Burden Sharing: Income, Inequality, and Willingness to Fight

Christopher J. Anderson, Anna Getmansky, Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler

Online Appendix

This appendix reports in detail our data collection methods, provides additional details about our empirical tests, and includes additional tests. Section A.1 provides detailed information about our dataset, and presents correlations between our dependent variable and our independent variables. Section A.2 presents the full regression tables of our main tests. Section 3 includes full results of our robustness tests, and Section A.4 provides more details about the way in which we test the four different explanations for our major findings.

A.1 Data description

A.1.1 Generating the dataset

Our unit of analysis is individual i from country j in survey wave t. We utilize all the World Values Survey waves available so far (the surveys span the period from 1981 through 2013, and cover 98 countries or territorial units1). We use the longitudinal data obtained here http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp (file name 1981_2014 v.18_04_2015.csv). This dataset does not include responses from Sweden in waves 1 and 4, and from the US in wave 4. These countries are included in the European Values Study (EVS) longitudinal dataset, and they were omitted from the WVS longitudinal dataset to allow for easier integration between the WVS and the EVS). We add the responses from Sweden in waves 1 and 4, and the responses from the US in wave

[1] Hong Kong and the Palestinian Authority are also included in the survey.

4 to the WVS longitudinal dataset using the WVS integrated datasets for these waves (WV1_IntegratedData_stata_dta_v_2014_06_17.csv and WV4_IntegratedData_stata_dta_v_2014_06_17.csv, respectively).

Table A.1 below lists all the countries and units included in the WVS waves 1 through 6, the survey years if each country, the percentage of respondents who expressed willingness to fight for their country, and the number of respondents from each country. The Table also presents what percentage of the dataset each country constitutes.

We merged the WVS data with several other datasets to obtain country-level controls. We also control for individual characteristics of the respondents using the information provided in the WVS. We provide description of the controls below.

Table A.1: List of countries and units in WVS waves 1-6.

Country	Survey years	Willingness to Fight "yes" share	Respondents	% of dataset
Albania	1998, 2002	0.76	1,999	0.58
Algeria	2002*, 2013	0.83	2,482	0.72
Andorra	2005	0.41	1,003	0.29
Argentina	1984, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2006, 2013	0.59	6,398	1.85
Armenia	1997, 2011	0.79	3,100	0.9
Australia	1981, 1995, 2005, 2012	0.69	6,174	1.79
Azerbaijan	1997, 2011	0.87	3,004	0.87
Bahrain	2014	0.51	1,200	0.35
Bangladesh	1996, 2002	0.92	3,025	0.88

Belarus	1990, 1996, 2011	0.86	4,642	1.34
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1998, 2001	0.77	2,000	0.58
Brazil	1991, 2006, 2014	0.48	4,768	1.38
Bulgaria	1997, 2005	0.68	2,073	0.6
Burkina Faso	2007	0.85	1,534	0.44
Canada	2000, 2006	0.62	4,095	1.19
Chile	1990, 1996, 2000, 2006, 2011	0.66	5,700	1.65
China	1990, 1995, 2001, 2007, 2012	0.88	7,791	2.25
Colombia	1997*, 1998*, 2005*, 2012	0.73	10,562	3.06
Croatia	1996	0.8	1,196	0.35
Cyprus	2006, 2011	0.79	2,050	0.59
Czech Republic	1991, 1998	0.6	2,071	0.6
Dominican Republic	1996	0.79	417	0.12
Ecuador	2013	0.67	1,202	0.35
Egypt	2001*, 2008, 2013	0.72	7,574	2.19
El Salvador	1999	0.69	1,254	0.36
Estonia	1996, 2011	0.67	2,554	0.74
Ethiopia	2007	0.77	1,500	0.43
Finland	1981, 1996, 2005	0.84	3,004	0.87
France	2006	0.6	1,001	0.29

Georgia	1996, 2009, 2014	0.74	4,710	1.36
Germany	1997, 2006, 2013	0.43	6,136	1.78
Ghana	2007, 2012	0.79	3,086	0.89
Guatemala	2004	0.7	1,000	0.29
Hong Kong	2005, 2013	0.49	2,252	0.65
Hungary	1982, 1998, 2009	0.72	3,121	0.9
India	1990, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2014	0.85	10,124	2.93
Indonesia	2001*, 2006	0.92	3,015	0.87
Iran	2000*, 2007	0.81	5,199	1.5
Iraq	2004, 2006, 2012	0.44	6,226	1.8
Israel	2001	0.8	1,199	0.35
Italy	2005	0.43	1,012	0.29
Japan	1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010	0.26	8,170	2.36
Jordan	2001*, 2007, 2014	0.89	3,623	1.05
Kazakhstan	2011	0.77	1,500	0.43
Kuwait	2014	0.81	1,303	0.38
Kyrgyzstan	2003, 2011	0.78	2,543	0.74
Latvia	1996	0.68	1,200	0.35
Lebanon	2013	0.53	1,200	0.35
Libya	2014	0.71	2,131	0.62
Lithuania	1997	0.68	1,009	0.29

Macedonia	1998, 2001	0.82	2,050	0.59
Malaysia	2006, 2012	0.8	2,501	0.72
Mali	2007	0.88	1,534	0.44
Mexico	1981, 1990, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2012	0.76	10,827	3.13
Moldova	1996, 2002	0.77	3,038	0.88
Montenegro	1996, 2001	0.7	1,300	0.38
Morocco	2001, 2007, 2011	0.83	3,651	1.06
Netherlands	2006, 2012	0.49	2,952	0.85
New Zealand	1998, 2004, 2011	0.63	2,996	0.87
Nigeria	1990, 1995, 2000*, 2011	0.66	6,778	1.96
Norway	1996, 2007	0.88	2,152	0.62
Pakistan	1997*, 2001*, 2012	0.89	3,933	1.14
Palestine	2013	0.66	1,000	0.29
Peru	1996, 2001, 2006, 2012	0.79	5,422	1.57
Philippines	1996, 2001, 2012	0.86	3,600	1.04
Poland	1989, 1997, 2005, 2012	0.82	4,057	1.17
Puerto Rico	1995, 2001	0.73	1,884	0.55
Qatar	2010	0.98	1,060	0.31
Romania	1998, 2005, 2012	0.75	4,518	1.31
Russia	1990, 1995,	0.8	8,534	2.47

	2006, 2011			
Rwanda	2007, 2012	0.75	3,034	0.88
Saudi Arabia	2003*		1,502	0.43
Singapore	2002, 2012	0.81	3,484	1.01
Slovakia	1990, 1998	0.64	1,561	0.45
Slovenia	1995, 2005, 2011	0.76	3,113	0.9
South Africa	1982, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2013	0.65	16,786	4.86
South Korea	1982, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2005, 2010	0.79	7,070	2.05
Spain	1990, 1995, 2000, 2007, 2011	0.49	6,319	1.83
Sweden	1981, 1996, 1999*, 2006, 2011	0.85	5,187	1.5
Switzerland	1989, 1996, 2007	0.71	3,853	1.11
Taiwan	1994, 2006, 2012	0.86	3,245	0.94
Tanzania	2001	0.93	1,171	0.34
Thailand	2013	0.9	2,734	0.79
Trinidad and Tobago	2006, 2011	0.66	2,001	0.58
Tunisia	2013	0.77	1,205	0.35
Turkey	1990, 1996, 2001*, 2007, 2011	0.93	9,289	2.69
Uganda	2001	0.65	1,002	0.29

Ukraine	1996, 2006, 2011	0.73	5,311	1.54
United Kingdom	1998*, 2005	0.62	2,134	0.62
United States of America	1981, 1995, 1999, 2006, 2011	0.69	8,548	2.47
Uruguay	1996, 2006, 2011	0.55	3,000	0.87
Uzbekistan	2011	0.94	1,500	0.43
Venezuela	1996, 2000	0.84	2,400	0.69
Vietnam	2001, 2006	0.96	2,495	0.72
Yemen	2014	0.77	1,000	0.29
Yugoslavia	1996, 2001, 2005	0.73	3,700	1.07
Zambia	2007	0.65	1,500	0.43
Zimbabwe	2001, 2012	0.54	2,502	0.72

Notes: * - Willingness to fight question not included in the survey

A.1.2 Dependent variable

Our main dependent variable is respondents' willingness to fight for their country, measured using their responses to the following WVS question (variable E012 in the longitudinal dataset):

Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?

The possible answers to this question are 'yes' and 'no'. We code the 'yes' answers as 1, and the 'no' answers as 0. Other answers -- 'Missing; Unknown' (0.3%), 'Not asked in survey' (8.6%), 'Not applicable' (0.01%), 'No answer' (2.4%), and 'Don't know' (8.4%)

-- are coded as missing. The overall percentage of missing values is 19.8%, of which 8.6% is due to surveys in which this question is not included.

The percentage of each country's 'yes' answers is in Table A.1. Figure A.1 depicts the distribution of answers over time. This figure shows that 'yes' is the mode answer to the willingness to fight question during this period. There are very small fluctuations, but overall it seems that in each wave the percentage of 'yes' (among the non-missing responses) is above 70%.

Figure A.1: Answers to the willingness to fight question over time



Figure A.2 presents a scatterplot of all countries in all waves. It is particularly helpful for detecting outliers. It easy to see that there is an unusually low percentage of affirmative answers in Japan. Other countries, such as Turkey, have a consistently high percentage of such answers. This suggests that there are time-invariant country-level trends that may affect some of the responses. There are also countries in which the

percentage of 'yes' responses varies over time. For example, Spain experiences a drop in the percentage of 'yes' responses in the fourth wave compared to the third wave. Similarly, over 90% of respondents in Sweden replied 'yes' in the third wave, but this number dropped to below 80% in the sixth wave. This suggests that there are time-varying country-level characteristics that affect these responses.

Figure A.2: Answers to the willingness to fight question by country over time

A.1.3 Main independent variable – individual income

We measure income using answers to the following question:

> *On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what*

group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. (Code one number):

Lowest group *Highest group*

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

We then convert these responses to quintiles by combining the first and the second deciles into first quintile; the third and the fourth deciles into second quintile; the fifth and the sixth deciles into third quintile; the seventh and the eighth deciles into fourth quintile; and the ninth and the tenth deciles into fifth quintile. Based on these quintiles, we create five binary quintile indicators, and use them as variables in our model ($QuintileZ_i$).

The self-reported nature of these income quintiles raises the question of whether they are a valid measure of our variable of interest – income. While we cannot directly ascertain to what extent these answers are accurate and precise, we validate this measure by exploring its correlation with other known correlates of income – education and employment status.

Looking at the correlation coefficients and their statistical significance suggest that the self-reported income deciles are a valid measure of income. There is a positive correlation between being employed full time and reporting higher income (correlation coefficient is 0.17, p-value=0.000). Furthermore, there is a negative correlation between those who identify as unemployed and income quintile (correlation coefficient is -0.10, p-value=0.000). Finally, there is a positive correlation between having a college degree and reporting higher income (correlation coefficient is 0.22, p-value=0.000). Based on the

correlation between self-reported income, education, and employment status, we conclude that self-reported income is a valid measure for individual income.

Income quintile appears to be uncorrelated with willingness to fight. Figure A.3 shows that individuals from different income quintiles are very similar in their willingness to fight. The only statistically significant difference ($p<0.05$) is between the first and the third quintiles, but the substantive difference is negligible (72.1% vs 72.6%, $p=0.03$).

Figure A.3: Willingness to fight and income quintile



A.1.4 Main independent variable – country-level income inequality

Our main measure of income inequality is the Net Gini variable from SWIID (Solt 2009). It ranges between 0 and 1 (originally it ranges between 0 and 100, but we rescale it to make it easier to depict the coefficients). Net Gini measures net-income (post tax) Gini.

SWIID data are available for most countries in the WVS. SWIID inequality data are not available for the following country-years that are in WVS: Montenegro (1996), Russia (1990), Libya (2014), Iraq (2004, 2006, 2012), Saudi Arabia (2003), Kuwait (2014), Bahrain (2014), Qatar (2010), and Palestine (2013). We omit these country-years from our analysis.

In addition, we collect data on gini coefficient from the Luxembourg Income Studies (LIS) Inequality and Poverty Key Figures (http://www.lisdatacenter.org/lis-ikf-webapp/app/search-ikf-figures). There is a very high correlation between Net Gini and the LIS gini coefficient (correlation coefficient is 0.97, p=0.000). There is a somewhat weaker correlation between the Market Gini variable from SWIID and the LIS gini coefficient (correlation coefficient is 0.52, p-value=0.000).

LIS data are available for only 33 countries out of the 96 in the WVS data. Using LIS as our primary measure would have restricted the scope of our analysis. The advantage of LIS is that it is based on household surveys, whereas SWIID is created using multiple imputations. We use the Net Gini from SWIID as our main measure because of the greater coverage that it provides. In some of our robustness checks we use the LIS gini coefficient.

Looking at the correlation between Net Gini and willingness to fight (Figure A.4) suggests that the overall relation appears to be slightly negative, though the Pearson correlation coefficient is statistically not significant. This figure shows that some countries are potential outliers in terms of their Net Gini, and to address this issue in robustness tests we drop country-years with very high and very low levels of inequality (Gini net index below the 25th percentile or above the 75th percentile, respectively). We

also repeat our tests dropping county-years with unusually high and low level of willingness to fight (below the 10th percentile or above the 90th percentile of the country-level Willingness to Fight).

Figure A.4: Willingness to fight and Net Gini



A.1.4 Control variables

We control for a wide range of individual-level and country-level time-varying controls.

Individual-level controls

First, we control for gender, and also focus on estimating our models using answers of male respondents. As we highlights in the paper, gender is especially important in this context because in most of the countries women are exempt from compulsory military service. Males, however, can at least in principle be called to serve even in countries without conscription army. Gender overall is well distributed in our

data, with a slight over-representation of females (the dataset contains 47.6% male respondents, 51.1% of female respondents, and the rest choose not to report their gender). Gender appears to be correlated with responses to the willingness to fight question – female respondents are about 12 percentage points less likely to indicate that they are willing to fight for their country: 66% vs 78%, p-value<0.000 (see Figure A.5).

Second, we control for age and age2. Similarly to gender, individuals who are relatively old may say that they are not willing to fight simply because they do not anticipate being drafted. Figure A.6 presents the relationship between age groups and willingness to fight. The Figure suggests that the willingness to fight is the highest among the youngest respondents (age<18), and the lowest in the oldest age group (age>45) (78% vs 70%, p<0.000), and that in between, the willingness to fight is increasing in age. The minimum age to participate in WVS is 18, but despite this, in our dataset there are respondents who are as young as 13 (2,065 respondents are below 18; most of them -- 1,671 – are 17 years old). In our empirical tests we control for respondent's age, and repeat the analysis only on respondents between the ages of 18 and 45, dropping those who do not expect to take part in a war.

We also control for family status, and distinguish among those who are single, married or living together, and divorces, separated, or widowed. Figure A.7 depicts the percentage of those who are willing and not willing to fight for their country across these three different groups. Married respondents exhibit a slightly higher willingness to fight than single respondents (72% vs 74%), and both of these groups express a higher willingness to fight than divorced, separated, or widowed respondents (64%). The differences among the three groups are statistically significant (p<0.000). Married

individuals may appear to be more willing to fight than others because of other characteristics, such as age, rather than their marital status. Therefore, we do not make any inferences based on these descriptive statistics. We present them here to get a better sense of our data.

Figure A.5: Willingness to fight and gender



Figure A.6: Willingness to fight and age



Figure A.7: Willingness to fight and marital status



An additional individual-level attribute that we control for is religiosity. We distinguish between secular and religious respondents using a WVS question that asks the respondents to indicate their religious denomination (variable F025 in the longitudinal dataset). Possible denominations are Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Jew, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, and Other. It is also possible to respond 'do not belong to a denomination.' We code respondents who name a denomination as religious, and those who indicate that they do not belong to a denomination as secular. Figure A.8 presents the distribution of willingness to fight answers across secular and religious respondents. Respondents who indicate that they do not belong to any denomination are less likely to say that are willing to fight for their country than respondents who indicate religious affiliation (66% vs 74%, $p<0.000$).

In some specifications, we also control for whether a respondents belongs to a linguistic minority group. We focus on language because it is a frequent attribute of ethnicity, and also because thee WVS asks which language respondents speak at home (variable G016 in the longitudinal dataset). We use the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2098.html) to code whether a respondent's language constitutes a minority language. We code minority language as (1) unofficial language; and (2) not one of the two most frequent languages in the country. Figure A.9 presents the differences between minority and non-minority respondents with respect to their willingness to fight for their country. Respondents who speak a minority language at home are slightly more likely to say they are not willing to fight for their country, but the differences are very small. We do not control for this

variable as part of our main regressions because there are many missing values in this variable (22.6% missing) as this question is not included in many surveys.

Figure A.8: Willingness to fight and religiosity



Figure A.9: Willingness to fight and linguistic minority status



Finally, in robustness checks we control for respondents' education level. This is based on variable X025 in the WVS that asks respondents to name their highest educational level that they attained. We do not control for this variable in the main tests because household income is correlated with education (the correlation coefficient between having a university degree and income is 0.3, p-value=0.000). In Figure A.10 we present the distribution of the willingness to fight answers across different levels of education. The figure shows some variation in answers. The overall relationship appears to be positive – respondents with less than elementary education are less willing to fight for their country than respondents with academic degrees. However, the relationship is not monotonic – those with some university education or with academic degrees are slightly more willing to fight for their country than those with secondary education.

Figure A.10: Willingness to fight and education



Country-level time-varying controls

We control for a wide range of time-varying country-level controls. In most cases, these control variables are measured one year prior to the survey. In a small number of cases, where data are not available, we lag by more than one year. For example, the last inequality data for Trinidad and Tobago are available for 2005, while the last WVS survey in that country is in 2011. We use the 2005 inequality data to estimate 2011 responses. For the same reason, we use the 2006 inequality data for Ghana to analyze the 2012 survey. Likewise, analysis of 2014 surveys relies on country-level controls that are more than one year lagged because not all variables are available for 2013.

Figure A.2 above suggests that there are country-level variations in the level of willingness to fight that need to be accounted for. We therefore collect data on a wide range of country-level controls, and include also country fixed effects to account for time-invariant country-level factors.

One variable we control for is regime type, measured using democracy and autocracy scores from Polity IV dataset (policy4v2012.csv file). As we explain in the main text, our democracy score ranges from 0 to 1, and is calculated as

$$Democracy_{j,t-1} = \frac{Democracy\ score_{j,t-1} - \ Autocracy\ score_{j,t-1} \ + 20}{20}$$

Plotting the percentage of respondents willing to fight for their country and country's democracy score suggests that these variables are negatively associated (Figure A.11). Pearson correlation coefficient between democracy score and the share of "yes" in country-year is -0.37, p-value=0.000. However, it seems that this relationship may be driven by several outliers – such as Germany and Japan – that have a high democracy

score and an unusually low rate of willingness to fight. Thus, in our empirical tests we include country fixed effects, and in robustness tests exclude various outliers.

Figure A.11 : Willingness to fight and democracy



Figure A.12 suggests that there may be a country-level positive association between population size and the willingness to fight. This association, however, is mainly due to China and India – two countries with large population and a relatively high level of willingness to fight. In fact, the Pearson correlation coefficient is negative, and statistically not significant (R=-0.01, p=0.86). Nonetheless, we control for population size in our regressions by including the log of population on the right-hand-side of the equation. We obtain data on population size from the Penn World Tables (PWT) dataset, version 7.1.

Figure A.12: Willingness to fight and population size



We also control for country-level GDP using data from PWT 7.1. We calculate GDP by multiplying the –rgdpch- variable by population × 1000 (population is reported in thousands). Looking at the association between GDP and mean willingness to fight in Figure A.13 suggests that there is a negative association, but it may be driven by cases of the US, Japan, and Germany – countries with high GDP and a medium-low level of willingness to fight. This again suggests the importance of including country fixed-effects, and conducting robustness checks by excluding outliers.

Figure A.13: Willingness to fight and GDP



We also control for past participation in conflict. We use the UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset, 1946-2014 (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/UCDP_monadic_conflict_onset_and_incidence_dataset/) and the MID Dataset v4.01 (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/news/mid-data-set-v4-01-available). Using these sources, we code conflict as equals 1 if the respondent's country had an intrastate conflict with above 25 death, or an interstate dispute at hostility level 4 or above in any of the 5 years preceding the survey. Figure A.14 suggests that country's involvement in conflict during five years preceding the survey slightly increases the percentage of those who are willing to fight.

Figure A.14: Willingness to fight and conflict



In addition, we control for whether a respondent's country has a conscription army using data from the CIA World Factbook and from World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service (1 These data are available here: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2024.html, and here: http://www.wri-irg.org/co/rtba/).

Figure A.15 depicts the distribution of willingness to fight in conscription and non-conscription army countries. It suggests that there is a slightly higher percentage of those willing to fight in countries with conscription.

Figure A.15 : Conscription military and willingness to fight



In some of our regressions reported below, we also include country level ethnolinguistic fractionalization computed by Roeder (http://pages.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm). This variable is measured in 1961 and in 1985, but it does not vary by much. Thus, we do not include it in our main estimations, where we use country fixed effect. The inclusion of fixed effects effectively control for this variable. Figure A.16 shows that there is a positive relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1961 and the willingness to fight on behalf of that country. This relationship, however, is barely statistically-significant (Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.13, p=0.07).

Figure A.16 : Willingness to fight and ethnolinguistic fractionalization



A.2 Summary statistics

Table A. 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables we use in our empirical tests.

Table A. 2: Summary Statistics

Variable	**Mean**	**St. d.**	**Min**	**Max**	**N**
Individual-level variables					
Willingness to fight	0.72	0.45	0	1	277,325
Income quintile	2.58	1.17	1	5	312,053
Female	0.52	0.5	0	1	340,825
Age	40.83	16.15	14	99	341,342

Single, never married	0.25	0.43	0	1	340,669
Married or living together	0.64	0.48	0	1	340,669
Divorced, separated, widowed	0.11	0.32	0	1	340,669
Secular	0.18	0.38	0	1	328,570
Linguistic minority	0.26	0.44	0	1	267,499
Country-level variables					
Gini (post tax)	0.38	0.09	0.16	0.59	328,942
Population (in millions)	107.38	245.43	0.83	1,330	341,262
GDP (in millions 2005 $US)	878,705	873,560.2	3,717.45	12,832,781	338,286
Democracy	0.73	0.29	0	1	333,760
Conflict in previous 5 years	0.66	0.47	0	1	343,565
Conscription military	0.64	0.48	0	1	321,195
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF1961)	0.44	0.28	0.003	0.909	288,999

A.3 Full regression results

A.3.1 Main results

In this section, we present the full regression table of our main results. The odd columns in Table A.33 report results of the full sample (male and female respondents), and the

even columns report results based on male respondents. In the paper, we present results based on male respondents only (Table 1). Here, we also add the coefficients of the control variables that we do not report in the paper.

A.3.2 Predicted probabilities based on the full sample

In the paper, we present predicted probabilities for male respondents only (Table 2). Here, we also report predicted probabilities based on the full sample (Column 9 of Table A.3). We use –mimrgns—command in Stata to calculate the predicted probabilities.

The predicted probabilities based on the full sample are in Table A.4. The results show that when the inequality is low, there are no statistically significant differences between the various quintiles of income. In the male sample reported in Table 3 in the paper, when the inequality is set at its minimum level, respondents from quintile 1 were slightly less likely to say they are willing to fight for their country, compared to respondents from quintile 5.

When the inequality is high, the full sample results show a statistically significant difference ($p<0.1$) between quintile 1 and quintile 5, with the poorer individuals more likely to say they are willing to fight for their country. These results are more significant in the male sample ($p<0.01$).

A.3.3 Standard errors adjusted for within-country clustering

In the main text, we present results clustered at sub-national level (Column 5 of Table 1). In Table A. 5, we show that these results are robust for clustering at country-level. The signs, the coefficients, and the significance levels are very similar to the results reported in the main text.

Table A.3**:** Main results

	(1) All	(2) Male	(3) All	(4) Male	(5) All	(6) Male	(7) All	(8) Male	(9) All	(10) Male
Gini	-0.58*	-1.77***	-0.34	-1.68***	-0.97***	-2.53***	-0.56	-2.33***	-0.58	-2.57***
	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.72)	(0.79)
Q1	-0.02	0.00	0.04**	0.03	-0.24***	-0.44***	-0.06	-0.37***	-0.04	-0.37***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Q2	0.00	0.01	0.04***	0.04**	-0.17***	-0.30***	-0.06	-0.20**	-0.06	-0.23**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Q3	0.02	0.02	0.05***	0.04**	-0.08	-0.18**	0.004	-0.08	0.04	-0.07
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Q4	0.02	0.02	0.04**	0.04**	-0.08	-0.19**	-0.06	-0.12	-0.03	-0.13
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Q1 × Gini					0.58***	1.18***	0.26*	1.05***	0.23	1.04***
					(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.27)
Q2 × Gini					0.48***	0.84***	0.27*	0.64***	0.27	0.700***
					(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.26)
Q3 × Gini					0.28**	0.56***	0.13	0.35	0.04	0.20
					(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.27)
Q4 × Gini					0.28*	0.59***	0.26	0.45**	0.20	0.46*
					(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.16)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Female			-0.39***				-0.39***		-0.39***	
			(0.006)				(0.01)		(0.01)	
Age			0.02***	0.01***			0.02***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age^2			-0.00***	-0.00***			-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00
			(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married			0.04***	0.08***			0.04***	0.08***	0.03**	0.07***
			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)

Divorced			-0.07***	-0.04*			-0.08***	-0.04*	-0.09***	-0.04*
			(0.01)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Secular			-0.14***	-0.15***			-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.13***	-0.14***
			(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP (log)			-0.59***	-0.57***			-0.59***	-0.59***	-0.62***	-0.61***
			(0.03)	(0.04)			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Pop (log)			-0.18**	-0.26**			-0.18***	-0.21*	-0.46*	-0.50*
			(0.07)	(0.12)			(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.27)
Democracy			0.12**	0.02			0.12**	0.01	0.34**	0.17
			(0.05)	(0.07)			(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Conflict			0.03**	0.04**			0.03**	0.05**	0.07	0.09*
			(0.01)	(0.02)			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Conscriptio n			0.15***	0.20***			0.15***	0.20***	0.24***	0.26***
			(0.02)	(0.03)			(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Country fe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey fe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered se	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.9***	1.6	21.4***	23.2***	1.1***	1.8***	21.4***	22.9***	27.7***	29.0***
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(1.6)	(2.4)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(1.6)	(2.4)	(4.8)	(5.5)
N	239,232	117,095	216,955	107,605	239,232	117,095	216,955	107,605	198,149	98,288
(countries)	(91)	(91)	(87)	(87)	(91)	(91)	(87)	(87)	(83)	(83)
F	207.80	91.96	209.35	82.27	199.26	88.44	201.77	78.87	92.74	38.09
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$

Notes: The unit of observation is individual. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. Columns (9) and (10) report robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within country. The odd-numbered models include all observations, and the even-number models include only male respondents. All results include country and survey fixed effects.

Table A.4: Predicted probabilities of Willingness to Fight=”yes” – full sample

	(1) Low Inequality				(2) High Inequality			
	Predicted Probability	St. Err.	p>|t|	95% CI	Predicted Probability	St. Err.	p>|t|	95% CI
Q1	0.747	0.035	0.000	[0.678 0.816]	0.706	0.048	0.000	[0.613 0.800]
Q2	0.744	0.034	0.000	[0.677 0.811]	0.709	0.046	0.000	[0.619 0.799]
Q3	0.758	0.033	0.000	[0.692 0.824]	0.697	0.048	0.000	[0.603 0.790]
Q4	0.746	0.035	0.000	[0.678 0.815]	0.703	0.048	0.000	[0.609 0.796]
Q5	0.744	0.035	0.000	[0.675 0.813]	0.676	0.049	0.000	[0.580 0.772]

Notes: This table reports estimates for the full sample of respondents using the results in Column 9 in Table A.3. Predicted probabilities are calculated using the –mimrgns- command in Stata, setting net Gini at its minimum (low inequality) and at its maximum (high inequality), and keeping the other variables at their real values.
There is a statistically significant (90%) difference in high inequality between Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 ($0.706 \neq 0.676$, $p=0.08$). The difference in low inequality is not statistically significant at acceptable levels.

Table A. 5: Main results – standard errors adjusted for within-country clustering

Variable	
Gini	-2.33*
	(1.34)
Q1	-0.37***
	(0.12)
Q2	-0.20*
	(0.11)
Q3	-0.08
	(0.10)
Q4	-0.12
	(0.09)
Q1 × Gini	1.05***
	(0.29)
Q2 × Gini	0.64**
	(0.26)
Q3 × Gini	0.35
	(0.24)
Q4 × Gini	0.45*
	(0.24)
Individual controls	Yes
Country controls	Yes
Country fe	Yes
Survey fe	Yes
Clustered se	Yes
Constant	22.91***
	(8.82)
N	107,605
(countries)	(87)
F	16897.87
Prob > F	0.000

* $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$

Notes: The unit of observation is individual. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors adjusted for within country clustering are in parentheses. These results are based on male respondents only. The individual controls include a gender indicator, age, age squared, three marital status fixed effects, and an indicator for whether the respondent is secular. The country controls include log of population, log of GDP, democracy score, an indicator for whether the respondent's country was involved in a conflict at some point within the five years prior to the survey, and an indicator for whether the respondent's country has a conscription-based military. All results include country and survey fixed effects.

A.4 Robustness tests

A.4.1 Regression tables for predicted probabilities in Table 3 in the paper

Table A.6 presents regression results of our robustness tests. These results are based on male respondents only. Columns 1 and 2 use alternative measures of inequality (LIS Gini index and relative redistribution variable from SWIID, respectively). Column 3 repeats the main estimation in Column 10 in Table A.4, dropping outliers. Outliers are country years with unusually high number of missing values (90th percentile or more), or country years with unusually high or low level of willingness to fight (90th percentile or more and 10th percentile or less, respectively). Column 4 focuses on young males (aged 18-45) in democracies.

Table A.6**:** Robustness checks regression results (male respondents)

	(1) LIS Gini	(2) Relative Redistribution	(3) Dropping outliers	(4) Young males in democracies
Gini	-1.67	0.60	-1.51*	-2.63***
	(1.12)	(0.66)	(0.83)	(0.66)
Q1	-0.49***	0.15***	-0.47***	-0.49***
	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Q2	-0.13	0.13***	-0.19*	-0.35***
	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Q3	-0.03	0.12***	-0.03	-0.18
	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Q4	-0.07	0.10**	-0.07	-0.13
	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Q1 × Gini	1.24***	-0.68***	1.33***	1.50***
	(0.34)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.30)
Q2 × Gini	0.26	-0.50***	0.67**	1.14***
	(0.34)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.29)
Q3 × Gini	-0.01	-0.44**	0.24	0.60**
	(0.32)	(0.18)	(0.28)	(0.28)

Q4 × Gini	0.18	-0.29	0.39	0.49*
	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.30)
Female				
Age	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age^2	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married	0.10***	0.07***	0.06***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Divorced	0.05	-0.04*	-0.06**	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Secular	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP (log)	-0.32	-0.65***	-0.35***	-0.90***
	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Pop (log)	-1.67**	-0.53*	-0.71**	-0.05
	(0.77)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.20)
Democracy	2.12***	0.32**	0.68***	0.811**
	(0.44)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.41)
Conflict	-0.16**	0.06	-0.03	0.13***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Conscription	-0.06	0.26***	0.28***	-0.03
	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Country fe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey fe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered se	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	41.62***	29.89***	25.02***	28.36***
	(15.34)	(5.78)	(6.12)	(3.88)
N	31,023	98,288	77,655	44,714
(countries)	(32)	(83)	(66)	(63)
F		37.43	25.32	53.07
Prob > F		0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$

Notes: The unit of observation is individual, based on male respondents. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. All results include country and survey fixed effects.

A.4.2 Robustness tests (full sample)

Table A.7 presents results of robustness tests using full sample (males and females), and Table A.8 reports the predicted probabilities of these tests.

Table A.7 Robustness checks regression results (full sample)

	(1) LIS Gini	(2) Relative Redistribution	(3) Dropping outliers
Gini	-0.52	0.24	0.69
	(0.89)	(0.61)	(0.78)
Q1	-0.24*	0.07**	-0.16
	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.10)
Q2	-0.05	0.08**	-0.08
	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Q3	-0.03	0.09***	0.04
	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.08)
Q4	-0.10	0.05	-0.05
	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Q1 × Gini	0.76*	-0.14	0.54**
	(0.40)	(0.15)	(0.25)
Q2 × Gini	0.23	-0.19	0.36*
	(0.35)	(0.14)	(0.22)
Q3 × Gini	0.01	-0.19	0.07
	(0.31)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Q4 × Gini	0.44	-0.04	0.29
	(0.32)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Female	-0.37***	-0.39***	-0.41***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.02***	0.01***	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Age^2	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married	0.06***	0.03**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Divorced	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Secular	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.12***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP (log)	-0.05	-0.62***	-0.46***
	(0.18)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Pop (log)			
	-1.51**	-0.47*	-0.73***

Democracy	(0.62)	(0.26)	(0.25)
	2.40***	0.37***	0.80***
Conflict	(0.38)	(0.14)	(0.15)
	-0.14***	0.06	-0.04
Conscription	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
	0.00	0.23***	0.25***
	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Country fe	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey fe	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered se	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	29.65**	27.83***	27.56***
	(12.46)	(5.22)	(5.56)
N	63,196	198,149	156,976
(countries)	(32)	(83)	(66)
F		76.90	54.38
Prob > F		0.000	0.000

* $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$
Notes: The unit of observation is individual. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. All results include country and survey fixed effects.

In Column 1 in Table A.8 (using LIS Gini instead of Net Gini from SWIID), there are statistically-significant differences between quintile 1 and quintile 5 when the inequality is high (the difference between 0.673 and 0.602 is statistically significant, p=0.04). There are no statistically-significant differences between the quintiles when inequality is low. In Column 2 (when we replace Net Gini with Relative Redistribution variable from SWIID), there are no statistically significant differences between quintile 1 and quintile 5 (there are statistically significant differences in the male sample). Our results also hold for high inequality in Column 3, when we drop outliers (countries where the share of missing values is in the 90th percentile or higher; and countries where the percent of willingness to fight is especially low or high – in the 10th percentile or below or in the 90th percentile or above, respectively). There is a statistically-significant difference between quintile 1 and quintile 5, when inequality is high (p=0.01). There is no statistically-significant difference when inequality is low.

Table A.8 - Robustness checks – Predicted probabilities of Willingness to Fight = "yes", based on Table A.7 (full sample)

Inequality	Quintile	(1) *LIS* Gini	(2) Relative Redistribution	(3) Dropping outliers
Low	Q1	0.643 (0.040) [0.564 0.721]	0.715 (0.093) [0.532 0.897]	0.670 (0.045) [0.581 0.759]
	Q2	0.668 (0.038) [0.594 0.741]	0.721 (0.087) [0.549 0.893]	0.681 (0.044) [0.594 0.768]
	Q3	0.679 (0.037) [0.607 0.751]	0.725 (0.088) [0.552 0.898]	0.670 (0.043) [0.614 0.785]
	Q4	0.667 (0.039) [0.592 0.743]	0.699 (0.098) [0.506 0.893]	0.685 (0.045) [0.597 0.773]
	Q5	0.668 (0.041) [0.587 0.749]	0.681 (0.098) [0.487 0.874]	0.682 (0.045) [0.594 0.770]
High	Q1	0.673 (0.065) [0.545 0.801]	0.735 (0.069) [0.598 0.873]	0.806 (0.038) [0.732 0.881]
	Q2	0.631 (0.067) [0.501 0.761]	0.729 (0.069) [0.593 0.866]	0.798 (0.039) [0.722 0.874]
	Q3	0.615 (0.067) [0.483 0.746]	0.732 (0.070) [0.594 0.869]	0.784 (0.041) [0.703 0.865]
	Q4	0.658 (0.065) [0.530 0.786]	0.745 (0.069) [0.609 0.881]	0.793 (0.040) [0.714 0.873]
	Q5	0.602 (0.075) [0.455 0.748]	0.737 (0.068) [0.603 0.872]	0.761 (0.045) [0.674 0.849]
N (countries)		63,196 (31)	198,149 (83)	156,976 (66)

Notes: This table reports the predicted probability of "yes" in response to the willingness to fight question; standard errors are in parentheses, and the 95% confidence intervals are in square brackets. These results use all respondents. All regressions include individual- and time-varying country-level factors, survey wave and country fixed effects, and standard errors adjusted for clustering.

A.4.3 Regression results with additional control variables

In this section, we present regression results controlling for additional individual-level characteristics.

In Column 1 in Table A.9, in addition to the standard controls, we include an indicator of whether a respondent is a college graduate and whether a respondent belongs to a linguistic minority group. To control for college education, we include a dummy variable equal to one if a respondent is a college graduate, and equal to zero if otherwise (we code this variable using responses to question X025 about education attainment). We control for respondents who are member of a linguistic minority group using the variable described above.

In Column 2, we include attitudinal controls using questions from WVS about confidence in government (question E069_11), confidence in the armed forces (question E069_02), and pride of nationality (question G006). As explained in the paper, previous studies report a correlation between these attitudes, and willingness to fight, and we include them here on the right-hand-side of the equation to check if they alter our main findings.

In Column 3, we report regression results without country fixed effects, explicitly controlling for country-level ethnolinguistic fractionalization measured in 1961.

Our main results hold: the poor are less likely to respond affirmatively than the rich when inequality is low, and they are more likely to respond affirmatively than the rich when inequality is high. The differences are statistically significant with $p<0.05$,

except for Column 2 low inequality, when the difference is statistically significant with p=0.056.

Table A.9**:** Robustness checks -- results with additional controls (male respondents)

	(1) Education and minority controls	(2) Attitudinal controls	(3) No country fe + ELF control
Gini	-1.05 (0.92)	-0.23 (0.66)	-2.08*** (0.21)
Q1	-0.43*** (0.11)	-0.29** (0.11)	-0.45*** (0.09)
Q2	-0.20* (0.11)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.51*** (0.09)
Q3	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.26*** (0.09)
Q4	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.10)	-0.17* (0.09)
Q1 × Gini	1.23*** (0.29)	0.85*** (0.30)	1.19*** (0.22)
Q2 × Gini	0.59** (0.29)	0.47* (0.26)	1.28*** (0.22)
Q3 × Gini	0.30 (0.29)	0.28 (0.28)	0.68*** (0.22)
Q4 × Gini	0.47* (0.27)	0.44* (0.26)	0.53** (0.23)
Age	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Age^2	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Married	0.07*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.01)
Divorced	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
Secular	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.21*** (0.01)
College Graduate	-0.05*** (0.02)		
Linguistic minority	-0.18*** (0.03)		
Confidence in government		0.11*** (0.02)	
Confidence in armed forces		0.66*** (0.03)	
Proud of nationality		0.99*** (0.03)	
GDP (log)	-0.51*** (0.12)	-0.54*** (0.08)	-0.09*** (0.01)
Pop (log)	-0.47* (0.28)	-0.03 (0.23)	0.10*** (0.01)
Democracy	0.63*** (0.17)	0.31** (0.13)	-0.44*** (0.03)
Conflict	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03*** (0.01)
Conscription	0.10 (0.08)	0.07 (0.06)	0.26*** (0.01)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF61)			0.35*** (0.03)
Country fe	Yes	Yes	No
Survey fe	Yes	Yes	Yes
Clustered se	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	25.09*** (6.81)	15.98*** (4.71)	2.25*** (0.14)
N (countries)	79,432 (79)	87,071 (81)	90,224 (81)
F (Prob > F)	37.70 (0.000)	56.39 (0.000)	139.08 (0.000)

* $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$

Notes: The unit of observation is individual, based on male respondents. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses.

A.5 Explaining our findings

Table A.10**:** Alternative explanations for the findings -- regression results (male respondents) presents regression results for the predicted probabilities we report in Table 4 in the paper. In Column 1, we test whether poor are more proud of their nationality than the rich when inequality is high. We use the WVS question that asks respondents to indicate how proud there are of their nationality (question G006). The answers range from 1 (very proud) to 4 (not proud at all). We reverse this scale, such that higher values correspond with more pride. Additionally, we rescale the answers to lie between 0 and 1. We then use OLS regression to analyze whether income and inequality are correlated with nationalistic sentiments.

In Column 2, we examine the relationship between income, inequality, and views about necessity of war. We use the WVS question about whether, under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice (question H007). Possible answers are agree and disagree. We analyze this question using a probit model. This question appears only in round 6. Thus we do not include survey fixed effect. In addition, we do not include country fixed effects because inequality is a country level variable, and since we use only one wave, we cannot estimate this model with both inequality and country fixed effects.

Finally, in Column 3, we test whether threat perceptions account for our findings. We want to see whether poor individuals have a higher threat perception than the rich when inequality is high. To test for this possibility, we use the WVS question about whether the respondent is worried that their country may be involved in a war (question H006_03). The possible answers range from 1 (very much worried) to 4 (not at all worried). As before, we reverse the scale such that higher values correspond to higher

levels of concern. Also, we rescale the answers to lie between 0 and 1, and analyze this question using an OLS model. This question appears only in round 6. As with the model in Column 4, we omit fixed effects.

Table A.10**:** Alternative explanations for the findings -- regression results (male respondents)

	(1) Proud of nationality	(2) War necessary to achieve justice	(3) War likely
Gini	0.03	-0.75	0.26
	(0.11)	(0.88)	(0.25)
Q1	-0.03	-0.86***	0.20**
	(0.02)	(0.27)	(0.09)
Q2	-0.02	-0.47*	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.26)	(0.08)
Q3	0.01	-0.51**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.08)
Q4	0.01	-0.37	-0.08
	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.08)
Q1 × Gini	0.10	1.46**	-0.22
	(0.03)	(0.70)	(0.23)
Q2 × Gini	0.03	0.60	0.15
	(0.06)	(0.68)	(0.21)
Q3 × Gini	-0.02	0.79	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.62)	(0.21)
Q4 × Gini	-0.02	0.67	0.27
	(0.05)	(0.61)	(0.20)
Age	-0.00***	-0.00	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Age^2	0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married	0.02***	-0.07***	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Divorced	-0.01	-0.13***	-0.03***
	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Secular	-0.04***	-0.10***	-0.07***
	(0.00)	(0.03)	(0.01)
GDP (log)	-0.02	0.09*	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Pop (log)	-0.13***	-0.01	0.03**
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.01)

Democracy	0.11***	0.09	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.04)
Conflict	-0.01	0.21***	0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Conscription	-0.00	-0.17***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Country fe	Yes	No	No
Survey fe	Yes	No	No
Clustered se	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.92***	-2.06***	1.20***
	(0.31)	(0.57)	(0.12)
N	113,941	29,950	30,608
(countries)	(83)	(42)	(52)
F	112.55	8.05	53.07
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000

* $p \leq 0.1$, ** $p \leq 0.05$, *** $p \leq 0.01$

Notes: The unit of observation is individual, based on male respondents. Quintile 5 is the baseline. Standard errors adjusted for within country clustering are in parentheses.