Did 9/11 Change Everything? Security and Human Rights Trade-offs in International Cooperation

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Abstract

Under what conditions are states more likely to trade-off human rights when cooperating on sensitive areas of international security? We now know that during the post-9/11 period, a number of countries have cooperated with the United States of America on a range of controversial security matters. The clandestine nature of counterterrorism cooperation makes it difficult to study the causes and dynamics of trading off security and human rights in international politics directly. However, one example of these post-9/11 practices (extraordinary rendition) has the advantage of being observable (ex-post), as we can analyse detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available data. This thesis capitalizes on an opportunity to provide theoretically driven and empirically testable answers to questions on the causes and consequences of contentious forms of international security cooperation. What influenced more than a quarter of the world's countries to participate in rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations during the post-9/11 period? What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 Central Intelligence Agency extraordinary rendition, secret detention and interrogation programme? This dissertation focuses on the tension between common and conflicting interests among states and between parties and voters to answer these questions. This thesis provides a substantive contribution to international relations literature by suggesting both which countries are more likely to tradeoff human rights and cooperate with one another on contentious security issues and which domestic environments are most likely to generate the greatest political costs for getting caught. The main findings from this thesis have important policy implications and provide academics and advocacy researchers with new tools for detecting human rights violations and holding states to account where previous efforts have failed due to a lack of evidence.

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1 Introduction

Previous international relations literature proposes that we are more likely to observe cooperation between states with common interests. If both parties agree on the topic under negotiation, cooperation is more likely to be mutually beneficial and less likely to involve either actors making large sacrifices (Jervis, 1978; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). If this is the case, why do we observe states cooperating with one another on a number of issues that they fundamentally disagree on?

A state's decision-making process in a bargaining situation is based on a calculation of the costs and benefits of cooperating versus not cooperating (Altfeld, 1984). In many cases, the costs of not cooperating (or the benefits of cooperating) can overshadow the preferences that a state has on a given issue. For example, during a nuclear disarmament negotiation a party may go into negotiations with an unwillingness to compromise on reducing their production of nuclear weapons. However, if it transpires that declining to cooperate could lead to a reprisal of some kind (e.g. economic sanctions) then they may be more likely to trade-off a preference between the right to nuclear energy and economic stability.

Similarly, a state may be more willing to trade-off their interests if they can secure favors through cooperation. For example, a temporary member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council may be willing to trade-off their preference on the outcome of a particular resolution (ex-ante) and change their vote in order to receive more aid from a permanent member (such as the United States of America (U.S.)). The balance of power between negotiating parties is a crucial aspect as a stronger country can have greater leverage in a bargaining situation; including the ability to manipulate the perception of payoffs for a weaker state (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Zimmerman, 1993; Katzenstein et al., 1998; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008). Therefore, we should be more likely to see country's trading preferences when the country seeking cooperation is a hegemon.

The tension between common interests and conflicting interests should be even more prevalent for those countries that regularly cooperate with one another as

the consequences of cooperation and conflict in one issue area can contaminate other issue areas in international politics (Keohane, 1986).

This thesis contributes to literature on the tension between common interests and conflicting interests by focusing on the causes and consequences of international security cooperation on sensitive issues during the post-9/11 period. One of the most controversial aspects of the War on Terrorism (WoT) includes the human rights violations committed by the U.S. and some of the countries involved. Notable examples include the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib prison (Iraq), Bagram prison (Afghanistan) and Guantánamo Bay (Cuba) by the U.S. Military Officials as well as the alleged torture of civilians perpetrated by British Armed Forces in Iraq (Vulliamy, 2013).

Most shockingly, in late 2005 it was discovered that the U.S. had been running a global rendition network that saw the transfer of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) terrorist suspects to secret detention sites where they faced interrogation and torture (Mayer, 2005). Extraordinary rendition operations used private civilian aircrafts to conceal detainee transfers and were most active between 2001 and 2005. International cooperation in rendition, secret detention and interrogation (RDI) included states hosting CIA secret detention sites; providing airports for rendition flights to rest, refuel and regroup; sharing intelligence during detainee interrogations; and carrying out the arrest, capture, detention and interrogation of detainees on behalf of the CIA (United Nations, 2010). Over 50 countries were suspected of cooperating in these secret counterterrorism operations including a number of established democracies (Open Society Foundations, 2013). Why did so many countries cooperate in rendition when doing so placed their commitment to human rights in jeopardy? What motivated countries such as Canada and Sweden (heralded as the global "gold standard" for human rights promotion) to participate (Brysk, 2009)?

One week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, states around the world faced a decision concerning their allegiance to the U.S. and the WoT – "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists" (Bush, 2001). In the area of international security

and counterterrorism, states frequently have to make a choice between upholding their legal obligations to human rights and strengthening national security. States have to pursue many national security policies in secret in order for them to be effective but when a government has discretion over what information is kept secret, there is the potential for abuse to take place (Colaresi, 2014).

In liberal democracies, the tension between preferences on the rule of law and security will be even greater given the prevalence of institutions and laws that constrain government behaviour and enable citizens to respond to moral and legal concerns. However, when states receive reassurance that cooperation on a sensitive issue will remain secret and the country seeking cooperation is a dominant power, democracies are just as likely to trade off human rights in the name of national security.

Nevertheless, identifying states with common interests on human rights and national security issues is a critical step for international cooperation in clandestine security matters when the costs of being caught include revealing classified plans to an enemy and threatening political survival at home. Countries that view security dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a similar light should not only be cheaper to buy off (and require less persuasion to cooperate in the first place) but should also be less likely to disclose sensitive information that is detrimental to the group since cooperation can be seen to enhance every member's national security.

An interesting implication of international security cooperation on sensitive issues is the extent to which the political costs associated with being caught matter in practice. In theory, we should expect leaders and governments in democratic countries to be punished when it is discovered that they have violated human rights. However, this is not always the case. For example, following the revelation at the end of 2005 that over a quarter of the world's countries participated in the RDI programme, only a small number of democracies have incurred political costs, including electoral defeats. What explains the variation in the political costs of international security cooperation on controversial issues?

Previous international relations literature has established that the public understands that there are times that the government has to operate in secret – and that in exceptional circumstances they face a pragmatic trade-off between security and human rights (Ignatieff, 2005; Colaresi, 2014; Wike, 2016). Accordingly, we should expect the political costs associated with being caught for violating human rights to be greater for those governments whose behaviour contradicts their public positions on human rights and national security to a greater extent.

Consequently, international security cooperation on sensitive issues should be more risky for left of centre governments because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014). This revelation is more likely to cause a grievance among voters who think they share common interests on human rights and security trade-offs with (in this case liberal voters); leading core voters to vote for another left of centre party or withdraw from voting altogether (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003).

Political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party's public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Tomz, 2007). It is essential to take into account the party orientation of a government when considering the consequences of international security cooperation on sensitive issues as the presence of democratic institutions (designed to prevent such behaviour taking place) do not always guarantee that perpetrators will be held to account.

In the first chapter of this thesis, I present a deterministic model that can be used to identify international cooperation in RDI operations using public flight data and information on rendition flight characteristics. The secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation has left previous research on rendition plagued by uncertainty, an absence of data and systematic empirical evidence (Efrat, 2015; Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010). Therefore, before diving into an analysis of the causes and consequences of international cooperation in this sensitive area of international politics, it is essential to establish how many countries cooperated

- and to what extent. My analysis identifies 307 new likely rendition flights and 15 previously unidentified countries potentially involved. This section contributes to a wider discussion within the field of political science that considers how to deal with the issues involved in measuring partially observed processes, such as repression and human rights violations.

The second chapter of this thesis explores why countries participated in the RDI programme. This clandestine security coalition becomes particularly intriguing when we take a closer look at the diverse group of states alleged to have collaborated with the U.S. and consider how core international relations theories fail to fully explain this form of cooperation. I argue that due to the sensitive nature of cooperation required, the U.S. screened countries according to their preferences on human rights-security trade-offs. I use UN General Assembly (UNGA) voting data to measure human rights preferences and find that states with common interests to the U.S. on human rights were more likely to participate. This analysis makes a substantive contribution to the field of international relations by explaining patterns of cooperation under conditions of secrecy and bridges the gap between theory from international security literature and empirical research on rendition.

In the third chapter of this thesis, I explain the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 RDI programme. I argue that the revelation of cooperation in rendition had a disproportionate negative effect for those governments that are expected to prioritise the promotion of civil liberties over national security interests. I use data on party orientation and find that left of centre governments were less likely to be re-elected following this revelation because their behaviour contradicted most with the interests of liberal voters on human rights. This section makes a valuable contribution to the field of international relations by exploring the factors that make cooperation in contentious security operations costlier for states.

In sum, this thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the field of international relations by helping us to understand under what conditions human rights are

more likely to be traded off for national security – and what the consequences are for countries that engage in this enterprise. The clandestine nature of counterterrorism cooperation makes it difficult to study these dynamics directly. However, the practice of extraordinary rendition has the advantage of being observable (ex-post), as we can analyse detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publically available data. This thesis capitalizes on an opportunity to provide theoretically driven and empirically testable answers to questions on the tension between common interests and conflicting interests on sensitive issues in the area of international security. Beyond the topic of rendition, the theoretical arguments and novel rendition flight data developed in this thesis can be used to scientifically evaluate other international security and foreign policy issues. This research can also be useful both for investigative researchers and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) interested in using the findings for advocacy purposes and forecasting which countries are more likely to cooperate with one another on sensitive issues in international security.

2 Measuring Extraordinary Rendition and International Cooperation

2.1 Abstract

Following the launch of the WoT, the U.S. established a global rendition network that saw the transfer of U.S. CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world. There has been considerable debate over how many countries participated in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period, and conventional accounts of foreign complicity suggest that diverse countries were involved, including many established democracies. However, research on rendition has continually suffered from uncertainty, a lack of data, and systematic empirical evidence due to the secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation. In this chapter, I argue that it is possible to study the practice of rendition, unlike many other forms of clandestine security cooperation, as it is partially observable. Specifically, suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths can be tracked using publicly available flight data. This chapter uses the world's largest set of public flight data relating to rendition to estimate cross-country collaboration in RDI activities. The result suggests 307 likely rendition flights and 15 new participating countries beyond the 54 known cases.

2.2 Introduction

At midday on February 17 2003, the Egyptian Cleric and former Militant Islamist Abu Omar, was walking down a street in Milan, Italy when he was stopped by the police and forced into a white van. Inside, the CIA blindfolded and beat him while he was driven to a U.S. airbase in Aviano, Italy and rendered to Cairo, Egypt on a Gulfstream IV Jet (via a U.S. airbase in Ramstein, Germany). Over the next four years he was tortured in secret detention facilities in Egypt on behalf of the CIA (Council of Europe, 2008; Amnesty International, 2009).

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. launched a secret rendition network enabling the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites (All Party Parlia-

mentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). Extraordinary rendition operations used private civilian aircrafts to conceal detainee transfers. They are believed to have been most active between 2001 and 2005, and had the assistance of over a quarter of the world's countries (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013a; Open Society Foundations, 2013). International cooperation in RDI operations included states hosting CIA secret detention sites; providing staging posts for rendition flights to rest, refuel and regroup; sharing intelligence during detainee interrogations; and carrying out the arrest, capture, detention and interrogation of detainees on behalf of the CIA (United Nations, 2010).

How many countries participated in the RDI programme during the post-9/11 period – and to what extent? The most frequently cited account of foreign complicity is the Open Society Foundations (2013) *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition* report, this points to 54 countries (a diverse set of states which included many of the world's established democracies) being involved.[1] However, there has been considerable debate over how many countries participated in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period. For example, the European Parliament and Council of Europe concluded their corresponding investigations into the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners with different lists of countries (in Europe and elsewhere) that they suspected were involved (Council of Europe, 2006a; European Parliament, 2007). Similarly, while Blakeley and Raphael (2013b) identify over 400 "highly suspicious" flight circuits that land in a total of 81 countries across the globe, the United Nations (2010) only include 20 countries in their allegations concerning involvement in secret detention practices in the WoT since 11 September 2001 (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b; United Nations, 2010).

This characteristic is not unique to the task of determining the number of coun-

[1] Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe (Open Society Foundations, 2013).

tries that were involved as there are also conflicting accounts concerning many other details of the WoT RDI programme. For example, during the early years of the WoT, there were reports that thousands of CIA terrorist suspects had been processed through the rendition "system" (Campbell and Norton-Taylor, 2008; Hooper, 2009). Whereas, recent investigations on U.S. RDI operations have only been able to confirm the identity of 131 individuals subjected to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013c; Open Society Foundations, 2013; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). The secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation has left previous qualitative research plagued by uncertainty, an absence of data and systematic empirical evidence (Efrat, 2015; Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010). In addition, many governments have been reluctant to admit to their participation in rendition due to national security concerns or political and legal consequences (Brysk and Safir, 2007).

Together these factors have made it difficult to estimate the countries involved in rendition as well as the number of cases of secret detention during the post-9/11 period. This chapter contributes to a wider discussion within the field of political science that considers how to deal with the issues involved in measuring partly perceptible processes such as repression and human rights violations. Brysk (1994) describes the systematic measurement of complex political processes as "the first critical step" in quantitative research. Recent research in international relations and human rights has continued this call by emphasising the importance of adopting measured and careful analyses grounded in accurate data (Dancy and Fariss, 2017; Fariss, 2014). By revisiting the debate over how many countries participated in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period, and providing a more accurate estimate of international cooperation, this chapter fills a gap in the literature that can facilitate further studies on this topic by academic researchers and human rights practitioners. For example, the data produced by this chapter provide new opportunities for international security researchers to analyse the causes and dynamics of international cooperation under conditions of secrecy hidden by their intrinsic nature.

Beyond extraordinary rendition, these findings might be used to predict future counterterrorism cooperation and evaluate the characteristics of those countries that are more or less likely to engage in similar kinds of repressive behavior in secret. The results can also be useful both for investigative researchers and NGOs interested in using the data for advocacy purposes; particularly those states that have continued to enjoy impunity from their actions due to a lack of evidence.

How can we measure international cooperation in such a deeply sensitive area of international politics? Unlike other forms of clandestine security cooperation, the practice of rendition has the advantage of being observable, as we can analyse suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available flight data. Past attempts to identify and track the aircraft used by the CIA as part of the post-9/11 RDI programme include *The Rendition Project* – headed by Professor Ruth Blakeley, University of Kent and Dr Sam Raphael, University of Westminster. Blakeley and Raphael (2013a) map more than 11,000 individual flights related to rendition and identify more than 60 rendition flights that closely match known dates when prisoners were moved between secret prisons.

However, this analysis only accounts for the transfer of 34 individuals into CIA custody, and leaves a vast gap between the number of confirmed prisoners that were enrolled into the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013a; Open Society Foundations, 2013; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). Also, this method is likely to undercount actual rendition flights, and could be problematic for instances where the identity of individuals subjected to CIA rendition cannot be revealed due to national security concerns.

To overcome these limitations in identifying rendition flights and the countries likely involved, I apply data pre-processing methods to the Rendition Project Database of flights (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b). I build a Rendition Flight Specification Model based on the characteristics of confirmed high profile detainee renditions and estimate binary outcomes for more than 11,000 flights related to rendition. My results suggest an additional 307 rendition flights that are identical in every observable way to known renditions and 15 previously unidentified

countries. This research shows how systematic empirical analysis of international cooperation in post-9/11 RDI operations is possible using public flight data, and provides a more general foundation for research to measurement challenges on international security and human rights events.

2.3 Data and Methods

The Rendition Project database represents the world's largest collection of public flight data possibly related to rendition, comprising 11,000 individual flights landing in 136 countries for the period 2001–2012 (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b). Blakeley and Raphael (2013a) compile their dataset by gathering flight data from several European intergovernmental investigations, government and parliamentary inquiries, NGOs and investigative journalists. The original data result from numerous Freedom of Information requests made to air navigation organisations (such as Eurocontrol and the Federal Aviation Agency) showing the flight plans of aircrafts suspected of being used for extraordinary rendition purposes. Every flight within the dataset contains information on the aircraft; flight route; companies involved in each journey; and suspected detainees onboard (see Appendix 2.1). By producing an interactive flight database that visualizes the flight path of every flight in the dataset on a world map, Blakeley and Raphael (2013a) utilize the data to identify more than 60 rendition flights that closely match known dates when prisoners were moved between secret prisons. This process tracing analysis has been underpinned by a range of primary material including prisoner testimonies, declassified documents, flight records, company invoices,and court documents (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013a). This chapter looks beyond this limited number of flights to uncover further flights within the dataset that share the same characteristics of known renditions but where the transfer of a detainee is unknown (due to the secret nature of these operations).

While the data are dyadic and record a flight between two airports, international cooperation in rendition is best understood in terms of rendition circuits.[2]

[2]A flight circuit captures the aircraft's journey from start to finish and is made up of several individual flights where each leg represents a single flight from a departure airport to an arrival airport, and flights are considered part of the same flight circuit that took place on the same aircraft, on the same day (+/- 1 day).

Due to the limited size of the private civilian aircrafts used by the CIA, rendition operations tended to include a series of flights where aircrafts could rest, refuel and regroup (commonly in Western Europe) during a long journey from the U.S. to secret detention sites located in Eastern Europe, North Africa and Asia (Open Society Foundations, 2013). Despite a detainee only being onboard the aircraft for one or two legs of the circuit, the detainee transfer would not be possible without these additional flights, as explicitly stated in the UN's model of international counterterrorism cooperation in secret detention (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: International Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation Post-9/11.

(a) Hosting Central Intelligence Agency secret detention facilities
(b) Assisting with the arrest, capture, detention and interrogation of detainees
(c) Sending or receiving intelligence or interrogation questions
(d) Providing staging posts for rendition flights to rest, refuel and regroup

Source: (United Nations, 2010).

The dependent variable in the analysis is binary, namely whether a flight is likely to be a rendition flight or not. The proposed model is deterministic and assigns degenerate probabilities to each flight within the dataset, based upon its similarity to confirmed high profile detainee renditions.[3] Flights are classified as likely rendition flights (i.e. 1) if they demonstrates all of the typical characteristics of a rendition flight listed in Table 2.2 and are classified as likely non-rendition flights (i.e. 0) if they fail to satisfy any one of these conditions (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013d; Council of Europe, 2008; European Parliament, 2006a; Open Society Foundations, 2013; Raphael et al., 2015; United Nations, 2010). This conservative appoach builds upon previous research on extraordinary rendition and directly correspond to the structural qualities of known rendition flights that can be observed using public flight data.

First, a flight must land within close proximity to a confirmed CIA secret detention site after September 11 2001. Second, the circuit must also include a

[3]This group of flights necessarily includes detainee renditions that have been at the center of a major inter-governmental investigation into rendition or high profile legal case linking the aircraft to a confirmed detainee transfer (American Civil Liberties Union, 2007; Council of Europe, 2008; European Parliament, 2006a; Redress, 2014; United Nations, 2010).

Table 2.2: Rendition Flight Specification Model (Dummy Variables).

(a) Flight lands within close proximity to a confirmed Central Intelligence Agency secret detention site
(b) Flight lands at a well-known staging post during the circuit
(c) Aircraft has been previously used during past renditions of detainees
(d) Flight lands at Washington Dulles International Airport during the circuit

flight to a well-known staging post where previous flights connected to a high profile detainee rendition landed at in order for the aircraft to rest, refuel and regroup. Third, the aircraft flight registration number must also have been used during high profile detainee renditions in the past (Open Society Foundations, 2013; United Nations, 2010). Finally, the circuit must also include a flight that landed at Washington Dulles International Airport, where confirmed high profile detainee rendition circuits typically began and completed their journey in order to pick up and drop off rendition teams (see Appendix 2.2 for the content of all the covariates) (Council of Europe, 2008; Shane, 2005).

This objective framework differs from previous research on rendition in avoiding reliance on speculation and circumstantial evidence to identify rendition flights (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013a). For example, this measurement model does not require a flight to match known dates when prisoners were moved between secret prisons that could result in over fitting. There are many security reasons other than rendition that the CIA may wish to contract a private civilian aircraft for; moreover, luxury aircrafts are also routinely booked by corporate and private clients for a range of personal and business purposes.

I use matching to preprocess the public flight data and measure extraordinary rendition. Flights are matched on exactly the same values of the covariates outlined in the Rendition Flight Specification Model in Table 2.2 and discarded if they do not exhibit any of these features. The matched dataset is divided into treatment and control groups, whereby flights assigned to the treatment include the 61 rendition flights identified by Blakeley and Raphael (2013a) and flights assigned to the control include new flights identified by this chapter (Ho et al., 2007).

The particular algorithm for matching that has been selected for this analysis is exact matching; which ideally finds multiple matches within the Blakeley and Raphael (2013b) dataset on all of the individual variables contained within the Rendition Flight Specification Model (Morgan and Harding, 2006). Flights within the control group are identical in every observable way to their confirmed rendition flight counterparts within the treatment group (Gu and Rosenbaum, 1993). This approach represents the first attempt to systematically quantify the uncertainty of identifying rendition flights during the post-9/11 period.[4]

2.4 Results

The results support the idea that confirmed high profile rendition flights share measureable common characteristics that enable us to predict the likelihood of other previously unconfirmed rendition flights. The results from the model are shown in Table 2.3 and suggest 307 new likely rendition flights within the Rendition Project Database and 15 previously unidentified participating countries.

Table 2.3: Results from Matching.

Sample sizes							
				Control		Treated	
All				10916		61	
Matched				1218		61	
Discarded				9698		0	
Matched sample sizes							
Subgroup	Treated	Control	Total	Detention	Staging	Aircraft	Washington
1***	43	307	350	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2	10	83	93	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
3	4	155	159	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
4	1	32	33	Yes	No	Yes	No
5	3	641	644	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

***, subgroup containing those flights most likely to be rendition flights.

Successful matches are found for 1218 observations while 9698 units are discarded due to their distinct dissimilarity to the 61 previously identified rendition flights. The successfully matched sample is then disaggregated into five subgroups. Previous unidentified rendition flights (control group) share the exact values on

[4]Specifically, I use matching as a data pre-processing procedure. Unlike many studies that use matching as a pre-processing procedure for causal inference to ensure balancing on the observed covariates, I use it to set specific criteria to identify flights that have the same characteristics as known rendition flights. Although matching could potentially produce the same information as a truth table, it also provides valuable additional information such as the likelihood that each flight will meet these conditions. For instance, since the values of all the covariates are binary, this process produces five categories with varying degrees of similarity from Subgroup 1 (most similar) to Subgroup 5 (least similar); the procedure can also be easily used for replication.

each of the covariates to confirmed rendition flights (treatment group) within the same subgroup (see Table 2.3). I interpret flights in the first subgroup as most likely to be rendition flights given that they meet all of the conditions outlined in the Rendition Flight Specification Model. Flights within the second subgroup satisfy all but the fourth indicator, that is, a flight within the same circuit landing at Washington Dulles International Airport.[5] Flights within the third subgroup meet every requirement outlined in the Rendition Flight Specification Model except for landing at well-known staging posts where rendition flights in the past had landed to rest, refuel and regroup.[6] Flights within the fourth subgroup only demonstrate half of the characteristics outlined in the Rendition Flight Specification Model, that is, a flight landing in a secret detention site and taking place on an aircraft used during past renditions. Finally, flights within the fourth subgroup fail to satisfy the most important condition, namely landing in a secret detention site. Figure 2.1 represents the distribution of the various subgroups in the analysis over the period 2001–2012.

Matching Stage '0' represents the distribution of flights over time in the original dataset prior to matching. Matching Stage '1' represents the first actual stage of matching and includes only those flights which satisfy the first condition within the model, requiring a potential rendition flight to land within close proximity to a confirmed secret detention site. This stage discards 9712 flights from the matching model but still includes flights that run from each of the annual extremes of the dataset. Next, Matching Stage '2' reduces the distribution of flights over time from 2001–2007 and discards 354 flights from the model that do not satisfy the first and second condition outlined in the Rendition Flight Specification model requiring a flight to land within close proximity to a confirmed secret detention site and land at a well-known staging post used during past renditions. Accordingly, Matching Stage '3' includes those flights which land at a secret detention site,

[5]While these flights shall not be taken into consideration, it is entirely possible that aircrafts may not have had a chance to return to their home bases between rendition operations or that rendition teams allegedly based in Washington Dulles International were already stationed in the field (Reprieve, 2012).

[6]Accordingly, many of these flights include journeys directly from Washington Dulles International Airport to secret detention sites such as Guantánamo Bay. One can consider many security reasons as to why private civilian aircraft might have been contracted to such destinations aside from detainee transfers – including the sending of CIA interrogators to secret detention facilities.

Figure 2.1: Distribution of Flights During Each Stage of Matching.



Matching Stage 0 represents the original dataset prior to matching, while matching Stages 1–4 represents each phase of matching.

also land at well-known staging post used during past renditions, and take place on an aircraft contracted by the CIA for rendition purposes. This third stage of matching discards 468 flights from the model and reduces the distribution of flights within the dataset overtime from 2001–2006. Finally, the fourth stage of matching includes the 350 flights contained in Subgroup 1 that satisfy every covariate within the Rendition Flight Specification Model (including that a flight within the circuit also landed at Washington Dulles International Airport). This final stage of matching discards 93 flights from the model. This indicates that the most likely rendition flights were confined to the period 2001–2005 with majority taking place between 2003 and 2004. These findings tell a story that is consistent with the historical events that took place during the early years of the WoT (see Figure 2.2).

For example, we should expect few flights in 2001 compared to subsequent years, since rendition operations did not officially start until the end of 2001 after

Figure 2.2: Distribution of Identified Rendition Flights.



the 9/11 attacks (Fitzpatrick, 2003). The increase of flights in 2002 coincides with the presidential authorisation permitting the CIA to use enhanced interrogation techniques on detainees (Andrew and Tobia, 2014). Similarly, the peak around 2003 and 2004 coincides with the U.S. Justice Department drafting a memo authorising the CIA to transfer detainees out of Iraq for interrogation (Radnofsky, 2008). Moreover, the drop in flights in 2005 follows the release of the "Torture Memos" in 2004 that provided the legal basis for approval of the mistreatment of detainees during the WoT (Allen and Priest, 2004). In 2006, the CIA secret prisons were closed and prisoners were transferred to Guantánamo Bay or in some cases released (Cornwell, 2006). This finding links patterns in rendition flights to the U.S. government's need for support from global public opinion to obtain successful international cooperation on other areas (Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010).

By tracking the flight paths of suspected extraordinary rendition aircrafts, one can analyse all of the flights within a circuit; including those that facilitate the refueling of an aircraft before and after the transfer of a CIA terrorist suspect to

a secret detention site where they face the risk of torture (see Figure 2.3). Figure 2.3 maps the frequency of rendition circuits by countries based on the identified likely rendition flights in Subgroup 1.

Figure 2.3: Frequency of Rendition Circuits.



Frequency of Flights, with Darker Shades Indicating Higher Values, and White for Countries not Identified by the Analysis (Excluding the U.S.).

The most frequently visited secret detention sites within Subgroup 1 include 96 flights that land in Kabul between 2002 and 2005. This is not surprising since several CIA secret prisons were reportedly established within close proximity to Kabul International Airport after the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in October 2001 (Reprieve, 2015). After Afghanistan, the next five secret detention sites that receive the greatest amount of likely rendition flights are located in Amman, Jordan (65 flights), Cairo, Egypt (43 flights), Rabat, Morocco (37 flights), Baghdad, Iraq and Tashkent, Uzbekistan (both 28 flights each). All of these flights take place between 2001 and 2005, in line with previous research on rendition, which claims that, the CIA frequently outsourced interrogations to detention facilities within these countries (Irish Times, 2007; Urry, 2014). See Appendix 2.3 for the full country list of rendition flights.

On the other hand, countries that received the greatest number of flights within a rendition circuit (beyond the aforementioned countries where secret detention sites were located and the U.S.) include Cyprus, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the UK. Such countries have been at the center of high profile governmental inquiries and investigations on state complicity in rendition (All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; State Watch, 2009). See Appendix 2.4 for the full country list of rendition circuits.

The UN's model of international cooperation in rendition post-9/11 in Table 2.1 demonstrates that state participation in the RDI system was far from uniform and involved countries participating in a varying number of ways. Figure 2.4 display two examples of new rendition flight circuits identified by the matching model which pass through Norway (red circuit) and Kazakhstan (blue circuit).

Figure 2.4: Example of New Rendition Circuits.



During mid-September 2005, flight data relating to the Norway circuit records a previously used rendition aircraft, with the tail number N248AB, flying from Miami, U.S. to one of the CIA's most famous detention sites located in Guantánamo Bay. The aircraft is then observed flying to a frequently used staging post in Shannon, Ireland, before landing in Kabul, Afghanistan where a number of confirmed CIA secret prisons were located. The next day, the aircraft is then observed flying straight to Bergen, Norway before heading back to Washington, DC, US. On the other hand, flight data related to the Kazakhstan circuit document the same previously used rendition aircraft, with the tail number N248AB,

completing a return flight from Teterboro, New Jersey, U.S. to Toronto, Canada before departing from Washington, U.S. during mid-October 2003 and flying to the same staging post based in Shannon, Ireland. The aircraft is then recorded as landing in Baghdad, Iraq and finally Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The identification of 15 new countries potentially involved in this secret rendition network, could have important implications for the concerned states if it is proven that they knowingly participated in or condoned rendition.[7] While the secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation imposes serious constraints on being able to externally validate these key findings with high degrees of certainty, triangulating new results with reliable qualitative evidence is a crucial step. I shall demonstrate this point by presenting two examples of how novel results from the data can be cross-verified with findings from a robust selection of sources. For example, while there have been no formal allegations made against Qatar, a substantial body of qualitative reports allege that a CIA secret detention site was located in the country. As a key participant in Operating Enduring Freedom, Qatar is known to have offered the U.S. and its allies use of the Al Udeid Airbase – where detainees were reportedly imprisoned in secret and interrogated (Mayer, 2005).

On the other hand, despite public opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, a number of news sources have revealed that the U.S. and France regularly cooperated in secret during the WoT. This included the establishment of a covert intelligence center in 2002 in Paris that tracked the movement of terrorist suspects and organized operations to capture them (Priest, 2005a). In addition, a criminal investigation was opened in 2005 following a complaint that two aircrafts had landed in France suspected of transporting CIA prisoners. The investigation concluded with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs explaining that they could not exclude the possibility that CIA flights had landed on French soil (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, 2009). France was also one of thirteen governments who maintained administrative silence during an investigation

[7] Brazil, Dominican Republic, France, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Qatar, Senegal, Seychelles, South Korea, Tajikistan, and Tunisia (see Appendix 2.4).

that used the right of access to enquire about the landing of flights associated with extraordinary rendition (Reprieve and Access Info, 2011).[8] This brief exercise demonstrates the valuable contribution that this chapter makes towards our understanding of international cooperation in RDI beyond the known 54 cases, when its inferences are coupled with credible qualitative evidence.

2.5 Discussion and Conclusion

How many countries participated in the RDI programme during the post-9/11 period – and to what extent? The clandestine nature of counterterrorism cooperation makes it difficult to study this directly, and previous research on rendition has continually suffered from uncertainty and a lack systematic data and empirical evidence. This chapter provides a unique contribution to a wider discussion within the field of political science that considers how to deal with the issues involved in measuring partially observed processes, such as repression and human rights violations (Brysk, 1994; Dancy and Fariss, 2017; Fariss, 2014). I seek to overcome these common challenges by creating a deterministic model to identify international cooperation in extraordinary rendition. Despite its secret nature, potential international cooperation in rendition can be measured using publicly available flight data and information on flight characteristics. This provides an ideal opportunity to expand our understanding of international cooperation in sensitive areas of international politics and empirically test relevant theoretical arguments.

In addition to the 61 previously identified rendition flights and 130 individuals confirmed to be subjected to CIA detention and interrogation during the post-9/11 period (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013c; Campbell and Norton-Taylor, 2008; Hooper, 2009), there are likely to be many more detainees possibly unaccounted for. My analysis identifies 307 new likely rendition flights and 15 previously unidentified countries potentially involved. This provides a new and improved rendition indicator that can be used to scientifically evaluate international security and foreign

[8]The majority of these countries are known to have been involved in RDI operations; Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Cape Verde, Georgia, France, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Russia, Spain, and Turkey (Open Society Foundations, 2013)

policy issues, as well as a template for how challenging international politics and human rights events can be studied using insight from matching data mining analyses.

However, the conservative research design adopted in this chapter warrants further discussion. For example, while the deterministic approach of measuring extraordinary rendition and international cooperation (that assigns a degenate distribution to the probability of a flight being a rendition flight) reduces the likelihood of overcounting rendition flights, it runs the risk of undercounting them instead. For example, any flight in the (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b) dataset that does not meet every condition outlined in the rendition flight specification model (Table 2.2) is automatically excluded from being considered as a likely rendition flight. This strict criteria results in 30% of previously confirmed rendition flights recieving the incorrect classification (i.e. non-rendition flights). While the structural differences between these flights in the data (displayed in Table 2.3) are described within the text, the deterministic approach prevents a deeper consideration of those flights that fail to satisfy just one or two of the typical characteristics of a rendition flight. Moving forward, I would like to extend this research by using a proabilistic method (such as propensity score matching) to measure extraordinary rendtion and international cooperation. This process would assign probabilities to all flights between 0 and 1 and enable us to evaluate the degree to which flights within the dataset are more or less similar to previously confirmed rendition flights.

2.6 Appendicies

Appendix 2.1: New Flight Data Variables.

Variable	Description
Flight identification (ID):	Unique flight ID
Flight registration:	Aircraft registration number
Year:	Year that the flight took place
Date:	Date of flight
Date maximum:	Only circuit start and end dates are given
Departure time:	Flight departure time
Arrival time:	Flight arrival time
Departure ICAO[9]:	ICAO code for departure airport
Arrival ICAO:	ICAO code for departure airport
Departure country:	Country that the flight departs from
Arrival country:	Country that the flight arrives in
Departure city:	City that the flight departs from
Arrival city:	City that the flight arrives in
Departure airport:	Airport that the flight departs from
Arrival airport:	Airport that the flight arrives in
Circuit ID:	Unique Circuit ID
Circuit code:	Unique Circuit ID (flight registration-circuit start-circuit end)
Circuit continues:	Flight directly continues from previous flight (dummy variable)
Circuit total:	Total number of flights in the circuit
Circuit start:	Start date of the circuit
Circuit end:	End date of the circuit
Parallel flight*:	Inconsistencies in flight data
Circuit category*:	Classification of rendition circuit
Circuit notes*:	Additional comments on flight
Flight notes*:	Additional comments on circuit
Detainees*:	Detainees suspected to be on board flight
Companies*:	Corporations suspected to be involved in flight
Source*:	Source where the flight data originates
Detention site:	Flight lands in close proximity to a secret detention site (dummy variable)
Staging actual:	Flight lands at a frequently used staging post for renditions (dummy variable)

Staging post:	Circuit contains flight that lands at a frequently used staging post (dummy variable)
Rendition aircraft:	Aircraft previously used for rendition purposes (dummy variable)
Washington actual:	Flight lands at Washington Dulles International Airport (dummy variable)
Washington Dulles:	Circuit contains flight that lands at Washington Dulles International Airport (dummy variable)
Known rendition:	Flight identified by Blakeley and Raphael (2013b) as a rendition flight (dummy variable)
Non-rendition:	Flight identified by Blakeley and Raphael (2013b) as non-rendition flight (dummy variable)
Rendition flight:	Flight identified by my analysis as a rendition flight (dummy variable)
Rendition circuit:	Circuit contains a flight identified by my analysis as a rendition flight (dummy variable)

*Variable constructed by Blakeley and Raphael (2013b).

[9]International Civil Aviation Organization.

Appendix 2.2: Rendition Flight Specification Model Covariate Content.

Secret detention site			
ICAO[10] code	Airport	City	Country
OAKB	Kabul International	Kabul	Afghanistan
OAIX	Bagram Air Base	Bagram	Afghanistan
OAKN	Kandahar	Kandahar	Afghanistan
LQSA	Sarajevo International	Sarajevo	Bosnia and Herzegovina
LQTZ	Tuzla International	Tuzla	Bosnia and Herzegovina
MUGM	Leeward Point Field	Guantánamo Bay Naval Station	Cuba
HDAM	Djibouti-Ambouli	Djibouti	Djibouti
HECA	Cairo International	Cairo	Egypt
HAAB	Bole International	Addis Ababa	Ethiopia
GBYD	Banjul International	Banjul	Gambia
ORBI/ORBS	Baghdad International	Baghdad	Iraq
OJAI/OJAM	Queen Alia International/Amman-Marka International	Amman	Jordan
HKJK	Jomo Kenyatta International	Nairobi	Kenya
HLLT/HLLM	Tripoli International/Mitiga	Tripoli	Libya
EYVI	Vilnius International	Vilnius	Lithuania
GMME	Rabat-Salé	Rabat	Morocco
OPRN	Benazir Bhutto International	Islamabad	Pakistan
OPKC	Jinnah International	Karachi	Pakistan
EPSY	Szczytno-Szymany International	Szymany	Poland
LRBS/LROP	Băneasa International/Henri Coandă International	Bucharest	Romania
VTBD	Don Mueang International	Bangkok	Thailand
UTTT	Tashkent International	Tashkent	Uzbekistan

OYSN	Sana'a International	Sana'a	Yemen
Staging Post			
ICAO code	Airport	City	Country
UBBB	Heydar Aliyev International	Baku	Azerbaijan
LCLK	Larnaca International	Larnaca	Cyprus
LKKV	Karlovy Vary International	Karlovy Vary	Czech Republic
LKPR	Ruzyně International	Prague	Czech Republic
EDDF	Frankfurt am Main International	Frankfurt	Germany
ETAR	Ramstein Air Base	Ramstein	Germany
LGAV	Eleftherios Venizelos International	Athens	Greece
BIKF	Keflavik International	Reykjavík	Iceland
EINN	Shannon	Shannon	Ireland
LIRA	Ciampino	Rome	Italy
RJBB	Kansai International	Osaka	Japan
EPWA	Warsaw Chopin	Warsaw	Poland
LPAZ	Santa Maria	Vila do Porto	Portugal
LPPR	Francisco de Sá Carneiro	Porto	Portugal
LRTR	Timişoara Traian Vuia	Timişoara	Romania
FSIA	Seychelles International	Mahe Island	Seychelles
LEPA	Palma De Mallorca	Palma de Mallorca	Spain
LTAG	İncirlik Air Base	Adana	Turkey
EGPK	Glasgow Prestwick Airport	Glasgow	UK
FJDG	Diego Garcia Naval Support Facility	Diego Garcia	UK
EGGW	London Luton	London	UK
OMDB/OMDM	Dubai International/Al Minhad Air Base	Dubai	United Arab Emirates
Rendition aircraft			

[10]International Civil Aviation Organization.

Aircraft registration	Aircraft type	Companies
N63MU	Gulfstream IV	Airborne/First Flight, International Group, Baseops International, Universal Weather and Aviation
N288KA	Gulfstream III	Air Castle, Kookabura Air, Worldwide Jet Charter
N85VM	Gulfstream IV	Assembly Point, Richmor Aviation, Air Routing International
N379P	Gulfstream V	Bayard Foreign Marketing, Premier Executive Transport Services, Aerocontractors, Jeppesen Dataplan
N724CL	Boeing 727	Classic Limited Air/Clay Lacy Aviation, Universal Weather and Aviation
N248AB	Gulfstream IV	Gulfstream Acquisitions, Prime Jet
N614RD	Gulfstream IV	International Group, Universal Weather and Aviation
N313P	Boeing 737	Keeler and Tate Management, Premier Executive Transport Services, Stevens Express Leasing Inc, Aerocontractors, Jeppesen Dataplan
N829MG	Gulfstream III	Presidential Aviation International, Universal Weather Aviation
N308AB	Gulfstream IV	Prime Jet, Baseops International, International Trip Planning Services
N982RK	Gulfstream III	Richmor Aviation, Air Routing International
N787WH	Boeing 737	Southern Aircraft Services Inc, United States Aviation Company, Victory Air Transport, Baseops International

N1HC	Gulfstream V	United States Aviation Company, Air Routing International

Washington Dulles International Airport			
ICAO code	Airport	City	Country
KIAD	Washington Dulles	Washington	United States

Sources: European Parliament (2006a); American Civil Liberties Union (2007); Council of Europe (2008); United Nations (2010); Blakeley and Raphael (2013d); Open Society Foundations (2013); Redress (2014).

Appendix 2.3: Country List of Rendition Flights.

Country	Frequency	Year (minimum)	Year (maximum)
Afghanistan	96	2002	2005
Albania	2	2004	2004
Algeria	3	2003	2004
Azerbaijan	4	2003	2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	2003	2004
British Indian Ocean Territory (UK)	3	2002	2004
Cuba	27	2002	2005
Cyprus	18	2002	2004
Czech Republic	14	2003	2004
Djibouti	11	2003	2004
Dominican Republic	1	2004	2004
Egypt	47	2001	2004
Ethiopia	1	2005	2005
France	1	2005	2005
Gambia	2	2002	2002
Georgia	1	2002	2002
Germany	64	2001	2004
Greece	6	2001	2002
Indonesia	1	2002	2002
Iraq	28	2003	2005
Ireland	21	2002	2005
Italy	6	2002	2004
Japan	2	2002	2003
Jordan	65	2001	2005
Kazakhstan	1	2003	2003
Kenya	4	2003	2003
Kuwait	1	2003	2003
Libya	22	2003	2005
Malta	1	2004	2004
Morocco	37	2002	2004
Norway	1	2005	2005
Pakistan	17	2001	2004
Poland	20	2002	2003
Portugal	21	2002	2005
Romania	8	2003	2004

Senegal	1	2003	2003
Seychelles	2	2004	2004
South Korea	1	2003	2003
Spain	16	2004	2005
Sri Lanka	3	2003	2003
Sweden	2	2001	2001
Thailand	6	2002	2004
Tunisia	2	2004	2004
Turkey	3	2002	2003
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	6	2002	2004
United Arab Emirates	15	2002	2004
United Kingdom	28	2001	2005
United States	26	2001	2005
Uzbekistan	28	2001	2003

Appendix 2.4: Country List of Rendition Circuits.

Country	Frequency	Year (minimum)	Year (maximum)
Afghanistan	96	2002	2005
Albania	2	2004	2004
Algeria	8	2001	2004
Austria	2	2002	2002
Azerbaijan	11	2002	2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4	2003	2004
Brazil*	3	2004	2004
British Indian Ocean (UK)	4	2002	2004
Canada	11	2002	2004
Cuba	27	2002	2005
Cyprus	39	2002	2004
Czech Republic	35	2003	2004
Djibouti	11	2003	2004
Dominican Republic*	1	2004	2004
Egypt	50	2001	2004
Ethiopia	1	2005	2005
France*	3	2004	2005
Gambia	2	2002	2002
Georgia	2	2002	2002
Germany	141	2001	2004
Greece	12	2001	2002
Hong Kong	1	2003	2003
Iceland	6	2004	2004
Indonesia	2	2002	2002
Iraq	28	2003	2005
Ireland	91	2001	2005
Italy	13	2002	2005
Jamaica*	1	2004	2004
Japan*	6	2002	2003
Jordan	66	2001	2005
Kazakhstan*	1	2003	2003
Kenya	4	2003	2003
Kuwait*	3	2003	2003
Libya	22	2003	2005
Malta*	3	2004	2005

Morocco	37	2002	2004
Norway*	2	2005	2005
Pakistan	18	2001	2004
Poland	24	2002	2003
Portugal	43	2002	2005
Qatar*	1	2003	2003
Romania	11	2003	2004
Senegal*	2	2003	2003
Seychelles*	2	2004	2004
South Korea*	2	2003	2003
Spain	35	2001	2005
Sri Lanka	4	2003	2003
Sweden	2	2001	2001
Tajikistan*	3	2001	2004
Thailand	8	2002	2004
Tunisia*	2	2004	2004
Turkey	11	2002	2005
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK)	9	2002	2004
United Arab Emirates	23	2002	2004
United Kingdom	86	2001	2005
United States	471	2001	2005
Uzbekistan	28	2001	2003

*,15 new participating countries beyond the 54 known cases (Open Society Foundations, 2013)

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3 The Causes and Dynamics of International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

3.1 Abstract

Following the launch of the WoT, the U.S. established a global rendition network that saw the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world. Conventional accounts of foreign complicity show that 54 diverse countries were involved, including many established democracies. What influenced more than a quarter of the world's countries to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period? Given the sensitive nature of cooperation required, I argue that the U.S. screened countries according to their preferences on human rights-security trade-offs. Countries with similar preferences to the U.S. on human rights were cheaper to buy off and would have required less persuasion to cooperate. This theory is consistent with the existing claim that cooperation is more likely between countries with similar preferences as both actors are better off when the partnership increases. I test this hypothesis on global data using UNGA voting data as a measure of common interest, and the analysis provides robust empirical support for my theoretical argument.

3.2 Introduction

Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. launched a secret rendition network that enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites around the world (All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014). RDI practices would not have been possible without international cooperation. Outsourcing arrests, detention and interrogations to a third country was essential as it meant that the process took place out of public view; unconstrained by the due legal process on U.S. territory (Mayer, 2005; Satterthwaite, 2006). Moreover, due to the limited range of the private civilian aircrafts used by the CIA to conceal detainee transfers, the U.S. required a number of countries to allow flights to land discretely at their airports

(Open Society Foundations, 2013). Unlike other forms of secret counterterrorism cooperation, the practice of extraordinary rendition has the advantage of being observable (ex-post), as we can analyse detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publically available data.[11] However, very little is known as to why states became involved in this deeply sensitive area of international politics. What influenced more than a quarter of the world's countries (including many established democracies) to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period?[12] This puzzle is magnified by the political and socioeconomic diversity of the states alleged to have collaborated in this clandestine security alliance - ranging from Sweden and Canada to Iran and Zimbabwe.

I argue that the U.S. screened countries according to their human rights preferences, given the sensitive nature of cooperation required. The most desirable RDI partners should view security dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a similar light to the U.S.. Countries with similar preferences to the U.S. on human rights are cheaper to buy off and should have required less persuasion to cooperate. In order to obtain support from the international community during the WoT and maintain counterterrorism cooperation, the U.S. needed to ensure that their RDI programme remained secret. Global public opinion of the U.S. declined during the establishment of the WoT, particularly during times when reports of human rights abuses were exposed; threatening its support from allies (Pew Research Center, 2007; Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010). Therefore, it was crucial that the U.S. avoided approaching countries that could decline cooperation and risk leaking contentious counterterrorism plans. Cooperation in RDI operations offered participants a mutually beneficial partnership that was expected to strengthen every member's national security (Jervis, 1978; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985). Countries with closely aligned preferences and a vested interest in the out-

[11] This has been made possible by a series of Freedom of Information requests and reports on foreign complicity in the global rendition network from European intergovernmental investigations, government and parliamentary inquiries, NGOs and Investigative Journalists (European Parliament, 2006a; Council of Europe, 2008; All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; United Nations, 2010; Reprieve and Access Info, 2011).

[12] Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, UK, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe (Open Society Foundations, 2013).

comes of counterterrorism cooperation would make more reliable partners as they are less likely to disclose classified information that is detrimental to the group.

To test my hypothesis, I use UNGA voting data to measure similar human rights preferences (Voeten, 2013) and a novel approach to identify rendition flights (Cordell, 2017). Results from the analysis indicate support for my theoretical argument. These results are robust to a series of different model specifications shown in the results section and appendicies. This chapter provides a first account of the causes and dynamics of international cooperation in RDI practices during the post-9/11 period from a quantitative perspective (Raphael et al., 2015; Colaresi and DiBlasi, 2017). This analysis makes a substantive contribution to the field of international relations by explaining patterns of cooperation under conditions of secrecy and bridging the gap between theory from international security literature and empirical research on rendition.

3.3 International Cooperation During the Post-9/11 Period

Like many other aspects of the WoT, the RDI programme would not have been possible without international cooperation (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2002). All forms of cooperation were bilateral, between the U.S. and a country that could provide a particular service. While some states hosted CIA secret detention sites, others carried out the arrest, capture, detention and interrogation of detainees on behalf of the CIA, shared intelligence during detainee interrogations, and provided staging posts for rendition flights to rest, refuel and regroup at their airports (United Nations, 2010). This clandestine security coalition becomes particularly intriguing when we take a closer look at the diverse group of states alleged to have collaborated with the U.S. (from Australia and Ireland to Syria and Libya) and consider how core international relations theories fail to fully explain this form of cooperation.

For example, one might expect to observe cooperation between allies since defence pact members are obliged to come to the aid of their alliance partners in times of need (Long et al., 2000; Marinov et al., 2015).[13] Allies are more trust-

[13]This does not mean that alliances are always fully reliable. Many studies emphasise the importance of country

worthy and reliable as these states know that they will be dealing with each other repeatedly in the future; reducing the incentives to exploit a situation and weaken the alliance (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995; Fearon, 1998). States are more likely to exchange favors with friends and take great risks in order to maintain their international and domestic positions and reputations (Levy, 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004). However, this arguments fails to fully account for international cooperation in RDI operations as only 28% of countries that participated had formal alliances with the U.S.. For example, longstanding U.S. allies such as France and Mexico did not participate but non-allies such as Iran and Zimbabwe did (see Figure 3.1). Moreover, when the mean of the *Alliance* variable is compared across this chapter's sample, there is no signficant difference between those countries that we know cooperated in RDI operations and those that did not (at the 95% confidence level).

Figure 3.1: International Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation (Alliances).



Collaboration in rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations visualised according to the Open Society Foundations (2013), with light blue representing non-U.S. allies, dark blue indicating U.S. allies, and white for countries not identified as being involved.

Similarly, previous research suggests that democracies are less likely to violate

characteristics (e.g. regime type and power-status), treaty content and the compatibility of state interests in shaping the creditability of alliances (Smith, 1995; Long et al., 2000; Leeds, 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004).

human rights because of the domestic costs that would result if detected (Davenport, 2007; Vreeland, 2008; Conrad, 2014). Countries with liberal democratic institutions should be less likely to engage in repression as their behaviour is constrained by domestic and international legal commitments (Kelley, 2007; Rejali, 2009; Davenport et al., 2008). However, this also fails to explain international cooperation in RDI, since as many as 40% of participating states were democracies, including established democracies such as Denmark and Sweden. Moreover, when the mean of the *Regime Type* variable is compared across this chapter's sample, there is no signficant difference between those countries that we know cooperated in RDI operations and those that did not (at the 95% confidence level).

On the other hand, past studies would predict cooperation from states with high levels of terrorism threat because of shared grievances with the U.S. and the opportunity to defeat a common enemy and foil potential attacks on their territory (Lai and Reiter, 2000; Sandler, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita, 2007; Kroenig, 2009). A state's decision to engage in harsh counterterrorism approaches also depends upon the policies of other countries experiencing similar levels of threat from terrorism to avoid becoming the softest target in a peer group (Neumayer et al., 2014). However, 43% of the countries that participated in RDI operations actually faced low levels of terrorism threat, with participating states such as Finland and Portugal not experiencing a single terrorism attack in the ten years that preceded 9/11. Moreover, when the mean of the *Terrorism (log)* variable is compared across this chapter's sample, there is no signficant difference between those countries that we know cooperated in RDI operations and those that did not (at the 95% confidence level).

Conversely, perhaps we should expect to observe cooperation from states that are more dependent on the U.S. since hegemonic actors can better use sanctions effectively to secure desired policy outcomes when the balance of power is unequal (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Zimmerman, 1993; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008). As a result, we should expect countries with financial linkages to the U.S. to be more likely to collaborate in

clandestine security matters since refusing to cooperate could place valuable economic transactions in jeopardy (Hufbauer et al., 1990; Nooruddin and Payton, 2010).[14] Along the same lines, we might expect countries with smaller populations to band wagon and ally with a great power like the U.S. in order to increase their defense capability and reduce their relative vulnerability (Rothstein, 1968; Jervis, 1978; Walt, 1985). However, these explanations also fail to explain variation in international cooperation in RDI. For example, between 40%-49% of the countries that cooperated had low levels of U.S. trade and aid, and 66% had a large population size above the global median. Moreover, when the means of the *Trade%GDP and Aid%GDP* variables are compared across this chapter's sample, there is no signficant difference between those countries that we know cooperated in RDI operations and those that did not (at the 95% confidence level). However, on average, countries with smaller populations did cooperate and the mean of the *Population (log)* variable between the two groups is statistically different (at the 95% confidence level).

Past research on the importance of domestic politics suggests that we might expect to observe more cooperation from right wing governments, as such parties are more likely to implement policies that strongly prioritise national security over civil liberties (Imbeau et al., 2001; Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014). Country leaders play a major role in determining the political and economic policies of the country; with party ideology informing the general approach that is taken as well as the outcome (Jones and Olken, 2005; Dreher and Jensen, 2012). However, we find quite the opposite, as 81% of the countries that participated in RDI operations had left-of-centre governments (including countries such as Canada and the UK). Moreover, when the mean of the *Party Orientation* variable is compared across this chapter's sample, there is no signficant difference between those countries that we know cooperated in RDI operations and those that did not (at the 95% confidence level).

[14]While economic sanctions literature tends to focus on punishment as a possible outcome of asymmetric relationships in international politics, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2014) report on the CIA's detention and interrogation programme also revealed how financial rewards had been distributed to countries that hosted CIA secret prisons including payments of $15 million USD.

Given these largely null findings, what influenced more than a quarter of the world's countries to participate in this deeply sensitive area of international politics? I argue that the secret nature of the RDI programme imposed an entirely different dynamic on alliance formation that core international relations theory is ill-equipped to explain. Participation in this clandestine security network carried far greater public costs than other forms of cooperation due to the human rights abuses involved in these operations. This is particularly true for many established democracies with a strong domestic rule of law that are expected to honour their commitments to international law de facto (Kelley, 2007). In addition to causing negative public opinion that could foreseeably threaten a leader's popularity and survival, several governments complicit in RDI operations have had to compensate victims of torture and fund investigations into their alleged illegal activity after it was revealed that they cooperated.

For the U.S., the domestic and international costs associated with a leak ranged from hindering counterterrorism progress and threatening national security, to triggering negative public opinion among the electorate, and gaining a deceitful reputation that could hinder international relations (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Satori, 2002; Wike, 2016). There are several examples where revelations that threatened exposing details of the programme shaped state behaviour and the structure of the programme itself. For example, a leak to the New York Times in 2002 regarding the location of a secret detention site in Thailand allegedly led directly to its closure, and important details in the Washington Post in 2005 about the programme caused Romania to demand that a secret prison on their territory was shut down (Miller and Goldman, 2014).

As a result, it is likely that the U.S. would have had to be far more selective concerning the countries that it approached in order to prevent public opposition from states. Given the unpopular global opinion ratings of the U.S. during the WoT (particularly during times when human rights abuses were exposed) it would be surprising if countries that had refused to cooperate neglected the opportunity to capitalize on public outcry (Pew Research Center, 2007; Hafner-Burton and

Shapiro, 2010; Weaver, 2014).[15]

Given these costs, what motivated more than a quarter of the world's countries to agree to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period in the first place? It has been well established by literature across political science that government decisions are primarily driven by a desire to preserve their survival and strengthen their national security (Legro, 1996). Becoming a member of the network was expected to enhance a state's security at the domestic and international level. For example, a former senior Romanian Intelligence Official acknowledged that Romania had agreed to host a CIA secret detention site in order to demonstrate their commitment to the U.S. and secure their integral support for National Atlantic Treaty Organization membership, that they acquired alongside RDI partner, Lithuania in 2004. Failure to cooperate with the U.S. would foreseeably have led to country leaders facing sanctions in other areas of international politics that placed their national security and international standing in jeopardy (Leventoglu and Tarar, 2005).[16]

In addition, unlike conventional domestic defensive counterterrorism tactics (such as increasing security in public places), cooperation in RDI operations presented countries with a unique opportunity to prevent terrorism attacks everywhere by proactively seeking to dismantle the Al Qaida network. While many citizens and countries have condemned foreign complicity in RDI, proactive counterterrorism tactics in general can imply public benefits as country leaders are seen to possess strength on national security issues that become important for reelection in the future (Leventoglu and Tarar, 2005).[17] Foreign policy choices in times of international crises have both profound international and domestic consequences for country leaders; affecting transnational alliance networks as well as voting decisions back home (Smith, 1998). Accordingly, at a minimum, state lead-

[15]This type of behaviour in international relations is frequently observed at the UN Commission on Human Rights where governments publically name and shame others for abusing their citizens (Lebovic and Voeten, 2006).

[16]There are a number of examples in international politics where the U.S. has been successful in persuading or coercing countries to adopt particular foreign policy positions by leveraging certain rewards and punishments that skew an actor's goals and payoffs and make noncooperation a far worse option (Keohane, 1986; Martin, 1992; Fearon, 1998; Katzenstein et al., 1998; Kelley, 2007; Nooruddin and Payton, 2010).

[17]However, some proactive policies may inevitably provoke terrorist backlash. Thus, governments may seek to reduce their offensive counterterrorism tactics closer to elections if they can be perceived by the public as costly (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004; Marinov et al., 2015).

ers cooperated in order to maintain their international positions, reputations and domestic political support through cooperation with the U.S (Levy, 1997). While at a maximum, states cooperated in an attempt to secure favors from the U.S. that helped them to achieve goals in national security, governance and international politics (Sepper, 2010).

3.4 Identifying State Preferences

In order to maintain secrecy and reduce the risk of counterterrorism operations being exposed, it would have been crucial that the U.S. only approached countries likely to agree to cooperate in the first place. This selection mechanism can be conceptualized as a screening process that identified those countries most likely to perceive the payoffs of cooperation as positive and eliminated those states most likely to perceive the payoffs of cooperation as negative (Jervis, 1978; Glaser, 1997; Sagan and Waltz, 2003; Asal and Beardsley, 2007). Several studies have emphasised the importance of perception in decision making within the field of international security as actor's decisions can be heavily influenced by the way they think about their problems (Jervis, 1976; Van Evera, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Downs et al., 1985). The most desirable RDI partners should be those that view security dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a similar light to the U.S.. Axelrod and Keohane (1985) argue that we are more likely to observe cooperation between countries that have mutual interest as the likelihood of both actors being satisfied with the outcome from negotiations increases. In international politics, states recognise and develop transnational in-groups by identifying similar states with shared norms and political culture in order to overcome collective action problems. Cooperation has a higher rate of success when states have similar aims as actors become less worried about eliciting reciprocal cooperation from others and find rewards in cooperating to help others for their own sake (Wendt, 1994; Lai and Reiter, 2000).

This would have been particularly beneficial during bilateral negotiations as it reduces the need for expensive rewards to be offered in receipt of cooperation

as countries would have required less persuasion to join the alliance. For example, countries with similar security interests that view the imminent threat posed by Al Qaida in a similar manner may be more willing to agree or comply with aggressive counterterrorism approaches in order to achieve the aims of the network. Whereas states who emphasise the importance of upholding human rights over national security at all times would require larger bribes as they would be more likely to object to the nature of the operations. Countries with closely aligned preferences and a vested interest in the outcomes of counterterrorism cooperation make more reliable partners as they are less likely to disclose classified information that is detrimental to the group (Kydd, 2005). This is an exceptionally important consideration given the sensitive nature of RDI cooperation and a desire to maintain secrecy for as long as possible.

While preferences are difficult to observe directly, they can be analysed at the level where they manifest; behaviour. The UNGA provides a unique opportunity to explore the foreign policy positions of every nation in the world within the same institutional environment (Bueno de Mesquita, 1975; Midlarsky, 1981; Moon, 1985; Hagan, 1989; Signorino and Ritter, 1999; Gartzke, 2006; Bailey et al., 2015).[18] The UNGA is comprised of all 193 members of the UN who meet in regular annual sessions to vote on a range of important international security and peace issues. States at the UNGA are able to observe one another's voting behaviour and derive conclusions about the underlying preferences of their peers (Bailey et al., 2015). Equally, it also provides an international platform for states to express their preferences on each topic that a resolution addresses and deliberately signal their type to peers (Hillman and Potrafke, 2012).[19]

It is largely agreed that the foreign policy position of states (in general) transcends domestic party orientation as UNGA votes remain fairly constant before and after leadership changes. Moreover, domestic political institutions mediate

[18]In seeking to explain the formation of state preferences, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that state behaviour tends to be shaped by those groups in society who ensure a government's survival in office. Therefore, in democracies state preferences are more likely to be influenced by the electorate, whereas in autocracies state behaviour is more likely to represent preferences of elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

[19]While several studies have demonstrated that UNGA voting with the U.S. is consequential, strategic voting is noticeably less prevalent compared to other forums such as the UN security council (Wang, 1999; Thacker, 1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Vreeland, 2005).

the level of change in foreign policy as they constrain a leader's decision making process and rarely change across time (Moravscik, 1997; Dreher and Jensen, 2012; Mattes et al., 2015). This is particularly beneficial for analysing international cooperation in RDI operations as the type of senior government officials representing the state and directly engaging in these counterterrorism practices varied across countries (from intelligence and security personnel to politicians). Moreover, empirically speaking, many governments changed leadership between 2001-2005 (when RDI operations were most active) and cooperation continued.

However, it is unlikely that all votes matter in this context as there is great variation in the types of resolutions that states vote on at the UNGA. The category of votes that are most important in relation to cooperation in the RDI programme are human rights.[20] Voting patterns on this set of resolutions are a representation of state preferences on human rights that enables states to gather information on each other's type and reach conclusions about how they expect certain countries to behave. There may be many states who agree with the U.S. on security issues but who fundamentally disagree with the human rights trade-off that must be made in return. This forum generates data that the U.S. could process when screening countries according to those states that are more likely to prioritise national security over human rights in the context of counterterrorism - and agree to cooperate in RDI. This leads us to the chapter's central hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 1: Countries with similar human rights preferences to the U.S. were more likely to cooperate in RDI operations.

While previous research has established that allies have similar preferences, using alliances as a measure of preferences fails to account for the variation in preferences specifically on human rights between countries that typically cooperate (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Farber and Gowa, 1997; Smith, 1995; Carnegie, 2015). UNGA voting behaviour on human rights resolutions provide states with a far more accurate idea of where their peers are ideologically situated on this

[20] While preferences on other issue areas such as trade or economic development may possibly be correlated with preferences on human rights, we would not expect these factors to have a major direct impact on U.S. decision making in this context.

precise issue. Similarly, analysing the domestic human rights behaviour of states falls short of capturing preferences on human rights at an international level. This is especially important given that the RDI programme was transnational in nature (including the nationality of CIA terrorist suspects and the locations where interrogations took place). Likewise, using ratification records of international human rights law as a measure of state preferences on human rights is unsuitable as governments have a multitude of reasons for committing themselves to human rights treaties. This can result in an asymmetry between ratification patterns and state behaviour (Hathaway, 2007; Vreeland, 2008; Simmons, 2009; Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011; Smith-Cannoy, 2012).

3.5 Research Design

In order to evaluate this chapter's hypothesis, I estimate a probit model that tests the effect of U.S. human rights similarity on cooperation in RDI. The unit of analysis is the country in 2000 and the data used for estimation has information on 169 states.[21]

Dependent Variable (Cooperation)

The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a state cooperated with the U.S. in RDI operations at any point after September 11 2001, and 0 otherwise.[22] This is the case for 31% of the observations (53) but not for the remaining 69% (116). Cooperation is identified by the Open Society Foundations (2013) *Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition* report, which provides the most "comprehensive catalog" of detainee transfers and foreign government participation in RDI practices. The factual content of the report is derived from carefully reviewed credible public sources and information provided by reputable human rights organizations (Open Society Foundations, 2013). As an alternative data source for the dependent variable, I use novel rendition flight

[21] Using data from 2000 prevents post-9/11 events in the final quarter of 2001 from contaminating the analysis.

[22] While there are interesting alternatives to this unit of analysis (including the frequency of participation and category of participation), the current research design focuses solely on what motivated more than a quarter of the world's countries from participating in the RDI programme during the post-9/11 period.

data that estimates a country's likelihood of participation using public flight data and a deterministic model developed by Cordell (2017). This identifies rendition flights based on the characteristics of confirmed high profile detainee renditions and estimates binary outcomes for more than 11,000 flights related to rendition.[23] This robustness test shall enable me to evaluate whether this chapter's theoretical argument holds according to alternative empirical accounts of international cooperation in RDI. Results from this different specification of the probit model are displayed in Appendix 3.1.

Independent Variable (Human Rights Similarity)

To test this chapter's hypothesis, I use Voeten (2013) *UNGA Voting Data* to measure a country's human rights similarity to the U.S.. I extract data from 2000 on human rights resolutions only.[24] Each country observation records whether a state voted yes, no or abstained on a particular resolution.[25] I construct a measure of U.S. human rights similarity by following Lijphart (1963) formula for *Index of Agreement*:

$$IA = \frac{f + \frac{1}{2}g}{t}100$$

Where f equals the number of votes that a country is in full agreement with the U.S., t equals the total number of votes under consideration, and g equals cases where one country abstained but the other voted yes or no. For each resolution, states are coded 1 if they agree with the U.S., 0 if they disagree and .5 if one state votes yes or no and the other abstains. The index is continuous and has a scale from 0 to 100. States with higher values (greater similarity) such as the UK have more similar human rights preferences to the U.S. and states with lower values (less similarity) such as Lebanon have less similar human rights preferences to the U.S..

[23] The results suggest 310 likely rendition flights and 15 new participating countries beyond the 54 known cases including Brazil, Dominican Republic, France, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malta, Norway, Qatar, Senegal, Seychelles, South Korea, Tajikistan, Tunisia.

[24] All human rights related votes in 2000 were on measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This international legislation is particularly relevant for the type of human rights that this chapter focuses on as it establishes the standards of humanitarian treatment in war.

[25] States that were not present at the meeting or are not a member of the UNGA are coded NA.

There is complete information for the *Human Rights Similarity* variable for 161 out of 169 countries. The median value is 31.250 (e.g. Nicaragua), the maximum value is 90.620 (Israel), the minimum value is 3.125 (Equatorial Guinea) and the standard deviation across the sample is 18.808. The top ten states with the closest human rights similarity to the U.S. within the sample of countries known to have cooperated in RDI operations include the UK, Poland, Czech Republic, Germany, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, Canada, and Denmark.

As an alternative data source for the independent variable, I construct a second measure of U.S. human rights similarity by following Signorino and Ritter (1999) formula for *S Scores*:

$$1 - \frac{2(d)}{dmax}$$

Where d equals the sum of metric distances between votes and $dmax$ equals the largest possible distance for votes. The index is continuous and has a scale from -1 to +1. Higher values indicate that a country has similar human rights preferences to the U.S. and lower values indicate that a country has different human rights preferences to the U.S.. Results from this different specification of the probit model are displayed in Appendix 3.2.

Controls

To eliminate the possibility that other factors affecting the likelihood of cooperation in RDI operations may be correlated with the preference measure, I control for a number of confounders.

Flight Path (log)

Extraordinary rendition operations during the post-9/11 period used private civilian aircrafts to conceal detainee transfers. Rendition circuits typically began and completed their journey in the U.S. (where the home bases of aircrafts were located) and included a stop at Washington Dulles International Airport as it pro-

vided a convenient location to pick up and drop off rendition teams (Shane, 2005). Due to the limited range of the private civilian aircrafts used by the CIA, extraordinary rendition operations included a series of stops where aircrafts could rest, refuel and regroup (commonly in Western Europe) during a long journey from the U.S. to secret detention sites located in Eastern Europe, North Africa and Asia (Open Society Foundations, 2013). It is possible to analyse all of the flights within a circuit by using public flight data to track extraordinary rendition flight paths; including those that facilitate the refuelling of an aircraft before and after the transfer of a CIA terrorist suspect to a secret detention site (Raphael et al., 2015).[26] Accordingly, we might be more likely to observe cooperation from countries with an airport closer to the flight path based on their geographical position and logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee.

I create a Flight Path spatial control variable by calculating the distance of every airport in the world from the shortest flight path between the U.S. and the WoT battle ground in Afghanistan. The shortest distance between two points on the surface of the earth is known as a great circle. I use Geographic Information System data to model the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles International Airport to Kabul International Airport (a central location for Operation Enduring Freedom from the end of 2001).[27] I calculate the minimum distance between a state and the flight path using latitude and longitude coordinates from Our Airports (2016) data. This dataset is the largest publically available dataset in the field of Aviation; containing geographical information on 39,864 airports (Our Airports, 2016). I construct a continuous variable and take the natural logarithm. A high value (e.g. Fiji) represents a greater distance from the flight path (less logistical utility) and a low value (e.g. Canada) represents a shorter distance from the flight path (greater logistical utility). Figure 3.2 gives a visual representation of the flight path control variable. The blue points on the map

[26]However, in many cases flight data is missing from extraordinary rendition circuits as civil aviation authorities beyond North America and Europe do not have the same standards for the logging of flight plans or the storing of data.

[27]While many other variables inform the "optimum flight path" (defined as the minimumtime route) such as weather, air traffic, terrain, the safety of fly-zones etc., the current measure provides a simple baseline model that is still able to capture the theoretical notion of the most convenient extraordinary rendition flight path (Warntz, 1961).

depict the airport within each country closest to the flight path, and the red line represents the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles International Airport, U.S. to Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan.

Figure 3.2: Visual Representation of the Flight Path Control Variable.

The red line represents the shortest flight path from Washington Dulles International Airport, U.S. to Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan, and the blue points represent the airport within each country closest to the flight path. Source: Our Airports (2016).

Alliance

I create an *Alliance* control variable to account for whether or not a state is a U.S. ally by using Leeds et al. (2002) *Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions* data. I construct a dummy variable and code states 1 if they have a formal military alliance with the U.S. in 2000 (e.g. Australia), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Switzerland) (Leeds et al., 2002). Following Mattes and Vonnahme (2010), I exclude non-aggression and neutrality pacts from my analysis as the motivations and obligations behind these agreements are entirely different and do not require states to actively "cooperate militarily in the face of potential or realised military conflict" (Leeds and Mattes, 2007; Mattes and Vonnahme, 2010).

Regime Type

I control for *Regime Type* by using Coppedge et al. (2016) *Varieties of Democracy* data. I extract the electoral democracy index; *polyarchy* and retrieve country

scores from 2000. This continuous variable captures Dahl (1971)'s conceptualization of polyarchy and includes a country's respect for freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected executive and suffrage. A higher value (e.g. Luxembourg) indicates that a state has greater presence of electoral democracy and a lower value (e.g. Saudi Arabia) indicates that a state has a lower presence of electoral democracy.

Terrorism (log)

I control for *Terrorism* threat by using Enders et al. (2011) *Domestic Versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics* data. This data separates the *Global Terrorism Database* (GTD) into transnational and domestic terrorist incidents and calibrates transnational terrorist data from *GTD* and *ITERATE* to overcome the inaccuracies in counting of events (Enders et al., 2011). Given the international nature of the WoT, I exclude domestic terrorist incidents from the data and count the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a given year. I construct a continuous variable and take the natural logarithm of the total number of transnational terrorist incidents in the ten years preceding the start of the WoT (1991-2000).[28] A higher value (e.g. France) indicates that a state has a greater terrorism threat and a lower value (e.g. Iceland) indicates that a state has a lower terrorism threat.

Dependence on the U.S. (Trade%GDP (log), Aid%GDP (log), Population (log))

I control for dependence on the U.S. by using the International Monetary Fund (IMF (2016)) *Direction of Trade Statistics* and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) *Foreign Aid Explorer* dataset. I construct two continuous variables using data from 2000 that calculate the amount of trade as a percentage of GDP and the amount of aid as a percentage of GDP using Gleditsch (2002) *Expanded GDP and Trade* Data. For the *Trade* variable, I add a state's imports and exports together IMF (2016). For the *Aid* variable, I add the military

[28]To account for values of 0 (states that experienced no terrorism attacks) I use the algorithm log(1+x).

and economic obligations (money agreed to be spent) together (USAID, 2016). In both instances, I take the natural logarithm of the total.[29] A higher value indicates that a state depends more on the U.S. (e.g. Mexico and Jordan) and a lower value indicates less dependence (e.g. Cuba and Iran). To further control for the balance of power with the U.S., I construct a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of a country's *Population* size in 2000 using Gleditsch (2002) *Expanded GDP and Trade* Data. A higher value indicates that the balance of power between a state and the U.S. is more equal (e.g. China) and a lower value indicates that the balance of power between a state and the U.S. is less equal (e.g. Belize).

Party Orientation

I control for *Party Orientation* by using the Beck et al. (2015) *World Bank Database of Political Institutions*. I extract data for 2000 from the categorical variable *EXECRLC* that codes the party orientation of a government as left, center or right (Beck et al., 2015). I construct a dummy variable for this measure. States are coded 1 if they are right-wing (e.g. Denmark), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Norway). These scores specifically relate to a party's economic policy, but are likely to be highly correlated with a more general ideological positioning that applies to other political domains. Table 3.1 displays descriptive statistics of this chapter's independent and control variables; including the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values.

Method

Given that the dependent variable capturing dyadic cooperation with the U.S. in RDI is binary, I use a probit model with robust standard errors. I also test the robustness of the model on a subset of states that are located closer to the flight path, based on an advantageous geographical position and high logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee. I interpret countries with a shorter distance to

[29] To accommodate values for states in receipt of no aid or trade from the U.S., I take the log after adding 1 to the base.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables.

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Human Rights Similarity	161	36.820	18.808	3.125	90.620
Flight Path (log)	169	7.729	1.327	2.272	9.408
Alliance	169	0.296	0.458	0	1
Regime Type	158	0.527	0.274	0.027	0.941
Terrorism (log)	168	2.110	1.510	0	6.528
Trade%GDP (log)	169	8.266	2.892	0	13.620
Aid%GDP (log)	169	5.113	3.165	0	10.400
Population (log)	169	8.984	1.639	5.523	14.040
Party Orientation	169	0.231	0.423	0	1

the flight path as those below the median value of 8.035 (Venezuela). This reduces the number of observations from 169 to 85. The distribution of the dependent variable in this subsample includes 37 countries coded as 1 (that did cooperate), and 0 otherwise (that did not cooperate).

3.6 Results

The theoretical argument predicts that states with similar human rights preferences were more likely to cooperate with the U.S. in RDI. The first model in Table 3.2 presents the baseline effect of human rights similarity on dyadic cooperation with the U.S.. The second model presents the full model including control variables.

Table 3.2: Probit Regression, Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation.

Variables	Model 1	Model 2
	Baseline Model	Full Model
	Human Rights Similarity	Human Rights Similarity
Human Rights Similarity	0.015***	0.022**
	(0.005)	(0.010)
Flight Path (log)	-	-0.127
		(0.086)
Alliance	-	-0.568*
		(0.334)
Regime Type	-	-0.652
		(0.736)
Terrorism (log)	-	0.074
		(0.098)
Trade%GDP (log)	-	0.009
		(0.047)
Aid%GDP (log)	-	-0.090**
		(0.041)
Population (log)	-	0.085
		(0.094)
Party Orientation	-	-0.246
		(0.297)
Constant	-1.033***	-0.282
	(0.235)	(1.206)
N	161	149
LR chi^2	8.024	26.462
Prob>chi^2	0.005	0.002
Pseudo R^2	0.075	0.215
Log Likelihood	-97.272	-82.507
AIC	198.54	185.01

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table 3.3 tests the hypothesis on a subset of states that are located closer to the flight path, based on an advantageous geographical position and high logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee. The results from Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 provide empirical support for the hypothesis.

Table 3.3: Probit Regression, Cooperation in Rendition, Secret Detention and Interrogation – Using the Flight Path Subgroup.

Variables	Model 3 Flight Path Subgroup Human Rights Similarity
Human Rights Similarity	0.028**
	(0.014)
Flight Path (log)	-
Alliance	-0.288
	(0.419)
Regime Type	-1.190
	(1.143)
Terrorism (log)	0.135
	(0.131)
Trade%GDP (log)	0.048
	(0.079)
Aid%GDP (log)	-0.105**
	(0.051)
Population (log)	-0.032
	(0.132)
Party Orientation	-1.505
	(0.395)
Constant	-0.383
	(1.287)
N	76
LR chi^2	12.811
Prob>chi^2	0.119
Pseudo R^2	0.207
Log Likelihood	-46.168
AIC	110.34

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

As expected, countries with greater human rights similarity to the U.S. are more likely to cooperate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period. This positive relationship holds in every model and is statistically significant at the

95% confidence level (or more) throughout. We observe less cooperation from states with opposing human rights preferences to the U.S. as the U.S. only approached those countries that it expected to agree to cooperate (states with similar preferences on human rights-security trade-offs). The perceived likelihood of cooperation plays an important part in this story as keeping RDI operations secret was paramount. Human rights preferences can easily be observed by peers at the UNGA; enabling states to both signal their type and identify countries that are more likely to view security dilemmas in a similar way. I test the robustness of my empirical results using alternative data sources for the dependent and independent variable and the results still hold (see Appendix 3.1 and Appendix 3.2).

The full model (model 2) that includes all the control variables and tests the effect of *Human Rights Similarity* using a global sample demonstrates the greatest model fit. The effect of *Human Rights Similarity* to the U.S. has a significant and positive effect on cooperation in RDI at the 95% confidence level. The *Alliance* control variable has a significant but negative effect at the 90% confidence level and the *Aid%GDP (log)* variable is significant but negative at the 95% confidence level. These findings indicate that states with less formal alliances and less dependence on the U.S. were more likely to cooperate; the opposite of what the literature expects. This finding supports my claim that the secret nature of RDI operations imposed an entirely different dynamic on alliance formation that required the U.S. to be far more selective beyond its usual cooperation partners.

Figure 3.3 shows the predicted probability of human rights similarity on cooperation in RDI during the post-9/11 period according to model 2. The predicted probabilities are computed by holding all control variables at their means. The x-axis displays the range of values for Human Rights Similarity to the U.S. rescaled between 0 and 1 from 0.0313 (very dissimilar) to 0.906 (very similar). The y-axis displays the probability of dyadic cooperation with the U.S., ranging from 1 (cooperated) to 0 (did not cooperate). The observed values of human rights similarity (black points) hug the minimum and maximum range of the plot along the horizontal axis (with darker points indicating more observations and lighter

points indicating less observations). The blue solid line represents the predicted probabilities and the dashed black lines represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3.3: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model 2).



The results show that the probability of dyadic cooperation increases as human rights similarity increases. When the independent variable is held at its mean (e.g. South Africa and Thailand), the probability of cooperation in RDI is 31%. When the independent variable is held at the 95th percentile (e.g. the UK and Poland), the probability of cooperation in RDI increases to 50%. These empirical findings support the hypothesis that we are more likely to observe secret security cooperation in RDI from states with similar human rights preferences to the U.S..

3.7 Model Evaluation

In order to test the robustness of my empirical results and evaluate the model fit, I compare the expected and observed outcomes of cooperation in RDI between pairs of countries included in the full model (model 2) using repeated cross validation.[30] I run Optimal Non-Bipartite Matching on the sample of complete cases (149 countries) to identify pairs of countries that have the greatest similarity to one another on the *Flight Path (log)*, *Alliances*, *Terrorism (log)*, *Trade%GDP (log)*, *Aid%GDP*

[30]Given the odd number of complete cases included in the sample, there is one country that does not receive a matched pairing: India. This is because the distance to its closest match is the greatest of all observations and as a result it is discarded from the cross validation analysis.

(log), *Population (log)*, *Party Orientation* variables. This method creates a N x N distance matrix for all potential matches and finds optimal pairs according to the smallest total sum of distance between two units in the data on all the covariates (see Appendix 3.3).

I examine the predictive capability of the model by constructing a dummy variable of expected cooperation that assigns 1 to the country in each pair whose human rights preferences are most similar to the U.S., and 0 otherwise. The theoretical argument predicts that states with similar human rights preferences were more likely to cooperate with the U.S. in RDI. I perform repeated cross validation that evaluates the accuracy of the predictive model trained on one set of the data, using a machine-learning algorithm that randomly splits the data into k-folds and measures accuracy of the model by the mean over samples.

Table 3.4 displays the results of a Naïve Bayes analysis of the model's predicted conditional probability of dyadic cooperation with the U.S. using the Open Society Foundations (2013) data (model 1) and the Cordell (2017) *Rendition Flight Data* (model 2). Both models are trained using 10 folds of the training data and repeated 10 times; computing model accuracy based on the test data not used for training. The results indicate a model accuracy of 66% using the Open Society Foundations (2013) data and a model accuracy of 67% using the Cordell (2017) *Rendition Flight Data*.

Table 3.4: Estimating Model Accuracy with 10 x Repeated K-fold Cross-validation Using Naïve Bayes.

Model 1 (Open Society Foundations, 2013)	
Kernel density distribution	Accuracy
False	0.655
True	0.655
Model 2 (Cordell, 2017)	
Kernel density distribution	Accuracy
False	0.669
True	0.669

3.8 Discussion and Conclusion

What influenced more than a quarter of the world's countries to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period? Unlike other forms of secret counterterrorism cooperation, the practice of extraordinary rendition has the advantage of being observable (ex-post), as we can analyse detainee testimony and suspected extraordinary rendition flight paths using publicly available data. Given the sensitive nature of cooperation required, I have argued that the U.S. screened countries according to their preferences on human rights-security trade-offs. Countries with similar preferences to the U.S. on human rights were cheaper to buy off and would have required less persuasion to cooperate as they are more likely to view security dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a similar light. In order to obtain support from the international community during the WoT and maintain counterterrorism cooperation, the U.S. needed to ensure that their RDI programme remained secret. Therefore, it was crucial that the U.S. avoided approaching countries that it expected would decline cooperation and risk leaking their contentious counterterrorism plans. Cooperation in RDI activities offered participants a mutually beneficial partnership that was expected to strengthen every member's national security. Countries with closely aligned preferences and a vested interest in the outcomes of counterterrorism cooperation make more reliable partners as they are less likely to disclose classified information that is detrimental to the group. To test this hypothesis, I used UNGA voting data to explore similarity in state preferences on human rights. Results from my quantitative analysis provide robust empirical support my theoretical argument. This analysis contributes to a wider discussion in the field of international relations that seeks to understand the causes and dynamics of clandestine security cooperation.

However, one concern with this chapter's results that warrants further discussion is that the relationship between the independent variable, *Human Rights Similarity*, and the dependent variable, *Cooperation*, may be spurious. Specifically, the U.S.' need to induce concessions from a given country might explain both voting behaviour at the UNGA on human rights and whether a country co-

operates in RDI operations. While this concern is valid, previous literature on sanctions and strategic voting behaviour have established that a) tactical voting at the UNGA is noticeably less prevalent compared to other political forums and that b) not all countries are as likely to targeted by the U.S. and coerced into behaving in a specific way (Wang, 1999; Thacker, 1999; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Vreeland, 2005). When considering human rights behaviour in particular, Kelley (2007) argues that the U.S. is less likely to try and persaude a country with liberal democratic insitutions to engage in represson because coercion is less likely to work (since their behaviour is constrained by domestic and international legal commitments to human rights). Similarly, Nooruddin and Payton (2010) find that the U.S. is more likely to attempt to influence the behaviour of states that depend on them for things like trade and aid as the leverage is greater and the sanctions are more likely to be sucessful. Accordingly, both of these important confounding variables are controlled for in my empirical model (*Regime Type* and *Trade%GDP, Aid%GDP and Population (log))* and the results do not suggest that there is there should be any endogeneity concerns. Moreover, by focusing on UN votes in 2000 (before the start of the WoT) the possibility that the U.S. is using UN votes to secure RDI cooperation (and vice versa) is eliminated. More generally, I will also include all votes at the UNGA in 2000 as a control variable in a future version of this chapter in order to test whether the *Human Rights Similarity* variable captures something unique about preference similarity on human rights as this chapter advocates (as opposed to preference similarity in general).

In addition, I intend to advance this chapter by replacing the current measure of *Human Rights Similarity* with an ideal point measure of state preferences on human rights (such as the dynamic ordinal spatial model developed by Bailey et al. (2015)). Lijphart (1963) and Signorino and Ritter (1999) alternative S Score formulas for measuring foreign policy positions are both intutive and easy to interpret and have thus been useful in initially testing whether the empirical results yield support for my main hypothesis. However, moving forward it is important to test whether the results hold according to more sophisicated measures of state

preferences. Beyond the main empirical model, using an ideal point model instead of S Scores will enable additional (and more accurate) robustness tests that consider the extent to which state preferences on human rights have changed over time (leading up to the WoT) and enable checks for strategic voting to take place (Bailey et al., 2015).

3.9 Appendicies

Appendix 3.1: Probit Regression Using Alternative Data for Dependent Variable – using Cordell (2017) rendition flight data.

Variables	Model 1 Baseline Model Human Rights Similarity	Model 2 Full Model Human Rights Similarity	Model 3 Flight Path Subgroup Human Rights Similarity
Human Rights Similarity	0.014**	0.017*	0.022
	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Flight Path (log)	-	-0.190**	-
		(0.088)	
Alliance	-	0.219	0.561
		(0.327)	(0.413)
Regime Type	-	-0.513	-1.400
		(0.744)	(1.160)
Terrorism (log)	-	0.123	0.159
		(0.099)	(0.130)
Trade%GDP (log)	-	-0.053	-0.044
		(0.047)	(0.078)
Aid%GDP (log)	-	-0.047	-0.024
		(0.041)	(0.136)
Population (log)	-	0.076	-0.106
		(0.10)	(0.135)
Party Orientation	-	-0.510*	-0.660*
		(0.304)	(0.396)
Constant	-0.986***	0.359	0.636
	(0.234)	(1.227)	(1.310)
N	161	149	76
LR chi^2	6.659	27.222	10.253
Prob>chi^2	0.001	0.001	0.248
Pseudo R^2	0.070	0.232	0.190
Log Likelihood	-97.955	-80.761	-47.316
AIC	199.91	181.52	112.63

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Appendix 3.2: Probit Regression Using Alternative Data for Independent Variable – Using (Signorino and Ritter, 1999) Rendition Flight Data.

Variables	Model 1 Baseline Model Human Rights Similarity	Model 2 Full Model Human Rights Similarity	Model 3 Flight Path Subgroup Human Rights Similarity
Human Rights Similarity	0.670**	0.709*	0.981**
	(0.272)	(0.391)	(0.497)
Flight Path (log)	-	-0.117	-
		(0.091)	
Alliance	-	-0.602*	-0.379
		(0.333)	(0.417)
Regime Type	-	-0.036	-0.381
		(0.609)	(0.877)
Terrorism (log)	-	0.016	0.103
		(0.098)	(0.128)
Trade%GDP (log)	-	0.016	0.090
		(0.047)	(0.085)
Aid%GDP (log)	-	-0.102**	-0.111**
		(0.041)	(0.051)
Population (log)	-	0.088	-0.012
		(0.096)	(0.132)
Party Orientation	-	-0.209	-0.434
		(0.293)	(0.395)
Constant	0.384***	0.224	-0.035
	(0.108)	(1.146)	(1.243)
N	161	149	76
LR chi^2	6.260	24.604	12.589
Prob>chi^2	0.012	0.003	0.127
Pseudo R^2	0.066	0.206	0.205
Log Likelihood	-98.154	-83.436	-46.278
AIC	200.31	186.87	110.56

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Appendix 3.3: Results from Optimal Non-Bipartite Matching.

Greater U.S. Human Rights Similarity	Lesser U.S. Human Rights Similarity
Afghanistan	Tajikistan
Albania	Moldova
Algeria	Sri Lanka
Armenia	Macedonia
Australia	Japan
Barbados	Suriname
Belarus	Azerbaijan
Bhutan	Swaziland
Brazil	Argentina
Bulgaria	Romania
Burkina Faso	Botswana
Canada	Denmark
Chad	Cameroon
Chile	Greece
Colombia	Peru
Comoros	Qatar
Congo	Angola
Croatia	Israel
Cyprus	Austria
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Nigeria
Djibouti	Solomon Islands
Dominican Republic	Hungary
Egypt	Ethiopia
El Salvador	Honduras
Estonia	Latvia
Finland	Sweden
France	United Kingdom
Gabon	Malaysia
Ghana	Mongolia
Guyana	Trinidad and Tobago
Haiti	Jamaica
Indonesia	Bangladesh
Iran	China
Ireland	New Zealand
Italy	Netherlands

Ivory Coast
Jordan
Lebanon
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Maldives
Mauritania
Mauritius
Morocco
Namibia
Nepal
Nicaragua
North Korea
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Poland
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
South Korea
Spain
Sudan
Syria
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
South Africa
Georgia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Yugoslavia
Guinea
Paraguay
Fiji
Gambia
Slovenia
Zimbabwe
Lesotho
Ukraine
Guatemala
Eritrea
Iceland
Russia
Bolivia
Thailand
Ecuador
Czech Republic
Benin
Rwanda
Lithuania
Portugal
Belgium
Cuba
Saudi Arabia
Kenya
Burundi
Laos
Germany
Kyrgyzstan
Mozambique
Costa Rica
Kazakhstan
Mexico
Myanmar
Cambodia

Zambia	Mali

Pairs are matched according to the total similarity on the following control variables; Flight Path (log), Alliances, Terrorism (log), Trade%GDP (log), Aid%GDP (log), Population (log), Party Orientation.

4 The Political Costs of International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

4.1 Abstract

We now know that more than a quarter of all countries in the world cooperated in a secret rendition network that enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites after the launch of the WoT in 2001. While governments and leaders in some states have not been punished for participating, others have incurred several political costs, including electoral defeats. What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 RDI programme? I argue that left of centre governments suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that they should be more concerned about protecting civil liberties in the context of national security. This theory is consistent with the existing claim that political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party's public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government. I test the effect of party orientation on electoral defeat at the election following the revelation of cooperation in extraordinary rendition using a sample of all democracies where the party in office at the time of cooperation remained the same. The analysis provides some empirical support for my theoretical argument.

4.2 Introduction

At the end 2005 it emerged that several European countries had been helping the U.S. to run a post-9/11 global rendition network that enabled the transfer of CIA terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world (Amnesty International, 2005; Human Rights Watch, 2005; Priest, 2005a,b; Ross, 2005). In response, the Council of Europe and European Parliament established committees to investigate "alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member states" (Council of Europe, 2006b; European Parliament, 2006b). From June 2006, the commissions released a se-

ries of investigative reports that relied upon detainee testimony, expert witness accounts and suspected extraordinary rendition flight data; and pointed to the participation of more than 60 states (in Europe and elsewhere).[31] They described how foreign governments had assisted with the arrests, detention and interrogation of CIA terrorist suspects and enabled extraordinary rendition aircrafts to fly in their airspace and land discretely at their airports (Council of Europe, 2006b; European Parliament, 2006b). The reports elicited mainstream media coverage, public debates and condemnation from the international community (Bonini, 2006; Cameron, 2006; Kirk, 2006).[32] While some governments have not been punished for participating, others have incurred several political costs including a loss in votes, a decline in public opinion, and the ability to hold office at the election following the revelation of cooperation in rendition (of Human Rights, 2016).[33] What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in post-9/11 CIA extraordinary RDI operations?

I argue that states with left of centre governments suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014).[34] Liberal voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties in the name of national security and would be more likely to perceive the revelation that their government was complicit in the violation of human rights as a grievance (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003). Consequently, left of centre parties are more likely to be hurt by a contentious security scandal as liberal voters disillusioned by the government's behaviour could

[31] Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, UK, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zambia.

[32] See here for examples: a) http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/ciagate2/rapporto-marty/rapporto-marty.html b) http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/council-of-europe-cia-used-prague-airport-for-refuelling-secret-flights c) https://euobserver.com/foreign/21855.

[33] Several governments have also suffered financially through schemes that compensate survivors of torture and fund government and parliamentary inquiries into their alleged complicity.

[34] It is certainly evident that left-wing governments are not de facto liberal in practice. For example, throughout history left-wing totalitarian governments have committed mass atrocities and under the presidency of Barack Obama, the Democrats deported more people than any other government (Mitchell and McCormick, 2011; Marshall, 2016). However, in the context that this chapter focuses on, it is the perception among voters that left of centre governments are more liberal that their right of centre counterparts that counts.

respond by voting for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own (Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970; Jessee, 2009). Alternatively, this event could foster a distrust in politicians and democratic institutions among left of centre voters that leads to a decline in political engagement and withdrawal from voting altogether (Downs, 1957; Converse, 1966; Citrin et al., 1975; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004). A scandal that causes a deterioration in a party's social respectability can also alienate swing voters and cause the median voter to opt for a more viable and reputable alternative (Hibbing and Welch, 1997; Green et al., 2002). This theory is consistent with the existing claim that political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party's public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Tomz, 2007).

To test my hypothesis, I interact data on party orientation (Hyde and Marinov, 2012) with a variable that codes whether a country was described as cooperating in the RDI programme by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports. The results from the empirical analysis indicate some support for my theoretical argument. This chapter makes a substantive contribution to the field of international relations by exploring the factors that make cooperation in contentious security operations costlier for states.

4.3 Political Survival

Political survival literature has identified several areas where challenges to tenure in office can originate. These explanations can broadly be divided into internal forces (e.g. domestic policy failures) and external forces (e.g. military defeat following an inter-state war) (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011). However, even when the domestic conditions for surviving in office seem positive, an exogenous event can unexpectedly take place that disrupts a stable political environment and threaten the tenure of a politician or government. Examples of these "critical events" include scandals, prime ministerial deaths, contentious policy issues, party fractionalisation, intragovernmental disagreements, and crises relating to

the economy, war and international relations (Browne et al., 1984, 1986). Exogenous events (such as a political scandal) provide a unique opportunity to study the processes within an internal political system that determine whether a leader or government is likely to survive in office. In order to understand how exogenous events threaten durability in office, it is important to consider the domestic processes that they can interact with.

For example, one of the primary reasons why an exogenous event (such as a global economic crisis) can have such an adverse effect on political survival is because resources are integral to sustaining political support (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999). In a democracy where the size of the group in society with the ability to choose the leadership that governs the country is large (the selectorate) and the size of the group in society whose support determines whether the leadership can remain in office is also large (the winning coalition), the provision of public goods is of central importance. Whereas, in an autocracy, where the selectorate is large but the winning coalition is small, the distribution of private goods to a limited number of peers is a greater determinant for political survival (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009). More generally, in a democracy if the government fails to provide adequate levels of public goods such as the rule of law, low tax rates, national security, education and human rights, then their supporters can defect to a rivalling party that promises better policy provisions. For governments operating in presidential systems, a decline in the allocation of public goods is even more critical since the group of people that compose the winning coalition is far larger than in parliamentary systems (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

On the other hand, an exogenous event (such as a political scandal) can threaten the survival of a political leader or government because it often implies that they are incompetent. The degree to which a leader is seen to be competent and have the ability to run the government effectively (in comparison to the perceived competence of the opposition leader) strongly influences voter decisions (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). At the beginning of a leader's time in office they are particularly vulnerable to being removed from office but over time as they gain

experience, this hazard rate decreases (Chan and Scarritt, 2003). However, this relationship is not linear as long periods of governance can result in the public developing a fatigue with the current leader and a desire for a new replacement (Bienen and Van De Walle, 1991).

More generally, minority governments are considered to be more vulnerable to turnover in office (particularly in parliamentary systems) than their majoritarian counterparts as they have greater difficulty implementing their chosen policies. As a consequence, they are seen to perform worse in office (Johnson, 1975; Powell, 1982; Strøm, 1985). Along similar lines, the concentration and influence of the ideological opposition (on a left-right scale relative to the incumbent's party) can also determine the expected duration of a government; with greater numbers making it easier to form a legislative coalition that can defeat the ruling party (King et al., 1990). Strøm (1984) and Goemans et al. (2009) also find that the way a government enters office can affect the policy decisions that they make as well as determine the fate of their exit. For example, leaders who enter office in an irregular manner (e.g. following mass popular protests or a coup d'état) are more likely to pursue risky and opportunistic policies as well as exit office in an irregular manner (Goemans et al., 2009).[35] Similarly, coalitions struggle to hold onto office because their formation typically follows an unexpected electoral outcome in an unstable fractionalised environment (Strøm, 1984; Laver and Schofield, 1990). Therefore, we might expect an exogenous event to have more of a debilitating effect on survival in office for political leaders and governments operating in these contexts as they are more vulnerable to being perceived by their selectorate and/or winning coalition as incompetent in the first place.

While the cause of a critical event can often be traced back to the actions of individuals within the government, the timing of their exposure is largely out of the hands of those at the centre of the allegations (Browne et al., 1986). These events can be fatal for politicians and cabinets. However, their timing, magnitude and intensity can have disproportional effects (Browne et al., 1984). For example,

[35] Although this relationship weakens over time.

if an event takes place close to an election, we should expect the impact to be more severe than events that take place in the middle of an election cycle as they are more likely to be forgotten over time (Diermeier and Stevensen, 1999). A government's initial response can also counter some of the negative effects of an external event; such as firing the individual(s) associated with the scandal or calling for their resignation (Dewan and Myatt, 2007).

One type of exogenous event that can threaten duration in office is the revelation that the government has committed human rights abuses. Although the domestic costs associated with violating the rights of individuals are more likely to affect democracies than autocracies. Countries with liberal democratic institutions provide the opportunity for citizens to respond to moral and legal concerns regarding contentious government behaviour (e.g. protests) and threaten the government for violating human rights (e.g. removal via ballot) (Davenport et al., 2008). Specifically, the cost of using repression in liberal democracies is greater because of "voice" (a competitive and fair electoral system that incentivises leaders to behave according to public opinion), "veto" (constraints on executive authority and a dispersion of power) and the legal guarantee of free speech/freedom of expression (that allow journalists and civil society to track, criticise and challenge the behaviour of state officials) (Van Belle, 2000; Davenport, 2007; Davenport et al., 2008).

An example that demonstrates the political costs for a democracy that engages in serious human rights violations are the events that followed the release of photographs documenting abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq by the U.S. military. Polls indicated widespread disapproval regarding the mistreatment of detainees and the overall performance rating of former U.S. President, George W. Bush, fell to the lowest in his presidency (Drash, 2009). Accordingly, we should not expect a scandal of this kind to pose a meaningful threat to non-democratic regimes where human rights abuses are more commonplace. When a political scandal like this ocurs, the institutions that enable "the people" to punish leaders are usually absent and it is elites (not the public) who hold the power when

choosing whether to make a challenge to the leadership (Downs and Rocke, 1994).

4.4 Foreign Complicity in Rendition

I frame the revelation that states cooperated in RDI operations uncovered by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) committees as an exogenous shock to domestic voting conditions.[36] Government officials were not responsible for exposing this political scandal and could do very little to prevent the information from reaching the electorate (Maurer, 2011).[37] States would have been aware of the domestic and international costs associated with these activities; from perpetuating grievances (that can lead to an increase in terrorism threat) to triggering negative public opinion among the electorate, and gaining a disingenuous reputation that could hinder international relations (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Satori, 2005; Wike, 2016). Whilst these costs are all worth consideration, for the purposes of this chapter, I focus on the ultimate cost of being caught for participation in rendition; losing office.[38] Figure 4.1 demonstrates the disproportionate effect of this revelation among those democracies that allegedly cooperated where the party in office during the period that extraordinary rendition operations took place (2001-2005) was the same party in office at the election that followed the revelation in 2006 (excluding Cyprus and Japan). This context provides an ideal opportunity to analyse the causes and dynamics of the political costs associated with contentious security cooperation.

The details that emerged from the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports on the extraordinary rendition and secret detention of CIA terrorist suspects generated a great deal of attention both domestically and internationally for those countries allegedly involved. To take one example, the

[36] It is important to note that while the revelation of participation in RDI operations may be exogenous, RDI cooperation certainly is not as the U.S. selects which countries to approach for cooperation and in turn countries select into the RDI network by deciding whether or not to participate (as the previous chapter argues). However, we should not expect this feature to bias results as I test whether the main explanatory variable in this chapter (*Party Orientation)* is a significant predictor of RDI cooperation in chapter 3 (included as a control variable in the empirical model) and find that it is not. In relation to endogeneity concerns regarding the dependent variable in this chapter (*Electoral Defeat*), the findings from chapter 3 also confirm that *Regime Type* is not a signficiant predictor of cooperation in RDI (which is promising given the possibility that democracies are more likely to incur political costs from participating).

[37] Excluding the possibility of whistleblowers.

[38] While there are conceivably worse costs than removal from office (e.g. assassination or execution), there is no evidence that a leader or government incurred this post-exit fate as a result of participating in rendition (Goemans et al., 2009)

Figure 4.1: Ability of Party to Hold Office Following Revelation of Cooperation in 2006.



Ability of party to hold office, with parties in red countries failing to secure re-election and parties in yellow countries succeeding, and white for countries not identified by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports. Source: Hyde and Marinov (2012)

European intergovernmental committees concluded in their reports that the UK was directly responsible for violating the rights of three detainees (and indirectly responsible for allowing "stopovers" for flights involving the unlawful transfer of many more) (Council of Europe, 2006a; European Parliament, 2006a). One of these detainees, Jamil El-Banna, stated:

> "My interrogator asked me 'Why are you so angry at America? It is your Government, Britain, the MI5, who called the CIA and told them that you and Bisher were in the Gambia and to come and get you. Britain gave everything to us. Britain sold you out to the CIA'"
> (Council of Europe, 2006a).

In response to growing domestic pressure and calls for the UK to investigate its alleged collusion in post-9/11 RDI operations, the UK parliament established two major inquiries headed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and The All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition. The committees analysed detainee testimony, government and security service telegrams, extraordinary

rendition flight paths and interviewed several UK government officials including Ministers, Members of Parliament and Ambassadors (Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2006; Gough et al., 2011). Beyond these dedicated forums, there have been over 200 spoken references on "rendition" in the UK House of Commons and House of Lords and three exclusive debates since it was discovered that the UK was complicit in these secret counterterrorism operations (UK Parliament, 2017a,b). These revelations both provided ammunition to opposition parties in the UK (e.g. the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats party) and caused rifts within the Labour party and other government departments during the election period that followed the release of the reports (2006-2010) (Carey, 2008; Hague, 2009; Clegg, 2010; Hopkins and Norton-Taylor, 2016).[39] During this time, several public opinion polls on the British public revealed that the majority of people rejected torture and supported the "unequivocal rule against torture, even in the case of terrorists who have information that could save innocent lives" (Opinion, 2006, 2008). Together, investigative reports and media spotlight on foreign complicity in torture during the post-9/11 period have "driven public opinion in Europe on the issue of rendition" (Benjamin, 2007).

However, not every leader and government that was caught cooperating in rendition has been punished for participating. What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 RDI programme? I argue that states with left of centre governments were hurt more by the revelation of foreign complicity in RDI operations because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014). Previous research has demonstrated strong ideological differences between liberal and conservative voters regarding the importance of protecting civil liberties versus maintaining social order. Liberal voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties than conservative voters and accordingly would be more likely to perceive the revelation that their govern-

[39]See here for examples: a) http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2008/02/diego-garcia-british-foreign b) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1161081/WILLIAM-HAGUE-We-let-judge-probe-torture-case.html c) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7099169/The-US-is-our-ally-but-we-arent-its-servant.html d) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/may/31/revealed-britain-rendition-policy-rift-between-spy-agencies-mi6-mi5.

ment was complicit in the violation of human rights as a grievance (McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003). The consequences of a voter discovering that the party they are affiliated with no longer shares the same interests on security and human rights trade-offs are two-fold.

First, this event could generate disillusion among liberal voters and drive them to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own (Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970; Jessee, 2009). For example, UK Actor, Colin Firth, described how he was voting for the Liberal Democrats at the election that followed the revelation that the Labour Party had engaged in rendition because of their policies on asylum seekers, Iraq, rendition and Guantánamo Bay (Hope, 2010). Similarly, the number of votes that the left wing Democratic Party in Cyprus received in the 2008 elections that followed the discovery that they participated in rendition dropped dramatically from 51.5% (at the previous election) to 31.79%. The party that replaced them was a left of centre party; the Progressive Party of the Working People (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2017). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) explore the issue of conflicting attitudes on policy decisions between voters and the government in their analysis of threats to political survival and argue that the domestic backers of parties must be satisfied in order to prevent them from defecting to a challenger.

Second, this event could foster distrust in politicians and democratic institutions among left of centre voters and plausibly lead to a decline in political engagement and a withdrawal from voting altogether (Downs, 1957; Converse, 1966; Citrin et al., 1975; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Trubowitz and Mellow, 2005). For example, UK Actor, Julie Walters, stated that she was not going to vote for any party in the 2010 election that followed the revelation that the UK cooperated in rendition. This was a direct result of feeling "disillusioned and let down" by the Labour party in general that she perceived consisted of "slippery, evasive, irresponsible liars" (particularly in relation to their dishonest foreign policy behaviour) (Todd, 2010). Similarly, at the 2008 elections in Cyprus that followed the revelation that the left wing Democratic Party had participated in rendition,

voter turnout was down from 91.75% (at the previous election) to 89.62% (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2017). In addition to preventing the party from securing re-election, these steps can also be pursued by voters to send a signal to future leaders regarding their tolerance and preferences on such issues and deter the party from behaving in a similar manner in the future (Downs and Rocke, 1994).

A scandal that causes a deterioration in a party's social respectability can also alienate swing voters and cause the median voter to opt for a more viable and reputable alternative (Hibbing and Welch, 1997; Green et al., 2002). While the public is aware that effective diplomacy requires secrecy and freedom from democratic constraints, principle agent theory explains how the principal (electorate or elites) are motivated to punish agents (politicians) when their actions are discovered to be at odds with the commitments made to the public at the beginning of the contract (previous election) (Holmstrom, 1979; Rasmusen, 2001; Baum and Potter, 2008; Lane, 2013; Colaresi, 2014). Political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party's public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government (Guisinger and Smith, 2002; Tomz, 2007). Experimental research has shown that the public dislikes a political leader that behaves in an inconsistent manner, with contradictory statements from an incumbent resulting in widespread disapproval among the population (Tomz, 2007).

Such events can also generate negative consequences at the international level that interact with voting decisions back home. Guisinger and Smith (2002) argue that voters have an incentive to punish agents who behave dishonestly as their behaviour over time will lack credibility and possibly threaten a country's national security. When a state is repeatedly observed as behaving inconsistently (in private and in public) they are more likely to gain a damaging reputation internationally for lying that could prevent future cooperation between states (Satori, 2005). Trust is paramount to international cooperation, otherwise countries will fail to collaborate and opponents will question whether a country's threat is cred-

ible (Smith, 1998; McGilivray and Smith, 2000; Satori, 2002). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that citizens care about how their state fares in international politics (both for material and policy reasons) which can motivate voters to remove parties from office and replace them with parties whose international credibility appears to be intact (Croco, 2011). This discussion leads to the chapter's central hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 1: The political costs of participation in post-9/11 RDI operations were greater for left of centre parties relative to parties ideologically to the right

It also follows from this argument that centrist parties should experience greater political costs for cooperating in rendition relative to right of centre parties (though they should be less severe in comparison to the political costs that left of centre parties incurr). Previous research on centrist voter ideology demonstrates that the median voter prefers a more moderate approach to governance. However, the revelation that a centrist party engaged in the violation of human rights suggests that they are ideologically positioned further to the right than expected (Downs, 1957; Aspinwall, 2002; Green, 2007; Treier and Hillygus, 2009). Thus, this exogenous event could also have a negative impact on domestic voting conditions as it can both reveal a conflict between voter and party preferences on civil liberties in the context of national security and expose an inconsistency between a government's private and public stance on these issues. However, we should expect the political costs to be worse for parties where the distance between their private and public type is greater (i.e. left of centre parties).

Another extension of the main hypothesis is that the political benefits of participating in the RDI programme were greater for right of centre parties. Conservative voters are more likely to prioritise national security over human rights and perceive the pursuit of tough counterterrorism measures as a positive demonstration of strength on this issue (Berrebi and Klor, 2006; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014). Accordingly, right of centre governments that participated in rendition

should be more likely to be re-elected because it showed conservative and swing voters that they are competent at combatting terrorism – which is a particularly salient issue during election periods.

Alternatively, one might expect left of centre parties to benefit from the discovery that they cooperated in aggressive counterterrorism action and pick up votes from voters ideologically to the right of them. Left of centre governments are traditionally perceived to be more "dovish" on counterterrorism which can be viewed by some voters as a weakness and a prime reason not to vote for them (Names, 2017). By demonstrating that they are willing to adopt offensive measures against terrorism, left of centre parties could increase their attractiveness to both right of centre and swing voters who prefer harsher counterterrorism approaches. The provision of counterterrorism is a type of public good and the revelation that a state cooperated in RDI operations signals to voters that they are competent at responding to terrorist threat (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007). However compelling this alternative explanation may be, I expect the effects from a party's traditional voter base to be stronger than those generated by swing voters and the opposition party's traditional voter base. Therefore, left of centre parties should overall experience greater political costs for participating in rendition relative to right of centre parties.

The decision to focus on the incumbent's political party as the unit of analysis instead of the political leader is driven by the fact that the type of senior government officials that directly engaged in these counterterrorism practices varied across countries. In many countries it was not just the Chief Executive that was perceived to be culpable. For example, in the case of the UK two of Labour's Former Foreign Secretaries, Jack Straw and David Miliband, and Former Home Secretary, Alan Johnson, were accused of being complicit in RDI activities (Seddon, 2010). Croco (2011)'s work on culpability and domestic punishment explains how citizens not only blame political leaders for foreign policy failures but also consider members of the same party responsible if they had close proximity to the decision-making process (making it more likely that they were involved too).

Therefore, I would expect the revelation that Tony Blair's Labour government participated in the RDI programme to have a negative effect on the party's reputation in general (and reduce their chances of survival in office) that did not disappear following the Prime Minister's resignation. While cabinet changes can be made by governments to regulate the negative effect of a scandal, the majority of governments denied participating in rendition in order to avoid incurring political costs. Therefore, most individuals allegedly responsible for cooperating were not removed from their positions as this action would imply that they knowingly cooperated (Dewan and Myatt, 2007). These factors, together with a lack of transparency on the government's knowledge of the RDI programme, created a general impression that cooperation in rendition was a wider party issue (and not just the result of one or two corrupt individuals).

The culpability issue is also the reason why the sample used for estimation only includes those democracies where the party in office at the time of the alleged cooperation (2001-2005) was the same party in office at the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in 2006. It does not follow from the theory outlined in this chapter that we should expect to see governments incur political costs for cooperation in a clandestine security scandal that they themselves did not participate in. Thus, it would be misleading to include these parties in the analysis.

4.5 Research Design

In order to evaluate this chapters hypothesis, I estimate a probit model that tests the effect of party orientation on electoral defeat. For the independent variable, I interact party orientation with cooperation in post-9/11 RDI operations (as identified by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports). The unit of analysis is the incumbent's political party in the year that the election took place following the revelation of cooperation in the RDI programme in 2006. The data used for estimation has information on 60 democracies

where the party in office at the time of cooperation remained the same.[40] In an ideal setting, the sample size would be much bigger. However, as an event study that seeks to measure the impact of an exogenous event on domestic voting conditions, the data has been shaped by the empirical realities of cooperation in rendition and previous theoretical work that suggests the environments where we are most likely to see the effects.

Dependent Variable (Electoral Defeat)

The dependent variable captures *Electoral Defeat.* I use Hyde and Marinov (2012) *National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) 4.0* data and extract the variable *NELDA 24* that measures whether the incumbent's party won during the national election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI programme in 2006.[41] Table 4.1 displays the distribution of elections by year. I construct a dummy variable for this measure. Parties are coded 1 if the party associated with the incumbent lost, and 0 otherwise.[42] This is the case for 38% of the observations (23), but not for the remaining 62% (37).

Table 4.1: Distribution of Elections that Followed the Revelation of Cooperation (by Year).

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Elections	2	17	12	17	7	4	1

As an alternative data source for the dependent variable I construct a measure of *Vote Loss (log)* to indicate the extent to which a party's vote share declined at the national election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI programme. I use Kauffman and Kraay (2015) *Worldwide Governance Indicators Project* data and extract the *numvote* variable that records the

[40] I use **?** *Modified Polity 4 and P4D Data, Version 4.0* to create a sample of all democracies. I subset those countries with *Polity* scores between 6-10 (democracy to full democracy) which results in an N of 102 countries. I then use Beck et al. (2015) *Database of Political Institutions* and extract the *EXECME* (party name) to create a sub-sample of all democracies where the party in office at the time of the alleged cooperation (2001-2005) is the same in office at the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in 2006. This results in a final N of 66.

[41] For many countries there is data for executive, parliamentary/legislative, and constituent assembly elections. I recode the data as follows: First, I combine same-day legislative and executive elections. Second, I separate executive and only count parliamentary/legislative and constituent assembly elections when the political system is something other than presidential. Finally, when there are multiple rounds of elections, I only count the result from the final round.

[42] There is complete information on this variable for 60 countries (this excludes Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta from the sample because of their population size).

percentage of vote share that the incumbent's party received at an election.[43] I create a continuous variable by subtracting party vote share at the election that preceded the revelation in 2006 from party vote share at the election that followed the revelation and then take the natural logarithm.[44] A higher value indicates a greater loss in votes and a lower value indicates a lower loss in votes. If my theoretical argument is correct, then I would expect to observe a greater decline the number of votes for left of centre governments that were caught cooperating in rendition relative to parties ideologically to the right. The results from this linear model are displayed Appendix 4.1.

*Independent Variable (Revelation*Party Orientation)*

To test my hypothesis, I interact data on party orientation (Hyde and Marinov, 2012) with a variable that codes whether a country was described as cooperating in RDI operations by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports. I construct a dummy variable that measures whether a country that was suspected of engaging with the U.S. had a left of centre party in office or not. Parties are coded 1 if there were details of the country allegedly participating in the reports and the party in office was were left of centre (e.g. Cyprus), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Greece). This is the case for 8% of the observations (5), but not for the remaining 92% (61). In an ideal setting the distribution of values for the independent variable would be more balanced. However, this is the empirical reality of international cooperation on rendition and nevertheless presents us with an interesting puzzle worth pursuing. If anything, it would be more remarkable to find significant support for the main hypothesis given the small number of observations in the sample.

Revelation

[43]There is no information on vote share for Montenegro and Serbia in the data. Therefore, I have used the International Foundation for Electoral Systems *ElectionGuide* to fill in the missing data and calculate the change in vote share.

[44]To account for values of 0 (parties that did not lose any votes) I take the log after adding 1 to the base, i.e. log(1+x).

For the first component of the interaction term, I construct a dummy variable that measures whether a country was described as cooperating in the RDI programme by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports.[45] Parties are coded 1 if the country was named in the reports (e.g. Portugal), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Mexico). This is the case for 32% of the observations (21), but not for the remaining 68% (45).

Party Orientation

For the second element of the interaction term, I use data from Beck et al. (2015) *Database of Political Institutions* as a measure of party orientation. I extract data from 2006 (the year that the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports were released documenting foreign complicity in the RDI programme) from the categorical variable *EXECRLC* that codes the party orientation of a government as left, centre or right (Beck et al., 2015). I construct a dummy variable for this measure. Parties are coded 1 if they are left of centre (e.g. the United Kingdom (UK)), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Ireland). This is the case for 30% of the observations (20), but not for the remaining 70% (46). These scores specifically relate to a party's economic policy, but are likely to be highly correlated with a more general ideological positioning that applies to other political domains.

In order to overcome the empirical challenges associated with the small number of observations in the sample and specifically the uneven distribution of binary values on the independent variable *Revelation*Party Orientation*, I construct an alternative version of *Party Orientation* that collapses left of centre parties and centrist parties (using the same Beck et al. (2015) data). For the interaction term, parties are coded 1 if there were details of the party allegedly participating in the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports and they were left of centre or centrist, and 0 otherwise. This is the

[45] For the purposes of this analysis, I look at the effects of being caught for cooperation in rendition regardless of the type and intensity of cooperation. Avenues for future research include disaggregating categories of cooperation and frequency of cooperation to see whether the revelation was costlier for those countries perceived to be more culpable.

case for 20% of the observations (13), but not for the remaining 80% (53). The theory outlined in this chapter predicts that the political costs of participation in post-9/11 RDI operations should be greater for left of centre parties relative to parties ideologically to the right. More generally, this argument implies that a party caught cooperating in rendition that is ideologically to the left of a right of centre party should always be worse off (in comparison). If my theoretical argument is correct, then I would expect both left of centre and centrist parties in the sample to be more likely to lose following the revelation of cooperating in rendition. While the method of pooling left of centre and centrist parties together is certainly not an ideal way to test the chapter's main hypothesis, it nevertheless presents us with an opportunity to overcome the limitations of the data and test whether the results are consistent with the core theoretical argument. Appendix 4.2 displays the differences in coding for the two versions of the *Party Orientation* variable.

Controls

To eliminate the possibility that other factors affecting the likelihood of *Electoral Defeat* may be correlated with the *Revelation*Party Orientation* measure, I control for a number of confounders.

WoT Casualties

I create a *WoT Casualties* control variable to account for whether a country that contributed troops to the WoT incurred casualties during the period between the election that preceded the revelation of rendition and the election that followed. I use Marinov et al. (2015) data on troop contributions and casualties regarding Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (two central WoT military operations based in Afghanistan from 2001). Parties are coded 1 if the country's troops suffered casualties in these WoT campaigns (e.g. France), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Belgium). This is the case for 12% of the

observations (8), but not for the remaining 88% (58). It is anticipated that parties in office in countries experiencing causalities were more likely to lose at the election that followed the revelation that they cooperated in RDI operations because it highlights the human costs of the war effort and points to a larger foreign policy failure (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1992; Zaller, 1992; Bennett and Paletz, 1994; Berinsky, 2009; Marinov et al., 2015).

Terrorism (log)

I control for *Terrorism* threat by using the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) *GTD* (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016a,b). Given the international nature of the WoT, I exclude domestic terrorist incidents from the data and count the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a given year. I create a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of the total number of transnational terrorist incidents that took place between the election before the revelation of international cooperation in the RDI programme in 2006 and the election after (averaged by the number of years between the two elections).[46] A higher value (e.g. Spain) indicates that a state has a greater terrorism threat and a lower value (e.g. Netherlands) indicates that a state has a lower terrorism threat. It is expected that states with a higher number of terrorist events were less likely to be punished by voters for cooperation in rendition (and lose at the election that followed) because the public understands that in exceptional circumstances leaders face a pragmatic trade-off between security and human rights; particularly in contexts that have high terrorism threat (Ignatieff, 2005; Colaresi, 2014; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014; Wike, 2016).

Rule of Law

I control for *Rule of Law* by using Kauffman and Kraay (2015) *Worldwide*

[46]To account for values of 0 (states that experienced no terrorism attacks) I take the log after adding 1 to the base, i.e. log(1+x).

Governance Indicators Project data. I extract data on the *Rule of Law* from the election year following the revelation of cooperation in the RDI programme in 2006. This measure captures the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts and the likelihood of crime and violence. This variable is continuous, with higher scores (e.g. Australia) indicating a strong rule of law and lower scores indicating a weak rule of law (e.g. Russia). It is predicted that a government in a country with a strong rule of law were more likely to lose at the election that followed the revelation that they cooperated in the RDI programme given the expectation that agents of the state will abide by the rules of society. This variable is also highly correlated with freedom of the press, which makes it more likely that citizens will be made aware that their government cooperated in rendition in the first place.

Economic Growth

I control for *Economic Growth* by using Hyde and Marinov (2012) *National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) 4.0* and extract the variable *NELDA 17* that measures whether economic growth in the country is said to be good running up to the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI programme in 2006. This variable is based on perception, as reported by media sources.[47] I construct a dummy variable for this measure. Parties are coded 1 if economic growth in the country was said to be good (e.g. Brazil), and 0 otherwise (e.g. Philippines).[48] This is the case for 38% of the observations (23), but not for the remaining 62% (37). It is anticipated that a party in office during a time where GDP growth rate is good should be less likely to lose at the election following the rendition revelation because of the salience of the economy as an issue among voters (Schultz, 1995; Aidt et al., 2011).

[47]This perception measure is preferred to raw GDP growth as it better represents public opinion on economic growth as voters are more likely to learn about the state of the economy from media sources as opposed to studying the figures directly produced by financial institutions such as the World Bank.

[48]There is complete information on this variable for 60 countries (this excludes Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta from the sample).

Time in Office (log)

I control for a party's *Time in Office* using data from Beck et al. (2015) *Database of Political Institutions*. I extract the variable *EXECME* that provides the name of the party in office on an annual basis (Beck et al. 2015). I create a continuous variable that takes the natural logarithm of the number of consecutive years that a party has been in office at the time of the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in RDI programme in 2006.[49] A higher value indicates that the party has been in office for a longer time (e.g. Japan) and a lower value indicates that the party has been in office for a shorter time (e.g. Romania). It is anticipated that parties that had been in power for a shorter amount of time were more likely to lose at the election that followed the revelation that they cooperated in RDI operations as they have less time to gain experience in governance and demonstrate their competence to voters (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Chan and Scarritt, 2003).

Table 4.2 displays descriptive statistics of this chapter's independent and control variables; including the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values.

Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables.

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Revelation	66	0.318	0.469	0	1
Party Orientation	66	0.303	0.463	0	1
Revelation*Party Orientation	66	0.076	0.267	0	1
WoT Casualties	66	0.121	0.329	0	1
Terrorism (log)	66	0.485	0.902	0	3.589
Rule of Law	66	0.241	0.918	-1.118	1.987
Economic Growth	60	0.383	0.490	0	1
Time in Office (log)	66	2.145	0.742	0	3.555

Method

Given that the dependent variable capturing *Electoral Defeat* is binary, I use a probit model with robust standard errors. In order to overcome the empirical limitations associated with the small number of observations in the sample that

[49]There is no information on party name for Montenegro and Serbia in the data. Therefore, I have used the International Foundation for Electoral Systems ElectionGuide and Wikipedia to fill in the missing data and calculate the relevant party's duration in office.

cooperated in rendition and were left of centre, I also test the effect of *Revelation*Party Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat* when left of centre and centrist parties are collapsed on the *Party Orientation* variable.

4.6 Results

The theoretical argument predicts that the political costs of participation in post-9/11 RDI operations were greater for left of centre parties. The first model in Table 4.3 only includes the interaction term and its constituent variables; and displays their effect on *Electoral Defeat* at the election that followed the revelation of foreign cooperation in these contentious security operations. The second model includes the two components of the interaction variable (*Revelation* and *Party Orientation*), as well as the control variables. Finally, the third model presents the full model including the interaction term *Revelation*Party Orientation*, its constituent variables (*Revelation* and *Party Orientation*), and the control variables.

The results in Table 4.3 appear to provide empirical support for the hypothesis. However, the statistical significance of the effect of the interaction term (*Revelation*Party Orientation*) in the regression table for model 3 is misleading. When the marginal effect of the interaction term is computed along with its constituent terms (*Revelation* and *Party Orientation*), the difference of the predicted value of 1 and the predicted value at 0 for the dependent variable (*Electoral Defeat*) is no longer statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. Under these conditions, the interaction effect of *Revelation*Party Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat* is 36% with a confidence level of 88%. Given the small number of observations in the sample with a value of 1 (8%) on the interaction term (i.e. parties that were caught cooperating in rendition and were left of centre), it is not surprising that the results in Table 4.3 do not provide significant support for the main hypothesis. However, the results are still worth exploring and nevertheless provide us with a valuable insight into the factors that make cooperation in contentious security operations costlier for states. As expected, the direction of the relation-

Table 4.3: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat.

Variables	Model 1 Interaction Term and Constituent Variables	Model 2 Constituent Variables and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model
Revelation	-5.024	-0.111	-0.534
	(4.343)	(0.486)	(0.546)
Party Orientation	-7.916*	-0.640	-1.088**
	(4.444)	(0.412)	(0.495)
Revelation*Party Orientation	1.041	-	1.794*
	(8.072)		(0.992)
WoT Casualties	-	-1.220	-1.820*
		(0.772)	(1.004)
Terrorism (log)	-	0.116	0.086
		(0.205)	(0.213)
Rule of Law	-	0.350	0.417
		(0.251)	(0.259)
Economic Growth	-	-0.507	-0.497
		(0.369)	(0.380)
Time in Office (log)	-	0.344	0.366
		(0.270)	(0.278)
Constant	5.586	-0.593	-0.495
	(2.369)	(0.631)	(0.652)
N	60	60	60
LR chi^2	3.738	10.019	13.496
Prob>chi^2	0.291	0.188	0.020
Pseudo R^2	0.047	0.125	0.169
Log Likelihood	-38.071	-34.931	-33.192
AIC	84.143	85.861	84.384

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

ship between *Revelation*Party Orientation* and *Electoral Defeat* is positive: Left of centre governments that participated in the RDI programme were more likely to lose office at the election that followed the revelations in 2006 (as outlined by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports).

Model 2 demonstrates that simply being caught for participating in this contentious security programme did not have a detrimental effect on party survival. However, the direction of the relationship between *Revelation* and *Electoral Defeat* changes dramatically when the party caught was left of centre. The extent to which a party behaves consistently in public and in private plays an important part in this narrative. Left of centre governments are expected to be better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security than their right of centre counterparts. Thus, it brought their credibility as a government into question when it was revealed that they engaged in a secret counterterrorism programme that violated the rights of CIA detainees. This revelation could have caused lib-

eral voters to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own or could have led to a decline in voter turnout in support of the party. This deterioration in a party's social respectability could also have alienated swing voters and caused the median voter to opt for a more viable and reputable alternative.

The full model (model 3) that includes the interaction term (*Revelation*Party Orientation*), its constituent terms (*Revelation* and *Party Orientation*) and the control variables demonstrates the greatest model fit. As previously discussed, the effect of *Revelation*Party Orientation* has a positive (but not significant) effect on *Electoral Defeat*. However, the two components of the interaction variable (*Revelation* and *Party Orientation*) have an opposite effect on *Electoral Defeat* that is negative and significant at the 95% confidence level for *Party Orientation* and negative (but not significant) for *Revelation*. First, this finding demonstrates that the political costs of being caught for cooperation in rendition was not equal across all countries. Second, the results show that the period between the election that preceded the revelation of cooperation in rendition in 2006 and the election that followed was not a particularly bad time (in general) for left of centre governments included in the sample. However, this changes dramatically when the government that was caught cooperating in rendition was left of centre. Finally, the *WoT Casualties* variable has a significant and negative effect on *Electoral Defeat* at the 90% confidence level. This is likely because the data structure used for estimation is cross-sectional and not time series. Previous literature has established that incurring casualties during war is costlier for governments when they take place closer to elections; which is why states tend to reduce troop numbers at these critical junctures (Marinov et al., 2015). However, governments that suffer casualties in the battle field – in general – may not necessarily be more prone to electoral defeat as the public understand that loss of life is an inseparable part of war. Furthermore, the decision to contribute troops to the WoT could even play a positive role for these governments as it sends a signal to voters that they are willing to respond proactively to terrorism threat (Bueno de Mesquita, 2007).

Figure 4.2 shows the different predicted probabilities of *Revelation*Party Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat* at the election that followed the revelation of cooperation in the RDI programme with 95% confidence intervals for the unique combinations of the interaction variable's constitutent terms. The predicted probabilities are computed by adding the corresponding values of the constituent variables (*Revelation* and *Party Orientation*) to the interaction term while holding all control variables at their means. The x-axis displays the range of possible values for *Revelation*Party Orientation*: *Revelation* = 1 and *Party Orientation* = 1; *Revelation* = 1 and *Party Orientation* = 0; *Revelation* = 0 and *Party Orientation* = 1; *Revelation* = 0 and *Party Orientation* = 0. The y-axis displays the probability of *Electoral Defeat*, ranging from 0 (remained in office) to 1 (was replaced by another party). From left to right, the first two points display the predicted probabilities of those parties in the sample that were caught cooperating in rendition and the final two points display the predicted probabilities of those parties in the sample that were not. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4.2: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model 3).



Predicted probabilities of electoral defeat based on the unique combinations of the revelation variable and the party orientation variable. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals

As expected, countries that were caught cooperating in rendition and had left of centre governments were the most likely group within the sample to be removed from office (with a predicted probability of *Elecotral Defeat* at 58%). Whereas, the predicted probability of *Electoral Defeat* for a country that was caught cooperating in rendition but was not left of centre is 31%. The group of parties least likely to be removed from office in the sample were left of centre and were not caught participating in rendition (with a predicted probability of *Electoral Defeat* at 14%). Whereas, the predicted probability of *Electoral Defeat* for a government that was neither caught cooperating in rendition nor was left of centre is 51%. These empirical findings provide some support for the main hypothesis that left of centre governments were more likely to incur political costs for cooperating in the RDI programme relative to right of centre parties. The difference between the predicted probabilities of *Electoral Defeat* for left of centre governments that were caught cooperating in rendition and those that appeared to have stayed committed to protecting human rights in the context of national security (and did not cooperate in rendition) are striking – particularly because the latter group were the most likely type to stay in office at the election that followed the revelation in 2006. However, it is important to reiterate that the effect of this exogenous event on domestic voting conditions is not statistically significant in the probit model displayed in Table 4.3.

I test whether these results are robust using *Vote Loss* as an alternative measure for political costs and the results still hold (see Appendix 4.1). However, the sample size and low number of observations in the sample that cooperated in rendition and were left of centre place the same restrictions on the conclusions that can be derived from the model (i.e. the results are still not statistically significant). As an alternative non-parametric representation of the substantive effect of *Party Orientation* on *Vote Loss* for parties that were caught cooperating in the RDI programme, Appendix 4.3 includes a histogram of the average *Vote Loss (log)* percentages for left of centre parties compared to other parties. The results show that on average, left of centre governments that were caught cooperating in

rendition lost twice as many votes than those that were not left of centre.

I further test the robustness of my results by dropping parties from the sample that were caught cooperating in rendition and were left of centre to ensure that no single party is driving the results. Appendix 4.4 and 4.5 display the results from two probit models that test the effect of *Revelation*Party Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat* using one sample that excludes Cyprus (whose government lost office following the revelation of cooperation in rendition) and one sample that excludes Portugal (whose government did not lose office following the revelation of cooperation in rendition) – and the results still hold. However, because there is such a low number of cases with a value of 1 on the interaction variable (i.e. the country caught cooperating in rendition had a left of centre government), when we remove any one of the cases that experienced electoral defeat (in this case Cyprus), the interaction term effect loses statistical significance at the 90% confidence level in the regression table.

In order to assess the reason behind the statistically insignificant effect of *Revelation*Party Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat*, I rerun the probit model displayed in Table 4.3 using an alternative version of the *Party Orientation* variable. Instead of solely focusing on left of centre parties, the new measure collapses left of centre parties and centrist parties to increase the balance of binary values on the interaction term *Revelation*Party Orientation*. An implication of the main theoretical argument is that the political costs of being caught cooperating in rendition should be greater for parties ideologically to the left of right of centre governments because of the perception that they are less likely to trade-off civil liberties in the context of national security. We should expect this exogenous event to disproportionately (negatively) effect left of centre and centrist governments in comparison to right of centre governments because this scandal both reveals an inconsistency between a party's private and public type and clashes with liberal and centrist interests on commitments to human rights in the context of national security.

The first model in Table 4.4 only includes the alternate version of the in-

Table 4.4: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat – with Left of Centre and Centrist Parties Collapsed on the Party Orientation Variable.

Variables	Model 1 Interaction Term and Constituent Variables	Model 2 Constituent Variables and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model
Revelation	-1.4076**	-0.128	-1.541
	(0.676)	(0.492)	(0.830)
Party Orientation	-1.421***	-0.834**	-1.498***
	(0.509)	(0.415)	(0.549)
Revelation*Party Orientation	1.638**	-	1.893**
	(0.813)		(0.907)
WoT Casualties	-	-1.512*	-1.625**
		(0.780)	(0.824)
Terrorism (log)	-	0.161	0.194
		(0.211)	(0.210)
Rule of Law	-	0.291	0.390
		(0.250)	(0.264)
Economic Growth	-	-0.495	-0.477
		(0.371)	(0.388)
Time in Office (log)	-	0.133	0.059
		(0.273)	(0.284)
Constant	0.841*	0.267	0.925
	(0.452)	(0.780)	(0.877)
N	60	60	60
LR chi^2	9.052	11.624	16.181
Prob>chi^2	0.029	0.114	0.040
Pseudo R^2	0.113	0.146	0.203
Log Likelihood	-35.414	-34.128	-31.850
AIC	78.829	84.257	81.7

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

teraction term *Revelation*Party Orientation* and its constitutent variables; and displays their effect on *Electoral Defeat* at the election that followed the revelation of foreign cooperation in these contentious security operations. The second model includes the two components of the alternate version of the interaction variable (*Revelation* and *Party Orientation*), as well as the control variables. Finally, the third model presents the full model including the interaction term *Revelation*Party Orientation*, its constituent variables (*Revelation* and *Party Orientation*), and the control variables.

As expected, when we pool left of centre parties and centrist parties on the *Party Orientation* variable (and improve the balance of the binary values for the interaction term), both the model fit for the probit regression improves and the effect of *Revelation*Party Orientation* on *Electoral Defeat* becomes statistically significant (at above the 95% confidence interval) in models 1 and 3. Specifically, left of centre and centrist governments that were caught cooperating in the RDI

programme were 47% more likely to be removed from office at the election that followed the revelations in 2006 (as outlined by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports).

This alternative model specification does not change the direction of the relationship between any of the control variables and the dependent variable *Electoral Defeat* in models 2 and 3 (in relation to the original probit regression displayed in Table 4.3). Most importantly, we still find that simply being caught for participating in this contentious security programme did not have a detrimental effect on party survival (see model 2). However, the direction of the relationship between *Revelation* and *Electoral Defeat* changes dramatically when the party caught was left of centre or centrist. A plausible explanation for why centrist parties were more likely to experience greater political costs from being involved in contentious security cooperation also relates to the perception of party preferences on commitments to civil liberties in the context of national security. Centrist voters prefer a more moderate approach to governance (Downs, 1957; Aspinwall, 2002; Green, 2007; Treier and Hillygus, 2009). The revelation that a government engaged in the violation of human rights suggests that they are ideologically positioned further to the right than first anticipated. Therefore, we would expect to see the same theoretical mechanism at work for centrist parties as is the case for left of centre parties. The revelation that a centrist party cooperated in rendition could also drive centrist voters to vote for an alternative centrist party whose preferences they perceive are closer to their own and could also foster a distrust among politicians and democratic institutions that then leads to a reduction in voter turnout.

Whilst voter preferences on security and human rights tradeoffs may not be as clear cut for centrist voters (in comparison to left of centre and right of centre voters) public opinion surveys on the use of torture in the context of national security have shown that members of the public, at large, disapprove of it (Opinion, 2006, 2008). This indicates that the average person (i.e. the median voter) should also be shocked to discover that their government participated in the violation of

human rights; and could also percieve it is as a grievance. Put differently, the parties most resilient to an exogenous shock of this kind are right of centre parties because their traditional voter base is more likely to consider trading off civil liberties in this context and are thus less likely to waiver in their support following the revelation that the party they support participated in the RDI programme.

4.7 Discussion and Conclusion

What explains the variation in the political costs of participation in the post-9/11 RDI programme? I have argued that states with left of centre governments suffered greater political costs from being caught because of the perception that they are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security. Liberal voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties in the name of national security and would be more likely to perceive the revelation that their government was complicit in the violation of human rights as a grievance. Consequently, left of centre parties are more likely to be hurt by a contentious security scandal as liberal voters disillusioned by the government's behaviour could either decide to vote for another party whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own or withdraw their support altogether A scandal that causes a deterioration in a party's social respectability can also alienate swing voters and cause the median voter to opt for a more viable and reputable alternative. This theory is consistent with the existing claim that political scandals that reveal greater differences in a party's public and private type threaten their survival in office as it causes voters to question their credibility as a government. To test this hypothesis, I used data on party orientation to explore the political costs of being caught cooperating in the RDI programme (where "political costs" are defined as experiencing electoral defeat).

The results from the quantitative analysis provide some empirical support for my theoretical argument. However, as has been discussed throughout this chapter, the small sample size and low number of observations with a value of 1 on the interaction variable (i.e. parties that were caught for cooperation and

were left wing) place strong limitations on the analysis and interpretation of the results in their current form. Nevertheless, this event study still provides the field of international relations with a substantive and transparent insight into the factors that make cooperation in contentious security operations costlier for states. Moving forward, I aim to develop this chapter by considering alternative methods suitable for analysing smaller samples including non-parametric Bayesian techniques.

Given the secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation, many of the research design choices in this chapter have been conservative in order to reduce the likelihood of identifying false positives (i.e. coding countries that may not have participated in RDI operations as participating). For example, the first component of the interaction term, *Revelation*, is constructed according to whether a country was described as cooperating in the RDI programme by the Council of Europe (2006b) and European Parliament (2006b) reports so that country cooperation is measured using the same comprehensive high profile sources and thus we can be more confident that those countries cooperated and that members of the public were aware of these allegations. However, it is important to note that some time passed between the first news reports concerning RDI operations at the end of 2005 and the release of these intergovernmental reports in 2006. This leads to the possibility that the main empirical model might fail to capture earlier (and perhaps stronger) reactions to the revelation itself during this time period when elections in some countries took place. However, if anything, this issue is more likely to bias the results against finding support for this chapter's main hypothesis and makes the findings even more compelling (by capturing an effect that is likely within the lower bounds of electoral defeat).

An additional feature of the research design that warrants further discussion includes a potential selection issue that could bias the results in this chapter. In the current format, the sample size is conceptually divided into a treatment group (countries that cooperated in RDI and were caught) and a control group (countries that did not cooperate and thus were not caught). However, the clandestine na-

ture of counterterrorism cooperation means that we cannot be certain that a third group of countries does not exist (that cooperated in RDI but were not caught). While this concern is theoretically possible, it is important to note that there has been no evidence over the last 12 years to suggest that this special group of countries exists in reality. Moreover, given the incentives to shift the blame to another country, it would be surprising if countries that did cooperate (and were caught) neglected the opportunity to reveal the identity of those countries they knew cooperated (but were not caught) once the information on foreign complicity in RDI was out. Similarly, it would be unusual if detainees, former intelligence officals and country ambassadors had neglected the opportunity to name and shame all of the countries that they knew participated during interviews by European intergovernmental investigations, government and parliamentary inquiries, NGOs and Investigative Journalists (European Parliament, 2006a; Council of Europe, 2008; All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, 2009; United Nations, 2010; Reprieve and Access Info, 2011). If anything, this possibility presents a bias in the results that makes it less likely to find support for the main hypothesis, given the small the number of countries that were caught and were left wing, in comparison to those that were not. While these empirical constraints mean that there is no way of modelling this third group given the current research design, a future extension of this chapter could be to test the main hypothesis under experimental conditions to see whether left of centre voters are more likely to withdraw support for a political party based on information that they were involved in the violation of human rights.

4.8 Appendicies

Appendix 4.1: Linear Regression, Vote Loss (log).

Variables	Model 1 Interaction Term and Constituent Variables	Model 2 Constituent Variables and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model
Revelation	-0.658	-0.246	-0.557
	(0.416)	(0.471)	(0.515)
Party Orientation	-0.664	-0.362	-0.671
	(0.405)	(0.389)	(0.443)
Revelation*Party Orientation	1.156	-	1.185
	(0.767)		(0.837)
WoT Casualties	-	0.260	0.103
		(0.634)	(0.638)
Terrorism (log)	-	-0.026	-0.075
		(0.193)	(0.194)
Rule of Law	-	-0.127	-0.082
		(0.243)	(0.243)
Economic Growth	-	-0.019	0.024
		(0.354)	(0.352)
Time in Office (log)	-	0.095	0.079
		(0.260)	(0.257)
Constant	1.207	0.890	1.042*
	(0.234)	(0.614)	(0.617)
N	60	60	60
R^2	0.067	0.036	0.073
Adjusted R^2	0.017	-0.094	-0.073
Residual Standard Error	1.238 (df = 56)	1.306 (df = 52)	1.293 (df = 51)
F Statistic	1.331 (df = 3; 56)	0.279 (df = 7; 52)	0.500 (df = 8; 51)

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Appendix 4.2: Coding of Party Orientation Variable for the Main Interaction Variable (Left of Centre) and the Alternative Version of the Interaction Variable (Left of Centre or Centrist).

Country	Party	Left of Centre	Left of Centre or Centrist
Australia	LPA	No	No
Bahamas	PLP	No	Yes
Barbados	BLP	Yes	Yes
Belgium	VLD	No	No
Belize	PUP	No	No
Benin	independent	No	Yes
Botswana	BDP	No	No
Brazil	PT	Yes	Yes
Cape Verde	PAICV	Yes	Yes
Chile	CPD	Yes	Yes
Colombia	independent	No	Yes
Croatia	HDZ	No	No
Cyprus	DIKO	Yes	Yes
Denmark	V	No	No
Dominican Republic	PLD	No	Yes
El Salvador	ARENA	No	No
France	UMP	No	No
Georgia	UNM	No	Yes
Ghana	NPP	No	No
Greece	ND	No	No
Guatemala	GANA	No	No
Guyana	PPP	Yes	Yes
Honduras	PL	No	No
Hungary	MSzP	Yes	Yes
Iceland	IP	No	Yes
India	INC	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	PD	No	Yes
Ireland	Fianna Fail	No	Yes
Jamaica	PNP	Yes	Yes
Japan	LDP	No	No
Kenya	NARC	No	Yes
Lesotho	LCD	Yes	Yes
Luxembourg	PCS	No	Yes
Macedonia	SDSM	Yes	Yes

Madagascar	TIM	No	Yes
Mali	independent	No	Yes
Malta	NP	No	No
Mauritius	MSM	No	Yes
Mexico	PAN	No	No
Moldova	PCRM	Yes	Yes
Mongolia	MPRP	No	Yes
Montenegro	DPSM	No	Yes
Mozambique	Frelimo	Yes	Yes
Namibia	SWAPO	Yes	Yes
Nepal	NC	No	Yes
Netherlands	CDA	No	No
New Zealand	Labour Party	Yes	Yes
Panama	PRD	No	Yes
Papua New Guinea	NAP	No	Yes
Paraguay	Colorado	No	No
Philippines	Lakas-CMD	No	Yes
Portugal	PS	Yes	Yes
Romania	independent	No	Yes
Russia	independent	No	Yes
Senegal	PDS	Yes	Yes
Serbia	DPS	No	Yes
Slovenia	SDS	No	Yes
South Africa	ANC	No	Yes
South Korea	Uri Party	No	Yes
Spain	PSOE	Yes	Yes
Taiwan	DPP	No	No
Trinidad and Tobago	PNM	No	No
Turkey	AKP	No	Yes
Ukraine	independent	No	Yes
United Kingdom	Labour	Yes	Yes
Uruguay	EP-FA	Yes	Yes

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Appendix 4.3: Average Percentage of Vote Loss for Countries Caught Cooperating in Rendition Based on Party Orientation.



Average percentage of vote loss is calculated by adding the total percentage of vote loss (log) for left of centre parties versus parties that are not left of centre (divided by the total number of observations for each group).

Appendix 4.4: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat - Excluding Cyprus from the Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Interaction Term and Constituent Variables	Model 2 Constituent Variables and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model
Revelation	-5.024	-0.405	-0.538
	(4.343)	(0.522)	(0.545)
Party Orientation	-7.916*	-0.937**	-1.090**
	(4.444)	(0.456)	(0.494)
Revelation*Party Orientation	6.196	-	1.060
	(8.912)		(1.133)
WoT Casualties	-	-0.884	-1.302
		(0.798)	(0.979)
Terrorism (log)	-	0.177	0.130
		(0.210)	(0.215)
Rule of Law	-	0.330	0.368
		(0.256)	(0.262)
Economic Growth	-	-0.672*	-0.612
		(0.388)	(0.397)
Time in Office (log)	-	0.426	0.406
		(0.280)	(0.281)
Constant	2.265	-0.658	0.565
	(2.369)	(0.641)	(0.653)
N	59	59	59
LR chi^2	4.024	12.31	13.095
Prob>chi^2	0.259	0.091	0.109
Pseudo R^2	0.052	0.158	0.168
Log Likelihood	-36.956	-32.812	-32.420
AIC	81.911	81.624	82.841

Significant Codes p≤ 0.01 '***', p≤ 0.05 '**', p≤ 0.1 '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Appendix 4.5: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat - Excluding Portugal from the Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Interaction Term and Constituent Variables	Model 2 Constituent Variables and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model
Revelation	-5.024	-0.405	-0.538
	(4.343)	(0.522)	(0.545)
Party Orientation	-7.916*	-0.937**	-1.090**
	(4.444)	(0.456)	(0.494)
Revelation*Party Orientation	1.294	-	1.886*
	(8.501)		(0.980)
WoT Casualties	-	-1.139	-1.566
		(0.792)	(0.995)
Terrorism (log)	-	0.103	0.040
		(0.207)	(0.260)
Rule of Law	-	0.341	0.400
		(0.252)	(0.260)
Economic Growth	-	-0.515	-0.508
		(0.369)	(0.380)
Time in Office (log)	-	0.347	0.371
		(0.269)	(0.277)
Constant	3.003	-0.598	-0.485
	(2.369)	(0.630)	(0.649)
N	59	59	59
LR chi^2	3.945	9.214	13.043
Prob>chi^2	0.267	0.238	0.110
Pseudo R^2	0.050	0.117	0.165
Log Likelihood	-37.479	-34.845	-32.930
AIC	82.958	85.689	83.86

Significant Codes $p \leq 0.01$ '***', $p \leq 0.05$ '**', $p \leq 0.1$ '*' with Standard Errors in parentheses.

5 Conclusion

The three preceeding chapters sought both to theoretically study and empirically test the causes and consequences of international security cooperation on sensitive issues during the post-9/11 period. In the first chapter of this thesis, I offered a novel solution for measuring partially observed processes such as repression and human rights violations with a specific focus on international cooperation in the RDI programme. Due to the secret nature of counterterrorism cooperation, previous research on this topic has been plagued by uncertainty, an absence of data and systematic empirical evidence (Efrat, 2015; Hafner-Burton and Shapiro, 2010). As a consequence, it has remained unclear just how many countries participated in RDI operations – and to what extent. To overcome the limitations of identifying rendition flights and the countries likely involved, I applied data pre-processing method to the world's largest collection of public flight data possibly related to rendition (Blakeley and Raphael, 2013b). The central finding from this section includes the identification on an additional 307 rendition flights and 15 countries potentially involved, beyond the 54 known cases.

The second chapter of this thesis considered how common interests on human rights and national security can inform patterns of international cooperation on sensitive issues under conditions of secrecy. I focused on the example of international cooperation in the RDI programme to demonstrate how states are able to analyse one another's preferences on these issue areas in order to identify which countries are more likely to cooperate with them on contentious security matters. The empirical findings from this section supported the idea that countries with similar preferences to the U.S. on human rights were the most desirable rendition partners as they are more likely to view security dilemmas and human rights trade-offs in a similar light. Countries with closely aligned preferences and a vested interest in the outcomes of cooperation are more reliable as they are less likely to disclose classified information (based on legal or moral grounds) that is detrimental to the group (Kydd, 2005). This screening process plays a particularly important role when the costs of someone uncovering the operations include

revealing confidential plans to the enemy and causing a political backlash at home that can threaten the survival of the leaders and governments involved.

In the third chapter of this thesis, I explored the conditions under which being caught for cooperation on a sensitive issue (that involves the violation of human rights) is politically costly. Focusing again on cooperation in RDI operations during the post 9/11 period, I argued that the political costs of a revelation of this nature are greater for those countries whose behaviour is perceived to be a more profound contradiction of their preferences on human rights and national security trade-offs. The main finding from this section is that being caught for cooperation in extraordinary rendition had a disproportionate negative effect on left of centre governments (with a greater chance of them experiencing electoral defeat following the revelation). I explain how this result is a consequence of the perception that left of centre governments are better at protecting civil liberties in the context of national security (Welch and Schuster, 2005; Moeckli, 2008; Neumayer et al., 2014). This revelation demonstrated a greater conflict of interests between left of centre parties and their supporter base as liberal voters are less likely to consider trading off civil liberties at the expense of national security. This could plausibly have led to liberal voters voting for a different party at the following election whose preferences they perceive are closer aligned to their own or could have caused some supporters to withdraw from voting altogether (Downs, 1957; Davis et al., 1970; Converse, 1966; Citrin et al., 1975; McClosky and Brill, 1983; Davis and Silver, 2003; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Trubowitz and Mellow, 2005; Jessee, 2009).

This thesis makes a substantive contribution to the field of international relations by explaining the sources and implications of secret and controversial forms of international cooperation during the post-9/11 period. The main findings have demonstrated how the tension between common interests and conflicting interests on issues such as security and human rights is important for understanding how international security cooperation under conditions of secrecy works. In addition, the perception of political ideology and preferences on security and human rights trade-offs are a significant factor in determining which countries are more likely

to be hurt for cooperating on a sensitive issue in the area of international security.

A striking finding from the preceding two chapters is that core international relations theories fail to fully explain the form of counterterrorism cooperation studied in this thesis. On the one hand, the secret and sensitive nature of RDI operations imposed an entirely different dynamic on alliance formation that required the U.S. to be far more selective beyond its usual cooperation partners. And on the other hand, the WoT has seen some democratic governments make foreign policy decisions that contradict conventional wisdom that liberal democratic institutions are more effective at constraining the behaviour of government officials and are better at ensuring the protection of human rights.

> "Let no one be in any doubt that the rules of the game are changing" (Blair, 2005).

The main findings summarise above are novel and together provide a broader template for both detecting human rights violations that take place in secret and predicting which countries are a) likely to engage in similar kinds of repressive behaviour in secret and b) incur domestic penalties for their involvement when the costs of being caught are high. First, this thesis makes a unique contribution to academia and the policy world by bridging the gap between theory from international relations literature and empirical research on rendition. The discovery that a quarter of the world's countries (including many established democracies) had been cooperating with the U.S. in an illegal rendition programme elicited mainstream media coverage, public debates back home and condemnation from the international community (Bonini, 2006; Cameron, 2006; Kirk, 2006). However, despite the salience of this issue, political scientists have paid little attention to the topic of rendition. This thesis has provided a first account of the causes, dynamics and consequences of international cooperation in this sensitive area of international politics from a quantitative perspective. In addition, the empirical contribution of a new and improved rendition indicator that provides a more accurate estimate of international cooperation can help facilitate further studies on

this subject by academic researchers and human rights practitioners.

Second, the innovative approach adopted by this thesis that utilises public flight data, detainee testimonies and NGO reports has made it possible to study theoretically interesting questions on controversial international security cooperation that is usually off limits given the topic's inherent secret nature. The main findings from this thesis are generalizable beyond the issue of extraordinary rendition and can be used to scientifically evaluate other forms of cooperation in international security. For example, the predictive model used to identify international cooperation in extraordinary rendition from the first chapter provides a prototype for how challenging international politics and human rights events can be studied using insight from matching data mining analyses. Similarly, the simple theoretical framework on preference similarity developed in the second chapter can be applied to other areas of international politics to make sense of cooperation patterns where collaboration with traditional alliance partners may not the be the most practical option. Likewise, the model of party orientation advanced in the third chapter can also be applied to other sub-fields in politics in order to predict which types of external events are more likely to disrupt a stable political environment and threaten the tenure of a politician or government.

Third, the key findings from this thesis have important policy implications for the promotion of human rights and the counterterrorism methods employed during the post-9/11 period. For example, the results from the first chapter can be useful for NGOs interested in using the rendition flight data for advocacy purposes; particularly where previous efforts have failed to hold states account due to a lack of evidence. The identification of 15 new countries potentially involved in the RDI programme, could have important legal implications for the concerned states if it is proven that they knowingly participated in or condoned rendition. Since the publication of this chapter in the *International Area Studies Review*, I have received requests from human rights litigators, policy experts and NGOs in the U.S. to use the data for policy and advocacy purposes. Similarly, civil society continues to be interested in the methods that can be undertaken to prevent hu-

man rights abuses. The second chapter of this thesis demonstrates how measures of state preferences on human rights (e.g. public data on UN voting records) can be used as a tool to predict which countries are more likely to trade-off civil liberties for national security during the post-9/11 period in the future. This suggests that these findings could help NGOs and investigative researchers dedicated to the promotion of human rights in the context of counterterrorism to narrow their focus on a number of 'at risk' countries. Equally, the main findings from the third chapter highlight the current failure of democratic institutions designed to prevent repressive policies on national security from taking place and hold governments accountable that engage in such behaviour. This indicates that policy organisations may want to turn their attention to strengthening the institutional and legal frameworks that have failed to prevent human rights being violated through national security cooperation.

While this thesis has found empirical support for newly developed arguments in the theoretical literature of international cooperation, there are a number of avenues for future research that can help broaden our understanding of cooperation in sensitive areas of international politics. For instance, it would be interesting to see whether the political and socio-economic sources of secret security cooperation change when cooperation is treated as a categorical or continuous variable. For example, state participation in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period was far from uniform and involved countries participating in a varying number of ways. However, this thesis only focuses on the causes and dynamics of cooperation at a binary level; i.e. what caused countries to cooperate (period) and not what caused some states to engage in some practices but not others. Along the same lines, it would be useful to look at whether the consequences of being caught for security cooperation on a sensitive issue (that included the violation of human rights) are worse for countries that engage more regularly or engage in a wider array of repressive acts.

On a broader level, it would be worthwhile to look at similar instances of cooperation on sensitive areas of international politics to see whether the theoret-

ical frameworks advanced by this thesis still hold. Some examples might include cooperation on controversial arms trade deals, cooperation on countering cyber terrorism, cooperation on the war on drugs, and cooperation on combatting anti-human trafficking networks etc.. More generally, the global campaign that gave rise to RDI practices (the WoT) is still ongoing with political leaders from some of the main countries involved indicating that national security will continue to take precedence over human rights:

> "I'm clear: if human rights laws get in the way of tackling extremism and terrorism, we will change those laws to keep British people safe" (May, 2017).

> "When ISIS is doing things that nobody has ever heard of since medieval times. Would I feel strongly about waterboarding. As far as I'm concerned we have to fight fire with fire" (Trump, 2017).

Furthermore, the post-9/11 era also coincides with an increase in access to big data that can be used to study future international security and human rights events that are usually hidden by secrecy.

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