

The Influence of Structural and Perceived Privilege on
Political Participation in the United Kingdom

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Abstract

This thesis addresses the question of how structural and perceived privilege impact on political participation in the United Kingdom. In doing so it adopts the causal propositions of the Civic Voluntarism Model as its starting point and adds Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of economic, social, and cultural capital, which are argued to encompass structural privilege. Perception of privilege is posited to be constituted by self-perceived status, explanations for that status, and explanations for status differences in society. Subsequent politically relevant components are perceptions of the difference and privilege of politically active people. Thus, the thesis proposes a model running from background characteristics through capital profiles to perception of privilege and thence political engagement and participation. An original survey covering these areas was designed and fielded online to a representative sample of 1,480 British adults. The resultant data is analysed using structural equation modelling, which allows for the simultaneous estimation of underlying tendencies and the structural relationship between them. The results of that model generally support the causal hypotheses of the research, as well as providing evidence of the impact of the three forms of capital and perception of privilege. In particular, a strong positive effect of legitimate cultural capital is observed and found to be more important in influencing political participation than the previously observed effects of social and economic capital. In addition, perception of privilege is found to promote participation and to channel people towards individualised political activities, especially where they subscribe to the fundamental attribution error. These effects are as hypothesised and confirm the role of both structural and perceived privilege in influencing political participation in the United Kingdom.

Shout Outs

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¹ We need to have a vote on whether to induct Alfie as an honorary member; I assume the result will be a landslide in favour.

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Introduction: A Motivating Conundrum

From the minister proclaiming that election turnout is important to the anti-cuts campaigner recruiting to their local group there is recognition that democracy, however envisaged, cannot function without public involvement. As such the concern about declining participation amongst those who practice politics has been matched by the piquing of academic interest in the topic.² That interest has been additionally keen because of the mixed political engagement effects of rising levels of education, which had been anticipated to deliver a participatory dividend.³ However, the focus on those topics is only a contemporary manifestation of one of the key motivating conundrums of political behaviour research: why do people participate or not in political activity?⁴ This is a question that has been considered extensively through three overarching approaches to explaining behaviour; those of rational choice, psychology, and sociology.

Rational choice theory has been one of the most influential in political science and, in its mainstream form, posits that individuals are self-interested utility maximisers with existing sets of preferences. Further it argues that they have the ability, when confronted with a choice, to rank options and choose the most beneficial to themselves.⁵ Using the classic example of voting, rational choice theory suggests that individuals will rank parties' policies against their preferences, assess the benefits to themselves of each party being elected, consider the chance that their vote will affect the outcome of the election, and calculate the costs to themselves of

² John Curtice and Ben Seyd, 'Is there a crisis of political participation?', in Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Lindsey Jarvis, Catherine Bromley (eds.), *British Social Attitudes, The 20th Report (2003/2004 Edition): Continuity and change over two decades* (London, Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 93-104; Susan E. Scarrow, 'Declining memberships, changing members? European political party members in a new era', *Party Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 6 (May, 2010), pp. 823-843; Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen, 'Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000', *Party Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 5 (2001), pp. 5-21.

³ Curtice and Seyd, 'Is there a crisis of political participation', p. 93; Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Citizens and Political Behavior', in Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 3-26, p. 14; Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, 'Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2, (Jun., 1995), pp. 271-294; Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 73-74.

⁴ Max Kaase, 'Perspectives on Political Participation', in Dalton and Klingemann, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, pp. 783-796.

⁵ Hugh Ward, 'Rational Choice', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 65-89, pp. 68-71.

voting. The exceptionally low chance of any individual vote influencing the outcome of an election leads the theory to suggest that most people should not vote. Thus emerges the much-studied paradox of voting in which most (or at least many) people turn out to vote despite it being strictly irrational for them to do so.⁶ This is especially the case because voting is an example of collective action in which the benefits of the outcome (i.e. the election of a government and implementation of its policies) cannot be withheld from non-voters.⁷

It has been argued that voting is poor example of behaviour with which to test rational choice theory because it is such a low cost and low benefit activity.⁸ Nevertheless, the debates around the paradox of voting have had implications for rational choice theory as it is applied to other behaviour. Additional components of the calculations that underpin political behaviour have been proposed, for example in terms encompassing duty and other expressive motivations.⁹ In fact, a general incentives model encompassing selective, collective, and expressive motivations has been found to do a good job of accounting for party activism, and voluntary and political activity more generally, in the context of the United Kingdom.¹⁰ However, it has been argued that such additions, whilst adding explanatory power, run the risk of tautology and may undermine the case that the models remain meaningfully about instrumental rationality.¹¹ Crucially, such additions also point to the social contexts that create and give meaning to expressive motivations.¹² Thus, the process of amending rational choice models has raised questions about how motivations and preferences emerge.

Another amendment to rational choice theory has proposed that individuals act with bounded rationality, which is to say that they have incomplete information and that their

⁶ William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, 'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Mar., 1968), pp. 25-42, p. 25.

⁷ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups* (New York, Schocken Books, 1968), p. 50.

⁸ John H. Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 247-278.

⁹ Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings, 'Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 2011), pp. 645-670.

¹⁰ Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, Jeremy Richardson, and Paul Bissell, 'Explaining Party Activism: The Case of the British Conservative Party', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 79-94. Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.181.

¹¹ André Blais, *To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory* (Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp. 4-5.

¹² Hamlin and Jennings, 'Expressive Political Behaviour', pp. 657-661.

calculations may be imperfect.¹³ In that light individuals may satisfice by alighting on the first satisfactory option rather than expending the effort to obtain all information and identify the optimum option. Further, they may deploy heuristics, or decision-making shortcuts, rather than going through the laborious process of ranking all the options against their preferences. As an example, an individual who votes for a party because it has historically been associated with the interests of their class is deploying a heuristic, rather than being purely rational by assessing the potential impact of its policies. This could also constitute an example of satisficing if an alternative party would actually be the optimum choice based on consideration of their policies. This may imply that bounded rationality leads to poor decision making but, in fact, it has been argued that the efficient decision-making that results, and which can take in more than purely instrumental considerations, is ‘*more than rational*’.¹⁴

By introducing the idea of shortcuts to speed up decision-making, the amendments of bounded rationality bridge the divide between rational choice theory and psychological approaches to accounting for human behaviour. One such approach has proposed that humans have two systems, based on intuition and reason, that function in parallel to enable decision making.¹⁵ Intuitive thoughts, such as heuristics, are highly accessible and frequently used making them a fast route via which to make decisions. Intuitive thoughts are thus the basis for most easy day-to-day decision-making but are monitored by the more considered, and slower, reason-based system. That system assesses the appropriateness of decisions in light of the context and amends or tweaks them as necessary. Elsewhere these have been referred to as the disposition and the surveillance systems, and it has been argued that the latter system is activated by negative emotional responses to inappropriate decisions or behaviour stemming from the former system. It is thus posited that, far from being irrational, emotion has a key role

¹³ Herbert A. Simon, ‘Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science’, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Jun., 1985), pp. 293-304.

¹⁴ Arthur Lupia, ‘Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting in California Insurance Reform Elections’, *The American Political Science Review*, Col. 88, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 63-76; Jon Elster, *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 342.

¹⁵ Daniel Kahneman, ‘A Perspective on Judgement and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality’, *American Psychologist*, Vol. 58, No. 9 (Sep., 2003), pp. 697-720.

to play in improving decision-making and behaviour, affirming when they're appropriate but prompting review when they're not.¹⁶

A key feature of the intuition or disposition system is that it is immediately available and thus allows fast responses, which points to the importance of the concept of accessibility in the psychological approach to explaining behaviour. It has been repeatedly observed that the opinions expressed by humans are based, to a large extent, on the information that is most accessible to them.¹⁷ Thus, although humans may possess underlying values (of varying strengths), the particular opinions that they express on, amongst others, political issues will also be affected by the information that they access in their minds. The importance of available information means that opinions may also be affected by exposure to the prevailing narratives that exist in a particular context.¹⁸ This, of course, has implications for political behaviour because prevailing narratives may be stocked with information that promotes or stifles political participation, for instance if individuals are socially connected to others who express scepticism and uncertainty about political participation.¹⁹

The fact that the decision-making processes studied by the psychological approach are affected by prevailing information and social norms points to the importance of the sociological approach to accounting for behaviour. This approach focuses on the role of social structures in defining behaviours and access to opportunities. In so doing it addresses a major weakness of the psychological and, especially, the rational choice approaches, which is their lack of consideration of individuals' differential ability to behave in particular ways, for instance by getting involved in politics. The sociological approach suggests the possibility that such differences in ability to participate may be due to advantage or disadvantage stemming from social structures. Crucially, such explanations are arguably causally prior to those offered

¹⁶ George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman and Michael McKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 46-64.

¹⁷ Roger Tourangeau, Lance J. Rips, and Kenneth Rasinski, *The Psychology of Survey Response* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 7-8, pp. 62-99.

¹⁸ John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 40-49, pp. 59-75.

¹⁹ Julia Partheymüller and Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, 'A "Social Logic" of Demobilization: The Influence of Political Discussants on Electoral Participation at the 2009 German Federal Election', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov., 2012), pp. 457-478.

by the psychological and rational choice approaches, in that social structures are likely to affect individual psychological dispositions and processes as well as the calculus of decision-making rather than vice-versa. In other words, whether or not one can get involved in politics precedes whether or not one decides to do so.

Drawing on the sociological approach, the idea that politics in the United Kingdom is dominated by those with inherited advantage is supported by the unrepresentative prevalence of privately educated white men in Parliament.²⁰ Thus, privilege, albeit often filtered through class narratives in public discourse, is highly relevant to the context of the United Kingdom.²¹ Beyond being folk wisdom, though, the importance of privilege may offer an answer to the opening conundrum. Indeed, research has suggested that despite the emergence of new forms of political activity, participation remains structured by inequalities, and there is 'very little evidence of a more level participatory playing field' in politics.²²

Answering the question of why people do or do not participate in politics with the refrain that 'it's all down to privilege', however, is hardly satisfactory. This is not least because the status of that sentiment as folk wisdom suggests that holding such a belief, or perceiving

²⁰ The Sutton Trust 'The Educational Background of Members of Parliament 2010', *The Sutton Trust*, Monday 10 May 2010, viewed at http://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/IMPs_educational_backgrounds_2010_A.pdf on 27.08.2013; Afua Hirsch, 'UK Election results: Number of minority ethnic MPs almost doubles', *The Guardian*, Friday 7 May 2010, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/07/black-minority-ethnic-mps-2010> on 27.08.2013; Kira Cochrane, 'Election results for women to celebrate – and worry about', *The Guardian*, Friday 7 May 2010, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/07/women-parliament-election-losses-wins> on 27.08.2013.

²¹ Nadia Gilani, 'Snobbery is in a class of its own', *Metro*, Monday 07 October 2013, viewed at <http://metro.co.uk/2013/10/07/are-you-a-snob-4134407/> on 25.10.2013; Jonathan Freedland, 'British stereotypes: do mention the war, please!' *The Guardian*, Thursday 26 January 2012, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/26/british-stereotypes-please-mention-war> on 27.08.2013; Stephanie Flanders, 'Do we really want more social mobility?', *BBC*, Monday 24 June 2013, viewed at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-23040308> on 27.08.2013, and accompanying programme listened to at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b02yjf15> on 01.07.2013; Hannah Richardson, 'Elite Firms "exclude bright working class"', *BBC*, Monday 15 June 2015, viewed at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-33109052> on 12.08.2015; Will Hutton, 'State or private? Painful school choice that still fuels inequality in Britain', *The Guardian*, Sunday 28 June 2015, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/28/state-or-private-education-painful-decision-britains-class-divide> on 12.08.2015; Katherine Sellgren, 'Privately educated graduates "earn more" than state school colleagues', *BBC*, Thursday 06 August 2015, viewed at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-33775082> on 12.08.2015; Owen Jones, Stephen Moss, Lucy Mangan, Imogen Fox, and Archie Bland, 'How to pass the posh test: "Do you know Marmaduke Von Snittlebert?"', *The Guardian*, Monday 15 June 2015, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/15/posh-test-privately-educated-war-pros-and-cons-pass> on 12.08.2015; Tom Beardsworth and William Pimlott, 'Buller, Buller, Buller! Just who is the modern Bullingdon Club boy?', *London Evening Standard*, Friday 12 April 2013, viewed at <http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/esmagazine/buller-buller-buller-just-who-is-the-modern-bullingdon-club-boy-8568320.html> on 12.08.2015; Louise Mensch, 'How about some reality-based feminism?', *The Guardian*, Thursday 30 May 2013, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/30/reality-based-feminism-louise-mensch> on 13.08.2015; Laurie Penny, 'Louise Mensch, take a lesson on privilege from the internet', *The Guardian*, Friday 31 May 2013, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/31/louise-mensch-privilege-internet> on 13.08.2015; Hadley Freeman, 'Check your privilege! Whatever that means', *The Guardian*, Wednesday 05 June 2013, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/jun/05/check-your-privilege-means> on 13.08.2015; Zoe Williams, 'Are you too white, rich, able-bodied and straight to be a feminist?', *The Guardian*, Thursday 18 April 2013, viewed at <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/18/are-you-too-white-rich-straight-to-be-feminist> on 13.08.2015.

²² William A. Maloney and Jan W. van Deth, 'Conclusions: Professionalization and individualized political action', in William A. Maloney and Jan W. van Deth, *New Participatory Dimensions in Civil Society: Professionalization and individualized collective action* (London, Routledge, 2012), pp. 231-242, p. 241.

the importance of privilege, is itself an important factor in people's approaches to politics. Whilst the sociological approach accounts for the impact of social structures on individual behaviour it does not address the intricacies of the decision-making processes at work within an individual. Such processes may function in ways that reinforce or challenge the behavioural patterns that emerge from social structures. Therefore, if we are to understand the impact of privilege on political participation we must consider the understanding of privilege that people have and the relevance of the concept to them. Perception of privilege, as well as structural privilege, may have an important impact on individual political participation. As such, both sociological and psychological approaches are brought to bear in attempting to explain such participation in the following chapters.

The adoption of both approaches allows this research to account for two major steps in the causal process that leads to political participation. First, the sociological approach considers some of the opportunities that individuals may be afforded and the behavioural norms that they may learn. Second, the psychological approach considers some of the ways that individuals think about themselves, about politics, and about participation. Indeed, it is argued that these are the first two steps in a process that leads from structural inequalities through the perceptions that result from them, which underpin the assumptions that allow intuitive decision-making, to decisions about whether or not to participate in politics. It is only at the last stage, if the reason-based decision-making system is activated, that rational choice theory becomes relevant to the process. Thus, the sociological and psychological approaches are the focus of this research because they account for processes that are constant influences on behavioural outcomes, and that are causally prior to those addressed by rational choice. Developing that latter point, and as will be argued subsequently, explanatory factors that fall further back in the funnel of causality but have a continuing effect are more interesting than influences that are more proximal to the outcome under study.²³ Thus, this research is primarily concerned with the impact of factors that are not directly related to political activity in

²³ Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1964), pp. 24-25.

accounting for that behaviour. Despite this ultimate goal of the research, it must start by considering how the behaviour of interest is conceptualised. This is the first step in answering the central research question of how, if at all, privilege and perception of it impact on political participation in the United Kingdom.

Chapter One will begin by presenting a broad definition of political participation and adapting existing typologies to fit with that definition. It will then move on to present in detail an established sociological model of the processes that lead from background characteristics to unequal political participation. The focus of that work on inequality will then be linked to wider work on inequality, which provides the bridge to the key concept of privilege. Literature identifying various effects of inequality and privilege will then be presented before the first chapter is rounded off with an outline of the flaws of the preceding literature. In particular it will be noted that, despite the relevance of the concept, the established model lacks a holistic theory of privilege and is thus theoretically and substantively incomplete. In particular, it will be argued that the established model lacks potentially important, and causally prior, components that fall within the concept of privilege and contribute to inequality in political participation. Further, and of particular importance, it will also be noted that the literature in general and the established model in particular account for structural privilege alone and, as such, provide an insufficient account of its workings. It will thus be argued that a full account of the concept must also accommodate its perceived component.

In addressing the above flaws Chapter Two will begin by presenting a holistic theory of the workings of privilege, which is argued to function through the economic, social, and cultural forms of capital. It will then draw on work that adapts that theory to the context of the contemporary United Kingdom, in particular with reference to its identification of cultural omnivores and the persistence of elites. More crucially, and drawing on the same work, it will argue that the forms of capital act as the mechanisms of privilege rather than just components of class. As such, background class will be argued to be one of many background characteristics that impact on capital profiles, which in turn influence political behaviour. This adaptation allows the forms of capital to be reconciled with the approach to causality adopted

in the established sociological model outlined in the first chapter. As such it will be suggested that privilege, as embodied in forms of capital, can be subjected to a more robust causal analysis than has previously been the case.

Chapter Three will then address the final criticism of the established sociological model outlined in the first chapter. That is to say it will move beyond the sociological approach to accounting for political behaviour to introduce the complementary psychological approach. Specifically, theories drawing on that approach will underpin the introduction of the concept of perception of privilege. That concept will address the previous chapters' failure to accommodate internal considerations in the causal processes leading to political behaviour. The impact of perception of privilege will be argued to work through the intuition-based, or fast, decision-making system that is, at times, superseded by the reason-based system that leads to more rational decision-making. However, such reason-based decisions will be argued to be too causally proximal to the behaviour of interest and thus beyond the purview of this research. Finally, to close the chapter it will be argued that structural and perceived privilege encompass parts of a causal process that leads from background characteristics to capital profiles and then through perception of privilege to political behaviour. In doing so, it will complete the theoretical work underpinning this research.

With the theoretical groundwork laid in the first three chapters, Chapter Four provides details of the online survey that was designed for the current research and fielded to a representative, though non-probability, sample of British adults. One of the major advantages of fielding the survey online is the number of questions that could be included, and the chapter will outline the measures of key concepts that are included in the survey. It will then consider the representativeness of the resulting sample by comparing it with census data, concluding that the sample is similar to the population in terms of sex and region of residence but not in terms of age, ethnicity, or religion. These flaws in representativeness are argued to be less important for the current research because of its focus on the relationships between variables, rather than their distributions in the population. As such, it is more important that there is sufficient variation in the measures to allow associations between them to be tested, which is

revealed to be the case in the subsequent chapter. Before that the fourth chapter outlines, in detail, analytical approach that is adopted: structural equation modelling. That approach allows for the simultaneous estimation of latent factors underpinning multiple indicators in the data and the testing of structural relationships between those factors. Thus, the approach is argued to be suited to the focus of the current research on testing hypothesised causal relationships between the concepts of interest.

With the data and analytical approach outlined the Chapter Five commences the substantive analysis by outlining the latent factors in the full structural model embodying the theoretical propositions of the research. Before doing so, however, it briefly considers the distributions of the variables that are underpinned by those factors, and compares them to equivalent variables in data emerging from previous research. This task is hampered by the fact that most of the variables in the dataset were original or adopted altered wording or formats to reflect the focus of the research or the limited survey space available. Thus the distributions of the variables are frequently distinct from those in other datasets, although in many cases the differences are not too dramatic. Crucially, as noted, the focus of the research on hypothesised causal relationships means that the key concern is that there is sufficient variation in the measures, and this observed to be the case. Those measures are found to load onto factors in line with expectations, and the bulk of the chapter focuses on describing the factors, and their distributions and correlations.

In line with the findings of *Citizenship in Britain*, Political participation is found to be represented by distinct individualised, contacting, and collective activity factors, which are nonetheless highly correlated with each other. Political engagement is embodied in factors representing perceived engagement, knowledge of politics, external and internal efficacy, and recruitment requests, as specified by the *Civic Voluntarism Model*. Those factors are also generally positively correlated, although the negative relationship between knowledge and recruitment suggests the channelling of political energies to either observation or engagement with political networks. The next chapter observes this to be related in part to perception of privilege, which is embodied as expected in factors relating to self-perceived status,

explanations for status differences in society, equivalent explanations relating to the self, perception of the difference of politically active people, and perception of their privilege. Again, the factors tend to be positively correlated, but contrasting positive and negative effects of self-perceived status on perception of privilege in society and one's own life provides an early indication of the importance of the fundamental attribution error.

Turning to the forms of capital, economic capital is underpinned by a single factor but cultural capital is embodied in nine factors, with the first four covering work-based civic skills, attendance at legitimate cultural performances, visits to legitimate cultural venues, and consumption-based activities. The subsequent five relate to cultural tastes, and specifically to preferences for educational films, family-friendly films, blockbusters, bass and sample heavy music, and legitimate cultural tastes. Focussing on the latter eight, Bourdieusian, factors, their generally positive correlations are indicative of a tendency towards omnivorousness amongst respondents. However, the opposition between attendance at legitimate cultural performances and preferences for blockbuster movies and bass and sample heavy music suggests a limit to that omnivorousness. Finally, social capital is embodied in five factors covering number of friends, diversity of friends, acquaintance with high status individuals, and help received from close and loose networks, and those factors tend to be positively correlated with each other. Crucially, all of the factors identified display decent levels of variation, and the distributions of factor scores are themselves rather varied.

With the factors encompassing the key concepts described, Chapter Six turns to the main focus of the research in the form of the structural relationships between those factors. Before considering those relationships, however, the chapter outlines the theoretically informed hypotheses that are being tested in some detail. The hypotheses relate to the factors of interest, which is to say the forms of capital and the elements of perception of privilege, and thus provide a focus for the subsequent sections of the chapter. The analysis in those subsequent sections reveals that, in addition to the expected positive effects of recruitment, perceived political engagement, and internal efficacy, there are unexpected direct effects of visits to legitimate cultural venues, and perception of the difference of politically active people.

The former of those loadings is positive as expected but the positive effect of the latter is counter to expectations and hints at the subsequent importance of the ‘fundamental attribution error’.

Going one step further back in the structural model, that chapter observes that cultural capital is found to be important in promoting perceived engagement with politics, which is to say interest in, discussion of, and perceived knowledge of the topic. Legitimate tastes also play a role in promoting external and internal efficacy, whilst perception of the privilege of political activists suppresses external efficacy. Further, perception of the role of privilege in society prompts perceived engagement with politics, whilst perception of the role of privilege in one’s own life is negatively related to political knowledge, which is again suggestive of role of the fundamental attribution error. The elements of perception of privilege are interrelated to a significant degree, as expected, and they tend to be additionally influenced by social and economic, rather than cultural, capital.

With the direct effects at the various stages of the model outlined, the chapter turns to consider the total effects, both direct and indirect, of key factors on political participation. These reveal that cultural capital is amongst the most important influences, and functions as the main mechanism by which education is translated into participation. Further, the patterns of political activity associated with perception of privilege suggest that the previously mentioned fundamental attribution error has a role to play. Specifically, those who apply consistent privilege-based explanations for their own status and status differences in society also more readily engage in all forms of political activity, whilst those with low perception of their own privilege but high perception of privilege in society are less apt to engage in socially-orientated political activity but still able to undertake self-motivated acts. With this in mind, the chapter analyses the effects of hypothesised interactions between the elements of perception of privilege, finding few to have significant effects. Despite this, the chapter notes that most of the tested hypotheses are at least partially supported, and thus the causal propositions of the research are generally supported. The chapter then concludes that the first main contribution of the research is the strong, positive, and sometimes direct, effect on

political participation of cultural capital, especially in its legitimate form. This is complemented by the second main finding of the research, which is that perception of privilege differentiates the type of participation that people engage in, with those who consistently perceive privilege having a broader participatory repertoire.

Chapter One: Participation, Inequality, and Privilege

What is Political Participation?

Before examining its causes it is important to consider what is meant by political participation. The concept is defined in broad terms in the current research and taken to be any attempt by an individual, in interaction with an institution or organisation, to change or conserve an element of society at some level. Within that overarching definition there is a 'kaleidoscope' of political causes that individuals can support but the focus here is on the range of modes of participation.²⁴ The distinctions between those modes are many and varied, from broad differentiation between 'organized civil society' and 'not as well (as in ad-hoc, "temporarily") organized civil society',²⁵ to the more specific typology that 'categorizes different participation acts according to type of influence, initiative required, level of conflict and scope of outcome.'²⁶ There has been notable consistency in the distinction between conventional and unconventional participation, with the former described as 'institutionalised', 'traditional', 'normal', and 'legitimate'.²⁷ Unconventional participation is not necessarily the opposite; rather it may just be less institutionalised, traditional, normal, or legitimate. The most complete definition differentiates not only between institutionalised and non-institutionalised modes but also, within the latter, between the individual, contacting, and collective modes.²⁸ That three part distinction has then, in turn, been re-applied to both institutionalised and non-institutionalised acts, and found to apply to the United Kingdom.²⁹ Importantly, such definitions accommodate new forms of participation such as ethical

²⁴ Richard C. Cornuelle, *Reclaiming the American Dream* (New York, Vintage, 1965), p. 38.

²⁵ Bruno Kaufman and Johannes W. Pichler (eds.), *The European Citizens' Initiatives: Into New Democratic Territory* (Wein, NWV Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2010), p. 63.

²⁶ Jan E. Leighley, 'Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation', *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 181-209, p. 197.

²⁷ Reingard Spannring, Günther Ogris and Wolfgang Gaiser (eds.), *Youth and Political Participation in Europe: Results of the Comparative Study EUYOUPART* (Leverkusen Opladen, Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2008), pp. 16-17; Lester W. Milbrath and M. L. Goel, *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1977), p. 20.

²⁸ Achim Goerres, *The Political Participation of Older People in Europe: The Greying of our Democracies* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 160.

²⁹ Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, pp. 133-137.

consumerism that have become relevant in recent years.³⁰ Whilst new in themselves these modes of participation have proven to be no more accessible to new participants.³¹

In contrast to new modes of political participation the most well-established mode, voting, is also the most widely engaged in. However, this has not stopped the case being put for its exclusion from analyses. This is on the basis that it is such a low cost and low benefit activity that it is difficult to usefully consider motives relating to it.³² That suggestion was made from the perspective of rational choice theory but has been supported by survey evidence from the United Kingdom.³³ The limitations of focussing on voting alone, thus, point to the expedience of adopting an inclusive definition of political participation so that the impact of different influences on various modes can be observed.³⁴

The different modes of participation that have been identified previously include giving financial support, campaigning in elections, attending meetings, standing for election, and discussing politics with friends, acquaintances, or strangers (especially with the goal of persuading them of something).³⁵ Elsewhere, other modes have been suggested to include joining organisations, signing petitions, wearing badges, contacting public officials or politicians, and protesting.³⁶ Ultimately, the broadest definition of participation encompasses both the civic form, including activities such as local religious group involvement and volunteering for charities, and the political form, including all the activities just outlined.³⁷ This distinction underpins the typology developed by Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Scholzman, and Henry E. Brady in their work on civic voluntarism.

Demonstrating the centrality of political participation to the work, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* begins by outlining key concepts in the area, resulting

³⁰ Spanning, Ogris and Gaiser (eds.), *Youth and Political Participation in Europe*, p. 23.

³¹ John Curtice, 'Political Engagement Bridging the Gulf? Britain's democracy after the 2010 election', in Alison Park, Elizabeth Clery, John Curtice, Miranda Philips and David Utting (eds.), *British Social Attitudes, The 28th Report (2011-2012 Edition)* (London, Sage Publications, 2012), pp. 1-15, pp. 14-15; Milbrath and Goel, *Political Participation*, p. 20; Kaase, 'Perspectives on Political Participation', pp. 783-796; Max Kaase, 'Social Movements and Political Innovation', in Dalton and Kuechler, *Challenging the Political Order*, pp. 84-101; Maloney and van Deth, 'Conclusions', p. 237.

³² Aldrich, 'Rational Choice and Turnout', pp. 247-278, pp. 264-266.

³³ Curtice and Seyd, 'Is there a crisis of political participation?', p. 97-98.

³⁴ Kaase, 'Perspectives on Political Participation', p. 793.

³⁵ Susan E. Scarrow, 'Political Activism and Party Members', in Dalton and Klingemann, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, pp. 636-654, pp. 646-650.

³⁶ Goerres, *The Political Participation of Older People in Europe*, p. 160.

³⁷ Cliff Zukin, Scott Keeter, Molly Andolina, Krista Jenkins and Michael X. Delli Carpini, *A New Engagement? Political Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 63-64.

in the definition of political participation as 'activity that is intended to or has the consequence of affecting, either directly or indirectly, government action.'³⁸ The difficulty of measuring political participation and its effects is recognised but it is suggested that its different forms can be arrayed along two spectrums.³⁹ The first spectrum runs from voting, in which the volume of participation is the same by law (i.e. one person one vote), to making donations to political causes, through which individuals can participate to hugely different degrees (i.e. one donation may be many multiples of another). The second spectrum runs again from voting, which is severely restricted in the amount of information that it can convey about an individual (i.e. only their preferred candidate or party), but this time to direct contact with representatives, which can convey a large amount of complex and in-depth information (e.g. if a face-to-face meeting is arranged).⁴⁰

Further to the above, political activity must be voluntary and, as such falls within the broader concept of 'civic voluntarism' that encompasses other activities such as involvement in neighbourhood groups, religious engagement beyond attendance, or participation in a range of civic bodies such as school boards. Interestingly, there has been less of a decline in civic voluntarism overall than in many areas of political participation in particular.⁴¹ In fact, it was found that the vast majority of Americans engage in at least two of secular, religious, and political volunteering.⁴² Civic activity is posited to be linked to, and often to underpin, political participation to the extent that there is a 'fuzzy border between the two.'⁴³ In both being inclusive and acknowledging the blurred boundaries between modes this typology of political activity and civic voluntarism fits well with the broad definition of political participation provided at the outset.

Adopting such a broad overarching definition in conjunction with Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's typology of participation is intended to suggest the political nature of civic

³⁸ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 9.

³⁹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 13.

⁴⁰ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 9-10.

⁴¹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 73-79.

⁴² Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 81-84.

⁴³ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 7, pp. 38-39, p. 59; Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, and Delli Carpini, *A New Engagement*, p. 52.

engagement. That is to say that by volunteering for a charity or participating in a local community group individuals are, in interaction with an institution or organisation, attempting to change or conserve an element of society at some level. Thus, the current research departs, if only semantically, from the typology of participation presented as part of the Civic Voluntarism Model. It refers to civic engagement instead as implicit political participation whilst those activities referred to previously as political participation are identified as explicit political participation. With this main distinction established it is worth specifying in a little detail the modes that explicit and implicit forms of participation include.

The previously identified distinction between institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation, onto which individual, collective, and contacting modes map, now falls within the domain of explicit political participation. This means that a whole range of activities, from writing a letter to an elected representative to padlocking oneself to the gates of a coal-fired power station, are encompassed by explicit political participation. Implicit political participation is similarly broad, including as it does all of the secular and religious activities that Verba, Schlozman, and Brady were interested in. As such some modes of implicit political participation are equivalent to modes of explicit political participation and differ only on the basis of the organisation that they relate to. For instance, donating to a charity is considered to be implicit political participation whereas donating to a political party or campaigning organisation is considered to be explicit political participation. Of course, a key defining feature of both explicit and implicit political participation is that they are voluntary, meaning that the current research is not concerned with paid work for any causes. For ease of reference Table 1.1, presented below, maps Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's political participation and civic voluntarism onto explicit and implicit political activity alongside previous typologies, and gives examples of each.

Again, it is worth noting that in the United States there has been less of a decline in implicit than explicit political participation, which suggests that there may be different

processes at work in relation to each.⁴⁴ Of course, the continuing attraction of implicit political participation does not reduce the importance of its explicit counterpart, and it has been argued that both are necessary for meaningful societal change.⁴⁵ This is particularly the case because, as will be outlined below, there is a risk that explicit political participation can become dominated by particular groups, leading to representatives acting more in their interests than those of the general population. The idea of differential access to politics and its outcomes is key to the current research and suggests the need to consider the factors that underpin political participation. Thus, having defined the dependent variable the next sections move on to consider, in some detail, a set of independent variables that may impact on it.

Table 1.1. Mapping Implicit and Explicit Political Participation
onto the Civic Voluntarism Model and Previous Typologies

Current Typology	Civic Voluntarism Model Typology	Previous Typologies	Example Activities
Implicit Political Participation	Religious Volunteering	N/A.	Donating Fundraising Event organisation Committee involvement Giving time
	Secular Volunteering		
Explicit Political Participation	Political volunteering	Institutionalised	Voting Donating to a party or campaigning organisation Party or campaigning organisation membership Committee involvement Standing for election
		Non-institutionalised (including individual, contacting, and collective)	Boycotting Signing a petition Contacting the media Contacting representatives Contacting companies Mass demonstrations Direct action

⁴⁴ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 74-81.

⁴⁵ Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, and Delli Carpini, *A New Engagement*, p. 207; Mary Pattillo-McCoy, *Black Picket Fences: Privilege and Peril among the Black Middle Class* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 208.

The Causes of Political Participation and the Civic Voluntarism Model:

As noted in the introduction the question of why people do or do not participate in politics is one of the key motivating conundrums of political behaviour research. In seeking to solve that conundrum it is useful to refer again to the work of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in *Voice and Equality*, which provides the established model that this research builds upon. That model emerged from the call to move 'beyond SES', or socio-economic status, and focus on how background characteristics translate into trends in political participation.⁴⁶ In advocating consideration of how those processes work rather than just observing correlations the model provides not only some of the key independent variables for the current research but also, crucially, the causal approach that is adopted by it.⁴⁷ Thus, the Civic Voluntarism Model is taken as the established sociological model of political behaviour because it elucidates processes that link background characteristics to unequal outcomes. Those processes, it will be argued, are incomplete but the idea that the mechanisms that reproduce inequality should be accounted for is sound.

Focussing on the United States, the Civic Voluntarism Model is interested not in aggregate participation but in who participates, especially in political activity. As expected on the basis of previous research it is found that the likelihood of political participation, and the amount of money and time given when participating, reflect the societal cleavages of class (as measured using wealth), race and ethnicity, and gender. Specifically, the wealthy participate in political activity more than the less wealthy, whilst Anglo-Whites participate more than African-Americans, Latino citizens, and Latino non-citizens in that order, and men participate more than women.⁴⁸ Interestingly these patterns of political participation do not apply across the board in relation to religious and secular volunteering. Whilst the same patterns relating to race and ethnicity apply to secular voluntary activity, African-Americans are the most likely to attend religious services and give time and money to their church, whilst Latinos attend

⁴⁶ Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 'Beyond SES'; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 3, pp. 19-20.

⁴⁷ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁸ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 187-196, pp. 202-204, pp. 231-235, pp. 254-257.

services more than Anglo-Whites but give less time and money.⁴⁹ Women are roughly as likely as men to be involved in secular volunteering, and are more likely to be involved in church activities. However, they give the same amount of time and less money when they get involved than do men.⁵⁰ This observation of participation in non-political volunteering being less structured by background characteristics fits with the observation that the majority of Americans participate in at least two of secular, religious, and political activity.

Confirmation of the importance of background characteristics in structuring political activity, whilst interesting, is not the purpose of *Voice and Equality*, which focuses instead on explaining those well-documented patterns. In doing so it begins by considering motivations for political participation. Drawing on an expanded version of rational choice theory, these are identified as selective material (i.e. focussed on material benefits to the individual), selective social (i.e. focussed on social benefits to the individual), selective civic (i.e. focussed on the duty or social expectation of involvement), and policy-based (i.e. focussed on specific policies that spark interest).⁵¹ The possibility that such motivations are post-hoc rationalisations is accepted but, if this is the case, their importance remains because they can influence future behaviour and contribute to the discourse around civic voluntarism.⁵²

Selective material motivations are found to be highly relevant to involvement in work-related political action committees (PACs), contacting representatives about issues of particular importance to one's self, political organisation affiliation, and church involvement. By contrast, selective social motivations are found to be important for campaigning, protest, political organisation affiliation, and church involvement. Selective civic motivations are then found to be important across the board, though less so in relation to involvement in work-related PACs, contacting representatives about issues of particular importance to one's self, and non-political organisation affiliation. Last, policy motivations are found to be generally quite important, and especially so in relation to voting, campaign work, candidate

⁴⁹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 241-247.

⁵⁰ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 260-262.

⁵¹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 104, pp. 108-112; Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, pp. 140-144.

⁵² Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 97-99.

contributions, work-related PACs, issue-based organisation affiliation, contacting representatives about community or national issues, and protest.⁵³ Importantly, such motivations have also been found to play an important role in defining political behaviour in the United Kingdom.⁵⁴

Motivations are clearly an important part of the process that leads to political participation and the above findings are of interest in their own right. However, their utility in explaining the processes that lead from background characteristics to political participation is less clear. It seems unlikely that differences in participation between classes, races, and genders, are based on those groups possessing markedly different motivations. If there are, in fact, different trends in motivations between those groups then the reason for those differences would need to be explained. In fact, it seems more likely that there are barriers to participation that affect some groups more than others, regardless of their motivations, and it is this line of thinking that informs the direction of *Voice and Equality* as well as this research.

In moving beyond motivations to find a more complete explanation for patterns of political participation the Civic Voluntarism Model focuses on the importance of resources, engagement, and recruitment. The first of those concepts encompasses the money, time, and civic skills that are at the disposal of individuals.⁵⁵ Of those components the first two are familiar but the third requires further explanation. The acquisition of civic skills:

begins early in life in the family and in school and continues throughout adulthood in non-political domains – at work, in organizations, and in church. These civic skills are, thus, developed in the course of activities that have nothing to do with politics: making a presentation to a client, organizing a celebrity auction for a charity, or editing the church’s monthly newsletter. Once honed, however, they are part of the arsenal of resources that can be devoted, if the individual wishes, to politics.⁵⁶

⁵³ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 114-121.

⁵⁴ Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, pp. 173-185.

⁵⁵ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 271.

⁵⁶ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 296, pp. 330-331.

The role of socialisation in transmitting civic skills is apparent and indicates a link from background characteristics to resources. This suggests, in turn that there may be patterns in the distribution of resources between different groups.

Based on their survey data Verba, Schlozman, and Brady find that resources are, indeed, distributed unevenly across the population. Education and employment status, which are related to background characteristics, are positively related to income and thus to the resource of money. Free time is more evenly distributed than money, though the unemployed have more of it and, in employment, Latinos have the least, followed by African-Americans and then Anglo-Whites.⁵⁷ Of course, there are other factors that impact on time, such as having pre-school or school-aged children to look after, and housework to do, both of which responsibilities are still more likely to fall to women.⁵⁸ Moving beyond money and time, civic skills are related to job status, with Anglo-White men most likely to have high-level employment and thus the skills that come with it. At the same time, civic skills are also related to the patterns in non-political volunteering noted previously. Thus, whilst White-Anglo men are again advantaged in terms of civic skills by their tendency to be more involved in secular voluntary activity, African-Americans and women can gain civic skills from their greater engagement with religious activities.⁵⁹ This tendency for churches to provide a route to civic skills for groups that are less involved in high-status work or secular volunteering leads to the suggestion that they act as an equalising force in American political participation in a similar manner to trade unions in Europe, at least in the past.⁶⁰

The second concept posited by the Civic Voluntarism Model to be of importance in political participation is engagement. That concept encompasses interest in politics, belief in the efficacy of political action, level of political information held, and identification with a political party.⁶¹ These components of political engagement are often considered in research on political behaviour, and are commonly understood, so further explanation is not required.

⁵⁷ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 291-294.

⁵⁸ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 296, pp. 302-303.

⁵⁹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 314-317.

⁶⁰ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 332-333.

⁶¹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 345-348.

Of interest, however, is the fact that their distribution is observed to be uneven and related to background characteristics. In particular, education and income are positively related to all of the components of political engagement except party identification. Further, White-Anglos are more engaged than African-Americans and Latinos in relation to all of the components with the exception that African-Americans have the strongest party identification. Interestingly, gender is of little significance in relation to political engagement although women tend to hold less political information. However, this latter finding has been queried on the grounds that it may reflect differences between the genders in how knowledge questions are answered rather than actual knowledge held.⁶²

Before considering the final component of the Civic Voluntarism Model, recruitment, it is worth noting the emphasis in *Voice and Equality* on the greater importance of resources and engagement. This is because they are considered necessary for political participation to occur whereas recruitment tends to activate those who have the requisite levels of resources and engagement rather than be a necessity in itself.⁶³ Nevertheless, the fact that recruitment fulfils such a role is important, not least because resources point only to who can get involved in politics rather than who does.⁶⁴ Further, whilst engagement may suggest who does get involved in politics it is beset by issues of causality because components such as political interest and information could result from political activity rather than cause it.⁶⁵ With these points in mind, the impact of recruitment is found to be complemented by that of resources and engagement.

The concept of recruitment is centred on requests to take part in political activities. Such requests may come from an array of sources including family and friends but the interest is in those that come in institutionalised contexts such as the workplace, church, or meetings of secular voluntary organisations.⁶⁶ In a similar vein to the observations relating to resources

⁶² Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 348-350; Jeffery J. Mondak and Mary R. Anderson, 'The Knowledge Gap: A Reexamination of Gender-Based Differences in Political Knowledge', *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66, No. 2 (May, 2004), pp. 492-512.

⁶³ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 270.

⁶⁴ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 343.

⁶⁵ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 344.

⁶⁶ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 372-375.

and engagement, there are different patterns of recruitment between groups. The starkest of those patterns is based on educational level and income (with the former strongly linked to the latter), which are positively related to requests to participate in political activity in the work, church, and secular voluntary organisational settings. Requests are also patterned by race and ethnicity, with Anglo-Whites receiving the most followed by African-Americans and then Latinos. This applies in both the work and secular voluntary organisation settings but African-Americans are most likely to receive requests in the church setting.⁶⁷ It is also the case that a higher proportion of men than women are recruited to political activity in church or secular voluntary organisation settings, while the opposite is the case in workplaces, though all these trends are slight.⁶⁸

These patterns again point to religious institutions in the United States providing a route for otherwise marginalised groups to get involved in politics; not only do they offer a context in which civic skills can be developed but they also act as a source of requests to participate.⁶⁹ Of course, there is the risk that those who undertake more political activity subsequently receive more requests for further participation. As with engagement, this poses questions of causality relating to recruitment because we cannot be sure that requests to participate in politics necessarily precede that participation.⁷⁰

The fact that there are causal questions relating to two of the key concepts in the Civic Voluntarism Model, namely engagement and recruitment, suggests the utility of considering Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's approach to causality. As is common practice in political science they utilise statistical analyses to examine probabilistic relationships.⁷¹ As such, they do not merely describe the distribution of particular variables, or even the associations between sets of descriptive variables, in the population. Rather, they outline testable relationships between variables in which some are causally prior to, and argued to impact on, others. That approach allows them to propose a causal path that begins with background characteristics

⁶⁷ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 375-377.

⁶⁸ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 375-377.

⁶⁹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 380-388.

⁷⁰ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 370-372.

⁷¹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 24-25.

such as gender, race and ethnicity, and parental class. Those characteristics precede and influence pre-adult experiences of politics at home, education, and extra-curricular activity at high school, which in turn impact on adult institutional involvement such as job status, organisational affiliations, and religious attendance. Ultimately, the preceding stages of the causal path are posited to influence the distribution of the participatory factors that constitute the Civic Voluntarism Model; resources, engagement, and recruitment.⁷²

Having proposed a detailed causal path *Voice and Equality* dedicates considerable space to testing its propositions, primarily by means of Two-Stage Least Squares statistical analyses. This leads to the conclusion that:

The data confirm the existence of two paths from characteristics of one generation to the acquisition of the factors that foster political participation in the next. The starting point of each one is the education of the parents, and respondents' educational attainment figures importantly in both. One path is more or less socioeconomic. The main effect along this path is the impact of parents' education on respondents' education and from there to the job and income levels that they ultimately attain. The second path runs through political stimulation in the home and school. Well-educated parents are more likely also to be politically active and to discuss politics at home and to produce children who are active in high school.⁷³

Having established that the proposed causal process leading to the formation of the key factors in the Civic Voluntarism Model is supported by empirical evidence it is useful to turn to the last step in the causal process, that is the impact of the key factors on political participation.

The effects of resources and engagement are found to be wide-ranging and statistically significant. In relation to time-based political activities they find that civic skills, political interest, political efficacy, and political information are all positively related to participation. Turning to voting, it is found that political interest, partisanship, and political information are

⁷² Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 416-418.

⁷³ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 439.

positively related to turning out. Unsurprisingly, income is unchallenged as the most significant factor relating to political donating whilst interest and information are positively related to political discussion. There are of course other factors that are found to relate to participation such as education, which is positively related to time-based activity, and citizenship, which is related to voting.⁷⁴ However it is resources and engagement that are, as predicted by the model, found to be crucial components of the causal process that leads to political participation. The third factor in the model, recruitment, whilst arguably activating rather than enabling participation, is also found to be positively related to it.⁷⁵

Building on the above model they note that, like recruitment, particular issues can activate political participation. In the mid-1990s when the research for *Voice and Equality* was being conducted abortion was, as it continues to be, a major motivating issue in American politics. Focussing on that issue it was found that there is a strong link between holding staunchly pro- or anti-abortion opinions and being active in that area. Such activation does not result from all issues on which people hold equally strong opinions so it is not the case that topics that provoke staunch positions are necessarily those that will motivate political activity.⁷⁶ Additionally, and crucially, issue activation does not trump the impact of the Civic Voluntarism Model:

For a group that is resource-deprived, issue engagements go only so far in elevating a depressed level of participation. For a group that is well-endowed with participatory resources, issue engagements can give an additional participatory push. Thus, political participation is deeply enmeshed with the substance of politics. Yet the way in which political issues and conflicts are manifest in participatory input also depends fundamentally upon the structure of participatory factors having their origins outside politics.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 352-364.

⁷⁵ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 388-390.

⁷⁶ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 391-415.

⁷⁷ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 414-415.

Thus, whilst acknowledging the importance of other factors, the Civic Voluntarism Model is retained as the primary account of the causal process that leads to political participation.

To summarise, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady present a model that posits a causal path from background characteristics through early socialisation and subsequent organisational affiliation to the key concepts of resources, engagement, and recruitment, which account to a great degree for political participation. Those key concepts draw on well-established components such as income and political interest as well as a new component of resources in the form of civic skills. The posited model, including new and existing components, is tested using survey data gathered for the purpose and found to work as predicted. The model is not intended to be complete and other factors including motivations and issue activation are found to work alongside it without reducing its efficacy. Thus *Voice and Equality* provides an intellectually convincing and empirically robust account of the mechanisms that translate background characteristics into different patterns of political participation. Crucially, in providing that account it is not attempting to explain away the participatory inequalities that exist between sexes, races and ethnicities, and classes but to illuminate how and why those very real inequalities do exist.⁷⁸

Unequal levels of political participation across key societal cleavages are of particular significance because they can contribute to unequal outcomes resulting from the political process. In fact, the voting records of elected representatives have been shown to reflect the opinions and interests of wealthy constituents, which may be in part because those constituents are more active.⁷⁹ The fact that political participation is structured by race and ethnicity, and gender as well as class suggests that the interests and opinions of privileged groups more generally may be better reflected by elected representatives. This lends additional significance to the ultimate and succinct conclusion of *Voice and Equality* 'that the voices heard through the medium of citizen participation will be often loud, sometimes clear, but rarely equal.'⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 522-524.

⁷⁹ Larry M. Bartels, *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 252.

⁸⁰ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 532.

Inequality and Privilege:

The identification of inequalities in political participation highlights the impact of structural forces on individuals. Whilst the Civic Voluntarism Model provides a strong account of the processes that link background characteristics with unequal political participation it is just that, a model, and does not identify a broad theory that can accommodate its findings. As such, it is only a starting point for this research, which identifies the concept of privilege as one that can encompass the inherited advantage related to gender, race and ethnicity, and class. The theories around privilege are numerous so it is expedient to begin the consideration of the concept with a basic definition upon which the following can rest:

“Privilege,” both in its legal and its everyday use, indicates what someone or something has in virtue of being singled out for advantageous treatment. A privilege is necessarily reserved for a few not given to all.⁸¹

Privilege may be positive, entitling the holder to certain benefits, or negative, freeing the holder from restrictions, and in either case may be earned or unearned.⁸² In its earned form it may be associated with particular positions that one can attain, with a classic example being parliamentary privilege, in which those elected to a legislature are protected from prosecution for statements made or actions done in that legislature. In its earned form, privilege is not necessarily associated with particular background characteristics but with particular formally or informally held positions in society. Of course, such positions may be dominated by groups with particular backgrounds but the privileges are not a direct consequence of the individual characteristics of the post-holders.

By contrast, unearned privilege is granted to certain groups, usually on the basis of particular background characteristics, for reasons other than merit. This granting of privilege may be explicit or not but, in either case, it is in this way that social structures are recreated and different groups are afforded different opportunities and inducted into different

⁸¹ Alan R. White, ‘Privilege’, *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May, 1978), pp. 299-311, p. 299.

⁸² White, ‘Privilege’, p. 300.

behaviours. In this form privilege has been likened to an 'invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, code-books, passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks.'⁸³ That knapsack allows those with privilege to go about their lives easily and without considering the advantages that have been bestowed upon them. It is thus unearned rather than earned privilege that is the focus of this research.

Questions about the effects of such unearned advantage are closely linked to the wider debate around the effects of inequality. The politically heated nature of that debate has led to questions about how to define and measure inequality. For instance, it has been noted that the distribution of income is less dispersed than the distribution of wealth, and that lifetime income is more equally dispersed than is annual income, whilst some have argued that personal expenditure should be the measure of inequality.⁸⁴ Such measurement effects inform the criticism that 'measures such as the Gini coefficient are not purely "statistical" and they embody implicit judgements about the weight to be applied to the inequality at different points on the income scale.'⁸⁵ Despite such criticisms the Gini coefficient is widely used and has underpinned work arguing that greater inequality is linked to worse outcomes at aggregate level. These have been observed in a range of areas including levels of trust, prevalence of mental health issues, obesity rates, average educational attainment, numbers of teenage births, levels of violence, proportion of the population imprisoned, and social mobility.⁸⁶ More directly pertinent to the current research, higher income inequality has also been linked to lower turnout rates in national elections.⁸⁷ It is not only important that inequality impacts on politics, however, and it has been argued that inequality is a political phenomenon.⁸⁸ It has been shown that the policies of political parties can impact on levels of inequality and yet that people continue to vote for parties that arguably do not act in their best interests.⁸⁹

⁸³ Peggy McIntosh, 'White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies', in Michael S. Kimmel and Abby L. Ferber, *Privilege: A Reader* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2003), pp. 147-160, p. 148.

⁸⁴ Anthony B. Atkinson, *The Economics of Inequality* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 19-21, pp. 42-43, pp. 50-51.

⁸⁵ Atkinson, *The Economics of Inequality*, p. 56.

⁸⁶ Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, *The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone* (London, Penguin, 2009), pp. 52-54, pp. 66-69, pp. 91-101, p. 105, pp. 122-123, pp. 131-144, pp. 148-149, pp. 160-161.

⁸⁷ Frederick Solt, 'Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 2008), pp. 48-60.

⁸⁸ Bartels, *Unequal Democracy*, p. 3.

⁸⁹ Bartels, *Unequal Democracy*, pp. 47-50, p. 62, p. 125.

As noted previously, evidence has also suggested that elected representatives' voting records more closely reflect the views of their wealthy constituents than of their poor constituents.⁹⁰ Thus, the day-to-day advantages of having a higher income or more wealth may be complemented by policy-making that reflects your interests and views and sustains your day-to-day advantages. Such advantages might be reasonable if they were earned but, returning to the focus of the current research, the literature on privilege suggests the pervasive influence of unearned advantage. Although those effects also relate to areas such as sexuality,⁹¹ disability, and age, privilege is most frequently cited in relation to the three commonly identified social cleavages of sex, race, and class.⁹²

Moving beyond aggregate level observations of inequality more critical approaches have documented the pervasive workings of privilege at all levels of society. Research has demonstrated that, even as explicit sexism and racism are challenged, the overrepresentation of white men in senior management jobs remains constant across most sectors despite the growth in white collar job numbers.⁹³ At higher levels, women in elite jobs are less supported by traditional family structures, and have access to fewer elite networks to sustain their positions.⁹⁴ In fact, it has been noted that opponents of affirmative action ignore the institutionalised affirmative action that previously functioned, as a matter of course, in favour of white men.⁹⁵ Indeed, blindness to the benefits of being white and male has been posited to constitute a nonconscious ideology that pervades society, assigning roles to individuals with little consideration for their abilities or aspirations.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Bartels, *Unequal Democracy*, pp. 255-262.

⁹¹ Michael A. Messner, 'Becoming 100 Percent Straight', in Michael S. Kimmel and Abby L. Ferber (eds.), *Privilege: A Reader* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 2003), pp. 181-187, p. 186; Damien W. Riggs, *Priscilla, (White) Queen of the Desert* (New York, Peter Lang, 2006), p. 5.

⁹² Peggy McIntosh, 'White Privilege and Male Privilege', p. 158.

⁹³ Kevin Stainback and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, 'Intersections of Power and Privilege: Long-Term Trends in Managerial Representation', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 74, No. 5 (Oct., 2009), pp. 800-820.

⁹⁴ Mino Vianello and Gwen Moore (eds.), *Gendering Elites: Economic and Political Leadership in 27 Industrialised Societies* (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000), pp. 270-271.

⁹⁵ Troy Duster, 'The Structure of Privilege and Its Universe of Discourse', *The American Sociologist*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 73-78.

⁹⁶ Sandra L. Bem and Daryl J. Bem, 'Case Study of a Nonconscious Ideology: Training The Woman to Know Her Place', in Daryl J. Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs* (Belmont, CA, Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1970), pp. 89-99; John Ellis, 'Ideology and subjectivity', in Stuart Hall (ed.), *Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79* (London, Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 186-194, p. 189-190.

Mirroring the complexity of the relationships between race and ethnicity, and sex and gender,⁹⁷ arguments regarding what constitutes class have been widespread.⁹⁸ This is reflected in the number of contending class structures that have been posited, operationalised, and measured,⁹⁹ though the concept itself is generally accepted to be of import. Research controlling for educational attainment has revealed that class and gender limit social mobility in the United Kingdom, with higher social class providing insurance against downward mobility.¹⁰⁰ This undermines the claim that Britain constitutes a meritocracy in which ability alone determines societal position. It has been argued that this is morally problematic as well as, based on formal mathematical models, economically inefficient. This is because the most able individuals are excluded from appropriate employment, which may also be the employment that they wish to pursue, by less qualified but more privileged individuals.¹⁰¹

In addition to wider societal inequalities based on privilege there is also evidence of the specific relevance of sex, race, and class to political participation. Gender stereotypes associate masculine and feminine traits in candidates with competence in certain policy areas, and inform the widespread belief, held by both sexes, that men know more about politics than women.¹⁰² Such beliefs may contribute to the exclusion of women from politics, with even otherwise progressive groups sometimes becoming dominated by men, raising the need for organisations to positively encourage female participation.¹⁰³ At the same time, turnout and representation in the UK differs between races, and a range of models have been tested elsewhere to explain observed differences in general political participation rates between

⁹⁷ Andrew Heywood, *Key Concepts in Politics* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), pp. 204-205, pp. 226-227.

⁹⁸ Stephen Edgell, *Class* (London, Routledge, 1993), pp. 1-2; Magne Flemmen, 'Putting Bourdieu to work for class analysis: reflections on some recent contributions', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Jun., 2013), pp. 325-343.

⁹⁹ Manfred Max Bergman and Dominique Joye, 'Comparing Social Stratification Schemas: CAMSIS, CSP-CH, Goldthorpe, ISCO-88, Treiman, and Wright', viewed at

http://www.freewebs.com/stratificare_mobilite/Comparing%20Social%20Stratification%20Schemas.pdf on 27.08.2012.

¹⁰⁰ Gordon Marshall and Adam Swift, 'Social Class and Social Justice', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp. 187-211.

¹⁰¹ Richard Breen, 'Inequality, Economic Growth and Social Mobility', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 429-449.

¹⁰² Leonie Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, 'Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 119-147; Jeanette Morehouse Mendez and Tracy Osborn, 'Gender and Perception of Knowledge in Political Discussion', *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Jun., 2010), pp. 269-279.

¹⁰³ Jane Ward, "'Not All Differences Are Created Equal": Multiple Jeopardy in Gendered Organizations', *Gender and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 82-102; Richard L. Fox and Jennifer L. Lawless, 'If Only They'd Ask: Gender, Recruitment, and Political Ambition', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (Apr., 2010), pp. 310-326.

racism.¹⁰⁴ Those models have suggested that socio-economic factors and levels of psychological engagement with politics can explain some of the differences in rates of participation, though those variables can have different effects amongst different races.¹⁰⁵ In relation to class, it has been argued that occupational status is still significantly related to both volume and type of political participation, and that class is still related to party choices.¹⁰⁶ There is also evidence that political participation can be related to other factors such as religion and, to a very great extent, age.¹⁰⁷ Crucially, the structuring of political participation by background characteristics, whatever they may be, can be difficult to overcome when dominant groups fail to acknowledge their privilege by resisting information that runs counter to their existing beliefs.¹⁰⁸ This can underpin opposition to attempts to make participation more open, and thus sustain patterns of exclusion based on privilege.

It is often asserted that people are advantaged or disadvantaged by background characteristics such as sex, race, and class; the idea that society is structured by these cleavages is commonplace. Nevertheless, that observation is unsatisfactory when it comes to explaining why people do or do not engage in political activity; to simply observe such patterns is not to explain them. This recognition led to the previously noted call for research to move 'beyond SES' when attempting to account for political behaviour.¹⁰⁹ In answering this call it is possible to deploy privilege as the overarching concept accommodating the mechanisms through which background characteristics translate into advantage or disadvantage. The nature of those mechanisms will be more fully elucidated below but there are two points about their relationship with background characteristics that must be made. First, they are not simple relationships; characteristics such as sex, race, class, sexuality, religion, age, disability, and

¹⁰⁴ Shamit Saggat, 'Race and Political Behavior', in Dalton and Klingemann, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, pp. 504-517; Muhammad Anwar, 'The participation of ethnic minorities in British politics', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), pp. 533-549.

¹⁰⁵ Jan E. Leighley and Arnold Vedlitz, 'Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Nov., 1999), pp. 1092-1114.

¹⁰⁶ Miguel Caínzos and Carmen Voces, 'Class Inequalities in Political Participation and the "Death of Class" Debate', *International Sociology*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (May, 2010), pp. 383-418; Geoffrey Evans, 'The Continued Significance of Class Voting', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jun., 2000), pp. 401-417; Bartels, *Unequal Democracy*, p. 96.

¹⁰⁷ Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, 'A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections, 1972-2000', *The Sociological Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 2004), pp. 421-450; Goerres, *The Political Participation of Older People in Europe*, pp. 161-167.

¹⁰⁸ Angela T. Haddad and Leonard Lieberman, 'From Student Resistance to Embracing the Sociological Imagination: Unmasking Privilege, Social Conventions, and Racism', *Teaching Sociology*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jul., 1983), pp. 328-341.

¹⁰⁹ Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 'Beyond SES', pp. 271-294.

location, interact to give each individual a unique privilege profile.¹¹⁰ Second, each individual cannot be placed in a neat privilege compartment but will hold a unique position on a spectrum of privilege relating to any context,¹¹¹ such as political participation.

The above two points suggest that privilege as formulated here can work well alongside the concept of intersectionality, which encompasses the idea that different forms of privilege and discrimination intersect to advantage and disadvantage different groups. In this light, the experiences of, for instance, black women cannot be understood in terms of discrimination against black people in general or against women in general, but only as an intersection of those discriminations resulting in a particular set of experiences.¹¹² Extending the argument, white men do not enjoy the privileges of being white and male separately but in a combined fashion that makes their experiences, again, particular to them. Understanding discrimination and privilege in these terms has led to the suggestion that those campaigning for the rights of groups that are discriminated against should be aware of their own privilege. Further they should be alive to the possibility that the groups they are campaigning on behalf of may have differing goals from their own because of their particular experiences.¹¹³

To summarise, the literature on inequality and privilege emphasises the impact of background characteristics on unequal outcomes across society, including in political participation. That literature often focuses on the frequently cited cleavages of sex, race, and class but the concept of privilege can also accommodate the impact of other characteristics such as sexuality, religion, disability, age, and location. Thus, it acts as an overarching concept that can accommodate the mechanisms that translate those background characteristics, in interaction, into advantage or disadvantage. One account of those mechanisms was presented in Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's work but it did not provide a complete concept of privilege, to which the next section turns.

¹¹⁰ bell hooks, 'Class and Race: The New Black Elite', in Kimmel and Ferber, *Privilege*, pp. 243-252; Pattillo-McCoy, *Black Picket Fences*, pp. 209-214; Riggs, *Priscilla, (White) Queen of the Desert*, p. 5; McIntosh, 'White Privilege and Male Privilege', pp. 147-160; Vianello and Moore, *Gendering Elites*, pp. 270-271

¹¹¹ Les Back, *New Ethnicities and Urban Culture: Racism and multiculturalism in young lives* (London, Routledge, 1996), p. 11.

¹¹² Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics', *University of Chicago Legal Forum* (1989), pp. 139-168.

¹¹³ Lila Abu-Lughod, 'Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 783-790.

A Fuller Concept of Privilege:

Thus far, this chapter has illustrated the extent of the literature that relates to political participation and the inequalities in such activity that stem from background characteristics. The literature has provided numerous categorisations of political participation which have been amalgamated to create the typology adopted in the current research. That typology draws on the work of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, who also provide the established model of the causal processes that translate background characteristics into unequal political participation. The account has been supplemented by the wide-ranging literature on the impact of inequality and privilege, the latter of which has been introduced as the broad concept that can accommodate the observations outlined in *Voice and Equality*.

Extensive though the outlined literature is there remain crucial gaps. First, the preceding section outlined a host of texts that have observed the connections between background characteristics and unequal outcomes, and the relevance of privilege to those connections, but no holistic theory of privilege that can elucidate all of the processes of interest. There has been an extensive focus on economic inequality and on the direct effects of key social cleavages but no complete account of how they result in unequal outcomes. The established model proposed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady also adopts an incomplete approach to the workings of privilege, presenting only some of the mechanisms by which background characteristics may be translated into the advantage and disadvantage that underpin unequal outcomes. Further, some of those mechanisms, in particular political knowledge, interest, efficacy, and recruitment, are very close to political participation in the funnel of causality and are therefore not especially illuminating in accounting for it. As will be shown below, it is quite easy to accommodate those mechanisms within a broader, and richer, theory of privilege that includes components with more causal distance from the dependent variable. This fuller conception will also aim to address the fact that, despite providing a useful account of the causal processes that lead to political participation, the established model leaves considerable room for improvement in accounting for that

behaviour.¹¹⁴ Indeed, in the context of the United Kingdom, other models have been found to perform better than the Civic Voluntarism Model in accounting for participation.¹¹⁵ This may be to do with the causal proximity of some of the independent variables to the dependent variable in those, better performing, models but it may also reflect the incompleteness of the Civic Voluntarism Model itself.

Further, all of the above observations relate to the impact of structural forces on individual behaviour, failing to account for the effects of internal affective and cognitive processes that have important implications for behaviour. Thus, the current research aims to go one step further than adopting a more holistic account of the structural workings of privilege by also considering the role of perception of privilege. In doing so it will address the paucity of research considering the importance of perceived privilege and its interactions with its structural counterpart. In addressing that paucity it will be advancing a more meaningful understanding of the causal processes that lead to political participation. Indeed, the lack of previous consideration of perceived privilege should be considered an oversight; how can the mechanisms that translate privilege into political participation be understood if individuals' internal processes are not considered? Thus, perceived privilege represents a key link in the causal chain that must be considered alongside its structural counterpart. Providing this more complete account may also help to explain the different trends in implicit and explicit political participation noted previously. That is to say that it may prove to be the case that the importance of privilege is perceived by individual to be different in relation to explicit rather than implicit political participation, acting as a barrier in relation to the former but not the latter.

Finally, in providing a fuller account of the workings of both perceived and structural privilege it is the aim of the current research to provide an improved understanding of why some people do not participate in politics. As noted at the outset it is commonly recognised that democracy, however envisaged, cannot function without public involvement. If that

¹¹⁴ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 334-368.

¹¹⁵ Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, p. 185.

involvement is disproportionately undertaken by certain groups then it is important to understand why. Indeed, the approach to addressing participatory inequality should be quite different if perception of privilege is found to have an important effect than if structural factors alone affect such participation. In that light, the next chapter will provide a holistic account, and thus improved conception, of the workings of structural privilege. The subsequent chapter will then turn to perception of privilege, outlining the origins and workings of perceptions before conceptualising perception of privilege specifically. In doing so those chapters will lay the groundwork for analysis that will both offer a more complete account of the processes that lead to political participation and insight into how people understand privilege and their relation to it. As such, it will shed light on the question of how, if at all, privilege and perception of it impact on political participation in the United Kingdom.

Chapter Two: Privilege and Capital

Class and Capital:

The preceding chapter presented an array of findings that have emerged from the sociological approach to accounting for differences in political behaviour. That approach has the benefit, through focussing on social structure, of addressing influences on behaviour that fall further back in the funnel of causality than do the focuses of either the psychological or the rational choice approach. As such, this chapter retains a sociological approach but aims to improve upon the established sociological model that was the focus of the previous chapter. It does so by proposing the importance of variables that were overlooked by the established model, and which have the benefit of being causally prior to some of the variables included within that model. Crucially, the additional variables emerge from the main work of this chapter, which is its introduction of an overarching theory of privilege that accommodates and the established model and explains unequal outcomes more generally.

Theories relating to the workings of inherited advantage or disadvantage are numerous and have extended to account for the workings of privilege over the whole course of human history.¹¹⁶ The goal here, however, is to seek an overarching theory of the mechanisms of privilege in modern society. In that light it is useful to refer to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of class, which posits that it works through the capital that individuals hold and:

can present itself in three fundamental guises: as *economic capital*, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as *cultural capital*, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualification; and as *social capital*, made up of social obligations (“connections”), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into

¹¹⁶ Gerhard Lenski, *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 435-443.

economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title or nobility.¹¹⁷

The above provides a concise summary of Bourdieu's approach to capital but his work is extensive and rich enough to warrant more in-depth consideration. In particular, his seminal work *Distinction* is full of fascinating thick description of the cultural capital possessed by people of different classes in 1960s France. Based on a mix of sources including survey data, interviews, and photographs, the description of his subjects encompasses their musical tastes, artistic preferences, choice of literature, home decoration, trips to the theatre and cinema, food preferences and body shape, clothing and appearance, favoured sports, use of language and speech patterns, and choice of newspaper.¹¹⁸ In each of these areas there are 'legitimate', 'middle-brow', and 'popular' tastes, which are more or less widespread and accessible.¹¹⁹

Beyond the presentation of detailed descriptive content Bourdieu used *Distinction* to posit a cultural market in which there is competition not only to obtain capital but also to define which capital is most legitimate.¹²⁰ This competition is partly an effort to obtain the best rates for the cultural capital held when exchanging it into economic capital, but also to assert the opposition between cultural capitals and the superiority of some forms over others.¹²¹ This struggle for superiority is a manifestation of the class struggle that motivated Bourdieu's work, and it led to an original conception of class relations. He posited that class is not defined only in economic terms but also in relation to the other two forms of capital, though the cultural form was the focus of *Distinction*. The introduction of these other elements of class allowed him to expand upon purely economic definitions of the concept as posited by Karl Marx.¹²²

¹¹⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital', in John G. Richardson (ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (New York, Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 241-258, p. 243.

¹¹⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 19-21, p. 28, pp. 32-34, p. 43, pp. 54-60, pp. 185-196, pp. 201-206, pp. 217, , p. 226, p. 255, p. 270, pp. 274-278, pp. 288-290, pp. 298-301, pp. 324-325, pp. 334-336, pp. 346-351, pp. 355-357, pp. 391-393, pp. 413-414, pp. 444-449.

¹¹⁹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 1, p. 16, pp. 359-360.

¹²⁰ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 93, p. 250, pp. 327-328.

¹²¹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 134, p. 147, p. 149, pp. 176-177, p. 196, p. 218, p. 220, p. 231, p. 246, p. 273, p. 311, p. 395, pp. 450-451.

¹²² Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 224, p. 226; Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1948), pp. 13-26.

Bourdieu's analysis included additional complexity because he focussed not only on the volume but also the composition of capital that was held by different classes.¹²³ This theory was reflected in the correspondence analysis that he undertook, which allowed him to differentiate between fractions within the dominant and dominated classes. Amongst the bourgeoisie he profiled the cultural and economic distinctions between old industrialists and new entrepreneurs.¹²⁴ Similarly, within the middle class he distinguished between the professionals and the petty bourgeoisie, and even within the working class between more and less politically aware fractions.¹²⁵ Thus he maintained the division between the dominant and the dominated classes and, at the same time, accommodated the complexity of relations within them by positing that fractions vie for dominance over each other. He also accepted that other structural factors such as sex, age, and location could affect the capital held by individuals, though such factors were accommodated within the overarching analysis of class competition.¹²⁶ Thus, for Bourdieu, social class is not defined by a single property 'but by the structure of relations between all the pertinent properties which gives its specific value to each of them and to the effects they exert on practices.'¹²⁷

Bourdieu's focus on the structure of relations between the volume and composition of capital held by different classes was expressed through his proposition of the concept of habitus, in which 'all the practices and products of a given agent are objectively harmonized among themselves, without any deliberate pursuit of coherence, and objectively orchestrated, without any conscious concertation, with those of all members of the same class.'¹²⁸ Since it is an original concept that was developed by Bourdieu, it is useful to give two examples of how he applied it, in this instance in relation to the different manners of classes. For him, the bourgeoisie expresses:

¹²³ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 120, pp. 128-129.

¹²⁴ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 218, p. 254, p. 270, pp. 305-309

¹²⁵ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 327-328, 341-342, pp. 346-352, p. 396.

¹²⁶ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 382-383, p. 458.

¹²⁷ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 106.

¹²⁸ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 173.

a habitus of order, restraint, and propriety which may not be abdicated. . . . It is also a whole relationship to animal nature, to primary needs and the populace who indulge them without restraint; it is a way of denying the meaning and primary function of consumption, which are essentially common.¹²⁹

By contrast, the working class habitus stands for:

sincerity, for feeling, for what is felt and proved in actions; it is the free-speech and language of the heart which make the true “nice guy”, blunt, straightforward, unbending, honest, genuine, “straight down the line” and “straight as a die”, as opposed to everything that is pure form, done only for form’s sake; it is freedom and the refusal of complications, as opposed to respect for all the forms and formalities spontaneously perceived as instruments of distinction and power.¹³⁰

For the sake of clarity, and since it is a complex concept, habitus is here understood to be the totality of and connections between all of the habits, preferences, and understandings possessed by virtue of being socialised into a particular class.

One of the key means by which such socialisation occurs is education, which Bourdieu describes as institutionalised or formalised cultural capital.¹³¹ Education is thus a means by which to transmit advantage and, as such, is closely linked to background.¹³² The possession of advantage resulting from education can lead to a sense of qualification to engage with topics such as politics,¹³³ which is of particular relevance to the current research. Crucially, the sense of qualification to talk on topics is part of a wider confidence that is imbued by the transmission of cultural capital through both formal and informal means. Such confidence is expressed in relation not just to politics but in a whole host of settings in which “[i]t confers the self-certainty which accompanies the certainty of possessing cultural legitimacy, and the ease which is the

¹²⁹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 196.

¹³⁰ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 199.

¹³¹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 23, p. 387.

¹³² Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 1, p. 105.

¹³³ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 409.

touchstone of excellence'.¹³⁴ This ease is communicated not only through words but also a manner of being:

What is learnt through immersion in a world in which legitimate culture is as natural as the air one breathes is a sense of the legitimate choice so sure that it convinces by the sheer manner of the performance, like a successful bluff.¹³⁵

Such confidence is linked not only to one's habitus but also to the trajectory that results from the current combination of capital, and people are additionally classified by whether they are seen to have upward mobility.¹³⁶ In fact, part of the competition between classes is around the creation of high status jobs that fit the capital profiles, including educational qualifications, of their members to ensure that their trajectory is positive.¹³⁷

To summarise, Bourdieu's work in *Distinction*, which is commonly cited as one of the most important books of twentieth century sociology,¹³⁸ presents a complex and original theory of class. He posits that it is about more than economics and proposes that the market in which the classes compete is based around the volume and composition of both economic and cultural capital (with social capital considered subsequently). Thus, whilst accepting the fundamental divide between dominant and dominated classes, he describes the contending factions of the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the working class. From that description he develops a new concept, habitus, to summarise the relationship between all of the habits, preferences, and understandings possessed by each class and fraction. Habitus is linked to future status through trajectory and is communicated through, amongst other things, formal educational qualifications and a general sense of confidence. Crucially, he achieves all of the preceding based on a rich descriptive account of class in 1960s France that draws on a range of quantitative and qualitative data. As such, in addition to his engaging, powerful, and

¹³⁴ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 66; see also p. 252.

¹³⁵ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 91-92.

¹³⁶ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 110, p. 134, p. 206, p. 346.

¹³⁷ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 155-156, pp. 333-337, pp. 358-359, p. 387.

¹³⁸ 'Books of the Century', *International Sociological Association*, 2007, viewed at http://www.isa-sociology.org/books/alfa/booksa_b.htm on 29.08.2013.

important theoretical contributions, Bourdieu can be seen as an early proponent of mixed methods research.¹³⁹

Focussing on his theory rather than his methods, Bourdieu's impact has been reflected in the extent of the literature related to the three forms of capital. Recent research has utilised survey and census data to show that economic capital in the form of parental wealth is at least equal in significance to parental income in affecting children's educational attainment and future occupations.¹⁴⁰ It is posited that wealth provides an insurance function allowing children to make riskier educational decisions such as choosing long or expensive courses without concern for the costs of failure.¹⁴¹ The findings apply across mobility regimes characterised by the different educational, social welfare, and redistributive systems in the United States, Germany and Sweden.¹⁴² In the United Kingdom, wealth is related to an array of important outcomes including infant mortality, educational attainment, anxiety levels, obesity rates, alcohol and tobacco consumption, drug use, and life expectancy.¹⁴³ The importance of wealth in influencing outcomes also relates to government policy towards job creation and social services, which it has been argued should complement local community action.¹⁴⁴

Whilst there have been differing suggestions of what the best measures of economic capital are (e.g. income or wealth), the debates around social capital have been more fundamental and have led to its identification as an 'essentially contested concept'.¹⁴⁵ Most famously, Robert Putnam identified social capital as aggregate levels of engagement with the civic organisations and public spaces that bind society together.¹⁴⁶ More specifically, it was identified as the 'features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that

¹³⁹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 147.

¹⁴⁰ Fabian T. Pfeffer and Martin Hällsten, 'Mobility Regimes and Parental Wealth: The United States, Germany, and Sweden in Comparison', *Population Studies Center Research Report*, No. 12-766, p. 21, viewed at <http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr12-766.pdf> on 27.08.2012.

¹⁴¹ Pfeffer and Hällsten, 'Mobility Regimes and Parental Wealth', pp. 5-9; Atkinson, *The Economics of Inequality*, pp. 106-111.

¹⁴² Pfeffer and Hällsten, 'Mobility Regimes and Parental Wealth', pp. 2-5.

¹⁴³ Eric Midwinter, 'Age and Inequality', in Geoff Dench (ed.), *The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy* (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 109-115, pp. 110-112.

¹⁴⁴ Yvonne Roberts, 'Marginalised Young Men', in Dench, *The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy*, pp. 97-104, pp. 97-100; Michelynn Laflèche, 'Face, Race and Place, Merit and Ethnic Minorities', in Dench, *The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy*, pp. 90-96, p. 94; Pattillo-McCoy, *Black Picket Fences*, p. 208.

¹⁴⁵ Michael Woolcock, 'The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital, 1998-2008', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jun., 2010), pp. 469-487, p. 482.

¹⁴⁶ Robert D. Putnam, 'Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 65-78.

facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.¹⁴⁷ For him, social capital is both a positive end in itself and an important component of a functioning democracy, with its decline considered to be a trend that should be halted. The relationship between social capital and trust has been focused on elsewhere, leading to the argument that together they facilitate cooperation that could not happen if enforcement institutions alone regulated human interaction.¹⁴⁸ These definitions focus on social capital as the glue that binds society and allows it to function but Putnam also distinguishes between ‘*bridging* (or inclusive) and *bonding* (or exclusive)’ social capital, likening the former to ‘a sociological WD-40’ and the latter to ‘a kind of sociological superglue’.¹⁴⁹ This distinction is key for Bourdieu, who is concerned primarily with the bonding form, which can encompass the importance of access to social networks with higher or lower social status. His view of social capital, as with the other forms, is of something that is held as part of the habitus of a particular class position. As its name suggests, it can be accumulated or exchanged for other forms of capital in the market that he described. Thus, although it is possible to see social capital as a communal resource binding society, from Bourdieu's perspective it is much more something that is distributed unevenly and sustains the class inequalities of society.

Based on Bourdieu's definition, social capital stemming from privilege has been identified most explicitly in the transition from school to university. In the United States elite schools lobby through well-established links with university admissions offices to ensure that the playing field is tilted in favour of their students even when they are not the best qualified candidates.¹⁵⁰ The children of alumni also receive preferential treatment in admissions to elite universities, a phenomenon referred to as the ‘legacy preference’.¹⁵¹ This suggests that social capital is something that can function in the interests of those who hold it without action on

¹⁴⁷ Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone’, p. 67.

¹⁴⁸ Karen Schweers Cook, ‘Networks, Norms, and Trust: The Social Psychology of Social Capital 2004 Cooley Mead Award Address’, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Mar., 2005), pp. 4-14.

¹⁴⁹ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York, NY, Simon & Schuster, 2000), pp. 22-23.

¹⁵⁰ Caroline Hodges Persell and Peter W. Cookson Jr., ‘Chartering and Bartering: Elite Education and Social Reproduction’, *Social Problems*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Dec., 1985), pp. 114-129.

¹⁵¹ John Larew, ‘Why are Doves of Unqualified, Underprepared Kids Getting into our Top Colleges? Because Their Dads Are Alumni’, in Kimmel and Ferber, *Privilege*, pp. 135-144.

their part. Nonetheless survey research has illustrated that the children of high status parents can be quite aware of the social capital that they possess.¹⁵² At the other end of the spectrum, it has been argued that the dislocation associated with large council estates in Britain destroyed working class communities by removing social capital embodied in traditional family networks.¹⁵³ In fact, more recent work has also shown that relocation resulting from urban regeneration projects can also have negative effects by removing people from their established social networks.¹⁵⁴

Recent research based on official records in Denmark has demonstrated the power of social connections in relation to voting. A special edition of the *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties* included work that showed the lower likelihood of turning out associated with leaving home before the habit of voting, inherited from parents, has taken hold.¹⁵⁵ This decline in voting amongst young people is also associated with later maturation; young people are leaving education, getting married, and having children later. This means that they are less settled in one location and, in part because of the social networks that they are therefore part of, less likely to vote.¹⁵⁶ At the other end of the age scale, people are found to 'retire' from voting as their social networks decline with old age.¹⁵⁷ The effects of social connections on turnout are not restricted to youth and old age, and evidence also suggests that discussing politics with non-voters who communicate their scepticism or uncertainty about voting impacts negatively on one's own likelihood of turning out.¹⁵⁸ Social connections and pressure can also work to promote turnout, as demonstrated in a field experiment that found the prospect of having one's choice of whether or not to vote made public significantly raised turnout.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵² John E. Hughes, 'The Perception of the Influence of Parental Occupational Prestige', *The American Catholic Sociological Review*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 1961), pp. 39-49.

¹⁵³ Phil Cohen, 'Subcultural conflict and working-class community', in Hall, *Culture, Media, Language*, pp. 78-87.

¹⁵⁴ Anne Power and Helen Willmot, 'Social Capital Within the Neighbourhood', *Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion (London School of Economics and Political Science)*, CASEreport 38 (Jun., 2007), viewed at <http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cr/CASEREport38.pdf> on 25.10.2013.

¹⁵⁵ Yosef Bhatti and Kasper M. Hansen, 'Leaving the Nest and the Social Act of Voting: Turnout among First-Time Voters', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov., 2012), pp. 380-406.

¹⁵⁶ Kaat Smets, 'A Widening Generational Divide? The Age Gap in Voter Turnout Through Time and Space', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov., 2012), pp. 407-430.

¹⁵⁷ Yosef Bhatti and Kasper M. Hansen, 'Retiring from Voting: Turnout among Senior Voters', *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov., 2012), pp. 479-500.

¹⁵⁸ Partheymüller and Schmitt-Beck, 'A "Social Logic" of Demobilization', pp. 457-478.

¹⁵⁹ Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green and Christopher W. Larimer, 'Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 102, no. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 33-48.

That research is complemented by evidence that voting is contagious within households, and that personal connections are more important in mobilisation than are remote messages.¹⁶⁰ All of the preceding serves to emphasise the importance of social connections in political participation. Thus, social capital, in the form of who one knows, what their statuses are, and how strong the connections are, has important implications for life outcomes in general and political participation in particular.

As indicated by the length and complexity of *Distinction*, cultural capital is perhaps the least easy of the three forms to succinctly define, which has led to criticism of the varied operationalisation of the concept.¹⁶¹ Further it has been argued that levels of cultural capital when entering education have no effect on subsequent attainment.¹⁶² Such arguments have not deterred the literature from focussing on the role of the educational context in reproducing and measuring cultural capital. It has been argued that ‘choice of school appears as the one real chance that parents get to structure a significant slice of socialisation beyond the home.’¹⁶³ In that vein, research has illustrated that even when middle-class parents go ‘against the grain’¹⁶⁴ by choosing urban schooling for their children, they do so with specific goals in mind. These may be educational, for instance to instil a work ethic, or more broadly experiential, for instance to gain diverse cultural experiences in a moderated environment.¹⁶⁵

Those parents who do choose to send their children to private school may focus on the material benefits such as better facilities, more highly qualified teachers, smaller class sizes, the array of extra-curricular activities, and better results and prospects for university entrance.¹⁶⁶ At a less tangible level, they may hope that such schools will build their children’s character, instil discipline in them, and generally ‘polish’ them in preparation for their future

¹⁶⁰ David W. Nickerson, ‘Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field Experiments’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 102, No. 1 (Feb., 2008), pp. 49-57; Daryl J. Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs* (Belmont, CA, Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1970), pp. 75-77.

¹⁶¹ Paul W. Kingston, ‘The Unfulfilled Promise of Cultural Capital Theory’, *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 74, Extra Issue: Current of Thought: Sociology of Education at the Dawn of the 21st Century (2001), pp. 88-99.

¹⁶² Kingston, ‘The Unfulfilled Promise of Cultural Capital Theory’, pp. 88-99.

¹⁶³ Diane Reay, Gill Crozier and David James, *White Middle-Class Identities and Urban Schooling* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 19, p. 21.

¹⁶⁴ Reay, Crozier and James, *White Middle-Class Identities and Urban Schooling*, p. 29.

¹⁶⁵ Reay, Crozier and James, *White Middle-Class Identities and Urban Schooling*, pp. 31-42, pp. 166-167.

¹⁶⁶ Geoffrey Walford, *Privatization and Privilege in Education* (London, Routledge, 1990), pp. 44-55.

lives.¹⁶⁷ Hence academic qualifications can represent more than ability in certain fields, indicating that children have been socialised to be motivated and to understand the requirements of their role in any given context.¹⁶⁸ Beyond school, '[a] college degree confirms that the graduate is a responsible, diligent member of society who knows how to conform to its requirements.'¹⁶⁹ On the other side, for those without the privilege of attending university or 'good' schools, the educational system can prove alienating as 'middle-class teachers operate a whole series of linguistic and cultural controls which are "dissonant" with those of [their] family and peers, but whose mastery is implicitly defined as the index of intelligence and achievement'.¹⁷⁰ Further, privileged students who conform to the 'mainstream' academic culture may behave disparagingly towards a lack of privilege that can manifest itself in delinquency.¹⁷¹

On a more material level, the importance of cultural capital extends beyond the confines of formal education, for instance into consumption habits. It has been argued that rising general wealth leads to '[t]he eclipse of "waste" by "taste"'¹⁷² as the privileged demonstrate their cultural superiority through consumption of particular brands with associated images. This re-establishes or reinforces control of cultural signifiers including habits and brands because ability to consume excessively loses its value.¹⁷³ Interestingly, and as with social capital, children of high status parents are often aware of the impact that family background has on consumption habits.¹⁷⁴

Higher levels of education can also translate into higher levels of interest in politics and participation in political activity.¹⁷⁵ As noted previously, Bourdieu also identifies the link from education to a sense of entitlement to express political opinions. That observation,

¹⁶⁷ Walford, *Privatization and Privilege in Education*, pp. 42.

¹⁶⁸ Alan C. Kerckhoff, 'Family Position, Peer Influences, and Schooling', in Richardson, *Handbook of Theory and Research in the Sociology of Education*, pp. 93-112, p. 109.

¹⁶⁹ Peter Marris, 'Just Rewards: Meritocracy Fifty Years Later', in Dench, *The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy*, pp. 157-162, p. 159.

¹⁷⁰ Cohen, 'Subcultural conflict and working-class community', in Hall, *Culture, Media, Language*, p. 86.

¹⁷¹ Reay, Crozier and James, *White Middle-Class Identities and Urban Schooling*, p. 143; Pattillo-McCoy, *Black Picket Fences*, pp. 212-213; Cohen, 'Subcultural conflict and working-class community', in Hall, *Culture, Media, Language*, p. 86.

¹⁷² Alan Shipman, 'Lauding the Leisure Class: Symbolic Content and Conspicuous Consumption', *Review of Social Economy*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 277-289, p. 280.

¹⁷³ Shipman, 'Lauding the Leisure Class', pp. 283-288.

¹⁷⁴ Hughes, 'The Perception of the Influence of Parental Occupational Prestige', pp. 44-45.

¹⁷⁵ Jim Ogg, 'A Brief Profile of the New British Establishment', in Dench, *The Rise and Rise of Meritocracy*, pp. 81-89, pp. 84-85.

however, is only part of his assessment of the role of cultural capital in individuals' approaches to politics and, in fact, he gives over a section in *Distinction* to the topic. In it he suggests political opinions and issue positions, for instance on policies relating to minimum wages and accommodation for the working classes, are based on class position.¹⁷⁶ Further, and more fundamental than opinion, he argues that an inclination towards political engagement itself is a facet of the middle-class habitus.¹⁷⁷ The importance of class can be seen in the domination of politics by those who speak using a particular style and, in so doing, demonstrate their political qualifications.¹⁷⁸ The dominance of the political style of expression means that even representatives of the working classes, such as those who rise through the ranks of trades unions, end up being detached from the class that they came from.¹⁷⁹ This detachment is such that '[a]bstentionism is perhaps not so much a hiccup in the system as one of the conditions of its functioning as a misrecognized – and therefore recognized – restriction on political participation.'¹⁸⁰ Further, the requisite manner of performance in politics acts as a structural barrier to political participation in which those outside politics hold:

suspicion of the political “stage”, a “theatre” whose rules are not understood and which leaves ordinary taste with a sense of helplessness, [and which] is often the sources of “apathy” and of a generalized distrust of all forms of speech and spokesmen.¹⁸¹

This speaks of the potential importance of cultural capital in enabling political participation, and empirical work has shown the link between the two in Denmark, albeit based on very restricted measures of the former concept.¹⁸² The possible relationship between the two, then, needs to be examined in more detail whilst taking into account the other elements of privilege.

In summary, Bourdieu's seminal work suggests the importance of cultural tastes, habits, and consumption patterns, as well as social networks, alongside economic capital. He

¹⁷⁶ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 418, pp. 431-432.

¹⁷⁷ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 419.

¹⁷⁸ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 413-414, pp. 343-344.

¹⁷⁹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 417, p. 424, p. 462.

¹⁸⁰ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 398.

¹⁸¹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 464-465.

¹⁸² Gitte Sommer Harrits, 'Class, culture and politics: on the relevance of a Bourdieusian concept of class in political sociology', *The Sociological Review*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Feb., 2013), pp. 172-202, pp. 179-185.

argues that those three forms of capital are exchangeable but that their distribution is defined by the ongoing struggle between classes and the fractions within them. The defining role of class means that there are homologies between the different types of each of the three forms of capital, which come together to form the habitus of each class and fraction. Thus, Bourdieu presents a detailed account of the workings of class, the importance of which has been reflected in the extensive empirical work relating to the impact of economic, social, and cultural capital.

Adapting Capital:

There have, of course, been critiques of Bourdieu's theories, not least stemming from those adhering to economically based definitions of class. For instance, it has been argued that Bourdieu's claim that certain class traits lead to misrecognition of economic exploitation cannot, for instance, explain why workers in the former Soviet Bloc rejected their exploitation. Instead, Gramsci's concept of false consciousness is developed to suggest that particular systems of work mystify, and thus sustain, economic exploitation.¹⁸³ That argument posits the continuing centrality of economic relations to understanding class and exploitation. This is a point that has been developed elsewhere in the suggestion that Bourdieu does not pay enough attention to classic European understandings of class as a relation to the means of production, be they based on Marx or Goldthorpe. It is argued that Bourdieu fails to accommodate the fundamental importance of the power that stems from economic position.¹⁸⁴ This point has been also been made, albeit in different terms, in criticisms of the Great British Class Survey, which applied the forms of capital to describe the contemporary classes in the United Kingdom. It has been argued that it is unnecessary and unhelpful to expand the concept of class beyond the occupational statuses categorised by the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC), which is less complex and captures the class hierarchy well.¹⁸⁵

These critiques seem to suggest a particular understanding of the causal processes that lead to societal hierarchies, positing that economic structures define access to power and hierarchical position. By contrast, this research applies a reading of Bourdieu that suggests it is socialisation and life experiences, which are here taken to be influenced by background class as well as other background characteristics that furnish individuals with the three forms of capital. The resultant capital profiles allow the attainment of particular statuses in any given

¹⁸³ Michael Burawoy, 'The Roots of Domination: Beyond Bourdieu and Gramsci', *Sociology*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 2012), pp. 187-206.

¹⁸⁴ Flemmen, 'Putting Bourdieu to Work for Class Analysis', pp. 325-343.

¹⁸⁵ Office for National Statistics, 'SOC2010 volume 3: the National Statistics Socio-economic classification (NS-SEC rebased on SOC2010)', *The National Archives*, Wednesday 06 January 2016, viewed at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/classifications/current-standard-classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec--rebased-on-soc2010--user-manual/index.html> on 24.04.2017.

social hierarchy and thus access to the power that influences, amongst other things, subsequent economic outcomes. Thus, in an important respect, this research adapts the forms of capital to account not for the workings of class but of privilege. This means that background class can be retained as a relatively simple indicator of parental economic status. In that light, some element of the criticism of Bourdieu is accepted, in that capital profiles are not considered to reflect class in this research, but to reflect the broader encompassing concept of privilege.

With the above broad adaptation in mind it is useful to consider work in which Bourdieu's theories were applied to the context of the United Kingdom with the result that certain key, and more specific, adaptations were proposed. In *Culture, Class, Distinction*, Tony Bennett and colleagues set out three key questions:

Our first question . . . is to assess whether we can detect cultural capital in contemporary Britain, and if so, to delineate what form it takes.

. . .

Our second question . . . is whether different cultural fields, namely in the worlds of music, reading, art, television and film viewing, and sport are structured along similar principles, and if so, what is the nature of the similarities between them?

. . .

Our third question is to what extent we can see a process whereby established middle-class groups are advantaged by the organisation of cultural forms, and how similar processes inform the ordering and reproduction of the relations between genders and ethnic groups.¹⁸⁶

In addressing those question they adopt a similar mix of research methods to Bourdieu to inform their description of the different British classes' tastes and levels of participation in areas including music, print news, art, books, television, cinema, sport, clothing, and eating

¹⁸⁶ Tony Bennett, Mike Savage, Elizabeth Silva, Alan Warde, Modesto Gayo-Cal, and David Wright, *Culture, Class, Distinction* (London, Routledge, 2009), pp. 12-14.

out.¹⁸⁷ Unsurprisingly, since the research was conducted in a different country and at a different time to Bourdieu's they find notably different cultural capital profiles, not least because new forms of entertainment such as television have become relevant.¹⁸⁸ Despite this, they retain a three-class model for the contemporary United Kingdom whilst noting some overlap between those classes.¹⁸⁹ Importantly, they find differences in the structure of the cultural capital held by the various classes in contemporary Britain.

Their first departure from Bourdieu is in the identification of the decline in the power of legitimate culture in the United Kingdom.¹⁹⁰ It seems that the struggle to define the value of particular forms of cultural capital in the market has resulted in a situation in which the value of almost all forms is accepted, or at least not dismissed. In fact, the research repeatedly finds that people are keen to avoid the label of 'snob' and are thus hesitant to pass judgement on any form of cultural capital in which they are not interested.¹⁹¹ There are some exceptions with, for instance, particular genres of music provoking strong positive or negative reactions but the trend towards, if not acceptance, then tolerance of diverse cultural forms prevails.¹⁹² Thus, Bourdieu's posited hierarchy of types of cultural capital is of less relevance with the value of capital varying with context. Relating to this, familial social capital is found to have continuing greater significance for working class people than for their middle or upper class counterparts and, to an extent, substitutes for the more confined cultural tastes and lower levels of cultural participation noted below.¹⁹³

Extending the above, the second adaptation to Bourdieu that Bennett et al. identify relates to the diversity of cultural forms consumed. It seems that, beyond mere tolerance, it has become a badge of honour to maintain diverse tastes, leading to the emergence of the phenomenon of the 'cultural omnivore'.¹⁹⁴ In fact, such wide-ranging cultural preferences seem

¹⁸⁷ Bennett et al., *Culture, Class, Distinction*, pp. 47-48, p. 76, pp. 90-93, p. 98, pp. 106-109, p. 114, p. 121, p. 132, p. 136, p. 140-141, p. 144, pp. 155-157, p. 162, pp. 164-166,

¹⁸⁸ Bennett et al., *Culture, Class, Distinction*, p. 254, p. 22, p. 132, p. 149.

¹⁸⁹ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 55.

¹⁹⁰ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 38, p. 56, p. 75, p. 205, p. 255.

¹⁹¹ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 59, p. 70, p. 111, p. 186, p. 189, p. 194, p. 211, p. 256.

¹⁹² Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 79.

¹⁹³ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 71.

¹⁹⁴ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 18.

to act as a new form of distinction; in contemporary Britain it is not important to be familiar with particular cultural forms but to know, like, and be comfortable with a large range of such forms.¹⁹⁵ This finding is suggestive of prioritisation of liberal values such as tolerance amongst classes that have begun to deprioritise economic concerns as they enter 'postmaterialism'.¹⁹⁶ In fact, the extent of the phenomenon has led the authors to suggest that part of the reason for a decline in the distinctiveness of working class culture is that many components of it have been co-opted by middle and upper class cultural omnivores.¹⁹⁷ Interestingly, there is no suggestion that middle and upper class culture has been co-opted by similar working class cultural omnivores. This is a significant break from Bourdieu's findings, which identified a disinterested analytical approach to culture, rather than a willingness to engage in many cultural contexts, as the measure of distinction.¹⁹⁸ In fact, it seems that only one group in the contemporary United Kingdom has retained a cultured detachment in their consumption habits: the elite. The distinctiveness of the upper echelons is maintained by some cultural forms that have not diffused downwards, such as classical music and opera, though these are now the exceptions rather than the rule.¹⁹⁹ Indeed, the continued distinction of the elite may be exaggerated by the reduced distinction between the middle and working classes based on cultural omnivorousness.

Bennett et al. repeatedly find that an identifiable British elite breaks with the tenor of their observations, for instance regarding the declining importance of legitimate culture. This small group of senior people in various fields continues to consume cultural forms identified as markers of distinction by Bourdieu, as well as holding a more stringent information-focussed approach to newer forms of entertainment such as television.²⁰⁰ The social circles in which such people move allow them to maintain their relationships with other members of the elite, potentially working in other organisations or sectors than themselves.²⁰¹ The fact that the

¹⁹⁵ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 88, p. 172, p. 194, p. 255.

¹⁹⁶ Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997), p. 22, p. 35, p. 39.

¹⁹⁷ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 212.

¹⁹⁸ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 253.

¹⁹⁹ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 76, p. 84, pp. 189-190, p. 253.

²⁰⁰ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, pp. 92-9, p. 135.

²⁰¹ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 90, p. 122, p. 190, p. 253.

elite seems to be identifiable and detached has important implications for the current research, especially since national politicians are likely to fall within that group.²⁰² If the upper echelons of society are particularly different from the majority of the population, and can be seen as such, this may detach them from the public and create barriers to engagement.

Notwithstanding the elites, it is wide-ranging cultural tastes that maintain distinction in the contemporary United Kingdom, though other patterns are also significant. In their third adaptation to Bourdieu, Bennett et al. note that the volume of participation in cultural activities outside the home is a key means by which to differentiate the classes.²⁰³ Thus it is that, although they cannot be easily characterised with reference to particular cultural tastes, the middle and upper classes are more likely than the working classes to attend events and venues associated with their cultural interests.²⁰⁴ Often the ability to participate reflects access to greater levels of economic capital but in all cases frequent participation helps to maintain cultural profiles.²⁰⁵

Building on the identification of changes in the structure of cultural preferences the next adaptation proposed by Bennett et al. is more fundamental. Noting that one of the major critiques of Bourdieu has been his failure to adequately account for the impact of gender, and his inability to consider the impact of ethnicity due to data restrictions, they argue that other factors contribute extensively to the formation of cultural capital.²⁰⁶ Throughout *Class, Culture, Distinction*, they find evidence that, whereas Bourdieu accommodated such factors within an overarching class analysis, gender, ethnicity, and age actually interact with class to create a diverse array of cultural capital profiles in the United Kingdom.²⁰⁷ The significant impact of all these factors suggests the utility of the adaptation outlined in opening this chapter,

²⁰² Hywel Williams, *Britain's Power Elites: The Rebirth of a Ruling Class* (London, Constable, 2006), pp. 220-222; George Walden, *The New Elites: Making a Career in the Masses* (London, The Penguin Press, 2000), pp. 206-207; Sue Cameron, *The Cheating Classes: How Britain's Elite Abuses their Power* (London, Simon & Schuster, 2002), p. 243-251.

²⁰³ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 43.

²⁰⁴ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 52, p. 114, p. 160, p. 168.

²⁰⁵ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 140, p. 165.

²⁰⁶ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 214, pp. 234-235.

²⁰⁷ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, pp. 2-3, p. 43, pp. 52-53, p. 82, p. 105, p. 130, p. 133, p. 142, p. 147, p. 156, p. 160, p. 168, p. 171, p. 216, p. 221, p. 222, p. 237, p. 249.

in which the forms of capital are taken as indicators not of class but of privilege, which can accommodate all of the relationships between background characteristics and capital profiles.

The replacement of class with privilege as the focus of research can also address the next adaptation to Bourdieu that Bennett et al. suggest. In recognising the complexity of the terrain of cultural capital in contemporary Britain, and accepting the role of a number of factors on that terrain, they provide the basis to critique the problem of class determinism.²⁰⁸ Whilst Bourdieu challenged the economic determinism of Marxist theories it is class that retains a central role in his analysis. In particular he presented habitus not only as the possession of particular tastes in the various cultural fields but also as the homology between those tastes. That is to say, he posited that the structure of relations between classes is the same across all of the fields of cultural capital.²⁰⁹ By contrast, their findings allow Bennett et al. to conclude:

While we find the notion of class habitus unhelpful, we agree with him [Bourdieu] that cultural proclivities are closely associated with social class; the three classes that we inductively generated from our cultural maps transcend particular occupational positions. This does not, however, produce exclusive, highly integrated and unified patterns of class behaviour; perhaps it is more useful to see classes as force fields, within the parameters of which individuals vary, though within limits.²¹⁰

In rejecting the assertion of homology across the fields of cultural capital that comprise the habitus they are providing scope for probabilistic rather than deterministic analysis. This adaptation to Bourdieu is important for the current research because it allows for the possibility that multiple factors, rather than just class, influence capital profiles. It also accommodates the idea that those capital profiles are part of a causal process that has consequences in the context of political participation. In other words, contra Bourdieu, political participation may be behaviour that results, in part, from the possession of capital rather than as something that is determined by class in the same way as capital profiles. Importantly, the placing of capital in

²⁰⁸ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 18, p. 27.

²⁰⁹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 470.

²¹⁰ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 252.

a causal process also allows for the introduction of perceptions as crucial additional steps in that causal process. It accommodates the idea that the relevance of privilege is affected by the extent to which, and how, it is perceived.

To summarise, in *Culture, Class, Distinction*, Bennett et al. retain a fundamentally Bourdieusian analysis but make some important adaptations based on empirical observations that render his theories applicable to contemporary Britain. In answering their three motivating questions they find, first, that cultural capital does exist in that setting and that it varies across the classes. However, they find that the cultural capital profiles of the different classes are notably different from those observed in 1960s France. Crucially, in answering their second question, they find that there is a less deterministic relationship between fields of cultural capital than that posited by Bourdieu, thus challenging the assertion that they are homologous. Third, they find that the decline in the significance of legitimate culture has blurred the hierarchy of the classes in terms of cultural capital. Instead, those in the higher classes have a tendency to have become cultural omnivores, marked by their diverse tastes and frequent participation in an array of activities. Finally, in answering their third question, they find that trends in cultural tastes and practices are not only structured by class but also by sex, race, and age.

In challenging Bourdieu's overly-deterministic approach to the relationship between class and capital, Bennett et al. lay the foundations for the adoption of the broader concept of privilege by the current research. Privilege translates the various identified background characteristics, as well as others, into the unequal societal outcomes with which they are associated. It encompasses the socialisation process by which different capital profiles are created, and can be seen as the mechanism through which background characteristics lead to advantage or disadvantage. Thus, privilege can accommodate the impact of class, sex, race, sexuality, age, religion, disability, and location as they influence the capital profile of each individual and thus the outcomes that are more or less available to them. This adoption of privilege over class as the focus of the research is the first major departure from the Bourdieusian theory that informs it.

The second major departure from Bourdieu is in its focus on testing causality. As noted previously, Bourdieu adopts a highly descriptive approach and, in utilising correspondence analysis, focuses to a great degree on mapping the distribution of and associations between the forms of cultural capital. Of course, Bourdieu's is a class analysis and, as such, fundamentally asserts a causal process leading from class to homologous profiles across the various fields of cultural capital. However, the focus of the work is not on testing or assessing that causal process but on describing its results. His use of survey data does not imply the testing of hypotheses and, in fact, it is deployed in an inductive manner to illustrate the differences between classes.²¹¹

Similarly, although they recognise the importance of sex, race, and age alongside class in defining cultural profiles, Bennett et al. do not test those causal relationships. This thick descriptive approach stands in contrast to the approaches to assessing causality that are adopted by social science researchers who are more informed by practice in the discipline of economics. Such approaches, often deployed in analyses of inequality, tend to test the aggregate level impact of concepts such as supply and demand, or focus on economic calculations at the individual level. Indeed, the established model of inequality in political participation that was outlined in the first chapter, though not concerned with such economic calculations, adopts such an approach to causal analysis.

Taking an approach that draws both on the established model and on Bourdieu's theories, the current research focuses on testing individual level causal processes. In particular, it is concerned with the processes that run from background characteristics through privilege to political participation. This is arguably a perversion of the Bourdieusian concepts of economic, social, and cultural capital that were conceived as indicators of class rather than causal mechanisms. However, as outlined in the previous consideration of the literature that has adopted and tested those concepts, this will not be the first time that they have been put to such a use. Crucially, it is also considered worthwhile to build on the rich and important

²¹¹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 78-79, p. 202, p. 241, pp. 245-246, pp. 265-270, pp. 374-379.

descriptive work undertaken by Bourdieu and Bennett et al. by testing the causal impact of the processes that work through the forms of capital. Thus, this research is not concerned with the dispersion of capital per se, but with its origins and effects.

Despite the adoption of a different causal approach it remains the case that Bourdieu, as adapted by Bennett et al., provides the holistic theory of privilege that was lacking in the previously reviewed literature on the concept. In doing so it provides the first main focus for the current research; the link from privilege as it is embodied in the three forms of capital to political participation. This is posited to be a more illuminating relationship than that between background characteristics and political participation because privilege is more than merely a summary of those characteristics. The three forms of capital, which indicate privilege, are rich in detail and indicate the particular circumstances of each individual in a way that simply observing their background characteristics cannot. Habits, preferences, and understandings are undoubtedly affected by those characteristics but they also suggest how a person was brought up, and they encompass the key factors that were identified by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady as influencing political participation.

Reconciling Privilege, Capital, and Political Participation:

As has been argued, and despite its relevance, the Civic Voluntarism Model does not refer to the concept of privilege that is a crucial component of this research. As was noted in the introduction, that concept is also of particular relevance to the context of the United Kingdom. This suggests the utility of reconciling the work outlined in the first chapter with that outlined so far in this chapter. This will allow the current research to identify the three forms of capital as the mechanisms through which privilege works but, at the same time, adopt the causal approach and focus on political participation of the Civic Voluntarism Model. Thus, it is necessary, reasonable, and intuitively satisfying to reconcile Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's model with Bourdieu's conceptualisation of economic, social, and cultural capital.

First, Bourdieu's economic capital clearly encompasses the money component of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's concept of resources. Of course, and as noted previously, money does not come only from income but also from wealth (i.e. a stock of assets that is exchangeable into money or provides earnings), which also contributes to unequal outcomes.²¹² Thus, economic capital is here taken to be an amalgamation of wealth and income, and to include the money component of the concept of resources from the Civic Voluntarism Model. It is also taken to incorporate the time component of resources, though it is a more unusual component in terms of its relationship with background characteristics. Time is structured along different lines from income and wealth, and has interesting relationships with each. Increasing income may be negatively related to free time if it is the result of more work but positively related to an increase in wealth if it implies that income from work becomes less critical. Time is also arguably heavily related to family structure, with traditional divides in housework and child rearing being based on sex.²¹³ Thus, whilst time is marked by its relationships with the other components of economic capital, the nature of those relationships is complex.

²¹² Atkinson, *The Economics of Inequality*, pp. 157-167; Pfeffer and Hällsten, 'Mobility Regimes and Parental Wealth', p. 21.

²¹³ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 291-294; Bennett et al. *Culture, Class, Distinction*, pp. 60-61.

The influence of background characteristics on economic capital is apparent; its transfer from one generation to another is likely to sustain the structures that existed in the previous generation. By definition, wealth that is transferred to children from parents remains in the hands of those with the similar background characteristics. At the same time, the persistence of income differences between groups, in part due to time constraints imposed by factors such as housework and child rearing, complements wealth transfer in structuring economic capital by background characteristics.

Second, Bourdieu's approach to the 'essentially contested concept'²¹⁴ of social capital focuses on the bonding element identified by Robert Putnam, and is more concerned with social capital within groups than in society as a whole.²¹⁵ Thus, Bourdieu's definition focuses on who individuals know and, implicitly, what they can expect from those relationships. It is relatively easy to reconcile this with Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's concept of recruitment if it is accepted that social capital also relates to the requests that are likely to come from the people who one knows. This is not a great leap; different acquaintances will have different habits of their own so requests for participation will differ depending on who one knows. This means that, like the social connections that they stem from, requests are structured by background characteristics.²¹⁶ Thus, social capital is here taken to be the number of social connections that one has, the status of the people to whom one has connections, the strength of those connections based on what can be expected of them, and the requests that result.

The maintenance of the structuring of social capital through its transfer between generations is easily comprehended; parents can offer introductions to family friends, colleagues, or fellow members of organisations. At a less explicit but more fundamental level the parental role in choosing schools, supporting extra-curricular activities, and, in some cases, vetoing friendships all play a part in defining the social networks in which people find themselves. The social skills developed in those networks then influence the networks that

²¹⁴ Michael Woolcock, 'The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital', pp. 469-487, p. 482.

²¹⁵ Robert D. Putnam, 'Bowling Alone', pp. 65-78.

²¹⁶ Leighley, 'Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives', pp. 181-209, pp. 189-191.

develop once one strikes out and leaves home, not least if one attends university (which is, again, a decision often influenced by parents).

Finally, Bourdieu's cultural capital encompasses the bulk of the components of the model presented in *Voice and Equality*. Civic skills, which stem from education (itself a key component of cultural capital) and ongoing engagement with employment and voluntary contexts, both enable participation and act as a qualification to do so. They are also likely to deliver the kind of self-assured manner in a political setting that Bourdieu identified. Thus, civic skills both enable individuals to participate and mark them out as able to others. Similarly, the components of engagement act as cultural qualifications that incline those who possess them towards political activity and suggest to others that they are competent to do so. Being interested in politics, believing that one can effectively engage with the political system, and holding political information are signifiers of political competence that assure the self and others. Party identification is less necessary for political participation and despite its well-documented decline remains widespread, perhaps because of its utility in the most prevalent form of political participation, voting.²¹⁷ Nevertheless, party identification is here taken to be part of cultural capital along with the other components of engagement, civic skills, and Bourdieu's originally posited cultural tastes, habits, and activities. Crucially, all of these elements share a common origin in that they stem from socialisation. This concept is of wide significance but is particularly relevant to cultural capital, and can be defined as:

“the process by which persons acquire the knowledge, skills, and dispositions that make them more or less able members of their society” (Brim 1966, p. 3). Socialization does not include all formative processes experienced by individuals. It is limited to those associated with *acquired* characteristics (and thus it excludes qualities evolving through biological maturation) which have *social* significance (and thus excludes individual differences that are not systematically relevant to social functioning).²¹⁸

²¹⁷ Mair and van Biezen, 'Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies', pp. 5-21.

²¹⁸ Kerckhoff, 'Family Position, Peer Influences, and Schooling', p. 94.

It is socialisation that, as Verba, Schlozman, and Brady note, functions both in early years and in impressionable adolescence, transferring cultural capital between generations, to form Bourdieu's habitus.²¹⁹ It may be less homologous than he posited but it encompasses patterns in civic skills and engagement that are structured, through socialisation, by background characteristics.

To summarise, it is relatively simple to reconcile the Civic Voluntarism Model proposed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady with the three forms of capital proposed by Bourdieu. For ease of reference Table 2.1, presented below, maps the components of the former onto the latter. This exercise is critical for the current research because it reconciles work on the key concepts of privilege and political participation by positing a path that leads from background characteristics through inheritance, socialisation, and networks to the economic, social, and cultural capital, which encompass resources, recruitment, and engagement as proposed in the Civic Voluntarism Model. In doing so it also reconciles Bourdieu's theory of the forms of capital with the causal rather than descriptive analytical approach taken in this research.

Table 2.1. Mapping the Civic Voluntarism Model onto the Three Forms of Capital

Form of Capital	Original Components	New Components
Economic	Income Wealth	Time
Cultural	Education Tastes Habits Consumption patterns	Civic skills Political interest Political efficacy Political information Party identification
Social	Number of social connections Strength of those connections Status of those known	Requests

²¹⁹ M. Kent Jennings, 'Political Socialization', in Dalton and Klingemann, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, pp. 29-44.

Conclusion:

This chapter has presented a holistic theory of privilege in the form of Pierre Bourdieu's work on economic, social, and cultural capital. That theory and his in depth work on the nature of cultural capital and class competition were taken to offer a detailed explanation of the workings not, as he argued, of class but of privilege. Indeed, drawing on criticisms of Bourdieu's work it has argued that background class constitutes one among many background characteristics that influence capital profiles. Those profiles then go on to influence current socio-economic classification as well as a range of other outcomes including political behaviour. Building on the key adaptation of the forms of capital to be the mechanisms of privilege rather than class, the chapter outlined recent work by Bennett and colleagues that render Bourdieu's theories relevant to the context of the contemporary United Kingdom. In particular, they introduced a culturally omnivorous approach as the new indicator of cultural distinction, with only the small elite remaining distinct on the basis of its consumption of highbrow, or legitimate, culture.²²⁰ More fundamentally, they introduced the possibility that variance, rather than homology, exists within capital profiles constituted of various forms and types of capital. As such, they accommodated the possibility that the elements of those capital profiles may be influenced by a range of background characteristics beyond class, as is argued by this research. Building on those adaptations, the chapter put forward a key argument of the research, which is that in focussing on political participation the causal approach of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady should be adopted in place of Bourdieu's descriptive approach. In that light the propositions of those two key texts were reconciled to provide an outline of the process that runs from background characteristics through privilege to political participation.

²²⁰ The term 'legitimate' is used in place of 'highbrow' throughout the thesis for two reasons. First, it more accurately reflects the language used by Bourdieu when outlining the theory underpinning this research. Second, it attempts to avoid valorising the types of capital that are described as legitimate by placing them in an explicit hierarchy of 'highbrow', 'middle-brow', and 'lowbrow' capital. Thus, the choice of language aims to recognise the kinds of capital that are legitimised by society, and that support political participation, whilst not reinforcing the idea of the superiority of that capital, as far as that possibility can be avoided.

Chapter Three: The Importance of Perception of Privilege

Perception and Inequality:

The preceding chapters have outlined in detail a process that leads from background characteristics to political participation and, in doing so, have provided an account of the workings of privilege. In considering such mechanisms the focus has been on the impact of structural influences at the individual level. In other words, until this point a sociological approach has been adopted that accounts for only one part of the causal process that influences political behaviour. For a fuller account of that process it is crucial to consider not only influences that are external to individuals but also the internal processes that are a crucial influence on outcomes. That is to say that what people think and feel is a critical additional link in the causal chain from background to behaviour. Thus, the previous chapters have dealt with the key externally observable concepts that account for the workings of the overarching concept of privilege, and can thus be seen as an account of structural privilege. They do not account for perceived privilege, or the thoughts and feelings that people have about their backgrounds, how they relate to their current place in society, and their ability to participate in certain activities such as politics.

Missing the perceptual component out of any account of the influence of privilege on political participation renders the causal chain incomplete, undermining any explanation. The impact of structural privilege may be crucially related to whether it is perceived and how relevant it is seen to be in a given context. Ultimately, behaviour is not influenced only by structural forces but also by beliefs about those forces. A key reason for not participating in politics may be the belief that one is not able to, perhaps because of a lack of economic, social, or cultural capital. Structural privilege may have an impact on political participation but that impact will be notably different if it is alive in the minds of individuals. Perception of privilege is thus important in its own right but also has the potential to improve our understanding of how structural privilege impacts on political participation. Indeed, it may be that a key

component of privilege is the perception that one has a high status and thus is able to behave in particular ways, for instance by participating in politics.

Questions regarding the origins of perception, how it functions, and its effects have been a matter for philosophical debate and extensive psychological research.²²¹ The focus of the current research is particularly on the components of perception that relate to relations and causality.²²² Specifically, it is concerned with whether individuals perceive a societal hierarchy that encompasses them (relations), and what they perceive to be the reasons for that hierarchy and any effects it may have (causality). It has been argued that '[i]ndividual psychology and social inequality relate to each other like a lock and key.'²²³ This is because there is a crucial relative component to inequality, with perception of one's own position being related to perceptions of the positions of others.²²⁴ This recognition of the significance of self-comparison against others informed the development of relative measures of wealth and poverty.²²⁵ The relative component of inequality, though, does not just relate to economic measures and, in Britain, class labels and their associated places within a status hierarchy are of great importance.²²⁶ Relative placement is bound up with perception and has consequences for political participation. Thus, for the sake of clarity, the focus of this research is not on perception in general but specifically on the perception of privilege. It is necessary below to consider the workings of some more general components of perception, and the impact that they have, but only in so far as they inform our understanding of perception of privilege.

Survey evidence has suggested that in countries with a history of enforced equality the perception of conflict in society, especially between rich and poor, leads to lower support for democracy, and a reduced likelihood of participation in it.²²⁷ This is complemented by survey evidence that negative information, for instance relating to conflict, is more important

²²¹ A. D. Smith, *The Problem of Perception* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 1-17; Joseph Margolis, 'Objectivity as a Problem: An Attempt at an Overview', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 560, The Future of Fact (Nov., 1998), pp. 55-68.

²²² Walter Hopp, *Perception and Knowledge* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 60-61.

²²³ Wilkinson and Pickett, *The Spirit Level*, p. 33.

²²⁴ Frances A. Maher and Mary Key Thompson Tetreault, *The Feminist Classroom* (Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p. 22.

²²⁵ Atkinson, *The Economics of Inequality*, pp. 227-228.

²²⁶ Bennett et al., *Culture, Class, Distinction*, p. 193.

²²⁷ Krzysztof Zagórski, 'The Perception of Social Conflicts and Attitudes to Democracy', *International Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Fall, 2006), pp. 3-34.

than positive information in the formation of political impressions and subsequent behaviour.²²⁸ Aggregate measures also show that higher inequality depresses voter turnout in democratic societies.²²⁹ Returning to the individual level, experimental evidence indicates that disengagement may be underpinned by low power individuals heightening their perceptions of relationships between the powerful, perhaps because of anxiety stemming from the perceived threat of an outgroup.²³⁰ Heightened perceptions of power relations further up a hierarchy could contribute to the ‘paradox of distance’ in which voters can hold negative dispositions towards politicians in the abstract whilst being more favourable to individual local politicians.²³¹ At the same time, those of higher status tend to inflate their distance from those of lower status by perceiving more layers in the hierarchy, which may inhibit reconciliation between politicians and the voting public.²³² This has led to calls for politicians to emphasise positions on issues that are of common benefit to all rather than focussing on specific group interests.²³³

Perceptions of certain groups can act as barriers to their participation, with evidence suggesting that those who are excluded from social groups display a disparity between how others perceive them and their self-perception.²³⁴ Such excluded groups may be victims of stereotyping based on characteristics beyond their control,²³⁵ for instance family status.²³⁶ It was previously noted that stereotypes of women can lead to their exclusion from politics but gender is only one basis for stereotypes that can affect status. Whatever their basis, as the importance of stereotypes increases they can create a culture of symbolic politics in which

²²⁸ Richard R. Lau, ‘Negativity in Political Perception’, *Political Behaviour*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1982), pp. 353-377.

²²⁹ Solt, ‘Economic Inequality and Democratic Political Engagement’, pp. 48-60.

²³⁰ Brent Simpson and Casey Borch, ‘Does Power Affect Perception of Social Networks? Two Arguments and an Experimental Test’, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 278-287; Walter G. Stephen, ‘Cognitive Differentiation in Intergroup Perception’, *Sociometry*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Mar., 1977), pp. 50-58.

²³¹ H. George Frederickson and David G. Frederickson, ‘Public Perceptions of Ethics in Government’, *Annals of the American Academy of Politics and Social Science*, Vol. 537, Ethics in American Public Service (Jan., 1995), pp. 163-172, p. 163.

²³² Lionel S. Lewis, ‘Class and the Perception of Class’, *Social Forces*, Vol. 46, No 3 (Mar., 1964), pp. 336-340.

²³³ Gregory Bovasso, ‘Self, Group, and Public Interests Motivating Racial Politics’, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), p. 3-20.

²³⁴ David A. Goslin, ‘Accuracy of Self Perception and Social Acceptance’, *Sociometry*, Vol. 25, No. 65 (Sep., 1965), pp. 283-296.

²³⁵ Eric Luis Uhlman, T. Andrew Poehlman, and Brian A. Nosek, ‘Automatic Associations: Personal Attitudes or Cultural Knowledge’, in Jon Hanson (ed.), *Ideology, Psychology, and Law* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 228-260, pp. 244-245.

²³⁶ Linda R. Bryan, Marilyn Coleman, Lawrence H. Ganong, and S. Hugh Bryan, ‘Person Perception: Family Structure as a Cue for Stereotyping’, *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Feb., 1986), pp. 169-174.

certain groups trigger affective responses in the population that can be played on by politicians.²³⁷ This is particularly important because survey research has demonstrated that the public hold inaccurate perceptions in relation to a range of important policy issues in the United Kingdom.²³⁸ Indeed, it can be argued that politicians and the media play a part in creating, sustaining, and exaggerating such misperceptions and their associated affective responses.

In fact, affect as well as cognition has an important impact on how political information is processed and they can work together to influence outcomes.²³⁹ The relevance of both cognition-based calculations and affect-based expressive motivations in political behaviour has led to the proposition that individuals have an 'all-things-considered evaluation' that points to their preferred course of action.²⁴⁰ This links back to the overarching account of decision-making as based on the parallel intuition- and reason-based systems. In that account the role of affect is to signal when decisions made through the intuition-based system are inappropriate, thus activating the reason-based system instead. This can lead to a change in behaviour as the activation of the reason-based system helps individuals learn what is appropriate in unfamiliar contexts.

The importance of affect and, in particular, anxiety in defining behaviour are the focus of the theory of cognitive dissonance. That theory posits that individuals have relatively accurate, if imperfect, perceptions of their immediate reality and thus of disparities between their opinions, beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviours.²⁴¹ The anxiety caused by the dissonance between those elements motivates people to bring them into line with each other, which they may do by changing their behaviour, their environment, or by seeking new information.²⁴² Considerable evidence was marshalled to support the theory, for instance

²³⁷ David O. Sears, 'Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory', in Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire (eds.), *Explorations in Political Psychology* (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 113-146.

²³⁸ Bobby Duffy, 'Perceptions are not reality: The top 10 we get wrong', *Ipsos MORI*, Tuesday 9 July 2013, viewed at <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3188/Perceptions-are-not-reality-the-top-10-we-get-wrong.aspx> on 02.09.2015.

²³⁹ Robert S. Wyer, Jr., and Victor C. Ottati, 'Political Information Processing', in Iyengar and McGuire, *Explorations in Political Psychology*, pp. 264-293, p. 282.

²⁴⁰ Hamlin and Jennings, 'Expressive Political Behavior', pp. 667-669.

²⁴¹ Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 9-11.

²⁴² Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, pp. 19-24.

demonstrating that being asked to publicly advocate a position leads to a greater adherence to that position because beliefs are brought into line with behaviour in order to avoid dissonance.²⁴³ This corroborated evidence of a wider trend for individuals to bring their beliefs into line with their roles, be they in the work, social, or political context.²⁴⁴

The theory of cognitive dissonance has been influential in the field of political psychology, particularly in relation to voters' candidate preferences. Survey evidence has suggested that voters selectively perceive their preferred candidate's policy positions, a phenomenon referred to as projection, to ensure that they match their own.²⁴⁵ This is especially the case when they hold a positive affective disposition towards the candidate, when the candidate is ambiguous on the policy, and when the policy is important to the voter.²⁴⁶ The evidence that voters bring their beliefs, affective dispositions, and actions into balance has been used to counter claims that voters learn candidates' positions from cues such as their party.²⁴⁷

Despite its influence, the theory of cognitive dissonance suffers from causal ambiguity with regard to, for instance, the negative relationship that may emerge between perception of privilege and political participation. The theory suggests that this could be the result of a process in which individuals perceive their low levels of privilege as inappropriate in political contexts, and bring their political behaviour into line with those perceptions. Alternatively, politically inactive people could justify their behaviour by bringing their beliefs into line with it, thus constructing a belief in the exclusionary importance of privilege in political contexts. Thus, whilst perception clearly has an important role understanding and behaviour, there is a need for a clearer account of how these relationships work.

²⁴³ Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, pp. 104-112.

²⁴⁴ Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, pp. 271-275.

²⁴⁵ Drury R. Sherrod, 'Selective Perception of Political Candidates', *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter, 1971-1972), pp. 554-562.

²⁴⁶ Michael D. Martinez, 'Political Involvement and the Projection Process', *Political Behaviour*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1988), pp. 151-167.

²⁴⁷ Donald Granberg, Jeff Kasmer, and Tim Nanneman, 'An Empirical Examination of Two Theories of Political Perception', *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Mar., 1988), pp. 29-46; Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, 'Projection and the Perception of Candidates' Issue Positions', *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1982), pp. 228-244; Donald Granberg, 'An Anomaly in Political Perception', *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Winter, 1985), pp. 504-516.

The Self-Perception and Planned Behaviour:

Countering cognitive dissonance theory, and providing a clearer causal proposition, is the self-perception theory of Daryl J. Bem. In *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, he suggests that the idea of cognitive dissonance holds sway with academics because they spend a large part of their lives considering the consistency of their theories.²⁴⁸ In its place he outlines an extensive theory of perception that begins with the identification of different levels of belief. 'Zero-order beliefs' are developed from the senses and 'are the "nonconscious" axioms upon which our other beliefs are built'. For example, the belief that our senses do not lie, or that our parents do not lie, are zero-order beliefs.²⁴⁹ 'First-order beliefs' rely on zero-order ones and are based on information that is received from the sources that have been judged to be trustworthy. For example, identifying with a political party because one is brought up by parents who support it is a first order belief. Beyond first-order beliefs there is a vertical structure of higher-order beliefs, for example regarding the qualities of a policy proposed by a political party, all tracing their roots back to first- and zero-order ones.²⁵⁰ At the same time, Bem suggests that there are horizontal links between higher-order beliefs meaning that there can be multiple reasons for holding a belief. Crucially, he also posited that the order of a belief can change over time so that, for instance, if the reason for trusting a newspaper is forgotten (due to habitual readership) then that trust becomes a zero-order belief.²⁵¹

Based on the above ideas, Bem suggests that the links between beliefs require that they be cognitively consistent but that this does not mean that they must be logical or rational. This can be manifested in a number of ways, for instance if inductive generalisations are wrong, as with stereotypes. Alternatively, false premises may lead to false beliefs, for instance if an unreliable source is trusted. Higher-order beliefs may also be inconsistent despite shared bases, for instance if the fundamental belief in freedom leads to a contradiction in beliefs about

²⁴⁸ Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, p. 34.

²⁴⁹ Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 6-7.

²⁵⁰ Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 10-11.

²⁵¹ Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 11-12.

protecting freedom with law. Finally, reasoning may be subtly illogical, for instance if correlation is identified as causation.²⁵² Thus the drive to resolve logical inconsistency may not be as strong as previously suggested and the possibility emerges that people can sustain imbalance between beliefs and behaviour.²⁵³

If dissonance is not the driver then an alternative explanation for the experimental results that support cognitive dissonance theory is required. In that light, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs* marshals the same experimental evidence to support an alternative theory. It shows that external cues are used both in forming other's perceptions of an individual and by the individual when forming their self-perceptions. Bem posits that self-perception is taught in childhood by parents, who diagnose internal conditions from external cues, for instance identifying soreness from bruising. Learning this process of diagnosis from their parents, people come to diagnose their own conditions based on external cues as well as internal ones. Hence, experiments have shown that when physiological responses are induced with drugs similar to adrenalin the resultant mood reflects the cues provided, which were varied to indicate anger or happiness. The importance of external cues was also demonstrated by experiments showing that obese people rely more on external than internal cues for their eating habits. Additionally, and finally, corroboration was provided by the experimental finding that attraction to semi-nude pictures altered depending on the pace of heartbeat on a recording, thought to be an amplification of the subject's own heart.²⁵⁴

In addition to reporting the above, Bem replicated experiments demonstrating that individuals change their opinions to match conditioned or paid behaviour that contradicts their initial opinions if the conditioning or payment is not too incongruous. Crucially, the experiments are also replicated with individuals observing the behaviour in others and building their perceptions on that basis, with the same perceptual outcomes. It is argued that individuals are not driven to resolve cognitive dissonance in relation to others, but that their perceptions

²⁵² Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, p. 13.

²⁵³ Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, p. 34; Donald Granberg, 'Political Perception', in Iyengar and McGuire, *Explorations in Political Psychology*, pp. 70-108, p. 89.

²⁵⁴ Bem, *Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 48-53.

and self-perceptions are based on the same external cues that others may use to perceive them.²⁵⁵ This accommodates the importance of context and roles in defining behaviour.²⁵⁶ At the same time, the theory provides a link from external structural influences to the internal influences that play a part in defining subsequent behaviour.

In relation to the current research, self-perception theory suggests that individuals utilise the same indicators to perceive their levels of capital as do those around them. Thus, individuals are likely both to perceive the extent to which they are privileged and, using different cues, the extent to which they are involved in political activity. This suggests that those who are less privileged, who are also less likely to participate in political activity, are likely to think of themselves as 'not political' or to consider that politics is 'not for them'. This is not just a process leading from external cues to perceptions; Bem did not deny that beliefs can also influence behaviour. Thus, once the belief that one cannot engage in political activity is established it is likely to contribute to and sustain disengagement. This is similar to the observation made by Brady, Schlozman, and Verba that motivations may be post-hoc rationalisations of behaviour but retain significance because of their capacity to influence future behaviour.

Crucially, the complex relationships between the three forms of capital, and the varying prominence of different types within each form, suggests that perceptions of capital will not be uniform. Different capital has relevance in different contexts and the significance of a certain type or form at a key formative stage of socialisation could influence persistent perceptions. In other words, the cues that individuals use to perceive privilege may vary, for instance on the basis of differing experiences of socialisation. This sustains the possibility that individuals may have perceptions in line with the cues that they base them on but divergence between perceptions and current circumstances. A classic example of this is the prioritisation of childhood experiences rather than current circumstances when perceiving one's social class. In short, there is the possibility of variance in the relationship between privilege, perception

²⁵⁵ Daryl J. Bem, 'Self-Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena', *Psychological Review*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May, 1967), pp. 183-200.

²⁵⁶ Bem, *Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 66-69.

of it, and political participation. This also has the potential to explain the different trends in participation in implicit and explicit political participation because people may perceive those activities, and thus their ability to participate in them, differently.

The above process leading from external structure to internal beliefs and then to subsequent behaviour fits within the molecular opinion structure proposed by Bem. This posits that a given belief is grouped with an attitude and a perception of social support.²⁵⁷ Again this proposal only relates to a structure, not to the content of any of its parts. Thus, a person who believes that they are not privileged, by Bem's reckoning because they have observed external cues indicating as such, will feel a particular way about it and will seek other opinion that is supportive of that belief and feeling. This indicates that social groups can be important in maintaining beliefs, perceptions, and, as already noted, behaviour.

²⁵⁷ Bem, *Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 38-39.

Perceptions of Social Groups:

The importance of social groups is emphasised by social identity theory. That theory is based on experimental evidence suggesting the formation of group identity, and associated positive and negative emotions relating to in- and out-groups, independently of competition between groups for scarce resources.²⁵⁸ The process that leads to that group identity begins with social categorisation, or 'the process through which separate individuals are clustered into groups.'²⁵⁹ Subsequently social comparison is undertaken in which 'characteristic group features are interpreted and valued.'²⁶⁰ Finally, social identification leads to seeing one's self as part of a given group to the extent that the features of the group become associated with the self.²⁶¹ It is argued that social identification is an affective process, with the complement to this being the more cognitive self-categorisation theory.²⁶² That theory posits that identification can occur at different levels of abstraction, for instance from the individual to the national. It further posits that self-categorisation depends on which other groups are salient, for instance influencing whether sex, ethnicity, class, nationality, or another grouping provides the basis for categorisation. The process depends not only on which groups are salient but also the size of the differences between them, meaning that categorisation is likely to be defined against the most different group. Thus, the process of self-categorisation means that patterns of assimilation and contrast stem from identification with or against the salient groups at the time.²⁶³ A particularly salient group identity in the context of the United Kingdom is that of class, and the above suggests that the class-based status hierarchy has roots not only in social structures but also the process of group categorisation and identification that individuals undertake.

²⁵⁸ Naomi Ellemers and S. Alexander Haslam, 'Social Identity Theory', in Paul A. M. Van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanski, and E. Tory Higgins (eds.), *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology* (Volume 2, London, Sage Publications, 2012), pp. 379-393, pp. 379-380.

²⁵⁹ Ellemers and Haslam, 'Social Identity Theory', p. 381.

²⁶⁰ Ellemers and Haslam, 'Social Identity Theory', p. 381.

²⁶¹ Ellemers and Haslam, 'Social Identity Theory', p. 382.

²⁶² Ellemers and Haslam, 'Social Identity Theory', p. 389.

²⁶³ Ellemers and Haslam, 'Social Identity Theory', p. 388; see also John C. Turner and Katherine J. Reynolds, 'Self-Categorization Theory', in Van Lange, Kruglanski, and Higgins, *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology*, pp. 400-414.

The persistence of hierarchies based on groupings such as social class suggests the relevance of group status. It has been argued that membership of a low status group, especially in contexts where that low status is salient, lowers self-esteem, aspirations, and performance.²⁶⁴ This can be linked to research suggesting that feelings of insecurity, which may be prompted by low status, make one less open to new ideas and settings.²⁶⁵ The power of low status can feed into patterns of self-verification, in which people seek information that affirms their perceived status, linking to Bem's molecular belief structure in which beliefs are grouped with attitudes and social support. This can potentially lead to an ongoing cycle of low self-esteem, limited aspirations, and underperformance.²⁶⁶ The significant impact of low group status, and perception of that status, is important for the current research. Status is assigned on the basis not only of background characteristics but also of the associated levels of capital. This provides a direct link from privilege to group status and its associated behavioural implications.

The proposition that the negative feelings, such as anxiety, associated with low status lead to worse performance contradicts the dual-system theory of decision-making that suggests the motivating impact of negative affect stemming from behaviour being inappropriate to the current setting.²⁶⁷ The important point to note here is the different bases for the negative emotions; in the latter instance it is behaviour or beliefs that are at stake but in the former it is the status of the individual, which is more fundamental. That is to say, it is rather more challenging to struggle with a low status that implies an overarching inferiority, especially if that status has been assigned from an early age, than it is to deal with current behaviour being inappropriate to a particular setting. This can be linked to Bem's suggestion of zero-, first-, and higher-ordered beliefs; in the latter instance it is only higher order beliefs or behaviours that are being challenged whereas in the former it is a zero-order belief being reaffirmed. Being in

²⁶⁴ Wilkinson and Pickett, *The Spirit Level*, pp. 36-39; Laurie T. O'Brien and Brenda Major, 'Group Status and Feelings of Personal Entitlement: The Roles of Social Comparison and System-Justifying Beliefs', in John T. Jost, Aaron C. Kay, and Hulda Thorisdottir (eds.), *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 427-439, pp. 429-430; Turner and Reynolds, 'Self-Categorization Theory', p. 410; Chris D. Hardin, Rick M. Cheung, Michael W. Magee, Steven Noel, and Kasumi Yoshimura, 'Interpersonal Foundations of Ideological Thinking', in Hanson, *Ideology, Psychology, and Law*, pp. 132-159, pp. 136-137.

²⁶⁵ Geoffrey L. Cohen, 'Identity, Belief, and Bias', in Hanson, *Ideology, Psychology, and Law*, pp. 385-403, pp. 391-397.

²⁶⁶ William B. Swann, Jr., 'Self-Verification Theory', in Van Lange, Kruglanski, and Higgins, *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology*, pp. 25-38.

²⁶⁷ Marcus, Neuman and McKuen, *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement*, pp. 48-58.

a context in which one's own capacities and worth are identified as low relates not only the zero-order belief about one's status but also, potentially, associated first- and higher-order beliefs.

The importance of low status is the focus of social dominance theory, which identifies five different strategies for dealing with it. First, individuals may try defection from a group with low status, though this requires that the boundaries between groups are permeable or that they are able to disguise themselves. Second, they can be socially creative by redefining the grounds upon which groups are compared and selecting those that give their group high status. Third, retaining the current grounds that are used to assign status to groups, they can assert that their group's current practice is high status. Fourth, they can identify lower groups against which they can compare themselves. Fifth and finally, they can choose to compete with higher status groups for a better position.²⁶⁸ Interestingly, these strategies echo features of Bourdieu's market for cultural capital, in which the classes not only compete for cultural capital but also to define which cultural capital has value. Crucially, competition stemming from hierarchies can take place outside the cultural domain and it has been posited that aggression stemming from marginalisation can lead to political activity.²⁶⁹

Beyond culture and politics, the general idea of group competition fits within the broader propositions of social dominance theory, which assumes that:

- (1) Human social systems are predisposed to form group-based social hierarchies.

This social hierarchy consists of at least one Hegemonic group at its top and at least one Negative Reference Group at its bottom. . . .

- (2) Males will tend to possess a disproportionate degree of political power. We refer to this as the Iron Law of Andrarchy. . . .

²⁶⁸ James Sidanius, 'The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression: A Social Dominance Perspective', in Iyengar and McGuire, *Explorations in Political Psychology*, pp. 184-218, pp. 191-192.

²⁶⁹ Russell J. Dalton, Manfred Kuechler, and Wilhelm Bürklin, 'The Challenge of New Movements' in Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (eds.) *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990), pp. 3-20, pp. 6-7; Edward N. Muller, *Aggressive Political Participation* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 180-182; Karl-Dieter Opp, 'Grievances and Participation in Social Movements', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 53, No. 6 (Dec., 1988), pp. 853-864.

- (3) Most common forms of group conflict and oppression (e.g., racism, sexism, nationalism, classism) can be regarded as different manifestations of the same predisposition toward group-based social hierarchy.
- (4) The formation of social hierarchy and primordial groups are survival strategies adopted by humans.²⁷⁰

The result of the above assumptions is the assertion that there will always be hierarchies with negative reference groups at the bottom, and questions remain about the extent to which challenging such inequality will be fruitful.²⁷¹ Part of the reason for the difficulty of challenging inequality is that there are those who defend the existing hierarchies, often amongst those who are in higher status groups or enforcement roles. Such people, who are disposed towards upholding the hierarchy, are referred to as having a high 'social dominance orientation'.²⁷²

According to social dominance theory, the maintenance of the hierarchy, in part by those with a high social dominance orientation, disempowers those with low status and restricts their options for action.²⁷³ This leads to behavioural asymmetry, in which:

on the average, the behavioral repertoires of individuals belonging to groups at different levels of the social hierarchy will show significant differences, differences that have been produced by the dynamics of and which, in turn, reinforce and perpetuate the group-based hierarchy system. This behavioural asymmetry is induced by socialization patterns, stereotypes, legitimization myths . . . , and the operation of systematic terror.²⁷⁴

Thus, the hierarchy is sustained not only by the actions of those in enforcement roles or with high status but also, in part, by the behaviour of those with low status. In fact, social dominance theory suggests multiple different ways that behavioural asymmetry may manifest itself in

²⁷⁰ Sidanius, 'The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression', pp. 196-197.

²⁷¹ Sidanius, 'The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression', pp. 215-218.

²⁷² Sidanius, 'The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression', p. 214; James Sidanius and Felicia Pratto, 'Social Dominance Theory', in Van Lange, Kruglanski, and Higgins, *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology*, pp. 418-434, pp. 419-420.

²⁷³ Sidanius and Pratto, 'Social Dominance Theory', p. 430.

²⁷⁴ Sidanius, 'The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression', p. 202.

high and low status groups. It may take the form of systematic out-group favouritism or deference amongst low status groups or, at the other end of the hierarchy, in-group bias. Alternatively, it may take the form of self-handicapping amongst low status groups, resulting in the lower performance noted previously. Finally, it may take the form of ideological asymmetry, in which the political ideology of a high-status group is more related to in-group favouritism than is the political ideology of a low-status group.²⁷⁵ Such behavioural patterns are based around perceptions of in- and out-groups that may become entrenched from an early age and lead to automatic associations, implying that it can be difficult for individuals to change the associated behavioural patterns.²⁷⁶ Those behavioural patterns are complemented by the capital profiles outlined in the previous chapter, leading to the situation identified by Bourdieu in which those who hold certain forms of capital are able to behave in particular ways, for instance by participating in politics.

In identifying ways in which unequal systems are maintained social dominance theory fits within a broader system justification theory, which posits that there are a range of beliefs that can be held to justify unequal systems. It has been argued that social dominance orientation functions as one of the main modes of system justifying alongside right-wing authoritarianism. Whilst the former is based around group competition, and the resultant right of high status groups to retain their earned position in the hierarchy, the latter is much more focussed on the threat posed by out-groups, with the in-group taken to be 'normal, morally good, [and] decent'.²⁷⁷ It has been observed, based on survey evidence, that social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism function as separate spectrums in a similar fashion to the left-right and liberal-authoritarian political spectrums, which they may underpin.²⁷⁸ It

²⁷⁵ Sidanius, 'The Psychology of Group Conflict and the Dynamics of Oppression', pp. 202-207.

²⁷⁶ Uhlman, Poehlman, and Nosek, 'Automatic Associations', pp. 228-260.

²⁷⁷ James Duckitt and Chris G. Sibley, 'A Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideological Attitudes and System Justification', in Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir, *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, pp. 293-308, pp. 307-308.

²⁷⁸ Duckitt and Sibley, 'A Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideological Attitudes and System Justification', p. 296; Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 17-19; Anthony Heath, Geoffrey Evans, and Jean Martin, 'The Measurement of Core Beliefs and Values: The Development of Balance Socialist/Laissez Faire and Libertarian/Authoritarian Scales', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 115-132, p. 117; Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and John T. Jost, 'The Politics of Intergroup Attitudes', in Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir, *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, pp. 480-504, p. 481;

follows that individuals may be high in social dominance orientation but low in right-wing authoritarianism, vice versa, high in both, or high in neither.

Being high in either social dominance orientation or right-wing authoritarianism means that one holds system justifying beliefs. One of the forms that such beliefs frequently take is the 'fundamental attribution error' in which the low status of others is seen to be the result of their inherent flaws whilst one's own status is considered to stem from a range of external and internal factors. Thus, those adhering to the error assign low status groups characteristics such as laziness, lack of work ethic, or lack of money management skills.²⁷⁹ Such beliefs are associated with the background characteristics of those who hold them but are also sustained through their prevalence in society at large.²⁸⁰ As such, it has been argued that:

those who make external attributions have overcome the fundamental attribution error, the dominant ideology of individualism, the dearth of coherent philosophical justification for egalitarianism, and a noticeable lack of forthright political leadership.²⁸¹

Thus, in 'explaining differences in the distribution of social and material goods in terms of differences in individual effort, talent, and merit and by holding people responsible for their outcomes'²⁸² system justifying beliefs are here considered to exist in opposition to perception of privilege, which requires recognition of systemic causes of inequality. This opposition is of particular relevance to the current research because system justifying beliefs have been found to relate to lower involvement in political activity.²⁸³ Such beliefs are not only held by those with high status, and it is possible that the extent of disengagement from politics differs between individuals of varying statuses. This also suggests that the impact of perception of privilege may differ across different status groups, an idea that will be developed subsequently.

²⁷⁹ Kathleen Knight, 'In Their Own Words: Citizens' Explanations of Inequality Between the Races', in Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (eds.), *Perception and Prejudice: Race and Politics in the United States* (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 202-232, pp. 210-213.

²⁸⁰ Knight, 'In Their Own Words', p. 221.

²⁸¹ Knight, 'In Their Own Words', p. 228.

²⁸² O'Brien and Major, 'Group Status and Feelings of Personal Entitlement', p. 432.

²⁸³ Carolyn L. Hafer and Becky L. Choma, 'Belief in a Just World, Perceived Fairness, and Justification of the Status Quo', in Jost, Kay, and Thorisdottir, *Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification*, pp. 107-119, p. 109.

Perception of Privilege and Causality:

To summarise the preceding sections, the combination of Bem's self-perception theory and theories related to group identity and status suggest an important role for perception of privilege in influencing political participation. It has been posited that individuals perceive their status in a hierarchy, albeit imperfectly, based on the cues that others may also use to assign a status to them. This is particularly important for low status groups that not only face structural barriers but, upon perceiving their low status, are also likely to respond with less effective behaviour. Even when successfully adopting strategies to overcome low status, for instance in the form of competition with other groups, low status groups may not fundamentally challenge the hierarchy itself. Since, as is argued in previous chapters, background characteristics are an important influence on status and since hierarchies are widespread it is likely that perception of status begins at an early age. Despite those early origins the perception of status does not necessarily entail perception of the reasons for that status. This is a crucial focus for the current research, which is concerned with the perception of role of background characteristics in defining status and that perception's impact on political participation.

Background characteristics also featured prominently in the preceding two chapters, which proposed privilege as the process by which those characteristics influence in the capital profiles that contribute to unequal outcomes. It is important to reconcile that causal process with the implications of the preceding sections of this chapter, which is to say that it is important to specify the relationship between structural privilege and perception of privilege. Drawing on self-perception theory, both background characteristics and the consequent capital profiles are taken to be cues that individuals may draw on when perceiving their statuses. At the same time those statuses are bound up with the self-categorisations that individuals undertake and thus the groups that they identify with, both of which are therefore also influenced by background characteristics and capital profiles. The linked self-perceived statuses, self-categorisations, and group self-identifications constitute a set of beliefs that

individuals hold about themselves. Adapting the theory of planned behaviour, it is argued that those beliefs underpin attitudes that influence the dispositions or, in other words, behavioural intentions that ultimately lead to behaviour such as political participation.²⁸⁴

The preceding outline of the causal process running from structural privilege through perceived privilege to political participation should not be taken to be deterministic. If it were, then it would be possible to account for such participation on the basis of background characteristics alone, which is demonstrably not the case. Whilst a single overarching theory of privilege has been presented in this research there is no reason to assume that such a conceptualisation is universal in the population. There are multifarious reasons why individuals may prioritise particular background characteristics or forms of capital in their perceptions of the workings of privilege generally and their own levels of privilege specifically. An array of experiences in childhood, at school, or in the workplace can raise the salience of particular characteristics or capitals in manners that have a lasting impact on perception of privilege. Crucially, those experiences may happen at different points in individuals' lives and thus, because of the potential lasting impacts, lead to perceptions that become out of line with those individuals' changing circumstances. Thus, if individuals' levels of privilege, based on their capital profiles, differ from their perceived levels of privilege, based on the cues that they have internalised, then each will contribute in a different way to their behaviour.

Returning to the three approaches to answering the motivating conundrum outlined in the introduction, it may be that rational processes also have a part to play in the decisions that lead to behaviour. Crucially, this is likely to be the case only to the extent that reason-based decision-making processes are activated by affective responses to inapplicable intuition-based behaviour. Intuition-based, or fast, processes are considered here to include the workings of perception of privilege outlined above. Individuals' perceptions of their privilege, based on salient cues at particular points in their lives, and the beliefs, attitudes, and behavioural intents

²⁸⁴ Icek Ajze, 'Martin Fishbein's Legacy: The Reasoned Action Approach', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 640, No. 1 (Mar., 2012), pp. 11-27.

that stem from them are posited to impact on behaviour without consideration unless affective responses indicate the circumstances render the resultant behaviour inappropriate. Thus, and to be as specific as possible, the concern here is with the process that runs from background characteristics through capital profiles to the perception of privilege that, with its associated attitudes and intents, constitute part of the intuition-based decision-making process that impacts on political behaviour.

This research thus combines both sociological and psychological approaches to accounting for political behaviour and, in doing so, argues that they are complementary. Indeed, as has been outlined above, the intuition-based decision-making processes that include perception of privilege are argued to stem, at least in part, from socialisation processes that also affect capital profiles. It may reasonably be argued that the rational choice approach is also complementary because reason-based decision-making processes, characterised by consideration of the costs and benefits of actions, are activated when the intuition-based processes that are shaped by socialisation are found wanting. However, the causal proximity of rational processes to any subsequent behaviour renders such explanations less illuminating. In other words, if an individual has got to the stage of reasoning that such behaviour is worth undertaking they are already very close to undertaking that behaviour. It is thus more interesting to consider the social and psychological processes that impact on behaviour before rational processes are activated, and indeed which may activate them.

Conclusion:

This chapter has argued that there is a need to move beyond a focus on structural privilege to account for perceived privilege. It has outlined the importance of perception in relation to privilege with reference to a range of empirical work. In that light, and having considered the uncertain causal implications of cognitive dissonance theory, the chapter has argued that Bem's self-perception theory is highly relevant. That theory suggests that individuals draw on the external cues that those around them may also use when perceiving their levels of privilege and political participation. The resultant perceptions have implications for subsequent behaviour. This is of particular importance because those perceptions are bound up with relevant self-categorisations, group self-identifications, and group statuses. This suggests the relevance of social dominance theory, which accommodates the observation that, despite possible strategies to raise status, low status leads to worse outcomes for individuals when it is perceived. This is not least because perceptions, self-categorisations, group self-identifications, and group statuses are internalised as beliefs that, through attitudes, impact on behavioural intentions. These processes have been argued to be part of the intuition-based decision-making system that is, at times, replaced by the reason-based decision-making system that may underpin more rational decision-making. Such rational decision-making, however, is beyond the scope of this research because of its causal proximity to the behaviour of interest. Thus, it is considered likely that those who perceive their statuses as low or high, and the structural reasons for those statuses, will behave in different ways from each other. Further, they may hold markedly different behavioural patterns than those who hold system justifying beliefs, which hold that inequality is not caused by structural factors. The posited importance of perception of privilege stems from the psychological approach to accounting for behaviour, which has been argued to complement the sociological approach dealt with in the preceding two chapters. Thus, together, structural privilege and perceived privilege are argued to be important parts of any answer to the question of why people participate or not in political activity.

Chapter Four: Data and Analytical Approach

Introduction:

The preceding chapters have established the need to consider both structural and perceived privilege when explaining differential participation in politics. As has been shown, there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to consider both, but that joint focus is also reflective of a critical realist standpoint. That is to say that the research is informed by 'an integration of a realist ontology (there is a real world that exists independently of our perceptions, theories, and constructions), with a constructivist epistemology (our understanding of the world is inevitably a construction from our own perspectives and standpoint).²⁸⁵ That approach requires recognition that the current research is informed not only by theory and prior empirical observations, but also by the values and previous experience of the researcher themselves.²⁸⁶ Further, it requires understanding that the research is making observations that are informed by the perspective of the researcher to the extent that, arguably, what is ultimately being tested is the relevance and utility of a particular narrative regarding privilege, perception, and political participation. Recognition of the interplay between the world and interpretations of it accommodates a 'retroductive' approach to research in which theory and empirical analysis are developed in interaction.²⁸⁷

Such a retroductive approach is applied in the current research to the analysis of data collected through an original online survey of a representative, though non-probability, sample of British adults. That analysis allows for the testing of hypothesised causal relationships between the key independent and dependent variables, which provides the basis for inferences about the population. Both the identification and operationalisation of the variables of interest,

²⁸⁵ John W. Creswell and Vicki L. Plano Clark, *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, 2011), p. 45.

²⁸⁶ Charles Teddlie and Abbas Tashakkori, *Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and Behavioural Sciences* (Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, 2009), pp. 90-91.

²⁸⁷ David Sanders, 'Behaviouralism', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 45-64, pp. 61-62.

as well as the hypothesised relationships between them, are informed by the theory outlined in the previous chapters. Those chapters provide conceptualisations of the three forms of capital, which are taken to be measurable mechanisms through which privilege functions. In addition, the preceding chapters provided a conceptualisation of perception of privilege, which is argued to intervene in the relationship between capital and political participation. Information on the measures of those concepts is provided in this chapter, which also provides technical information relating to the survey that was designed and fielded for this research. It then compares the sample with the population to establish its representativeness, observing that the sample is notably more representative in terms of sex and region of residence than it is in relation to age, ethnicity, or religion. After this, the chapter outlines, in some detail, the analytical approach that is adopted in the subsequent chapters, which is Structural Equation Modelling. That approach allows the simultaneous estimation of latent factors relating to the concepts of interest, and the structural relationships between them. It is thus particularly suitable for the current research because it allows the measurement of broad concepts like cultural capital with multiple indicators and, at the same time, facilitates the testing of the clear causal propositions of the research. In providing details of the data and analytical approach, this chapter provides the basis for interpreting the results in the subsequent chapters.

Sample and Survey Details:

A survey was designed to cover the areas specified by the theories outlined above and fielded to a sample drawn from YouGov's online panel, which is comprised of more than 360,000 respondents who have opted-in to answer surveys for the company. Panellists are recruited through the YouGov website as well as through advertising on other websites, and the company makes extensive efforts to recruit underrepresented groups to the panel. When the company fields a survey, requests are sent to panellists who then click on a link and are directed to whichever survey is most in need of respondents with their characteristics. That directing of respondents is designed to maximise the representativeness of the sample, ensuring that the burden placed on the weighting process is not too great.

The survey was split into two waves to reduce the number of questions that respondents were asked in a single sitting, with the hope that their attention would be sustained and the quality of their responses maintained. Further, splitting the survey into two waves allowed the questions on perception to be temporally separated from the questions on activities. This reduced the possibility of respondents' perceptual answers being influenced by their answers relating to activities. Thus, the first wave of the survey included sections on political activities, group membership and voluntary activity, cultural preferences and activities, and social networks. The second wave then contained sections on political opinions, perceptions of societal hierarchies and their explanations, and background information such as parental occupation, educational level, and religious beliefs. Full versions of the two waves of the survey are included in appendices A and B.

In terms of the key concepts in the research, political participation is measured by questions regarding the frequency of undertaking a range of specific political acts. Recruitment is measured by the frequency of requests to get involved that respondents received, whilst engagement is covered by questions regarding attention and discussion of politics, perceived knowledge of the topic, and actual knowledge by the ability to identify the roles of key political figures. Internal and external efficacy are then asked about in relation to local, regional and

national levels of government. The elements of perception of privilege are covered by questions on self-perceived status relative to society at large and personal acquaintances. Respondents are then asked to rank their explanations for status differences in society, and for their own status. The politically-relevant elements of perception of privilege are measured by questions asking respondents to rank the various ways in which politically active people are different to them, and then to rate how much more or less privileged such people are than themselves and society at large.

Turning to the other key concepts embodying structural privilege, economic capital is measured in terms of household income, wealth, and types of property owned. This means that the research focuses on measuring not only how much individuals are paid but also their physical assets and investments, savings and debts. Cultural capital is measured with questions relating preferences for particular film and music genres, frequency of trips to various cultural institutions and engagement in other cultural activities, and skills developed in various contexts (e.g. writing formal letters or emails, or delivering presentations at work). Finally, social capital is measured in terms of numbers of friends, diversity of social networks in terms of sex, ethnicity, and religion, the occupational classes of acquaintances, and the types of help (e.g. job advice, financial support, or practical help) that have been received from various groups. Many of the questions included in the two waves of the survey were based on those asked in previous research. However, because of the focus of the research, the wording or format of most questions was changed in order to gain more information where relevant or, if the questions were not central, to abbreviate them to save survey space.

The various sections of the survey were tested in thirteen cognitive interviews conducted with administrative staff in the Department of Government at the University of Essex, and with staff from a range of departments at YouGov, none of whom design or field surveys as part of their work. Further, the survey was circulated for comments to the team specialising in political and social polling at YouGov. Following the cognitive interviews and review by specialists the two waves were redrafted and each piloted to 100 respondents from the YouGov panel to check for remaining substantive or technical issues. Following final

amendments, the first wave of the survey was fielded between Monday 17 March 2014 and Tuesday 01 April 2014. The second wave of the survey was then fielded between Monday 07 April 2014 and Thursday 17 April 2014.

1,904 respondents started the first wave of the survey and 1,515 of them went on to complete both the first and second waves, giving a respectable retention and completion rate of 79.6%. A further thirty-five respondents displayed consistent signs of satisficing, or did not answer the questions needed for weighting, and were excluded to leave a final sample of 1,480, or 77.7% of those who started the first wave. An analysis comparing the starters and completers in each wave, and between waves, was undertaken and revealed no substantively important differences between those who dropped out of the survey at any stage and those who completed both waves. The median completion time for the first wave was just over 18 minutes whilst for the second wave it was just under 18 minutes. There were 169 questions included in the two waves of the survey, although respondents did not answer all of them due to filtering based on their answers. In the resultant dataset questions with multiple substantive topics arranged in grids or as separate binary options are split up, which raises the number of variables to 900. Of course, it is neither theoretically desirable nor statistically practical to include so many variables in the model so the analyses presented in subsequent chapters include only a subset of variables that are related to the concepts with which the full model is concerned.²⁸⁸

When compared to 2011 Census data the sample is representative in terms of sex and region but less so in terms of age (in part because YouGov panellists must be aged 18 or over), ethnicity, and religion.²⁸⁹ This can be seen in tables 4.1 to 4.5, which show the differences between the census data and the sample, both unweighted and weighted. The fact that the sample is not representative of the British population has implications for the generalisability of any findings that emerge from the data analysis. However, representativeness is a matter of degree, so although the sample is less representative of the population than a ‘gold standard’

²⁸⁸ Please see Appendix C for descriptive information regarding the variables included in the full model.

²⁸⁹ There are particular issues with the representativeness of online samples in terms of ethnicity, as outlined in Robert Ford, Laurence Janta-Lapinski, and Maria Sobolewska, ‘Are the Conservatives really breaking through with ethnic minority voters?’, *YouGov*, Friday 12 June 2015, viewed at <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2015/06/12/are-conservatives-really-breaking-through-extend/> on 22.04.2017.

probability sample it is also more representative than samples from alternative survey fielding services such as MTurk. Further, it is the mode of fielding the survey that allowed space to ask about the topics of interest in detail and thus enabled the current research to be conducted. It is also the case that the less representative nature of non-random online samples may be more important when presenting descriptive statistics than it is when examining relationships between variables, although this finding has been disputed.²⁹⁰ Considering issues of representativeness in relation to the data analysed here, it must be noted that YouGov panellists are disproportionately politically active. However, the types of political activity that are considered in the analysis are far from widespread in the general population so it may be beneficial to have a higher proportion of politically active respondents who are more likely to engage in rare activities. Crucially, and as the next chapter demonstrates amply, there is a good level of variation in the measures of political participation that constitute the dependent variables.²⁹¹ In addition, there is also sufficient variation in measures of both structural and perceived privilege. As such, although the data is not from a probability sample, there is no reason to think that the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable will be different in the sample than in the population at large.

Table 4.1. Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted Sample to the Population in terms of Sex

Sex	Sample		2011 Census
	Unweighted	Weighted	
Men	48.51%	48.50%	49.14%
Women	51.49%	51.50%	50.86%

²⁹⁰ For the two sides of the argument see David Sanders, Harold Clarke, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, 'Does Mode Matter for Modeling Political Choice? Evidence From the 2005 British Election Study', *Political Analysis*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer, 2007), pp. 257-285; and Neil Malhotra and Jon A. Krosnick, 'The Effect of Survey Mode and Sampling on Inferences about Political Attitudes and Behavior: Comparing the 2000 and 2004 ANES to Internet Surveys with Nonprobability Samples', *Political Analysis*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer, 2007), pp. 286-323.

²⁹¹ See Appendix C for information regarding the variation in the indicators included in subsequent analyses.

Table 4.2. Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted
Sample to the Population in terms of Age

Age	Sample		2011 Census
	Unweighted	Weighted	
15-19	0.81%	2.10%	7.60%
20-24	4.12%	10.03%	8.23%
25-29	6.42%	6.57%	8.26%
30-34	9.39%	9.18%	7.94%
35-39	9.86%	9.71%	7.97%
40-44	6.55%	5.96%	8.85%
45-49	8.38%	7.52%	8.92%
50-54	11.15%	10.01%	7.89%
55-59	11.76%	10.65%	6.94%
60-64	11.82%	10.85%	7.30%
65-69	11.82%	10.13%	5.89%
70-74	5.34%	4.91%	4.71%
75-79	1.76%	1.72%	3.88%
80-84	0.81%	0.66%	2.90%
85-89	0.00%	0.00%	1.77%
90 and older	0.00%	0.00%	0.94%

Table 4.3. Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted
Sample to the Population in terms of Ethnicity

Ethnic Group	Sample		2011 Census
	Unweighted	Weighted	
White British	89.53%	88.16%	81.46%
Other White	3.65%	3.86%	5.37%
White and Black Caribbean	0.20%	0.18%	0.70%
White and Black African	0.27%	0.39%	0.27%
White and Asian	0.20%	0.31%	0.56%
Other Mixed	0.34%	0.41%	0.50%
Indian	1.15%	1.26%	2.36%
Pakistani	0.34%	0.39%	1.91%
Bangladeshi	0.27%	0.61%	0.73%
Other Asian	0.34%	0.40%	1.40%
Caribbean	0.54%	0.65%	0.98%
African	0.54%	0.49%	1.66%
Other Black	0.00%	0.00%	0.46%
Chinese	0.61%	0.67%	0.70%
Arab	0.00%	0.00%	0.39%
Any other ethnic group	0.61%	0.61%	0.55%
Refused	1.42%	1.61%	0.00%

Table 4.4. Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted
Sample to the Population in terms of Religion

Religion	Sample		<i>2011 Census</i>
	Unweighted	Weighted	
Christian	45.88%	45.11%	58.81%
No Religion	47.09%	47.26%	26.13%
Muslim	1.28%	1.64%	4.53%
Hindu	0.47%	0.67%	1.36%
Sikh	0.14%	0.11%	0.70%
Jewish	0.81%	0.70%	0.44%
Buddhist	0.61%	0.71%	0.42%
Other	3.72%	3.80%	0.42%
Not Stated	0.00%	0.00%	7.18%

Table 4.5. Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted
Sample to the Population in terms of Region of Residence

Region	Sample		<i>2011 Census</i>
	Unweighted	Weighted	
North East	4.53%	4.52%	4.22%
North West	11.69%	11.32%	11.48%
Yorkshire and The Humber	8.78%	8.70%	8.60%
East Midlands	6.22%	6.65%	7.38%
West Midlands	9.39%	9.67%	9.12%
East of England	9.93%	9.60%	9.54%
London	12.36%	12.85%	13.35%
South East	13.72%	13.38%	14.08%
South West	9.46%	9.55%	8.62%
Wales	5.14%	5.11%	4.98%
Scotland	8.78%	8.65%	8.62%

Analytical Approach:

Each of the variables included in the survey data indicates behaviour or opinions that can be considered to be manifestations of the broad underlying concepts that this research is interested in. So, to take an example relating to the dependent variable, it may be the case that respondents who contact elected representatives are acting on an underlying disposition to engage with politics by contacting institutions and representatives. As such, those respondents might also be expected to be more likely to contact the media or government departments. Indeed, previous research has revealed that there are separate underlying tendencies to engage in individualised political acts such as signing petitions and boycotting products, contacting political acts such as those just mentioned, and collective political acts such as protest and direct action.²⁹² Underlying dispositions or tendencies may be referred to as latent factors, and each of the concepts representing the stages of the posited causal process can be considered to contain such factors. Thus, before considering the structural relationships between the stages of the causal process, the shape of the latent factors at each stage must be considered. The next chapter analyses such factors and, as such, describes a measurement model, the testing of which is the first stage in the approach to statistical analysis that is adopted in this research: structural equation modelling. Before proceeding with that analysis it is useful to provide an explanation of the approach.

Structural equation modelling is a statistical method that allows the simultaneous estimation of latent factors with multiple indicators, and the structural paths between those latent factors. In other words, underlying concepts with multiple indicators can be identified at the same time as relationships between those concepts are tested. This approach is appropriate for the current research because the hypothesised model has multiple stages with structural paths linking them, each of which can be specified and tested simultaneously with structural equation modelling. Further, the survey included multiple measures of key concepts

²⁹² Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, pp. 133-137.

so that the latent factors representing those concepts can be identified. This has the advantage of allowing the measurement error associated with the variables to be estimated separately from the stochastic error, or residual, associated with the latent factors. This means that the underlying concepts are estimated more accurately than if single indicators, or constructed indices, are used.

The particular statistical package used in this analysis, Mplus, allows for the testing of latent factors in the absence of structural paths, and for the exploration of data to identify which variables are indicative of different latent factors. This latter approach is referred to as exploratory factor analysis and is differentiated from the confirmatory factor analysis that is usually associated with structural equation modelling. The former approach identifies latent factors that most closely fit the data by rotating the dimensions that represent the factors until they best account for the variance in the data. By contrast, the latter approach allows the specification of latent factors in line with theory or previous empirical work and then tests how well those factors fit the data. In other words, with confirmatory factor analysis, no attempt is made to find the best fitting latent factors, and Mplus provides statistics that indicate how well the specified factors fit the data.

The distinction between exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis is indicative of the three approaches to structural equation modelling that may be adopted.²⁹³ First, the strictly confirmatory approach is the most stringent, and allows for the testing of a single specified model on the data, with the results indicating whether the model is accepted or rejected. Second, the alternative models approach specifies multiple competing models and applies them to the same data, with the results allowing the selection of the most empirically appropriate model. Third and finally, the model generating approach is the least stringent and allows for the specification of an initial tentative model based on existing theory and empirical evidence. That model is then tested on the data and, if found to fit poorly, modified and tested again. This process can be repeated until a model that fits the data and can be meaningfully

²⁹³ Barbara M. Byrne, *Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus: Basic Concepts, Applications, and Programming* (New York, NY, Routledge, 2012), p. 8.

interpreted is identified. Aiding this process is the fact that Mplus produces modification indices that suggest measurement and structural loadings that can be added to the model in order to improve fit. Each modification must be made separately because additional loadings affect the estimation of the overall model, and each modification must also be substantively justifiable. This process is an example of the previously mentioned idea of retroduction, or the 'continuous interplay between theory and empirical testing, in which theory acts as a guide to empirical observation, operationalization and testing and in which empirical findings are subsequently used to modify, revise and refine theory.'²⁹⁴

The current research adopts a model generating approach to testing both the measurement and structural elements of the full model. This is because the theory informing the model relates to the overarching direction and nature of the structural relationships between key elements of the posited causal process, but not to specific relationships between the elements of those stages. For instance, whilst it is posited that cultural capital, and especially legitimate cultural capital, will be positively related to political participation both directly and indirectly, the particular latent factors encompassing cultural capital, and the variables indicating them, are not specified. Further, the theory allows for the possibility that some cultural capital factors may have different effects from others, or be related to political participation via different structural paths. Thus, a model generating approach can accommodate respecification of particular measurement and structural loadings in the full model whilst, at the same time, allowing for testing the overarching theoretical propositions.

This approach informed the development of the measurement model outlined in the next chapter, which is contained within the full model that also includes the structural loadings that are examined in Chapter Six. In the final model, and in the confirmatory models that informed it, variables are treated as reflective indicators of the latent factors. That is to say they are thought to be manifestations of underlying constructs rather than to constitute them, in which case they would be formative indicators. Many of the latent factors in the

²⁹⁴ Sanders, 'Behaviouralism', pp. 61-62.

measurement model were theoretically specified, fitted the data well, and included in the full model without revision. Additionally, some of the factors were theoretically specified and then revised by removing insignificant loadings or by adding loadings suggested by the modification indices. Additionally, preceding the final model, some of the factors were identified through exploratory factor analysis because they theoretically differ across times and contexts, or because they are original concepts that are being tested for the first time in the current research.²⁹⁵ An exploratory approach was also adopted because, as will be seen in Chapter Six, the theoretically specified hypotheses of the research reflect its focus on the structural relationships between the concepts of interest rather than the shape of those concepts themselves. Thus, the factors encompassing the types of cultural and social capital, and the elements of perception of privilege were developed through exploratory analysis.

Assessing the latent factors that are indicated by exploratory analysis in Mplus is much the same as in other statistical packages, with a table indicating the factor structure being provided.²⁹⁶ By default Mplus uses geomin rotation, which is a form of oblique rotation (allowing correlation between factors), to identify the best fitting latent factors. The loadings of indicators onto latent factors can then be interpreted in the same way as in any exploratory factor analysis, with higher values showing stronger relationships. In addition, Mplus provides a number of indices of model fit, depending on the estimator used, to allow assessment of how well the factor structure fits the data overall. Those fit indices are important when assessing confirmatory factor analyses as well as full structural models so it is worth providing a brief description of them.

The first indicator of model fit is the Chi-square (χ^2) statistic, which may be familiar from its application on other areas such as significance testing for crosstabulation of categorical variables. However, by contrast with such applications, with confirmatory measurement and full structural equation modelling a small and insignificant Chi-square value

²⁹⁵ John Perry, 'Can we perform EFA before we confirm the model via CFA?', *ResearchGate*, Tuesday 20 January 2015, viewed at https://www.researchgate.net/post/Can_we_perform_EFA_before_we_confirm_the_model_via_CFA on 24.02.2017.

²⁹⁶ Institute for Digital Research and Education, 'Exploratory Factor Analysis: Mplus Annotated Output', *University of California Los Angeles*, viewed at <http://stats.idre.ucla.edu/mplus/output/exploratoryfactor-analysis/> on 24.02.2017.

is indicative of good model fit. This is because the goal is to minimise the difference between the theoretically specified model and the empirical data, with an insignificant Chi-square value indicating no significant difference between the two. However, the statistic is sensitive to small differences between the model and the data when there is a large sample.²⁹⁷ This is particularly problematic for the current research, which is testing a complex model in which numerous small differences may emerge when it is applied to the survey data, and which is being tested on a large sample of 1,480 respondents. Thus, the subsequent analyses follow the advice that ‘[a]lthough the χ^2 statistic, by convention, is always reported, decisions regarding adequacy of model fit are typically based on alternate indices of fit’.²⁹⁸

Alternative indices of fit may be categorised as incremental, absolute, and predictive, and the subsequent analyses focus on indices in the first two categories. Mplus provides statistics relating to two incremental fit indices, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Fit Index (TLI). In both cases the fit of the specified model, or how well it matches the relationships in the data, is compared to the fit of a baseline model in which all variables are uncorrelated. The CFI figure runs from zero to one whilst the TLI figure can exceed one, but they are generally interpreted in the same way. In both cases figures exceeding 0.95 are indicative of good fit whilst those exceeding 0.90 indicate adequate fit.²⁹⁹ By contrast, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is an absolute index of fit in which values below 0.05 are indicative of good fit. Unlike CFI and TLI, RMSEA does not compare the fit of the specified model against that of an uncorrelated baseline model but simply assesses how closely it matches the data. An additional absolute index of fit, the Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and two predictive indices, Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayes Information Criterion (BIC), are commonly provided by Mplus but are not available with the estimator that is used in the analysis presented in the subsequent analyses. The choice of estimator is informed by the nature of the data, and specifically the fact that the majority of variables are binary or ordinal, having fewer than ten categories and generally six

²⁹⁷ Byrne, *Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus*, p. 68.

²⁹⁸ Byrne, *Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus*, p. 69.

²⁹⁹ Byrne, *Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus*, pp. 70-71.

or less, and are generally not normally distributed.³⁰⁰ As such, the full model was developed and tested using the weighted least squares with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV) estimator, which was specifically designed for ordinal variables and can accommodate non-normal distributions.³⁰¹ As noted, this restricts the number of fit indices that are produced by Mplus, and therefore the CFI, TLI, and RMSEA are used in conjunction with each other to assess model fit.³⁰²

The full model encompassing the posited causal process includes a range of variables related to the concepts of interest, many of which are sub-divided into separate binary or ordinal indicators relating to specific answer options. So, for instance, the question regarding the frequency with which eleven political acts are undertaken was presented to respondents on a single screen but is divided into eleven separate ordinal variables in the dataset. Thus, overall, the data includes 111 variables, of which four are binary independent background variables relating to gender, ethnicity, disability, and relationship status, and are not loaded onto latent factors. In addition, there is an interval independent background variable relating to age that is also not loaded onto a latent factor. Cases must have data on independent background variables so the 21 respondents who did not indicate their ethnicity are excluded from the analysis, reducing the number of cases to 1,459. Otherwise, and by default, Mplus uses pairwise deletion to deal with missing values so no other cases are excluded from the analysis despite the presence of missing values on particular variables.³⁰³ There is also a single indicator of generalised trust that cannot be loaded onto a factor because there are no additional variables measuring the concept, and is thus included in the model on its own. This means that there are 106 indicators used to estimate the 34 latent factors that embody the forms of capital, perception of privilege, political engagement, and political participation. As noted previously,

³⁰⁰ See Appendix C for information regarding the variation in the indicators included in subsequent analyses.

³⁰¹ Byrne, *Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus*, pp. 131-133.

³⁰² Mplus also provides the Weighted Root Mean Square Residual (WRMR) index of model fit when the WLSMV estimator is used but this is an experimental statistic and does not need to be considered; Linda K. Muthén, 'Model Fit Index WRMR', *Mplus Discussion*, Thursday 29 May 2014, viewed at <http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/9/5096.html?1429189065> on 09.02.2017.

³⁰³ Linda K. Muthén, 'WLSMV Missing Data', *Mplus Discussion*, Monday 15 September 2014, viewed at <http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/22/824.html?1467127502> on 09.02.2017.

the results have been weighted using YouGov's standard demographic weights in order to improve the representativeness of the sample.

The high number of indicators and latent factors reflect the aim of the model, which is to illuminate processes that link background characteristics to different political behaviour. This necessarily entails a reduction in parsimony because the model seeks to provide a fuller explanation of the mechanisms of structural and perceived privilege. As an illustrative example, Chapter Six notes the resilient influence of education on political participation, and a parsimonious model drawing a direct link from one to the other could thus be specified. However, this would not add to our understanding of why education prompts political activity, which the full model indicates is largely because it furnishes individuals with the requisite informal cultural capital to engage with the topic. However, the additional understanding provided by the inclusion of factors relating to structural and perceived privilege is in tension with the limits of the data, which cannot sustain models that are too complex. As such, the process of creating the full model entailed striking a balance between improving the explanation of differences in political activity by adding factors whilst keeping the model simple enough to be fitted to the data. Thus, preceding the specification of the final model, numerous models with additional loadings were tested. For example, the first full model specified structural links from all the forms of capital to all the elements of perception of privilege, and then from all those elements to all aspects of political engagement. That model was too complex and did not converge, so it was split into two halves in order to allow the identification and removal of nonsignificant loadings. Thus, theoretically specified models were tested, and insignificant loadings were removed in order to respecify those models. As part of the same process, theoretically sustainable loadings suggested by the modification indices were also added. Thus the model outlined in the next two chapters is the result of the extensive testing of other models, in line with the model generating approach.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁴ For information on the development of key models see Appendix E.

As noted, many of the latent factors load onto the theoretically specified indicators as expected, and these factors will be outlined relatively briefly, especially to the extent that they are not the core concepts considered by this research. Thus, the focus in the next chapter is on cultural and social capital, perception of privilege, and political participation. Nevertheless, it is useful to consider the other factors so that their structural relationships can be meaningfully interpreted subsequently. All of the results reported are estimated through the confirmatory factor analysis that is conducted within the full model, even where the factors were identified through preceding exploratory factor analyses. Mplus produces both unstandardised and standardised factor loadings, and only the latter (i.e. Betas) are reported (along with their significance, as indicated by p-values) in order to allow for the assessment of their relative importance.³⁰⁵ Additionally, the factors that emerged from a preceding exploratory factor analysis are noted and the reasons for the exploratory analysis are explained. Overall, this provides a full model that measures multiple forms of political activity, political engagement, the elements of perceived privilege, the three forms of capital including multiple types of cultural and social capital, and background characteristics.

It would be possible to simplify the model by introducing theoretically specified higher order factors, which would have those multiple factors as their indicators. Such higher order factors might, for instance, underpin all cultural activities or all legitimate cultural activities and tastes. The introduction of such factors would have the benefit of reducing the number of factors between which structural loadings would need to be specified in Chapter Six, which could improve model fit. However, such simplification would suggest homogenous effects of distinct types of capital, with the cost of obscuring the relationships between those types of capital and other factors of interest. Thus, despite the potential costs in terms of empirical fit, the separate factors identified in the next chapter are retained in the model without loading them onto higher order factors, so that their separate effects can be observed subsequently. Further, as the next chapter shows, there is a clear distinction between activities

³⁰⁵ Linda K. Muthén, 'Loading coefficients', *Mplus Discussion*, Monday 18 December 2006, viewed at <http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/9/276.html?1481818597> on 09.02.2017.

and tastes within each area, and between varying levels of engagement with or preference for those areas, suggesting low levels of satisficing, for instance in the form of acquiescence, and implying the absence of strong methods factors. This suggests that the observed distinctions between types of capital are meaningful and should not be obscured with higher order factors.

The relationships between those factors are interpreted, in Chapter Six, in terms of causality so it is worth considering what the full model allows us to conclude on that topic in relation to the modification indices provided by Mplus. In some cases the causal implications of the suggested modifications suggested could be easily dismissed, for example the loading of parental occupational class onto current economic capital that would imply the former precedes the latter. Similarly, it can be safely assumed that education, which tends to be attained relatively early in life, precedes recent cultural participation (excepting the small number of full-time students in the sample). However, it may be the case that recent cultural activities reflect cultural capital that has been accumulated over a long period of time and that such accumulation starts before, and contributes to, educational outcomes. Thus, it would be possible to posit alternative causal processes and restructure the model in line with those, for instance if Bourdieu's view that social class underpins both capital and political participation were adopted. In that light the results of the model offer support for the theoretically specified causal process but do not prove causality. Thus, the fact that structural equation modelling allows the estimation of robust latent factors and the testing of relationship between multiple stages in a hypothesised causal process does not eliminate the need for interpretation of the resulting correlations. Nevertheless, as outlined extensively in previous chapters, there is good theoretical reason to think that a range of background characteristics influence capital profiles, which influence whether one engages or disengages with politics, through perceptions of one's self and society.

Conclusion:

This chapter has built on the preceding theoretical chapters to provide information regarding the survey that was designed to measure the concepts of interest emerging from those chapters. Specifically, it has given an overview of the extensive range of questions covering political participation and engagement, perception of privilege, and the three forms of capital. It has also provided details of the sample that responded to the survey, which is notably more representative in terms of sex and region of residence than it is in relation to age, ethnicity, or religion. These issues with representativeness are argued to be less problematic because the research is concerned primarily with relationships between the variables of interest rather than with describing the distributions of those variables in the population. Further, and crucially, the variables all have sufficient levels of variation to allow inclusion in the subsequent analyses. Those analyses are undertaken using structural equation modelling, which allows for the simultaneous estimation of latent factors underpinning variables of interest, and the structural relationships between those factors. That analytical approach is deployed in the subsequent two chapters to identify factors relating to the key concepts of interest, and to test the proposition that background characteristics affect capital profiles, which in turn shape perception of privilege and then political engagement and activity. As such, they focus on answering the overarching research question: how do structural and perceived privilege impact on individual political participation in the United Kingdom?

Chapter Five: The Elements of Capital, Perceptions, and Participation

Measuring Underlying Concepts:

This chapter focuses on the latent factors representing the concepts of interest in the full model, with the relationships between those latent factors reported in the next chapter. As outlined previously, the method of analysis used is structural equation modelling, which combines factor and path analysis and allows for the simultaneous specification, and testing, of factors and the relationships between them. This chapter focuses on the measurement model contained within the full model, presenting an overview of the identified factors and the indicators that load onto them. Before doing so, however, it provides information comparing the variables that load onto the factors to equivalent variables in previous research. Unfortunately, comparability is limited due to changes that were made to question wording and format in the current research, so there are many differences between the current data and previously gathered data, as well as some similarities. Crucially, and as noted previously, the focus of the research on relationships between variables means that the key question is whether they display adequate variation, which is certainly found to be the case. That variation allows for the identification of the underlying factors that are the focus of the chapter, which proceeds to outline the factors at each stage in the causal process, working backwards from the dependent variables relating to political activity. Thus, in turn, the chapter reports the latent factors relating to political engagement, perception of privilege, the forms of capital, and demographics and basic beliefs.

In outlining the latent factors that underpin the variables in the full model, the distinction between individualised, contacting, and collective forms of political activity is confirmed. The chapter also confirms the existence of factors relating to perceived political engagement, internal and external efficacy, and recruitment. The existence of factors relating to the posited elements of perception of privilege, which take the form of self-perceived status, privilege-orientated explanations for status differences in society, and privilege-orientated

explanations for one's own status is confirmed. Related factors concerning perception of the privilege and difference of those involved in politics are also identified. Additionally, a single factor underpinning economic capital is identified whereas multiple factors relating to different types of cultural capital emerge. Specifically, attendance at legitimate cultural performances is differentiated from visits to legitimate cultural institutions and, crucially, consumption-based cultural activities. Distinction is also made between tastes for family-friendly films, blockbuster movies, and educational or informative films, as well as between preferences for bass and sample heavy music and a refined set of legitimate cultural tastes. Social capital is found to be represented by separate factors relating to number and diversity of friends, acquaintance with high status individuals, and help received from family friends and close social networks. Finally, the existence of factors relating to parental social class, respondents' education, occupational class, religious activity, left-right position, and social authoritarianism is also confirmed.

Throughout, the chapter also provides information on the distributions of the factors which, like those of the variables that load onto them, are found to be rather different from each other but unified in displaying decent levels of variation. Thus, although the sample is not fully representative of the British population it is far from homogeneous in terms of any of the measures that are included in the data. Further, the chapter concludes that the confirmation of latent factors specified on the basis of theory and previous empirical work suggests the external validity of the results. This allows confidence to be placed in the newly identified factors and the structural relationships between them that are considered in the subsequent chapter.

Indicators and Comparisons:

Before considering the latent factors that underpin the variables of interest, it is worth summarising the key observations that may be made about their distributions and comparing them to relevant data from previous research. Reflecting the overall structure of the chapter, the dependent variables are taken as the starting point and the preceding causal steps are worked through backwards from there. All of these observations are based on charts that are available in Appendix C. Political activity is measured with reference to the frequency of undertaking eleven specific acts, and is generally widespread but infrequent. Within that overall observation low-cost forms that can be undertaken alone are notably more widespread than higher costs forms that require interaction with others.

It is difficult to compare the forms of participation to those asked about in other research, for instance Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley's *Citizenship in Britain* and the most recent Hansard Society *Audit of Political Engagement*.³⁰⁶ This difficulty stems from three key differences between those surveys and the one conducted for the current research. First, for reasons of survey space, categories of participation asked about in other research were combined or excluded in the current research, sometimes to allow for the inclusion of items that had not been asked about previously. Second, the current research focused on acts undertaken by respondents 'in relation to any issue that [they] care about personally', whereas respondents to the other two surveys asked about acts undertaken to 'influence decisions, laws or policies'. The decision to utilise a more inclusive wording in the current research was taken because of its adoption of a broad definition of political participation. Specifically as outlined in Chapter One, political participation is considered to be any attempt by an individual, in interaction with an institution or organisation, to change or conserve an element of society at some level, and the survey question wording reflected this.

³⁰⁶ Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, p. 78; Ruth Fox and Joel Blackwell, *Audit of Political Engagement 13: The 2016 Report* (Hansard Society, London, 2016), p. 58, viewed at https://assets.contentful.com/u1rlvvbs33ri/24aY1mkabGU0uEsoUOekGW/06380afa29a63008e97fb41cdb8dcad0/Publication_Audit-of-Political-Engagement-13.pdf on 19.04.2017.

Table 5.1. Levels of Political Participation in the Current Research
Compared to *Citizenship in Britain* and the *Audit of Political Engagement*

Current Research		<i>Citizenship in Britain</i>		<i>Audit of Political Engagement 2016</i>	
Act	%	Act	%	Act	%
Petition or Online Action	78	Signed a petition	42	Created or signed an e-petition	18
				Created or signed a paper petition	8
				Contributed to a discussion or campaign online	10
Boycott Products	60	Boycotted products	31	Boycott certain products	11
Contact Government	51	Contacted a public official	25	Contact an elected representative	12
		Contacted a politician	13		
Attend a Public Meeting	50	Attended a political meeting or rally	5	Attend political meetings	5
Urge Others to Act	41	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Contact Media	38	Contacted the media	9	Contact the media	4
Display Materials	37	Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker	22	N/A.	N/A.
Meet a Representative	34	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Attend a Protest	24	Taken part in a public demonstration	5	Take part in a demonstration, picket or march	4
Organise a Public Meeting	13	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Take Direct Action	7	Participated in illegal protest activities	2	N/A.	N/A.

Third, the current research asked respondents about the frequency of their activities over the last five years, which gave them more scope to include activity than the twelve month period asked about in the other two surveys. Again, the wording adopted for the current research was intended to capture as much political activity as possible, and it also made sense to ask about a longer period of time because the question focused on frequency rather than just whether or not acts had been undertaken.³⁰⁷ In light of these differences it is not surprising that notably higher rates of political activity are recorded in the current research, as shown in Table 5.1.

³⁰⁷ Additionally, because respondents opt into the YouGov panel it is possible that it includes a disproportionate number of politically interested, and thus active, respondents.

Table 5.2. Number of Political Acts Undertaken in the
Current Research Compared to *Citizenship in Britain*

	No Acts	One Act	Two to Four Acts	Five to Nine Acts	Ten or More Acts
Current Research	13%	13%	29%	38%	8%
<i>Citizenship in Britain</i>	15%	13%	39%	29%	4%

Interestingly, despite these discrepancies, the number of political acts undertaken by respondents is rather similar across the current research and *Citizenship in Britain*, as can be seen in Table 5.2. The key difference is that the percentages undertaking two to four or five to nine political acts has switched, reflecting the higher prevalence of each activity in the current research.

In terms of political engagement, respondents report middling-to-high attention to and discussion of national politics, with lower figures relating to local politics. They also perceive their knowledge of politics to be high, and this is backed up by widespread knowledge when asked about national political figures. Despite or perhaps because of this knowledge, respondents are sceptical about the openness of the political system and their own influence within it. They do not remove themselves from that political system, though, in the sense that they receive numerous requests to get involved with groups, especially via mass communications. As with the variables underpinning the political participation factors, the variables relating to political engagement are similar to, but not the same as, questions that have been asked in other research. Starting with interesting in politics, unlike the *Audit of Political Engagement* the survey conducted for the current research included a middle answer option and asked about both local and national politics. Comparing these results in Table 5.3, it seems that if the middle option was not available then the respondents who select it would be likely to indicate lower levels of interest. Otherwise, the distributions of answers relating to national politics are reasonably similar, and the percentages of respondents who express quite a lot or a great deal of interest in national politics are similar to those in the audit who

say that they are fairly or very interested. That source did not ask about the frequency with which respondents discuss politics so an alternative external comparison point, the *British Social Attitudes Survey*, is presented. As can be seen in Table 5.4, respondents to the current research report greater frequency of discussion, which may be attributable to the more specific answer options that do not require them to judge what ‘Often’ or ‘Sometimes’ mean.

**Table 5.3. Political Interest in the Current Research
Compared to the *Audit of Political Engagement***

Level of Interest	Current Research		<i>Audit of Political Engagement 2016</i> ³⁰⁸	
	Local Politics	National Politics	Level of Interest	Politics
A great deal	6%	13%	Very interested	18%
Quite a lot	19%	36%	Fairly interested	39%
Some	40%	37%	N/A.	N/A.
Hardly any	28%	10%	Not very interested	25%
None at all	7%	4%	Not at all interested	18%

**Table 5.4. Political Discussion in the Current Research
Compared to the *British Social Attitudes Survey***

Frequency of Discussion	Current Research		<i>British Social Attitudes Survey 2004</i> ³⁰⁹	
	Local	National	Frequency of Discussion	Politics
Every day or almost every day	4%	11%		
A few times a week	9%	19%	Often	9%
Once or twice a week	17%	24%	Sometimes	37%
A few times a month	18%	15%		
Once or twice a month	12%	9%		
A few times a year	16%	7%	Rarely	35%
A couple of times a year or less	13%	7%		
Never	11%	7%	Never	19%

³⁰⁸ Fox and Blackwell, *Audit of Political Engagement*, p. 59.

³⁰⁹ National Centre for Social Research, *British Social Attitudes Survey, 2004* (2006, data collection, UK Data Service. SN: 5329) viewed at http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2F5329&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FVariable%2F5329_V668&top=yes on 23.04.2017.

In terms of self-assessed political knowledge, the provision of a middle option again alters the distribution of answers in the current research compared to the *Audit of Political Engagement*. Unlike political interest, however, Table 5.5 indicates that if the middle option were not available then the respondents who select it would be likely to split to the adjacent categories in both directions. As it stands, moderate-to-high levels of self-assessed knowledge prevail in both datasets. As for political knowledge itself, the questions asking respondents to match political figures to their position were replicated from the wave of the *British Election Study* that was fielded at the same time of the survey for the current research. As can be seen in Table 5.6, this means that the results are similar, although respondents to the *British Election Study* demonstrated even higher levels of political knowledge than the already high levels in the sample for the current research.

Table 5.5. Self-Assessed Knowledge of Politics in the Current Research Compared to the *Audit of Political Engagement*

Current Research		<i>Audit of Political Engagement</i> 2016 ³¹⁰	
Knowledge of Politics	Percentage	Knowledge of Politics	Percentage
A great deal	6%	A great deal	8%
Quite a lot	35%	A fair amount	47%
A little bit	45%	N/A.	N/A.
Hardly anything	11%	Not very much	32%
Nothing	3%	Nothing at all	12%

Table 5.6. Political Knowledge in the Current Research Compared to the *British Election Study*

Current Research		<i>British Election Study</i> 2014 ³¹¹	
Political Figure	Correctly Matched with Position	Political Figure	Correctly Matched with Position
Ed Miliband	90%	Ed Miliband	92%
Nick Clegg	90%	Nick Clegg	91%
Theresa May	74%	Theresa May	83%
John Bercow	74%	John Bercow	78%
Own MP	71%	Own MP	72%
Justine Greening	38%	N/A.	N/A.

³¹⁰ Fox and Blackwell, *Audit of Political Engagement*, p. 60.

³¹¹ British Election Study, 'Data Playground', Tuesday 09 December 2014, viewed at <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-playground/?action=new#page-title> on 24.04.2017.

As noted previously, the high levels of interest in, discussion of, and knowledge of politics observed in the current research are not matched by equivalent levels of internal or external efficacy. Indeed Table 5.7 shows that, compared to the *Audit of Political Engagement*, respondents to the current research appear to be particularly sceptical of the influence of the public over policy decisions. Again, however, this may be more to do with the question wording, which asked respondents to assess how much influence members of the public have over decisions at local, regional, and national level rather than to express a level of agreement with the idea that the public can change the running of the UK. Similarly, and again because of differing question wording, respondents' reported internal efficacy is difficult to compare to that recorded in the *Audit of Political Engagement*. This is because the latter focused on the general influence of the respondent rather than asking them to compare their influence to that of other people, as the current research did. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority of respondents considered themselves to have equivalent influence to others. Otherwise, and reflecting the findings of the *Audit of Political Engagement*, respondents were notably more likely to rate their influence as low than as high. Finally, it is hard to identify equivalent data against which to compare the requests to get involved in political activity that respondents received. The survey for *Citizenship in Britain* did ask a question on the topic but only to those respondents who had already reported political activity, which explains the much lower levels of recruitment indicated in

Table 5.7. External Efficacy in the Current Research
Compared to the *Audit of Political Engagement*

Level of Public Influence	Current Research			<i>Audit of Political Engagement 2016</i> ³¹²	
	Local Level	Regional Level	National Level	People Like Me can Influence Politics	UK Level
A great deal	1%	1%	1%	Strongly agree	6%
Quite a lot	14%	7%	7%	Tend to agree	29%
A little bit	41%	37%	27%	Neither agree nor disagree	24%
Hardly any	33%	42%	42%	Tend to disagree	27%
None at all	11%	13%	23%	Strongly disagree	12%

³¹² Fox and Blackwell, *Audit of Political Engagement*, p. 63.

**Table 5.8. Internal Efficacy in the Current Research
Compared to the *Audit of Political Engagement***

Influence Compared to Others	Current Research			<i>Audit of Political Engagement 2016</i> ³¹³		
	Local Level	Regional Level	National Level	Influence	Local Level	National Level
Much more	1%	0%	1%	A great deal	2%	1%
Slightly more	7%	3%	3%	A fair amount	23%	12%
About the same	55%	56%	55%	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Slightly less	15%	15%	12%	Not very much	39%	42%
Much less	22%	27%	29%	Nothing at all	34%	43%

**Table 5.9. Recruitment Requests in the Current Research
Compared to *Citizenship in Britain and Voice and Equality***

Current Research		<i>Citizenship in Britain</i> ³¹⁴ and <i>Voice and Equality</i> ³¹⁵	
Source of Request	Percentage who have Received	Source of Request	Percentage who have Received
Mass request	70%	N/A.	N/A.
Volunteer	52%	Stranger*	12%
Friend	49%	Close friend*	5%
Family member	47%	Family*	1%
Colleague	28%	On the job [†]	11%
Religious congregation	24%	Church [†]	21%
Neighbour	23%	N/A.	N/A.
Charity	41%		
Trade union	14%	Non-political organisation [†]	5%
Campaign organisation	13%		
Political party	9%	N/A.	N/A.

Table 5.9. The survey conducted for *Voice and Equality* also asked about recruitment but only in a limited number of contexts, with those results also presented in Table 5.9. The levels of recruitment reported are also notably above those reported in the 2010 *British Election Study*,

³¹³ Fox and Blackwell, *Audit of Political Engagement*, pp. 65-66.

³¹⁴ *Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, pp. 81-82; the question was asked only to political participants so the figures as a percentage of the whole sample were calculated from that information.

³¹⁵ † Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 373.

in which only 18% of respondents had been asked to get involved in politics or community affairs in preceding years.³¹⁶ Overall, the higher levels of recruitment reported in the current research are likely to be the result of the question wording, which specified a broad range of activities for any cause that could be recruited to, with no time limit for the receipt of requests.

Moving one step further back in the causal process to consider perception of privilege, respondents tend to perceive their own status as middling-to-high. They also appear to engage in a version of the fundamental attribution error when explaining their own status as opposed to differences in status more generally. In other words, they are more inclined to acknowledge the role of social factors in influencing status in society at large than they are in relation to their own status, which is attributed to individual characteristics. This is reflected in their view of politically active people as privileged, or the beneficiaries of status that does not necessarily stem from their own efforts. This general sense of their privilege, however, is not channelled into commonly cited differences between politically active people and the population at large, though there is a general sense that they are different in some respect.

The comparability of the questions covering the core elements of perception of privilege to those in other research is again limited, although there is more similarity than was the case in the previous section. The question on self-perceived status was based on one in the 2005 *British Election Study* that asked respondents whether they were better or worse off than the people that they know. By contrast, the question in the current research specifically asks about status in comparison to both acquaintances and society in general, and removes the middle point from the scale as well as reversing its numerical order. Despite this, and with the exception of the surprisingly large number of respondents who place themselves in the highest rank, the distribution of answers is similar across the current research and the *British Election Study*. As Table 5.10 shows, the bulk of answers are in the middle categories and centred on the value of 5, which functions as an intuitive middle point despite not technically being one.

³¹⁶ David Sanders and Paul Whiteley. *British Election Study, 2010: Campaign Internet Data* (2014, data collection, UK Data Service. SN:7530), viewed at http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2F7529&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FVariable%2F7529_V616&top=yes on 23.04.2017.

Table 5.10. Self-Perceived Status in the Current Research
Compared to the *British Election Study*

Current Research			<i>British Election Study 2005</i> ³¹⁷		
Rank: Highest to Lowest	Compared to Acquaintances	Compared to Society	Rank: Highest to Lowest	Compared to People You Know	
	1	18%		10	1%
	2	8%		9	2%
	3	13%		8	9%
	4	17%		7	16%
	5	22%		6	17%
	6	10%		5	26%
	7	6%		4	11%
	8	4%		3	8%
	9	2%		2	4%
	10	1%		1	3%
				0	3%

Explanations for differences in statuses in society were asked about extensively in the 2009 *British Social Attitudes Survey*, though the questions focussed on ‘getting ahead’ rather than achievement of status specifically, as in the current research. The answer options differed slightly and format of the questions also changed between the surveys, with the current research asking respondents to rank their answers rather than indicate how important they are on a Likert-type scale. As Table 5.11 demonstrates, this resulted in quite a different distribution of answers relating to the role of background in defining status, with considerably more respondents ranking this explanation highly in the current research than indicating its importance in the *British Social Attitudes Survey*. By contrast, whilst inequality based on sex, ethnicity, and religion were not indicated to be important by many respondents to that survey, even fewer ranked such explanations for status difference highly in the current research. Similarly, fewer respondents in the current research ranked hard work highly, although Table 5.13 shows that it was one of the most prevalent explanations in both datasets. The role of ambition is also seen as less important in both datasets, and Table 5.14 shows that endorsement

³¹⁷ Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, *British Election Study, 2005: Face-to-Face Survey* (2006, data collection, UK Data Service. SN: 5494), viewed at http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2F5494&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FVariable%2F5494_V888&top=yes on 23.04.2017.

of this explanation for status inequality is again lower in the current research. Thus, it is clear that respondents to the current research are more likely to prioritise background over hard work and ambition as explanations for status differences, whilst the reverse is the case in the *British Social Attitudes Survey*. As noted previously, respondents to the current research were notably more likely to explain their own status with reference to hard work and ambition than background, so it may be the case that the ‘getting ahead’ wording in the *British Social Attitudes Survey* prompts respondents to think about themselves. However, there is no equivalent question that explicitly asks for respondents’ explanations for their own status, as the current research does. In addition, the questions relating to the difference and privilege of politically active people are original to the current research so cannot be compared to external sources.

Table 5.11. Background as an Explanation for Status Difference in the Current Research Compared to the *British Social Attitudes Survey*

Current Research		<i>British Social Attitudes Survey 2009</i> ³¹⁸		
Importance	Background	Importance	Wealthy Family	Well-Educated Parents
Ranked first	39%	Essential	2%	5%
Ranked second	12%	Very important	12%	26%
Ranked third	11%	Fairly important	25%	44%
Selected	7%	Not very important	38%	16%
Not selected	31%	Not at all important	20%	7%

³¹⁸ National Centre for Social Research, *British Social Attitudes Survey, 2009* (2011, data collection, UK Data Service, SN: 6695), viewed at http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2F6695&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FVariable%2F6695_V639&top=yes on 23.04.2017.

Table 5.12. Inequality Based on Sex, Ethnicity, and Religion as Explanations for Status Difference in the Current Research Compared to the *British Social Attitudes Survey*

Current Research		<i>British Social Attitudes Survey 2009</i> ³¹⁹			
Importance	Inequality based on sex, race, and religion	Importance	Sex	Ethnicity	Religion
Ranked first	5%	Essential	3%	2%	3%
Ranked second	6%	Very important	6%	6%	6%
Ranked third	6%	Fairly important	12%	17%	10%
Selected	10%	Not very important	27%	27%	27%
Not selected	74%	Not at all important	45%	40%	51%

Table 5.13. Hard Work as an Explanation for Status Difference in the Current Research Compared to the *British Social Attitudes Survey*

Current Research		<i>British Social Attitudes Survey 2009</i>	
Importance	Hard Work	Importance	Hard Work
Ranked first	24%	Essential	31%
Ranked second	17%	Very important	52%
Ranked third	12%	Fairly important	14%
Selected	6%	Not very important	2%
Not selected	41%	Not at all important	1%

Table 5.14. Ambition as an Explanation for Status Difference in the Current Research Compared to the *British Social Attitudes Survey*

Current Research		<i>British Social Attitudes Survey 2009</i>	
Importance	Ambition	Importance	Ambition
Ranked first	18%	Essential	24%
Ranked second	24%	Very important	47%
Ranked third	10%	Fairly important	24%
Selected	7%	Not very important	3%
Not selected	42%	Not at all important	0%

³¹⁹ National Centre for Social Research, *British Social Attitudes Survey, 2009* (2011, data collection, UK Data Service, SN: 6695), viewed at http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2F6695&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FVariable%2F6695_V639&top=yes on 23.04.2017.

Preceding perception of privilege are the forms of capital, which are taken to be an embodiment of structural privilege. Respondents tend to hold modest levels of economic capital but much higher levels of cultural capital. Consumption-orientated cultural activities are the most widespread and some elements of legitimate cultural capital are amongst the rarest, though others are common. In terms of cultural tastes, respondents enjoy numerous film genres but fewer musical genres, and legitimate tastes in radio, food, and film are rare. The variables can be compared, in some cases, to those collected in previous research, though the questions were again asked in different ways. Starting with cultural activities, the 2001 *Arts in England Survey* and the research for *Culture, Class, Distinction* asked respondent whether they had engaged in such activities in the last year or, in some cases, whether they ever do so. By contrast, the current research asked respondents how often they engage in activities with no specified period, so the results are not strictly comparable and this is reflected in Table 5.15. The current research records similar levels of attendance at ballet, dance, opera, and classical performances, and at the cinema, as the *Arts in England Survey*. The same can be said live music gigs if it is assumed that those who attend rock and pop, and jazz, gigs in the latter sample are largely separate groups. By contrast, if some overlap is assumed between the groups who attend pantomime, musicals, and plays, then there may be a similar prevalence of activities in both samples. Attendance at both museums and art galleries is notably more prevalent amongst respondents to the current research than the *Arts in England Survey*.

Quite the opposite is observed in comparison with the data gathered for *Culture, Class, Distinction*, which found higher levels of attendance at museums, art galleries, classical concerts, theatre and musicals, and historical buildings than does the current research. Indeed, the higher level of participation extends beyond legitimate activities to also include visits to nightclubs, although the figures relating to popular culture are generally closer when comparing the current research to *Culture, Class, Distinction*. Thus, similar levels of attendance at live music, and eating out are observed, though more respondents to

Table 5.15. Prevalence of Cultural Activities in the Current Research Compared to the Arts in England Survey and Culture, Class, Distinction

Current Research		<i>Arts in England Survey</i> 2001 ³²⁰		<i>Culture, Class, Distinction</i> ³²¹	
Activity	At Least Once a Year	Activity	Past 12 Months	Activity	Ever
Bingo	9%	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Dance or ballet performances	13%	Ballet Other dance	2% 13%	N/A. N/A.	N/A. N/A.
Classical or opera performances	18%	Classical Opera or operetta	10% 6%	Orchestral or choral concerts Opera	34% 17%
Nightclubs	21%	N/A.	N/A.	Night clubs	35%
Playing sport with others	25%	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Stand-up comedy	22%	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Watching live sport	33%	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Live music gigs	35%	Pop or rock Jazz	23% 6%	Rock concerts N/A.	31% N/A.
Art galleries	34%	Exhibition or collection of art, photography or sculpture	21%	Art galleries	45%
Theatre or musical performances	44%	Pantomime Musical Play or drama	15% 25% 29%	N/A. Musicals Theatre	N/A. 51% 57%
Museums	50%	Museum or art gallery	39%	Museums	63%
Historic buildings	56%	N/A.	N/A.	Stately homes or historic sites	70%
Cinema	62%	Cinema	63%	Cinema	48%
Shopping for pleasure	79%	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Pubs, bars, or cafés	86%	N/A.	N/A.	Pub	74%
Walking for pleasure	84%	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.	N/A.
Eating out with others	86%	N/A.	N/A.	Eat out	90%

³²⁰ As reported in: Tak Wing Chan and John H. Goldthorpe, 'Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: Music in England', *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 2007), pp. 1-19, p. 5; Tak Wing Chan and John H. Goldthorpe, 'Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: The visual arts in England', *Poetics*, Vol. 35, Nos. 2-3 (Apr.-Jun., 2007), pp. 168-190 p. 174; and Tak Wing Chan and John H. Goldthorpe, 'The Social Stratification of Theatre, Dance, and Cinema Attendance', *Cultural Trends*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 193-212, p. 197.

³²¹ Bennett, Savage, Silva, Warde, Gayo-Cal, Wright, *Culture, Class, Distinction*, pp 265-273.

the current research visit pubs with some frequency. Again, it is worth noting that the questions asked were different so the figures should be expected to differ, though it can be concluded that the current sample has less of a tendency to engage in legitimate cultural activities than observed in *Culture, Class, Distinction*, but a similar or slightly greater tendency than found in the *Arts in England Survey*. By contrast, respondents to the current research appear to be generally similarly disposed towards popular culture as were respondents in both of the comparative datasets.

Moving onto cultural tastes, the full model focussed primarily on film and music preferences, asking respondent which genres they like to watch and listen to. This contrasts with the survey conducted for *Culture, Class, Distinction*, which asked respondents to identify their favourite film genres, and the lack of comparability is apparent in Table 5.16. The figures in Table 5.17 are more comparable because both surveys asked respondents which musical genres they like rather than to identify their favourite, although the current research asked respondents to select the genres that they like rather than express the extent to which they like them. With the exception of rock and pop, and dance and electronic music, which were phrased more broadly in the current research, the genres are more popular in *Culture, Class, Distinction*, and this is especially the case in relation to classical, country and western, world music, and Urban including hip hop and R&B.³²² Nevertheless, the figures for dance and electronic, modern jazz, and metal and punk are similar across both datasets, though there is an overall tendency for musical genres to be liked by fewer respondents in the current research.

Turning to social capital, respondents have modest numbers of close friends, though the numbers increase as frequency of contact decreases. The diversity of their acquaintances is also modest, though this is less the case in relation to sex than ethnicity or religion due to distributions in the population. There is widespread acquaintance with high occupational status individuals, which reflects both respondents' own occupations and the prevalence of

³²² If the respondents to the current research who listen to either RnB and urban or rap and hip hop, or both, are totalled they constitute 23% of the sample, which is notably less than the 30% observed in *Culture, Class, Distinction*.

Table 5.16. Preferences for Film Genres in the Current Research Compared to *Culture, Class, Distinction*

Current Research		<i>Culture, Class, Distinction</i> ³²³	
Genre	Like to Watch	Genre	Favourite
Comedy	69%	Comedy	16%
Drama	64%	N/A.	N/A.
Thrillers	61%	Action or thrillers	27%
Action	54%		
Crime	55%	Crime	4%
Documentaries	46%	Documentary	7%
Sci-fi	42%	Science fiction	7%
Family	41%	N/A.	N/A.
Classics	39%	Costume dramas	9%
		War films	3%
		Westerns	4%
History or Biography	39%	N/A.	N/A.
Romance	34%	Romance	7%
Fantasy	32%	Fantasy	2%
Horror	24%	Horror	4%
Musicals and Dance movies	23%	Musicals	5%
Foreign or Art House	13%	Alternative or arts	2%
Other	4%	Other	2%

Table 5.17. Preferences for Music Genres in the Current Research Compared to *Culture, Class, Distinction*

Current Research		<i>Culture, Class, Distinction</i> ³²⁴	
Genre	Like to Listen	Genre	Like
Rock and pop	65%	Rock	40%
Classical and opera	29%	Classical including opera	42%
Alternative and indie	26%	N/A.	N/A.
Dance and electronica	25%	Electronic	20%
Country	23%	Country and western	39%
Folk	22%	N/A.	N/A.
Jazz and blues	22%	Modern jazz	26%
Soul and funk	21%	N/A.	N/A.
RnB and urban	19%	Urban including hip hop and R&B	30%
Rap and hip hop	15%		
Metal and punk	17%	Heavy metal	19%
World music	12%	World music	23%
Other	11%	N/A.	N/A.

³²³ Bennett, Savage, Silva, Warde, Gayo-Cal, Wright, *Culture, Class, Distinction*, p. 139.

³²⁴ Bennett, Savage, Silva, Warde, Gayo-Cal, Wright, *Culture, Class, Distinction*, p. 78.

relatively high status occupations in the population. Last, receipt of help from close social networks is more prevalent than from looser ones, though it is not widespread in either case.

When comparing the variables that load onto the social capital factors to equivalents in previous research the problem of question wording is again encountered. Nevertheless, questions relating to the first two elements of social capital have been asked previously, and Table 5.18 compares the answers relating to number of friends in the current research to those in the 2001 *General Household Survey*. As can be seen, the latter does not differentiate between friends depending on the frequency with which they are seen or contacted, and restricts the focus to those who live nearby. Nonetheless, focussing on those who are seen or contacted monthly, the proportion of respondents who report having six or more friends in the current research is very similar to the proportion reporting five or more friends in the *General Household Survey*. The proportion with one or two friends is also similar, but far more people in the current research report having three to five friends than report having three or four in the *General Household Survey*. There is then a concomitant difference in the opposite direction between those reporting no friends, which may reflect the geographical restriction in the latter question. Differences in question wording also have implications for the comparability of the variables relating to diversity of friends. This topic was asked about in the 2011 *Citizenship Survey*, which gave respondents four possible answer options rather than a slide rule on which to indicate the percentage of their friends from the same ethnicity and religion as themselves. Despite this difference in question wording the distributions of answers relating to the ethnicity of friends are reasonably similar, though notably more respondents to the current research indicate having more than half of their friends from the same ethnicity as their own rather than a half and half split. By contrast, in relation to religion, the respondents to the *Citizenship Survey* report more homogenous networks than do the respondents to the current research. Still, the patterns across the categories are broadly the same in both datasets, even if the percentages in each category differ. The patterns in relation to acquaintance with people in various types of work are also similar in the data gathered for the current research when compared to the nationally representative dataset

Table 5.18. Number of Friends Reported in the Current Research Compared to the *General Household Survey*

Friends Seen or Contacted	Current Research			<i>General Household Survey 2000-2001</i> ³²⁵	
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Close Friends	Within a 15-20 Minute Walk
10 or more	3%	8%	17%	Five or more	28%
6 to 9	4%	11%	13%	Three or four	17%
3 to 5	20%	30%	29%	One or two	28%
1 or 2	45%	37%	29%	None	27%
None	28%	14%	12%		

Table 5.19. Diversity of Friends Reported in the Current Research Compared to the *Citizenship Survey*

	Current Research		<i>Citizenship Survey 2010-2011</i> ³²⁶		
	Ethnicity	Religion	Ethnicity	Religion	
95%-100%	36%	15%	All the same	35%	29%
55%-94%	48%	40%	More than half	37%	37%
45%-54%	8%	26%	About half	15%	19%
0%-44%	8%	19%	Less than half	12%	15%

gathered for the *Great British Class Survey*. As can be seen in Table 5.20, there is a tendency for the types of occupation that are more widely known in the current research data to also be more widely known in the *Great British Class Survey* data. As always, there are differences in the question wordings that need to be accounted for and, for reasons of space, the current research asked about types of work (including example jobs) rather than specific occupations. This accounts for the figures that are higher in the current research because it is more likely that respondents will be acquainted with someone from a type of work including multiple jobs than from a specific occupation. It also means that where the figures are lower

³²⁵ Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division. *General Household Survey, 2000-2001* (2006, data collection, 3rd Edition, UK Data Service. SN: 4518), viewed at http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2F4518&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FVariable%2F4518_V1529&top=yes on 23.04.2017.

³²⁶ Department for Communities and Local Government, Ipsos MORI, *Citizenship Survey, 2010-2011* (2012, data collection, UK Data Service, SN: 7111), viewed at http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FStudy%2F7111&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%2FVariable%2F7111_V75&top=yes on 23.04.2017.

Table 5.20. Social Acquaintance with Occupations in the Current Research Compared to the *Great British Class Survey*

Current Research	<i>Great British Class Survey</i> ³²⁷		
Job Type	Know Someone	Kind of Work	Know Someone Socially
State professionals	71%	Nurse	58%
		Teacher	63%
Technical occupations	64%	Electrician	60%
		Gardener	44%
		Farmer	29%
Clerical occupations	54%	Secretary	50%
		Call centre worker	31%
Traditional professions	54%	Accountant	49%
		Solicitor	40%
		Doctor	39%
Semi-routine service occupations	52%	Sales or shop assistant	63%
		Catering assistant	32%
		Receptionist	50%
Unemployed	51%	Never worked	48%
Middle managers	46%	Publican	35%
		Bank manager	23%
		Office manager	48%
		Restaurant manager	29%
Semi-routine manual occupations	41%	Postal worker	38%
		Security guard	27%
		Machine operator	31%
Routine manual occupations	37%	Armed forces	41%
		Cleaner	56%
Routine service occupations	36%	N/A.	N/A.
Routine transport occupations	36%	Truck or bus driver	51%
Creative professions	35%	Artist	36%
Technical professions	30%	Civil engineer	42%
		Scientist or researcher	28%
Senior managers	28%	Chief executive	23%
		Finance manager	26%

³²⁷ Mike Savage and Fiona Devine, *BBC Great British Class Survey, 2011-2013* (2015, data collection, UK Data Service, SN: 7616), obtained from <http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7616-1> on 21.04.2017.

in the current research it is clear that respondents are less likely to be acquainted with people from that type of work than was observed in the *Great British Class Survey*. This is the last observation that can be made on the basis of comparisons between the current data and other data. In particular, the questions regarding the types of help that have been received from various groups are original to this research so have no external comparison point.

All of the preceding distributions are observed amongst respondents who are largely below retirement age, split equally between the genders, and a large majority of whom are White British. In general, they have attained higher educational levels and occupational classes than their parents, are not religiously active, and hold left-wing and authoritarian social views. Crucially, the levels of variation allow the relationships between the variables to be analysed in the subsequent sections of the chapter, albeit with an analytical approach that adjusts for the prevalence of non-normal distributions in the data.


Participation in Political Activity:

It is instructive to begin the consideration of latent factors underpinning the variables of interest by focusing on the relationships between respondents' reported levels of engagement in various political acts. Such activity has previously been found to load onto separate latent factors relating to those that are individualised, those that are centred on contacting representatives or government bodies, and those that are collective.³²⁸ This provided the basis for a confirmatory analysis in which the individualised factor was indicated by frequency of signing petitions and taking online actions, boycotting products, and displaying campaign materials. The contacting factor was then indicated by frequency of contacting a representative or government department, contacting the media, and meeting an elected representative. Finally, the collective action factor was indicated by frequency of attending public meetings, organising public meetings, attending protests or demonstrations, taking direct action, and urging others to take action. The analysis revealed the factors to fit well, indicating that this distinction between types of political act is persistent in the United Kingdom.

One alteration was made to the previously observed factors because displaying materials and urging others to take action loaded weakly onto their respective latent factors. Further, the modification indices suggested that the two variables should be swapped in their loadings, and this was confirmed by a subsequent analysis. Thus, it appears that respondents who undertake individualised activity such as signing petitions and boycotting products are also more likely to take it upon themselves to urge others to undertake political activity. By contrast, the analysis suggests that it is attendance at protests and public meetings that furnishes respondents with materials to display. Despite this swap of indicators the three-factor model is found to be shaped in much the same way as previously observed, with individualised

³²⁸ Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, pp. 133-137.

Diagram 5.1. Section of the Full Model Encompassing
Factors Representing the Three Types of Political Activity



activity indicated by signing petitions and taking online actions ($B = 0.694$, $p = 0.000$), boycotting products ($B = 0.754$, $p = 0.000$), and urging others to take action ($B = 0.861$, $p = 0.000$). As outlined previously, the first two of those activities are the most widespread amongst respondents, and the latter activity is undertaken by a large minority, so it seems that the tendency to engage individualised political activity is most widespread.

The next most popular type of political action is contacting, which is indicated by meeting an elected representative ($B = 0.823$, $p = 0.000$), contacting an elected representative or government body ($B = 0.830$, $p = 0.000$), and contacting the media ($B = 0.747$, $p = 0.000$). Half of respondents undertake the second of those activities, whilst large minorities do each of the other two. The third factor is indicated by the activities that tend to be undertaken by the fewest respondents, namely displaying materials ($B = 0.782$, $p = 0.000$), attending public meetings ($B = 0.836$, $p = 0.000$), attending protests or demonstrations ($B = 0.847$, $p = 0.000$),

Table 5.21. Bivariate Correlations of the Political Participation Factors

	Individualised	Contacting	Collective
Individualised	1.000		
Contacting	0.820***	1.000	
Collective	0.801***	0.887***	1.000

taking direct action ($B = 0.792$, $p = 0.000$) and organising public meetings ($B = 0.834$, $p = 0.000$). Amongst those, attending a public meeting and displaying materials are widespread but the other three indicators are the least popular. So, the tendency to undertake collective political activity seems to be the least widespread, though some such activities are preferred to others. The results are presented in Diagram 5.1, in which the boxes represent indicator variables, ovals represent the latent factors, and the figures above the arrows are the standardised loadings. The figures to the left of the latent factors are the residual variances, and the arrows linking those indicate their correlation (as standard for the dependent variables in a full structural equation model). Indeed, as can be seen in Table 5.21, the bivariate correlations between the three political activity factors are very high and significant, it is clear that those who participate in one type of political activity are likely to participate in others.

As noted previously, there is a crucial similarity between the factors that are observed to underpin these political acts in the current research and *Citizenship in Britain*. This demonstrates that, whilst the prevalence of political activities observed depends on the question that is asked, the association between those activities remains largely the same. That stability is notable also because of the decade that has passed between the two research projects. The general similarity between the three factors relating to political activities and those that have been observed in previous research has positive implications for the external validity of the data used in the analysis. Additionally, whilst the number of respondents engaging in each political activity is high, the variation in each indicator is sufficient to place confidence in the identified factors.³²⁹ Further, the factors themselves display sufficient

³²⁹ Information on the distributions of all the variables included in the full model is included in Appendix C.

variation to allow for analysis, as can be seen in charts 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Whilst the factor scores themselves are not interpretable the histograms demonstrate not only that the factors vary but also that they are approximately normally distributed. As expected, the contacting and collective participation factors are slightly positively skewed, and the higher number of respondents with lower factor scores reflects the less prevalent nature of many of the political acts that load onto them. Thus, it is meaningful to observe the influences on these factors but, before that, it is necessary to outline the shape of the factors that are found to impact on them.

Chart 5.1. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Individualised Political Activity




Chart 5.2. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Contacting Political Activity





Chart 5.3. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Collective Political Activity



Political Engagement:

The factors relating to political engagement were specified on the basis of the *Civic Voluntarism Model* and tested using confirmatory factor analysis.³³⁰ The first such factor indicates perceived engagement with politics and is indicated most strongly by attention paid to national politics ($B = 0.883$, $p = 0.000$) and frequent discussion of it ($B = 0.883$, $p = 0.000$). It is also indicated strongly by self-perceived knowledge of politics ($B = 0.792$, $p = 0.000$), the loading of which was also tested on the subsequently considered political knowledge factor but found to be weaker. In addition, views of politics as ‘for you’, and of one’s self as a ‘political person’, load onto the factor but are excluded from the final model to minimise the number of variables. In the same way, the single binary indicator of party identification is not included despite loading onto the factor.³³¹ Thus, the factor embodies a general perceived engagement with politics that underpins not only one’s declared engagement with the topic but also the sense that one is capable of engaging with it.

The political knowledge factor underpins knowledge of the roles of national political figures at the time of the survey, and specifically Nick Clegg ($B = 0.901$, $p = 0.000$), Ed Miliband ($B = 0.867$, $p = 0.000$), John Bercow ($B = 0.843$, $p = 0.000$), as well as respondents’ own MPs ($B = 0.725$, $p = 0.000$). The focus of political knowledge on national politics raises the question of whether that political system is seen as efficacious. Only two indicators of the efficacy of the political system, in terms of the influence that the population are seen to have over, are included in the final model. They relate to the population’s influence at the local ($B = 0.699$, $p = 0.000$) and national ($B = 0.723$, $p = 0.000$) levels, which are underpinned by a single external efficacy factor. The indicator of population influence at the regional level was found to be too closely related to the national level indicator, and thus was overdetermined by the factor and excluded from the model. By contrast, all three of the indicators relating to the

³³⁰ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 334-390.

³³¹ To accurately reflect the Civic Voluntarism Model, party identification should strictly be treated as a separate factor from interest in or attention paid to politics, here referred to as perceived engagement with politics. However, because of the need to keep the model as simple as possible, and of the observed loading of party identification onto that factor, it is considered acceptable to exclude it from the full model.


respondents' own influence at the local ($B = 0.887$, $p = 0.000$), regional ($B = 0.976$, $p = 0.000$), and national ($B = 0.863$, $p = 0.000$) levels load onto a single internal efficacy factor. Thus, the model includes four factors within the broad area of political engagement identified by the *Civic Voluntarism Model*, relating specifically to perceived engagement, knowledge of politics, and internal and external efficacy. All of these elements of political engagement are likely to predispose respondents towards participation but they may still need to be asked to get involved for that predisposition to be activated, meaning that recruitment must also be accounted for.

Three recruitment factors relating to requests to get involved from close acquaintances, generic sources, and groups already involved in were tested in a confirmatory model and found to have adequate fit. In the full model the focus is on the first of those factors because recruitment is argued to be a manifestation of social capital, and requests from close acquaintances most clearly relate to respondents' social networks. Generic requests, but contrast, are just that and their widespread nature suggests that they are less targeted and tailored to respondents. Further, the factor relating to recruitment by volunteers from organisations that respondents are already involved in is only relevant to the small number who meet that criteria. Thus, the factor encompassing recruitment in the final model relates to the frequency with which request to get involved in groups are received from family ($B = 0.754$, $p = 0.000$), friends (0.802 , $p = 0.000$), neighbours ($B = 0.724$, $p = 0.000$), and members of local religious congregations ($B = 0.761$, $p = 0.000$).

The levels of perceived engagement with politics, knowledge of it, external and internal efficacy, and recruitment are reflected in the distributions of the factors that are found to underpin them.³³² Thus, as Chart 5.4 shows, the factor scores for perceived engagement with politics are grouped around positive values, and this reflects the high levels of interest in, discussion of, and self-perceived knowledge of politics in the sample. Unlike perceived political engagement, however, Chart 5.5 shows that the factor scores for political

³³² Details of the distributions of the variables that load onto the factors are available in Appendix C.

Diagram 5.2. Section of the Full Model Encompassing the Five Factors Related to Political Engagement and Recruitment



knowledge are not normally distributed, displaying obvious negative skew resulting from the bulk of respondents having high scores. This reflects the very large number of respondents who were able to correctly answer the majority of the political knowledge questions that they were asked. The external efficacy factor scores are also centred on positive values, as shown in Chart 5.6, whilst the internal efficacy factor clearly demonstrates that respondents tended to give the same answer regarding their relative influence at local, regional, and national level, hence the clear clustering of factor scores observed in Chart 5.7. Finally, Chart 5.8 shows that the bulk factor scores for receipt of recruitment requests are low, with an associated positive skew indicating that most respondents receive requests only from a few sources rather than

from many. As with the factors relating to political participation, although the factor scores are not themselves interpretable it is clear that they vary sufficiently to be included in the analysis of influences on political participation, though they are less likely to be normally distributed than was the case for political participation.

Chart 5.4. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Perceived Political Engagement




Chart 5.5. Histogram of the Factor Scores for National Political Knowledge




Chart 5.6. Histogram of the Factor Scores for External Efficacy




Chart 5.7. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Internal Efficacy





Chart 5.8. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Receipt of Recruitment Requests



Based on the above, it is fair to conclude that respondents are highly engaged with politics but sceptical of their ability to influence it. Large majorities pay at least some attention to politics, especially at the national level, and discussion of the topic is widespread and frequent. Respondents are also moderately confident of their knowledge of politics, and they can generally back this up with the ability to correctly identify relevant political figures. These qualities, however, do not lead respondents to a positive assessment of the political system's openness to influence by the population in general, nor of their own ability to exert such influence, although a majority are no more sceptical about their own influence than that of the population at large. The relationships between these elements of political engagement can be seen in Table 5.22, which presents the bivariate correlations between each factor. As expected, they are largely positively correlated, though the negative relationship between political knowledge and receipt of recruitment requests is of interest. The positive relationship of those two factors with perceived engagement suggests that those who wish to engage with politics do so through networks that recruit them to action or, in a more detached fashion, by paying attention to and gaining knowledge of national politics. Beyond this observation, it appears that perceived engagement is central to engagement overall, and has the strongest relationship

Table 5.22. Bivariate Correlations of the Political Engagement Factors

	Perceived Engagement	Political Knowledge	External Efficacy	Internal Efficacy	Recruitment
Perceived Engagement	1.000				
Political Knowledge	0.597***	1.000			
External Efficacy	0.196***	0.088* ³³³	1.000		
Internal Efficacy	0.297***	0.110**	0.481***	1.000	
Recruitment	0.213***	-0.132**	0.149***	0.081**	1.000

with each of the other factors (excepting the unsurprisingly strong relationship between internal and external efficacy).

³³³ Identification issues were encountered resulting from the presence of only five indicators for two factors when testing the bivariate correlation between internal and external efficacy, so the cited figure is from a model in which all five political engagement factors were correlated.

Perception of Privilege:

The first element of perception of privilege, self-perceived status, was measured in relation to society as a whole and in relation to people who respondents know personally, and both were posited to be underpinned by a single factor. Such a factor is confirmed in the full model, and displayed in Diagram 5.3 below, suggesting an underlying estimation of status that informs how respondents see themselves both in relation to society ($B = 0.991$, $p = 0.000$) and the people they know personally ($B = 0.814$, $p = 0.000$).³³⁴ By contrast the latent factors relating to explanations for status differences in society were identified through an exploratory analysis. This is because perception of privilege as formulated is being tested for the first time in this research and, as such, there were only a limited number of theoretical expectations that could inform measurement of the concept. Those expectations were that explanations for societal status should be separate from explanations for one's own status, whilst perception of privilege in politics and of the ways in which those involved in politics are different from society as a whole would also form separate factors. Further, it was expected that social- and individual-based explanations for status are opposed. However, there were no expectations regarding how many factors should relate to explanations for status or to political difference and privilege, or in some cases the particular indicators that might load onto those factors.

The exploratory analysis revealed factors in line with the above-specified expectations, with separate factors relating to explanations for societal and own status, and to perception of the difference and privilege of those involved in politics. Social- and individual-orientated explanations for status were found to be opposed to each other in their loadings onto the two factors relating to status in society and one's own status. In addition, the exploratory analysis revealed the belief that status inequality in society is inevitable to be unrelated to any of the identified factors but that inevitability as an explanation one's own status is underpinned by the same factor as social- and individual-orientated explanations. Further, those who

³³⁴ Whilst two-indicator factors are not ideal, it is acceptable to utilise them if they have been tested in alternative measurement models and found to be robust; see Bengt O. Muthén, '2 Indicator Latents', *Mplus Discussion*, Thursday 17 December 2009, viewed at <http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/11/4965.html?1261084141> on 23.04.2017.

attribute social status to luck do so both for society and themselves, forming a separate factor. That factor is not included in the final model because the research is more concerned with the opposition between social- and individual-orientated explanations for status difference. Thus, after self-perceived status, the second latent factor relating to perception of privilege included in the full model is indicated most strongly by a belief in the importance of background in influencing status in society ($B = 0.608$, $p = 0.000$), which is opposed to the belief that it is hard work that influences such status ($B = -0.301$, $p = 0.000$). The weakest loading onto the factor is that of belief in the importance of group-based inequality in affecting social status ($B = 0.156$, $p = 0.000$) but the indicator is retained in the full model because it is theoretically important to account for such explicit recognition of the role of social forces in defining status when considering perception of privilege.


In contrast with the above, belief in the importance of group-based inequality in defining status is the strongest indicator ($B = 0.796$, $p = 0.000$) of the latent factor underpinning explanations for one's own status. The factor is also indicated by a belief that one's own status is inevitable ($B = 0.587$, $p = 0.000$), which contrasts with the previous observation that inevitability does not load onto any factor relating to explanations for status differences in society. The third indicator of the factor is belief in the role of background in influencing one's own status ($B = 0.453$, $p = 0.000$), meaning that group-based inequality and background load onto the factors relating to explanations for status difference in society and one's own status. Hard work was also found to load onto the latter factor negatively as expected but is a weaker indicator than inevitability and was not included in the full model. Thus, latent factors covering the three components of perception of privilege are included in the model. Self-perceived status is manifested in relation to both society at large and personal acquaintances as expected. Social-orientated explanations for status differences in society, which are indicative of perceiving structural privilege, are opposed to individual-orientated explanations. The same is the case in relation to explanations for one's own status, although the positive loading of the inevitability explanation suggests that the tension may also be between those who perceive an internal or external locus of control.

Crucially, respondents are notably more likely to identify individual-orientated explanations for their own status than they are for status differences in society. This appears to reflect the ‘fundamental attribution error’ in which the low status of others is seen to be the result of their inherent flaws whilst one’s own status is considered to stem from a range of external and internal factors.³³⁵ Crucially, the relationship appears to have been reversed in respondents’ answers to above two questions, which may be because both, to differing degrees, primed respondents to think about high rather than low status. Thus, the corollary to thinking that external constraints limit one’s own status whilst individual character traits limit the status of others is thinking that individual character traits drive one’s achievement of status whilst external forces underpin other’s achievement of status. In others words, people are motivated to credit their achievements to their own characteristics and their limitations to external factors, and to reverse that attribution when accounting for others’ achievements and limitations. These three elements of perception of privilege may also relate to how respondents view the relative privilege of politicians, and the difference of those who are involved in politics from themselves.

Perception of privilege relating to politics is found to be separate from perception of privilege in society at large and in relation to one’s self. A single factor emerged from the exploratory analysis that underpins the view that both politicians ($B = 0.915$, $p = 0.000$) and those who are involved in politics ($B = 0.877$, $p = 0.000$) are more privileged than one’s self, we well as more privileged than society at large (respectively, $B = 0.850$ and $B = 0.832$, whilst $p = 0.000$ in both cases). Such views are widespread amongst respondents, with almost none selecting categories indicating the politicians and those involved in politics are

³³⁵ Knight, ‘In Their Own Words’, pp. 210-213.

Diagram 5.3. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors
Representing the Five Elements of Perception of Privilege



less privileged than themselves.³³⁶ It is clear that these views are related and that respondents have an underlying view of the political world as one of privilege. This could, however, just be a manifestation of the sense that those involved in politics are different from one's self and the population at large, which is why such views were measured separately in the survey. The exploratory analysis revealed a single factor underpinning all of the ways in which those involved in politics are seen as different from the respondent, although the weaker loadings of differences centred on ideas, cultural tastes, and social networks suggest that these may form

³³⁶ Information on the distributions of all the variables included in the full model is included in Appendix C.

a separate factor. Nevertheless, a single latent factor embodying the sense that politics is populated by people who are different from one's self is supported, and its strongest indicators are the identification of difference on the basis of education ($B = 0.615$, $p = 0.000$), income ($B = 0.603$, $p = 0.000$), and where they live ($B = 0.575$, $p = 0.000$). Thus, views of politically active people as different from one's self are separate from views of them as privileged, and this observation is the result of adopting an exploratory approach, which has again produced theoretically sound factors.

Turning to the distributions of those factors, the uneven distribution of the factor scores in Chart 5.9 reflects the tendency for respondents to select the same rank when asked about their status in relation to their own acquaintances and in relation to society at large. The distribution of the factor scores relation to explanations for status difference in society is much more even and notably different from the distribution relating to explanations for own status, as can be seen by comparing charts 5.10 and 5.11. The difference between these distributions, with the bulk of scores for explanations of own status being low, indicates

Chart 5.9. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Self-Perceived Status




Chart 5.10. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Perception of Privilege in Society




Chart 5.11. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Perception of Own Privilege




Chart 5.12. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Perception of the Difference of Politically Active People





Chart 5.13. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Perception of the Privilege of the Politically Active Factor



the lower levels of endorsement of privilege-based explanations for one’s own status than for status in society as a whole. Last, the distributions of the factor scores relating to the perception of the difference and privilege of politically active people are also notable for their difference, and charts 5.12 and 5.13 show that the bulk of scores for difference are low whilst more of the scores for privilege are higher. This reflects the fact that respondents are likely to consistently rate politicians and politically active people as more privileged than themselves and society, and less likely to consistently identify the particular differences of those people. As with the previous section, whilst the factor scores cannot be interpreted themselves, it is clear that they have sufficient variation to be included in analysis of the influences on political participation, and they tend not to be neatly normally distributed.

Many of the factors relating to perception of privilege are correlated, and it is unsurprising to observe that perception of privilege in society is positively related to perception of own privilege as well as the difference and privilege of politically active people. This implies that there is a tendency to consistently apply privilege-based explanations in different areas, though the strength of correlations leaves plenty of space for respondents to apply inconsistent explanations as well. Additionally interesting is the fact that high self-perceived status is associated with lower perception of privilege in society as well as of the difference and privilege of politically active people. At the same time, it is

Table 5.23. Bivariate Correlations of the Perception of Privilege Factors

	Perception of Privilege in Society	Perception of Own Privilege	Self-Perceived Status	Perception of the Difference of Politically Active People	Perception of the Privilege of Politically Active People
Perception of Privilege in Society	1.000				
Perception of Own Privilege	0.229***	1.000			
Self-Perceived Status	-0.256***	0.128***	1.000		
Perception of the Difference of the Politically Active	0.376***	0.024	-0.356***	1.000	
Perception of the Privilege of the Politically Active	0.374***	-0.071**	-0.416***	0.496***	1.000

positively associated with perception of one's own privilege so high status individuals are apt to recognise the role of societal influences on their status but less likely to do so in relation to society itself. Finally, and unsurprisingly, those who view politically active people as different are also likely to view them as privileged, and it may be that the latter is a particular form of the former.

To summarise, the self-perceived status factor encompasses measures relating to both acquaintances and society at large, with both indicators suggesting middling to high self-perceived status. Social explanations for status in society tend to be opposed to individual explanation, and this holds for explanations for own status as well. The distributions of the two factors, though, reflect the fact that social explanations are more likely to be applied in relation to society than the self. This observation suggests a logical concomitant to the 'fundamental attribution error' that relates to explanations for low status and has been observed in previous research. Turning to perception of privilege in politics, a single factor underpins respondents' sense that they are less privileged than politicians and those who are involved in politics, and their perception of similar relationships between those groups and society at large. Further, whilst no particular difference between the population and politically active people appears to be emblematic, a single factor underpinning perceived differences is observed. The impact of these factors on political participation remains to be seen, but before turning to that it is necessary to consider the factors relating to the other key elements of the model: the forms of capital.

The Forms of Capital:

Economic capital is posited to be measured by household income, assets, and property ownership. All three indicators are indeed found to be underpinned by a single latent factor with similarly strong and significant loadings associated with each (household income $B = 0.682$, number of types of property owned $B = 0.671$, assets $B = 0.641$, and $p = 0.000$ in all three cases).³³⁷ As noted previously, it is posited that economic capital impacts on political participation only in terms of its volume, meaning that it can be measured relatively simply with a single latent factor. By contrast, cultural capital and social capital are posited to be important not only in terms of volume but also type and, as such, each concept is measured by multiple factors. The first factor is work-based civic skills, which is the element of cultural capital that is closest to economic capital and was specified on the basis of the *Civic Voluntarism Model*.³³⁸ The loadings of the indicators confirm the relevance of the concept in the United Kingdom twenty years after it was measured by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in the United States. The factor is indicated most strongly by the frequency of organising or chairing decision-making meetings at work ($B = 0.898$, $p = 0.000$), and then by attendance at such meetings ($B = 0.871$, $p = 0.000$) and giving presentations ($B = 0.862$, $p = 0.000$).

Turning to the core of *Distinction*, Bourdieu's conception of cultural capital encompasses, but is not limited to, musical tastes, artistic preferences, choice of literature, home decoration, trips to the theatre and cinema, food preferences and body shape, clothing and appearance, favoured sports, use of language and speech patterns, and choice of newspaper.³³⁹ In that light, the survey included an extensive battery of questions relating to cultural activities and tastes. Beyond outlining the various activities and tastes that can constitute cultural capital, though, Bourdieu argued that there is ongoing competition to attain and define its value, so the particular types that are considered legitimate may vary across

³³⁷ Pfeffer and Hällsten, 'Mobility Regimes and Parental Wealth'.

³³⁸ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 304-334.

³³⁹ Bourdieu, *Distinction*: pp. 19-21, p. 28, pp. 32-34, p. 43, pp. 54-60, pp. 185-196, pp. 201-206, pp. 217, , p. 226, p. 255, p. 270, pp. 274-278, pp. 288-290, pp. 298-301, pp. 324-325, pp. 334-336, pp. 346-351, pp. 355-357, pp. 391-393, pp. 413-414, pp. 444-449.

times and contexts.³⁴⁰ Indeed, as outlined previously, recent work considering the distribution of cultural capital in the United Kingdom identified a rather different picture than that painted by *Distinction* in relation to France in the second half of the twentieth century.³⁴¹ As such, and reflecting Bourdieu's use of multiple correspondence analysis to map the distribution of capitals, the current research established the latent factors underpinning cultural capital through exploratory factor analysis.³⁴²

The initial exploratory factor analyses relating to cultural capital contained eighty variables relating to frequency of cultural activities outside the home, preferred eateries, preferred cuisines, frequency of home-based cultural activities, favoured musical genres, and favoured film genres. Part of the purpose of conducting exploratory analysis is to reduce the number of variables included in the final model and, as such, multiple analyses were run with the weakest indicators being removed after each. Over the course of this process two competing trends emerged in relation to the frequency of cultural activities outside the home. The first identified a single factor underpinning attendance at classical and opera, theatre, and dance performances, as well as visits to museums, galleries, and historic buildings. The second identified two separate factors relating to attendance at performances, and visits to institutions. All of the activities may be seen as legitimate in the Bourdieusian sense, meaning that they are commonly held up as enriching and valuable forms of cultural participation. Thus, the competing trends identified in the exploratory factor analyses suggest both that there is an underlying tendency to engage with legitimate types of cultural capital but that such engagement may be undertaken in different ways.

In light of the above, the decision was taken to retain separate factors relating to the two distinct forms of legitimate cultural capital in the final model so that their effects on political participation can be examined separately. As such, the first factor relates to cultural performances and is indicated by frequency of attendance at classical or opera concerts (B =

³⁴⁰ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 93, p. 250, pp. 327-328, p. 134, p. 147, p. 149, pp. 176-177, p. 196, p. 218, p. 220, p. 231, p. 246, p. 273, p. 311, p. 395, pp. 450-451.


³⁴¹ Bennett et al., *Culture, Class, Distinction*, p. 254, p. 22, p. 132, p. 149.

³⁴² Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 339-342.

0.862, $p = 0.000$), theatre shows or musicals ($B = 0.817$, $p = 0.000$), and ballet or dance performances ($B = 0.806$, $p = 0.000$). The second factor then relates to cultural institutions and is indicated by frequency of visits to museums ($B = 0.886$, $p = 0.000$), art galleries ($B = 0.899$, $p = 0.000$), and historic buildings ($B = 0.836$, $p = 0.000$). In addition, a third factor relating to consumption-orientated activities was consistently identified in the exploratory models and is indicated by the frequency of eating out with friends ($B = 0.894$, $p = 0.000$), going to the pub ($B = 0.723$, $p = 0.000$) and, weakly, shopping for pleasure ($B = 0.301$, $p = 0.000$). The three factors relating to cultural activities, along with their indicators are shown in Diagram 5.4. Referring back to the descriptive statistics, two of the three indicators of the first factor (classical and opera, and ballet and dance performances) are amongst the least participated in, whilst all three of the indicators of the second factor are participated in quite widely, and all three of the indicators of the third factor are amongst the most widespread activities. Thus, whilst the first and second factors relate to different types of legitimate cultural capital, the third factor encompasses more popular cultural activities.

Diagram 5.4. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors

Relating to the Three Types of Cultural Activity




Moving from activities to tastes, which are displayed in Diagram 5.5 below, three robust factors relating to preferences for film genres were revealed by the exploratory factor analyses and are thus included in the final model. The first of those factors relates to family-friendly genres and is indicated by watching of family films ($B = 0.743$, $p = 0.000$), musical and dance movies ($B = 0.646$, $p = 0.000$), and romance films ($B = 0.875$, $p = 0.000$). The second factor relates to blockbuster films and is indicated by the viewing of releases in the action ($B = 0.712$, $p = 0.000$), fantasy ($B = 0.848$, $p = 0.000$), and science fiction ($B = 0.911$, $p = 0.000$) genres. Finally, the third factor relates to genres that are often considered to be educational, informative, or otherwise enriching, in the form of the classics ($B = 0.642$, $p = 0.000$), documentaries ($B = 0.659$, $p = 0.000$), and historical or biographical films ($B = 0.937$, $p = 0.000$). In contrast with activities outside the home, where the three factors were distinguished both by qualitative differences between the activities that they underpinned and by differences in their popularity, the factors relating to film preferences are differentiated primarily in terms of the types of genre that they relate to rather than their popularity (all of the genres included are watched by between 54.3% and 33.8% of respondents). Nonetheless, the factor relating to classic, documentary, and historical or biographical films can be marked out as legitimate in the sense that, as noted, they are often considered to be educational, informative, or otherwise enriching.

Only one factor relating to musical tastes proved to be robust to the removal of the variables with weaker loadings during the exploratory analyses. That factor relates to musical genres that commonly feature sampling, electronic effects, and strong basslines, in the form of rap and hip hop ($B = 0.946$, $p = 0.000$), RnB and urban ($B = 0.843$, $p = 0.000$), and dance and electronica ($B = 0.678$, $p = 0.000$). This factor stands in stark contrast to the final factor relating to cultural tastes in the full model, which was specified theoretically rather than emerging from the exploratory analyses. This was necessary because the large number of indicators of cultural tastes (177 in total) meant that, in order to avoid model identification problems, they were initially explored in blocks relating to different areas. The strongest factors from those models were then tested in models encompassing tastes in

Diagram 5.5. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors

Relating to Five Sets of Cultural Tastes



different areas. This means that some variables were not tested in the same models as each other because they were weak indicators of factors that were subsequently included in combined models. Thus, it is a possible that some of these indicators are underpinned by factors that did not emerge from the analysis due to limits on the number of variables that can be included in a single model. In that light, a final latent factor indicated by tastes that are considered especially legitimate was specified and confirmed in the full model. The factor is indicated by eating at wine bars and bistros ($B = 0.457$, $p = 0.000$), watching foreign and arthouse films ($B = 0.491$, $p = 0.000$), and listening to BBC Radio 3 ($B = 0.589$, $p = 0.000$), all of which are undertaken by a small minority of respondents (between 22.8% and 6%). This

factor was included to ensure that there is a clear test of relationship between legitimate cultural tastes and perceptions and political participation when the structural loadings are considered.

The identification of a factor relating to legitimate cultural tastes in food, radio, and film breaks with the general observation that cultural tastes are grouped in areas relating to activities, film, and music. These observed distinctions between particular areas of cultural taste and activity were not anticipated and have been identified because of the decision to adopt an exploratory approach. Indeed, confirmatory factor analysis would have been a rather blunt tool for identifying factors in an area with only broad theoretical expectations. Whilst Bourdieu's work may have suggested a factor centred on legitimate cultural capital, it would not have distinguished attendance at cultural performances from visits to cultural institutions, nor would it have suggested a consumption-orientated factor. Nevertheless, the observed distinctions do reflect the theory in the sense that they tend to identify more and less legitimate cultural activities and tastes, albeit in unanticipated ways. Further, the distinctions also make sense because in addition to people who, for instance, enjoy particular genres of films there are also people who generally do not enjoy watching films. Thus, differentiation between both particular preferences within a cultural area and between areas of taste and activity are to be expected, and this helps to explain the observed cultural factors. As such, these results are a good example of retroduction; Bourdieu's theory informed the choice of questions to ask and the broad expectation that cultural activities and tastes are related, but empirical analysis indicated the particular relationships that exist.

Charts 5.14 to 5.16 present the distributions of the factor scores relating to cultural activities, and the similarity of the two legitimate factors is notable. Both are approximately normally distributed and centred on higher scores, which reflects the fact that most respondents undertake at least some of those activities at least some of the time, whilst few respondents engage in all of them frequently or none of them ever. This contrasts with the distribution of the factors scores relating to consumption-orientated cultural activities, which is wider, lower, and are largely positive, reflecting the fact that a higher number of respondents engage in more

of those activities with greater frequency. Moving on from activities, Chart 5.17 shows that the factor scores associated with legitimate tastes are tightly and normally distributed around zero, which distinguishes them from the factor scores relating to other tastes displayed in charts 5.18 to 5.21. The distribution of the educational and informative films factor is wider and lower, and the bulk of scores are positive. The distributions of the factor scores relating to family-friendly and blockbuster films have multiple peaks, which suggests strong grouping of answers, whilst the bass and sample heavy music factor has a low and wide distribution with scores that are largely negative, reflecting the low prevalence of such tastes in the sample. As with the factors observed in previous sections, only some of the factor scores distributions associated with cultural capital are normal but they all display sufficient variation to be included in the analysis of influence on political participation.

Before proceeding to consider social capital it is also useful to consider the associations between the eight cultural capital factors. The bivariate correlations between those factors can be seen in Table 5.24 and there are two trends that appear to be in competition. First, legitimate cultural capital is generally not opposed to other forms of cultural capital, with legitimate tastes positively and significantly associated with most other cultural tastes. Legitimate activities are also positively and significantly associated with consumption-based activities, and visits to legitimate venues are not significantly related to family friendly and blockbuster films, or bass and sample heavy music. Thus, those who hold legitimate cultural capital display some tendency to cultural omnivorousness, in line with previous findings in this area.³⁴³ By contrast, the second trend indicates that there is a limit to that omnivorousness, and the associations between legitimate and other forms of capital are notably weaker than those within legitimate capital. Further, there is a clear opposition between attendance at legitimate performances and preferences for blockbuster films, and bass and sample heavy music. Those who hold legitimate cultural capital, then, also possess some other forms of capital whilst tending to reject others.

³⁴³ Chan and Goldthorpe, 'Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: Music in England', p. 7; Chan and Goldthorpe, 'Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: The visual arts in England', p. 182; and Chan and Goldthorpe, 'The Social Stratification of Theatre, Dance, and Cinema Attendance', p. 199.

Chart 5.14. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Visits to Legitimate Cultural Venues




Chart 5.15. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances




Chart 5.16. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Consumption-Based Cultural Activities




Chart 5.17. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Legitimate Cultural Tastes




Chart 5.18. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Preferences for Educational and Information Films




Chart 5.19. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Preferences for Family-Friendly Films




Chart 5.20. Histogram of the Factor Scores for
Preferences for Blockbuster Movies




Chart 5.21. Histogram of the Factor Scores for
Preferences for Bass and Sample Heavy Music




Table 5.24. Bivariate Correlations of the Cultural Capital Factors

	Legitimate Performances	Legitimate Venues	Consumption-Based Activities	Legitimate Tastes	Educational Films	Family-Friendly Films	Blockbuster Movies	Sample and Bass Heavy Music
Legitimate Performances	1.000							
Legitimate Venues	0.748***	1.000						
Consumption-Based Activities	0.376***	0.405***	1.000					
Legitimate Tastes	0.547***	0.682***	0.450***	1.000				
Educational Films	0.119***	0.304***	0.127***	0.584***	1.000			
Family-Friendly Films	0.068	-0.042	0.141***	0.036	0.372***	1.000		
Blockbuster Movies	-0.152***	0.010	-0.003	0.143*** ³⁴	0.366***	0.161***	1.000	
Sample and Bass Heavy Music	-0.121**	-0.035	0.113**	0.116*** ³⁵	0.113**	0.265***	0.420***	1.000

The factors underpinning social capital were identified in a similar fashion to those underpinning cultural capital, with two of the five factors relating to the concept being identified through confirmatory models whilst the remaining three emerged from exploratory analyses. Beginning with those that were defined theoretically, and as can be seen in Diagram 5.6 below, the first factor relates to number of friends and is posited to underpin the indicators of how many friends are seen with three levels of frequency. Number of friends contacted weekly is found to have the strongest loading onto the specified factor ($B = 0.870$, $p = 0.000$), followed by friends seen monthly ($B = 0.809$, $p = 0.000$) and then friends seen daily ($B = 0.550$, $p = 0.000$). Thus, there is an underlying tendency influencing how many friends respondents have, whether they are seen or contacted frequently or infrequently.

The posited latent factor representing diversity of friends is found to be strongly indicated by the percentage of friends with different ethnicities from the respondent's own ($B = 0.596$, $p = 0.000$) and less strongly by the percentage of friends with different religious beliefs from the respondent's own (0.513 , $p = 0.000$).³⁴⁴ This gap between the loadings may suggest that there are differing geographical distributions of ethnic and religious groups, which mean that respondents who are disposed to have diverse friends are more or less likely to meet people with different ethnicities or religions depending on where they live. Additionally, the indicator relating to diversity of friends in terms of sex, recoded so that respondents with half of their friends from the same sex as themselves were assigned the highest value whilst those with all their friends from one gender were assigned the lowest values, is found to have the weakest loading onto the factor ($B = 0.342$, $p = 0.000$). That weakness is likely to reflect the equal split and even geographical distribution of genders in the population when compared to ethnic and religious groups. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that respondents who have friends from other ethnic groups than themselves also have friends with different religions, and a more even split of friends in terms of gender.

³⁴⁴ The variables relating to ethnicity and religious beliefs were inverted so that high values indicated high diversity rather than high numbers of friends from the same group as one's self.

In positing that the forms of capital are structured by class, Bourdieu suggests social capital should reflect social position, and thus that individuals know others who have similar occupations to their own.³⁴⁵ However, Bourdieu also argued that there is ongoing competition between classes to gain capital and establish the value of the capital that they hold.³⁴⁶ So, as noted, the combinations of capital that individuals hold across times and contexts should be expected to vary. This suggests that, whilst it might be expected that those with higher occupational status acquaintances and those with lower occupational status acquaintances form separate groups, the precise nature and number of those groups cannot be specified theoretically.

In light of the above, and again mirroring Bourdieu's own use of multiple correspondence analysis to map the distribution of capitals in the population, the factors underpinning the occupational statuses of respondents' acquaintances were established through exploratory factor analysis.³⁴⁷ The analysis revealed a clear distinction between acquaintance with people in professional and higher managerial occupations, and acquaintance with people in other occupations. Of particular interest is whether acquaintance with high status individuals is related to political participation, so only the former factor and its strongest indicators are included in the full model, which also has the benefit of minimising the already large number of variables and factors. This means that acquaintance with people in technical professions ($B = 0.698$, $p = 0.000$), traditional professions ($B = 0.646$, $p = 0.000$), and senior management positions ($B = 0.612$, $p = 0.000$) are included in the model as indicators of a general tendency to know people in high status occupations.

The strength of social relationships in terms of the things that can be expected of acquaintances is also important, and respondents were asked about thirteen types of help that they might have received from five different groups of people. There are a number of contending expectations that might be held about the loading of the answers onto latent factors. First, it may be that help received is underpinned by latent factors relating to the types of help,


³⁴⁵ Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital', pp. 241-258.

³⁴⁶ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 93, p. 250, pp. 327-328.

³⁴⁷ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 339-342.

meaning that respondents who have received a particular type of help from one source are also likely to have received it from other sources. Second, it may be that help received is shaped primarily by the groups who offer it, so that respondents who receive one type of help from a given group are also more likely to receive other types of help from that group. Third, it may be that different forms of help are received from different groups so that, for instance, respondents rely on family for childcare and financial help, friends for crisis support and help with moving house, and family friends for help with applying for work and provision of references.

Diagram 5.6. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors
Relating to the Five Types of Social Capital



The above alternative possibilities, and associated uncertainty regarding how factors should be specified, mean that the latent factors relating to help received were also established with exploratory factor analysis. The analysis revealed a clear tendency, with some exceptions, for help to be received on a group by group basis rather than by type. Within that tendency there are also some types of help that are most strongly associated with each group, but the overall picture is one in which reliance on a group for one type of help is related to reliance on that group for other types of help as well. With this in mind, a simpler confirmatory model positing two factors relating to help received from family friends and help received from partners, family, and friends was tested. This model was found to have adequate fit and allows for the distinction between the effect of help received from loose and close networks whilst minimising the number of factors and indicators to be included in the full model. Problems with empty cells were encountered in relation to the binary indicators of help received that had the strongest loadings in the confirmatory models and, as such, some alternative indicators are included in the final model. Thus, the latent factor relating to help received from family friends is most strongly indicated by the receipt of help with writing a C.V. ($B = 0.598, p = 0.000$), then by having received a loan in an emergency ($B = 0.442$), and finally by having had a good word put in with a potential employer on one's behalf ($B = 0.387, p = 0.000$). The indicators of help received from close social networks relate to career advice received from a partner ($B = 0.796, p = 0.000$), family contacting potential employers on one's behalf ($B = 0.527, p = 0.000$), and friends contacting potential employers on one's behalf ($B = 0.461, p = 0.000$). The final model, then, includes five factors relating to social capital, and specifically to the number of friends, the diversity of friends, acquaintance with people who have high occupational status, help received from family friends (loose social networks), and help received from family, friends, and partners (close social networks). As with cultural capital the particular shape that they take, for instance the differentiation between help from close and loose social networks, is the results of the exploratory approach, which has nonetheless produced theoretically sensible factors. Thus, they account for, the extent of social networks, their nature in terms of who is known, and the strength of the relationships with those people.

As always, the distributions of the factors are important. Starting with the number of friends that respondents report having, Chart 5.22 shows that the distribution of factors scores is relatively low and wide. Chart 5.23 then shows a markedly different distribution for the factor representing diversity of friends, with the prevalence of negative scores reflecting the fact that a small number of respondents report having diverse networks on all three measures (sex, ethnicity, and religion). More respondents report acquaintance with individuals in high status occupations and this is reflected in Chart 5.24, which shows an approximately normal distribution of factor scores that tend to be positive. This is, in turn, different from the distributions of the factors representing help received from close and loose social network, which are shown in charts 5.25 and 5.26. These indicate that both distributions are tend towards negative values, reflecting the low number of respondents who report receiving a great deal of help from their social networks. Overall, and as observed in the previous sections, these factors display ample variation to be included in the analysis of the influences on political participation and, again, are only sometimes normally distributed.

With the distributions of the factors outlined a final consideration is the associations between them, and Table 5.25 presents the bivariate correlations of the social capital factors. These show that number of friends appears to be a central factor, and is positively and significantly associated with all of the others except help from loose networks. Indeed, the latter factor is only correlated with receipt of help from close networks and, similarly, diversity of friends is only correlated with number of friends. Thus, having more friends is associated with also having a more diverse social network, knowing more people with high occupational status, and receiving help from friends and family. The latter two factors are also correlated, indicating that those who inhabit high status networks are also more likely to receive help from those with whom they are most closely acquainted.

Chart 5.22. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Number of Friends




Chart 5.23. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Diversity of Friends




Chart 5.24. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Acquaintance with High Status Individuals




Chart 5.25. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Help Received from Close Social Networks




Chart 5.26. Histogram of the Factor Scores for
Help Received from Loose Social Networks




Table 5.25. Bivariate Correlations of the Social Capital Factors

	Number of Friends	Diversity of Friends	High Status Acquaintances	Help from Close Networks	Help from Loose Networks
Number of Friends	1.000				
Diversity of Friends	0.093**	1.000			
High Status Acquaintances	0.317***	0.070	1.000		
Help from Close Networks	0.237***	0.061 ³⁴⁸	0.239***	1.000	
Help from Loose Networks	0.137	0.172 ³⁴⁹	-0.005	0.369***	1.000

To summarise in relation to all three forms of capital, the distributions of the factors underpinning them vary not only between forms but also between types within those forms. Most respondents have modest or middling amounts of economic capital, and this is reflected

³⁴⁸ Identification issues were encountered resulting from the different distributions and values of the factor scores, based on the contrast between the interval and binary variables that load onto them, so the cited figure is from a model in which all five social capital factors were correlated.

³⁴⁹ Identification issues were encountered resulting from the different distributions and values of the factor scores, based on the contrast between the interval and binary variables that load onto them, so the cited figure is from a model in which all five social capital factors were correlated.

in the distribution of the factor scores.³⁵⁰ Cultural capital is widespread, though notably more respondents engage in consumption-based cultural activities and visits to cultural venues than in trips to see performances, and the factor score distributions reflect this distinction. Further, respondents clearly distinguish between the types of film that they watch, and the factors relating to educational, family, and blockbuster films have notably different distributions. This is also the case in relation to the factors encompassing bass and sample heavy music, and legitimate tastes. The relationships between the factors suggest a level of omnivorousness, with respondents happy to maintain both legitimate and other cultural capital. However, there is a limit to that omnivorousness, as indicated by the opposition between attendance at legitimate performance, blockbuster movies and bass and sample heavy music. Turning to social capital, distinct factors relating to number and diversity of friends, with notably different distributions, are observed as expected. The distribution of the factor relating to high status acquaintances respondents indicates the preponderance of such social connections whilst, by contrast, the factor distributions associated with help received from close and loose social networks indicate that such help is not widespread. The social capital factors are more consistently positively associated than are those relating to cultural capital.

³⁵⁰ See Appendix D for the charts showing the distributions of factors not presented in the chapter.

Background, Demographics, and Basic Beliefs:

The indicators of gender, ethnicity, disability, and relationship status are included in the model directly so the first latent factor relating to background is parental social class. This concept is indicated by both parental education and occupation, with the strongest indicator of being father's education ($B = 0.804$, $p = 0.000$), followed by mother's education ($B = 0.731$, $p = 0.000$). Parental occupational status is a weaker but still significant indicator of parental social class, with father's occupational status ($B = 0.472$, $p = 0.000$) being stronger than mother's occupational status ($B = 0.338$, $p = 0.000$). Moving from background characteristics to behaviour that is likely to emerge during early and formative years, religious activity is indicated by religious volunteering ($B = 0.964$, $p = 0.000$), donating ($B = 0.941$, $p = 0.000$), and service attendance ($B = 0.884$, $p = 0.000$).

Like religious beliefs, respondents' ideological dispositions are considered to be what Bem referred to as first- or second-order beliefs.³⁵¹ That is to say that they are defined relatively early in life, and probably a reflection of the ideas expressed by parents during the respondents' childhood years. Whether those ideas were accepted or rejected, the consequent ideological dispositions of respondents are likely to have solidified during their formative years. It is possible that these dispositions influence the perception of privilege that is one of the focuses of the current research, so it is important to measure them. The results confirm the expectation that left-right position and social authoritarianism are separate, and the former is most strongly indicated by the belief that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor ($B = 0.833$, $p = 0.000$). The belief that big business takes advantage of ordinary people ($B = 0.720$, $p = 0.000$) and the belief that management will always try to take advantage of employees ($B = 0.719$, $p = 0.000$) are also strong indicators of the position. In the indicators higher values indicate agreement with left-wing statement, so high factor scores in this case indicate a left-wing ideological position. By contrast, the widespread agreement with authoritarian social

³⁵¹ Bem, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 6-7, pp. 10-11.

statements means that high factor scores in this case are indicative of an underlying socially authoritarian position. The indicators of this factor are support for stiffer sentences for criminals ($B = 0.776$, $p = 0.000$) and the use of the death penalty in some circumstances ($B = 0.774$, $p = 0.000$), whilst support for schools teaching children to respect authority is a weaker but still significant indicator ($B = 0.423$, $p = 0.000$) of the factor.

The bulk of formal education also takes place during formative years and is thus attained relatively early in people's lives, meaning that it is considered at the beginning of the model. Both age of leaving education ($B = 0.507$, $p = 0.000$) and educational level ($B = 0.500$, $p = 0.000$) have moderate and significant loadings onto the education factor. Relatedly, occupational status is indicated by social grade ($B = 0.636$, $p = 0.000$), type of work ($B = 0.619$), and responsibilities at work ($B = 0.276$, $p = 0.000$). To summarise, the expected latent factors encompassing respondents' background characteristics, demographics, and basic beliefs are confirmed by the analysis. Namely, in addition to the single indicators of age, sex, ethnicity, disability, and relationship status, there are factors relating to parental social class, religious activity, left-wing views and social authoritarianism, education, and occupational status.

Old and New Factors:

The variables that load onto the factors outlined in the model have limited comparability with external data. However, the factors that underpin them reflect factors that have been observed in previous research, or conform to expectations stemming from previous research and theory. Summarising the shape of the factors that have been identified through confirmatory and exploratory analysis, the dependent concept is measured by three latent factors that encompass the individualised, collective, and contacting forms of participation observed in previous research. Individualised political participation is the most widespread form, followed by the contacting and collective forms, and they are all significantly and positively correlated. Political engagement is measured by four factors covering perceived engagement, knowledge of national politics, and external efficacy and internal efficacy, with the final factor encompassing recruitment to political and civil society groups by close social networks. Respondents tend to perceive themselves as politically engaged and to hold high levels of knowledge of politics but this does not translate into high levels of either internal or external efficacy, whilst recruitment from close social networks is moderately common. The engagement factors tend to be positively correlated, with the notable exception of political knowledge and recruitment, which suggests that politically engaged individuals tend to channel their energies into one or the other.

Perception of privilege is found, as posited, to be measured separately by factors relating to self-perceived status, explanations for status differences in society, and explanations for one's own status. Respondents tend to perceive their own status as middling-to-high, and perceptions of the importance of individual-orientated explanations for status are higher in relation to the self than society at large. Separate factors relate to the perception that those who are involved in politics are more privileged than one's self and society, and that they are different, with the former more widespread than the latter. The factors relating to perception of privilege tend to be positively correlated but there are initial signs of the

‘fundamental attribution error’ in the opposite effects of self-perceived status on explanations for status difference in society and for one’s own status.

There are low-to-moderate levels of economic capital amongst respondents, and the concept is also indicated by a single factor underpinning income, assets, and property ownership. Cultural capital is measured by nine factors, the first four of which cover the frequency of activities relating to work-based civic skills, attendance at cultural performances, visits to cultural institutions, and consumption-orientated pastimes. Civic skills are widespread but infrequently exercised by respondents, whilst attendance at cultural performances is generally less widespread and frequent than visits to cultural institutions and consumption-orientated activities. The next four factors relate to cultural tastes, and specifically to tendencies to watch family-friendly films, blockbusters, and educational or informative films, and the tendency to listen to bass and sample heavy music. Most of the film genres are watched by large minorities of respondents, whilst the preference for bass and sample heavy music is held by a smaller minority. The final factor encompasses legitimate cultural tastes in terms of film, radio, and dining, which are amongst the least widespread types of cultural capital. The correlations between the cultural capital factors are generally positive, and indicate a limited level of omnivorousness that does not overcome the opposition between attendance at legitimate cultural performances and preferences for blockbuster movies and bass and sample heavy music.

Social capital is measured by five factors relating to number of friends, diversity of friends, acquaintance with high status individuals, and receipt of help from family friends and close social networks. Respondents tend to have moderate numbers of friends and low-to-moderate levels of diversity in their friendship groups. At the same time, considerable numbers of respondents are acquainted with high status individuals, but few have received help from family friends or close social networks. These factors are more consistently positively correlated than their cultural capital counterparts, and none of them are in opposition to each other.

Background characteristics that are generally measured by single indicators, though there is a single factor relating to parental social class that underpins their occupational statuses and educational levels. A single factor also underpins religious activity, which is taken to reflect the importance of religion in respondents' lives. Further factors underpin left-right position and authoritarian social views, and respondents tend to hold left- rather than right-wing and authoritarian rather than liberal social views. Respondents also tend to have higher levels of education and, relatedly, to occupy higher occupational status positions, with each of those concepts measured by a separate factor. The factors from parental social class to economic capital, and from political engagement to participation, were tested with confirmatory analysis and generally found to match theoretical expectations as well as previous empirical work. The remaining factors relate to the core concepts of cultural and social capital, and perception of privilege. They were identified through exploratory analysis in line with Bourdieu's analytical approach, and because the broad theoretical expectations relating to these concepts did not specify the particular shape of factors or, necessarily, all of the indicators that should load onto them.

The emerging factors are in line with broad theoretical expectations but also reveal patterns that were not expected, such as the separation of cultural capital relating to performances and visits to institutions, the particular film and musical tastes observed, and the differentiation of help received on the basis of the groups from which it is received rather than by type. Thus, the measurement component of the full model confirms the form of commonly measured concepts relating to background and political engagement and participation, whilst at the same time offering new insight into the associations between types of cultural and social capital, and supporting the posited components of perception of privilege. The volume and types of capital held are posited to be a key means by which background characteristics are transformed into different behaviour, in this case relating to political participation. The perceptual components of the model are then posited to mediate this effect, so that it is not only the capital that individuals hold but also how they see themselves and their place in society that affects their political participation. The fact that many of the identified factors are

similar to those observed in previous research, or conform to expectations stemming from theory or past research, suggests their reliability and external validity. Notably, there are decent levels of variation in the factors, and the factor score distributions themselves are rather varied in form. This means that the structural relationships between the factor scores can be meaningfully analysed. It is to that task, and thus the testing of causal hypotheses of this research, that the next chapter turns.

Chapter Six: The Impact of Capital and Perceptions on Political Participation

From Hypotheses to Relationships:

Having outlined the factors underpinning the variables representing the concepts of interest, this chapter analyses the relationships between them. This analysis is conducted in pursuit of an answer to the overarching research question: how do structural and perceived privilege impact on individual political participation in the United Kingdom? A model will be tested that embodies a proposed causal process leading from background characteristics to capital profiles and then through perception of privilege to political engagement and thence behaviour. In the hypothesised model, each of the stages in that causal process is multifaceted, with different background characteristics impacting on the capital profiles that are the manifestation of the workings of structural privilege. Each form of capital then impacts on perceptions in its own right, and those perceptions are multifaceted and interrelated. Perceptions then impact on psychological engagement with, and the beliefs about, politics that immediately precede recruitment to and participation in political activity.

The exploratory analysis of the factors underpinning the types of cultural and social capital in the previous chapter was in line with Bourdieu's own use of multiple correspondence analysis, which mapped how the forms and types of capital were related to each other. This chapter departs from that approach by positing causal links, whereas Bourdieu would consider both capital and political activity to be manifestations of class position.³⁵² As outlined previously, however, this research considers the forms of capital to stem from a range of background characteristics rather than just class, and to function as a means by which those background characteristics become associated with different behaviour. This raises the possibility that people with the same class background may have quite distinct capital profiles due to other influences in their lives, in line with previous research findings.³⁵³ Those capital

³⁵² Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 104.

³⁵³ Bennett et al., *Class, Culture, Distinction*, p. 214, pp. 234-235.

profiles, a manifestation of structural privilege, may then promote engagement with the political arena, or disengagement from it. This will be at least in part due to how the political arena is perceived, which is posited to relate to the capital one holds. The proposal of the centrality of Bourdieu's forms of capital within a causal process that expands the *Civic Voluntarism Model* is the first key contribution of this research. The second is its proposal of the mediation of the effect of structural privilege by perceived privilege. Such perception is related, at its core, to society and the self but it also includes elements relating to politics specifically. The inclusion of these multiple elements allow the model to consider how understandings and beliefs about the world and one's place within it play a part in transforming structural influences into different behaviour relating to politics.

Despite the multiple elements of each stage of the causal process, and the large number of potential relationships between them, the theories that underpin the model produce a number of clear hypotheses. The chapter begins by specifying those hypotheses and linking them to the previously outlined theory. This is followed by the analysis of the structural relationships between the factors, which allows for the majority of the hypotheses to be tested. The applicability of the full model is considered in relation to the three forms of political participation identified in the last chapter; individualised, contacting, and collective. Specifically, the chapter begins by identifying the factors that directly influence those forms of political activity, and then works backwards through the model from there, considering the influences on political engagement, perception of privilege and, last, the forms of capital. Each of those sections is considering one part of the overarching model, which is analysed in sections to aid analysis. However, the separate consideration of the causal steps in the model does not allow complete interpretation of the effects of each key factor. As such, after considering the sections of the full model, the chapter turns to consider the total effects of each factor, whether direct or indirect, on the political activity factors. The chapter then addresses the proposed highly interactive nature of the elements of perception of privilege by presenting a separate interaction analysis of the effects of those elements. Having reviewed the structure of the full model, the total effects of the factors, and the supplemental interaction analysis, the

chapter concludes by noting the strong, direct, and positive effect of cultural capital, and especially legitimate cultural capital, on political activity. This appears to be the main route via which education impacts on political participation, and the identification of the importance of cultural capital is the first main finding of the research.

The second main finding is that consistent perception of privilege keeps more forms of political activity open to people than adherence to the fundamental attribution error that is commonly associated with system justifying beliefs. Thus, seeing others and one's self as influenced by privilege enables participation in both self-motivated and socially-orientated political activity, whilst seeing others as the beneficiaries of privilege that has not helped one's self turns people away from the latter type of political participation. This effect is complemented by stronger influence of social capital on socially-orientated participation, with diverse, loose, but strong networks promoting that kind of activity. These findings generally support the causal hypotheses outlined below, although there are unanticipated direct effects in the model. Nevertheless, the overall picture is one in which background characteristics impact on capital profiles, embodying structural privilege, that then shape political engagement and activity directly and via perception of privilege.

Specifying Effects and Causal Paths:

Given that the posited causal process has multiple stages and multiple factors at each stage there are a large number of hypotheses that could be specified. However, this research is primarily concerned with the impact of structural privilege, embodied in the forms of capital, and the elements of perception of privilege on political participation. As such, the focus of the specified hypotheses is on those relationships, and the first stems from Bourdieu's widely tested claim that volume of capital reflects social position and influences behavioural repertoires.³⁵⁴ Applying that idea in the context of the current research, we should expect to see volume of capital enabling a greater range of behaviour, and thus that it should be positively related to political participation:

***Hypothesis 1:** The volume of economic, social, and cultural capital is positively related to political participation.*

Of course, Bourdieu also argues that there is competition, particularly in the cultural domain, over what constitutes legitimate capital.³⁵⁵ It is assumed that economic capital (i.e. income and wealth) is exempt from this observation in the sense that it is only its volume, rather than its type, that is important in defining social position. By contrast, differences between the types of social and, especially, cultural capital are of great importance because type is related to value. Thus, it is supposed that legitimate cultural capital is of higher value than other cultural capital, and thus enables one to engage in a wider range of contexts and activities, including politically:

***Hypothesis 2:** Legitimate cultural capital is more strongly related to political participation than are other forms of cultural capital.*

³⁵⁴ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 199, pp. 91-92; Chan and Goldthorpe, 'Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: Music in England', pp. 1-19; Chan and Goldthorpe, 'Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: The visual arts in England', pp. 168-190; and Chan and Goldthorpe, 'The Social Stratification of Theatre, Dance, and Cinema Attendance', pp. 193-212; Bennett et al., *Culture, Class, Distinction*.

³⁵⁵ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 93, p. 250, pp. 327-328, p. 134, p. 147, p. 149, pp. 176-177, p. 196, p. 218, p. 220, p. 231, p. 246, p. 273, p. 311, p. 395, pp. 450-451.

Turning to social capital, and again drawing on Bourdieu, connections with higher status individuals are assumed to be of higher value than are connections with lower status individuals.³⁵⁶ Further, the strength of social connections is important; there is more value in knowing someone from whom one can request help and assistance than in knowing someone only to exchange pleasantries with. These observations imply that knowing higher status individuals, and being able to ask for help or assistance from acquaintances, raises one's capacity to engage in a range of behaviour, including political participation:

***Hypothesis 3a:** Being acquainted with high status individuals is positively related to political participation;*

***Hypothesis 3b:** Receipt of help from acquaintances is positively related to political participation.*

Moving beyond structural privilege to account for the impact of perceived privilege, the first concept of interest is self-perceived status. Drawing on self-perception theory it is assumed that assessment of one's own status is based on indicators that could also be used by others to make a similar external appraisal.³⁵⁷ However, because the indicators that are used by each individual will differ, the effects of self-perceived status will vary across individuals. Nevertheless, in reflecting meaningful indicators of status at some point in life, self-perceived status is considered to reflect elements of status in the structural hierarchy. If this is so, and bearing in mind the observation that high status is associated with better performance in a range of contexts,³⁵⁸ we should expect that perceiving one's own status as high enables one to engage in a broader repertoire of behaviour, including in relation to politics:

***Hypothesis 4a:** Self-perceived status is positively related to political participation.*

The two further components of perception of privilege relate to explanations for the statuses that people attain, in the first instance in society at large. The interest here is in the extent to which individuals endorse explanations for status inequality in society that are

³⁵⁶ Bourdieu, 'The Forms of Capital', pp. 241-258.

³⁵⁷ Bem, *Attitudes, and Human Affairs*, pp. 48-53.

³⁵⁸ Wilkinson and Pickett, *The Spirit Level*, pp. 36-39; O'Brien and Major, 'Group Status and Feelings of Personal Entitlement', pp. 427-439, pp. 429-430; Turner and Reynolds, 'Self-Categorization Theory', p. 410; Hardin, Cheung, Magee, Noel, and Yoshimura, 'Interpersonal Foundations of Ideological Thinking', pp. 132-159, pp. 136-137.

predicated on some idea of privilege, which are posited to exclude other explanations based on ideas such as hard work or chance. To the extent that individuals adhere to such privilege-orientated explanations it is possible to suppose competing plausible effects on political participation. It may be that a belief in the power of background and structural inequality to shape people's lives, in identifying an external locus of control, is demotivating and leads to a conclusion along the lines of 'what difference can I make?' Alternatively, perceiving that such a system produces inequality may prompt individuals to challenge or endorse it depending on their normative position regarding its legitimacy. In other words, identifying some external system that has important implications for social outcomes may prompt a desire to exercise some influence over that system and its associated power. This possibility fits with the proposed opposition of perception of privilege to system justifying beliefs, which has been shown to be related to lower levels of political participation.³⁵⁹ As such, it is considered more likely that perception of the role of privilege in society is linked to higher levels of political participation:

Hypothesis 4b: *Perception of the role of privilege in defining status in society is positively related to political participation.*

Of course, the explanations that individuals provide for differential status attainment in society may differ from the explanations that they apply to their own status. Thus, the third component of perception of privilege centres on the extent to which individuals apply explanations related to privilege to their own status. Again, the identification of an external reason for one's own status may be demotivating, or alternatively may prompt action to challenge or defend the systems that influenced it. As with perception of privilege in society, the latter possibility is considered more likely because it fits with the opposition between perception of privilege and system justifying beliefs. So, all other things being equal:

Hypothesis 4c: *Perception of the role of privilege in defining status in one's own life is positively related to political participation.*

³⁵⁹ Hafer and Choma, 'Belief in a Just World, Perceived Fairness, and Justification of the Status Quo', pp. 107-119, p. 109.

Moving one step closer to political participation itself, people may also perceive the role of privilege in the political domain. Such domain-specific perceptions are considered subsequent to more general and personal perceptions of the role of structural privilege in society and one's own life but, clearly, they may be an important influence on political participation. Further to the above ideas, it is likely that viewing those who are involved in politics as different from and more privileged than one's self will reduce the sense that politics is a domain in which one can function:

***Hypothesis 5a:** Perception of the difference of those who are involved in politics from one's self is negatively related to political participation;*

***Hypothesis 5b:** Perception of the privilege of those who are involved in politics is negatively related to political participation.*

Beyond their main effects, the elements of perception of privilege are expected to be related to one another and, crucially, to be interactive in their effects on political participation. Most importantly, explanations for one's own status relate to the self so it is likely that they interact with self-perceived status. It may be the case that, counter to the prevailing main effect, those with particularly low self-perceived status have a sense of grievance resulting from the recognition that their status is a result of structural privilege, whilst those with high self-perceived status have no such sense of grievance.³⁶⁰ Thus, the positive effect of perceiving the role of privilege in one's own life would be expected to be stronger amongst low status than those with high status. Alternatively, perception of the role of privilege in one's life could interact with self-perceived status to impact on the sense that one has the right, and is qualified, to participate in politics. This would suggest that low status will weaken the positive effect of perceiving the role of privilege in one's own life.

Going one step further, and extending the logic, perception of privilege in one's life may exaggerate the existing effects of low and high self-perceived status. Thus, those who perceive their status as low would have their already low political participation further reduced

³⁶⁰ Opp, 'Grievances and Participation in Social Movements', pp. 853-864

by viewing society's deck as being stacked against them. By contrast, those who perceive their status as high are likely to have their high political participation exaggerated by an understanding that society is set up to benefit them. In light of the previously hypothesised negative impact of low self-perceived status on the capacity to participate in politics, it is considered likely that the further challenge presented to the self by an understanding that one's position is externally defined will exaggerate rather than moderate that effect. Similarly, it is considered likely that the participatory dividend of high self-perceived status will be magnified by the understanding the society works in one's favour, rather than dampened by it.

Hypothesis 6a: *Perception of the role of privilege in one's own life interacts with self-perceived status to exaggerate the low and high participatory tendencies amongst those with low and high self-perceived status.*

By contrast, the above explanations are not expected to apply to the much less personal explanations for status differences in society at large. Thus, with explanations for one's own status from explanations for society at large separated from each other it is not expected that the effect of the latter will be affected by one's self-perceived status:

Hypothesis 6b: *Perception of the role of privilege in society does not interact with self-perceived status in its effect on political participation.*

The above is the only relationship between elements of the perception of privilege that is expected not to be interactive and the direction of the effect of perception of own privilege is expected to be opposite depending on perception of societal privilege. Respondents with high perception of societal privilege but low perception of their own privilege manifest the fundamental attribution error and have the sense that social structure benefits others but has not helped them, which is expected to be alienating.³⁶¹ Respondents who perceive the role of privilege in both society and their own lives have consistent social structure-based explanations for status, avoid the fundamental attribution error, and have reason to want to influence that structure. Respondents with low perception of privilege in society and their own

³⁶¹ Knight, 'In Their Own Words', pp. 202-232, pp. 210-213.

lives apply consistent non-social structure based explanations for status that neither strongly promote nor undermine participation. Last, respondents who consider their status to be the result of social-structure but do not apply this explanation to society at large are expected to participate more than those subscribing to the fundamental attribution error, and the lines should cross. Thus, for those with high perception of privilege in society, perception of own privilege has a positive effect, whilst for those with low perception of privilege in society it has a negative effect:

***Hypothesis 6c:** Perception of the role of privilege in one's own life interacts with perception of the role of privilege in society to have a positive effect where the latter is high but a negative effect where it is low.*

Moving onto perceptions relating to those who are politically active, the negative effects of both the perception that they are different and that they are privileged are expected to be weaker for those with high status. This is because those with low status are considered likely to perceive a greater threat from the difference or privilege of politically active people and thus disengage from politics to a greater extent, with higher status insuring against this:

***Hypothesis 6d:** Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active people interact with self-perceived status to have stronger effects amongst those with low status.*

By contrast to the above, the negative effect of perceiving the difference and privilege of politically active people is expected to be stronger for those with high perception of the role of privilege in society. This is because the perceived difference is likely not to be considered a quirk of character but rather a result of social structure that has benefited some, such as the politically active, but not others:

***Hypothesis 6e:** Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active people interact with perception of the role of privilege in society to have stronger effects amongst those who explain status in society on the basis of social structure.*

Similarly, recognising the role of social structure in one's own status may imply the application of such explanations to the difference and privilege of those who are politically active, making them a social other rather than merely individually different:

Hypothesis 6f: *Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active people interact with perception of the role of privilege one's own life to have stronger effects amongst those who explain their status on the basis of social structure.*

Finally, the effects of perceiving the difference and privilege of politically active people are expected to interact positively because seeing both a general gap between one's self and politically active people, and also one based on privilege should exaggerate the negative effect of each:

Hypothesis 6g: *Perception of the difference of politically active people impacts positively with perception of the privilege of politically active people to increase its negative effect.*

For the sake of ease of interpretation, the hypothesised interaction relationships are represented in charts 6.1 to 6.7 below. Charts 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 illustrate the hypothesised interactions between perception of the difference of politically active people and the other more fundamental elements of perception of privilege. However, those hypotheses apply equally to the interactions between perception of the privilege of politically active people and the other elements of perception of privilege, so the charts can be read as such.

The order in which the above hypotheses are presented reflects the overarching causal process running from background characteristics through capital profiles and perception of privilege to political participation. That causal process suggests that whilst it is possible to observe the relationships between each of the variables of interest and political participation, those relationships will function through other concepts. Thus, a causal order is expected to be observed in the model testing the impact of the above concepts on political participation:

Hypothesis 7a: *Levels of capital impact on political participation primarily via perception of privilege rather than directly;*

Chart 6.1. Hypothesised Interaction
between Perceptions of Own Status
and Societal Privilege




Chart 6.2. Hypothesised Interaction
between Perceptions of Own Status
and Own Privilege




Chart 6.3. Hypothesised Interaction
between Perceptions of Own
and Societal Privilege




Chart 6.4. Hypothesised Interaction
between Perceptions of Own Status and the
Difference of Politically Active People




Chart 6.5. Hypothesised Interaction between Perceptions of Societal Privilege and the Difference of Politically Active




Chart 6.6. Hypothesised Interaction between Perceptions of Own Privilege and the





Chart 6.7. Hypothesised Interaction between Perceptions of the Difference and the Privilege of Politically Active People



Hypothesis 7b: *Perception of privilege impacts on political participation primarily via political engagement rather than directly.*

Together, the above eighteen hypotheses outline not only the expected impact of each concept of interest on political participation, but also the causal paths by which those effects are expected to travel. As noted when outlining the analytical approach in the previous chapter, the need to consider not only effects but also causal paths informed the choice of structural

equation modelling as the means by which to test the above hypotheses. The result of adopting this approach is a large model that includes factors representing each of the steps in the causal process. Each of those factors has multiple indicators, as well as structural loadings onto other factors in the model. As such, and as can be seen in Diagram 6.1 (which presents only the structural loadings in the model, excluding the measurement loadings for ease of presentation), the model is large and contains multiple loadings linking factors within and across the causal steps. Thus, for ease of interpretation, it is sensible to consider the model section by section rather than in its entirety, and this is the approach that is adopted in the following sections of the chapter. The next section will consider the direct effects on the dependent factors relating to individualised, contacting, and collective activity, which is to say their direct structural loadings onto preceding factors in the model. The subsequent sections will then apply the same approach, working backwards through the full model, considering the direct effects on political engagement, perception of privilege, and the forms of capital. Each of those sections, it must be remembered, is presenting part of the full model rather than a separate analysis. So, factors that appear as independent in one section are the same factors that are dependent in another section. All of these links can be seen in Diagram 6.1 overleaf, and it can be seen that the standardised loadings in the full model are identical to those presented in the subsequent sections of the chapter, which consider it in causal steps working back from the dependent political participation factors.

Direct Effects on Political Participation:

The first thing to consider before proceeding to interpret the loadings in the full model is the extent to which it fits the data. The Chi-square statistic of 10511.302 is very large and highly significant ($p = 0.000$) but, as noted in Chapter Four, this reflects the complexity of the model and the size of the sample, which magnifies each of the minor discrepancies between the hypothesised model and the observed relationships in the data. Thus, it is more useful to refer to the CFI (0.903) and TLI (0.900) statistics, which indicate that the model has adequate fit, whilst the RMSEA (0.023) figure suggests good fit. Combined, they indicate that the model fits the data to an acceptable degree, so it is reasonable to interpret the results. Before turning to the factors that influence political participation it is worth noting that the model does a good job of accounting for the variation in the three dependent factors. The adjusted R^2 figure for individualised political participation is 0.471, whilst it is 0.505 for contacting political activity, and 0.516 for collective activity.³⁶² Thus, the model accounts for around half of the variation in all forms of political activity, taking into account the large number of factors that precede them in the model. These results have been cross-validated by splitting the sample into random halves, fitting the model to the first half of the data (CFI = 0.904, TLI = 0.901, RMSE = 0.023, individualised activities adjusted $R^2 = 0.435$, contacting activities adjusted $R^2 = 0.422$, collective activities adjusted $R^2 = 0.400$) and then applying the parameter estimates from that model to the second half of the data, which results in a model with approximately equivalent fit (CFI = 0.898, TLI = 0.905, RMSEA = 0.021, individualised activities adjusted $R^2 = 0.538$, contacting activities adjusted $R^2 = 0.552$, collective activities adjusted $R^2 = 0.572$).³⁶³ With the fit of the model validated it is reasonable for the chapter to proceed with consideration of the factors that impact on political participation.

³⁶² These figures do not differ greatly from the unadjusted R^2 numbers, which are 0.484, 0.517, and 0.528 respectively. Thus the good job that the model does in accounting for the variation in the dependent factors does not appear to be a consequence of the large number of preceding factors that are included.

³⁶³ Model fit results for the cross-validated models, compared with the full model, are available in Appendix F.

Diagram 6.1. Full Structural Equation Model




Table 6.1. Glossary of Factor and Indicator Names in the Full Model

Name	Description
Age	Interval indicator of age
Autho.	Factor encompassing authoritarian social views
Block. F.	Factor encompassing preferences for blockbuster films
Civ. Ski.	Factor encompassing work-based civic skills
Close	Factor encompassing help received from close social networks
Collect.	Factor encompassing collective political activities
Consum.	Factor encompassing consumption-orientated cultural activities
Contact.	Factor encompassing contacting political activities
Disabil.	Binary indicator of disability having a large daily impact
Divers.	Factor encompassing diversity of friends
Econ.	Factor encompassing economic capital
Edu F.	Factor encompassing preferences for educational films
Educ.	Factor encompassing education
Ext. Effic.	Factor encompassing external efficacy
Fam. F.	Factor encompassing preferences for family-friendly films
Female	Binary indicator of female gender
Friends	Factor encompassing number of friends
High Stat.	Factor encompassing acquaintance with people in high status occupations
Ind. Priv.	Factor encompassing perception of own privilege
Indiv.	Factor encompassing individualised political activities
Int. Effic.	Factor encompassing internal efficacy
Left W.	Factor encompassing left-wing views
Legit.	Factor encompassing legitimate cultural tastes
Loose	Factor encompassing help received from loose social networks
Occup.	Factor encompassing occupational status
P. Class	Factor encompassing parental social class
Perc. Eng.	Factor encompassing perceived engagement with politics
Perform.	Factor encompassing attendance at legitimate cultural performances
Pol. Diff.	Factor encompassing perception of the difference of politically active people
Pol. Kno.	Factor encompassing national political knowledge
Pol. Pri.	Factor encompassing perception of the privilege of politically active people
Recruit.	Factor encompassing recruitment requests received
Relate.	Binary indicator of relationship status
Relig.	Factor encompassing religious activities
Sample M.	Factor encompassing preferences for bass and sample heavy music
Soc. Priv.	Factor encompassing perception of privilege in society
Status	Factor encompassing self-perceived privilege
Trust.	Interval indicator of generalised trust
Visits	Factor encompassing visits to legitimate cultural institutions
Whi. Bri.	Binary indicator of White British ethnicity

Recruitment by close social networks impacts positively on the three types of political activity, and its effect is the strongest or second strongest in all cases. It has a notably stronger effect on collective activity ($B = 0.506$, $p = 0.000$) than on contacting ($B = 0.465$, $p = 0.000$) and especially individualised ($B = 0.306$, $p = 0.000$) activity, which reflects the extent to which social interaction is involved in each of those types of activity. In other words, it takes large amounts of coordination, involving numerous requests and reminders, to arrange collective political activities and, to a lesser extent, campaigns centred on contacting relevant political figures or bodies. By contrast, whilst individualised activity can clearly be prompted by requests from close acquaintances, it is also possible to undertake such activity without the need for input from others. This is reflected by the fact that individualised activity is influenced more strongly, and again positively, by perceived engagement with politics ($B = 0.326$, $p = 0.000$) than by recruitment requests from close social networks. Perceived engagement then has the second strongest effect ($B = 0.297$, $p = 0.000$) on contacting activity but is not significantly related to collective political activity. Thus, the importance positive effects of recruitment and political interest identified by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, are replicated in this model.³⁶⁴ Further, there is an inverse relationship between the importance of recruitment and perceived engagement in influencing political participation depending on the extent to which the activity is social. In other words, as the form of activity entails greater interaction and coordination with others recruitment becomes more important than self-motivation as embodied in a perceived engagement with politics.

Crossing this boundary between more and less socially embedded political activity is the strong and positive effect of visits to cultural institutions on collective ($B = 0.304$, $p = 0.000$) and individualised ($B = 0.236$, $p = 0.000$) political activity. This is the first structural loading with direct relevance to the hypotheses and, in support of *Hypothesis 1* and *Hypothesis 2* but contra *Hypothesis 7a*, suggests that cultural capital has an important direct effect on political participation. This does not function through recruitment so it is not because holding

³⁶⁴ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 389.

that type of cultural capital indicates qualification to participate to potential recruiters in close social networks. Intriguingly, it also does not function through perceptions or the efficacy component of engagement, so it does not apparently give people a sense that they are qualified to participate. Two possible explanations relating to a participatory disposition and insulation against social discomfort may help understand this effect. The first of those explanations suggests that some people are disposed to be generally active and thus to undertake visits to cultural institutions as well as political activity, perhaps because they have more energy or time, were socialised to actively engage with a range of contexts from a young age, or have psychological characteristics leading them to seek active engagement with those contexts.

Although the famed ‘big five’ psychological characteristics were not measured in the survey for reasons of space, the active disposition explanation is undermined by the fact that only one form of cultural activity is closely related to political activity.³⁶⁵ Were people to have a general active disposition then we would expect to see similar direct effects of attendance at cultural performances and engagement in consumption-orientated activities. Instead, it is only engagement with cultural institutions such as museums, art galleries, and historic buildings that is closely related to individualised and collective political activity. This suggests the sustainability of the second explanation, centred on the idea that individuals with particular types of cultural capital are insulated from the discomfort of not conforming to the norms of a particular social context. In other words, having the cultural capital associated with visiting legitimate cultural institutions reduces the likelihood that one will encounter cues that one does not ‘belong’ in the political context. This idea is supported by the factor’s stronger relationship with collective participation, which is engaged in socially, than individualised participation. Crucially, not encountering cues that prompt social discomfort would not necessarily be expected to work through perception of privilege or sense of efficacy because it is an implicit rather than explicit affirmation that one can function in a range of contexts including the political one. So, the sense that one does not fit into the context is more likely to be activated

³⁶⁵ Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, and Chang E. Ha, ‘Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Feb., 2010), pp. 111-133.


for those without the requisite capital profiles and thus to make them less likely to participate, though it does not appear to manifest in perception of privilege. Of course, without variables measuring how comfortable people feel in different contexts, including political ones, this explanation remains speculative.

The sense that the political system can be influenced by one's self has a stronger relationship with contacting activity ($B = 0.234, p = 0.000$) than with collective ($B = 0.180, p = 0.000$) or individualised ($B = 0.105, p = 0.000$) participation. Nonetheless, it is clear that internal efficacy is an important positive influence on all three forms of participation, as was observed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady.³⁶⁶ Relatedly, the perception that those who are involved in politics are different from one's self is the final factor that influences individualised political participation ($B = 0.205, p = 0.000$). The effect is stronger than that of internal efficacy, and its positive nature runs counter to *Hypothesis 5a*. This suggests that, taking into account all of the other factors in the model, perception of the difference of politically engaged people prompts participation, perhaps due to a sense of grievance. The idea that this effect is due to grievance is supported by the fact that it drives individualised political activity that do not entail engagement with the very people who are seen as different. In other words, all else being equal, a sense of difference from politically active people appears to drive those who wish to engage with politics to do so as outsiders. This is the last direct effect on political activity, and complements the previously observed effects of internal efficacy, visits to cultural institutions, perceived engagement with politics and, most strongly, recruitment by close social networks. These effects are all shown in Diagram 6.2, which shows the section of the full model encompassing the direct effects on the three dependent factors. The ovals represent factors but the indicators that load onto them are removed for simplicity. Thus all of the arrows indicate structural rather than measurement loadings, with the associated figures being standardised. As in the previous chapter, the figures to the right of the dependent factors are the residual variances, and the arrows that link them indicate their correlations. Together,

³⁶⁶ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, p. 389.

these results affirm Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's observation that political engagement and recruitment are crucial promoters of participation. At the same time, they indicate the importance of cultural capital and perceptions in facilitating and motivating that participation. These initial findings are supported further by the results indicating the influences on the factors that impact directly on participatory activity, the most important of which is recruitment.

Diagram 6.2. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors with Direct Effects on the Forms of Political Activity



Direct Effects on Recruitment and Engagement:

Recruitment to political groups is most strongly influenced by perceived engagement with politics ($B = 0.573$, $p = 0.000$), suggesting that requests to get involved are targeted at those who are known to be politically minded by members of their close social networks. By contrast with this strong positive effect, there is an almost equally strong negative effect of political knowledge ($B = -0.506$, $p = 0.000$). This result should be interpreted in the context of all the other factors that are included in the model, and it can be seen that social and, through political interest, cultural factors are what prompt recruitment requests. By contrast, national political knowledge is held by those who do not see themselves a privileged but observe a high level of privilege in politics, and it thus appears to be a refuge for politically interested people who are disengaged from recruitment networks. Alternatively, perhaps focusing one's energy on knowing about the national political arena detaches one somewhat from the close social networks through which recruitment percolates, and in which knowledge of key political figures may be unimportant. The negative effect of political knowledge on recruitment is counteracted by the positive effects of diversity of friends ($B = 0.409$, $p = 0.000$) and religious activity ($B = 0.397$, $p = 0.000$). So, having friends from different ethnicities, religions, and genders may indicate membership of more social networks, and networks with more diverse interests, resulting in more requests to get involved in a range of different activities, including political ones. The effect of religious activity affirms Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's finding that religious involvement leads to recruitment to political causes, though in a different country at a different time.³⁶⁷ Thus, a combination of perceived engagement, diverse acquaintances, and religious activity promote recruitment to political activity, whilst high levels of knowledge of politics depress it.

A further explanation for the negative effect of political knowledge on recruitment presents itself when the factors that influence the former are considered. Perceived political

³⁶⁷ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*, pp. 432-437.

engagement is strongly associated with higher levels of knowledge ($B = 0.608, p = 0.000$) whilst perception that those who are involved in politics are privileged is also positively related to it ($B = 0.141, p = 0.000$). At the same time, perception of the role of privilege in influencing one's own status is negatively associated with political knowledge ($B = -0.291, p = 0.000$). Thus, the people who are most knowledgeable about politics tend to perceive themselves as politically engaged but see those who get involved as the beneficiaries of privilege that they, themselves, have not had access too. The strong positive influence of perceived engagement on both knowledge and recruitment, and the negative relationship between the latter two concepts, suggests that those who are disposed towards politics tend to channel their engagement into knowledge or engagement with social networks that recruit political activity, but not both. Crucially, part of the reason for focusing on knowledge rather than social engagement is the view that one is less privileged than those who are involved in politics, and indeed that one's own status is not due to privilege. This suggests a sense that one is less able to engage with political networks despite one's interest in the topic.

The most important influence on internal efficacy is external efficacy ($B = 0.446, p = 0.000$), and a sense that the political system is open to influence by citizens tends to increase the sense that one can exercise influence in that system (relative to others). Authoritarian social views have a negative effect on internal efficacy ($B = -0.184, p = 0.000$), which may be because two of the three authoritarian social views indicate opposition with current practice (specifically, the belief in the appropriateness of the death penalty in some cases, and in the need for stricter sentencing), perhaps prompting a sense of being overlooked by the political system. By contrast, legitimate cultural tastes have a positive effect on internal efficacy ($B = 0.173, p = 0.000$) that is almost as strong as the negative effect of authoritarian social views. Thus, enjoying things such as listening to BBC Radio 3, eating at bistros, and watching foreign and art-house films increases the sense that one can exercise influence in the current political system. Indeed, this effect is also observed in relation to external efficacy ($B = 0.175, p = 0.000$), so legitimate cultural tastes impact on internal efficacy both directly and indirectly. This suggests that those who hold forms of cultural capital that are generally designated as


legitimate are able to sustain a sense that societal systems work for them and thus that they are able to engage with them. This is strongly linked to Bourdieu's observation that part of what facilitates engagement with politics is the sense of entitlement to do so that flows from one's social position.³⁶⁸ That sense is undermined, by the perception that those who are politically involved are more privileged than one's self and society ($B = -0.322$, $p = 0.000$). Given the direct and positive effect of internal efficacy on all three forms of political participation these effects are only one or two steps removed from the dependent factors. Thus, they provide further evidence that legitimate cultural capital supports political participation, and the first evidence that perception of the privilege of those who are involved in politics depresses such activity. As such, they support *Hypothesis 1*, *Hypothesis 2*, and *Hypothesis 7b*.

A further affirmation of *Hypothesis 1* and *Hypothesis 2* is provided in the strong positive influence of legitimate cultural tastes on perceived political engagement ($B = 0.558$, $p = 0.000$). In fact, cultural capital is by far the most important influence on perceived engagement, with preferences for bass and sample heavy music ($B = -0.315$, $p = 0.000$) and family films ($B = -0.131$, $p = 0.000$) having negative effects whilst a preference for educational and informative films ($B = 0.179$, $p = 0.000$) has a positive effect. Together, these relationships offer a partial endorsement of *Hypothesis 1* in the sense that the volume of cultural capital is a positive influence on a key determinant of political activity. However, that positive effect is limited to legitimate cultural capital whilst other types are negatively associated with perceived engagement with politics. This suggests that *Hypothesis 2* should have suggested that the positive influence of legitimate cultural capital stands in contrast to the negative influence of other types. The importance of the association between cultural capital and perceived political engagement is further underlined by the fact that the former accounts for four of the five significant influences on the latter. The remaining influence is perception of the role of privilege in defining status in society at large ($B = 0.234$, $p = 0.000$). The positive nature of the relationship supports *Hypothesis 4a* and suggests that perception of the role of privilege in

³⁶⁸ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 419, pp. 413-414, pp. 343-344.

society is, indeed, opposed to system justifying beliefs in their negative effect on political participation, though the effect is indirect. These results are all shown in Diagram 6.3 below, which presents the relevant section of the full model.

Diagram 6.3. Section of the Full Model Encompassing
Factors with Direct Effects on Political Engagement and Recruitment



Direct Effects on Perception of Privilege:

The perception that privilege plays a part in defining status differences in society has strong positive effects on the perception that those who are involved in politics are more privileged than one's self and society at large ($B = 0.568, p = 0.000$), and that they are different from one's self ($B = 0.557, p = 0.000$). This supports the idea that general explanations for status differences in society are central to individuals and thus influence their perceptions of the social positions of specific groups such as politicians. Authoritarian social views are also found to be positively related to perceptions of the privilege ($B = 0.170, p = 0.000$) and difference ($B = 0.341, p = 0.000$) of those who are involved in politics. This effect is countered by that of self-perceived status on perception of the difference of those who are politically involved ($B = -0.158, p = 0.000$), which indicates that those who believe their status to be high tend to consider themselves less different from politically involved people. This effect does not apply to perception of the privilege of politically active people, which is influenced instead by help received by loose social networks ($B -0.326, p = 0.000$). Being part of a social network in which family friends can provide important forms of help and support may reduce the sense that other groups are more privileged than one's self, and certainly does so in relation those who are politically active.

The preceding has shown privilege-based explanations for status difference in society to be an important influence on perceptions of those who are politically active and on perception of own engagement with politics. The most important factor that influences such explanations for status difference in society is left-right position ($B = 0.663, p = 0.000$) and the positive relationship indicates that it is left-wing views that promote those explanations. This effect stands in opposition to that of self-perceived status ($B = -0.396, p = 0.000$), and those who view their own status as high are less likely than others to attribute status difference in society to privilege. There is also a role for both cultural and social capital in promoting perception of privilege in society, with a preference for blockbuster films ($B = 0.249, p = 0.000$) and higher numbers of friends ($B = 0.175, p = 0.000$) both associated with that

perception. The first of those relationships indicates that a taste for elements of popular culture heightens the sense that there are privileged-based divides in societal status, and thus provides evidence in support of *Hypothesis 7a*. This is also the case in relation to the impact of number of friends, and the positive effect reflects the observation that expansive but close social networks tend to be an important part of less privileged communities.³⁶⁹ Overall, then, the people who are most likely to attribute status difference in society to privilege are left-wing, view themselves as low status, and enjoy elements of popular culture whilst having expansive social networks. These factors are distinct from those that impact on individuals' explanations for their own status in society, and perception of privilege in society is not significantly related to perception of privilege in one's own life.


The endorsement of privileged-based explanations for one's own status is related to only two factors, the first of which is receipt of help from family friends ($B = 0.433$, $p = 0.000$). Thus, the ability to rely on help from loose social networks at key junctures in one's life promotes recognition of the influence of social factors on status attainment. This is important because one of the key indicators of social status, occupational status, is negatively related to recognition of the role of privilege in influencing one's status ($B = -0.352$, $p = 0.000$). This again suggests the relevance of the fundamental attribution error, with those who have attained high status endorsing individual rather than social explanations for their status. The larger effect of help from family friends than occupational status implies that people who attain high status but do so with the help of loose social networks are, on balance, more likely to recognise the role of privilege in explaining their status. This effect is complemented by a similar one relating to the final component of perception of privilege, self-perceived status.

Receipt of help from family friends is the strongest influence on self-perceived status ($B = 0.521$, $p = 0.000$) and promotes a greater sense of high status than the more prevalent metric of social status, economic capital ($B = 0.318$, $p = 0.000$). Indeed, another element of social capital in the form of help received from close social networks also has a stronger effect

³⁶⁹ Phil Cohen, 'Subcultural conflict and working-class community', in Hall, *Culture, Media, Language*, pp. 78-87; Power and Willmot, 'Social Capital Within the Neighbourhood'.

on self-perceived status ($B = -0.382$, $p = 0.000$) than economic capital, albeit a negative one. This presents a situation in which the effect of help received on self-perceived status is contingent on who that help is received from. If your relatives know people who can be relied on to provide help at key junctures then one's own status tends to be seen as higher, whereas reliance on family, friends, and partners for such help depresses the sense that one has high status. The latter form of help is received significantly more by people who are acquainted with high status individuals, as will be detailed below, and the negative effect on self-perceived status suggests that receipt of help from friends and family within high status networks is treated as indicative of relatively low status by those who have received it. Additionally, turning to cultural capital, a preference for educational and informative films depresses one's self-perceived status ($B = -0.269$, $p = 0.000$), and it may be the case that information about a range of topics promotes understanding of the full range of social status and lowers one's sense of status within that range. Nevertheless, it is clearly social capital, and specifically, the strength and nature of one's social networks, that most importantly define one's sense of status, with economic capital also being more important than cultural capital. Again, this provides evidence of support of *Hypothesis 7a*, with the effects of the forms of capital on political participation passing through perception of privilege, at least in part. The above outlined results are all displayed in Diagram 6.4 below, which again shows the relevant section of the full model.

Diagram 6.4. Section of the Full Model Encompassing
Factors with Direct Effects on the Perception of Privilege



Direct Effects on Capital:

Social capital largely has its roots in occupational status, education, and background characteristics, though the influence of these factors runs through some forms of social capital to others. That said, age is a strong direct influence on receipt of help from both family friends and close social networks, and reduces the level of help received in both instances (respectively, $B = -0.415$ and $B = -0.534$, whilst $p = 0.000$ in both cases). This suggests that older people have either been less reliant on such help in recent years and thus report lower levels, which is a lifecycle effect, or that help received from such groups was less important at key junctures in their lives than it is or has been for younger people, which is a generational effect. In addition, as noted previously, acquaintance with people in high status occupations has a positive influence on receipt of help from close social networks ($B = 0.367$, $p = 0.000$), so people are more likely to receive help from friends and family if they inhabit high status social networks. For help received from wider social networks, namely family friends, it is not the status of those who are known but the cultural context that one inhabits that is important. Specifically, this is the only point in the model where a significant effect of attendance at legitimate cultural performances ($B = 0.533$, $p = 0.000$) is observed.

Acquaintance with high status individuals is positively influenced by education ($B = 0.589$, $p = 0.000$) and economic capital ($B = 0.309$, $p = 0.000$). These effects mean suggest that acquaintance with people who hold high occupational statuses stems from the social milieu associated with higher levels of education and by the economic capacity to sustain those networks, rather than from having a similar occupational status to them. However, occupational status is important in its effect on diversity of friends, which is strong and negative ($B = -0.513$, $p = 0.000$), and may speak of the continued disproportionate representation of white men in high status occupations. However, the positive effect of work-based civic skills ($B = 0.475$, $p = 0.000$), which are themselves positively influenced by occupational status ($B = 0.452$, $p = 0.000$), attenuates this direct effect. This suggests that there are certain kinds of high status jobs that entail the use of transferable soft skills, and it is this


sub-set of jobs that is associated with greater diversity of friends despite the overall negative effect of high occupational status. These effects are all stronger than the negative impact of being White British on diversity of friends ($B = -0.417, p = 0.000$), though it is still strong. Thus, unsurprisingly, those who are in the majority ethnic group in the country are less likely to have friends from minority ethnic groups than vice versa, and also less likely to have diverse friends in terms of religion and sex. Counter to this tendency, educational settings may be populated with people from diverse backgrounds and enable people to make acquaintances outside their usual social networks, leading education to be positively related to diversity of friends ($B = 0.196, p = 0.002$).

Finally, in terms of social capital, number of friends is also positively, but weakly, influenced by education ($B = 0.098, p = 0.012$), which is likely to be for similar reasons to those just outlined. Much stronger is the positive effect of consumption-orientated cultural activities ($B = 0.314, p = 0.000$), which implies that this widespread form of cultural capital is important in sustaining larger social networks. Indeed, one of the indicators of the factor specifies that the activity (eating out) is undertaken with others, whilst the other two are usually (visiting pubs) or often (shopping for pleasure) associated with socialising. Thus consumption-orientated cultural capital is both popular and social in nature. Religious activity is also social and is thus positively related to number of friends ($B = 0.234, p = 0.000$), implying the presence of religious friendship groups from which the higher number of recruitment requests associated with religious activity may stem. The direct effects on social capital are displayed in Diagram 6.5, which shows the relevant section of the full model.

Moving on to cultural capital, by far the most important influence is education, which has a positive effect on work-based civic skills ($B = 0.280, p = 0.000$) alongside the previously mentioned impact of occupational status, which is itself heavily influenced by education ($B = 0.587, p = 0.000$). Higher levels of education are associated with a preference for educational and informative films ($B = 0.294, p = 0.000$) and very strongly with legitimate cultural tastes ($B = 0.832, p = 0.000$), as well as with visits to legitimate cultural institutions ($B = 0.792, p = 0.000$) and attendance at legitimate cultural performances ($B = 0.753, p = 0.000$). Age and

gender are also important influences on cultural tastes, though not on the frequency of cultural activities. Age is positively related to a preference for educational and informative films ($B = 0.240, p = 0.000$) but negatively related to tastes for blockbuster films ($B = -0.216, p = 0.000$) and especially bass and sample heavy music ($B = -0.628, p = 0.00$). As observed in relation to the impact of age on help received from close and loose social networks, these may be akin to either generational or lifecycle effects. So, it may be that older people avoid modern blockbuster films and bass and sample heavy music because they

Diagram 6.5. Section of the Full Model Encompassing
Factors with Direct Effects on Social Capital




are unfamiliar, which would be a generational effect. Alternatively, it may be that older people prefer calming rather than loud or explosive forms of entertainment, meaning that their rejection of the preceding cultural forms would be a lifecycle effect. Similarly, women's preference for family-friendly films ($B = 0.456, p = 0.000$) over blockbuster movies ($B = -0.228, p = 0.000$) may indicate tastes stemming from socialisation, akin to a generational effect. Alternatively, they may reflect the need to watch certain types of film when caring for children, a task that still falls disproportionately to women, which is close to being a lifecycle effect.

An additional influence on cultural tastes is left-wing views, which are positively associated with bass and sample heavy music ($B = 0.157, p = 0.000$). Thus, it is not only the case that cultural capital aids participation in politics but also that political views can influence the types of culture that one consumes. Extending this point, it may be the case that such musical tastes express an affiliation with a particular young and left-wing political subculture. Such a subculture is distinct from the widespread consumption-orientated activities that constitute the final element of cultural capital, and that are positively related to acquaintance with high status individuals ($B = 0.493, p = 0.000$). The previously observed influence of such cultural activities on number of friends suggests an important nexus between particular types of social and cultural capital in which acquaintance with high status people prompts the consumption-orientated activities that sustain larger social networks. That nexus is influenced indirectly by education through its positive influence on acquaintance with high status individuals, and this emphasises the overall importance of education in influencing cultural capital. It is especially important in imbuing people with legitimate forms of cultural capital, in terms of their tastes and activities, whilst tastes that are not elevated to the status of legitimate tend to have their roots in background characteristics rather than education. The influences on cultural capital can be seen in Diagram 6.6, which presents the relevant section of the full model.

Education is thus a means by which capital can be transmitted, not only in the sense that it teaches and accredits knowledge and skills but also because such knowledge and skills

enable the attainment of other forms of capital. The formalised element of education opens career paths that deliver greater economic capital and access to wider, more diverse, and higher status social networks. At the same time, both formally and informally, education imbues people with the knowledge and skills to inhabit those social networks and, crucially, to accumulate the legitimate cultural capital that facilitates engagement with further contexts. Of particular interest is the ability to participate in political contexts, which the results presented thus far have shown to be contingent not only on education but also the other forms of capital that it can translate into. This may help explain why rising levels of

Diagram 6.6. Section of the Full Model Encompassing
Factors with Direct Effects on Cultural Capital



education have not delivered the expected participatory dividend. So, the frequently observed role of education in enabling political engagement and activity is confirmed at the same time as it is revealed to be an incomplete explanation. Education facilitates participation through its impact on other forms of capital, and thus acts only as the first part of a mechanism that recreates structural privilege. Crucially, perception of privilege also partially mediates the effect of structural privilege on political participation, demonstrating the need to account not only for the capital available to individuals but also how they perceive themselves and society.

Summarising the results presented thus far, recruitment is important in activating all three types political participation, but less so in relation to the contacting and individualised activity that may be undertaken independently of others. In turn, those forms are more dependent on whether the individual perceives themselves to be engaged with politics, which is not important for collective participation. These findings, along with the positive effect of internal efficacy on all three forms of participation, affirm Verba, Scholzman, and Brady's findings. The *Civic Voluntarism Model*, however, does not tell the whole story, as the direct, strong, and positive effect of legitimate cultural capital on individualised and collective political activity demonstrates. Legitimate cultural capital also plays a key role in shaping the engagement factors that influence participation, impacting positively on internal efficacy, external efficacy, and perceived engagement with politics. The latter factor is almost entirely defined by the cultural capital that one possesses, with the strong positive effect of legitimate tastes opposed by the negative effects of cultural tastes that are not elevated to a position of legitimacy.

The engagement factors are also influenced by perception of privilege, with such explanations for status differences in society contributing to perceived political engagement. Further, perception of the privilege of those involved in politics reduces external efficacy but, along with the perception that one's own status is not the result of privilege, promotes political knowledge. The negative relationship between political knowledge and recruitment indicates that perception of privilege in politics channels those who perceive themselves as politically engaged towards knowledge rather than links with social networks that recruit to political

activity. This tendency is also reflected in the promotion of individualised political activity by perception of the difference of those who are involved in politics, which indicates that those who see themselves as politically engaged but also different from politically active people seek forms of activity that do not require contact with those people. Thus, elements of cultural capital and perception of privilege impact directly on political activity and indirectly via their impact on the political engagement. These relationships offer partial evidence relating to the hypotheses outlined at the beginning of the chapter. However, in order to fully confirm or dismiss those hypotheses it is necessary to consider the total effects of each of the key factors in the model on the forms of political activity, as well as the interactions between some of them. Fortunately, Mplus allows the calculation of both the direct and indirect effects of each factor in a model on the dependent factors, and it is to these results that the chapter now turns.

Total Effects, Interactions, and Support for Hypotheses:

The total effects of the key variables in the full model are presented below in relation to individualised, contacting, and collective activity in tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. All three tables have ranked the factors by the size of their total effects, whether direct or indirect. The factor with the strongest total effect on both contacting and collective political activity is recruitment requests (respectively, $B = 0.465$ and $B = 0.506$, and $p = 0.000$ in both cases), and it is the third most important influence on individualised activity ($B = 0.306$, $p = 0.000$), with all of those effects being direct. The effects of education are entirely indirect but it is the most important influence on individualised activity ($B = 0.440$, $p = 0.000$), the second most important influence on collective activity ($B = 0.479$, $p = 0.000$), and the third most important influence on contacting activity ($B = 0.392$, $p = 0.000$). Perceived political engagement completes the top three factors influencing both individualised ($B = 0.407$, $p = 0.000$) and contacting ($B = 0.421$, $p = 0.000$) activity, with the effects being direct. The third most important influence on collective political activity is the direct effect of visits to legitimate cultural institutions ($B = 0.304$, $p = 0.000$), which is also the fifth most important factor for individualised activity ($B = 0.236$, $p = 0.000$). That direct effect is complemented by the indirect effect of legitimate cultural tastes on individualised activity ($B = 0.254$, $p = 0.000$), and those tastes are also the fourth most important influence on contacting activity ($B = 0.294$, $p = 0.000$). The negative indirect effect of political knowledge is the fifth strongest for contacting activity ($B = -0.235$, $p = 0.000$), and fourth for collective activity ($B = -0.256$, $p = 0.000$), whilst diversity of friends is the fifth most important influence on the latter form of activity ($B = 0.207$, $p = 0.000$).

The strong effect of cultural capital places it alongside established factors such as education, recruitment, and perceived engagement as one of the most important influences on political activity. Cultural factors make up two of the top five influences on individualised activity, and are also amongst the top five influences on contacting and collective activity. The effects of the elements of cultural capital on the forms of participation are shown in

Table 6.2. Total Effects of Key Factors on Individualised Political Activity

Factor	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Significance	Indirect Significance
Education	0.440	0.440	0.000	0.000
Perceived Political Engagement	0.407	0.081	0.000	0.000
Recruitment	0.306	0.000	0.000	N/A.
Legitimate Cultural Tastes	0.254	0.254	0.000	0.000
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions	0.236	0.000	0.000	N/A.
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors	0.205	0.000	0.000	N/A.
Perception of Privilege in Society	0.188	0.188	0.000	0.000
National Political Knowledge	-0.155	-0.155	0.000	0.000
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music	-0.128	-0.128	0.000	0.000
Diversity of Friends	0.125	0.125	0.000	0.000
Self-Perceived Status	-0.107	-0.107	0.000	0.000
External Efficacy	0.105	0.000	0.000	N/A.
Preference for Educational and Informative Films	0.102	0.102	0.000	0.000
Occupational Status	-0.101	-0.101	0.000	0.000
Economic Capital	-0.061	-0.061	0.000	0.000
Work-Based Civic Skills	0.059	0.059	0.000	0.000
Preference for Blockbuster Movies	0.047	0.047	0.000	0.000
Perception of Own Privilege	0.045	0.045	0.000	0.000
Partner, Friends, and Family Support	0.041	0.041	0.000	0.000
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors	-0.037	-0.037	0.000	0.000
Number of Friends	0.033	0.033	0.000	0.000
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances	0.020	0.020	0.000	0.000
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.000
Preference for Family-Friendly Films	-0.053	-0.053	0.003	0.003
External Efficacy	0.047	0.047	0.003	0.003
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances	-0.013	-0.013	0.083	0.083
Family Friend Support	-0.024	-0.024	0.090	0.090

charts 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10, which include the 95% confidence intervals around the Beta estimates. The charts utilise the same scale to aid comparison and clearly demonstrate the importance of certain types of legitimate cultural capital, with either legitimate tastes or trips to legitimate venues being the most important cultural factor in all cases. Further, they are the two most important cultural influences on both individualised and collective political activity, so only contacting activity has a different factor in its top two most important cultural influences in the form of the negative effect of bass and sample heavy music. Generally, however, the effects of both legitimate tastes and visits to legitimate venues are notably stronger than those of other cultural factors. Indeed, the generally weak effects of attendance at legitimate performances and moderate effects of preferences for educational

Table 6.3. Total Effects of Key Factors on Contacting Political Activity

Factor	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Significance	Indirect Significance
Recruitment	0.465	0.000	0.000	N/A.
Perceived Political Engagement	0.421	0.124	0.000	0.000
Education	0.392	0.392	0.000	0.000
Legitimate Cultural Tastes	0.294	0.294	0.000	0.000
National Political Knowledge	-0.235	-0.235	0.000	0.000
Internal Efficacy	0.234	0.000	0.000	N/A.
Diversity of Friends	0.190	0.190	0.000	0.000
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music	-0.132	-0.132	0.000	0.000
External Efficacy	0.104	0.104	0.000	0.000
Work-Based Civic Skills	0.090	0.090	0.000	0.000
Occupational Status	-0.090	-0.090	0.000	0.000
Preference for Educational and Informative Films	0.082	0.082	0.000	0.000
Perception of Own Privilege	0.068	0.068	0.000	0.000
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors	-0.067	-0.067	0.000	0.000
Perception of Privilege in Society	0.060	0.060	0.003	0.003
Preference for Family-Friendly Films	-0.055	-0.055	0.003	0.003
Family Friend Support	0.039	0.039	0.005	0.005
Self-Perceived Status	-0.024	-0.024	0.005	0.005
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances	0.021	0.021	0.009	0.009
Preference for Blockbuster Movies	0.015	0.015	0.009	0.009
Partner, Friends, and Family Support	0.009	0.009	0.011	0.011
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances	0.005	0.005	0.012	0.012
Number of Friends	0.011	0.011	0.017	0.017
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities	0.003	0.003	0.021	0.021
Economic Capital	-0.012	-0.012	0.055	0.055
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors	0.000	0.000	N/A.	N/A.
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions	0.000	0.000	N/A.	N/A.

films demonstrate that all types of legitimate cultural capital are not equal in their capacity to facilitate political activity. This observation also applies to other types of cultural capital, with the negative effects of preferences for bass and sample heavy music consistently stronger than the negative effects of preferences for family-friendly films. Those effects are, in turn, notably stronger than the positive effects of preferences for blockbuster films and the consistently weak effects of consumption-based cultural activities. Thus, in addition to demonstrating the importance of cultural capital, especially in its legitimate form, this analysis also shows that the particular type of cultural capital matters in terms of capacity to facilitate political activity.

Moving from cultural to social capital, the total effects tables show the positive effects of being acquainted with high status individuals on individualised and contacting

Table 6.4. Total Effects of Key Factors on Collective Political Activity

Factor	Total Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Significance	Indirect Significance
Recruitment	0.506	0.000	0.000	N/A.
Education	0.479	0.479	0.000	0.000
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions	0.304	0.000	0.000	N/A.
National Political Knowledge	-0.256	-0.256	0.000	0.000
Diversity of Friends	0.207	0.207	0.000	0.000
Internal Efficacy	0.180	0.000	0.000	N/A.
Perceived Political Engagement	0.134	0.134	0.000	0.000
Legitimate Cultural Tastes	0.120	0.120	0.000	0.000
Work-Based Civic Skills	0.098	0.098	0.000	0.000
Occupational Status	-0.085	-0.085	0.000	0.000
External Efficacy	0.080	0.080	0.000	0.000
Perception of Own Privilege	0.074	0.074	0.000	0.000
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors	-0.062	-0.062	0.000	0.000
Family Friend Support	0.053	0.053	0.000	0.000
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music	-0.042	-0.042	0.000	0.000
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances	0.028	0.028	0.000	0.000
Preference for Educational and Informative Films	0.024	0.024	0.001	0.001
Preference for Family-Friendly Films	-0.018	-0.018	0.005	0.005
Economic Capital	0.003	0.003	0.316	0.316
Self-Perceived Status	0.001	0.001	0.727	0.727
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances	0.000	0.000	0.727	0.727
Perception of Privilege in Society	-0.004	-0.004	0.728	0.728
Partner, Friends, and Family Support	-0.001	-0.001	0.728	0.728
Number of Friends	-0.001	-0.001	0.729	0.729
Preference for Blockbuster Movies	-0.001	-0.001	0.729	0.729
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities	0.000	0.000	0.729	0.729
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors	0.000	0.000	N/A.	N/A.

political activity, offering partial support for *Hypothesis 3a*. They also show that help from close social networks promotes self-motivated political activity, whilst help from looser social networks promotes socially-orientated political activity, which supports *Hypothesis 3b*. In line with *Hypothesis 7a* these effects run through elements of perception of privilege, and suggest a distinction between more and less socially orientated forms of political participation. Indeed, it is clear that collective activity is the most contingent on social connections, with diversity of friends amongst its most important influences alongside group recruitment. By contrast, individualised activity is the least contingent on social connections and is instead more strongly influenced by perceived engagement. Thus, if political activity is arranged along a continuum according to how much interaction with others it entails then

Chart 6.8. Total Effects of the Types of Cultural Capital on Individualised Political Activity




Chart 6.9. Total Effects of the Types of Cultural Capital on Contacting Political Activity





Chart 6.10. Total Effects of the Types of Cultural Capital on Collective Political Activity



there is an inverse relationship between the importance of social factors and self-motivation as the continuum is travelled along. This continuum is also important in understanding the impact of perception of privilege, which is a more important influence on individualised activity than on contacting or collective activities. This is particularly so in relation to self-perceived status, perception of the role of privilege in defining status in society, and perception of the difference of those who are involved in politics, all of which have a much larger effects on individualised activity than on contacting or collective activities. This can be seen in charts 6.11, 6.12, and 6.14, which along with charts 6.13 and 6.15 clearly demonstrate the importance of perception of privilege in influencing the type of participation that is engaged in. The charts have the same scale to aid comparison and each one shows the effect, with 95% confidence intervals, of a different component of perception of privilege on the three forms of political activity, and the importance of differentiating social from non-social activity is apparent.

Self-perceived status has a strong negative effect on individualised activity, less so on contacting activity, and has no significant effect on collective activity. Thus, those who

consider their status to be high are notably disinclined to undertake non-social activity but not social activity. This is mirrored by the effect of perceiving the role of privilege in defining status in society, which is strongly positively related to individualised activity, less so to contacting activity, and not significantly to collective activity. Thus, whereas high self-

Chart 6.11. Total Effects of Self-Perceived Status on the Types of Political Activity




Chart 6.12. Total Effects of Perception of Privilege in Society on the Types of Political Activity




Chart 6.13. Total Effects of Perception of Own Privilege on the Types of Political Activity




Chart 6.14. Total Effects of Perception of the Difference of Politically Active People on the Types of Political Activity





Chart 6.15. Total Effects of Perception of the Privilege of Politically Active People on the Types of Political Activity



perceived status channels people away from non-social political activity, high perception of the role of privilege in society channels people towards such activities. This is also the case with perception of the difference of politically active people, which has a strong positive effect on individualised activity but no significant effect on contacting or collective activities. Similar patterns are also observed in relation to perception of the role of one's own privilege, which has a stronger positive effect on social than non-social forms of participation, and perception of the privilege of politically active people, which has a slightly stronger negative effect on social than non-social activities, with those effects in line with *Hypothesis 5b*. These latter two patterns, however, are not significant in terms of the difference between the size of the effects. So, self-perceived status, perception of privilege in society, and perception of the difference of politically active people are more important than perception of own privilege or perception of the privilege of politically active people in influencing the social or non-social nature of political activity that people undertake.³⁷⁰

Beyond their total effects, the elements of perception of privilege were hypothesised to be highly interactive in their effect on political participation. To address those hypotheses, a supplemental analysis was conducted in which the factor scores from the full structural

³⁷⁰ The total effects of cultural capital and perception of privilege are similar to those observed when the political participation factors are loaded directly onto them in bivariate regressions, as shown in Appendix I.

equation model were saved and used in a path analysis including interaction terms, which was conducted using Stata. This method of analysis was chosen because the additional complexity of adding interaction terms to the full model caused identification problems. As such, conducting a path analysis using saved factor scores is considered a close enough reproduction of the full model for the results to allow reasonable conclusions to be made about the hypothesised effects of the interactions.³⁷¹ In line with *Hypothesis 7b* the effects of perception of privilege, and the interactions related to its elements, were expected to pass through the political engagement factors. However, the full structural equation model demonstrated that individualised political activity loads directly onto perception of the difference of politically active people, so the effects of the interaction terms associated with that relationship were also tested. Indeed, the results of the full model were used to identify possible paths for the effects of interaction terms, which were only tested where a main effect of one of the elements of perception of privilege was observed. In that light, the effects of interactions relating to the following main effects were tested:

1. The previously mentioned positive main effect of perception of the difference of politically active people on individualised political activity;
2. The negative main effect of perception of the privilege of politically active people on external efficacy;
3. The positive main effect of perception of the privilege of politically active people on national political knowledge;
4. The negative main effect of perception of the role of privilege in one's own life on national political knowledge;
5. The positive main effect of perception of the role of privilege in society on perceived political engagement.

There were four interaction terms associated with each of the above main effects (i.e. the interactions between the elements of perception of privilege in question and the four other

³⁷¹ In order to save the factor scores it was necessary to remove the loading of general trust onto education so that it became an independent indicator, which will have slightly altered the estimates. Further, Mplus did not report encountering an error but saved values of 999 for all factor scores in 27 cases, which were removed from the interaction analysis.

elements of perception of privilege), and they were introduced into the path analysis in groups based on the factors that they were expected to impact on. Of the twenty interactions that were tested four were found to have significant effects and were thus retained in the final version of the path analysis. The relevant results are presented in tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7, each of which presents one section of the overarching path analysis. The results demonstrate that the interaction of perception of privilege in society and of the difference of politically active people has a negative effect on individualised political activity, which runs counter to a number of hypotheses. The effect is direct rather than via political engagement factors, counter to *Hypothesis 7b*, whilst the positive main effect of perception of the difference of politically active people runs counter to *Hypothesis 5a*. The effect of the interaction with perception of the role of social structure in defining status in society runs counter to *Hypothesis 6e*. This means that the positive effect of perceiving politically active people as different is weaker for those who strongly perceive a role for social structure in defining status in society. Concomitantly, the effect of perception of the difference of politically active people is particularly strong amongst those who do not perceive a role for social structure in defining status in society. This suggests that such people do not perceive the difference, and perhaps distance, of politically active people as the manifestation of broader social structure, and this particularly motivates them to channel their political energies into individualised activity. This may be because they attribute social outcomes to

Table 6.5. Effects of Perception Interactions on Individualised Political Activity

Factor	Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance	Beta
Perceived Political Engagement	0.318	0.016	0.000	0.389
Recruitment	0.348	0.018	0.000	0.345
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions	0.142	0.014	0.000	0.198
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors	0.271	0.034	0.000	0.187
Internal Efficacy	0.078	0.014	0.000	0.099
Perception Interaction: Privilege in Society *				
Difference of Politically Active People	-0.185	0.057	0.001	-0.098
Perception Interaction: Privilege of Politically Active People *				
Difference of Politically Active People	0.082	0.036	0.022	0.056
Constant	0.083	0.018	0.000	.

Table 6.6. Effects of Perception Interactions on National Political Knowledge

Factor	Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance	Beta
Perceived Political Engagement	0.463	0.010	0.000	0.706
Perception of Own Privilege	-0.332	0.017	0.000	-0.313
Perception of the Privilege of the Politically Active	0.121	0.014	0.000	0.208
Perception Interaction: Own Privilege * Privilege of Politically Active People	0.082	0.018	0.000	0.107
Constant	0.452	0.014	0.000	.

Table 6.7. Effects of Perception Interactions on Perception of the Difference of Politically Active People

Factor	Coefficient	Standard Error	Significance	Beta
Perception of Privilege in Society	0.554	0.012	0.000	0.694
Social Authoritarianism	0.257	0.008	0.000	0.378
Self-Perceived Status	-0.068	0.007	0.000	-0.142
Perception Interaction: Privilege in Society * Status	0.027	0.010	0.007	0.034
Constant	-0.007	0.008	0.368	.

individual behaviour and thus choose to engage in politics as such, or because they perceive politically active people as ‘a bit weird’ (i.e. different because of individual traits rather than social structure), and thus prefer to engage in politics without dealing with them.

The interaction of perceiving the difference and the privilege of politically active people has a positive effect on individualised political activity, in line with *Hypothesis 6g*, although as noted this relates to a main effect that runs counter to *Hypothesis 5a*. This means that the positive effect of perceiving the difference of politically active people is stronger amongst those who also perceive politically active people to be more privileged than themselves. Thus, directing one’s political energies towards individualised activity is associated more strongly with those who not only see politically active people as different but

also consider privilege to be a component of that difference. Moving one step back in the posited causal process, the interaction between perception of the role of privilege in one's own life and perception of the privilege of politically active people has a positive effect on national political knowledge. This effect is in line with *Hypothesis 6f*, but relates to a negative main effect of perception of own privilege that breaks with *Hypothesis 4c*. This means that the negative effect of attributing one's own status to social structure is stronger for those who perceive politically active people to be more privileged than themselves. Thus, people who both recognise the role of social structure in their own life and identify its positive effects in the lives of politically active people tend to hold less knowledge about national politics, perhaps because it is considered to be a preserve of those with privilege.

The last interaction term that was found to have a significant effect does not relate to any of the hypotheses, which focus on the effects of perception of privilege on political activity. This interaction was tested in light of the observed structural paths between the elements of perception of privilege in the full model. In particular, the direct effects of self-perceived status on perception of privilege in society and perception of the difference of politically active people, and of perception of privilege in society on perception of the privilege and difference of politically active people, suggested the possible relevance of associated interaction terms. However, only one such term was found to be significant in the relationships between the elements of perception of privilege, indicating that the interaction between perception of privilege in society and self-perceived status has a positive effect on perception of the difference of politically active people. This finding indicates that the positive effect of perceiving privilege in society on perceiving the difference of politically active people is stronger amongst those who perceive their own status as high. This may be due to recognition that social structure creates a gap between themselves and politically active people that is all the more important, and thus emphasised, because it still exists despite their own high status. Thus, most of the hypotheses relating to interactions are not supported but, overall, the majority of the hypotheses specified at the outset of the chapter are at least partially supported, as Table 6.8 summarises.

Table 6.8. Summary of Support for Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Result
H1: The volume of economic, social, and cultural capital is positively related to political participation.	Partially supported: The hypothesis holds for elements of social and cultural capital.
H2: Legitimate cultural capital is more strongly related to political participation than are other forms of cultural capital.	Supported: Elements of legitimate cultural capital are amongst the strongest influences on all three forms of political activity.
H3a: Being acquainted with high status individuals is positively related to political participation.	Partially supported: The hypothesis holds in relation to individualised and contacting activity, but not collective activity.
H3b: Receipt of help from acquaintances is positively related to political participation.	Supported: Help from close social networks promotes self-motivated political activity, whilst help from looser social networks promotes socially-orientated political activity.
H4a: Self-perceived status is positively related to political participation.	Rejected: Self-perceived status is a negative influence on individualised and contacting activity, and is unrelated to collective activity.
H4b: Perception of the role of privilege in defining status in society is positively related to political participation.	Partially supported: The hypothesis holds in relation to individualised and contacting activity, but not collective activity.
H4c: Perception of the role of privilege in defining status in one's own life is positively related to political participation.	Supported: Perception of the role of privilege one's own life is a positive influence on all forms of political activity.
H5a: Perception of the difference of those who are involved in politics from one's self is negatively related to political participation.	Rejected: Perception of the difference of politically active people is unrelated to contacting and collective activity, and a positive influence on individualised activity.
H5b: Perception of the privilege of those who are involved in politics is negatively related to political participation.	Supported: Perception of the privilege of politically active people is a negative influence on all forms of political activity.
H6a: Perception of the role of privilege in one's own life interacts with self-perceived status to exaggerate the low and high participatory tendencies amongst those with low and high self-perceived status.	Rejected: No significant effects observed on activity or engagement factors.
H6b: Perception of the role of privilege in society does not interact with self-perceived status in its effect on political participation.	Supported: No significant effects observed on activity or engagement factors.
H6c: Perception of the role of privilege in one's own life interacts with perception of the role of privilege in society to have a positive effect where the latter is high but a negative effect where it is low.	Rejected: No significant effects observed on activity or engagement factors.
H6d: Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active people interact with self-perceived status to have stronger effects amongst those with low status.	Rejected: No significant effects observed on activity or engagement factors.

Table 6.8. Summary of Support for Hypotheses (Continued)

Hypothesis	Result
<i>H6e</i> : Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active people interact with perception of the role of privilege in society to have stronger effects amongst those who explain status in society on the basis of social structure.	Rejected : The interaction of perception of privilege in society and of the difference of politically active people reduces the positive effect of the latter on individualised political activity.
<i>H6f</i> : Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active people interact with perception of the role of privilege one's own life to have stronger effects amongst those who explain their status on the basis of social structure.	Rejected : The interaction of perception of own privilege and of the privilege of politically active people strengthens the negative effect of the latter on national political knowledge.
<i>H6g</i> : Perception of the difference of politically active people impacts positively with perception of the privilege of politically active people to increase its negative effect.	Rejected : The interaction of perception of the difference and privilege of politically active people strengthens the positive effect of the latter on individualised political activity.
<i>H7a</i> : Levels of capital impact on political participation primarily via perception of privilege rather than directly.	Partially supported : Some elements of capital impact on political activity and engagement via perceptions whilst others do so directly.
<i>H7b</i> : Perception of privilege impacts on political participation primarily via political engagement rather than directly.	Partially supported : Some elements of perception of privilege impact on political activity via engagement whilst others do so directly.

The Power of Culture and the Fundamental Attribution Error:

The first major conclusion that emerges from the above results is that cultural capital is of great importance in facilitating political activity. Further, and in line with Bourdieu's theories, it is particularly legitimate cultural capital that furnishes people with the capacity to undertake political activity, whilst other forms have weaker or, in some cases, negative relationships with participation. Specifically, the frequency of visits to cultural institutions such as museums, galleries, and historic buildings is positively related to individualised and collective political activity, and is amongst the strongest direct influences on those forms of participation. Such cultural activities are widespread but infrequently engaged in whilst legitimate cultural tastes encompassing wine bars and bistros, arthouse and foreign films, and BBC Radio 3 listenership are considerably less widespread. Such tastes are strongly and positively, though indirectly, related to all three forms of political activity. As such, they stand in stark contrast to tastes for family films and especially bass and sample heavy music, which are associated with lower levels of political activity. These effects function primarily through perceived engagement with politics, which promotes political activity and is largely influenced by cultural capital.

The direct and indirect effects of cultural capital are notably stronger than those of the factors relating to social capital. Only diversity of friends, in terms of ethnicity, religion, and sex, approaches cultural capital in the size of its effect on political activity. Other types of social capital have significant but small effects on participation, and do not approach the cultural factors described above in terms of their influence. Economic capital has no significant relationship with collective activity, and weak negative relationships with collective and individualised activity. Thus, once the cultural factors that are commonly associated with higher economic capital are included in the model, it appears that the energy expended to gain income and wealth leaves less capacity to engage with politics. The relatively weak effects of social and economic capital suggest that cultural capital is the main mechanism by which education has its positive influence on political engagement and participation. It is certainly

the case that education is the main influence on cultural capital, and specifically, it furnishes people with legitimate cultural capital whilst other types tend to have their roots in background characteristics. Education itself is influenced by parental social class, gender, and ethnicity, supporting the departure from Bourdieu's view that capital and social position are determined entirely by class. Thus, the results support something akin to the posited causal model, in which background characteristics impact on stocks of capital via education, and those stocks go on to influence political participation. The fact that cultural capital plays such an important part in this mechanism is the first major finding of this research.

Economic and social capital both have larger roles in influencing perception of privilege, which is also influenced by basic beliefs and, to a lesser extent, cultural capital. The stronger influence of social and economic capital is important because perception of privilege goes on to impact on political participation in a particularly interesting way. Whilst legitimate cultural capital seems to promote engagement with and participation in political activity regardless of the type, perception of privilege pushes people towards some forms of activity more than others. The distinction between those forms is their social or non-social nature, and they can be arranged along a spectrum with individualised activity at one end, collective at the other, and contacting in the middle. With this in mind, a common pattern emerges in relation to the elements of perception of privilege. Specifically, self-perceived status is strongly negatively associated with individualised activity, less so with contacting, and not with collective activity. Perception of privilege in society most strongly promotes individualised activity, then contacting activity, and is not significantly related to collective activity. By contrast, perception of privilege in one's own life most strongly promotes collective activity, then contacting, and finally individualised activity. Similarly, though with a less clear pattern, perception of privilege in the political arena puts people off individualised activity less than it puts them off contacting and collective activity. Finally, perception of the difference of politically active people promotes individualised political activity but neither of the two other forms.

The common pattern in the above is that people who perceive the privilege or difference of others in society and politics are more inclined towards political activities requiring less interaction. Further, people who perceive the role of privilege in their own lives, in terms of either their status or their explanations for it, are more inclined towards political activities that require interaction, or at least less disinclined towards them. Thus, the people who are most disengaged from socially-orientated political activities are those who see other people as the beneficiaries of privilege that they do not perceive to have played a part in their own lives. Whilst this may indicate that such respondents have not benefited from privilege despite seeing it in society, it could also be a manifestation of the fundamental attribution error in which others' perceived successes are attributed to social factors and their perceived failures to personal influences whilst the opposite is true for the self. This constitutes a limited perception of privilege, with a fuller form recognising the role of privilege both in society and one's life. Crucially, the results of the full model indicate that this consistent approach leads to less differentiation between self-motivated and socially-orientated forms of political participation, and keeps open more types of activity. By contrast, exhibiting the fundamental attribution error, which is commonly associated with the system justifying beliefs that are opposed to perception of privilege, turns one away from socially-orientated activity but not from political participation in general. This is the second major finding of this research.

The above main findings are complemented by additional findings relating to the hypotheses, and the results of the full model confirm a general trend for capital to be positively related to participation, with the exception of the minimal negative effects of the economic form once other factors are accounted for. As hypothesised, acquaintance with high status individuals and receipt of help from close and loose social networks are generally positively related to political activity. Interestingly, help from loose social networks opposes the fundamental attribution error in its effect, more strongly promoting socially-orientated activity and slightly turning respondents away from individualised activity. Thus the preference for political activity that involves interaction with others is based both on whether one sees others as notably more privileged than oneself, and on the strength of one's loose social networks.

Diversity of friends also has a similar effect, leading to a picture of strong but loose and diverse social networks promoting socially-orientated political activity.

Finally, the causal propositions of the hypothesised model are broadly supported, with background characteristics and basic beliefs generally preceding capital, which influences perceptions that contribute to political engagement and thus participation. However, the causal effects are not that simple, and there are direct links from social and cultural capital to both political engagement and participation, skirting the effects of perception of privilege. Such perceptions appear to be more of a channel for social and economic capital than cultural capital, which is reflected in the previously mentioned complementary effects of social capital and perception of privilege on shaping the particular types of participation that are engaged in. The strong direct and indirect effects of capital, generally positive in nature, on participation support its identification as a key mechanism through which structural privilege leads to differing political behaviour. At the same time, the impact of perception of privilege alongside those effects indicates that it plays a crucial role on where people channel their political energies, and specifically, whether they are willing to engage with others in their efforts to change or conserve elements of the society around them.

Conclusion: Culture Enables and Perception Channels

The research undertaken for this thesis began at a time when the government of the United Kingdom was described by some as a ‘cabinet of toffs’.³⁷² Such commentary was a manifestation of the initial intuition of this research that participation in politics might be shaped not only by structural privilege but also by the appearance, and thus perception, of privilege in politics. Extending that intuition beyond the upper echelons of national government provides a possible explanation for differences in the extent and types of political participation undertaken by the population. As such, it offers a new answer to one of the key motivating conundrums of political behaviour research: why do people participate or not in political activity? Indeed, the research question that this thesis addresses is a specific manifestation of that conundrum: how do structural and perceived privilege impact on individual political participation in the United Kingdom?

The thesis utilises a broad definition of political participation encompassing any attempt by an individual, in interaction with an institution or organisation, to change or conserve an element of society at some level. In trying to explain why some people undertake activity more than others, the Civic Voluntarism Model was taken as the starting point.³⁷³ This is an established sociological model of political behaviour but is argued to be incomplete in its account of structural privilege, and to overlook people’s perceptions of privilege. To address this, Bourdieu’s forms of capital are argued to more fully encompass the mechanisms of structural privilege by which background characteristics can be translated into different behavioural repertoires, and thus promote or depress activities such as political participation.³⁷⁴ In reconciling these two approaches the thesis departs from Bourdieu’s causal approach generally, and from his class determinism specifically. Crucially, it also departs from

³⁷² Joey Millar, ‘Patrick McLoughlin appointed as Chairman of Conservative Party’, *The Daily Express*, Thursday 14 Jul 2016, viewed at: <http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/689443/patrick-mcloughlin-chairman-conservative-party> on 27.04.2017.

³⁷³ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, *Voice and Equality*.

³⁷⁴ Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’.

both approaches by arguing that they fail to accommodate the important role of perceptions in shaping behaviour. As such, it considers the basic perceptions, or lower order beliefs, that people hold about status, and their explanations for it. Such perception of privilege is posited to be an important intervening stage between the capital that people hold and their political activities. As such, the thesis proposes a causal process leading from background characteristics through capital profiles to perception of privilege and thence political engagement and participation.

To test this model, an original survey including extensive batteries of questions relating to capital, perceptions, and participation was designed and fielded online to a non-probability sample of British adults. Although there are some similarities, the distributions of the variables in the resultant data are generally not comparable with those in data from previous research. This is because the questions asked were altered to reflect the focus of the research or, indeed, created from scratch. Crucially, and whilst the sample is not fully representative, there is considerable variation in most of the variables included in the analysis, so it is appropriate to analyse the relationships between them. The analytical approach adopted, structural equation modelling, allows the identification of underlying tendencies, both in terms of capital held and perceptions, as well as of structural relationships between them, which can be interpreted causally.

The underlying tendencies, or factors, that emerge from the analysis are as expected on the basis of past research and theory. Specifically, the individualised, contacting, and collective forms of political activity that were previously observed in *Citizenship in Britain* are replicated in the current research, whilst the political engagement and recruitment elements of the Civic Voluntarism Model are also identified.³⁷⁵ Distinct political perceptions are observed in the form of beliefs that politically active people are different and privileged. Further, the posited core elements of perception of privilege are confirmed in the shape of self-perceived status, explanations for that status, and explanations for status differences in society.

³⁷⁵ Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, pp. 133-137.

Finally, Bourdieu's proposal of the difference between the three forms of capital and between types within them is supported, which is particularly important in relation to the distinction between legitimate cultural capital and other types.³⁷⁶

Beyond observing of the posited factors, the results generally support the causal hypotheses of the research. Specifically, the full model that is tested and found to fit the data supports the proposition that political participation is most importantly defined by engagement and recruitment, which are influenced by both perceptions and capital. Capital also influences perceptions as expected, whilst relationships are also observed between types and forms of capital as Bourdieu's theory and research would suggest. Finally, capital itself is shaped by a range of background characteristics and basic beliefs, breaking with Bourdieu's proposition that capital profiles are defined by class position alone. This confirms the findings of *Culture, Class, Distinction*, and supports the idea that capital acts as a means by which privilege generally, rather than just class, expresses itself.³⁷⁷

The focus of when analysing the full model is cultural capital because it has been covered less extensively than social capital and economic capital in the past. Thus, the first main contribution of this thesis is the observation of the remarkably strong positive effects of legitimate cultural capital on political participation. Thus, the distinction between types of cultural capital is crucial, and both the strength and direction of their effects vary. Specifically, legitimate cultural tastes such as watching arthouse and foreign films, eating at bistros, and listening to BBC Radio 3 are amongst the strongest positive influences on individualised and contacting activities. At the same time, visits to legitimate cultural institutions such as museums, art galleries, and historic buildings are strongly associated with individualised and collective participation. These effects dwarf those of attendance at performances such as opera, ballet, and plays so it appears that not all legitimate cultural capital is important for facilitating political activity.

³⁷⁶ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 1, p. 16, pp. 359-360.

³⁷⁷ Bennett et al., *Culture, Class, Distinction*, p. 18, p. 27.

The effects of other types of cultural capital are generally positive, with two notable exceptions. Preferences for family-friendly films and for bass and sample heavy music are consistently negative, so certain types of cultural capital are associated with disengagement from all three types of political activity. These effects and those of legitimate tastes are observed to impact on participation via political engagement, which indicates that there is a particular cultural milieu in which paying attention to politics and discussing it is the norm. The fact that such cultural tastes are directly related to political engagement runs counter to the expectation that perception of privilege should intervene in the relationship. This is even more apparent in relation to visits to legitimate cultural institutions, which impacts directly on individualised and collective participation. Rather than pointing to a generally active disposition, which would suggest stronger links with other cultural activities as well, this suggests that individuals who hold such capital are insulated from the discomfort of not conforming to the cultural norms in political contexts. Such discomfort would not necessarily need to manifest itself through explanations for status difference or even through the sense of one's status, which can be assessed on the basis of numerous other indicators outside the political context. Thus, those who do not conform to the prevailing cultural practices of a given context, in this case a political one, can simply disengage from it without necessarily changing their perceptions of themselves, society, or even the context itself. Again, this explanation for the surprisingly direct effects of legitimate cultural capital on political engagement and activity, suggest a cultural milieu in which politics is the 'done thing'.

In addition to being more direct than expected, the effects of cultural capital are notably stronger than those of either social or economic capital, which have been the subject of a great deal of past research. Social capital does have a positive effect on political participation as expected, and the notable effect of diversity of friends suggests the particular importance of Putnam's bridging capital.³⁷⁸ By contrast, the inclusion of other factors renders the effect of economic capital on contacting and collective activity insignificant, whilst its

³⁷⁸ Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, pp. 22-23.

effect on individualised activity is weak and negative. Further, the effects of cultural capital are notably larger than those of work-based civic skills, though they retain the positive effect observed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady. More dramatically, free time is found not to have a significant effect on political participation once other factors are accounted for and is thus excluded from the full model.³⁷⁹ This suggests that the effects of time observed in *Voice and Equality* may, in part, have encompassed the capacity to accumulate and exercise cultural capital that facilitates such participation. The importance of cultural factors in improving the Civic Voluntarism Model is of particular note because they are further removed from politics than the engagement and recruitment components of that model. To observe that those who pay attention to politics, hold information on it, and are asked to get involved also participate more is important but unsurprising. Equally important but more surprising, however, is the observation that people who visit art galleries frequently, enjoy eating in bistros, and listen to BBC Radio 3 are more apt to engage with politics and undertake activities related to it.

The legitimate elements of cultural capital are heavily influenced by education and thus appear to be the main mechanism through which it has its effect on political participation. This presents a possible answer to the conundrum of rising levels of education not necessarily being associated with increasing political participation. In other words, the positive effects of education flow not only from its formal elements, and the associated qualifications, but also from its capacity to furnish people with informal but legitimate cultural capital. To the extent that opportunities for engagement with such culture are not equal in all educational settings we should not expect to see an increased prevalence of educational qualifications prompt a uniform rise in levels of legitimate cultural capital. This suggests that two people who are equally qualified will not have equivalent capital profiles and will thus not participate in politics to the same extent or in the same ways. The fact that education itself is only influenced to a limited degree by class background, and that cultural capital is influenced by other background characteristics such as age and sex, again implies the need to depart from

³⁷⁹ An equivalent model in which time was loaded onto occupational status (B = 0.114, p = 0.001), female gender (B = -0.083, p = 0.002) and being in a relationship (B = -0.110, p = 0.000) found that it had no significant effect on individualised (B = 0.044, p = 0.098), contacting (B = 0.033, p = 0.314), or collective (B = -0.014, p = 0.632) political activity.

Bourdieu's class determinism. This suggests that one's habitus is not merely a manifestation of class status but of one's cultural milieu more generally, and that part of that environment is the prevalence of norms that promote engagement with and participation in politics. This supports the proposition that capital functions as a mechanism of structural privilege, and that its uneven distribution between groups enables the participation of some, but not others, in politics.

Two of the core elements of perception of privilege are also found to have positive effects on political participation, and thus to function in opposition to system justifying beliefs as expected.³⁸⁰ Specifically, holding privilege-based explanation for one's own status and for status in society more generally both promote participation in the political domain. The application of privilege-based explanations for status indicates recognition of the importance of social influences on individual outcomes, and this provides a motive for efforts to change or conserve those social influences through politics. In other words, if individual outcomes are primarily the result of individual characteristics then there is perhaps less reason to attempt to shape society, especially collectively, and one is better off focussing on one's own outcomes. Opposing these effects, and contrary to expectations, self-perceived status has a negative effect on political participation. Thus, to the extent that perceiving one's status as high promotes a sense of capacity, and perhaps entitlement, it is not directed towards politics. This is explicable with reference to the negative effects of self-perceived status on privilege-based explanations for status in society, and on perception of the difference of politically active people. Whilst not hypothesised, those effects imply that seeing one's self as having high status provides a motive to attribute status to individual effort rather than social influences, even if in relation to society rather than one's self. Further, to the extent that politically active people and politicians are seen to have high status, and manifest traits associated with it, those cues will promote less of a sense of difference amongst those who see themselves as high status. Given that perception of privilege in society and of the difference of politically active people are

³⁸⁰ Duckitt and Sibley, 'A Dual Process Motivational Model of Ideological Attitudes and System Justification'.

positively associated with political participation, the negative effects of self-perceived status become explicable.

Moving beyond the core components of perception of privilege, the previously mentioned positive effects of perceiving politically active people as different are counter to expectations and suggest a grievance-based explanation.³⁸¹ By contrast, the expected negative effect of perceiving politically active people as privileged is observed. Thus, viewing politically active people as different from one's self without applying the label of privilege sparks political participation, perhaps on the grounds that politics should be run by more 'normal' people. By contrast, a privileged-based recognition of their difference seems to promote a sense of alienation that causes disengagement from the political arena. Crucially, the results provide a clear indication that the elements of perception of privilege do not promote or suppress the types of participation in a uniform fashion. Indeed, patterns are observed in which the effects of each component of perception of privilege increase or decrease in line with the level of social interaction required by the type of political activity. Thus, self-perceived status, perception of privilege in society, and perception of the difference of politically active people all have stronger effects on individualised activities than on other forms. More important than the patterns in the effects of each element, however, are their combined effects.

Taken together, the effects of perception of privilege in society and in one's own life suggest an important role for the fundamental attribution error in shaping political participation.³⁸² Specifically, those who apply consistent privilege-based explanations for both status in society and their own status are apt to engage in all three forms of participation. By contrast, those who view status in society as defined by social influences but their own status to results from individual characteristics have their political participation limited to individualised activities. That is to say, the negative effect attributing own status to individual characteristics depresses contacting and collective participation but does not outweigh the

³⁸¹ Opp, 'Grievances and Participation in Social Movements'

³⁸² Knight, 'In Their Own Words'. p. 228.

positive effect on individual activities of perceiving status in society to result from privilege. Thus, endorsing the fundamental attribution error, and so perceiving others to be the beneficiaries of privilege that one has not enjoyed, channels people towards less social forms of political participation. Specifically, this means such people are apt to engage in activities such as petition signing, online expression of views, and boycotting of products, but not to interact with elected representatives or government departments, or to get involved with public meetings or protests. This observation is the second main contribution of the research, and suggests that despite the persistence of inequalities in new forms of political participation, online modes may at least remain open to those who are disinclined to interact or coordinate face-to-face in relation to politics.

The above findings suggest that the distinction between individualised, contacting, and collective activities is more than just a useful typology of participation. It seems that the distinction is used by people not only in terms of the time and effort required but also in terms of their social nature. Thus, the distinction is meaningful in a social sense, and this is further supported by the strong positive effect of perceiving the difference of politically active people on individualised activities alone. In other words, a disinclination to interact with people who are seen as different from one's self is apparent in relation to political participation. This is complemented by the previous observation of a positive relationship between diversity of friends and political participation, which is stronger in relation to more social forms of activity. Further, and returning to the effects of cultural capital, it may be that people perceive the cultural milieu they inhabit and its similarity or difference to those inhabited by politically active people. Thus, it is clear that structural privilege, especially in the form of cultural capital, enables participation in politics. That participation is then channelled to more or less social forms of participation depending in part on the gaps that are perceived between people, society, and those involved in politics.

The enabling and channelling of political participation by structural and perceived privilege may, of course, be specific to the time and place in which the research was conducted. In terms of the first of those considerations, there is no comparable data that has been gathered

over time in the United Kingdom but speculative comments can be made on the basis of three changes that have occurred in the latter half of the twentieth and first part of the twenty-first centuries. First, educational levels have increased over that period and, to the extent that those who gain such qualifications increase their stock of legitimate cultural capital, this can be expected to have opened the political arena to people who might otherwise have found it harder to enter. This is linked to the idea of the demise of the United Kingdom's rigid class structure and the increase in social mobility, though there is competing evidence regarding the latter and its effects may be unevenly spread.³⁸³ Second, the increase in the diversity of the population over that period can be expected to have raised participation amongst those who might otherwise have had less diverse social networks. As with the effects of education and social mobility, however, these effects are not likely to be spread uniformly throughout the population, particularly in light of the geographically concentrated nature of diversity.³⁸⁴ Thus, whilst both of these trends have positive implications they are limited by their uneven distribution, which may increase participatory inequality. This is also the case with the third change, which is the decline of the trade union movement. This has been argued to have increased participatory inequality by closing a major route to participation associated with working class backgrounds, and trends in the House of Commons may reflect those in society at large.³⁸⁵ They show that the positive increase of the chamber's representativeness in terms of sex, ethnicity, and sexuality has been countered by its increasing domination by those with university degrees and, after a decline towards the end of the last century, independent educations.³⁸⁶ Together, this suggests that some of the participatory inequalities of the past are in decline whilst others have found new expression in the cultural domain, and that this is

³⁸³ Jo Blanden, Paul Gregg, and Stephen Machin, 'Social mobility in Britain: low and falling', *CentrePiece*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring, 2005), pp. 18-20, viewed at: <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/centrepiece/v10i1/blanden.pdf> on 26.04.2017; Christopher Snowdon, 'Social mobility in the UK', *Institute of Economic Affairs*, Saturday 10 October 2015, viewed at: <https://iea.org.uk/themencode-pdf-viewer-sc/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Social%20Mobility%20in%20the%20UK%20-%20CS.pdf&settings=111111011&lang=en-GB#page=&zoom=75&pagemode> on 26.04.2017.

³⁸⁴ Stephen Jivraj, 'How has ethnic diversity grown 1991-2001-2011?', *Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity*, Tuesday 11 November 2014, viewed at: <http://www.ethnicity.ac.uk/medialibrary/briefings/dynamicsofdiversity/how-has-ethnic-diversity-grown-1991-2001-2011.pdf> on 26.04.2017.

³⁸⁵ Michael Biggs, 'Has Protest Increased Since the 1970s? How a Survey Question Can Construct a Spurious Trend', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Mar., 2015), pp. 141-162.

³⁸⁶ University education an imperfect measure of cultural capital but is the best available: The Sutton Trust 'The Educational Background of Members of Parliament 2010' p. 7; The Sutton Trust, 'The Educational Backgrounds of Members of the House of Commons and House of Lords', *The Sutton Trust*, Thursday 01 December 2005, p. 11, viewed at: http://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2005/12/PoliticiansBackgrounds_09-Dec-05.pdf on 26.04.2017.

likely to have promoted the perception of privilege in politics amongst some groups but not others.

Turning to the applicability of the research findings in different locations, the first point to note is that Bourdieu's research focused on France but the theory that he developed was not intended to be context-specific.³⁸⁷ Indeed, the findings of the current research and past research focusing on capital and inequality in the United Kingdom demonstrate the applicability of the theory in a context beyond the one in which it was developed. It may be, however, that this country provides the weakest test of the cross-cultural applicability of Bourdieu's theory because of the unusually widespread concern with the concept of class in Britain. However, the current research breaks with the class determinism of Bourdieu and, as such, certainly supports the relevance of two overarching components of the theory in different contexts. The first of those components is the idea that all three forms of capital must be accounted for when explaining the workings of privilege. The second is the idea that the particular types of capital that have value are defined by competition between groups in any given context. Thus, the posited mechanism of structural privilege, embodied in the forms of capital, are expected to be observable in multiple contexts but the specific types of capital that hold particular importance will change across those contexts. Taking the case of cultural capital, it should be possible to observe the distinction between legitimate and other forms of capital in different contexts, but the particular cultural tastes and activities that are designated as legitimate will differ. Further, the particular background characteristics that shape capital profiles will vary between contexts, though the role of those capital profiles in recreating structural privilege will be the same. These proposition needs to be tested with future research, which could fruitfully focus on comparisons with India and the United States. In the former instance there is a clear alternative system of social stratification based on caste and a markedly different set of cultural traditions. This would allow testing of the effects not only of different background characteristics but also of different types of capital within the three forms. By

³⁸⁷ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, pp. 82-83, p. 365, pp. 476-477.

contrast, the latter case would provide a 'class free' context in which to test the role of capital as a mechanism of privilege. Both contexts would also allow the testing of the effects of perception of privilege, which should be expected to vary in line with both structural privilege and prevailing understandings of society and the self.

In addition to testing the applicability of a model encompassing the forms of capital and perception of privilege in different contexts, there are a number of other questions that future research should address. First, a larger sample with better measurement and representation of a range of background characteristics would allow a fuller analysis of the roots of capital profiles. The current research uses crude measures of ethnicity and disability, and does not consider sexuality, all of which may be found to have important implications for capital if better measured and represented. Second, the question of causal order is perhaps the largest issue requiring future investigation, despite theoretical justification for the adopted causal interpretation. In terms of immediate action this can be partially addressed by testing models that embody alternative causal propositions, such as the idea that all forms of capital and behaviour, including political participation, precede and influence perceptions, and vice versa. This, of course, will not conclusively answer questions of causality and an expensive longitudinal study of the development of capital, perceptions, and participation seems unlikely to be possible in the near future. As such, a good way to test some of the causal propositions of the model would be an experimental approach in which the effects of cultural stimuli on perceptions, and of perceptions on political engagement, are tested. Third, such future tests should include measures of the Big Five personality traits and basic values to test for the relationships between underlying psychological disposition, values, capital, perception of privilege, and political participation.³⁸⁸ Fourth, forty-five in-depth focus groups and interviews with politicians, volunteers and activists, and members of the public were conducted for the research underpinning this thesis but, due to the demands of structural equation modelling, were not analysed. Future research must analyse this qualitative data and relate the emerging

³⁸⁸ Shalom H. Schwartz, 'An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values', *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Dec., 2012), viewed at <https://doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1116> on 27.04.2017.

findings to the results of the qualitative analysis. Fifth and finally, a small third wave survey was conducted after the 2015 general election and future research should utilise this data set to analyse the effects of institutional demand on political participation.

Building on the final point above, the analysis undertaken in this thesis has been steeped in terms of the characteristics that enable, or incline people towards, political participation. That is to say it has focused on the supply of potential and actual political participants rather than the impact of demand, constituted by institutional efforts to promote or activate political participation. Indeed, the only part of the full model that relates to demand, in the form of receipt of recruitment requests, focuses on individuals' close social connections rather than recruitment by institutions. Such requests are directed towards those in diverse social networks, who engage in religious activity, and who perceive themselves to be politically engaged, but less to those who hold a great deal of political knowledge. As noted, perceived political engagement is heavily influenced by legitimate cultural tastes, so requests to get involved are more likely to reach those with particular types of capital, though this is likely to be a manifestation of the prevalence of political activity in their cultural milieu than the targeting of demand. Indeed, the argument of this thesis is that privilege is a feature of society at large, and that the forms of capital that act as the mechanism of that privilege, as well as perception of privilege, are the results of an array of background characteristics and life experiences. Of course, institutions in a tight sense of the word, meaning organisations that can create demand for participation, are not necessarily responsible for the creation of inequalities stemming from structural and perceived privilege. However, this does not mean that they have no role to play in overcoming those inequalities, and there are clear implications for the nature of that role.

This thesis began by noting the recognition, common to ministers and campaigners alike, that democracy, however envisaged, cannot function without public involvement. Thus, to the extent that some groups are less able to participate in politics due to structural and perceived privilege there is a problem for democracy. It may be the case that some people actively choose to not to participate in politics, but the strength of the results make it clear that

such disengagement is not randomly distributed in the population, and is thus unlikely to be based solely on personal choice. The findings regarding perception of privilege suggest that people need to see a more representative cross-section of the population engaged in politics. Thus, political organisations should frequently and explicitly convey the message that they are open to all. This is already done, to an extent, with ‘easy asks’ such as petitions and social media campaigns, but these could be complemented by messages focussing on members or supporters who were previously disengaged in order to demonstrate the openness of organisations and offer concrete examples of how to get involved. More to the point, the people represented in campaigns connected to politics need to be diverse not only in terms of background characteristics but also the cultural milieus that they inhabit. Such superficial changes, of course, cannot and should not be the only attempts to address unequal access to politics.

Presenting politics as open to people with diverse backgrounds and cultural profiles is a lot easier and more convincing if it is actually the case. This means that political organisations need to proactively engage politically disengaged communities in the spaces that they already inhabit, and this needs to be done consistently. Thus, if it is not already the case, surgeries and meetings should be held in cafes and shopping centres rather than town halls or other formal institutions. Organisations should undertake recruitment campaigns through current members and supporters, but asking them to focus their requests on acquaintances that they would not usually approach. Where appropriate, links should be built between organisations with distinct memberships in order to promote diversity in each, whilst campaigns and recruitment focused on educational institutions should be complemented by efforts to engage people who do not inhabit those contexts. Similarly, campaigns that are explicitly focused on legitimate cultural institutions, either as targets or locations for activities, should be understood to appeal only to some people. They should thus be complemented or replaced by campaigns dealing with issues of interest to a less restricted cultural milieu. This might involve asking a wider audience what their political priorities are and focusing

campaigns on changing or conserving different elements of society in so far as those priorities fit with organisations' aims and objectives.

Thus, whilst cultural institutions need to continue their efforts to be as open and accessible as possible, the solutions suggested here are explicitly not about educating people or converting them to legitimate tastes and habits. Rather, organisations should move outside their comfort zones and engage those who are not active on their own terms, and on their own turf, regardless of their backgrounds and cultural preferences. Further, this speaks of the importance of reinforcing or complementing the role of trade unions as forums for political engagement because the majority of the population must hold employment for at least some part of their lives, and workplaces thus encompass people with diverse backgrounds and capital profiles. These efforts seem all the more important in the aftermath of political events that have emphasised the divide between the population and a detached political elite. Thus, now more than ever, politics must be open to all, regardless of their privilege, and must explicitly challenge the perception that it is not.

Appendix A: Full Wave 1 Survey

**Questionnaire
Final_Wave1_VFS_J
G_14_03_14_G4**



Joe Greenwood

Final Version
2014-03-17
17:41:42.

Module: IntropdlUpdate

Page: Wave1_Intro

Thank you for taking this survey, which is about your free time, who you know, and your voluntary activities. Your YouGov Account will be credited with 75 points for completing the survey. We have tested the survey and found that, on average it takes around 17 to 20 minutes to complete. This time may vary depending on factors such as your Internet connection speed and the answers you give. Please click the forward button to continue.

Page: pdl_EducLeve

EducLeve-

SINGLE CHOICE

What is the highest educational or work-related qualification you have?

- 1 No formal qualifications
 - 2 Youth training certificate/skillseekers
 - 3 Recognised trade apprenticeship completed
 - 4 Clerical and commercial
 - 5 City & Guilds certificate
 - 6 City & Guilds certificate - advanced
 - 7 ONC
 - 8 CSE grades 2-5
 - 9 CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, School Certificate
 - 10 Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate
 - 11 GCE A level or Higher Certificate
 - 12 Scottish Higher Certificate
 - 13 Nursing qualification (eg SEN, SRN, SCM, RGN)
 - 14 Teaching qualification (not degree)
 - 15 University diploma
 - 16 University or CNAA first degree (eg BA, B.Sc, B.Ed)
 - 17 University or CNAA higher degree (eg M.Sc, Ph.D)
 - 18 Other technical, professional or higher qualification
 - 19 Don't know
 - 20 Prefer not to say
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_WorkStat

WorkStat-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which of these applies to you?

- 1 Working full time (30 or more hours per week)
 - 2 Working part time (8-29 hours a week)
 - 3 Working part time (Less than 8 hours a week)
 - 4 Full time student
 - 5 Retired
 - 6 Unemployed
 - 7 Not working
 - 8 Other
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_MariStat

MariStat-

SINGLE CHOICE

What is your marital status?

- 7 Civil Partnership
 - 4 Divorced
 - 2 Living as married
 - 1 Married
 - 6 Never married
 - 3 Separated (after being married)
 - 5 Widowed
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_Household

HousStat-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which of these applies to your home?

- 1 Own the leasehold/freehold outright
 - 2 Buying leasehold/freehold on a mortgage
 - 3 Rented from local authority
 - 4 Rented from private landlord
 - 5 It belongs to a Housing Association
 - 6 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Questionnaire

HousSize-

SINGLE CHOICE

How many people, including yourself, are there in your household? Please include both adults and children.

- 1 1
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 4
- 5 5
- 6 6
- 7 7
- 8 8 or more
- 9 Don't know
- 10 Prefer not to say
- 98 *Skipped*
- 99 *Not Asked*

ChilStat-

SINGLE CHOICE

How many of the people in your household are under 18?

- 1 0
- 2 1
- 3 2
- 4 3
- 5 4
- 6 5
- 7 6 or more
- 8 Don't know
- 9 Prefer not to say
- 98 *Skipped*
- 99 *Not Asked*

end module: IntropdlUpdate

Module: VolPolAct

Page: VolPolAct_OfficPosit

OfficPosit-

DYNAMIC GRID

First, have you ever held or do you currently hold any of the following positions?

Local councillor (for local authority, town, or parish)
School governor
Parent-teacher association member
Tenants' or residents' association member
Neighbourhood watch member
Volunteer Police Special Constable
Magistrate

-
- 1 Currently
2 In the past
3 Never
8 *Skipped*
9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_ConsidOfficPosit

ConsidOfficPosit-

SINGLE CHOICE

Thinking about the positions you've just seen, would you consider holding any of them in future?

- 1 Definitely
2 Probably
3 Probably not
4 Definitely not
8 *Skipped*
9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_PolActFreq

Now we'd like to ask you about things you've done in relation to issues that matter to you.

PolActFreq-

DYNAMIC GRID

In the last five years roughly how often have you done the following things in relation to any issue that you care about personally?

- Displayed campaign materials (e.g. posters, badges, stickers)
- Signed a petition or taken an online action (e.g. joined a group, liked a page, or posted a link on a social network)
- Chosen to boycott a product or company
- Met with an elected representative
- Attended a public meeting
- Gone on a public rally, protest or demonstration
- Taken a direct action (e.g. a public stunt, or chaining yourself to something)
- Organised a public meeting or set up a group
- Contacted an elected representative or a government body
- Contacted the media (i.e. local or national radio, TV, or newspapers)
- Urged someone to take any of the actions we've just asked about

- 1 Once a month or more often
- 2 Once every two to three months
- 3 Once every six months
- 4 Once a year
- 5 Less often
- 6 Never
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page: VolPolAct_PolActRecruit

Here's the list of things that we just asked about:

- Display campaign materials (e.g. posters, badges, or stickers)
- Sign a petition or take an online action (e.g. join a group, like a page, or post a link on a social network)
- Boycott a product or company
- Meet with an elected representative
- Attend a public meeting
- Go on a public rally, protest or demonstration
- Take a direct action (e.g. a public stunt, or chaining yourself to something)
- Organise a public meeting or set up a group
- Contact an elected representative or a local or national government body
- Contact the media (i.e. local or national radio, TV, or newspapers)
- Urge someone to take any of the actions we've just asked about

PolActRecruit-

DYNAMIC GRID

Roughly how often, if ever, have you been asked to do any of those things...

- ...via a mass email, mass social network request, or mass letter?
- ...by a family member?
- ...by a friend?
- ...by a neighbour?
- ...by someone at work?
- ...by a member of a local religious congregation?
- ...by someone from a political party, trade union or professional association, charity, or campaigning or voluntary organisation that you're already involved in?
- ...by a campaigner or volunteer for an organisation that you're not involved in (including by phone or in the street)?

-
- 1 Once a month or more often
 - 2 Four times a year or more often
 - 3 Two or three times a year
 - 4 Once a year or less often
 - 5 Never
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*

Page: VolPolAct_PolActPotent**PolActPotent-**

DYNAMIC GRID

You said that you've never done some of the things we asked about. Would you do those things in the future in relation to an issue that you cared about?

- Display campaign materials (e.g. posters, badges, or stickers)
- Sign a petition or take an online action (e.g. join a group, like a page, or post a link on a social network)
- Choose to boycott a product or company
- Meet with an elected representative
- Attend a public meeting
- Go on a public rally, protest or demonstration
- Take a direct action (e.g. a public stunt, or chaining yourself to something)
- Organise a public meeting or set up a group
- Contact an elected representative or a government body
- Contact the media (i.e. local or national radio, TV, or newspapers)
- Urged someone to take one of the actions we've asked about

-
- 1 Definitely
 - 2 Probably
 - 3 Probably not
 - 4 Definitely not
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*

Page: VolPolAct_GroupInvolv

Now we're interested in the organisations that you support.

GroupInvolv-

GRID-CHECK

In the last five years have you been involved in any of the following types of organisation in any of the ways listed? Please select all the options that apply:

Political party
Trade Union or professional association
Campaigning organisation
Charity

- 1 Donate any money (e.g. sponsorship, direct debit, or spare change)
 - 2 Volunteer time
 - 3 Am a member
 - 4 Hold an unpaid position of responsibility (e.g. chair, secretary, or organisor)
 - 5 Not involved
-

Page: VolPolAct_GroupRecruit

Here's the list of ways to support organisations that we just asked about:

- Donate money
- Volunteer time
- Become a member
- Take up an unpaid position of responsibility

GroupRecruit-

DYNAMIC GRID

Roughly how often, if ever, have you been asked to do any of those things...

...via a mass email, mass social network request, or mass letter?
...by a family member?
...by a friend?
...by a neighbour?
...by someone at work?
...by a member of a local religious congregation?
...by someone from a political party that you're already involved in?
...by someone from a trade union or professional organisation that you're already involved in?
...by someone from a campaigning organisation that you're already involved in?
...by someone from charity that you're already involved in?
...by a campaigner or volunteer for an organisation that you're not involved in (including by phone or in the street)?

- 1 Once a month or more often
 - 2 Four times a year or more often
 - 3 Two or three times a year
 - 4 Once a year or less often
 - 5 Never
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_Break

Next we want to know more about the things you do for the organisations that you support.

Page: VolPolAct_CivSkillGroup

CivSkillGroup-

MULTIPLE CHOICE DYNAMIC GRID

Over the last six months, have you engaged in any of the following activities for...

...the political party that you're involved in? Please select all those that apply:

...the trade Union or professional association that you're involved in? Please select all those that apply:

...the campaigning organisation that you're involved in? Please select all those that apply:

...the charity that you're involved in? Please select all those that apply:

-
- 1 Written a formal email or letter
 - 2 Attended a meeting where you made decisions
 - 3 Planned or chaired a meeting
 - 4 Given a presentation
 - 5 None of these
-

Page: VolPolAct_Donate

Donate-

SINGLE CHOICE

Roughly what is the total amount of money that you have personally donated to all the organisations that you support over the last twelve months? This includes donations to collection tins, sponsorship, and direct debits, but not membership fees:

- 1 £24.99 or less
 - 2 Between £25 and £49.99
 - 3 Between £50 and £99.99
 - 4 Between £100 and £249.99
 - 5 Between £250 and £499.99
 - 6 £500 or more
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_DonateDK

DonateDK-

SINGLE CHOICE

You just moved on without answering this question? Can you estimate roughly what the total amount of money is that you have personally donated to all the organisations that you support over the last twelve months? This includes donations to collection tins, sponsorship, and direct debits, but not membership fees:

- 1 £24.99 or less
 - 2 Between £25 and £49.99
 - 3 Between £50 and £99.99
 - 4 Between £100 and £249.99
 - 5 Between £250 and £499.99
 - 6 £500 or more
 - 7 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_Vol

VolFreq-

SINGLE CHOICE

Thinking of all of the organisations that you volunteer for, roughly how frequently have you volunteered in the last twelve months?

- 1 Daily
 - 2 2-3 times a week
 - 3 Once a week
 - 4 2-3 times a month
 - 5 Once a month or less
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

VolTime-

SINGLE CHOICE

And on average, roughly how much time did you give each time you volunteered?

- 1 Less than one hour
 - 2 One or two hours
 - 3 Three to five hours
 - 4 Six to eight hours
 - 5 Nine to eleven hours
 - 6 Twelve hours or more
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_MemberPolPar

MemberPolPar-

SINGLE CHOICE

How long have you been a member of any political party (including if you have been a member of different parties over the years)?

- 1 Less than 1 year
 - 2 1-2 years
 - 3 3-5 years
 - 4 6-10 years
 - 5 More than 10 years
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

VolPolAct_MemberTradUnProfAsso

C

MemberTradUnProfAssoc-

SINGLE CHOICE

How long have you been a member of any trade union or political association (including if you have been a member of different unions or associations over the years)?

- 1 Less than 1 year
 - 2 1-2 years
 - 3 3-5 years
 - 4 6-10 years
 - 5 More than 10 years
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

VolPolAct_MemberCampaignOrg

MemberCampaignOrg-

SINGLE CHOICE

How long have you been a member of any campaigning organisation (including if you have been a member of different campaigning organisations over the years)?

- 1 Less than 1 year
 - 2 1-2 years
 - 3 3-5 years
 - 4 6-10 years
 - 5 More than 10 years
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_MemberCharity

MemberCharity-

SINGLE CHOICE

How long have you been a member of any charity (including if you have been a member of different charities over the years)?

- 1 Less than 1 year
 - 2 1-2 years
 - 3 3-5 years
 - 4 6-10 years
 - 5 More than 10 years
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_UnpaidPosPolPar

UnpaidPosPolPar-

SINGLE CHOICE

Thinking of your unpaid position of responsibility in a political party, how long have you held this or a similar position in any political party?

- 1 Less than 1 year
 - 2 1-2 years
 - 3 3-5 years
 - 4 6-10 years
 - 5 More than 10 years
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

PolPolAct_UnpaidPosTradUnProfAss

OC

UnpaidPosPosTradUnProfAssoc-

SINGLE CHOICE

Thinking of your unpaid position of responsibility in a trade union or professional association, how long have you held this or a similar position in any union or association?

- 1 Less than 1 year
 - 2 1-2 years
 - 3 3-5 years
 - 4 6-10 years
 - 5 More than 10 years
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

VolPolAct_UnpaidPosCampaignOrg

UnpaidPosCampaignOrg-

SINGLE CHOICE

Thinking of your unpaid position of responsibility in a campaigning organisation, how long have you held this or a similar position in any campaigning organisation?

- 1 Less than 1 year
 - 2 1-2 years
 - 3 3-5 years
 - 4 6-10 years
 - 5 More than 10 years
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_UnpaidPosCharity

UnpaidPosCharity-

SINGLE CHOICE

Thinking of your unpaid position of responsibility in a charity, how long have you held this or a similar position in any charity?

- 1 Less than 1 year
 - 2 1-2 years
 - 3 3-5 years
 - 4 6-10 years
 - 5 More than 10 years
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: VolPolAct_OrgName

CampaignOrgName-

OPEN TEXTBOX

You've said you support a campaigning organisation in one of the ways we asked about. What is the name of that campaigning organisation? If you support more than one campaigning organisation then please list them all:

CharityName-

OPEN TEXTBOX

You've said you support a charity in one of the ways we asked about. What is the name of that charity? If you support more than one charity then please list them all:

Page: VolPolAct_PolActNonMult

PolActNonMult-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Here are some reasons people have given about why they don't take the kind of actions that we've asked about. Which of these, if any, are reasons why you haven't taken any of those actions? Please select all that apply:

- 1 I don't have enough time
 - 2 It wouldn't make a difference
 - 3 I'm not knowledgeable enough
 - 4 I don't have the skills needed
 - 5 I don't have enough money
 - 6 No one ever asked me
 - 7 No one I know does those sorts of things
 - 8 Those sorts of things aren't for people like me
 - 9 I don't have the confidence
 - 10 Other
-

Page:

VolPolAct_PolActNonMultOthText

PolActNonMultOthText-

OPEN TEXTBOX

You said that there are other reasons that you haven't taken the kinds of actions that we've asked about. What are those reasons?

Page: VolPolAct_PolActNonLes

PolActNonLes-

RANKING

Please rank the options that you selected in terms of their importance as reasons for you not taking the actions that we asked about:

Rank in 3 slots

- 1 x I don't have enough time
 - 2 x It wouldn't make a difference
 - 3 x I'm not knowledgeable enough
 - 4 x I don't have the skills needed
 - 5 x I don't have enough money
 - 6 x No one ever asked me
 - 7 x No one I know does those sorts of things
 - 8 x Those sorts of things aren't for people like me
 - 9 x I don't have the confidence
 - 10 x Other
-

Page:

VolPolAct_GroupInvolvNonMult

GroupInvolvNonMult-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Here are some reasons people have given about why they don't volunteer for or donate money to groups. Which of these, if any, are reasons why you haven't donated to or volunteered for the kinds of groups that we asked about? Please select all that apply:

- 1 I don't have enough time
 - 2 It wouldn't make a difference
 - 3 I'm not knowledgeable enough
 - 4 I don't have the skills needed
 - 5 I don't have enough money
 - 6 No one ever asked me
 - 7 No one I know does those sorts of things
 - 8 Those sorts of things aren't for people like me
 - 9 I don't have the confidence
 - 10 Other
-

Page:

VolPolAct_GroupInvolvNonMultOth

Text

GroupInvolvNonMultOthText-

OPEN TEXTBOX

You said that there are other reasons that you haven't donated to or volunteered for the kinds of groups that we asked about. What are those reasons?

Page: VolPolAct_GroupInvolvNonLes

GroupInvolvNonLes-

RANKING

Please rank the options that you selected in terms of their importance as reasons for you not volunteering for or donating money to the kinds of groups that we asked about:

Rank in 3 slots

- 1 x I don't have enough time
 - 2 x It wouldn't make a difference
 - 3 x I'm not knowledgeable enough
 - 4 x I don't have the skills needed
 - 5 x I don't have enough money
 - 6 x No one ever asked me
 - 7 x No one I know does those sorts of things
 - 8 x Those sorts of things aren't for people like me
 - 9 x I don't have the confidence
 - 10 x Other
-

end module: VolPolAct

Module: FreeTimeHols

Page: FreeTimeHols_Intro

Now we're moving on from questions about your voluntary activities to questions about what you do with your time.

Page: FreeTimeHols_Time

Time-

GRID-OPEN

First, we would like to ask you about how you divide your hours between various activities. On average, roughly how many hours per weekday do you spend doing each of the following things? Please round your answers to the nearest whole number and enter zero if you do not spend time doing that thing. Your total must equal 24 hours:

- Sleeping
- Caring for your family, for instance children or elderly relatives
- Housework such as cooking, cleaning, and shopping
- Paid employment including work you bring home
- Commuting to and from your place of work or study
- Commuting to and from your place of work
- Studying
- Looking after yourself (e.g. eating, showering, exercising)
- Other

1 Hours per weekday

8 *Skipped*

9 *Not Asked*

Page: FreeTimeHols_AnyWork

AnyWork-

SINGLE CHOICE

You said that you don't do any paid work during the week. When was the last time you had paid work?

1 I do currently have paid work, but only at weekends

2 In the last year

3 Between one and two years ago

4 Between two and five years ago

5 Between five and ten years ago

6 More than ten years ago

7 Never

8 *Skipped*

9 *Not Asked*

Page:

FreeTimeHols_CivSkillWorkCurr

CivSkillWorkCurr-

DYNAMIC GRID

Thinking about your paid employment, in the last six months roughly how frequently have you...

- ...written a formal email or letter?
 - ...gone to a meeting where you took part in making decisions?
 - ...planned or chaired a meeting?
 - ...given a presentation?
-

- 1 Daily
 - 2 A couple of times a week
 - 3 Once a week
 - 4 Once a fortnight
 - 5 Once a month
 - 6 Less than once a month
 - 7 Not in the last six months
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

FreeTimeHols_CivSkillWorkPast

CivSkillWorkPast-

DYNAMIC GRID

Thinking about your last paid employment, roughly how frequently did you...

- ...write a formal email or letter?
 - ...go to a meeting where you took part in making decisions?
 - ...plan or chair a meeting?
 - ...give a presentation?
-

- 1 Daily
 - 2 A couple of times a week
 - 3 Once a week
 - 4 Once a fortnight
 - 5 Once a month
 - 6 Less than once a month
 - 7 Never
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_Break

Now we're going to ask you about how you spend your free time.

Page: FreeTimeHols_CultCapExt

CultCapExt-

DYNAMIC GRID

Roughly how often, if at all, do you...

- ...go to the cinema?
 - ...go to live music gigs?
 - ...go to classical music or opera performances?
 - ...go to the theatre or a musical?
 - ...visit museums?
 - ...visit art galleries?
 - ...visit historic buildings?
 - ...go out to eat with others?
 - ...go to the bingo?
 - ...go to watch dance or ballet?
 - ...go to watch live sport (not on TV)?
 - ...go out to a pub, bar, or cafe?
 - ...go out to a nightclub?
 - ...go to see stand-up comedy?
 - ...go shopping for pleasure?
 - ...go out for a walk for pleasure?
 - ...play sport with others?
-

- 1 A couple of times a month or more
 - 2 Once a month
 - 3 Once every two to three months
 - 4 Once every six months
 - 5 Once a year
 - 6 Less often
 - 7 Never
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_EatOutVenue

EatOutVenue-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

When you go out to eat with others, where do you go? Please select as many of the options as apply:

- 1 Cafe or tea shop
 - 2 Pub
 - 3 Wine bar or bistro
 - 4 Hotel
 - 5 Fast food outlet
 - 6 High street restaurant (chain)
 - 7 High street restaurant (independent)
 - 8 Fine dining restaurant
 - 9 Market or street stall
 - 10 Other
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_EatOutType

EatOutType-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

And what types of food do you eat? Please select as many of the options as apply:

- 1 British
 - 2 French
 - 3 Italian
 - 4 Spanish
 - 5 Greek
 - 6 Turkish
 - 7 Eastern European
 - 8 Other European
 - 9 American
 - 10 Mexican
 - 11 Latin American
 - 12 South Asian (e.g. Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani)
 - 13 East Asian (e.g. Chinese, Thai, Japanese, Vietnamese)
 - 14 African
 - 15 Middle Eastern
 - 16 Other
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_CultCapInt

CultCapInt-

GRID

Roughly how often, if at all, do you...

- ...spend time reading a book (including on an electronic device)
 - ...read a magazine (including online)
 - ...listen to the radio
 - ...listen to music (not on the radio)
 - ...watch TV programmes or films at home (including live TV, streaming, catch-up services and DVDs)
 - ...play computer or video games
 - ...browse the internet (excluding news and social network websites)
 - ...use social networking websites
-

- 1 Daily
 - 2 2-3 times a week
 - 3 Around once a week
 - 4 Less than once a week
 - 5 Never
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_MusicGenre

MusicGenre-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

What types of music do you like to listen to? Please select all the options that apply:

- 1 Alternative/Indie
 - 2 Rock/Pop
 - 3 Classical/Opera
 - 4 Country
 - 5 Dance/Electronic
 - 6 Folk
 - 7 Metal/Punk
 - 8 Jazz/Blues
 - 9 Rap/Hip-Hop
 - 10 RnB/Urban
 - 11 Soul/Funk
 - 12 World Music
 - 13 Other
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_FilmGenre

FilmGenre-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

What types of films do you like to watch? Please select all the options that apply:

- 1 Action
 - 2 Classics
 - 3 Comedy
 - 4 Crime
 - 5 Documentaries
 - 6 Drama
 - 7 Family
 - 8 Fantasy
 - 9 Foreign/Art House
 - 10 History/Biography
 - 11 Horror
 - 12 Musicals and Dance movies
 - 13 Romance
 - 14 Sci-fi
 - 15 Thrillers
 - 16 Other
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_HolsFreq

HolsFreq-

GRID

On average, how often do you go on holiday (including weekend breaks)...

- ...on your own?
 - ...with your partner and/or children?
 - ...with your partner?
 - ...with family?
 - ...with friends?
-

- 1 Twice a year or more
 - 2 Once a year
 - 3 Less than once a year
 - 4 Never
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_HolAct

HolAct-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

When you go on holiday, what do you spend your time doing? Please select as many of the options as apply:

- 1 Clubbing or going out
 - 2 Learning about local history or culture
 - 3 Reading
 - 4 Relaxing by doing as little as possible
 - 5 Sightseeing
 - 6 Shopping
 - 7 Trying local cuisine
 - 8 Taking part in organised group tours
 - 9 Taking part in organised group activities (such as hikes or treks, sports, or performances)
 - 10 Visiting places of natural beauty
 - 11 Other things not listed above
-

Page: FreeTimeHols_HolsActOthText

HolsActOthText-

OPEN TEXTBOX

You said that you do other things when you're on holiday. What are those things?

end module: FreeTimeHols

Module: SocNet

Page: SocNet_Intro

Now we're going to ask you about the people you know and the ways they might help you out.

Page: SocNet_WhoKnow

WhoKnow-

DYNAMIC GRID

Do you know anyone who does this sort of job?

Teacher, nurse, or social worker
Artist, musician, or performer
Secretary, office clerk, or call centre agent
Chief executive, finance manager, or military officer
Mechanic, plumber, electrician, gardener, or farmer
Postal worker, security guard, caretaker, machine operator or farm worker
Sales assistant, catering assistant, or receptionist
Military non-officer, labourer, porter, or cleaner
Bus, coach, lorry, or van driver
Waiter or waitress, or bar staff
Pub, shop, bank, office, or restaurant manager
Accountant, solicitor, or medical practitioner
Civil engineer, researcher or scientist
No job (long-term unemployed)

- 1 Yes
2 No
8 *Skipped*
9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: SocNet_FriendsNo

Friends_Daily-

SINGLE CHOICE

How many friends do you have who you see or are in contact with daily or nearly every day?

- 1 None
2 1 or 2
3 3 to 5
4 6 to 9
5 10 or more
8 *Skipped*
9 *Not Asked*
-

Friends_Weekly-

SINGLE CHOICE

And what about other friends who you see or are in contact with weekly or nearly every week?

- 1 None
 - 2 1 or 2
 - 3 3 to 5
 - 4 6 to 9
 - 5 10 or more
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Friends_Monthly-

SINGLE CHOICE

And now, what about other friends who you see or are in contact with monthly or nearly every month?

- 1 None
 - 2 1 or 2
 - 3 3 to 5
 - 4 6 to 9
 - 5 10 or more
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: SocNet_NeighboursKnow

NeighboursKnow-

SINGLE CHOICE

Roughly how many people, if any, do you know in your neighbourhood (excluding family members who live near you)?

- 1 None
 - 2 1 or 2
 - 3 3 to 5
 - 4 6 to 9
 - 5 10 or more
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: SocNet_NeighboursTalk

NeighboursTalk-

SINGLE CHOICE

How often, if at all, do you talk to any of your neighbours?

- 1 On most days
 - 2 Once or twice a week
 - 3 Once or twice a month
 - 4 Less than once a month
 - 5 Never
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: SocNet_FriendSex

FriendSex

RULE

Roughly what proportion of your friends are the same sex as you?

left	0%
right	100%

Page: SocNet_FriendSexDK

FriendSexDK-

RULE

You just moved on without answering this question.

Can you estimate roughly what proportion of your friends are the same sex as you?

left	0%
right	100%

Page: SocNet_FriendEth

FriendEth

RULE

Roughly what proportion of your friends are the same ethnic group as you?

left	0%
right	100%

Page: SocNet_FriendEthDK

FriendEthDK-

RULE

You just moved on without answering this question.

Can you estimate roughly what proportion of your friends are the same ethnic group as you?

left	0%
right	100%

Page: SocNet_FriendRel

FriendRel

RULE

Roughly what proportion of your friends have the same religious beliefs as you (including if you have no religious beliefs)?

left	0%
right	100%

Page: SocNet_FriendRelDK

FriendRelDK-

RULE

You just moved on without answering this question.

Can you estimate roughly what proportion of your friends have the same religious beliefs as you (including if you have no religious beliefs)?

left	0%
right	100%

Page: SocNet_FriendMeet

FriendHome-

SINGLE CHOICE

Roughly how often do you spend time with friends at your home or one of theirs?

- 1 Daily
 - 2 A couple of times a week
 - 3 Once a week
 - 4 Once a fortnight
 - 5 Once a month
 - 6 A few times a year
 - 7 Once a year or less often
 - 8 Never
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

FriendOut-

SINGLE CHOICE

Roughly how often do you go out with your friends?

- 1 Daily
- 2 A couple of times a week
- 3 Once a week
- 4 Once a fortnight
- 5 Once a month
- 6 A few times a year
- 7 Once a year or less often
- 8 Never
- 98 *Skipped*
- 99 *Not Asked*

ColleaguesOut-

SINGLE CHOICE

Roughly how often do you go out socially with your colleagues?

- 1 Daily
- 2 A couple of times a week
- 3 Once a week
- 4 Once a fortnight
- 5 Once a month
- 6 A few times a year
- 7 Once a year or less often
- 8 Never
- 98 *Skipped*
- 99 *Not Asked*

Page: SocNet_FamilyClose

FamilyCloseBy-

GRID

Apart from any relatives who you live with, how many close relatives live...

...within a 15-20 minutes walk or 5-10 minute drive?
...further away?

- 1 None
- 2 1 or 2
- 3 3 to 5
- 4 6 to 9
- 5 10 or more
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page: SocNet_HelpReceived

HelpReceived-

MULTIPLE CHOICE DYNAMIC GRID

Has anyone ever done the following things for you? Please select all the people that have helped you in these ways:

- Helped you write your C.V.
 - Given you career advice or asked someone they know to give you career advice
 - Searched for jobs or work experience for you
 - Contacted people they know to get you a job or work experience
 - Put in a good word for you with a potential employer
 - Offered you a job or work experience
 - Given you financial support or paid your fees when you were a student
 - Given you financial support (or paid debts) whilst you were unemployed or looking for work
 - Loaned you money in an emergency
 - Helped you financially when buying a house
 - Helped you move house
 - Helped you with childcare
 - Helped you in a crisis
-

- 1 Partner
 - 2 Family
 - 3 Friends
 - 4 Family friends
 - 5 Colleagues
 - 6 None of these groups
 - 7 Not applicable
-

Page: SocNet_HelpWouldGet

HelpWouldGet-

SINGLE CHOICE

Thinking generally, if you asked for help how likely do you think it is that you would receive it?

- 1 Very likely
 - 2 Likely
 - 3 Unlikely
 - 4 Very unlikely
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

HelpWouldAsk-

SINGLE CHOICE

And finally, would you ask for help if you needed it?

- 1 Definitely
- 2 Probably
- 3 Probably not
- 4 Definitely not
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

end module: SocNet

Questionnaire

Appendix B: Full Wave 2 Survey

**Questionnaire
Final_Wave2_vvU_J
G_14_03_28_G4**



Joe Greenwood

Final Version

2014-04-08

11:43:08

Page: ViewsPol_Intro

Thank you for taking this survey, which is about your interest in politics, views on British society, and background. Your YouGov Account will be credited with 75 points for completing the survey. We have tested the survey and found that, on average it takes around 17 to 20 minutes to complete. This time may vary depending on factors such as your Internet connection speed and the answers you give. Please click the forward button to continue.

Page: ViewsPol_SISE

SISE-

SCALE

Before we start the main questions, we'd just like to ask how true the following statement is of you: I have high self-esteem

min	1
max	7

Page: ViewsPol_PolForYou1

Now we're moving on to some questions about politics.

PolForYou1-

SINGLE CHOICE

First, generally speaking to what extent do you think that politics is for people like you?

- 1 Completely
 - 2 Largely
 - 3 Somewhat
 - 4 Not really
 - 5 Not at all
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_PolPers1

PolPers1-

SINGLE CHOICE

And to what extent would you describe yourself as a political person?

- 1 Completely
 - 2 Largely
 - 3 Somewhat
 - 4 Not really
 - 5 Not at all
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_IntNat

IntNat-

SINGLE CHOICE

How much attention, if any, do you pay to what's going on in national politics?

- 1 A great deal
 - 2 Quite a lot
 - 3 Some
 - 4 Hardly any
 - 5 None at all
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_IntLoc

IntLoc-

SINGLE CHOICE

And thinking about your local community, how much attention, if any, do you pay to local politics?

- 1 A great deal
 - 2 Quite a lot
 - 3 Some
 - 4 Hardly any
 - 5 None at all
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_DiscNat

DiscNat-

SINGLE CHOICE

Generally speaking, how often do you discuss national politics?

- 1 Every day or almost every day
 - 2 A few times a week
 - 3 Once or twice a week
 - 4 A few times a month
 - 5 Once or twice a month
 - 6 A few times a year
 - 7 A couple of times a year or less
 - 8 Never
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_DiscLoc

DiscLoc-

SINGLE CHOICE

And generally speaking, how often do you discuss local politics with others?

- 1 Every day or almost every day
 - 2 A few times a week
 - 3 Once or twice a week
 - 4 A few times a month
 - 5 Once or twice a month
 - 6 A few times a year
 - 7 A couple of times a year or less
 - 8 Never
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_RealComfDiscWell

RealComfDiscWell-

SINGLE CHOICE

Generally speaking, when you discuss politics with people who you know well how confident are you in expressing your views?

- 1 Very confident
 - 2 Confident
 - 3 Fairly confident
 - 4 Not very confident
 - 5 Not at all confident
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

ViewsPol_HypComfDiscNotWell

HypComfDiscNotWell-

SINGLE CHOICE

And generally speaking, if you were discussing politics with some people who you'd just met how confident would you be in expressing your views?

- 1 Very confident
 - 2 Confident
 - 3 Fairly confident
 - 4 Not very confident
 - 5 Not at all confident
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_Understand

Understand-

SINGLE CHOICE

To what extent do you agree or disagree that it is generally hard for you to understand what is going on in government and politics?

- 1 Strongly agree
 - 2 Agree
 - 3 Tend to agree
 - 4 Tend to disagree
 - 5 Disagree
 - 6 Strongly disagree
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_KnowPerc

KnowPerc-

SINGLE CHOICE

How much would you say that you know about British politics?

- 1 A great deal
 - 2 Quite a lot
 - 3 A little bit
 - 4 Hardly anything
 - 5 Nothing
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_KnowVenue

KnowVenue-

SINGLE CHOICE

Off the top of your head, can you think of a place in your local area that you could use if you wanted to arrange a public meeting or set up a group?

- 1 There aren't any places like that in my local area
 - 2 I can't think of any places like that in my local area
 - 3 I have an idea of a place or some places that I might be able to use
 - 4 I definitely know a place or some places that I could use
 - 5 I don't know whether there are any places like that in my local area
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_KnowLetter

KnowLetter-

SINGLE CHOICE

Many people don't know whether MPs are required to respond to contact from them. Do you know which of the following statements is true?

- 1 MPs are not required to reply to letters or emails that they receive, regardless of who they come from
 - 2 MPs are required to reply to all letters or emails that they receive from their constituents
 - 3 MPs are required to reply to all letters or emails that they receive from British citizens
 - 4 Don't know
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_KnowMP

knowMP-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which of the following people is the MP in your UK parliamentary constituency?

- 1 John Robertson
 - 2 Mary Davies
 - 3 Susan Stewart
 - 4 David Johnston
 - 5 [correct local MP]
 - 6 Salaam Fadhil
 - 7 Don't know
- 998 *Skipped*
- 999 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_MPsPrivSch

MPsPrivSchRule-

RULE

What percentage of Members of Parliament do you think were privately educated?

right	100%
left	0%

Page: ViewsPol_Knowledge

Knowledge-

DYNAMIC GRID

Please match the following people to their jobs:

Ed Miliband

Nick Clegg

Justine Greening

Theresa May

John Bercow

- 1 International Development Secretary
 - 2 Deputy Prime Minister
 - 3 Leader of the Labour Party
 - 4 Home secretary
 - 5 Speaker of the House of Commons
 - 6 Work and Pensions Secretary
 - 7 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

LeftRight-

DYNAMIC GRID

Generally speaking, how much do you agree or disagree that...

... it's not government's job to redistribute income from the better off to those who are less well off?

...big business takes advantage of ordinary people?

...ordinary working people get their fair share of the nation's wealth?

...there is one law for the rich and one for the poor?

...management will always try to take advantage of employees if it gets the chance?

...private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic problems?

-
- 1 Strongly disagree
 - 2 Tend to disagree
 - 3 Both disagree and agree
 - 4 Tend to agree
 - 5 Strongly agree
 - 6 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_LibAuth

LibAuth-

DYNAMIC GRID

Generally speaking, how much do you agree or disagree that...

...people in Britain should be more tolerant of people who lead unconventional lives?

...for some crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence?

...schools should stress the importance of obeying authority to children?

...people should always be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government?

...people who break the law should be given stiffer sentences than they are at present?

...even political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should not be banned?

-
- 1 Strongly disagree
- 2 Tend to disagree
- 3 Both disagree and agree
- 4 Tend to agree
- 5 Strongly agree
- 6 Don't know
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_SysInfluence

SysInfluence-

GRID

Generally speaking, how much influence would you say that members of the public have over decisions affecting relevant policies in...

...their local area (within 20 minutes walk of their homes)?

...their city or region?

...the United Kingdom?

-
- 1 None at all
- 2 Hardly any
- 3 A little bit
- 4 Quite a lot
- 5 A great deal
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_IndInfluence

IndInfluence-

GRID

Compared to most people, how much influence would you say that you have over decisions affecting relevant policies in...

...your local area (within 20 minutes walk of your home)?

...your city or region?

...the United Kingdom?

- 1 Much less
 - 2 Slightly less
 - 3 About the same
 - 4 Slightly more
 - 5 Much more
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_RepLoc

RepLoc-

SINGLE CHOICE

Generally speaking, if you had a complaint about a something that your council was doing and took it to your councillor, how much attention do you think that they would pay to what you say?

- 1 A great deal
 - 2 Quite a lot
 - 3 A little bit
 - 4 Hardly any
 - 5 None at all
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_RepNat

RepNat-

SINGLE CHOICE

Generally speaking, if you had a complaint about a national political issue and took it to your MP, how much attention do you think that they would pay to what you say?

- 1 A great deal
 - 2 Quite a lot
 - 3 A little bit
 - 4 Hardly any
 - 5 None at all
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_MPsLoseTouch

MPsLoseTouch-

SINGLE CHOICE

Generally speaking, which of the following statements best represents whether the people we elect as MPs are in touch with the public?

- 1 They stay in touch with the public even once they're elected
 - 2 They lose touch with the public once they're elected
 - 3 They were never in touch with the public in the first place
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_LeftRightSelf

LeftRightSelfGrid-

GRID

In politics, people talk of 'left wing' and 'right wing'. Where would you place your views, generally speaking?

- 1 Left wing
 - 2
 - 3
 - 4
 - 5
 - 6
 - 7
 - 8
 - 9
 - 10 Right wing
 - 11 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_PartyID

PartyID-

SINGLE CHOICE

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National Party(SNP) or Plaid Cymru, or don't you usually think of yourself as any of these things?

- 1 Yes - Labour
 - 2 Yes - Conservative
 - 3 Yes - Liberal Democrat
 - 4 Yes - Scottish National Party (SNP)
 - 5 Yes - Plaid Cymru
 - 6 Yes - Green Party
 - 7 Yes - UK Independence Party (UKIP)
 - 8 Yes - British National Party (BNP)
 - 9 Yes some other party
 - 10 No don't think of myself as any of these
 - 11 Don't know
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsPol_PartyCloser

PartyCloser-

SINGLE CHOICE

Do you feel a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?

- 1 Yes - Labour
 - 2 Yes - Conservative
 - 3 Yes - Liberal Democrat
 - 4 Yes - Scottish National Party (SNP)
 - 5 Yes - Plaid Cymru
 - 6 Yes - Green Party
 - 7 Yes - UK Independence Party (UKIP)
 - 8 Yes - British National Party (BNP)
 - 9 Yes - some other party
 - 10 No - I don't feel closer to any of these
 - 11 Don't know
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_PastVote

PastVote-

SINGLE CHOICE

Thinking back to the General Election in May 2010, do you remember which party you voted for then - or perhaps you didn't vote?

- 1 Did not vote
 - 2 Conservative Party
 - 3 Labour Party
 - 4 Liberal Democrats
 - 5 Scottish National Party
 - 6 Plaid Cymru
 - 7 British National Party (BNP)
 - 8 Green Party
 - 9 Respect
 - 10 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
 - 11 Some other party
 - 12 Don't know
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

end module: ViewsPol

Module: ViewsImpBack

Page: ViewsImpBack_Intro

Now we're going to ask you about some of your views about British society and your place in it. Remember, these questions are about your opinions so there are no right or wrong answers; it's just important to us that you answer truthfully.

Page: ViewsImpBack_Trust

TrustGrid-

GRID

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

- 1 You can't be too careful about people
 - 2
 - 3
 - 4
 - 5
 - 6
 - 7
 - 8
 - 9
 - 10 Most people can be trusted
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsImpBack_ReasStatMult

ReasStatMult-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Which of the following do you think are reasons for some people achieving higher status than others? Please select all the options that you think have any effect on the status that people achieve:

- 1 Because they have been lucky
 - 2 Because they work hard
 - 3 It's an inevitable part of modern life
 - 4 Because of their backgrounds
 - 5 Because they are ambitious
 - 6 Because of inequality based on things like sex, race, and religion
 - 7 Other things not covered above
-

Page: ViewsImpBack_ReasStatOth

ReasStatOth-

OPEN TEXTBOX

You said that there are other reasons for some people achieving higher status than others. What are those reasons?

Page:

ViewsImpBack_ReasStatRankLes

ReasStatRankLes-

RANKING

Please rank the reasons that you selected in order of their importance for the status that people achieve:

- 1 Because they have been lucky
 - 2 Because they work hard
 - 3 It's an inevitable part of modern life
 - 4 Because of their backgrounds
 - 5 Because they are ambitious
 - 6 Because of inequality based on things like sex, race, and religion
 - 7 The other reasons you listed
-

Page: ViewsImpBack_StatBreak

Now we'd like to ask you about the things that have contributed to the social status that you have achieved.

Page:

ViewsImpBack_BackImpSelfRank

BackImpSelfRank-

RANKING

Which of the reasons that we've asked about have played the most important part in the social status that you have achieved? If you think an option has not played a part in the social status that you have achieved then you do not need to rank it:

- 1 Luck
 - 2 Hard work
 - 3 Inevitable status differences in modern life
 - 4 Background
 - 5 Ambition
 - 6 Inequality based on things like sex, race, and religion
 - 7 Other reasons
-

Page:

ViewsImpBack_ReasStatBackNot

ReasStatBackNot-

SINGLE CHOICE

You didn't rank background as one of the reasons for the social status that you have achieved. Do you think that your background has played any part at all in the social status that you have achieved?

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

ViewsImpBack_BackImpPosNeg

BackImpPosNegGrid-

GRID

Using this scale, where -5 equals "very negative" and 5 equals "very positive", please indicate whether your own background has had a negative or positive impact on the social status you have achieved:

- 1 -5 very negative
 - 2 -4
 - 3 -3
 - 4 -2
 - 5 -1
 - 6 0 Equally positive and negative
 - 7 1
 - 8 2
 - 9 3
 - 10 4
 - 11 5 very positive
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

ViewsImpBack_IndStatGenMult

IndStatGenMult-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Which of the following things, for you, are indicators of people's status? Please select all the things that you think indicate people's status:

- 1 Their appearance and dress
- 2 The way they speak
- 3 Their ideas
- 4 Their cultural interests and activities
- 5 The things they buy or own
- 6 Their type of occupation
- 7 Their education
- 8 Who they know
- 9 Where they live
- 10 Their income
- 11 Other things not covered above

Page: ViewsImpBack_IndStatGenOth

IndStatGenOth-

OPEN TEXTBOX

You said that there are other indicators of people's status. What are those indicators?

Page:

ViewsImpBack_IndStatGenRankLes

IndStatGenRankLes-

RANKING

Please rank the options that you selected according to which is the most important indicator of people's status:

- 1 x Their appearance and dress
- 2 x The way they speak
- 3 x Their ideas
- 4 x Their cultural interests and activities
- 5 x The things they buy or own
- 6 x Their type of occupation
- 7 x Their education
- 8 x Who they know
- 9 x Where they live
- 10 x Their income
- 11 x The other things you listed

Page: ViewsImpBack_IndStatPolMult

IndStatPolMult-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Now please think about people who get involved in politics. Do you think any of the things we've asked about make them different from you? Please select all the options that you think make people who get involved in politics different from you:

- 1 Their appearance and dress
- 2 The way they speak
- 3 Their ideas
- 4 Their cultural interests and activities
- 5 The things they buy or own
- 6 Their type of occupation
- 7 Their education
- 8 Who they know
- 9 Where they live
- 10 Their income
- 11 Other things not covered above
- 12 The same things I ranked in the last question also make people who get involved in politics different from me
- 13 Nothing makes people who get involved in politics different from me

Page: ViewsImpBack_IndStatPolOth

IndStatPolOth-

OPEN TEXTBOX

You said that there are other things that make people who get involved in politics different from you. What are those things?

Page:

ViewsImpBack_IndStatPolRankLes

IndStatPolRankLes-

RANKING

Please rank the options that you selected according to which makes people who get involved in politics most different from you:

- 1 x Their appearance and dress
- 2 x The way they speak
- 3 x Their ideas
- 4 x Their cultural interests and activities
- 5 x The things they buy or own
- 6 x Their type of occupation
- 7 x Their education
- 8 x Who they know
- 9 x Where they live
- 10 x Their income
- 11 x The other things you listed

Page: ViewsImpBack_LadSoc1

LadSoc1-

RANKING

Imagine that all the people in society are on different rungs of the ladder shown below in terms of their status. Those with the lowest status are on rung 10. Those with the highest status are on rung 1. Compared to people in society in general, which rung are you on?

- 1 x People in society
 - 2 x People in society
 - 3 x People in society
 - 4 x People in society
 - 5 x People in society
 - 6 x You
 - 7 x People in society
 - 8 x People in society
 - 9 x People in society
 - 10 x People in society
-

Page: ViewsImpBack_LadKnow1

LadKnow1-

RANKING

Now imagine that the people you know personally are on different rungs of the same ladder. Again, those with the highest status are on rung 1 and those with the lowest status are on rung 10. In your opinion which rung are you on?

- 1 x People you know
 - 2 x People you know
 - 3 x People you know
 - 4 x People you know
 - 5 x People you know
 - 6 x You
 - 7 x People you know
 - 8 x People you know
 - 9 x People you know
 - 10 x People you know
-

Page: ViewsImpBack_SocClaSelfFil

SocClaSelfFil-

SINGLE CHOICE

Do you feel like you belong to a particular social class?

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

ViewsImpBack_SocClaSelfOpen

SocClaSelfOpen-

OPEN TEXTBOX

What social class do you feel you belong to? Please write your answer:

Page: ViewsImpBack_PolPrivSelf

PolPrivSelf-

GRID

Generally speaking, how much more or less privileged than you do you think the following people are?

People who become politicians
People who get involved in
politics generally

- 1 A lot less privileged than me
 - 2 Less privileged than me
 - 3 A little less privileged than me
 - 4 About equally privileged to me
 - 5 A little more privileged than me
 - 6 More privileged than me
 - 7 A lot more privileged than me
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsImpBack_PolPrivPop

PolPrivPop-

GRID

And generally speaking, how much more or less privileged than most people in the population do you think that those people are?

People who become politicians
People who get involved in
politics generally

- 1 Much less privileged
 - 2 Less privileged
 - 3 A little less privileged
 - 4 About equally privileged
 - 5 A little more privileged
 - 6 More privileged
 - 7 Much more privileged
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: ViewsImpBack_PrivDef

PrivDef-

OPEN TEXTBOX

If you hear people talking about someone being 'privileged', what kinds of things come to your mind?

end module: ViewsImpBack

Module: UpbringCurrCirc

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_Intro

Finally, we're going to ask you some questions about your background and current circumstances.

Page: pdl_Ethnicity

Ethnicity-

SINGLE CHOICE

To which of these groups do you consider you belong?

- 1 White British
- 2 Any other white background
- 3 White and Black Caribbean
- 4 White and Black African
- 5 White and Asian
- 6 Any other mixed background
- 7 Indian
- 8 Pakistani
- 9 Bangladeshi
- 10 Any other Asian background
- 11 Black Caribbean
- 12 Black African
- 13 Any other black background
- 14 Chinese
- 15 Other ethnic group
- 16 Prefer not to say

98 *Skipped*

99 *Not Asked*

Page: pdl_Sexuality

Sexuality-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which of the following best describes your sexuality?

- 1 Heterosexual
 - 2 Gay or lesbian
 - 3 Bisexual
 - 4 Other
 - 5 Prefer not to say
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ParentWork

ParentWork-

GRID

Thinking about when you were 14, did your mother or father have paid employment?

Mother

Father

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 3 Not applicable
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_MotherWork

Please explain a bit more about your mother's work when you were 14. Please give enough information to give a clear picture of what she did.

MotherOcc-

OPEN TEXTBOX

What job did your mother have? What was the name or title of her job?

MotherOrg-

OPEN TEXTBOX

What did the firm or organisation your mother worked at when you were 14 mainly make or do?

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_MotherOccStatus

MotherOccStatus-

SINGLE CHOICE

Was your mother an employee or self-employed/an independent contractor?

- 1 An employee
- 2 Self-employed/an independent contractor
- 3 Don't know
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_MotherOccSupervise

MotherOccSupervise-

SINGLE CHOICE

Did your mother supervise or was she responsible for the work of any other people?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_MotherOccOrgSize

MotherOccOrgSize-

SINGLE CHOICE

About how many people worked for your mother's employer at the place where she worked?

- 1 1 to 24 employees
- 2 25 to 499 employees
- 3 500 or more employees
- 4 Don't know
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_MotherOccEmployees

MotherOccEmployees-

SINGLE CHOICE

Did your mother work on her own or did she have employees?

- 1 She did not have employees
- 2 She had employees
- 3 Don't know
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_MotherNumEmployees

MotherNumEmployees-

SINGLE CHOICE

How many people did she employ at the place she worked?

- 1 1 to 24 employees
- 2 25 to 499 employees
- 3 500 or more employees
- 99 Don't know
- 998 *Skipped*
- 999 *Not Asked*

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_FatherWork

Please explain a bit about your father's job when you were 14. Please give enough information to give a clear picture of what he did.

FatherOcc-

OPEN TEXTBOX

What job did your father have? What was the name or title of his job?

FatherOrg-

OPEN TEXTBOX

What did the firm or organisation your father worked at when you were 14 mainly make or do?

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_FatherOccStatus

FatherOccStatus-

SINGLE CHOICE

Was your father an employee or self-employed/an independent contractor?

- 1 An employee
- 2 Self-employed/an independent contractor
- 3 Don't know
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_FatherOccSupervis

e

FatherOccSupervise-

SINGLE CHOICE

Did your father supervise or was he responsible for the work of any other people?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 3 Don't know
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_FatherOccOrgSize

FatherOccOrgSize-

SINGLE CHOICE

About how many people worked for your father's employer at the place where he worked?

- 1 1 to 24 employees
 - 2 25 to 499 employees
 - 3 500 or more employees
 - 4 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_FatherOccEmployees

FatherOccEmployees-

SINGLE CHOICE

Did your father work on his own or did he have employees?

- 1 He did not have employees
 - 2 He had employees
 - 3 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_FatherNumEmployees

FatherNumEmployees-

SINGLE CHOICE

How many people did he employ at the place he worked?

- 1 1 to 24 employees
 - 2 25 to 499 employees
 - 3 500 or more employees
 - 4 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page:
UpbringCurrCirc_MotherEdLev

MotherEdLev-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which of the following best describes the highest educational level that your mother finished?

- 1 Never finished school
 - 2 O-Levels
 - 3 GCEs
 - 4 GCSEs
 - 5 A-Levels
 - 6 Undergraduate Degree
 - 7 Postgraduate Degree
 - 8 Other
 - 9 Not applicable
 - 10 Don't know
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_FatherEdLev

FatherEdLev-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which of the following best describes the highest educational level that your father finished?

- 1 Never finished school
 - 2 O-Levels
 - 3 GCEs
 - 4 GCSEs
 - 5 A-Levels
 - 6 Undergraduate Degree
 - 7 Postgraduate Degree
 - 8 Other
 - 9 Not applicable
 - 10 Don't know
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_EducAge

Now we're moving on from your parents to think about your own education.

EducAge-

SINGLE CHOICE

At what age did you finish full-time education?

- 1 15 or under
- 2 16
- 3 17-18
- 4 19
- 5 20+
- 6 Still at school/Full time student
- 7 Can't remember
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_SchTypLast

SchTypLast-

SINGLE CHOICE

What type of school or college did you last attend?

- 1 Academy
- 2 City Technology College
- 3 Comprehensive School
- 4 Faith School
- 5 Foundation or Trust School
- 6 Grammar School
- 7 Independent (Private) School
- 8 Secondary Modern School
- 9 Other State Secondary School
(including Community Colleges)
- 10 State Sixth Form College (separate from
a school)
- 11 Other - please specify the type:
- 12 Not applicable
- 98 *Skipped*
- 99 *Not Asked*

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_SchTypPriMid

SchTypPriMid-

SINGLE CHOICE

And did you attend an independent (private) school at primary or middle-school level?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_SchFees

SchFees-

SINGLE CHOICE

How were the fees paid?

- 1 My parents/guardians paid them in full (including if they had help from other family members)
 - 2 The school covered them in part (for instance through a scholarship) but my family paid the rest
 - 3 The school covered them in full (for instance through a scholarship)
 - 4 Other
 - 5 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_Region

Region-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which area of the UK do you live in?

- 1 North East
 - 2 North West
 - 3 Yorkshire and the Humber
 - 4 East Midlands
 - 5 West Midlands
 - 6 East of England
 - 7 London
 - 8 South East
 - 9 South West
 - 10 Wales
 - 11 Scotland
 - 12 Northern Ireland
 - 13 Non UK & Invalid
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Show if 0

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ChilReg

ChilReg-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which area of the UK did you grow up in?

- 1 North East
- 2 North West
- 3 Yorkshire and the Humber
- 4 East Midlands
- 5 West Midlands
- 6 East of England
- 7 London
- 8 South East
- 9 South West
- 10 Wales
- 11 Scotland
- 12 Northern Ireland
- 13 I grew up elsewhere in Europe
- 14 I grew up outside Europe

98 *Skipped*

99 *Not Asked*

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_AccentYesNo

AccentYesNo-

SINGLE CHOICE

Would you say that you have a regional accent?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No

8 *Skipped*

9 *Not Asked*

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_AccentText

AccentText-

OPEN TEXTBOX

How would you describe your accent?

Page: pdl_PersInc

PersInc-

SINGLE CHOICE

Gross PERSONAL income is an individual's total income received from all sources, including wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions...What is your gross personal income?

- 1 under £5,000 per year
- 2 £5,000 to £9,999 per year
- 3 £10,000 to £14,999 per year
- 4 £15,000 to £19,999 per year
- 5 £20,000 to £24,999 per year
- 6 £25,000 to £29,999 per year
- 7 £30,000 to £34,999 per year
- 8 £35,000 to £39,999 per year
- 9 £40,000 to £44,999 per year
- 10 £45,000 to £49,999 per year
- 11 £50,000 to £59,999 per year
- 12 £60,000 to £69,999 per year
- 13 £70,000 to £99,999 per year
- 14 £100,000 and over
- 15 Don't know
- 16 Prefer not to answer

98 *Skipped*

99 *Not Asked*

Page: pdl_HousInc

HousInc-

SINGLE CHOICE

Gross HOUSEHOLD income is the combined income of all those earners in a household from all sources, including wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions. What is your gross household income?

- 1 under £5,000 per year
 - 2 £5,000 to £9,999 per year
 - 3 £10,000 to £14,999 per year
 - 4 £15,000 to £19,999 per year
 - 5 £20,000 to £24,999 per year
 - 6 £25,000 to £29,999 per year
 - 7 £30,000 to £34,999 per year
 - 8 £35,000 to £39,999 per year
 - 9 £40,000 to £44,999 per year
 - 10 £45,000 to £49,999 per year
 - 11 £50,000 to £59,999 per year
 - 12 £60,000 to £69,999 per year
 - 13 £70,000 to £99,999 per year
 - 14 £100,000 to £149,999 per year
 - 15 £150,000 and over
 - 16 Don't know
 - 17 Prefer not to answer
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_Property

Property-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Which, if any, of the following do you own?

- 1 Residential property for own use – owned outright
 - 2 Residential property for own use – on mortgage
 - 3 Residential property rented out to others
 - 4 Plot of land over 1 acre with no development
 - 5 Commercial property - i.e. property used for business purposes, either used by yourself or rented to someone else
 - 98 Not sure
 - 99 None of these
-

Assets-

SINGLE CHOICE

Please can you provide an estimate of the total value of your wealth and assets?

This includes, for example, your savings, investments, shares, stock and option holdings in the company you work for, properties you own OTHER THAN YOUR MAIN RESIDENCE, works of art and other collectible items, and your pension fund IF YOU ARE RETIRED.

Please exclude the value of your main home that you live in, any businesses that you own, your pension fund if you are not retired and please subtract the value of any debts secured against your assets, e.g. a mortgage you might have on a second home.

- 1 Up to £9,999
 - 2 £10,000 to £24,999
 - 3 £25,000 to £49,999
 - 4 £50,000 to £74,999
 - 5 £75,000 to £99,999
 - 6 £100,000 to £249,999
 - 7 £250,000 to £499,999
 - 8 £500,000 to £749,999
 - 9 £750,000 to £999,999
 - 10 £1 million to £1,999,999
 - 11 £2 million to £4,999,999
 - 12 £5 million to £9,999,999
 - 13 £10 million to £19,999,999
 - 14 £20 million or more
 - 99 Don't know
 - 100 Prefer not to answer
 - 998 *Skipped*
 - 999 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_Debts

Debts-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which one of the following statements BEST describes how well you (and your partner if you live with someone else) are keeping up with your bills and credit commitments at the moment?

- 1 I am/we are keeping up with all bills and commitments without any difficulties
 - 2 I am/we are keeping up with all bills and commitments, but it is a struggle from time to time
 - 3 I am/we are keeping all bills and commitments, but it is a constant struggle
 - 4 I am/we are falling behind with some bills or credit commitments
 - 5 I am/we are having real financial problems and have fallen behind with many bills or credit commitments
 - 6 I/we don't have any bills or credit commitments
 - 7 Don't know
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_Benefits

Benefits-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Which, if any, of the following government benefits are you currently claiming?

- 1 Council tax reductions
 - 2 Disability benefit
 - 3 Carers allowance
 - 4 Housing benefits
 - 5 Means-tested benefits
 - 6 Health benefits
 - 7 Heating benefits
 - 8 Child benefit
 - 9 Child tax credit
 - 10 Income support
 - 11 Pension credit
 - 12 The Social Fund
 - 98 Prefer not to say
 - 99 None of these
-

Page: pdl_Disability

Disability-

SINGLE CHOICE

Are your day-to-day activities limited because of a health problem or disability which has lasted, or is expected to last, at least 12 months?

- 1 Yes, limited a lot
 - 2 Yes, limited a little
 - 3 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_Health

Health-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Have you been diagnosed with any of the following? Please tick all that apply.

- 1 Alzheimer's
 - 2 Arthritis - Osteoarthritis
 - 3 Arthritis - rheumatoid arthritis
 - 4 Arthritis - other / unsure which type
 - 5 Asthma
 - 6 Autism
 - 7 Cancer
 - 8 Cerebral Palsy
 - 9 Cystic fibrosis
 - 10 Dementia
 - 11 Diabetes
 - 12 Dyslexia
 - 13 Epilepsy
 - 14 Hearing impairment
 - 15 HIV/ Aids
 - 16 Multiple Sclerosis
 - 17 Osteoporosis
 - 18 Parkinson's disease
 - 19 Mental health illness
 - 100 Prefer not to say
 - 99 None of these
-

Page: pdl_Children

Children-

SINGLE CHOICE

How many children do you have, including those who are now aged 18 or over?

- 0 None
 - 1 1
 - 2 2
 - 3 3
 - 4 4
 - 5 5
 - 6 6
 - 7 7
 - 8 8 or more
 - 100 Prefer not to say
 - 998 *Skipped*
 - 999 *Not Asked*
-

Page:

UpbringCurrCirc_CarRespNoChi

CarRespNoChi-

SINGLE CHOICE

Do you have caring responsibilities for anyone?

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_CarRespChi

CarRespChi-

SINGLE CHOICE

Do you have caring responsibilities for anyone other than your children?

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: pdl_Religion

Religion-

SINGLE CHOICE

Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion, and if so, to which of these do you belong?

- 1 No, I do not regard myself as belonging to any particular religion.
 - 2 Yes - Church of England/Anglican/Episcopal
 - 3 Yes - Roman Catholic
 - 4 Yes - Presbyterian/Church of Scotland
 - 5 Yes - Methodist
 - 6 Yes - Baptist
 - 17 Yes - Orthodox
 - 18 Yes - Pentecostal (e.g. Assemblies of God, Elim Pentecostal Church, New Testament Church of God, Redeemed Christian Church of God)
 - 19 Yes - Evangelical – independent/non-denominational (e.g. FIEC, Pioneer, Vineyard, Newfrontiers)
 - 7 Yes - United Reformed Church
 - 8 Yes - Free Presbyterian
 - 9 Yes - Brethren
 - 10 Yes - Judaism
 - 11 Yes - Hinduism
 - 12 Yes - Islam
 - 13 Yes - Sikhism
 - 14 Yes - Buddhism
 - 15 Yes - Other
 - 16 Prefer not to say
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligAttend

ReligAttend-

SINGLE CHOICE

How often do you attend religious services?

- 1 Never
 - 2 Less than once a month
 - 3 Once a month
 - 4 2-3 times a month
 - 5 Once a week
 - 6 2-3 times a Week
 - 7 Daily
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligInst

ReligInst-

SINGLE CHOICE

Do you belong to, or are you a member of, a religious institution in your local area or a nearby area?

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligPar

ReligPar-

SINGLE CHOICE

When you attend services do you usually go to the same congregation or parish?

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligVol

ReligVol-

SINGLE CHOICE

Other than attending services, in the past twelve months have you been an active member of your congregation by serving on a committee, giving time for a special project, or helping to organise meetings?

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligVolTim

ReligVolTim-

SINGLE CHOICE

In an average week about how many hours do you give to religious activity other than attending services? For instance, how many hours do you give to participating in educational, charitable, or social activities, or in other congregation affairs?

- 1 Four hours or more
- 2 Between two and four hours
- 3 Between one and two hours
- 4 One hour or less
- 5 None
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligOfficPos

ReligOfficPos-

SINGLE CHOICE

In the past five years, have you served on a board or held an official position in your congregation?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligDonat

ReligDonat-

SINGLE CHOICE

Roughly how much money do you contribute to your religion each year?

- 1 £500 or more
- 2 Between £250 and £500
- 3 Between £100 and £250
- 4 Between £50 and £100
- 5 £50 or less
- 6 Nothing
- 8 *Skipped*
- 9 *Not Asked*

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_CivSkillRel

CivSkillRel-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Here is a list of things that people are sometimes asked to do as part of their involvement with a religious congregation. Have you engaged in any of these activities in the last six months? Please select all of those that apply.

- 1 Written a letter
 - 2 Gone to a meeting where you took part in making decisions
 - 3 Planned or chaired a meeting
 - 4 Given a presentation or speech
 - 5 None of these
-

Page: pdl_Newspaper

Newspaper-

SINGLE CHOICE

Which daily newspaper do you read most often?

- 1 The Express
 - 2 The Daily Mail / The Scottish Daily Mail
 - 3 The Mirror / Daily Record
 - 4 The Daily Star / The Daily Star of Scotland
 - 5 The Sun
 - 6 The Daily Telegraph
 - 7 The Financial Times
 - 8 The Guardian
 - 9 The Independent
 - 10 The Times
 - 11 The Scotsman
 - 12 The Herald (Glasgow)
 - 13 The Western Mail
 - 14 Other local daily morning newspaper
 - 15 Other Newspaper
 - 16 None
 - 98 *Skipped*
 - 99 *Not Asked*
-

Magazines-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Which, if any, of the following types of magazine do you ever read?

- 1 Fashion
 - 2 Beauty
 - 3 Celebrity/Gossip
 - 4 Real life stories
 - 5 Home
 - 6 Gardening
 - 7 Sport (excluding football)
 - 8 News/Topical
 - 9 Financial/Economic
 - 10 Professional/Trade (i.e. magazines for specific professions or industries)
 - 11 Political
 - 12 Health/Fitness
 - 13 Technology
 - 14 Music
 - 15 Automotive
 - 16 Food/Cooking
 - 17 Business
 - 18 Art
 - 19 Gaming
 - 20 Travel
 - 21 Men's interests/lifestyle
 - 22 Women's interests/lifestyle
 - 23 Parenting
 - 24 Family
 - 27 Hobbies
 - 28 Football
 - 97 Other (open [Magazines_Other])
 - 99 Not applicable - I do not read any type of magazine
-

Page: pdl_Radio

Radio-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Which, if any, of the following radio stations do you ever listen to?

- 1 Absolute Radio
 - 2 BBC Radio 1
 - 3 BBC Radio 1Xtra
 - 4 BBC Radio 2
 - 5 BBC Radio 3
 - 6 BBC Radio 4
 - 7 BBC Radio 5 Live
 - 8 BBC Asian Network
 - 9 BBC World Service
 - 10 Classic FM
 - 11 Smooth FM
 - 12 talkSPORT
 - 13 Capital FM
 - 14 Choice FM
 - 15 Gold
 - 16 Heart
 - 17 Kerrang!
 - 18 Kiss
 - 19 LBC 97.3
 - 20 Magic 105.4
 - 21 XFM
 - 22 Other local commercial radio station
(open [Radio_OtherLocal])
 - 23 Other local BBC radio station (open
[Radio_OtherBBC])
 - 98 Don't know
 - 99 None of the above
-

Page: pdl_TV

TV-

MULTIPLE CHOICE

Which, if any, of the following TV channels do you ever watch (including any +1 or catch-up/on-demand services)? (Please select all that apply)

Questionnaire

- 1 BBC One
 - 3 BBC Two
 - 2 BBC Three
 - 49 BBC Four
 - 4 ITV1 (or STV/UTV)
 - 5 ITV2
 - 6 ITV3
 - 7 ITV4
 - 8 Channel 4
 - 9 E4
 - 10 More 4
 - 11 Channel 5
 - 12 Sky 1, 2 or 3
 - 13 Sky Atlantic
 - 14 Sky Living
 - 15 Dave
 - 16 G.O.L.D
 - 17 S4C
 - 18 Hallmark Channel
 - 19 CBS Action
 - 20 CBS Drama
 - 21 CBS Reality
 - 22 Challenge
 - 23 Comedy Central
 - 24 E! Entertainment
 - 25 Sky Arts (1 or 2)
 - 26 Discovery Channel
 - 50 National Geographic
 - 27 Good Food
 - 28 Home
 - 29 MTV (any MTV channel)
 - 30 VH1
 - 31 ESPN
 - 33 Sky Movies (any Sky Movies channel)
 - 34 Film 4
 - 35 TNT
 - 36 Pick TV
 - 37 Quest
 - 38 Sky News
 - 39 BBC News
 - 40 Bloomberg
 - 41 CNBC
 - 42 CNN
 - 43 al-Jazeera
 - 44 Russia Today
 - 45 Euro News
 - 46 Sky Sports 1, 2, 3 or 4
 - 47 Sky Sports News
 - 51 Disney (any Disney channel)
 - 52 cBeebies
 - 53 Nickledeon
 - 54 4Music
 - 55 4Seven
 - 56 5 USA
 - 57 5*
 - 58 BT Sport (1 or 2)
 - 59 Eden
 - 60 Kiss TV
 - 61 Smash Hits
 - 62 The Box
-

Questionnaire

- 63 TLC
 - 64 Viva
 - 65 Watch
 - 66 Yesterday
 - 98 Don't know
 - 99 None of the above
-

Page: UpbringCurrCirc_FocGroup

Thank you for completing this survey; it's very much appreciated. The questions that you've just answered are part of a wider research project about people's lifestyles, backgrounds, opinions, and their voluntary and political activity. As part of that research we are also organising interviews and focus groups.

FocGroup-

SINGLE CHOICE

Would you be willing to be contacted to be interviewed or invited to a focus group for this research?

- 1 Yes
 - 2 No
 - 8 *Skipped*
 - 9 *Not Asked*
-

end module: UpbringCurrCirc

Appendix C: Full Model Variable Descriptive Tables and Charts

Tables and Charts

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Chart C20. Percentage of Respondents by Number of Friends Seen or Contacted Daily, Weekly, or Monthly	p. 335


Tables and Charts (Continued)

Chart C21. Percentage of Respondents who Listen to Thirteen Music Genres	p. 335
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Chart C36. Number of Respondents by Age	p. 344

Notes

- With few exceptions, the variables are ordinal or binary so the charts display the percentages selecting answers or the distribution of respondents across categories. Means and standard deviations are provided for interval variables.
- Responses to the questions, and the results, have been weighted using YouGov’s standard demographic weights in order to improve the representativeness of the sample and, unless otherwise stated, there are 1,480 cases.

Chart C1. Frequency of Undertaking Eleven Political Acts



Question: ‘In the last five years roughly how often have you done the following things in relation to any issue that you care about personally?’

Chart C2. Percentage of Respondents by Number of Political Acts Undertaken (Mean = 4.4, S.D. = 3.2)






Chart C3. Percentage of Respondents by Frequency of Receiving Requests to get Involved with Groups from Eleven Sources




Question: Here's the list of ways to support organisations that we just asked about: Donate money; Volunteer time; Become a member; Take up an unpaid position of responsibility. Roughly how often, if ever, have you been asked to do any of those things...'

Chart C4. Percentage of Respondents by Perceived Level of Own Influence at Local, Regional, and National Levels




Question: ‘Compared to most people, how much influence would you say that you have over decisions affecting relevant policies in... [...your local area/your city or region/the United Kingdom]’

Chart C5. Percentage of Respondents by Perceived Level of Population Influence at Local, Regional, and National Levels



Question: ‘Generally speaking, how much influence would you say that members of the public have over decisions affecting relevant policies in... [...their local area/their city or region/the United Kingdom]’


Chart C6. Percentage of Respondents Correctly Identifying Political Figures



Questions: 'Which of the following people is the MP in your UK parliamentary constituency?'


'Please match the following people to their jobs.'

Chart C7. Percentage of Respondents by Self-Perceived Knowledge of British Politics



Question: 'How much would you say that you know about British politics?'


Chart C8. Percentage of Respondents by
Frequency of Discussing National and Local Politics



Questions: ‘Generally speaking, how often do you discuss national politics?’

‘And generally speaking, how often do you discuss local politics with others?’

Chart C9. Percentage of Respondents by
Level of Attention Paid to National and Local Politics




Questions: ‘How much attention, if any, do you pay to what's going on in national politics?’

‘And thinking about your local community, how much attention, if any, do you pay to local politics?’

Chart C10. Percentage of Respondents Selecting and Ranking


Differences between Themselves and Politically Involved People



Questions: 'Now please think about people who get involved in politics. Do you think any of the things we've asked about make them different from you? Please select all the options that you think make people who get involved in politics different from you.'
 'Please rank the options that you selected according to which makes people who get involved in politics most different from you:'

Chart C11. Percentages of Respondents Perceiving Politicians and Politically


Active People as More or Less Privileged than Themselves and Society



Questions: 'Generally speaking, how much more or less privileged than you do you think the following people are?'
 'And generally speaking, how much more or less privileged than most people in the population do you think that those people are?'

Chart C12. Percentage of Respondents Selecting and


Ranking Explanations for Own Status



Questions: ‘Now we’d like to ask you about the things that have contributed to the social status that you have achieved. Which of the reasons that we’ve asked about have played the most important part in the social status that you have achieved? If you think an option has not played a part in the social status that you have achieved then you do not need to rank it.’
 ‘You didn’t rank background as one of the reasons for the social status that you have achieved. Do you think that your background has played any part at all in the social status that you have achieved?’

Chart C13. Percentage of Respondents Selecting and


Ranking Explanations for Status Differences in Society



Questions: ‘Which of the following do you think are reasons for some people achieving higher status than others? Please select all the options that you think have any effect on the status that people achieve.’
 ‘Of the reasons that you selected which do you think are the three most important reasons for the status that people achieve?’

Chart C14. Percentage of Respondents by Self-Ranked


Status in Relation to Society and Acquaintances



Question: ‘Imagine that all the people in society are on different rungs of the ladder shown below in terms of their status. Those with the lowest status are on rung 10. Those with the highest status are on rung 1. Compared to people in society in general, which rung are you on?’


‘Now imagine that the people you know personally are on different rungs of the same ladder. Again, those with the highest status are on rung 1 and those with the lowest status are on rung 10. In your opinion which rung are you on?’

Chart C15. Number of Respondents by Number of Types of Help Received




Question: ‘Has anyone ever done the following things for you? Please select all the people that have helped you in these ways:’

Chart C16. Mean Types of Help Received from Each Group (Max. = 13)



Question: 'Has anyone ever done the following things for you? Please select all the people that have helped you in these ways:'


Chart C17. Mean Number of Groups from which Types of Help have been Received (Max. = 5)



Question: 'Has anyone ever done the following things for you? Please select all the people that have helped you in these ways:'

Chart C18. Percentage of Respondents who are Acquainted


with Someone from Fourteen Occupational Status Categories



Question: 'Do you know anyone who does this sort of job? [examples provided]'


Chart C19. Number of Respondents Indicating the Percentages

of their Friends Who Share their Sex, Ethnicity, and Religion




Question: 'Roughly what proportion of your friends are the same [sex/ethnic group/have the same religious beliefs] as you?'

Chart C20. Percentage of Respondents by Number of Friends Seen or Contacted Daily, Weekly, or Monthly



Question: 'How many friends do you have who you see or are in contact with [daily/weekly/monthly] or nearly every [day/week/month]?'


Chart C21. Percentage of Respondents who Listen to Thirteen Music Genres (Mean = 5, S.D. = 4.2)



Question: 'What types of music do you like to listen to? Please select all the options that apply:'

Chart C22. Percentage of Respondents who Watch


Sixteen Film Genres (Mean = 6.4, S.D. = 3.3)



Question: 'What types of films do you like to watch? Please select all the options that apply:'


Chart C23. Percentage of Respondents by Number of

Cultural Activities Participated In (Mean = 10.5, S.D. = 3.9)




Question: 'Roughly how often, if at all, do you... [participate in seventeen cultural activities]'

Chart C24. Frequency of Undertaking Nine Cultural Activities



Question: 'Roughly how often, if at all, do you... [go to]'

Chart C25. Percentage of Respondents by Frequency of Exercising Four Civic Skills at Work




Question: 'Thinking about your paid employment, in the last six months roughly how frequently have you...?'

'Thinking about your last paid employment, roughly how frequently did you...'

Table C1. Respondents by Number of Property Types Owned (n = 1,454)

Number of Property Types Owned	No.	%
Zero	496	34.1%
One	911	62.7%
Two	39	2.7%
Three	6	0.4%
Four	1	0.1%
Five	1	0.1%

Chart C26. Percentage of Respondents by Net Assets (n = 1,177)




Question: 'Please can you provide an estimate of the total value of your wealth and assets?

This includes, for example, your savings, investments, shares, stock and option holdings in the company you work for, properties you own **OTHER THAN YOUR MAIN RESIDENCE**, works of art and other collectible items, and your pension fund **IF YOU ARE RETIRED**.


Please exclude the value of your main home that you live in, any businesses that you own, your pension fund if you are not retired and please subtract the value of any debts secured against your assets, e.g. a mortgage you might have on a second home.'

Chart C27. Percentage of Respondents by Household Income (n = 1,177)




Question: 'What is your gross household income?'

Chart C28. Percentages of Respondents Holding Authoritarian Social Views



Question: 'Generally speaking, how much do you agree or disagree that...'

Chart C29. Percentages of Respondents Holding Left-Wing Views




Questions: 'Generally speaking, how much do you agree or disagree that...'

Table C2. Respondents by Levels of Religious Activity

Religious Activity	Frequency or Amount	No.	%
Attendance at Services	Never	1036	70.0%
	Less than once a month	274	18.5%
	Once a month	30	2.0%
	2-3 times a month	27	1.8%
	Once a week	75	5.1%
	2-3 times a week	30	2.0%
	Daily	8	0.5%
Hours of Volunteering	None	1393	94.1%
	One hour or less	15	1.0%
	Between one and two hours	13	0.9%
	Between two and four hours	25	1.7%
	Four hours or more	34	2.3%
Donation of Money	Nothing	1144	77.3%
	£50 or less	169	11.4%
	Between £50 and £100	31	2.1%
	Between £100 and £250	35	2.4%
	Between £250 and £500	43	2.9%
	£500 or more	58	3.9%


Chart C30. Percentage of Respondents by Work Type



Question: 'Please tell us which one of the following options best describes the sort of work you do.

(If you are not working now, please tell us what you did in your last job.)'

Chart C31. Percentage of Respondents by Social Grade




Note: Respondents were coded into the above categories by YouGov.

Table C3. Highest Educational Qualification by Age of Leaving Formal Education (n = 1,437)


		Highest Educational Qualification					Total	
		CSE or lower	GCSE or equivalent	A-Level or equivalent	Undergraduate degree or equivalent	Postgraduate degree or equivalent		
Age of Leaving Formal Education	15 or under	Count	97	14	7	3	17	138
		%	30.9%	7.2%	3.1%	0.8%	6.7%	10.0%
	16	Count	120	112	32	26	38	328
		%	38.2%	57.4%	14.0%	6.8%	15.1%	23.9%
	17-18	Count	70	61	122	43	49	345
		%	22.3%	31.3%	53.5%	11.2%	19.4%	25.1%
	19	Count	16	5	36	9	14	80
		%	5.1%	2.6%	15.8%	2.3%	5.6%	5.8%
	10+	Count	11	3	31	304	134	483
		%	3.5%	1.5%	13.6%	79.0%	53.2%	35.2%
	Total	Count	314	195	228	385	252	1374
		%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chart C32. Percentage of Respondents by Age of Leaving Formal Education (n = 1,404)



Question: 'At what age did you finish full-time education?'


Chart C33. Percentage of Respondents by Highest Educational Qualification



Question: 'What is the highest educational or work-related qualification you have?'

Chart C34. Percentage of Respondents' Parents by NS-SEC Category

(n = 1,346 for mothers, n = 1,324 for fathers)



Questions: 'Thinking about when you were 14, did your mother or father have paid employment?'


'Please explain a bit about your [their] job when you were 14. Please give enough information to give a clear picture of what [they] did.'

What job did your [mother/father] have? What was the name or title of [her/his] job?

What did the firm or organisation your [mother/father] worked at when you were 14 mainly make or do?'


Chart C35. Percentage of Respondents' Parents by Education Level

(n = 1,039 for mothers, n = 1,007 for fathers)



Question: 'Which of the following best describes the highest educational level that your [mother/father] finished?'

Chart C36. Number of Respondents by Age (Mean = 47, S.D. = 16)



Questions: 'On what day of the month were you born?'; 'In what month were you born', 'Please enter your year of birth'.

Table C4: Percentages of Respondents by
Sex (n = 1,480) and Ethnicity (n = 1,456)

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Female	51.5%
Male	48.5%

<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Non-White British	10.4%
White British	89.6%

Appendix D: Additional Factor Score Distributions

Chart D1. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Work-Based Civic Skills




Chart D2. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Economic Capital




Chart D3. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Occupational Status




Chart D4. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Education




Chart D5. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Religious Activity




Chart D6. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Authoritarian Social Views




Chart D7. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Left-Wing Views





Chart D8. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Parental Social Class



Appendix E: Model Development Information

Table E1: Summary Results from Key Models
in the Development of the Full Model

No.	Description	Specification Information	Fit Information
1	Name: fullsem1 First full model.	Indicators: 109 Factors: 40 Estimator: WLSMV	No convergence due to iterations being exceeded.
2	Name: fullsem2 Development of Model 1, testing the first half of the model (relating to background characteristics and the forms of capital) in order to identify significant loading to retain in the simplified full model to avoid non-convergence.	Indicators: 74 Factors: 29 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 3935.960 DF: 2290 RMSEA: 0.022 CFI: 0.939 TLI: 0.928
3	Name: fullsem3 Development of Model 1, testing the second half of the model (relating to perceptions of privilege, political interest, and participation) in order to identify significant loading to retain in the simplified full model to avoid non-convergence.	Indicators: 35 Factors: 11 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 1882.388 DF: 521 RMSEA: 0.042 CFI: 0.963 TLI: 0.958
4	Name: fullsem4 Development of Model 1, testing the middle section of the model (relating to capital and perceptions) in order to identify significant loading to retain in the simplified full model to avoid non-convergence.	Indicators: 64 Factors: 21 Estimator: WLSMV	No convergence due to iterations being exceeded.
5	Name: fullsem5 Development of Model 2 and Model 3, including background characteristics, capital, perceptions of privilege, political engagement, and participation factors, and combining the loadings from the two preceding SEMs.	Indicators: 109 Factors: 40 Estimator: WLSMV	No convergence due to iterations being exceeded.
7	Name: fullsem7 Development of 2016-09-02 Final ECPR General Conference Full Model, introducing the amended parental NS-SEC factor and amending the help received loose and close networks factors to load onto the indicators identified in the exploratory factor analyses, as a first step towards amending the starting model to create a full model.	Indicators: 95 Factors: 33 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 7418.609 DF: 4263 RMSEA: 0.022 CFI: 0.932 TLI: 0.929

Table E1: Summary Results from Key Models
in the Development of the Full Model (Continued)

No.	Description	Specification Information	Fit Information
Intervening models tested the effects of introducing theoretically important factors one at a time (due to the potential repercussions of each change) in order to construct a convergent full model. Subsequently, insignificant loadings were removed before theoretically justifiable amendments were made on the basis of modification indices, also one at a time.			
72	Name: fullsemindivi1 Development of Model 61, with relevant variables inverted for ease of interpretation.	Indicators: 102 Factors: 38 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 8917.217 DF: 4945 RMSEA: 0.023 CFI: 0.917 TLI: 0.914
73	Name: fullsemindiv1 Development of Model 72, using the binary indicators of background characteristics directly rather than via single indicator factors, as advised by Mplus Support.	Indicators: 102 Factors: 32 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 9074.471 DF: 4945 RMSEA: 0.024 CFI: 0.913 TLI: 0.910
78	Name: fullsemindivdgt1 Development of Model 75, adding the general trust variable on the advice of the supervisory board, and specifying structural loadings onto number of friends and diversity of friends, as well as of external efficacy onto general trust.	Indicators: 102 Factors: 32 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 9182.097 DF: 4958 RMSEA: 0.024 CFI: 0.913 TLI: 0.910
79	Name: fullsemidgt1 Development of Model 78, adding the additional dependent factors relating to contacting and collective political activity in order to test whether they can be included in the same model.	Indicators: 110 Factors: 34 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 10276.909 DF: 5786 RMSEA: 0.023 CFI: 0.910 TLI: 0.907
88	Name: fullsemacts1 Development of Model 86, adding attendance at private school, responsibility at work, difference of the statuses of acquaintances, and self-identified class as third indicators of two-indicator factors (education, occupational status, friend diversity, and self-perceived status respectively), amending issues with the recoding of the attendance at religious services indicator, recoding 'skipped' values in a binary indicators as zeros (due to routing in the survey), reintroducing the non-combined efficacy indicators and, at the same time, reintroducing the regional external efficacy indicator.	Indicators: 115 Factors: 34 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 11458.383 DF: 6347 RMSEA: 0.023 CFI: 0.899 TLI: 0.896

Table E1: Summary Results from Key Models
in the Development of the Full Model (Continued)

No.	Description	Specification Information	Fit Information
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Again, intervening models removed insignificant loadings were before theoretically justifiable amendments were made on the basis of modification indices, all one at a time.

110	Name: fullsemacts23 Final full model.	Indicators: 111 Factors: 34 Estimator: WLSMV	Chi ² : 10511.338 DF: 5903 RMSEA: 0.023 CFI: 0.903 TLI: 0.900
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Appendix F: Model Fit Information

Table F1. Full Model Fit Indices

<u>Chi-Square Test of Model Fit</u>	
Value	10511.338
Degrees of Freedom	5903
P-Value	0.000
<u>RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation)</u>	
Estimate	0.023
90 Percent Confidence Intervals	0.022 - 0.024
Probability RMSEA \leq .05	1.000
<u>CFI/TLI</u>	
CFI	0.903
TLI	0.900
<u>Adjusted R-square</u>	
Individualised Acts	0.471
Contacting Acts	0.505
Collective Acts	0.516

Table F2. Cross-Validation: First Model Fit Indices

<u>Chi-Square Test of Model Fit</u>	
Value	8160.760
Degrees of Freedom	5903
P-Value	0.000
<u>RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation)</u>	
Estimate	0.023
90 Percent Confidence Intervals	0.022 - 0.024
Probability RMSEA \leq .05	1.000
<u>CFI/TLI</u>	
CFI	0.904
TLI	0.901
<u>Adjusted R-square</u>	
Individualised Acts	0.435
Contacting Acts	0.422
Collective Acts	0.400

Table F3. Cross-Validation: Second Model Fit Indices

<u>Chi-Square Test of Model Fit</u>	
Value	8537.670
Degrees of Freedom	6516
P-Value	0.000
<u>RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation)</u>	
Estimate	0.021
90 Percent Confidence Intervals	0.020 - 0.022
Probability RMSEA \leq .05	1.000
<u>CFI/TLI</u>	
CFI	0.898
TLI	0.905
<u>Adjusted R-square</u>	
Individualised Acts	0.538
Contacting Acts	0.552
Collective Acts	0.572

Appendix G: Full Model Measurement Results

Table G1: Standardised Measurement Loadings for Full Model

Factors and Indicators	Estimate	Standard Error	Estimate/ Standard Error	Two-Tailed P-Value
Parental Social Class by				
Mother's Education	0.731	0.049	14.974	0.000
Father's Education	0.804	0.054	14.934	0.000
Mother's Occupational Status	0.338	0.049	6.946	0.000
Father's Occupational Status	0.472	0.054	8.799	0.000
Religious Activity by				
Religious Attendance	0.884	0.017	52.938	0.000
Religious Volunteering	0.964	0.019	51.820	0.000
Religious Donations	0.941	0.015	60.909	0.000
Left-Right Position by				
Big Business Takes Advantage	0.720	0.021	33.755	0.000
Different Law for Rich and Poor	0.833	0.021	39.601	0.000
Managers Take Advantage	0.719	0.021	34.349	0.000
Social Authoritarianism by				
Death Penalty Appropriate	0.774	0.033	23.369	0.000
Schools Stress Authority	0.423	0.039	10.754	0.000
Stiffer Sentences	0.776	0.034	23.060	0.000
Education by				
Highest Qualification	0.500	0.027	18.778	0.000
Age Left Education	0.507	0.028	18.078	0.000
Occupational Status by				
Social Grade	0.636	0.025	25.078	0.000
Work Type	0.619	0.030	20.296	0.000
Work Responsibility	0.276	0.068	4.032	0.000
Economic Capital by				
Household Income	0.682	0.035	19.646	0.000
Assets	0.641	0.036	18.044	0.000
Property Types	0.671	0.039	17.239	0.000
Work-Based Civic Skills by				
Meeting Participation	0.871	0.013	69.103	0.000
Meeting Chairing	0.898	0.015	61.047	0.000
Presentations	0.862	0.013	64.432	0.000
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances by				
Classical and Opera	0.862	0.021	40.627	0.000
Theatre and Musicals	0.817	0.020	40.506	0.000
Dance and Ballet	0.806	0.026	30.870	0.000
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions by				
Museums	0.886	0.011	82.997	0.000
Art Galleries	0.899	0.012	75.287	0.000
Historic Buildings	0.836	0.013	62.457	0.000

Table G1: Measurement Loadings for Full Model (Continued)

Factors and Indicators	Estimate	Standard Error	Estimate/ Standard Error	Two-Tailed P-Value
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities by				
Eating Out	0.894	0.033	27.293	0.000
Going to Pubs, Bars, and Cafes	0.723	0.03	23.985	0.000
Shopping for Pleasure	0.301	0.036	8.472	0.000
Preference for Family-Friendly Films by				
Family Films	0.743	0.033	22.681	0.000
Musicals and Dance Films	0.646	0.039	16.677	0.000
Romance Films	0.875	0.038	22.752	0.000
Preference for Blockbuster Movies by				
Action Films	0.712	0.030	23.73	0.000
Fantasy Films	0.848	0.028	30.736	0.000
Sci-Fi Films	0.911	0.026	35.032	0.000
Preference for Educational and Informative Films by				
Classic Films	0.642	0.049	13.178	0.000
Documentary Films	0.659	0.044	14.902	0.000
Historical and Biographical Films	0.937	0.045	21.000	0.000
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music by				
Dance and Electronic Music	0.678	0.040	16.969	0.000
Rap and Hip Hop Music	0.946	0.025	37.415	0.000
RnB and Urban Music	0.843	0.029	29.576	0.000
Legitimate Cultural Tastes by				
Winebars and Bistros	0.457	0.048	9.556	0.000
Foreign and Arthouse Films	0.491	0.047	10.400	0.000
BBC Radio 3	0.589	0.060	9.786	0.000
Number of Friends by				
Friends Contacted Daily	0.550	0.030	18.297	0.000
Friends Contacted Weekly	0.870	0.024	36.119	0.000
Friends Contacted Monthly	0.809	0.027	30.272	0.000
Diversity of Friends by				
Percentage with Different Ethnicities	0.596	0.043	14.017	0.000
Percentage with Different Religious Beliefs	0.513	0.038	13.398	0.000
Percentage with a Different Sex	0.342	0.040	8.573	0.000
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances by				
Senior Manager Known	0.612	0.036	16.891	0.000
Traditional Professional Known	0.646	0.034	19.057	0.000
Research Professional Known	0.698	0.036	19.479	0.000
Family Friend Support by				
Family Friend CV Help	0.598	0.116	5.135	0.000
Family Friend Good Word with Employer	0.387	0.111	3.497	0.000
Family Friend Loan	0.442	0.105	4.206	0.000
Partner, Friends, and Family Support by				
Partner Advice	0.796	0.090	8.860	0.000
Family Contact Job	0.527	0.085	6.217	0.000
Friends Contact Job	0.461	0.085	5.412	0.000

Table G1: Measurement Loadings for Full Model (Continued)

Factors and Indicators	Estimate	Standard Error	Estimate/ Standard Error	Two-Tailed P-Value
Self-Perceived Status by				
Status in Society	0.991	0.027	36.721	0.000
Status amongst Acquaintances	0.814	0.023	35.143	0.000
Perception of Privilege in Society by				
Status Differences Based On Hard Work	-0.301	0.037	-8.199	0.000
Status Differences Based On Background	0.608	0.033	18.653	0.000
Status Differences Based On Inequality	0.156	0.044	3.524	0.000
Perception of Own Privilege by				
Own Status Inevitable	0.587	0.029	20.427	0.000
Own Status Based On Background	0.453	0.027	16.970	0.000
Own Status Based On Inequality	0.796	0.036	22.351	0.000
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors by				
Where Political Actors Live	0.575	0.044	13.105	0.000
Political Actors Education	0.615	0.037	16.606	0.000
Political Actors Income	0.603	0.039	15.262	0.000
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors by				
Politician Privilege Compared to Society	0.915	0.010	92.650	0.000
Political Actor Privilege Compared to Society	0.877	0.010	86.456	0.000
Political Actor Privilege Compared to Respondent	0.850	0.010	89.018	0.000
Politician Privilege Compared to Respondent	0.832	0.011	77.473	0.000
Political Disposition by				
Attention to National Politics	0.883	0.011	77.071	0.000
Discussion of National Politics	0.883	0.012	73.899	0.000
Perceived Political Knowledge	0.792	0.016	48.727	0.000
National Political Knowledge by				
Know Local MP Name (Binary)	0.725	0.041	17.553	0.000
Know Ed Miliband Role (Binary)	0.867	0.025	34.453	0.000
Know Nick Clegg Role (Binary)	0.901	0.027	33.759	0.000
Know John Bercow Role (Binary)	0.843	0.038	22.096	0.000
Systemic Efficacy by				
Local System Open to Public Influence	0.699	0.036	19.603	0.000
National System Open to Public Influence	0.723	0.036	20.187	0.000
Individual Efficacy by				
Able to Influence Local Politics	0.887	0.009	98.800	0.000
Able to Influence Regional Politics	0.976	0.007	137.857	0.000
Able to Influence National Politics	0.863	0.011	77.246	0.000
Group Recruitment by				
Requests from Family	0.754	0.025	30.570	0.000
Requests from Friends	0.802	0.023	35.641	0.000
Requests from Neighbours	0.724	0.032	22.416	0.000
Requests from Religious Congregation Members	0.761	0.030	25.609	0.000

Table G1: Measurement Loadings for Full Model (Continued)

Factors and Indicators	Estimate	Standard Error	Estimate/Standard Error	Two-Tailed P-Value
Individualised Political Activity by				
Petitions and Online Actions	0.694	0.021	32.837	0.000
Boycotting	0.754	0.019	39.042	0.000
Urging Others	0.861	0.017	49.391	0.000
Contacting Political Activity by				
Meeting a Representative	0.823	0.017	48.361	0.000
Contacting Government	0.830	0.015	54.564	0.000
Contacting the Media	0.747	0.021	35.485	0.000
Collective Political Activity by				
Displaying Materials	0.782	0.019	41.326	0.000
Attending Public Meetings	0.836	0.015	54.586	0.000
Attending Protests	0.847	0.016	52.791	0.000
Attending Direct Actions	0.792	0.033	24.310	0.000
Organising Public Meetings	0.834	0.024	35.066	0.000

Appendix H: Full Model Structural Results

Table H1. Standardised Structural Loadings for Full Model

Factors	Estimate	Standard Error	Estimate/ Standard Error	Two-Tailed P-Value
Religious Activity on				
Education	0.335	0.038	8.833	0.000
Female	0.123	0.037	3.337	0.001
Left-Right Position on				
Economic Capital	-0.321	0.038	-8.508	0.000
Social Authoritarianism on				
Education	-0.474	0.032	-14.874	0.000
Education on				
Parental Social Class	0.256	0.034	7.572	0.000
Female	-0.167	0.031	-5.394	0.000
White British	-0.160	0.034	-4.738	0.000
Occupational Status on				
Education	0.587	0.030	19.685	0.000
Age	0.276	0.036	7.745	0.000
Disability with a Great Deal of Daily Impact	-0.274	0.032	-8.528	0.000
Economic Capital on				
Occupational Status	0.780	0.033	23.486	0.000
Relationship	0.276	0.039	7.020	0.000
Work-Based Civic Skills on				
Education	0.280	0.045	6.170	0.000
Occupational Status	0.452	0.046	9.823	0.000
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances on				
Education	0.753	0.020	37.192	0.000
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions on				
Education	0.792	0.018	43.689	0.000
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities on				
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances	0.493	0.038	12.919	0.000
Preference for Family-Friendly Films on				
Female	0.456	0.031	14.555	0.000
Preference for Blockbuster Movies on				
Age	-0.216	0.039	-5.611	0.000
Female	-0.228	0.035	-6.595	0.000
Preference for Educational and Informative Films on				
Education	0.294	0.036	8.183	0.000
Age	0.240	0.041	5.826	0.000

Table H1. Standardised Structural Loadings for Full Model (Continued)

Factors	Estimate	Standard Error	Estimate/ Standard Error	Two-Tailed P-Value
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music on				
Left-Right Position	0.157	0.043	3.626	0.000
Age	-0.628	0.033	-19.119	0.000
Legitimate Cultural Tastes on				
Education	0.832	0.041	20.513	0.000
Number of Friends on				
Education	0.098	0.039	2.514	0.012
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities	0.314	0.035	8.987	0.000
Religious Activity	0.234	0.038	6.113	0.000
Diversity of Friends on				
Education	0.196	0.064	3.039	0.002
Occupational Status	-0.513	0.072	-7.168	0.000
Work-Based Civic Skills	0.475	0.070	6.816	0.000
White British	-0.417	0.035	-11.807	0.000
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances on				
Education	0.590	0.046	12.688	0.000
Economic Capital	0.309	0.051	6.101	0.000
Family Friend Support on				
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances	0.533	0.051	10.551	0.000
Age	-0.415	0.058	-7.178	0.000
Partner, Friends, and Family Support on				
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances	0.367	0.063	5.815	0.000
Age	-0.534	0.050	-10.716	0.000
General Trust on				
Education	0.350	0.029	11.974	0.000
Self-Perceived Status on				
Economic Capital	0.318	0.042	7.643	0.000
Family Friend Support	0.521	0.061	8.583	0.000
Partner, Friends, and Family Support	-0.382	0.069	-5.556	0.000
Preference for Educational and Informative Films	-0.269	0.043	-6.267	0.000
Perception of Privilege in Society on				
Left-Right Position	0.663	0.037	17.742	0.000
Preference for Blockbuster Movies	0.249	0.049	5.048	0.000
Number of Friends	0.175	0.047	3.762	0.000
Self-Perceived Status	-0.396	0.039	-10.037	0.000
Perception of Own Privilege on				
Family Friend Support	0.433	0.052	8.400	0.000
Occupational Status	-0.352	0.044	-7.976	0.000
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors on				
Perception of Privilege in Society	0.557	0.047	11.822	0.000
Self-Perceived Status	-0.158	0.047	-3.375	0.001
Social Authoritarianism	0.341	0.059	5.818	0.000

Table H1. Standardised Structural Loadings for Full Model (Continued)

Factors	Estimate	Standard Error	Estimate/ Standard Error	Two-Tailed P-Value
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors on				
Perception of Privilege in Society	0.568	0.031	18.311	0.000
Social Authoritarianism	0.170	0.033	5.094	0.000
Family Friend Support	-0.326	0.042	-7.716	0.000
Political Disposition on				
Legitimate Cultural Tastes	0.558	0.035	15.814	0.000
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music	-0.315	0.046	-6.781	0.000
Preference for Family-Friendly Films	-0.131	0.043	-3.069	0.002
Preference for Educational and Informative Films	0.179	0.040	4.540	0.000
Perception of Privilege in Society	0.234	0.034	6.902	0.000
National Political Knowledge on				
Political Disposition	0.608	0.037	16.278	0.000
Perception of Own Privilege	-0.291	0.040	-7.263	0.000
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors	0.141	0.036	3.948	0.000
Systemic Efficacy on				
Legitimate Tastes	0.175	0.049	3.551	0.000
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors	-0.322	0.033	-9.743	0.000
General Trust	0.157	0.039	3.980	0.000
Individual Efficacy on				
Legitimate Tastes	0.173	0.049	3.509	0.000
Systemic Efficacy	0.446	0.040	11.145	0.000
Social Authoritarianism	-0.184	0.041	-4.494	0.000
Group Recruitment on				
Religious Activity	0.397	0.036	11.178	0.000
Diversity of Friends	0.409	0.044	9.306	0.000
Political Disposition	0.573	0.069	8.337	0.000
National Political Knowledge	-0.506	0.082	-6.158	0.000
Individualised Political Activity on				
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors	0.205	0.034	5.962	0.000
Group Recruitment	0.306	0.036	8.431	0.000
Political Disposition	0.326	0.037	8.766	0.000
Individual Efficacy	0.105	0.035	3.047	0.002
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions	0.236	0.038	6.150	0.000
Contacting Political Activity on				
Group Recruitment	0.465	0.039	12.013	0.000
Political Disposition	0.297	0.034	8.730	0.000
Individual Efficacy	0.234	0.033	7.183	0.000
Collective Political Activity on				
Group Recruitment	0.506	0.031	16.423	0.000
Individual Efficacy	0.180	0.040	4.455	0.000
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions	0.304	0.036	8.400	0.000

**Appendix I: Bivariate Relationships between Cultural Capital,
Perception of Privilege, and Political Participation**

Table I1. Bivariate Regressions Loadings of each Form of
Political Participation on each Element of Perception of Privilege

	Individualised	Contacting	Collective
Perception of Privilege in Society	0.424***	0.296***	0.394***
Perception of Own Privilege	0.026	0.026	0.164***
Self-Perceived Status	-0.072**	0.071**	0.153***
Perception of the Difference of the Politically Active	0.000	-0.172***	-0.147***
Perception of the Privilege of the Politically Active	-0.015	-0.149***	-0.272***

Table I2. Bivariate Regressions Loadings of each Form of
Political Participation on each Type of Cultural Capital

	Individualised	Contacting	Collective
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances	0.339***	0.397***	0.532***
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions	0.420***	0.385***	0.489***
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities	0.131***	0.039	0.073*
Legitimate Cultural Tastes	0.396***	0.357***	0.310***
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music	-0.013	-0.197***	-0.058
Preference for Family-Friendly Films	-0.017	-0.185***	-0.103**
Preference for Educational and Informative Films	0.287***	0.135***	0.109**
Preference for Blockbuster Movies	0.020	-0.114***	-0.130***

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