Recent historians of wartime Britain and the Attlee years have taught us a great deal about the fundamental role played by popular consumption during this crucial period. Consumption issues were brought to the fore during the Second World War and they continued to be vital in its aftermath. Most obviously, personal consumption was severely restrained, by 15% for foodstuffs in 1942, more than 30% for clothing, probably 75% for household goods, cutbacks that represented the largest reduction in personal consumption in modern British history. Brand names largely disappeared to be replaced by standardised goods produced through ‘pooling’ arrangements with manufacturers. Government policy of ‘Fair Shares For All’ and ‘Make do and Mend’ promulgated by the Ministry of Food and the Ministry of Information legitimised a ‘moral economy’ of consumption from above. Despite the inevitable evasions and negotiations, these priorities it seems were broadly supported by the majority of the British people, as Mark Roodhouse’s work on rationing and the black market has convincingly demonstrated.

In this context, commercial advertising – which had enjoyed a golden age during the interwar period when the industry attempted to boost its public standing by means of formal professional bodies and large-scale exhibitions – was placed firmly on the defensive. Advertising continued of course, funded by government to publicise various campaigns and by manufacturers who recognised the importance of maintaining consumer goodwill for branded goods that had taken years to build up. Nevertheless, its influence was severely curtailed and it was feared that it was increasingly regarded by the public as at best wasteful, at worst downright unpatriotic. Research by David Camplin and Philippa...
Haughton has shown how the advertising industry coped with these pressures by proving their usefulness to government during the national emergency. Professional groups such as the Advertising Association and the Incorporated Institute of Practitioners in Advertising worked hard to build links with the Ministry of Information and other government departments with a view to help maintain morale on the home front. However, such initiatives were frequently undermined by commercial self-interest, which fuelled popular mistrust; Excess Profits Tax that was introduced in September 1939, for example, and which froze profits at pre-war levels, was often evaded by manufacturers who preferred to spend profits on advertising goods that were in short supply or even unavailable rather than give more money to the Treasury. Moreover, advertising campaigns that cynically used the experience of war for private gain unsurprisingly generated opprobrium. Mass-Observation reported in September 1940 that an advertisement for Aspro, which claimed the product had helped save soldiers’ lives at Dunkirk, was thought particularly distasteful, one air raid warden in his mid-30s condemning it as, ‘Bloody disgusting. I don’t think Aspro should ever have put it in. Our troops fighting on Aspro...It says a lot for this nation if Aspro saved Dunkirk...It’s bloody disgusting.’

Published in 1943, Denys Thompson’s ironically titled book *Voice of Civilisation* was a forthright expression of the critique of advertising that flourished during wartime. In it, Thompson raised the possibility of the complete elimination of what he regarded as an unnecessary and often deceitful stimulus, remarking; ‘advertising as we know it may be dispensed with after the war. We are getting on very well with a greatly diminished volume of commercial advertising in war time, and it is difficult to envisage a return of the 1919-39 conditions in which publicity proliferated.’ Tapping into the uncritical pro-Sovietism that was widespread at the time, Thompson went on to praise the U.S.S.R. as ‘a country which
adopts twentieth-century manufacturing technique without twentieth-century sales talk’, and where he believed production for use rather than profit had been successfully established. In this new economy and society he argued, the desire for superfluous luxuries had died out and with it the largely irrational psychological appeals of commercial advertising, to be replaced by rational public information. Thompson thought Britain had moved closer to this model during the war as brands had been mostly abolished and the Pharmacy and Medicines Bill of 1941 had rendered illegal the most misleading claims made by advertisers of patent or ‘quack’ medicines. The headmaster of Yeovil Grammar School, Thompson’s mentor before the war had been the literary and cultural critic F. R. Leavis (they published Culture and Environment together in 1933), and though he could still be patronising about the gullibility of ‘the masses’, he had moved much further to the left during the war under the influence of the exiled political sociologist Karl Mannheim, whose work sought to provide a philosophical and historical explanation for the inevitable triumph of ‘planning’ over the anarchy of laissez faire capitalism. Thompson also feared that advertising, as the vanguard of the commercial domain, was colonising politics more thoroughly than ever before, with ominous results. Nazi Germany was only the logical outcome of a situation where people had not been taught how to think for themselves and where, ‘Political discussion is carried on at the advertising level.’

Thompson’s view seems rather extreme in hindsight but it was not that unusual at the time. Advertising was assailed from many quarters; a Presbyterian minister in Sunderland, the Reverend Wigham Price, even preaching to his flock just after the war about the evils of the modern advertising ‘racket’, which he described as nothing less than a form of ‘Commercial Gangsterdom’. Scholars have frequently drawn attention to the attack on advertising and consumer culture in the late 1950s launched by Leavisites like
Richard Hoggart on this side of the Atlantic and economists and writers such as J. K. Galbraith and Vance Packard in the United States, as well as those intellectuals influenced by Marxist theorists such as Herbert Marcuse that grouped together to form the New Left. However, it is important also to take a wider and longer perspective, for the critique of advertising and consumer culture had deep indigenous roots in the British labour movement, drawing on various ideological sources, including the writings of John Ruskin, William Morris and J. A. Hobson, as well as an immensely rich tradition of associational practice, most importantly nonconformist religious organisations and the Co-operative movement. This article argues that war and the growing popularity of ‘planning’ in broad (and often vague) terms served to knit together and focus the various component parts of this critique, which reached a kind of high-water mark under the period of the first Attlee government.

Advertisers themselves acknowledged the difficulties they faced at the end of the war, and not only from preachers, intellectuals and the labour movement. It was hardly surprising that the editor of Advertiser’s Weekly should dismiss Thompson’s book as nonsense, no more than a ‘fanatical tirade’; or that they should condemn a later intervention by the same writer – dismissively labelled ‘the pedagogue’ – as nothing more than ‘the prejudiced outpouring of a man whose life is spent in the petty kingdom of the schoolroom.’ Nevertheless, the periodical also admitted that the most urgent task facing the industry was to bring about its ‘rehabilitation’ and ‘restore faith in advertising’. The problem was that Thompson’s negative assessment resonated widely and as the editor concluded, ‘We have to deal with what the voter thinks advertising is up to...Time is running short’. Early in 1947 John Nicholas, managing director of the advertising agency Rumble, Crowther and Nicholas, advised that ‘they must destroy the popular jibe that had fastened the word
“racket” upon them; they might even persuade the BBC to take advertising out of the mouths of the prigs of culture and allow responsible advertising men to tell the public what advertising really meant, and how it worked.¹⁴ Two years later Mass-Observation conducted a study of press readership. Most people interviewed said that they were not interested in advertisements and this attitude was even more pronounced amongst readers of working-class dailies. To cheer up the sponsors of the study (the Advertising Service Guild), Mass-Observation pointed to what they regarded as a contradiction between conscious and unconscious influence, for regardless of their stated views, the majority could recall brand names when asked.¹⁵ Nevertheless, it was significant surely that interviewees choose to distance themselves from advertisements.

Surprisingly, given the recent interest in the politics of consumption among historians of this period, the relationship between the advertising industry and government remains relatively understudied.¹⁶ Yet the heated debate on advertising during the war and in its immediate aftermath helps illuminate the wider struggle taking place between ‘planning’ and ‘free enterprise’ at this crucial juncture in modern British history. Drawing on the advertising press, particularly the most important trade publication at the time, Advertisers’ Weekly, this article represents an analysis of what was at stake in that debate. It is divided into three main parts. First, the contradictory situation that faced the advertising industry at the end of the war is briefly discussed. I then go on to consider how advertisers tried to conciliate government and build alliances against their political enemies. The crisis of late 1947, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, and his successor Sir Stafford Cripps following Dalton’s unexpected resignation, threatened to levy a punitive tax on advertising, provides the major focus for the article. The final section discusses the aftermath of this struggle and reflects on its significance.
Challenges and opportunities

The advertising industry may have been highly defensive at the end of the war but it was also dynamic and progressive, eager to face the challenges that it confronted. The advertising press worked hard to balance a realistic appreciation of the changed situation with hope for expansion. Government plans for nationalisation generated specific anxieties, while more generally it was feared that opponents of advertising in the Labour Party (and there were many), would force through punitive measures. Although the industry still had strong support in parliament, the four candidates with a background in advertising that stood for election in 1945 were all unsuccessful. Figures for expenditure on advertising did not provide any comfort either, as they demonstrated that the industry was stagnating or worse. Government was the largest advertiser at the end of the war and total expenditure figures for press advertising for 1945 were slightly down on those for the previous year; £14,547,268 compared to £14,593,692, due to cut backs in government advertising. Indeed, although the situation improved gradually, total expenditure on advertising did not recover to pre-war levels until 1949.

Against this challenging background, *Advertiser’s Weekly. The Organ of British Advertising* provided guidance and encouragement for those employed in the advertising industry. It was owned and edited by an ebullient American business journalist, T. J. Zimmerman, who had moved to London and purchased the periodical just after the First World War. Zimmerman transformed the paper into the most imaginative trade publication in the field, pushing aside the monthly *Advertising World* and building a substantial publishing house that eventually comprised twenty-two titles. Circulation rose steadily from about 25,000 copies a month in the late 1930s to over 40,000 a decade later, a highly
respectable figure for a trade paper, copies of which would have been passed round in offices and read by many employees.\textsuperscript{19} It sought to represent and speak for the various groups that comprised the industry, including the advertisers who funded campaigns for their goods, advertising agents that designed and orchestrated campaigns, artists and printers that did much of the creative work, and the owners of media in which advertisements appeared, most importantly the press. Not infrequently, these groups pulled in different directions, were divided between and among themselves. During the war and the Attlee years, for instance, agencies were split between the few large firms that managed to win government contracts from the Ministry of Information and later the Central Office of Information (including Bensons, London Press Exchange, and Mather & Crowther), and those smaller firms that were shut out.\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly} generally managed to skilfully harmonise these competing voices to create the appearance at least of a largely unified industry with shared interests. Moreover, that fact that Zimmerman had experienced the way in which the British state had encroached on advertising during an earlier total war was no doubt invaluable, enabling him to take a calmer view.\textsuperscript{21}

Thus, the continuing importance of government for the advertising industry was recognised at the end of the war by \textit{Advertiser’s Weekly}, which noted in August 1945 that some advertisers believed ‘that Socialism will be the biggest advertiser under the new regime’, though the paper went on to point out that this was likely to undermine agencies as expenditure would most probably be orchestrated by departments and nationalisation would have adverse effects on advertising for transport and industry.\textsuperscript{22} The dangers of state control of advertising were frequently underlined by leading figures in the industry, by the Director of the Advertising Association, J. L. Henderson, for example, at a meeting of the Glasgow Publicity Club, who also noted widespread ‘public scepticism’ concerning
advertising. Guided by Zimmerman, however, the paper tried to make the best of things, publishing the views of advertising men who stressed that it was ‘business as usual’. The editor impatiently called for advertisers to ‘Snap out of it’, to put negative thoughts to one side and adjust to the changed situation. These were ‘dog days’ for advertising, certainly, but there was no excuse for the defeatism that had spread throughout much of the industry: ‘in a profession which specialises in shouting from the housetops we never found so many tongue-tied barkers, so many shy extraverts, so many bashful showmen nor so much whispering in dark places.’ Agents ought to take the lead the editor advised, after all, it was they who had developed modern techniques of market research that had an invaluable role to play in state planning. Noting that electors had diverse motives for voting Labour the editor concluded, ‘Whatever else the country’s decision at the polls means it means a vote for a planned economy.’ There was no need, however, to over-react; ‘The Labour Party, contrary to popular belief, is not really a Socialist party’ and was pledged to work in the interests of both the working and middle classes. The need for the industry to adapt was underlined, then, but Zimmerman was also keen to reassure readers that, ‘This is not the end of free enterprise in advertising.’

The situation on the other side of the Atlantic – where advertising had successfully bounced back – was repeatedly pointed to as a beacon of hope. Writing on the theme of ‘Advertising in a Planned Economy’, a special correspondent for the paper asserted that people in Britain would also eventually demand ‘freedom of choice and ease of availability, rather than pay a large sum in taxes for State-controlled commodities, of limited range, backed by a hoard of inspecting and preventive officials.’ The idea that the situation in Britain, however adverse, was temporary and that eventually free market capitalism would inevitably reassert itself, was a running if usually subordinated theme in the immediate
post-war period, as indeed it had been during the war. Many were far less sanguine, however, and even the most optimistic commentators had to acknowledge that a renaissance was highly unlikely in the immediate future. The President of the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising, Hugh Appleton, attended the Annual Convention of the American Association of Advertising Agencies in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in April 1949 and although Appleton put a positive gloss on the prospects ahead he admitted that the British were ‘as a people, far less Advertising-conscious than you are.’ Back home enemies seemed to be everywhere; the BBC even broadcast an attack on the industry by an insider, Roger Falk, who was accused by advertising agents of representing them as ‘a cross between an American wise-cracking salesman and an English market-place huckster.’

Advertisers were naturally very concerned about economic growth and the development of new markets globally. *Advertiser’s Weekly* consequently published detailed monthly reports on the prospects for the industry in numerous countries from the end of the war, including ex-colonies such as India but also in many other spheres of interest such as the Middle East, South Africa, South America, the Far East and China, mapping markets, existing media and varied social and political contexts for its readers. Historians of advertising have recently stressed how it is mistaken to regard British advertising agencies as inexorably eclipsed by their US rivals between the wars; they opened many offices overseas and grasped opportunities made possible by empire. The US was regarded as the major competitor for trade in these markets, though in India, for example, demand for British brand name goods would remain buoyant, it was hoped, and the failure of American soap to push out British brands before the war supported this optimistic view. Having won the war as allies, the US and Britain were now regarded as fighting the battle for trade, with advertisers portraying themselves as in the front line of this conflict. The advertising press
combined this global vision with regular detailed analysis of regional economies in the UK and the future business possibilities they represented. Plans to rebuild city centres destroyed by the Luftwaffe in places like Plymouth and turn them into modern shopping wonderlands were reported enthusiastically, one writer observing that by such means ‘New Consumers are Being Assembled’.\(^{31}\) Consumer demand that had been pent-up for so long during the war – one writer estimated small savers in Yorkshire alone had accumulated £390 million – would be satisfied in shopping cities like Leeds, where over 700,000 people had attended a ‘Homes of Tomorrow’ exhibition organised by the *Yorkshire Evening Post* during August and September in 1945.\(^{32}\) If the context was hostile in many respects the outlook was by no means totally gloomy.

**Conciliation**

The advertising industry initially adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the Labour government and the policy of austerity and there was widespread recognition that it had to work within and adapt to the new environment. Complaints were constantly made, however, prompted by constraints caused by paper rationing, limits on space devoted to advertising in newspapers and firms’ shrinking budgets. Controls were strictly enforced; fines of £2,350 were imposed on Croydon Advertiser Ltd, for example, when the Ministry of Supply took action against the firm for giving too much space to advertising in its local papers.\(^{33}\) And signs were that things could get worse. The Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan – who famously described advertising during the debate over the introduction of commercial television in 1953 as ‘one of the most evil consequences of a society which is, itself, intrinsically evil’ – threatened to tighten further the legislation on patent medicines in 1946, forcing the Advertising Association to produce a tougher revised code.\(^{34}\) A Royal
Commission on the Press was set up the following year, critics in the Labour Party like Michael Foot, a leading light in the Keep Left Group established at this time, but also others such as Tom Driburg and Douglas Jay hoping that it would expose the pernicious influence exerted by advertisers who they believed held the so-called free press in thrall. 35 Interestingly, before the war Jay had been in favour of allowing the maximum freedom of choice for consumers (and hence a free rein for advertising), but had come to embrace ‘planning’ and the subordination of commercial advertising which the idea entailed. 36 The Royal Commission eventually published its report in 1949 that downplayed overt influence, much to advertisers’ relief, but until then the investigation and the threat of government intervention deeply coloured advertisers’ attitudes. Pressure on the industry increased as the country’s economic position deteriorated still further in 1947; newspapers had to reduce their size by a page from that summer or cut sales, and advertising agents faced substantial increases in rates, less frequent insertions and further reductions in space. 37

For its part, the Labour government needed advertisers to help sell austerity and plans for a welfare state to the people, which was why it became the biggest single advertiser after the war. ‘Informational’ advertising, including press and poster campaigns and documentary films about food safety, the need to increase industrial productivity and reduce waste as well as many other subjects, was therefore discussed extensively in the advertising press. 38 The Ministry of Food’s ‘crusade’ against bread waste was designed to educate consumers about the world food shortage and included ‘Battle for Bread’ exhibitions in 140 towns. The campaign was directed by the Ministry but it also involved leading agencies such as Mather & Crowther and J. Walter Thompson. 39 The editor of Advertisers’ Weekly often pointed to such activity as proof of the usefulness of the industry against its most vocal critics. But fears remained as many believed that influential Labour
politicians and intellectuals who forged policy were implacably opposed to advertising, which they regarded as ‘the very head and front of the system of free enterprise’ and that if Labour got a second term ‘a mortal blow may be struck’. Some advertising men thought that the paper went too far in its efforts to placate opponents and the editor was forced to defend the conciliatory line, which Zimmerman did in no uncertain terms.

Government was also grateful for help in its export drive, vital for Britain’s economic recovery after Lend Lease was abruptly terminated by the Truman administration. Thus, the President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, supported the British Export Trade Research Organisation (BETRO) and the British Export Trade Advertising Corporation (BETAC), which were established early in 1946 by a number of industrialists and advertising executives to provide market research and advertising services for exporters. BETAC operated in 41 countries and was headed by Sinclair Wood, a director of Pritchard, Wood & Partners. Cripps attended a luncheon organised by this body in March 1946 as chief guest and, eager to boost exports, addressed the meeting in supportive tones, although he was careful to recommend the importance of ‘advertising publicity done in a really first-class way’, and stressed that publicity ought to be part of a much wider ‘sales relation service’.

In a speech to BETRO the year after, Cripps promised government subsidy for the initiative, up to a definite point at least. He also criticised industry for not doing more itself to aid a body that was likely to prove invaluable as the economy changed from a seller’s to a buyer’s market in which skilled salesmanship would be a necessary requirement. Cripps has often been portrayed as the embodiment of austerity, but this is to simplify. Indeed, this was the label that was attached to him at the time by Lord Woolton, chairman of the Conservative Party, who used it as a weapon. Cripps may have been against the New Look and the Housewives’ League, certainly, but he also dressed smartly and indulged a taste for good
cigars, as well as using advertisers’ expertise when he believed it to be in the national interest. Significantly enough, Woolton, who as Minister of Food had been responsible for rationing during the war, was awarded the Publicity Club Cup for services to advertising in 1947.

The desire to co-operate and conciliate led advertisers to stress repeatedly the importance of putting their own house in order. The advertising press was keen to curb the worst excesses of the industry and promote ‘ethical’ advertising, remoralise their practice and reassert their professional status, in order to educate the public that advertising was honest as well as indispensable for economic growth. There was much talk of the urgent need to ‘restore faith in advertising’ and ‘rehabilitate’ the industry as we have noted. This necessarily involved a good deal of soul searching and owning up to past mistakes. The editor of Advertiser’s Weekly emphasised that exaggerated claims in copy, craftily worded sales agreements and the practice of pushing inferior goods had now to be avoided, remarking that ‘the stunts of the “foolish thirties”’ had lost them much public good will and that there was ‘growing consciousness of the consumer that advertising was not always honest.’ In similar vein, the advertising manager of The Times, W. R. Balch, observed that people had learnt to make do with substitutes during the war and needed re-educating about brands, but admitted that this would not be easy as people had gone through a period of ‘discipline and training’ in both the armed forces and industry that they would not have experienced in peacetime, and as a result they were ‘critical of private enterprise, and not easily to be persuaded. How to appeal to this new public was the question they had to face.’ The best solution, Balch maintained – and many agreed with him – was that advertisers had to clean up their act and only publicise good value, honest commodities.
Some Labour Party MPs were more sympathetic to advertisers and these were wooed assiduously. Gilbert McAllister, who had stood against Jennie Lee in North Lanark in the 1935 general election and had been elected MP for Rutherglen in 1945, addressed the Publicity Club of London in March 1946. In his address to this body, McAllister argued that ‘publicity’ was ‘a great educational force’ that ought to be used to trumpet the superiority of ‘the democratic way of life’ over totalitarianism, which at present used publicity to greater advantage: ‘In road-making and house-building before the war we were far ahead of any other country, yet the totalitarian regimes, by doing a better job of publicity, had “sold” to the world fairy tales about supermen working wonders, when in reality this country was achieving greater things.’ This theme became more important as the Cold War developed as we shall see later.48 Another friend of the industry, the emollient Minister for Town and Country Planning, Lewis Silkin, addressed the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers on the subject of outdoor advertising later that year and urged its members to make their posters more tasteful and unobtrusive. However, Silkin was keen to reassure the audience that he supported advertising generally and distanced himself from hostile critics who now seemed to be in the ascendent, though he also stressed that the countryside and the new towns could not be allowed to be defaced.49 There was a good deal of communication between Silkin and the industry before and after the passage of the Town and Country Planning Act in 1947, which tightened up the law considerably but which fell short of realising advertisers’ worst fears, despite continued pressure from bodies like the BBC and the Council for the Preservation of Rural England.50

Crisis
An Advertising Convention was held at Margate in May 1947, the first for eight years, on the theme of ‘Advertising: A Vital Stimulus to National Recovery.’ Welcoming plans for the Convention, the editor of *Advertiser’s Weekly* reminded readers:

The Margate Convention will face a new world with a new set of problems. The country has been ravaged by a world war. A Government critical of private enterprise is in power. Advertising is under heavy attack from many quarters, official, professional, and political. The whole climate of the country has changed towards our profession, not without reason. For seven years every form of advertising has been painfully restricted in volume, and therefore in vigour and attack. A generation has grown up which has no memory of advertising operating with the full range of its powers.51

The editor hoped that the industry would use the opportunity afforded by the Convention to ‘put advertising back in its proper place’ by demonstrating to government that it was not resolutely opposed to planning but rather had a vital role to play in national economic reconstruction. The Advertising Association that organised the Convention had approached Cripps, asking for his seal of approval and inviting him to address delegates. Cripps refused to attend, much to the disgust of the editor of *Advertiser’s Weekly*, who remarked that the President of the Board of Trade had merely given the event ‘a condescending pat on the head, and passed on’.52

It fell to Glenvil Hall, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, to represent the Government at the Convention, which attracted between 500 and 600 advertising people. In his speech to delegates, Hall joked about the event serving as a ‘curtain-raiser’ to the Labour Party Conference that was taking place a few weeks later (the joke fell flat), and also stressed that Government, which was spending about £3 million a year on advertising,
needed the industry’s services to help both inform and inspire the population. Replying for
the industry, F. P. Bishop, chairman of the executive committee of the Advertising
Association and one of the industry’s key ideologists in post-war Britain, portrayed
advertising as incompatible with social democracy, owing to its historical roots and
economic function. Bishop liked to take a comprehensive, philosophical view:

The task of advertising during the last three hundred years...had been to condition
the consumer to the rising standard of living made possible by machine production.
It might be that in our own day they were confronted with a change – with the
function of conditioning people for a return to a medieval planned economy.

Advertising was essentially involved in the system of capitalistic free enterprise
(applause). For Bishop, planning was by definition anti-modern and backward looking, ‘medieval’ in fact.
Advertising on the other hand was integrally bound up with ‘free enterprise’, which had
literally delivered the goods for consumers since the mid-seventeenth century, first in
Britain and then in the West more generally, as agricultural and industrial capitalism had
spread. The idea that advertising and an expanding economy went hand in hand was also
frequently reiterated in the Advertising Association’s journal, re-launched to coincide with
the Margate Convention. A leading article in the first number denounced government
control of advertising that would ‘take us back to an unchanging state like that of one of the
civilisation’s of the Orient, “half as old as time”...a certain way to poverty.’ The journal’s
editor concluded that the key object of the Convention, which had been to get government
on side, had failed.

One of the reasons why advertisers were so anxious about their future was that they
were aware that Dalton had wanted to impose a punitive tax on advertisements since the
end of the war. Indeed, Dalton’s hostility towards advertising and consumer culture more generally went back much further than that; speaking at a Fabian Society conference in 1934 he had remarked that, ‘A dictatorship of consumption was desirable...There would be less dislocation on the producers’ side if the caprice of consumers’ expenditure were controlled.’ Advertisers’ worst fears were confirmed when the Chancellor announced his intention of introducing such a tax in the Finance Bill in November 1947. Under this scheme, only half rather than the full amount of a company’s expenditure on advertising (except for the export and trade press) would be allowed to be written off for tax purposes. Dalton wanted to damp down inflationary pressure by reducing demand for luxury goods and those in short supply or unavailable, cut out the wastage of labour power and strengthen the export drive. After Dalton resigned following the budget leak, his successor as Chancellor, Sir Stafford Cripps, continued the attack. Cripps hoped that pursuing a demand management strategy would solve the very serious monetary and fiscal crisis that faced the country; though Advertiser’s Weekly reckoned his approach was ‘more reminiscent of the early Fabian than of the Keynesian economics of 1947’, modern historians such as Peter Clarke have argued convincingly that this budget was indeed classic Keynes. Like Dalton, during the depression of the 1930s Cripps had believed that consumer wants should be subordinated under a system of government planning. He criticised the production of luxury goods while the majority experienced scarcity and concluded that ‘unless you can plan the whole consumption of a country against its whole production you never can distribute abundance.’ However, Cripps’s position had become more contradictory by the late 1940s. Keen to balance the compulsions required by state planning with the individual freedom necessary in a democracy, for example, he sometimes expressed the hope that the Co-operative movement would help regulate consumer demand. As Richard Toye has
observed, a ‘dictatorship of consumption’ was not on his agenda by this time. Nevertheless, and despite such ambiguities, it was little wonder surely that as far as advertisers were concerned, the proposed tax on advertising was another sign of government hostility to free enterprise and the rising tide of planning, which threatened their very raison d’être.

The advertising industry sent deputations to the Chancellor and the Advertising Association immediately launched a co-ordinated campaign against the tax in the country and in parliament. The association’s journal, which was not usually alarmist, portrayed the challenge to the industry as profoundly serious. The confrontation it argued had been coming for some time; pressure from government had been mounting since the end of the war, with the ban on goodwill advertising being rigorously enforced more than it had been in the past. The editor of the journal referred to the refusal by the Ministry of Food in January 1946 to allow advertising as an item of cost by a manufacturer of a famous branded product. The Town and Country Planning Act, which would seriously curtail outdoor advertising, was seen as another aspect of a wider assault. Careful not to blame Cripps personally whose motives were accepted as genuine, the journal nevertheless accused his supporters of having ‘ulterior motives’, for many of them ‘regard both Advertising and the Press as fair game for their political spleen. Advertising is just another part of capitalism that can be struck down.’ The ultimate threat facing the industry was no less than ‘direct control of advertisement, both as to volume and character, for and on behalf of the Government.’ The industry’s spokesmen pointed to critics like Kingsley Martin at the *New Statesman*, who was greatly alarmed by the economic waste represented by ‘de-concentration’ and the return of brand names to market soft drinks and petrol. However, much to advertisers’ relief, within less than a month Cripps indicated that he was willing to compromise,
accepting a voluntary plan for regulation put together by the Federation of British Industries and overseen by a Conservative MP, Isaac Pitman. Cripps agreed to a year’s trial of what he described as the ‘workmanlike’ plan in February 1948, which it was estimated would represent a cut of 15% for luxury and scarce goods. It covered all kinds of media – outdoor, press, exhibitions, films and direct mail – and 10,000 copies of the plan were distributed to national advertisers, agencies, retail and trade associations that were asked to sign up.

It would be misleading to suggest that Cripps was not keen on this tax or that he backtracked easily, as have a number of historians. The right wing press was naturally delighted when the proposed tax was shelved. The Daily Express had condemned it from the start as an attempt by the state to re-impose the ‘taxes on knowledge’ which had been abolished in 1853 and underlined the case for advertising’s role in promoting economic growth. The Express welcomed Cripps’ decision to drop the tax and so did the Daily Mail, though the papers also reported the fact that Cripps had threatened to revive the tax in the April budget if advertisers proved reluctant to fall in line. Taunts made in the Commons by Oliver Stanley, MP for Bristol West, about the Chancellor having performed ‘infanticide’ on an ‘infant’ that was not his own incensed Cripps, who rose ‘grim-faced and white’, slapped the Treasury box and ‘glaring’ at Stanley exclaimed, ‘I was just as much responsible for the advertisement tax and as much in agreement with it as Mr Dalton.’

Fully understanding that the Chancellor meant business, Pitman was keen to placate Cripps and assure him that the industry strongly supported the government at this moment of national crisis. And most of the industry duly signed up. By late May 1948 Pitman could report that a total of 196 trade associations, 3,221 individual advertisers, 298 advertising agencies and 375 media owners had lent their support; nearly 400 of those advertisers who regularly spent more than £5,000 per annum, out of a total of less than 600, had already
affirmed the plan. However, there were also calls for the voluntary agreement to be dropped as soon as the immediate crisis had passed and this pressure increased from late summer 1948, though Cripps insisted that the plan needed to be extended for another year, despite the fact that the economy picked up slightly and more consumer goods started to appear in the shops. By Christmas the plan was dropped, advertisers congratulating themselves that they had done their bit and proved their usefulness, though the struggle undoubtedly strengthened the belief that the industry would not be safe until Labour had been removed from power. Indeed from this time onwards, the necessity of a specifically ideological campaign against advertising’s critics was frequently urged. This was the key theme, for example, of the ‘Convention in print’ published in *Advertiser’s Weekly* in the summer of 1948. The line now taken was far more combative and less conciliatory than before, the tone shriller. W. D. C. Cormac, for example, warned that the ‘barrier of resistance to advertising’ encouraged by ‘so-called intellectuals’ represented, ‘the most dangerous menace to our livelihood which has ever existed.’

Advertisers mounted a staunch campaign against the threat of taxation and used a number of key arguments in their defence. They maintained predictably that the tax was practically unworkable in many respects and restricted ‘freedom of choice’ for consumers even more than at present. But the crisis also forced the industry’s ideologues to develop reasons that were rather more elevated. Most important, apologists increasingly conflated advertising with democracy. This line was employed before Dalton and Cripps’ assault, by the editor of *Advertiser’s Weekly* in autumn 1946, for instance, who asserted that advertising was the ‘Basis for Democracy’ and that if left-wing moralists and economists like Nicholas Kaldor got their way, ‘they will be guilty of pulling down the structure on which democracy, so rightly valued, is dependent.’ Early the following year John Nicholas in a
lecture to the Publicity Club of London entitled, ‘Democracy cannot be made to work without Advertising’, distinguished between advertising and propaganda, affinities between which had typically been asserted by the industry’s critics. According to Nicholas, while free economies and societies used the former, servile states characterised by dictatorial forms of state planning used the latter. He made the contrast in the most colourful, sexist language he could muster:

If democracy doesn’t use advertising, it has to use propaganda – and propaganda is an anonymous lying harlot, a secret and corrupt woman whose brazen and furtive mischief has wrecked Europe more than once. Advertising is not a branch of propaganda...advertising is the corrective of propaganda, the antidote, the prophylactic. Advertising properly used protected the public mind against the wild words of the agitator, against the emotional fevers of the demagogue, against the subtle partisanship of the leader writer, the pamphleteer and the inspired article.77

Nicolas puffed advertising as a cure-all, quite capable he believed of convincing American citizens of the rightness of the US loan to the British state, or Germans of the necessity of the Occupation, or even ‘straightening out the relations between Labour and Capital’ domestically. However, the context remained extremely unpropitious and the fact that the Labour government was now spending about £3,000,000 a year on advertising was regarded by many commentators as an ominous sign that it was propaganda that now had the upper hand in Britain, a point also frequently made by Tory leaders such as Lord Woolton, who called for it to be drastically curtailed.78

The developing Cold War was a boon to those who wished to collapse together democracy and advertising. In an important article, Stefan Schwarzkopf has shown how advertising professionals capitalised on the increasing ideological polarisation that occurred
in the late 1940s, portraying themselves as champions of Western ideas of ‘freedom’ and ‘consumer choice’, which they frequently elided. This was the dominant theme of the International Advertising Convention organised by the Advertising Association in London in 1951, which carried the strap line, ‘The Task of Advertising in a Free World’. People like Nicholas and F. P. Bishop, who published two book length ripostes to critics in the 1940s, readily employed the emerging discourse of ‘totalitarianism’ to support their case.

Influenced by Friedrich Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom* (1944) they sought a loftier vision. For Nicholas, utilitarian arguments in support of advertising were not enough, the battle needed to be waged on a much higher, more spiritual, level. He asked rhetorically, ‘Of what good are your export and marketing campaigns...if the morals of the world’s markets is disrupted by communistic advertising and propaganda?’ And Nicholas went on to warn that, ‘If we didn’t want to fight Russia sooner or later we should have to outsell her in the ideological market.’ For Bishop, who won Harrow for the Conservative Party in February 1950, free consumer choice underpinned political freedom; indeed the latter was only made possible by the former. Dictatorship, including an ‘economic planning commission with dictatorial powers’, were forms of ‘totalitarianism’ and therefore fundamentally opposed to ‘free enterprise’ and the lifeblood of the economic system, a free press and ‘competitive advertising’.

Conservative politicians such as Harold Macmillan found such arguments highly appealing, naturally, delighting guests at a luncheon organised by the Advertising Association at the Savoy early in 1949 with an encomium to an industry that he asserted represented ‘the essential defence of individualism, of private choice, of personal taste, of consumers’ rights, of all the things, in a word, that distinguish a free from a servile economy.’ Anthony Eden voiced similar sentiments when guest of honour at the dinner
held at the Dorchester the following year to mark the jubilee of the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising.84

If the Cold War emboldened the supporters of advertising, conversely it cut the ground from under those who wished to constrain the industry. The growth of anti-Soviet feeling, fuelled by most of the popular press and geo-political events, served to strengthen the arguments of British advertisers who had forged close relationships with their counterparts in the US for decades; one of the largest agencies in the country, J. Walter Thompson, was American owned, even if the London office enjoyed a large degree of autonomy.85 As we have noted, Cripps hoped to balance socialist planning with consumer freedom, but this became more and more difficult when planning of any kind could be convincingly portrayed as signalling the threat of communism, a homegrown variety of ‘totalitarianism’. Announced in summer 1947, Marshall Aid represented a key moment, forcing people to make stark choices and splitting the left. Although the links between Marshall Aid and the spread of consumer culture were far from straightforward, and historians have rightly questioned simplistic accounts of ‘Americanization’, connections did exist, if not immediately then in the medium and long term.86 In the 1950s, forms such as the self-service supermarket, for instance, came to symbolise the consumer good life made possible by American free enterprise, and Marshall Aid helped cement this identification, albeit often in oblique ways; the popularity of supermarkets was encouraged by fact-finding tours of the US by British retailers funded through the programme.87 And it is not coincidental surely that Aneurin Bevan, who continued to declaim against advertising, was also a critic of Atlanticism. For his part, as Chancellor of the Exchequer struggling to deal with a dire financial crisis, Cripps had little alternative but to accept Marshall Aid. In a speech he gave in summer 1948, Cripps praised Secretary of State George Marshall for
having the ‘vision’ to recognise that ‘Western European democracy’ would not survive without American support for economic reconstruction. Cripps went on to note how the term ‘cold war’ was now being used to describe the struggle ‘between two very different conceptions of the way of life of nations’, and although he reaffirmed commitment to ‘an economy planned to serve the community as a whole’, he concluded by stressing that he ‘adhere(d) firmly and unalterably to what we conceive to be the democratic way of life in which the individual counts as a human being, whose freedom must be preserved to think, act and talk as he likes.’

**Conclusion**

It was the threat of taxation and the indignity of the voluntary plan that forced advertisers to take sides more openly in the increasingly polarised contest between planning and free enterprise in Britain in the late 1940s. For years, most ideologists of advertising had feigned political impartiality but this could no longer be maintained. As J. Fordham Sadler put it in a letter to the *Journal of the Advertising Association* in autumn 1948, advertisers had to come off the fence for if planning finally triumphed in this country, ‘there will be just as many opportunities for advertising men as there are in Moscow.’ The industry had to acknowledge the fact, Sadler continued, that ‘the future of advertising, like our very existence, is a political matter.’ A more bullish approach was also encouraged by the gradual shift from a seller’s to a buyer’s market with more choice for consumers; the gradual easing of constraints imposed by the shortage of newsprint and the voluntary reduction in expenditure made prospects appear much brighter. *Advertiser’s Weekly* summarised in detail an article in the *Statistical Review* that appeared in January 1950, which reported that press advertising expenditure for 1949 had at last surpassed pre-war
levels, reaching over £30.5 million. Even more promising, the figure for the last quarter of the year was up nearly 55 per cent over the corresponding quarter for 1948 – the highest ever recorded for a single quarter.\textsuperscript{91}

Not surprisingly, relations between the advertising industry and government became more hostile. Labour Party threats to nationalise sugar refining provoked a wide scale campaign against nationalisation from the summer of 1949, which was funded by Tate and Lyle and orchestrated by Aims of Industry, a pro-free enterprise pressure group with close links to the Conservative Party that had been founded seven years before by business leaders. Packets of sugar carried a cartoon character Mr. Cube, who exhorted consumers to back ‘Tate not State’. Various techniques were employed to win over the public, including cardboard ration book holders and Mr. Cube cut-outs for children that were distributed through grocery stores, propaganda films, a board game and even a dance. Press advertisements for the ‘Sugar Consumers’ Petition’ aided the collection of over one million signatures. Lord Lyle, who became a director of Aims of Industry in 1950, thought the sharp increase in his company’s advertising expenditure money well spent and envisaged more would be necessary in the future.\textsuperscript{92}

It is impossible to say with any certainty what effect this anti-government advertising had on the result of the February 1950 general election, which saw Labour’s majority slashed to a mere five seats in the Commons, but it was hardly likely to have been positive. In private advertisers worried about the legality of such advertising or if it contravened existing statutes regarding election expenses; in its confidential quarterly bulletin, for example, the Institute of Incorporated Practitioners in Advertising issued members careful advice about how to remain on the right side of the law.\textsuperscript{93} The situation was fluid and advertisers were themselves divided on whether they should line up openly on the side of
free enterprise, understandable given the fact that many agencies were heavily dependent on government contracts. An editorial in *Advertiser’s Weekly* that appeared a week before the election urged readers to take sides as ‘one cannot divorce politics from economics’ but also attempted to reconcile such contradictory imperatives. Doubting that a Conservative majority would usher in a ‘golden age of advertising’ immediately, the alternative continued the editor would be far worse, including the likely introduction of Consumer Advice Centres.94 The tone became much more strident after the polls. A front page article declared the result a decisive victory against further nationalisation, strongly implying that anti-nationalisation advertising had had ‘some effect on the anti-Socialist vote’, and noting approvingly that the campaign would continue in sugar, meat distribution, cold storage and cement.95 By the summer a decidedly combative stance had been adopted, Zimmerman suggesting that the Advertising Convention that was being planned for the year following ‘should be a battle school for advertising as a militant force in the war for a free world.’96

Though it has been largely overlooked by historians, the attack on commercial advertising that came to a head in 1947 represented a serious challenge to the industry. Ideologists of advertising interpreted it as such at the time; it convinced them that their industry would never be safe until a Conservative government was returned to power and they worked hard to bring that about. After Cripps reluctantly backed off, they waged a sophisticated, on-going campaign to make advertising respectable and insinuate commercial discourse into political as well as economic life. This was no easy task in the early 1950s. Heated debate preceded the introduction of commercial television in 1955, for example, which provoked anxieties across the political spectrum.97 However, the attack on advertising from the labour movement now lacked its earlier focus as part of a more sustained critique of capitalism. When the literary intellectual Richard Hoggart declaimed against the industry
towards the end of the decade, he employed liberal Leavisite arguments, along with the snobbishness they entailed. More radical critics that came to identify with the New Left looked instead to Frankfurt School Marxism for inspiration, although Raymond Williams’ insightful essay on the subject borrowed heavily from Thompson’s *Voice of Civilisation*, not least by insisting against those who claimed that advertising was as old as civilisation itself that modern advertising was actually a quite recent development, closely bound up with the growth of monopoly capitalism from the late nineteenth century. But the case against commercial advertising failed to resonate widely in newly ‘affluent’ Britain and was no longer mainstream in the labour movement, as it had been during and immediately after the war against fascism.

**Acknowledgements**

Different versions of this paper were presented at the Centre for Cultural and Social History, University of Essex, June 2014, the Social History Society Annual Conference, University of Lancaster, April 2016, and the Department of Economic and Social History, University of Glasgow, October 2016. My thanks to participants at these events for their suggestions, particularly Sean Nixon, James Taylor, Michael French and Neil Rollings. At the History of Advertising Trust archive, Eve Read was most helpful. I am also most grateful for the advice of the journals’ anonymous readers.

**Notes**

2 Roodhouse, *Black Market Britain*. 
See Schwarzkopf, “Advertising, Cultural Authority and the Governance of Consumption in England”; James Taylor, ““A Fascinating Show for John Citizen and his Wife.””

Saxon Mills, There is a Tide, 158.

Clampin, “The Role of Commercial Advertising,” 342. See also Clampin, Advertising and propaganda in World War II; Haughton, “Justifying British Advertising.”

Thompson, Voice of Civilisation, 94.

Ibid., 161.

Mannheim lectured at the London School of Economics in the 1930s, then at the Institute of Education during the war. A revised and enlarged edition of his magnum opus, Man and Society In an Age of Reconstruction, which Thompson cites extensively, was published in English in 1940.

Thompson, Voice of Civilisation, 199. Unfortunately, Thompson has been largely overlooked by historians, though there are some useful leads in Hilliard, English as a Vocation.

Advertiser’s Weekly, August 23, 1945.

See Nixon, Hard Sell, 165-75; Black, The political culture of the left in affluent Britain; Thompson, “The Reception of J. K. Galbraith.”

Thompson, “Hobson and the Fabians”; Social Opulence and Private Restraint, 61-5 passim; Gurney, Co-operative Culture; Catterall, Labour and the Free Churches.

Advertiser’s Weekly, August 16, 1945, italics in original; June 12, 1947. The later intervention was an essay Thompson contributed to Laws (ed.), Made for Millions.

Advertiser’s Weekly, March 6, 1947.

The subject is overlooked, for example, by Zwieniger-Bargielowska, *Austerity in Britain*; Roodhouse, *Black Market Britain*; and Hilton, *Consumerism in Twentieth-Century Britain*.

*Advertiser’s Weekly*, August 2, 1945. Two of the candidates were Conservatives, one was a Liberal, and one stood for the Common Wealth Party, though the latter withdrew before the polls.


Ibid., August 2, 1945.

Ibid., October 10, 1946.

Ibid., August 2, 1945.

Ibid., August 16, 1945.


*Advertiser’s Weekly*, February 7, 1946.

See, for example, ibid., September 6, 1945.

Advertiser’s Weekly, September 6, 1945.

Ibid., August 16, 1945.

Ibid., November 29, 1945.

Ibid., January 24, 1946.

Ibid., April 4, 1946; July 25, 1946; Nixon, Hard Sell, 164.

Advertiser’s Weekly, March 21, 1946; October 31, 1946.

Toye, “‘The Gentleman in Whitehall’ reconsidered.”

Advertiser’s Weekly, July 17, 1947.

The extensive coverage devoted to the uses of documentary film in the advertising press supports Nixon’s observation about the influence of the documentary tradition on British advertising in the later period. See Nixon, Hard Sell, 12, 112-13.

Advertiser’s Weekly, March 21, 1946.

Ibid., July 18, 1946.

Ibid., April 4, 1946.


Advertiser’s Weekly, March 7, 1946.


Clarke, The Cripps version, 504-5.


Ibid., December 13, 1945.

A reading that chimes with a classic statement of the ‘optimistic’ view of the industrial revolution put forward in *Capitalism and the Historians*, the influential collection of essays edited seven years later by Friedrich Hayek.


56 Ibid., 5 no. 3 (January 1948), 30-1.

57 Cited in Toye, “‘The Gentleman in Whitehall’ reconsidered”, 190.

58 *Advertiser’s Weekly*, November 20, 1947; November 27, 1947; Clarke, *The Cripps version*.

59 Need for planning to arrange consumption. Untitled, undated essay. MS Cripps 716, 7.

60 A New Britain in a New World, February 3, 1945. MS Cripps 137, 30-2, 46-8; Speech to London Co-operative Society, February 20, 1946. MS Cripps 275, 10-12.


62 The wider business community also felt squeezed at this time by increased taxation of dividends. On this see Blank, *Government and Industry in Britain*, 94-104; Whiting, “Taxation policy, ” 117-35.

63 *Journal of the Advertising Association* 5 no. 3 (January 1948), 2-7; 17-20.

64 Ibid., 5 no. 2 (September 1947), 15; *New Statesman and Nation*, August 23, 1947.

66 Ibid., February 19, 1948.


68 Daily Express, November 27, 1947.

69 Ibid., December 4, 1947; Daily Mail, December 4, 1947.


71 Ibid., May 27, 1948; Journal of the Advertising Association 5 no. 5 (July 1948), 4-8.

72 Advertiser’s Weekly, May 20, 1948; May 27, 1948; September 23, 1948; October 21, 1948.

73 Ibid., December 23, 1948; January 6, 1949.

74 Ibid., July 1, 1948.

75 Ibid., November 20, 1947.

76 Ibid., October 17, 1946.

77 Ibid., March 6, 1947. Advertisers’ appropriation of the concept of democracy is also noted by Haughton, “Justifying British Advertising,” 400, 413.

78 Advertiser’s Weekly, September 16, 1948.

79 Schwarzkopf, “They do it With Mirrors.”

80 Bishop’s books were The Economics of Advertising and The Ethics of Advertising. The latter text was eulogised by and serialised in the trade press.

81 Advertiser’s Weekly, December 9, 1948.

82 Ibid., January 6, 1949.

83 Ibid., February 10, 1949.

84 Ibid., October 5, 1950.


*Journal of the Advertising Association* 5 no. 6 (October, 1948), 29-30.

Ibid., 5 no. 7 (January 1949), 6-9.

*Advertiser’s Weekly*, March 2, 1950; Clayton, “Advertising expenditure in 1950s Britain.”


*Advertiser’s Weekly*, February 16, 1950. For a later attack on the idea of Consumer Advice Centres, see August 10, 1950.

Ibid., March 2, 1950. The paper quoted Morgan Phillips, the Secretary of the Labour Party, who estimated that ‘an organisation, financed by business’ had spent about £20,000 per month campaigning against Labour over the previous year.

Ibid., July 6, 1950.

Gurney, “The Battle of the Consumer,” 969-72; Nixon, “‘Salesmen of the Will to Want.””
Williams, “The Magic System.” An expanded version of this essay was later published in *Problems in Materialism and Culture*. See also Thompson’s remarks in Laws (ed), *Made for Millions*, 78; Madeleine Davis, “Arguing affluence.”

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