more explicitly subordinate entities to language.¹ The unity of Heidegger's project was thus seen as consisting in a semantic (non-metaphysical) idealism.

However, I was suspicious about Lafont’s premises. In terms of the criticism of idealism, I saw a potential interpretative danger of attempting to fit Heidegger into a contemporary framework for understanding idealism in terms that seemed to be foreign to him. While such an enterprise might be useful in understanding where Heidegger fits into our current philosophical landscape, the issue of both the usefulness of such a definition of idealism as well as its ability to provide exegetical insight into Heidegger’s work seemed questionable. As Heidegger himself puts it, one is “completely misled” if one understands Idealism in epistemological terms, and in relation to a Descartes or a Hegel, Heidegger continues, one “can understand nothing” of their work with an epistemological definition of idealism (GA 42, 162). Given that Heidegger was even less interested in explicitly articulating something approaching a semantic theory than he was in epistemological approaches, similar comments seem to apply to semantic understanding of idealism. Again, for heuristic purposes understanding idealism in these terms seems relatively unproblematic. However, in conjunction with Lafont’s thesis on the unity of Heidegger’s early and late work in terms of an idealist theory of reference, I doubted such an understanding

¹ see e.g. Heidegger's discussion of Stefan George's statement “where there is no word the thing is lacking”; see generally the volume On the Way to Language (GA 12).
of idealism would be sufficient to do the exegetical work of unifying the late and early Heidegger.

One way to counterbalance the potential dangers in an exegetical approach that imposes a framework foreign to its object seemed to be, in this case, to direct more attention to what Heidegger himself says on the issue. The present thesis consequently began with the attempt to understand Heidegger's relation to idealism more organically, so to speak, by attempting to explore both Heidegger's own implicit or explicit understanding of idealism as well as the question of whether and how this understanding changes between Heidegger's early and late period. I thought one way to do this would be to focus less on Heidegger's definitions and programmatic declarations and more on his understanding of and engagement with traditionally idealist philosophers. I thought, furthermore, that Kant would be a good starting point, both because of the intensity of Heidegger's own engagement with Kant and because of Kant's influence on the understanding of “idealism” in the subsequent philosophical development in general. Felicitously, the period of Heidegger's most intense engagement with Kant (specifically the late 1920s) came just before the so-called turn that is seen as representing the shift from the early to the late Heidegger (usually seen as taking place in the mid-1930s or slightly later), and thus seemed to represent a useful platform for exploring the potential unity/disunity in the early and late Heidegger.

A close study of the texts of this period, however, caused both of my primary questions, namely about the nature of idealism and about continuity of the early
and late work, to drop out of the present work, at least in the explicit formulation I began with. In terms of the latter question, I had realized that the relatively short and transitory period between Heidegger’s early and late works forms an uncompleted but relatively integral, unified, and philosophically interesting project in its own right, one that is moreover not recognised in the literature. Due to the richness of this project and to the paucity of analyses in the literature, rather than taking the middle period as merely a fulcrum between the early and late Heidegger, I decided to focus on providing an interpretation of the project that, as I will argue, Heidegger is attempting to develop.

In a later reflection on his own undertakings on the middle period that followed the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger writes that his works from this period lead merely to “Umwenge” in relation to the “eigentliche Frage” (GA 49, 40). His endeavours in this period that I referred to above represent one such Umweg. This Umweg, however, at the same time represents an integral and philosophically interesting project in its own right that is unified around a primary guiding question that is explored within a consistent framework, as I shall argue. Specifically, Heidegger’s efforts in this period are directed at the concentrated attempt to develop an account of the problem of the “multiplicity of the modes of being” in terms of “the unity of the concept of being in general” (GA 24, 170). In Being and Time Heidegger forcefully argues that we must distinguish the distinct mode of being of an entity, be it Dasein, a tool, or a natural object – the question that consequently arises is simply, how are we to understand the relation of being itself to the plurality of its manifestations?
The temporal analysis of Dasein contained in divisions I and II of part I of *Being and Time* was intended to provide the grounds for a clarification of the “meaning of being in general” (SZ, 17), and Heidegger in the period directly following the publication of *Being and Time* comes to stress more and more the subservience of the former to the broader task of the latter, characterising his project in more universal or general terms. The change in vocabulary from Germanic to Latinate forms in Heidegger’s key terms from *Being and Time* is supposed to signify the shift from the fundamental-ontological investigation of the being of Dasein to a thematisation of “the conditions of possibility of the understanding of being and of ontology as such” (GA 24, 324). So, for example, “Zeitlichkeit”, to the extent that it operates as the ground for “the ontological understanding of being [ontologische Seinsverständnis]” (GA 24, 388) is rechristened as “Temporalitaet”, and in a similar vein “Anwesenheit” becomes “Praesenz” (GA 24, 433-4). As Heidegger writes towards the end of *Being and Time*, “the exposition of the constitution of the being of Dasein remains only one path (Weg), [where] the aim is the development of the question of being as such” (GA 2, 575).

Concomitantly with the above shift in focus, Heidegger also redirects his attention to the investigation of entities of modes of being different to that of Dasein, such as those pertaining to nature (GA 27), to mythical thinking (GA 27), or to animals (GA 29/30). In the inaugural Freiburg course from 1929, Heidegger states that the determination of “Existenz” as the being of Dasein means that, strictly speaking, only Dasein “exists”. This, however, does not mean that other entities that are not Dasein are not actual, but rather that they have a distinct mode of being to Dasein: plants and animals do not “exist” but *live*, tools likewise
do not exist but are ready to hand, and material objects are present at hand (GA 27, 71). These distinct “modes of being” have a “wholly distinct meaning”, and each has its own conditions of intelligibility and modes of disclosure specific to its mode of being (GA 27, 71).

Thus while Heidegger in this period turns to being in its generality, he at the same time directs his attention to an exploration of entities in their ontological specificity. The conjunction of these two paths makes pressing a particular question: In each of the four volumes from GA 24 to GA 27, roughly covering the period from 1927 to 1929, Heidegger raises the problem of the universality or unity of the concept of being in the context of its distinct modes or regional variations (most clearly in: GA 24, 317-320; GA 26, 192-3; and GA 27, 78-82). In other words, as we saw above, being is supposed to be conceived in some more general or universal way in the development of Heidegger's project after Being and Time, and at the same time being is also supposed to be able to account for the specific modes of being pertaining to a multiplicity of entities of distinct kinds.

Thus, we have being in its universality and unity, and we have distinct modes of being in relation to different kinds of entities; the question now is how the two relate. Being needs to be both universal and unified, but particular enough to account for its distinct modes. On the face of it, such a strategy would seem to raise some prickly questions: if we understand entities through their mode of being, how do we understand being itself? Is it even coherent to claim that the meaning of being is univocal in its universality but equivocal with respect to
particular kinds of entities? And, even if it were, how would we know which kind of being to apply to a given entity given that we can only understand entities precisely through their being?

These are problems which Heidegger's philosophical project in the period following *Being and Time* will have to address, problems which will be the focus of a large part of the present thesis. For now, I want to raise a question at a more formal level, namely, whether the explorations from Heidegger's middle period display sufficient unity and philosophical promise to the extent that it is warranted to speak of Heidegger's philosophical project in this context. One objection immediately comes to mind, namely: the question of the multiplicity of modes of being seems to be merely some variation of the question of being in general, which seems not to be an *Umweg* but to be the *eigentliche Frage* mentioned above – in what sense, then, does the relatively short period represent a unified, philosophically interesting project rather than just a variation of Heidegger's general question of determining the meaning of being? On the other side, however, if the work from this period represents a philosophically interesting project that is relevant to Heidegger's *eigentliche Frage*, in what sense is it merely an *Umweg* as Heidegger claims? In short, how can it be both an *Umweg* and simultaneously an, or even the, *eigentliche Frage*? These questions are all the more pressing given the state of the discussion in the literature. As mentioned above, this period in Heidegger's works has rarely been systematically explored or even identified as an integral project, and when it has been identified as such it has often been dismissed as an excessively metaphysical and philosophically uninteresting or as an unpromising path to a
dead end (see chapter 3). Other interpretations, conversely, have stressed the unity in Heidegger's overall philosophical development, in which case Heidegger's reflections on the multiplicity of modes of being would be either sub-theme to the *eigentliche Frage* or an inseparable part of a larger unified project (in this sense see not only Lafont 2000, cited above, but also e.g. Sheehan (2001), Gadamer (1994) or Pattison (2013, esp. 13ff. and 220 n.9)).

A large part of the present thesis is dedicated to shedding light on Heidegger's approach to the questions raised in the previous paragraph and to a partial defence of this approach. At this stage, I just want to map out the period and the relevant texts that the above project is concentrated around. Heidegger taught in Marburg from 1923 to 1928, and for present purposes it is useful to distinguish between an early and a late Marburg period. Many of Heidegger's courses in the early period, roughly up to 1926, are attempts at working out the themes that would form the core of *Being and Time*. Especially relevant in this respect are the lecture courses entitled *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* from 1923/4 (GA 17) and *History of the Concept of Time* from 1925, as well as the courses on Greek philosophy (namely GA 18, GA 19, and GA 22), in which we also recognise many of fundamental-ontological themes at the heart of *Being and Time*, such as the analyses of mood or of circumspective understanding.

Around the publication of *Being and Time*, however, several new themes emerge in Heidegger's courses and papers, some of which were to make up the unfinished Division III and Part II of *Being and Time*, and included among which was the problem of the multiplicity of modes of being. The texts from the late
Marburg period form the core of the attempt to work out this latter problem, and comprise the courses *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (GA 24), *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* (GA 25) and *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (GA 26), though some of the relevant themes belonging to this project are also anticipated in the earlier period, specifically in the 1925/6 *Logic* course (GA 21). The project as a whole culminates with Heidegger's arrival in Freiburg in 1928, specifically in his first lecture course of the same year *Introduction to Philosophy* (GA 27) and his first published book after *Being and Time, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* from 1929 (GA 3).

The two subsequent Freiburg courses (1929 and 1929/30) briefly touch on themes relevant to the above project, as do two published papers from 1929, *What is Metaphysics?* and *On the Essence of Ground* (both in GA 9). Then, however, these and subsequent Freiburg courses lead further away from the late Marburg project, as I understand it, both in terms of the themes dealt with as well as the specific transcendental framework Heidegger operates with. The themes explored in these later Freiburg courses pertain to the "Metaphysics of Dasein" or to issues related to “Dasein’s Transcendence”, and ultimately lead to the topic of freedom, culminating in a lecture course on Kant's practical philosophy in 1930 (GA 31), and a deeper exploration of Dasein’s transcendence. These investigations would ultimately lead to the abandonment of a transcendental framework of enquiry (see e.g. the last chapter of Jaran’s (2010) *La métaphysique du Dasein*), a framework that I take to be at the heart of the approach Heidegger takes in the late Marburg project.
Finally, the watershed year 1935, with the course *Introduction to Metaphysics* and the lecture *Origin of the Work of Art*, already sees the development of characteristic late-Heideggerian themes, in the two works above particularly the criticism of metaphysics and the role of art. Around this period we also have the introduction of the distinctive cast of characters that would dominate the later period, with courses on Hölderlin in 1934 (GA 39), Nietzsche in 1936/7 (GA 43) and finally Parmenides in the early 1940s (GA 54). The period of 1930-1935 can be seen as a sort of prelude with fluid boundaries to this later period, which is already in full swing with the two courses mentioned above in 1935. In other words, what I shall call the late Marburg project, consists primarily of the texts comprising the last three Marburg lectures, the first Freiburg course, and the first Freiburg published book, and is concentrated in the years between 1927 and 1929. As mentioned previously, I will argue that this relatively short period constitutes a concentrated effort to determine the unity of the concept of being in light of the ontological multiplicity of its manifestations.

The works and lectures from this period also represent a philosophically interesting project in its own right, as I shall argue, and relate to a question that is essential to Heidegger’s work, perhaps what Heidegger during this period took to be *the eigentliche Frage*. In Heidegger’s comments on the notorious *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article on Phenomenology, Heidegger wrote (much to Husserl’s chagrin) that Phenomenology merely “stands in the service of the guiding philosophical problematic, namely the question about the being of entities in the articulated manifold of its kinds and levels” (cited in the Sheehan and Palmer edition (1997, 13) of the drafts of the *Britannica* article). In 1927,
then, in what was intended to be among the central manifestos of philosophy as Phenomenology, Heidegger instead formulates the aim of philosophy as the determination of the unity of being among its multiplicity. It is this task, I will argue, that forms the crux of Heidegger’s late Marburg project.

The above description of the late Marburg project, however, merely returns us to the second side of the initial objection: if the late Marburg project represents the philosophical problem and task par excellence, then in what sense is it merely an *Umweg*, as Heidegger designated his works from this period, and not *the eigentliche Frage*? As may have been noticed from my mapping of the texts that comprise the core of the project, the only published work from the period is a work on Kant, and this is no accident. Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, I will argue, is the key to understanding the late Marburg project and forms the basis of Heidegger’s framework for articulating and approaching the problem of the unity of the concept of being in light of the multiplicity of its manifestations. The late Marburg project is thus primarily a post-Kantian project that is framed in terms of and operates within a transcendental framework. However, though this project responds to genuine problems that arise in the post-Kantian context in interesting and novel ways, severe tensions arise in Heidegger’s attempt to shoehorn his own line of inquiry into a Kantian framework. Problems arising from the failure to resolve such tensions lead Heidegger to abandon or modify key aspects of the transcendental framework of the late Marburg project, a move that perhaps is at the source of Heidegger’s designation of this project as merely an *Umweg* – as such, however, it is an instructive *Umweg* not only for
understanding Heidegger's later development, but a philosophically interesting contribution to the post-Kantian tradition in its own right.

This returns me to my original questions with which I began the preface, namely the questions of the unity of Heidegger's project and the nature and plausibility of his idealism. Firstly, the question of the unity of Heidegger's project, as we have seen, has become concentrated on the question of the nature of Heidegger's late Marburg project as I (briefly) characterised it above. While this project, as mentioned, also has implications for how to understand the later period and its relation to the early work, a detailed investigation of the development of the later works in light of this project, and thus the question of the unity of Heidegger's work as a whole, will have to be left to future works. The present thesis does not trace out this path into Heidegger's later works, but it does attempt to identify the tensions internal to the late Marburg project, which can at least provide some indication of the above path.

Secondly, the question of Heidegger's idealism, as we can now see, also gives way to a more focused and specific question of the nature of Heidegger's appropriation of Kant's transcendental-idealistic framework that is more relevant for the purposes of the late Marburg project. The main issue in Heidegger's relation to Kant is not idealism, and Heidegger's work in this period is not driven by an attempt to improve upon, absolutise, or curtail Kant's specific brand of idealism, as was explicitly the case not only for many of the philosophers working immediately in Kant's wake such as Fichte and Hegel, but also for later post-Kantians such as Cassirer and Bradley. Rather, two much more specific
issues will form the crux of my reading of Heidegger's engagement with Kant's transcendental idealism for the purposes of the late Marburg project, namely Heidegger's interpretation, transformation, and appropriation of (what he calls) transcendental knowledge and of the doctrine of schematism.

Thus, rather than an attempt to determine the nature of the unity of Heidegger's entire philosophical trajectory and to determine and assess the nature of its idealism, the present work has the much more modest aim of determining the aims and nature Heidegger's late Marburg project, as well as its possible internal tensions, in the context of its appropriation of Kant's transcendental framework. It is thus intended primarily as a contribution to the literature on Heidegger, specifically on the interpretation of the development of the post-*Being and Time* works, but also as a contribution to literature on the development and possibilities of post-Kantian philosophy more generally.

**Introduction**

In what follows, I argue that the late Marburg period generates a philosophical project that is interesting both in the context of Heidegger's development and in its own right. On the former point, the project represents more a shift in focus than a departure from *Being and Time*, but a significant and noteworthy one. I do not claim that it is a novel feature of Heidegger's late Marburg period to regard temporality as the meaning of being in general. Rather, the manner in which the question of being in general is approached and ultimately answered is novel with respect to *Being and Time*. The novelty consists in the role that horizontal
schemata of temporality in articulating the meaning of meaning and the role that the Kantian framework plays in Heidegger's approach to this issue. The specific formulation of the question of being in terms of horizontal schemata and the manner in which it is answered both owe a debt to Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Kant. However, my aim is not to assess the accuracy or plausibility of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, but to show the role this interpretation played in the development of Heidegger's thinking.

My plan in the introduction is as follows. I first review the relevant literature pertaining to the development of Heidegger's project and possible reasons for its failure. For reasons given above, I focus especially on Crowell's contribution, which is crucial for my purposes because it 1) understands Heidegger's project in Kantian terms and 2) develops an account of how Heidegger's Kantianism influences and ultimately undermines Heidegger's project. Next, on the basis of my difference to Crowell's account, I identify what I take to be the novel elements of Heidegger's late Marburg period, especially in relation to the Being and Time project. Finally, I discuss my understanding of the relation between Heidegger's appropriation of Kant and the articulation of the question of the multiplicity of modes of being in light of the unity of the concept of being, and I simultaneously clarify some methodological questions with respect to my use of Kant throughout this thesis. I return to the literature in the conclusion of the present thesis, focussing on three contributions that raise problems for my interpretation. There, I also return to the claims I make in this introduction, and I defend these claims more fully in light of my overall conclusions.
The increased significance in the immediate post-*Being and Time* period of the two themes highlighted above – i.e. 1) the Kantian / Transcendental and 2) the universality of being / metaphysical themes – has not gone unnoticed by commentators, nor has the possible connection between the two in interpreting the further development of the Heidegger’s project. Because the latter project, initiated in *Being and Time* or earlier, is seen as either abruptly ending, gradually petering out, or as undergoing significant transformation some time in the early-to mid-1930s, the above conjunction of themes has at times been used to explain the demise of the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*, or at least as providing clues for the reasons behind its transformation.

For this reason, works that attempt to provide a diagnosis of Heidegger’s difficulties in this period become highly relevant, especially those works that emphasise the Kantian strand in Heidegger’s thought during this period. For my purposes, the most significant among these is Steven Crowell’s contribution to this debate (2001), which takes on Heidegger’s works in the period between 1927 and 1937 as a “metontological” project in its own right. According to
Crowell’s argument, Heidegger’s enthusiasm for Kant’s special metaphysics leads Heidegger’s project in what is dubbed “the metaphysical decade” (Crowell 2001, 225) into an unsustainable and metaphysically excessive dead-end. To the extent that Crowell sees Heidegger as developing a project that is or comes to be distinct from the transcendental-phenomenological project of Being and Time, and to the extent that he understands this project as an explicitly Kantian one (228), Crowell’s interpretation comes closest to my overall reading.

The primary virtue of Steven Crowell’s account of the development of Heidegger’s thought is that it manages to spin a compelling narrative about the aims, nature and limitations of Heidegger’s project in this period by exploiting the link between metontology and “entities as a whole”. To this aim, Crowell further draws on Heidegger’s close engagement with Kantian metaphysics in this period, and relates the metontological inquiry into entities as a whole with the attempt to establish a successor to the “special metaphysics” Kant ruled out. Specifically, Crowell argues that Heidegger’s enthusiasm for Kantian system-building leads him to take up something akin to a special metaphysics that would have “entities as a whole” as its theme. Putting these pieces together in the context of Heidegger’s philosophical trajectory, Crowell concludes that Heidegger’s metaphysical ambitions lasted about a decade until Heidegger realised the untenability of the project, finally abandoning it wholesale and returning to the anti-metaphysical transcendental phenomenology that Crowell finds in the Being and Time period (228).

Crowell’s account focuses on the question of the status of an inquiry into entities
as a whole by indicating that such an enterprise seems to stand in tension with the framework of *Being and Time* (231). Heidegger raises the idea of entities as a whole only once in *Being and Time*, namely in the context of a discussion of death with the specific intention of pointing out that the theme of entities as a whole is beyond the ken of the existential analysis that is in the process of being worked out (GA 2, 330). In an essay published only two years later, Heidegger appears to go even further and to explicitly rule out any inquiry into entities as whole as “in principle impossible” (GA 9, 110). Finally, and especially if one has a Husserlian reading of the *Being and Time* project (as Crowell does) that brackets metaphysical questions and is concerned primarily with the way objects appear within the transcendental structures of subjectivity, an apparently metaphysical inquiry into entities as a whole seems a poor fit, if not a blatant inconsistency. For these reasons, according to Crowell, Heidegger “owes us an account” of how such wholes can become available as objects of inquiry (2001, 231).

Given that in articulating the nature of metontological inquiry Heidegger fails to provide explicit instructions on how exactly to understand the concept of “entities as a whole”, Crowell employs a two-fold strategy in reconstructing the account Heidegger is said to owe. Firstly, citing Heidegger's rhetorical question at the end of *Being and Time* of whether ontology does not require “in addition an ontic ground (*Fundament*)” (GA 2, 576), Crowell connects inquiry into entities as a whole with an attempt to adduce ontic grounds of explanation, much in the way that a naturalism, for example, might seek to explain the complete set of existent objects in terms of (ontic) natural processes (2001, 223). On Crowell’s reading, then, entities as a whole require an explanatory method that in some
sense seeks for ontic grounds. Relating the metontological inquiry into entities as a whole to the search for ontic grounds, furthermore, seems to jibe with Heidegger’s own description of metontology as “metaphysical ontic” (GA 26, 201).

Noting Heidegger’s “renewed enthusiasm” for Kant in this period, Crowell’s second strategy for understanding the exact meaning of “entities as a whole” and the kind of ontic grounds these may require is to approach the question from the perspective of the Dialectic of The Critique of Pure Reason: “Kant’s transcendental dialectic is concerned precisely with inquiry into entities as a whole—that is, with reason’s claim to be able to grasp the “totality” of a series of conditions for every conditioned” (238), and in this sense Heidegger’s inquiry into entities as a whole seems to be following suit. However, seen from this perspective, it cannot be a question of simply re-initiating an inquiry into entities as whole from a Kantian perspective, for the Dialectic argues that precisely such an inquiry is in principle impossible. Based on this, Crowell takes Heidegger’s metontological project as an attempt to “rescue metaphysics from Kant’s transcendental dialectic” driven by Heidegger’s belief that the kind of metaphysical inquiry ruled out by Kant is “possible after all” (229-230).

Such an endeavour may seem doomed from the start even for non-Kantians, and Crowell again appeals to Kant in explaining why it is especially problematic within Heidegger’s phenomenological framework. The problem is not so much that Heidegger attempts such an inquiry (though this too is problematic), but that he confuses the two forms of inquiry that are now in play with respect to
their grounding function, namely a metaphysical-ontic form of grounding and a phenomenological one. A phenomenological ground would relate to the sense-making activities of the subject, whereas a metaphysical ground, at least according to Crowell, seeks ultimate foundations in the empirical world. In this sense the latter is connected to the search for ontic grounds to explain ontological knowledge, an appropriate example again being naturalism in its attempt “to explain ontological knowledge in terms of causal relations between environment and brain states” (223). According to Crowell, the problems for Heidegger arise when he confuses these two grounding functions, and “metontology names the confusion of the two” (231). As Crowell puts it, “the real danger lies in misconstruing transcendental relations as ontic ones, thereby succumbing to what Husserl, in Cartesian Meditations, calls transcendental realism” (237).

I develop a detailed critique of Crowell’s position in chapter 3 of the present thesis. At this stage, I merely highlight my differences from Crowell’s position. My aim in doing this is 1) to spell out what I take to be novel in Heidegger’s Late Marburg Project and 2) to show how I understand the relation between the Kantian strand in Heidegger’s thought and the question of the regional multiplicity of being in light of its unity. I state my position here, which I defend throughout the thesis, and return to these claims in the conclusion of the thesis.

Among the possible kinds of ground Crowell takes Heidegger to be searching for – nature, language, history – one obvious candidate seems to be lacking, namely temporality. As I shall show in chapter 3, Crowell is correct that Heidegger
intends to articulate a manner of grounding his project. However, this manner of grounding is not ontic as Crowell believes, but temporal. In this sense, it is consistent with Heidegger’s claims throughout *Being and Time* related to temporality serving as the horizon for understanding being. This is precisely the form of grounding, I shall argue, that Heidegger develops in the late Marburg period.

Nonetheless, the question arises, if Heidegger is attempting to develop the idea of a temporal ground of being that is present in *Being and Time*, how can I claim that the late Marburg project is novel with respect to the project developed in the former work? There is, in this sense, as I have stressed above, a continuity running from Heidegger’s early works into the late Marburg project. Nevertheless, there is one element that is novel in this later project, namely the idea of horizontal schematism. It is this component that, crucially, allows Heidegger to develop a response – whether this response is satisfactory or not – to the question of the multiplicity of modes of being in light of the unity of being. While the idea of horizontal schema is introduced in *Being and Time*, it is there underdeveloped and applied solely to Dasein. This means that in the form that it takes in this work, the idea of horizontal schematism is not yet able to do the work that Heidegger needs, namely, to show how being (and not only Dasein) is temporal. In my view, a turning point was when Heidegger found that the horizontal schema can be applied to ready to hand and present at hand entities to generate distinct modes of being that the question of the possible multiplicity of being comes to the fore. This move is made in the 1927 work, *Basic Problems of
Phenomenology, the next major text following Being and Time and, as I argue, the beginning of the late Marburg project.

In my view, it is likely that Heidegger was thinking about the idea of the horizontal schema while working on Being and Time, perhaps even of the role it could play in the understanding of being in general. However, from the brief and possibly confused treatment it receives in Being and Time, it is clear it is not yet able to play the role of articulating the temporal basis of the ontology of the ready to hand and the present at hand that it does in Basic Problems. Nonetheless, the question of how much of the machinery of horizontal schematisation that was to appear in Basic Problems Heidegger had privately worked out in his head is secondary to my purposes. Rather, what is important is the textual development of Heidegger’s thinking. And here, as I shall argue in detail in chapter 5, the breakthrough comes in Basic Problems with the treatment of horizontal schematism. Because this doctrine, as presented there, implies that being can be ‘schematised’ or expressed in distinct ways, and more importantly explains how being can be expressed in a multiplicity of ways, the question of the unity of being becomes central and, as I argue, the driving force of Heidegger’s philosophical production in the next several years.

An analogy may make this point clearer. Many of the elements of Kant’s transcendental idealism that appeared in the first Critique in 1781 were already present in the 1770 Dissertation – the critique of metaphysics, the division of cognition into two stems, or the treatment of space and time as forms of intuition, among others. Thus, there is much continuity between Kant’s project in
1770 and in 1781. Nonetheless, the 1781 project is also radically novel in that it adds a ostensibly minor but crucial element to the mix. In my view this is the idea of a transcendental deduction, which would show how the two stems of cognition relate to one another and how the \textit{a priori} relates to the \textit{a posteriori}. It is this doctrinal element that focuses Kant's project on the conditions of possibility of experience and constitutes transcendental idealism as we know it today. Thus, though Kant's aims and the contours of his project were largely the same between the two works, the first \textit{Critique} was at the same time a novel and, in Kant's case, revolutionary work. In this sense, Heidegger's idea of a horizontal schema is analogous to Kant's idea of a transcendental deduction in terms of its import. It allowed, namely, Heidegger to articulate his project in a novel way and in this sense transformed the scope and focus of the project itself.

To summarise, the novel aspect of Heidegger's project is the articulation of the horizontal schemata, which in turn allows him to attempt to formulate more sharply the problem of the question of the multiplicity of being in light of its unity, as well as to sketch a strategy for responding to this problem, as I shall show in Chapter 5. The second point I want to take up in this introduction is the question of the relation of Heidegger's engagement with Kant to the above mentioned problem. Above, I have identified Heidegger's engagement with Kant and the articulation of the problem of ontological multiplicity in unity as the two primary strands of Heidegger's project in the late Marburg period. Do these represent two strands that lack any intimate relation and merely happen to come together through circumstance?
In fact, as should be clear from the above, there is an intimate relation between these two strands. Namely, it is Heidegger’s engagement with Kant that leads him to the problem of the multiplicity of being as well as to the means of its solution. Because the result of Heidegger’s engagement with Kant is the criticism that the philosophy of the latter represents a mere regional ontology of nature, Heidegger articulates the necessity of moving beyond what he takes to be a monochromatic metaphysics by formulating a concept of being that will allow a multiplicity of ways of being. If Kant’s conception of being can account for the mode of being of objects of nature alone, then it misses the modes of being of non-natural objects such as human beings or tools. Consequently, a truly universal concept of being must include the mode of being of what Heidegger calls Dasein or of readiness to hand, which correspond roughly to human beings and tools, respectively. It is thus a critical engagement with Kant that puts the desideratum of an ontological pluralism on the table, as I show in Chapter 1.

There is, furthermore, a second aspect that unites the two strands I identify. Namely, Heidegger’s solution is at bottom a Kantian one. Because Heidegger believes that Kant, implicitly and perhaps unbeknownst to himself, had the tools to articulate the desired ontological pluralism in his concept of schematism, Heidegger’s own approach to the question is by means of a development of this Kantian notion – this in Heidegger’s hands takes the form of the aforementioned horizontal schematism. I explore Heidegger’s appropriation of this central concept in Chapter 2, and the desiderata resulting from this appropriation for Heidegger’s own project. Because the imagination is the source of the schemata, the sense of Heidegger’s claim that imagination is the hidden root of Kant’s two
stems of cognition is precisely the articulation of the demand that schematism take precedence over both intuition and discursivity in ontological questions. In other words, being is neither concept nor sensation but temporal schema.

In this sense, Heidegger’s late Marburg project is a deeply post-Kantian undertaking. Another analogy may help to bring this point home. The German Idealists, similarly to Heidegger, believed that Kant became entrapped within his own strictures, and that it was necessary to overcome the letter of the Kantian philosophy in order to remain true to its spirit. This was to be carried out through (among other things) the articulation and development of Kant’s idea of the intuitive intellect from the third *Critique*. Similarly to Heidegger, the criticism was that Kant’s conception of the discursive understanding needs to be overcome by getting behind it, so to speak, to its true ground. Both in their belief to be developing and bringing to light ideas already implicit in Kant, and in their attempt to articulate their own philosophy through a transformation of the Critical System, Hegel and Schelling were deeply Kantian thinkers. Similarly, in the attempt to transform Kant’s regional ontology into a universal one by means of a transformation of Kant’s conception of being – namely, by locating it in temporal schematism rather than discursivity or intuition – Heidegger in the late Marburg period is articulating a deeply Kantian project. In other words, Heidegger’s criticism of Kant and his appropriation of the key Kantian concept of schematism underpin the formulation of the problem of the unity of being in its multiplicity and to its purported solution through horizontal schematism, respectively. In this sense, the two strands of Heidegger’s late Marburg period – the engagement with Kant and the articulation of an ontological pluralism in
terms of horizontal schematism – are two inextricable components of a unified project.

The above should at the same time make clear a methodological issue pertaining to the present thesis. Namely, my aim is not to assess the correctness of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant nor the plausibility of his criticisms. Rather, my aim is to articulate the manner in which Heidegger thinks the Kantian project needs to be transformed, and to establish the desiderata that follow from this for Heidegger’s own project.

The plan of the thesis is as follows. The first chapter looks at the primary aspects of Kant’s framework that Heidegger appropriates for the purposes of the late Marburg project. An equally important clue as to the nature of the project can be gleaned from what Heidegger rejects in the Kantian framework, and how he suggests its pitfalls can be improved upon. In this chapter I thus also isolate some criticisms that will serve as desiderata for the success of Heidegger’s own project. Heidegger also believed that the potential solution to the above criticisms lay concealed within the Kantian project itself, particularly in the notion of schematism and its relation to temporality. A final clue to how Heidegger intends to solve the problem of the relation of an ontic multiplicity to an ontological unity is to be found in Heidegger’s re-reading of Kant’s conception of schematism, which will be the subject of Chapter Two. With this initial formulation of the basis of Heidegger’s project in hand, Chapter Three looks at the literature, primarily contrasting my view with one significant counterposition, with the ultimate aim of specifying more precisely the
particular tasks constituting Heidegger’s project. The next section moves to the execution of the project: Chapter Four looks at Heidegger’s conception of ready to hand entities and their temporal basis. Chapter Five examines the conception of being and of the role of temporal schematism in articulating a framework for understanding the relation of the plurality of the modes of being.

Chapter 1. Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant: Finitude, Ontological Conditions, and Natural Entities

The Significance of Kant for Heidegger’s Project

Both the idiosyncrasy as well as the violence with which Heidegger appropriates Kant for his own fundamental-ontological purposes, often pointed out by commentators, are immediately evident from the first pages of Heidegger’s Kantbuch: the intention of the interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason contained therein is said to be “to place the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology” (GA 3, 1). This broad strategy of appropriating Kant for fundamental-ontological purposes would lead commentators such as Cassirer, among the first critics of Heidegger’s reading, to state that in the Kant-book Heidegger speaks “no longer as a commentator, but as a usurper” (Cassirer 1931, 17). Indeed, even Heidegger himself would come to concede that he was imposing on Kant “a question that was foreign” to Kant (GA 3, xiv) and that the
interpretation contained in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (KPM) was not “historically accurate” and even “distorts” Kant’s philosophy (GA 65, 253).

Yet the emphasis placed on the violence and distortion of the *Kantdeutung* in KPM by commentators, including by Heidegger himself, masks a deeper methodological and thematic affinity between Heidegger’s and Kant’s respective projects, not least because the development of Heidegger’s project during the period surrounding the publication of KPM itself takes on a decidedly Kantian bent. In other words, while it cannot be denied that Heidegger attempts to mould the Kantian project to fit his own programmatic, fundamental-ontological purposes, it is equally the case – or so I shall argue – that the development of the Heideggerian question of the meaning of being in the late Marburg period, conversely, is itself conceived along the lines of a Kantian transcendental enquiry. In this light, both Heidegger’s affinity to the Kantian project as well as the critical attempts to modify it provide a valuable clue, even a sort of blueprint, for understanding the aims, nature, and development of Heidegger’s project in the period directly following the intense engagement with Kant, a project that the failure to complete *Being and Time* left in a notoriously piecemeal state.

This affinity should hardly be surprising given the sheer number of words that are dedicated to Kant in the roughly five-year period following the publication of *Being and Time*. Apart from the publication of the *Kantbuch* in 1929, the years in the immediate post-*Being and Time* period saw a profound engagement with Kant’s philosophy, producing lecture courses dedicated to Kant’s transcendental philosophy in 1927/28 (GA 25) and in 1931 (GA 84.1) and to his practical
philosophy in 1930 (GA 31) and 1931/32 (GA 84.1), along with numerous seminars and talks (for a list of these see Kisiel 1995, 466-8), including the famous Davos Disputation in 1929 (for excerpts see GA 3, esp. 271-296). Courses from this period, furthermore, that are not explicitly about Kant often nonetheless contain lengthy discussions of aspects of the Kantian philosophy (e.g. the discussion of Kant’s conception of world in GA 26 and GA 27 or of Kant and perception in GA 24), as does one of Heidegger’s few published essays from this period (the 1929 piece *On Essence of Ground* in GA 9).

The significance of Kant for Heidegger in this period is not restricted to the amount of words spent on the subject but also pertains to the manner in which Heidegger came to increasingly characterise his own project in Kantian terms. Upon re-reading Kant’s texts in this period, Heidegger claims that the “scales fell from [his] eyes” and Kant came to replace Husserl as the philosopher that has come closest to letting himself “be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves” (GA 2, 31). In this sense, as Heidegger himself puts it, the *Kantbuch* can serve as a “historical introduction of sorts to clarify the problematic treated in the first half of *Being and Time*” (GA 3, xvi). In a later reflection (from the *Beiträge* in 1936-8), Heidegger maintains that “Kant continues to be the only one since the Greeks who brings the interpretation of beingness (*Seiendheit*) into a certain relation to time” (GA 65, 253-4). Given Heidegger’s insistence throughout this period on the importance of both “the phenomena themselves” and the intimate connection between time and the meaning of being (together with Heidegger’s characteristic abstemiousness in praising other philosophers), the reference to the positive role of Kant in
connection with the two above themes gives some hint to the importance of the latter to Heidegger’s project. Indeed, as Heidegger states, the “fundamental problematic of Being and Time” is nothing but a “radicalization” of the Kantian problem of “ontological knowledge” (GA 25, 425-27). Heidegger thus views his own Being and Time project as a continuation and critical extension of what he takes to be the central issue of Kant’s philosophy, namely “ontological knowledge”. As one commentator succinctly puts it, Heidegger’s aim in this period is to “take up Kant’s project and do it right” (Braver, 63).

Furthermore, from an architectonic standpoint, Kant’s doctrine of schematism was to be the topic of the planned second part of Being and Time, which was of course never to appear (for the announced table of contents of Being and Time see GA 2, 53). In other words, whatever the extent of the correspondence between the content of what was supposed to appear in the next step of the Being and Time project and what actually did appear in subsequent works and lectures, the path of the project in any case was to lead through Kant, specifically through the doctrine of schematism. As Heidegger states, the “interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason [contained in the KPM] arose in connection with a first working-out of Part Two of Being and Time” (GA 3, xvi), and the common theme seems to be the doctrine of schematism, both emphasised in KPM and planned for Part Two of Being and Time. In relation to Schematism in particular, Heidegger writes that while preparing the 1927 lecture course on the first Critique his attention was “drawn to” Kant’s schematism chapter, in which he “glimpsed” a connection between “the problem of Categories, that is, the problem of being in traditional Metaphysics and the phenomenon of time” (GA 3, xiv). In
this manner, Kant provides the first impetus for Heidegger’s own programmatic declarations of the intention to work out the meaning of being against the backdrop of time (see e.g. the preface to Being and Time, GA 2, 1).

In the following chapter I isolate the basic thematic affinities between the Heideggerian and Kantian frameworks on the basis of Heidegger’s interpretation of the latter. These will then provide a clue for the determination of the nature of the development of Heidegger’s project in the immediate post-Being and Time period. The line of argumentation that Heidegger develops in KPM and related texts, I will argue, is a development and extension of the Kantian conception of a priori conditions of possible experience, which Heidegger re-christens in Kantian terms as “ontological knowledge” or, in more Heideggerian terms as the “pre-understanding of being”. For the particular direction that Heidegger’s project takes, however, not only the similarities but the specific differences from Kant provide a useful blueprint: despite the apparent proximity of Heidegger’s project to Kant’s, Heidegger believes that the latter nonetheless requires significant critical modification in order to be capable of operating as a fruitful means for answering the question of the meaning of being. Although in his interpretation of being and existence Kant is said to “certainly be moving in the right direction” in this regard (GA 25, 67), he is ultimately said to have “shrunk back” (GA 3, 160) from the more radical and philosophically fruitful line of questioning that Heidegger thinks the problem of being requires. While Heidegger’s project in this period is formally analogous to Kant’s, the content – particularly the content of the a priori conditions of experience – is singled out for criticism. The second aim of the present chapter, then, after establishing the basic similarities between the
two projects, is to isolate the particular criticisms of Kant and to reformulate these as desiderata for the further development of Heidegger’s own project.

**Heidegger on Kant on Finitude and Ontological Neediness**

The general procedure of Heidegger's fundamental ontology as well as Kant's transcendental idealism coincide in both taking an essentially finite human subject as the starting point for an enquiry into the nature of the experience of objects. Kant's Copernican revolution was to make objects conform to the cognitive capacities of the subject, and so the core of both the Aesthetic and the Analytic comprises an investigation of such subjective faculties, which were seen as making objects of experience possible. Furthermore, Kant's rejection of *intuitus originarius* as a model for human knowing meant that such cognitive capacities were conceived of as finite in that a finite cognizer cannot bring about but rather is “dependent on the existence of the object” (KrV B72), an interpretation of finitude that Heidegger places at the basis of his conception of Dasein’s relation to entities. In this way, Heidegger believes that his intention to ground ontology in the finite essence of Dasein, an intention that perhaps receives its most explicit formulation in the *Kantbuch*, finds support in the notion of finitude developed by Kant.

Heidegger's answer to the question of how it is possible for entities to manifest at all for a finite subject also follows a Kantian line: one must be in possession, as we shall see, of the being of an entity prior to its apprehension in order for the
entity to appear at all. Dasein must, through its activity and constitution, somehow bring about the possibility of entities appearing. In Kantian terms, what enables the possibility of objects of experience is the a priori possession and application of pure concepts of understanding, which dictate in advance the potential forms that objects of a possible experience can take. Through the synthesising activity of the subject, such pure concepts delineate in advance the sphere of what can count as an object of experience. Transcendental, as per Kant’s definition, refers to that knowledge “by which we know that – and how – certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely a priori” (KrV A56/B80) and so provides a certain model for the form an appearance must have in order to count as an object, as Heidegger emphasises (GA 3, 11, 84).

Such “transcendental knowledge”\(^2\), because it is a priori and because it determines in advance a given entity (that is, determines in advance what an entity must be in order to count as an entity) is precisely what Heidegger calls ontological knowledge, or knowledge of being: “Transcendental knowledge is a knowledge which investigates the possibility of an understanding of being” (GA 25, 186). In that such knowledge “makes the comporting toward entities (ontic knowledge) possible”, it is at the same time “the preliminary understanding of the constitution of being, [that is] ontological knowledge” (GA 3, 11). In this

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\(^2\) “Knowledge” translates “Erkenntnis” and in more recent translations of Kant is usually rendered more accurately as cognition. There are disadvantages to employing both “cognition” and “knowledge” in the context of Heidegger’s discussion of the issue, but I will retain “knowledge”, which is almost universally used by Heidegger translators. However, I will add the qualification that for Heidegger “knowledge” does not refer to conscious or explicit propositionally-structured beliefs but may be non-conceptual or implicit (“non-thematic”), and so is closer to Heidegger’s notion of “understanding” or “pre-understanding” than the English rendering of the term may imply.
sense, Heidegger interprets transcendental knowledge as ontological knowledge: “Transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge, i.e., a priori knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings” (GA 25, 186).

To the extent that Heidegger interprets both Kant’s as well as his own project as concerned with the being of entities, and to the extent that entities are made possible as objects of possible experience by “transcendental knowledge,” the latter represents for Heidegger the common fulcrum around which both projects turn. For this reason, the question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments just is, in Heidegger’s reformulation, the question of the being of entities, or, in other words, the question of the possibility of ontological knowledge (GA 3, 14). The need for such ontological knowledge in the relation to objects, furthermore, is based in the above conception of finitude. In other words, Dasein’s ontological neediness follows from its inability to bring its objects into existence in the way that an intuitus originarius is able to. Together, finitude and transcendental knowledge, as well as the relation between them, represent the core issues for Heidegger’s Kant.

Though finitude is not an explicitly thematized problem in the first Critique (or at least, not as explicitly as Heidegger would have it seem), much Kant interpretation has revolved around this issue, from the earliest attempts of German Idealists such as Hegel to overcome the limits implicit in Kant’s conception of a finite subject (see e.g. Sedgwick 2012, p. 78ff.), to more recent, non-metaphysical readings of the Critique. In this latter vein, Henry Allison for example argues that the kernel of Kant’s Copernican Revolution is primarily a
shift from the infinite, theocentric conception of knowledge to an anthropocentric perspective that is more representative of human finitude (Allison 2004, xv). As Allison puts it, creative intuition, which serves as a model for the theocentric conception of knowledge, is “ruled out for human cognizers as incompatible with our finitude” (Allison 2004, 14). Because the finite, human perspective requires not only intuition but concepts, the shift from a theocentric to an anthropocentric model is also “a shift from an intuitive to a discursive conception of cognition” (Allison 2004, xvi).

Heidegger, however, finds in Kant a more substantive notion of finitude, one that has not only epistemological but also ontological implications. While Heidegger agrees that because finite cognizers are dependent on what is given to intuition their knowledge of what is intuited must be mediated by concepts, he wants to deepen this connection to the extent that not only conceptual but ontological knowledge, i.e. the understanding of being, is an index of finitude: “we do not even need first to ask about a relationship between the understanding of being and the finitude in human beings... it itself is the innermost essence of finitude” (GA 3, 229). Finitude is no longer solely to consist in the dependence of thinking on intuition, intuition itself is to be dependent on ontological knowledge. Heidegger will argue that our inherent finitude leads to an ontological neediness on our part, in the sense that the possibility of relating oneself to an entity is dependent on a prior understanding of the being of that entity.

To see why finitude is an index of ontological neediness, we must first take a brief look at how Heidegger interprets Kant’s notion of finitude. Heidegger, like
Kant, illustrates the nature of the finitude of intuition by contrasting it to infinite intuition, or *intuitus originarius*:

[The difference between infinite and finite intuition consists in the fact that the former, in its immediate representation of the individual, i.e., of the unique, singular entity as a whole, first brings this entity into its being, helps it to its coming-into-being (*origo*). Absolute intuiting would not be absolute if it depended upon an entity already at hand and if the intuitable first became accessible in its "taking the measure" of this entity. Divine knowing is representing which, in intuiting, first creates the intuitable entity as such. But because it immediately looks at the being as a whole, simply seeing through it in advance, it cannot require thinking. Thinking as such is thus already the mark of finitude (GA 3, 24).]

Thus, like for Kant, for Heidegger infinite intuition does not require thinking – it simply grasps the entity immediately and as a whole. Because it grasps this entity as a whole, it grasps it as it “is” in itself. The reason, then, that man can only know appearances and not things in themselves is that he is equipped with a finite cognitive apparatus that is unable to grasp the entity as a whole. Because infinite intuition grasps the entity as a whole, in grasping the entity it first brings it into its being (*Sein*). There is a subtle but important point to be made about Heidegger's claim that the infinite nature of intuition resides in its bringing an entity into its being. It is not, at least not primarily, that infinite intuition is causally creative in the sense that it causes an entity to come into existence, as it seems Kant would have it. Rather, infinite intuition is the origin of the “being” (*Sein*) of the entity. Heidegger's laconic definition of being in *Being and Time* is
that which "determines entities as entities" (SZ, 6), which implies that infinite intuition brings about an entity in the sense that it fully determines it in its being, i.e. as the entity that it is. As Heidegger writes, "infinite intuition as intuition is the origin of the being of what is intuited" (GA 25, 85).

For Heidegger, the finite nature of the human intellect leads to a crucial question: if the divine intellect knows an entity by virtue of having brought it into its being, how does a finite human intellect, on the other hand, that is not the source of the being of entities come to know such entities? In this sense, for Heidegger the "leading problem" (GA 3, 42) of the first Critique is the question:

How can a finite creature, which as such is delivered over to entities and is directed by the receptive apprehension of these same entities, know, i.e., intuit, prior to all [instances of] the apprehension of the entity without being its "creator"? (GA 3, 38-9).

Heidegger would agree with Kant (and Allison) that a finite cognizer is not the source of the existence of a given entity and is thus dependent on the empirical presence of that entity. However, a finite cognizer is also not the source of the "being" of a given entity and is also thus dependent on the prior availability of the being of that entity. In this sense, for Heidegger, finitude means dependence not only on intuitive, but also ontological knowledge. It is in this sense that finitude will be indexed to Dasein’s "ontological neediness": because the human subject is finite, it cannot intuit the entity as a whole, i.e. the entity in its being. Consequently, the being of the entity must be available beforehand – to be finite
thus means to be dependent on ontological knowledge for the possibility of establishing an intentional relation to entities:

A finite, knowing creature can only relate itself to an entity which it itself is not, and which it also has not created, if this entity which is already at hand can be encountered from out of itself. However, in order to be able to encounter this entity as the entity it is, it must already be "recognized" generally and in advance as an entity, i.e., with respect to the constitution of its being (GA 3, 70).

In other words, our finitude requires a sort of prior knowledge of the constitution of the being of entities that must be given in advance and that guides and enables our orientation towards entities of a given ontological constitution. Dasein's finitude thus leads to its “transcendental neediness”, as Heidegger puts it, in which “Dasein shows itself as in need of the understanding of being” (GA 3, 235-6).

Heidegger's ontological reading of Kant is thus the result of a thematization of finitude, because finitude is revealed as a dependence on ontological knowledge: “ontology is an index of finitude. God does not have it.” (GA 3, 280). The requirement for ontological knowledge as a condition of apprehending entities is established through the unavailability of a God’s eye view, that is, precisely through our finitude. Ontological knowledge, then, means that a finite cognizer must know in advance the being (Sein) of the entity (Seiende), which determines what that entity is, in order for it to appear to us an entity.
The terminological differences between Heidegger and Kant mask the similarity in the basic framework each employ for accounting for the relation to entities. Where Kant would say that the transcendental analytic of the subject shows the necessity of a certain set of a priori conditions that make experience possible, Heidegger speaks in terms of the necessity of a prior understanding of being that is grounded in Dasein’s finitude. Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant aims at bringing out precisely these similarities. The meaning and significance of the Copernican turn, for example, is seen by Heidegger as residing in its attempt to demonstrate precisely the necessity of such ontological knowledge. Kant’s famous description of this turn as establishing “the possibility of having a knowledge of objects a priori, of determining something about them before they are given to us” (Bxvi) is re-interpreted by Heidegger as the claim that “entities are in no way accessible without an antecedent understanding of being” (GA 25, 55). What this implies for Heidegger, as mentioned above, is that “entities which encounter us must already be understood in advance in their ontological constitution” (GA 25, 55), that is, that in our relating to entities we are dependent on the prior understanding of their being. For Heidegger this is “the only possible meaning of Kant’s thesis, which is frequently misunderstood and which is called his Copernican revolution” (GA 25, 55).

**The Pre-understanding of Being**

While the claim that this is the only possible way to understand the nature of the Copernican Revolution may be hyperbolic, it does point to the issue that
Heidegger considers to be the common centrepiece to Kant’s and his own project. The significance of finitude that Heidegger finds in Kant, as we have seen, lies in the fact that it points to the necessity of ontological knowledge: as finite cognizers that cannot spontaneously bring about an entity in its being, we are dependent on the prior availability of the being of the entity. Despite the formal similarities in the framework for approaching the issue, it is the nature and specific content of the “ontological knowledge” that constitutes this pre-understanding of being in the two cases that will represent the most significant issue: what is the nature of this prior ontological knowledge and how does the subject apply it in its attempts to relate to entities?

The answer that Heidegger finds to this question in Kant is the following: The subject is such that it is in advance equipped with categories that determine what is to count as a possible object of experience, and so the content of “ontological knowledge” just is the content of the categories. In other words, what we understand in advance when we understand the “being of an entity” is the content of the categories or, more specifically, the propositions that we can form based on the categories, i.e. the system of the principles of the understanding. Because the categories, through the principles to which they give rise, determine in advance the constitution of objects before any object is given, they provide a model according to which we can determine what an object is. It is, consequently, through such a model of objectivity that objects are able to show themselves, precisely in the form determined by the contents of this model, i.e. the categories and forms of intuition.
We have seen how the problem of finitude, which manifests in the ontological neediness of the subject, ultimately leads to the question of the possibility of the disclosure of objects, which Heidegger takes to be the “leading problem” of the first Critique. This is, in Heidegger’s terminology, the question of transcendence: how can the (finite) subject “step beyond” its immanent sphere and establish a relation to objects that lie outside of this sphere (see e.g. SZ, 60ff. or GA 24, 86ff.)? Transcendence – a concept which, as we will see, undergoes a radical transformation in Heidegger’s hands – is what makes the relation to the object possible, or, in Heidegger's terms it is what makes intentionality possible, where intentionality designates simply, in Heidegger’s words, “the relation of the subject to the object” (GA 24, 86). Heidegger calls transcendence the “ratio essendi of intentionality in its diverse modes”, where intentionality is, conversely, the “ratio cognoscendi of transcendence” (GA 24, 91). While “transcendence” refers to the “subject-object relation”, the two designations are not identical; rather, “transcendence” is “more primordial in dimension and kind” than the former, and is “directly connected with the problem of being as such” (GA 26, 169-70). The distinction between transcendence and intentionality or comportment will be the subject of more detailed analysis in what follows, but for now what is important to establish is that both transcendence and intentionality pertain to the relation to entities, where intentionality refers to the understanding of objects and transcendence to the understanding of being.³

Though Heidegger uses Husserl-inspired concepts such as intentionality and

³ On a final terminological note, Heidegger often substitutes his own preferred term “comportment” for “intentionality”, but all forms of comportment are essentially intentional, that is, directed at entities (GA 24, 85).
transcendence in his analysis of Kant, part of his intention is to transform these concepts in light of his appropriation of the ontological dimension of Kant's critical philosophy. In somewhat of a reversal, Heidegger's discussion of intentionality in the context of an analysis of Kant's thesis on being in a 1927 lecture course develops this notion in a way that is far more Kantian than Husserlian. In a view similar to Husserl's, Heidegger states that to intentionality belong the *intentio* and the *intentum*, which correspond to the act of intending and the thing intended, respectively. Heidegger argues, however, that there is a third element that belongs to intentionality, namely a pre-understanding of the being of the entity intended (of the intentum). Speaking specifically about perceptual intentionality, Heidegger writes that

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\text{not only do intentio and intentum belong to the intentionality of perception but so also the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum (GA 24, 100-1).}
\]

The mode of being of the intentum is the ontological knowledge mentioned above that makes possible and determines in advance the possible forms that the intentio can take. Such knowledge, as we have seen, is the kind of knowledge provided by the Kantian pure concepts of the understanding, which then serve as the conditions of the possibility of objects of experience – what will be at stake, however, is the nature of such conditions (i.e. of ontological knowledge) and the consequent forms of the relation to objects of experience (i.e. intentionality).

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4 Though for a more nuanced account of Heidegger's relation to Husserl on this point see Moran (2000), who argues that "Heidegger is developing Husserl, focusing in particular on the ontological dimension of intentionality, not reversing or abandoning Husserl's account, as many commentators have suggested" (40).
Like Kant, Heidegger argues that one cannot conceive the relation to the object as a relation to a transcendentally real object, or, in Heidegger’s terms, as a relation between “two present at hand entities” (GA 24, 86). Kant argues that conceptualising the object-relation in this way necessarily leads to an empirical idealism, where what is known with certainty are the subject’s representations of the object and what remains clouded in doubt is the way these representations then relate to such objects (see KrV A371). Heidegger agrees that such a conception of the object-relation, which he refers to as the “subjectivist misinterpretation of intentionality”, is misguided and raises questions that are both insoluble as well as misplaced:

Experiences are intentional and accordingly belong to the ego, or, in erudite language, they are immanent to the subject, they belong to the subjective sphere... The question arises, How can this ego with its intentional experiences get outside its sphere of experience and assume a relation to the extant world? (GA 24, 86).

Like Kant, Heidegger thinks that a starting point that begins with an inner sphere of “immanence” from which a subject must then “transcend” to the external world of objects must be rejected. Rather than asking how the subject leaves its sphere of immanence and establishes a relation to transcendent objects, Heidegger argues, we must see the subject as always already dwelling among objects: “it belongs to the essence of Dasein to exist in such a way that it is always already in the midst of other entities” (GA 24, 244). The relation to the object is thus not a relation that must first of all be established, but one that is always already underway, so to speak. Thus, transcendence means that to be a
subject just is to be outside of itself and among objects, or to exist as ecstatic, as it is put in *Being and Time*. Another way to put this is to say that the intentional relation is such that entities are always already disclosed to the subject. It is not that one first creates a world for oneself by establishing a relation to the entities in one's surroundings, but rather that the entities in one's surroundings are only apparent because one is already in the world – intentionality, then, is what uncovers entities on the basis or their prior disclosedeness: “primal transcendence makes possible every intentional relation to entities”, a relation which is based on “a preliminary understanding of the being of entities” (GA 26, 170). Because what is disclosed prior to the experience of the entity is the being of the entity, as we saw above, Heidegger argues that intentionality is characterized by a prior understanding of the being of the entity towards which intentional comportment is directed. In other words, if we already understand the being of entities in advance, we need not transcend a private inner space of immanence, but rather already inhabit the sphere of possible entities.

Heidegger, speaking about perception as a form of intentional comportment, puts it in the following manner:

> The mode of the possible uncoverability of the present at hand in perception must already be prescribed in the perceiving: that is, the perceptual uncovering of the present at hand must already understand beforehand something like presence at hand. In the intentio of the perceiving something like an *understanding of presence at hand* must already be antecedently present (GA 24, 99).
In order to intend a present at hand entity, Heidegger’s term for, roughly, a physical object, one must know what presence at hand is, that is, one must know what it is to be a physical object in the first place. In other words, the being of the entity (in this case presence at hand) must be known beforehand in order for a particular entity to show up as present at hand. The same schema applies to entities that are not present at hand but of a different mode of being: in order to establish an intentional relation to a tool, for example, I must already understand what it is to be a tool, that is, I must understand the being of a tool, namely what Heidegger calls readiness to hand (GA 25ff.). Pre-understanding of being thus involves the employment of a sort of model that orients the subject’s intentional comportment by providing pre-established possibilities for what can be intended. In Heidegger’s terminology, an entity must be “disclosed” (with regard to its being) in order to be “uncovered” (as an entity):

The intentio itself includes an understanding of presence at hand, even if it is only pre-conceptual. In this understanding, what presence at hand means is unveiled, laid open, or, as we say, disclosed. We speak of the disclosedness given in the understanding of presence at hand (GA 24, 100).

In this manner, rather than being shut off in a private inner space, we are constitutively “open” to entities that are already “laid open” or “unveiled” because the being of entities is available to us in advance. In Kantian terms, a priori conditions make experience possible. The capacity to comport oneself to entities, then, depends on a prior disclosure of the being of the given entity. For

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5 While Kant emphasises perceptual cognition, for Heidegger entities are uncovered through intentional comportment, of which perception, for example, is one species.
this reason, Heidegger draws an important distinction between disclosure and uncoveredness using the example of perception as a specific mode of intentional comportment:

Not only does its uncoveredness – that it is uncovered – belong to the entity which is perceived in perception, but also the being-understood, that is, the disclosedness of that uncovered entity’s mode of being. We therefore distinguish not only terminologically but also for reasons of intrinsic content between the uncoveredness of an entity and the disclosedness of its being. An entity can be uncovered, whether by way of perception or some other mode of access, only if the being of this entity is already disclosed – only if I already understand it (GA 24, 101-2).

It is important here to hold these two levels and the difference between them apart in order to avoid confusion. The prior understanding of being does not mean, then, that one must be in possession of the empirical concept corresponding to an entity in order to in any way apprehend that entity. It is not, as the story goes, that the Spanish ships were somehow “invisible” to the Inca because they did not know ships and thus lacked the empirical concept “ship”. For the ship to show up, rather, its being needs to be understood beforehand. For example, the ship can be disclosed as a physical object (as something possessing a certain mass, shape, certain properties), or disclosed as a tool (something that allows me to cross the ocean, in order to collect gold, for the sake of becoming rich etc. etc.) – or, indeed, disclosed as a divinity, as something possessing supernatural powers etc. etc. (which, according to historical reports, may have actually been the case here (O’Brien 1997, 23-4)). Heidegger’s point is that for an
entity to show up as, for example, a divinity, what it is to be a divinity (assuming divinity is a separate mode of being) must be understood, or disclosed, beforehand. Heidegger’s “pre-understanding of being” thus corresponds to the level of the application of the categories to the manifold of intuition – what is a priori are the categories, which enable experience of empirical objects but do not determine the particular empirical properties of the objects experienced.

Thus the question of disclosure and uncoveredness is one of constitution, but viewed in a twofold manner: the constitution (Konstitution) of the object, and the prior constitution (Verfassung) of the being of the object. In Heidegger’s terms, this means uncoveredness, which refers to the constitution of the object at the level of the intentional relation, and disclosure, which corresponds to the constitution of the being of the object and thus enables the intentional relation. Both questions can simply be summed up as the question of the constitution of the being of entities, which, for Heidegger, is precisely the question of ontological knowledge, a question that he can then equate with transcendental knowledge in Kant:

Transcendental knowledge does not investigate the being itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary understanding of being, i.e., at one and the same time: the constitution of the being of the entity (GA 3, 16).

Because what Heidegger calls transcendental knowledge is precisely what determines in advance the possible objects of experience – i.e. determines in advance what something must be like in order to count as a possible object of
experience – transcendental knowledge comprises the prior understanding of the constitution of the being of entities, as described above. Here, the affinity Heidegger sees between Kant’s enquiry and his own again becomes apparent. What Kant showed is that there are certain conditions that make objects of experience possible, and that such conditions are a priori in the sense that they are not derived from experience and precede the establishment of the relation to the object. What makes the apprehension of empirical objects possible is this a priori, transcendental level of pure concepts of the understanding. In other words, what makes empirical synthesis (judgement) possible, is the prior transcendental synthesis involving the pure concepts of the understanding. In the Husserlian terms Heidegger at times uses (primarily in GA 24), empirical synthesis corresponds to intentionality; In Heidegger’s preferred terminology, the uncoveredness of entities is made possible by the prior disclosure of the being of the entity. The basic idea across these terminological differences is that empirical or ontic knowledge is dependent on transcendental or ontological knowledge:

Ontic knowledge can only correspond to entities (“objects”) if this entity as entity is already first disclosed [offenbar], i.e., is already first known in the constitution of its being. Disclosure of entities (ontic truth) revolves around the unveiledness of the constitution of the being of entities (ontological truth) (GA 3, 13).

In this manner, what Heidegger calls disclosure is the correlate to transcendental synthesis, in the sense that such synthesis determines what objectivity (or, the being of objects) is in advance, and thus makes possible an empirical synthesis,
which is in turn then the correlate to uncoveredness. In this way, the ostensibly Husserlian notion of intentionality, by being welded to disclosure in Heidegger's hands takes a decidedly Kantian turn, and is now characterised in terms of conditions of possibility:

[U]ncovering comportment towards the present at hand maintains itself in an understanding of [the mode of being of] presence at hand... This is the condition of the possibility of the uncoverability of present at hand entities (GA 24, 101; italics added).

By placing disclosure in centre stage, both by reading transcendental philosophy in terms of this concept as well as in developing his own conception of intentionality through the Kantian framework, what becomes the primary issue in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is the way of understanding the constitution of the being of entities that occurs in and through transcendence: to the extent that transcendental knowledge investigates “the constitution of the being of the entity”, it concerns “the stepping-over (transcendence) of pure reason to the entity, so that it can first and foremost be adequate to its possible object” (GA 3, 16)

In other words, I need to understand and to project in advance the essential ontological constitution of a given entity in order for that entity to be empirically available to me as an entity of a particular ontological constitution, or of a particular mode of being. In this sense, furthermore, I am “outside of” myself and so step over or “transcend” to the world of entities because I occupy the ontological sphere of possible entities that I project. Such a projection of being,
then, is a mark of Dasein's transcendence: I project a particular mode of being and I disclose the entity by coming back to it in light of that mode of being. Because it is transcendental knowledge that allows me to project the possible mode of being of a given entity in advance, transcendental knowledge at the same time enables the possibility of transcendence. Thus Heidegger can write that “the problem of the inner possibility of ontological knowledge is nothing other than the unveiling of transcendence” (GA 3, 76). The common ground that Heidegger finds between his own project and that of Kant is the question of establishing the possibility of an intentional relation between a finite subject and the object by means of a prior understanding of the ontological constitution of such object that discloses the latter, that is, through transcendence.

Furthermore, as we shall see, Kant intimates the temporal nature of transcendental conditions in a manner that Heidegger will seek to develop and build on in the articulation of a general ontology that would answer the question of the meaning of being in general, and much of Heidegger's critical rejoinders to Kant are meant to bring out and radicalise such a conception of the role of temporality. Before turning to Heidegger's criticisms in order to establish the particular form that the above development of the Kantian framework will take, I will now attempt to make the above, somewhat abstract account of the manner in which the pre-understanding of being functions in enabling the disclosure of objects more concrete through several of Heidegger's examples. What I aim to illustrate is how a particular understanding of being enables the disclosure of a particular kind of entity. Because Heidegger's perhaps most paradigmatic examples of entities with distinct modes of being corresponding to distinct kinds
of disclosure – namely, tools and natural objects – will be the subject of a detailed discussion to follow, and because I want to show that the above structure is applicable to all possible ontological classes of entities, I will take up firstly Heidegger's example of the particularly Greek disclosure of being as *ousia* in what Heidegger calls productive (*herstellende*) intentional comportment, and secondly the example of the disclosure of being of natural entities through scientific comportment. The latter will at the same time allow a critical platform from which to show, ultimately, where Heidegger thinks Kant’s conception of being is lacking, to which I move on in the following section.

**Being and Entity: A (Greek) Case Study**

The following analysis of an example of a particularly Greek understanding of the being of a specific kind of entity is not intended to serve a solely illustrative purpose. As I will attempt to show, Heidegger’s discussion of the Greek understanding of being reveals a certain danger, namely that of mistaking one particular understanding of the being of a particular region of entities for being simpliciter – in other words, the mistake lies in attempting to reduce *all* entities to a particular understanding of being operative in one specific intentional comportment. The question, then, for Kant will be whether his conception of the ontological conditions is broad enough to encompass all entities, or whether it displays an unwarranted bias toward only one particular kind of entity.

Heidegger's strategy is to attempt to trace back the concepts the Greeks used to
designate being to a certain intentional comportment, which itself displays a certain disclosure, or pre-understanding of being. This tracing back of an intentional comportment to being, incidentally, is what Heidegger identifies with the phenomenological notion of Wesenschau, or intuition of essences (GA 24, 161). Indeed, Heidegger's procedure here displays all three elements of the phenomenological method that he enumerates in Basic Problems – the reduction of a phenomenon to its being, by way of the destruction of the concepts used to designate being and a construction of the way being is projected in the relevant intentional comportment: thus, reduction, destruction, construction (GA 24, 29-31).

Heidegger's basic argument is that the understanding of being in Greek philosophy was an articulation of a pre-ontological understanding of being characteristic of a particular intentional comportment, namely productive comportment. Heidegger begins by arguing that the Platonic eidos, form, idea, or look, should be viewed with reference to the intentional comportment of production:

What is formed is, as we can also say, a shaped product. The potter forms a vase out of clay. All forming of shaped products is effected by using an image, in the sense of a model (Vorbild), as guide and standard. The thing is produced by looking to the anticipated look of what is to be produced by shaping, forming. It is this anticipated look of the thing, sighted beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea. The shaped product, which is shaped in conformity with the model, is as such the exact likeness of the model (GA 24, 150).
The understanding of being that is projected in “productive comportment” is one that understands entities in terms of a model that one has in mind before the production of the particular entity and which serves as a standard for how that entity is to be produced. A potter, for example, might have an image of a pot in mind that will allow the moulding of the clay into a certain shape. Such a mode of being is projected in a variety of specific comportments that we can classify under the genus of “productive comportment”:

Shaping, forming, making all signify a letting-come-here, letting-derive from. We can characterise all these modes of action by a basic comportment of Dasein which we can concisely call producing 

(\textit{Herstellen}) (GA 24, 152).

In production, the product is then “released” from the process of making and, as determined by its \textit{eidos}, is then able to stand on its own, as \textit{hypokeimenon}, or substance:

To pro-duce, to \textit{place-here} (\textit{Her}-stellen) means at the same time to bring into the narrower or wider circuit of the accessible, here, to this place, to the Da, so that the produced being \textit{stands for itself} on its own account and remains able to be found there and to \textit{lie-before there} as \textit{something established stably for itself} (GA 24, 151-2).

The potter thus simply actualises the pot, the form of which is based not on the clay but on the \textit{eidos} that served as a model for the final form the pot takes. The \textit{eidos} is “the look, anticipated in imagination, of what is to be formed gives the
thing with regard to what this thing already was and is before all actualization” (GA 24, 150). In this sense, what determines the particular pot as the pot that it is the eidos. The empirical process of production merely actualizes a pot that already in some sense “is” without yet being actual, or without yet physically existing. What the productive comportment does do, however, is to project an understanding of the being of entities based on an eidos – in other words, it understands entities in the way outlined above, i.e. as the kinds of things that are determined as the things that they are by a prior eidos.

What is produced, i.e. the product, is then understood as available for use, or as ousia:

That which first of all and constantly lies-before in the closest circle of human activity and accordingly is constantly disposable is the whole of all things of use, with which we constantly have to do, the whole of all those existent things which are themselves meant to be used on one another, the implement that is employed and constantly used products of nature: house and yard, forest and field, sun, light and heat. What is thus tangibly present for dealing with (vor-handen) is reckoned by everyday experience as that which is, as an entity, in the primary sense. Disposable possessions and goods, property, are entities; they are quite simply that which is, the Greek ousia (GA 24, 152).

The outcome of productive comportment toward an entity is the creation of a product that can “stand alone” and is available for use, which (at least according to Heidegger) is the etymology of the Greek “ousia”. This allows Heidegger to
account for the Greek understanding of being in terms of *ousia* as one that is the result of productive comportment:

Productive comportment’s understanding of the being of the entity toward which it is behaving takes this entity beforehand as one that is to be released for its own self so as to stand independently on its own account. The *being (Sein)* that is *understood in productive comportment* is exactly the being-in-itself of the product (GA 24, 152).

Heidegger's claim is not that every possible entity is always necessarily to be understood as a product. Rather, what the above suggests is that a certain pre-ontological understanding of being that is disclosed in a given form of an intentional comportment – in this case, productive (*herstellende*) intentionality – is then generalized into an ontology, into a theoretical understanding of being. The original, pre-ontological understanding of being is then, to some extent, covered up through the concepts that go to make up this theoretical ontology (hence, the need to deconstruct such concepts – this covering up is also, incidentally, the main import of Heidegger's talk of the forgetting of being). In the attempt to explicitly understand the nature of entities and to formulate a corresponding ontology, the *eidos* based on which entities of the mode of being of the product are understood is taken to be the basis for the understanding of entities in general. However, in the Greek understanding, the focus subsequently shifts from the model based on which entities are understood (i.e. the “*eidos*”) to the entities that result from productive comportment, namely “*ousia*”, the product qua good available for public use and consumption. In this manner entities ultimately come to be understood in terms of “*substances*”, as those
goods that can “stand alone” (GA 24, 152).

The structure of transcendence of this particular example can be divided into the constitutive moments that Heidegger identifies in his interpretation of Kant’s conception of transcendence. There is, firstly, a projection of a prior understanding of the being of entities, in this case, being is understood as substantiality, or the capacity of “standing alone”. Secondly, the projection of this particular understanding of being discloses entities in terms of the corresponding form: entities are here disclosed as either capable of “standing alone” or not, that is, as substances or non-substances (i.e. accidents). This projection, thirdly, opens up a field of entities that are manifest in such a manner, and is indexed to a form of intentional comportment towards these entities, namely productive comportment.

In terms of the intentio-intentum framework, the intentio in this particular case is the productive comportment towards entities, and the intentum is the product, that is, the entity that is intended in productive comportment. As mentioned above, however, to this structure belongs a prior understanding of the being of the intentum that is determined by the particular intention. In this case, the intentum is understood in terms of an eidos, the model according to which the product is to be produced. Again, it should be emphasised that this understanding of being does not relate to any particular model or other. Rather, it involves understanding an entity to be determined as the entity that it is by an eidos, as opposed to understanding an entity as determined by space-time coordinates and causal laws, or by pragmatic relations. In other words, it means
to understand an entity as the product of an *eidos*, rather than as, for example, a collection of particles or a cultural item or tool. Thus, to understand the being of an entity as product does not mean that I need to know in each case the particular plan that the producer had in mind in the case of any particular product; rather, I need to know that what I am dealing with is the kind of thing that is understood in terms of such a plan in general, whatever its particularities may be. This prior understanding, conversely, is what allows other entities to show up as products, that is, as the kinds of things that are determined as the entities they are by a plan, that is, by an *eidos*.

Ultimately, as mentioned previously, the focus in the above intentional structure shifts from the *eidos* to the product itself, and shifts from an understanding of being in terms of *eidos* to one in terms of *ousia*. Two important points can be gleaned from the above. The first is that there is a multiplicity of modes of comportment, and thus a multiplicity of modes of being that are projected each with their corresponding ontological region of kinds of entities. The structure of the way of relating to the product by means of the projection of its being in *Herstellende* comportment is of course not particular to entities of this kind, but applies in its basic outline to entities of distinct modes of being, or to entities as such.

Each distinct ontological kind thus requires a distinct pre-understanding of being. In the case of comportment toward tools, for example, it is equally the case that “we must already understand ahead of time something like tool and tool-character in order to set about using a certain tool” (GA 25, 22-3). What we
have to know in the case of entities of this latter mode of being is not a given *eidos* or plan but instead what the given tool is for or, in short, its function. Again, this should be taken in a more general sense: we understand a tool when we understand that it is the kind of thing that should be understood in terms of its function or use (*Bewandtnis*). When I open the door using a doorknob, in one of Heidegger’s examples, what I need to understand beforehand is not what a doorknob in particular is, but rather what an “object of use” (*Gebrauchsding*) or a “tool in general” (*Zeug überhaupt*) is, which then gives me the general blueprint for becoming familiar with a given particular tool. As Heidegger puts it, “we do not learn what a tool [in general] is by using a knife, a typewriter, or a sewing machine, but the other way around: we can only encounter such entities because we already understand something like tool in general” and we understand this in advance of our dealing with empirical objects (GA 27, 192). Such a prior understanding, as Heidegger puts it, “opens the horizon for us in advance so that, in using a specific tool, we can comport ourselves toward it” (GA 25, 22-3). What is projected and understood, in this sense, “is nothing but the manner and constitution of the being of entities” (GA 25, 22-3).

The second point is related to the first. As we saw, the mode of being projected in the specifically Greek mode of comportment becomes theoretically articulated into a general ontology. In other words, because of the fact that for the Greeks the primary or privileged (at least according to Heidegger) manner of relating to entities is through productive comportment, the mode of being implicit in such a comportment is taken as the primary or sole mode of being of entities in general. Though stemming from characterisations of being in a specifically productive
mode of comportment, eidos, or later ousia, come to be taken as designations for being in general. However, as we have seen in the first point above, there is also a multiplicity of modes of being corresponding to distinct regions of entities. The above multiplicity of modes of being leads to the question of whether the horizon in terms of which entities are disclosed in one particular form of intentional comportment, in this case herstellende comportment, is exhaustive for understanding all entities, regardless of the intentional structure through which they are uncovered: “The question arises here whether [the Greek articulation of being]… can be made to hold in its purportedly universal ontological validity for every being in general” (GA 24, 169).

Heidegger, indeed, points out that while the understanding of being disclosed in a given intentional comportment may certainly be valid for a particular region of entities, it is an open question whether an ontology based on that specific understanding of being is able to account universally for entities in general:

Entities present at hand can certainly be interpreted ontologically in the horizon of production. It can certainly be shown that in every instance a whatness having the characteristics mentioned belongs to being at-hand [i.e. to the mode of being of present at hand entities]. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the whole universe of beings is exhausted by the present at hand. Does the realm of the present at hand coincide with the realm of entities in general (GA 24, 169)?

There thus exists in principle a danger of taking one particular mode of being, (and, as we shall see, the particular form of temporality that pertains to it) to be
somehow more basic than all others and to be constitutive not merely of a particular mode of being but of being simpliciter. According to Heidegger Dasein, the subject, is an example of one entity whose being cannot be understood according to the disclosive horizon of herstellende comportment (GA 24, 169). Heidegger's aim in this particular case is, of course, to prepare the ground for an analytic of Dasein, one that relies on categories radically different from “traditional” ontologies. However, this insight applies equally to other entities that cannot be understood as present at hand (as substance): tools, art works, or ideal entities (such as numbers or logical connectives) seem to be among the candidates that must be understood as constituted through distinct intentional comportments, and thus as having a distinct mode of being.

Thus, the purported mistake would be to absolutise one mode of disclosure across all entities or, in other words, to ontologically reduce all entities to one mode of being. If entities are disclosed as physical substances in one particular form of intentionality, this does not mean that all entities can be described in terms of their physical properties (as e.g. physicalism would have it) – one would completely miss, Heidegger, would say, what a given art work is if one were to reduce it to the physical components that make up the artwork, precisely because such entities are disclosed through different forms of intentional comportment and their corresponding projections of being than physical entities, and thus have a different mode of being to physical entities. So it is with understanding entities according to practical intentionality: some entities can indeed be understood through practical engagement, or on the background of such practical engagements, but not all entities are necessarily constituted
through the corresponding intentional comportment (as e.g. pragmatism, or even many practice-based readings of Heidegger would have it).

Heidegger’s critique of Kant’s conception of being: natural objects and their conditions

We have seen that Heidegger interprets intentional comportment in the framework based on his interpretation of Kant, namely, as the projection of a prior understanding of being in a given comportment that then enables entities to become manifest in light of the particular mode of being that is projected. However, Heidegger does not take over the Kantian framework *simpliciter*, and indeed has severe reservations about specific aspects of it, which he believes must be rectified in his own articulation of the framework for understanding the relation to entities. Isolating Heidegger’s specific criticisms of Kant can thus provide us with certain desiderata for the specific nature of the development of the late Marburg project. We also looked above at an example of this framework applied to a particular (Greek) mode of comportment, and saw that there is a certain danger in the articulation of a concept of being based on a particular comportment due to the tendency to take one such comportment and its relevant mode of being as a stand-in for all possible modes of being, that is, for being in general – this general point will now put us in a position to understand Heidegger’s specific criticisms of Kantian ontology, and ultimately of Heidegger’s way of redressing these criticisms in the development of his own project.
Unlike the (at least according to Heidegger) Greek orientation toward practical-productive comportment and the resulting substance-ontology, the specific mode of comportment that determines Kant’s general ontology is the scientific mode of comportment based on the scientific revolution of the 17th century. Kant’s alleged prejudice towards science is thus the result of the worldview of the age in which he was writing; as Heidegger puts it, such a prejudice “is no accident” and does not merely “represent the private preference of Kant” (GA 25, 43-4). Rather, Kant considers the modern scientific conception of objects “as unshaken and self-evident”, and for this reason “natural science is inevitably given a priority in the fundamental discussion of the possibility of a science of entities in general” (GA 25, 43-4). The result of the priority of scientific comportment, however, is that Kant’s posing of the problem of being “suffers from a significant contraction” (GA 25, 43-4). My next task is to understand why exactly this should be so. In what follows I examine Heidegger’s understanding of the nature of scientific comportment, its particular mode of being that it presupposes, and the resulting kinds of entities it makes manifest. This will lead to two concrete criticisms of the Kantian project that Heidegger formulates on the above basis, which will ultimately provide grounds for a closer determination of the nature of Heidegger’s own project.

Much as in the case of productive comportment and pragmatic comportment in relation to products and tools, respectively, the objects of science are for Heidegger indexed to a particular kind of comportment. The comportment that is particular to science and the natural-scientific understanding of objects is, specifically, a “knowing comportment” (GA 25, 17), much in the same way that
“productive comportment” is indexed to an understanding of objects as products or that “pragmatic/manipulative comportment” aims at objects qua tools. Whereas the aim of, for example, pragmatic comportment towards tools is to employ a given object for a particular task determined by a particular purpose (such as hammering a nail in order to build a house), the aim of scientific comportment is to acquire explicit knowledge of a particular entity: “To inhere in [the scientific] way of being and of knowing means to have a relationship with entities that are knowable or known, such as nature, history, space or time” (GA 25, 18-9). As in the above cases of kinds of comportment that we saw, the scientific form of comportment also projects a mode of being that uncovers the entities that are intended: Scientific comportment “relates to entities themselves; in fact, it is a comportment which reveals the entity to which it is related” (GA 25, 18-9).

Though this form of comportment is orientated toward, in some sense, knowledge of an entity in abstraction from subjective or inter-subjective practical contexts, this comportment nonetheless remains “a human comportment” that constitutes a “definite, possible way for humans to be” with respect to a given entity (GA 25, 18-9). As such, this comportment involves a prior understanding of the being of the intentional object:

To bring to light entities as entities now becomes the real and sole task [the realization of which] thus depends primarily on the realization of the basic condition which pertains to all uncovering of entities, i.e., depends on the enactment [Vollzug] called understanding of being (GA 25, 27-8).
However, science – *Wissenschaft* in the broadest sense – has many possible objects and thus attempts to “bring to light” a variety of kinds of entities, including “nature, history, space or time” (GA 25, 18), and in this sense “many and entirely different regions of entities can become an object for scientific investigation” (GA 25, 27). These kinds of entities then form ontological regions, each corresponding to a particular kind of object, which the particular sciences then explore:

Since every science always has its field and its region of beings as object, the corresponding ontological reflection always refers to the regional constitution of being that determines one region. Latent in every science of a realm of beings there always lies a regional ontology which belongs to this science, (GA 25, 36-7).

Because each ontological region is based on a particular prior projection of an understanding of being, and because this projection of being then discloses the objects populating the region in question, science then consists in “the development of an understanding of the constitution of the being of the respective entity” (GA 25, 28). Such a development of the understanding of being consists in the emergence of concepts “which circumscribe what is, for instance, historical reality as such, or what basically distinguishes a being as a living being, i.e., the basic concepts of the respective sciences” (GA 25, 28).

Despite the possible variety of ontological regions corresponding to the particular sciences, Heidegger’s interest here is to develop the understanding of being implicit in the region of entities that Kant takes to be exemplary, namely
the natural entities that serve as the objects of the “mathematical sciences”. As Heidegger puts it, “the mathematical sciences of nature are precisely what became and remained for Kant the model of science as such” (GA 25, 29). Because mathematical sciences delimit their own region, they also project a particular understanding of being that allows the entities in this region to become manifest.

What does it mean for entities to become manifest in the ontological region corresponding to the mathematical sciences in accordance with the mode of being that these project? In the case of this particular projection of being, when I look at, in Heidegger’s own example, a bridge in front of me the things I see do not show up as e.g. functional parts of the bridge – piers, suspender cables, deck etc. – as they would in service of my everyday, practical mode of comportment, but instead as “material bodies, points of mass standing in certain relations” (GA 27, 184). There is then, for Heidegger, a transformation of what shows up and how it shows up at an empirical level, that is, a new determination of the entities around me in terms of both their “what-content” and their “how-content” (GA 27, 184).

In the case of the natural entities that serve as the objects of physics, the “what-content” conceals a range of further determinations, such as: “material, movable in space in the sense of alteration of place in time”. This new “what-content” at the same time leads to a new “how”: the things no longer appear as “ready to hand for practical-technical manipulation (Bearbeitung)” but as “simply just present at hand material bodies” (GA 27, 184). These determinations of the
what-being and how-being (Wassein und Wiesein) in conjunction constitute the “being of the particular entity” (GA 27, 184). It is not the case that the new determination of the being of material bodies is drawn from the determinations inherent in material bodies themselves; rather, the projection of the respective mode of being is prior to, and at the same time enables, the disclosure of individual things as material bodies. In this sense, such a projection opens up a region of material entities that together constitute “a universal region of material things, called physical nature” (GA 27, 189).

Heidegger considers the determination of the being of nature in this projection to have been “Galileo’s and Kepler’s basic achievement” (GA 25, 31). In Galileo’s conception of being, nature is said to have been circumscribed in advance “as to be determinable and accessible to inquiry as a closed system of locomotion of material bodies in time” (GA 25, 31), and in this sense the basic determinations of nature – motion, body, place, time – were “thought in such a way as to make mathematical determinability possible” (GA 25, 31). Such mathematical determinability is enabled by the projection of nature as a “context of bodies in motion, the basic character of which lies in their spatial and temporal extension, and where motion is nothing other than change of place in time” (GA 27, 189). What is thus projected in the pre-understanding of being in the physical sciences of Galileo and up to Kant’s day is a spatio-temporal realm governed by causal laws – it is this prior understanding that enables the ontic understanding of entities qua physical or natural objects, much in the way that a prior understanding of pragmatic-teleological relations enables the understanding of entities as tools or as ready to hand more broadly.
As a description of the scientific revolution or even as an incipient theory of science there is nothing very surprising in Heidegger's reflections, especially in our post-Kuhnian context. Nor does such a description of either the kind of intentional attitude particular to science or of the regional nature of specific scientific disciplines depart much from the Husserlian picture (see Ideas II, Husserl 1989, pp. 3-29 for the former and Ideas I, Husserl 1983, pp. 18-32 for the latter). What is distinctive, however, in Heidegger's account is the emphasis on the priority of the ontological level, and the way that this level functions as conditioning the possibility of the experience of a corresponding field of empirical objects. New scientific paradigms are not straightforwardly the result of empirical practices of processes, but are made possible by an a priori understanding of being that stretches far beyond the realm of science itself, and of which scientific practice is merely one possible manifestation. The projection of being then “stakes out” a particular region of entities that can only subsequently become the object of this or that science, because the entity determined in this manner only first “comes into relief” against the background of such a projection of being (GA 27, 196). This projection first “brings the entity to light” and first “makes possible” the presence of the entity (GA 27, 196). In this sense, and as argued above, in his emphasis on an ontologically enabling function of the pre-understanding of being, Heidegger is once again operating close to a Kantian framework for understanding the conditions that enable the experience of determine objects a priori and constitute the field of objects for a possible

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experience.

The “what-content” in Heidegger’s “being” – materiality and movability in space, in the case of the being of nature – thus corresponds to Kantian pure concepts in the sense that together they a) enable the experience of objects of a given constitution and b) set limits to what counts as an object. In the case of b), Heidegger would add that what the projection of being limits is whether something counts as an object for a given region rather than for experience in general, which also counts among Heidegger's primary complaints against Kant – in other words, Kant took the conditions of possibility that determine the ontological region of natural entities to be a determination of experience in general.

The specific criticism that can be gleaned from the above is the following. Kant's critical philosophy is (according to Heidegger) an attempt to articulate a general ontology, or a theory of being. In this sense, he needs to show how certain ontological conditions make objects possible. Based on such conditions, we can at the same time determine the “being” of these objects, i.e. what must a priori belong to their constitution universally and necessarily. However, we have seen that the being of entities (i.e. the ontological conditions) is bound up with a particular mode of intentional comportment, where distinct modes of comportment project distinct modes of being. There are as many kinds of entities of distinct ontological constitutions as there are possible comportments. Because Kant, however, specifically took “scientific comportment” as his model for determining the conditions of the experience of objects and with these the
ontological content of objects, the result was that his ontology countenances only those objects that are uncovered through the particularly scientific form of comportment, namely natural objects. Thus, given that there are not only natural objects, and that a general ontology would have to account for not only natural objects but all possible objects, Kant’s ontology suffers from the aforementioned “significant contraction”.

Kant therefore, according to Heidegger, failed to produce a general ontology but instead produced merely a regional ontology of nature. In this sense, according to Heidegger’s argument, what Kantian philosophy articulates is an “ontological foundation for the positive sciences” (GA 25, 426-7) rather than the ontological foundation of the understanding of entities in general at which the question of being qua being should aim. If we are seeking the meaning of being in general we are not seeking the ontological foundations for this or that science but for entities universally. For this reason, it is the question of “the universality of being” rather than any of its particular regions that denotes “the task which a further thinking through [of Kant’s philosophy] calls for” (GA 25, 427). Heidegger’s further “thinking through” of this task determines the development of his work in the period following the publication of Being and Time, an effort that represents what I have been referring to as the late Marburg project.

There are several points worth remarking upon in relation to the above criticism. Firstly, if Heidegger’s criticism is supposed to be an internal one then it only works if one accepts the first premise, namely that it was Kant’s explicit intention to articulate a general ontology. Heidegger clearly insists on this last
point in no uncertain terms:

what Kant really wanted to give is not a categorical, structural doctrine of the object of mathematical natural science. What he wanted was a theory of entities in general. Kant sought a theory of being in general... He sought a general ontology... the Analytic is not just an ontology of nature as object of natural science, but is rather a general ontology, a critical, well-established Metaphysica Generalis... the central motive is the question concerning the possibility of Metaphysica Generalis, or rather the carrying-out of same (GA 3, 278-9).

Heidegger thus believes that Kant's aim was to construct a critical version of general metaphysics ("Metaphysica Generalis"), which could then serve as a basis for a critical "special metaphysics" in Kant's sense, or for articulating regional ontologies in Heidegger's sense. This is, however, an ascription of an aim to Kant's project that many will find dubious, and indeed, as we saw, Heidegger himself admits that his reading distorts Kant. Nonetheless, the particular criticism can function as an external one: if Heidegger shows that there are entities of a distinct ontological kind that cannot be accounted for by a Kantian framework, then the need to modify or expand the general framework appears to be genuine. Seen from this external perspective, Kant succumbs to the danger that appeared in the case of the Greeks, namely of attempting to absolutise one particular mode of being based in a particular intentional comportment into being as such. As Heidegger puts it: "Ontologically, Kant depends entirely on the

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7 Kant refers to his project in The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as a "special metaphysics", which he contrasts to the "general metaphysics" contained in the first Critique (4:470).
traditional ontology of what is present at hand” (GA 25, 281). Because the content of Kant's metaphysical principles yields only the determinations of natural objects – material, movable in space, causally interacting, etc. – Heidegger sees it as an ontology of the region of present at hand natural objects. As in the case of the Greeks, this becomes a problem if it can be shown that the region of entities of the mode of being of presence at hand does not coincide with entities as such:

the Kantian ontology does not prove to be the ontology which ought to be equated with *metaphysica generalis*. This equation is legitimate only insofar as and as long as "being" is equated with "being present at hand" and its concomitant determinations – an equation which has remained self-evident for the whole philosophical tradition up to now, but fundamentally without justification (GA 25, 199-200).

We can, furthermore, learn from the above criticism something of the particular constraints on Heidegger's aims to “think through” this problem in the late Marburg period. Heidegger claims that Kant’s general metaphysics is identical to a special metaphysics of nature or, in other words, that general metaphysics can only accommodate a special metaphysics of natural entities. What must be done, then, is to rework the general metaphysics so that it is able to accommodate a wider range of kinds of entities, indeed, that it is able to accommodate all possible entities universally. In the previous section, we saw that Heidegger accepts the basic *form* of Kant’s framework for understanding the nature of the object-relation, that is, of what he now calls his general metaphysics. However, the *content* that Kant gives to his basic metaphysical principles, because it is able
to yield merely natural entities, needs to be revised in light of the above. We can thus say, somewhat sloganistically, that Heidegger accepts the basic form of Kant’s general ontology, but not the content. We can also expect, based on this, that Heidegger will attempt to re-work or transform the content of the metaphysical principles in his own appropriation of the form of the problem.

This is indeed how Heidegger characterizes the task stemming from the above criticism of Kant’s framework in a passage that is worth quoting in full:

If we radicalize the Kantian problem of ontological knowledge in the sense that we do not limit this problem to the ontological foundation of the positive sciences and if we do not take this problem as a problem of judgment but as the radical and fundamental question concerning the possibility of understanding being in general, then we shall arrive at the philosophically fundamental problematic of *Being and Time*. Time will then no longer be understood in terms of the ordinary concept of time, but in terms of temporality as the original unity of the ecstatic constitution of Dasein. Being will then no longer be understood in terms of nature’s being extant, but rather in that universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation. Universality of being and radicality of time are the two titles which together denote the tasks which a further thinking of the possibility of metaphysics calls for (GA 25, 426-7).

In the first section of the above quotation, Heidegger repeats what we have signaled above, namely that the Kantian framework must be expanded so as to
cover not merely the region of natural objects, but of entities as such. This represents the move from an “ontology of the positive sciences” to a general ontology, that is, to the possibility of “understanding being in general”. Heidegger also notes that such a move would shift the focus away from judgment towards understanding. This is also consistent with the above if we keep in mind that judgment is one particular kind of intentional comportment, specifically one belonging to scientific comportment, and that if we want to bring in other kinds of intentional comportments we need to expand the conception of the understanding beyond the particularly judging comportment (this will be the subject of Chapter 4).

Heidegger concludes that such a radicalization of the conception of ontological knowledge means that “being will then no longer be understood in terms of nature’s being extant, but rather in that universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation” (GA 25, 426-7). In other words, this is the central aim I signaled above (and to which I shall return in what follows), namely that being cannot be reduced to the being of the region of natural entities as it is in Kant, but rather must encompass all possible regions, or in short, must relate universally to entities in general. For this reason, Heidegger concludes that “universality of being” is the first of two “titles” for the task that is required for a “further thinking” of the possibility of metaphysics. It is precisely the attempt to further think through the question of the universality of being in light of the regional multiplicity of entities that best represents what I have called the late Marburg project. This attempt is carried out in the Kantian transcendental framework that I have delineated in the present chapter. We now, however, have
a first desideratum for the project in relation to a criticism of the Kantian framework: the content and nature of the ontological principles that correspond to the general metaphysics must be re-thought or expanded so as to countenance a wider range of regions of entities, which correspond to special metaphysics.

As we can note from the quotation, however, there is a second “title” for this future task, namely what Heidegger calls the “radicality of time”. This title also follows from a radicalization of the Kantian problem of ontological knowledge and is said to lead to “philosophically fundamental problematic of Being and Time”. This relates to a second criticism that is closely connected to the first. In Kant’s privileging of knowing comportment in the construction of his ontology, he conceived of the content of the ontological principles (i.e. of being) principally in terms of the categories of thought. This problem will be explored in more detail in chapters to follow, but briefly the problem is the following. The categories are derived from logical functions of thought, as Kant puts it, which means that they are the expression of thought. One of the reasons that Kant ends up with merely a regional ontology of nature, according to Heidegger, is that his ontology privileges logical functions of thought. As Heidegger puts it:

Although Kant sees the crucial place served by thinking and its object-relatedness, he nevertheless conceives thinking as more originally a priori than intuition, instead of taking intuition – time – as a priori over against thinking. This means misconstruing the primary transcendence (GA 25, 246-248).

While categories of thought may be appropriate to a comportment that
privileges pure knowing, as scientific comportment does, and thus may be capable of yielding a regional ontology of natural objects, they are not necessarily appropriate to other regions. One way of expanding the general ontological conditions so as to make them capable of accounting for a wider region of entities is to include not only discursive but also intuitive content. Because, as stated in the quotation above, Heidegger equates intuition with time, he believes that ontological conditions – that is, being – should be grounded not merely in pure concepts but in time as well. The requirement to give temporal content to the ontological principles – in other words, to think being in terms of time – responds to the \textit{how} of the desideratum identified above of rethinking the ontological conditions in order to make them more inclusive.

If a Kantian general metaphysics based on ontological conditions grounded in subjective laws of thought or functions of judgment can yield merely a special metaphysics of nature, and if we want a more general metaphysics that will encompass not only a special metaphysics of nature, then we must look for ontological conditions not in the transcendental unity of subjectivity but elsewhere. The question is, of course, what kind of a transcendental unity can provide such conditions. In other words, the problem is the question of where we can ground these more universal or general ontological conditions if not in transcendental subjectivity.

Heidegger's answer is, notoriously, that it is not the subject but \textit{time} that is the ground of being, which represents among the most exegetically problematic and prima facie implausible aspects of his doctrine – I will spend a good portion of
part II simply interpreting what such a thesis could mean. I want to set the stage
for such an interpretation by dedicating a few words to at least making the
source of the problem as well as Heidegger’s intuition for its potential solution
slightly more plausible.

Suppose, in light of the above, that one wants to expand the range of kinds of
possible objects of experience in relation to those countenanced by Kant. This
would require a reassessment of the ontological conditions themselves that
make objects possible; and, if one wanted to radically expand the range of
possible objects, one might consider detaching such conditions from subjective
forms of intuition or of judgment, perhaps detaching them from subjectivity as
such – this is so especially if one believes, as Heidegger does, that such a
subjective conception of ontological conditions are able to yield nothing but
natural objects.

One can provide a satisfactory derivation of natural objects if one conceives their
conditions of possibility in Kantian terms. But, if there are more such kinds of
objects beyond natural ones, then the conception of being in terms of subjective
forms is merely one conception of being among others. Perhaps the above
subjectively conceived ontological conditions are themselves based upon other,
more basic conditions, of which the former are but one manifestation. Next, if
one has the intuition, as Heidegger does, that the history of metaphysics has
always understood its basic concepts in temporal terms – substance is that
which is permanent in time, God is the being that is timeless or eternal, etc. – then
one might wonder whether the Kantian ontological conditions also have such a
Finally, one might notice in Kant himself, as Heidegger did, an inchoate development of, or a possible blueprint for, just such a temporally-grounded understanding of being. Kant’s categories and forms of intuition, as the two sources of transcendental conditions, appear to be heterogeneous to one another, raising the question of how the two relate. Kant’s solution to this problem was to translate categories into a temporal schema, which would make the former homogenous with intuition within the universal medium of time which is, as the universal form of sense, common to both intuitions and categories in their object-relatedness. In this manner the logical relations at the bottom of categories can be reformulated in temporal relations: the relation of two propositions in hypothetical judgements can be reformulated in terms of the temporal succession of two appearances, and so forth for the remaining functions of judgement. In this sense, schemata are a “third thing” (KrV A155/B194) that functions as a bridge between pure concepts and pure intuitions.

Now, Heidegger reasons, if all ontological relations can be reformulated in terms of temporal relations, and if categories are merely one set of such ontological relations, then could it be that categories are not basic subjective capacities that ground cognition but rather are themselves grounded in temporal relations? If we can reformulate the logical relations comprised by categories that yield natural entities in terms of temporal relations, can we also reformulate the pragmatic relations that yield ready to hand entities in temporal terms? And can
we do so for all possible modes of being? In this sense, temporal schemata would not be a third thing that subsequently relates two ontologically basic sets of conditions but the common unified ground of both – might temporal schemata be the common root of both sets, of intuition and thought, at which Kant himself hints at times? Heidegger's gambit is to respond in the affirmative to all the above questions. It is in this sense that the meaning of being is to be time. Part II of the present work will be concerned with spelling out how Heidegger does so, and with assessing to what extent this gambit is successful.

Imagination represents the “hidden root” of intuition and understanding that many commentators emphasise in Heidegger's Kant reading, and represents a solution that Heidegger claims Kant famously “shrank back” from. To the extent that the imagination is temporal, the common root is also temporal, and consequently Heidegger needs to also provide a temporal interpretation of the self. As Käufer (2011, 194) puts it:

> If the self makes synthesis possible – or, in Heidegger’s system, unifies the ecstasies – then the self must be temporal. In fact, Heidegger claims, “time and the ‘I think’ do not incongruously oppose one another, but turn out to be one and the same” (KPM 191/134).

The care structure of the self that Heidegger develops in Being and Time is thus (among other things) a temporalised re-reading of the Kantian subject. This is also certainly an important result of Heidegger's engagement with Kant, and a large part of the aim of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time is to show that the subject (i.e. Dasein) is constitutively temporal. However, as I have
mentioned, the later Marburg project develops more the object pole of the relation of transcendence, and aims to show how time is constitutive of ontological regions of entities in the projection of being. As Heidegger put it in a later note in the margin to one of the first mentions of “Dasein” in Being and Time: “Sein aber hier nicht nur als Sein des Menschen (Existenz)… In-der-Weltsein schließt in sich den Bezug der Existenz zum Sein im Ganzen: Seinsverständnis” (GA 2, 16, note a). Heidegger’s project was thus to develop not only toward an account of the being of Dasein but of “being as a whole”, a move that we shall see develop in the late Marburg period. To the extent that the being of Dasein also needs to be constitutively temporal to relate to entities, the result of the existential analytic of Dasein is presupposed in the late Marburg project. However, in the latter project the emphasis will be less on imagination as a faculty of Dasein and more on the imagination in its role in producing the temporal schemata in terms of which the ontological constitution of entities is understood.

In this sense, schematism becomes central both to Heidegger’s reading of Kant and to the development of the late Marburg question of the unity of being in light of its regional multiplicity. I have argued that Heidegger’s primary criticism of Kant that drives the late Marburg project is that of the restrictiveness of the ontological conditions that constitute the understanding of being. Heidegger’s aim is thus to re-think these ontological conditions. I also briefly alluded above to the fact that Heidegger not only identifies this lack in Kant but also finds in the critical philosophy the blueprint for a potential solution to the problem, namely in the doctrine of schematism. The option to interpret being not in terms of
logical functions of judgement but rather in terms of temporal schemata is the path that Kant failed to take, that he “shrank back” from. In this sense, Heidegger writes that “in the chapter on schematism time is shown to be that pure intuition upon which the pure thinking of objects... must be grounded” (GA 25, 194), and the schematism chapter is said to represent the “the central core of the entire Critique” (GA 25, 287). In order to understand Heidegger’s own attempts to develop the late Marburg question of the being of entities it is necessary to understand Heidegger’s interpretation and appropriation of the Kantian doctrine of schematism, to which I now turn. Heidegger’s own approach to the problem of the multiplicity of ontological regions in the late Marburg project will be centred on precisely the understanding of schematism that Heidegger develops in his engagement with Kant.

Chapter 2. The Appropriation of Kant’s Doctrine of Schematism

The Methodological Significance of Schematism

The significance that Heidegger accords to the relatively short section on schematism is primarily due to the central role that it is to play in unifying the whole of transcendental knowledge. Once organized around schematism, the elements that go into transcendental knowledge themselves take on a new import. Not only does the true nature of categories here first come into view, as Heidegger states, but the doctrine of schematism even represents a “fundamental retraction of [the categories’] initially assumed character of pure
concepts of understanding” (GA 25, 402-3). By first coming into contact with time, the categories not only come to form a unity with intuitions (and thus, come to constitute transcendental knowledge in its unity), but are transformed in their very nature. In this sense, the section on schematism forms the “central core” (GA 3, 89; GA 25, 287) of the entire first Critique. As mentioned, “transcendental knowledge” is comprised of two primary elements, concepts and intuitions. Why, however, does Heidegger take the central problem of the Critique to be the establishment of an “essential unity of transcendental knowledge”? Furthermore, was not the unity between these two primary components already established in a section that precedes the schematism section, namely the transcendental deduction, which aims at showing that pure concepts apply to intuition?

For Heidegger, “essential unity of transcendental knowledge” refers to the problem of the applicability of the categories to intuitions, which was also central to Kant. The transcendental deduction was intended to establish the right by which categories are to be applied to what at first appear to be an element that is heterogenous to concepts, namely the sensible manifold given in intuition. Yet, Heidegger argues that Kant takes up the question from the wrong end: because the finite nature of human knowledge means that thinking is dependent on intuition, for the categories to play any part at all in human knowledge, they must already contain a built-in reference to intuitions. It is thus only because Kant conceives of categories in abstracto, as pure notions of the understanding that initially have no connection to sensibility, that he is pushed toward the necessity of attempting to provide an account of their connectivity with the other
element of knowledge, namely intuition, in the form of a juridical question of right, the so-called *questio juris*. In this manner, the initial isolation of category and intuition in the structure of the Critique is revealed as an “artificial” one, and the relatability of both must be based on a prior or more “essential” unity:

the more radically one seeks to isolate the pure elements of a finite [act of] knowledge, the more compelling becomes the impossibility of such an isolation and the more obtrusive is the dependency of pure thinking on intuition. With that, however, the artificiality of the first point of departure for a characterization of pure knowledge [i.e. that of the *questio juris*] is revealed. Pure concepts, then, can only be determined as ontological predicates if they are understood as based on the *essential unity* of finite, pure knowledge (GA 3, 58).

Once the starting point that takes categories as pure concepts that are initially unrelated to intuitions is eliminated, the nature of categories themselves changes. Because ontological knowledge, or the understanding of the being of entities, must “lie directly in the categories”, and because knowledge requires the interdependence of intuiting and thinking, Heidegger concludes that for “the essence of the categories it is precisely the pure intuitability of the notions that becomes decisive” (GA 3, 67). When, on the other hand, Kant initially conceives of categories as pure notions that are “shorn” of reference to intuition, he is taking up a merely abstract starting point that results in a fragmentary and incomplete determination of the essence of the categories:

If the pure concept is apprehended initially as notion, then the second element of pure knowledge has by no means yet been attained in its
elementary character. On the contrary, it has been shorn of the decisive, essential moment, namely, the inner reference to intuition. The pure concept as notion is therefore only a fragment of the second element of pure knowledge (GA 3, 57).

Where the categories do attain, for Heidegger, their full-blooded, concrete, and essential nature, now determined to contain an inherent reference to intuition, is in the schematism section. It is this section that demonstrates, for Heidegger, how intuitions and concepts are intrinsically interconnected, and thus establishes the essential unity of transcendental knowledge. But why was this task not successfully carried out in the section previous to it, the deduction, as Kant intended? The answer was partially indicated above, as Heidegger thought that this section was conceived too much in the sense of a juridical deduction, in consequence of which Kant was never able to solder together what he had originally divided too sharply, except in a haphazard, *ex post facto* manner. As Heidegger states, the necessary interdependence of the two elements of knowledge, concept and intuition, means that “their unity cannot be “later” than they are themselves, but rather that it must have applied to them “earlier”” (GA 3, 58). In other words, if one can show that it is in the very nature of the categories to form a unity with intuition, one no longer need pose the question of the juridical right of their applicability. Kant’s attempt to bridge the gap between concept and intuition by means of the synthesis of the imagination, though on the right track, was thus insufficient in fully displaying the underlying and essential unity of transcendental knowledge. But such an essential account of
this unity, for Heidegger, does appear in the schematism section, which is for this reason taken as the crowning achievement of the entire Critique.

How then does the schematism section establish the unity of pure knowledge? The categories, as we saw, can only fulfil their transcendental function when they cease to be depicted as pure concepts of the understanding and are conceived of as bearing an inherent relation to objects. This object relation, as we saw, is what Heidegger calls transcendence – the transcendental function of the categories, then, is to enable a relation to the object, or to enable transcendence. This relation is thus to make up the unity of transcendental knowledge precisely by connecting up or relating both of its elements, namely pure concepts and intuitions. In other words, to the extent that the unity of pure concepts and intuitions makes possible ontological knowledge, and ontological knowledge (i.e. understanding of being) is a condition on the understanding of entities (i.e. of transcendence) the unity of ontological knowledge makes transcendence possible (as per the conception of transcendence mentioned previously). The categories are seen as enabling such a relation through their function of projecting an ontological horizon against which empirical objects then appear and become accessible. At the beginning of his analysis of the schematism chapter, Heidegger equates transcendence with the formation of this horizon:

   Ontological knowledge "forms" transcendence, and this forming is nothing other than the holding-open of the horizon within which the being of the entity becomes discernible in a preliminary way (GA 3, 123).
If ontological knowledge is pure a priori knowledge – specifically, knowledge by means of the categories – then what establishes the reference to objects of the categories is precisely the formation of the horizon that makes reference to objects possible. How does schematism form such a horizon? As mentioned above, for the categories to attain unity with intuitions they must be made intuitable, as Heidegger puts it. In the context of what was said above, this means that the horizon that is projected through the categories must itself be made intuitable, or sensible. The process is the following: a horizon is projected against which entities are understood in their being and thus encounterable as the entities that they are. For them to be encounterable, however, means for them to be perceivable. For them to be perceivable, they must take a sensible form. But this means, Heidegger reasons, that the horizon within and through which they are encountered, must itself be made sensible. To be sensible, to be available to sensory intuition, means to present an image or to have what Heidegger calls “a look”. A concept, as a series of marks or a rule, presumably does not have a look – it does not have a sensuous form that can be presented to intuition. But, if the categories are to play any role in ontological knowledge, the horizon they project cannot be simply a collection of conceptual determinations or marks, but must itself have precisely such an intuitable look that can become available to sensibility. As Heidegger puts it:

If in the letting-stand-against, the horizon which is formed therein is to be made intuitable (and again, finite intuition is called sensibility), then the

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8This way of putting it is slightly misleading, as it implies that categories are first of all non-intuitable (i.e. pure concepts) and then must be subsequently made intuitable, i.e. just the chronology that Heidegger wants to reject. A better way of putting it would be: to display their inherently intuitable character. Whenever Heidegger speaks of “making intuitable” and “making sensible” it is in this sense that it should be understood.
offering of the look can only be a making-sensible of the horizon. The horizon of transcendence can be formed only in a making-sensible (GA 3, 91).

The making-sensible of the horizon, which is to enable the sought-after unity, and thus relatability, of the two poles of transcendental knowledge (pure concept and intuition), is precisely the task of schematism:

The pure making-sensible occurs as a "Schematism." The pure power of imagination gives schema-forming in advance the look ("image") of the horizon of transcendence (GA 3, 91).

Thus, schematism is the process by which the horizon is made available to intuition through the production of images. This is, ultimately, the manner in which transcendental knowledge is unified into a coherent whole and, consequently, is itself made possible. The key role in this section is taken on by the “image”: in what sense does a schemata produce an image, and how does this image make pure concepts intuitable? – indeed, what does Heidegger mean by image here? The weight of the schematism chapter thus falls on an analysis of “image”, the production of which is not only to ground the “applicability” of categories to intuitions but should also allow a more detailed account of the interconnection between the two elements of pure knowledge than the one presented in the transcendental deduction.
As the section on schematism is among the most complex, both in Kant's text as well as in Heidegger's treatment of it, it is best approached through an account of the relation between an empirical concept and its image (i.e. empirical schematism), based on which a characterization of transcendental schematism of pure concepts can then be given. Beginning, then, at the empirical level, Heidegger distinguishes between three meanings of image: 1) the immediate look of an entity as given through intuition, 2) a likeness or copy of an entity in the sense of a photograph, and 3) the look of something in general. The first two characterizations are ruled out as candidates for the making-sensible of concepts as both are strictly singular representations, whereas the concept is always a general or universal (Allgemein) representation in the sense that it applies to multiple particulars. Consequently, the particulars represented in the first two kinds of image cannot supply the generality that a concept requires. The third meaning of image, however, provides something like the look of a thing in general precisely through a singular representation, according to Heidegger. This kind of image, then, is both singular (like intuitions) and universal (like concepts), and so it is this kind of image that now must “serve the making-sensible of concepts” (GA 3, 94). To distinguish it from the other two kinds of image, Heidegger calls it the “schema-image” (GA 3, 97).

The question is, of course, that of how an image, as singular representation of a particular, can provide the look of something in general. In other words, how can something be both particular and general at the same time? Heidegger attempts
to explain this apparent contradiction through an example of a house and its schema-image. Considered as schema-image, we are not concerned with the singular, determinate look of the house, but only with the as-structure of a house in general that the look of this particular house reveals: “this house shows itself in exactly such a way that, in order to be a house, it must not necessarily appear as it does. It shows us "only" the "as ... " in terms of which a house can appear” (GA 3, 95). Thus the particular form that this house takes – its specific determinations and properties – is disregarded. What is the focus, rather, is the range of possible determinations within which these particular actual determinations appear. It is this range which is captured by the as-structure of appearing. In other words, a house could presumably appear in its given particularity (as red, as blue, as big, as small etc.) and still appear as a house in general regardless or in spite of these particularities. According to Heidegger, what we perceive in such an image is

the range of possible appearing as such, or, more precisely, we [perceive] that which cultivates this range, that which regulates and marks out how something in general must appear in order to be able, as a house, to offer the appropriate look (GA 3, 95).

Thus, what is given to perception in this image of the house is not so much the determinate house but the range of all possible determinate houses. This, then, is the as-structure of appearing: what is revealed through the as-structure of a given house is something like a “horizon” of all possible sensible houses – though, at this stage it is necessary to put “horizon” in quotation marks, as the
full-blooded notion of horizon will only emerge, as we shall see, at the transcendental, not the empirical level, though the mechanism is analogous.

We thus have three elements: the immediate singular look of an empirical intuition, the general but sensible look of the schema-image, and the mediated, general but not (yet) sensible nature of conceptual determinations. The question that here arises pertains to the latter two, the schema-image and the concept: what is the exact relation between the two, and in what sense is schematism an active “making-sensible” of the concept?

The process of making-sensible is, indeed, the process of schematisation: if the concept is a rule, then schematisation is the representing of this rule, such that it gives rise to sensible figures. Heidegger explains that what is represented in a rule is not a mere list of determinations or marks as with (unschematized) concepts, but a way of giving unity to an intuitive manifold as corresponding with its requisite conceptual counterpart:

This initial sketching-out [Vorzeichnung] of the rule is no list [Verzeichnis] in the sense of a mere enumeration of the “features” found in a house. Rather, it is a “distinguishing” [Auszeichnen] of the whole of what is meant by [a term] like “house” (GA 3, 95).

Thus, what a schema-image represents is, strictly speaking, a rule. This rule does not provide a list of conceptual determinations of the features of the entity represented, but presents the entity “as” a whole (“as—” this or that entity). However, the rule is not explicitly perceived in the schema-image; rather, what is
perceivable in the schema-image is a given possible version of an object that corresponds to the concept which provides its requisite rule:

What is in [the schema-image], and what necessarily comes forward with it in the immediate look, is not, properly speaking, meant as something thematic. Rather, it is meant as that which is possibly capable of being presented in the presentation whose manner of regulation is represented. Thus, in the empirical look it is precisely the rule which makes its appearance in the manner of its regulation (GA 3, 95).

The particular determinations of a given house, for example, are disregarded, and what is represented in schematisation is the rule for perceiving an object in general, which, however, appears in each case as one or other particular object. While, however, the schema-image depicts this particular, determinate object, by dint of representing a general rule it nevertheless stands in for the complete range of possible depictions of that object in general. The schema-image projects this range of possible sensible forms of a given object precisely because it is the representation not merely of a particular object but of the general rule of the concept of that object.

Here, the question may arise as to the “direction” of the process of making-sensible: is it the case that conceptual determinations are somehow imposed onto a bare particular, so to speak, in order to produce a schema-image? Or, is it

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9 As Kant himself puts it, 'The concept of dog signifies a rule according to which my power of imagination can specify the form [Gestalt] of a four-footed animal in general, without being limited to any particular form which experience offers to me, or also to any possible image which I can present in concreto" (KrV, A141/B180).
instead the case that the schema-image is abstracted from the look of an unconceptualised entity? The form of this question, however, would for Heidegger concede too much to the kind of abstractly dualistic approach mentioned at the beginning of this section that he wishes to avoid: it is not that there are at first concepts and intuitions and subsequently that the one needs to be connected up with the other. Rather, what is essential about the schema-image is that it is always the result of the interplay between the two. As Heidegger puts it, the schema-image does not get the character of its look only or first of all from the content of its directly discernible image. Rather, it gets the character of its look from the fact that it springs forth and how it springs forth from out of the possible presentation represented in its regulation; thus, as it were, bringing the rule into the sphere of possible intuitability (GA 3, 99).

An empirical concept divorced from its schema image is thus an undue abstraction – Heidegger will even deny the possibility of such concepts: “beyond the representation of this regulative unity of the rule, the concept is nothing. What logic refers to as a concept is [always] grounded in the schema” (GA 3, 98). Nor, however, can there be such a thing as an unschematised, sensible given: “in the immediate perception of something at hand, this house for example, the schematizing preview [Vorblick] of something like house in general is of necessity already to be found” (GA 3, 101). In other words, as there can be no concept without a schema neither can there be an intuition without a schema.
The schema-image through which an entity is given provides, and necessarily contains, both intuitive and conceptual content. This may sound simply like a rephrasing of the Kantian dictum that concepts without intuitions are “empty” and intuitions without concepts are “blind” (KrV A51/B75). However, this would miss a subtle but significant point. As stressed above, it is not that there are concepts and then there are intuitions, and the two are subsequently conjoined to create knowledge. Rather, both intuitions and concepts turn out to be abstractions from a prior unity, and it is for this reason alone that they by themselves alone, or in abstracto, could play no significant role in knowledge. This prior unity, as we saw, is embodied in the schema-image. Moreover, this unity takes the shape neither of a singularity nor a universal, but of “horizon” containing a range of possible co-determinations of universal and particular that together produce the form or figure of a given entity. This horizontal nature of the unifying element in empirical knowledge will take on a significant role in transcendental schematism, and in Heidegger’s conception of transcendental knowledge in general, as we shall presently see.

Transcendental Schematisation

The basis for understanding transcendental schematisation has already been provided by what was said about empirical schematisation above, with one essential difference: because we are here dealing with pure concepts, i.e. ones that are prior to and independent of all experience, their corresponding schema-image must also be pure. In other words, the “look” of these concepts cannot be
taken from “the sphere of the empirically intuitive” (GA 3, 102). If the “look” of these concepts cannot be taken from the empirical sphere, it must be taken from the pure sphere. However, the look of the concept cannot be taken from the sphere of pure concepts, because they are by definition non-sensible and thus are not able to deliver the requisite intuitive content. But then, Heidegger reasons, for Kant the only option that can provide content that is both pure and intuitive is time, because time is both an intuition and a priori, and so combines the particularity of the former with the universality of the latter (KrV A138/B177). Time, as a priori intuition, writes Heidegger, is thus able to “procure a look prior to all experience” (GA 3, 103). Consequently, the schemata for pure concepts must be based in schema-images of pure time. Or, as Kant puts it, transcendental schemata are “a priori determinations of time” (KrV A145/B184). The schema-images produced in transcendental schematism, then, are pure images of time and represent the only possible form through which pure concepts can acquire a particular, intuitable look: “time is not only the necessary pure image of the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding, but also their sole, pure possibility of having a certain look” (GA 3, 104).

Furthermore, much as the empirical schema represents possible forms of unification that the look of a given object may take, the schema of categories also represents possible unities that structure an “object” – the object under consideration is now, of course, not an empirical object, but what Kant elsewhere calls a “unique object” (KrV A31/B47), namely time itself:

As schema in general, [the transcendental schema] represents unities, representing them as rules which impart themselves to a possible look.
Now according to the Transcendental Deduction, the unities represented in the notions refer essentially and necessarily to time. The schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding, therefore, must necessarily regulate these internally in time (GA 3, 104).

Thus, the schema of the pure concepts of the understanding produces images by means of its structuration and unification of temporal relations according to its particular rule. In this manner, the rule that characterizes each category of the understanding comes to have an intuitable counterpart in the specific image into which time is configured by that particular rule:

Now if the closed multiplicity of the pure concepts of the understanding is to have its image in this unique possibility of having a certain look, then this image \([\text{Bild}]\) must be one which is pure and which is formable \([\text{bildbar}]\) in a variety of ways. Through internal self-regulation in time as pure look, the schemata of the notions pass their image off from this and thus articulate the unique pure possibility of having a certain look into a variety of pure images (GA 3, 104).

The question might now arise, how can something as ephemeral or abstract as time be configured according to rules? or, indeed, what might an “image” of time even look like? Heidegger here, however, stays quite close to Kant, simply taking over the character of schemata as time-determinations and showing how each time-determination provides an image of pure time in the way described above. Heidegger demonstrates this on the example of substance, a category of relation, for which the corresponding schema is, in Kant’s words, “persistence of the real
in time” (KrV A143/B183). Substance is thus here taken as, roughly, something that is permanent and persists throughout change. Heidegger can then show how the image of persistence as such is inuitable in time:

Now time, as pure sequence of nows, is always now. In every now it is now. Time thus shows its own permanence... [As such] time gives the pure look of something like lasting in general (GA 3, 107).

Thus the notion of substance, characterized by permanence, can itself appear as an image of time precisely in the permanence of “the now” that time is characterised by. We can now also see how time can provide images of the other categories: causality, or necessary succession in time, can be glimpsed in the succession of one now after another; sensation, the schema-image of reality is an image of “filled” time, and so forth. 10

The possibility of concepts to correspond to a particular configuration of time that is expressible in terms of a rule just means that the schemata are the reference to intuition that a given category requires, the necessity of which was sketched out above. Through the possibility of, for example, “seeing” the determinations that make up the pure concept of substance in particular configurations of time, the pure concept of substance is instantiated in an intuitive content. In other words, the conceptual content of the category of substance can be expressed in temporal terms, which means that to the extent

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10 In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Heidegger only analyses the schema for “substance”. However, in the 1925 Logic lectures he provides an analysis of all the schemata that Kant enumerates in the Critique. It is not necessary to go into all of these now, nor is it necessary to raise the question of whether Heidegger is able to plausibly provide a “pure image” for each individual category.
that time is intuitive, it is also expressed in intuitive terms. It is in this sense that transcendental knowledge requires “an essential unity”, as stressed above, and also the sense in which schematism enables or is this unity. Because these schematised categories represent both of the elements of knowledge at a level that is prior to all experience or, rather, the relation between the two that is constitutive of pure knowledge, Heidegger calls them “the ground for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge” (GA 3, 108). Knowledge, it should be remembered, requires both intuitions and concepts; consequently, although the categories are in some sense available prior to experience, shorn of a reference to intuitions they cannot yet play a role in knowledge. In providing an intuitive correspondence to the categories, the schematism just is this necessary reference of categories to intuitions.

The schema, then, creates the intuitive element of pure knowledge by providing a pure, intuitable schema-image. This does not mean, however, that the subject “creates” the empirical world through its own schematising activity. As Heidegger points out, the intuitive element is in no way created in the same manner that the divine intellect creates entities simply by intuiting them. Schematism does not create particular entities, nor can it really provide any knowledge of entities: indeed, it does not “relate itself at all, thematically or directly”, to entities (GA 3, 120). Rather, it is creative in the sense that it projects a horizon of possible unities against which the particular unities that individual entities instantiate can then appear. The schema-image of substance, for example, as permanence in time, provides the horizon through which particular substances (entities that persist throughout change) are able to be identified:
“Through the schematism [of substance] the notion [i.e. the category] as schematized stands in view in advance, so that in this preliminary view of the pure image of persistence, an entity which as such is unalterable in the change can show itself for experience” (GA 3, 108).

It is thus not that particular substances are created through transcendental schematisation. Rather, it is only if persistence-in-time is disclosed in advance that particular entities that persist in time (i.e. substances) can then show themselves. The schematized categories are thus the a priori that must be disclosed before all experience of particular entities, which at the same time enables access to these entities. Hence, transcendental schematisation is the process of the disclosure of being that forms the basis for the intentional comportment that was discussed above. With the transcendental schematism, the complete nature of disclosure can now be established in outline:

As we saw, the being of an entity must be disclosed before the apprehension of that entity. For example, I need to know what presence at hand is before I can experience any particular present at hand entities. This disclosure of the being of the entity at the same time allows that entity to appear by determining it beforehand as the entity that it is (as e.g. a present at hand entity). This determination of the entity prior to all experience takes place by way of the categories. So, for example, a Kantian object must be determined with regard to its quantity, quality, relations, and modality (i.e. according to the categories) in order to be a possible object of experience. In this sense, the being of an entity contains the a priori categorial determinations that constitute that entity as the
entity that it is. The disclosure of being is the projection of these categorial determinations into the sphere of the intuitable, which makes the particular entities that partake in these determinations available to intuition. These categorial determinations do not produce individual entities (as in the *intuitus originarius*). Rather, what is projected is a sphere of all possible categorial determinations of an entity of a given ontological kind, which kind as we now see, and as shall be examined in detail subsequent chapters, corresponds to a particular configuration of temporality. For example, to the extent that the necessary a priori constitution of a given entity contains substantiality, the latter, together with whatever other such categorical content comprise the constitution of the entity, makes up the horizon in terms of which that entity can appear, and thus represents the "being" of the entity that must be understood and projected in advance in the manner described in detail above.

For Kant, i.e. in the case of “objects” of possible experience, what is projected is *objectivity as such*, or, as Heidegger points out, the transcendental object = X (GA 3, 122). The object = X is the conceptual figure or form (*Gestalt*) which an object must satisfy or fit in order to be counted as an object. As mentioned, because this figure is a sphere of possible pure conceptual determinations or marks (*Merkmale*), what is thus projected is not available to intuition, and what the schematism section reveals is that – and how – these pure conceptual determinations are to be made intuitable. As mentioned before, the categories in their unschematised form, shorn of all reference to intuition, can play no role in knowledge. The categories understood as pure notions of the understanding, then, turn out to be abstractions that have no independent function.
Consequently, the making-sensible of the horizon of objectivity should not be understood as a temporally discrete step, which follows upon the projection of objectivity described above. Rather, schematization turns out to be the ground of both objectivity as such (i.e. the categories) as well as objects (intuition), and thus the ground of transcendence (of the subject-object relation).

This ground thus takes the form of an intuitable horizon consisting of variously unified temporal figures, as described above, which it is the function of schematisation to produce:

[The transcendental schematism] forms [bildet] that which stands against in the pure letting-stand-against in such a way that what is represented in pure thinking is necessarily given intuitably in the pure image [Bild] of time. Thus it is time, as given a priori, which in advance bestows upon the horizon of transcendence the character of the perceivable offer (GA 3, 108).

Transcendental schematism forms the horizon, the pure “letting-stand-against”, by determining time according to a categorial rule and producing a pure image of time that can then be given to intuition. The horizon thus contains all possible intuitable iterations of entities corresponding to the schematized categories (e.g. all possible substances, all possible causally-interacting objects, and so forth). The horizon that is opened up through schematism is then the condition of the possibility of objects of experience in that it constitutes objects at the ontological level:
This horizon is the condition for the possibility of the object [Gegenstand] with respect to its being-able-to-stand-against [Gegenstehenkonnens] (GA 3, 118).

This process then enables the uncoveredness of particular empirical (ontic) entities, which then come to represent the third moment of the intentional relation, the intentum. As with categories, empirical objects cut-off from their mode of being and its disclosure would not be capable of appearing as objects. These three moments – projection of objectivity through the categories, uncoveredness of particular entities, and the horizon opened up through schematisation which serves as the unity of both previous moments, together form the unity of transcendence. Heidegger can thus state that the essential unity of the full structure of transcendence... lies in the fact that the letting-stand-against which turns itself toward as such forms the horizon of objectivity in general (GA 3, 119).

We thus have the full structure of the intentional relation described in the previous chapter: the intentio is the act of schematisation of a particular conceptual content; the horizon of possible temporal unities that is projected in this schematisation is the being of the region of entities in question; and the particular entity that is able to then show up in terms of the above determinations represents the intentum.
In unifying transcendence in such a way as to enable the relation between concept and intuition, schematism is thus the ground of the essential unity of transcendental knowledge\textsuperscript{11} that itself makes experience as such possible:

Possibility of experience is therefore synonymous with transcendence...

[and] means primarily: the unified wholeness of what finite knowledge makes possible in its essence (GA 3, 117)

The Broader Significance and Consequences of Heidegger’s Understanding of Schematism

By unifying the structure of transcendence, then, schematism is what enables the possibility of experience and thus on Heidegger’s reading constitutes the core of the critical philosophy. In this way, what began as a methodological imperative for allowing a better presentation of the unity of concept and intuition now takes on a much broader significance. The schematism becomes the function that opens the horizon that contains both concept and intuition, pure as well as empirical. Because the transcendental schema traverses both its conceptual and intuitive manifestations (as category and time-image, respectively), it encompasses both the subject and object pole and constitutes the possibility of the relation between both (i.e. transcendence). By thus shifting the centre of the entire Kantian framework to schematism as the real engine behind

\textsuperscript{11} It may appear at first blush that Heidegger is running together the concepts of transcendence, as the establishment of a relation to entities, and (transcendental) knowledge, as an explicit theoretical reflection on this process. However, it must be kept in mind that transcendental knowledge is just the pre-ontological understanding of being that takes place in apprehending entities, and is thus one (and perhaps the main) component of transcendence itself.
transcendence, pure notions and bare intuitions become mere theoretical abstractions with no role to play in knowledge when considered in isolation from one another: transcendental schematism is the projection of the horizon in which both these elements of knowledge acquire their sense. Consequently the transcendental subject, as the source of the conceptual pole, loses its pride of place and relinquishes the constitutive function it maintains in Kantian (and other forms of) Idealism. Finally, the categories cease to be the aprioristic, rationalistic constructs by means of which a transcendental subject constitutes its world, and become given. We thus see how Heidegger's exploration of a possible solution to the problem in the Kantian framework identified in the previous chapter and the subsequent appropriation of the doctrine of schematism prepares the ground for Heidegger's turn away from what he considers to be the subjectivism and intellectualism of Kant's determination of ontological conditions, and for a move toward understanding such ontological conditions in terms of the horizon of time.

Apart from the centrality it now takes on, there is another subtle but ultimately significant consequence to Heidegger's account of schematism. If the categories are homogeneous with pure intuitions of time in the way that empirical concepts and sensible intuitions are homogeneous, then one would expect that the same process of subsumption and concept formation applies to both. Empirical concepts, for Kant, not only subsume empirical intuitions, but are also formed based on reflection, comparison and abstraction from said intuitions – this is what Kant refers to as empirical concept-formation (See Longuenese 1998, 115). If the categories are similarly able to "subsume" pure intuitions of time, then one
would expect that they are also originally *extracted from* such pure intuitions. And indeed, this is what Heidegger states:

In the Transcendental Schematism the categories are formed first of all as categories. If these are the true "primal concepts," however, then the Transcendental Schematism is the original and authentic concept-formation as such (GA 3, 110).

Though Heidegger does not develop it sufficiently at this stage of his *Kantdeutung*, to do it justice, this point represents one of the central axes of Heidegger's attempt to determine the multiplicity of regions in light of the unity of being. At his stage, one can draw the consequences of the above in the following way.

If the categories are originally extracted from, and thus formed in, [pure] experience, then they do not originally reside or have their origin in the faculties of the transcendental subject. While they do precede all empirical experience, they are in fact dependent on and derived from an "experience" of pure time. Though they are independent of empirical intuitions, they are nonetheless based in pure intuitions. Thus, the subservience of knowledge to intuition – the original index of finitude – is here significantly radicalized. This would seem to cash out Heidegger's anti-constructivist and anti-intellectualist points against Kant: It is no longer the case that the subject constructs the world based on purely rational or logical categories. Rather, the categories are themselves extracted from temporality, which thus forms their ontological ground.
In the previous chapter we saw that Heidegger wants to maintain the basic Kantian framework for approaching the question of being, namely, through (what he takes to be) an articulation of transcendence based on human finitude and the resulting ontological neediness, that is, the resulting necessity of a pre-understanding of being that would make possible intentional comportment to entities. However, we also saw that Heidegger’s criticism was that at the same time this framework turned out in Kant’s hands to be too narrow, in that it managed to provide the ontological conditions for only one set of entities, namely natural objects and their particular mode of being. Finally, we saw that the reason for this misstep resides in the content that Kant gives to these ontological conditions, which in turn resulted from his focus on a particular kind of comportment. The ontological conditions, i.e. the categories, are derived from the logical functions of judgement, which represent the intentio of a particularly theoretical or “scientific comportment”.

The problem is thus that ontological conditions projected by scientific comportment yield solely the kinds of entities that serve as the objects of such comportment, namely natural entities. The desideratum following from this is that such conditions must be expanded or re-thought, if it is accepted that there are entities of a distinct mode of being than that of natural entities. Now, finally, in the present chapter we have seen that Heidegger finds in the Kantian framework itself a clue for how to rethink and expand such ontological conditions. Ontological conditions in general, namely, come not from the forms of unification derived from logical functions of judgment, but from forms of unification derived from time. From this perspective, the ontological conditions
of the particularly scientific mode of comportment are derivative of more
general ontological conditions to the extent that the content of the logical
functions of judgement is derived from a more “essential” form of unification,
namely temporality. In other words, ontological propositions are expressions of
temporal-ontological propositions, and the specific Kantian set of ontological
propositions (i.e. the transcendental principles) is but one subset of the set of
general temporal ontological propositions. What this means, at this stage, is that
potentially there are other, diverse sets of ontological propositions that can be
derived from the set of general temporal ontological propositions. In other
words, it is possible that there are other modes of being grounded in
configurations of temporality distinct to the categorical ones of Kant. Nothing
more (if the argument is correct) has been proven at this stage. This means that
Heidegger has to develop just this possibility. Specifically, he has to show that
there are entities that have a mode of being distinct to natural entities, as well as
that and how these entities are grounded in temporal rather than categorial
ontological conditions. This will be the subject of my Chapter 4. Chapter 5 then
discusses whether such temporal ontological conditions can then be generalised
to account for the complete multiplicity of possible modes of being while
maintaining a unified ontological ground in temporality – which is precisely the
question of “the unity of being among its regional variants” that I have argued
characterises Heidegger’s late Marburg project. First, however, Chapter 3
contrasts my approach to this period of Heidegger’s thought by contrasting it to
some alternative approaches in the literature, with the intention both of
defending my interpretation of the late Marburg period as a unified and
philosophically interesting project, as well with the intention of further specifying the particular directions this project takes.

Chapter 3. Special Metaphysics, World, and Entities as a Whole

In the present chapter, I assess Crowell’s thesis that Heidegger’s aim was to develop a pre-critical metaphysica specialis based on a reassessment of Kant’s transcendental dialectic. I show that such a reading misrepresents the nature of Heidegger’s project in this period and argue that Heidegger was instead attempting to develop a distinctively critical metaphysics in a post-Kantian vein.

Crowell and Metontology

As mentioned previously, Crowell believes Heidegger’s project after Being and Time lapses into an incoherent transcendental realism in its attempt to articulate entities as a whole. As Crowell puts it, “to suggest that Dasein’s understanding of being presupposes the factual extantness of nature [or any ontic ground]... implies a shift toward a transcendental realistic perspective that is not supplemental to, but inconsistent with, the phenomenological project” (Crowell 2001, 237). For our purposes it is not necessary to belabour the perils of a transcendentally realist position, either in terms of its general incoherence or its compatibility with a phenomenological framework. We can simply assume
together with Crowell, Husserl, and Kant that this would not be a desirable position to end up in, and instead focus on the question of whether Crowell’s reading is correct in ascribing to Heidegger the above programmatic designs. In what follows, I will argue that Crowell’s interpretation is based on a subtle misunderstanding of Kant’s conception of the relation between general and special metaphysics and its parallels to Heidegger’s own project and thus, ultimately, leads to a mischaracterisation of Heidegger’s aims in this period.

If we consider the evidence Crowell cites it is by no means clear that Heidegger engages in a search for an ontic ground in the sense that Crowell ascribes to him, be it nature, God, Dasein, or entities as a whole, all specific possibilities for an ontic ground that Crowell considers and rules out as incoherent. As mentioned above, a primary bit of evidence Crowell cites in support of his thesis that Heidegger is searching for something like an ontic ground, whatever it may be, is found in the closing paragraphs of *Being and Time*. Heidegger there, reflecting on the exercise just completed, asserts that an analytic of Dasein is “but one way” of reaching the overriding aim that is said to be, unsurprisingly, “the question of being in general” (GA 2, 576). Heidegger then goes on to immediately pose the following seemingly rhetorical question: “can one provide ontological grounds for ontology, or does it also require an ontic foundation (*Fundament*)? and which entity must take over this function of founding (*Fundierung*)?” Crowell connects the ostensibly sought-for *Fundament* with the ground of the “metaphysical ontic” represented by metontology and concludes that “it appears that when Heidegger asks for an “entity” in which to ground ontological knowledge, he stands poised to make a move that has since become familiar in philosophy, namely, to
relativize such knowledge to some aspect of the context in which it arises”, where such a context, as mentioned before, may be an entity such as nature, language, or even God (Crowell 2001, 223).

It may certainly appear that such a move is implied by Heidegger's rhetorical question, but the evidence for drawing such a wide-reaching conclusion hardly seems to be decisive – too many other interpretational possibilities for approaching Heidegger’s closing question from *Being and Time* seem to be left unexplored. For example, in the paragraphs following the above question Heidegger goes on to state that the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein is grounded in temporality, and asks if “time itself” might not turn out to be the “horizon of being” (GA 2, 577). In this light, one possibility for an alternative interpretation is that Heidegger's prior question of whether ontology requires an ontic ground will simply turn out to receive a negative answer, and that the apparently sought-for “entity” will turn out not to be an entity at all but to be time as the above implies. Such an interpretation of the incriminating rhetorical question seems no less plausible than Crowell’s – indeed, it seems to fit better both with Heidegger's emphasis on the ontological function of time as well as with the principle of charity in general. In either case, neither option seems to provide decisive evidence for an interpretation according to which Heidegger's project after *Being and Time* is slated to transform into something akin to a naturalism, a theology, or a linguistic relativism.

What of Heidegger's mention of “the ontic” in connection with metontology, which, as highlighted above, is supposed to constitute a “metaphysical ontic”? 
Such references seem to provide support for Crowell’s reading independently of the questionability of the above argument. How, furthermore, are we supposed to understand “ontic” here if not in Crowell’s manner? However we are to understand the word, the implicit identification of “ontic” with “empirical” that underpins Crowell’s reading also requires a second look. While Crowell is right that Heidegger often uses “ontic” to contrast with “ontological”, in which case it would run parallel to Kant’s transcendent-empirical distinction as Crowell intends it to, this is not the only use of “ontic” that Heidegger makes.

“Ontic”, for example, could also be used to contrast with “existentiell”, in which case it would refer to all non-Dasein entities in a manner that would not exclude questions of their ontological constitution. One such example of this use appears in Being and Time itself where Heidegger states that “the question of the ontic is the ontological question of the state of being of entities other than Dasein – of what is present at hand in the widest sense” (GA 2, 533; italics in original). Here, clearly, the ontic represents all entities that are not Dasein in a manner, furthermore, that is explicitly said to include ontological questions of their state of being. In this sense, the Kantian parallel to the ontological/ontic couplet would seem to be not the transcendent-empirical but rather the subject-object distinction, where ontic questions are the correlate to questions related to the object, regardless of whether we are asking about its being or merely its empirical features. Naturally we cannot neglect Crowell’s sense if we do not want to miss something important, but the case is, also, that this second understanding of “ontic” again seems to fit better with Heidegger’s focus on the being of entities rather than the being of Dasein in works subsequent to Being.
and Time, which I alluded to previously. An enquiry that understands “ontic” as referring to the ontological constitution of entities that are not Dasein would thus seem to be a natural sequel to an existential analytic focused primarily on the ontological constitution of Dasein in Being and Time.

The other main pillar of Crowell’s argument for reading Heidegger’s post-Being and Time “metaphysics” as “the heading under which an ontic ground is sought” (224) seems to be the support that Heidegger himself seeks in Kant’s transcendental philosophy in this period, and in the specific parallels between Heidegger’s project and special metaphysics understood in a Kantian manner. While the two above pieces of evidence for understanding Heidegger’s project as a special metaphysics seeking access to ontic grounds above are inconclusive, it is Crowell’s analysis of this parallel to Kant’s own conception of special metaphysics that allow him to spell out in more detail what the expression “entities as a whole”, as the object of Heidegger’s metontology, is supposed to mean as well as how Heidegger thinks an enquiry into them is possible. As Crowell puts it, Heidegger’s enquiry into entities as a whole “is perhaps best understood through a comparison that Heidegger himself increasingly employed in the later 1920s, namely, with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason” (222). What we find in such a comparison, according to Crowell, is that “Heidegger tied Kant’s transcendental project (and so also his own) to the distinction between metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis” (228), the latter of which “is concerned precisely with inquiry into entities as a whole” (229).12

12 Crowell writes, here and throughout, “beings” rather than “entities” for Heidegger’s “Seiende”, which I have modified in the above quotation in order to make it consistent with my rendition of “Seiende” as “entity” – my aim, especially in this particular case, is to highlight the continuity
It is here that Crowell sees a parallel that can bear exegetical fruits. Where *Being and Time*, according to Crowell, is conceived along the lines of a *metaphysica generalis*, metontology is “linked” to *metaphysica specialis* (239) and so, because of the close connection between metontology and the development of Heidegger’s project after *Being and Time*, the latter represents “something like a *metaphysica specialis* in Kant’s sense” (214). The nature of the object of metontology, then, should be conceived in the manner of the nature of the objects of *metaphysica specialis*, namely the physical world as a whole (the cosmos), the spirit as a whole (the soul), or being as a whole (God), all potential varieties of the referent of “entities as a whole”.

However, as Crowell points out, the trouble with Heidegger’s approach is that Kant dedicates a large part of the first *Critique* to demonstrating that *metaphysica specialis* is not a valid form of enquiry; as Crowell states, “according to Kant’s transcendental dialectic, *metaphysica specialis* proves to rest on a “transcendental illusion” (*Schein*) and cannot yield any genuine theoretical knowledge” (228). Consequently, Heidegger must “take a stand on the dialectic’s negative judgment on the possibility of *metaphysica specialis*”, and reassesses the dialectic in a way that makes possible “some sort of *metaphysica specialis*” as a “legitimate form of metaphysical enquiry” (229).

Crowell finds between entities/beings as a whole in Kant’s and in Heidegger’s sense. Throughout the thesis, I follow the original English translation in writing ‘entities’ rather than ‘beings’. This is due to 1) stylistic reasons, where it is at times difficult to distinguish *Sein* and *Seiende* if both are rendered as ‘being’ and 2) in my view ‘being’ is better reserved to translation ‘Wesen’ (as in *Lebendiges Wesen*, which I translate as ‘living being’). Throughout, I generally use the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time*, though I at times make slight modifications where necessary.
It is not completely clear how Crowell envisions such a reassessment, as he merely states that “in a series of elliptical remarks [Heidegger] suggests that what Kant identified as transcendental appearance [Schein] or illusion needs to be rethought in light of Being and Time’s theory of truth, such that the “infinitude” presupposed in raising the question of Dasein’s finitude can itself be brought into focus” (229). Whatever the exact nature of such a reassessment, Crowell reasons that since Kant’s dialectic ruled out “reason’s claim to be able to grasp the “totality” of a series of conditions for every conditioned”, Heidegger’s reassessment is meant to take up just such a totality, which is what Heidegger’s “entities as a whole” refers to: “Heidegger, thanks to his reassessment of the dialectic, seems to believe that an inquiry that ‘makes beings thematic in their totality in light of ontology’—hence an inquiry with the scope of metaphysica specialis—is possible after all” (229). The key for understanding “entities as a whole”, as well as for understanding Heidegger’s aims and why they are doomed to failure – that is, why such an enquiry is impossible – thus seems to reside in the nature of metaphysica specialis. I will now briefly look at Kant’s understanding of metaphysica specialis as a form of enquiry, specifically what its object is, what kind of knowledge it aims at, and, briefly, why Kant considers it impossible, after which I will return to Crowell’s thesis about the meaning and epistemological viability of Heidegger’s enquiry into “entities as a whole”. As in the previous case, Crowell is right to connect Heidegger’s inquiry to special metaphysics, but misunderstands both Kant’s conceptions of the distinction between general and special metaphysics as well as the manner in which Heidegger intends to take up and transform Kant’s line on inquiry in this respect.
Getting some of the details relating to special and general metaphysics on the table will help us to understand both the specific mistake that Crowell makes in interpreting the former as well as the particular manner in which we should understand the role of Kantian special and general metaphysics in Heidegger's late Marburg project.

**Special Metaphysics and the Enquiry into the World as Whole**

*Metaphysica specialis*, as Crowell uses the term, refers primarily to the rationalist metaphysics of Leibniz’s followers as expounded in, notably, the texts of Wolff and Baumgarten that Kant used for his metaphysics lectures. In a division of labour ultimately traceable through Scholasticism back to Aristotle (see Vollrath 1962), metaphysics was divided into *Metaphysica Generalis*, which dealt with (as the name implies) general metaphysical questions, while *Metaphysica Specialis* focused on three specific objects of inquiry, namely the soul, the world, and God, and was consequently itself divided into rational psychology, cosmology, and rational theology. The title, for example, of Wolff’s book on special metaphysics, *Rational thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Human Beings*, in this sense covers the complete range of objects of special metaphysics (selections from this work are contained in Watkins (ed.) 2009).

Crowell briefly considers all three subdivisions of special metaphysics as potential themes of Heidegger’s metontology, and while due to paucity of references it is difficult to establish precisely which one Heidegger intends to
take up, Crowell leans towards cosmology (adding that Heidegger may have been spurred on by Scheler’s own cosmological investigations; Crowell 2001, 231). Theology, for example, is ruled out as the least plausible interpretation of the kind of ontic whole that is to serve as the object of metontology for, as Crowell remarks, Heidegger’s reading of theology is “essentially cosmological” (239). Heidegger’s frequent association of “entities as a whole” with “the world” as he attempts to develop the concept in this period, together with the radically different treatment that “the soul” receives under the heading of Dasein in Being and Time, also speaks for the cosmology option. Furthermore, the reference to “entities as whole” seems to rule out psychology (nor, it should be mentioned, does Heidegger anywhere show any predilection for questions such as “is the soul immortal / simple?”, questions with which rational psychology deals), and would not sit well with Crowell’s argument, among the pillars of which is that metaphysical wholes or totalities are not possible object of enquiry. The reason why a special metaphysics is not a possible form of enquiry in Crowell’s sense, furthermore, is most apparent from Kant’s treatment of cosmology and its object of world-wholes and so, like Crowell, in what follows I will focus on this particular branch of special metaphysics.

The method of rational cosmology, the object of which was the world as a whole, is to approach its object by attempting to derive general predicates about the world from the concept of the world, that is, from the way that “world” was defined. Though there exist slight variations among metaphysicians, most, including the pre-critical Kant (see Kant’s Dissertation, AK 2, 387-419), define the world as a composite whole that is not part of another whole. Roughly, this
means that, for example, this room is not itself a world because it is part of a larger whole, namely this building, which itself is part of an even larger whole, the city for example; once we reach a whole that is no longer part of any other such larger whole, we have the world in view. It thus follows that the world is identical to the totality of existing things because, on pain of contradiction, there can be no existing thing outside of a whole that is not part of another. We here require, in rational cosmology, furthermore, the qualifier “existing” or “actual” when discussing things, because the whole of all possible things, be they existing or non-existing, is God, and such a whole is thus the object of rational theology rather than rational cosmology.

Rational cosmologists would then use the above-mentioned concept to derive propositions about the world, an example of which would be the proposition that there can only be one world (because if there were more worlds, the world would then be part of a larger whole, which would lead to contradiction). Another example, from Wolff, is that because the world is a composite whole it must be composed of simples, which is entailed in the concept of “composite whole” (see Wolff’s Rational Thoughts in: Watkins 2006, 38). As is well known, a crucial tenet of Kant’s critical philosophy is that cognition cannot derive from concepts alone but requires also intuition. This, however, represents only one premise in Kant’s argument against rational cosmology, one, furthermore, that he takes to have been proven in the Analytic of the First Critique. What the Dialectic adds to this picture is that we can never get the whole of existing things into view, which together with the premise that we cannot derive cognition of the world from concepts alone, means that there can be no cognition of the world
as a whole. Because Crowell takes Heidegger's metaphysical project to represent an attempt to revive the possibility of cognizing precisely the world understood as the totality of existing things, and because he takes Kant's arguments for the impossibility of such an endeavour to be sound, he thus considers Heidegger's project to be incoherent in its very starting point. I will now take a brief look at Kant's arguments for such impossibility in order to acquire a closer perspective on Crowell's account.

Why does Kant consider “the world” to be and object beyond the realm of possible experience? Firstly, Kant adds a transcendental twist to the cosmological concept of world I outlined above, defining it in the following way: “In the transcendental sense the word "world" signifies the absolute totality of the sum total of existing things and... the completeness of [their] synthesis (A419/B447)”. The world is thus still the totality of existing things, but now supplemented by qualification “in the completeness of their synthesis”. This proviso follows from the premise of the impossibility of purely conceptual cognition: because we cannot cognize the world from its concept alone, it needs to be synthesized, that is, given and apprehended as an intuitable object of possible experience.

However, even though we are naturally impelled by reason to form a concept of such a synthetic whole by following the chain of existing things back to their condition (to the unconditioned), Kant argues such a process is a theoretical impossibility. Kant's claim is, briefly, that the givenness of a totality of appearances (i.e. the world) is either “too big or too small for every concept of
the understanding” (KrV A486-7/B514-5). In other words, because synthesis itself is conditioned by time (i.e. happens in time) the totality of appearances will either be too big for a finite subject to synthesise, or it will be too small in the sense that it will represent a merely incomplete totality. Kant demonstrates the above in one particular case of attempting to acquire cognition of the world, specifically in terms of its temporal magnitude (i.e. of whether it does/does not have a beginning in time):

Assume: First, that the world has no beginning; then it is too big for your concept; for this concept, which consists in a successive regress, can never reach the whole eternity that has elapsed... Suppose [on the other hand] it has a beginning, then once again it is too small for your concept of understanding in the necessary empirical regress. For since the beginning always presupposes a preceding time, it is still not unconditioned, and the law of the empirical use of the understanding obliges you to ask for a still higher temporal condition, and the world is obviously too small for this law (KrV A486/B514).

In other words, if we want to claim either that the world has a beginning in time or that it is infinite, the world qua totality of existing things must be available as an object of synthesis. But, because synthesis is temporally successive, that is, it moves from (conditioned) thing to (conditioning) thing, the totality of such things and their synthetic conditions is unavailable to a finite subject. The world itself can thus be neither finite nor infinite – in fact, for us at least, it cannot exist as object of cognition at all: “Because the world does not exist at all (independently of the regressive series of my representations), it exists neither
as an in itself infinite whole nor as an in itself finite whole” (A505/B533). Kant thus considers the impulsion of reason to get such a totality into view as culminating in a transcendental illusion: “what we have to do with here is a natural and unavoidable illusion, which even if one is no longer fooled by it, still deceives though *it does not defraud* and which thus can be rendered harmless but never destroyed” (A422/B450). While we are naturally compelled by reason to form a concept of the unconditioned totality of the world, the arguments of the *Dialectic* can serve as a therapeutic that would prevent us from being defrauded into an attempt to make such a totality the object of a metaphysical enquiry.

To the extent that Heidegger attempts to make entities as a whole into a possible object of enquiry, he appears to fall prey to precisely the kind of illusion that Kant mentions. As Crowell puts it, “at least during his metaphysical decade, [Heidegger] remained seduced by a kind of dialectical illusion” (2001, 242). Crowell thus takes Heidegger – to relate this to Kant’s statement of the unavoidability of illusion – to have been not only deceived but also defrauded by a natural and unavoidable transcendental illusion.

We can thus reconstruct the specifics of Crowell’s argument based on the above discussion in the following way. Heidegger’s enthusiasm for system-building in the Kantian style leads him take up and transform the *metaphysica specialis* that Kant rules out into a valid form of enquiry. *Metontology* is the name for this line of enquiry and represents the focus of Heidegger’s project after *Being and Time* in the period (according to Crowell) between 1927 and 1937 (Crowell 2001, 225). Entities as a whole, the object of metontology, should thus be conceived in
terms of the totality of a series of conditions; in the case of rational cosmology specifically, these are the totality of existing things in their synthesis. However, because Kant has demonstrated that such a totality cannot become an object of experience, Heidegger’s project becomes tangled up in a transcendental illusion that results from “an esprit de système that originates in his renewed enthusiasm for Kant” (228). Heidegger remains in the grip of transcendental illusion for about a decade until finally becoming aware of the impossibility of a special metaphysical enquiry into entities as a whole. Subsequent to the realization of the untenability of this project he reformulates his project anew, this time as an overcoming of metaphysics that returns to “the spirit” of the transcendental phenomenology of the Being and Time project (224-5).

Crowell is thus able to provide a convincing narrative that explains both the direction as well as the viability of the development of Heidegger’s project by bringing out its affinity to and critical difference from the Kantian project. Crowell is right, as I mentioned, to highlight the role of Kantian themes in Heidegger’s project, specifically in the framing of the relation between ontology, the subject of Being and Time, and what Crowell calls metontology, the subject of subsequent works, in terms that are analogical to Kant’s conception of the relation between metaphysica generalis, as the subject of the Analytic, and metaphysica specialis, the (alleged) subject of the Dialectic. I also agree that such a project displays a certain “esprit de système” analogical to the Kantian project in which the “method of science” expounded in the Critique of Pure Reason was to be supplemented by “the system” of the science in the form of a metaphysics of its possible objects, notably of nature and of morals (See e.g. Kant’s preface to the

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Furthermore, Crowell is correct to say that a project that takes up entities as a whole conceived in terms of the finite series of conditions of special metaphysics is highly problematic – if it is not impossible altogether then it is at least seemingly incompatible with a transcendental or phenomenological methodology. That Crowell has a strong case for this claim is what my reconstruction of Kant’s conception of rational cosmology and his arguments against it was intended to show. However, I think the evidence points against interpreting Heidegger’s project along these lines, as I will argue in what follows. Specifically, Crowell mischaracterizes the precise nature of Heidegger’s relation to Kant in this period, and hence misidentifies the particular strand of Kant’s enquiry that Heidegger takes up. Based on this, Crowell’s interpretation of the meaning of “entities as a whole” is not entirely accurate, thus also making Crowell’s understanding of the nature of the development Heidegger’s project highly questionable. In what follows I will argue that Heidegger’s reassessment of Kant’s dialectic is of a different nature, based on which I will show how entities as a whole should be understood. This will provide a more detailed plan for how Heidegger’s project is to be understood. The second part of the following will then provide an interpretation of the project by filling in the positive content of entities as a whole.

The Transformation of Kant’s Weltbegriff
In the same lecture course in which the theme of metontology is raised, Heidegger provides a condensed genealogy of the concept of “world”. Unlike the usual Heideggerian genealogies in which the origin or beginning is conceived as the richest and most developed, here it is a relative late-comer to the metaphysical scene, namely Kant, that is praised for having gone farthest in the development of the concept of world, specifically by having overcome the metaphysical definition of world that Crowell attributes to Heidegger himself. Heidegger begins by citing a variation of the definition of world in rational cosmology, this time from Baumgarten, which states that “the world (the totality of entities, die Allheit des Seienden) is the series (multiplicity, totality) of finite existing things, the series which is itself not in turn a part of another” (GA 26, 223), which, as we have seen, is both the conception of world that Kant wishes to deny as well as the conception of world that Crowell wishes to read into Heidegger’s “entities as a whole”. Heidegger first criticises this conception – or, rather, simply casts aspersion on it – as a “contrived”, “confused” and “superficial” mere “summation” of existing present at hand entities (wirklich Vorhandenen), before noting that it was Kant who “first mentions the essential distinctions” (GA 26, 224). The precise nature of such “essential distinctions” will provide us with an idea of the elements of Kant’s conception of world that Heidegger wishes to take up.

Kant’s innovation is said to consist in conceiving of the world as “a whole (Ganzheit)” in the “ontological-metaphysical sense” rather than as a totality (Allheit) in the pre-critical sense of rational cosmology. The difference between these two conceptions is that the latter conceives of the whole as “a totality of
determinate summation of ontic present at hand entities”, and thus takes the world to reach merely as far as the aggregate of entities that happen to be present at a given time (GA 26, 225). The former, ontological-metaphysical, Kantian whole, however, consists not in an aggregate of existing entities, but in the whole of “intrinsic possibilities” (GA 26, 225), and is thus not “a what”, a particular content, but “a how (ein Wie)” (GA 26, 224). In other words, Kant interprets “world” in terms of how a given particular content shows up. To the extent that it is the a priori content of entities that determine how such entities show up, world, then, refers to “the whole (Ganzheit) of the a priori essential contents of that which belongs to nature – regardless of whether it exists or not!” (GA 26, 228-9). In other words, what Kant’s concept of world refers to is not a totality of existing entities but rather to the whole of the a priori contents that determine how such entities appear.

To return to Crowell’s thesis: in light of the above, the claim that Heidegger’s project in the late twenties and early thirties is based on an attempt to revive special metaphysics based on a pre-critical conception of the whole of entities appears dubious. What the above discussion seems to imply is that Heidegger’s project is motivated not by a confusion of the kind of ontic and ontological ground that is required but, on the contrary, bases itself precisely on sharp distinction between an ontic whole and an “ontological-metaphysical” or “transcendental” whole, and on a categorical rejection of the viability of the former. Kant is praised precisely for having overcome the pre-critical concept of world and for having ushered in a new, critical “ontological” concept of world. Indeed, Heidegger conceives of the dialectic as establishing the impossibility of
the former and raising the possibility of the latter, that is, of world conceived not as an ontic but as a transcendental whole:

Thus Kant goes unequivocally beyond the ontic concept of world as a *series actualium finitorum* [series of finite actualities] to a transcendental conception. This is also the *positive work* and *metaphysical content* of the Kantian transcendental dialectic (GA 26, 225; italics added).

The metaphysical content that Heidegger wishes to rescue from the *Dialectic* is not the possibility of an enquiry into the ontic conception of world as conceived by pre-critical special metaphysics but one into the transcendental conception of world that is opened up precisely through a repudiation of the former. The vigorous rejection of the ontic conception of world as the sum-total of existing entities is by no means limited to the 1928 lecture course that contains both the introduction of metontology and the above genealogy of world, and by no means appears specifically indexed to interpretations of Kant. In a 1927 lecture course, for example, the published version of which was revised by Heidegger, he states:

Nature – even if we take it in the sense of the whole cosmos – all these entities taken together, animals, plants, and humans, too, are not the world, viewed philosophically... And the world? Is it the sum of what is within the world? By no means... World is not something subsequent that we calculate as a result from the sum of all entities (GA 24, 235).

In another example, from a 1929 essay that is one of the few published works from this period, Heidegger states simply that “the manifestness of entities as a whole is not equivalent to the sum of entities that we happen to know at a given
time” (GA 9, 192). In light of quotations such as these it seems doubtful that Heidegger's positive reassessment of the Dialectic aims at securing a pre-critical, ontic world-whole as a topic for enquiry, as Crowell argues. If, however, Heidegger does not want to reject the Dialectic's prohibition of objects that exceed our cognitive capacities such as the kinds of totalities that comprise the pre-critical concept of world – this Heidegger is in full agreement with – then what, if anything, does he wish to “reassess”? In other words, we know what Heidegger wishes to rescue from the Kantian framework – namely, the “transcendental” conception of world – but the question that will allow us to determine the direction of the further development of this conception of world is the question of what Heidegger wants to reject in the Kantian framework. We can further specify our question in terms of the other outstanding issue that Crowell’s narrative has placed on the table, namely the question of entities as a whole. If Crowell’s claim that entities as a whole are the primary theme of Heidegger's middle project, and if Crowell’s intuition that the way of understanding the nature of entities as a whole is Kantian in inspiration – and I have mentioned that he is correct to argue this – then Heidegger's critical engagement with Kant in the question of entities as a whole should provide us a clue for understanding the latter.

The Being of the Whole

The first obvious critical departure from the Kantian conception of the whole is that for Heidegger what we encounter first of all is not a manifold of intuition
that needs to be unified into a whole through the subsumption under concepts. It is, rather, a manifold of things that already always forms a unified whole of referential relations determined by practical relations: “The manifold of things encountered here is not an arbitrary manifold of incidental things; it is first and only present in a particular context of references” (GA 20, 252). I will take up Heidegger’s conception of entities of this kind in more detail in the following part, and at this stage I want to merely point out that this structured whole precedes and determines the individual entities, which are only accessible on its basis:

“It is precisely out of this totality that, for example, the individual piece of furniture in a room appears. My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and put together a manifold of things in order then to see a room. Rather, I primarily see a referential whole as closed, from which the individual piece of furniture and what is in the room stand out (GA 20, 253).

Such a referential whole, it is worth adding, is structured by pragmatic relations of assignment – the chair in the room is for sitting on, for example. Heidegger’s point, however, is that at a phenomenological level individual objects appear as the objects that they are in the context of a structured whole of referential relations: “The individual object that we encounter is precisely this individual only in the whole of its referential context” (GA 27, 78). Correlatively, at the epistemic level the judgments we make of individual objects presuppose a prior familiarity with such a whole: “we do not make a judgement in relation to an isolated object, but in this judgement we speak out of this whole that we have
already experienced and are familiar with” (GA 29/30, 503). This whole against the backdrop of which entities are disclosed and in terms of which they become objects of judgement is precisely what Heidegger calls entities as a whole: “In our being together with the manifold of things, entities as whole are manifest in one stroke” (GA 27, 78).13

Before moving on to the first distinction from Kant’s version of entities as a whole, it must be pointed out that it would be a mistake to say that there is no Kantian correlate to such a structured, holistic background against which objects become manifest. At least as Heidegger reads him, for Kant this background is comprised of spatio-temporal relations together with conceptual relations based on the categories – causal relations holding between individual appearances, for example. Because such sets of relations are a priori, they form a whole that precedes the apprehension of any individual entity. Though Kant places significantly less stress on the holistic nature of the a priori, Heidegger points out, as we saw, that precisely the above spatio-temporal and conceptual relations need to form a unified “homogeneous” context against which entities first appear as possible objects of experience (see for example GA 27, 187), thus highlighting the formal or structural similarities in the two respective conceptions of the holistic nature of the encounter with objects.

However – and this is the primary distinction I am driving at – Heidegger’s “whole” is comprised of pragmatically determined relations, relations such as “in

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13 This is my translation of: „In diesem unserem Sein bei der Dingmannigfaltigkeit ist das Seiende im Ganzen und zwar in einem Schlag offenbar” (Ga 27, 78).
order to” or “for”, in the sense that the chalk is “for” writing on the blackboard. Kant’s spatio-temporal and conceptual relation could not, Heidegger thinks, account for the givenness of entities of the mode of being of the chalk, for example. In other words, such a conception of the background could not do the transcendentally-enabling work of disclosing entities that are determined by the above network of pragmatically rather than spatio-temporally and categorically structured relations. And so the first point of departure from Kant in the conception of “entities as a whole” is that Heidegger thinks that the “as a whole”, at least for entities as they appear in “average everydayness”, is comprised of a different set of relations, a set of relations, Heidegger further thinks, that is somehow richer or more basic than the Kantian set of relations:

The entirety of the constitution of the being of entities as a whole that become manifest [in the above] manner is in principle richer and more fundamental as what is thought through Kant’s cosmological concept of world (GA 27, 308).14

A determination of the content of the ontological conditions  (of the constitution of being) in terms of the content that yields entities of the mode of being of nature – namely, extension, spatial location, causal relations, etc. – is, Heidegger thinks, not rich enough to yield entities of the mode of being of tools. I have already briefly indicated that such ontological content comprises of pragmatically structured relations and it will turn out that such content will also consist of temporal relations, based on Heidegger’s specific understanding of

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14 Das Ganze der Seinsverfassung dieses so offenbaren Seienden im Ganzen grundsätzlich reicher und ursprünglicher als das, was in Kants kosmologischem Weltbegriff gedacht ist (GA 27, 308).
“temporal”. The first task, thus, for determining how “entities as a whole” should be conceived based on Heidegger’s critical engagement with Kant is to bring to light the specific nature of the relations and structures that make entities such as the chalk, in their particular mode of being, intelligible. Heidegger, in other words, must show that there are entities that can only be disclosed against the backdrop of a whole of pragmatically rather than spatio-temporally and conceptually structured relations and to show how this is possible. This will at the same time be the subject of the Chapter 4 of the present work.

As should be clear from the above, however, we do not understand all entities universally in terms of a lecture hall as we did in the example of the piece of chalk. On the contrary, and unlike for Kant for whom e.g. spatial or causal relations are always in place in the same form, the Heideggerian network of relations is always changing depending on the particular context in terms of which we interpret particular entities. Consequently, both the content and form of this structured whole is constantly shifting. As Heidegger puts it, “this 'as a whole' varies in its expanse and transparency and in the richness of its contents, and it changes more or less constantly for us in the everydayness of our Dasein” (GA 29/30, 505-6). In this sense, we “carry around with us” this structured whole based on which individual entities become manifest, though its particular individual contents are always changing: "This sphere of disclosed entities can change in its particularities, but Dasein always takes this sphere with it, so to speak; wherever Dasein finds itself, it moves in such a sphere” (GA 27, 131).

Individual entities fit into distinct kinds of wholes and so are determined by a
varying set of particular relations. For example, while I may understand this piece of chalk as “for” writing on the blackboard in the context of a whole constituted by the task of giving a public lecture, I may understand the pieces of chalk lying on the floor as obstructions or as “obtrusive” in the context of a whole constituted by the task of cleaning up the lecture hall. However, as should be clear from my second chapter, not only is it not the case that every entity we encounter is a piece of chalk specifically, neither is every entity we encounter a tool generally (i.e. in terms of its being). In other words, we do not encounter always and only entities of a mode of being that is determined through pragmatic relations. On the contrary, we also encounter material objects, such as rocks, or other human beings, neither of which (according to Heidegger) shares the mode of being of the piece of chalk. This means, according to Heidegger, that “a manifold of entities of a multitude of [ontological] kinds is always disclosed to us” (GA 27, 82). In Heidegger's words:

The following entities are also real (Wirklich): entities that are present at hand (stones), that are living (plants, animals), that exist (humans). We thus ask now about the manifestness of all these entities, which of course may be distinct in terms of their mode of being (GA 27, 82).

Consequently, if we are to understand these kinds of entities as well, “the whole” in light of which we understand entities in general must be composed of relations that will account for the being of such entities. As Heidegger puts it, the above situation indicates to begin with that this “as a whole” is not tailored to any particular region nor even any particular species of entity. Rather this “as
a whole”, the world, admits precisely the manifestness of manifold entities in the various contexts of their being – other human beings, animals, plants, material things, artworks, i.e., everything we are capable of identifying as an entity (GA 29/30, 513-4).

The “whole” out of which entities become manifest, then, cannot be equated with the equipmental whole of pragmatically structured relations that is constitutive of entities of the mode of being of tools, but must rather be able to account for the disclosure of any entity whatsoever no matter its particular mode of being.

Two consequences follow from this that are immediately relevant to our present task and which I want to highlight here. Firstly, entities as whole, and consequently the “world” to the extent that it comprises entities as a whole (as Heidegger stresses on various occasions) is not to be equated with any particular ontological, and so cannot be equated with the ontological region of the pragmatically structured whole of entities I described above (namely tools):

We cannot accordingly understand world as the ontic context of useful items [i.e. tools], the things of historical culture, in contradistinction to nature and the things of nature. Yet the analysis of useful items and their context nevertheless provides an approach and the means for first making visible the phenomenon of world. World is therefore not entity qua tool, as that with which humans have to deal, as if being-in-the-world meant to move among cultural items. Nor is world a multiplicity of human beings (GA 26, 232-3).
The analysis of the particular world of pragmatic “in order to” relations in *Being and Time* is thus not yet an analysis of the “world as a whole”, which must be conceived in some more general or full-blooded sense. The analysis in terms of pragmatic relations can nonetheless serve as “an approach and the means for” bringing the world in this more full-blooded sense into view (an approach I shall also take in the next two chapters, the first of which contains a discussion of the world of ready to hand entities and the second of which moves to a discussion of the being of the world in general).

Secondly, in relation to Kant, the above is a development of the criticism that the Kantian conception of “being” in terms of the a priori relations represented by the forms of intuition and the categories is not able to account for entities of a distinct mode of being other than that of nature. A second desideratum for how the Kantian “whole” of entities needs to be reassessed and transformed becomes clear in the following passage:

> If the world is necessarily to determine the totality of the entities cognizable by man, and if these entities do not solely have the character of things of nature but also of things of history [i.e. cultural artefacts] or humans themselves, then is not the Kantian concept of world fundamentally too narrow? (GA 27, 296).

Pending a demonstration that there are entities of distinct modes of being, the question is thus simply whether the Kantian world is able to accommodate the full range of entities of distinct modes of being that are disclosable to us. Based on what I have argued above, there should be no doubt as to the answer to this
question, which Heidegger confirms in a separate lecture course:

The conception of world as mathematical whole (*Ganzheit*) indicates that the concept of world in Kant is, as a whole, unrefined and still *too narrow* (GA 26, 228-9; italics added).

Kant’s conception of world, though it made headway by replacing the ontic version of the concept of world in pre-critical metaphysics with a transcendental one, is still nonetheless unable to grasp the full range of the possible ontological mutations of “entities as a whole” due to its narrow orientation toward merely one region of entities, namely natural entities. And because for Heidegger world is not a “regional title” that would refer merely to “this or that kind of entity” but rather in its full-blooded sense denotes “entities as a whole” (GA 27, 240), Kant’s conception of world is for this reason still “too narrow”.

The second reassessment in relation to how “entities as whole” should be filled in – at the same time both the task for Heidegger’s middle project and for the next section of the present work – results in the requirement that such a whole comprise entities of all possible modes of being, be they tools, natural objects, plants, or human beings. The task, then, is to show how the a priori relations that comprise such a whole are able to disclose entities of various modes of being. Kant’s a priori conditions of possibility of experience (namely forms of intuition and categories), seemingly only capable of disclosing the particular ontological region of nature, appear to be unfit for this broader ontological task. The conditions of possibility, or the projection of being in the understanding of entities as a whole, must for Heidegger in some sense be able to accommodate all
possible modes of being in a sense that Kant’s conception of such conditions fails to do.

The conjunction of the two above desiderata stemming from the two criticisms of Kant – relating to, namely, 1) the kinds of relations that enable the ontic understanding of particular regions of entities and 2) the relations that enable the ontological understanding of entities in general raises a third question for Heidegger, namely, how do the particular regions of 1) relate to one another and how do these taken together relate to 2), that is, to being in general?

Again departing from Kant, Heidegger insists that the above ontological regions of particular kinds of entities cannot be merely placed alongside one another haphazardly or “simply lined up alongside one another in a vacuum” (GA 29/30, 514), but must be somehow transcendentally unified or grounded in a unified concept of world:

The problematic of the Kantian question in the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be placed upon its metaphysical ground only when we comprehend that so-called regions of being are not arrayed alongside one another or above or behind one another, but are what they are only within and out of a prevailing of world (GA 29/30, 514-5).

The unified manifold of entities of distinct modes of beings is “poorly comprehended, or is not comprehended at all, if we take it merely as a colourful multiplicity of things at hand” (29/30, 514) and thus demands some form of unity. For this reason, the following question “becomes more acute”:
given this radical distinction of ways of being in general, can there still be found any single unifying concept of being in general that would justify calling these different ways of being ways of being? How can we conceive the unity of the concept of being in reference to a possible multiplicity of ways of being? (GA 24, 250).

What is required in the above unified concept of being, presumably, is something to ground the a priori projections of being of the particular ontological kinds of entities. This problem seems to ineluctably arise when one detaches the conditions of possibility from the structure of subjectivity: for Kant, the conditions for whichever regions of objects are capable of being constituted a priori are traceable back to the structure of subjectivity and its forms of intuition in conjunction with its “general laws of thought” (AK 4:473). If subjectivity, as the source of the a priori forms of unification, can yield merely the forms of natural objects, and if we require additional a priori forms that would yield distinct ontological regions, then where should these additional forms be located?

The third task, then, is to somehow bring all these manifold modes of being under one roof, so to speak, again by developing the concept of world:

the manifoldness of the various specific manners of being with respect to their possible unity poses a quite specific problem, one that can only be tackled as a problem once we have developed a satisfactory concept of world (GA 29/30, 404).
The concept of world must somehow be able to coordinate all the distinct ontological regions of entities to one another and to relate each back to their ontological conditions, that is, to the projection of their way of being. On the one hand, as stressed above, we must have the possibility of encountering entities of various modes of being within the world. On the other hand, however, the encountering of these entities is based upon the projection of a variety of distinct modes of being, for which we must now find a unified ground through a re-articulation of the *Weltbegriff*.

The problem of the relation between being in general and various modes of being is thus quite specific to Heidegger's framework, in the sense that the latter must accommodate various ontological kinds in a way that for example the Kantian framework does not. Formally, however, Heidegger's general framework of posing the question of the relation of ontological conditions to the particular objects they make possible mirrors Kant's critical conception of the relation between the transcendental principles in the first *Critique*, which ground the a priori cognition of objects in general, and the principles of special metaphysics, which result from the application of the above principles to particular objects. Herewith my interpretation of the tasks pending for the development of entities as whole / world come full circle back to the relation between general and special metaphysics – the above Kantian conception of the relation between general and special metaphysical principles is to now be reassessed and transformed in terms of the concept of world Heidegger wishes to develop:

For our particular questions, the problem of *metaphysica generalis* and at the same time of *metaphysica specialis*, of cosmology, transforms itself
and with it the [new] concept of world (GA 27, 250).

Kant’s conceptualisation of the relation between general and special metaphysics points to a transformed concept of world. In light of Heidegger’s further reassessment of Kant’s concept of world that I signalled above, i.e. in terms of its expansion to include all possible regions of being, special metaphysics can no longer only relate to natural objects, but must relate to the whole of being corresponding to this ontologically broader concept of world. World, as Heidegger puts it, must be conceived as “the whole of the constitution of being, not just nature” (GA 27, 309).

However, with this transformation of the special metaphysics we at the same time require a transformation of general metaphysics, that is, of the content of the ontological conditions that make such objects possible. Such a re-working of the basic ontological conditions of entities that appear in the world means that the task is not merely one of supplementing Kant’s ontology of natural objects in his special metaphysics of nature with other further kinds of ontologies:

The problem is precisely the whole (Ganzheit) of such a Dasein-oriented whole (Ganze); we do not achieve this by merely placing next to Kant’s ontology of nature in the broadest sense an ontology of historical Dasein, of tools or of subjectivity; with all this the problem is already essentially lost (GA 27, 309).

Rather than merely conjuring up a list of additional regional ontologies to supplement the Kantian ontology of nature, what must be determined is the
“specific whole (Ganzheit) of the whole of being that is always understood in Dasein, the inner organisation of the whole of being (Seinsganzheit)” (GA 27, 309). In this sense the reassessment of special metaphysics requires at the same time a transformation of general metaphysics, that is, of the conception of being in general. In other words, if we reassess the Kantian problem of ontology in a more radical way, according to Heidegger, then we will be pulled towards a different and more universal conception of being itself. As Heidegger puts it, “being will then no longer be understood in terms of nature’s being extant, but rather in that universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation” (GA 25, 426-7).

Before moving on to the next section, we can briefly return to Crowell’s thesis. The great virtue of Crowell’s argument is that he sees that the development of Heidegger’s project is closely bound up with his interpretation and reassessment of the Kantian framework in general, and particularly of the mode of enquiry of special metaphysics. However, from the above it should be clear that Heidegger is concerned not with reviving the pre-critical version of special metaphysics, but of reassessing Kant’s critical conception of special metaphysics, as for example contained in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (AK 4). Heidegger’s critical engagement with the latter, furthermore, leads also to a reassessment of the general metaphysics of the first Critique, specifically to an attempt to develop transcendental conditions of experience based not on categories and forms of intuition but, following the lead established in the previous chapter, on something more closely approximating temporal schemata. It is this conception of being in terms of temporality that is to serve as the ground for the
fundamental ontology of Dasein.

There is one interesting point to note with respect to Crowell’s argument, which is that he briefly considers and rules out the possibility that the aim of metontology should be seen as one of “supplying the complete ‘system of categories’ hinted at in Being and Time, [i.e.] the regional ontologies” (232). On the up side, understanding metontology in this manner, as Crowell sees, would render it consistent with the transcendental standpoint of Being and Time to the extent that the categories would still be conceived transcendentally. Furthermore, such a conception of the object of metontology could be seen as comprising a metaphysical ontic “without much semantic strain” (232) to the extent that it is to be directed towards the objects made possible by such a system of categories.

Crowell believes, however, that two considerations speak against the above as a candidate for understanding metontology. The first consideration is architectonic, as Crowell argues that “the place for regional ontologies” is chapter three of part one of the lecture course Basic Problems of Phenomenology which deals with, according to Heidegger’s table of contents, “the thesis of modern ontology” on “the basic ways of being”, namely res extensa and res cogitans (GA 26, 32-3). Because this section of the course does not contain a metaphysics, Crowell eliminates it as the place to develop a possible theme for metontology (Crowell 2001, 233).

If one considers the proposed structure of the lecture course more closely, it
appears that the architectonic considerations Crowell cites, however tenuous such considerations in general may be, seem to speak precisely in favour of the option ruled out by Crowell. Part one of the course considers four basic problems of phenomenology, the (chronologically) third of which indeed relates to the multiplicity of modes of being. However, the method of part one as a whole is historical or genealogical, and aims to provide a discussion of, in Heidegger’s words, “several traditional theses about being” – hence chapter three considers the specific historical thesis of “modern ontology”. These historical considerations then provide starting point for Heidegger’s positive articulation of “the basic structures and basic ways of being” which was to be contained in part two of the course. Thus, the place for a corresponding positive re-articulation of the thesis of modern ontology on the plurality of being is not to be contained in chapter three of part one as Crowell claims, but in chapter three of part two, which is entitled, appropriately, “The problem of the possible modifications of being and the unity of its manifoldness” (GA 26, 32-33). Alas, much in the spirit of the originally planned continuation of the Being and Time project, only chapter one of part two was delivered. Apparently, Heidegger ran out of time towards to end of the course and was not able to cover all the proposed material. Whatever the precise circumstances around this omission may be, we can plausibly imagine that the topic that was to be covered in chapter three of part two did not finish together with the end of the course, but is developed in other works of Heidegger from around this period, as I have argued above. A cursory look at these works indicates that Heidegger was engaged precisely in a metaphysical project of working out the relation of being in general with its regional variants, if we understand “metaphysics” not in Crowell’s pre-
critical sense but rather in the sense I outlined above.

Crowell’s second consideration against the above option is that an enquiry into the unity of being and its regional variants “still operates with the phenomenological concept of grounds of meaning” whereas metontology is said “not to be grounded in Dasein’s understanding (or the “idea” of being) but is to provide grounds for Dasein” (Crowell 2001, 233). Rather than disqualifying the above form of enquiry as a candidate for the theme of Heidegger’s project after *Being and Time*, such considerations speak rather for a different interpretation of this project, namely one along the lines that I argue for above, according to which Heidegger ultimately wants to ground being in temporality. It is in this sense that such a project would “provide grounds for Dasein”, as Crowell puts it, and, indeed, for any other entities that may appear in the world, that is, for “entities as a whole”. Seen in this light, the omission from Crowell’s account of the kind of grounding that Heidegger’s project after *Being and Time* is supposed to take up is the idea of temporal grounding, the requirement for which I have argued for in the previous chapter, and which represents an option that Crowell fails to consider. Among the list of the possible guiding themes of Heidegger’s project that Crowell provides – God, the totality of existing things, Dasein, nature, etc. – temporality is a conspicuous omission, one that should appear all the more conspicuous in light of the evidence speaking in favour of this option provided above.

In the previous I have argued that attention to Heidegger's statement of his intentions after *Being and Time* point to a project that has the aim of grounding
entities as a whole in temporality. The task of the next part of the present thesis considers the texts in which this project is carried out, with the aim of answering the question of how Heidegger executes this project, based on the three desiderata provided in the present chapter: Heidegger, firstly, must establish that there are entities of a distinct mode of being than natural entities, and indicate that the nature of such entities points to a temporal source. This will be the topic of Chapter 4, in which I explore Heidegger’s conception of entities of the mode of being of readiness-to-hand. Secondly, Heidegger has to show how an entity of this mode of being is grounded in temporality, and to indicate how temporality is able to provide grounds for entities with distinct modes of being, that is, for entities as a whole. This will be the subject of Chapter 5, in which I examine the grounding function of schematism with regard to entities as a whole.

Chapter 4. The Mode of Being of the Ready to Hand

In the previous chapters I have characterised Heidegger’s position as a kind of transcendental pluralism: parallel to Kant’s argument that conditions of possibility precede and enable experience, Heidegger wishes to maintain that the understanding of being precedes and enables the understanding of entities – this is the transcendental part. Against Kant, Heidegger’s aim is to expand the field of possible kinds of entities by articulating a distinction between modes of being based on the above conditions – this is the pluralism part, opposed to what Heidegger takes to be Kant’s monochromatic account of entities. Apart from
rational subjects along with the particular laws of freedom by which they are
governed, Kantian ontology countenances solely “natural objects” and the
general laws that both make them possible at the transcendental level and
govern them at the empirical level.\(^{15}\)

The primary question that has here arisen is: apart from subjects – or, rather, the
Heideggerian version thereof, i.e. Dasein – and natural entities, what other kinds
of entities might an ontology of the Kantian stripe be missing? Heidegger gives
the following list of the “distinct modes of being of entities” (verschiedene Arte
des Seins des Seienden):

In relation to the distinct modes of being of entities we can distinguish:
entities that “exist”: people; Living entities: plants, animals; Present at
hand entities: material things; Ready to hand entities: useful things
(Gebrauchsdinge) in the widest sense; Entities that subsist (Das
Bestehende): number and space (GA 27: 71-2).\(^{16}\)

This list is most likely not exhaustive – Heidegger might want to add artworks or,
later, technology, as entities of distinct modes of being. Partially because the
ready to hand receives by far the most detailed treatment in Heidegger’s works,
but also because these entities, I will argue, serve as a sort of model for
Heideggerian ontology in the 20s and 30s and represent a stark contrast case to
Kantian natural entities, in what follows I will focus on the ready to hand. As

\(^{15}\) Though, of course, there is a disproportion in the status of the subjects and objects, as the
former are not available for theoretical cognition except as objects.

\(^{16}\) The original German reads: “So koennen wir mit Rücksicht auf diese verschiedenen Arten des
Seins des Seienden scheiden: das Existierende: die Menschen; das Lebende: Pflanzen, Tiere; das
Vorhandene: die materielen Dinge; das Zuhandene: die Gebrauchsdinge im weitesten Sinne; das
Bestehende: Zahl und Raum”.

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mentioned in the previous chapter, Heidegger understood entities of the mode of being of readiness to hand as providing a particularly good entry point to the question of the being of entities as a whole.

Such a focus at the same time brings us back to a question that we have raised in previous chapters and to which we can now turn, namely: what is the nature of ready to hand entities and in what precise sense are they ontologically distinct in kind from Kantian entities? As mentioned previously, the identification of the ontological conditions of ready to hand entities was at the same time supposed to point to the ontological conditions of entities as a whole. The aim was, as presented in the previous chapter, to understand how Heidegger’s critical engagement with a Kantian ontology ultimately leads to Heidegger’s ontology of “entities as a whole”, intended as an improvement upon Kant’s narrow ontology of natural entities. We also saw that Heidegger’s term “entities as a whole” is equivocal: on the one hand it refers to the given particular whole in terms of which Dasein makes sense of regional entities of a particular mode of being, and on the other hand it also refers to the whole of possible regions of entities whatever their mode of being. These two meanings correspond to Kant’s special metaphysics, which deals with the conditions that make determinate objects possible, and general metaphysics, which deals with conditions of objects in general. As we further saw, Heidegger objects to the fact that a Kantian general metaphysics can yield only a special metaphysics of one particular region of entities (i.e. of natural entities). It is this general-metaphysical framework that Heidegger thinks will require a wholesale revision based on its inability to account for the paradigmatic case of ready to hand entities.
The first task for Heidegger’s project that results from the above criticism is to show that there are objects of a fundamentally different kind and requiring a different set of specific ontological conditions. The second aim is to then show that the above step further requires a radical re-configuration of the nature of the general ontological conditions of entities as such. It is precisely in this sense that tools, entities of the mode of being of readiness to hand, are exemplary for Heidegger: these entities are made possible by a distinct set of special ontological conditions, conditions which then point to a distinct basis for the general ontological conditions of entities as such regardless of their particular mode of being. Ready to hand entities, then, form a bridge between the two meanings of “entities as a whole” indicated above in that they relate the particular whole available to intuition to the whole of the general conditions of entities as such, and thus also relate special to general metaphysics.

The present chapter takes up Heidegger's ontological retort to the alleged narrowness of Kant’s “special metaphysics” by examining Heidegger's articulation of an ontology of ready to hand entities along with the specific ontological conditions of entities of this kind. The first aim of the present section is thus to establish the difference between Kant's “objects” and Heidegger's “tools”, which are the paradigmatic example of an entity of the mode of being of readiness to hand. Heidegger thinks it is precisely these latter kinds of entities that do not fit into Kant’s model, and which thus point to distinct sets of enabling conditions – we thus want to know, specifically, how the ready to hand differ from Kant's objects, why they do not fit the general ontological framework in
terms of which the latter are articulated, and what kind of alternative ontological framework they point to.

In relation to the first point, Heidegger commentators typically take Kantian entities as present at hand, that is, roughly, substances with properties (material objects), from which the ready to hand is distinguished by its relationality, its holism, and pragmatic structure: rather than consisting of monadic properties, ready to hand entities are said to be constituted by their relations and references to other entities (including Dasein). These relations then form a holistic network or framework within which these entities are determined as the entities that they are. Finally, this entire network is pragmatically structured by Dasein's practices and pragmatic aims (All three features are used to characterise the ready to hand by, for example: Dreyfus 1991, 104; Blattner 1999, 71; and Käufer 2008, 153).

Yet, such a conception need not yet paint a picture that is very distinct from the Kantian conception of natural entities on all three of the above points, namely relationalism, holism, and priority of the practical. With regard to the first of these, as Kant stresses, phenomena are composed solely of relations\textsuperscript{17}. Regarding the second, Kantian objects both are embedded in a network or community of the totality of all other phenomena, as per the third relational sub-category of community, which can be seen as forming a prior, unified backdrop against

\textsuperscript{17} Something the interpretations of Langton (1998) or Franks (2005), for example, have recently emphasised – and, because of this, phenomena are neither genuine substances nor have monadic properties, as Langton argues.
which individual entities are understood\textsuperscript{18}. In relation to the final point, one can even interpret the relation between the first and the second \textit{Critiques} in a way that leaves space for the subordination of theoretical to practical reason\textsuperscript{19}. This is not to say that Kant had anticipated Heidegger’s conception of the mode of being of the ready to hand, but simply that the above list of characteristics of the ready to hand does not yet capture its distinctness from a more “traditional” (for which Kant is here the placeholder) conceptions of entities.

\textbf{Kant on Unity of Intuition, Relations, and Conditions of Apprehension}

In light of the above, the first part of the present chapter thus takes a closer look at the contrast between Heidegger’s and Kant’s characterisation of objects and their conditions. In the next two sections I look at Heidegger’s characterisation of ready to hand entities in terms of a more detailed examination of two of the specific features that I pointed to above, holism and relationality, the latter of which will lead me to the third, namely the significance of practical relations.

As a first pass, I begin with a characterisation of Kantian and Heideggerian entities at a phenomenological level (in the sense of how they are experienced) – Among the most “phenomenological” descriptions along these lines that one finds in Kant, as far as I can see, is the following:

\textsuperscript{18} in different ways, A.D. Dickerson (2003) and Longuenesse (1998), for example, both stress Kant’s holism.  
\textsuperscript{19} A strategy that, for example, Fichte is often seen as having employed. For a nuanced reading of Fichte on the primacy of practice see Chapter 6 in Martin (1997, 118-141).
We glimpse a country house in the distance. If we are conscious that the intuited object is a house, then we must necessarily have a representation of the various parts of this house, the windows, doors, etc. For if we did not see the parts, we would not see the house itself either. But we are not conscious of this representation of the manifold of its parts, and our representation of the object indicated is thus itself an indistinct representation (AK 9:34).

How does this contrast with the way that Heidegger describes the way that tools, as a paradigmatic case of entities of the mode of being of readiness to hand, manifest to consciousness? At first blush, it seems likely that Heidegger would simply deny the veracity of the above picture on phenomenological grounds: one need not have a representation of the various parts of the house precisely because the house always appears within the context of a whole that co-determines the house: if, e.g. I see a row of three houses on a suburban street, I need not have a clear representation of the windows, doors, etc. of the fourth object in the row for it to appear as a house. It might suffice that I glimpse that this object is of roughly the same size and shape as the previous three houses for it to show up as the fourth house on the street.

Heidegger takes the example of a room in order to illustrate how the context always co-determines, and is in some sense prior to, how entities manifest themselves:

The manifold of things encountered... is not an arbitrary manifold of incidental things; it is first and only present in a particular correlation of
references. This referential contexture is itself a closed totality. It is precisely out of this totality that, for example, the individual piece of furniture in a room appears. My encounter with the room is not such that I first take in one thing after another and put together a manifold of things in order then to see a room. Rather, I primarily see a referential whole ... from which the individual piece of furniture and what is in the room stand out (GA 20, 253. Cf. GA 27: 75ff.).

In this sense, in the case of the ready to hand the whole precedes the parts, certainly at the level of perception, and possibly at the level of the ontic determination of individual objects as well.20 When contrasted to this example, Kant appears to hold a typically atomistic position, whereby discrete monadic elements are cobbled together into the objects of perception through subjective processes. On this picture, the difference between a Heideggerian holism and a Kantian atomism would be the following: firstly, it would be one of the magnitude of what is immediately presented to intuition – individual object in a room versus the entire room, for example. Secondly, there would be a difference in the quantity of what is immediately presented – a manifold of either objects or even sense data versus a unified whole which individual objects or sense data comprise. Thirdly, the nature of the movement of the understanding would be

20 So, we must distinguish between the manner objects are perceived, understood, or cognized, and the way in which they 'really' are, in some sense of 'real' -- i.e. between, roughly, an epistemological or semantic holism and an ontological holism. This distinction raises some vexed questions related to Heidegger's ostensible realism / idealism and the question of the extent to which entities are bound up with the conditions of their disclosure. Any attempt to find an answer to the above questions is beyond the scope of the present thesis, though I will say something about the kind of holism to which Heidegger ascribes in what follows. In any case, what we can say here is that the way entities appear for us is a clue to how they are in themselves for Heidegger, so we can draw at least this weaker version of the connection between the two at this stage without the risk of conflating or running the two together.
different, i.e. either from part to whole or whole to part, that is, either understanding would constitute a synthesis of individual elements into a (conceptual) whole, or it would constitute an analysis or a prior-given whole into its component parts.

Though this characterization of both of Kant’s apparent atomism and of Heidegger's holism is in some senses correct, I do not think it captures the essential distinction between the two positions and so does not get to the crux of the difference between ready to hand entities and natural objects. As mentioned previously, Heidegger understands Kant’s conditions of possibility in a holistic sense, often invoking the phenomenological notion of horizon in this context (e.g. in GA 25, 344 or GA 3, 77). Zahavi describes the way in which the notion of horizon tends to be used in phenomenology in the following manner:

To claim that there are objects that are not actually experienced—stones on the backside of the moon, plants in the Amazon jungle, or colors in the ultraviolet spectrum, for instance—is to claim that the objects in question are embedded in a horizon of experience and could be given in principle (Zahavi 2003, 70).

A horizon, seen in this manner, functions in a holistic manner to determine which objects “could be given in principle” in a way that mirrors Kant’s possibility of experience. Consider Kant’s example of objects that are not actual but can in principle be given within experience: “That there could be inhabitants of the moon, even though no human being has ever perceived them, must of course be admitted; but this means only that in the possible progress of
experience we could encounter them” (KrV A493/B521). Possible experience for Kant thus functions holistically like a “horizon” to determine the full range of what can in principle be given, though a given object of a possible experience, such as the inhabitant of the moon, may not be “actually experienced”. Because what can be given are objects, Heidegger seems right to speak of Kant’s conditions of experience as establishing a “horizon of objectivity in general” (GA 3, 84). What Heidegger objects to in Kant, then, is not a kind of perceptual atomism that one might find in empiricist or phenomenalist theories, and so the issue of holism (despite the vagueness of the term) by itself does not seem to provide the necessary point of distinction sufficient to characterize the difference between Heidegger’s “tools” and Kant’s “objects” at the empirical or phenomenological level, because both seem to be embedded within a holistic horizon of possible experience.

Where, then, does the primary difference lie? It is necessary to thus take a closer look at the manner in which Kant conceives of the way in which the subject apprehends or constitutes objects in the context of a given horizon in order to be in a position to distinguish his position from Heidegger’s, and to understand the specific motives underlying Heidegger’s further development of the position. Specifically, we need to focus on the three elements that we can take to provisionally characterise Heidegger’s ready to hand entities as they operate in Kant’s theory, namely the holistic nature of intuition, its relational nature, and the nature of the conditions that make the above possible.
According to Kant’s well-known account in the A deduction, the empirical synthesis through which objects are constituted is a threefold process and primarily consists in the procedure of bringing together, distinguishing and locating appearances in space and time with the aim of then subsuming them under concepts in order to constitute objects of experience. What is initially presented to the subject through the receptive faculty is what Kant calls simply a manifold, which, in any given moment of intuition, can only be presented as an “absolute unity” (KrV A99). Consequently, the unity must be “run through” by the synthesis of apprehension, in order for the manifold implicitly contained in the initial intuition to be capable of being brought out and taken as a manifold.

This gloss on the (first half of) the synthesis of apprehension already raises some thorny interpretative issues with respect to the relation of unity and manifoldness in this first synthesis. However, it is here impossible to go into these, and I will merely state that on my reading, what Kant means is quite similar to what he describes as the movement from indistinct to distinct representations in the logic lectures, which relates to the conscious awareness of the individual parts that comprise a given unity of representation. In Kant’s example, sensible (as opposed to “intellectual” or conceptual) distinctness consists in the consciousness of the manifold in intuition: “I see the Milky Way as a whitish streak, for example... But the representation of this... becomes distinct only through the telescope, because then I glimpse the individual stars contained in the Milky Way” (AK 9:35). In this sense, the unified representation (a whitish streak) that initially presents itself to intuition must be “run-through” at the empirical level – in this case with the help of a telescope – in order to bring out
the manifold of individual parts that are contained in and make up this representation (here, the individual stars).

We, of course, do not always require a telescope in order to run through a given unity of intuition. With everyday objects – such as the house in Kant's previous example – if we do not perceive the manifold that is contained in the "whole representation", then the representation is "indistinct" and, Kant implies, cannot become an object of experience: "if we did not see the parts, we would not see the house itself either" (AK 9:34). In other words, the distinguishing of the manifold of elements that make up a representation of a house, together with the successful identification of these parts (windows, doors, etc.), is necessary in order for the house to show up as a house.

Kant’s conception of the process of empirical apprehension, however, requires a further step. One disanalogy between Kant’s discussion in the logic lectures and the synthesis of apprehension in intuition as described in the Critique is that the latter does not yet deploy empirical concepts, and so any parts that are distinguished cannot yet be (conceptually) identified as windows or doors, for example. What is in play at the level at which Kant is operating here turns out to be extensive and intensive magnitudes – that is, what is given, at this level, are roughly appearances of various shapes and sizes that stand in various spatial relations to one another (in the case of extensive magnitudes) characterised by various secondary qualities of specific degrees, such as colours of varying brightness (in the case of intensive magnitudes). Once the manifold elements are thus run-through and distinguished from each other, the second task of the
The question is now how these magnitudes are “gathered together” into a whole, be that whole comprised of an individual object or of a unified contexture of equipment, as Heidegger describes in the previous example. According to Kant, we locate the manifold of elements presented to intuition based on a spatial framework consisting of three horizons (Gegend) based on our own body. One horizontal plane with respect to our position in space gives rise to the horizons of “above and below”, and two vertical planes standing perpendicular to each other give rise to the horizons of “right and left” and “ahead and behind” (AK 2:375ff.). In this way, we constitute a relative space that acts as a frame of reference that can be used to locate objects in space not only with respect to our own bodies but to each other as well.

As Michael Friedman stresses, this frame of reference is merely arbitrary and relative. What is thus established in this process is not only a “frame of reference or coordinate system” for locating objects in space, but also “the first term of one of Kant’s “infinite progressions” of ever more inclusive relative spaces” (2013, 44). As he puts it:

All location of objects in a space, and, in particular, all location of objects in an oriented space, is therefore achieved by starting from our own body as given and then working outwards step by step – from everyday objects in our familiar surroundings, to our more general location with respect to
the earth, and finally to the (changing) location of the earth itself with respect to the heavens (Friedman 2013, 40-1).  

What the relativity of space establishes is that a given totality or whole of objects is always a relative one that itself can be located within a larger whole, and that an absolute whole is impossible. In this sense, absolute space is merely an idea in the Kantian sense, a regulative ideal that guides our spatial determination of objects (and, primarily, of the motions of objects) but which is itself never achievable.

This completes the discussion of the synthesis of apprehension, at least at the empirical level. When the parts of a manifold are thus distinguished and located in space, the synthesis of imagination and the synthesis of recognition in a concept serve to identify the various arrangements of magnitudes in space as objects. These subsequent two syntheses, for my purposes, require only a brief account. In short, the various magnitudes are associated or connected to each other based on either subjective rules of the imagination or objective rules of concepts. Thus, in the latter case, I conjoin a square shaped figure and a triangle figure located directly above it into the façade of a house because I have the concept of house which serves as a rule for synthesis. In the former case I make associations based on subjective principles such as habit or contiguity (it is likely that Kant here more or less accepts Hume’s list of principles of association, with the exception of causation, of course), which connections thus do not constitute

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21 I thus agree with Friedman’s position that there is continuity between Kant’s early text and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science on the topic of space, and that the former is representative of Kant’s mature position. See Friedman (2013), 40ff.
objective cognition. Through the subsequent synthesis of appearances, I in this manner constitute a whole of objects with greater or smaller levels of distinctness that appear in a given relative horizon.

The position of the Kantian subject is thus much like the position of the viewer of a cubist landscape painting: he or she must determine which shapes (extensive magnitudes) and colours (intensive magnitudes) to connect together in order to form recognizable objects, and then piece these objects together to form a picture of the whole of the canvas (the region of relative space). What presents itself in intuition, as well as how it presents itself, will in my reading turn out to be the primary point of contrast between the Kantian and Heideggerian accounts of object-apprehension at the empirical/ontic level, based on which Heidegger will raise the necessity of a corresponding transformation of the a priori/ontological level.

For Kant, objects thus present themselves as unities in intuition of varying levels of distinctness, based on which further unities can be constructed. We have said above that for both Heidegger and Kant appearances consist of relations. The question now is about the specific composition of the unities that make up objects. It is, again, well known that the process of synthetic apprehension I have described is underwritten by a set of pure concepts or categories, which are in turn based on the forms of unification that the understanding employs in making judgements. The various forms of unification of the understanding in making judgements are brought together in Kant’s table of judgments, each of which thus has a corresponding category. In perhaps the clearest example of such
correlation, that between the form of unification in hypothetical judgements and
the category of causality, the understanding's manner of unifying two elements
hypothetically (such that if x is the case then necessarily y) is the case is
instantiated in causal relations among appearances (in the sense that y
necessarily follows upon x, i.e. y is caused by x).

The unified wholes that are instantiated in the process of apprehension of
objects described above are thus grounded in logical functions of unification, in
other words, in the various ways that the mind is able to unify the terms in a
judgment. These terms may be propositions, as in the example of causality above
or, as in the case of categorical judgements and the corresponding category of
substance, they may refer to ways of unifying predicates with a subject. Because
the categories structure the manifold of intuition at the transcendental level,
objects thus appear within experience as unified wholes consisting of logical
relations. In all cases, however, the forms of unities that objects instantiate at the
empirical level are grounded in such logical functions at the transcendental level
– this is why, as we shall see, Heidegger believes that a distinct conception of the
former needs to be based on a reconceptualization of the latter. The exemplarity
of ready to hand entities resides in that they provide a distinct conception of the
relation composition of empirical (ontic) unities or wholes and for this reason
demand also a reconceptualization of the ground of ontological functions of
unification in general.

It is in this sense that, furthermore, Heidegger’s reformed version of the Kantian
conception of world is to relate to both levels. The above transcendental
functions of unification generate not only categories but also transcendental principles, which are propositions formulated based on the rule pertaining to a given function of unification. These principles determine a priori what an appearance must be like and how it exists (in the above example, it exists as either the cause or the effect of another appearance). In Heidegger’s gloss on Kant’s conception of world, the a priori content of all appearances refers to the content of the principles, that is, to what necessarily and a priori belongs to appearances. As we saw above, Heidegger interprets Kant’s conception of world as the “mathematical whole of the essential what-contents” of nature, which is, further, a whole of “intrinsic possibilities” and “a how” (ein Wie)” (GA 26, 225). The what-contents, as mentioned, refer to the content of the mathematical principles, and they are “essential” because they pertain to the essence of appearances in the sense they necessarily belong to, and characterize them as, what they are – in other words, if an appearance were not an extensive magnitude, then it would not be an appearance.22

Following on from this point, the reference to “intrinsic possibilities” is meant to pick out the fact that these what-contents delineate a priori the complete range of possible forms that an appearance can take. In other words, an appearance can have, for example, any size whatsoever but it must have some size or other – and so for the other determinations of extensive magnitude, such as shape, duration, etc. Similarly, an appearance can have any intensive property whatsoever, such as heat, colour, etc., but that property must appear with some

22 It should be noted that an extensive magnitude may consist of temporal or spatial parts, and so includes representations of inner sense, which are not spatial but temporal
determinate degree. In this sense, the what-contents determine all the possible ways that something can appear within the world. The mathematical principles are constitutive, according to Kant, precisely in the sense that they constitute appearances with respect to their form. Following from this, finally, Heidegger calls this whole “a how” (ein Wie) because it is the complete range of possible ways that an appearance can exist, or how an entity must be in order to be an appearance.

For Kant, then, the range of possibilities of the form of the whole of what can be apprehended in any given moment is prescribed by the mathematical principles with respect to how it exists. The Kantian manifold is preceded by a unitary whole, and arises only from a secondary operation of the cognitive faculties. What comprises the whole are spatial and causal relations, which then allow a conceptual articulation of a manifold of elements that stand in such relations. Heidegger, on the other hand, countenances a whole that is much broader and that – and this is the main point – is comprised of a different sort of relations, which Heidegger will call circumspective relations of significance, as we shall see. How these relations are then manifest for the subject will then of course lead to a different sort of entity, structured by practical rather than causal relations and understood hermeneutically rather than apophantically. The nature of the relational properties that comprise this whole, as well as its pragmatico-hermeneutic structure, will be the topic of the next two sections, respectively, and correspond to different functions of the understanding. I therefore now turn to Heidegger's particular holism with respect to the ready to hand.
Heidegger on the Unity in Intuition

I begin with a brief summary of the well-known section 15 of *Being and Time*, in which Heidegger introduces readiness-to-hand as an “ontologico-categorial” determination of the being of entities. Entities of the mode of being of the ready to hand are not objects of “bare perceptual cognition” but of “concern which manipulates and puts to use” (SZ, 67). Heidegger tells us that the Greeks had a term for such things, “pragmata”, and Heidegger designates them as *Zeug*, “equipment” or “tools”. These kinds of things, unlike spatio-temporally individuated objects of “bare perception”, however, always appear within, and disappear into, a context – according to Heidegger, it is inaccurate to speak of an equipment in the singular; rather, one must take equipment as constituting an equipmental whole or totality structured by in-order-to relations. Individual pieces of equipment “withdraw” into the work to which they are put and which itself “bears with it the referential totality within which tools are encountered” (SZ, 70). The in-order-to relations which mutually refer to one-another and which constitute the whole can be divided into three types: 1) the what-for relation, (*Wozu*), e.g. a shoe is for wearing etc; 2) the whereof, (*Woraus*) is another type of reference, viz. to the materials from which something is made, and 3) a final kind of reference for which Heidegger does not provide a name, but which refers to other Dasein, in the way that the shoe carries with it a reference to the wearer or the shoesmith (or factory worker) that produced it. Heidegger’s word for the being of the kind of entities individuated by such relations (rather than by Kantian spatio-temporal and categorial relations) is *Zuhandenheit*, readiness-to-hand.
The key point to take away from this summary is that these relations individuate entities in the sense that they determine the kinds of entities they are. The favourite example of Heidegger commentators does a fairly good job of illustrating this point: a baseball bat, for example, would not be the thing that it is (namely, a baseball bat) without the inter-referential network of what-for relations (the bat is for hitting the ball, which is for scoring a run, which is for winning the match, etc.), the whereof relations23 and the relations to other people, e.g. the batter, but also the fielders, umpires, fans, etc. These networks of relations determine that baseball bat as a baseball bat, in the sense that the bat would not be what it is if such network either did not exist or were configured in a sufficiently distinct way.

There are two points worth emphasizing here: firstly, as ready to hand entities are not objects of theoretical reflection nor even of perception in a narrow sense, they have to correspond to their own specific capacity or “kind of seeing”, which Heidegger calls circumspection. This kind of “seeing” is characterised by a capacity to survey and keep together the whole of a given totality or set of relations to the extent that individual objects recede into the totality of their relations. As Heidegger puts it, “what is proximally ready to hand... must, as it were, withdraw [zurückzuziehen] in order to be ready to hand quite authentically (SZ, 69)”. We shall return to circumspective sight when discussing

23 Presumably, the bat would not be what it is without the wood from which it was made – though this point is controversial, as it is unclear if Heidegger is referring to the material composition of the given entity or to something more at the "social" level, so to speak (see GA 20, 261ff.)
the understanding, of which this kind of “seeing,” and seeing in general, is a function.

This referential whole or totality is thus what is presented to intuition in the manner of the “closed totality” in Heidegger’s room example and on the backdrop of which “individual pieces of furniture appear”. The important point is that the relations that make up this whole exceed what is present in perception – for example, the baseball bat includes references to the baseball rule-book (without which it would not be a baseball bat), which must be given along with or prior to the givenness of the bat though it is not “present” in Kant’s sense of the word. Similarly, the bat may involve references to future, possibilities – hitting a homerun, say – which are not yet present actualities. In this sense Heidegger transforms, or rather departs from, the Kantian notion of intuition. As mentioned above, Kantian intuition refers to what is present for the subject, what shares the subject’s spatial and temporal horizon in some sense and can causally act on it to produce representations – as he puts in the first Critique, empirical cognition “presupposes the actual presence of the object” in intuition (A50/B74). In this way, for Heidegger, what is given in intuition exceeds what is present for intuition – entire networks of relations must be in some sense given in order for ready to hand entities to be what they are. Nor are the relations that comprise the Heideggerian whole inferential relations that obtain between concepts or propositions – they are either given or presented prior to individual entities or co-presented along with them, and thus are neither discursive (i.e. mediated) nor spontaneous (i.e. produced by the subject). Indeed, because this manner of intuition does not merely take in what is there or what is present, it is
not wholly passive either, and so this mode of givenness will in some sense transcend a sharp passive/active distinction, a point I shall return to shortly.

Heidegger's version of intuition, then, is not indexed to the presence of the object as the Kantian counterpart in that it does not merely take in what is present within the immediate temporal and spatial horizon of the subject – it must go beyond what is present in some sense, and be able to reach out toward relations that are either not yet or no longer present. In fact, Heidegger abandons all talk of intuition for this reason, even claiming in Being and Time that “intuition” is a derived mode of the understanding (SZ, 147). The tradition “from Antiquity to Kant”, Heidegger tells us, has focused one-sidedly on intuition, which has served as “the ideal” for apprehension of the entity (GA 24, 167). Intuition, however, is merely one mode of relating to entities based on one particular “understanding of being” that enables the entity to be encountered in a particular manner, namely as object of perception (GA 24, 166). Because, presumably, our intuitive apparatus is sensuous, and because the corresponding comportment to sensuous intuition is perceptive comportment or simply perception, not only the faculty (i.e. intuition) but also its particular comportment (perception) as well as its kind of object (present at hand) have acquired an epistemically privileged position. Given the variety of ontological kinds of entities and the corresponding variety of intentional comportments belonging to these entities, Heidegger thinks that an exclusive focus on the epistemic package of present at hand / perception / intuition is unjustified. If the mode of comportment corresponding to ready to hand entities is not perception but use, the corresponding mode of givenness of the object cannot be intuitive. Rather, we need a broader conception
of the manner in which objects are given, and the term with which Heidegger replaces intuition with is \textit{begennen}, translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as “encounter” – entities are not intuited but \textit{begennen}, encounter or are encountered.

\textit{Begegnen} must be terminologically distinguished both from “involvement”, \textit{Bewandtnis}, which relates to entities qua apprehended or understood (though, in the sense of: used or put to use) as well as from “discovery”, \textit{entdecken}, which relates to how entities are conceptually grasped based on their position within the whole. There is, however, a major grammatical difficulty with the English translation of \textit{begegnen} as encounter, namely that the English verb is usually transitive whereas the German can be both transitive and intransitive, and indeed Heidegger uses it in both ways in a way that is most likely meant to straddle the active / passive distinction. The transitive use, namely, implies a subject-object, active-passive model that Heidegger wishes to avoid: I encounter something, or something is encountered (by me). Heidegger often uses the verb intransitively, something \textit{begegnet}, something arises or is given at a particular time. Another relevant linguistic feature of the German word is that it is derived from “\textit{gegen}”, against, and so is a cognate of \textit{Gegenstand}, object, but without the implication of the “\textit{stand}”, standing. So, it is in a sense what is “over against” the subject, but without the permanence of the “\textit{stand}”, that is, without yet being objectified into a \textit{Gegenstand}, which Heidegger thinks is a secondary operation of cognition. In this sense, he speaks of \textit{Gegenstehenlassen},\textsuperscript{24} which implies that

\textsuperscript{24}For example: "der Horizont des \textit{Gegenstehenlassens} Dementsprechend vollzieht die Synthesis von Denken und Anschauen das Offenbarmachen des begegnenden Seienden als \textit{Gegenstand}" (GA 3).
what is first of all given is not an individual object but a whole or totality first based on which individual objects can appear, as I have been emphasising above. With these two qualifications, I will continue to translate the term with “encounter”, though I will at times use it intransitively as Heidegger does.

Before moving on to relations, I would like to come back to a couple of points that were raised previously and that are worth developing here: Firstly, the relations that comprise this whole are not inferential or logical relations. They do not exist ideally or merely in thought (or wherever else logical relations are taken to exist) – these Kant could account for – and are not the product solely of the spontaneity of the subject in any clear sense. Rather, much like the back side of Husserl's chair that is not inferred from the concept “chair” but given immediately, Heidegger’s relations are “given” to the subject immediately in the sense of being encountered, *begegnen*, along with world, and are relations of significance rather than of, e.g. material implication.

Secondly, that they cannot be logical relations stems from the fact that they are not the product of a pure spontaneity and, indeed, at the level of encounter (*Begegnen*) the sharp distinction between spontaneity and receptivity does not hold. In this manner *begegnen* differs from Kant's notion of intuition, which is wholly receptive or passive. Indeed, Heidegger chides Kant for drawing the spontaneity/receptivity distinction too sharply,”25 which Heidegger labels a

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25 “Kant wurde durch die Spontaneität des Denkens und überhaupt aller Tätigkeit des Bewußtseins im weitesten Sinne dazu verleitet zu sagen, nur wo Spontaneität ist, da ist Denken — also ein Bestimmen mit Bezug auf die Dinge, ein Zuspreehen von bestimmten logischen Charakteren. Das ist ein Grundirrtum. Wo Spontaneität ist, ist nicht notwendig ausgeschlossen, daß da nicht gerade noch eine eigentümliche Receptivität ist. Gerade im Aufmerken auf etwas,
“Grundirrtum,” a fundamental error. What Kant considers to be spontaneity is for Heidegger in its “original essence” a “Begegnen-lassen,” a letting be encountered, which has its own “peculiar passivity, its own peculiar receptivity” (GA 27: 74). This Begegnen-lassen or letting be encountered is thus according to Heidegger “spontaneity in a certain sense, but such that nonetheless has the intentional character of taking-in, of receptivity” (GA 27, 74).26

Ultimately, the reason that the sphere in which entities are encountered (begegnet) is neither wholly active nor wholly passive – or, rather, is inextricably both – is due to the nature of the understanding, which both projects itself onto the world and, reciprocally, lets itself be determined by the world in light of the particular manner of its projection. This will be explored in the subsequent section, where I discuss how the three structural components of ready to hand entities, viz. their holistic, relational, and pragmatico-hermeneutic nature, are together grounded in functions of the understanding, or functions of unification.

Up to this point, however, we have only seen the first structural component of ready to hand entities, their begegnende-holistic structure. By way of summary, we can say that this holism refers to the unity and breadth of what is given (begegnet), which is encountered both as a whole and as stretching beyond what

26 The full passage (from the unfortunately untranslated GA 27) reads: Es liegt im Charakter dieses Aufmerkens auf das Ding, daß das Ding selbst uns gewissermaßen sagt: ich war schon da, bevor du mich auffaßtest. In diesem Aufmerken auf die Dinge tragen wir ihnen nichts zu, wir reden ihnen gewissermaßen nichts auf, sondern sie, die Dinge selbst, begegnen uns so. Das Aufmerken auf die Dinge, scheinbar eine Tätigkeit von unserer Seite, -- ein scheinbares Tun, oder mit Kant zu sprechen, eine scheinbare Spontaneität unserer selbst, ist aber ihrem eigentlichen Wesen nach gerade ein Begegnen-lassen, eine eigentümliche Passivität, eine eigentümliche Receptivität. Bei diesem Begegnen-lassen gibt es weder »Eindruck« von einem Außen noch Hin-ausgehen von uns, also auch kein Drinnen; weder ist es ein Kausalverhältnis noch verkehrte Transzendenz. Dieses Begegnen-lassen ist in gewisser Weise Spontaneität, aber eine solche, die intentional doch den Charakter des Hinnehmens, der Receptivität hat (GA 27: 74)
is empirically spatio-temporally present for Dasein. This is, then, what distinguishes Heidegger’s from Kant’s holism (should we choose to ascribe him such), namely that the Kantian whole is composed of what is immediately present in intuition for the subject against the backdrop of the whole of the horizon of possible experience – hence Heidegger’s criticism of ontologies of “presence”. Thus, the crucial distinguishing feature of Heidegger’s holism is the nature of conceiving *begegnen* and of the structure of what is encountered, *begegnet*.

**Heidegger on the Relational Context of Apprehension**

A further distinguishing characteristic leads into what follows: the Kantian whole that is taken in through intuition is structured by spatial and logical relations, whereas the Heideggerian whole is structured by relations of significance, which itself follows into the third component, i.e. that these relations are grasped hermeneutically-pragmatically rather than apophantically-theoretically. In light of this, I now turn to the nature of the above relations.

For a ready to hand entity to be, according to Heidegger, it must “appear” in the world. In other words, while the chains of relations that characterise such entities always *encounter* in the sense that they are immediately given, they can be “lit up” in different ways according to how they are plugged into the chains of relations that make up the world, the totality of which Heidegger will call “significance” (SZ, 87). This chain of relations which comprises the world is in
this manner, as Heidegger says, the ground in “terms of which the ready to hand can be ready to hand” (SZ, 83). Certain chains of relations enter the world by being “freed” in the context of the structure of significance through what Heidegger calls *Bewandtnis*, involvement or relevance. Within the world, the being of ready to hand entities takes on the character of *Bewandtnis*. Above, Heidegger stated that the being of tools is *Zuhandenheit*; in the present section (*Being and Time*, section 18) he states that the character of the being of ready to hand entities is *Bewandtnis* – In this respect, the question arises of why ready to hand entities, apart from their being qua *Zuhandenheit*, need on top of this what appears to be another kind of being, *Bewandtnis*.

At first blush, the entanglement of these questions poses a significant interpretative problem. According to e.g. Dreyfus, *Bewandtnis* considers equipment in relation to humans, whereas *Zuhandenheit* in abstraction from humans (Dreyfus 1991, 91ff.). Again, this is partially true, but does not really get at the heart of the difference between the two ways of being – the issue, as far as I can see, can only be resolved with reference to the distinction between *begegnen* and *bewandtnis* drawn above. An equipmental whole needs to first encounter/be encountered (*begegnen*), to be given, for elements within it to be involved, (*bewandt*); next, this involvement (*bewandtnis*) places equipment into the context of relations with other kinds of entities that are not ready to hand, primarily individual Dasein, thereby highlighting and modifying certain chains of relations in specific ways, of “lighting them up” in different manners.
To make this point more intuitively graspable we can draw a parallel with Kant’s distinction (or, rather, the traditional distinction, as articulated by Kant) from the example above between conscious and non-conscious apprehension: something can be given to intuition but not yet constitute a conscious representation, that is, not yet be cognition. So for Heidegger something – a link in the chain of references, let’s say – can encounter (which is the correlate to intuition, above), but not yet be “grasped” in some further to be specified way. Of course, for “consciousness,” Heidegger substitutes something like “use” – to understand a ready to hand entity is not to become conscious of it, but to use it – and just as begegnen is much broader than intuition, “use” is much broader than consciousness of an entity. So, while there is a disanalogy in the two cases due to the difference between consciousness and use, the manner in which one does not “see” the house if one is not conscious of it in Kant’s example is analogous to the manner in which one does not “see” – in the sense of the circumspective seeing of “use” – an entity unless its involved in Dasein’s web of significative relations. Thus, something can be “given”, but still be veiled in some sense, specifically, in the sense that it is not involved (in the world of a particular Dasein) or not discovered (this will help later to explain a mysterious phrase in which Heidegger speaks of entities that are “understood but still veiled”) within the context of significative relations.

Thus, the begegnende whole can acquire a further level of intelligibility through its articulation into particular involvements within particular sets of relations, in the context of which ready to hand entities become visible. What is the nature of these relations and how do they enable ready to hand entities to be “seen” or to
be discovered within the world? We saw in the previous section that to the relational whole which is encountered by or encounters (begegnet) Dasein corresponds to a particular kind of seeing, namely circumspective seeing (Umsicht); I further implied that circumspection is also structured and directed by Dasein's particular self-understanding and understanding of its world. In this sense, Dasein is directed towards or takes up particular wholes or chains of relations within the whole which then become articulated based on Dasein's manner of self-projection – we can say based on Dasein’s “interests”, if we take interests in the sufficiently broad sense to be outlined below. In this manner, Dasein can discover (entdecken) particular entities within particular chains of relations. What Heidegger calls “letting be involved” is what corresponds to the “lighting up” of particular relations within a whole that is given through encounter (begegnen) and to the particular content of these relations that have the character of bewandtnis, of involvement.

There are two main characteristics of bewandtnis, both of which cut against the grain of traditional theories. Once again taking Kant as a stand-in for “traditional theories”, an entity or object is “apprehended” when a manifold is given conceptual shape based on a rule, and in this sense the object is cognized. There are variations on this story, even within Kant interpretations, but the basic tenet is: intuition + concept = cognition. The first difference in the Heideggerian articulation is that cognition, reformulated as bewandtnis, grasps an object by letting it be involved in a chain of relations, that is, by putting an object to use in a way that unlocks the chains of relations that particular use requires. Hence, the tool that is put to use becomes understood through its particular involvement in
the specific set of relations relevant to that use. In this sense “the character of its being” (*Seinscharakter*) is involvement rather than cognition. So, I let a given tool be involved, roughly, by using it, and need not have a conceptual or conscious grasp of it. Using this tool, at the same time, means plugging it into, so to speak, a network of relations that characterise the particular world in which the entity and I find ourselves, and in this sense the entity is always referred to something else. As Heidegger puts it, “an entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and, referred as that entity which it is” (*SZ*, 84). I discover a piece of chalk, for example, when I “refer” it to the blackboard on which I write, and the blackboard in turn “refers” to the board eraser required for wiping it and so forth, and in this way the piece of chalk is “involved” in a particular relational chain determined by the task of giving a lecture.

This leads to the second difference to the Kantian picture: because of the relational nature of the ready to hand, I do not discover individual spatio-temporally individuated objects, but the entire holistic framework of relations in which the entity becomes involved. In other words, I cannot discover the piece of chalk unless it bears a functional relation of reference to other entities, to blackboard and eraser (among others) in the example above. Furthermore, this framework of relations is in the “perfect a priori”, as Heidegger says, meaning that it is always already discovered. I move from one particular configuration of a framework to the next, so to speak; I am never frameworkless, which is partially what Heidegger’s insistence that Dasein is *always already* in the world is intended to emphasise. As Heidegger puts this point:
When we speak of having already let something be involved, so that it has been freed for that involvement, we are using a perfect tense a priori which characterizes the kind of being belonging to Dasein itself... [For] Dasein as such... a context of the ready to hand is already essentially discovered (SZ, 85, 87).

Thus, the first sense in which ready-at-hand entities differ from (Kantian) natural entities is in that the being of the former is encountered against a holistic background that exceeds what is present to intuition (in the sense described above) in a way the latter are not; secondly, a further distinction in the “character” of their being is that whereas the latter are determined through a cognitive relation to the subject, the former are apprehended as appearances in terms of their functional use within a relational network that is always already in place. An example will help bring this difference into relief. Here, Heidegger describes a lecture hall, in a passage that is worth citing in full:

We always have before us a manifold of things: not only chalk, but [in the case of this lecture hall] also eraser, blackboard, chairs etc. etc... But these are not haphazardly thrown together in a relationless chaos like at a flea market... [Rather], the chalk is for writing on the blackboard, the eraser for erasing what is written on the blackboard. These things... stand in a network of interrelations (Zusammenhang) of serviceability for.... Within this network, they have specific relations. That there is such a totality of involvements... is determined by the fact that here in the lecture hall one is writing on the board, which serves for better communicating the subject matter of the lecture. Through this task, the totality in this room is
determined in advance... The manifold of these entities, as they announce themselves to us, is only intelligible because we understand in advance something like “lecture hall”, because we have some idea of it. In the light of a determinate totality of involvements, which is dictated by the task – public lecture – the entity as it is in-itself... is unconcealed for us (GA 27, 75-6).

The objects in the lecture hall form a whole that is tied together by the relations of involvement each object has with the other. I uncover a particular set of relations through a determinate Aufgabe, task, in this case going to or giving a lecture. The chalk is for writing on the blackboard, which is for communicating information, which is for understanding the lecture, and so forth. In this sense a determinate chain of relations is discovered based on Dasein’s particular task (public lecture). A distinct task, e.g. cleaning the room, would uncover a distinct chain of relations – e.g. the blackboard is for washing, washing the blackboard is for preparing it for tomorrow’s lecture and so forth. It must be noted that despite the fact that a determinate chain of relations gets “lit up” in becoming involved, the kinds of relations that make up the being of the ready to hand described in the holism section above – the blackboard refers to the institution of education, to the materials it is made of etc. etc. – need to also be given because they determine the blackboard as the thing it is, though they need not be “consciously” given, need not be “lit up” or highlighted within the chain uncovered through these involvements. The former relations are at the level of begegnen – they are given, but not lit up or involved, in short, they do not have the character of Bewandtnis. Rather, certain relations within what is given are
selected, highlighted, or “lit up” precisely through the kinds of involvements required for Dasein’s particular task. A particular task is at the same time a possibility that Dasein projects and that has a certain significance for it – hence the kind of referential relations that make up the being of **bewandtnis** is one of significative relations, or simply of significance (*Bedeutstamkeit*).

Before turning to the understanding, in which the above unities that constitute ready to hand entities are grounded, the main points to keep in mind based on the previous discussion are 1) the distinction between the kinds of relations that characterise ready to hand entities at the level of the given that encounters, *begegnet*, the kinds of relations that characterise significance, and the character that the former take on in the context of the latter, viz. that of *Bewandtnis* or involvement, as described above – these distinct levels of aspects of apprehension will turn out to correspond to distinct functions of the understanding. As should be clear, 2) all three sets of relations are essentially different to the kinds of causal relations that characterise Kantian objects, which are also said to consist in “nothing but mere relations” (*KrV* B66). 27 Finally, 3) in the same way that the *Begegnende* comes in wholes or totalities, the relations that are implicit in this whole come in “chains” and constitute this whole or totality, in the manner exemplified above.

27 For an account of these kinds of relations see, generally, Rae Langton’s (1998) *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves.*
Judgment and Understanding

Heidegger defines the understanding in terms of the aforementioned projection of possibilities. In the relevant section of *Being and Time* (viz. sections 31 and 32), Heidegger’s intention is primarily to show how Dasein relates to entities at an empirical level, but also to make several points about the nature of Dasein itself, about the relation of facticity to factuality (the former always outstrips the latter) or about authenticity and inauthenticity (i.e. self-understanding by means of oneself or by means of the world, respectively). I will not touch on these issues; in line with my aims of providing an interpretation of the nature of the relation of entities and their conditions that constitute “world”, I will focus on the way that ready to hand entities are understood and grounded in the understanding, making reference to Dasein only in those facets that are necessary in order to explain this issue. I will take up the two components of Heidegger’s canonical definition of the understanding cited above – namely projection and possibility – in this context, before moving on to discuss the way that the structure of the understanding is isomorphic with the structure of the being of ready to hand entities, thus enabling or grounding their intelligibility in interpretation. Ultimately, my aim will be to show how ready to hand entities require ontological conditions that are distinct from the conditions required by natural entities, before moving on to Heidegger’s conception of the nature of such conditions.

Firstly, possibilities: the understanding discloses and projects existential possibilities, or possible ways that Dasein can be in the world. But, along with
Dasein's individual possibilities, possible relations that characterise the ready to hand are also disclosed. As Heidegger puts it:

As a potentiality-for-being, any being-in is a potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Not only is the world, qua world, disclosed as possible significance, but when that which is within-the world is itself freed, this entity is freed for its own possibilities. That which is ready to hand is discovered as such in its serviceability, its usability, and its detrimentality. The totality of involvements is revealed as the categorial whole of a possible interconnection of the ready to hand (SZ, 144).

Thus, the relations of the ready to hand and the relations of Dasein are necessarily intertwined and co-disclosed, because Dasein’s own possibilities are partially understood in terms of how it projects such possibilities upon innerworldy entities (and partially how it projects its possibilities upon the for-the-sake-of-which). In this sense, the relations that constitute readiness-to-hand and the relations that constitute Dasein's self-understanding themselves form a unity, namely, that of entities as a whole or simply “world”. Much in the same way that Dasein understands entities in the holistic context formed by its own projection into possibilities, Dasein likewise understands itself and its own possibilities in terms of entities. As Heidegger puts it, for Dasein a given entity of the mode of being of readiness to hand is

intelligible as the tool that it is only by way of the particular world that belongs to the existential constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world. In understanding itself by way of things, Dasein understands itself as being-in-the-world by way of its world (GA 24, 243-4).
Dasein understands entities in terms of its possible ways of being, but equally understands its own possible ways of being in terms of ontic possibilities of innerworldly entities. We saw in our above example the way in which existential possibilities such as giving a lecture become intertwined with ontic possibilities such as using this chalk which is for writing on the blackboard – the question will be how these ways of bringing possibilities into unities is itself made possible by the understanding. It should be further noted that to the extent that Dasein understands its own being in terms of entities its understanding of being partially acquires an ontic ground, a move that Crowell decries, as we saw above. However, this ontic ground, as should be clear from the above, should not be interpreted as a form of naturalism as Crowell intends it, but rather should be taken hermeneutically: Dasein simultaneously understands itself in terms of entities and understands entities in terms of itself in an ever shifting circle in which neither pole serves as the sole and unique ground. Rather, the ground of this process, which Heidegger calls ontic transcendence, will turn out to be ontological transcendence, specifically the temporal schemata which make the latter possible.

This latter point brings me, secondly, to projection: in its projective character, the understanding is Dasein's “sight”, which itself can take many forms depending on the being of what is seen. In this sense, circumspective sight (Umsicht) corresponds to (and uncovers) ready to hand entities, the sight of solicitude (Rücksicht) corresponds to other Dasein, and the sight of transparency (Durchsichtigkeit) corresponds to (one’s own) existence. Thus, distinct kinds of
“sight” represent kinds of comportments that intend or uncover entities of distinct modes of being – so, to be able to use the chalk to write on the blackboard I need to have both the functional relations constituting the chalk as well as my own existential possibilities circumspectively in view through circumspection (Umsicht) and the sight of transparency (Durchsichtigkeit), respectively. It should be added that “intuition”, when understood as “perception” is a theoretical kind of sight that intends natural entities of the kind Kant countenances, or of present at hand entities in general. Perception in Kant’s sense, as Heidegger puts it, “has the character of a setting free of the present at hand to let it be encountered” (GA 24, 166-7).

Heidegger also cites “Sicht auf das Sein als solches” – the sight directed at being as such (SZ, 146). This relates to the ontological, rather than to the ontic or empirical level we are presently occupying, and I shall return to it later – by way of anticipation, it is perhaps worth pointing out that it is the understanding that is able to grasp and switch between ontologically distinct kinds of entities by projecting their respective mode of being, a point which will take on importance in the discussion of the “switch-over” from the ready- to the present at hand. In any case, the point to take away from the projective aspect of understanding is that the projection of a set of possibilities takes the form of a kind of sight relative to particular kinds of entities, which surveys or uncovers potential relational chains within this set of possibilities.

We have discussed the sight of circumspection above, but the point worth highlighting in this context is that this "sight" is not to be taken primarily as an
empirical, sensory capacity, but as corresponding to the manner in which certain chains of relations are “lit up” based on the specific direction of Dasein’s concern. As Heidegger states: “[Sight] corresponds to the ‘clearedness’ [Gelichtetheit] which we took as characterizing the disclosedness of the ‘there’” and in this manner it “lets entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly [unverdeckt begegnen läßt] in themselves” (SZ, 147). In this sense, it is the sight of the understanding that allows what is given (begegnet) to be unconcealed or discovered (unverdeckt) by “lighting up”, highlighting, or taking up certain particular chains of relations that are implicit within the whole of what is given.

Much like the Kantian understanding, the Heideggerian understanding has a certain structure, based upon which it produces certain kinds of unified objects and is able to combine those objects in specific ways. What I mean is the following: For Kant, the understanding is structured by a priori concepts and principles, which themselves derive from, and to a certain extent mimic, possible forms of judgements themselves deriving from the aforementioned logical table of judgments. These forms of judgments, by way of the categories of the understanding, then synthesise objects based on the requisite form. For example, corresponding to the category of relation, which itself corresponds to the subject-predicate structure of judgment, objects are “synthesised into”, in this case, the substance-accident form. In other words, in this case we have: categorical judgment (as a possible form of judgment of relation) --> inherence and subsistence (the corresponding category of relation) --> objects with properties (as intuitions synthesised according to this category). In this manner, the substance-accident form that objects take mirrors and derives from the
subject-predicate form of judgment. So with the other categories: the particular form of an object instantiating a given property, for example, is based on the form of an affirmative judgment, which ascribes a predicate to a subject, vice versa for negative judgments, and so forth. The point to take away from this discussion is that, for Kant, 1) the understanding is, roughly, structured by possible forms of judgements, 2) these structures are possible forms of unity based on which objects are synthesised, and so 3) the particular structure of the understanding is in this manner “projected” into objects, which then instantiate the corresponding forms.

The crucial point in relation to Heidegger is that he, like Kant, thinks the understanding has a certain structure that is then reflected in the structure of the being of the objects of the understanding. Even if he does not accept the stronger (Kantian) claim that the understanding actually introduces that structure into objects, there is an isomorphism between the structure of the understanding and the structure of objects, which enables those objects to be grasped by the understanding. The reason Heidegger does not accept the thesis that the understanding introduces structure into the object is not that he denies an isomorphism between the two, but because he thinks this isomorphism is a function of the structure of time rather than of the logical structure of the understanding. While Kant, in order to make the two poles fully isomorphic, needs to introduce a temporal basis which unites the two poles (namely schematisation), Heidegger simply takes this temporal unity as basic – which is a point that I have indicated in chapter two and will develop further in the next chapter. The point is simply that, both for Kant and for Heidegger, we can grasp
particular unities of objects or relations because the understanding has an a priori capacity for unifying according to particular forms. For Heidegger, however, unlike for Kant, the logical forms of unification derived from the tables of judgement are insufficient for explaining the kinds of unities instantiated by entities of the mode of being of the ready to hand.

Heidegger thus takes over the basic blueprint for the understanding from Kant, but substantially reworks the “content,” both the content of the “principles” of the understanding – in other words, the deployment of its structure qua rules of synthesis – as well as the content of that which the understanding takes in and interprets. We are already familiar with the latter point – the nature of the given (begegnen), for Heidegger, is much broader than what is given in intuition for the Kantian subject, and has a holistic, relational structure. Because what is given (begegnet) is already disclosed by the understanding, and because it is disclosed holistically, i.e. as an initially relatively undifferentiated totality (i.e. it is not yet “lit up”), the function of the understanding is essentially to differentiate or interpret what it has already understood:

In terms of the significance which is disclosed in understanding the world, concernful being-alongside the ready to hand gives itself to understand whatever involvement that which is encountered can have [welche Bewandtnis es je mit dem Begegnenden haben kann] (SZ, 148).

Thus that which is given to / projected by the understanding (in short, das Begegnende) gets “lit up” in the sense that particular assignments of involvement are made, which themselves are articulated in particular chains of referential
relations. In this way, the sight corresponding to ready to hand entities, circumspective sight, "discovers" particular ready to hand entities by making their relational properties explicit:

To say that "circumspection discovers" means that the "world" which has already been understood comes to be interpreted. The ready to hand comes explicitly into the sight which understands (SZ, 148).

In articulating or making explicit a relational chain, the understanding also articulates a given entity by making explicit those relations that characterise it, which it again selects out of the implicit relations structuring the whole or totality (Ganzheit) that is given to, and given by, the understanding (begegnen):

In the mere encountering of something [das schlicht Begegnende], it is understood in terms of a totality (Ganzheit) of involvements; and such seeing [i.e. circumspection] hides in itself the explicitness of the assignment-relations (of the "in-order-to") which belong to that totality (SZ, 149).

In our example, the totality of the component relations comprising the institution of the "public lecture" (and in some sense of academia, or education more generally) are given along with my task (Aufgabe) of giving a public lecture. This does not, however, mean that I am consciously aware of the functional properties of every entity in the lecture hall. Rather, I “discover” the chalk and the chain of referential relations it is embedded in (for writing, etc.) precisely by using it to write on the blackboard (in order to convey the title of the lecture to students for example). It is in this sense that such relations are “hidden in” the
whole that is grasped in advance and that interpretation makes such relations explicit through assignments of involvement.

The two primary features of the ready to hand that I highlighted above (holism and relationality), which themselves correspond to two levels of givenness (begegnen and Bewandtnis) as well as to two epistemic stances or kinds of “seeing” (circumspection and discovery), here find their corresponding functions of unification in the understanding: the understanding 1) holds together the Begegnende whole in its unity, and 2) analyses it into the relations that this whole consists of. Circumspection and discovery are grounded in these two functions in the sense that they are modes of seeing or surveying a whole (corresponding to 1) and of picking out chains of relations within that whole (corresponding to 2), respectively. The relations that the whole is articulated into are, as mentioned above, the relations of the in-order-to (um zu):

[W]e take apart in its "in-order-to" that which is circumspectively ready to hand, and we concern ourselves with it in accordance with what becomes visible through this process [der sichtig gewordenen Auseinandergelegtheit]. That which has been circumspectively taken apart with regard to its "in-order-to", and taken apart as such – that which is explicitly understood – has the structure of something as something (SZ, 149).

The whole that is taken in as a whole in circumspection is articulated into its in-order-to relations; the added point in the quotation above is that in the
articulation of these in-order-to relations individual entities are also articulated as something. Heidegger continues:

The “as” makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation. In dealing with what is environmentally ready to hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we “see” it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge (SZ, 149).

The chalk is grasped “as” a piece of chalk not when I subsume a given intuition under a concept or when I ascribe the predicates “white” or “chalk-like” to a sensible given; rather, the chalk appears as a piece of chalk when I pick out a structural component of a particular chain of relations, in this case the relation “in order to write on the board” and assign it to its particular function. As Heidegger puts it, in “circumspective letting-function” we understand an encountered entity “by way of its functionality, by its in-order-to relations” (GA 24, 441). In this manner, the structure of the ready to hand entities to be understood is isomorphic to the structure of the understanding itself. In other words: ready to hand entities are holistic and relational and the understanding is holistic and relational (or, relations-directed). Specifically, ready to hand entities are holistic and relational in the sense that they are determined as the entities they are by their place within a whole that is structured by in-order-to relations, and the understanding is holistic and relational in that it grasps a whole and articulates it into its relational components.

As mentioned before, the nature of this isomorphism finds its ground not in the understanding itself but in the structure of time – or, putting the issue more
carefully, it is grounded in the understanding to the extent that the understanding itself is temporal. I will turn to this issue in what follows, after examining the structure of the understanding in more detail – at this stage, Heidegger can only insist once again that the structure of the entities is not merely the structure of the perception of the entity – of the way it is for us – but belongs to the entity itself, which is in this sense isomorphic to the understanding. The “as” structure, Heidegger emphasises, is not merely added onto a present at hand entity by our cognitive apparatus – Heidegger calls this a “misunderstanding” – but belongs to the “thing in question”:

[Do we not] in the first instance experience something purely present at hand, and then taken it as a door, as a house? This would be a misunderstanding of the specific way in which interpretation functions as disclosure. In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a “signification” over some naked thing which is present at hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation (SZ, 149).

The Fore-structure of Understanding

To return to the understanding: as mentioned, for Heidegger the understanding has an a priori structure, a “fore-structure”, that guides interpretation of particular entities, much in the way that the Kantian understanding has a
structure of possible functions that guide its subsumption of intuitions under concepts. The particular structure of Heidegger's understanding, as can be gleaned from the above, consists not of the functions of judgement but of three primary components, fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception:\footnote{Which in the original are really just the standard German words for “plan” (Vorhaben), “attention” (Vorsicht) and “anticipation” (Vorgriff), respectively – I will continue to employ the standard but somewhat awkward English translations above, but will be emphasising their original German connotations in my interpretations of them.}

Fore-having holds together what is encountered (begegnet) as a unified whole:

> In every case this interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance – in a fore-having. As the appropriation of understanding, the interpretation operates in being towards a totality (Ganzheit) of involvements which is already understood (SZ, 150).

The emphasis of fore-having is on the unified whole or totality, Ganzheit, and so the function of unity of this segment of the understanding is unification qua totality of involvements. This whole or totality, as mentioned previously, is understood as a whole yet still in some sense “veiled”, namely in that the individual relational chains that compose the whole are not made explicit by this form of unification – the next function, then, i.e. fore-sight is the breaking down of this whole into its component relational chains. It is thus function of “lighting up” certain relational chains by focusing its “sight” on particular relations, and thus “appropriating” them:

> When something is understood but is still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an act of appropriation, and this is always done under the guidance of a point of view, which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is
to be interpreted. In every case interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance - in a fore-sight. This fore-sight "takes the first cut" out of what has been taken into our fore-having, and it does so with a view to a definite way in which this can be interpreted (SZ, 150).

Thus, fore-sight "takes a cut" out of the whole that is held in the fore-having, precisely by lighting up certain relations of the whole. This is done, as mentioned, in light of and based on Dasein's particular concern, on Dasein's particular "task", and corresponds to bewandtnis - specific relations are assigned to specific involvements. A "point of view" may refer to a task, such as a public lecture or cleaning a room in the example above, which in turn determines the kinds of relational chains that show up. Understanding, as was mentioned, has in its view both the self and the world, which we can now specify to mean: both the particular task (and the for-the-sake-of-which in light of which it is carried out) as well as the possible relational chains suitable for involvement in this task. It is based on this that the interpretation "takes a first cut" out of the whole maintained in the fore-having.

Finally, in the third structural moment, fore-conception (or fore-grasp), "individual" entities within the chain of assigned involvements can be discovered and explicitly grasped as something or other:

Anything understood which is held in our fore-having and towards which we set our sights "foresightedly", becomes conceptualizable through the interpretation. In such an interpretation, the way in which the entity we are interpreting is to be conceived can be drawn from the entity itself, or
the interpretation can force the entity into concepts to which it is opposed in its manner of Being (SZ, 150).

This is the structural moment relative to discovery proper: entities are grasped as a table or as a house or a room or hammer by our relating to them conceptually – staying with the previous example, I grasp the blackboard as a blackboard (and now we can see that, given the previous two structures, this simple grasping is predicated on having grasped the blackboard as something to write on, for a lecture, etc.).

In fore-conception, furthermore we can force an entity into concepts that are “opposed to its manner of being”, which can happen at various levels: it may be that I simply take a table as a chair (which may constitute simply my comportment to the table as such, i.e. my sitting on it – in this case I am still taking it at something though I may not be consciously aware of it), or it may be that I treat a Dasein or a ready to hand entity as a present at hand one, I objectify people or tools by applying concepts “drawn from” the realm of material objects to either. This latter example, however, already moves towards the ontological plane in that it is a case of the understanding of the being of a given entity, which will become relevant in the “switch-over” to the present at hand – at this stage, I would just like to point out that the understanding will also turn out to have an ontological function, and not merely the ontic function with which we are concerned with at present. Furthermore, in relation to concept-application, Heidegger wants to distance himself from the Kantian model of subsumption of content under concepts in theoretical cognition by highlighting
the hermeneutical nature of conceptualisation. As he puts it, it is appropriate to speak of concepts only “as long as we do not understand concept as a theoretical concept” but rather in a hermeneutical sense “as the concept of an entity that appears along with me in my world” (GA 21, 264).

The three above structures comprise the structure of the understanding as a whole. As with Kant, for whom the categories are ontological (or at least its correlate: transcendental), but manifest at the ontic (empirical) level in terms of certain unities that objects instantiate or display (substance, properties, and so forth – see above), so for Heidegger these ontological structures of the understanding are ways of unifying present at hand entities. Rather than synthesising a manifold of intuition according to the forms proper to the logical structure of judgment, they unify what is given (begegnet) according to just three features of ready to hand entities I highlighted above: namely, 1) as a whole/unity, 2) as the relational chains of that whole, and 3) as individual entities in a hermeneutical sense (i.e. as something for (Wozu) something or other). The corresponding ways of interpreting I discussed above – namely, analysing wholes into their component relations – also correspond to structural forms of the understanding.

The primary difference between the Kantian and Heideggerian conceptions of the kinds of unities that natural objects and ready to hand entities, respectively, instantiate, resides in the difference in their underlying grammar. The Kantian grammar is logical, in the sense that the unities that objects instantiate are based on the forms of unification in judgements, whereas the Heideggerian grammar is
hermeneutical in the sense outlined above. Thus, for example, whereas in the
Kantian framework I ascribe a property to an object based on the categorical
form of judgment, in the Heideggerian framework I locate an entity within a
functional chain of relations based on the understanding’s function of picking out
individuals within unified sets of relations. To cite another example, whereas in
the Kantian framework I form a picture of a state of affairs by associating
propositions through the form of disjunctive judgement (P v Q v R...), for
Heidegger I am confronted with a functional background through the
understanding’s form of holding together sets of significative relational chains.
This point is important with respect to entities, because these then instantiate
the forms based on which they are apprehended: in the example of Kant’s
categorical form of judgement objects come packaged in the object-property
form, whereas in Heidegger's relational-holistic grammar entities appear as
functional components of pragmatically structured relational contexts.

Kant’s grammar of objects is thus logical in two senses. It is logical in the sense
that objects of possible experience reflect logical forms. In the second manner,
Kant’s grammar is logical in that the logical forms that objects instantiate are
derived from the subject’s capacity to judge (on this see especially Longuenesse
1998). In other words, objects instantiate logical unities because we unify them
based on a logical structure, and we unify them based on a logical structure
because our understanding is itself logically structured. That is, the logical
grammar is grounded in the structure of the understanding, which is thus the
source of the possible unities that objects of experience are capable of
instantiating. Because the Heideggerian unities that ready to hand entities
instantiate are not logical, it should be clear that their source cannot be the same as the Kantian one. Furthermore, because Heidegger considers both the logical functions of judgement as well as the forms through which the understanding grasps ready to hand entities to be equally valid expressions of particular modes of intentional comportment, namely scientific and circumspective comportment respectively, neither can be basic. In other words, the forms of unities employed by both kinds of comportment must have their source elsewhere. I have also stated above that ready to hand entities provide a particularly good pointer toward that source. Specifically, the temporal nature of the intentional comportment to ready to hand entities points to a temporal source for the unities that not only this but also other comportments employ, namely temporality (*Temporalität*). In the remainder of the present chapter I examine the temporal (*zeitliche*) nature of circumspective comportment, before turning to the ontological basis of comportment, namely temporality (*Temporalität*) in the final chapter.  

**The Temporal Nature of Existentiell and Ontic Understanding**

As mentioned above, Dasein understands itself primarily by means of the world – it becomes intelligible to itself in coming back to itself from the world, always in light of its given history or situation, and constitutes itself through this kind of understanding. Now, Heidegger’s claim is that both the disclosedness of Dasein’s

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29 As will become clear in chapter 5, *Temporalität* is distinct from *Zeitlichkeit*, where the latter refers to ontic comportment and the former to its ontological basis. Unfortunately, there is no elegant way that I know of to convey this distinction in English, so I will often include the German version in brackets especially when discussing *Temporalität*.  

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own possibilities as well as the disclosedness of innerworldly entities is temporal in nature. The entirety of Dasein’s care structure – its basic constitution or way of being – turns out to have a temporal basis, that is, not only the structure of the understanding I outlined above, but also attunement (or state of mind), falling, and discourse are essentially temporal. As mentioned above, my aim is not to provide a complete interpretation of the being of Dasein but of the being of innerworldly entities, for which reason I have focused on the relation between the structure of the understanding and the structure of entities, at the expense of the other existentialia. The understanding that is directed at entities is “ontic understanding” and the understanding directed at Dasein’s existence is termed “existentiell understanding” (SZ, 12); I will make reference to the latter only to the extent that is necessary for understanding the former. Thus, further distinctions in kinds of existentiell understanding, such as those between authentic and inauthentic self-understanding, highly relevant for a complete characterisation of the constitution of Dasein, will receive a much briefer treatment below.

The first question to be answered is thus: in what sense is the structure of Dasein’s (ontic) understanding of entities temporal? As mentioned above, the analysis of the understanding that Heidegger’s late Marburg project presupposes is carried out primarily in Being and Time, the relevant section in this case being ¶68 on The Temporality of Disclosedness (SZ, 335). Heidegger begins by emphasising that the understanding is the source of distinct kinds of sight including circumspective sight, which as we saw is the sight corresponding to the disclosure of entities of the mode of being of readiness to hand. As entities of the
mode of being of readiness to hand such as tools are not the only kinds of entities, circumspective sight is not the only kind of sight of which the understanding is capable. As mentioned, the “sight of transparency” (Durchsichtigkeit) which is aimed at and discloses one’s own Dasein is another. Though these various kinds of sight (and kinds of entities) must be sharply distinguished, to the extent that an understanding of ready to hand entities also entails an understanding of oneself and one’s own possibilities, I will begin by briefly considering the temporal nature of Dasein’s own self-understanding, or existentiell (as opposed to ontic) understanding.

As we have seen above, the understanding is defined in terms of its capacity to project possibilities dictated by practical aims or tasks rather than, for example, its capacity to subsume under concepts or to apply rules. Showing that the understanding is temporal means showing that such projection is made possible by temporal forms rather than by, for example, logical forms of judgement. Heidegger’s explication of the temporal structure of understanding is the following: Dasein’s projecting itself is enabled through the opening of a future horizon (SZ, 336); at the same time, it retains itself in terms of what it has been, i.e. in terms of its past horizon (SZ, 339); finally, the manner in which it projects itself into the future in light of the past discloses a present horizon, its current situation or nearest environment (SZ, 337-8). In this sense, the projection of the possibilities that constitute Dasein’s existence is dependent not only on three temporal horizons, but on the interplay and unity between these horizons (SZ, 366).
Dasein’s self-understanding, furthermore, can take many distinct forms, depending on how the unity of these temporal horizons is configured. For example, Dasein can understand itself proper, i.e. authentically, through resolute comportment by anticipating (Vorlaufen) (SZ, 336) its future possibilities in a way that has a grasp on what it already is or has been (Wiederholung) (SZ, 339), and this in turn makes its present show up in a particularly lucid way (at least according to Heidegger, viz. as Augenblick) (SZ, 328). In this case of authentic existentiell understanding, the configuration of the unification of the three temporal horizons is future driven: it is specifically the manner in which Dasein projects itself into the future that determines how the past is “repeated” or retained and, consequently, how the present shows up (SZ, 339).

The configuration of the unification of these horizons varies: Dasein can also understand itself inauthentically, that is, not by way of its future possibilities proper but by way of the things present in its nearest environment, and so the present horizon takes priority in the configuration of the temporal unity: because Dasein is focused on the things that appear within its present environment, its comportment towards its own past in the manner of “forgetting” what it itself has been at the expense of things (SZ, 339), and, likewise, its projection into the future is guided not by the possibilities proper to it but an “awaiting” of those given by the things around it (SZ, 338). The future still has primacy in some sense even in this latter case, however, because it is the awaiting of possibilities in a future horizon which ultimately configures the way the present shows up; such possibilities are, however, determined by the things
present in Dasein's most temporally immediate horizon rather than by the future possibilities of Dasein itself.

In the manner that the understanding is made possible by the future, so the other two existentialia are made possible by the remaining temporal horizons, viz. attunement (or state of mind) corresponds to the past (SZ, 340) and falling to the present (SZ, 346). In the case of the former, for example, fearful comportment is characterised by “fleeing” in the face of the past, which determines the projection into the futural horizon as a “depressed awaiting” and the present as a “bewildered making-present” (SZ, 342) – Heidegger's example for this manner of making-present is the way in which people in a catastrophic situation such as an earthquake try to save primarily insignificant items and ignore the significant ones (SZ, 342). We see how this way of making the present the current possibilities is determined by Dasein's fleeing from what it has been, and thus from what is significant for it, and so failing to project what is significant for saving as a future possibility – in this sense, we again have a past-driven configuration of the unity of the three temporal horizons that determine Dasein's attunement.

The important point to take away from this is that Dasein understands itself by means of temporality in the sense described above, with different possible ways of configuring the fashion in which the horizons are unified that correspond to different kinds of comportments. This existentiell understanding, though merely existentiell (and thus not ontological or “existential”) nonetheless implies an understanding of being, as we shall see. Furthermore, existentiell understanding
further implies an understanding of not only the being of Dasein but also of the being of the world and of innerworldly entities – Dasein's possibilities are co-determined by the world and thus an understanding of the one implies an understanding of the other. In light of the above, we can now move to “ontic understanding”, the understanding of entities in one's nearest environment, viz. ready to hand entities. The corresponding comportment is circumspective concern and also has a similarly temporal structure.

As with existentiell understanding, so ontic understanding is characterised by a particular way of making present through projecting into the future in light of a retention of the past. Because ready to hand entities are individuated not spatio-temporally but “functionally”, i.e. by their position within a network of relations of involvement, and, indeed, lack anything like properties in the traditional sense, what is projected and retained are sets of involvement relations:

An entity of the nature of equipment is thus encountered as the entity that it is in itself if and when we understand beforehand the following: involvement, involvement relations, involvement totality. In dealing with equipment we can use it as equipment only if we have already beforehand projected this entity upon involvement relations. This antecedent understanding of involvement, this projecting of equipment onto its involvement character, we call letting-be-involved (bewenden-lassen) (GA 24, 415).

Thus, as should be clear from the discussion of the structure of the understanding in general, ontic understanding constitutes entities by “letting
them be involved”, which involves projecting relational totalities and networks into which individual entities fit like cogs. Because the mode of being of the ready to hand is my focus, the temporality of ontic understanding requires a more detailed analysis than that of existentiell understanding, though the general principles are similar and have already laid much of the groundwork. Heidegger analyses the temporal nature of the understanding of these relations in a particularly dense passage, which is worth quoting in full:

Letting something be involved is implied in the simplest handling of an item of equipment. That which we let it be involved in [Das Wobei desselben] has the character of an in-order-for [Wozu]; with regard to this, the equipment is either usable or in use. The understanding of the in-order-to – that is, the understanding of what the equipment is involved in– has the temporal structure of awaiting. In awaiting the in-order-to, concern can at the same time come back by itself to the sort of thing in which it is involved. The awaiting of what it is involved in, and – together with this awaiting – the retaining of that which is thus involved, make possible in its ecstatical unity the specifically manipulative way in which equipment is made present (SZ, 353).30

One lets an entity be involved by simply using it, and when an entity is in use it is involved in the context of some work or task, as for example giving a public

lecture, or painting a picture – its Wobei is the task or work that the entity is used in; further, in a given work or task, a particular entity has a function, something which it is for, which is here the Wozu, the “in-order-to” or “for” – the board is “for” writing on in order to convey information in a public lecture, for example. This initial segment of the above quotation has already been clarified above; Heidegger now wants to uncover the temporal basis of the above process: Dasein needs to project the function for which a given entity serves (i.e. the in-order-to Wozu) by “awaiting” it – only by “awaiting” or maintaining in view a given Wozu in the future horizon can we “come back to” something that is being used in a given task or work and take it as fit for this task. In this sense, Heidegger can say that the understanding of a functional relation of use (a Wozu) has the “temporal structure of awaiting”, which, as we saw, is the characteristic way in which Dasein projects onto the future horizon. Concernful circumspective comportment – “using” things such as tools, in plain language – is thus a particular mode of anticipation in the sense that we await a functional in-order-to relation (Wozu), such as writing on the board in order to convey information.

At the same time, we retain a Womit, that is, we retain the set of kinds of things that is co-determined by a specific Womit. The Womit is that with which we are fulfilling a particular in-order-to relation – the totality of equipment constituting the institution of “lecture-giving” in general (or education in general, etc.) is that with which (Womit) I convey information, for example. Though this technical use of Womit often gets lost in Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation, it is important to note that the Womit is holistic and so always refers to a whole or equipmental totality, as is apparent from the original version of the following passage:
Für die Analyse des Umgangs in Absicht auf sein Womit ergibt sich hieraus die Anweisung, das existierende Sein beim besorgten Seienden gerade nicht auf ein isoliert zuhandenes Zeug zu orientieren, sondern auf das Zeugganze (SZ, 353).31

In relation to the *Womit*, as Heidegger emphasises, it is especially important to keep in mind that we are dealing not with individual pieces of equipment but wholes or totalities, as per the functions of unification of the understanding. We thus retain a given equipmental totality or whole, as determined by the way that we project a particular *Wozu*, a particular in-order-to relation. So, in projecting the *Wozu* of “writing on the board to convey information”, for example, I retain the complete interrelated and constitutively interdependent totality comprising chalk, eraser, blackboard, and so forth. Subsequently I may select the chalk (instead of the eraser) to fulfil a determinate function, but what is retained is always the whole – indeed, it seems to be that what allows me to select among entities is precisely that I retain the complete set, including the possible functional relations that interpenetrate it. This retention of the *Womit* – the total package of available things and their functions, so to speak – is enabled by the past horizon, much like the future horizon enables the projection of a *Wozu*. The particular *Wozu* I project, it should be emphasised, co-determines the *Womit* that show up for me – if my task is not to convey information in a public lecture but to play hide-and-seek in the lecture hall, the totality of my *Womit* will not be based

31 Macquarrie and Robinson translate: "The upshot of this is that if in our analysis of dealings we aim at that which is dealt with, then one's existent Being alongside the entities with which one concerns oneself must be given an orientation not towards some isolated item of equipment which is ready to hand, but towards the equipmental totality," which, as is often the case throughout the translation, fails to capture the emphasis on the nature of the *Womit*. 

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on the institution of lectures but of children’s games – and it is in this sense that
the future horizon, by means of my particular Wozu (practical task), co-
determines the past horizon, in which a Womit (equipment relevant to the task)
is retained for me.\footnote{Needless to say, “co-determine” should not be taken causally here – I do not cause certain things to appear, but rather what is determined is the way in which the things that are in some sense already there show up, as a lecture hall, as a hiding place, etc.} The unity, then, of both horizons together form a present
horizon in which an entity is “made-present” as an entity. As Heidegger puts it:

Letting be involved, that is, the understanding of the involvement which
makes possible an equipmental use at all, is a retentive expectance, in
which the equipment is made present as this specific equipment. In
awaiting-retentive making-present, the equipment comes into play,
becomes present, enters into a present (*Gegenwart*) (GA 24, 416).

The entity becomes present in light of what is retained and what is awaited.
Further, it becomes present as an entity, specifically, as the entity that it is in
light of its relations of involvement: we “first understand a tool as a tool in its
specific involvement relation” (GA 24, 415-6). Understanding the entity as
*something* points back to the structure of the understanding in its fore-grasp, as
discussed above. Something is made present e.g. as a blackboard in terms of the
awaiting of the *Wozu* relevant to the *Wobei* of a particular task, represented in
our example as writing on the board to convey information relevant to the task
of a public lecture, as well as the relevant *Womit*, represented by an equipmental
totality that is constituted through the relations that are “lit up” through its
involvement in this task, i.e. blackboard, chalk, and so forth. Thus Heidegger can
refer the as-structure of the fore-conceptual function of unification of the
understanding to temporality as well: "The as-structure is grounded ontologically in the temporality of understanding" (SZ, 359).

We can now also make explicit how the structure of the understanding described above, particularly in its specific functions of unification, is related to, and made possible by, the temporal structure here outlined. Fore-having, which as we saw above grasps a whole or totality, is made possible by the retention of the *Womit* of an available equipmental totality, itself made possible by the opening of a past horizon through which such a totality is given. In the case of fore-sight, the projection of a possible functional relation of use (*Wozu*) in the context of a given future picks out, or “lights up” certain relevant chains of relations – the equipmental totality for conveying information and so forth in the context of the practical task “giving a lecture”. Different chains will be “lit up” in the context of the task “finding a place to hide”, for example (equipment for concealing myself etc.). Finally, within the context of a retained past totality of equipmental relations and the context of chains of involvement relations that are lit up in such an equipmental totality through the projection of a future task, fore-grasp can conceptualise individual entities as they appear in my present surroundings: this particular thing shows up now as a thing for writing on the blackboard, that is, as a piece of chalk.

In this sense, the grammar underpinning the functions of unification of the (Heideggerian) understanding is temporal (rather than logical). Fore-having is able to grasp and retain a whole not because it is able to combine propositions but because it has a past horizon from which to draw at its disposal. Similarly,
fore-sight is able to “light up” particular chains of significative relations because it can project a future task or aim in light of which just those relations chains are relevant. Finally, fore-conception can identify individual functional nodes within the whole offered by fore-having in light of the relevant relations projected by fore-sight because it has at its disposal a present situation. In other words, this last function unifies a relational chain that is significative in light of a future task with an individual entity as the entity that is determined by such a unity. For example, I identify an entity as a piece of chalk not by unifying a manifold according to the “subject—predicate” form of judgement but by unifying items according to the “future task—present functional relation” temporal form. In other words, the former functions of judgement consist of ways of unifying logical relations, that is, relations of subject to predicate, or kinds of relations of proposition to proposition such as “→” or “v” as in the case of Kant’s second and third forms of relational judgement. In Heidegger’s case, the relations that are unified are temporal relations, that is, using a present tool in relation to a future task, for example, unifies two items based on a temporal relation between future and present.33

We can thus see that the functions of unification through which the world of entities is constituted has a temporal basis, much in the same way that the Kantian world of objects (ultimately) has a logical basis. With the twofold aim of bringing this difference into relief and of providing a more concrete illustration

33 In light of the revolution in logic that postdated Kant, it is an interesting question whether for example temporal logic would be able to capture the kind of grammar that I am ascribing to Heidegger. As far as I know there is no literature on this topic, but for an interesting attempt to formalize Heidegger’s categories in relation to Dasein, see Brandom (2002, 298-322). In this context, also see Heidegger’s claim in Being and Time that such involvement relations “resist mathematical formalization” (SZ, 88)
of the above temporal basis of understanding, I now turn to Heidegger's temporalized re-reading the Kantian conception of empirical synthesis that I previously described. The relevant passage is worth quoting in full:

Let us say that I am supposed to give a total and complete description of this auditorium. At first I seize in apprehension the objects that are present and render them concretely and intuitively accessible to myself: chalkboard, lamp, chalk, etc. But we have the possibility of reproduction—we can retain the lamp or piece of chalk as seen. But what about this piece of chalk that I saw here? I just saw a piece of chalk and only this belongs to the stock of what belongs to this auditorium. But how can I now say this, because now I am describing the hard seats and do not see the chalk but only visualize it? For who tells me that the chalk that I visualize now belongs to the auditorium? I can return to the place of the chalk and confirm that. But what do I confirm here? That here there is a piece of chalk. And previously I perceived a piece of chalk. Hence there would be two pieces of chalk which belong to the auditorium.... the fact that the piece of chalk is manifest in all the various apprehensions and reproductions as one and the same [piece of chalk] is not sufficiently accounted for by the simple apprehending and reproducing (GA 25, 362-3).

As should be clear from the above description of the temporality of the understanding of entities, Heidegger agrees with Kant that “synthesis” is reproductive, in the sense that it has at its disposal a past horizon on the basis of which it can apprehend entities that are present. However, what the example
above is intended to show is that the availability of solely these two temporal horizons is not a sufficient condition for grasping an entity as the entity that it is, e.g. a piece of chalk as the self-same chalk I perceived previously. As discussed above, what is also required is the opening of a future horizon:

We cannot identify what is brought forth again with what is offered at first, if we do not hold on to this from the beginning already as one and the same. And what is offered in apprehension shows itself each time already against the background of that which is present to us in advance. Factically and essentially, we never begin with the simple grasping of something present as though prior to this grasping nothing had been given. We never begin with a now. Rather in beginning, that is, in apprehending, there is already present to us an interrelation of entities which is somehow unified without its unity's being conceptually clear to us... In identifying [entities as the entities they are]... we are always already awaiting a unity of entities.... [The understanding] opens up and projects in advance a whole – a whole which is in fact in one way or another disclosable and appropriatable in apprehension and reproduction (GA 25, 362-3).

Even though Heidegger here uses the Kantian vocabulary of reproduction, identification etc., we see that what he is describing is in fact the fore-structure of the understanding as explicated above: the understanding projects a whole or totality of entities structured by functional relations, within which it picks out particular chains of relations and, ultimately, individual entities are defined as the entities they are based on their involvements within these relational chains.
What this example illustrates is not only that this fore-structure is itself temporal but also how the more abstract description of the temporality of circumspection functions in concrete instances: In order for a piece of chalk to become present for me in certain way, i.e. for me to identify it as the particular piece of chalk it is present before me, I need not only to retain the past network of involvement relations that determine its function – those relations that tell me it is for writing on the blackboard, for conveying information, etc. etc., in short, that it is a piece of chalk – but I need to also anticipate its position within a totality of relations by projecting and maintaining this totality in a future horizon. Because ready to hand entities are individuated by their position within a determinate totality of relations, this totality must be kept in view in advance of any apprehension of an entity. In other words, because an entity is determined by the as-structure, and because the as-structure is in turn determined by a totality of involvement relations, the projection of this totality is an a priori condition on the apprehension of the entity, or on the “making-present” of an entity as Heidegger would say.

This rounds off our discussion of existentiell and ontic understanding. These two forms of understanding are related and mutually entail one other because an existentiell understanding of one’s existential possibilities requires an ontic understanding of entities in one’s environment and an understanding of entities requires a self-understanding of Dasein’s existential possibilities to the extent that the former figure in relational wholes co-structured by the latter. Nonetheless, we are here dealing with two kinds of entities, Dasein and the ready to hand, with two distinct modes of being. What is understood in each case is an
entity in light of its mode of being. For this reason understanding in these two cases is existentiell and ontic, respectively, and not yet ontological. However, since the understanding of being precedes the understanding of entities, one must also have in some sense understood being, in other words, there must be not only an ontic or existentiell understanding directed at entities and Dasein respectively, but also an ontological understanding that grasps being as such:

In [Dasein] there is present an understanding which, as projection, not only understands entities by way of being, but since being itself is understood, has also in some way projected being as such (GA 24, 396).

Consequently, understanding of being, or ontological understanding, must be distinguished from the understanding of entities, ontic understanding:

“Verständnis des Seins ist ontologisches Verständnis. Erkenntnis des Seienden an ihm selbst ist ontische Erkenntnis” (GA 27, 150).34

**Indifference of Being**

While ontic (or existentiell) projects the entity onto its being by means of temporality as described in detail above, the ontological understanding, on the other hand, projects “being as such”, as Heidegger puts it (GA 24, 396). But what could “being as such”, as I refer to it here, possibly mean at this stage? Which entity is “being as such” the being of if it is not the being of the ready to hand or present at hand? In §69, Heidegger provides the following indication:

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34 In translation: Understanding of being is ontological understanding. Cognition of entities in themselves is ontic cognition.
In so far as Dasein... exists, it must already understand something like being. Such understanding of being can remain neutral. In that case readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand have not yet been distinguished (SZ, 364).

Heidegger's claim seems at first glance implausible. In what sense can Dasein understand being in a “neutral” way? – does this not clash with Heidegger's continual insistence that being is always the being of an entity? How can this apparently free-floating being even become intelligible and what role could it play in Dasein's relation to the world? Heidegger repeats essentially the same assertion elsewhere in no uncertain terms, while providing an important clue to the above questions:

The interpretation of the possibility of being-in-the-world on the basis of temporality is already intrinsically interpretation of the possibility of an understanding of being in which, with equal originality, we understand the being of Dasein, the being of fellow-Dasein or of the others, and the being of present at hand and ready to hand entities always encountered in a disclosed world. This kind of understanding of being is yet indifferent (Indifferent), unarticulated at first (GA 24, 417).

Being is thus unarticulated in that it must encompass, “with equal originality”, the full range of possible modes of being of the distinct kinds of entities manifest to Dasein. The understanding of being is “indifferent” with respect to the mode of being of a given entity – such an understanding of being relates to entities as such regardless of their specific mode of being, where the understanding of
entities of a particular mode of being is as yet “unarticulated”. As we saw, the second task of Heidegger’s late Marburg project determined above, after showing that there are entities with modes of being irreducible to logical ontological conditions, was to show how a different and broader set of conditions are able to make possible not only these entities (i.e. ready to hand entities) but any possible entity regardless of their mode of being (i.e. entities as a whole). In this context, it makes sense that after a kind of understanding directed at natural objects and a distinct kind of understanding directed at ready to hand entities, each with their particular conditions, there should also be a kind of understanding directed at entities in general, of which the two above kinds of understanding are species. However, these two levels of understanding are not on an even par: where the first is directed at particular entities, the other is in some sense not directed at any particular entity but at being in general – furthermore, if the latter is to make possible the former, it requires a distinct explanatory approach.

One may be tempted to argue that being at this stage is not differentiated merely for Dasein in an explicit or articulated sense, in the sense that Dasein would simply go about its business in the light of a pre-ontological, pre-predicative understanding of being – one need not explicitly be aware of the being of the entity that one is comporting oneself knowingly toward, as this form of knowledge could be cashed out in terms of a know-how, or mindless coping that need not thematise the ontological basis for this know-how. Or, such indifference of Seinsverständnis may refer to the levelling of inauthentic understanding, to the “deficient and indifferent modes that characterize everyday, average Being-with-
one-another” (SZ, 121). This last option is made questionable by the fact that Heidegger uses *Gleichgültigkeit* in this last quotation and *Indifferenz* in the previous quotations, a distinction that often gets lost in translation (though Heidegger does at times use *Indifferenz* for average everydayness as well (e.g. SZ, 121)).

Yet, there is further reason for why the *Indifferenz* of the understanding of being refers to a phenomenon distinct to the above *Gleichgültigkeit*, as Heidegger makes clear that it is not a question of the undifferentiatedness of indeterminacy but of the undifferentiatedness of a universal concept of being that is to cover all particular entities regardless of their particular mode of being; or, as Heidegger puts it, “this indifference (*Indifferenz*) is not the indeterminateness of an emptiness, but of a fullness” (GA 27, 142). In other words, what is disclosed to Dasein is the full range of entities as a whole, regardless of their particular mode of being: “With the existence of Dasein entities are disclosed, though not arbitrarily but rather as what is present in a broader sense, as “nature”, as the ready to hand, as [one’s own] Dasein, and as other Dasein, and all these [are disclosed] together in a certain manner as a whole” (GA 27, 158).

This unified amalgam of implicitly diverse entities, “entities as a whole”, is indifferent or indeterminate in the sense that it is not yet distinguished according to the various ontological kinds contained within it (living things, natural objects, etc.):
The entities disclosed are not yet differentiated according to the various modes of being (Arten des Seins), and here all manifest entities are indeterminate, indifferent (GA 27, 158).

It is the problem, then, not of a pre-reflective or pre-thematic Gleichgültigkeit towards the world but of the manifold ways of being implicit in a whole that is given to intuition, which leads, furthermore, to the question of a concept of being that would account for the possible unity across such differences. Heidegger sets out essentially the same series of claims in Basic Problems (GA 24, 249-251), adding in the final step of the argument how the initial indeterminacy of entities leads to the problem of a unified concept of being. The argument is the following, of which I here provide a summary in four steps (with the original text added in brackets below for reference):

1. To the intentional relation belongs an understanding of the being of the intentum.

   (Zur Intentionalität als Verhalten zu Seiendem gehört jeweils ein Seinsverständnis des Seienden, worauf die intentio sich bezieht)

2. This understanding of being is tied up with the understanding of world; consequently, such understanding must include all possible entities that can appear in the world: that is, an understanding of the being of Dasein as well as an understanding of any kind of entity that is not Dasein.

   (Nunmehr wird deutlich, daß dieses Seins-Verständnis des Seienden mit dem Weltverstehen zusammen-hängt, das Voraussetzung ist für die

3. This means that, in order to cover all such entities (any possible entity that can appear in the world), the being that is understood must be undifferentiated with respect to the particular kind of entity that is understood (though it most have the property of being “differentiatable”, must be capable of being differentiated).

   (Dieses Seinsverständnis, das alles Seiende in gewisser Weise umgreift, ist zunächst *indifferent*; wir nennen gemeinhin alles, was irgendwie als Seiendes begegnet, seiend, ohne hinsichtlich bestimmter Weisen des Seins zu differenzieren. Das Seinsverständnis ist indifferent, aber jederzeit *differenzierbar*.)

4. This, finally, leads to the question of the possible unity of the concept of being, and to the question of how this undifferentiated understanding of being relates to the everyday way that being is always understood as the being *of* entities:

   So verschärft sich die Frage: Ist bei diesem radikalen Unterschied der Seinsweisen überhaupt noch ein einheitlicher Begriff von Sein zu finden, der berechtigt, diese verschiedenen Seinsweisen als *Seinsweisen* zu bezeichnen? Wie verhält sich zur Einheit eines ursprünglichen
Seinsbegriffes zugleich die Indifferenz des Seins, so wie es im alltäglichen
Verstehen von Seiendem enthüllt ist?\textsuperscript{35}

The above argument from Heidegger's 1927 lecture course is a statement of the
guiding problem of what I have referred to as the late Marburg project. The
problem of the multiplicity of distinct modes of being in light of the apparent
unity of the concept of being is explicitly formulated as a problem in virtually
every significant text in the late Marburg period. As stated in the preface,
Heidegger's re-draft of Husserl's Britannica article in the above states the same
problem, asserting that the “the guiding philosophical problematic” is “the
question about the being of entities in the articulated manifold of its kinds and
levels”\textsuperscript{36}. We have also seen how the Kant course from the same year (GA 25)
and the Kant book published two years later (GA 3) also focus on this same
problem in the context of Kant's philosophy – indeed, I have argued that the
formulation of the problem as a problem owes a debt to Kant's conception of the
relation between general and special metaphysics, and that Heidegger's
approach in solving the problem is Kantian in form (in the transcendental
approach I sketched in chapter 1) as well as in the resources it employs for its
solution (namely schematism as sketched in chapter 2, and as will be fully
developed in chapter 5). Both Heidegger's final Marburg course (GA 26), which
was the next course he gave after the Kant course, as well as his first Freiburg

\textsuperscript{35}De Boer (2000, 120) reads this mention of indifference in GA 24 as referring to an
"inauthentic" indifference of the traditional, present-oriented concept of being. Though I agree
there are modes of being that can be characterized in this manner, it is a mistake to take this as
one such instance – I take the context of the present quotation as well as the quotations from GA
27 above to be decisive in this sense.

\textsuperscript{36}See page 7 above.
course (GA 27) contain a statement of the same problem. In the last Marburg course, Heidegger's formulation is the following:

[T]he existence of the material things of nature is not the only existence; there are also history and art works. Nature has diverse modes: space and number, life, human existence itself. There is a multiplicity of modi existendi, and each of these is a mode belonging to a being with a specific content, a definite quiddity. The term "being" is meant to include the span of all possible regions. But the problem of the regional multiplicity of being, if posed universally, includes an investigation into the unity of this general term "being" into the way in which the general term "being" varies with different regional meanings. This is the problem of the unity of the idea of being and its regional variants (GA 26, 191-2; also see GA 27, 78-82 for a similar formulation).

Heidegger's first sentence in the above quotation, that “the existence of the material things of nature is not the only existence”, was examined in the context of Kant's regional ontology of nature. We also saw that this claim raised the necessity to show that there are in fact entities of a distinct mode of being to that of natural objects, which we have done in the present chapter in relation to the ready to hand. Secondly, the present chapter has also shown that the conditions of such entities point not to functions of judgement but to temporality as their ontological basis. Finally, we have also seen that this ontological basis must be broad enough to cover not only ready to hand entities but also Kantian natural entities and, indeed, “entities as a whole”. We have thus followed what I have called the late Marburg project to its final task. I have attempted to bring to light
the problems motivating this project and its specific aims, and to show both that such problems and aims have some justification and that Heidegger's transformed Kantian framework potentially has the resources to provide a philosophically interesting solution – this does not yet mean, however, that Heidegger's solution is ultimately successful.

Chapter 5. The Temporality of Being

It is worthwhile here to briefly take stock of what has been accomplished so far and to sketch out the precise task ahead and the manner in which Heidegger intends to approach it. We have so far seen that entities have a certain structure and that the understanding has a similar structure. The question now is how the two relate – how can the understanding grasp objects in the world? Kant, at a similar stage in the Critique, conceives this question in the form of a deduction, or of the famous *quid juris* – how do we have the right to apply pure concepts of the understanding to the external world? In the jargon common in Heidegger's time this was referred to as the problem of transcendence. Representations of objects were considered “immanent” to consciousness, but because the objects of representations were “transcendent” to consciousness, the question was one of how the two relate, or how consciousness reaches beyond itself or “transcends itself” to objects in the world that are external to it. Transcendence is thus simply another name for object-relation, or the possibility of the object-relation, in Kant's terminology.
Kant’s solution to the problem of the possibility of experiencing objects is, roughly, that objects are accessible to consciousness because they are themselves constituted by consciousness. It is for this reason that we have a “right” to apply (certain) a priori subjective concepts to external objects. As Kant famously put it: “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience (KrV A158/B157)” – in other words, that which structures subjectivity at the same time structures objectivity, thus making both poles isomorphic (at the transcendental level) and so enabling “transcendence”. Further, the manner in which such concepts are applied is through what Kant called schematism – because concept and object do not have the right kind of fit, the schemata are a “third thing” which transposes concepts into a sensible form and thus mediates between the two poles. Because time, for Kant, is both the form of inner as well as outer sense, and thus is particularly suited to serve as a “bridge” between the inner and the outer, schemata are temporal determinations. In this sense, the relation between subjective and the objective is (also) conditioned by time.

Here, Heidegger significantly departs from Kant. We mentioned earlier that Heidegger sharply rejects the quid juris manner of posing the question. The quid juris question only arises, according to Heidegger, because of Kant’s failure to answer the quid facti. A quid facti would need to show that the subject in its essence relates objects, that the subject is transcendent by its nature – Kant, according to Heidegger, failed to give an ontological account of the subject that takes into account its constitutive transcendence. Transcendence, or object-relation, in in this manner to be a unitary phenomenon – Heidegger takes this
unity to be enabled by temporality, specifically by temporal schemata, as I argued in chapter 2. Being-in and the world, i.e. the transcendent, thus constitute a unitary phenomenon made possible by time – in Heidegger's jargon, being-in-the-world is essentially temporal. Thus, Heidegger's own “quid facti” needs to show how being-in-the-world is unified by means of time or, in other words, how transcendence is essentially temporal. Furthermore, schemata are in this sense not a “third thing” that imposes itself between the subject and the object, but take on a much more central role. Because temporality underpins the unity of the phenomenon of being-in-the-world, and because schemata are determinations of temporality, it is primarily by means of schemata that Dasein orientates itself in the world.

Heidegger's first task, then, is to show how temporality is the condition of the possibility of transcendence, i.e. Dasein's capacity to relate itself to entities – in short, that being-in-the-world, Heidegger's name for the unity of Dasein's being-in and world, is temporal. This will be Heidegger's manner of cashing out the first criticism of Kant, viz. that the categories are excessively subjectivistic – the ground of object-relatedness is no longer to be located in the subjective unity of apperception, the “I think”, but rather in the temporally constituted relation to entities. A second task here arises, however: because an understanding of a given entity involves an understanding of the being of that entity, Heidegger needs to show that time is, furthermore, a condition of the possibility of the understanding of being.
An understanding either of Dasein or of entities is ontic/existentiell understanding, because it is directed at entities, rather than at being itself. This kind of understanding is made possible by temporality in its ecstatic function. However, in order for Dasein to understand an entity, it needs a prior understanding of the being of that entity. This form of understanding is thus properly ontological, because it is directed at being rather than entities. Furthermore, ontological understanding, like its ontic/existentiell counterpart, is also made possible by time, though in a different sense. The difference is, briefly, the following: All understanding, for Heidegger, is projecting. In understanding an entity, that entity is projected onto its being, and so made intelligible. However, being itself, in order to be understood, also needs to be projected. What being is projected onto is temporality. Hence, an understanding of being is made possible by temporality.

The task of providing the temporal conditions of the understanding of being follows from Heidegger’s second criticism of Kant, namely from the charge that the latter’s ontology is a merely regional ontology of nature. This criticism, as argued above, shares the same basis as the previous: in attempting to theorise ontological knowledge, Kant grasped not the (hidden) root of such knowledge but only one of its branches, so to speak. In other words, Kant took merely one particular mode of intentional comportment and its specific conditions for the ratio essendi of intentionality itself, namely scientific comportment. Due to the specific nature of this mode of comportment, the conditions of this mode of intentional relation to the object are primarily theoretical ones, taking the form of pure concepts ultimately grounded in the subject’s capacity to judge. Because
these pure concepts are capable of merely logical functions of unification, their corresponding objects instantiate solely logical unities and take the form of (what Heidegger calls) natural entities. Heidegger's conception of being in terms of temporality, then, apart from unifying ontological knowledge in the manner that follows from the first criticism, also needs to be capable of yielding a sufficient regional variety in modes of being, indeed, it needs to account not for this or that mode of being but for being as such.

In other words, I have isolated two primary criticisms that Heidegger directs towards Kant, and two desiderata that flow from these criticisms in Heidegger's articulation of the late Marburg project, which, as we have seen, is on the one hand closely bound up with Kant's transcendental framework but on the other relies on a reassessment of some of the primary components of this framework.

In summary, the two criticisms highlighted in chapters 1 and 2 are that the categories have an excessively subjectivistic status, and that they are based solely on logical functions of judgement. The former represents a problem because the location of the categories on the subjective side make difficult their applicability to the objective realm, and leads Heidegger to reject both the quid juris form of posing the question as well as the results of the transcendental deduction. The latter, though closely connected, points to a different set of problems, and targets not the applicability claim but the exhaustiveness claim of the metaphysical deduction. In articulating a theory of categories based on logical functions of judgments, Kant's resulting theory of possible objects of experience is limited to merely objects of explicit judgement, roughly the objects
of the natural sciences, at the expense of other kinds of objects. Paradigmatic of these “other kinds of objects”, for Heidegger, are ready-to-hand entities, which are neither spatio-temporally individuated, nor satisfy the Kantian conditions for what it would be to count as objects of possible experience (e.g. having an extensive and intensive magnitude, being substances, etc.), as chapter 4 showed.

Following up on the former criticism, i.e. the charge of the subjectivism, and following a clue from Kant himself, Heidegger locates the categories of possible objects not in the subjective realm of pure concepts, but in the temporal schematism, which, as both subjective and objective, has an “in-between” status. This will also allow Heidegger to respond to the second criticism, and to derive “categories” of being from temporal schemata, rather than from logical functions of judgement. The two desiderata on Heidegger’s reformulation of transcendental philosophy for the purposes of the late Marburg project that follow from his criticisms of the former are 1) that the object-relation (or, transcendence) should be grounded not in the subjective unity of apperception, but in the ecstatico-horizontal unity of temporality and 2) that “categories” (or, a priori determinations of being more generally) are not to be derived from functions of judgment or logical relations at all but from temporality. Furthermore, the temporal manner in which the ready to hand is understood (chapter 4 above) points to the possible derivation of this mode of being from temporality, and Heidegger’s interpretation of the Kantian categories as also deriving from temporal schemata (chapter 2 above) means that both modes of being, the ready to hand as well as the present at hand, respectively, should be derivable from temporality. Heidegger’s final task, then, is to show that this is so.
in the case of these two modes of being, and to show that this is so in the case of all modes of being, in other words, for being as such.

**Ontological Understanding**

As Heidegger states, “temporality is the condition of possibility of all understanding of being”, which means that “*Being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time*” (GA 24, 389). Heidegger's thesis that time is the meaning or sense (*Sinn*) of being means that being is understood in terms of time, specifically by its projection onto a temporal horizon. The meaning of entities, however, is not time but being. We have to keep in mind Heidegger's definition of sense or meaning: as he puts it, sense is that “wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself” (SZ, 151), or that in terms of which something is understood. To say that the meaning of an entity is its being should be understood along the following lines. As we saw, the categories that make up the being of the ready to hand are: involvement, involvement relations, and involvement totality (GA 24, 415). In other words, we understand a ready to hand entity as ready to hand when we understand it in terms of its involvement relations and involvement totality. Thus, the “sense” (*Sinn*) of a ready-to-hand entity is its being, in this case its involvement relations, or letting-be-involved, because it is such involvement-relations that make a ready to hand entity intelligible as the entity that it is. This form of understanding is temporal because temporality *enables* the projection and retention of involvement relations, not because it is the background of “sense” based on which the entity is understood.
Temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) thus enables the understanding of the entity in terms of its being. It does not yet, however, enable the understanding of the being of that entity – if and how understanding can also be ontological, and how temporality comes into play in this, is still an open question at this stage and will be the subject of the present chapter. The case is similar for existentiell understanding, that is, understanding of the entity that is Dasein. The “categories” that make up the being of Dasein (or, the existentialia) are: existence, throwness, and falling. Dasein's sense – that in terms of which it is intelligible to itself – is thus its existence, throwness, and falling; Dasein understands itself when it projects itself onto its potentiality of being (its existentiell possibilities), retains the past in which it is thrown, and makes present the entities in its environment. Again, this form of understanding is temporal in that temporality enables in turn the projection of its existence, the retention of that into which it is thrown, and the making-present of its environment. However, temporality enables only an understanding of the entity “Dasein” in terms of its being, but does not yet enable an understanding of the being of Dasein as such – it is existentiell and not yet ontological. In understanding these kinds of entities – Dasein, the ready to hand – the understanding of their being itself has not yet been explicitly articulated, then, but rather is presupposed by it.

The distinction between existentiell and ontic understanding on the one hand – the understanding of entities – and ontological understanding on the other hand – the understanding of the being of entities – is a crucial one if the latter is
supposed to have a grounding function in relation to the former. Ontic understanding is grounded in the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of understanding, but the latter is itself grounded in the temporality (*Temporalität*) of ontological understanding:

Our existent comportment toward entities is grounded as understanding in temporality, and then... *further back, the understanding of being that belongs to this comportment is conditioned by time* (GA 24, 406).

Another way to put this, in line with Heidegger’s revision of Kant, is that the temporality that enables the understanding of being is the common root that enables the understanding of the multiplicity of modes of being corresponding to ontological regions. In this sense, the above represents a shift from the ontico-ontological to the ontological level proper, in a way that parallels Kant’s distinction between general and special metaphysics. Both general and special metaphysics are a priori sciences, with the difference that the latter relates to particular kinds of objects while the former relates to objectivity as such (see the preface to *Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, AK 4, 467-479*). So it is with Heidegger’s ontic / ontological distinction: both relate to the being of entities, but the former is directed at entities in terms of their being whereas the latter is directed at being as such. For Kant, general metaphysics provides the general transcendental conditions for the objects of special metaphysics, and so for Heidegger the ontological is to provide conditions of possibility for the ontic, that is, specifically, for Dasein’s temporal understanding of entities in terms of their being:
If Dasein harbors the understanding of being within itself, and if temporality makes possible Dasein in its ontological constitution, then temporality must also be the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being and hence of the projection of being upon time (GA 24, 397).

As briefly stated in the preface, Heidegger signals this shift by a change in vocabulary from the Germanic Zeitlichkeit to the latinate Temporalität: The zeitliche conditions of ontic understanding are themselves conditioned by temporale conditions. It is in this latter set of conditions that we enter the plane of ontology proper. Heidegger's most substantive analyses of such conditions appear in the 1927 course Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA 24). Though subsequent works in the late Marburg period do not explicitly develop the concept of Temporalität they nonetheless presuppose it. Heidegger's analyses of the being of entities, especially in the 1929 course Introduction to Philosophy, consistently operate within the temporal-ontological framework that receives it most explicit statement in Basic Problems. My focus in developing this framework in what follows will thus be on this latter course.

Though it is crucial to distinguish ontic from ontological understanding in order to bring out the enabling function of the latter, commentators often run these two levels together, which leads to dismissiveness, misunderstanding or puzzlement when approaching this critical point in Heidegger's project more generally, and when reading the relevant sections of Basic Problems more specifically. Blattner, for example, regarding the relation between Kant's
transcendental deduction and the above stage in Heidegger’s project, sees that Heidegger “runs an analogous argument” and in this sense “turns out to be a Kantian in a fairly detailed sense” (1999, 245). Furthermore, Blattner agrees that a distinction is to be drawn between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalität in terms of ontological generality, and that the latter “is intended to cover both the "regional" frameworks of Dasein, the available, and the occurrent, as well as the "general" framework of being überhaupt, being in general” (254). However, when Blattner comes to providing an ontological interpretation of the Temporalität of entities of the three entities that feature most prominently in Being and Time, those of the mode of being of Dasein, of the ready to hand, and of the present at hand, his reading essentially repeats the ontic interpretation of these entities in terms of Zeitlichkeit.

Thus Blattner’s analysis of the ready to hand in terms of what is supposed to be their ontological temporal (temporale) content comes out very similar to my analysis of these entities above in terms of their ontic temporal (zeitliche) content. As Blattner puts it, “Definition by a task is a futural condition”, “being involved along with wherewithal is a past condition”, and “being put to use is a Present condition”, a basic framework of the ontic understanding of ready to hand entities that I have spelled out above (with minor terminological and other differences). However, Blattner (using the capital “T” for Temporalität as distinct from Zeitlichkeit with a lower-case “T”) now claims that the above framework constitutes the temporale, and thus ontological, interpretation of these entities: the above is said to mean that “[t]he being of equipment is essentially Temporal” (255).
Blattner admits that *Basic Problems* contains a further determination of the difference between “temporality and Temporality” (258), that is, of time in its enabling function at the ontic and at the ontological levels, respectively. However, because the distinction between the two essentially gets lost in the running together of the two levels that characterize Blattner’s reading, he is forced to deny that “*Basic Problems* even vaguely sheds light on either the ontological framework of being in general or the more limited framework of the occurrent in the widest sense” (254). When *Basic Problems* tackles, in Heidegger’s words, the “temporal (temporale) interpretation of the being of the primarily at-hand, i.e. of the ready to hand”, an analysis that is supposed play the ontological role of showing “how the understanding of being is possible” (GA 24, 431), Blattner glosses the relevant passages in the following way:

> It is hard to know exactly what Heidegger is up to. On balance, most of his discussion is devoted to developing the temporality of missing something and being surprised, "privative" modes of pragmatic temporality that Heidegger had already described in *Being and Time* (S&Z, pp. 355-6) and, thus, that cannot be of much use to us (Blattner 1999, 260).

In other words, Blattner again fails to see the distinction between the ontological level of the temporal understanding of being that is described in the above passage and ontic level of the temporal understanding of entities in terms of their being that was described in *Being and Time* as well as in my previous chapter, a distinction without which Heidegger’s discussion will indeed not be of much use to us.
So far, I have merely signalled the necessity of drawing the above distinction, but have not yet given the content of the temporality in its ontological function. In light of my above comments on Blattner, the onus is now on the present chapter to not only describe this content but also to show that *Basic Problems* articulates a sharper difference between the levels than Blattner allows – an unenviable task given the notorious opaqueness, apparent confusedness, and incompleteness of the work, which Blattner is correct in pointing out. I will argue that *Basic Problems* does shed light – even if “vaguely” – on the question of the temporal meaning of being in general. Apart from the above distinction between ontic and ontological temporality to be articulated in the text, I argue, specifically, that *Basic Problems* sheds light on the issues under discussion in at least three ways (the most important of which for my purposes is the third):

1. *Basic Problems* makes clear that the temporal forms of understanding under discussion in *Being and Time* sections 68 and 69a are existentiell or ontic and not yet ontological; this in turn segues into the task of clarifying the temporality of the understanding of being, which is supposed to explain the manner in which the conditions of the understanding of being operate.

2. *Basic Problems* further sheds light on *Being and Time* section 69c, which abruptly and somewhat mysteriously introduces the notion of “horizontal schemata” but does not clarify their role or purpose. Based on the explanation of the role of schemata in general that is provided in *Basic Problems*, the horizontal schema of *Being and Time* can now be understood as the schemata of Dasein’s projection of its own being (i.e. of its
existentialia) onto time and so constitute the understanding of the being of Dasein by means of temporal schemata.

3. Finally, Basic Problems also gives an indication of how the understanding of the being of the present at hand in the broadest sense ( = of all non-Dasein entities) differs from the understanding of the being of Dasein, and gives some hints as to how the understanding of the being of the ready to hand might differ from the understanding of the being of the present at hand in the narrow sense ( = of, roughly, spatio-temporally individuated entities).

Before going on to an analysis of the text itself, there is one glaring omission in Blattner’s account of the grounding role of Temporalität we can point to in a preliminary way, something we should be prepared for given the content of the above three points, namely the role of schematism. As I state in point 2, ontological understanding, the understanding of being in general, proceeds by means of temporal schemata. This is an element that we should be further prepared for in light of the interpretation of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant’s notion of schematism in chapter 2: if Heidegger thinks that the doctrine of the schematism can plug a gap in Kant's ontology, a gap that, furthermore, significantly motivates his own project of developing a general ontology in the late Marburg period, then we can expect that schematism will play a significant role in the articulation of the latter. And, indeed, in Basic Problems Heidegger stresses the role of schemata in moving from temporality in its ontic function qua Zeitlichkeit to temporality in its ontological function qua Temporalität and thus the role of schemata in the understanding of being in general:
“Temporality in its ontological function (Temporalität) is temporality in its ontic function (Zeitlichkeit) with respect to the unity of the horizontal schemata belonging to it... We understand being from the original horizontal schema of the ecstases of temporality” (GA 24, 436).

The most detailed discussion of the role of schematism in the literature in relation to the understanding of being in general is contained in the book Die Schematisierung des Seinsinnes als Thematik des dritten Abschnitts von Sein und Zeit (1993) and a subsequent article, Die Einbildungskraft und das Schematismusproblem, both from Köhler. Like Blattner, Köhler sees the influence of Kant on this stage of Heidegger’s project, but, unlike Blattner, locates this influence in the schematism doctrine specifically: “Heidegger's idiosyncratic interpretation of the Kantian doctrine of schematism” is a “template for his idea of the structuration of the meanings of being by means of temporal schemata” (1997, 20). As Köhler emphasises, “because being is understood originally out of the horizontal schemata of the ecstasies of temporality (Zeitlichkeit), the full content of “Temporalität” is obtained only with reference to such schemata” (1993, 110). In other words, as I have mentioned above, temporal schemata are at the centre of temporality in its ontological function. In fact, Köhler argues that “the distinct modes of the meaning of being” are supposed to be “differentiated through the temporal schemata” (1997, 27). In other words, if Heidegger were to succeed in articulating the temporal schemata, he would succeed in at least one half of what I have described as the late Marburg project (though Köhler does not take this endeavour as a unified project but rather as the completion of fundamental ontology (1993, 96)).
While Blattner has an overly pessimistic view of Heidegger’s ability to spell out the meaning of being in general in terms of temporality, Köhler is perhaps excessively optimistic in this regard. While I do agree that Heidegger is able to make significant headway in philosophically interesting ways on a project that is motivated by genuine problems in post-Kantian thought, the endeavour is ultimately beset with inner tensions – I will return to Köhler’s interpretation in my assessment of Heidegger’s project in the second part of this chapter, and turn to the interpretation of temporality in its ontological role in the understanding of being in general.

**Temporal Schemata**

I now turn to the text. Heidegger begins the discussion of ontological understanding in the *Basic Problems* by recapitulating the manner in which the ontic / existentiell understanding is enabled by temporality, namely, how what allows Dasein to understand an entity is its prior projection onto its being – it is this projection that is made possible by temporality (GA 24, 395). Heidegger terms this form of temporality “ecstatic”, because of the manner in which Dasein is “outside of itself” in occupying distinct temporal horizons.

Implicit in the projection of an entity onto its being is an understanding of being itself. Because being is the schema or blueprint based on which one determines what counts as an entity, one must have some prior understanding of this
schema. Furthermore, one need also know which schema to apply to which kind of being – I comport myself towards Dasein as Dasein and towards tools as tools and do not, for example comport myself towards Dasein as if it were a tool (and if I do, I have misunderstood the nature of Dasein). In this mode of comportment I must already have a prior understanding of the schema that allows me to identify Dasein as Dasein as well as of the schema that allows me to identify the ready to hand as the ready to hand. As we saw above, one of the most serious problems plaguing Kant’s account was that he applied the schemata of the being specific to natural entities to all other kinds of entities, and if Kant’s account is to be improved on this point then the possibility of some manner of differentiation with respect to the application of being to entities need be in place.

Central to Heidegger’s differentiation of existentiell / ontic understanding from ontological understanding is the function of temporality, which is in each case distinct. At this point, then, Heidegger draws the distinction between Zeitlichkeit, which is temporality in its existentiell / ontic function, and Temporalität, which relates to the understanding of being as such (GA 24, 323-4). Both forms of temporality operate as conditions on the possibility of understanding in its respective function, but in distinct ways. In the former case, it is by enabling projection, in the manner described above. How time is the condition of the possibility of being in the ontological sense is the subject of the present account. In a similar vein, Heidegger writes “Praesenz” in its Latinate form in order to distinguish it from presence as ecstasis of Dasein (GA 24, 433).37 In light of this, Heidegger emphasises that the kind of presence that belongs to e.g. the

37 I will follow standard translations and render “Praesenz” as “praesens” in English.
Augenblick or to making-present is sharply distinguished from "praesens"; indeed, Heidegger claims that praesens does not refer to an ecstatic phenomenon at all, as e.g. present or future do:

"The name "praesens" itself already indicates that we do not mean by it an ecstatic phenomenon as we do with present and future, at any rate not the ecstatic phenomenon of temporality with regard to its ecstatic structure" (GA 24, 435).

Praesens thus does not refer to the manner that Dasein is "outside of itself" in existential and ontic understanding, that is, to the manner in which Dasein projects a future horizon while retaining a past within the present, as described in detail above. In other words, it does not refer to temporality in its ecstatic function. Rather, praesens refers to a horizon or, more specifically, is the horizontal schema of the present. Praesens, furthermore, is in some sense "a more original phenomenon" than the present and is said to represent "the condition of the possibility" for the understanding of entities (GA 24, 434).

While "the present" and "praesens" constitute separate phenomena, or even distinct ontological levels, there is however a connection between the ecstases and the horizontal schemata of praesens: ecstases are simply the names for the way that Dasein is "outside of itself" in occupying and coming back from futurual, past or present horizons and so is the way Dasein gets pulled out of itself and carried away from itself when, as Heidegger puts it, it is "temporalized" through these three ecstatic modes (which, of course, is always). However, each of these
temporal modes which Dasein occupies has a determinate structure or horizon. As Heidegger puts it:

As the condition of possibility of the “beyond itself”, the ecstasis of the present has within itself a schematic pre-designation (Vorzeichnung) of the where out there this “beyond itself” is. That which lies beyond the ecstasis as such, due to the character of removal and as determined by that character, or more precisely, that which determines the whither of the “beyond itself” as such in general, is praesens as horizon (GA 24, 435).

Thus, in apprehending entities Dasein is outside of itself, in the sense that it needs to occupy e.g. a future possibility in order to grasp a present actuality as explicated above – but “outside of itself” is merely a negative determination (i.e. “not in itself”). The positive answer to the question “where exactly then is Dasein?” is: in a determinate temporal horizon, and that which gives the temporal horizon its determinateness are the schemata, and it is in this sense that praesens is identified with the “horizontal schemata” of the present.

A reminder of what was said about schemata and horizon above, especially in relation to Kant, will help make these somewhat abstruse comments clearer. Heidegger identifies the horizon of objects in Kant with objectivity as such. This horizon contains all the possible ontological determinations that every object must have in order to count as an object. For example, it must have an extensive magnitude (e.g. a shape, a size) and an intensive magnitude (e.g. a temperature, a colour – roughly, non-spatial properties) in order to count as an object at all. What provides this horizon of objective determinations in Kant are the
categories (as well as the forms of intuition) – so e.g. extensive magnitude corresponds to the category of “quantity”, intensive magnitude to “quality”, etc.

We have pointed out above the analogical nature of what Heidegger calls the horizon in relation to what Kant calls possible experience.38

The Kantian “horizon” of possible experience, then, provides a prior view in light of the categories of what an object must be like in order to count as an object. So it is with the horizon of praesens, for Heidegger: the prior view of the set of necessary determinations that a possible entity must have to count as an entity of a particular mode of being is provided precisely by the horizontal schemata. It should, furthermore, be clear that different kinds of entities will require different horizontal schemata. The projection of the horizon of praesens is thus an openness for an entity of a certain kind of being, namely, an entity the being of which in this case is determined by the horizontal schema of praesens:

Making-present is the ecstasis in the temporalizing of temporality which understands itself as such upon praesens. As removal to... the present is a being-open for entities confronting us, which are thus understood antecedently upon praesens. Everything that is encountered in making-present is understood as present (Anwesendes) (GA 24, 436).

Thus, an entity that is understood on the basis of the horizontal schema of praesens needs to be present (Anwesendes) in order to count as an entity. The function of a schema is to determine or configure a temporal horizon in a specific way so that entities become intelligible a priori through such determinations, in

38 See page 75ff.
this case, presence (or absence, as we shall see). The horizontal schema, then, determines a priori all entities as present or absent much in the same manner that Kantian categories determine a priori all objects as e.g. extended or causally efficacious etc. In other words, if an entity is not present (or absent), it does not count or show up as an entity, in the same way that if a Kantian object does not have e.g. an intensive and extensive magnitude, it does not show up as an object of possible experience. As Heidegger puts it,

An entity can be uncovered as an entity of the ontological type of the readiness to hand, [that is] it can be encountered in our commerce with it as the entity which it is and how it is in itself, only if and when this uncovering and commerce with it are illuminated by a praesens somehow understood” (GA 24, 438).

We can now see a clear difference between presence qua Anwesenheit and praesens in its ontological function, a difference that the parallel with Kant helps bring out. For Kant, an object is “present” if it has a material existence that is given in intuition in the present, where having a material existence means being in space and time (or more precisely standing in spatial and temporal relations). What determines how an object can be present (namely as material object) as well as the possible content that can be present is the horizon of possible experience determined by the pure forms of intuition and functions of judgement. For Heidegger, an entity can be present by materially existing – but, as we saw above in the case of the ready to hand, and entity can also be present by being part of a referential chain, and in this sense need not be physically present. As described in detail in chapter four, what is encountered in intuition
is, for Heidegger, much broader than what is given through intuition in the Kantian framework. In the same way, then, that Kantian conditions determine a horizon of what and how objects are present, Heidegger’s horizontal schema of praesens determines what an entity can be and how it can be present.

This prior understanding of praesens is the basis on which entities of the mode of being of readiness to hand are understood. Like in Kant, an a priori cognition (of namely the categories) is a necessary condition for cognition of empirical objects. As we saw, Heidegger glosses this as the requirement for a pre-understanding of being – in order to understand e.g. an entity of the mode of being of readiness to hand such as a tool, we must have a prior understanding of the being of readiness to hand. Entities of distinct modes of being, however, also require a prior understanding of their own particular kind of being and thus equally require their own particular horizontal schemata. In this sense, being in general is always understood based on horizontal schemata: „Sein verstehen wir demnach aus dem ursprünglichen horizontalen Schema der Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit“ (GA 24, 436). As Heidegger stresses throughout, the understanding of being is always the understanding of the being of an entity, which means that being is never anything like a “pure” concept but is always schematised; the understanding of being just is the projection of a horizontal schema pertaining to the kind of entity Dasein’s comportment is directed at.

Because every act of understanding is projective there is not one but a “series of projections”, as Heidegger says: understanding of the entity, projection onto its being, understanding of being, projection onto time (GA 24, 437). Another way to
understand the above series of projections is the following: as we saw, entities are understood in terms of [a projection onto] their being. This means that being is also somehow understood, and because understanding is projective or hermeneutical – that is, it always understands something in terms of another thing – it must now project being itself onto something. Now, the final step in the series (which is of course not intended to be taken as a chronological one) is the projection of being onto time, which yields schemata, and both ends the series of projections and serves a condition for its possibility. Praesens as the horizontal schema of the ready to hand, then, is the being of the ready to hand (which as we saw is comprised of involvement relations) projected onto time. As we saw, for Heidegger's Kant the “being” of natural objects in the form of the categories is comprised of logical relations (if-then for causality, etc); Heidegger's task now will be to attempt to show how the being of ready to hand entities in the form of praesens is comprised not of logical but of temporal relations. Before moving on to this, given the apparently foundational nature of the series of projections a natural question seems to be that of how we understand schemata – are these in turn also projected onto something? Heidegger sidesteps this issue (and never returns to it), but the finality of the schemata are somehow to have their source in the finitude of time itself:

It can no longer be asked upon what the schemata can on their part be projected, and so on infinitum. The series of projections... has its end at the horizon of the ecstatic unity of temporality. We cannot establish this here in a more primordial way; to do that we would have to go into the problem of the finitude of time (GA 24, 437).
Whether and in what sense the horizontal schemata require in turn their own “schemata” in order to be understood is thus left as an open question. It is possible that Heidegger considered temporality to be explanatorily basic – at one point he refers to temporality as a “metaphysical Urfaktum” (GA 26, 270) – and the question of why there is temporality as unanswerable as the Kantian question of why we have the forms of intuition we have. On the other hand, however, the reference to the “finitude of time” implies that Heidegger thinks there is a possible answer to the question that he is for whatever reason unwilling or unable to go into. I shall return to this question at a later stage.

The main points to take away from the preceding are that 1) the projection of being onto time takes the form of horizontal schemata, and that 2) such schemata are implicitly projected in every comportment towards entities. We should just add here that every comportment is a comportment towards entities (of some sort or other – as Heidegger puts it, the phrase “intentional comportment” is a “pleonasm” (GA 24, 85), implying that every comportment is necessarily intentional), and so being is never “pure” or divorced from entities but always schematised in one way or another.

According to Heidegger, the above introduction of the ontological role of praesens in the understanding of the ready to hand can be summarised in one sentence, which I cite in the original:

Zuhandenheit des Zuhandenen, das Sein dieses Seienden, wird als Praesenz verstanden, welche Praesenz als unbegrifflich verständliche schon enthüllt ist im Selbstentwurf der Zeitlichkeit, durch deren Zeitigung
As we have seen, entities such as tools are understood in terms of their being, in this case their Zuhandenheit, that is, their possible and actual involvement relations. Now, Heidegger adds, Zuhandenheit itself is understood as praesens. Praesens is “non-conceptually intelligible” and, as the prior understanding of being that is required for the understanding of entities, “makes possible” comportment towards entities. To this summary we should just add that praesens is “non-conceptual” in the sense that it consists of temporal relations and that, furthermore, it schematises not individual objects but the horizon against which objects can appear.

Next, Heidegger adds that readiness to hand “formally” means praesens, but praesens of a specific mode (eigener Art) – the praesential content of the horizon needs a closer determination, because a “richness of developed structures” lies in the content of the praesential horizon that belongs to readiness to hand (GA 24, 439).

Why does Heidegger argue that praesens requires this further specification? Patently, the nature of the being of the ready to hand as Heidegger describes it – involvement relations, involvement totality, etc – is much richer than the kind of

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39 The English translation reads: “The readiness to hand of the ready to hand, the being of this kind of entity, is understood as praesens, a praesens which, as non-conceptually understandable, is already unveiled in the self-projection of temporality, by means of whose temporalizing anything like existent commerce with ready to hand and present at hand entities becomes possible.”
content that this mode of being can be given based solely through praesens. In other words, simply by determining an entity as present (or absent) does not yet provide one with the right kind of blueprint for understanding the being of an entity of the mode of being of the ready to hand, i.e. based on its involvement relations and involvement totality. In other words, praesens is yet too general and indeterminate to yield an understanding of the kind of being that belongs to the ready to hand. In order for Heidegger to be able to derive this mode of being from its horizonal schema he needs to fill in the content of the praesential horizon in more detail. Only praesens as modified in specific ways yields a rich enough blueprint sufficient to provide Dasein with the right kind of orientation to be able to comport itself to entities of this kind of being.

What then is the role of praesens as such, unmodified? Notice that in the above summary Heidegger states, somewhat against the grain of this "Temporal Interpretation of The Being of Readiness To Hand" (as the title of this section reads), that the temporal horizon of praesens makes possible Dasein’s dealings with the ready to hand and the present at hand, mit Zuhandenem und Vorhandenem (GA 24, 439). This indeed points to one of the most serious ambiguities in Heidegger’s attempt to articulate an ontological pluralism that is transcendentally grounded in temporality, as I see it. Is the being of both the ready and the present at hand understood as praesens and subsequently modified into the one or the other, or does the present at hand have its own schema, corresponding to its own specific sort of being? These are questions that I will return to in the following section – for now, keeping these questions in mind, I will follow Heidegger’s thread in Basic Problems on how the horizontal
schema of praesens needs to be modified in order to furnish Dasein with an openness to entities of the kind of being of the ready to hand.

The (roughly) second half of Heidegger's discussion of praesens is thus dedicated to the particular way in which the horizontal schemata are “modified” in the case of the projection of the being of ready to hand entities which is to provide a “closer determination” of the “praesential content” of the schema of praesens (GA 24, 439). Heidegger reminds us again of the way in which a ready to hand entity is present at the ontic level, of how it appears to us in our commerce with it, viz. in the context of a totality (i.e. holistically) which is formed of individual chains of involvement relations. What follows from this is that the being of a ready to hand entity is determined by its position within a given whole or totality and by its relations to other entities:

The equipmental totality has the characteristic that the individual pieces of equipment are correlated among themselves with each other, not only in general with reference to the inherent character of each but also in such a way that each piece of equipment has the place belonging to it. The place of a piece of equipment within an equipmental totality is always determined with regard to the readiness to hand of the entity that is prescribed and required by the functionality totality (GA 24, 440).

Presumably, this particular way of coming into presence, i.e. of appearing, that belongs to the ready to hand must be dictated by the determinate form that the horiz on of praesens takes. In other words, I must be able to orientate myself to this particular mode of being (involvement-relations, involvement-totality) by
means of schematically dictated temporal structures (rather than e.g. categorial structures dictated by possible forms of judgment). The particular way that these entities have of being present must have a temporal correlate that is more determinate than mere presence (as the horizontal schema of praesens seems to dictate). What this temporal correlate must be composed of is thus not the particular content of the involvement-totality or its relations, but some temporal structure that makes possible the blueprint according to which an entity is ontologically defined by its place within such a totality and position within a relational chain in the first place and made accessible in this way. In other words, what the temporal schema of the ready to hand must provide is the possibility to grasp an entity (a tool for example) based on its involvement-totality and relations (rather than, e.g., based on its properties).

However, instead of providing a complete picture of the “richness of the developed structures” that make up the kind of praesens that belongs to the ready to hand, Heidegger here states that he will merely “try to procure indirectly at least an idea” of such structures (GA 24, 440). Furthermore, Heidegger claims that “everything becomes clear when seen from the side of the privative”, and so the attempt to familiarize us more closely with the structure of the praesens of the ready to hand will we be carried out from the perspective of the “un-ready to hand”:

the temporal (temporale) interpretation of readiness to hand in its sense of being must be more clearly attainable in orientation toward un-readiness to hand [that is, when a tool is unavailable for involvement] (GA 24, 439).
The “privative” account of the manner in which the schema of praesens is modified in understanding the being of the ready to hand is as follows (GA 440ff.). When a particular piece of equipment is not-ready to hand, if, for example, it is missing, this does not mean that it is not present at all. Rather, it means that it is present in a particular way, namely as absent (GA 441). This kind of presence through absence is possible because equipment comes in chains of involvement relations – when one “link” in the chain is missing, this link becomes present as absent. For example, the chalk that I cannot find but need in order to write on the blackboard shows up as absent or as missing from the particular equipmental context relevant to my task. “Missing” a piece of equipment is thus a specific way of making an entity present. As such, missing has its own temporality and so its own specific temporal horizon: “To the ecstasis of failing to make present that makes missing possible there belongs the horizonal schema of absens” (GA 24, 442). The schema of absens is a modification of the schema praesens. Without this modification of the horizonal schema, Dasein could never encounter an entity as missing, and so a basic aspect of its orientation to ready to hand entities within the world would be impossible:

[I]f a pertinent horizonal schema were not antecedently unveiled in this ecstatic unity... then Dasein could never find that something is missing. In other words, there would be lacking the possibility of an essential factor of commerce with and orientation within intraworldly entities (GA 24, 442).
Similarly, the ontological possibility of being surprised by the appearance of a new entity is also grounded in a modified horizontal schema of praesens:

Conversely, the possibility of being surprised by a newly emerging thing which does not appear beforehand in the customary equipmental context is grounded in this, that the expectant making-present of the ready to hand is unexpectant of something else which stands in a possible functionality connection with what is at first handy (GA 24, 442).

Just like the possibility of missing, the possibility of being surprised is grounded in a prior understanding of a horizon determined by the significance of relevant equipmental relations.

Missing is, furthermore, not only a discovery of un-ready-to-hand, but an explicit making present of the already and at least (gerade schon und zumindest noch) ready to hand, and so the ‘absensual’ modification of the schema of praesens serves to make the ready to hand entities conspicuous:

The absensual modification, precisely, of the praesens belonging to the making present of commerce [with the ready to hand], the praesens that is given with the missing, is what makes the ready to hand become conspicuous (GA 24, 442).

So ends Heidegger’s discussion of the modification of the praesential content of the schematic horizon of entities of the mode of being of the ready to hand. As was mentioned earlier, Dasein also understands entities of the mode of Dasein in a similar manner, but based on the projection of different horizontal schemata.

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Heidegger's above discussion of how the schemata enable an understanding of being allow us to understand the much sparser discussion of the horizontal schemata in *Being and Time* section 69c, which we can now identify with the horizontal schemata of the being of Dasein. Heidegger describes the horizontal schemata in 69c in the following way:

The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon. Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a “whither” to which one is carried away. This "whither" of the ecstasis we call the "horizontal schema". In each of the three ecstases the ecstatical horizon is different. The schema in which Dasein comes towards itself futurally, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the “for-the-sake-of- itself”. The schema in which Dasein is disclosed to itself in a state-of-mind as thrown, is to be taken as that in the face of which it has been thrown and that to which it has been abandoned. This characterizes the horizontal schema of what has been. In existing for the sake of itself in abandonment to itself as something that has been thrown, Dasein, as Being-alongside, is at the same time making present. The horizontal schema for the Present is defined by the “in-order-to”. The unity of the horizontal schemata of future, present, and having been, is grounded in the ecstatical unity of temporality. The horizon of temporality as a whole determines that whereupon [woraufhin] factically existing entities are essentially disclosed (SZ, 365)
The ecstases are the manner in which Dasein “gets carried away” into a future or past horizon, in other words, they are what enables Dasein to occupy a given temporal horizon. As we saw, in the case of the future horizon, Dasein projects itself forward and comes back to itself from out of the future through future-oriented comportments such as awaiting or expecting. In this sense, it projects itself onto its being qua existing; it projects itself onto its existence, on its existentiell possibilities. Because existence is one of the “categories” or existentia that define Dasein’s being, this means that Dasein projects itself onto its being (when combined with the other two existentia) and becomes intelligible to itself in terms of the projection of its existentiellia. In short, Dasein understands itself, broadly speaking, when it understands itself in terms of its thrownness, its falling, and its projectiveness. Temporality (Zeitlichkeit) in its ecstatic function enables such a projection.

However, in order to understand being – in this case, in order to understand the mode of being of “existence” – being itself must also be projected. Much like in the case of the ready to hand, Dasein understands its being by means of the corresponding horizontal schemata. The schemata serve to orient Dasein in its comportments by disclosing the range of possible ways of being Dasein in the same manner that the horizontal schema of praesens discloses the range of possible ways in which an entity can be present. The schemata, in both cases, determine how the horizons show up by providing them with a determinate structure. The case of Dasein’s self-directed ontological understanding is more complex for a variety of reasons, not least of which because Heidegger provides all three horizontal schemata (as opposed to the case of the ready to hand, where
only one is provided); nonetheless, based on the passage above, we can say that
Dasein’s understanding of its own being takes the following form: Dasein shows
up to itself in its futural horizon as “for-the-sake-of-itself”, in its present horizon
as “in-order-to”, and in its past as “in-the-face-of”. Every comportment of Dasein
toward innerworldly entities presupposes a self-understanding, and every self-
understanding presupposes an understanding of the being of the entity to which
this self-understanding is directed – this understanding of the being of the entity
that understands itself in this manner presupposes and is guided by the above
horizontal schemata.

So, once again we have a model that distinguishes between existentiell
understanding and ontological (or “existential”) understanding, where the
former projects the entity onto its being and latter projects the entities being
onto time. In other words, Dasein understands itself in terms of its projections,
its throwness, etc., but it knows that it is the kind of entity that should be
understood in terms of its projections, its throwness etc. (rather than a kind of
entity that should be understood by its involvement-relations, by its physical
properties etc.) because it has at its disposal the horizontal schemata, in other
words, because it has projected the kind of being that pertains to itself onto time.

There are obviously many unanswered questions in the ontological difference in
Dasein’s self-understanding, not least of which that of whether temporality
provides a rich enough blueprint that can account for Dasein’s understanding of
its being. As Stephen Käufer puts it: “Coming towards oneself, finding oneself,
and seizing upon objects: this already suggests a richer structure than time... The
vulnerability is that the phenomena that Heidegger encounters and interprets in articulating the a priori of experience suggest a more multifarious origin than temporality” (Käufer 2003, 89). However, my focus is not to provide an assessment of existential understanding but rather of the understanding of the being of the ready to hand and present at hand, and so my aim here has been merely to point out that, formally, the temporal structure of the understanding of the difference between ontic and ontological understanding in the case of Dasein’s self-understanding is the same as that of the understanding of innerworldly entities, and that temporality here also plays a dual grounding function, namely, as ecstatic (Zeitlichkeit) it enables ontic transcendence and as horizontal (Temporalität) it enables ontological transcendence by means of a projection of Seinsverstaendniss, the understanding of being. That said, and due to this similarity in the temporal structure of understanding of the being of Dasein and the understanding of the being of innerworldly entities, many of the problems and questions hinted at here reappear in the discussion of the horizontal schemata of the ready to hand.

**Assessment**

Apart from the brief section 69c in *Being and Time*, with the end of the course *Basic Problems* ends Heidegger’s discussion of horizontal schemata, and so of the understanding of being in terms of time – while he mentions the concept of horizon in later works, especially in the context of a discussion of Nietzsche, and schemata are mentioned in the works on Kant in the late 20s, nowhere does
Heidegger return to the idea of a horizontal schema that is to serve as the understanding of being. It is likely that the third division of Being and Time was supposed to contain an exposition of the schemata related to the various modes of being. As Köhler sees it, what Heidegger wanted to develop in this division was a “grammar of the sense of being” based on the schemata (1993, 95). However, as we know, this section was never to appear, though the lectures on the Basic Problems of Phenomenology do contain a preview of some of the material that was to appear in division three, namely the discussion of the horizontal schema for the ready to hand and the hints about the schema of the present at hand. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Heidegger's late Marburg project, which I described as an ontological pluralism transcendentally grounded in temporality, would significantly transform from the 1930s onward as Heidegger continued to struggle with problems and outstanding questions inherent in this project. Part of my aim in what follows will be to bring out the positive content of Heidegger's thesis that ontological understanding is temporal through a closer interpretation, as well as some of the difficulties and internal tensions that lead up to this transformation, and to indicate the direction that Heidegger's further project would have needed to take.

First we begin with the positive content. We pick up again the dual grounding function that time is supposed to play. Firstly, temporality (as Zeitlichkeit) makes possible the object-relation, or transcendence, through its ecstatic function by enabling the understanding of entities based on their mode of being. This is the transcendentally-ontic function that is directed at entities. Secondly, temporality (as Temporalität) makes possible the understanding of the being of entities
through its horizontal function, by enabling the disclosure of a region of possible entities based on a given projection of being onto time and a corresponding configuration of the temporal horizon projected upon.

In the first case, if to understand an entity is a projecting that makes the entity present by retaining, then temporality functions as a condition of possibility in that it enables the projection by keeping open a future horizon, the retention by keeping open a past horizon, and the making-present through a determination of the present horizon, in the sense described earlier. Furthermore, if understanding is dependent on all three temporal moments, then it is the unity of all three that ultimately enables transcendence. What is projected, retained, and made present is the being of a given entity, and so what makes possible the understanding of an entity in its being is the temporal structure that makes possible such projection, retention and making-present.

As stated in the introduction, Heidegger's strategy here follows from his criticism of Kant's subjectivism: what accounts for the possibility of understanding entities is not the bringing of that entity to the unity of the understanding, but the appearance of the entity within the unity of the temporal horizons. The particular content of Kant's categories determines the ontological constitution of the entity as a possible object of experience, just as for Heidegger the content of being determines the constitution of the entity that is understood. Thus, the necessary constitution that an entity must have to count as an entity is determined by the categories for Kant and by temporal schemata for Heidegger. In the first case, an entity must have quantity, quality, relations, and modality to
count as an entity that can show up in experience, and so it is in Heidegger’s case, with the difference that particular content is determined by the content of the kind of being in its temporally schematised form. In this sense, it is not categorial relations that determine an entity as the entity that it is in the case of the present at hand, but temporal relations that determine how an entity shows up in the present horizon.

Before looking more closely at the nature of Heidegger’s temporal relations that underpin being, it is worthwhile to first ask how exactly temporality operates as a condition of possibility for transcendence. We saw that there is a certain isomorphism between the understanding and the “objects” of understanding, and it was implied that this isomorphism is grounded in time. Objects and understanding both have a temporal form. For Kant, both have a categorial form, dictated by the pure concepts of understanding; the reason they have a categorial form is that they are constituted by the categorial function of the understanding – hence, the two are isomorphic at the a priori level. For Heidegger, however, this isomorphism consists not in a categorial form but in a temporal one. Furthermore, Heidegger seems to take the isomorphism to not be due to our imposition of certain forms on a manifold but to be due to a common temporal structure for Dasein and Dasein’s intentional objects. As we have seen, this follows from Heidegger’s rejection of the quid juris manner of posing the question as well as his objections to Kant’s subjectivism: it is not that the subject imposes a temporal structure on the object, but rather that the common (hidden) root of both subject and object is temporality and its schematic manifestations.
The manner in which temporality functions as a condition of possibility is in its horizontal function, whereby the content of the being of a possible region of entities is constituted through the schematisation of a horizon. In this sense, being must be derived from temporality – or, as Heidegger put it earlier, all ontological propositions (i.e. characterisations of being) must be expressible in temporal terms. What does derivation mean, and in what sense are ontological concepts or categories derived from temporality? What I think Heidegger means here is that the ontological predicates or concepts in which philosophy spells out the character of being are derived from Dasein’s pre-ontological and pre-thematic comportment to entities by means of the schematisation of temporality, in the sense that these concepts have their source in this comportment – this is also what I take Heidegger to mean when he refers to “primordial source”, “Ur-ground” etc. I thus take “derivation” in a relatively weak sense, much in the manner that Kant “derives” the table of categories from the logical table of judgements – the categories, as forms of unification of the manifold, are correlated to logical functions of unifying concepts into judgements. In this manner the categories are expressions or instantiations of our capacity to form judgments, as Longuenesse (1998) puts it. For Heidegger, on the contrary, the “categories” with which being is expressed are themselves expressions of comportments to entities guided by temporal schemata, where distinct comportments (and thus distinct ontological concepts) are possible based on distinct schematisations of temporality. Therefore, the different determinations of being must have a temporal-schematic correlate in order to be intelligible to Dasein, albeit at a pre-thematic level. This strategy for deriving being from temporal schemata thus follows from the second criticism of Kant cited above
that was directed against Kant’s logic-centrism in grounding the categories in the table of judgments.

In what manner, then, are ontological predicates derived from temporal schemata? Heidegger illustrates this in the case of Kantian ontological predicates (i.e. the categories) through an analysis of the Kantian pure notion of substance:

[Substance] signifies that which forms the ground for a "thing which adheres" [ein "Anhangendes"]. Thus time is only the pure image of the notion Substance if it presents precisely this relation in the pure image. Time, however, is a sequence of nows precisely because in every flowing now it is a now, even another now. As the look of what lasts, it offers at the same time the image of pure change in what lasts.... Through this schematism the notion as schematized stands in view in advance, so that in this preliminary view of the pure image of persistence, an entity which as such is unalterable in the change can show itself for experience (GA 3, 107-8)

The image of “substance” is thus “offered” by a schematic configuration of time rather than through a sensibilization of a pure conceptual content. Based on this, Heidegger argues that the concept “substance” is derived from the temporal relations “permanence of the now” and “alteration of nows”. We do not, as Kant would have it, apply the pure concept of substance to a pure manifold in order to determine the substance-accident form of entities; rather, we intuit substantiality in time’s capacity to persist through change. It is in this sense that all ontological propositions are actually temporal propositions: "all the
propositions of ontology are temporal (temporale) propositions. Their truths unveil structures and possibilities of being in the light of Temporality (Temporalität)” (GA 24, 460). Furthermore, for this reason Heidegger names the science of ontology, in opposition to “the positive sciences”, a “temporal science” (GA 24, 460).

This already implies an answer to the question of why it is that temporality is to play such a foundational role. We mentioned in the introduction that Heidegger thinks that being has always been understood in terms of time, and now we can give a more specific content to this claim: ontological predicates, or determinations of being qua being, are derived from schematisations of pure time. Heidegger's gambit, as it was called before, is that being has been understood in terms of time in an implicit way throughout the history of philosophy:

My whole interpretation of temporality has the metaphysical intention of asking: Are all these headings from transcendental metaphysics, namely a priori, aei on, ousia -- are they accidental, or from where do they come? If they speak of the eternal, how are they to be understood? They are only to be understood and are only possible owing to the fact that an inner transcendence lies within the essence of time; that time is not just what makes transcendence possible, but that time itself has in itself a horizontal character; that in future, recollected behaviour I always have at the same time a horizon with respect to the present, futurity, and pastness in general; that a transcendental, ontological determination of time is found here, within which something like the permanence of the substance is
constituted for the first time. – My whole interpretation of temporality is to be understood from this point of view (GA 3, 282).

This is so because being in its pre-theoretical and pre-ontological form is understood by means of its projection onto time, and so any understanding of being necessarily takes a temporal form. However, another correlate to this claim is that being in its theoretical and ontological form – that is, being as articulated by philosophy – is based on this temporal understanding of being, and so the conceptual articulation of being is derived from its temporal schemata much in the way that the conceptual articulation of substance is derived from the temporal schema of permanence in time in relation to change through time. In this sense, ontological concepts are originally formed through schematisation:

In the Transcendental Schematism the categories are formed first of all as categories. If these are the true "primal concepts," however, then the Transcendental Schematism is the original and authentic concept-formation as such (GA 3, 110).

Thus it is not the case or not exactly the case that Dasein “applies” existentialia or categories to a manifold external to it – what has priority is the schema that already includes both the understanding and intuition or both the subjective and objective poles. In other words, this is simply another way of saying that Dasein is being-in-the-world (for more on this, see the chapter on schematism). The important point, however, that is implied by the priority of the schema over concepts or categories is that schemata, as time determinations, consist of
temporal rather than logical relations, and that the latter are derivations of the former.

The thesis that all ontological propositions are actually temporal propositions is actually a very weighty one. On the one hand, it explains why being has historically always been understood in terms of time, as Heidegger thinks. On the other hand, it also states that any further articulations of being, be they on an explicitly temporal basis as Heidegger intends in his own conception of being or not, need also be derivable from temporal structures and temporal relations, in short, from temporal schemata, which just are the configurations from which temporal structures and relations arise, as in the case of substance. In this sense, the ontological categories – the content of being – is for Heidegger to be derived from time in the same manner that Kantian categories are derivable from the logical table of judgments and, ultimately, from possible functions of judgement.

What was said here in the context of the temporal content of the category of substance applies to other categories in a similar vein: the prior image of one thing necessarily succeeding another (i.e. causality) is derived from the succession of one now after the other, and so on. Because time has always been a presupposition in the formation of categories, or ontological predicates more generally, and because this presupposition has never explicitly come to light, Heidegger thinks that the result has been a sort of myopic focus on the present horizon in light of a particularly theoretical mode of comportment; a richer view of time, then, will lead to a broader range of “ontological predicates”, to different modes of being. Heidegger’s attempt, then, to articulate schemata for all three
temporal horizons then should be seen in the context of an attempt to articulate an ontological form of pluralism. Thus Heidegger holds something like a “temporal derivation thesis”, which can be phrased roughly as follows: All ontological predicates or propositions, which have traditionally been accounted for by categories, pure concepts, properties of God, etc., are either derivable from or reducible to or in some way traceable to temporal structures, relations or schemata. To demonstrate that this thesis is true Heidegger would need to show both that the traditional concepts of ontology are derivable from temporality in this manner as well as that the ontological propositions pertaining to his late Marburg project are all ultimately derivable from temporality in the same manner.

Though Heidegger attempts to provide the above examples in support of his thesis, its success nonetheless remains questionable; for our purposes, however, we can turn to the latter and ask the question of how Heidegger’s analysis of temporality in its ontological function, and specifically the analysis of praesens as the ontological horizon of the ready to hand, sheds light on the temporal derivation thesis; how, in other words, are ontological propositions pertaining to the ready to hand derived from temporal propositions?

As can be gleaned from the reading I provided above of temporality in its ontological function and of praesens as the horizon of the ready to hand, Heidegger’s account in Basic Problems is not only incomplete, but highly abstruse and possibly incoherent. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s focus on the example of the modification of the horizon of the ready to hand through absence is instructive in
giving an indication of how the entire temporal framework of understanding being is (at least) supposed to work in terms of its capacity to yield a multiplicity of modes of being. Once again, for reasons emphasised throughout, a comparison to Kant’s treatment of a similar issue can shed light on Heidegger’s account.

The issue is the constitution of the ontological horizon based on which entities are understood, or what is called possible experience in Kant. I have pointed out the functional similarities between Heidegger’s ontological horizon and Kant’s possible experience previously; the question now is about the constitution of each, where Kant’s is ostensibly logical and Heidegger’s ostensibly temporal. In Kant’s case, possible experience is constituted through logical relations in the sense that the temporal manifold of pure intuition in which all objects of possible experience must appear is structured by relations that trace back to logical functions of judgement. Specifically, the relations between propositions instantiated in hypothetical (\(\rightarrow\)) and disjunctive (v) judgements, when applied to the temporal manifold of intuition, produce the temporal relations of succession in time and simultaneity.\(^{40}\) Thus, there are two temporal relations that are constitutive of experience, which means that every entity appears against the backdrop of possible experience as occupying a subsequent (or prior) time as objects and as occupying the same time as other objects. Kant argues that time is structured in this way because of the application of the categories. Heidegger, on the other hand, has argued that we form the categories we do because of the nature of time, in other words, that the relation of priority is the reverse.

\(^{40}\) Kant calls the temporal result of the application of categorical form of judgement a “mode of time”, and so this form does not sensu stricto count as a temporal relation – specifically, it does not relate two temporal elements as in the case of succession of simultaneity.
We can now see that Heidegger’s reversal of priority potentially expands the range of ontological categories. For Kant there are two possible temporal relations because there are two pure concepts that structure time in this manner. For Heidegger, however, without this categorial constraint, and together with the horizontal conception of temporality indicated previously, there is a larger variety of possible temporal relations, and thus a larger variety of possible ontological contents. We must keep in mind that Heidegger’s original aim is to expand the realm ontological categories in a way that can account for a broader range of entities. This expanded range of possible temporal relations, then, is supposed to be capable of accounting for (among others) the constitution of the ready to hand, in the same way that Kant’s logical relations, when applied to time, account for the constitution of possible objects.

We have seen that ready to hand entities are not ontologically determined in their existence by causal relations or by relations of community, as Kantian objects are, but by their position in a relational chain in light of a task formulated in terms of institutional or equipmental totalities. In the same way that for Kant the logical relation of the hypothetical form of judgement accounts for the causal relation that objects instantiate in relation to other objects, Heidegger’s temporal relations must in some sense account for the functional relations that determine ready to hand entities as the entities they are.

The relation of the present horizon to the past or future horizon is supposed to provide the blueprint for the functional relations of ready to hand entities. This is
the significance of Heidegger’s emphasis on the example of missing or being surprised by an entity at the ontic level. As we saw, it is possible to comport oneself towards an entity in the form of missing it or being surprised by it because we understand in advance the temporal relation of the present to the future horizon. Here we thus have a phenomenon that is of a different ilk than what Kant could account for at the ontological level. In the Kantian framework, we could miss or be surprised by a material object if in the causal relation \( A \rightarrow B \), \( B \) failed to appear in the case of missing, or if in the same causal relation \( C \) appeared instead \( B \) in the case of surprise. For Kant, this would clearly be a case of applying the wrong rules at the empirical level rather than a possible ontological determination of how an entity can appear (i.e. it would be a case of what he calls “semblance”; see *Metaphysical Foundations*, AK 4, 555).

For Heidegger, because of the particular ontological constitution of ready to hand entities (see chapter 4), entities are present qua being involved in a relational chain rather than a causal one. It is the constitution of the horizons against which this relational chain appears that is constituted through temporal relations. For Heidegger it is precisely missing or surprise that brings to light this dependence on a temporal framework of relations. A tool shows up for me as missing not because I cannot locate it with respect to a previous causally efficacious state and so by identifying it according to the temporal relation of succession, but because I relate a present link in a chain to a past equipmental totality in light of a future task, and so by identifying it (as missing) according to a temporal relation between a past, present and future horizon. It is this configuration of relations between temporal horizons which is supposed to
enable ready to hand entities to appear as present in various ways: present as involved, present as missing, present as obtrusive, and so forth. These latter are the involvement relations that constitute ready to hand entities, and it is the horizon of temporal relations that is to make possible such relations. Thus, an entity of this mode of being can be present in light of its relation to its possible involvement in a future horizon, or it can be present in light of its belonging to a past totality of equipment that is significant for a future task (in which case it can be present as absent or as unavailable in my present environment). In this sense Heidegger is able to construct a mode of being that is distinct from the mode of being of Kant's natural objects, and at the same time is able to show that this mode of being is underpinned by temporal rather than logical relations. The horizon of relations pertaining to a given mode of being is the product of schematisations of temporal relations. It is this horizon that is understood in advance and which determines an entity as the entity that it is. Consequently, when we understand the temporal schemata that produce the horizon in terms of which entities are constituted, we understand the being of that entity.

I now turn to the critical assessment of Heidegger’s thesis that the sense of being is time in the context of the notion of the horizonal schema. Firstly, the gaps in Heidegger's account: There are three main lacunae, as I see it, that Heidegger for whatever reason did not manage to spell out by the conclusion of the 1927 course on the Basic Problems and never returned to afterwards:

1) We are missing a more complete account of the richer structures that are contained in the praesential content of the horizonal schema for the ready to
hand. We only get an indirect indication, and then only a negative one, of how the schema needs to be modified in order to produce a blueprint for an understanding of being specific enough to disclose the full range in which the ready to hand can be present.

2) We do not know the horizontal schemata for the past and future horizons of the ready to hand. Instead, after describing the present horizon Heidegger laconically tells us: “and similarly for the other two horizons”. This point is closely related to the previous: If we keep in mind that the manner in which the present is made present is dependent on the nature of the temporal relation to the future and the past horizons, then it is clear that the corresponding schemata of the past and futural horizons would be determining with respect to the “richer” structures contained in the present horizon. In other words, the shape that especially the futural horizon takes – the manner in which Dasein projects – structures and determines the shape of the present horizon, and so the lack of development of the schema of the future horizon of the present at hand is a significant lacuna.

3) We do not get a clear statement of how the praesential schema of the being of the ready to hand and its corresponding schemata relate to the schemata of the being of Dasein, namely the for-the-sake-of, the in-order-to, and the in-the-face-of (for the future, present, and past, respectively). Indeed, we also do not know how these schemata relate to the schemata of the present at hand, or how schemata as such relate to each other more generally. This is the question of the possibility of grounding entities as a whole in temporality – all modes of entities
have a temporal structure in some sense, but what is the relation between the
different modes and how do we define the difference between them? For
example, is the present at hand merely a modification of the ready to hand? This
would seem to imply that it is not a distinct mode of being at all, for the
difference between them would thus be ontic. Or, is the schema of the present at
hand separate and distinct from that of the ready to hand? As mentioned above,
there is some ambiguity in the scope of the temporal horizon of praesens – most
of the time Heidegger takes it as the horizon specific to the being of the ready to
hand particularly, but at times seems to imply that it is the horizon of the present
at hand more generally, where it is unclear whether “present at hand” is used
more specifically to designate, for example, material entities, or if it is taken to
refer to all non-Dasein entities more generally, in which case it would be a mode
of being that includes the ready to hand.

In light of the above three omissions, we see that a systematic articulation of the
temporal relations that ontologically underpin the ready to hand, to say nothing
of other modes of being, is not successfully completed. Furthermore, we see that
a successful completion of the project would require near mind-numbing levels
of complexity. For example, we know that in the present horizon the ready to
hand can appear as absent due to the configuration of the relation between the
present and future horizon, which modifies the horizon of praesens, and with it
the manner in which such entities appear. However, the future horizon, in order
to take a specific enough form by which it can determine the make-up of the
present horizon, presumably also needs its own horizontal schema that would
determine how ready to hand entities appear in this future horizon, and this in
turn would need to be connected to a past horizon along with its own schema for
the ready to hand. However, as we know, in the example of the ready to hand
more generally, the present horizon is co-determined in light of Dasein’s
practical considerations, and so the future horizontal schema of the ready to hand
would also need to be co-determined by the horizontal schemata of Dasein. We
mentioned briefly that the futural horizon schema of Dasein’s own being is the
for-the-sake-of-which – in other words, the future horizon appears as something
for the sake of which Dasein potentially is or comports itself. This, however, co-
determines the future task based on which certain relational chains appear as
relevant in the present horizon of the ready to hand. Consequently, we are not
dealing merely with the manner in which the relations between the three
horizontal schemata of the ready to hand can be modified in order to determine
how entities appear in the present horizon (as involved, as missing, etc.). We are
also dealing with the manner in which the relations between the three horizontal
schemata of Dasein’s own existence determine one another and co-determine
the horizontal schemata of the ready to hand.

Furthermore, given that the ready to hand in some manner has a material
composition that is unaccounted for by the temporal relations constitutive of
their being and that the temporal schemata of the present at hand could
potentially account for materiality of objects (see chapter 2), it is not implausible
that not only the temporal schemata of Dasein’s own being co-determine the
horizon of the ready to hand, but that the horizontal schemata of (Kantian-like)
natural entities co-determine the presentential content of the horizon of the ready
to hand. It is not necessary to tally up the number of possible temporal relations
that the distinct horizons of the distinct modes of being can hold to one another, but while the Kantian framework was criticised for operating with only two possible temporal relations, Heidegger seems to have multiplied the number of possible relations to unmanageable proportions.

Furthermore, in light of the above, not only is it questionable whether Heidegger was able to successfully provide a temporal ontological foundation for the ready to hand, but it is clear he was unable to relate all the distinct modes of being to this temporal ground. As noted previously, Heidegger’s programmatic statement of what I have called the late Marburg project, as well as the specific demands that arise in his attempt to transform the Kantian framework for the purposes of this project, both point to the requirement to supply an ontological temporal ground for what Heidegger calls entities as a whole, which covers the multiplicity of all possible modes of being of entities that can appear in the world. Entities of the mode of being of Dasein receive an even briefer treatment than entities of the mode of being of readiness to hand. In terms of entities of the mode of presence at hand, though my chapter 2 gives an indication of how a temporal derivation would go based on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s schemata of the present at hand, there is some ambiguity as to whether praesens is also the temporal horizon of these kinds of entities or whether they are to have their own distinct temporal schemata.

Even apart from the three kinds of entities above, entities of other modes of being remain unaccounted for. At different points Heidegger mentions the modes of being of “subsistence” enjoyed by e.g. numbers or the mode of being of “life”
enjoyed by plants and animals, as I have mentioned previously – whether, and if so, how, such entities can be grounded temporally, as the project seems to demand, is a question Heidegger never returns to. In this context, Köhler cites several further kinds of entities that would need to be included in such an endeavour: the modes of being of language, of art, or of cultural signs such as religious symbols are all mentioned as possible candidates, but Köhler also points out that Heidegger at times uses “nature” in a way that is not coextensive with “present hand”, in which case it seems to enjoy a distinct mode of being that would need to be accounted for separately (Köhler 1993, 127).41

Köhler's evaluation of the attempt to derive modes of being from temporal schemata revolves primarily around the above incompleteness. Specifically in relation to the aforementioned modes of being, Köhler writes that the question arises whether “the manifoldness of the modes of being is able to be brought under” Heidegger's temporal concept of being (1993, 128). Köhler concludes that in light of the “merely fragmentary elaboration of the schematisisation of the modes of being”, it remains “an open question” whether a “more intensive elaboration could have provided a solution” to the outstanding issues and omissions (1993, 131). Heidegger's failure to provide a complete derivation of the modes of being from temporal schemata is an indication that Heidegger encountered “große Schwierigkeiten”, though Köhler adds that it is difficult to know their precise nature (1993, 132).

41 Specifically, according to Köhler “nature” is said to exist when there is no Dasein, which is not the case for the “present at hand”.

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However, because of the light it would shed on the scope and limits of the later Marburg project, we want to push the question of the specific nature of the Schwierigkeiten that Heidegger’s project encountered. We know that the project was left incomplete, but what we do not know is if it was possible to complete but was abandoned for contingent reasons, or if there was a tension inherent in the project that made it in principle impossible to bring to completion. Also, given that we now have a comprehensive overview of the entire project as a whole, we seem to be in a particularly good position to answer the above question. Namely, we know what the motivating problems and theory-building motives for the project were (chapter 1), we know the framework and manner in which Heidegger thought those problems should be approached (chapter 2), we know the explicitly formulated, detailed aims of the project (chapter 3), we know how the first step of the project went, namely the articulation of a mode of being distinct to natural objects (chapter 4), and we know how the final step was supposed to be carried out, even how a significant part of it actually was carried out (chapter 5). We furthermore know exactly what was missing from the project, and we know the time period when it was underway, and so we also know the nature of the works that preceded and, more importantly, that followed the project.

Furthermore, there has been a spate of recent literature that attempts to diagnose precisely the issue of the shift in Heidegger’s thinking in the period coinciding with the end of the late Marburg project as I define it. Generally, the two authors whose interpretations come closest to my own are Crowell and Köhler, the former for the identification of a similar project and the latter for the
emphasis on the role of temporal schemata in ontological understanding. However, as we have seen, Crowell’s diagnosis of Heidegger’s abandonment of the project was not quite right due to his misidentification of the precise nature of the project, and Köhler seems to be ambivalent in his assessment as to the potential success or failure of the project and, more importantly, fails to follow up the question of the precise reasons for its failure. Nonetheless, at this stage of the present work, other works that attempt to provide a diagnosis of Heidegger’s difficulties in this period become highly relevant for my purposes, especially those works that emphasise the Kantian strand in Heidegger’s thought during this period, and I will now approach the assessment of the viability of Heidegger’s project in light of these works.

Firstly, Golob provides a similar reading of temporal schemata to Köhler’s and to my reading, taking schemata as “prototypes” based on which being is understood (2014, 121). However, as Golob puts it, “Heidegger himself falters at precisely the point when we need a detailed specification of the relevant temporal prototypes” (151) beyond the description of praesens and of substance that I described above. Golob states that at this point that “it is incredibly hard to see how this gap might be filled” and that “there is simply no principled reason to believe that the explanatorily fundamental relations in terms of which we understand entities will admit of reduction to some form of temporal relation” (152). More importantly, Golob does provide a specific and potentially weighty reason for the above difficulty, namely that Heidegger’s attempt to derive the complete range of Kantian categories from temporal schemata fails. Specifically, in the attempt to derive causality from temporal (rather than logical) relations,
Heidegger moves illegitimately from the temporal relation of succession to the relation of necessary succession in time that is required for Kant's category of causality. As Golob puts it Heidegger “is forced to conflate the definitional connection between the concepts of earlier and later, a property which 'the now sequence' might very reasonably be said to exemplify, with a causal connection between earlier and later states of affairs, a property which is clearly quite different” (152).

The failure to derive any Kantian categories beyond substance indeed poses a serious problem for the late Marburg project, as I have characterized it, for two primary reasons. Firstly, as we have said, Heidegger's objection to Kant's category-based ontological framework was not that it is somehow wrong, but rather that it is reductive in that it applies merely to natural objects. Nevertheless, all indications are that Heidegger sees natural objects and their specific ontological conditions as described by Kant as a legitimate ontological region, once one realizes it is merely one region among many and does not constitute being as such. Indeed, Kant's ontology is taken as a theoretical articulation of the kind of being projected in modern scientific comportment (see chapter 1). As such, the region of natural objects would seem to represent quite an important region and one that Heidegger's own framework would need to account for.

Indeed, Heidegger criticizes Kant's ontological framework primarily for not being able to account for objects such as tools; it would be a serious failure, then, if Heidegger's alternative ontological framework were unable to account for
natural objects. And, in my view, Golob is correct in pointing out that Heidegger does not provide detailed derivations of the other categories apart from substance, and where he does provide them, as in the case of causality, they are highly dubious. In the case of the latter, Golob's analysis of the derivation is correct – specifically, in my view Heidegger's derivation of causality ends up smuggling in conceptual content in order to move from the temporal relation of succession to the Kantian conception of causality, which undermines Heidegger's claims that Kantian pure concepts are “formed by” and reducible to temporal schemata. Secondly, this also implies that Heidegger's temporal conception of being is unable to fully account for natural entities. There is, however, some leeway on this last point, in that Heidegger's own conception of natural causality need not be a precise reproduction of Kant's, and it is possible a weaker conception of causality would be capable of being derived from the above temporal relation.

This leads us to a second but closely related problem, one more specifically directed to the explanatory role that temporality is capable of playing within Heidegger's architectonic. We have seen that one of the impulses for the formulation of Heidegger's project was the belief that temporal schemata can play the role of “ontological concept formation”, in other words, that it can be shown that the Kantian categories in reality depend on a more basic explanatory ground, namely temporal schemata. If this intuition was misguided, then Heidegger's gambit of shifting the ontological weight from pure concepts to temporality would seem equally misguided right from the start. In this sense, we have the problem of the derivability of natural objects, a seemingly important
species of the region of the present at hand, from temporal schemata, which not only makes Heidegger's aim of deriving the multiplicity of regions of being from a temporal source appear overinflated, but also throws into question the viability of temporality as an ontological ground as such.

A worry of this sort has most compellingly been articulated by Käufer (2002, 2003). Similarly to Golob and to the present work, Käufer emphasises both the role of Kantian transcendental philosophy generally and the role of schemata specifically in Heidegger's attempt to articulate the temporal meaning of being. According to Käufer, Heidegger's project is driven by the attempt to shift the ontological weight from a logic-based conception of ontological understanding to a schematic-temporal one: it is schematism that “reveals originary temporality, and Kant misses this point... because he is trapped in a logic-inspired model of experience” (Käufer 2003, 83). In this sense, “the important point that Heidegger takes from Kant is... that our experience has an articulated a priori structure, and that this structure is produced in the originary production of a patterned, unitary time” (2003, 87). As we have seen, it is the schemata rather than categories or functions of judgement that are to fulfill the role of providing this structure from temporality. Furthermore, on Käufer's reading, Heidegger's aim was to articulate a system in the Kantian style based on temporality as its first principle, or its “monistic principle” as Käufer calls it (2002, 183).

One potentially fruitful result of such an endeavor, according to Käufer, is that it can serve as sort of corrective to the overly-theoretical Kantian (or neo-Kantian) system. As Käufer puts it, “Heidegger's articulations of temporality as the most
fundamental explanatory structure shift focus onto an important feature of experience that had been omitted in the Kantian tradition, due to the emphasis on high-level theoretical objects, on mathematics and natural science” (2002, 183). However, Heidegger’s system-building ambitions also come at a price, which according to Käufer is that the level of generality of the first principle that such a system requires underdetermines the phenomena that it attempts to account for. Käufer thus contrasts the generality of the temporal source of being with the “richness” and “multifarious origin” of experience (2003, 89). Heidegger had argued that experience is richer than Kant conceives of it, but precisely by “exhibiting this richness, it raises the question whether it is even possible to fit the whole of experience into a systematic form” (2002, 183). Käufer argues that it is, if not impossible, then at least not desirable to attempt to do so: “the unified basis [of Heidegger’s system] simply isn’t interesting in the face of the diversity of the phenomena” (2002, 183). A similar worry is raised by McManus (2013) in light of the generality of the concept of being in relation to the particularly of its explananda.

The above worry would also represent a significant problem in the context of the attempt of Heidegger’s late Marburg project to articulate a systematic account of the unity of being in light of its regional multiplicity. Specifically, even if we were to grant that temporality is a more explanatorily basic ontological condition than say Kantian forms of pure thought, it seems pointless to posit such a level if it is not able to do the constitutive work with respect to the entities that it is supposed to account for. This relates to the need to develop the “richness of structures” contained in the horizon of praesens that Heidegger hints at but does
not successfully work out, and to the need to articulate and systematise the blinding vastness of possible temporal relations I pointed to above, all of which (as temporale relations) can potentially play some ontologically constitutive role. As it stands however, and failing a development of the above points, the gap between the temporal relation of a present to a future horizon and, for example, using a present entity in light of a future task seem to be excessively wide to the extent that it is not clear what kind of explanatory work the former (ontological) level is able to do with respect to the latter (ontic) level. However, as with the above worry, the present problem seems to arise due to omission rather than due to an in-principle impossibility. In other words, Käufer does not raise any principled reason why it would be impossible to develop the temporal structures and relations in a richer manner so as to account for the richness of experience.

A third worry, one mentioned by both McManus (2013) and Braver (2015), does seem to point to in-principle irresolvable structural problems: namely, the danger of an infinite regress. Indeed, if Käufer is correct to describe Heidegger’s project as a system based on a first principle, the spectre of infinite regresses seems to ineluctably arise: if the first principle, in this case temporality, is supposed to explain being, what is supposed to explain temporality itself? Specifically, McManus puts it in terms of the horizon for understanding being (which, as I argued, consists of temporal schemata): “If [this] “horizon” possesses a mode of Being of its own, then to make sense of that and other modes of Being being modes of Being, there must be... a yet further horizon against which its mode of Being and the other modes of Being are projected. And so on” (2013, 667). Heidegger’s attempts to determine temporality as the ultimate ground of
being would thus fail (and necessarily so) just because it was an attempt to find an ultimate ground, whatever that ground may be. As Braver puts it, “no matter how far back we go, we will always reach a point that is itself unexplained. The problem is not that Being and Time gives a bad answer... but that it gives an answer at all, that is, an “ultimate” explanation” (2015, 67). According to this narrative, the impossibility of navigating the infinite regress that attaches to ultimate grounds led Heidegger to abandon the business of seeking out grounds altogether. According to Braver, “what Heidegger realizes in the later work is that in principle there can be no such final explanation... We can find grounds but these remain groundless. Heidegger replaces Dasein as the foundational ground of ontology with groundless being” (67). Apart from the two above worries, which do pose serious problems but perhaps relate more to sins by omission rather than structural impossibilities, this third worry seems to point to a structural impossibility that represents a genuine impasse in the execution of Heidegger’s project.

**The Fate of the Late Marburg Project and Beyond**

How are we to assess Heidegger’s late Marburg project in light of the above possibly irresolvable tensions? More pressingly, why should we dedicate interpretative time and energy to this project, or why should we even take it as a project, in light of its fragmentary nature and obvious incompleteness? Firstly, it must be said that as a project we have a more complete overview of it in terms of its aims, method, and its endpoint than we have of the Being and Time project. If completeness is a criterion, then we should dedicate just as much attention, if not
more, to the late Marburg project as we do to Being and Time. However, it is questionable whether completeness should be any kind of criterion in guiding philosophical interest. I have, at least implicitly up to this point, tried to locate Heidegger’s late Marburg project in the post-Kantian tradition, and here especially there are some interesting parallels: if one looks through the successive drafts of the successive systems of a Fichte or Schelling one will be hard-pressed to find any remnants of completeness of a final project, at least not of one that is not immediately renounced. Indeed, in a late letter from 1798, in a period following the completion of all three Critiques, Kant himself reports “a pain like that of Tantalus” of seeing before him “the unpaid bill of my uncompleted philosophy” (cited in Förster 2000, 48). Whether analogous circumstances caused Heidegger a similar pain is unknown, but if they did then (like Fichte or Schelling) it was one that he learned to live with, or even to embrace.

This, however, brings us back to the first point. In spite of its alleged incompleteness, Kant’s project is generally seen as an interesting and more or less viable philosophical option. If, however, Heidegger’s project is beset with irresolvable problems or internal tensions, such as those pointed out above, then this alone rather than its incompleteness would be sufficient to throw its viability into question. In light of this, I will dedicate my concluding remarks to defending the interpretation of what I have been calling the late Marburg project as a project, especially in relation to Heidegger’s earlier fundamental-ontology, and the interpretation of the project as a potentially interesting one both in relation to Heidegger’s later work and in the context of post-Kantian philosophy.
generally. My comments on this will be somewhat speculative – not primarily in the Hegelian sense of speculative (though that too), but in the sense that a rigorous substantiation of the following comments would require a more detailed exploration of Heidegger’s later work and a more detailed comparison to several of the post-Kantian projects I will mention (needless to say, both are beyond the scope of the present work).

My comments on the first point, namely on the relation of the late Marburg project to fundamental ontology will be the briefest, both because much of what I have to say is implicit in what I have already written, and because the incompleteness of fundamental ontology does not allow for a clear comparison of the two projects. As is clear from my interpretation, the late Marburg project presupposes important elements from the fundamental ontological project, most significantly Dasein’s temporal understanding and the idiosyncratic conception of time that the latter develops. There is thus some continuity between the two projects. Nonetheless, in my view this continuity is not such as to unproblematically consider the late Marburg project a simple extension of fundamental ontology. The problems motivating the former and the explicit formulation of its aims, its (more) specifically Kantian approach, its ontic (rather than existential) focus, and its emphasis on temporality (rather than on Dasein) as the fundament, in my view make it a distinct and independent project in its own right. Indeed, in this context Heidegger speaks of an Umschlag or a Kehre (GA 26, especially pp. 199 and 201) in moving from fundamental ontology to the question of the regional multiplicity of modes of being. As Crowell points out, if one moves on from a transcendental framework that takes Dasein’s meaning-
making activities as the ground of ontology, one is moving on to a different kind of project altogether. This remains true even if Crowel misidentifies the exact nature of the second form of ontological grounding as I have argued.

I now return to the three worries that I have articulated above in relation to the tenability of the late Marburg project. As is clear from my gloss on all three, they represent significant obstacles to the late Marburg project in its current form. Nevertheless, though the project requires some modifications to accommodate them, in my view none of them represent in principle irresolvable problems. To take the most serious problem in this respect, that of the infinite regress arising from Heidegger’s attempt to provide an ultimate ground in the form of a (temporal) first principle, much depends on how one conceives of the nature of the grounding role such a first principle is to play. For example, one could conceive of the first principle in a Fichtean vein as somehow immediately available to intuition, or one could conceive it in a Hegelian vein as somehow substantiated by historical processes. In each case, the appeal to justificatory grounds will take a distinct form, as in the difference in the appeal e.g. to intellectual intuition or to the historical development of reason. As mentioned previously, Heidegger’s most detailed reference to the foundational nature of temporality as a first principle is his gloss on it as an “Urfaktum im metaphysischen Sinne” (GA 26, 270), which tells us little as to the nature of its role in the system.

However, it should be noted that the problem of infinite regress from first principles does not arise for Kant, at least not with the same force that it arises
for a Fichte or a Hegel, and given the proximity of Heidegger’s project in this period to Kant’s it is here worthwhile to explore why this is so. Kant discusses regresses in relation to the search for the unconditioned in the *Dialectic of the First Critique*, and what becomes clear from his discussion is that the subject is in principle unable to reach the unconditioned due to the subject’s constitutive finitude. While reason by its nature posits the unconditioned, it is by the nature of experience beyond our cognitive ken. Kant thus avoids an infinite regress in that he does not posit an unconditioned (such as a first principle), at least not one that is available within experience; this unconditioned is not available to experience, furthermore, because of the finite nature of our cognitive apparatus.

In this sense, does Heidegger’s similar emphasis on finitude put him in a position to avoid such a regress? There is, in fact, one element that seems to be missing in the Heideggerian story vis a vis Kant, and that is the notorious issue of things themselves. Like Fichte and Hegel (and Husserl), Heidegger at this stage of his development rejects the notion of an in itself that is in principle unavailable to experience (see e.g. GA 3, 32ff.). The aspect of Kant’s system, however, that allows him to avoid an infinite regress based on an unconditioned that would serve as a first principle is precisely the distinction between the for-us and the in-itself, which results both in the finitude of human experience but also in an inscrutable sphere of things in themselves. In other words, if for Kant there “is” no first principle, this means there is no first principle *for us*, or there is no unconditioned available to us within experience based on which we could

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42 I have discussed this issue briefly in chapter 3 of the present work.
43 The similarities in Heidegger’s and Kant’s conceptions of finitude are discussed in chapter 1.
construct first principles; there is, however, a possible unconditioned *in itself* that is unavailable to experience. One could draw this distinction in terms of the epistemic and the ontological levels: epistemically, there is no first principle, but ontologically there may be an ultimate ground or fundament in the form of the unconditioned. The regress mentioned above, then, only arises in the attempt to achieve epistemic access to the unconditioned and to formulate principles based on it, a path which would then seem to lead to the problems highlighted above.

Interestingly, as mentioned, the problem of the infinite regress arises for two prominent post-Kantians that famously reject the notion of an in-itself as incoherent, namely Fichte and Hegel. The positive formulation of the rejection of the in-itself as a sphere of in-principle uncognizability is that there is nothing that is in principle unavailable to cognition, in other words, that there is full intelligibility. If everything is in principle fully intelligible, then the unconditioned is intelligible as well, including the cognition of an unconditioned that would then serve as the basis for the formulation of a first principle of philosophical system. In other words, the problem of regress seems to arise in the context of a rejection of an inscrutable in-itself and the subsequent (alleged) full intelligibility.

The details and nuances of the relation between a rejection of things in themselves and problems with infinite regress in Fichte and Hegel would, obviously, require a much more detailed treatment than I can provide here. However, we can use their example as an exploration of this relation in Heidegger's project. Firstly, Heidegger seems to be committed to the full
intelligibility thesis by his rejection of things in themselves. Secondly, Heidegger's ontologisation of Kant (see chapter 1) would also seem to preclude him from drawing the distinction as one between an epistemic and ontological level. In Heideggerian ontological terms, then, full intelligibility would mean full openness to being, in the sense that there is no aspect of being that cannot in principle appear. Again, it should be stressed that this does not mean that all of being appears all of the time but that there is no sphere of being that is in principle inscrutable or constitutively unavailable to Dasein. This, however, as implied above, blocks the second element of Kant's strategy for avoiding regress: in light of 1) the necessary finitude of the human cognitive apparatus, the unconditioned is not merely eliminated altogether but merely located beyond the sphere of experience, that is, 2) in the sphere of things in themselves. Step 2) is unavailable to Heidegger, because he does not posit a sphere of the in-itself beyond experience. Again, formulated in Heidegger's ontological terms, this would mean that we are constitutively open to the self-manifestation of being.

However, around the period in which the attempt to systematically ground being in terms of temporality peters out, Heidegger begins to emphasise more and more the constitutive denial of the intelligibility of a full manifestation of being. Heidegger had early on worked out a conception of truth based on Greek thought which emphasises the coming into unconcealment of entities in their being, and by the end of the late Marburg project Heidegger was already emphasising the other side of the coin, namely the constitutive withdrawal of being into concealment. This constitutive self-concealment of being in accordance with the failure of the full intelligibility thesis, is now said to represent an obstacle to the
appearance of entities as a whole. For example, in a 1929 Heidegger states that “the prevailing of entities as a whole intrinsically strives to conceal itself [Das Walten des Seienden im Ganzen hat in sich selbst das Streben, sich zu verbergen]” (GA 29/30, 51).

In one of many examples, five years later in the context of a discussion of Heraclitus, Heidegger puts the point in the following way:

Being means: to appear in emerging, to step forth out of concealment –and for this very reason, concealment and the provenance from concealment belong to being essentially (GA 40, 87).

In other words, being is constitutively unconcealed (and self-unconcealing), but this implies that it is at the same time constitutively or “essentially” concealed and self-concealing. The constitutive inscrutability that such a (revised) conception of being implies would thus at least open the possibility of a new strategy for approaching the question of the regress mentioned above in more nuanced ways. Specifically, a parallel option to the Kantian strategy of blocking a regress by locating the unconditioned in an inscrutable sphere beyond experience becomes an option. We could thus no longer construct a complete system of the various possible regional manifestations of being based on possible configurations of temporality. At the same time, however, this impossibility would obviate the requirement for an absolutely unconditioned or universal first principle to underpin what manifestations there are.
The constitutive inscrutability of being would thus be the result of the failure to bring being in all its possible manifestations fully into view. One difference between the Heideggerian and Kantian strategies is that the latter conceives of the in-itself in a static manner while the former provides a more dynamic conception. In other words, what is beyond experience for Kant is, so to speak, forever beyond experience, and the boundaries between what is for-us and what is in-itself do not shift. Heidegger’s revised model seems to differ in this regard. Namely, the boundary between what is in principle unconcealed and in principle concealed varies through time.

This move toward a more fluid or historical conception of the boundary of the relation between the concealed and unconcealed raises a host of other problems for Heidegger, chief among which is the question of whether Heidegger manages (or whether it is possible at all) to maintain a transcendental historical enquiry that succeeds in avoiding a historical relativism without falling back into the static, Kantian a-historical conception of the transcendental. Nevertheless, a historicised conception of the transcendental ground based on the constitutive play of concealment and un-concealment of being seems capable of being brought to bear on the first set of criticisms articulated above relating to the underdetermination of entities with respect to their explanatory ground, the potential of temporality to carry out this explanatory function. Bearing in mind the danger of historical relativisation, in this new model, there arises the possibility of shifting some of the constitutive role that temporality previously had with respect to entities to historical factors. For example, Heidegger’s exploration of the mode of being of technology from the 1950s has a much more
nuanced relation to temporality, and Heidegger draws on other elements in his articulation of this mode of being. Similar comments apply to, for example, Heidegger’s explorations of the mode of being of art from the mid-1930s onward or of the mode of being of language from the same period.

The question that arises is, of course, how is the role of temporality in the constitution of these and other modes of being conceived on this later model? Does temporality drop out completely? Or does it continue to play a co-constitutive function? If we were to answer negatively to this latter question, it would appear that we are so far removed from what I described as the late Marburg project that scarcely any continuity between the two could be found. Nevertheless, there are two points that speak against a hasty judgement on this question. Firstly, the fact that Heidegger is still concerned with the articulation of modes of being, as is clear from the examples of technology or art I referenced above, and that he is furthermore concerned with being as such, as is equally clear from his later writings, mean that these later works maintain a similar orientation to what I identified as the main aims of the late Marburg project, namely an articulation of the question of the multiplicity of modes of being in light of the unity of being. Indeed, that these modes of being are to be historically indexed in some manner seems to be the result of difficulties that arose in the late Marburg project, and in this light Heidegger’s later reflections on the issue should be more fruitfully seen as a further development of the late Marburg project rather than its outright abandonment.
Secondly, it is not clear that temporality drops out of the equation altogether. If, as we would expect from the above difficulties, temporality no longer is to play the role of a first principle based on which being could be systematically displayed in all its modes, this does not mean that temporality no longer has any constitutive role to play. On the contrary, in one of Heidegger’s late seminars, from 1962, we still find him claiming that “the sending of being (Seinsgeschick) lies in the extending of time” (GA 14, 27). In terms of the later vocabulary, the “sendings of being” that guide the manifestations of the distinct modes of being is thus in some sense connected to the way that time extends itself. At this stage, however, these sendings are related not to temporality as an ultimate ground or primordial source, but to the constitutive inscrutability of being. It is, in Heidegger’s words, “a sending in which the sending source keeps itself back”. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s conception of the nature of temporality mirrors that which is at the heart of the late Marburg period. In “true time”, Heidegger writes, in the giving of what has been, that is of what is no longer present, the denial of the present manifest[s] itself. In the giving of future, that is, of what is not yet present, the withholding of the present manifest[s] itself. Denial and withholding exhibit the same trait as self-withholding in sending: namely, self-withdrawal” (GA 14, 27).

In other words, the play of concealment and unconcealment of being exhibits a temporal structure which, moreover, is structurally similar to the schematic configurations of the relation between temporal horizons as spelled out in Basic Problems. Thus, it seems that while Heidegger has abandoned a conception of temporality as the original source of the constitution of the being of entities, a
more nuanced understanding of constitution in terms of the interplay between the temporal concealment and unconcealment of being has taken its place. In this sense, while the late Marburg project required, and indeed underwent, several significant modifications in Heidegger's later work in light of the difficulties highlighted above, the problems and themes motivating the project continue into Heidegger's later work. A more detailed examination of the fate of these themes and projects in the later works is required; nonetheless, I have argued, the motives driving the late Marburg project as well as its internal tensions in this manner provide an exegetical entry point into the later work, which should be seen as a taking up an associated approach to the problem of being rather than abandonment of the project.

**Conclusion**

Though the above comments provide rays of light with respect to potentially fruitful future exegetical approaches to the later work, the extent of the changes required with respect to Heidegger's late Marburg project, especially in light of the internal tensions plaguing this project I highlight above, mean that the present thesis ends on a seemingly negative note. Heidegger's late Marburg project, in other words, is untenable in its current form. However, my primary aim throughout the thesis has been to bring some exegetical order to the wilderness of those of Heidegger's in-between texts that are bookended by the well-explored fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* and the works of the notorious so-called Late Heidegger. This, at the same time, I take to be the primary positive contribution of the present thesis. Specifically, I achieve this by
locating Heidegger's works from this period around a central axis represented by the conjunction of two themes that dominate Heidegger's thought in this period. These are the engagement with the question of the unity of the modes of being in light of its regional multiplicity and the engagement with the Kantian project. The latter theme yields both a systematic framing of the problem and a Kant-inspired but ultimately novel method for approaching the former theme. In this sense, I have argued that the texts from this period represent a unified project.

Furthermore, this approach has enabled me to isolate the unstable elements in Heidegger's project, which enables not only to understand the nature of the project itself, but also the specific problems motivating the "Sprung" into the later works. I take this to be the second positive contribution of the thesis. As we have seen, the aforementioned problems to a large extent become visible against the backdrop of a Kantian scaffold. In this light, Heidegger wrote the following in an unpublished note reflecting on his path from a Kant-inspired transcendental conception of being to his later idea of the “truth of being”:

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\text{In-der-Welt-Sein – “wohnen”, “Ek-sistenz”, darf nicht einfach mit dem Transzendentalen der Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung in Zusammenhang gebracht werden, trotzdem der Absprung dahin – in das “Wohnen” in der Warheit des Seyns von “Kant” her vollzogen ist.}^{44}
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\(^{44}\) Re-printed in *Heidegger Studies*, 27, p. 12. The translation reads: Being-in-the-world – “dwelling”, “Ek-sistenz”, should not simply be brought into connection with the transcendental subject-object relation, but nonetheless the leap therein – in the "dwelling" in the truth of being (Seyn) is accomplished on the basis of "Kant".
To return to the conclusions of my thesis in light of the above: My first conclusion was, as stated, that Heidegger attempted to develop a project as a response to the problem unity of being in light of the multiplicity of its modes. Second, I argued that this project was motivated by Heidegger's engagement with Kant, both in the articulation of the problem as well as in the manner of approaching its solution. As should be clear from the above discussion, we can now add a third conclusion, namely, this project fails, for the reasons discussed above. However, I have argued that this failure can nonetheless be viewed as a productive one in the manner in which it sets up Heidegger's later thought. In this sense, the project I sketched above serves as a prolegomena to Heidegger's later works. My final conclusion is thus that, despite its limitations, the project is philosophically interesting and significant for the development of Heidegger's thought.

To come back a point that I raised in my introduction – namely, to what extent is the late Marburg project novel with respect to Being and Time – we can now see how this claim played out during the course of the thesis. Specifically, I stated that the novelty of the project lay in the articulation of being in terms of temporal schemata. Thus, while the idea that temporality is the ultimate horizon for understanding being is not novel, the idea that being should specifically be spelled out in terms of temporal schemata, where each schema underpins a distinct mode of being, is novel to the late Marburg period. The idea of temporal schemata is not just an arbitrary supplement to the thesis of the temporality of being articulated in Being and Time. Rather, the idea of temporal schemata is significant in that it is just what allows Heidegger to spell out how being is
temporal, as I demonstrated in chapters 2 and 5 of the present thesis. Chapter 2 showed how it is the Kantian idea of schematism that Heidegger thinks can plug a crucial gap in the critical system. Namely, schematism is the product of the hidden root that can connect concepts and intuitions. In this sense, for Heidegger schematisation is the ultimate concept formation. Thus even pure concepts, pace Kant, are the product of temporal schemata. In this sense, Heidegger is both able to connect up concept and intuition, or mind and world. The unity of mind and world, which Heidegger calls Dasein or being-in-the-world, is continually asserted in *Being and Time*, it is even made plausible on a phenomenological level, but its ontological grounding is pending. The significance of the idea of schematism is precisely to provide just such a ground.

However, the primary point is, of course, that there are multiple temporal schemata, as is clear from Kant's own discussion. The novel element of Heidegger's version of the schematism doctrine is that each schema is mapped onto a distinct mode of being. My argument for this is contained in chapter 5. We can now characterise this innovation with respect to *Being and Time* more precisely than we did in the introduction. Namely, while *Being and Time* showed that Dasein's understanding of being is temporal, the relevant passages of *Basic Problems* showed that being itself is temporal in its constitution. This is the difference between *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalitaet*, which I explored in this chapter. In other words, while *Zeitlichkeit* is an expression of the manner in which Dasein's understanding of being is temporal, *Temporalitaet* is an expression of the temporality of being itself, which, as I argued, is the main import and the primary innovation that comes in the late Marburg period.
It is, furthermore, precisely this conception of Temporalitaet as temporal schematism that is at the heart of the late Marburg project. The expression of this conception is a focus on the plurality of modes of being. This is so since there is a plurality of temporal schemata, and since each temporal schema maps on to a mode of being. This plurality, in turn, brings into relief the question of the potential unity of this plurality of modes of being. This question is thus central to the late Marburg period, not only because it is in this period explicitly formulated as a question by Heidegger, but also becomes it stems directly from the above innovation in Heidegger’s project. Because the late Marburg project continues the theme of the question of being in light of temporality, there is a certain continuity between it and the Being and Time project. Because, however, the late Marburg project introduces the tools to articulate an answer to the question of being, namely temporal schematism, which in turn leads to its own set of problems and sub-questions, it is at the same time novel with respect to the Being and Time project. The analogy I raised in the introduction is with Kant: while a thoroughgoing critique of metaphysics and determination of the limits of reason had been on the table throughout Kant’s pre-critical project, it was the specific innovations of the Critique of Pure Reason that enabled Kant to carry this problem through and gave it the form that it took. So with Heidegger's temporal schemata: while the question of being was on the table earlier, the late Marburg period allows Heidegger to spell out the answer and in this sense, like Kant's first Critique, and despite its continuities with the preceding works, represents a novel and innovative project in its own right. The primary aim of this thesis was
to spell out the ways in which the late Marburg period produced a novel project, and to assess its plausibility and potential.
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