Kant on Time

Self-affection and the Constitution of Objectivity in Transcendental Philosophy

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Abstract

This dissertation’s contribution consists in providing a novel interpretation of the role time plays in Kant’s transcendental idealism. A significant part of Kant scholarship on the Critiques tends to assume that time, as understood in transcendental philosophy, is solely a formal property of intuition. This assumption has led several commentators to overlook a fundamental feature of transcendental idealism, namely, that in being the most basic form of intuition time is, also, a provider of content in and for experience. In looking attentively at such feature this dissertation shows that time is the activity of the self that grounds the possibility of objectivity and explores the philosophical implications of such an interpretation.

In the first Chapter I conduct a comprehensive survey of relevant literature and show that it is impossible to separate general metaphysics from transcendental logic in the context of Kant’s transcendental philosophy without making serious philosophical sacrifices. I then argue, in the second Chapter, that time is not merely a formal property of intuition but is, rather, the fundamental form of intuition and that, even if space is in no way reducible to, or derivable from it, time has nonetheless primacy over space on both logical and ontological grounds. From this I argue that by time, or self-affection, Kant understands the activity of subjectivity that brings about the possibility of relating to objects through the power of imagination. In the third Chapter, I show that such relation is not left wholly undetermined and that, instead, it occurs in accordance with the layout presented by Kant in the Table of Judgments, the Table of Pure Concepts of the Understanding, the Schemata and, importantly, in the System of Principles of the Understanding. I show that only an interpretation that acknowledges the systematicity found in the Analytic section of the Critique of Pure Reason can justify the distinction drawn by Kant between the mathematical and the dynamical and conclude, from that, that time does indeed provide a specific content in and for experience to be found in the Schematism doctrine. Finally, in the fourth Chapter I broaden the philosophical scope and inquire as to whether Kant has the theoretical means to articulate something like an uncategorized schema or time-determination. I conclude that, although in the Critical period Kant can do so only problematically, in the post-Critical period there are means to do so categorically: system, as such, is a time-determination for which the understanding lacks a pure concept.
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Introduction

In Kant’s Theory of Experience, Hermann Cohen warns against a possible circularity that lies at the heart of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. If transcendental philosophy in its theoretical guise, asks Cohen, is understood as a propaedeutic science, then what exactly could it mean that such a propaedeutic will ‘securely ground’ science in the first place? If, that is, one conceives of transcendental philosophy as itself a science, then it is clearly circular to appeal to transcendental philosophy as grounding science insofar as which is supposed to be doing the grounding is, itself, presupposing that which it is supposed to ground. Furthermore, to the extent that transcendental philosophy is defined not solely in terms of its domain [Gebiet], but also in terms of its method, the circularity danger becomes all the more pressing. After all, Cohen thinks, “[t]he originality and the mission of Kant consists especially in this method”1. This method, one learns, is the transcendental method and it “arose in reflection on the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica”2. In using a ‘scientific’ method to ground ‘science’ Kant’s circulus becomes even more obvious. Specifically, Cohen invites the reader to think of the issue in the following, strictly critical terms: since Kant derives the forms of intuition, space and time, and the categories, the pure concepts of the understanding, from Newton’s system of principles, what is it that prevents Kant from simply lapsing back in justifying the validity of that system of principles onto their already proved status?3 Is Kant not trapped in a circle where he seems to be assuming the validity and legitimacy of precisely what he is trying to prove?

The way out of the circle –and into transcendental philosophy–, for Cohen, resides in the following two considerations. It resides, first, in properly recognising the propaedeutic and provisory character of the science in question. Indeed, metaphysics alone cannot answer the question of whether the general validity of scientific principles needs to be presupposed or proved in the first place. Instead, a transcendental and propaedeutic science should complement metaphysics so as for the two of them, taken together, to be able to address the task. Since metaphysics “has

2 Ibid. p. 67.
3 “Space, time, motion, mass, cause, force and inertia are named and explained by Newton, and the foundations of physics are indicated in these terms” Ibid. p. 67.
only a relative, provisory value insofar as its results are concerned”⁴, it needs transcendental philosophy because only the latter shows that the “elements of consciousness are elements of cognising consciousness, which are sufficient and necessary to establish and ground the fact of science”⁵. Thus, metaphysics necessarily leads to transcendental inquiry since the grounding task of metaphysics can only realise itself in transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy, in turn, ought to be recognised as merely paving the way for a metaphysics of experience qua science. Cohen would probably say that this is what Kant had in mind when, in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, he somewhat ominously announced that “a complete reform or rather rebirth [eine neue Geburt] of metaphysics, according to a plan completely unknown before now, is inevitably approaching”⁶. In having provided the transcendental propaedeutic and having recognised its provisory character, that is, one should see that the metaphysical way lies ahead.

The way out of the circle, however, resides also in being able to identify the presuppositions that motivate the transcendental endeavour. Recognising transcendental philosophy’s propaedeutic character is without a doubt fundamental if one is to understand the aim and the scope of Kant’s critical project and a lot more will be said about this later. But it is equally as fundamental to recognise the presuppositions that led Kant to formulate such a project if it will be understood systematically. Cohen states this second consideration, in fact, by opening Kant’s Theory of Experience thus: “The study of Kant requires knowledge of its presuppositions”⁷. The statement, undoubtedly correct as to its form, is Cohen’s succinct way of saying that understanding Kant’s ambitions in the transcendental project, especially as it is constructed in the first Critique, requires that one be familiar with the ‘the fixed point’ from which the project departs. The ‘fixed point’ for Cohen is, as briefly mentioned before, Newton’s system of principles. According to Cohen, if one is to understand Kant systematically, then one “must determine this stable point from which Kant departs more specifically and with which the

⁴ And Cohen goes on saying “The metaphysical discussion cannot contain the answer as to whether, for instance, causation suffices, or whether it has to be assumed that consciousness possesses a purposive element” Ibid. p. 77.
⁵ Ibid. p. 77.
⁶ (AA 4:257) Kant’s works will be referenced using the standard Akademieausgabe pagination of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. The only exception is the Critique of Pure Reason that will be referenced using the conventional A- and B- pagination. For a complete list of Kant’s works cited, see list of Kant’s works referenced at the end. For translations used, see Bibliography.
reconstruction of his thoughts is to begin. This fixed point is the fact [Tatsache] of the science founded by Newton”\textsuperscript{8}. Kant’s presupposition as to what nature is, and nature is nothing but a system of principles on Cohen’s account\textsuperscript{9}, provides the fixed point from which one can depart in the reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental project.

Although Cohen is correct that transcendental philosophy ought to be understood as propaedeutic, and although he is further correct in stating that one ought to know the presuppositions of that propaedeutic in order to understand Kant’s general endeavour, there is nonetheless a different way of understanding the content of these two desiderata that does not necessarily overlap with that of Cohen. This is to say, in other words, that there is a way of meeting these two demands that does not necessarily entail one’s commitment to Cohen’s reading of Kant unreservedly. It can be argued, as an example that would meet the first desideratum, that transcendental philosophy ought indeed to be understood as a propaedeutic, but that such a propaedeutic is not necessarily indexed to any special metaphysical domain. It can likewise be argued, as an example that would meet the second desideratum, that the presuppositions one must be familiar with have less to do with Newton’s system of principles and more to do with the limits of a Leibnizian physical monadology. In sum, one can acknowledge the demands brought forward by Cohen as legitimate, while nonetheless rejecting Cohen’s way of meeting those demands.

Regarding the first point, or whether transcendental philosophy should be understood as a propaedeutic, it helps to think of the distinction Kant draws, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, between general and special metaphysics\textsuperscript{10}. General metaphysics concerns itself with the most abstract level of synthetic a priori knowledge and with the general propositions of pure reason. Special metaphysics, in contrast, concerns itself with the realisation of synthetic a priori propositions in that it furnishes, by means of examples, those propositions as they are applied to, e.g. a doctrine of body. If general metaphysics deals with the general problem of pure reason, namely, the possibility of synthetic a priori

\textsuperscript{8} Ibid. p. 55.
\textsuperscript{9} Cohen thinks ‘experience’ [Erfahrung] does exactly that: “experience must count as the total expression of every fact and method of scientific cognition, with the exclusion of ethics, to which the philosophical question has to be directed. Kant sets out from the word experience in this encompassing, as it were encyclopaedic sense: he seeks to determine the concept of it as the concept of the cognition of nature” Ibid. p. 59.
\textsuperscript{10} (AA 4:478)
judgments\textsuperscript{11}, special metaphysics deals with the application of these judgments to specific domains of reason. Unlike general metaphysics, the ground of which is pure reason, “[m]etaphysica specialis has as its ground either sensation or feeling”\textsuperscript{12}. If that ground is sensation, then the result is a metaphysics of nature; but if that ground is feeling, then the result is a metaphysics of morals. This implies that constraining the domain of general metaphysics, or transcendental philosophy, to solely one of the (relatively) restricted domains of each of the aforementioned special metaphysics is simply not possible\textsuperscript{13}. But, to the extent that philosophy is concerned not only with pure concepts, but also with their application, general metaphysics or transcendental philosophy must have the preparatory character mentioned by Cohen. Hence, although it is true that transcendental philosophy has a provisory character, it is also true that it need not be dependent on any given special metaphysics – natural or otherwise.

This leads to the second point – as to whether knowledge of Kant’s presuppositions means solely knowledge of the ‘fixed point’ provided by Newton’s system of principles\textemdash. The problematic nature of the relation Kant had to Newton’s system has been noted before with respect to Kant’s rejection of the law of inertia\textsuperscript{14} and the further rejection of absolute space\textsuperscript{15}. Concerning the latter, the relation between Kant and Newton is problematic not only because Kant’s arguments against both Newtonian absolute space and Leibnizian relational space shifted through time, but also because of Kant’s position on the matter is radically different from Newton’s (and Leibniz’s). Thus, while in the 1768 essay \textit{On the Ultimate Ground for the Differentiation of Directions in Space} Kant uses the incongruent counterparts argument to show the non-relationality of space\textsuperscript{16}, by the time of the 1770 \textit{Dissertation} he attacks the Newtonian notion of absolute space as being merely an

\textsuperscript{11} (B19); (A10-16/B24-30); (AA 4:276)
\textsuperscript{12} (AA 18:11)
\textsuperscript{13} It is interesting to note, also, that to the extent the general metaphysics concerns itself with pure reason, it cannot be said that its domain is reducible to the Analytic of the \textit{Critique}. An argument for this can be found in (Ch. IV, intro, pp. 136-146).
\textsuperscript{16} (AA 2:377ff) The incongruent counterparts argument states, basically, that one would be unable to determine a right from a left hand if one were to think of space as relational simply because the two mirror each other. Since it is obvious to all, however, that there is a difference between a right and a left hand, claims Kant, then space must not be relational. Any two equal and overall similar shapes that cannot be enclosed in the same limits serve to prove the point that their differentiation will only be possible in reference to an absolute framework and not, as Leibniz would want it, a relational one.
‘empty fabrication of reason that pertains to fable’\textsuperscript{17}. One might then think that in the 1768 essay Kant could then have been presupposing absolute space as a departure point, as perhaps Cohen does, but this seems to be directly contradicted by the closing remarks of the text where Kant claims that \textit{“(…) absolute space is not an object of external sensations, but rather a fundamental concept, which makes all these sensations possible in the first place”}\textsuperscript{18}. All this comes to show is that, in some way, the so-called ‘fixed point’ of Newton’s system of principles is not necessarily fixed and is not necessarily a point, either. Of course this does not mean Kant was in the business of rejecting Newtonian physics altogether, for there is overwhelming evidence to the contrary, but it does mean that the presuppositions one should be familiar with when engaging with Kant are not reducible to the \textit{Principia}.

What the previous considerations amount to should be clear: one may very well grant that transcendental philosophy ought to be understood as a propaedeutic and that knowledge of that propaedeutic’s presuppositions are indispensable requirements for understanding the critical project systematically. But granting these two demands should not be committing \textit{eo ipso} to the specific content Cohen attaches to them. Instead, these two desiderata can be kept in view only enough as to orientate one’s thought in a slightly different direction. Thus, granting both, i.e. the propaedeutic nature of Kant’s meta-philosophy, or what is also called Architectonic\textsuperscript{19}, and knowledge of the presuppositions that lie at its basis, should in this sense shed light on the main motivations for this investigation. The first motivation for the present investigation is not to ask how, or in what way, time is related to any given special metaphysics but rather how, or in what way, time is related to general metaphysics or transcendental philosophy \textsuperscript{20}. The second motivation for this investigation, likewise, is to ask about the presuppositions that allowed Kant to articulate a robust theory of time in relation to cognition. Stated differently, the following inquiry will not only try to clarify the role of time in transcendental

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} (AA 2:404)
\item \textsuperscript{18} (AA 2:383)
\item \textsuperscript{19} “In all sciences, especially of reason, the idea of the science, its universal synopsis, its outline of the extent of all cognitions, and consequently the whole thereof, is the first thing that must be sought. This is architectonic” (AA 16:537). Kant is not the first one to identify general metaphysics and architeconic: “Ontology (ontosophia, metaphysics, universal metaphysics, architeconic, first philosophy) is the science of the more general predicates of a being” (Baumgarten, \textit{Metaphysics}, I.i. §4).
\item \textsuperscript{20} The myriad ways in which Kant refers to what has hitherto been called a ‘propaedeutic’ should not cloud this important point: pure philosophy, transcendental philosophy, critique, general metaphysics, and ontology are in what follows taken to signify more or less the same thing, i.e. the science that concerns itself with the possibility and limits of synthetic \textit{a priori} knowledge (\textit{Vid}. Ch. I. pp. 44-45).
\end{itemize}
philosophy but also try to justify why it is time, and not something else, that must have that specific role. It will therefore not come as a surprise if this investigation is characterised as an attempt to answer to a Heideggerian challenge. Formulated at its most overarching level, formulation that will be developed shortly, the challenge consists in that Heidegger rightly claims, initially, that Kant makes way for a general metaphysics the likes of which cannot be found before (or after)\(^{21}\). But Heidegger claims, further, that Kant was unable to carry the general metaphysical project through because of a commitment to special metaphysics of the Newtonian kind that prevented him from realising the depth of his own philosophy.

Kant and Plato, exclusively according to Heidegger, saw and understood that ‘being’ (in the first designated as ‘reason’, in the second designated as ‘what is’) is that which must be given beforehand for the given to arise as what it is\(^{22}\). This put Kant, in Heidegger’s reading, at the centre of the problem of transcendence, namely, at the centre of the problem of justifying the possibility of there being an \textit{a priori} contentful correlate to the forms of the understanding\(^{23}\). What Kant calls the matter of appearance, Heidegger calls the ‘content’ [Wasgehalt] or the ‘real’ [das Reale] of appearance\(^{24}\). Unlike in the case of the Marburg School, for Heidegger’s Kant this ‘real’, however, is not something to which one attaches the orderability of the forms of intuition \textit{a posteriori}\(^{25}\). In fact, what makes Kant (and Plato) unique, in a way, is the soundly demonstrated thesis of the first \textit{Critique}: that thinking can think \textit{a priori} contentful thoughts. But if this is going to be upheld by Kant, by Heidegger’s standards, then intuition in itself must entail an \textit{a priori} content. To Heidegger it is clear that the pure forms of intuition are not merely the modes in which intuition intuits but are, also, that which is intuited\(^{26}\). If this is the case, then Kant’s general metaphysical endeavour at the very least manages to get off the ground: if general metaphysics should concern itself with anything, it should first and foremost concern itself with the problem of transcendence or the question of how is object-relatedness possible.

\(^{21}\) (GA 2, p.23) Heidegger’s Works will be referenced using the standard Gesamtausgabe edition. For a list of Heidegger’s references see Bibliography at the end.
\(^{22}\) (GA 25, p.45)
\(^{23}\) (GA 25, p. 106)
\(^{24}\) (GA 25, p. 102)
\(^{25}\) (GA 25, p. 105)
This is no small endeavour, in Heidegger’s view, but it is not sufficient either. The ‘answer’ to this problem came in the form of a ‘deduction’ for Kant: “The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I call a transcendental deduction”\(^{27}\). But the issue Heidegger sees here is that the framing of the question is inadequate. Kant asks how concepts completely pertaining to the understanding can relate \textit{a priori} to objects instead of asking, more adequately, about the categories’ innermost possibility in their object-relatedness. Kant misses in this sense the problem of transcendence because he severs the categories’ relation to the forms of intuition –especially to time\(^{28}\). In other words the problem resides, in Heidegger’s view, in Kant’s conception of the \textit{a priori} insofar as the latter resides absolutely within an assumed subject as completely detached from objects: “\textit{a transcendence-free conception [Auffassung] of the a priori}”\(^{29}\). This, in turn, forced Kant to pursue the problem in juridical terms: a \textit{quaestio juris}, Heidegger thinks, that ends up yielding a single form of validity justifiable only within the one \textit{science} that is ‘general’ only nominally\(^{30}\). Famously, in treading the path of the \textit{quaestio juris} as opposed to the path of the innermost possibility of object-relatedness, Kant had to drop the idea that the two sources of knowledge, intuition and understanding, might stem from a common rhizome, that is to say, “\textit{Kant recoiled from the unknown root}”\(^{31}\).

Conceiving of transcendence thus has for Heidegger a further problematic implication apart from missing a sufficient justification for object-relatedness: if metaphysics is ‘science’ then it must reduce itself to one sole domain of being. In Heideggerian terms, through objectification, scientific comportment as such is constituted\(^{32}\) because through objectification beings become objects. This means that science will have no option but to reduce itself to beings without paying due heed for being as such: “\textit{Bringing entities [Seiende] as entities to the light becomes the sole

\(^{27}\) (A85/B117)  
\(^{28}\) (GA 25, pp. 309-313) This is not an accusation that occurs in isolation. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, A Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and Logic: The Question of Truth, all bear numerous claims that Heidegger makes in the same lines.  
\(^{29}\) (GA 25, p. 315)  
\(^{30}\) Since, Heidegger cites Kant, only general metaphysics or ontology is “that science which makes out a system of all concepts of understanding and principles but only insofar as they relate to objects, to which a sense can be given and which thus can be confirmed by experience” (AA 20:260).  
\(^{31}\) (GA 3, p. 161)  
\(^{32}\) (GA 25, p. 19).
and proper task”\textsuperscript{33}. This is to say that science originates in the objectification of a domain of entities or in the unfolding of an understanding of the constitution of the being of each one of the entities in question\textsuperscript{34}. What Kant had in mind when speaking of ‘objects’, according to Heidegger, is that and nothing more: in order for something to become the object of science, even if such an object is being itself, for Kant it must be determined and be thought of in advance as the kind of something that can be disclosed, and perhaps even constituted, within the bounds of calculation and computation. Nature must, therefore, be circumscribed as what it is in advance, i.e. a closed system of locomotion of matter in time: “From here on, nature must be projected in its mathematical constitution”\textsuperscript{35}. In Heidegger’s notoriously laconic words, Kant thereby confines himself to a scientific metaphysics of presence\textsuperscript{36}.

The answer to this challenge, as will be made manifest in the following investigation, is that although Heidegger is right in the departing premise, he is nonetheless wrong in what he derives from it. It will be argued, that is, that the critical project as a whole is indeed concerned with developing a general metaphysics of the transcendental kind that works as a propaedeutic to any possible special metaphysics. It will be argued further, however, that from this it does not follow that Kant must have therefore been committed to elaborating a general metaphysics that would only come to fruition in justifying a specific special metaphysics –Newtonian or otherwise. Heidegger’s claim that Kant’s commitment to a determinate, paradigm-dependent special metaphysics led him to substantialise every thing\textsuperscript{37} (including what could not and should not be substantialised) will be contested by taking Heidegger’s objections seriously and bringing them into question. It will be argued that the only reason why Kant can ask about the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments is, precisely, because he thinks that natural entities are an insufficient ground for

\textsuperscript{33} (GA 25, p. 28) “Being” Heidegger had claimed in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology “is not itself a being” but, rather, “Being is always the being of beings” (GA 24, p. 22). This means, as Heidegger goes on to make clear, that being itself is not reducible to any one entity including, but not limited to, the most general predicate attributable to entities overall (GA 2, pp. 2-8).

\textsuperscript{34} (GA 25, p. 20)

\textsuperscript{35} (GA 25, p. 31)

\textsuperscript{36} (GA 21, p. 356)

\textsuperscript{37} Because there is no representation of time as a whole, Heidegger thinks, Kant must claim that the sensible depiction of substance, persistence, is itself the representation of time. Cf. (A182/B226). One must, in other words, highlight that what, via synthesis, has been determined as substratum (ὑποκείμενον). Formulated in a summarised, and yet technical way, the synthesis speciosa is for Heidegger an allowing oneself to be encountered by that what remains against the backdrop ‘pre-viewed basis on which’ as the ‘what’ that it is: ”Die Zeit als vorgängig-ständiges Begegnenlassen läßt, weil sie sich un-thematisch zu sich selbst verhält, das Das als selbiges zu jeder Zeit begegnet” (GA 21:400). This in turn yields that whatever may be represented, is represented only inasmuch as it persists.
deriving the validity of objectivity. Kant must, and indeed does, appeal to a prior something that must be in place in order for experience to take place at all. The prior something is, as the Aesthetic and the Analytic show, the pure concepts of the understanding and the forms of intuition. The categorial is, in fact, sufficient ground for deriving the validity of objectivity but only once it has been set in relation to the Principles by means of the Schematism (and therefore set in relation to time, as the basic form of intuition). In this regard, this investigation’s focus on time as the primary form of intuition is far from accidental. It answers, instead, to the fact that only in being able to understand the whole range of implications of Kant’s theses on time, does one come to understand the scope of Kant’s general metaphysical project. For experience to be possible at all, intuition as well as judgments, categories, schemata, and principles must be articulated as delimiting a field of objectivity. Furthermore, it will be argued that if enough attention is paid to the second and third Critiques and the role time plays in both of these, one realises that Kant did not narrow ‘general validity’ to natural entities as understood in the first Critique but, rather, opened up the general validity to other modes of being that do not necessarily overlap with what Heidegger calls ‘presence’\textsuperscript{38}. The argument elaborated in what follows will conclude positively by stating that Kant’s general metaphysics are indeed wide enough to accommodate other modes of being that are, in turn, irreducible to mere substance but only wide enough as to do so problematically.

To this end, Chapter I of this dissertation will be concerned with adequately locating and understanding the unity of the Kantian project understood as general metaphysics and transcendental logic. Briefly and concretely, in this chapter it will be argued that no coherent philosophical interpretation of Kant’s critical project can be constructed that does not have object-relatedness, or the problem of transcendence, as one of its central themes. In light of the general thesis of this chapter, the first part will be concerned with addressing some of the contemporary readings of Kant that tend to focus on, sometimes solely on, the epistemological aspects of the Critique of

\textsuperscript{38} “‘Being equals perception’, when interpreted in original phenomenological terms, means: being equals presence, praesens. At the same time, it thus turns out that Kant interprets being and being-existent exactly as ancient philosophy does, for which that which is, is the hypokeimenon [substratum], which has the character of ousia” (GA 24, p. 448). There is a dear price to be paid for equating the horizon of intelligibility of Being in general with the temporal present, Heidegger thinks. This is why Taylor Carman states: “For although Kant may have succeeded in overcoming the traditional theocentric conception of knowledge, Heidegger insists that he never abandoned the ancient metaphysical interpretation of being as presence (Anwesen, Anwesenheit, Praesenz)” (Carman, Taylor. Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 33-34) where ‘presence’ is understood as “the horizon of the present” (Carman, Taylor “Heidegger’s Concept of Presence” in Inquiry, 1995, 38:4, 431-453, p. 444).
Pure Reason and the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. Perhaps Butts’ dictum exemplifies this best: “Metaphysicians used to delude themselves that they could tell us what is worth seeking to know by telling us first what is. After Kant, epistemologists and methodologists tell us what is a consequence of what is worth seeking to know. Thus the norms of knowing define the norms of being. Ontology follows epistemology”\textsuperscript{39}. Against the tendency to read Kant in a way that seems to leave important philosophical insights completely untouched it will be shown that, by overemphasising Kant’s theory of knowledge, some commentators are unable to account for the possibility of a transcendental logic –logic, that is, that cannot sacrifice its relation to objects–.

This will be complemented, in the second part, by arguing in favour of the continuity and cohesion of Kant’s critical project. If the case is that the worry about a transcendental logic, and with it a general metaphysics, is not one that can be dispensed with without thereby threatening to collapse the entirety of Kant’s critical project, then it must also be the case that Kant must have explicitly addressed the problem of object-relatedness. By looking at several writings, some Critical, some pre-Critical, the need to inquire into the possibility of a general metaphysics will become obvious. The argument in this regard will not only show that constructing a propaedeutic, understood as transcendental philosophy, is a theme common to the writings of mid-1770s, 1780s, and early 1790s, it will further show that such endeavour is the essential one in this period of Kant’s thinking –especially in relation to the way in which Kant’s theses about time and the temporal evolved. But to the extent that constructing a logic that is transcendental cannot dispense with object-relatedness, it will be concluded, such transcendental effort cannot under any circumstance dispense with intuition, especially temporal intuition, and the role the latter plays in the constitution of experience.

Following from this, Chapter II will narrow down on the priority and essence of time. The previous chapter’s conclusion states that transcendental philosophy cannot get off the ground unless intuition, as such, is factored into the apparatus of experience. In the current chapter, however, it is argued more narrowly that not intuition in general, but the form of inner sense, specifically, is the primary conditio sine que non of experience in general and is that which cannot be forfeited in tackling

the problem of transcendence. The first section is therefore devoted to arguing in favour of the priority of time as the most fundamental form of intuition. There is little doubt in that Kant states unequivocally that there are two forms of intuition and that they are mutually irreducible to each other. This section’s aim nonetheless is not to argue in favour of space, or spatial properties, to be reducible to time. Instead, the aim is to show that time, and not space, accounts for the entirety of intuition and, moreover, that time provides the self with a manifold in intuition a priori. In response to an early Maimon criticism, the echo of which has re-emerged under several different guises in contemporary Kantian literature (e.g. Arthur Collins or Markos Valaris), it will be concluded that the manifold of inner sense, simply put, is richer than the manifold of outer sense. Thus, the first section is divided in turn into two subsections. The first subsection presents an argument in favour of the logical priority of inner sense: Time is logically prior to space insofar as it is the form of all representation whatsoever. Since space itself must be represented prior to any particular representations which emerge within it, then, it must be the case that the intuition of time logically precedes that of space. The second subsection is concerned with presenting yet another argument, at a separate level, concerning the ontological priority of inner sense: Time is also ontologically prior to space insofar as it is the immediate product of the activity of the subject. Since the receptivity of anything in space presupposes the subject’s capacity of being affected somehow, then, it must be the case that time is prior to space insofar as it enables that subject’s affectivity. It will be concluded from this that, to be affected even by space itself, time must have taken a hold of the subject.

The second section of this second chapter builds on the previous conclusion by asking what the essence of time is. When speaking of ‘essence’ in the context of Kantian philosophy, though, one needs to tread carefully since, building on a distinction that is drawn in several different writings, Kant explicitly denies that the ‘real’ essence of time can be known. Instead, Kant claims in a letter to Reinhold from 1789 that only the ‘logical’ essence of time can be known. Asking about the logical

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40 Solomon Maimon denies this, in a letter to Kant from the 30th of November, 1792, on several grounds one of which is that “The diversity of outer appearances is represented in time only if it is not represented in space, and vice versa” (AA 11:393). For a contemporary version of Maimon’s point see: Collins, Arthur, Possible Experience. University of California Press, L.A., 1999, pp. 107-120. And Valaris, Markos. “Inner Sense, Self-Affection, & Temporal Consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason” in Philosophers’ Imprint, Volume 8, No.4, May, 2008.

41 Vid. (AA 28:49); (AA 24: 116 [Logik Blomberg]); (AA 29:820)

42 (AA 11:37)
essence of time will entail looking closely at the arguments Kant presents in the Aesthetic and how these arguments further articulate with the various elements at stake in cognition. The logical essence of time, its primitive *constitutiva* and attributes, will be found in the analysis\(^4\) of time itself and its relation to experience. The role time plays in Kant’s transcendental deduction will, therefore, be examined closely. It will be argued that for experience to be such, a *unity* of experience needs to be posited. Time, insofar as it is a unitary and pure indeterminate intuition, operates as the warrant for the possibility of the unity of experience through the various subjective faculties in general and through the transcendental power of imagination in particular. It will be derived from this that the power of imagination provides the subject with the possibility of merging the past-ness of the past with the future-ness of the future as to allow representations to endure – and thus allows the subject to bring the heterogeneous together: concepts and intuitions. Following from that, it will be argued that the transition from the unity of consciousness to the consciousness of unity occurs, first and foremost, as the emergence of the possibility of being affected by oneself. If the transcendental unity of apperception is understood in its ad-[p]erceptive character, that is, in its relation to objects, then, the pure intuition of time can be nothing but the unity against which individual temporal states are outlined and through which the subject generates its own affectivity (following from the argument in the previous section).

Since the previous discussion on the essence of time brings about several questions – chief amongst which is the question about the role of time in the constitution of objectivity, Chapter III, in turn, will look at time determination in considerable detail. It is argued here, generally, that in answer to the problem of how objectivity comes to be constituted, Kant responds displaying the general structure of sensibilisation of pure concepts i.e. the structure of the processes of sensibilisation that make up the whole within which objectivity arises. In the first section it is seen that, although Kant would abandon the terminology associated with affinity that occurs in the A-Edition of the Transcendental Deduction by the time the B-Edition was published, there are nonetheless good reasons to avoid disregarding the affinity argument. By looking into affinity, association, and combination, it will be seen that Kant sought to provide a justification for the regularity of appearances. The transition from the unity of consciousness to the consciousness of unity involves three

\(^4\) Kant associates real essence to synthetic judgment and logical essence to analytic judgment (AA 11:36-38).
differentiable conditions that are nonetheless related one to the other. These are: first, that the unity of apperception be able to bestow its own identity upon appearances; second, that those appearances be relatable to one another; and third, that a subjective link amongst them be possible. It will be concluded here that the power of imagination provides the self with the possibility of conducting all of the former inasmuch as it is the only faculty that partakes in the receptivity of sensibility and the spontaneity of the understanding.

Although the affinity doctrine is not given much continuity by Kant, the rules in accordance with which the transcendental power of the imagination provides the three conditions mentioned above for relating an object to itself, an object to other objects, and an object to thought, are the pure concepts of the understanding. But if these rules are going to achieve objective validity, then they need to be provided with a sensible condition in intuition for their application. It needs to be shown, in Novalis’ words, that “The actual objects [Gegenstände] only fasten the endless variations in the shapes [Gestaltungen] of space and time through the power of imagination. They fasten the schemata through ‘filling’ with reluctant, abiding mass in a synthesis of the I and the not-I”44. The second section of this chapter is therefore concerned with the sensibilisation and determination of the categories to the extent that they require a sensible condition that will constrain their applicability to specific objects. It is argued here, in what is perhaps the main section of this Dissertation, that not only the sensibilised portrayal of the pure concepts of the understanding in the Schematism and the Principles secures the provision of sensibilised content in virtue of the schemata being time determinations; it is argued, furthermore, that the ‘architectonic’ division that Kant adopts in order to present them answers to the same mathematical/dynamical distinction that guided the metaphysical deduction. An extremely important consequence of the argument developed in this chapter is that a justification can be provided for the numerical disparity, or structural asymmetry, between the Table of Judgments and the Table of Categories and the Doctrine of Schematism and the Analytic of Principles. The literature has missed, with the notable exception of Monck (and to a lesser extent Caird), that whereas the metaphysical deduction of the categories from the four kinds of judgments yields twelve concepts of the understanding, there are only eight schemata and only as many

44 (Novalis, Werke, II:220)
explicitly stated principles\textsuperscript{45}. The reading elaborated here has the advantage of not only allowing one to raise the question as to why there is this asymmetry, but of answering the question. I propose that the Schematism and the Principles, just as much as judgments and categories, answer to a division between the mathematical and the dynamical: for mathematical judgments and categories only one schema and one principle is necessary because they are constitutive of experience overall; for dynamical judgments and categories, however, a specification is needed of three schemata and three more principles each because, here, no constitution at all, but regulation of the existence of objects of experience takes place.

Finally, after the somewhat minute analyses of the Schematism doctrine carried out before, in Chapter IV the philosophical question will be significantly broadened and the opening up of the validity entailed by the conception of time developed throughout this investigation will be addressed. It will be seen that, when facing the question of whether there is such a thing as an uncategorised schema, Kant must adopt either one –but not both, of two possible answers. In this limited sense, and to the extent that the question about an uncategorised schema is legitimate for Kantian philosophy, the structure of this chapter can be thought of as a dilemma: either Kant agrees with the possibility of an uncategorised schema or he renounces the thesis that time is radically subjective and universal. The path that takes the first horn of the dilemma is characterised as the weaker of the two insofar as it concludes affirmatively as to the possibility of an uncategorised time determination but it claims for it a constitutive status only for reflective judgment. The first section of this chapter is devoted to reconstructing this option by attending to the role that time plays in the second and third Critiques. Summarily, the argument there states that in virtue of time being primarily self-affection, and in virtue of the fact that to appear means to be an object of sensible intuition\textsuperscript{46}, no appearance whatsoever can occur exempt from the condition of time\textsuperscript{47}. This claim in itself would, after the preceding chapters, be somewhat trivial if it were not complemented by the fact that “appearances can certainly [allerdings] be given in intuition independently of functions of the

\textsuperscript{45} Kant himself seems to hint explicitly at this division in a letter to Schulz from November, 1788, when he says: “But insofar as specific magnitudes (quanta) are to be determined in accordance with this [pure intellectual synthesis], they must be given to us in such a way that we can apprehend their intuition successively; and this this apprehension is subject to the condition of time” (AA 10:557).

\textsuperscript{46} (Bxxvi)

\textsuperscript{47} Perhaps clearer still in Metaphysik L: “Every appearance is, as representation in the mind, under the form of inner sense, which is time. Every representation is so constituted that the mind goes through it in time; that is, the mind expounds the appearance, thus, every appearance is expoundable” (AA 28: 202 [Metaphysik L]).
From this it is inferred that although all appearances are in time, not all are subordinated to the rules of the pure concepts of the understanding. So, if appearances can appear independently of the functions of judgment, but all appearances are in time, then there must be some things present to the mind that although being temporal, are nonetheless uncategorised. The question elaborated here, in discussion with Franks and Tuschling, is whether Kant can then produce a principle that would govern the appearing of these, temporal but undetermined appearances. According to the weaker path, the answer to this is affirmative in that such representations may be judged in regulative terms only and in accordance with a principle that exhibits the pure image of future orientation: purposiveness. The first path therefore suggests that the principle is indeed possible—and actual, as a constitutive principle but only for reflective judgment; that the principle is the law-likeness of nature’s behaviour in the diversity of its laws manifest in purposiveness; and that the principle’s relation to time just is that of a quasi-schematic exhibition [Darstellung] of the latter’s futural orientation. The imagination, in this case, hypotypically provides the form of the sought-for principle by exhibiting time symbolically.

In the second section of this last chapter, however, the second horn of the dilemma is elaborated by looking into the Opus Postumum. There seem to be good reasons for avoiding the first, weaker path: the principle of purposiveness, although constitutive, is only so for reflective and not for determining judgment. This means that the use of the principle of purposiveness will be limited to instances where the theoretical means of cognition fail to suffice in accounting for the object in question. But this poses a serious problem for transcendental philosophy: it is impossible to determine a priori when the principle of purposiveness will be adequate for judgment and this jeopardises in the best case, or completely undermines in the worst, any special metaphysics that will want to be based on it. In answer to a question such as

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48 (A90/B122) The whole fragment, in different translation, reads: “Appearances could ... be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance.Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking” (A90-91).

49 (AA 5:169); (AA 5:181-186) There is, of course, an important question concerning the kind of relation that determining and reflective judgment have to each other. This will be addressed in Chapter IV and, to an extent, in the Conclusions. For further reading see Hughes, Fiona. Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007, and Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Taste, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1997.
when is one supposed to grasp an object according to the principle of purposiveness, the reply can go no further than ‘when the object thus demands it’. But this is not satisfactory by Transcendental Philosophy’s standards. In the previous answer nothing prevents the diversity of empirical laws that should become unified under one purposive principle from multiplying endlessly – and this would imply the impossibility of a unified system of philosophy in the first place. In response to this, the second horn of the dilemma, i.e. renouncing the subjectivity and universality of time, is presented. Indeed, the second path that can be taken will state that the principle is not only possible but necessary – and therefore actual, too, that the principle is the articulation of motions of forces in a world-system, and that the principle’s relation to time is given by the unity of the empirical laws that constitute the entirety of the world-system as stemming from the unity of subjectivity. It will be argued, with Förster and Mathieu, that the schema of the world-system presupposes abandoning the subjectivity of time and even the notion that time is constrained to being a form of intuition. Instead, in tilting, if not eradicating altogether, the distinction between what is ‘in us’ and ‘out of us’, between the intellectual and the sensible, Kant confirms his commitment to an objective becoming the nature of which hardly seems justifiable within transcendental philosophy.

In Book XV of the Metamorphoses, Ovid wrote that “[a]ll things flow, and are formed as a fleeting image (…) for what was before is left behind; what was not comes to be; and each moment is renewed”. The lines seem to capture relatively well Kant’s general philosophical conception of time and temporality: in forming or imagining – what is an image if not a product of the imagination? –, activity at the very root of thinking, one commits to transience. This means, in turn, that the activity of affecting oneself opens up, for our faculty of representation, temporal variations in connection to past, present, and future horizons that, although ultimately coming to be unified in time’s uni-dimensionality, justify nonetheless that the subject be an object for itself and that things be objects for the subject. If that holds, then a secure ground for transcending solipsism must have been found – and, thus, a secure ground for constructing a transcendental propaedeutic. In relation to this last point, it will

50 Because one would end up not with a ‘system’, properly speaking, but only with what Kant calls in the Metaphysik Mrongovius an ‘aggregate’ of laws (AA 29:805-806). See also: (AA 18:284); (AA18:286).
51 Lichtenberg had stated, perhaps ironically, that “Da der Mensch toll werden kann, so sehe ich nicht ein, warum es ein Weltsystem nicht auch werden kann” [J854].
52 “Cuncta fluunt, omnisque vagans formatur imago (…) nam quod fuit ante, relictum est, fitque quod haud fuerat, momentaque cuncta novantur” (Ovid. Metamorphoses 15.178-185).
become clear in the course of this investigation that the greatest effort will be devoted to two questions that answer to Cohen’s demands as reconstructed above: what exactly is the role of time in Kant’s general metaphysics when the latter is understood as a propaedeutic? And, can general metaphysics be ‘general’ in any meaningful sense if it fails to account for all that may be provided as representation in intuition? It will be seen, in answering these, that the presupposition that grounds daring to ask the questions is not foreign to critical philosophy itself, but rather internal to it—that, perhaps following the letter too closely, “[w]hat reason produces entirely out of itself”, as Kant writes in the Preface to the first edition of the first Critique, “cannot be concealed, but is brought to light through reason itself”\textsuperscript{53}.

\textsuperscript{53}“(…) weil, was Vernunft gänzlich aus sich selbst hervorbringt, sich nicht verstecken kann, sondern selbst durch Vernunft ans licht gebracht wird (…)” (Axx).
Chapter I

Acknowledging the fundamental role time plays in Kant’s critical philosophy is indispensable for understanding transcendental idealism. Conversely, understanding the nature of Kant’s critical project, if not simple, is likewise an indispensable task if one is to delve into Kant’s conception of time. Locating, even, the exact position ‘critique’ adopts, and the role it plays, in light of Kant’s general architectonic becomes immediately problematic when one fails to consider the origin and development of such a vast endeavour. Inquiring as to whether the *Critique of Pure Reason*, for example, is supposed to be some kind of foundational project that deals with the origins of knowledge, and if so, what it is foundational of, remain, to a large extent, questions in need of an answer. Furthermore, that Kant insists on the ‘propaedeutic’ character of the *Critique* does not come to simplify matters in any way. Instead, it poses serious problems for any attempt at addressing the *Critique* itself as a whole and it poses other problems, perhaps less serious, for any attempt at engaging with atomised parts of that whole. Yet, scholarship on Kant often insists that it is possible to focus solely on what it considers useful and is content to simply discard the rest. This is noticeable in scholarship dealing with Kant’s practical philosophy but it is even more noticeable in scholarship working on Kant’s theoretical philosophy. It is, perhaps, somewhat of a truism for Anglophone scholarship to claim that Kant’s ‘transcendental psychology’ is the product of some outdated rationalist presuppositions or to claim that Kant’s metaphysics breach the very standards that made it possible. This chapter, which should work as a general survey on the status of relevant Kantian scholarship and the reasons there are for not agreeing with it uncritically, will therefore be concerned with the question of whether it is possible to understand Kant’s critical philosophy, its queries and its concerns, without paying due heed to the way in which Kant articulates critique, transcendental philosophy, transcendental logic, and metaphysics.

Concretely, in this chapter it will be defended that Kant’s metaphysics cannot be disentangled from the broader critical project and that doing so results in a

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1 There are, of course, many exceptions to this complacency: Frederick Beiser and Sebastian Gardner will be discussed in what follows. But Gerd Buchdahl, Béatrice Longuenesse, Michael Friedman, Eckart Förster, Lucy Allais, Paul Franks, and, more recently, Fiona Hughes, Rae Langton, Sebastian Rand, and Nicholas Stang have also made way for better understanding Kant. This investigation is indebted to their insightful readings to varying degrees.
philosophically bastardised version of transcendental philosophy. To this end, this chapter will begin by discussing a tendency, originally noted by Sebastian Gardner and Frederick Beiser, towards interpreting Kant in a radically anti-metaphysical way. Indeed, recent Anglophone scholarship on Kant displays a marked propensity towards stressing epistemological nuances in Kant’s arguments at the expense of metaphysical claims and ambitions at the heart of those arguments. Although there is nothing intrinsically wrong with paying attention to Kant’s insights into the nature of cognitive processes, there is something intrinsically wrong with limiting one’s understanding of Kant to whatever it yields solely in terms of those processes. It will be argued, in fact, that readings of Kant that subscribe to this tendency depart from the assumption that Kant was solely concerned with some kind of theory of perception the nature of which precludes metaphysics. Thus, Strawson, Guyer, Pippin, and Allison will be discussed as pertaining to this anti-metaphysical tendency. It will be noted that, although these interpretations vary greatly, and although they differ significantly as to their many virtues, they all nonetheless partake in a fundamental commitment to deflate Kant’s metaphysical claims and inflate Kant’s epistemological claims.

It will then be argued that reading Kant anti-metaphysically presents a series of problems that are not easily overcome. Following Gardner, first, it will be argued against the deflationary tendency by pointing out that no amount of meta-philosophical reflection, and likewise no amount of perspective-shifting, will be able to justify robustly enough, by Kant’s standards, a difference between appearances and things in themselves and, importantly, the relation between the two. It will then be argued, following Beiser, that deflationary understandings of Kant fail to do justice to the broader philosophical context within which Kant’s transcendental project emerged and miss, therefore, important aspects of that transcendental project including, but not limited to, Kant’s relation to his contemporaries. The third criticism addressed at the deflationary readings of Kant will be the most elaborate and will make up the second part of the chapter. It will be seen that a fundamental portion of the critical project has to do with Kant’s general metaphysical ambitions and, furthermore, with Kant’s relentless pursuit for integrating metaphysics, as such, into a broader philosophical project. Thus, in tracing back, as it were, Kant’s reflections on the nature of intuition in general, and of time as form of intuition in particular, it will be seen that the very origin of transcendental philosophy owes much to the way in
which Kant thought of metaphysics and the *a priori*. In this sense, ‘architectonic’ – as understood by Kant– will figure prominently. The final criticism enunciated above, as will be seen, will open the door to seeing that Kant’s critical project will simply not get off the ground unless it has the problem of transcendence or object-relatedness at its core, i.e. unless it is conceived as transcendental philosophy or transcendental logic.

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The tendency towards deflationary readings of idealism has been noted recently with remarkable acuteness. Sebastian Gardner, for example, has pointed out that Anglophone literature of the second half of the twentieth century shows a clear tendency towards, first, minimising the relevance of metaphysical claims and, second, increasing the relevance of epistemological claims that could, ultimately, stand in for the first ones. Along the same lines, Frederick Beiser has also pointed out that current Anglophone scholarship on Kant has failed to do justice to Kant’s metaphysics in the sense that it has shunned the metaphysical or ontological content it entails.

In “The Limits of Naturalism”, Gardner notes that current Anglophone scholarship is not, not obviously at least, receptive to some of the fundamental insights of German Idealism. This is so because in his view Anglophone scholarship views German Idealism as relevant only to the extent that it is a resource for ‘progressive and non-metaphysical contemporary philosophical developments’. Thus, Gardner thinks, claims like the following, to name but a few, are not uncommon amongst the literature: that ontological commitments of German Idealism are no different from those other naturalist positions of the time and perhaps even compatible with a full-blown physicalism; that normativity is irreducible and should work as that in accordance with which explanations should hold; that German Idealism sought to validate a modern conception of autonomy; or that German Idealism is only aiming to expand on Kant’s epistemological turn understood as a correction to naïve empiricism.

Following Kemp Smith, Gardner opposes idealism to naturalism and differentiates two main variants within the latter: hard naturalism and soft naturalism.

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What is common to both these variants of naturalism is that they both conceive of the natural order, broadly understood, as having some sort of epistemological or metaphysical priority in philosophical inquiry. According to his account, both hard and soft naturalists will think that what there is, is natural in the sense that it belongs to what Kemp Smith calls ‘the terrestrial environment’³, i.e. all that exists, including the explanations one might give of the existence of things, is subordinated to natural forces and therefore eventually justifiable in terms of natural science. But there are also important differences between the two. Hard naturalism, for example, is comfortable in transforming the epistemological prerogatives of modern natural science into a philosophical position that, if not fully metaphysical, is ‘as good as’ the latter⁴, simply because it conceives of the totality of its objects as belonging to one and the same order. Soft naturalism, in contrast, cannot grant that and, instead, will claim that even if a natural order exists, it must nonetheless be complemented by adding elements that were initially foreign to it. For the soft naturalist hard, physical reality does not encompass all of what can be thought and one must, or so their narrative goes, aggregate elements to that physical reality so as to reach the totality conceivable in thought. In this sense, the soft naturalist will, according to Gardner, think of him or herself as correcting or improving the unsophisticated position of the hard naturalist in such a way that the austere and overly simplistic conception of nature of this one will be enriched by adding meaningful statements to its repertoire.

Because the soft naturalist, in the sense mentioned above, wants a nuanced reality with nuanced claims as to its justification that will sound feasible to contemporary ears, Gardner goes on, it will necessarily have to interpret away, flatten out, or deflate, metaphysical claims⁵—no matter how central these might seem to the philosophical account discussed. The way to do this is by an appeal to ‘perspective’ or ‘standpoint’ from which to interpret claims that would otherwise sound overly ontological or metaphysical. Because the soft naturalist is in no position to challenge the completeness or elegance of the natural system that the hard naturalist appeals to, he or she instead refuses to engage the hard naturalist in its own terms and seeks refuge in a meta-philosophical position that introduces a ‘view’, ‘perspective’, or ‘standpoint’, from which to carry out complex phenomenological descriptions. Thus, the soft naturalist can invoke a perspective from which entities, entities that

would be mere fancy for the hard naturalist, can be called ‘real’. In Gardner’s words, this is simply another way of saying that soft naturalism subscribes to the idea that “philosophical vindication of phenomena can be provided by something other than ontological grounding and which instead involves essential reference to the subject or to a ‘perspective’ relative to which internal, perspectival reality can be claimed for the phenomena”\(^6\). In this sense it seems as if soft naturalism would want to preserve two not obviously compatible things: agreeing, on the one hand, with the traditional conception that philosophy is supposed to provide sufficient legitimating grounds for the phenomena it addresses, and, on the other hand, withdrawing from that by appealing to the ‘perspective’ one has on things as furnishing those grounds. The question for the soft naturalist will be, of course, how ‘perspective’ can fulfil such demand without lapsing back onto hard naturalism.

Not only Gardner, but Frederick Beiser, too, has voiced serious concern about what he calls the ‘sanitisation’ of German Idealism—especially of Kant and Hegel—. Beiser claims that Anglophone scholarship has domesticated, or read metaphysics ‘out of’ German Idealism to the extent that it now offers but one ‘advantage’, namely, not challenging contemporary ways of thinking. Beiser rightly points out that this ‘philosophical ventriloquism’, where one uses a historical thinker merely as a puppet for voicing one’s own views, is nowhere as noticeable as it is in Anglophone scholarship about Kant\(^7\). Although Beiser agrees with Gardner in that “(…)
revisionist readings of German idealism arise from a reluctance to face metaphysical issues”\(^8\), the reasons he gives for that being the case are somewhat different. Beiser is more concerned with the poverty of interpretative tools available to the analytic method of Anglophone scholarship. First, understanding Kant as if he were a contemporary thinker, answering solely to contemporary issues of common sense philosophy, Beiser thinks, will at most be able to yield what Kant ought to have said and not what Kant did in fact say\(^9\). But, second, transforming any historical thinker into a contemporary interlocutor limits the philosophical scope of the themes that

\(^6\) Ibid. p. 32.
\(^7\) “Nowhere has ventriloquism been pursued with more vigour and rigour than with contemporary interpretations of Kant and Hegel”. Beiser, Frederick. “Darks Days: Anglophone Scholarship Since the 1960s” in Hammer, Espen (Ed.) German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge, London, 2007, p. 70.
\(^8\) Ibid. p. 79. There is something important to remark about this point. Although in what follows it will be wholly agreed with Beiser’s diagnosis of current Kantian scholarship, it will be later disagreed with him on what Kant meant by ‘metaphysics’ since, Beiser thinks, “Kant would not have regarded his transcendental idealism as metaphysics” (Ibid. p.87fn).
\(^9\) Ibid. p. 72.
thinker might engage with. Historical thinkers are philosophically relevant in Beiser’s view because of how they differ from contemporary thinkers. Only in acknowledging, therefore, that Kant might have had concerns beyond contemporary ones is Kant’s philosophy worth looking at.

To the extent that its aim is kept in mind, however, the analytic method is not altogether mistaken. Being able to reconstruct and appraise an argument is just as important for proper philosophical inquiry, according to Beiser, as is being familiar with the historical context of a specific work and, importantly for present purposes, as important as being able to recognise the metaphysical commitments of specific philosophical projects. In this regard, Anglophone scholarship on Kant has more or less fulfilled the first demand but failed at accomplishing the last two: neither the historical context nor Kant’s metaphysical ambitions are recognised in sufficient detail for transcendental idealism to be able to challenge current deflationary philosophical convictions. In this regard Beiser’s hermeneutic point is no doubt right: cherry-picking around the Critical project by ‘taking what is relevant and dumping the rest’ has done more harm than good for contemporary interpretations of Kant simply because it has created an echo chamber for deflationists’ own prejudices.

An example of a ‘soft naturalist’ reading of Kant, following Gardner, or ‘anti-metaphysical’ Kant interpretation, following Beiser, is found in Peter Strawson’s *The Bounds of Sense*. There, Strawson claims that the whole Kantian endeavour is directed by a ‘principle of significance’, i.e. the principle that “there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application”. This ‘reduction’ of the application of ideas and concepts signifies that the doctrine of transcendental idealism is, accordingly, not merely that one can have no knowledge of a supersensible reality but “that reality is supersensible and we can have no knowledge of it”. The principle of significance has many implications, but an important one is that which leads Strawson to claim that Kant breached the very

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10 Ibid. pp. 84-87.
11 This is particularly poignant with the Schematism section of the first *Critique*. Thus, Wilkerson claims that “the Schematism serves no useful purpose and can be ignored without loss” (Wilkerson, T.E. *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1976, p.95) while Bennett claims that “the incoherence of Kant’s problem [in the Schematism] is matched by the vacuity of its supposed solution” (Bennett, J. *Kant’s Analytic*. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1966, p. 151).
13 Ibid. p. 38.
limits of intelligibility, the bounds of sense, he had originally posited. Indeed, if one looks at Kant’s theory of synthesis, Strawson claims, it is easy to see that Kant is simply constructing an essay in transcendental psychology: in Kant’s view, synthesis is held to be the antecedent condition of empirical knowledge, but synthesis itself is not empirical. By the principle of significance, however, if synthesis is not empirical then it is, strictly speaking, meaningless and it would be best to regard this as one of the ‘aberrations’ into which Kant’s explanatory model led him\textsuperscript{14}.

In spite of its virtues, amongst which one may count his detailed analyses of some of Kant’s arguments and the clarity with which he presents some Kantian themes, what makes Strawson’s reading of Kant anti-metaphysical is the former’s belief in the possibility of constructing an argument simply by repudiating what he calls ‘Kant’s transcendent metaphysics’. The problem, according to Strawson, begins with Kant’s affirmation of the ideality of space and time. Kant, just as much as the scientist, wants to contrast things as they appear and things as they are in themselves by means of affectivity. Kant, just as much as the scientist, will find it useful to be able to distinguish, for example, something appearing a certain colour under a setting sun from that same thing actually being that colour. The difference between the scientist and Kant, however, is that unlike the scientist, Kant’s way of drawing the distinction is by means of linking things as they appear to the subjective forms of sensibility, i.e. space and time. Things as they appear are such because they affect the subject and because the subject can grasp them in specific spatio-temporal relations. Thus, if Strawson’s Kant is going to make sense, by which Strawson means respecting the principle of significance, then it needs to renounce any metaphysical claims about things as they are in themselves and, instead, limit itself merely to claims about things as they appear. In other words, Strawson’s Kant is in fact embodying what was called, with Gardner, the perspectival move: the vindication of philosophical (and perhaps scientific) claims need not fall on any kind of metaphysical or ontological grounding but can, instead, simply rely on the perspective of a given subject\textsuperscript{15}. It is, in fact, because of this that Strawson thinks not only that Kant’s metaphysics and transcendent psychology\textsuperscript{16} are out of the bounds of

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. p. 32.
\textsuperscript{15} Interestingly in Strawson’s reading, this ‘given subject’ need not be identified with any one subject in particular and can, instead, simply be identified with whatever has the specific modes of representation that we do, i.e. the human perspective, as it were. See: (Ibid. pp. 271ff; pp 241ff).
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. p. 32. This does not mean that Strawson repudiates the term ‘metaphysics’ altogether, for he does not. Indeed, he thinks a ‘descriptive metaphysics’ is possible. Vid. Strawson, Peter. \textit{Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics}. Routledge, London, 1959.
intelligibility but, also, that the artificial and ‘baroque’ structure of the Critique itself is something one can “(...) in the end discount without anxiety”\(^{17}\).

Yet Strawson is far from alone in reading Kant thus. Further examples can be found in Paul Guyer, Robert Pippin, or Henry Allison. In a similar vein to Strawson, Guyer also takes as a starting point the assertion that space and time are, for Kant, nothing but the forms of sensibility\(^{18}\). But this led Kant, in Guyer’s view, to a “fundamental ambivalence about the conception of experience to be assumed”\(^{19}\). The ambivalence resides in that, on the one hand, one could take Kant’s assertion that ‘experience contains a concept of an object as being given’ as an analytic definition – evident from the very concept of experience itself. But one could also take Kant’s assertion that ‘experience contains a concept of an object as being given’ as the synthetic conclusion at which one arrives if the departure was from experience understood as a purely subjective activity that does not necessarily require the representation of objects\(^{20}\). Both of these options are equally viable because, Guyer says, the forms of sensibility are that which we ourselves ‘impose’ on the raw material given in intuition.

The ambivalence remarked on by Guyer is harmful at two levels –one general and one technical. It is harmful at the general level insofar as it fails to clarify

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\(^{17}\) Ibid. p. 24. Although the problem of ‘system’ will reappear much later in this investigation (cf. Ch. IV, §1, pp. 146-165) there is something else that should be noted about Strawson’s reading of Kant in relation to ‘system’: Strawson Believes the first Critique contains the whole system of transcendental philosophy (Strawson, Op. Cit. p. 11). This investigation, however, will understand by the ‘system of transcendental philosophy’ or simply by ‘transcendental philosophy’ all that is encompassed by Kant’s three Critiques.

\(^{18}\) In Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, Guyer departs from the assumption that transcendental idealism’s underlying and fundamental presupposition is that appearances are, with the mediation of space and time, the rendering into experience of an ‘independent reality’ that works as the first’s raw material (Guyer, Paul. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 2-7). From the claim that space and time are only forms of sensibility, presented in the Preface to the B edition of the first Critique, Kant concludes that “we can therefore have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance” (Bxxvi). Guyer takes this to mean that, although this in fact suggests a reduction of the scope of the validity we derive from our indispensable modes of cognition (i.e. that of space and time “we may assert that they hold of all objects we are capable of experiencing, but not of whatever other objects there might be, if there are any others” [Ibid. p. 4,]), Kant failed to prove why these very conditions do not apply to an independent reality beyond the one already given in cognition. Up to here, however, Guyer would be adding nothing to the well-known Trendelenburg alternative in which the latter accuses Kant for failing to prove that the ideality of space and time excludes their reality. But Guyer does indeed go further than that. According to him, the ideality of space and time, and the not-so evident conclusion that that excludes their reality, is maintained by Kant in order to be able to justify synthetic a priori knowledge as pertaining to a world of representations (Ibid. pp. 37-40) –and only to a world of representations, whereby space and time must be thought of as the subjective conditions for the possibility of any representation whatsoever.

\(^{19}\) Ibid. p. 73.

\(^{20}\) Ibid. p. 79.
whether Kant is replying to the empiricist, who grants the validity of judgments about objects but questions the necessity of *a priori* concepts, or to the sceptic, who grants the validity of judgments about one’s own inner states but questions their validity concerning an independent reality. But the ambivalence is also harmful at a more technical level in that it prevented Kant from making an *analytic* connection between the concept of ‘self-ascription of experiences’ and the existence of ‘synthetic unity among experiences so ascribed’. Instead, the ambivalence in the concept of experience forced Kant into making a synthetic connection between consciousness and the self-ascription of experience (self-consciousness). The technical difficulty that Guyer describes will be addressed later in more detail, but it should suffice to say that this point leads Guyer to conclude that Kant’s mistake resides in the following: instead of limiting himself to the analytically valid claim that “whatever representations I can ascribe to myself as my own are subject to whatever conditions govern such ascription”, Kant overreaches the limits he had set in the Aesthetic by making the synthetically invalid claim that “I cannot have a representation which is not subject to these conditions [the conditions that govern the ascription]”. In so doing Kant thus commits to having to provide an account of how it is that one comes to know that no representation is possible that is not subject to self-consciousness and commits, therefore, to having to develop a ‘faulty transcendental psychology’.

In a somewhat similar vein to Strawson, Guyer, too, suggests a deeply anti-metaphysical reading of Kant. “Kant’s own transcendental idealism”, writes Guyer, “(…) was thought to require the ontological assertion that the objects represented by means of these forms [space and time], namely objects as appearances, ‘are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves (A369)”’. But, Guyer thinks, Kant needed only to drop this metaphysical claim in order to achieve a ‘convincing’ account of experience. If only no ontological claim had been made regarding the status of representation as such, then Kant’s epistemological argument about the conditions of possible experience would have proved solid enough: the ideality of space and time should amount only to the ideality of the forms of things and not of things as such. In Guyer’s reading, Kant had the

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22 (Ch. II, §ii, pp. 65-82)
tools to build a thoroughly epistemological theory of experience devoid of ontological claims—a way of reading Kant as being a ‘formal idealist’, but not a ‘real’ one27, but, alas, failed to use them.

Robert Pippin, too, reads Kant in an anti-metaphysical way. Although Pippin’s reading of Kant is complex, the following brief remarks should suffice to show in what way Pippin advocates in favour of a deflationary reading of Kant. In *Kant’s Theory of Form*, Pippin unequivocally states that any metaphysical interpretation of Kant must abandon what he thinks is a central tenet of Kantianism: the claim that “all a priori knowledge [is] exclusively formal, and not directly about any object of knowledge”28. He thinks, furthermore, that in abandoning such a claim, metaphysical interpretations inflate Kant to a degree where no recognisable theory of knowledge is identifiable. Now, there is little doubt in that Pippin is very much aware of the difficulties that interpreting Kant in a purely epistemological way raises when he says, for example, that a “problem in opting for one alternative to the exclusion of the other is clearly evident in recent works which attempt a wholly epistemological interpretation, (...) which encourage us to jettison the ‘metaphysics of transcendental idealism’”29. But, of course, in light of the fact that Kant is presenting “an analysis of human knowledge and then trying to draw some substantive conclusions from it”30 the question is whether the middle ground between the epistemological and metaphysical readings will work in the first place. Although Pippin’s response to this last question is clearly in the affirmative31, the lack of a direct relation between the a priori and objectivity jeopardises the possibility of being able to safely tread this supposed middle ground.

Unlike for Strawson or Guyer, it is possible to think that for Pippin the difference between an epistemological and a metaphysical reading of Kant is more a distinction in stress, or emphasis, than in substance. Pippin does recognise, for example, that “Kant quite clearly did intend to establish in this transcendental philosophy an ‘a priori relation to objects’”32. The way Kant does this is, in Pippin’s view, by withdrawing from straightforwardly metaphysical claims and instead

27 Ibid. p. 414.
29 Ibid. p. 21.
30 Ibid. p. 23.
31 Ibid. pp. 16-25; 218-222.
32 Ibid. p. 22.
characterising the general endeavour undertaken in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as strictly methodological\(^{33}\). Kant’s predecessors had also been concerned with synthetic *a priori* knowledge, but only Kant managed to show the close interdependence of the finite being’s modes of cognition and the way things ‘are’ *sensu stricto*. Because “[w]e do not know why our forms of experience are as they are, but we do know that understanding such a formal structure is what accounts for such reality (again ‘for us’)”\(^{34}\) it can be argued that for Pippin, then, the emphasis on ‘form’ might count as metaphysical. If this is the case, however, it will only be the case in a weak sense: after all, Pippin thinks Kant is short of an explanation for why ‘intuitability’ and ‘constructability’ would be prior to experience and for why they determine things in the way they do\(^{35}\).

There is, finally, one last example of an anti-metaphysical reading of Kant worth discussing in virtue of how influential it has been: Henry Allison’s. In *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, Allison suggests an understanding of the Kantian project which fits the soft naturalist or deflationary description by attempting to back away from a two-object world view and advocate, instead, for a two-aspect world view reading of Kant. Allison is careful in distinguishing his position from that of what he calls ‘separabilitists’ (e.g. Strawson, Prichard, Guyer, etc.): against these, who advocate in favour of drawing a sharp separation between the real and what appears, Allison proposes a compound argument. The first part of the argument states that epistemic conditions of thought must be distinguished from both psychological and ontological conditions of thought. Epistemic conditions of thought are different from psychological conditions insofar as, although both subjective, only epistemic conditions tend to objectivising. But epistemic conditions of thought differ from ontological conditions, too, insofar as, although both are objective, the former do not condition the very existence of things, but rather the objectivity of our representations of such things\(^{36}\). The second part of Allison’s argument states that these epistemic conditions of thought must be divided in accordance with a discursivity thesis, namely, that cognition requires concepts *and* sensible intuitions to operate\(^{37}\).


\(^{34}\) *Ibid.* p. 225. The emphasis is Pippin’s.

\(^{35}\) *Ibid.* pp. 77-78, 84ff; 226ff.

\(^{36}\) The whole problem for transcendental idealism is, following Allison, determining how is it precisely that epistemic conditions can be subjective and objective at once. Allison, Henry. *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*. Yale University Press, New York, 2004, p. 11.

Cognition, put differently, needs both that an object be given to the mind and that it be given in sensibility “capable of being ordered”\textsuperscript{38}. Both of these parts of the argument, rejecting the separability thesis and postulating a discursivity thesis, constitute in Allison’s reading “the basis of Kant’s idealism”\textsuperscript{39}.

The departure point opens an important question, however, for the Allisonian reading of Kant. If there is no metaphysical separation between appearances and things in themselves, what then does the distinction really amount to? For Allison, the question is best answered by reading Kant’s transcendental idealism in opposition to transcendental realism. The latter conceives of space and time as things given in themselves and irremediably derives, in Kant’s view, into empirical idealism. Because it lacks a criterion for clearly distinguishing between what is subjective and what is objective, transcendental realism transforms what is mere appearance into a thing in itself. But in doing so, transcendental realism becomes entirely untenable as a philosophical position since it will have to posit a conditioning ground for things beyond us that will be, at best, indemonstrable\textsuperscript{40}. With this in mind, for Allison, to consider things as they appear is to consider them ‘in uns’ in the transcendental sense, and to consider them as they are in themselves is to consider them ‘außer uns’ also in the transcendental sense –i.e. regardless of their relation to the subject’s epistemic conditions of thought\textsuperscript{41}. It is, in other words, a distinction best understood in terms of the standpoint one adopts\textsuperscript{42}: if one views things taking epistemic conditions into consideration, then those things will be as they appear; if, however, one views things independently of those very conditions, then those things will be in themselves. Interestingly, though, since Kant repeatedly says that one can think things apart from the conditions of sensibility, so long, that is, as one does not relate them to schemata but only to the pure categories, the consideration of things in themselves will then yield nothing but analytic judgments about the concepts of those very things\textsuperscript{43}. In other words, to the extent that we can think of things in themselves, even if only analytically, for Allison the distinction between considering things as they appear and considering them in themselves is methodological and not metaphysical\textsuperscript{44}. This, in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} (A29/B34)
\item \textsuperscript{40} Kant certainly agrees with this. \textit{Vid.} (A369); (A490-91/B518-19) and (A543/B571).
\item \textsuperscript{41} Allison, Henry. \textit{Op. Cit.} p. 56.
\item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid.} p. 39ff.
\item \textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.} p. 56.
\item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.} p. 57.
\end{itemize}
turn, puts Allison’s reading of Kant neatly in the soft naturalist, deflationary side of the fence.

Hopefully the previous remarks, even if brief, convey with enough generality and clarity the ‘spirit’, as it were, of much of Anglophone scholarship on Kant. It is true, of course, that not all of Kantian scholarship subscribes to the deflationary, anti-metaphysical tendency. Exceptions exist and they are significant not so much because of their number, but because of their insight. Sebastian Gardner and Fredewrick Beiser, who were just discussed, Béatrice Longuenesse, who will be discussed later, Michael Friedman, who will also be discussed later, Rae Langton, Paul Franks, Jane Kneller (mostly concerning Kant’s relation to Novalis and the wider context of Romanticism), and Eckart Förster (mostly in relation to Kant’s post-Critical work), to name but a few, all have sophisticated readings of Kant that would hardly fit the description of ‘anti-metaphysical’. For the time being, however, it is important to remark on some of the issues that face deflationary Kant interpretations in the hope of bringing the problem addressed in the rest of this work to the fore.

There are several issues with the anti-metaphysical, deflationary readings of Kant but here, only three will be mentioned. The first two should be easy to grasp in light of the opening discussion of Gardner and Beiser. As Gardner points out, the first problem has to do with soft naturalist readings of Kant, German Idealism, or with soft naturalism generally speaking, being between a rock and a hard place, as it were: it wants to follow traditional philosophy in providing not just necessary but sufficient legitimising grounds for phenomena, but it wants to maintain, at the same time, that one’s standpoint may furnish those grounds while renouncing the standpoint’s metaphysical status. In this sense, Gardner’s worry is strictly philosophical. Unlike the hard naturalist interpretation that will reduce the ontological order to the ‘terrestrial environment’, and unlike the metaphysical interpretation that will categorically affirm such order but at a different level, the soft naturalist approach must supply validating grounds for why things are perceived or judged the way they are in some other, derivative way. It does this by pointing towards the standpoint adopted by philosophy. Allison’s reading of Kant illustrates this neatly: the distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves is solely a distinction between ways of considering things (as dependent or independent of epistemic conditions of thought, respectively). The problem facing this kind of
reading, however, resides in that it will find it impossible to justify just why one is able to abstract from the conditions of thought or, even further, whether one can actually do so in the first place. Perhaps the soft naturalist could retort that this is precisely the worry that a meta-philosophical perspective addresses: after all, one might want to call such meta-philosophical perspective ‘transcendental’ or ‘ontological’ in an epistemologically based idealism. But such a move would mean, as Gardner puts it in relation to Pinkard, that “the deflationist wishes to treat the distinction between thought and being as merely a further distinction within thought, something which, Kant and the German idealists are clear, it cannot be.”

The second problem is related to what Beiser terms the sanitisation of idealism—transcendental or otherwise. This problem is philosophical, too, but to a lesser extent than the problem pointed out by Gardner. It is, in fact, more of a historico-hermeneutical issue. There is, of course, copious textual evidence that suggests Kant was engaged in seriously criticising metaphysics—not least in Kant’s famous dictum that “the proud name of an ontology, that presumptuously claims to supply, in systematic doctrinal form, synthetic a priori knowledge of things in general (for instance, the principle of causality) must, therefore, give place to the modest title of a mere Analytic of pure understanding.” But one should be extremely careful when uncovering what exactly is it that Kant had in mind when speaking of metaphysics or ontology and not simply assume that it was what, say, Strawson, believes metaphysics to be. As Beiser rightly points out, Anglophone scholarship on Kant was heavily influenced by positivism and ordinary language philosophy. As such, these interpretations are incapable of taking Kant’s transcendental analytic too seriously. Strawson claims repeatedly through *The Bounds of Sense* that what is worth preserving from the first *Critique* is its analysis of the structures of possible experience, but not its transcendental psychology. This sort of attitude requires that one ask whether it is Kant that is being interpreted in the first place or whether it is someone else. Beiser shows, by means of a clear example, what the difficulty amounts to: the *Critique of Pure Reason* departs from distinguishing between the two

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46 Gardner, Sebastian. *Op. Cit.* p. 44. Interestingly, Gardner’s criticism can also be constructed differently. Gardner could be thought of as saying that with soft naturalist readings of idealism the issue resides in that, in spite of having a ‘richer’ reality, as it were, than hard naturalists, soft naturalists and their interpretations of idealism will fall short from fulfilling a need internal to idealism, namely, that ‘reality’ as such be predicable of the ideal meaningfully.
47 (A247/B303)
stems of human knowledge, sensibility and understanding. The distinction itself, however, did not emerge out of nowhere. A quick glimpse into Kant’s handwritten notes to Baumgarten’s *Metaphysics* corroborates that the division between sensibility and understanding was already being thought of, albeit in a precarious way, since at least 1769-1771\(^{49}\). If *Kant* is going to be interpreted, Beiser suggests, then the historical and philosophical context of Kant’s ideas should be taken into account\(^{50}\). Not only is not doing it intellectually unchallenging, it is also risks being philosophically irrelevant.

There is yet a third difficulty that, although related to both of the previous ones, goes beyond what either Gardner or Beiser state and that will be extensively elaborated in what follows. The difficulty, in short, resides in that deflationary or anti-metaphysical readings of Kant will be unable to understand the depth of Kant’s insights into the nature of time because of their departure point. Failing to understand, in other words, how closely intertwined time, general metaphysics, special metaphysics, and transcendental philosophy are, precludes deflationary readings from grasping Kant’s original insight into the forms of intuition *ab initio*. Whether that alone warrants the conclusion that Kant is a metaphysician in the full-blooded sense is something that will remain to be seen. What will be clearly shown, however, is that it is illusory, at best, to try and disentangle metaphysics from Kant’s critical project and that it is dangerous, at worst, to the extent that in doing so one would risk missing some crucial aspects of that very philosophy. The discussion below will begin to shape, in fact, the orientation of this investigation since it will show how Kant’s concept of time is related to his broader philosophical concerns. In relation to this last point, two things will be remarked on: that it is simply unwise to try to shun Kant’s metaphysics in light of his iterating invitations not to do so; and that, for an inquiry that seeks to understand Kant’s conception of time and its role in the constitution of objectivity, the explanatory power of transcendental philosophy, with its metaphysics included, should not be simply set aside. After tracing back Kant’s shifting position on the role of sensibility in general, and of time in particular, it will be seen not only that disentangling the forms of intuition from the rest of Kant’s architectonic is impossible but that, moreover, acknowledging the forms of intuition’s fundamental

\(^{49}\) e.g. (AA17:552); (AA 17:563)
\(^{50}\) Beiser, Frederick. *Op. Cit.* pp. 84-87.
role in the constitution of objectivity is necessary for understanding the genesis\textsuperscript{51}, development, and eventual solidification of transcendental idealism.

Kant’s original formulation of the thesis on the subjectivity and ideality of time was not, not immediately at least, easy to agree with. In a letter dated from the 13\textsuperscript{th} of October, 1770, a few months after the thesis appeared in Kant’s inaugural dissertation on *De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principiis*, Johann Heinrich Lambert claimed to agree wholeheartedly with the first four propositions of §14, Section 3 of the *Dissertation*, but found the fifth proposition extremely problematic. Indeed, Lambert writes to Kant, one can perfectly well grant that the idea of time does not originate in sensibility but that, instead, sensibility presupposes time; one might further agree with the claim that the idea of time is singular and not general; that the idea of time is an intuition; and that time itself is a continuous magnitude. But, even if these four propositions are granted, it does not seem to Lambert to follow that one can deny time’s reality and objectivity\textsuperscript{52}. In fact, not only do the first four propositions not entail the fifth in any way, but admitting that they did would have catastrophic consequences for any metaphysical system that tries to account for the reality of change: “All changes are bound to time and are inconceivable without time. If changes are real, then time is real, whatever its definition may be. If time is unreal, then no change can be real”\textsuperscript{53}. ‘Even an idealist’, it seems to Lambert, would have to grant that changes occur –even if the only changes the idealist is willing to acknowledge are those of representations beginning and ending in one’s own consciousness.

Lambert’s commitment to the reality of time is deep-rooted: in the *Neues Organon*’s last section, famously entitled ‘Phänomenologie’, specifically in proposition 54 he claims that “*If a change occurs in appearance, a change also happens in reality. It remains indeterminate, however, whether the change occurs in the object, in sense, in the relation of the two, or in both of them*”\textsuperscript{54}. This is the case because of one of the presuppositions that Lambert shares with Wolffians, namely, that change is fundamentally intertwined with *duration*. For something to change, that

\textsuperscript{51} For an illuminating piece on the role inner sense plays in the initial sketches of transcendental idealism see Dyck, Corey “The Scope of Inner Sense: The Development of Kant’s Psychology in the Silent Decade” in *Con-textos Kantianos*, No. 3, June 2016, pp. 326-344.

\textsuperscript{52} (AA 10:106)

\textsuperscript{53} (AA 10:107)

\textsuperscript{54} (*NO*, II: Phänomenologie, II, §54)
is, for anything to transition from one state to another, a definite duration must be
given\(^{55}\). Since time is, by definition, definite duration, then it follows that change is
predicated on the basis of time. From this alone it does not follow that one must
predicate ‘reality’ to time. But once a further proposition is added, namely that ‘the
reality of the condition is equal to or greater than the reality of the conditioned or
that the conditioned cannot have greater reality than the condition\(^{56}\), one can derive the
reality of time: if duration is a condition for time, and time a condition for change,
and change is phenomenologically real, then it follows that the conditions of change
and time are themselves real –in accordance with the rationalist presupposition
enunciated above.

The concept of time is, in Lambert’s view, more determinate than the concept
of duration for the simple reason that whatever is in time has some duration but not
the reverse: eternity, for example, has infinite duration but is not itself in time. This
reasoning leads Lambert to affirm that the indeterminate concept of duration is
indissolubly bound with the concept of existence and that the two are, to some extent,
coextensive\(^{57}\) (it leads him, likewise, to draw an analogy where time is to duration
what a specific location is to space). What is important here, however, is one of the
many implications that can be drawn from Lambert’s objection. If indeed duration
and existence are necessarily bound, then, Kant’s general effort in the Dissertation,
seems to be jeopardised. If, that is, duration is an indeterminate concept that is, in
spite of its indeterminacy, necessarily linked with existence, then Kant’s
differentiation between the sensible and the intellectual must be mistaken: “For, in
addition to the fact that constant appearance is for us truth, though the foundations
are never discovered or only at some future time; it is also useful in ontology to take
up concepts borrowed from appearance [Schein], since theory must finally be applied
to phenomena again”\(^{58}\).

To this objection, Kant responded in two ways: the first is found in a letter to
Marcus Herz, a mutual friend of Lambert and Kant, from 1772; the second is found in
the Critique of Pure Reason, from 1781. Lambert’s objection, as Kant’s phrases it in

\(^{55}\) (Wolff, Christian. Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, §554)
\(^{56}\) This is one of the many different implications that Wolff derives from the Principle of Sufficient
Reason that, in §70 of the Ontologia, reads as follows: “Nothing exists without a sufficient reason for
why it exists rather than does not exist” (Wolff, Christian. Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, §70)
\(^{57}\) (AA 10:107-108)
\(^{58}\) (AA 10:108)
1772, is that “Changes are something real (according to the testimony of inner sense). Now, they are possible only if time is presupposed; therefore, time is something real that is involved in the determinations of things in themselves”\(^59\). But, to this, Kant first counter-argues that nobody would derive the reality of objects in space from the reality of the representations of those objects. If anybody were to do that, no criterion whatsoever could be provided for distinguishing between, say, a dream or fantastic contrivance and something actually taking place before one’s eyes. The same, in a way, is true for time: nobody would derive the reality of alterations in time from the reality of the representations of those alterations (or from the reality of the alteration of representations, for that matter). In keeping with the same example, if anyone were to derive the reality of the changes that some specific object undergoes from one’s own imagined possible variations of that object, once again no criterion could be provided for distinguishing the contrived alterations and those actually taking place. This line of argument, Kant admits, presupposes that one avoid thinking of one’s self as subordinated to the condition of time (for otherwise, the self that is doing the thinking would itself change and, thus, no stability would be gained for one to pin representations to). But so long as what one is thinking of is any other object that is not the self, the point should hold: time cannot be objectively real for, if it were, it would be impossible for us to distinguish an objective succession that occurs in the world from the subjective succession that occurs in our representations of that world.

The second and more elaborate response to the objection would have to wait another nine years to appear. Indeed, it was not until the publication of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that Kant would rebut Lambert conclusively and, importantly, in a slightly different way. In Section II of the Transcendental Aesthetic, specifically in the Elucidation to the Expositions of the Concept of Time, Kant reconstitutes Lambert’s criticism as follows:

“Against this theory, which concedes empirical reality to time but disputes its absolute and transcendental reality, insightful men have so unanimously proposed one objection that I conclude that it must naturally occur to every reader [...] It goes thus: Alterations are real (this is proved by the change of our own representations, even if one would deny all outer appearances

\(^{59}\) (AA 10: 134)
together with their alterations). Now alterations are possible only in time, therefore time is something real\textsuperscript{60}.

To the objection reconstructed thus, Kant responds somewhat differently than nine years before by stating that transcendental philosophy does not deny the reality of time altogether. Time is indeed real—it is without a doubt the real form of inner intuition. What transcendental philosophy does deny is the absolute reality of time, i.e. that the predicate ‘real’ could be applied to time abstracting from the consciousness for which change is present in the first place. In classical terms, transcendental philosophy would say that the concept of time does not, and cannot, inhere in the objects but rather it inheres solely in the subjects’ intuitions of those objects. Differently to what Kant had questioned in the 1772 letter to Herz, what is at stake in the counterargument of 1781 is not Kant’s scepticism regarding the principle of sufficient reason. Instead, what is at stake is slightly different in that Kant shows that proceeding, as Lambert does, to derive the absolute reality of anything external to us from the reality of something internal to us is, properly speaking, a fallacy of subreption\textsuperscript{61}.

In other words, if in 1772 Kant responded to Lambert by questioning the validity and applicability of the principle of sufficient reason, in 1781, more committed to the transcendental ideality of time than before, he responded by saying the ‘absolute’ qualification of the predicate ‘real’ is a misapplication\textsuperscript{62}. Although the difference between the two answers elaborated by Kant is somewhat subtle, it is nonetheless worth asking what justifies it: why would Kant first argue that the reality of time cannot be derived from the reality of alterations in our representations but then argue a few year later, slightly differently, that time’s empirical reality indeed holds but its absolute reality does not?

There are several reasons for Kant’s slight change of argumentative strategy. The first has to do with the predicate\textsuperscript{63} ‘reality’ only being conceived as a pure concept of the understanding towards the mid-1770s. Although the Dissertation

\textsuperscript{60} (A36/B53)
\textsuperscript{61} (A643/B671)
\textsuperscript{62} A different way of formulating the same point is as follows: in 1770, when delivering the Dissertation, Kant was still unclear about the meaning of the word ‘real’. It was not until the mid-1770s that Kant gained enough clarity on the concept as to be able to state whether time and space were ‘real’ or not.
\textsuperscript{63} Recall that predicate, or category (κατηγορία), will acquire a technical meaning in the critical period.
specifies in a lot of detail what the principles of sensibility are, and what their properties amount to, it leaves the principles of the intelligible somewhat less clear. The principle that governs the understanding amounts to little more than intelligence being a faculty in the subject through which it represents that which cannot be met with in the senses.\footnote{(AA 2:392)} More specificity would have to wait until 1775 when, in the *Duisburg Nachlaß*, the first mention of ‘reality’ as a concept of the understanding appears: “*The absolute predicate in general is ‘reality’ and whence [wovon]*”\footnote{(AA 17:657)} The second reason for the argumentative change has to do with difficulties inherent to the strict separation Kant had drawn between the sensible and the intellectual. After having separated neatly the provenance and applicability of the principles of each ‘world’ in the *Dissertation*, Kant seems to have become aware of a need to allow for at least some intelligible concepts to dominate in the sensible world too. And precisely this leads to the third, and final reason, for Kant’s argumentative change that will be the focus of what follows and it has to do with a shift in Kant’s general perspective as to the scope and limits of ‘phenomenology’ and ‘metaphysics’.

In the concluding remarks to the *Dissertation* there is a section devoted to ‘method’ in metaphysics. There, Kant claims that for pure philosophy, unlike for other sciences, the use of the understanding is ‘real’ and not merely logical. For this reason, metaphysics or pure philosophy must address first and foremost its own method: “*Here, in pure philosophy, method precedes all science*”\footnote{(AA 2:411)} The mention of ‘method’ in the *Dissertation*, as Laywine has pointed out, answers to Kant primarily being concerned with carving a niche for two branches of special metaphysics: rational theology and pneumatology.\footnote{Laywine, Alison. “Kant on the Self as Model of Experience” in *Kantian Review*, Vol. 9, 2005, pp. 1-29. Henry Allison, too, has pointed this out. See Allison, Henry. *Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical Historical Commentary*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 49-54.} Both of these sciences would need to be purged from any sensible content that could contaminate them and that meant, for Kant at that time, purging them from anything sensible that was provided in accordance with the principles of space and time. This is to say that the intellectual concepts discussed in the *Dissertation*, i.e. ‘existence’, ‘necessity’, ‘substance’, and ‘cause’, had all been stripped away from any sensible content and had been left, instead, as pertaining *solely* to an intellectual domain. This, however, becomes increasingly problematic: if these concepts bear no relation whatsoever to sensibility
and its principles, how is it then that one is entitled to use them in relation to sensible objects? In answer to this, Kant withdraws to a meta-metaphysical discussion on ‘method’. The ‘method’ in question is a ‘propaedeutic’, a general metaphysics or ontology\(^68\) that would first and foremost determine in advance what the limits of cognition –sensible or intellectual–, are. General metaphysics or ontology would, insofar as they are a propaedeutic, delineate the contours of what could become a science. General metaphysics or ontology would, in sum, show whether and how those concepts relate to sensibility –the problem of transcendental philosophy thus began taking shape–.

It is clear that if the concepts of existence, necessity, substance, and cause are going to pertain to a propaedeutic, to a general metaphysics or ontology, then it must be the case that they are applicable in the intellectual domains of special metaphysics and, also, in the sensible domain of special metaphysics (for whatever one predicates of being in general must in turn be predicated of any particular being). This is to say, in Kant’s terminology of the early 1770s, that these concepts need to hold equally well for a rational theology and a pneumatology as for a discipline occupied with sensible representations, i.e. general phenomenology. To make the point clear perhaps it is worth considering the context within which Kant’s first answer emerged. Lambert’s letter just discussed came partly in response to Kant’s inaugural Dissertation but partly, also, in response to a letter Kant had addressed to him a few months earlier. In the earlier correspondence, dated September 1770, Kant hinted at the importance of acknowledging the principles that govern sensibility if one is to undertake any kind of metaphysical endeavour:

> “The most universal laws of sensibility play a deceptively large role in metaphysics, where, after all, it is merely concepts and principles of pure reason that are at issue. A quite special, though purely negative science, general phenomenology (phaenomenologia generalis), seems to me to be presupposed by metaphysics. In it, the principles of sensibility, their validity and their limitations, would be determined, so that these principles could not be confusedly applied to objects of pure reason, as has heretofore almost always happened”\(^69\).

\(^68\) In a loose note from 1783 or 1784 Kant writes: “Metaphysica pura. Ontologia is the system of pure principles a priori” (AA 18:284).

\(^69\) (AA 10:98)
It would be tempting to think that Kant’s reference to a ‘general phenomenology’ in this quote was due more to seeking a common ground with its recipient –Lambert– on which to discuss the findings of the Dissertation than to any serious commitment with a ‘phenomenological’ discipline. Evidence, however, speaks to the contrary. In a letter to his friend Marcus Herz from February 21st, 1772, almost two years after having engaged with Lambert and in the midst of the ‘silent decade’ Kant’s reiterates his ambition for a titanic ‘critical’ project. There again Kant claims to be working on a new piece, that would bear the title The Limits of Sensibility and Reason, and that would consist of two main parts, i.e. theoretical and practical. The first, theoretical part would in turn consist of a ‘general phenomenology’ and a metaphysics and only in the possible transition from the first to the second, claims Kant, does the key to the secret of all possible metaphysics become available through the question of “[w]hat is the ground [Grund] of the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object [Gegenstand]?” Only once the ‘general principles of sensibility’ have been established, that is, can a critical metaphysical inquiry take place. General phenomenology, in this sense, is the name Kant gave to the discipline that would establish the origins and limits of sensible cognition so as to prevent metaphysics from being contaminated with elements that are foreign to it.

But this leaves an important question untouched: is this ‘general phenomenology’ suited to act as the propaedeutic that would prepare the ground for all of metaphysics? According to what Kant wrote to Lambert in 1770 and then again to Herz in 1772 it would seem the answer is clearly affirmative. General phenomenology, along with logic, and noology, is in fact the science that, without appealing to experience, will prepare the ground for future metaphysical investigation:

“All sciences of pure reason are either those that consider the rules of universal cognition in general through pure reason or the particular rules of pure reason themselves. Logica. Phaenomenologia generalis, Noologia

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70 (AA 10:130)  
71 (AA 10:131)  
72 (AA 10:108)
general have as their end merely the rules of universal cognitions that are not given through any experience”\textsuperscript{73}.

Although little is said about what the ‘particular rules of pure reason’ might be, there is little doubt that, in this fragment dated from around 1769 or 1770, Kant thinks general phenomenology can carry out the work of expounding the universal laws governing experience without presupposing experience in the first place.

By the mid-1770s, however, the answer is different. It is not a general phenomenology that as propaedeutic will prepare the ground for metaphysics. In its place, something different emerges: transcendental philosophy. It became increasingly unclear to Kant the extent to which a discipline under the heading of ‘general phenomenology’ could answer, and even ask, the question about the ground of the relation between representations and objects. The reason for this loss of confidence resides in that general phenomenology is suited, at best, for scrutinising the principles governing sensibility and the way in which they articulate natural laws: phenomenology is the science of ‘phainein’, after all\textsuperscript{74}. In other words, a general phenomenology can do nothing but presuppose that there is a factual connection between representation and object but is wholly unsuited to evaluate its possibility critically or, one learns later, transcendentally. As the Duisburg Nachlaß testifies, Kant’s disappointment with general phenomenology and his newly found enthusiasm for general metaphysics, and perhaps even ontology, led him to start thinking of the problem about the connection between the sensuous and the intellectual in different ways. Thus, in this somewhat embryonic piece, a very rudimentary exposition of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments appears as well as the first mention ever of apperception understood as intuition of the self that thinks\textsuperscript{75}.

By 1781 Kant’s suspicions about general phenomenology are no longer merely embryonic. Instead, Kant writes that “Philosophy stands in need of a science which shall determine the possibility, the principles, and the extent of all a priori knowledge”\textsuperscript{76} and explicitly identifies such science, in the Preface to the Critique of

\textsuperscript{73} (AA 17:440)
\textsuperscript{74} Vid. Lambert’s description of phenomenology as doctrine of ‘Schein’ (φαίνειν) in (NO-II: Phänomenologie, II, 217)
\textsuperscript{75} “Intuition is either of the object (apprehensio) or of our self; the latter (apperceptio) pertains to all cognitions, even those of the understanding and reason” (AA 17:651)
\textsuperscript{76} (A2)
Pure Reason, to ‘critique’, the task of which is to “discover the sources and conditions of the possibility”\(^{77}\) of all of metaphysics in the first place. Critique, thus understood, overlaps almost neatly with transcendental philosophy except in one regard: critique will not limit itself to dealing with \textit{a priori} synthetic knowledge, but will also have to elucidate analytic \textit{a priori} knowledge. This is, to some extent, why Kant excuses himself in the Introduction to the first Critique from not presenting the entirety of \textit{a priori} knowledge systematically\(^{78}\). But insofar as “Transcendental philosophy is the propaedeutic to metaphysics proper”\(^{79}\), the domain of both critique and transcendental philosophy seems to be the same. Thus, since the mid-1770s and onwards, Kant thinks that the task of preparing the way for metaphysics belongs not to general phenomenology but to critique, transcendental philosophy, or even transcendental logic insofar as “[t]ranscendental philosophy could also be called transcendental logic. It occupies itself with the sources, extent, and the boundaries of pure reason, without busying itself with objects”\(^{80}\). Perhaps this is why, in the series of logic lectures Kant was giving at the time, he explicitly identifies logic, in the abstract, with the aforementioned ‘propaedeutic’\(^{81}\) since logic itself “considers in everything only the form of concepts, judgments, and inferences. In short, it prepares us for other sciences”\(^{82}\). If this is the case, it would seem as if this were something that would get further specified in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the latter, Kant carefully distinguishes between general and transcendental logic: general logic abstracts from any content that its rules could possibly have and instead manipulates concepts and the relations they have to one another—but not to intuition. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, acknowledges the lessons taught by an Aesthetic doctrine. It acknowledges that there are pure intuitions and, even if bracketing empirical content, thinks of the rules of the understanding always, without exception, in relation to those pure intuitions. Transcendental logic, echoing the need for a science announced in the Introduction, “determines the origin, the scope, and the objective validity of [pure \textit{a priori}] knowledge”\(^{83}\).

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\(^{77}\) (Axxi)

\(^{78}\) “We have to carry the analysis so far only as is indispensably necessary in order to comprehend, in their whole extent, the principles of a priori synthesis” (A12/B25).

\(^{79}\) (AA 29:752 [Metaphysik Mrongovius])

\(^{80}\) (AA 29:756)

\(^{81}\) Προπαιδευτική understood as preparatory doctrine.

\(^{82}\) (AA 24:791 [Logik Wien])

\(^{83}\) (A57/B81) Also: Clinton Tolley has addressed the point of the difference between general and transcendental logic with remarkable clarity in a recent article entitled “The Generality of Kant’s Transcendental Logic”. Although Tolley is right about the good reasons there are not to draw a distinction between general and transcendental logic in terms of scope or domain, and although he is right, further, in his attempt at constructing the distinction between these in terms of ‘aspect’, he is
Thus, knowing that “Above all, transcendental philosophy requires critique,” leaves matters in the following way: the propaedeutic that was named at some point ‘general phenomenology’ gives way to ‘critique’, ‘transcendental philosophy’, or ‘transcendental logic’. Insofar as critique and transcendental philosophy bring into question the nature of the relation between the understanding, its representations, and what they represent they will also go by the name of transcendental logic. Viewed in this light, many of the Reflexionen from the mid-1770s on architectonic and system gain in clarity. Kant writes, for example that “Metaphysics is preceded by transcendental philosophy, which like logic does not deal with objects but with the possibility, the sum-total and the boundaries of all cognition of pure reason (also of pure mathematics). It is the logic of pure rational cognition. Prior to transcendental philosophy, the critique of reason in general.”

But, importantly, the reasons Kant had for changing his argumentative strategy in answering to Lambert also become clearer: Kant seems to have realised somewhere between 1772 and 1776 that phenomenology, as the science of ‘Schein’, was unable to account for the ground of the relation of objects to their representations. At most, the phenomenology appealed to earlier on, phenomenology understood in Lambert’s sense, would have been able to justify the subjective associations of representations, but without being able to justify their objectivity. On this basis, the 1781 accusation of Lambert’s making a fallacy of subreption, an accusation Kant could not have upheld in 1772, would seem thoroughly justified: only once the ground of object-relatedness is brought into question does Kant have the tools to criticise, from the newly developed transcendental standpoint, phenomenology’s misconception of the nature of intuition.

It is precisely this last point that leads back to Kant’s propaedeutic project: how is Kant’s counter-objection to Lambert linked to the broader ambitions of transcendental idealism? Perhaps it is important to dwell, for a brief moment, on this:

nonetheless mistaken in arguing that ‘transcendental content’, of which Kant speaks in (B105) as pertaining to the pure concepts of the understanding, is detached from intuition or ‘unschematised’ (Tolley’s expression, not Kant’s). See Tolley, Clinton. “The Generality of Kant’s Transcendental Logic” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 50-3, 2012, pp. 417-446

84 (R4558) This fragment was found on the margins of Kant’s copy of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics.

85 See, for example, “(…) all philosophy of pure reason is either critique or the organon thereof. The former is transcendental philosophy, the latter metaphysics” (AA 18:22 [R4897]) or “Metaphysics is a priori cognition of nature, the object of which is at least given by the senses; transcendental philosophy is pure a priori cognition” (AA 18:20 [R4889]).

86 (AA 18:285 [R5644])
what hangs on either holding on to or discarding ‘metaphysics’? Is this not a simple semantic discussion as to whether one is comfortable in characterising Kant’s project as ‘metaphysical’? Why exactly is it important to keep metaphysics? These are important questions and they need to be answered as clearly as possible. In this regard, an answer is already in sight and will be further developed in what follows: it is fundamental that one acknowledge the Kantian project as ‘metaphysical’ because only in so doing does one keep an eye on the problem of transcendence or object-relatedness, i.e. on the problem of synthetic a priori knowledge. This does not amount, of course, to saying that Kant offers a solution to that problem, but it does amount to saying that at the very least it is a problem that plays a crucial role in the construction of transcendental philosophy.

This point can be further specified by means of yet another relevant distinction (albeit one that would only appear later, in the mid-1780s) that will speak directly to Gardner and Beiser. Critique, pure philosophy, transcendental philosophy, and transcendental logic, are all metaphysics to the extent that they are concerned with a priori knowledge. Furthermore, they are ‘metaphysics’ in an even more precise sense since their aim is to answer how synthetic a priori judgments are possible, and “[t]he purpose of metaphysics is to make out the origin of synthetic a priori cognition.” But there are two levels of metaphysics, as was mentioned in the Introduction: there is general metaphysics that occupies itself with nature in general, and many special metaphysics that occupy themselves with narrower domains within that ‘nature in general’. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason this distinction between general and special metaphysics still echoes the terminology of Kant’s predecessors (especially Wolff and Baumgarten):

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87 Kant would have been justifiably reticent to identify without provisos, the problem of synthetic a priori knowledge with the problem of transcendence. The two reasons for this reticence, one can speculate, would have to do with the historico-philosophical background of the Latin transcendere and its Mediaeval connotations, and with Kant’s somewhat special conception of what the transcendental and the transcendent are. What entitles the usage above, however, is today’s use of ‘transcendence’ as signalling the relation between things other than the self and the processes for the constitution of the objectivity of those things.

88 In spite of Kant’s criticism of Baumgarten’s definition of ‘metaphysics’ in (A843/A871) on the grounds of such definition’s lack of specificity, the similarity between their respective definitions is striking. For Baumgarten “Metaphysics is the science of the first principles in human knowledge. To metaphysics belong ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology” (Met. Prol. §§1-2).

89 (AA 18:5 [R4849]) The note is from between 1776 and 1779.

90 Wolff opens the Ontology as follows “Ontologia seu Philosophia prima est scientia entis in genere, seu quatenus ens est” (Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, Prol. §1)
“Metaphysics in the narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason. The former considers only the understanding and reason itself in a system of concepts and principles that relate to objects in general, without assuming objects that may be given (Ontologia). The latter considers nature – i.e., the totality of given objects (...) and is therefore physiology (although only rationalis)”91.

Metaphysics, here, if dealing with the system of concepts and principles of the understanding and reason, is ontology. If dealing with the application to some specific domain of science is something else (depending on the domain itself). In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, this distinction stops echoing Kant’s predecessors and instead goes for a differentiation in scope or levels of generality:

“And so a separated [special] metaphysics of corporeal nature does excellent and indispensable service for general metaphysics, in that the former furnishes examples (instances in concreto) in which to realise the concepts and propositions of the latter (properly speaking, transcendental philosophy), that is, to give a mere form of thought sense and meaning”92.

That which considers all of synthetic a priori knowledge, one finds, is general metaphysics; that which considers the application of a priori knowledge to specific domains of cognition, is special metaphysics. In this sense, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and the Metaphysics of Morals are special metaphysical treatises, but the Critiques are treatises in general metaphysics.

The point to take away from the preceding discussion is the following: separating or disentangling Kant’s broad metaphysics from his conception of critical philosophy – be it in relation to time, specifically, or in relation to the nature of cognition, generally– is simply not possible. In light of the origin, development, and ultimate goal of Kant’s critical project, it can be conclusively maintained that any attempt at stripping metaphysical claims away, or reading metaphysics out of, such critical project is not only bound to miss its target, but will ultimately do more harm than good if the effort is to understand Kant. The 1770s and 1780s Reflexions,

91 (A845/B873)
92 (AA 4:478)
Metaphysics lectures, Logic lectures, Letters, Critiques, and Metaphysical writings, all seem to point towards an indissoluble bond between Kant’s critical ambitions and his attempts at criticising metaphysics from within. Failing to acknowledge this is bound to overlook some key philosophical insights Kant provided philosophy with. Take the opening paragraphs of the Analogies, for example, where Kant claims that “since experience is a knowledge of objects through perceptions, the relation in the existence of the manifold has to be represented in experience, not as it is com-posed in time [wie es in der Zeit zusammengestellt ist], but as it objectively exists in time [modified]”\(^93\). What will a thoroughly epistemological reading of Kant, one that shies away from metaphysical claims, be able to say about the contrast between composing in time and objectively existing in time? It will say, and indeed has said, that the Analogies should be read as an attempted solution to the problem of the possibility for the cognition of an objective temporal order (one apprehends the parts of a house successively, yet judges them to be coexisting parts of an enduring object – how then is such a judgment possible?\(^94\)). It will necessarily take this to mean, wrongly, that the question with which Kant is concerned in the Analogies is how time consciousness, or the cognition of a temporal order (wrongly equating the two\(^95\)), is possible\(^96\). The epistemological reading will conclude, finally, that Kant’s answer to the question of the cognition of a temporal order, formulated in just a few words, is that one represents appearance as an object, in this case the temporal order, by subjecting representations to a rule. But the question formulated above had to do with the difference between com-posing a manifold in time and a manifold objectively existing in time and, as such, the question has clearly been left untouched in virtue of the fact that the distinction between com-position in time and objective existence in time is not being recognised.

Other examples could be given along the same lines\(^97\), and yet others pertaining to the role of time in relation to the second and third Critiques\(^98\), where a deflationary, anti-metaphysical reading, will struggle to find its way. Many of such examples, however, will appear later in this investigation. What is important,

\(^93\) (B219)
\(^95\) Wrongly because, Allison thinks, the subjective order is “what would remain if (per impossible) we could remove the determinate structure imposed on the sensibly given (the manifold of inner sense) by the understanding” Ibid. p. 231.
\(^96\) Ibid. p. 231.
\(^97\) e.g. The capacity to distinguish between logical and real possibilities or the already mentioned difference between general and transcendental logic.
\(^98\) e.g. Seeing the connection between time, the future, freedom, and teleology.
however, to take away from all of this is simply that, in overstressing the epistemological, theory of knowledge related aspects of Kant, anti-metaphysical readings will struggle not only to answer important questions concerning the architectonic of the critical system and fundamental questions concerning philosophical content, but will struggle in even beginning to formulate such questions in a transcendental way, i.e. a way that problematises the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments.

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In this chapter it was seen that it is impossible to separate Kant’s critical project from its general metaphysical ambitions, i.e. impossible to separate transcendental philosophy from the question on the possibility of metaphysics. For all of the merit that anti-metaphysical readings of Kant deserve, insofar as they provide extremely detailed reconstructions of some of Kant’s arguments, it remains significantly problematic to try to disentangle metaphysics from epistemology in transcendental philosophy. It was seen, accordingly, that specifically in relation to Kant’s conception of time it would be unwise to separate sharply between an epistemological domain and a metaphysical domain. It was suggested, instead, that an inquiry into the nature of time and the constitution of objectivity, including of course the epistemological aspects therewith associated, must keep in sight Kant’s critical project in relation to the entirety of metaphysics.

The chapter began by appealing to a distinction brought forward by Sebastian Gardner and Frederick Beiser. The distinction consists in that one can have, on the one hand, a soft naturalist, anti-metaphysical, or deflationary approach to idealism or have, on the other hand, a metaphysical approach to idealism. To the extent that such distinction holds, it was seen that some contemporary Anglophone scholarship on Kant leans towards the soft naturalist, deflationary approach. This was done by reconstructing some of the major Anglophone interpretations of Kant that to a greater or lesser extent subscribe to the anti-metaphysical reading. Against these readings, however, three arguments were given that should discourage anyone from overemphasising Kant’s epistemological insights at the cost of metaphysics. First, it was argued with Gardner that so-called ‘epistemologically-based idealism’ will be unable to justify the supposed shift in standpoint that will allow a critical inquiry to
draw a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Without that
distinction, however, one might as well adopt a hard naturalist perspective. Second, it
was argued with Beiser that anti-metaphysical readings of Kant fail to do justice to
the broader philosophical and historical context within which transcendental
philosophy emerged. Most importantly it was argued, third, that Kant’s conception of
time, and especially of time in relation to the understanding, evolved through a period
of at least nine years. Whereas early on Kant had been thinking of constructing a
phenomenological project that would concern itself with the limits of sensibility, later
on he came to realise that such project needed to be widened. The later project,
fundamentally and inexorably related to general metaphysics and to transcendental
logic, is what came to be known as transcendental philosophy. From all of this
discussion it was concluded, finally, that if an enquiry into the a priori ground of the
possibility of relating to objects is going to take place, it will have to do so by means
of acknowledging the possibility of a transcendental logic.
Chapter II

The first chapter showed how closely intertwined a transcendental enquiry is to the problem of the \textit{a priori} ground of the possibility of relating to objectivity. This was shown by remarking on the difficulties that anti-metaphysical readings of Kant necessarily encounter and concluding that transcendental philosophy is best understood as a general metaphysical project. But that transcendental philosophy seeks the \textit{a priori} ground of the possibility of relating to objectivity was shown, furthermore, by means of tracing Kant’s metaphysical concerns, especially his concerns as to the nature of time, historically and philosophically since the time of the \textit{Dissertation}. It was seen that only once the possibility of object-relatedness was brought into question did Kant begin to conceive of the relation between intuition and understanding transcendentally.

Why, however, would an investigation concerned with the problem of how objectivity comes to be constituted focus primarily on the nature of time? There are, after all, \textit{two} forms of intuition so why focus exclusively on one of them? The current chapter aims at answering this question in as much precision as possible. To do so, it will be shown, first, that time is the most universal and also the most fundamental form of intuition. It will be shown, second, that these characteristics of time answer to the fact that inner sense is primarily the mode in which the subject affects itself. This chapter will therefore be divided accordingly into two main sections. The first section will argue in favour of the priority of time over space as the fundamental form of intuition: it will be shown that time, inner sense, is the fundamental form of intuition insofar as its most primary character is that of being the representation of unity as given by subjectivity from itself and to itself. But because two distinct arguments will be offered advocating for the priority of time, this section will be, in turn, divided into two sub-sections. In the first sub-section it will be seen that time is prior to space on logical grounds. It will be argued that although both of the forms of intuition are indispensable requirements for the objectivity of outer experience, following Kant’s own distinction between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’, only one of those two forms, i.e. time, is an indispensable requirement for the possibility of positing \textit{a priori} content. In the second sub-section it will be further seen that time is prior to space, also, on ontological grounds. It will be argued, namely, that time, in virtue of being primarily self-affection, that is to say the mode in which subjectivity opens itself as receptivity,
is the fundamental form of sensibility without which no representation whatsoever would be possible – not even the representation of space itself. From the two arguments brought forward in the course of this section it will be concluded, briefly, that in being the innermost activity of the subject, time is also the locus that grounds the possibility of affectivity.

The discussion about the priority of time, especially from the argument concerning the ontological priority of time, yields an extremely important implication. It will be clear that characterising time as self-affection sheds much needed light on Kant’s often obscure way of treating time and temporality. But in doing so, a question emerges concerning what kind of relation, if any, self-affection is supposed to have to apperception. In the second section of this chapter, therefore, the role that time plays in the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding will be elaborated on. It will be argued that, in relation to the A version of the Deduction, the supposed ‘paradox’ of self-knowledge and self-consciousness is dissolved by means of conceiving adequately of time and its relation to the syntheses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. It will be further argued that, in relation to the B version of the Deduction, the paradox is also dissolved by rightly conceiving of the relation between the unity of apperception and inner sense. This is to say that, by properly articulating unity and synthesis, it will be shown that in positing apperception Kant is positing an instance the essence of which is to encounter itself as temporally extended. This, in turn, will be seen to imply that time provides the self with a manifold that is independent from space in pure intuition.

Because of the structure of the chapter itself, one may regard the first section as a discussion seeking to illuminate the meaning of time in the Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason, and regard the second section as seeking to illuminate the meaning of time in the Analytic of the Critique.
The priority of time

Space and time are described in the first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, entitled Transcendental Aesthetic, of the Critique of Pure Reason, as pure forms of intuition. This, to Kant, means that neither space nor time are entities out there to be encountered but, rather, forms which allow the encountering of entities in the first place: space and time are the conditions which allow, in being represented purely themselves, the representations of objects of possible experience. The concepts of both space and time are each presented in the Aesthetic by means of a metaphysical and a transcendental exposition. Although Kant grants from the very outset that the exposition [Erörterung, exhibitio] itself will not exhaust all there is to say about each one of these concepts\(^1\), the importance of the remarks made there echo throughout all of the Critiques and are therefore worthy of serious consideration. About space one learns, in a metaphysical exposition that develops that which is given in the concept a priori, four things: that space is not an empirical concept derived from experience; that space is a necessary a priori representation underlying all outer intuitions; that space is not a discursive or general concept but, rather, itself a pure intuition; and, finally, that the representation of space is given as an infinite given magnitude [Grösse]\(^2\). In the transcendental exposition, that unlike the metaphysical exposition is supposed to explain the possibility of a priori synthetic knowledge, one learns of space that it must be the form of outer intuition and, again, an intuition itself—for only thus does it ground synthetic knowledge a priori, e.g. geometry. In a similar vein but with slight variations\(^3\), about time one learns, in the metaphysical exposition of the concept, five things: that time is not an empirical concept derived from experience; that time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions; that the possibility of apodeictic principles concerning temporal relations is grounded on time's a priori necessity; that time is not a discursive or general concept; and, lastly; that time too is given as one single infinite

\(^1\) (A23/B38)  
\(^2\) (A22/B37-A29/B45)  
\(^3\) Kant kept the five theses about time in the B edition of the Critique but dropped the fifth about space, for example.
magnitude. In the transcendental exposition of time Kant refers the reader back to the third point in the metaphysical exposition and briefly states that, in addition to a priori necessity of time for the possibility of apodeictic principles, time must also be thought as underlying the very possibility of alteration—something no concept whatsoever could ever do.

But, if Kant argues repeatedly that both of the forms of sensibility are necessary conditions for objective knowledge, why, then, orient an investigation solely to time? Is it that time has some sort of priority over space as the primary form of intuition? Why focus an investigation that has the problem of the constitution of objectivity at its heart solely on one of the forms of intuition? Kant is clear that intuitions and concepts are required for knowledge, but he is also clear there are two, and not just one, forms of intuition. What grounds can one have to focus only on one of the forms? Is there not a danger in reducing Kant’s position in this way? Why could it not be said that time just is ‘co-founding’, ‘co-originary’ or ‘equi-primordial’ with space instead of saying that time is prior to, or more fundamental than, it? In the current section of this chapter it will be shown that time does, indeed, have priority over space. The kind of priority which time will be shown to have is not solely, or not exclusively, a logical priority in the sense that time and not space allows one to account for the mode of appearing of objects that do not necessarily appear in space; also, a kind of ontological priority will be argued for, one that will prove to lead necessarily to the problem of the self. This will be done by means of two main arguments—logical and ontological, respectively—.

Although the problem of how objectivity comes to be constituted will only be frontally addressed in the following Chapter, there is nonetheless an important preliminary remark that should be made here. The aim in the current section is not to establish time as the sufficient condition for systematised experience of objects but, rather, to establish time as grounding the possibility of positing an a priori content-ful manifold in intuition. The latter claim should not be taken to mean, that is, that space is ‘dispensable’ in accounting for objectivity: Kant is clear, ever since the 1768 “Directions in Space” essay but also throughout the Critical period, in that the specificity of space is indispensable in accounting for the relations objects have to
one another and objects have to thought. The claim is weaker, to the extent that this Chapter is concerned, and should only be taken to mean that, existence not being something one can simply construct a priori, time is a necessary condition for all appearing but not a sufficient one in securing the objectivity of experience.

a) Logical argument for the priority of time: In the Aesthetic, Kant presents the reader with a series of distinctions the relevance of which, for the further development of the general argument of the Critique, can hardly be overestimated. Not only does Kant introduce there the difference between intuition and sensibility and that between sensation and appearance, he also presents the difference between form and matter in the briefest possible way, i.e. in two paragraphs. Intuition, one learns, is the immediate relation of a mode of knowledge to its object but intuition itself is possible only insofar as the mind is affected in some way. This ‘receptive’ capacity for being affected in some way is, simply, sensibility, and “it alone yields intuitions.” With sensation being something like the effect or repercussion that an object has on our faculty of representation one can infer that, if an intuition relates to its object through sensation, then that intuition relates to something given—in virtue of having specified ‘sensation’ as an ‘effect’ or ‘repercussion’ of an object on one’s faculty of representation. It is not implied by this, however, that intuition can solely be empirical since, one has also learnt, one can represent purely without anything belonging to sensation and this latter intuition is, once again in virtue of its lack of empirical content, pure. If by appearance one understands the undetermined object of an empirical intuition, then, Kant thinks, one must be able to distinguish between its matter and its form: its matter is that which corresponds to sensation and its form “that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations.” These distinctions allow one to see how and why Kant would want to use the term ‘pure intuition’ in the way he does: if the pure form of sensible intuitions is not encountered but, rather, is necessarily a priori then it is safe to call it ‘pure’ in the transcendental sense.

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4 See, for example, (AA 2:403); (AA 2:381); (AA 4:554ff) For an interesting account of the possible relations between schemata and spatiality, see Gibbons, Sarah. Kant’s Theory of Imagination. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, especially pp. 63-78.
5 (A179/B221) See, also, Kant’s claim that “the existence of appearances cannot be cognised a priori” (A178/B221). The question that inevitably follows, in this sense, is: if the existence of appearances cannot be cognised a priori, what can be cognised a priori?
6 (A19/B33)
7 (A20/B34)
8 (A21/B35) In (B2) Kant differentiates between ‘a priori’ propositions and ‘pure’ propositions on the basis that there are a priori propositions that derive (albeit weakly) from experience but no pure
Now, although the question about the distinction between form and matter only briefly mentioned before will be addressed later, one knows the following: whereas space is the form of outer intuition — allowing beings other than ourselves to be encountered, time is, on the other hand, the form of inner intuition — allowing beings in general, ourselves included, to be encountered. Time, unlike space, being “the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner states” cannot be thought of directly in terms of shape, or position, “(...) it cannot be a determination of outer appearances, it has to do neither with shape nor position (...)”, and that means, it must be thought of analogically — by representing becoming, a continuous line, a river, or the sort. This peculiarity about time — the fact that no matter how hard one tries one is bound to think of it as related to space, nonetheless, should not hinder one from seeing that, even if both outer and inner sense as the pure forms of intuition underlie all outer representations, only the latter, inner sense that is, underlies all representations whatsoever — inner as well as outer. This is to say that all appearances are given within time but not all are given within space. Time, inner sense, is the formal condition of the connection of all representation and this means, it will be seen in the following sub-section, that it contains a priori a manifold in pure intuition.

Already from these brief remarks it should strike one as odd that the literature has conventionally assumed that the manifold of time and space are coextensive or overlapping in all that subjectivity may represent. What has come to be known as the ‘parallelism thesis’, supposed to illustrate a parallel between appearances of outer and inner sense, argues that since there is no sensation pertaining to inner sense, there cannot therefore be a manifold that belongs to it and does not, ipso facto, belong to outer sense as well. This kind of argument has its origin in one of Salomon Maimon’s early criticisms of Kant. Because time and space, Maimon points out, are not forms of intuition but forms of the diversity of objects of sense in that they ground the proposition does. Since, in the case above, the pure intuitions are never derived from experience but necessarily ground experience, they may be called pure in the strict sense.

9 Cf. (Ch. II, §ii, pp. 59-61)
10 (A34/B51)
11 (A33/B49)
12 (A34/B50)
13 (B162ff)
14 (A31/B47)
15 (A139/B178)
possibility of comparison\textsuperscript{17}, and because comparison can only arise in something given as heterogeneous, there is no manifold of time that is not dependent on the heterogeneity of spatial representations\textsuperscript{18}. Maimon’s point has echoed far and wide. In \textit{Possible Experience}, Arthur Collins claims, for example, that “Objects figure in representations of inner sense only at second hand. Transient representations of outer sense constitute the only ‘stuff’ to which inner sense is receptive”\textsuperscript{19}. For Collins, this means that inner and outer sense, time and space as forms of intuition, must be parallel with one another to the extent that the manifold of the first is necessarily mediated through the manifold of the second. This mediation, in turn, amounts to saying that both manifolds are absolutely coextensive insofar as whatever is not mediated through outer sense cannot become an object of knowledge. In Collins’ reading, therefore, inner sense contains only a second degree manifold, as it were, of the representations of the representations already given in outer sense but nothing more: “in so far as there is an empirical manifold of inner sense, it will contain representations of the representations that make up the manifold of outer sense”\textsuperscript{20}.

There are two strong reasons for wanting to defend the parallelism thesis. The first reason has to do with the structural similarities in the corresponding exhibitions of the metaphysical and transcendental concepts of each one of the forms of intuition. As it was seen, save for a minor variation in the number of theses expounded in the B edition of the \textit{Critique}, both expositions virtually mirror each other. The second reason, even more compelling than the first, has to do with a passage where Kant claims that, except from feelings and matters of the will, everything belonging to intuition contains nothing but relations of extension, motion, and moving forces\textsuperscript{21}. Since these relations, in Collins’ reading, have to be ‘mediated’ through spatiality, it must follow therefore that relations in intuition must be located in space. In Kant’s words, it must follow that “the representations of the outer senses constitute the proper material with which we occupy our mind”\textsuperscript{22}. For defenders of the parallelism thesis this must mean, in turn, that the manifolds of inner and outer sense are completely overlapping.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{17} (AA 11:391) \\
\textsuperscript{18} (AA 11:392-393) \\
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.} p. 109. \\
\textsuperscript{21} (B66-B68) \\
\textsuperscript{22} (B67)
\end{footnotesize}
There are, however, better reasons to have serious reservations about the parallelism thesis. Starting with the structural similarities exhibited in both of the expositions contained in the Aesthetic, it would be unwise not to acknowledge that, in spite of their superficial similarity, there is, also, an extremely important difference. The transcendental exposition of the concept of space pursues an ostensive definition of the concept by means of geometry. This is not the case with the transcendental exposition of the concept of time where Kant self-consciously points the reader back to the third point defended in the metaphysical exposition concerning the a priori necessity of apodeictic principles for synthetic knowledge. The reason Kant had for asymmetrically exposing the two is apparent not only from the first edition of the Critique, but also from eleven years before, in the Dissertation. In the 1770 work there are, also, structural similarities between the expositions of the principles of sensibility, but that does not preclude Kant from constructing a significant argument in favour of the priority of time over space in logical terms. The same argument that would recur in the Critique goes as follows: space is an infinite given magnitude but, in order for it to be intelligible, i.e. in order to render its quantity sensible in the first place, one must presuppose the possibility of counting. Counting, however, is itself rendered possible in time and in time only: “And we can only render the quantity of space itself intelligible by expressing it numerically, having related it to a measure taken as a unity. This number itself is nothing but a multiplicity which is distinctly known by counting, that is to say, by successively adding one to one in a given time.” From this it clearly follows that the apparent resemblance between the modes of exposition is in no way sufficient to justify the parallelism thesis.

But there is a further reason to be suspicious of the parallelism thesis and this reason speaks against the claim that intuition contains nothing but relations encountered in outer sense: there is an overwhelming amount of philosophical evidence throughout the Critique of Pure Reason that seems to contradict that point.

23 (B40-B41) 24 (B48-B49) 25 (AA 2:406) Interestingly, space and time are both, in the Dissertation, immutable “images” (typi), but it is time that resembles rational concepts the most and this is what allows Kant to speak of space as the image (typus) of time and, also, what allows him to draw the conclusion that both these forms, taken together, are “the underlying foundations upon which the understanding rests” (AA 2:405). In fact, if one stays with Kant up to the Scholium of Section 4, the justification for this supposed similarity between time and rational concepts actually appears: following Kant’s own metaphor, were one to venture beyond a certain ‘closeness to the shores of cognition’, one would have to go so far as to say that “the concept of time, as the concept of something unique, infinite and immutable, in which all things are and in which all things endure, is the phenomenal eternity of the general cause” (AA 2:410).
Kant states, for example, that time and space are two distinct sources of knowledge: “Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge [Erkenntnisquellen] from which bodies of a priori knowledge can be derived”\(^\text{26}\). He claims that there is such a thing as ‘axioms of time in general’\(^\text{27}\) – the representation of which hardly seems to presuppose ‘mediation’ through outer sense. And lastly, but importantly, Kant also claims that “Time is not a determination of outer appearances”\(^\text{28}\) but, rather, “(...) the formal condition a priori of all appearances whatsoever”\(^\text{29}\) – space included, just as it was in the Dissertation\(^\text{30}\).

This important reason not to agree with the parallelism thesis can be better understood by means of a further distinction. Whereas, Kant claims, time is the immediate condition of inner appearances, it is only the mediate condition of outer appearances\(^\text{31}\). This means that if all representations that are in the subject are in time, then what is represented by that subject must also be in time in virtue of time’s immediate relation to subjectivity. This movement, which Heidegger and Sherover have described as a movement from the immediacy of the temporality of the representing subject to the mediacy of the intra-temporality of whatever is represented\(^\text{32}\), is very much in line with the Copernican Revolution in the sense that, representations of any other (supra-temporal) kind, are inaccessible to derivative, finite, and receptive beings – hence Kant’s emphasis on our mode of representation as opposed to some other, intellectually intuitive one\(^\text{33}\).

The reasons enunciated above make it very difficult to agree with the parallelism thesis but do not, not by themselves at least, justify time’s logical priority over space. To establish the latter, one need to look at the Transcendental Logic where Kant opens the exposition of the first synthesis, that of apprehension, in the Deduction by stating:

“Wherever our representations may arise, whether through the influence of external things or as the effect of inner causes, whether they have originated a

\(^{26}\) (A38/B55)  
\(^{27}\) (A31/B47)  
\(^{28}\) (A33/B50)  
\(^{29}\) (A34/B50)  
\(^{30}\) Vid. Supra.  
\(^{31}\) (A34/B51)  
\(^{33}\) (A26/B42)
priori or empirically as appearances - as modifications of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense, and as such all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations. This is a general remark on which one must ground everything that follows”\(^{34}\).

Once again with Sherover, for whom the remark about the movement from the temporality of the representing subject to the intra-temporality of the represented only derives from the relation to inner sense of those ‘modifications of the mind’, one can explain this as follows. Regardless of the relations attributable to appearances in terms of spatiality, representations are ‘brought into relations’ simply in virtue of their ‘belonging’ to inner sense. If time is the condition without which no relations, not even spatial ones, can be brought to bear, then, it follows that time is logically prior to space. It is impossible, therefore, to maintain as Collins does that all relations attributable to appearances are spatially mediated. The reason Kant had for making the claim Collins uses in support of the parallelism thesis, the claim about everything in intuition containing nothing but motive forces, can be explained differently. While Kant presents the passive or receptive side of the subject, portrayed in terms of sensibility, in the Aesthetic, he presents the active or spontaneous side, portrayed in terms of understanding, in the Analytic. In the former, space and time are paired with each other but, in light of the greater thesis the Aesthetic is trying to convey, in the latter the two are clearly disentangled: time discretely acquires its central importance in the Analytic –finding its culmination in the doctrine of Schematism and Principles\(^{35}\).

Perhaps a few examples as to the kind of relations Kant has in mind will help convey this point more clearly. What Kant calls, in the Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Time, the Axioms of Time in General, e.g. that time has but one dimension and that different times are not simultaneous but successive\(^{36}\), illustrates that specific relational properties can be drawn from appearances without a necessary appeal to their externality or spatiality. Kant goes as far as to say, further on in the same section, that the entire doctrine of motion itself is grounded on time’s priority over space and this is the case because matter will come to be defined, in the

\(^{34}\)(A98)


\(^{36}\)(A31/B47)
Phoronomy doctrine of the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, as whatever is movable in space\textsuperscript{37} something that, *ex definitio*, presupposes motion. As Kant points out, the being and not being of one and the same thing in one and the same place is not a contradiction for the simple reason that both predicates may take hold at different times\textsuperscript{38}. This is partly why further down in the fragment that Collins cites in support of the thesis that time’s relations need spatial mediation Kant speaks of strictly temporal relations of succession, endurance, and coexistence\textsuperscript{39}. Something similar, although questionably relational, happens with Kant’s arithmetic conception of number. Although this will be dealt with at length in the following chapter\textsuperscript{40}, suffice it to say for now and only as an example, that numbers, as such, are appearances with relational properties the nature of which is undoubtedly temporal but not spatial\textsuperscript{41}.

Thus, in light of what has been discussed it can be concluded that time has some kind of logical advantage, or edge, over space: it allows the subject to account for all appearances in general –those which are in space and others which are not necessarily spatial. It does so because in being the immediate condition under which representations come to be, it acts as *conditio sine qua non* of representation as such. In this sense, it is completely warranted to ask first and foremost about this form of intuition in the constitution of objectivity and thereby acknowledge its priority. In perhaps overly brief terms, the logical argument in favour of the priority of time over space as the fundamental form of intuition claims that time is prior to space simply because time is able to account for all representations and is not constrained to a given subset of that totality. But it is not the case that time is prior to space only in the sense that it allows for more representations to be accounted for. Time is, in fact, also prior to space in the sense that it is more closely linked, in its immediacy, to the subject as a representing entity\textsuperscript{42}. Time, as was just discussed, is the *immediate* condition of inner appearances (volitions, moods, and all modifications of the mind)

\textsuperscript{37} (AA 4:480) See, also, the root of the name of the doctrine itself: ‘phoronomy’.  
\textsuperscript{38} (B49)  
\textsuperscript{39} (B67)  
\textsuperscript{40} (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 112-114)  
\textsuperscript{41} (A142/B182) This affirmation is corroborated and clarified by Kant’s discussion of the construction of concepts, being somewhat analogous with sensibilisation in the Schematism, in the Doctrine of Method. There, Kant states “To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which corresponds to that concept. For the construction of a concept we therefore need non-empirical intuition. The latter must, as intuition, be a single object and yet nonetheless, as the construction of a concept (a universal representation), it must in its representation express universal validity for all possible intuitions which fall under the same concept” (A713/B741).  
\textsuperscript{42} If a metaphor not altogether devoid of irony is allowed, time is, more so than space, ‘closer’ to the soul.
and this means that what is first and foremost given to subjectivity, as a representing and receptive, is that infinite given magnitude in which one encounters something and anything. Precisely why this is the case, nonetheless, remains to be seen.

\[b)\textbf{ Ontological argument for the priority of time:}\] There is yet a further and stronger reason for advocating in favour of the priority of time over space. This further reason does not have to do so much with how much can be accounted for in terms of either one of the formal conditions of sensibility but, instead, with what each of these forms is and with the way of being of what is in them. Unlike what was before termed the logical argument, the ontological argument does not concern itself, not initially at least, with being able to account for, or being able to epistemically justify all representations. Instead, it will be seen, the ontological argument speaks about what is as being irredeemably temporal and not being inevitably spatial. In sum, the ontological argument concludes that without the orderability provided in the representation of time itself, understood as an activity of subjectivity, no representation of space would be possible.

What, after all, does it mean that time is a ‘form’ of intuition? And what exactly is represented when one posits time as ‘the necessary representation underlying all intuition’? Two important fragments, both from the Aesthetic, are worth quoting to begin answering these two questions:

\[\begin{quote}
\text{“Since this form [time] does not represent anything save insofar as something is posited in the mind, it can be nothing but the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity [Tätigkeit] (namely, through this positing of its representation), and so is affected by itself; in other words, it is nothing but an inner sense in respect of the form of that sense”}^{\text{45}}.
\end{quote}\]

And:

\[\begin{quote}
\text{“Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner states, yields indeed no intuition of the soul as an object [Objekt]; but there is nevertheless a determinate form, namely, time, in which alone the intuition of}\]
\[\text{\textit{---}}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{43} (A25/B40)}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{44} (A31/B46)}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{45} (B67-68)}\]
inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time [Modified].

A lot will be said in relation to these fragments but for now one central point should be considered: although primarily subjective, time is, Kant is saying, the form of intuition so far as one is affected by one’s self. Time is, in other words, the activity of subjectivity that propitiates or brings about affectivity. But, does this last nuance about time being ‘primarily subjective’ not create severe tension with its affective character? How can something be, simultaneously, subjective and affective? It is only natural if, following the previous quotes, one asks oneself about the possible subjective or objective status of time since Kant had spoken of time as ‘mode of intuiting’. But if time is a mode of intuiting, what could it mean that it ‘affects’ the subject? It is in order to answer the previous questions that the twofold thesis about space and time being empirically real and transcendentally ideal comes into play. As it was seen in the previous chapter, by saying that the pure forms of sensibility are empirically real Kant means that they belong, as determinations, to the factual character of objects – that is, they are not something one can get rid of in one’s mode of thinking about objects without it having fatal consequences to one’s very conception of what an object is. This is why Kant claims that one must dispute “all claim of time to absolute reality, namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition”. This entails, correspondingly, the other part of the twofold thesis, namely time’s transcendental ideality “according to which it is nothing at all if one abstracts from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, and cannot be counted as either subsisting or inhering in the objects in themselves (without their relation to our intuition). The twofold thesis on the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of space and time is helpful in clarifying their subjective character. It remains to be seen, however, what the affective character of time is.

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46 (A22-23/B37)
47 (A33/B49); (A34/B51); (AA 18:623) Yet again, that finite beings seem unable to describe to themselves the representation of time other than as a spatial magnitude does not imply that time itself is not, first and foremost, original self-affection. This curious property of the representation of time will come back as a relation of inverse proportion between the schemata of quantity and quality Vid. (Ch. III. §ii, pp. 112-116).
48 Cf. (Ch. I. pp. 33-34)
49 (A35/B52)
50 (A36/B53)
Immediately before the first of the self-standing quotations above, Kant speaks of ‘form’ as the mode in which the mind from and out of itself affects itself\(^5^1\). Even though intuition’s dependency on the ‘existence’ of things\(^5^2\) for providing it with determinate content will no doubt factor in the equation, it is important nonetheless to dwell, momentarily, on the possible meaning of ‘form’ in this context. In the opening lines of the *Critique*, as was mentioned before, Kant speaks of form as “that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations”\(^5^3\). This careful formulation is echoed elsewhere, in some *Reflexionen* for example, where Kant speaks of form in terms of coordination, for sensibility, and of subordination, for concepts\(^5^4\). Form thus conceived, allows Kant to move from ‘order’ or ‘coordination’ as such to the order of whatever is represented. Differently put, in stating that order or coordination are ‘form’ properly speaking for the sensible object, Kant is also saying that in the ‘form’ of intuition one posits an order or coordination according to which affectivity will arise. Because, however, the condition without which appearances would not even be such is time, the immediacy of that specific form of intuition once again comes to the fore:

> “Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuition is so far limited; it serves as the a priori condition only of outer appearances. But since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time is an a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever”\(^5^5\).

It is important to note that the part of this claim that is being emphasised here is not the universality of time, something addressed in the previous sub-section, or the specific order of succession that must be represented in the intuition of time, something that will be addressed in the following section. The part that is being emphasised, rather, is the proximity or immediacy of that intuition to our own

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\(^5^1\) “Now that which, as representation, can be antecedent to any and every act of thinking anything, is intuition; and if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition” and, Kant goes on with the first self-standing quotation above, “Since this form…” (B67/68).

\(^5^2\) (Cf. B72)

\(^5^3\) (A20/B34)

\(^5^4\) “Form for the objectis sensuum is coordination; form for the objectis rationis is subordination” (AA 16:119 [1769-1775])

\(^5^5\) (A34/B50)
subjective activity. All ‘determinations of the mind’, after all, belong to our ‘inner state’ – and that inner state, in turn, stands under the condition of time, i.e. under a condition of orderability or coordination. What this entails is best clarified in light of the age old problem of the relation between time and alteration. If alteration is the change of something in time, then a disjunction follows: either one thinks of alteration as being a particular species of the wider genus ‘change’ which, in turn, presupposes time as succession; or, one differentiates kinds of alterations. Now, it would seem that if the first disjunct is followed, that of alteration being a species of the genus change, one could, perhaps, identify time or succession as the being of change. But, as Aristotle warns in the Physics, this leads to a circular argument in which time is what it is in virtue of change, but change is what it is in virtue of time.

To avoid, then, such circularity, the second disjunct must be followed, namely, having to differentiate more than one kind of alteration. Kant is aware of this and he therefore distinguishes between alteration as an act of the subject and alteration as a determination of an object. Time, properly so called, is identified with the first: in representing time one attends “merely to the act of the synthesis of the manifold whereby we successively determine inner sense, and in so doing, attend to the succession of this determination in inner sense”. This kind of alteration, itself the activity whereby the subject ‘posits’ in abstracto, grounds the possibility of alteration as a determination of what appears in space. In this sense, because the very intuition of time is almost indistinguishable from the activity of the subject known as synthesis, the immediate relation of time as a form of intuition to the core of subjectivity becomes apparent. This is not a claim that would hold for space as the form of outer intuition.

Thus, while being given a priori, in time “alone is the actuality of appearances possible [In ihr allein ist Wirklichkeit der Erscheinungen möglich]”.

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56 Characterising the forms of intuition as activities is not unique to the Critique. See, for example, the Dissertation where Kant claims that the concepts of space and time have “been acquired, not indeed, by abstraction from the sensing of objects (…), but from the very action of the mind” (AA 2:406).

57 (Physics, Δ, 208a–223b)

58 (B154-155)

59 (B155) (Cf. A204/B249)

60 The qualifier here is important Vid. (Ch. II. §ii, pp. 77-81).

61 Putting this differently (if somewhat problematically): matter, the indeterminate correlate of sensation, can be intuited only to the extent that it is subject to motion, but motion in space occurs only insofar as the subject can differentiate between different states. One differentiates between different states on the grounds of time and, therefore, intuition of anything outside of ourselves presupposes time as an antecedently given condition. This is, of course, an extremely difficult point but it will be elaborated extensively in relation to the Principles Vid. (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 112-129).

62 (A31/B46)
Alternatively phrased, in being the form that most closely characterises the activity of subjectivity time provides or yields a somewhat determinate orderability. This is what, in a way, makes time a ‘source of knowledge’: that only in intuiting time, is conceptual determination expanded, *a priori*, beyond its merely logical form. This is why one can say that assertions such as ‘various times are not simultaneous but successive’ are synthetic *a priori*. One comes to see the specific character or mode of the orderability provided in time precisely because of this. If time as pure form of intuition is to be thought at all, it must be thought of as providing the subject with the orders of succession, endurance, and coexistence seen before –even if the dynamicity of the Analogies is needed to construct these orders in relation to space. Although the importance and implications of this will be dealt with at length much later what is nonetheless important to keep for now is that this order is “(...) nothing but the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity”.

Of course it is granted that, were space not also prior to experience, no possible outer intuition would arise –not even of one’s self as an embodied being occupying a determinate location–. Space, too, is an *a priori* intuition. But that does not entail, as far as one can see, that space itself is co-originary with time for it presupposes in any case the possibility of being affected in the first place, i.e. it presupposes time as self-affection or as having opened the possibility of affectivity in the first place. It is the presupposition of this order that partially justifies Kant’s first formulation, in the A edition, of the principle that makes experience possible in the Analogies and what justifies Kant in relating the unity of time itself to the necessary

63 (A38/B55)
64 (A31/B47)
65 Vid. (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 116-125)
66 (B67/68) Or, differently put, this order is “the time in which we set representations, which is itself antecedent to the consciousness of them in experience” (B67).
67 (A177); The B-Edition formulation differs from it and goes as follows: “Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B218). Although the Principles generally exhibit the previous conclusion in a relatively clear manner, a serious worry emerges if one commits to the point. The worry is that of attributing Kant a kind of impositionalist formalism which ends up sacrificing the role of that which is being taken up by form itself and no one, as far as the author of this is aware, has dealt with this issue more extensively than Fiona Hughes. In her view, Kant’s formal idealism, as opposed to a material one (A491/B519), is committed to the idea that “something must be given to the mind if experience is to be possible” (Hughes, Fiona. *Kant’s Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2007, p.88). This means that in the Copernican Revolution “Kant’s general point is that the extra-mental given in experience can only be taken up into consciousness and thus qualify as known by us insofar as we supply an a priori element that comes from mind alone. There are two elements of form, both aesthetic and conceptual, and they jointly allow the unification of the sensory object under the rules of understanding so as to give rise to knowledge” (Ibid. p. 91). What Kant claims, therefore, is not that one imposes an order on objects but, rather, that the forms of intuition allow one to grasp something extra-mental –that is, they make possible one’s reception or response to objects: “If receptivity is a necessary component of
The arguments presented so far in this chapter raise important questions. In light of what has been seen, there is little doubt in that Kant thinks of time as the most universal and most fundamental form of intuition. There is little doubt, furthermore, in that all that appears, must do so as temporally conditioned. The main concern Kant has throughout the Analytic, however, is not so much appearances in general, but, rather, knowledge that can, and must, be systematised into experience. A somewhat clumsy way of stating this last remark, but hopefully helpful, is by saying that, although time is a necessary condition for all appearing, it is not a sufficient condition for systematised knowledge. This implies a serious restriction on what time can offer in the Kantian view: without external validation, what one remains with is solely appearances but not secure objective knowledge. From this, two questions arise: first, what else, in addition to time, needs to be posited as for secure objective knowledge to arise? And, second, how is one to understand those appearances that, while being time-bound, do not amount to secure knowledge? Furthermore, the fundamentality of time is philosophically committing in the sense that it links the opening of affectivity directly and immediately to the activity of subjectivity. But does this point in favour of the priority of time mean that, in Kant’s terms, ‘all that is manifold in the subject is given by the activity of the self’? If so, then it would seem there would be little...
ground for differentiating between an intuitive intellect and a discursive intellect—but this is not something Kant can afford—.

§ ii

Self-affection and Apperception

Characterising time as an activity of subjectivity, indeterminate and ambiguous as it has been left so far, helps to clarify time’s pre-eminence in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. By relating synthesis to intuition, but without equating the two, Kant offers a picture where the activity of affecting one’s self is the condition without which no representation, of whatever kind, is possible. If, as was mentioned before, Kant presents in the Transcendental Aesthetic an account of time related to passivity and the constitution of affectivity, it is only fair to expect that in the Transcendental Logic he would present an account of time related to spontaneity and the constitution of objectivity. In what follows it will be shown that inner sense is represented in intuition as having the specific directionality and orderability it does precisely because the activity of synthesis itself generates such directionality and orderability in the process of rendering itself sensible through the power of imagination. It will be seen, specifically concerning the problem of the relation between apperception and inner sense, that the synthetic unity of apperception renders itself sensible by means of positing *a priori* a manifold of inner sense. This, it will be concluded, is what will ultimately allow for one’s self to be transcendentally and empirically affected.

In spite of the clarity and insight into the nature of time gained with the arguments of the last section the questions with which the previous sub-section came to a close only become more pressing once attention is paid not only to intuition and its form, but also to understanding—the second stem of human knowledge—. In the closing lines of the previous section it was implied that tension arises when one thinks of time as the activity of affecting one’s self. Expanding on this, the tension resides in that if one understands inner sense to be an activity, precisely what was defended before, then it is difficult to see how or why it would also be affective or affect-able. In other words, it would seem as if of inner sense one either predicates its active character, or one predicates its passive character, but not both. Kant himself
was aware of this tension and, in his way of formulating it, it becomes a full-fledged paradox:

“this sense [inner sense, time] represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected, and this would seem to be contradictory, since we should then have to be in passive relation [or active affection] to ourselves [wir uns gegen uns selbst als leidend verhalten müssten]”69.

In being an agent, differently put, one is also a patient70. The several complexities and ramifications of Kant’s doctrine of self-affection, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge, have been pointed out many times71. This has to do with what Ameriks calls the ‘intrinsic complexity’ of the doctrine72, but it also has to do with what Fink-Eitel has pointed out regarding the doctrine’s relevance, namely, that “Kantian philosophy is the first philosophy that is grounded, as a whole, on a theory of self-consciousness”73. In what follows, however, the focus will be on the possibility of empirical self-knowledge and on why self-affection and inner sense are not a hindrance but a necessary condition for self-knowledge. Because it would be impossible to address the myriad issues that arise in Kant’s doctrine of self-knowledge the following discussion will be narrower in scope: the paradox of self-affection will be treated in strict relation to inner sense as it has been so far construed.

In a remarkably clear piece on the subject matter at hand, Markos Valaris argues that the paradox of empirical self-knowledge resides in that, within Kant’s doctrine of sensibility, the subject has to be both passive, insofar as it is affected by itself, and active, insofar as it affects itself74. The solution to the paradox, namely that “a subject has empirical knowledge of itself as an appearance, and not as a thing in

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69 (B152)
itself\textsuperscript{75}, he rightly thinks, is entirely predicated on the claim that the synthesis of imagination makes experience of objects possible\textsuperscript{76}. This solution is available to Kant, he goes on, because of the resources presented in the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding—specifically, the resource of an imaginative synthesis. To be able to represent anything in intuition, one needs, beyond impressions received from the outer world, impressions to be organised in a spatiotemporal manifold. Impressions need, in other words, to be inserted into the relational structure of space and time. It is the synthesis of imagination that takes up precisely such task and in doing so makes experience of objects possible: it is the act of consciousness whereby sensibility is affected by the understanding. Valaris notes, however, that this should not be taken to mean that sensibility must have had some pre-given spatiotemporally undetermined manifold before even carrying out its combinatory action. That space and time are the forms of intuition surely entails that things cannot appear \textit{but} spatiotemporally determined and this applies to the representations of space and time themselves\textsuperscript{77}. In this sense, space and time do have a formal structure (geometrical and chronological, respectively) but they lack unity since ‘unity’ is never merely \textit{given}. The unity of space and time has its source, instead, in one’s own activity solely: “\textit{the upshot of the Transcendental Deduction is that sensibility itself owes its spatiotemporal form to the synthetic activity of the understanding}”\textsuperscript{78}. This is why the figurative synthesis needs to play, in Valaris’ reading, two distinct roles in the process of cognition: in a material sense, the imagination is also called ‘apprehension’ (in the B-Deduction) and what it does is provide the self with a particular spatiotemporal order of an empirical manifold; in its transcendental sense, however, it provides the self with the pure or formal intuitions of space and time.

For its many complexities, Valaris’ point is relatively easy to grasp in relation to outer sense. The transcendental syntheses have to include an awareness of one’s own situational standpoint. If one perceives, for example, a sofa in the corner of a room, the synthetic processes that yield cognition of the sofa possible also yield one’s own position in relation to that sofa, e.g. ‘the sofa is beside \textit{me}’. To see an object

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid.} p.1.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.} p.7.
\textsuperscript{77} Valaris thereby dismisses, like Longuenesse before him, the distinction between form of intuition and formal intuition as incoherent. See: Longuenesse, Béatrice. \textit{Kant and the Capacity to Judge}. Princeton University Press, NJ, 1998, pp. 214-228.
spatiotemporally located is to see it ‘from where one stands’, as it were. Indeed, the solution to the issues concerning inner sense rests, Valaris thinks, on recognising that the role of inner sense is “(...) precisely to make the subject aware of its outer perceptions as its own in just this sense, and thereby becoming aware of itself in relation to the objects of its outer perceptions as well”79. ‘Awareness’, after all, was not part of the ‘content’ of sensibility. Instead, such awareness must stem from elsewhere. An experience not only conveys the information of its spatiotemporal location, it conveys, too, further information about the perspectival stance adopted in regard to that experience. That is, for Valaris, the crux of the matter: “this further information cannot be part of the content of outer intuitions; it must, rather, be characteristic of the specific mode in which we are aware of our outer intuitions in experience”80. Inner sense, he concludes, just is that mode of being aware of outer intuitions in experience because in inner sense the subject appears as a point of view only, and not in any ‘substantive’ way81. The paradox of self-knowledge is therefore solved insofar as inner sense, or time, simply is the act of adopting a specific perspectival stance with respect to the way things, and our selves, appear.

Valaris’ account is extremely helpful in conveying the complicated relation in which inner sense and self-knowledge stand: it is because of inner sense that one is able to locate one’s self in relation to outer intuitions. Were it not because of time, then, one would be unable to experience the organisation of outer objects in any significant way. Going even further, inner sense provides the self with important information as to its own spatiotemporal relations –to itself and to other beings. Valaris is absolutely right in the way he thinks of the problem of self-affection and self-knowledge: for the Kantian doctrine of inner sense to be philosophically viable the subject must be both passive, to the extent that it is affected by itself, and active, to the extent that it affects itself. He is right, furthermore, in that if a solution to the problem exists in Kant, then it must be in relation to the power of imagination and the role the latter plays in relation to sensibility and the synthetic processes making cognition possible. The problem with Valaris’ argument, however, is that it mistakenly concludes that time is solely the mode of being aware of outer intuitions and nothing more. That is to say, for Valaris, and other readings that follow similar

79 Ibid. p. 9.
80 Idem.
81 Ibid. p. 11.
lines\textsuperscript{82}, inner sense can \textit{only} and \textit{exclusively} be the mode of awareness of the subject. But this conclusion relies on the mistaken premise that the manifolds of outer and inner sense just are one and the same manifold. In spite of the fact that Kant had claimed, in the Aesthetic still, that inner sense yields indeed intuitions\textsuperscript{83} Valaris insists that inner sense does not provide any ‘meaningful material’ for subjectivity to synthesise. Instead, he agrees with Allison in that the epistemic role of time is entirely procedural: time provides the limiting conditions in the acquisition of empirical knowledge. This can be corroborated, according to Valaris, in the B version of the Deduction where Kant claims: “I exist as an intelligence (…) which, in regard to the manifold that it is to combine, is subject to a limiting condition that it calls inner sense”\textsuperscript{84}. From this, Valaris derives that there is no independent manifold of inner sense since Kant’s concerns were, above all else, epistemological and, thus, that Kant could not have been concerned with representations such as feelings, pain, volitions, or, by implication, things such as what Kant calls the Axioms of Time in General\textsuperscript{85}. Rather, what Kant must have been concerned with is only what is given to the faculty of sensibility as outer intuition.

It was seen in the previous section, nonetheless, that equating the manifold of inner sense with the manifold of outer sense is not possible. Thus, Valaris’ account ends up owing an explanation as to what, if any, the role of inner sense will be once it is thought appropriately and independently from outer sense. In claiming, for example, that the role of inner sense is only that of allowing the self to position itself in relation to outer intuitions, Valaris reduces the function of time to the means through which the self will manage to establish itself in \textit{spatial} relations to itself and other objects. Since in this account the manifold of inner sense just is the same as the manifold of outer sense but seen procedurally and from within, it becomes extremely unclear how the self will manage to establish itself in temporal relations to things. One can, in a very everyday sense, locate oneself as, say, having shown up before or after the departure time of a train. Even without necessarily appealing to spatial relations, further, one can position one’s self in relation to any previous or future events.

\textsuperscript{82} Allison and Collins being but two examples.
\textsuperscript{83} (A33/B49)
\textsuperscript{84} (B158-159)
\textsuperscript{85} This is to the extent that Valaris thinks feelings, volitions, etc. are representations in the first place. In fact, Valaris insinuates that these are hardly representational and certainly not ‘sensational’ since no matter whatsoever is given in their intuition. For the many problems this kind of argument faces, however, see Dickerson, A. B. \textit{Kant on Representation and Objectivity}. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
moment, e.g. yesterday or tomorrow, with enough certainty. It seems unwise to sacrifice the possibility of accounting for the originality of these kinds of relations for the sake of maintaining Kant’s supposed empiricism.

But if this kind of solution to the problem of self-knowledge and the paradox of the active passivity or passive activity of inner sense is not viable, what sort of solution does Kant have? Is the Kantian account of self-knowledge bound to remain in utter obscurity? Or is there a way to interpret Kant’s argument that renders it philosophically tenable? In what follows, an argument that takes into consideration what has been discussed so far will be elaborated. In somewhat similar lines to Heidegger, Henrich, Fink-Eitel, and Mörchen it will be argued that the unity of consciousness just is the act of determining itself as consciousness of unity. It will be argued, furthermore, that Kant does indeed think that a pure manifold of inner sense is posited a priori and that, only once this is acknowledged, can one begin to think of Kant’s solution to, first, the paradox of self-knowledge but, second, the problem of how the categories come to be endowed with transcendental content. In overly brief terms, the account that follows suggests that it is by means of the transcendental power of imagination that the self can be, at once, active and passive –towards itself, and towards anything else—.

To begin with, it helps keeping in mind the many characterisations Kant gives of the faculty of understanding: spontaneity of knowledge,86 power of thought87, faculty of concepts88 or even judgments89, and, most importantly, the characterisation, Kant tells us, the characterisation that “comes closer to its essential nature”: the faculty of rules which “is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be increased by any additions from without”.91 As Béatrice Longuenesse has pointed out,92 a rule is according to Kant “the representation of a universal condition in accordance with which a certain manifold (of whatever kind) can be posited”.93 In this sense, concepts themselves are, properly speaking, ‘rules’. If an intuition is an immediate and singular representation (repraesentatio singularis), a concept is a

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86 (A51/B75); (B137)
87 (B158)
88 (A50/B74)
89 (A295/B352)
90 (A126)
91 (A64/B89)
93 (A113)
mediated and general representation (repraesentatio per notas communes)\textsuperscript{94} that acts as the condition of unification of a manifold. This means concepts are discursive or reflected representations of what is common to a plurality of things\textsuperscript{95}. Representing what is common to several things simply means to think as unified the plurality of the things that fall under a given concept. It is in this sense that Kant speaks of the unity of the concept as being its ‘form’ as opposed to its ‘content’ or matter, which is the determinability of that concept’s object\textsuperscript{96}. This shows that two things are, then, important to concepts: on the one hand, concepts must represent what is common to many but, on the other hand, concepts must preserve the difference amongst the elements they unify (otherwise, as the Jäsche Logik discusses later, commonality would not even show up)\textsuperscript{97}. In representing, therefore, what is common to several things, one must hold before one’s self the fact that commonality is of several things.

Where, however, does the unity thought of in the concept come from? Why can one think of the commonality of several things as unified? If the concept in question is empirical, Kant claims, then that unity is arrived at by means of comparison, abstraction, and reflection\textsuperscript{98}. If, say, several four-legged animals appear in one’s intuition, one can first compare each one of these creatures with one another, abstract then from their specific differences, and reflect, finally, on what is common to all –thus arriving at the genus ‘cat’, ‘dog’, etc\textsuperscript{99}. If the concept in question is not, however, empirical and is instead pure or a priori, then figuring out the origin of the unity thought of in that concept is slightly more complicated (as is thinking about the manifold that such concepts unify). Indeed, “A pure concept is one that is not abstracted from experience but arises from the understanding even as to content”\textsuperscript{100}. Thus, trying to figure out what the unity of pure concepts amounts to cannot remain with logical analysis only but will necessarily involve digging into the activity of the subject that unifies in the first place. For Kant, this activity is simply called synthesis: “synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and

\textsuperscript{94} (AA 9:91 [Jäsche Logik])
\textsuperscript{95} (AA 9:97)
\textsuperscript{96} (A239/B298)
\textsuperscript{97} (AA 9:146)
\textsuperscript{98} (AA 24:907 [Wiener Logik]); (AA 24:752ff [Dohna-Wundlacken Logik]); (AA 9:94 [Jäsche Logik])
\textsuperscript{99} Kant’s account on the acquisition of empirical concepts is not without issues, as Pippin has pointed out. Since the concern, at this point, is not with empirical concepts but with pure a priori concepts, the issue will be set aside. Pippin, Robert. “Kant on Empirical Concepts” in Studies in History of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1979, pp. 1-19.
\textsuperscript{100} (AA 9:92)
unifies them into a certain content”. Synthesis, in other words, is that activity which gives rise to the possibility of thinking the unity that must necessarily be posited in order for pure concepts to count as such. If one can think of a unity that pertains to the pure concepts of the understanding, it is so because it pertains to the nature of synthesis to ‘collect’ or bring together what would have otherwise been heterogeneous. Kant is famously ambiguous as to the nature of this supposed ‘unity’, of course, but what is important to keep in mind here is that collecting, bringing together, synthesising, are all activities that pertain to the understanding and, in this particular sense, the unity thought of in the concept must have its origin in that understanding. It is this insight, the insight that the birthplace of the categories is found in the understanding, which initially uncovered the problem of the legitimacy of the employment of the pure concepts of the understanding for Kant.

Immediately before presenting the Table of Categories, Kant claims that what transcendental logic teaches is not how one subsumes representations under concepts but, rather, how one brings the pure synthesis of representations to concepts. What transcendental logic teaches is, in other words, how the pure concepts of the understanding are endowed with transcendental content. This and nothing more is what is at stake in the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding: “The

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101 (A77/B103)
102 A ‘Fichtean’ worry might appear here concerning the nature of so-called positing [Setzen]. Is positing as understood here something defensible in Kant? It is important to distinguish Kant’s from Fichte’s doctrine of positing: Although for both Kant and Fichte positing is the product of the act of the positing of the self by itself, only for Fichte is the latter, the act of self-positing, immediate in the sense that it is simply an awareness of the subject-object relation. From this immediacy one can further infer that the positing of the self is absolute and not discursive (Werke I.97) and, in that sense, different from the Kantian self-positing to the extent that Kant’s positing of the self, and of anything else for that matter, is mediated through intuition (strictly speaking, through the fundamental form of intuition, i.e. time). See Fichte’s 1794 Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftlehre (Werke, I. 93-98).
103 In the famous “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction”, Dieter Henrich invites the reader to think of this ambiguity as presented in the second version of the Deduction in much clearer terms than the ones suggested so far (See: Henrich, Dieter. “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 22, No. 4, (Jun. 1969), pp. 640-659, p. 640.) The proof, up to §20, is stated as a conditional: Kant “established that intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity” (Ibid. p. 645). Kant indicates thus by capitalizing the indefinite article in the expression “in Einer Anschauung” (B143) which is not usually capitalized, and which, because of its root, points towards Kant’s interest in showing the unity, not the singularity of the intuition (Henrich, Dieter. Op. Cit. p. 645). The result of the proof until §20, therefore, is only valid insofar as intuitions already contain some unity and, so, “wherever we find unity, this unity is itself made possible by the categories and determined in relation to them. In our representations of space and time, however, we have intuitions which contain unity and which at the same time include everything that can be present to our senses” (Ibid. p. 646).
104 (A65/B90)
105 “The question now is whether a priori concepts do not also precede, as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited, nevertheless thought as object in general, for then all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily in accord with such concepts, since without their presupposition nothing is possible as object of experience” (A93/B126).
106 (A79/B104)
explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I call a transcendental deduction”\textsuperscript{107}. Knowing that the pure synthesis of representations and concepts must ‘meet’, as it were, is what allowed Kant to ask the question as to whether the object alone makes the representation in the subject possible or representation alone makes the objects possible\textsuperscript{108}. It should be clear that, if the first, then, only empirical representations would be possible. Since, however, other kinds of representations are possible, then it must be the second, i.e. the representation must make the object possible. This does not entail, in any way, that representation or the representing subject ‘causes’ the object. It means, instead, that in having derived the Table of Categories from the Table of Judgments in a Metaphysical Deduction, Kant begins outlining a field for objectivity in general that is object-enabling. Thus,

“Transcendental logic has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori which the transcendental aesthetic offered to it (...) Space and time contain [that] manifold of pure a priori intuition but belong nevertheless to the conditions of receptivity (...) Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it. This act I call ‘synthesis’ [Modified]\textsuperscript{109}.

The A edition account of this ‘going through’, ‘taking up’, and ‘combining’ is relatively well known. At the empirical level this works as follows: through the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the subject successively runs through a manifold in perception. In successively perceiving something, differently put, the self apprehends pluralities of things or pluralities of parts of things. Through the synthesis of reproduction in imagination cognition re-produces the given in empirical apprehension, ‘bringing a representation back’ (this is all that ‘retaining’ means), if it will be able to establish associations between objects. Through the synthesis of recognition in concept, finally, the mind identifies what it had previously apprehended and reproduced, intuited and imagined, and re-cognises it or brings it into unity as concept, insofar as the representation is the same as itself\textsuperscript{110}. At the transcendental level, nonetheless, the process works slightly differently: the transcendental synthesis of apprehension must hold together a plurality in intuition

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{107} (A85/B117)
\item \textsuperscript{108} (A92/B124)
\item \textsuperscript{109} (A77/B102)
\item \textsuperscript{110} (A103)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
that makes possible the empirical running through of multiplicities in perception\textsuperscript{111}. The transcendental synthesis of the productive power of imagination generates succession, as it were, so that apprehension is able to pick up that plurality, to ‘hold it together’, and for the empirical synthesis of reproduction to have something to reproduce –this is why Kant believes there is an essential connection between the first two syntheses\textsuperscript{112}. The specific operations being carried out by the transcendental power of imagination will be examined in substantial detail in the next chapter\textsuperscript{113}. For now, and for the sake of simplifying what already is an extremely difficult issue, however, it should suffice to keep in mind that Kant believes that not even the representations of pure space and pure time would be possible without this transcendental power\textsuperscript{114}. The transcendental synthesis of recognition, finally, provides the self with the possibility of ascribing identity to the representations produced. Thus, the synthesis of recognition at the transcendental level, comes to unify the entirety of the process as for it to be worthy of the name ‘cognition’ in the first place.

But if the operations that make cognition possible are divided and diverse, on what grounds can one claim that they constitute ‘one’ cognition or, even, cognition ‘in one subject’? In answer to this question Kant remarks that, insofar as the three syntheses answer to the question of what the nature of the relation between the cognising subject and the object of that subject’s cognising is\textsuperscript{115}, a unity needs to be posited as grounding and unifying the three processes. Without this original unity the syntheses would be disarticulated from one another to the extent that cognition would not be possible. But this unity, just like its synthetic counterparts, can also be of two kinds, i.e. empirical or transcendental. The empirical unity of apperception, or consciousness of the unity of the diverse acts of syntheses, unifies the manifold as for it to be subsumable under one representation: “The word ‘concept’ itself could already lead us to this remark [the remark of the consciousness of the unity of synthesis]. For it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation”\textsuperscript{116}. On the basis of the empirical consciousness of unity, then, the interrelatedness of the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{111} (A99)
\item \textsuperscript{112} (A102)
\item \textsuperscript{113} Cf. (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 112-129)
\item \textsuperscript{114} (A102)
\item \textsuperscript{115} (Axvi)
\item \textsuperscript{116} (A103)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
processes of cognition at the empirical level becomes relatively clear: just as much as reproduction presupposes a prior produced something in apprehension, recognition presupposes a prior reproduced something in imagination. But this is hardly the end of the story for even that consciousness of the unity of syntheses itself presupposes a further transcendental unity that grounds it. Thus, if empirical apperception is the consciousness of one’s own inner states, transcendental apperception is “the pure, original, unchangeable consciousness that is the necessary condition of experience and the ultimate foundation of the unity of the latter”\(^{117}\). This is to say, borrowing an Allisonian expression\(^{118}\), that consciousness of the unity of one’s diverse acts of synthesising is itself grounded on the transcendental unity of consciousness that conditions it. More accurately put, this time with Fink-Eitel, the transcendental unity of apperception is the unity of the consciousness of unity and multiplicity\(^{119}\). This implies amongst other things that, if it really is the case that both apprehension and production are, even at a transcendental level, subject to the original unity of apperception, and knowing that this original unity is synthetic\(^{120}\), then it must be the case that the transcendental unity of apperception, spontaneous as it is, provides itself from itself and for itself with the possibility of encountering a unified temporal successive manifold in intuition\(^{121}\).

\(^{117}\) (A107)
\(^{118}\) Allison, Henry. “Kant’s Concept of the Transcendental Object” in Kant-Studien, 59 (1-4):165-186 (1968)
\(^{120}\) “(…) pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences, and that appearances have a necessary relation to the understanding” (A120).
\(^{121}\) Perhaps clarity is gained by contrasting Kant’s account in this matter with another, similar account that is closer to our current paradigm, namely, Husserl’s. In Zur Phänomenologie der Zeitbewusstseins, Husserl indicates that the experienced present (Präsenzzeit) is the phenomenological articulation of retention, the direct and immediate consciousness of what is past, and protention, the direct and immediate consciousness of what is to come. Each of these are intentional acts that relate to the past and the future but that have a different and more primary intentional structure than their empirical counterparts, i.e. remembering and expecting. Retention and protention differ from remembering and expecting insofar as only the latter make the past and future ‘present’ to consciousness. Remembering and expecting, in other words, ‘presentify’ the past and the future. In retention and protention, the more primary, one does not bring the past or future to the present, but “directly perceives” (Hu X:39) them as they are. Retention and protention are, for Husserl, essentially non-presentifying and the primary manifestation of time consciousness. They are fundamental and, importantly, constitutive of the empirical level where time appears, in remembering and expecting, as a series of nows because the experienced present (Präsenzzeit) is itself the ground and possibility of the ‘now’ as such. For Kant, something similar is happening to the extent that the transcendental syntheses are necessary conditions for our formal intuition of time, i.e. for understanding time as past, present, and future, but it is also similar in that those syntheses themselves elapse in time as form of intuition -syntheses are, after, activities and, as such, elapse in time-. This is why Kant had linked, since the 1770s, synthesis as such with time as a form of sensibility and denied, therefore, that things can be represented in absolute time: “Everything that occurs is in the series of succession and is represented therein. Nothing, however, can be represented in absolute time, but things are represented in a successive series only insofar as there is conceived a real connection of things by means of which one member draws the next after itself; thus nothing in a series can be cognised as real if the transition from the preceding member to it is not necessary in accordance with a general law, i.e., without a ground, even if one does not cognise it”
There are several different philosophical implications that can be drawn from this account of the syntheses that make cognition possible for inner sense. One can think, for example, of the very fundamental relation that succession has to the transcendental synthesis of apprehension in giving rise to plurality from unity. One can think, also, that the transcendental power of imagination’s task of generating unified succession as to give rise to permanence is equally as, if not more, important than the first. One can think, moreover, that the synthesis of recognition presupposes time elapsing or flowing from the past, through the present, to the future, as for identity and empirical unity to arise. One can think, lastly, that this sort of account would fare well in justifying the ‘posteriority’ of consciousness whereby one is only ever conscious, even of one’s self, of a prior given something. For now, however, only one these implications will be developed, namely, that the sketch of the transcendental synthetic operations of cognition elaborated above warrants the beginning of an answer to the problem of self-knowledge in relation to passive activity or active passivity of inner sense.

This answer is best understood in light of the ambiguous role that the power of imagination plays throughout the Deductions. Indeed, Kant speaks often of the imagination as being linked to sensibility, but also often speaks of the imagination as being linked to the understanding. Thus, one reads, on the one hand, that “There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perception, I entitle apprehension”123. But one reads, on the other hand, that “The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is

122 This is indeed something Kant mentions but that, unfortunately, he leaves very underdeveloped. In the notes from Kant’s metaphysics lectures, from 1790-1791, entitled Metaphysik L₂, Kant writes, for example: “The faculty of imaginaining -facultas imaginandi- is the faculty of intuition of the objects of past time, the faculty of anticipation -facultas praevidendi- is the faculty of intuition of the objects of future time” (AA 28:585). This is reiterated in the Anthropology where Kant claims “The faculty of deliberately visualising the past is the faculty of memory, and the faculty of visualising something as taking place in the future is the faculty of foresight. Provided that they both belong to sensibility, both of them are based on the association of representation of the past and the future consciousness of the subject within the present; and although they are not themselves perceptions, as connecting of perceptions in time, they serve to connect in a coherent experience what no longer exists with what does not yet exist through what presently exists” (AA 7:182).

123 (A120)
the pure understanding”\textsuperscript{124}. Rendering these two seemingly incompatible claims coherent with one another is not simple, but it need not be impossible, either. Earlier, time was characterised as the primary form of intuition that must be understood as the activity through which the self opens itself to affectivity. It was then seen that, in Kant’s account of synthesis, the transcendental unity of apperception, because it grounds the possibility of being conscious of unity, and because it is synthetic in itself, provides the subject with the possibility of encountering the succession of the manifold in intuition\textsuperscript{125}. Pure apperception, in fact,

“(…) forms the correlate of all our representation insofar as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them. All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive pure apperception, as all sensible intuition, as representation, does to a pure inner intuition, namely to time. It is this apperception which must be added to pure imagination, in order to render its function intellectual”\textsuperscript{126}.

Because human subjectivity is not constituted as an intuitive intellect, time, Kant is saying, must be the act through which the transcendental unity of apperception renders itself intelligible: the transcendental unity of apperception, in time, determines –forms– the manifoldness of that which is to be determined – content, itself\textsuperscript{127}. But since for Kant “the unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic; [and] pure apperception therefore yields a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition”\textsuperscript{128}, the syntheticity of the unity of the manifold can mean nothing other than that apperception is indissolubly bound to time to the extent that the first wants to think of its own empirical determinacy. This is to say that apperception is indeed essentially synthetic but only to the extent that the representations it unifies are inscribed in its own activity. That activity, in turn, must be an \textit{a priori} synthesis that is able to move between the sensible and the intellectual.

\textsuperscript{124} And Kant goes on: “In the understanding there are therefore pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These, however, are the categories, i.e., pure concepts of the understanding” (A118).

\textsuperscript{125} It is not as Heidegger would want, therefore, that one permanently keeps the original and originary unity of temporality in view when synthesising (GA 3, p. 90). Instead, Kant’s account offers a picture where, because the synthetic processes of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition themselves elapse in time, the unity of apperception is able to become conscious of their unity.

\textsuperscript{126} (A123-124); See also (A117fn)

\textsuperscript{127} This is echoed in the \textit{Metaphysics} lectures when Kant claims that “If time were not given subjectively and thus a priori as the form of inner sense (and no understanding to compare it), then apperception would not cognise the relation in the existence of the manifold a priori, for in itself time is no object of perception” (AA 18:271)

\textsuperscript{128} (A116)
The ambiguity of the role played by the imagination is not, in this sense, contingent to Kant’s account. It is, instead, and as Hermann Mörchen has pointed out, fundamental to the productive power of imagination that it be capable of relating to sensibility as passivity and to the understanding as activity if it will successfully relate apperception and inner sense\(^{129}\). In this sense, that the transcendental power of imagination sustain inner sense, or the activity of subjectivity, as itself enduring is a crucial aspect to Kant’s account of synthesis.

It might be helpful to try to understand this point in relation to the B version of the Deduction. The problem of the relation between apperception and inner sense is, once more, that one needs to be able to maintain subjectivity as both passive, to the extent that it is affected by itself, and active, to the extent that it affects itself. The solution as presented in the B version, unlike in the A version, does not concern itself so much with the particular synthetic activities of the mind and, instead, departs from ‘synthesis’, as such, “being an act of the self-activity of the subject [ein Actus seiner Selbsttätigkeit ist]”\(^{130}\). This act of combining is carried out by a spontaneous understanding the nature of which demands that it accompany such combining with the possibility of ascribing the combined representations to a singular ‘I’\(^{131}\). In doing so, in ascribing multiple representations to a singular ‘I’ that is, that spontaneous understanding manifests as differing from the ‘product’, as it were, of the process: the first is the synthetic and synthesising unity of apperception, the second is the analytic unity of apperception. The latter, in turn, “is possible under the presupposition”\(^{132}\) of the former\(^{133}\). The synthetic and synthesising unity of apperception, Kant claims, is the unity through which the manifold of intuition is united in the concept of an object and is, in this sense, objective\(^{134}\). The analytic unity of apperception, in contrast, is merely subjective because it, itself, is the product of certain associations carried out in each individual’s mind. But, and the key move for present purposes resides here, Kant points out that

\(^{129}\) Mörchen, Hermann. *Op. Cit.* pp. 11-21. It should be noted that Mörchen arrives at this conclusion but having taken a different starting point, i.e. Kant’s anthropological writings and the role empirical imagination plays there.

\(^{130}\) (B130)

\(^{131}\) (B132-133)

\(^{132}\) (B133)

\(^{133}\) Paul Guyer is therefore mistaken in claiming that Kant conflates the meanings of consciousness and self-consciousness (Guyer, Paul. “Kant on Apperception and *a priori* Synthesis” in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Volume 17, No. 3, July 1980, pp. 205-212.). Consciousness is characteristic of the activity of subjectivity that makes empirical self-consciousness possible.

\(^{134}\) (B139)
“the pure form of intuition in time, merely as intuition in general, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, simply through the necessary relation of the manifold of the intuition to the one ‘I think’, and so, through the pure synthesis of understanding which is the a priori underlying ground of the empirical synthesis”\(^{135}\)

That time is subject to the original unity of consciousness, or to the synthetic and synthesising unity of apperception, means that if the understanding is the source of synthesis, inner sense is the activity through which that understanding comes to determine itself because it contains an a priori manifold\(^{136}\). This is not to say that inner sense synthesises, for it does not. It means, rather, that the understanding can determine itself inwardly with respect to its own activity by means of a faculty that oscillates between spontaneous activity and receptivity to a pure intuition: “Thus the understanding, under the title of transcendental synthesis of imagination, performs this act upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is, and we are therefore justified in saying that inner sense is affected thereby”\(^{137}\). The reason one encounters succession in the way one does, alternatively phrased, resides in that the synthesising of subjectivity determines the form of inner intuition sequentially —since one cannot think the whole at once—. That time is represented in intuition as having the specific directionality it does, answers precisely to the fact that synthesis itself generates such directionality in the process of rendering itself sensible through the power of imagination. Kant responds to the problem of the relation between apperception and inner sense by rendering the activity of the first as the origin of the specific determination of the second. This, in turn, is what will ultimately allow for one’s self to be inwardly and empirically affected\(^{138}\).

\(^{135}\) (B140)  
\(^{136}\) (B152-153)  
\(^{137}\) (B153-154)  
\(^{138}\) Perhaps it helps to try and understand this extremely complicated point by means of a parallel argument, one that Kant was surely familiar with, from Tetens. The argument claims that causality, as such, is something which thought posits in the manifold. The reason why, however, thought can do that, has to do with the fact that thought itself operates causally, i.e. it effects some repercussion on things. As Corey Dyck has pointed out, by ‘thought’, Tetens understands the faculty through which the soul cognises the relations among things (faculty which includes perception [Gewahrnehmen] and consciousness). For Tetens, crucially, those relations among things are in fact nothing but effects of the act of cognising itself: “(…) the very connections, or relations, among things that Sulzer takes to be the object of the act of attention are in fact effects of the activity of the power of thinking” (Dyck, Corey. “Spontaneity before the Critical Turn” in *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 54, Nr. 4, 2016, p. 641). Tetens agrees, therefore, with Hume in that the relation of causality is not something that is passively perceived and that is, instead, a contribution of the mind. But unlike Hume, Tetens thinks the ‘necessity’ implied by causality rules out the imagination as a suitable candidate for the role of its creator. Instead, because causal dependence is the same as conceiving an effect through its cause,
This does not entail that one has therefore empirical knowledge of one’s self. It entails, solely, that one is conscious of one’s self as having to determine that self in accordance with the succession inherent to the activity of thinking. Were it otherwise, no solution to the paradox of self-knowledge would have been found simply because no distinction between the appearance of the self and the being of the self could be upheld. One is indeed subject to the limiting condition imposed on the self by inner sense to the extent that any act of combination, any synthesis, will be made intuitable “only according to relations of time”. This is what Kant means by being conscious of one’s self. To have knowledge of the self, however, the positing of a manifold in intuition would also be required and this would imply linking the representation of the self to a particular given material content in intuition. Kant is not yet, at least not insofar as the problem of empirical self-knowledge and self-affection is at stake, concerned with specific content one will know of that self. Instead, he is concerned with the possibility of an act of determination the actuality of which resides in acknowledging that “(…) experience itself is nothing other than a continual conjoining (synthesis) of perceptions.”

From this it follows that if one wants to philosophically understand Kant’s solution to the paradox of self-knowledge, one must acknowledge, contra Valaris, that positing a manifold of inner sense independent from the manifold of outer sense, is absolutely indispensable. Indeed, Kant claims at the beginning of the Schematism chapter that “Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, and therefore of the connection of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in intuition.” In light of what has been discussed so far, this should be read and understood as saying that the transcendental unity of apperception owes its syntheticity to the fact that in unifying it posits itself as temporally indexed. In other

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Tetens argues the ability to effect a causal relation must pertain to thought itself: “[R]elation does not come to be from sensation, but rather is an effect added [hinzukommende Wirkung] by the power of thinking” (Tetens, J.N. Versuche, IV.vi.2.1.337). Tetens’ point is parallel to Kant’s, or illustrates neatly Kant’s argumentative strategy, not because they advocate the same thing, obviously, but because they advocate it in the same way: there is a peculiarity in the act of thinking that allows such act to ‘project’, as it were, its very action onto perception, for Tetens, or onto intuition, for Kant.

Kant illustrates this point by means of an act of attention: “In every act of attention the understanding determines inner sense, in accordance with the combination which it thinks, to that inner intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding” (B156-157fn). For further interesting discussion of the self’s representation in inner sense see: (AA 28:584, Metaphysik L [1777-1779]).

139 (B159)
140 (A138/B177)
words, that the transcendental unity of apperception, in being the innermost actus of subjectivity, materialises or determines itself as the temporally extended unity of the synthetic act of self-affection. Through the inherently ambivalent role of the power of imagination that at once affects and is affected, the self posits itself as subject and object—the self thereby renders itself intuitable. The power of imagination, the essence of which dictates that it relate content and form, not only takes place a priori but also “conditions the possibility of other a priori knowledge”\(^{143}\). This point holds as much for the general applicability of the pure concepts of the understanding as it does for empirical self-knowledge, self-affection, and self-consciousness. It will be therefore the task of the next chapter to show, in all specificity, how the productive synthesis of imagination provides the categories with transcendental content.

By way of conclusion, a few closing remarks on Heidegger’s reading of the relation between self-affection and apperception are pertinent. Although the account given above is very close to Heidegger’s in spirit, it also is on a collision course with it in the letter, as it were. Heidegger recognises that Kant’s account of time is the first and only to move forward in the direction of temporality\(^ {144}\). This is the case, Heidegger thinks, because in orienting his investigation toward the being of the connection between time and the ‘I think’ “Kant reached the limits of what can be possibly stated about time”\(^ {145}\). For Heidegger, too, transcendental apperception, understood as spontaneity of the self, just is the activity of combining carried out by subjectivity. But when this spontaneity is viewed qua self-affection, then it must be characterised as receptivity or ‘letting one’s self be encountered’. What Heidegger calls the ‘pre-view’ [Hinblick, Anblick] of time, or time understood as formal intuition, belongs therefore originally to spontaneity\(^ {146}\). “This spontaneity of the I (of the self) is thus also original apperception and pure self-affection, pure ‘I think’ and time”\(^ {147}\). In this sense, time provides what can be determined by the activity of

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\(^{143}\) (B151) See also the Anthropology where Kant contrasts ‘facultas’ to ‘receptivitas’: “In regard to the state of its representations, my mind is either active and exhibits faculty (facultas), or it is passive and consists in receptivity (receptivitas). A cognition contains both joined together, and the possibility of having such cognition bears the name of cognitive faculty – from the most distinguished part of this faculty, namely the activity of the mind in combining or separating representations from one another” (AA 7:140).

\(^{144}\) (GA 2, p.23)

\(^{145}\) (GA 21, p. 311)

\(^{146}\) (GA 21, p. 340) In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger goes even further. There, time is not something ‘added’ to pure apperception but is the ground for the possibility of selfhood as contained within it: time and apperception are identical (GA 3, pp. 191-193).

\(^{147}\) (GA 21, p. 342)
synthesis but the giving itself is the action of one’s activity. The pre-view on the basis of which the self comes to determine itself and appearances as pertaining to intuition, operates for Heidegger as the background condition against which transcendental content is highlighted. But that pre-view is there in the first place because “Pure self-affection provides the transcendental ground-structure [Urstruktur] of the finite self as such”. Now, since in Heidegger’s reading receptivity does not receive ‘from the outside’ anything the condition for which had not already been given by subjectivity, the case must be that the self pre-positis itself as capable of being affected temporally. This capacity for being affected temporally that arises from one’s own self-affectivity, in turn, constitutes the pre-viewed horizon against which one projects the categories as determining what amounts, and what not, to objectivity. In Heidegger’s terms: “The description of the ego as "abiding and unchanging" means that the ego in forming time originally, i.e., as primordial time, constitutes the essence of the act of objectification and the horizon thereof”.

The fact of the matter remains, however, that Heidegger’s reading misrepresents at certain points an important aspect of Kant’s understanding of time. Kant failed to articulate, in Heidegger’s view, the structural connections of the aforementioned ‘pre-view’ and of ‘letting-oneself-be-encountered’. In other words, according to Heidegger, Kant’s conception of the connections in spontaneity and in receptivity is deficient to the extent that Kant limited time to the latter –thus providing an unclear and partial picture of the receptivity of the subject. But as it was discussed above, Kant does not limit inner sense to radical passivity. By ‘inner

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148 In words from the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: although the self does not ‘access’ itself in intuition, transcendental apperception exists as spontaneous, but in order to be able to intuit itself, it needs to give itself, from itself, time –hence determining itself. Time is the mirror-like image that the self provides for itself in order to become intuitable (GA 25, pp. 377-395).

149 (GA 3, p. 191)

150 This results, again, because time and the ‘I think’ “beide sind vorgängig und unumgängliches Worauf des unthematischen Hinblicks im konkreten Erkennen, beide ursprüngliche Seinsmodi des Subjekts” (GA 21, p. 346).

151 (GA 3, p. 193)

152 The qualification is due to the fact that Heidegger’s position concerning Kant changed over time. As a quick glimpse onto, say, the 1929 Kantbuch in contrast to the 1935 lecture course Die Frage nach dem Ding illustrates, Heidegger reviewed and re-evaluated his assessment of some of Kant’s basic philosophical tenets. For literature on the matter see, for example, Engelland, Chad. “The Phenomenological Kant: Heidegger’s Interest in Transcendental Philosophy” in Journal for the British Society for Phenomenology, 41, 2010, pp. 150-169 and Reichl, Pavel. Heidegger’s Late Marburg Project: Being, Entities, and Schematism (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from University of Essex, 2016.

153 (GA 21, p. 340)
sense’ Kant understands, first and foremost, the mode in which the self affects itself and is thus, by means of the transcendental power of imagination, both passive and active with respect to the subject. There is a serious philosophical risk in missing this subtle point: Heidegger, perhaps understandably, seems to inadvertently approximate Kant’s understanding of time as *form of intuition* to Kant’s understanding of time as *formal intuition*. While not unaware of the distinction between the two, Heidegger does seem to miss its implications. Whereas, Heidegger claims, the *form of intuition* is the oneness of intuition that delineates and allows, without needing, the unity of the manifold of impressions, *formal intuition* is the product of categorically determining that unity. But, by his own standards, Heidegger collapses the two when he takes Kant to be saying that the ‘unity’ of time must be kept in view as for the categories to arise. For Heidegger, the temporal horizon, in its encounterable character, must be *constantly present* as pre-view for objectivity as such to emerge (for this is what it means that the understanding is sustained by intuition). But what this amounts to is a quasi-substantialisation of time where, unless the latter is kept permanently ‘in sight’, no transcendental content may be lifted by the act of synthesis. This hardly seems like what Kant meant when he characterised inner sense as “the intuition of ourselves and of our inner states”. This, of course, shifts the burden of proof towards the account developed here in the sense that this investigation will have to justify how exactly, if not in the way Heidegger describes, the categories are endowed with temporal transcendental content. That is, therefore, the basic task of the following chapter.

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In the course of this chapter, two questions were answered: whether there is any kind of priority that can be attributed to time over space as the basic form of intuition; and what the nature of the relation between apperception and self-affection is. In answer to the first question it was argued, in opposition to readings that seek to equate the manifolds of outer and inner sense, that there is way of conceiving of time

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154 (GA 25, p. 137); For Kant’s discussion of the distinction see (B160-163)
155 “(...) if beings are to be capable of offering themselves, the horizon within which they are encountered must itself have an offering-character [Angebotcharakter]” (GA 3, p. 90)
156 (A33/B49)
in Critical philosophy that renders it both logically and ontologically prior to space. The logical argument in favour of time’s priority states that, unlike space, time is not constrained to a sub-set of appearances and, instead, is able to account for all appearances whatsoever. The ontological argument in favour of time’s priority states that, unlike space, time more closely characterises the activity of subjectivity and, therefore, amounts to the primary condition according to which affectivity is possible.

In answer to the second question it was argued, counter to some recent readings, that the relation between apperception and self-affection is best understood in terms of the first grounding and making the second possible through the flow of time. In other words, it was argued that what makes the synthetic unity of apperception ‘synthetic’ in the first place, is precisely the fact that it carries out its combining activity as enduring. From that, it was inferred that if one can be conscious of the unity of the diverse synthetic processes elapsing in cognition, it is only because one can think of the unity that makes those processes possible as inherently and inexorably bound to an a priori manifold posited in inner sense. It was seen, first in relation to the A version of the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, that the synthoses of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition are unified because of the unity of apperception. But because Kant characterises that unity of apperception as itself synthetic, it was also seen, apperception must necessarily be conceived as having some kind of fundamental relation to time – for otherwise it would not be ‘synthetic’ in any meaningful sense. If that is the case, and it is also the case that time is the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity, then it follows that those transcendental synthoses constitute temporally the possibility of affectivity. This point was further clarified by looking at the B version of the Deduction. There it was argued that time is represented in intuition as it is, precisely because of the kind of relation it holds to synthesis as such. It was seen, furthermore, that Kant’s answer to the problem of the relation between apperception and inner sense resides in that he speaks of inner sense as the activity through which apperception renders itself intuitable through the oscillating power of imagination.

It was concluded, finally, that an indispensable requirement for thinking coherently about Kant’s conception of time is acknowledging that, in time, one posits a manifold a priori that is independent from the manifold of outer sense. Although this was stated as a condition without which Kant’s solution to the paradox of self-
knowledge could not work, the specific content of that pure manifold was left wholly
undetermined. For the purposes of trying to dissolve the paradox of how one renders
one’s self intuitable, merely stating the possibility of such pure manifold is enough.
For a thorough account of the way in which Kant conceives of time, however, merely
stating the possibility is far from being enough. Instead, it will be necessary to show
how is it exactly that categories, time-determinations, and principles relate to each
other.
Chapter III

If the first chapter successfully showed the impossibility of sacrificing the problem of relating to objects for understanding transcendental philosophy, the second chapter showed the way in which self-affection discloses the possibility of that relation. It was shown, first, that an enquiry into Kant’s critical philosophy must necessarily take into account the a priori ground for the possibility of the subject’s relation to objects. This was seen to entail distancing one’s reading of Kant from readings that tend to overemphasize Kant’s epistemology and seen to entail, also, approximating one’s reading to Kant’s general metaphysical project. Being able to engage with the question of the possibility of relating to objectivity, it was argued, depends on acknowledging Kant’s metaphysical worries. Indeed, the historical discussion of the way in which Kant arrived at formulating the subjectivity and universality of the forms of intuition generally, and of time particularly, showed this and nothing more: the forms of intuition need to be thought of as sensible conditions under which things appear precisely because only then the beginning of an answer to the problem of the constitution of objectivity shows up for transcendental philosophy. But it was shown, second, that in order to be able to establish the necessary conditions for objectivity, it is necessary to examine the temporal structure of the experience of objects. Hence, it was seen that time is the fundamental form of intuition to the extent that it is the manner in which the subject affects itself through its own activity. Time has, indeed, primacy over space, logically speaking, insofar as it is the form of intuition without which no appearance whatsoever would be possible and, ontologically speaking, insofar as it is inextricably related to the synthetic activity of subjectivity. This led, in turn, to a discussion that sought to clarify the relation between the activity of affecting one’s self and the unity of apperception. Since inner sense is affection of the self through that self’s own activity, it was concluded, the self’s activity, being temporal in its nature, cannot disclose the field of receptivity save as temporalised: whatever can appear, will appear as enduring. This is the sole meaning of the rather dense, but precise claim that time is self-affection.

This last remark is important for the main purposes of this investigation and for the discussion that will follow. The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding is supposed to answer the question, according to Kant, of whether “a priori concepts do not also serve as antecedent conditions under which alone
anything can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general"\(^1\). Because Kant answers in the affirmative, this is tantamount to saying that, in addition to the formal conditions of intuition, the pure concepts of the understanding must also be in place \textit{a priori} if knowledge of objects, as objects of possible experience, will arise. Now, in the previous chapter it was argued that a manifold of inner sense, independently from a manifold of outer sense, must be asserted as \textit{possible} if one is to account for receptivity in general. The question remains, however, as to whether affirming the possibility of receptivity amounts to affirming the actuality of objectivity. This chapter, therefore, should be read as addressing the central problem of this investigation, namely, the problem of understanding precisely in what way the content provided by the activity of affecting one’s self is structured or configured. It will be argued that, unlike empirical concepts, the objectivity of which is warranted by positing an objective unitary correlate in the form of the concept of the ‘object in general = x’, pure concepts of the understanding need to undergo a process of sensibilisation carried out by the transcendental power of imagination to gain a foothold in sensibility. It will be concluded, therefore, that in gazing at the structure that articulates judgments, categories, schemata, and principles, one sees in all precision the way in which self-affection discloses a radically temporal configuring or objectivising frame that is determinate enough as to warrant objective validity.

Before venturing to elaborate on this last point, however, an important omission in the previous chapter can no longer be ignored: Kant’s doctrine of affinity. Although the argument concerning the sensible provision of content through the schematism is not dependent on the affinity doctrine, it is nonetheless helpful to address the issue from the outset. The affinity doctrine presented in the A-edition of the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason} is not only extremely difficult but it is also almost entirely dropped in the B-edition. The reasons for this are various and will be explored later\(^2\). What must be borne in mind, nonetheless, is that the whole discussion on affinity that opens this chapter, enlightening as it may be for understanding the function of the power of imagination, is \textit{not} pivotal in the central argument developed in this investigation. This is to say that although transcendental affinity, as a philosophical concept, sheds bright light on the way in which the transcendental power of imagination operates in relation to the unity of apperception, it is nonetheless a dispensable doctrine for the philosophical argument that follows in the

\(^1\) (A93/B125); (A85/B117)
\(^2\) (Ch. III, §I, p. 98-99)
sense that, even if the affinity doctrine were deemed altogether philosophically untenable, the argument for the process of sensibilisation of the pure concepts of the understanding by means of the imagination could still hold.

What exactly is, in this account, the doctrine of affinity supposed to be doing? Precisely because time is self-affection whatever appears for the self will not only endure according to Kant, but also appear as having inherited, or having been bestowed with, the numerical identity of the unity of the self. In 1781, it will be argued in the first section of this chapter, Kant entertained that this ‘bestowal’ of identity not only is the ground for the self’s relation to possible objects of experience but that, furthermore, the bestowal works as the objective ground of interconnectedness of objects amongst themselves. In other words, in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, specifically in the first version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, the self’s activity has two necessary outcomes. The first, as was discussed in the previous chapter, is the self’s possible relation to objectivity. The second outcome, however, is that the self’s activity is supposed to provide the objective ground for the association of appearances amongst them. It will be seen that transcendental affinity, the name Kant gives to this objective interconnectedness of appearances, designates the inherited denominator that all appearances have in common or share insofar as they are identical to themselves, and that operates as the objective ground for associating one appearance to another. Simply put, all appearances, in virtue of being such, partake in the identity of the subject for whom they are appearances and, on that ground only, come to manifest as having some kinship amongst them –albeit a very minimal one.

Thus, even if the affinity doctrine presented in the first edition of the first *Critique* is ‘dispensable’, as it were, for the purposes of the argument that will be developed in what follows, the case remains nonetheless that, because of this doctrine’s proximity to what has been until now characterised as the unique nature of the power of imagination, it helps to clarify in some precision the relation between this power and objectivity. It will be seen that the objective interconnectedness of appearances helps in understanding the complicated relation in which objects stand to one’s cognising faculties because that interconnectedness grounds a subjective association amongst appearances. It is through the transcendental power of imagination that a subjective ‘law’ for the association of appearances emerges:
without the power of imagination’s productive and reproductive capacity no relation, not even of a single representation with its own past states, would be possible. In this sense, insofar as the A-Edition of the Deduction is concerned, that there is some kind of regularity in the appearing is what Kant terms the subjective association of appearances and nothing more.

Whether one takes the affinity doctrine presented by Kant in the A-Edition of the Transcendental Deduction as philosophically plausible or whether one does not, what becomes very clear in discussing the affinity doctrine is what was described, in the previous chapter, as the oscillating role of the power of imagination. Because of its inherently ambivalent role, the transcendental power of imagination relates to the activity of the understanding and to the passivity of sensibility in such a way that it connects the purely formal with the purely material and it does *so a priori*.

It was claimed in the previous chapter that the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding shows two things: it shows that there must be unified experience and, in virtue of the syntheticty of the transcendental unity of apperception, it shows the possibility of endowing the pure concepts of understanding with transcendental content. Although the discussion of the doctrine of affinity, as has been repeatedly stated, is not essential to the general argument developed here, its importance and helpfulness should become apparent in what follows. Indeed, the central question of this chapter, provided that it has been granted that the understanding can relate meaningfully to the content provided in intuition, is *how exactly is it that the imaginative provision of sensible conditions for the categories works*. The second section, which makes up the bulk of this chapter, is devoted to answering this question. It will be seen, there, that the imagination’s ambiguous status, wavering between subjectivity and objectivity, is a fundamental piece of the puzzle. *Synthesis speciosa* is both intellectual in its combining according to rules, therefore spontaneous or active, and also sensible, therefore receptive or passive to particulars, i.e. the *species*, in sensibility. It lingers in the ambiguity, so to say, of being active in its passivity and passive in its activity and this very ambiguity is passed onto its products, the schemata. Schemata, in virtue of their universality, and having derived their unity from concepts (and ultimately from apperception), must be *homogenous* with concepts themselves while, at the same time, in virtue of time being the fundamental form of intuition, schemata must also be *homogenous* with
appearances. The schema, product of the imagination, cannot therefore be an image, insofar as the latter is too closely linked to sensibility, nor a rule, insofar as images are too closely linked to understanding. The schema is, rather, a universal procedure which underlies both images and rules.

But if indeed the schemata are, properly speaking, the procedures of sensibilisation for the pure concepts of the understanding, why then is it that Kant enumerates, contrary to all expectation, only eight of them when there are twelve categories? It will be seen, in answer to this question, that because of the way in which the system of judgments, categories, schemata, and principles is articulated, two different kinds of relations need to be accounted for in relation to experience. Whereas, on the one hand, for the mathematical-constitutive judgments, categories, schemata and principles it is the construction of all objects in intuition that needs to be specified, for their dynamical-regulative counterparts, on the other, it is the legislation of the way of appearing of existing objects for experience that needs stipulation. The first two sets of judgments, categories, schemata, and principles genuinely constitute intuitions and are inescapable insofar as the structural relation in which they stand to intuitions is constructive. The second two sets of judgments, categories, schemata, and principles only regulate, mediated by experience, the existence of objects insofar as the structural relation in which they stand to the latter is merely legislative.

Lastly, the chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of how the sensibilisation processes occur: for judgments and categories of quantity, the procedure of sensibilisation is number and the principle that manifests number is the Axioms of Intuition. For judgments and categories of quality the procedure of sensibilisation is degree and the principle that manifests degree is the Anticipations of Perception. For judgments and categories of relation the procedures of sensibilisation are persistence, causality, and community and the principles that manifest them are the Analogies. Lastly, for the judgments and categories of modality the procedures of sensibilisation are agreement, actuality and eternity and the principles that manifest them are the Postulates.
Affinity and association

Ever since Kemp Smith’s *Commentary*, and perhaps even before that, Kant’s doctrine of affinity as presented in the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* has been in disrepute. Indeed, Kemp Smith made sure this was the case by characterising affinity as “obscure and misleading”, as implying all sorts of dire consequences, and worst of all, as an awkward piece of “conjectural transcendental psychology” that Kant must have written in the midst of some kind of ecstasy brought about by his own discoveries. Recently, however, the doctrine has undergone some kind of re-evaluation. In a recent article Gualtiero Lorini, for example, has advanced the hypothesis, opposed to what had been argued before by Kemp Smith, that the doctrine of transcendental affinity is not only a fundamental part of the Deduction but that it plays a systematic role in the entirety of the Analytic of Concepts. Recognising the fundamental role that the transcendental synthesis of the power of imagination plays in the so-called ‘objective’ part of the A-Deduction, Lorini defends that the very possibility of association of diverse appearances by means of the imagination is grounded on the possibility of an affinity that underlies their diversity.

In other words, that “the pure productive synthesis of imagination, synthesis which allows apperception to represent a series of phenomena in experience objectively, presupposes that ‘all possible phenomena belong, as representations, to a whole of self-consciousness’ (A113)”. Because of this, Lorini thinks, it should be unsurprising that Kant would move in the A-Deduction directly from the enunciation of this transcendental affinity and its immediate consequence, namely, empirical affinity, to

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6 *Ibid*. p. 490. Guyer, Strawson, and Allison also agree with this to some extent -although Allison’s latest book reconsiders this (See Allison, Henry. *Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 205-208). Attempts have also been made at recovering the affinity doctrine, albeit in a different way to the one that follows. Ståle R. S. Finke, for example, discusses affinity in relation to cognition, first, and in relation to reflective judgment, second. See: Finke, Ståle R. S. *Transcendental Affinities: Judgment and Experience in Kant* (Doctoral Dissertation) Retrieved from, University of Essex, 1998, pp. 51-54.
8 (A113)
the unity of nature: transcendental affinity allows Kant to move from the possibility of experience, through the laws that govern that experience, to the unity of those laws.\(^{10}\)

Conceiving of affinity thus, Lorini rightly thinks, allows Kant to formulate a transcendental rule according to which the *necessity* (and not just the possibility) of the objective validity of the forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding is secured.\(^{11}\) The further thesis Lorini entertains, as to the identity between transcendental affinity as it is conceived in the A-Deduction and affinity of the laws of the understanding as it is conceived in the Dialectic,\(^{12}\) will have to be left for another time. It was nonetheless important to rescue Lorini’s first point because, formulated in this way, important light is shed on the function of the transcendental power of imagination throughout the Deductions. Kant introduces affinity, indeed, as the objective interconnectedness that grounds any, and every, possible association between appearances: “The objective ground of all associations of appearances”, claims Kant, “I entitle their affinity”\(^{13}\) – relating thereby sensibility and understanding in one objective foundation. This is to say that, if the ‘object = x’ confers objective validity to concepts insofar as it acts as the ‘external’ correlate to all and any one of these concepts,\(^{14}\) transcendental affinity confers *necessity* to the particular relation in which one perceives the connection of two or more appearances. Affinity being, in fact, “the union of the manifold in virtue of its derivation from one ground”\(^{15}\), prevents one’s synthesising acts from associating perceptions in an entirely undetermined and accidental way.\(^{16}\) And, although the doctrine of affinity is not thoroughly developed in the first *Critique*,\(^{17}\) it is nonetheless useful for clarifying the

\(^{10}\) *Ibid.* p. 218. From this unity of nature arrived at in the A-Deduction, Lorini derives that it is possible to conjecture a possible corroboraton of Kant’s commitment to the doctrine of affinity in his mention of the *natura materialiter spectata* at the end of the B-Deduction. Lorini’s point, however, is based on merely conjectural evidence and it would be difficult to agree with him merely on that basis.


\(^{12}\) (A657/B685)

\(^{13}\) (A122)

\(^{14}\) (A109)

\(^{15}\) (AA 7:176-177)

\(^{16}\) (A122)

\(^{17}\) In spite of what a quick reading of the B-Edition of the first *Critique* might suggest, affinity, as understood and developed in this paper, does not completely disappear from Kant’s philosophy after 1781. In fact, as Erich Adickes suggested almost a century ago (*Adickes, Erich. Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affektion unseres Ichs als Schlüssel zu seiner Erkenntnistheorie*, Mohr, Tübingen, 1929, pp. 91-93), the subsequent unfolding of transcendental philosophy, especially as it is presented in the second section of the third *Critique*, in the Anthropology, and in the *Opus Postumum*, requires Kant to posit an objective ground for the relations amongst empirical objects and empirical subjects. Had more time been available, it would have been imperative to go precisely onto this; in post-Critical writings, instead of fading away, transcendental affinity only seems to gain in vigour and relevance -especially
discussion in the previous chapter concerning the relation between the transcendental 
unity of apperception and the transcendental power of imagination.

What, then, is the exact role that affinity plays in the A-Deduction? Since all 
possible appearances, as representations, belong to the whole of self-consciousness\(^\text{18}\), 
these appearances ‘inherit’ in their relation to each other, as it were, the numerical 
identity (=1) of that self-consciousness\(^\text{19}\). The inherited identity of each appearance is 
the necessary common denominator that appearances must have if they are to be 
related to one another (they are all ‘appearances’ after all). But the bestowal of this 
identity implies a common condition in accordance with which these appearances 
must be posited –a common condition that Kant calls the law of thoroughgoing 
connection or transcendental affinity–. There must be, in other words, some 
minimally constant element that appearances share. This constant is none other than 
their ‘belonging-to-someone-ness’ that allows for them to be unities in themselves 
and unified as a whole. This ‘kindred’ feature of appearances, in short, is what Kant 
designates transcendental affinity.

It is not surprising, then, that Kant uses the Latinate ‘Affinität’, most 
commonly employed in chemistry at the time\(^\text{20}\), instead of the more everyday German 
word ‘Verwandschaft’ to designate this interconnectedness or bonding capacity of 
appearances. The Latin ‘affinitas’, just as much as the English ‘kinship’, suggests a 
common note amongst things that allows one to gather them under a shared phylum. 
In this case, given the nature of the thing in question, this common note mandates that 
it be applicable as the most general possible predicate. If \(x\), say, did not appear, and it 
is worth pondering how much it has taken for some things to become manifest as 
appearance\(^\text{21}\), \(y\) would certainly not appear in any kind of necessary relati 
on to \(x\). It is 
only once \(x\) has been structured as appearance that \(y\) started appearing in necessary 
relation to it. But necessity in the connection of two or more appearances is not 
something that can be derived from the empirical. Rather, that two or more

\(^{18}\) (A113) 
\(^{19}\) (A112-14) 
\(^{20}\) (Newton, Opticks, Query 31); See, also, Lavoisier’s 1789 Traité élémentaire de chimie where 
affinity [affinité] is spoken of mostly in relation to acids and oxidation (pp. xxvii-xlii). Cf. Goethe’s 
Die Wahlverwandtschaften or Schopenhauer’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung Bd. 1, p. 193. 
Interestingly, Zedler’s 1740 Lexicon does not have an entry for affinity. 
\(^{21}\) See, for example, how gravity becomes appearance in Galilei, Galileo. Dialogue Concerning the 
appearances ‘appear’ in *necessary* connection one to the other owes its modal status to the fact that these appearances share their mode of appearing in virtue of their conforming\(^{22}\) to one consciousness. Affinity, in this sense, designates the fact that unification of two or more appearances in one cognition is not only possible but, for some appearances, necessary\(^{23}\).

Thus, in answer to the question of how it is that appearances relate necessarily to one another, Kant replies, in the A-Deduction, by means of the objective interconnectedness in which representations stand. Transcendental affinity must be presupposed in order for appearances to be relatable to each other as appearing necessarily and, hence, the ‘objective interconnectedness’. And, although it is easy to see how, through the synthesis of recognition, empirical cognition is endowed with the numerical identity of the unity of apperception –since all empirical cognition belongs to one nature\(^{24}\), seeing how transcendental affinity grounds the subjective association of appearances is less easy. Indeed, in the A-Deduction one reads that this objective interconnectedness gives rise to the subjective and yet empirical association of appearances carried out by the imagination:

“The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (of original apperception) is thus the necessary condition even of all possible perception, and the affinity of all appearances (near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination that is grounded a priori on rules [Modified]\(^{25}\).

Whereas the transcendental unity of apperception gives rise to the transcendental affinity of appearances in virtue of the first’s numerical identity, the power of imagination gives rise to a subjective ‘law’ for the association of appearances. That one can relate, say, redness with cinnabar requires that the

\(^{22}\) (A122)

\(^{23}\) (AA 7:177) Concoctions of the imagination, for example, are not necessarily connected when they are not ‘tied to anything objective’.

\(^{24}\) “That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, indeed in regard to its lawfulness even depend on this, may well sound quite contradictory and strange. But if one considers that this nature is nothing in itself but a sum of appearances, hence not a thing in itself but merely a multitude of representations of the mind, then one will not be astonished to see that unity on account of which alone it can be called object of all possible experience, i.e., nature, solely in the radical faculty of all our cognition, namely, transcendental apperception; and for that very reason we can cognise this unity a priori, hence also as necessary, which we would certainly have to abandon if it were given in itself independently of the primary sources of our thinking” (A114).

\(^{25}\) (A123)
perception of cinnabar itself be brought back from past perceptions by the reproductive power of imagination. But if this relation did not follow some kind of regularity, some kind of consistency, e.g. that cinnabar appears red constantly, then that initial relation between redness and cinnabar would not be possible. The reproduction of past perceptions in the imagination follows therefore a rule according to which the reproduction itself happens and it is this that Kant calls the subjective and empirical ground of reproduction in accordance with rules, or association of representations. The reproductive power of imagination, if left to fend for itself, would never bring back into cognition the necessary order and regularity that has to be assumed to achieve knowledge. Reproduction, however, does not work alone: the productive power of imagination provides it, through an a priori synthesis, with the possibility of holding things together as to be able to relate the present perception with either its past/future states or, other absent perceptions.

That one can, for another example, associate the position of heavenly bodies at an arbitrary point in time with the future behaviour of anyone born at that moment betrays the subjectivity of the principle of association brought about by the productive power of imagination. But the fact that such association, if it is to be counted as experience, should be grounded on the transcendental affinity of appearances is precisely what prevents one from drawing such arbitrary connections. Before going any further, however, it is worth asking whether Kant is not, as Deleuze swiftly

26 (A121) But note: perhaps it is the ambiguity in which affinity lingers that justifies Kant’s terminological carelessness. It is as if, sometimes, he felt compelled not to draw a distinction between the objective interconnectedness of appearances and the subjective association one makes between them. He will sometimes call association that which is here being identified as affinity (see A122) and sometimes call affinity that which is here being identified as association (see A123). Ultimately, because of the necessarily bipolar role of the imagination, this will come to be justified to some extent.

27 (A101-102)

28 The formative faculty happens in relation to both given and non-given (AA 15:131 [1776-1778]) objects: when in relation to given objects, the Bildungsvermögen is called Bildungskraft; when in relation to non-given objects it is called Einbildung. These last two, both modes of the Bildungsvermögen, are not exhaustive, however: Kant also speaks, at least pre-Critically, of Nachbildung (reproductive image formation) Abbildung (direct image formation) and Vorbildung (anticipatory image formation) (313a; AA 15:133; 123 [1776-1778]; [1769]); (AA 15:130 [1776-1778]) – all these ‘temporally definable’ (as opposed to Gegenbildung – symbol, Ausbildung – formation, and Urbildung – archetypal formation, which are not temporally definable). Regarding Einbildung specifically, the formative faculty when in relation to non-given objects, something else should be said: pre-Critically, Kant still speaks of it as “not having its cause in real representations, but arising from an activity of the soul” (AA 15:124 [1769]) which, it would seem, makes it a more active than passive faculty – something that will change when its function is narrowed in the first Critique. For further reading on the diverse functions of the imagination, see (Makkreel, Rudolf. Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, pp. 12-15).

29 We find ourselves drawing these kinds of connections frequently. The question is whether they amount to experience, properly speaking. Kant’s answer, clearly, is negative.
insinuates, smuggling in a reformed version of Leibnizian pre-established harmony. The suspicion does not seem groundless since, after all, whatever subjective association one might draw needs to be validated by that which grounds it, namely, transcendental affinity, and that ground is entirely ‘objective’. If this is right, then, the entirety of the Copernican revolution, “to substitute the idea of a harmony between subject and object (final harmony) for the principle of a necessary submission of the object to the subject”\textsuperscript{30}, seems to crumble. This, however, is hardly the case since it is clear that ‘objective’ here means something completely different than what Leibniz took it to mean. ‘Objective’, for Kant, just means indexed to the transcendental unity of apperception. As stated before, it is only in virtue of this unity of apperception that transcendental affinity arises and, in that sense, it is not ‘external’ objects which share their kindred but solely one’s representations of them.

This becomes very clear when contrasted to Baumgarten’s law of the nexus universalis –and the way Kant turns it on its head. In the Metaphysica, Baumgarten insists on there being some necessary link amongst singular things presented to external sense: “Imagination and sensation are of singular beings, and hence of beings located in a universal nexus. Whence the law of imagination: When a partial idea is perceived, its total idea recurs”\textsuperscript{31}. Since material particulars present themselves to sensation standing in a necessary relation to all its compossibles, it must be the case for Baumgarten that imagination, in representing these particulars, brings about the totality of their relations. Kant, however, is stating the opposite: if there is such a thing as a nexus universalis, then it is so in virtue of the connected particulars’ belonging to one consciousness. Then, if imagination brings about a pattern for their association, it will be so on the grounds that their objective affinity had already been given.

It has been seen so far that transcendental affinity is the objective ground of the associations of appearances\textsuperscript{32}, and it can only be found in the principle of the unity of apperception –in virtue of the latter’s synthetic unity\textsuperscript{33}. But this is not the end of the story for Kant since, moments later in the same section, he asserts that it is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Deleuze, Gilles. La Philosophie Critique de Kant. Quadrige/PUF, Paris, 1963, p. 23.
\item (\textit{Metaphysics}, III, i.iv §561)
\item (A122)
\item This is just to say that transcendental affinity is the totality of the unity of the layout or interconnectedness of the pure concepts of the understanding, as some have supported. See: Reich, Klaus. \textit{Die Vollständigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel}, Felix Meiner Verlag, Berlin, 1986, pp. 101ff.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
“only by means of this transcendental function of the imagination that even the affinity of appearances, and with it the association and through the latter finally reproduction in accordance with laws, and consequently experience itself, become possible”\(^{34}\). And, thus, how is it that the power of imagination does what it is supposedly doing in its transcendental function? That is, how is it that imagination can uphold the association of appearances, infused in normativity, while at the same time reproducing particulars, derived from sensibility? Or, why can the imagination mimetise the understanding in its legislating capacity\(^{35}\) and mimetise also sensibility in its receptive capacity\(^{36}\)?

In spite of their heterogeneity, understanding and sensibility must work in communion to yield cognition\(^{37}\). The unity of apperception and its inherent necessity on the one hand, and the manifold of intuition and its contingency on the other, have to be set in some kind of relation. It is the task of transcendental power of imagination to bring these two together and generate knowledge:

“This synthetic unity [of apperception], however, presupposes a synthesis, or includes it, and if the former is to be necessary a priori then the latter must also be a synthesis a priori. Thus the transcendental unity of apperception is related to the pure synthesis of the imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all composition of the manifold in cognition. But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; for the reproductive synthesis rests on conditions of experience. The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination, before [vor] apperception, is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience [Modified]\(^{38}\)."

Although a lot could be discussed about this dense paragraph, for present purposes what matters most about this it is the very peculiar character of the pure synthesis of the imagination. Kant is saying here that the imagination has to be able to

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\(^{34}\) (A123)

\(^{35}\) “In the understanding there are therefore pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These, however, are the categories, i.e., pure concepts of the understanding” (A118).

\(^{36}\) (A120).

\(^{37}\) “Despite their dissimilarity understanding and sensibility by themselves form a close union for bringing about our cognition, as though one were begotten by the other, or as though both had a common origin” (AA 7: 177).

\(^{38}\) (A118)
provide some way for apperception to ‘compose’ a manifold in sensibility. Indeed, the imagination is the only faculty capable of achieving this since it is both sensible and intellectual\(^{39}\) – it operates at both a subjective and objective level. This is the case because apperception cannot relate \textit{immediately} to the fundamental form of sensibility – time, that which is most foreign to it\(^{40}\), without thereby sacrificing its universality and necessity. Instead, it does so only \textit{mediately}, through the imagination’s swinging back and forth between the objectivity of the unity of consciousness and the subjectivity of the manifold in intuition. The image of a swinging pendulum going now hither, now thither is not altogether inaccurate: on the one side, the imagination renders rules sensible while, on the other, it renders intuitions conceptual. Being neither sensible nor intellectual and being both at the same time, it goes back and forth between the two poles of cognition providing sensible content-ful representations to rule-bound thought.

By way of conclusion to the present digression or \textit{excursus} on the role of affinity in relation to the A Deduction, it should be pointed out that the ambiguity with which Kant describes the function of the transcendental power of imagination in relation to the affinity doctrine is hardly accidental. As enunciated above, at times Kant defends the position that transcendental affinity is the product of the unity of apperception’s bestowal of identity onto appearances. At times, however, Kant defends that transcendental affinity is the product of the power of imagination carrying out combinations. But, even though illustrative for the purposes of grasping the general function of the transcendental power of imagination in the constitution of objectivity, the affinity doctrine poses nonetheless a serious interpretative challenge for anyone seriously engaging with the A-Deduction. Furthermore, this challenge will only become more puzzling if one considers the remarks Kant makes in the Dialectic. “\textit{Reason}” one reads there “\textit{prepares the way for the understanding}”\(^{41}\) in that it provides principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity of the forms in which the understanding may ‘move’ between representations. If homogeneity allows the understanding to go, within a certain horizon\(^{42}\), from the genus to the species of a representation, and specification allows the understanding to go from the species to

\(^{39}\) “\textit{For in itself the synthesis of the imagination, although exercised a priori, is nevertheless always sensible}” (A124).
\(^{40}\) (B156)
\(^{41}\) (A657/B685)
\(^{42}\) By ‘horizon’ Kant understands, in this context, “\textit{a multiplicity of things that can be represented and surveyed, as it were, from it}” (A658/B686).
the genus, continuity or affinity warrants the kinship between any two given representations as to give rise to a unified field within which to link representations. But in spite of their superficial resemblance, the continuity or affinity of nature and transcendental affinity differ in that the former is a mere idea of reason for which no corresponding object can be found. If one is willing to defend, with Lorini, that transcendental affinity warrants the move the understanding performs in going from the possibility of experience, through laws, to the unity of those laws, one would have to somehow square the ideality of the affinity of reason with the objectifying capacity of the transcendental affinity spoken of in the Deduction and the latter’s link to the imagination. Since this has not been done, nor an argument in this direction found, the issue of whether the affinity of reason and transcendental affinity are the same will remain undecided.

§ ii

Sensibilisation and determination

The previous chapter yielded the conclusion that time is self-affection. This was seen to imply that the relation between the transcendental unity of apperception and its empirical counterpart has to be understood as follows: one sees one’s self as a unity because, and not in spite of, the fact that the transcendental unity’s ‘reflection’ in the flux of time is successive. That one thinks of one’s own identity as necessarily abiding and unchanging could in no way have been derived from the experience of one’s empirical self. It was shown that the case must be, rather, that the empirical self is the temporally constituted correlate of an assumed transcendental unity that is absolutely self-same. In other words, the previous chapter concluded that there is a unity of consciousness and that, if time is the fundamental intuited unity, the unitary character of the latter is derivative from the unitary character of the former, i.e. time is both the activity of intuiting and the content intuited. It was seen, moreover, that the synthetic processes at work in the acquisition of knowledge come to be unified by means of a synthesis of recognition. Not only is it that the third

43 (A661/B689)
45 A promising path in the latter direction would be through the third Critique’s idea of reason as the necessary condition for the understanding to be able to exercise its capacity in reaching out into nature (AA 5:417ff).
46 (Ch. II, §ii, pp. 65-81)
synthesis provides the necessary rule for the unification of representations by providing the concept that renders what was previously only successive into a coherent unity. It is, also, that in carrying out such synthesis, the understanding becomes conscious of its own activity. This ‘becoming conscious’ was seen to designate nothing but the fact that the representations that ‘I am unifying’ just are representations ‘for/in me’. In other words, the synthesis of recognition makes evident two things. It makes evident, first, that consciousness of the unity of representations is, at one and the same time, the unity of the diverse acts of consciousness. The manifold, put differently, is a unity for the consciousness that apprehends it because that consciousness is itself a unity. But it makes evident, second, the closeness Kant thinks exists between the unity of consciousness and the concepts this consciousness uses to effect synthesis in intuition. The unity consciousness, after all, “(...) however, indistinct, must always be present; without it, concepts, and therewith knowledge of objects, are altogether impossible.”

This account signals, however, the beginning of a wider and more difficult problem since, as Kant makes clear at the end of the Deduction, the transition from transcendental unity to empirical unity is supposed to do two fundamental things: a) provide proof for the much sought-for objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding; and, b) provide some kind of legitimate warrant for these concepts’ relation to sensibility. Or, as Dieter Henrich has put it, Kant has to meet both of the aforementioned desiderata by, first, showing what the nature of a category is, and, second, showing that such category can exercise synthetic functions in intuition. In fact, Kant explicitly states as much when he asserts:

“(…) we cognise the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition. But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been brought about through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori and a concept in which this manifold is united possible [modified].”

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47 (A104)
48 (B163-B169)
49 Henrich, Dieter. “The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction” in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 22, No. 4, Jun. 1969, p. 652. The distinction between the ‘nature of the category’ and the category’s capacity to ‘exercise synthetic functions in intuition’ is not very clear-cut. The distinction can be drawn for analytic purposes, however, simply because the category as a function of judgment has a logical, if not transcendental, meaning.
50 (A105)
It is important to notice that Kant’s claim here is that the very ‘hervorbringen’ of an intuition is carried out by a ‘function of synthesis’. This corroborates, first, the conclusion reached in the previous Chapter, namely, that apperception posits itself as a temporally extended unity the essence of which is to be receptive to its own activity and also to whatever is given in intuition. But from the claim one can infer, second, that ‘cognition of the object’ is not possible without a ‘function of synthesis’ that brings about the intuition in accordance with a rule or concept that will allow it to do so. This is significant to the extent that phrasing things thus allows Kant to shift the terms of the discussion from how the subjective activity works to why there is objective validity. If up until now the discussion had to limit itself to speaking of the correlate of apprehension as ‘content’ or ‘whatever can be apprehended’, this is no longer the case. Instead, the discussion can now turn to something much more specific, namely, ‘objects’.

By object in general, Kant understands “that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion”\(^5^1\). This means, if what was seen in the previous chapter is correct, that the self must provide itself with some kind of a priori ‘traction’ whereby ontological relations, holding sway over specifics, do not do so in a completely erratic manner. But, where does this ‘traction’ reside? Is it something imposed on the mind by sensibility? Or is it, rather, something to be encountered in sensibility but posited by the mind?

The most intuitive, if not most philosophical, answer to these questions would begin by pointing out that, after all, there are things ‘out there’ to which one’s cognitive faculties relate. This kind of answer, however, does not sit well with Kant. The Aesthetic yielded, as a general result, that one is only ever conscious of one’s own representations\(^5^2\). By exclusion, and within the bounds of the Copernican turn, one is never conscious of some external ‘transcendently existing’ thing ‘out there’. Instead, what one can say and think about the ‘external’\(^5^3\) correlate of intuition is that it is a nothing\(^5^4\). But in light of the fact that one does cognise objects, this ‘nothing’, it

\(^{51}\) (A104)
\(^{52}\) (A42/B59)
\(^{53}\) ‘External’ in a rather sui generis way: certainly not in that it is outside of the self as some kind of transcendental existence.
\(^{54}\) “(…) vor uns nichts ist” (A105)
would seem, *does* more than something since the pure concept of it alone can confer empirical concepts with objective validity: “*The pure concept of a transcendental object, which is in reality one and the same = x throughout all our knowledge, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts the general relation to an object, that is, objective validity*”\(^{55}\). This is to say that, in spite of its indeterminacy, the concept of the ‘object in general = x’ provides a fixed pole to which consciousness can attach or link the objectivity of its representations.

Perhaps it is tempting to question, if not dismiss altogether, the role and legitimacy of such explanatory instance as the concept of the ‘object in general = x’. After all, if the ‘object in general = x’ is only the ‘external’ correlate of intuition about which one can predicate nothing, why not simply leave it aside as completely irrelevant? Why not just proceed in a quasi-Wittgensteinian way without it and speak solely of representations and the relation they have to one’s faculties and to each other? Legitimate as these questions may be, they find an answer in something stated a few moments ago: an ‘object’ is that which prevents one’s modes of knowledge [Erkenntnisse] from making random and arbitrary connections (or, by implication, an object is what it *is* out of necessity). The positing of the ‘object in general = x’ is therefore what allows the mind to establish necessary relations between representations validly\(^{56}\). It is in fact this positing that allows one to distinguish between the arbitrary imaginative subjective association of representations and the necessary objective relations one can establish amongst things. It allows one to do this simply because consciousness is always consciousness of representations and never of things themselves\(^{57}\) and, if one wants to distinguish between a subjective and an objective dimension of these representations, one has to do so through the *necessity* inherent to the latter. Only positing an ‘object in general = x’ as the objective correlate of the unity of apperception allows one to claim, validly, that there exists such a thing as a *necessary relation* between empirical entities.

As the triangle example used by Kant shows, the necessary unity of an object is nothing but the unity of the rule one uses to construct the object in the imagination\(^{58}\). Indeed, what is at stake here is not the relations one can establish between transcendentally existing elements, since ‘access’ to them was ruled out in

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\(^{55}\) (A109)

\(^{56}\) (A109)

\(^{57}\) (A197/B242)

\(^{58}\) (A105)
the Aesthetic (what one given is, after all, necessarily temporal\textsuperscript{59}). It is, rather, the objectivity of the concept of an ‘object in general = x’, i.e. the concept of the necessary synthetic unity of representations: “the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations”\textsuperscript{60}. In other words, the ‘object in general = x’ turns out to be nothing but the objective correlate of the unity of consciousness which grounded the consciousness of unity. It is, strictly speaking, mediated by the rule for the construction of the unity of an object. If, say, one were to associate one’s own body with the head of a bull and empirically identify one’s self as a Minotaur, one could do so on the sole grounds that there is a ‘one’ to identify-as[-a-Minotaur] and a ‘one’ doing the identifying. Something similar is happening concerning all empirical concepts: the unity of consciousness, grounding the consciousness of synthetic unity, determines the object of intuition in such a way as to allow for that object to be set in necessary relation to the rule whereby it was given and in necessary relation to other objects\textsuperscript{61}. The transcendent power of imagination’s task in all of this, to the extent that it “aims at nothing but the necessary unity in the synthesis of what is manifold in appearance”\textsuperscript{62}, is to grasp the particular that will be subsumed under a given concept –when this concept is empirical– or to sensibilise the concept itself –when it is a pure concept–.

\textsuperscript{59} (Ch. II, §ii, pp. 62-65) This should not amount to denying that there is a ‘material element in appearances’ (A20/B34)

\textsuperscript{60} (A105)

\textsuperscript{61} “The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected” (A108). A further example can therefore be given about this in relation to the B-Deduction. In a footnote, Kant famously claims: “The ‘I think’ expresses the act [Actus] of determining my existence. The existence is thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as belonging to it, is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is required, which is grounded in an a priori given form, i.e., time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable. Now I do not have yet another self-intuition, which would give the determining in me, of the spontaneity of which alone I am conscious, even before the act of determination, in the same way as time gives that which is to be determined, thus I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being, rather I merely represent the spontaneity of my thought, i.e., of the determining, and my existence always remains only sensibly determinable, i.e., determinable as the existence of an appearance. Yet this spontaneity is the reason I call myself an intelligence” (B158fn). Just as it is with the construction of the triangle, also in intuiting one’s self, or representing one’s own self-activity as existence, one determines what is intuitable about that very self. Or, better yet, the unity of the pure self, i.e. the act of determining, is necessarily mediated by the rule for the construction of the empirical self, i.e. the ‘I’ determinable as appearance. In an overly simplified way, this could be phrased as follows: a) The spontaneity of thought is the unity of consciousness; b) the representation of spontaneity is, in this case, the consciousness of unity; c) one does not know the first save insofar as it is perceived as the second; d) one merely represents the determining as determinable; d.i) but we are not intellectual intuitions; · the unity of consciousness (the determining) intuits itself only as the consciousness of its empirical determinations (the determinable).

\textsuperscript{62} (A123)
With empirical concepts the necessarily ambiguous task of the imagination is clear in light of the discussion of the ‘object in general = x’: the imagination provides an image for the concept which is, at the same time, a sensible representation and subsumable under a concept itself. Following on Kant’s example: the sensible representation of a dog can be subsumed under the general concept of ‘dog’ because the imagination provides an image of the doglike that is both sensible and intellectual. This image can be described, for instance, as that of any domesticated quadruped that barks and anything beyond these boundaries starts being un-doglike. The consciousness going through the process of identifying the dog enacts the rule according to which something will either resemble the image or will not (rule that would read something like: ‘if x is a quadruped that barks, then x pertains to the set of the doglike’) and ‘projects’, for lack of a better term, a unitary pole to which it can attach the objectivity of the sensible representation.

This discussion, however, brings to light the central problem of this investigation. If the concept of the ‘object in general = x’ warrants the general relation to an object that empirical concepts have, if, that is, by means of this concept empirical notions achieve objective validity, what then warrants the general relation to an object of pure concepts of the understanding? How, in other words, are the categories endowed with transcendental content? For the purposes of a reading such as the one herein developed –a reading, that is, that defends the thesis that time should be understood as affection of the self and that the activity of affecting one’s self yields an a priori manifold to which consciousness must fundamentally relate–, a lot depends on answering this very question. Primarily, understanding time as self-affection ought to concern itself with the question about the constitution of objectivity, and to do that, one has to justify not only the way in which empirical concepts have objective correlates but, also and more importantly, one has to justify the way in which pure a priori concepts relate to, and constitute, objectivity in general. It will be seen in what follows that in the activity of affecting one’s self, not only does one open one’s self to possibility of receptivity but, furthermore, that the opening is itself an already temporalised field of objectivity the nature of which allows for the categories to attach to transcendental content.
Categories, pure concepts of the understanding, are far from intuition in that they spring from the spontaneity of the understanding and in that they are pure and universal. Categories have indeed a meaning, but that meaning is a purely logical one: it expresses solely the logical function according to which a judgment can be carried out. This is the case precisely because one arrives at those categories by means of a metaphysical deduction from judgment itself. If one were to strip away the sensible condition for the application of the category, Kant says, one would remain with a function that represents no object whatsoever. But this is why Kant claims that “pure a priori concepts, in addition to the function of understanding expressed in the category, must contain a priori certain formal conditions of sensibility, namely, those of inner sense, i.e. time”. It is in providing those sensible conditions that imagination enters into a relation with the pure concepts of the understanding and, furthermore, that synthetic judgments a priori come to be possible. The supreme principle of all synthetic judgments states that the a priori conditions of all possible experience in general are at the same time the a priori conditions of all possible objects of experience. But, as the discussion of the previous chapter showed, this is so on the grounds that the formal conditions of a priori intuition have been brought into relation with the unity of apperception through the a priori synthesis of the imagination.

63 (A137/B176)  
64 (A147/B186)  
65 By ‘metaphysical deduction’ Kant understands the categories’ ‘concurrence’ with, and a priori origin from, judgments (B159).  
66 (A147/B187) Karin de Boer offers support for this reading in her excellent article “Categories vs Schemata”. Considering the schemata ‘conditions’ for the applicability of pure concepts, strictly speaking, means that they ought to be set in relation to judgment. But, she also thinks, a distinction can be drawn between categories and pure concepts: unlike categories, pure concepts do not abstract from the sensible condition for their application. Thus, when one speaks of a ‘category’ one may very well neglect the sensible content supposed to be thought in that function of unification in judgment. Not so much, however, when one speaks of ‘pure concept’ since, there, one necessarily thinks of the function of judgment as it is applied under the condition imposed on it by the pure intuition of time. In this sense, but in this sense only, the category is an abstracted version of the pure concept of the understanding. This, in turn, leads her to conclude that because the distinction between pure concept and schema is merely analytical, it is therefore impossible to grant priority to one or the other –one does not ‘add’ the schema onto the category but, rather abstracts the category or the schema from a previously unified ground that is the rule for the application of a certain judgment-. De Boer, Karin. “Categories vs Schemata: Kant’s Two-Aspect Theory of Pure Concepts and his Critique of Wolffian Metaphysics” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 54, No. 3, Jul. 2016, pp. 441-668. The distinction between category and pure concept will not be followed through in this investigation, however, simply because Kant himself does not abide by it Cf. (A76/B102); (A119); (B146ff).  
67 (A139/B178)  
68 (A111) and “In this way synthetic a priori judgments are possible, if we relate the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of the imagination, and its necessary unity in a transcendental apperception to a possible cognition of experience in general, and say: The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and on this account have objective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori” (A158/B197).
The name Kant gives to any one of the imaginative processes of ‘provision of sensible conditions’ is, famously, ‘schema’. Strictly speaking schemata are determinations of time or self-affection. They determine, again strictly speaking, the only pure inner intuition, time\(^{69}\), in that they transform its continuity into discreteness as for it to be able to relate to the logical functions of the understanding. Schemata, in virtue of their universality, and having derived their unity from concepts (and ultimately from apperception), must be *homogenous* with concepts themselves while, at the same time, in virtue of time being the fundamental form of intuition, schemata must also be *homogenous* with appearances\(^ {70}\). The schema cannot therefore be an image, insofar as the latter is too closely linked to sensibility, nor a rule, insofar as this one is too closely linked to understanding. The schema is, rather, a universal procedure which underlies both images and rules: “This representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the schema of this concept/Indeed it is schemata, not images of objects, which underlie [liegen…zum Grunde] our pure sensible concepts”\(^{71}\).

Before going on to explore in detail the nature of each one of the processes through which the imagination provides the self with the sensible conditions that must be in place for the categories to have objective validity, three important considerations ought to be kept in mind. The first consideration may be deemed semantic insofar as it concerns the division between the productive and reproductive synthesis of the imagination and the fact that only the former may be called *synthesis speciosa*, properly speaking. The second consideration may be deemed systematic insofar as it concerns the position of the Schematism section of the first *Critique* in relation to what comes before, namely the Deduction, and what comes after, namely the Principles. The third consideration may be deemed architectonic in the sense it was used in the first Chapter: it will be suggested, indeed, that the Schematism and Principles be read, too, as following the mathematical-constitutive/dynamical-regulative distinction.

The first consideration to keep in mind is related to the discussion in the previous chapter\(^ {72}\) insofar as claiming that the synthesis of imagination just is the

\(^{69}\) (A123-124)
\(^{70}\) (A139/B178)
\(^{71}\) (A140-141/B179-180)
\(^{72}\) *Vid.* (Ch. II. §ii. pp. 70-78)
effect spontaneity has in sensibility, is not altogether wrong\textsuperscript{73}. Indeed, the productive power of imagination, in opposition to the merely reproductive power and to apprehension, is characterised to a large extent as the \textit{determining} act of synthesis and not just as the \textit{determinable} matter of sense. But this characterisation, helpful as it may be, needs further consideration. The figurative synthesis, or productive synthesis of the imagination, is the synthesis of the manifold in \textit{sensible} intuition\textsuperscript{74}. It is distinguishable from an intellectual synthesis (\textit{synthesis intellectualis}) insofar as this one could only be a synthesis of the manifold of intuition \textit{in general} in accordance with concepts. The difference between the two is not as subtle as Kant’s wording might at first suggest: in sensibility there are only particulars, and therefore an intellectual synthesis cannot relate to them in any meaningful way\textsuperscript{75}. A figurative synthesis, however, is by definition\textsuperscript{76} capable of relating first, to these particulars, and second, these particulars amongst them –as discussed before. The discussion about the concept of the ‘object in general = x’ made clear that the imagination, when associating particulars amongst one another following a subjective empirical law, is only carrying out its reproductive task and not, therefore, yielding \textit{a priori} knowledge. It became clear, also, that in relating pure concepts of the understanding to sensibility, its task is \textit{a priori} and transcendental and was termed, therefore, ‘productive’. Since it is the faculty of imagination that carries out both these tasks, it is important to reserve the term ‘productive’ imagination solely for the one that relates pure \textit{a priori} concepts to sensibility.

Kant also calls this productive or figurative synthesis, once again in opposition to \textit{synthesis intellectualis}, simply \textit{synthesis speciosa} on the grounds that it alone can provide the ‘species’, ‘aspect’, or the particular in sensibility, of some wider \textit{genus} (in this case, the concept). \textit{Synthesis speciosa}, as its name indicates, is a ‘showing’ or ‘eidetic’ bringing together\textsuperscript{77} of the sensible particular, i.e. the appearance, with the rule that constructs it, i.e. the concept. This is why the previous discussion about what was characterised as the pendulum movement of the imagination, and the digression on the doctrine of affinity at the beginning of this

\textsuperscript{73} (B151-152)
\textsuperscript{74} (B151)
\textsuperscript{75} This is why the pure schema is “\textit{the pure synthesis, determined by a rule of unity, in accordance with concepts, to which the category gives expression}” (A142/B181).
\textsuperscript{76} In its most elegant formulation, imagination is “\textit{the faculty of a priori intuitions}” (AA 5:190).
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Species}, in Latin, just means a ‘look’, an ‘image’, an ‘aspect’, an ‘appearance’. In philosophical tradition, it was used in the Middle Ages to translate the Aristotelian formula (γένος + διαφορά = εἶδος) into (genus + differentia = species).
Chapter, were important. On the one side, the imagination renders rules sensible while, on the other, it renders intuitions conceptual. It is *synthesis speciosa* since it is both intellectual in its combining according to rules, and therefore spontaneous or active, and it is also sensible, and therefore receptive or passive of the species in sensibility. It lingers in the ambiguity, so to say, of being active in its passivity and passive in its activity. Although the process of sensibilisation of the pure concepts of the understanding is not particularly simple, it helps to keep this first consideration in mind.

The second consideration to bear in mind is that the Schematism chapter of the first *Critique* cannot be read independently of its subsequent section, the Analytic of Principles, just by dint of the fact that, in themselves, the schemata articulate no sensible content, i.e. no matter for perception. This is why Kant claims that “*The schematism displays the conditions under which an appearance is determined with regard to the logical function and thus stands under a category; the transcendental principles display the categories under which the schemata of sensibility stand*”\(^\text{78}\). Although in what follows a detailed analysis of each particular schema will be presented it is important to bear in mind that whereas the highest principle of all analytic judgments is the principle of non-contradiction; the highest principle of all synthetic judgments is that “*every object stands under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience*”\(^\text{79}\). By now it should be clear, given what was seen in the previous Chapter, that the possibility of combining is given solely in time. This is so because if one wants to develop knowledge beyond the one provided in a single concept, one needs to do so synthetically and, therefore, a third element is indispensable: “*What, now, is this third something that is to be the medium of all synthetic judgments? There is only one whole in which all our representations are contained, namely, inner sense and its a priori form, time*”\(^\text{80}\). Only with the former permanently in mind\(^\text{81}\) one can turn to look at the Schematism, along with its articulation with the System of Principles, in sufficient detail as to clarify how they articulate objective validity. Or, in other words, with the Table of Judgments as guide, one can finally see how the categories, schemata, and principles articulate themselves in such a *sufficient* way, one should say, as to ‘constitute’ objectivity.

\(^{78}\) (AA 18:393)  
\(^{79}\) (A158/B197)  
\(^{80}\) (A155/B194)  
\(^{81}\) (A160/B199)
This second consideration should be read as appeasing the worry, articulated most clearly but not solely\(^{82}\) by Eva Schaper, about the systematic role of the Schematism doctrine. Stated as a dilemma, the worry reads as follows: \textit{either} Kant achieved a transcendental proof for the objective validity of the categories in the Deduction—thereby rendering the Schematism redundant—, \textit{or} the Schematism contributes in some way towards this proof—thereby rendering the Deduction incomplete—\(^{83}\). The way out of the dilemma, for Schaper, consists in doing two things: \textit{a}) making central that the schemata are laid out by the pure productive power of imagination and not by understanding, sense, or reason; and \textit{b}) knowing that the schemata are pure time-determinations—which takes some of the burden off of formality and structure being completely on the side of the subject. This solution, however, has an important consequence that Schaper recognises and is willing to admit but that cannot be granted here, namely, that it must be the case that the architectonic is based on distinctions that will only work up to a point, but not beyond\(^{84}\). That point, she claims, is the end of the Deduction where Kant shifts the question to be answered and starts concerning himself with providing a metaphysics of experience. Because of this, “\textit{schemata as belonging to productive imagination, and schemata as pure time-determinations—can thus not be discussed without throwing doubt on some of Kant's own systematic tenets}”\(^{85}\). Although Schaper is generally correct in the way she understands the function of schemata\(^{86}\), the ‘systematic worry’ should be appeased once more to the extent that, it will be seen, there is absolutely no tension in the way the schemata relate to the preceding and succeeding sections of the first \textit{Critique}. As the following will make clear, the Schematism flows rather naturally from the systematic tenets laid by Kant in the Analytic of Concepts generally. As was mentioned a moment ago, the schemata and principles are arrived at using the blueprint of the categories, and the categories, in turn, were deduced from judgments (which is \textit{not} to say that the schemata and Principles are themselves deduced from the categories). That it is difficult to hold the

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\(^{82}\) See, for example, de Vleeschauwer's, H. J. \textit{La Déduction Transcendantale dans l'Oeuvre de Kant}. Vol. 3. Paris, 1937, pp. 441ff.


\(^{84}\) Ibid. p. 274.

\(^{85}\) Ibid. p. 275.

\(^{86}\) See, for example, the claim that “The basic Kantian insight which lurks in Schematism seems to me this: though it is true that we construct, we construct not as minds, or intellects, not by being mind, but by being in time” \textit{Ibid}. p. 281.
entire structure in view is certainly true, but that such difficulty amounts to an insurmountable systematic problem is not.

This leads to the third fundamental issue to bear in mind, one that can only be briefly mentioned here, related to Kant’s distinction between mathematical and dynamical judgments, categories, schemata and principles. As Michael Friedman has pointed out, the distinction between the ‘constitutive’ and the ‘regulative’ marks the division between understanding and reason in the first *Critique*\(^{87}\). This amounts to a rather clear distinction in that experience necessarily conforms to constitutive concepts and principles of the understanding but does not necessarily conform to regulative ideas of reason. The supposed clarity in the division between the two is blurred by Kant, however, when he distinguishes, even amongst the so-called constitutive principles of the understanding themselves, between mathematical-constitutive and dynamical-regulative principles\(^{88}\). This, in turn, has generated serious confusion in the literature about the schematism\(^{89}\). It is worth noting with Friedman, therefore, that the distinction between mathematical-constitutive and dynamical-regulative principles should be understood from the outset as follows: whereas the dynamic concepts and principles are merely regulative concerning intuition, they are constitutive regarding *experience*\(^{90}\). It is worth noting, further, that the distinction itself is not exclusive to the principles themselves and applies, instead, to judgments, categories, schemata, and principles. Although it will be discussed at length later in this section, it is nonetheless important to remark that the first and second sets of judgments, categories, schemata and principles are mathematical-constitutive insofar

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\(^{88}\) Ibid. p. 75.


as they are concerned with objects of intuition, both pure and empirical, and have therefore no previously given correlates. This means that, in carrying out synthesis in accordance with the rule provided by mathematical concepts, of concern is only the *intuition* of an appearance. Mathematical judgments, categories, schemata and principles will be unconditionally necessary (apodictic) and, therefore, constitutive and allow therefore for intuitive certainty. The third and fourth sets of judgments, categories, schemata and principles, however, are not mathematical but dynamical-regulative insofar as they are concerned with the existence of those objects and have therefore previously given objective correlates. This means that, in carrying out synthesis in accordance with the rule provided by dynamical concepts, of concern is the *existence* of the appearance. Dynamical judgments, categories, schemata and principles will also be necessary *a priori*, but only mediately so, i.e. mediated through *experience*. This is why they only attain discursive certainty and instead of being constitutive they are only regulative in their employment, that is, regulative insofar as empirical knowledge is concerned. Perhaps oversimplifying this, but important for the sake of clarity: whereas the mathematical is constitutive of whatever may appear in time, the dynamical is only regulative of what appears to us as experience, first, in relation of one appearance to another (Analogies) and, second, in relation to the understanding (Postulates). Without keeping this distinction in mind not only will the Schematism make no sense whatsoever but, even worse, later in the *Critique*, the Antinomies would prove irresolvable. For the sake of clarity in relation to this third consideration, a table accompanies this Chapter in the form of an Appendix.

With the semantic, systematic, and architectonic considerations in mind, then, the question about the way in which self-affection delineates objectivity may be re-stated: how are the categories endowed with transcendental content? In what way, exactly, does objectivity come to be constituted by the activity of affecting one’s self? In one widely neglected but crucially important remark that Kant makes in the

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91 (B110)
92 (A160/B199)
93 (A161/B201)
94 (B110)
95 (A160/B199)
96 This echoes Spinoza’s distinction between mathematical (“a certainty which follows from the necessity of the perception of the thing that is perceived or seen”) and regulative certainty in his discussion of prophetic revelation through imagination. See *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, II, 3-4.
97 (A162/B201)
98 Since the Antinomies presuppose that the Analogies and the Postulates are governing experience, properly so called (A494/B522).
99 (Ch. III. Appendix, p. 135)
Schematism section, a hint is provided as to how exactly the pure concepts of the understanding articulate themselves in and with time. Or, using Kant’s own words, how these time-determinations ‘connect’ a priori with the unity of apperception. The schemata are therefore nothing but a priori time-determinations in accordance with rules, and these concern, according to the order of the categories, the time-series, the time-content, the time-order, and finally the time-paradigm [Zeitinbegriff] in regard to all possible objects [Modified]. ‘According to the order of the categories’ means, here, according to quantity (unity, plurality, totality), quality (reality, negation, limitation), relation (of inherence and subsistence, of causality and dependence, of community) and modality (possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence, necessity-contingency). In other words the schemata can be classified, according to the function they are carrying out, as portraying the time-series as succession (numerus), as portraying the time-content as quid (sensation), as portraying the time-order as order (perdurance, causality, community) and, finally, as portraying the time-paradigm as relative to thought (agreement, actuality, eternity).

The first procedure for the sensibilisation of a category Kant presents is number. In number (numerus), the schema of quantity which manifests the time-series, Kant shows a fundamental feature of his understanding of self-affection, namely, that it cannot be solely a chronologically running sequence (or the elapse of a given sequence). One can see that in articulating number as the transcendental procedure for determining time according to quantity Kant hints, rather, at something important: the time-series, succession as such, once sensibilised, is not just a sequence but it is also a series. The synthesis speciosa provides an infinite series of moments necessary for counting as such to emerge at all. Put in other words, the synthesis speciosa highlights a possible particular moment against the intuited unity of time. Echoing Euler, Kant states: “Number is therefore the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the intuition.” But one must not understand this ‘generation’ as if it were a creation ex nihilo – this ‘generation’ is, rather, the bringing forth, a showing, of quantity as determinable against the unity of one’s own pure activity. Number is, put differently, the condition for the possibility of the

100 (A142/B181)  
101 (A145/B184)  
102 Kant uses ‘Zeitinbegriff’ to refer to this last one. This means: time-epitome, time-embodiment, time’s innermost essence or time’s example.  
103 (A143/B182)
determinability of the given in accordance with the *a priori* concept(s) of quantity. The homogeneity in question, here, can be no other than magnitude itself (or the having rendered discrete that which was continuous). This is to say that whatever appears, if it is to be known as object, it is to be known as unity, plurality, or totality. The sensibilised counterpart of these quantities is precisely the unity of synthesis insofar as it has been temporalised in accordance with the time-series.

Not in vain, therefore, does Kant state the principle of the Axioms of Intuition in relation to number: “*All intuitions are extensive magnitudes*”\(^{104}\). This means that appearances cannot be apprehended in the first place save through the combination of the manifold of homogenous intuitions and the unity of one’s apprehending it\(^{105}\), i.e. apprehension is always an apprehension of something numerically given. This is derived from the definition of the schema of number, certainly, and is very much in line with what would have been stated in the kind of foundational mathematics that Kant was familiar with. Euler’s definition of number, for example, as “*the proportion of one magnitude to another, arbitrarily assumed unit*”\(^{106}\), would have aimed at grounding numerical ordinality and cardinality. Kant, not unaware of this, is trying to preserve that definition’s capacity. That there is a one to one correspondence, for example, between the total amount of natural numbers (\(\mathbb{N}\)) and the total amount of prime numbers (\(\mathbb{P}\)), speaks of there being a homogenous note shared by both serial totals. The cardinality of both will be the same in this particular case due, precisely, to the synthesis being carried out in the homogeneity of that note.

The schema of number, along with the principle of the Axioms of Intuition, provides the necessary image of every extensive magnitude. For further clarifying this, in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* Kant invites anyone interested in connecting the doctrine of phoronomy with the schema of quantity to note that “*since the concept of quantity [read schema of number] always contains that of the composition of the homogeneous, the doctrine of the composition of motion is,\(^{107}\)

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104 (A162/B202)
105 (B203)
106 The full definition is worth quoting in full: “*Now, we cannot measure or determine any quantity, except by considering some other quantity of the same kind as known, and point out their mutual relation (…) So that the determination, or the measure of magnitude of all kinds, is reduced to this: fix at pleasure upon any one known magnitude of the same species with that which is to be determined, and consider it as the measure or unit; then, determine the proportion of the proposed magnitude to this known measure. This proportion is always expressed by numbers; so that a number is nothing but the proportion of one magnitude to another, arbitrarily assumed unit*” Euler, Leonhard. Vollständige Anleitung zur Algebra (Cap. 1, Def. 3), Opera Omnia, Teubner, Berlin, 1911, p. 106.
at the same time, the pure doctrine of the quantity of motion”\(^\text{107}\). In other words, anything that can be counted, and any thing intuited can be counted, will have to be subsumed in some way or other to unity, plurality, or totality. Subsumed, that is, under these categories’ schematic condition, i.e. number. At the same time, anything given in intuition, must be numerically identical to itself and, therefore, subsumable under the principle of the Axioms that all intuitions are extensive magnitudes. The principle itself, however, is not the same as particular formulae derivable from it. That ‘\(x + y = z\)’ certainly corroborates the operation of the schema, insofar as two homogenous things will synthetically yield a third one. But one would need an infinite amount of propositions like that one to account for the complex relation arithmetic holds to intuition. Instead, in the Axiom it becomes clear that, so long as anything is intuited, it is intuited as extension.

In sensation (sensatio), the schema of quality that manifests the time-content, yet another fundamental feature of self-affection emerges: just as it did in the number-schema, time here figures not so much as series but more so as something in the series, the content, i.e. its thingness (quid). Similar to what happens in the schema of number, then, the synthesis speciosa highlights or shows a possible something against the unity of self-affection that it itself fills up; dissimilar to what happens in the schema of number, time is not produced here but, rather, filled or imbued\(^\text{108}\) insofar as here the exhibiting is just a giving itself of the possibility of encountering something, a quid, in time. This means that sensation as the schema of reality is first and foremost the mode in which the synthesis speciosa provides itself for grounds of determinability –if the definition of matter is followed through\(^\text{109}\).

As previously with the schema of number and the principle behind the Axiom of Intuition, so it is with the schema of sensation and the principle behind the Anticipation of Perception: “In all appearances, the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, degree”\(^\text{110}\). This is to say that in perception, which is just empirical consciousness, appearances contain the matter of perception itself –the real of sensation as merely subjective representation. But from empirical to pure

\(^{107}\) (AA 4:495)  
\(^{108}\) (A143/B182)  
\(^{109}\) Matter signifies only “the determinable in general” (A266/B322); “the content of a cognition” (A59/B83); “that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation” (A20/B34); “that in the outer intuition which is an object of sensation” (AA 4:481). See also: (A261/B317)  
\(^{110}\) (B207)
consciousness a discrete transition can be followed: from the real to the merely formal and, so, also a magnitude is to be attributed to the spectrum of sensation. Whereas on the one side of the spectrum one finds absolute negation, as the categories show, on the other side of the spectrum one finds absolute reality. A sensation is that the apprehension of which does not entail, in any way, the process of going from parts to the whole\(^{111}\), however, and this is why Kant terms this magnitude ‘intensive’–as opposed to ‘extensive’. An intensive magnitude, or degree, is one which is apprehended as a unity and its reduction occurs only by limitation via negation. This is why, regardless of what is apprehended, the matter of that apprehension is said to have a greater or lesser degree of reality. The ‘moment’ therefore, the minimum unit of time, is said to be the fundamental form of realitas\(^{112}\).

It is important to remark here that property of magnitudes whereby no part of them is ever the smallest, i.e. their continuity. Unlike discrete magnitudes, such as the series of integers (\(\mathbb{Z}\)), continuous magnitudes, such as the series of real numbers (\(\mathbb{R}\)), cannot be reduced to distinguishable unities. It is this property that allows one to claim of intensive magnitudes, specifically, that no matter what the degree of reality which they are given, the importance for present purposes is that they are given in the activity of affecting one’s self at all\(^{113}\).

The fact that sensation, or the real, is ‘anticipated’ must strike anyone familiar with transcendental philosophy as problematic: how can the quality of something, its matter which is by definition empirical, be anticipated in any meaningful way? This problem is partially solved\(^{114}\), however, if one considers that empirical consciousness can be raised, in and through time, from absolute negation to absolute reality instantaneously\(^{115}\). This is to say: since the continuous magnitude in question is not an extensive but an intensive one, and since the number of appearance can vary independently of the sensation it produces, then it must be the case that the imagination (being a progression in time) gives rise to the property of degree in a synthesis a priori\(^{116}\). In an ironic twist of fate, and Kant remarks this, it is rather

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\(^{111}\) (A167/B209)

\(^{112}\) (A168/B210)

\(^{113}\) Uncountable infinity, such as the one found in real numbers (\(\mathbb{R}\)), is a great example of this: the infinite that separates 0 from 0.0…1 is greater that the infinite which separates 1 from \(\infty\). It is so much greater, in fact, that it is strictly speaking un-countable.

\(^{114}\) Vid. (Ch. IV, pp. 136-146) This will become a problem for Kant of significant proportions when set in relation to the concept of matter as an empirical correlate of sensation. Friedman, Rand, Förster, and Tuschling have all noted this issue.

\(^{115}\) (A176/B217)

\(^{116}\) (A176/B218)
curious that of extensive magnitudes we know *a priori* only their quality, i.e. their continuity, whereas of intensive magnitudes we know *a priori* their quantity, i.e. their degree—"everything else has to be left to experience"\(^{117}\). Sensation, importantly, designates nothing but the subjective aspect of one’s representations, i.e. the real in them\(^ {118}\). We can attribute reality, therefore, to an appearance solely in terms of its degree of reality (infinitely present in sensation), un-reality (infinitely absent in sensation), or limited-reality (present *and* absent in sensation). This justifies, in a way, that the Doctrine of Dynamics in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, would open by defining matter as "the movable insofar as it fills a space"\(^{119}\). There, where outer sense is already at play, something must be posited as occupying some space if it is to be considered subject to interaction with other things.

Now, in order to be able to elucidate the dynamical schemata, it is indispensable to go back to the third, that is, the architectonic consideration mentioned earlier. It was pointed out, with Friedman, that Kant draws a distinction, even within the constitutive principles of the understanding, between the mathematical-constitutive and the dynamic-regulative\(^ {120}\). It was only briefly insinuated that the reason Kant has for doing this lies in that, whereas the mathematical-constitutive principles are such for intuition, the dynamic-regulative principles are constitutive for experience\(^{121}\). In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant claims:

>"In the Transcendental Analytic we have distinguished, among the principles of the understanding, the dynamical, as mere regulative principles of

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\(^{117}\) (A176/B218)

\(^{118}\) “Sensation (...) expresses the merely subjective aspect of our representations of things outside us, [and] strictly speaking it expresses the material (the real) in them (through which something existing is given) [modified]" (AA 5:189)

\(^{119}\) (AA 4:496)

\(^{120}\) (A161/B201)

\(^{121}\) A helpful way of understanding the distinction between the mathematical-constitutive and dynamical-regulative has been recently offered by Konstantin Pollok in light of what he calls Kant’s theory of normativity: the dynamicity and ‘regulativity’ of the Analogies and the Postulates resides in that a judgment carried out in accordance with either may fail to obey the principle in question (i.e. one can make mistakes in these kinds of judgments) because an existence, beyond what is solely constructed in intuition, is factored into the function of the judgment. With mathematical-constitutive principles, however, one cannot fail to obey the principle but, instead, would fail applying the appropriate principle if one were to make a mistake in judging. Interestingly, Pollok arrives at the previous conclusion for different reasons than the ones developed here. For him, Kant is in need of the mathematical-constitutive/dynamical-regulative distinction because transcendental philosophy is seeking to justify the lawfulness of what would otherwise be completely contingent sensations. See Pollok, Konstantin. *Kant’s Theory of Normativity: Exploring the Space of Reason*. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2017, (see especially) pp. 220-248.
intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive with respect to intuition. In spite of this, the dynamical laws in question are nonetheless constitutive with respect to experience, in that they make the concepts without which no experience takes place possible a priori."122.

If Kant’s systematic ambitions are followed through, and it is being claimed here that they should be followed through, the distinction between the mathematical-constitutive and the dynamical-regulative is one that applies just as much for schemata and principles as it does for judgments and categories. Indeed whereas for the categories of quantity and quality the schema pertaining to each one of the categories is one and the same, in virtue of their mathematical-constitutive nature; for the categories of relation and modality the schema pertaining to each one of the categories, although following a uniform principle in each case, is different, in virtue of their dynamical-regulative nature. This is clarified perfectly if only one asks oneself a question hitherto neglected in the literature: given that there are twelve categories, three for each one of the four modes of judgment (quantity, quality, relation, and modality), why are there only eight schemata? The answer lies in that for the first two kinds of categories, the respective schema is number in the case of quantity and sensation in the case of quality –since they are both magnitudes123. For the modes of relation and modality, the former cannot be the case, however. This is to say that whereas there is only one schema for all of the categories of quantity, that of number, and one schema for all of the categories of quality, that of sensation; there are three schemata, one for each one of the categories, that fall under the heading of relation (although all of them expressing the time-order) and, likewise, three schemata, one for each one of the categories, that fall under the heading of modality (although all of them expressing the time-paradigm) –vid. Appendix124.

The previous point has often been missed in the literature and has therefore created a significant lacuna. Sebastian Gardner, for example, seems unaware of the division. In the Schematism section of his Guide he claims that “On this basis, Kant specifies twelve transcendental schemata, one for each category (A142-5/ B182-

122 (A664/B692)
123 “And thus the possibility of continuous magnitudes, indeed even of magnitudes in general, since the concepts of them are all synthetic, is never clear from the concepts themselves, but only from them as formal conditions of the determination of objects in experience in general” (A224/B271).
124 (Ch. III, Appendix, p. 135)
something that is, simply, false. Kant does not specify twelve but only eight schemata and he does so precisely because of what was mentioned. Not only Gardner, but other commentators have fallen prey to the complexity of the schematism as well. Gerhard Seel rightly claims that for the first class of categories (quantity) there is one schema, but wrongly claims that for the second class (quality), there are two and for the third and fourth classes there are three. Even Paton’s rather exhaustive commentary on the matter errs in this regard—albeit ‘errs’ differently. For Paton, there are only four real schemata and the role that the three schemata for each one of the last two classes are playing is more of an ‘explicative’, rather than constitutive one. Hence, one reads that “The difference between one schema and three is merely an indication of the less or greater difficulty of making clear what is involved in one aspect of synthesis”.

So, even though Paton recognises that there is a shortage of schemata, he nonetheless fails to grasp why that is the case. But as was argued a moment ago, and will be further clarified below, it cannot be as Gardner, Seel, or Paton want, because of the specific way in which time-determination occurs in each one of the eight schemata as following the time-series, time-content, time-order and time-paradigm. Only Klaus Düsing, who will be discussed later, comes close to seeing the distribution herein advocated. In “Objektive und Subjektive Zeit” Düsing seems to implicitly recognise that quantity and quality have only one schema each, but he does not specify the reasons why he thinks this to be the case nor what their relation to the time-series and the time-content is. Because of this the discussion that follows may be read as trying to remedy the lacuna in question.

Anything that may appear must do so as being numerically definite (as having an extensive magnitude) and as being gradually definite (as having an intensive

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128 And, perhaps, William H. S. Monck who indeed recognises the numerical discrepancy while nonetheless insisting vehemently that each category must have a schema: “There thus arise exactly as many a priori determinations of time as there are kinds of mental activity—that is to say, as there are categories” Monck, William H. S. *An Introduction to the Critical Philosophy*. University Press, Dublin, 1874, p. 44.
130 It could be argued that a further exception can be found in Mario Caimi’s extraordinary piece “The Logical Structure of Time According to the Chapter on Schematism” in *Kant-Studien*, 103. Jahrg., 2012, S. 415–428. What makes this piece unique is that Caimi does provide a comprehensive account of the way in which categories and time relate to one another. Unfortunately, Caimi does not justify in any way the numerical discrepancy of categories and schemata.
There is, in other words, no escaping the mathematical-constitutive judgments, categories, schemata and principles (this is what their intuitive certainty amounts to). It works differently, however, with the dynamical-regulative judgments, categories, schemata and principles: they are only mediately, and not immediately, necessary and the mediation is given by experience (this is what their discursive certainty amounts to). Take a mathematical figure like any Platonic solid, for example, into view: regardless of whether a dodecahedron exists or not, one can predicate it number and degree. But, if existence were removed from the concept of such figure, would one be able to predicate its cause or whether it is necessary? Certainly not: a dodecahedron contrived by the imagination, or somehow built in Euclidean geometry, will necessarily have a number and a degree pertaining to it – otherwise it would not appear as an object in intuition. This same dodecahedron need not appear as causally bound or as being necessary – that will only come about once the appearing of the figure is mediated through experience, e.g. having rendered it sensible on a piece of paper. In the terminology employed by Kant in the Metaphysical Foundations, one would say that the dodecahedron has an essence, but not a nature, properly speaking. Another way of putting this is as follows: Kant needs to be able to account for two heterogeneous relations in which thought stands to objects. According to the mathematical-constitutive relation one constructs all possible objects in intuition, i.e. nothing is without also thereby being numerical and gradual – for this is what ‘being constitutive’ means. According to the dynamical-regulative relation one legislates on the existence of objects in connection to one another (Analogies) and in connection to thought (Postulates). Succinctly phrased, one could say that the bond between quantity/quality and intuitions is structured differently from the bond between relation/modality and existence. Or, better yet, the structural relation characterised as mathematical-constitutive constructs all intuitions; the structural relation characterised as dynamical-regulative legislates the appearing of existence. This is the reason why Kant only provides one schema for quantity and one for quality but three for relation and three more for modality: the first two are necessary conditions for any appearing whatsoever; the following six, as will be discussed shortly, are necessary conditions, too, but only of the existence of the appearance. The exposition of the following schemata, therefore, will be

131 Nature in its formal meaning simply is “the first inner principle of all that belongs to the existence of a thing” whereas essence is “the first inner principle of all that belongs to the possibility of a thing” (AA 4:468).
132 Perhaps a perspectival point might help: seen from the perspective of appearances in general, all is bound to the mathematical-constitutive principles; seen from the perspective of experience, however,
divided in the following way: first, the relation of the general schema to the general principle will be stated; second, the particular schema will be presented in each case followed by its respective particular principle.

The general principle that manifests the time-order, as stated in the A-Edition, is “All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in time”\textsuperscript{133} (in the B-Edition: “Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions”\textsuperscript{134}). It is an analogy insofar as it allows one to see that if a perception is given, \textit{then} that perception is given in a time-relation, and only in a time-relation, as having its \textit{existence} necessarily connected with other perceptions – before and after it. Now, an analogy in Kantian philosophy is understood as “\textit{a rule according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception}”\textsuperscript{135} and, importantly, as the rule which allows for the subsumption of appearances not only under categories but, as Kant emphasises, under these categories’ respective schemata\textsuperscript{136}. This means that the analogies themselves serve no other purpose except for that of providing the necessary condition for the unity of empirical knowledge in the act of synthesis. Since one knows that such unity, the structural unity of possible ontological predicates, i.e. the categories, can \textit{only be thought in schematism}\textsuperscript{137}, then, it is only through clarifying the relation of specific relational schemata to their respective principles that one arrives at understanding how experience comes to be constituted in the first place.

The functions of the understanding, in themselves, have no sensible restriction and, therefore, no objective validity\textsuperscript{138}. It is only in their articulation with their respective schemata, and further articulation with their respective principles, that these functions achieve objective validity properly speaking. It is this that Kant means when he says that “\textit{In the principle itself we do make use of the category, but in applying it to appearances we substitute for it its schema as the key to its employment, or rather set it alongside the category, as its restricting condition, and all is bound by the dynamic-regulative principles. The two sets of principles operate, in other words, at different levels: the level of \textit{appearances} and the level of \textit{experience}. The difference between perspectives is precisely what will open the possibility for judgments that do not seek a thorough determination of their object – \textit{viz.} aesthetic judgments}.} (AA 5:232ff)
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{133} (A177)
\item \textsuperscript{134} (B218)
\item \textsuperscript{135} (A180/B222)
\item \textsuperscript{136} (A181/B223)
\item \textsuperscript{137} “\textit{But such unity can be thought only in the schema of the pure concepts of the understanding}” (A181/B224).
\item \textsuperscript{138} (B167fn)
as being what may be called its formula".139 The analogies are principles for the determination of the existence of appearances in time in accordance with self-affection’s own modes of instantiation (duration, succession and simultaneity). But this determination cannot be reduced to time itself, of course, since it pertains to the understanding to provide the rule according to which the existence of appearances will acquire synthetic unity —that is the role of the categories here—. Now, insofar as time comprehends all existence,141 and insofar as the analogies themselves are a priori, not only will they serve to ground empirical laws of every kind but, also, will evoke in a very particular way how time and apperception, taken together, constitute one nature.

In persistence (constans et perdurable), the schema of subsistence that first manifests the time-order, synthesis speciosa specifies, as transcendental time-determination, the time sequence in accordance with the category of substance. Subsistence should be understood here as that which underlies all possible mutation, i.e. an a priori determining of a (single) thing that remains throughout time. If the correlate of synthesis speciosa in its relation to time as number showed up as time-production and in relation to sensation showed up as time-filling, then, one must ask: what could possibly guarantee a persisting something through time that does not change? In one word: identity. But where can identity be derived from in an ever-flowing river of succession? When discussing whether every substance is extended and continuously changed,143 Kant says that the former is indeed true, at least pre-Critically, but only insofar as it pertains to the imagination’s efforts to adumbrate (adumbrare) for itself the aspect (species) of things —therefore inapplicable to the conditions of existence of some ‘external’ or transcendentally existing thing.144 In the Critical period this amounts to saying that what the imagination provides itself with in intuition, are essences insofar as the existence of something that remains does not allow for infinite variation.145 Substance here is just taken to mean an essence that

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139 (A181/B224)
140 An interesting question that will have to remain unanswered here is to what extent the ‘modes’ of time are not, themselves, different kinds of temporality.
141 (A216/B263)
142 (A143/B183)
143 Claim that is not a proper subreptic axiom but, rather, an imposture of the imagination.
144 (AA 2:414)
145 As stated in a quote above, “essence is the first inner principle of all that belongs to the possibility of a thing. Therefore, one can attribute only an essence to geometrical figures, but not a nature (since in their concept nothing is thought that would express an existence)” (AA 4:468). This is the sense in which Kant uses ‘essence’ in, for example, “On the final aim of the natural dialectic of human reason” when discussing systematicity late in the first Critique (A669/B697ff).
inheres, or participates, in existence –i.e. in time. If, for example, one wanted to
determine to what extent ice, water, and steam are one substance, it would be
necessary to strip away the inhering predicates of solidity, liquidity and gaseousness,
correspondingly. The identity of that which endures through time, however, could not
be removed (say, water’s chemical composition). But it will be solely on the basis of
that chemical composition’s endurance through time that its substantiality can be
predicated. Constancy and duration of a substratum, through time, are what provides
substance with its necessary determination, namely, essence that exists. The principle
that exhibits this time-determination, persistence, in its particularity is the first
analogy: “In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in
nature is neither increased nor diminished”\footnote{146}. It exhibits a time-determination
insofar as there must be a subsistent something\footnote{147} about which one must be able to
predicate, in the first instance, the identity of that thing to itself and, later, other
attributes such as motion, rest, etc. Taking this last one as an example, rest is only
attributed to something insofar as it “is perduring presence (praesentia perdurabilis)
at the same place; what is perduring is that which exists throughout a time, that is,
endures”\footnote{148}.

A brief note on what Kant is distancing himself from might be helpful in this
case. In §§193-204 of the Metaphysics, Baumgarten speaks of substance as something
that can exist without being a determination of another or as something that subsists
per se (accidents, on the other hand, are that the existence of which inheres in
something else)\footnote{149}. In light of the Copernican turn, however, Kant cannot accept the
Baumgartenian definition of substance simpliciter. Indeed, if Critical philosophy
depends on anything, it depends mostly on recognising that subsistence is a predicate
the correlate of which resides in intuition, and not in the mere concept of substance:
substance, in transcendental idealism, does not subsist per se but only per quod. This
is to say, with Kant, that the judgment ‘all substances persist’ is synthetic a priori.
Deriving, in fact, the subsistence of substance merely from the concept itself, would
amount to having made no appeal whatsoever to intuition or self-affection. Since,
however, subsistence itself is something that can only be predicated in relation to a
presupposed time, predicking subsistence will necessarily be in relation to intuition

\footnote{146}{(B224)}
\footnote{147}{Ἀν ὑποκείμενον.}
\footnote{148}{(AA 4:485)}
\footnote{149}{(Metaphysics, II.vii, §§191-204)}
or self-affection. One is, in conclusion, entitled to make objective use of the concept of substance in experience, precisely because in the activity of affecting one’s self, one recognises certain entities as persisting over time.

The schema of cause, and of causality in general, is the real upon which whenever \( x \) is posited, something inevitably follows: “it consists therefore in the succession of the manifold, insofar as that succession is subject to a rule.” Once the identity of something has been guaranteed as that something’s remaining in time, it is possible then to conceive how that identity is inscribed in the order of one after another that is exhibited in the general principle of the Analogies. Subordinated to this but nonetheless different, is the specific principle of this analogy, however, since what exhibits the time-determination as presented by the schema of cause-and-effect is, obviously enough, the second analogy: “Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule.” It is the second exhibition of the time-order insofar as that which is being articulated by it is nothing but succession that, in order to be thought in relation to the existent, has to be thought as the order of one after another that perception captures. Previously, persistence provided the grounds for the possibility that if something remains through time, and that something is self-same in its remaining, then that something is substance. But as is intuitively clear, things change, and while one knows that a substance’s endurance requires solely its constancy through time, that substance’s change will require a further ground for the determination of that specific change. Since matter has no essential internal determinations, insofar as matter just is the determinable in intuition, it follows that all change will have an external cause. One cannot think, again, a transition in the state of a substance (e.g. from liquid to gaseous) without thereby also thinking the external cause that brings that transition about (e.g. heat).

Although it would be impossible to cover the copious amount of literature that exists on the second Analogy, remarking on the following might be helpful. In “Kant

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150 (AA 29:794-797 [Metaphysik Mrongovius])
151 In this sense, what Rae Langton claims about substance in Kantian Humility is entirely correct: “When Kant says that we can have no knowledge of things in themselves, he means that we cannot make use of the pure concept of a substance in a manner that will enable us to determine a thing ‘through distinctive and intrinsic predicates’” Langton, Rae. Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Clarendon/Oxford Press, Oxford, 1998, p. 50.
152 (A144/B183)
153 (A189)
154 (AA 4:543)
on Receptivity and Representation”, Paul Abela speaks of schemata as being receptivity conditions for the pure concepts of the understanding\textsuperscript{155}. Although Abela’s reading of the schemata differs from the one being elaborated here\textsuperscript{156}, the way in which he describes the relation between hypothetical judgments and the schema of cause and effect is illuminating. He invites the reader to take the hypothetical judgment ‘if $x$, then $y$’ and think about the intellectual component expressed in it, namely, a ground and consequent relation. From this, he claims, one can think of its sensibilised counterpart as necessarily holding on to that relation while nonetheless respecting the restricting condition imposed by sensibility. Thus, the judgment ‘if $x$, then $y$’ turns out to be ‘whenever $x$ is posited, $y$ will follow in temporal succession’. In this sense, Abela thinks, the schema works as a non-discursive enabling condition that makes judgments meaningful by giving them intuitional form\textsuperscript{157}—and here it is being claimed that not just any form, but the form that the self provides itself with, namely, time.

The final schema that determines the time-order is that of community or reciprocity according to which “the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is the coexistence, according to a rule, of the determinations of the one substance with those of the other”\textsuperscript{158}. Importantly, here, the reproductive synthesis of imagination in apprehension shows only that when one perception is ‘in’ the subject, another one is not there, and vice versa. If that same synthesis, however, is taken in its full transcendental and productive power, as linking the pure concept of the understanding that pertains here (community), in relation to whatever is given in \textit{one} and \textit{the same} time, through the power of the schema of reciprocity, then, coexistence becomes possible. The imagination provides the self hereby, according to the definition of coexistence as time-determination, with the possibility of understanding mutual influence. The principle that exhibits the time-determination as presented by the schema of reciprocity or community is the third analogy: “\textit{All substances, insofar as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are in thoroughgoing


\textsuperscript{156} It differs in that, although this reading agrees with the claim that “As such, it is not that the Schematism restricts cognition to phenomena, but rather that the cognition of phenomena first becomes possible through the restriction imposed on judgment by the pure structures of receptivity” (\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 28-29); it nonetheless remains the case that the departure point for this investigation is the question about the way in which self-affection provides the understanding with transcendental content—something Abela does not elaborate on.

\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Ibid.} p. 28.

\textsuperscript{158} (A144/B183)
Influence, Kant says, is the relation of substances in which the one contains the grounds for the determination of the other and reciprocity is when one can add to that statement ‘and the interaction is reciprocal’. This is what leads, ultimately, to the continuity of nature, i.e. to a nature that saltum non facit, that has to be presupposed in experience and, furthermore, to being able to derive from it Newton’s Third Law of Motion, according to which, “To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.”

Finally, the last series of schemata pertains to the categories of modality (possibility/impossibility, existence/non-existence, necessity/contingency) and all of them, in one way or another, manifest the time-paradigm. That they manifest the time-paradigm just means that in one way or another, these schemata exemplify the kind of relation in which thought in general finds itself concerning its own temporality. Unlike the previous schemata, these, and their respective principles, the Postulates of Empirical Thought in general, are nothing but explanations of the categories themselves. In these, or better yet, in their mode of determining an object, they do not expand the concept of which they are predications. This becomes very clear if one remembers the ‘peculiarity’ attributed by Kant to judgments of modality very early on in the *Critique*: modal predicates, unlike the other three kinds, contribute absolutely nothing to the ‘content’ of a particular judgment, but only to the copula in the relation of a predicate to ‘thought in general’.

The schema of number as a determination of self-affection provides the sensible condition for the categories of quantity and constitutes whatever might be intuited as having a definite number. The schema of sensation does the same for the categories of quality and constitutes whatever might be intuited as having a certain degree of reality. The schemata of persistence, cause and effect, and reciprocity, regulate whatever might be experienced as necessarily being in relation to something beyond the initial experience. The schemata of relation, differently put, allow one’s experience to be an experience of a set of interconnected relations and not of isolated

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159 (A211/B256)
160 (A211/B258)
162 ‘Explanations’ in the sense that they do not expand the concept of the object, but only the object’s relation to the understanding in its empirical employment (A219/B266).
163 (A74/B99-100)
entities. The schemata of modality, lastly, regulate not so much the relations which one entity holds to another entity but, rather, the relation one or many entities hold to the thinking subject.

In agreement (adaequatio), the first schema of modality that manifests the time-paradigm, one sees “the agreement of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in general. Opposites, for instance, cannot exist in the same thing at the same time, but only one after another”\footnote{164}. The ‘conditions of time in general’ are what in the Aesthetic had been called the Axioms of time in general (e.g. time’s mono-dimensionality and the fact that different times can only be successive) and, therefore, one sees that via the articulation of the principle of non-contradiction, the supreme principle of all analytic judgments, Kant is articulating time’s exemplification of copulative thought. Because of this, it might be tempting to minimise the importance of the schemata of modality: after all, they, too, are only regulative of experience and only of experience as related to thought. Doing this would be a mistake, however. The first schema of modality yields a fundamental constraint upon which the transcendental power of imagination stumbles. To the question of what the transcendental power of imagination can conceive when articulating understanding and sensibility, Kant replies in one word: the possible\footnote{165}. It is clear, therefore, why the principle that exhibits the first determination of time in accordance with modality is the first postulate: “that which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that is, with the conditions of intuition and of concepts is possible”\footnote{166}. The principle is said to manifest the time paradigm insofar as, while being an exemplar of pure time, it exhibits the constraint the category stumbles upon, i.e. the formal conditions of experience. Perhaps it is useful to see this as echoing a distinction Kant had drawn in the 1763 essay “The only possible argument in support of the demonstration of the existence of God”. There, as Michelle Grier has noted\footnote{167}, Kant distinguishes between the logical and the real element in the concept of possibility\footnote{168}. The logical or formal element in the concept of possibility simply refers to that possibility’s agreement with the principle of non-contradiction. The real or material element in the concept of possibility, however, refers the datum about which

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotetext[164]{(A144/B184)}
\footnotetext[165]{(A144/B184)}
\footnotetext[166]{(A218/B265)}
\footnotetext[168]{(AA 2:77ff)}
\end{footnotesize}
possibility is being predicated. In the Schematism of the first Critique, mutatis mutandis, it is the schema of agreement that takes up the role of provider of that datum and the first Postulate that enacts, so to speak, such provision.

This last point illustrates neatly the pendulum function attributed to the imagination in the last section of the previous Chapter. The task of allowing one’s self to be encountered by the possible can be performed by no other faculty than the transcendental power of imagination, spontaneous receptivity, via the schematism. This is especially clear in the principles that concern not the relation amongst objects, since the Postulates say nothing about that, but the relation of objects to thought. If one claims of any given particular that it is ‘possible’, one does not thereby modify the intuition itself but, only, the modality of the relation of the intuition to concepts. But what can it mean that something be ‘possible’? From the previous discussion it becomes clear that it is not simply a matter of not contradicting thought. It must be, rather, that ‘possibility’ is linked via spontaneous receptivity to the way in which intuition is configured via the first three kinds of categories. This is where the traction spoken of earlier, traction in relation to the external correlate of intuition, is displayed, in the possible/impossible distinction, as the paradigmatic question evincing the nature of self-affection.

 actuality (actualitas) is the schema of existence in some determinate time and the principle exhibiting that time determination is the second postulate: “That which is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual”\(^\text{169}\). This is to say: if something is, at any given moment, a correlate of perception and consequently ‘occupying’ a definite portion of time, then that something is said to be actual. By perception here is meant, only, a sensation of which one is conscious\(^\text{170}\). Note, however, that this does not entail the immediate presence of something before perception since, as seen before with the Analogies, it is sufficient that something be in connection with some other, actual thing, for that other to be considered actual also —in virtue of the schema of reciprocity and the third Analogy. If through agreement one comes to be aware of whether something can be the case or not when the concept is set in a general relation to time, through actuality one comes to know whether that ‘possibly being the case’ is attached to a particular

\(^{169}\) (A218/B266)  
\(^{170}\) (A225/B272)
perception which provides it with ‘matter’\textsuperscript{171}. But from matter being only the subjectively determinable in sensation, it must follow that the attribution of actuality to it only comes after the perception itself\textsuperscript{172}. This is just to say that if possibility precedes perception, actuality presupposes it\textsuperscript{173}.

Finally, the schema of necessity is existence of an object at all times (\textit{aeternitas})\textsuperscript{174}, and the principle exhibiting it as a time determination, is the third postulate: “\textit{That which in its connection with the actual is determined in accordance with universal conditions of experience is (that is, exists as) necessary}”\textsuperscript{175} to which, Kant adds in a marginal note to his own copy of the first edition of the \textit{Critique}: “\textit{That which is determined through the concept of time itself [is (exists) necessarily}”\textsuperscript{176}. As a time determination, the schema of necessity illustrates clearly what Kant means by time-paradigm: something that is a certain way and could not have been otherwise is, according to the Introduction\textsuperscript{177}, ‘necessary’ and, furthermore, that it be so at all times without exception is its schematic extension: time provides the ground for something to be thus, and not in any other way, \textit{eternally}. If in the schema of agreement one thinks, for example, that \(x\) could be the case in accordance with the laws of thought and with experience; and if in the schema of actuality one thinks that \(x\) is the case as it is both possible for it to be thus, and also has a perception corresponding to it; in the schema of eternity one further adds that \(x\) not only \textit{can} be the case given certain conditions and \textit{is} the case since the conditions are in place but, also, that \(x\) \textit{must always be} (that is to say, \(x\) is in some way and cannot be otherwise) the case at any and every time, i.e. \textit{eternally}\textsuperscript{178}.

\[\therefore\]

\textsuperscript{171} The ‘Explication’ given at the beginning of the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Phenomenology}, the fourth and last part of the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science}, reads as follows: “\textit{Matter is the movable insofar as it, as such a thing, can be an object of experience}” (AA 4:554). Corresponding to actuality, however, is Proposition 2 therein: “\textit{The circular motion of a matter, as distinct from the opposite motion of the space, is an actual predicate of this matter; by contrast, the opposite motion of relative space, assumed instead of the motion of the body, is no actual motion of the latter, but, if taken to be such, is mere semblance}” (AA 4:557).

\textsuperscript{172} This is slippery terrain for Kant: matter is only definable at the level of special metaphysics (\textit{viz. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science}) but for the schema of actuality to be able to display the ‘material conditions of experience’, matter itself must be presupposed. This will re-emerge in the following Chapter.

\textsuperscript{173} (A225/B273)

\textsuperscript{174} (A145/B184)

\textsuperscript{175} (A218/B266)

\textsuperscript{176} (AA 23:32)

\textsuperscript{177} (B4)

\textsuperscript{178} In its temporalised version this would read as follows: if agreement says \(x\) can be at any time, actuality says \(x\) is at some determinate time, and eternity says \(x\) is at any and every single time.
But what does this rather convoluted portion of the architectonic say? And, furthermore, how is it related to the previously provided description of time understood as self-affection? Let the answer to these two questions work as a conclusion by way of a small summary of what has been achieved. It was after the findings of the previous chapters, after knowing that subjectivity affects itself and that it does so temporally, that the unity of consciousness emerged as a *conditio sine qua non* for being conscious of the unity of the diverse acts of synthesis. The power of imagination, in its empirical capacity, allows for the reproduction of past experiences; this same power, in its transcendental capacity, allows for the identification of past states with present and future ones. Thus, consciousness of the diverse acts of synthesis, mediated by the power of imagination, designates the possibility of ascription of experience to one and the same subject.

But if what one is after, and certainly this is what one is after, is determination of *sensible content*, i.e. sufficient determination of the given as to be able to make it knowable, then, the imagination has to be able to move between the particularity of intuition and the universality of understanding swiftly. Or, stated differently, apperception was seen to be essentially synthetic insofar as whatever it posits, it posits as grounded in some *a priori* synthesis capable of linking the understanding to sensibility. Only the pure productive synthesis of the imagination can do this. *Synthesis speciosa* is that which, standing over and against apperception, provides the latter with the necessary sensibilised ‘rules’ for synthesising the manifold originally given as unity, i.e. time. Only a faculty which is both intellectual and sensible can provide the necessary sensibilised time determinations sought for in the process of determination. These time determinations are the schemata. It was claimed that in addition to the logical functions of the understanding they express, categories have built into them, insofar as they are schematised, the sensible conditions provided by the power of imagination. What guarantees this step refers back to the discussion in the first Chapter. In sum, this is found in the difference between general logic and transcendental logic: whereas the former deals with possible relations within the understanding, the latter deals with those possible relations in their object-relatedness. Now, since the schemata are introduced as transcendental instances, then it must follow, according to what was seen, that they are the procedures which ground the

179 (A116)
object-relatedness of categories. As the transcendental products of the power of imagination, schemata are homogeneous with concepts insofar as their universality is concerned, but they are homogeneous with appearances insofar as their singularity is concerned. They sensibilise the universal functions of the understanding in their object-relatedness while, at the same time, delineating particular sensible images.

It was therefore argued, in the second section of this chapter, that the precise topological configuration, as it were, of the sensibilised portrayal of the categories answers to the moments into which Kant divides, initially, the Table of Judgments: quantity, quality, relation and modality. The schematic temporal division, in turn, into the time series, the time content, the time order and the time paradigm was shown to correspond to the first and indeed expand on it: a close interdependency between the modes of judgment and categories, and the modes of schemata and principles, has to be presupposed in order to account for the constitution of objectivity. It is this what Kant means when, speaking of the principles specifically, he says that “In the principle itself we do make use of the category, but in applying it to appearances we substitute for it its schema as the key to its employment, or rather set it alongside the category, as its restricting condition, and as being what may be called its formula”\(^{180}\).

To anyone familiar with transcendental philosophy the above claim must have seemed, initially, somewhat puzzling. There are, without a doubt, four kinds of categories (quantity, quality, relation and modality) and to each kind pertain three categories. There are, however, only eight transcendental schemata listed by Kant in both editions of the first Critique and only as many principles and, so, the reason for this had to be clarified (presupposing that the relatively asymmetrical division of the schemata and the principles cannot be due to Kant’s arbitrary whim). It was argued that it answers, instead, to a rather fundamental distinction between the mathematical and dynamical nature of judgments, categories, schemata and principles. Quantity and quality are mathematical insofar as they are concerned with objects of intuition; relation and modality are dynamical insofar as they are concerned with the existence of these objects in relation to the understanding\(^{181}\). In other words: the mathematical categories, schemata and principles are constitutive since, in their application, one quite literally constructs in time the magnitude in question (extensive or intensive). The dynamical categories, schemata and principles, unlike those, do not construct

\(^{180}\) (A181/B224)  
\(^{181}\) (B110)
anything, since existence can in no way be constructed\footnote{(B222)}, but are only regulative of the relations of existent objects\footnote{(A178-179/B221)}. Indeed, this is why Kant divides the schemata the way he does in the first place— in accordance with the order of the categories, but also in accordance with the kind of structural and structuring relation in which thought stands to objects. Whereas the first two are magnitudes, the first extensive and the second intensive, the third and fourth articulate the relations of objects, as existent, to one another and to the understanding, respectively.

This conclusion demands that one recall an important issue, left wholly undecided, brought about in the first Chapter\footnote{(Ch. I, pp. 45-46)}. It was claimed there, that overly epistemological readings of Kant would find it impossible to justify the distinction Kant draws between what is composed in time and what objectively exists in time\footnote{(B219)}. It was claimed, moreover, that these readings will seek, in vain, some ground for differentiating between a subjective and an objective time. But the temptation to find such ground has misled even some of the most sophisticated commentators on the matter. Klaus Düsing, for example, in an influential piece from the 1980s notes that there is a distinction to be drawn between a ‘subjective’ and an ‘objective’ time in Kant’s philosophy. Whereas, he claims, the first is immediate and closely associated to experience [Erleben], the second is closely associated to mathematical and physical processes and to the permanence of material traits\footnote{Düsing, Klaus. “Objektive und subjektive Zeit: Untersuchungen zu Kants Zeittheorie und zu ihrer modernen kritischen Rezeption” in \textit{Kant-Studien}, Vol. 71. 1-4, Jan. 1980, pp. 1-6.}. Noting that Kant never says what time \textit{is} in the Aesthetic, Düsing draws attention, instead, to the fact that a thorough account of the distinction is only found in the Analogies\footnote{Ibid. pp. 3-5.}. Thus, if the Aesthetic presents the objective side of a unified time the nature of which is independent of any particular intuition within it, the possibility of sufficient determinations in time, and therefore the comprehensive account of time developed by Kant, will only be found in the Deduction, the Schematism, and the Principles. This is not to say however, according to Düsing, that Kant does have an account of subjective time, for he does not (this is a point about which Düsing is unequivocal: \footnote{\textit{Ibid.} pp. 3-5.}.}
Kant was completely unable to produce an account of subjective time\(^{188}\). It is to say, nevertheless, that even if Kant’s ultimate ambition concerning time is to ground a Newtonian physicalist theory of absolute time\(^{189}\), one ought to recognise the basic foundation of it as being in the subject\(^{190}\).

According to the account so far developed, however, distinguishing between a subjective and an objective time *simpliciter* is as inadequate as it is misleading. Time is not ‘objective’ in any conventional sense but, rather, the *objectivising* subjective activity that brings about the possibility of constituting objectivity, i.e. the activity through which the self displays the conditions for anything to be an object. What one may want to distinguish is a subjective *succession* of representations from an objective succession of representations, as Kant himself does when discussing the second Analogy\(^{191}\). Thus, subjective succession would refer simply to the order in which representations follow one after another but objective succession would refer to “the order of the manifold of appearance according to which, in conformity with a rule, the apprehension of that which happens follows upon the apprehension of that which precedes”\(^{192}\). In light of the discussion above, this should be understood as saying that, even if one were to ‘bracket’, as it were, the dynamical-regulative judgments, categories, schemata, and principles, one could nonetheless witness subjective succession in intuition to the extent that one’s own representations could continue changing but without a rule to provide those alterations with order and regularity (representations would only be, briefly put, subject to the mathematical-constitutive judgments, categories, schemata, and principles). Dreams are a paradigmatic example of this: irrespective of any relationality or modality, things still ‘happen’ in one’s consciousness while one dreams. The story is completely different with objective succession, however, insofar as here one simply cannot ‘bracket out’ the dynamical-regulative judgments, categories, schemata, and principles and must, instead, witness succession as being *subordinated to a rule* that provides an order in accordance with which things happen\(^{193}\). Here, the existence of several objects in


\(^{190}\) *Ibid.*. p. 5.

\(^{191}\) (B233-244)

\(^{192}\) (A193/B238)

\(^{193}\) Interestingly, in the metaphysics lecture, Kant distinguishes between ‘course of nature’ and ‘order of nature’. The course of nature refers to “the series [Reihe] of the alterations of events” that can be
relation to one another and in relation to thought overrides, as it were, one’s own imaginary, contrived subjective succession. A different way of putting this thought is by saying that, whereas everything in intuition will be associated in accordance with subjective succession, only that which counts as experience will be associated, or connected, in accordance with a rule of objective succession. In experience, strictly so called, the objective succession of things imposes itself to the extent that it is the existence of things that is at stake\textsuperscript{194}. What this comes to show, therefore, is not that Kant was unable to ground an objective conception of time in his originally subjective conception of time, as Düsing claims\textsuperscript{195} but, rather, that Kant needs to show how, with time being irremediably subjective, one can account for an objective and necessary order of nature. Although complex, Kant’s response may be succinctly phrased as follows: the time series and the time content are constitutive for intuition, but the time order and the time paradigm are regulative for experience.

One last thing should be briefly mentioned, because of what has been developed so far, that is to say, because of how the myriad elements that have been presented here relate to, and interact with one another, a path linking the unity of apperception and the multiplicity of intuition is disclosed: by means of affecting itself apperception transcends itself. Instead of sounding like some enigmatic, oracular apothegm, hopefully the previous remark betrays by now the importance of having to understand this portion of the Critical System, the portion that articulates judgments, categories, schemata, principles and intuition, as one whole. To the question about the way in which the activity of affecting one’s self constitutes objectivity, Kant responds by means of a thorough account of ‘determination’, i.e. a thorough account of the processes of sensibilisation that make up the whole within which objectivity comes to be constituted. It is only in this whole and its almost indissoluble articulation that the transcendental power of imagination will be able to display, simply put, “the unity of all the manifold of intuition in inner sense, and so indirectly the unity of apperception which as a function corresponds to the receptivity of inner sense [time]”\textsuperscript{196}.

cognised empirically. The order of nature, however, refers to those alterations “but only to the extent that they stand under a general rule” and can only be cognised by means of the understanding (AA 28:216). The course of nature should not, therefore, be confused with subjective succession –the former is empirical, the latter is not necessarily.

\textsuperscript{194} (AA 18:116)
\textsuperscript{196} (A145-146/B185)
## Appendix

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<td>&quot;The real in space (a body) is the filling of space through a rectilinear motion&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;That which in relation to the first [the real], as the proper object of our outer perception is negative, namely, attractive force, whereby, for its own part, space would be penetrated, and thus the void would be completely destroyed&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;The limitations of the first force by the second, and the determination of the degree of filling of a space that rests on this&quot;</td>
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<td>1st Law of Mechanics: &quot;Every change in matter has an external cause. Every body possesses in its state of motion, in the same direction, and with the same speed, if it is not compelled by an external cause to leave this state&quot;</td>
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Chapter IV

So far it has been argued, in the first and second Chapters, that time, understood as self-affection, is the primary form of intuition and that its “primary” character is, first, due to time’s universality concerning appearances and, second, due to its closeness to subjectivity. It was shown, logically, that the universality of time regarding appearances allows for this form of intuition to be able to account for all that appears: including, but not limited to, the representation of space and, more importantly, the representation of the self. In this way, then, the conclusion that time is logically prior to space was reached. But it was also shown, ontologically, that time’s closeness to subjectivity allows for this form of intuition to exhibit the self as synthesising activity: time is the form in which the self affects itself. From this, then, the conclusion that time is ontologically prior to space was also reached.

The previous conclusions were summarised in the statement that the unity of consciousness grounds and, in a way, ‘calls’ for the consciousness of unity to be time-mediated while nonetheless remaining pure in a narrow sense. Whatever appears, including time itself, appears as having inherited the numerical identity of the synthesising unity of apperception (there is only one time\(^1\), after all). And whatever appears, will do so as enduring as well precisely because it will have to appear for the finite mind as lasting through time: this ‘enduring’ of whatever appears, it was argued, is the necessary and fundamental relation that subjectivity holds to all possible objectivity and what Kant refers to as ‘time’. This is why the expression ‘movement from unity of consciousness to consciousness of unity’ is being used for summarising the previous argument: one sees one’s self as a unity because, and not in spite of, the fact that the transcendental unity’s reflection in the flux of time is successive. That one thinks of one’s own identity as necessarily abiding and unchanging, especially when being conscious of the diverse synthetic activities being carried out (apprehension, reproduction, recognition), could in no way have been derived from the experience of one’s empirical self. It was shown that the case must be, rather, that the empirical self is the temporally constituted correlate of an assumed transcendental unity that is necessarily self-same. Following Kant’s own formulation of the process, and putting it as simply as possible: the unity of

\(^1\) “The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations of one single time that underlies it” (A32/B47-48).
consciousness just is the act of determining itself as consciousness of unity in pure, i.e. not attached to any external representation, succession\(^2\).

But beyond this, it was also argued, in the third Chapter, that time provides the self, by means of the transcendental power of imagination, with a specific configuring frame for the constitution and regulation of possible experience. This is to say that it is *not* enough to regard time as the general form of self-affection and the facilitator of that self’s own identification – the only thing that had been established up until the end of the second Chapter –. Rather, taking that as the departure point, it was argued in the third Chapter that by means of the transcendental power of imagination not only does the self relate to objects through concepts and their respective schemata and principles, but, also, the self is capable of relating objects to one another and to thought in an objectively valid way.

In saying that time is self-affection, by the transitive property, one is saying that in at least some way, even if very minimal, the self provides itself with the possibility of being affected by objects: the ground for the possibility of empirical concepts, what warrants that our empirical concepts are not haphazard and arbitrary, is an ‘x’ the concept of which allows cognition to firmly establish that if there is such a thing as an empirical concept, *then* it is so because of a certain correlate of intuition. The ‘object in general = x’, then, is nothing but the objective side of the coin that has, as the subjective side, the unity of consciousness. This means, in turn, that the unity of consciousness, grounding the consciousness of synthetic unity, begins determining the object of intuition in such a way as to allow for any object to be set in necessary relation to the rule whereby it was given and in necessary relation to other objects\(^3\).

The concept of the ‘object in general = x’ works, therefore, as a warrant that justifies that cognition perceives things as necessarily connected. But, evidently, one can associate things that are not *necessarily* connected, e.g. one could identify one’s self with a Minotaur – on what grounds, though? Associations carried out by the power of imagination, Kant tells us, are the product of an *a priori* synthesis that allows for the relation of present perceptions\(^4\) with other, absent ones. On those grounds, it was previously concluded, one can relate particulars with one another in one cognition. With empirical concepts this process is very clear: we can associate without a

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\(^2\) (B158)

\(^3\) (A108)

\(^4\) Perception [Wahrnehmung] taken here to mean “*that which is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in space and time*” (B147). 

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problem the concept ‘dog’ and the concept ‘mammal’ in one judgment, e.g. dogs are mammals.

But the process whereby associations are established amongst particulars is slightly less straightforward with pure concepts of the understanding: here, it was seen that a process of sensibilisation [Versinnlichung] for the pure concept is required if the concept is to relate to intuition in a meaningful sense. This is what Kant takes the schemata to be: processes that provide the sensible conditions for the application of pure concepts. It was argued, then, that the schematism, in providing the sensible conditions under which pure concepts of the understanding apply, is the name Kant gives to a necessary temporal opening, by means of the imagination, for synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments to be validated. All synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments, all judgments which expand our knowledge beyond the mere concept without deriving their predicate from experience, operate at two levels: they operate, first, at the level of the conjunction of appearances in intuition, i.e. that two things be related one to the other\textsuperscript{5}; but these judgments operate, as well, at the level of relating the product of that conjoining to the understanding or reason, i.e. that the relation of those two things be articulated with the knowing subject. Consequently, synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments are necessary and universal: that all ‘intuitions are extensive magnitudes’, for instance, appeals to the concept of appearances in intuition \textit{and} to the concept of extension. Synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments are, therefore, manifestations of associations carried out by the imagination insofar as the imagination is acting in the conjoining of individual appearances in intuition. Because of this, synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments can relate to particulars in the way they do: in the affirmation that all intuitions are extensive magnitudes one is implying that every single intuition, if it is such, must be extended. The necessary imaginative reproduction one carries out of any intuition whatsoever, must conform to a rule for its association with anything else. This applies as much for empirical concepts as it does for pure concepts: if they will be objectively validated\textsuperscript{6}, then they will be so in the imagination’s opening of a temporal, schematic field of objectivity. Seen from ‘within’, as it were, pure concepts of the understanding must undergo a process of sensibilisation that will allow them to determine something (and anything) in relation to self-affection.

\textsuperscript{5} This is a relatively uncontroversial point that Dickerson, for example, analyses in great detail. \textit{Vid.} Dickerson, A. B. \textit{Op. Cit.} pp. 8-11.
\textsuperscript{6} (A113)
And yet, now, after having analysed the way in which judgments, categories, schemata, and principles are articulated with one another, or exploring the aforementioned ‘field of objectivity’, the following becomes evident: the set of synthetic a priori principles expounded in the first Critique aims at accounting for a certain kind of objectivity, i.e. categorial-mechanical objectivity. Proof for this was found in the admittedly difficult, but sufficiently demonstrated interconnectedness of the first Critique’s Table of Categories, schemata, set of a priori Principles and the doctrines found in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. The Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, the Analogies of Experience, and the Postulates of Empirical Thought correspond to the doctrines of Phoronomy, Dynamics, Mechanics, and Phenomenology, respectively. The correspondence between the transcendental and the metaphysical doctrines, between the System of Principles of Pure Understanding and the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science, does not merely betray Kant’s enthusiasm for architecture, it also follows naturally from the premises laid out in the first Critique. Simply put: matter is thus configured for the self because the self is thus configuring it.

Having securely established not only the possibility, but also the actuality of pure a priori content in intuition provided by self-affection, perhaps it is time to broaden the philosophical scope of the question to be asked since, as the Introduction to this work announced, of concern is the relation of time to general metaphysics and not only its relation to special metaphysics. Indeed, Kant is rather emphatic in claiming that there are appearances in intuition wholly detached from the rules of the understanding, or even its concepts, that “appearances can certainly [allerdings] be given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding”7. Throughout this work, however, what has been claimed and, to some extent presupposed, is that appearances, if there will be such, require a set of synthetic a priori principles that

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7 The whole fragment, in different translation, reads: “Appearances could (...) be so constituted that the understanding would not find them in accord with the conditions of its unity, and everything would then lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the succession of appearances nothing would offer itself that would furnish a rule of synthesis and thus correspond to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would therefore be entirely empty, nugatory, and without significance. Appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking” (A90-91/B122). That, together with the following fragment, from Metaphysik L, “Every appearance is, as representation in the mind, under the form of inner sense, which is time. Every representation is so constituted that the mind goes through it in time; that is, the mind expounds the appearance, thus, every appearance is expoundable” (AA 28:202) yields the following, relatively simple argument: If appearances can appear independently of the functions of judgment, but all appearances are in time, and time is an intuition, then intuition is not exhausted by the functions of judgment. Alternatively: appearances can be without concepts, but not without time, therefore, some of things present to the mind although being temporal, are nonetheless uncategorical.
either constitute (as in the mathematical principles) or regulate (as in the regulative principles) their appearing. What, then, is one to think of when speaking of an ‘uncategorised’ appearance? Furthermore, the analyses thus far carried out have focused primarily on the fundamental form of intuition and the opening it generates for the self through intuition. But early on it was claimed that the primary concern of this investigation is the role time plays in Kant’s general and not special metaphysics and in this vein, building on previous discussions, the question as to whether time must be limited to what was previously referred to as ‘material or mechanical objectivity’ ensues: is it the case that time, and its determinations by means of the transcendental power of imagination, are restricted in what they can present in intuition? Are they incapable of providing the configuration, schematic or otherwise, for something other than this categorial material or mechanical objectivity? Or, yet more precisely, is not another set of synthetic a priori principles possible? Is the ‘opening’ referred to in the second Chapter, the opening of affection by means of spontaneous receptivity, exhausted by the configuration it adopts in determining judgment? If the opening is not, indeed, exhausted but is capable, rather, of providing something other than the merely categorial-mechanical, how would that ‘other’ relate to time and the imagination? In sum, if there were uncategorised appearances in time, would that mean that the possibility of such a thing as an ‘uncategorised schema’ exists in Kant’s transcendental philosophy?

It is important to note that the previous questions have not arisen, let alone been ‘answered’, in Kant scholarship. They cannot arise because the literature often tends to link the pure concepts of the understanding directly to the principles without due care for the role that self-affection and imagination –the latter as provider of the sensible conditions for the application of those concepts– are playing. After all, the assumption is that Kant is solely concerned with constructing a metaphysics of some artificially elucubrated Newtonian natural science and, if this is the case, then it must follow that as soon as one has provided the transcendental synthetic a priori principles that allow for such construction, one’s work is done –all that would be left would be ‘filling the gaps’. But in the previous Chapter it was shown that one cannot neglect the role that the transcendental power of imagination is playing, through its time-determinations, insofar as one wants to provide a transcendental account of experience. Indeed, it was conclusively shown that if one were to link the categories directly to the principles, then, one would have to remain with those principles’
logical validity, but incapable of showing their transcendental validity, i.e. how they constitute and regulate experience.

The problem being addressed here, however, is not completely foreign to all secondary literature – and certainly not to Kant himself as will be shortly seen. Paul Franks, for example, understands this issue as being one of the horns of a twofold general demand or desideratum apparent to every post-Leibnizian systematic philosophy. In *All or Nothing* Franks writes that Leibniz formulated a problem that requires a solution to meet two sides of a crucial demand: a monistic side, i.e. “the demand that every genuine grounding participate in a single systematic unity of grounds, terminating in a single absolute ground”\(^8\) and a dualistic side, i.e. “that physical grounding and metaphysical grounding be kept rigorously separate”\(^9\). Although the two are necessarily bound, it is the second of this demands that resonates with the problem being addressed here since, using Franks’ terminology, having provided an order of physical grounding does not, for Kant, necessarily amount to saying that there only is such an order of grounding (even if it does not amount to saying the opposite, either). Since the *Dissertation* and throughout the 1780s, Franks thinks, Kant was committed to upholding an opposition between a logic of truth that pertains solely to the subjective and ideal realm, and a logic of truth that pertains solely to the objective and sensible realm. For the second, the internal logic of truth that pertains to the objective and sensible realms, the standard of reality is found in the Principles: “*this standard of reality, articulated as a table of categories or corresponding principles, belongs to the understanding, which, however, has no objects of knowledge apart from those that are sensibly given*”\(^10\).

About the first, namely, the logic of truth that pertains solely to the subjective and ideal realm, though, can one provide such a ‘standard of reality’? The answer Franks gives is not simple since in order to address the question, he thinks, an essential distinction between appearance and the ‘in itself’ needs to be maintained (what he calls the two essences interpretation)\(^11\). Considering the transcendental/empirical distinction, for Franks the contrast between, on the one hand, transcendental reality and ideality and, on the other hand, empirical reality and ideality is one between hierarchies of grounding where each hierarchy ought to be understood in its own

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\(^8\) Franks, Paul W. *All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism in German Idealism*. Harvard University Press, MA, 2005, p. 20.

\(^9\) *Idem*.

\(^10\) *Ibid*. p. 37

‘substantive’ terms: “Put another way, the contrast between the in itself and appearances is a contrast between two construals of substantial being or essence”\textsuperscript{12}. This, then, opens the door, as it were, for Franks’ interpretation to be able to meet the second horn of the second side of the demand: if the hierarchies of grounding are indeed being kept separate, and the ‘standard of reality’ for one of these hierarchies has been provided, then it would seem to follow that another ‘standard of reality’ should be provided for the second of these hierarchies of grounding. This ‘standard’ Franks thinks can be found in Kant’s attempt at providing what the former calls a ‘non-relational’ ground for relational properties – an \textit{ens realissimum}\textsuperscript{13}. The many issues with this kind of response will be addressed later but what is relevant here is that, from this, one sees that Franks recognises the limitations inherent to the set of synthetic \textit{a priori} principles presented in the first \textit{Critique}. These principles, in his words, fail in accounting for the metaphysical order of grounding and, instead, only provide us with an order of grounding that is solely empirical.

Likewise, Burkhard Tuschling understands the problem of trying to account for a different kind of objectivity that exceeds mechanical objectivity – and of having to provide transcendental principles that would justify such account. In “The System of Transcendental Idealism: Questions Raised and Left Open in the Kritik der Urteilskraft” and again in “Appereception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant’s Opus Postumum”\textsuperscript{14} Tuschling shows that the third \textit{Critique} deals mostly with three problems: first, whether organic life can be accounted for in terms of the transcendental principles; second, whether nature and freedom can be reconciled with one another; and, third, whether it is possible to construct one system of nature, i.e. one system of objects and laws of nature which at the same time is one system of experience\textsuperscript{15}. Tuschling thinks that the role the third \textit{Critique} and the \textit{Opus Postumum} are playing, along with Kant’s use of the intuitive, non-human understanding, is what will supposedly provide some kind of solution to these three problems. Kant asserts, in the third \textit{Critique}, that the forms of nature are so varied, that the modifications in the concepts of nature are so many, that a higher

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid}, p. 50.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid}, p. 65.


principle must be sought in order to arrive at some kind of unity of experience. In fact, further in this section, Kant explicitly states that without such principle, not even the aim of the first *Critique* would have been reached. Tuschling takes this to imply that the whole endeavour of transcendental philosophy becomes to seek the principle that will “establish the unity, not only of Nature and Freedom, not only of inorganic and organic nature, but also the unity of one and only one nature, one and the same universal nature, now considered in particular”.

Since, Tuschling claims, it is possible for us to consider the world as appearance, and to nonetheless think of the idea of things in themselves, and to correlate to those things in themselves a super-sensible real ground for nature to which we ourselves belong, then, Kant’s point follows: “the material world would thus be judged in accordance with two kinds of principles, without the mechanical mode of explanation being excluded by the teleological mode, as if they contradicted each other”. And importantly, from this Tuschling infers that by the time of the third *Critique*, Kant had abandoned the notion that a human discursive understanding is the supreme ground of the unity of nature (*pace* Reinhold) and moved on to posit some other single ground. This would justify according to Tuschling why Kant was so concerned with developing a new transcendental deduction; why he pursued in the *Opus Postumum* to do so through a deduction of matter/ether; why he seeks a Schellingian doctrine of self-positing; and, finally, why Kant insists in identifying transcendental idealism to Spinozism.

It would be as unwise to overlook the significant differences between Franks’ and Tuschling’s accounts, as it would be to overlook the differences between their respective positions and the one that will be developed here. It is not the same to ask if Kant can provide a synthetic *a priori* transcendental principle that allows one to justify organic matter as organism as it is to ask, as is currently being done, if there

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16 (AA 5:179-180)
17 (AA 5:180)
19 (AA 5:409)
20 Tuschling does not dwell on the supposed ‘singularity’ of the super-sensible and perhaps this is what will later lead him astray: the super-sensible, as is pointed out in the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment can be thought of in three interconnected but different ways: “first, the idea of the super-sensible in general, not further determined, as the substrate of nature; second, the idea of the same super-sensible as the principle of nature’s subjective purposiveness for our cognitive power; third, the idea of the same super-sensible as the principle of the purposes of freedom and of the harmony of these purposes with nature in the moral sphere” (KU V:346). See: Hughes, Fiona. *Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, Continuum, London, 2010, pp. 134-147.
can be an un categorised schema – at least not *prima facie* –. Nor is it the same to ask whether Kant can construct a hierarchy of grounding that is wholly detached from the physico-mechanical hierarchy as it is to ask whether intuition is, as hinted at in the previous Chapter, infinite – or not confined to the categorial –. But the questions are not altogether different either. At the very least on can see a parallel between them in that both lines of inquiry recognise as indispensable that one acknowledge the need for something other than what determining judgment, as understood in the first *Critique*, can provide. Indeed, the parallel goes even further insofar as in both cases it is a priority to recognise the inherent limitations of the understanding in the face of what self-affection provides. For this reason, it is important to stress how, even in Kant’s own writings, such limitations of the understanding are addressed.

Early in the 1770s, Kant only hints at the difficulty but later, in the mid-1780s, he wholeheartedly commits to solving the problem. Thus, already in the *Dissertation*, one reads that: “Through the faculty of understanding, we know things as they really are in the intelligible or noumenal world, where they constitute a dynamic community. Through the faculty of sensibility, we know things as they appear in the sensible or phenomenal world”\(^{22}\). If one asks what the principles that ground and govern the sensible or phenomenal world are, then, the answer in the *Dissertation* is straightforward: space and time. If, on the other hand, one asks what the principles that ground and govern the intelligible or noumenal world are, then, the answer is not quite so simple. For if the world is a whole composed of contingent beings, then, Kant claims, it must have been caused by something outside the world *extramundanum*\(^{23}\) – for the relation of ground and consequent to be necessary, one needs to posit a necessary being as the ground (this is pre-Critical, after all, where Kant had not yet treated causality as a pure concept). And although this would not mean that there is only one possible world (for Kant clearly endorses that there could be more than one actual world – even if amongst worlds no communication of whatever kind would be possible\(^{24}\)), it would mean that all substances within that one world would have to be sustained by a common principle: a generally established harmony amongst substances\(^{25}\). The emphasis here rests on the generality of the


\(^{23}\) (AA 2:408)

\(^{24}\) “Thus, a number of actual worlds existing outside one another is not impossible simply in virtue of the concept itself (as Wolff wrongly concluded from the notion of a complex multiplicity, a notion which he thought sufficient for a whole as such)” (AA 2:408)

\(^{25}\) (AA 2:409)
harmony itself. A generally established harmony contrasts with an individually established harmony that refers only to the mutual adaptations that individual substances, and the states of affairs they give rise to, would have to undergo in order to be rationally relatable one to another. This is not the case for the generally established harmony that refers to the totality of substances: if the ‘conjunction’ of all substances were necessary, which is to say having all its conjuncts being related in a necessary way, then the world would appear as a ‘real whole’ [totum reale] in virtue of the definition of the conjunction itself. But since this is something that Kant does not, and cannot prove, then it follows that this general principle, the generally established harmony, ought to be entertained only as a possibility.26

But in spite of the previous conclusion, not incidentally a merely problematic one, the pursuit of a principle that would govern appearances in some non-categorial way was not abandoned. Kant does abandon the pursuit for a principle of a generally established harmony, if nothing at the very least nominally, but maintains the ‘spirit’, so to say, in seeking a principle governing appearances that goes beyond the two conditions of sensibility and that goes, furthermore, beyond the determinations pertaining to the understanding alone. In fact, through re-phrasings and re-workings of a transcendental system of philosophy, the need to provide such a principle only became more acute. Following on the example of the first Critique, the pursuit of a principle was guided initially by the faculty that enacts principles themselves, i.e. the faculty of judgment. Thus, in the hope of achieving a genuine system of philosophy, transcendental philosophy had to strive towards the exhibition of the a priori principle to which judgment lays claim but, importantly in this context, not deriving such exhibition from the understanding’s particular laws. Otherwise the principle itself would only be localised and determinate according to concepts, i.e. one would end up reproducing the Principles of Pure Understanding. The pursuit, indeed, had to go beyond the understanding’s rules. But, how to get started in such quest? What kind of principle should one be after and, furthermore, where would it be found?

In answering this last question, by bringing together some pieces that have thus far figured only fragmentarily in this investigation, this inquiry will conclude in a twofold way. Or, rather, two possibilities will be brought forward, both within reach of transcendental philosophy as it has been constructed here, that each in its own way

26 (AA 2:409)
27 (AA 5:169)
could ultimately constitute an answer to the question of whether there is, in fact, a synthetic \textit{a priori} principle that, while being grounded in self-affection, nonetheless governs appearances in a non categorial way. The first path that could be taken states that the principle is indeed possible—and therefore actual as a constitutive principle but only for reflective judgment; that the principle is the law-likeness of nature’s behaviour in the diversity of its laws manifest in purposiveness; and that the principle’s relation to time just is that of an exhibition [Darstellung] of the latter’s futural orientation: the imagination hypotypically provides the form of the sought-for principle by exhibiting time symbolically. This first path seems to be more in line doxographically, as it were, with the transcendental system as constructed in the B-Edition of the first \textit{Critique}, the second \textit{Critique}, the final version of the third \textit{Critique}, and the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science}. The second path that could be taken states that the principle is not only possible but necessary—and therefore actual, too, that the principle is the motion of forces in a world-system, and that the principle’s relation to time is given by the unity of the empirical laws that constitute the entirety of the world-system itself as stemming from the unity of subjectivity. This second path seems to be more in line, once more doxographically, with parts of the A-Edition of the first \textit{Critique}, with the project of transcendental philosophy as presented in the first Introduction to the third \textit{Critique}, with some late \textit{Reflexionen}, with some minor essays, and with the \textit{Opus Postumum}\textsuperscript{28}.

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\section{i}

\textbf{The first path}

How does one arrive, then, at a synthetic \textit{a priori} principle that is not constrained by the functions of judgment? As Kant shows in the third \textit{Critique}, by going back to the beginning: “\textit{Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal}\textsuperscript{29}. And there are two general kinds of judgments: first are those where the universal is given alongside the particular, and if one judges in subsuming that particular under that universal, then the judgment is

\textsuperscript{28} For an account of the possible relations between the two paths, see Conclusion.
\textsuperscript{29} (AA 5:179)
determining [bestimmend]. And, second, there are those kinds of judgments where the particular is given and then the faculty of judgment is required to seek a universal under which to subsume that particular –these Kant calls reflective [reflektierende] judgments\(^{30}\). Since, in the case at hand, no universal concept is given (for, as was said before, that would lead to the first *Critique’s* Table of Principles), then it must be the case that the *a priori* principle one is after is such for reflective judgment only.

The distinction is relatively easy to grasp by means of the ‘movements’ performed by the faculty of judgment itself: in determining judgment one subsumes the particular under the universal, that is, descends from the *genus* to the *species*; in reflective judgment one moves in the opposite direction, that is, ascends from the particular to the universal, from *species* to *genus* (even if that genus is not always reached or is, indeed, left wholly indeterminate), in accordance with a rule. And what rule is one to use in the movement of ascension? A rule that meets at least two distinct criteria: first, that it be not derived from experience –that would render it empirical; second, that it aim at some kind of unity\(^{31}\) –otherwise it would fail at unifying the diversity of experience. Now, the concept of an object contains [enthält] the ground for the object’s actuality [Wirklichkeit] and the concept is, therefore, also the object’s purpose [Zweck]\(^{32}\). Since the object’s harmony with the character that allows it to be purposeful is called the ‘purposiveness of its form’ [Zweckmäßigkeit der Form desselben], then, it follows that the principle in question must be the principle governing this purposiveness –that is to say, the ‘tendency’ an object has to conform to its concept. This then is the connection of reflective judgment to purposiveness: the particular the universal of which one must seek, exhibits a certain tendency to conform to an order of universality –demanded by the understanding, in that it tends to its own subsumption, its *telos*\(^{33}\). The principle of purposiveness, as stated in the second Introduction of the third *Critique*, is the following:

“[T]hat since universal laws of nature have their ground in our understanding, which prescribes them to nature (although only in accordance with the universal concept of it as nature), the particular empirical laws, in regard to that which is left undetermined in them by the former, must be

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\(^{30}\) “(…) ist aber nur das Besondere gegeben, wozu sie das Allgemeine finden soll, so ist die Urteliskraft bloss reflektierend” (AA 5:179).

\(^{31}\) (AA 5:182)

\(^{32}\) (AA 5:181)

\(^{33}\) (AA 5: 187)
considered in terms of the sort of unity they would have if an understanding (even if not ours) had likewise given them for the sake of our faculty of cognition, in order to make possible a system of experience in accordance with particular laws of nature”\textsuperscript{34}.

The Principle of the Purposiveness of Nature is transcendental – not metaphysical. This means that purposiveness allows one to think the universal \textit{a priori} condition under which things can become objects for cognition in general. Unlike metaphysical principles (which would allow one to think the \textit{a priori} condition under which objects whose concept is empirical can be determined \textit{a priori}\textsuperscript{35}), transcendental principles do not assume \textit{that} and \textit{what} an object is, but rather delineate the conditions which must be met for something to be cognised in general. One can think of the distinction between transcendental and metaphysical principles as parallel to the distinction between cognising \textit{a priori} through ontological predicates and cognising \textit{a priori} through empirical predicates\textsuperscript{36}; the law of continuity in nature, for example, is a metaphysical principle insofar as, even though it is necessary, its necessity is not established solely from concepts\textsuperscript{37}. The law is, in the sense delineated above, cognition \textit{a priori} through empirical predicates. Purposiveness, however, does establish its necessity solely from its unity insofar as, without it, the virtually infinite empirical laws that determine particulars in nature would simply appear as being too heterogeneous for our understanding to grasp: “we must necessarily presuppose and assume this unity [the unity in the purposiveness of nature], since otherwise, our empirical cognition could not thoroughly cohere with a whole of experience”\textsuperscript{38}.

But insofar as an aim [Absicht] or end is at stake in the Principle of Purposiveness, one must assume that in its presentation – of the condition of reaching the aim or end, that is– purposiveness will give rise to a feeling of pleasure. This

\textsuperscript{34} (AA 5:180,18-25)
\textsuperscript{35} (AA 5:181) An example of such metaphysical principles can be found in Kant’s doctrine of mechanics.
\textsuperscript{36} (AA 5:182)
\textsuperscript{37} In the Metaphysik L, Kant states: “The cause of the law of continuity is time. This law of continuity is no metaphysical whim, but rather a law that is spread through the whole of nature” (AA 23:201-202). See also (A228/B281).
\textsuperscript{38} (AA 5:183)
connection of a feeling of pleasure and the concept of purposiveness\textsuperscript{39} is what ultimately confers upon the representation of the latter its capacity to determine the former \textit{a priori}: the object, in this case the feeling of pleasure itself, is referred back to the cognitive power that makes it possible, i.e. the transcendental principle that acts as its universal ground. The harmony elicited in referring back to the cognitive powers that gives rise to a feeling of pleasure may be contingent, but even then it would nonetheless be indispensable insofar as there is a mutual configuration of the feeling elicited and the judgment itself\textsuperscript{40}. Purposiveness is, then, that through which nature harmonises with its own aim, though only insofar as it is directed to cognition. This is why Kant claims in the third \textit{Critique} that “[t]he universal laws of the understanding, which are at the same time laws of nature, are just as necessary for nature (even though they arise from spontaneity) as are the laws of motion regarding matter”\textsuperscript{41}. But then, if the presentation of purposiveness occurs solely as this ‘referring’ of a feeling back to the cognitive power that allowed for its happening, no matter how necessary it might seem, still the question of \textit{how} it presents itself remains unanswered.

The beginning of an answer takes here the form of a distinction (as well as the form of a division in the general Kantian architectonic, for the third \textit{Critique} is divided accordingly). There is an aesthetic and there is a logical presentation of purposiveness. What is merely \textit{subjective} in the presentation of an object, says Kant, is its aesthetic character and what serves to determine its \textit{objectivity} is its logical validity. The aesthetic presentation of purposiveness occurs when pleasure, or lack thereof, relates to the apprehension of the \textit{form} of an object of intuition – in previous terms, when the form of the object harmonises or disharmonises with the cognitive powers, i.e. apprehension, imagination and understanding. One judges, in the case where harmony is awakened, not in reference to the concept but in reference to the form or feeling of pleasure elicited by the harmony itself and this leads to the object being deemed ‘beautiful’. In the second case, the case where disharmony is awakened, one judges an object in reference not to its concept and not to the feeling it elicits but only in reference to freedom, in which case one deems the object

\textsuperscript{39} In the case of teleological judgments it is not a feeling of pleasure that gives rise to the possibility of engaging with the object but is, instead, the understanding’s realisation that the object conforms to its own end or \textit{telos}. The dynamic is in the two cases, I take it, the same. \textit{Vid. Infra.}

\textsuperscript{40} (AA 5:184)

\textsuperscript{41} (AA 5:186)
‘sublime’. These, then, are the two possible forms in which aesthetic judgment occurs. As to the logical presentation of purposiveness, on the other hand, it occurs when there is a harmony of the form of the object, again, but this time the harmony is with the possibility of the thing itself according to a prior concept of the thing that contains the ground of that form—hence ‘formal objective purposiveness’. The logical presentation, unlike the aesthetic, does not rest on the pleasure or admiration one might take on reflecting on the form of the object but, rather, on the understanding judging that object’s form by referring it back to a determinate cognition of the object under a concept—in other words, in the object’s form harmonising with its own end, hence, Kant terms these judgments ‘teleological’.

This extremely brief presentation yields the question of how, if at all, the subjective and aesthetic presentation of purposiveness relates to the objective logical presentation of purposiveness. This is an extremely difficult point, but it helps to differentiate between modes of presentation of purposiveness, as stated in the paragraph above. In the second Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, specifically in §§ VI, VII, and VIII, Kant speaks of the difference as residing in that the aesthetic presentation of purposiveness rests [beruhe] on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure taken from the reflection on the form of the object. Unlike the former, the logical presentation of purposiveness does not refer to the object’s form in the first place. Instead, it refers to a determinate cognition of the object in accordance with a given concept, i.e. it ‘rests’ not on a feeling of pleasure or displeasure, but on the understanding’s judging of an object as oriented towards an end. From this very basic difference between the two presentations of purposiveness, one might want to derive their commonality and, thus, establish the way in which the aesthetic and the logical presentations relate to one another: with Franks, whose reading was briefly expounded earlier, one might want to say that what the two presentations of purposiveness share is their ‘reflectivity’, i.e. that they are both presentations guiding reflective judgment only and that, therefore, they bear little or no relation to the constitution of knowledge. In this view, both of these are presentations of the principle merely guiding the way in which one ‘reflects’ upon things and, therefore, only showing the way in which one can conceive of things in accordance to a purpose. But as Hughes has noted, the issue is much more complicated for three

42 (AA 5:189-192)
43 (AA 5:192)
reasons. It is more complicated, first, because Kant seems to be making two contrary claims. He claims, in §VI, that when one discovers a certain homogeneity in laws of nature that are unifiable under one principle, a discovery propelled by the logical presentation of purposiveness, a feeling of pleasure arises similar to the one in the aesthetic presentation of purposiveness. But Kant also claims, in §VIII, that “the presentation of this [logical] purposiveness has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in things.” The issue is further complicated, second, by the fact that if it were straightforwardly the case that the principle is merely guiding our reflection on things, then Kant’s claim that the presentation of subjective purposiveness is indispensable if our understanding will not lose its way in the immensity of the laws of nature would have to be dropped. An in case this were not enough, things are more complicated because, third, one would also have to drop the claim that, insofar as its purpose is concerned, we attribute to nature a ‘regard’ or ‘concern’ [Rücksicht] for our cognitive faculties.

It is this last point, however, that provides a clue as to how the aesthetic and logical presentations of purposiveness are related. In the first Critique, and earlier in previous Chapters of this work, it has been shown that the laws of the understanding, the Principles of the Understanding to be more precise, are necessary for nature insofar as they are that which grounds our cognition of nature in the first place. This does not mean, however, that the order of the particular laws of nature that we might encounter is itself necessary. Rather, Kant repeatedly claims in both the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and in the third Critique that such order is itself contingent insofar as it is conceived as commensurate or even compatible with the laws of the understanding. The difference between the necessity of the laws of the understanding and the contingency of the order of the laws of nature, seems subtle, but it is an important one: the laws of the understanding are necessary insofar as they are constitutive of that which they grasp; but that particular laws would appear as having to be subsumed under some principle and not another is contingent. It is no more necessary, for example, to conceive of Boyle’s Law as subsumable under a general gas theory than it is to conceive of Avogadro’s Law as subsumable under a

46 (AA 5:187)
47 (AA 5:192)
48 (AA 5:186); (AA 5:193)
49 (AA 5:193)
50 (AA 4:468-470); (AA 5:186-187)
general gas theory or, indeed, to think of both these laws as having the same unitary ground. But this is precisely the point: nature, in its infinite diversity, appears as having some kind of ‘regard’ for the understanding; it appears as ‘wanting to have’, as it were, its particular empirical laws subsumed in such a way that more general principles are attainable. This is why judgment, deriving from freedom the concept of a purpose, uses that very concept in the twofold exhibition of purposiveness: if the imagination presents us with something beautiful, it is because a feeling of pleasure had been aroused in the harmonising of the object’s form with our cognitive powers. If nature, through its “power to produce in terms of purposes”\textsuperscript{51}, i.e. through its technic, presents us with something teleologically oriented, it is because we judge it - nature- as displaying a purposeful orientation. Calling it, in this sense, the ‘technic of nature’ might be slightly misleading. It would be much more accurate to call it the ‘technic of judgment for nature’, since “it is actually the power of judgment that is technical; nature is presented as technical only insofar as it harmonises with, and necessitates, that procedure of judgment"\textsuperscript{52}. It is in the former sense that a relation between the aesthetic and the logical presentations of purposiveness seems to hold: they appear as two sides of the same coin. One side, the aesthetic presentation of purposiveness (that can include the presentation of the whole of nature as a beautiful object), shows as the harmony of the form of the object and the faculties of imagination and understanding. The other side, the logical presentation of purposiveness, although not directly referring to any feeling, shows this purposiveness as the principle governing the link between nature and reason and, especially, between the particular empirical laws of the former and the general laws of the latter.

The previous characterisation and division of the ways in which purposiveness is grasped becomes of great help if one looks closely, first, at the aesthetic presentation of purposiveness –especially concerning the first kind of judgments, i.e. judgments of taste. The beautiful and the sublime are similar in certain respects and differ in others. They are similar in that they both presuppose reflective judgment rather than determining judgment. They are also similar in that the human understanding likes both for their own sake, and in that judgments about the beautiful and the sublime are singular and yet lay a claim to universal validity. They differ, however, in a relevant feature: whereas the beautiful necessarily concerns the form of

\textsuperscript{51} (AA 5:390)
\textsuperscript{52} (AA 20 [first Intro]: 220)
some bounded object, the sublime can concern formless objects insofar as one represents to one’s self their unboundedness. So, whereas the beautiful is the subjective exhibition of an indeterminate concept of the understanding, the sublime is the objective exhibition of an indeterminate concept of reason. Ideas are “presentations referred to an object according to a certain principle [nach einem gewissen Prinzip] (subjective or objective) but are such that they can still never become knowledge [Erkenntnis]”\(^53\). Ideas referred to an intuition according to the subjective side of the principle of mutual harmony of imagination and understanding are aesthetic. Ideas referred to a concept according to the objective side of the principle, but still incapable of yielding knowledge, are rational. Aesthetic ideas, therefore, cannot become knowledge because they are intuitions for which no concept can be given; and, unlike concepts of the understanding, rational ideas are transcendent and not immanent—for these, no intuition whatsoever can be given\(^54\).

This has extremely important consequences for present purposes. Kant had established, first in the first Critique and then again in the third, that “Concepts of the understanding must, as such, always be demonstrable (…) in an example; and this possibility must be there, since otherwise we cannot be certain that the thought is not empty, i.e. devoid of any object”\(^55\). But in the first Critique it was also established that to construct concepts is to “exhibit a priori their corresponding intuition [ihm korrespondierende Anschauung a priori darstellen]”\(^56\)–thereby showing that, and how, exhibiting a priori is not only possible but it is also necessary\(^57\). But what does ‘exhibiting’ mean here? It means rendering intuitable or sensibilising the rule according to which a representation comes to be constituted\(^58\). This is the reason why, for example, it was seen in the previous Chapter that ‘magnitude’, extensive or intensive, can be given in an a priori intuition\(^59\) and it is also why philosophy can prove its propositions on a priori grounds, but not ‘demonstrate’ them if it is to remain pure philosophy\(^60\). The demonstration would, as was also discussed in the previous Chapter, only arise once the metaphysical principle making use of the concept were put to the test (what one gets in the Metaphysical Foundations of

\(^{53}\) (AA 5:342)  
^{54}\) (AA 5:342)  
^{55}\) (AA 5:342-343)  
^{56}\) (A713/B741)  
^{57}\) (AA 8:242)  
^{58}\) (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 99-104)  
^{59}\) (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 112-116)  
^{60}\) (AA 5:232); (AA 5:343)
Natural Science). The implication arising from this is highly significant: if it necessarily is the case that the exhibition of concepts is possible, and it is also the case that the exhibition of a concept in intuition brings in something not previously contemplated within the concept, as illustrated by aesthetic ideas, then it is guaranteed that the imagination’s presentations go far beyond what is determined by means of categories alone. The imagination brings in something that concepts themselves, in other words, lacked: their intuitional character. This may hardly seem like a revelation given what was discussed about the Schematism section of the Critique of Pure Reason, but the relevance this has in this context is difficult to overestimate. The ‘going beyond’ justifies that “we must not judge the beautiful according to concepts, but according to the purposive attunement of the imagination that brings it into harmony with the power of concepts as such” and shows, furthermore, that the imagination’s import of content with reflective judgment occurs at a different level than with determining judgment. In the latter case it is the attunement with the faculty of concepts that does the heavy lifting.

Aesthetic ideas, Kant remarks, are representations provided by the imagination that have no adequate concepts to suit them – hence, impossible to determine thoroughly. And, while being the counterpart to ideas of reason that have no intuitions to suit them, aesthetic ideas exhibit that the power of imagination is in fact capable of creating ‘another nature’ – which may or may not share the material conditions of physical nature. This can be made sense of through a further distinction Kant makes: “Establishing that our concepts have reality always requires intuitions. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called examples. If they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called schemata.”

The process of sensibilisation [Versinnlichung] of concepts referred to in the previous Chapter is referred to here as ‘hypotyposis’ (exhibition, subiectio ad adspectum). And

61 Perhaps this is what grounds the possibility of ‘judgments of perception’, as opposed to ‘judgments of experience’, that Kant mentions in the Prolegomena: judgments of perception do not require a pure concept of the understanding, but only for the perceptions to be ‘logically’ (whatever that could mean here) connected to one another in the thinking subject. Thus, judgments of perception, e.g. ‘the room is warm’, are only subjectively valid (unlike judgments of experience) and, moreover, lay no claim whatsoever to universal validity (unlike aesthetic judgments). But because Kant is inconsistent with the distinction and because of how infamously problematic the examples of such judgments that Kant provides are, the distinction will not be used or appealed to in this investigation. See (AA 4:297-299).

62 (AA 5:344)

63 (AA 5:314) If the focus were solely on subjective purposiveness, for example, then the following would be clear: the criterion that renders necessary the universality of judgments of taste is none other than ‘nature in the subject’ [was bloss Natur im Subjekte ist] (AA 5:344) that is manifest in that subject’s free play of the imagination.

64 (AA 5:351)
hypotyposis can be of two kinds: it is *schematic* when, as shown before, the intuition for a concept is given wholly *a priori* and solely as a determination of self-affection⁶⁵; or it is *symbolic* when the given intuition is for an idea of reason and, although also mediated through the activity of affecting oneself as will be argued shortly, can only be arrived at analogically, i.e. by following the rule that should form the intuition, but without the process culminating successfully⁶⁶. So, although not through schematic hypotyposis, but certainly through symbolic hypotyposis, imagination provides, free of the bounds of concepts and purely from the intuitive nature of the subject, a law-like formal purposiveness in its exhibitions. This entails that imagination breaks free, as it were, of the law of association [Verwandtschaft] given by the understanding through ‘schematising’ without concepts⁶⁷ and in so doing genuinely restructures experience⁶⁸. Or that, alternatively, in allowing itself to be taken over by its own spontaneity, the imagination shows reason that determinate concepts do not exhaust or encompass all of what can be thought objectively—even if only for reflective judgment⁶⁹. This is the meaning of what was stated earlier: that understanding’s concepts, pure or otherwise, do not seem capable of encompassing all of the content in intuition⁷⁰.

But saying that the ‘symbol’ of an idea is exhibited does not amount to saying that through that exhibition the imagination provides the self with enough as to ground synthetic *a priori* judgments. To give rise to such judgments a likewise synthetic *a priori* principle is required. In looking at the issue thus, though, a picture starts emerging, a picture that shows how the principle of purposiveness, in being transcendental, could hypothetically justify that a different kind of objectivity, ‘another nature’, be thought of if the nature of the objects in question demand it (after all, one does not judge the artwork in terms of Newtonian physics only⁷¹). So, even if

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⁶⁵ In the essay on “What Real Progress Has Been Made in Metaphysics Since Leibniz and Wolff” Kant claims that “If we provide the concept with objective reality directly by means of the intuition that corresponds to it, rather than mediatly, this act is called schematism” (AA 20:279-280)

⁶⁶ Not culminating successfully insofar the aim itself, because of its inherent indeterminacy, is not reached. Importantly, though, the aim was never meant to be reached for, once more, rational ideas have no proper intuitions to suit them.

⁶⁷ (AA 5:287)

⁶⁸ (AA 5:314)

⁶⁹ Although Kant has relatively little to say about symbolic subsumption, in “The End of All Things” he claims “so muß die Vorstellung jener letzten Dinge, die nach dem jüngsten Tage kommen sollen, nur als eine Versinnlichung des letztern samt seinen moralischen, uns übrigens nicht theoretisch begreiflichen Folgen angesehen werden” (AA 8:328)

⁷⁰ (AA 5:344); (AA 5:343); (AA 5:232).

⁷¹ This would hold even if the case were, as Maurice Denis put it in 1890 when trying to define painting in relation to Gaugin’s syntheticsm, that first and foremost a painting is its material condition: “Se rappeler qu’un tableau –avant d’être un cheval de bataille, une femme nue ou une quelconque
it is granted that the principle of purposiveness is transcendental, the questions ‘is it nonetheless synthetic?’ and ‘where does its syntheticity come from?’ remain\textsuperscript{72}. In other words, even if what has been said is understood as parallel in some way to the argument of the third Chapter, where it was shown that time provides a rather specific schematic layout according to which the constitution of objectivity and experience becomes possible, the question of whether the imaginary symbolic exhibition itself is enough as to provide syntheticity to the principle of purposiveness is as of yet unanswered.

According to the first path, however, there can indeed be non-categorial syntheticity even if according to a merely regulative principle. And one might think that the easiest way to show this is, as Hegel does in the \textit{Science of Logic}\textsuperscript{73}, by appealing to the synthetic unity of apperception and then showing that it need not reflect itself or on itself categorically. This route for answering the question, however, has been shown to be doomed: it was argued before, in the second Chapter, that the synthetic unity of apperception is synthetic in virtue of its very fundamental relation to time, and not because it has objectively valid concepts \textit{simpliciter}. If that is true, then it must also be true that the unity of apperception cannot of itself unfold as synthetic in any meaningful way save insofar as time, the primary form of intuition, understood as self-affection is posited alongside of it. Stated differently: the categories in themselves, \textit{contra} Hegel, are not synthetic in virtue of having been derived from the synthetic unity of apperception. Not at all: the categories are synthetic, in fact, only in virtue of being related to time through the schematism by means of the imagination and only become synthetic once they are set in motion in the principles where it is the schema, and not the category, that is in operation.

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\textsuperscript{73} “It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of Pure Reason that the unity which constitutes the essence of the concept is recognised as the original synthetic unity of apperception, the unity of the ‘I think’, or of self-consciousness. –This proposition is all that there is to the so called transcendental deduction of the categories which, from the beginning, has however been regarded as the most difficult piece of Kantian philosophy –no doubt only because it demands that we should transcend the mere representation of the relation of the ‘I’ and the understanding, or of the concepts, to a thing and its properties or accidents, and advance to the thought of it. The object, says Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. P.137), is that, in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is unified. But every unification of representations requires a unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently, this unity of consciousness is alone that which constitutes the reference of the representations to an object, hence their objective validity, and that on which even the possibility of the understanding rests (…) [house then] The further development, however, did not live up to its beginning. The term itself, synthesis, easily conjures up again the picture of an external unity, of a mere combination of terms that are intrinsically separate” (Werke 12:18-23).

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Knowing this, then, leaves open only one other option to answer the question at hand: it must be by means of an intuitive/intellectual faculty that the syntheticity of the synthetic comes about, i.e. in relating intuition and understanding or intuition and reason. The only candidate that fits the definition, as the discussion of hypotyposis (schematic or symbolic) illustrated, is the transcendental power of imagination: it alone relates intuition and understanding, and intuition and reason, in such a way as to give rise to synthetic \textit{a priori} knowledge. This is exactly what the argument developed so far has shown: the imagination, as the essential part in the process of cognition that relates the intellectual faculties to intuition, is not constrained in its synthesising to the merely categorial or even conceptual and instead can, always in accordance with the form of intuition that grounds it, i.e. time, ‘imagine’ or ‘exhibit’ that there are manifold beings not reducible to their categorial determinations. Note something important, however: what is not being claimed here is that in this ‘syntheticity’, this other mode of synthesis is wholly independent from the functions of judgment. Indeed, not Kant, and not anyone in their right mind would claim that, say, Messiaen’s \textit{Quatuor pour la fin du Temps} is not subject to the laws of physics. What is being claimed, however, is that it would be impossible to account for the entirety of this piece by giving some infinite description of its mechanical properties. This is part of the problem with Franks’ attempt discussed at the beginning: by trying to keep the two orders of grounding entirely separate, he commits to the further claim that whatever one judges in accordance with one principle cannot be judged in accordance with the other. This is problematic however since surely one would like to preserve the explanatory power of physical principles when judging, for example, artworks, while simultaneously maintaining that physical principles in no way determine the object thoroughly. There must be, in other words, room for the physical specificities of the object to have some role in our act of judging\textsuperscript{74}.

With aesthetic judgments hopefully the following is clear: they cannot be carried out solely following the pure concepts of the understanding for, if this were the case, the very essence of what they judge would be missed in the act of judging\textsuperscript{75}. But there is another way to discuss whether the principle of purposiveness is synthetic and if it is, then why it is so: by looking at its logical presentation. Recall that earlier


the distinction between the aesthetic and the logical presentation of purposiveness was highlighted. It was claimed that there is a subjective and an objective presentation of purposiveness to the extent that the first rests on a feeling of pleasure or displeasure to which judgment refers while the second rests on judging an object as oriented towards an end. Now, is it the case that for the logical presentation of purposiveness, too, the syntheticticity of the principle of purposiveness derives from the imagination in relation to self-affection?

In the third and last essay of the so-called ‘race series’, entitled “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy” (1788), Kant writes:

“If one understands by nature the sum-total of all that exists as determined by laws, taking together the world (as nature properly so called) and its supreme cause, then the investigation of nature (which in the first case is called physics, in the second metaphysics) can pursue two paths: either the merely theoretical path or the teleological path.”

The latter path, the teleological, when using ends provided to us through experience is again called physics; and when using an end fixed through pure reason, in accordance with its calling [Berufe], is again called metaphysics. The first Critique showed that in the theoretical path, metaphysics is incapable of reaching the call of reason because of the constraints the understanding has placed upon the latter and that, for certain inquiries, only the teleological path remains. But this one, too, can only be reached through an end that is given and determined a priori through pure practical reason (the highest good). It was claimed before that the representation of the condition for reaching an aim or end, that is to say judging in accordance with the form of purposiveness, gives rise to a feeling of pleasure. This is the case because, once more, the concept of an object contains the ground for that object’s actuality, and since the concept itself is also called the object’s ‘purpose’, the relation between ground and concept, the purposiveness of the object’s form, shows structural similarities to those seen in practical causation. That one is able to perceive the

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76 (AA 8:157)

77 Although there is a great gulf that separates the realm of the sensible from the realm of the concept of freedom, and although the former can in no way affect the latter, “still the latter is meant to influence the former –that is to say, the concept of freedom is meant to actualise in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws; and nature must consequently also be capable of being regarded in such a way that in the conformity to law of its form it at least harmonises with the possibility of the ends to be effectuated in it according to the laws of freedom” (AA 5:175-176).
constitution of an object in purposive terms (and, by implication, in teleological terms) stems, therefore, from an analogical\(^{78}\) intimation of freedom and its inner dynamic: the categories of freedom are directed to the determination of a free choice\(^{79}\) and, unbound by the forms of sensibility, bring content immediately under themselves. These categories, the Types, Kant claims, produce the actuality of that to which they refer (the disposition of the will)\(^{80}\) insofar as they, as concepts, contain the ground for the determination of their object through the Typic of Practical Reason. Just like these latter categories, or to be more precise because of them, the principle of purposiveness for reflective judgment contains the ground for the determination of its object as an end\(^{81}\). Without being able to go into the problem of universal communicability\(^{82}\), however, suffice it for now to say that the same occurs when one judges in accordance with the form of purposiveness: such judgment gives rise to a pleasurable state of mind in the determination of the will to the extent that an end is contained in it\(^{83}\).

What does it mean, however, to contain a ground for the determination of an object as an end? It has been an important contention of this work so far that time, pure time, provides the condition under which any representation can be thought. This includes, but is certainly not limited to, the representation of a condition for the realisation, or achievement of something that has as of yet not been fulfilled. The principle of purposiveness acts as a principle for judgment precisely because one represents to one’s self the procedure in accordance with which something strives to realise itself –aesthetically or teleologically. This procedure is ‘visible’, as it were, because one is free, i.e. because “We must therefore regard future actions as undetermined through everything that belongs to the phaenomenis”\(^{84}\). And here is the crux of the matter: in this last quote, it would be tempting to read the stress as residing on the indeterminacy of such actions. Now, although that certainly matters,

\(^{78}\) On how it is possible to extend pure reason for practical purposes: “In order to extend a pure cognition practically there must be a purpose given a priori, that is, an end as object (of the will) that, independently of all theoretical principles, is represented as practically necessary by an imperative determining the will” (AA 5:134).

\(^{79}\) (AA 5:66)


\(^{81}\) Practical purposiveness, though, unlike purposiveness of nature, is not transcendental but only metaphysical: it is the purposiveness that must be thought in the idea of the determination of a free will and it is metaphysical because the concept of a power of desire, taken as will, has to first be given empirically (KU 5:182).

\(^{82}\) (AA 5:216-219)

\(^{83}\) (AA 5:222)

\(^{84}\) (AA 18:253)
the present point would nonetheless stress the futurity of actions insofar as that, too, is essential for those actions to be called ‘free’. Kant affirms this in several different places and in several different ways. In the *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*, for example, he claims that if a doctrine of freedom can indeed indicate the ultimate ground of purposiveness, if, that is, the possibility of ends realising themselves exists in the world, it is only because of the capacity to represent to one’s self the future [Zukunft]\(^{85}\). Also there, he claims that the ground for the determination of an action will be considered *a priori* (as it must if it is truly free) only “if the action is represented as *futural* (antecedenter) [künftig], [and] we will feel ourselves as undetermined with respect to it and as capable of making a first beginning of the series of appearances”\(^{86}\). Or yet, and finally, that a feeling of pleasure alone would not be sufficient to sway us into any particular moral act “(...) unless the representation of a *future condition* of the duration of such a moral beauty and of the happiness that will thereby be increased comes to its assistance, so that one will thereby find oneself more capable of so acting”\(^{87}\).

This is important for present purposes: by ‘future’ Kant understands “*what is not yet present* [was noch nicht gegenwärtig ist]”\(^{88}\) and only the representation of a future condition can act as the ground for something to be thought of as an end for two relatively simple reasons. The first simply is that the orientation of practical judgment, that it will something, can only be justified if that something is not already in its possession –i.e. if that something is not itself present. One does not will what one already has, simply put. The second, and more important for practical purposes, is that if practical judgment were indeed oriented to something which is itself already present to the will, then *ex definitio*, the will would have no choice but to determine itself in a heteronomous way in virtue of having to mediate its own determination through something that already is a representation, and hence have to determine itself

\(^{85}\) (AA 17:516)
\(^{86}\) (AA 18:256) The full quote reads: “*The higher power of choice is the capacity to make use of the incentives or sensible stimuli in accordance with their laws yet always in accord with the representation of the understanding (in relation to the ultimate and universal ends of sensibility). A posteriori, therefore, we will have cause a posteriori to find the ground of the action, namely the ground of its explanation but not its determination, in sensibility; but a priori, if the action is represented as futural (antecedenter), we will feel ourselves as undetermined with respect to it and as capable of making a first beginning of the series of appearances. If there is free will, then the appearances of rational beings do not constitute a continuum except in the case of firm principles of the understanding*”.
\(^{87}\) (Ri, i5) (Note on the obverse to AA: 2:207)
\(^{88}\) (AA 7:187)
This is clearly unacceptable: only the representation of something which is not yet, but which can be in some future time, can act as a ground for the a priori determination of the will. For these reasons practical judgment is inherently future oriented and so is any judgment in accordance with a principle of purposiveness: something will appear as a purpose if, but only if, that which strives to realise itself into that purpose has not yet achieved its goal.

This is partly why Kant claims that ends have a direct relation to reason. Natural ends cannot be known a priori even when one can know that there must be a connection of ground and effect in nature a priori. This means that the use of a teleological principle for nature, for example, will necessarily be empirically conditioned (and the same would go for ends of freedom were it not because there are pure practical principles). Teleology in nature cannot therefore indicate the ultimate ground of purposiveness –but a doctrine of freedom can. And since morality strives to realise itself in the world, it cannot overlook the fact that at least the possibility of ends exists in the world, and this is what makes a natural teleology and the possibility of nature in general, i.e. transcendental philosophy, possible: “This serves to secure objective reality to the doctrine of practically pure ends with respect to the possibility of the object in the exercise, namely the objective reality of the end that this doctrine prescribes as to be effectuated in the world”.

Earlier it was asked how the principle of purposiveness, in being transcendental, could hypothetically justify that a different kind of objectivity be thought of if the nature of the objects in question demanded it. The question, as Kant would phrase it, is about the warrant “of being allowed to use the teleological principle where sources of theoretical cognition are not sufficient.” But when is this case? When are the sources of theoretical cognition insufficient as for judgment to have to make an appeal to a wholly different principle regulating the appearing of an object? This right is restricted, Kant claims, to that instance where the theoretical means have been exhausted (as with artworks) –but then, again, the question would

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89 (AA 5:33-34)  
90 (AA 8:183)  
91 (AA 8:183)  
92 (AA 8:160)  
93 (AA 8: 160-161) This is not to say, however, that aesthetic judgments are a subset of teleological judgments but, rather, that aesthetic and teleological judgments are homogeneous in that they are both reflective judgments in accordance with a principle of purposiveness that is instantiated in two different ways.
remain: *when* is it appropriate, even rightful to use a teleological means of explanation?

There is apart from artworks another kind of beings that demand to be judged reflectively in accordance with the principle of purposiveness – but in this case their presentation is logical and not aesthetic. These beings, living beings or organisms, although material and therefore subordinated to the principles of the understanding, appear also as defying these very principles. Individuals within organised matter are indeed thought of as “*material being[s] which [are] possible only through the relation of everything contained in [them] to each other as end and means*”\(^95\). If these are to be accounted for, either in terms of a teleology or in terms of a physiognomy\(^96\), then one must assume an intrinsic purposiveness in nature. For example, says Kant, if one endeavoured to find whether there is kinship between different specimens of the human species, one would have to appeal to their common phyletic origin (thereby making it clear that one must be guided by a principle even to be able to observe the differences\(^97\)):

“The variety amongst human beings of the same race is in all likelihood just as purposively supplied in the original phylum in order to ground and subsequently develop the greatest degree of manifoldness for the sake of infinitely many ends, as is the difference of the races, in order to ground and subsequently develop the fitness to fewer but more essential ends”\(^98\).

In the context of a famous dispute with Herder, as Beth Lord has shown\(^99\), Kant engaged a certain naturalist, Georg Forster, who had criticised transcendental philosophy for granting precedence to theory over observation in the construction of a

\(^{94}\) ‘Logical’ in the sense described above, i.e. as related to teleology, but not in the sense of logical related to the technic of nature for the latter is concerned primarily with systematicity of nature as a whole, and not with organisms as such.

\(^{95}\) (AA 8:181)

\(^{96}\) As opposed to physiography. This echoes Lichtenberg’s position regarding a possible science of teleology and of the rule-bound future evolution of nature: “*Das Zukünftige sehen ist ebenfalls Physiognomik*” [F22].

\(^{97}\) (AA 8:165) This is all that ‘species’ or ‘kind’ refers to: “*the hereditary peculiarity that is not consistent with a common phyletic origination*” (AA 8:165).

\(^{98}\) (AA 8:166)

system of nature. Forster argued that it is climatic influences, exclusively, that determine skin coloration and straightforwardly denied that what Kant, in a previous essay, had termed ‘predispositional germs’ had any effect on this particular phenotypic trait. Kant reduces Forster’s criticism as stating “that everything in natural science must be explained naturally”. But, asks Kant, does not making this statement show that one has reached the limits of natural explanations insofar as one wants to subsume all explanatory grounds to experience of the physical-mechanical? In answer to this self-directed question, Kant replies:

“Since the concept of an organised being already includes that it is some matter in which everything is mutually related to each other as end and means, which can only be thought as a system of final causes, and since therefore their possibility only leaves the teleological but not the physical-mechanical mode of explanation, at least as far as human reason is concerned, there can be no investigation in physics about the origin of all organization itself. The answer to this question, provided it is at all accessible to us, obviously would lie outside of natural science, in metaphysics. I myself derive all organization from organic beings (through generation [Zeugung]) and all later forms (of this kind of natural things) from laws of the gradual development of original predispositions, which were to be found in the organization of its phylum.”

In response to Forster’s objection, but also as a development of the premises of the first Critique, Kant is saying here that the infinite variation found in nature is not accountable for in terms of chance but neither is it in terms of universal laws. Indeed, not chance in the form of external influences, but an inherent teleological predisposition within each living organism is what accounts for genetic variation. Likewise, not universal laws for which one would have to find particulars, as stated in the Critique of Pure Reason, but rather the positing of a unity the future existence

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101 (AA 8:178-179)
102 (AA 8:179)
103 (A687/B715ff)
104 (A647/B675)
of which is enough to warrant the regulative systematicity of nature\textsuperscript{105}. What makes, then, teleological judgments synthetic becomes rather evident: the syntheticity of synthetic \textit{a priori} teleological judgments arises, in short, in virtue of the futural unity towards which these judgments are oriented – the unity presupposed by the systematicity of nature. This, in turn, can be extrapolated to the principle of purposiveness assuming that teleology is but an instance of the former: the syntheticity, and transcendentality, as it were, of the principle of purposiveness arises in virtue of the future aim towards which judgments made on its behalf will seek to achieve.

In light of the previous answer, then, the conclusion to the first path can be reached. The principle of purposiveness, it has been seen, was brought about precisely in contradistinction to that which can be grasped through the pure concepts of the understanding in relation to the pure forms of intuition (this is precisely the meaning of the claim that teleology comes to supplement physical-mechanical explanations and also the reason why Kant thinks ‘teleology’ itself is not a science but is, rather, ‘only critique’\textsuperscript{106}). It has been shown in the course of this section that the principle of purposiveness can be understood as the indirect, future oriented relation between imagination and reason where pure exhibition in intuition, i.e. exhibition not constrained by concepts, takes place and does so in accordance with the form of a movement towards an end. So, unlike the determination of self-affection through the schematism of pure understanding, what one gets through purposiveness is the exhibition of a unified ‘tendency’ that is symbolically exhibited \textit{via} hypotyposis: a future oriented quasi-schema for which there is no determinate concept but only the form of a \textit{telos}, regulates and unifies the manifold expressions of nature. The quasi-schema of purposiveness, operating on the basis of the future orientation it derives from practical causation, takes the form of a procedure whereby something becomes possible even if it is cause and effect of itself\textsuperscript{107}. In the previous chapter it was seen that if the imagination and the understanding are paired together, then one gets the local systematic of the first part of the first \textit{Critique}. But now it has been seen that if the imagination and reason are paired together (when imagination is

\textsuperscript{105} It is a matter of further enquiry what the relation between empirical systematicity and teleology is. For the time being, systematicity as understood in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the first \textit{Critique} should be taken as grounding the empirical systematicity spoken of in the third \textit{Critique} (A647/B675ff); (A681/B709); (AA 5:379). As the discussion above should make clear this does not mean, however, that empirical systematicity ought to be equated with teleology.

\textsuperscript{106} (AA 5:416ff)

\textsuperscript{107} (AA 5:370)
understood as "the power of a priori intuitions"\textsuperscript{108} then one gets the principle of purposiveness as the validating unity through which the pure form of intuition is manifest. Only reflective, and not determining judgment, has the capacity to recognise this.

At the beginning of this whole investigation it was asked what role time, understood as self-affection, plays concerning the constitution of objectivity. If the answer of the first Critique came in the form of delineating a temporal field of objectivity articulated in the interconnectedness of judgments, categories, schemata, and principles, in the third Critique this is complemented by delineating a separate objectivity that answers to its own principle. This is to say that, if one asks whether the Kantian project could allow for more than one kind of objectivity, the clear answer, in light of the understanding of time and its relation to the imagination, is affirmative: purposiveness is the symbolic exhibition of future-orientation and the imagination can, in light of this symbol, reconfigure, as it were, the structural relations that make up the whole of any particular object as to render it not categorically bound. Instead, in virtue of the form of the subjective faculties and by means of referring back to its own activity, the imagination provides room for an alternative objectivity, ‘another nature’, that has more in common with freedom and its spontaneous capacity of production than it does with the understanding. It is in light of the imagination’s free relation to self-affection that artworks and living beings become what they are.

\textbf{§ ii}

\textbf{The second path}

And yet, the previous conclusion was characterised in the introduction to this Chapter as the ‘weaker’ of the two. It was thus characterised because in answer to the question of \textit{when} one is allowed, of \textit{when} one has the right to judge in accordance with the principle of purposiveness, only a formal negative answer was given: whenever the theoretical means of cognition fail to suffice in capturing the essence of that which is being judged. In other words, by following the previous conclusion one is committed to admitting that, although there is an ontology that pertains to the

\textsuperscript{108} (AA 5:190)
categorial and a distinct ontology that pertains to the practical, and although both relate to self-affection in their own unique way, one is nonetheless incapable of going beyond a merely phenomenological criterion that constitutes the object of judging. In answer to a question such as when is one supposed to grasp an object according to either one of the formal presentations of purposiveness, the reply can go no further than ‘when the object thus demands it’ thus remaining dependent on an a posteriori judgment. But this is not satisfactory by transcendental philosophy’s standards. Loosely prefiguring Meinong’s Jungle problem, whereby nothing prevents non-existent or ‘sosein’ beings from multiplying ad infinitum, in the previous answer nothing prevents the diversity of empirical laws that should become unified under one purposive principle from multiplying endlessly. The formality, in other words, of the principle of purposiveness (that it is a principle of ‘purposiveness’ and not a principle of ‘purpose(s)’) does not preclude the possibility of there being ‘false positives’ that will require the faculty of judgment to judge it purposively: there is no reason, in principle, why one ought not to judge, for example, an average brick wall as a self-organising being. It is, in sum, as if one had to choose between the synthetic character of the principle of purposiveness and its a priori character. If this is the case, however, any systematisation would be rendered impossible and, so, another answer must be pursued.

Now, at the beginning of this chapter it was asked whether the possibility of an uncategorised schema exists in transcendental philosophy. This question came to summarise a set of interconnected notions: that there might be time determinations not necessarily bound by the specific functions of the understanding derived from judgment; that the set of synthetic a priori principles constituting and regulating experience, as understood in the first Critique, might not cover the whole of appearances; that, perhaps, time as the fundamental form of intuition provided an opening wide enough as to be able to accommodate another kind of synthetic a priori transcendental principle that would either constitute or regulate some other form of objectivity, etc. The answer provided by the path developed in the second and third Critiques in the last section addresses some of these worries and ultimately states that time does, indeed, provide an opening wide enough as to accommodate more than

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109 ‘Phenomenological’ taken to mean here, with Lambert, grounded on that which appears and in the way that it appears: “Die Theorie des Scheins und seines Einflusses in die Richtigkeit und Urrichtigkeit der menfchlichen Erkenntniss, macht demnach den Theil der Grundwiffenſchaft aus, den wir die Phänomenologie nennen” (NO: Phänomenologie, iv.§1).

one kind of objectivity. That, in fact, the other kind of objectivity, one that derived from the temporal relation between imagination and reason, arises from the equivalent of the schema, the symbol of the unity of systematicity, and that it does so in accordance to a principle of purposiveness.

Does this mean that an un categorised schema has been found? The answer to this last, and most important question, is not that straightforward. Schemata, apart from arising out of time or being determinations of self-affection, provide the sensible conditions under which the application of particular functions of judgment becomes objectively valid. The symbol of the unity of systematicity, likewise, exhibits purposiveness in the face of time, but only analogically and indirectly—and, furthermore, only in its link to an end as an idea of reason\textsuperscript{111}. This presents a problem for transcendental philosophy in general and for the interpretation of transcendental philosophy presented here. The problem is being able to reconcile the synthetic \textit{a priori} status of the principle of purposiveness and the synthetic \textit{a posteriori} claim that certain objects will in, and out of, themselves, demand to be judged in accordance with the principle of purposiveness. The weaker conclusion, in other words, seems too weak for the \textit{desideratum} placed by transcendental philosophy unto itself\textsuperscript{112}. Partly due to the \textit{ideal} status of purposiveness\textsuperscript{113}, and partly due to the fact that the principle arrived at is a constitutive principle only for reflective and not determining judgment, it would seem as if the comparison of the symbol to an uncategorised schema were, simply speaking, unfitting. As time-determination schemata \textit{condition} anything and everything that can become an object of knowledge—this is certainly not the case, as the previous discussion illustrated, with purposiveness as constructed before. It is not the case because the principle of purposiveness is solely constitutive of reflective judgment and not of judgment in general\textsuperscript{114}. But if this is the case, does that mean that no uncategorised schema can be provided at all?

\textsuperscript{111} (AA 5:351-353)
\textsuperscript{112} This \textit{desideratum} being, as Horstmann has made clear, showing that the knowledge we can have of the manifold, perhaps infinite empirical laws of specific objects of nature is possible in the first place. If one relied solely on the principles of pure understanding and an infinite amount of empirical laws in one’s interpretation of nature, according to Horstmann, one would not have any systematic knowledge of nature at all (See (AA 5:179-180) and (AA 5:185)). A connected and unified experience presupposes, says Kant, a “\textit{nature} [that] \textit{specifies itself with regard to its empirical laws}” in a way that corresponds to conditions of knowledge (AA 5:186). Vid. Horstmann, Rolf-Peter. “Why Must There be a Transcendental Deduction in Kant’s Critique of Judgment?” in Förster, E. (ed.) \textit{Kant’s Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus Postumum}. Stanford University Press, CA, 1989.
\textsuperscript{113} (AA 5:188)
\textsuperscript{114} (AA 5:404)
As early as the Dissertation Kant speaks, indeed, of schemata without concepts: space and time are such in that they are ‘conditions under which the sensible appears’ in the first place\(^{115}\), but this would not seem like the kind of schema one would have to be after in order to answer the question. As it was seen when discussing Franks’ interpretation, space and time are the principles governing the categorial-mechanical order of grounding, and cannot therefore be used to justify a separate, parallel order of grounding (if there were one in the first place). In fact, when seen this way, the following becomes rather clear: if the uncategorised schema is to be found, it will not be found in either one Franks’ orders of grounding but rather behind both of them insofar as it has to, by definition, be a determination of self-affection that acts as a sensible condition for the application of concepts\(^{116}\).

This, then, seems to open the second path. What granted the syntheticity of the synthetic *a priori* principle of purposiveness was, ultimately, the unity towards which the manifold empirical laws of nature are oriented and, even if time mediated, this unity proves insufficient insofar as it is only available as a presupposition for reflective and not determining judgment. Since this unity is nowhere to be found save in reason, the outcome is that one cannot have a criterion that will *a priori* yield what constitutes an object worthy of being judged in accordance with the purposiveness of its form. What, now, if such unity were moved? What if instead of being a ‘presupposition’ the unity became a constitutive feature of a system of transcendental philosophy? Would that then prove sufficient to justify there being an uncategorised schema that acts as the condition under which concepts, theoretical and practical, acquire objective validity? Would, finally, the demonstration of the existence of an empirical system of laws warrant that even without categories there is nonetheless a schematic, or schema-like, structure conditioning experience at both theoretical and practical levels?

The second path takes the form of an answer to the last question. Although one might think that in the way presented here, the question is alien to the transcendental system, perhaps because of the seeming oxymoron in the expression ‘empirical system’, if one goes to the first introduction to the third *Critique*, this does not seem so alien. There, one reads:

\(^{115}\) (AA 2:398-401)

\(^{116}\) Somewhat surprisingly in the first *Critique*, too, Kant speaks of space and time as schemata: “Their [space and time’s] representation is a mere schema which always stands in relation to the imagination that calls up and assembles the objects of experience” (A156/B195).
“For unity of nature in time and space, and unity of experience possible for us, are one and the same, since nature is the sum total of mere appearances, a concept which can have its objective reality solely in experience; if we think of nature as a system (as indeed we must), then experience must be possible as a system even in terms of empirical laws. Therefore it is a subjectively necessary transcendental presupposition that nature does not have this disturbing boundless heterogeneity of natural forms, but that, rather, through the affinity of its particular laws under more general ones it takes on the quality of experience as an empirical system”\(^{117}\).

If, Kant is saying, there will be such a thing as experience, then, it must be the case that the multiple empirical laws to be met with in experience itself are not wholly different in kind. This is so precisely because radical difference in kind, when it comes to laws, would mean no common condition under which to subsume them — precisely what was discussed as an unavoidable difficulty to the first path. As to avoid the infinite multiplication of empirical laws, Kant’s Jungle as it were, a common condition has to be in place: such common condition is the unity of nature and it is precisely the exploration into the essence of ‘nature’ that will grant what one is after. This is not how nature had been conceived before. In the *Prolegomena*, for example, Kant says the highest question for transcendental philosophy contains, in turn, two distinct questions: the first asks how nature is possible in the material sense, the second asks how nature is possible in the formal sense\(^{118}\); alternatively, the first asks how time and space and all that ‘fills’ them are possible, the second asks how the manifold rules of understanding can possibly be unified. The answer provided for these two questions, in the critical period, had been that nature is “*the whole of all appearances, that is, the sensible world, excluding all nonsensible objects*” in material terms and “*the first inner principle of all that belongs to the existence of a thing*”\(^{119}\) in formal terms. According to the preceding discussions of this investigation this meant that something like Mahler’s *Auferstehungssinfonie* belongs to material nature to the extent that it consists of waves displacing particles in a certain medium, but has a formal nature that differs from its merely physical-mechanical determinations. By the time Kant drafted the first introduction to the third *Critique*,

\(^{117}\) (AA 8:209 [first Intro])

\(^{118}\) (AA 4:110)

\(^{119}\) (AA 4:467)
however, the distinction between material and formal nature is being collapsed into one single question about the condition that unifies, as system, the diversity intrinsic to the condition itself, i.e. ‘nature’. Not only have the answers to these questions changed scope, but also the questions themselves change: the two start being inseparable one from the other to the point where no longer can one distinguish between nature in the ‘formal’ and nature in the ‘material’ sense. Rather, nature itself morphs into the intelligible unity of rules, of laws even, that provides the systematicity of knowledge.

But by the same token, the argument applies not only to ‘nature’ but to transcendental philosophy itself. If in the first Critique and Prolegomena transcendental philosophy was the discipline delineating the boundaries of synthetic a priori judgments\textsuperscript{120}, while drafting the Opus Postumum Kant is claiming something rather different: “Transcendental philosophy is the act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the originator of itself and, thereby, also of the whole object of technical-practical and moral-practical reason in one system”\textsuperscript{121}. The aim of this shift is twofold, as will be seen: on the one hand Kant is trying to overcome a paradox concerning the concept of ‘matter’ yielded by the combination of transcendental philosophy as understood in the critical period and the principles laid out in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. On the other hand, Kant is trying to find a way of justifying an empirical unity that will warrant the systematicity of nature. These will elaborated on in what follows.

Beginning with the paradox, in the third Chapter\textsuperscript{122} of this dissertation it was mentioned how curious it was that Kant would articulate, in the first Critique, the principle behind the Anticipations of Perception as follows: “In all appearances sensation, and the real [das Reale] which corresponds to it in the object (realitas phaenomenon), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree”\textsuperscript{123}. It was characterised as curious because it is difficult to see, given that one is dealing with a synthetic a priori judgment, in what sense this could constitute an ‘anticipation’ in the first place. Back in that discussion, little depended on this. Now, however, it can be seen that this curiosity echoed in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is not just as a

\textsuperscript{120} (AA 4:279)
\textsuperscript{121} (AA 21:78)
\textsuperscript{122} (Ch. III, §ii, p. 115)
\textsuperscript{123} (A 166)
poor choice of words but, rather, as a flagrant inconsistency. As Sebastian Rand has pointed out, the 1786 work departs with an obvious contradiction: on the one hand Kant asserts that metaphysics, as presented there, is a wholly *a priori* science; on the other, he asserts that such science takes the empirical concept of matter as its basis. But how are these two compatible, if at all? If one departs from an empirical concept, of whatever, it will be impossible to, then, grant an *a priori* status to whichever claims one appends to that concept (indeed, a lot of the second Critique’s arguments depend on this being true). Conversely, if one departs from a purely *a priori* concept, it is close to impossible to see how one will get empirical content into it and still maintain that concept as being *a priori* save insofar as one introduces something like a doctrine of sensibilisation, as this investigation has shown.

But this problem is not completely unrelated to the further issue of systematising the entirety of transcendental and empirical knowledge under the heading of a unity. In the critical period the unity of the various operations carried out by the understanding according to its functions of unifications was warranted by the synthetic unity of apperception and the fundamental role the power of imagination played in delineating the temporal structure of the categories. But as mentioned before, in the new characterisation of transcendental philosophy, ‘the act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes originator of itself’ is supposed to provide the unity of the system. In the Analogies of Experience, along with the Refutation of Idealism, the categories of relation govern things as appearances and space was only a way for finite reason to represent things as ‘outside of itself’ – things that are nonetheless “*in uns*” – ‘Consciousness of our own existence’, however, was what proved that “*only through things outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me*” does one have experience. But this, as Burkhard Tuschling puts it, boils down the whole problem to the following question:

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124 Kant himself recognises this, as expressed in a letter to Beck from October 16, 1792, where Kant admits that his argument for the construction of matter in the *MFNS* moves in a circle (AA 11:376-377).
126 (AA 4:469); (A847/B875)
127 (AA 4:470); (A848/B876)
128 Amongst others the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy (AA 5:33-34).
129 “*The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence* [Daseins] *proves the existence of objects* [Gegenstände] *in space outside me*” (B275).
130 (A370)
131 (B275)
“How can an existent independent of us as knowing subjects be, nevertheless, nothing but an existent only ‘in appearance’ or ‘for us’? (…) Or, what is the same thing from the standpoint of transcendental idealism, how can ‘the original apperception’ through a priori reference to the mere form of inner sense alone determine the existence of appearances in such a way that ‘a priori determined synthetic unity’ is produced ‘in the time-relation of all perceptions’? (A177/B220)”

It had been apperception in relation to intuitions by means of time that had been enough to warrant that objects ‘ausser uns’ are objects ‘in uns’ – even if not being only objects in us–. But this, because of the paradox of matter mentioned before, does not seem to suffice anymore. Instead, now Kant needs to show that apperception is essentially related to intuitions and needs to be thus through the fundamental form of sensibility and its content. In other words, Kant needs to argue that the form of intuition by itself is no longer sufficient as a warrant and needs to show, instead, that the entirety of content of intuition is somehow also in the subject. This is why Kant emphasises in the Opus Postumum that the unity of time would remain completely empty were it not because of a dynamic continuum, i.e. the ether.

The combination of these factors, points to a new and more specific phrasing of the problem stated at the beginning of this section. In the post-critical period, the need is to show that the synthetic unity of apperception, through the same forms of intuition developed before, relates to the empirical manifold thought of as a system in itself. This newly discovered empirical system, to which Kant refers as the world-system, the dynamic continuum, the system of elementary forces, and even the cosmic whole, is supposed to provide the empirical self, in its relation to the unity of apperception, with the possibility of unified experience. The way in which the

133 Ibid. p. 199.
134 “Now what is at issue in the question whether there is an all-penetrating elementary material is the subjective element of receptivity to the sense-object, [necessary] for this material to be the object of a synthetic universal experience (…) Hence, the material must be valid both subjectively, as the basis of the representation of the whole of experience, and objectively, as a principle for the unification of the moving forces of matter” (AA 20:554).
135 (AA 22:200)
136 (AA 21:194)
137 (AA 22:193)
138 (AA 21:217)
Opus Postumum does this, is by means of an all pervading force that is as an “a priori demonstrable material”, a “primordial material [the reality of which] can only be verified by reason”\(^\text{139}\), or “the real and objective principle of experience”\(^\text{140}\). It is therefore clear that the ‘proof’ or deduction for this “cosmic whole from single matter”\(^\text{141}\) is of crucial importance. From the Metaphysical Foundations one knows that, in whatever way physical bodies are formed, they will nonetheless presuppose moving forces for their formation. In the Opus Postumum, the world-system is supposed to transform the forms of intuition into a unified object of possible experience. In fact, the world-system becomes the objective pole that acts as the sensible condition under which the application of a notion as basic as ‘matter’ will arise:

“Such a system cannot arise from mere experiences, for that would yield only aggregates which lack the completeness of a whole; nor can it come about solely a priori, for that would be metaphysical foundations, which however, contained no moving forces”\(^\text{142}\).

Or, yet more precisely put:

“The determinability of space and time, a priori by the understanding, in respect of the moving forces of matter, is the tendency of the metaphysical foundations of natural science towards physics; and the transition to it is the filling of the void by means of those forms which regard all objects of experience in their unity. It [the filling of the void] is the product of the idea of the whole, in the thoroughgoing, self-determining intuition of oneself”\(^\text{143}\).

If indeed the world-system or continuum provides a solution to the problem of being able to account for unified experience by means of an empirical system, then, the whole notion of ‘object of possible experience’ must have shifted: an object is no longer “that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united”\(^\text{144}\) but, instead, is the product of having blurred the boundaries that distinguished space and

\(^{139}\) (AA 21:219)  
\(^{140}\) (AA 21:224)  
\(^{141}\) (AA 21:217)  
\(^{142}\) (AA 21:478)  
\(^{143}\) (AA 22:193)  
\(^{144}\) (B137)
time from each other, and of having blurred the boundary of what is ‘in uns’ and what ‘ausser uns’\textsuperscript{145}. The outer and the inner, becoming almost indistinguishable from each other, thus make room for the notion of a fundamental force. When Kant says that “The material which, with its agitating forces (...) carries with it in its concept unity of the whole of all possible experience (according to the principle of identity)”\textsuperscript{146}, a new relation between apperception and the empirical is constructed: the only object of possible experience is matter (organic and inorganic) as it is constituted in the world-system. This is extremely important to bear in mind: the world-system just is the combination of time and space, once these have been extended beyond intuition itself and transformed into the loci of forces. If this is neglected, then one would end up, like Tuschling, having to criticise Kant for asserting that the only object of possible experience is primordial matter. In doing so, Tuschling thinks, Kant is downgrading space and time to merely relational determinations of things (they, themselves, are no longer objects of possible experience, after all)\textsuperscript{147}. But in this regard Tuschling is mistaken: Kant has certainly drifted from the commitments found in the first Critique but not so much as to make of space and time solely relational determinations. Instead, Kant is temporalising (and to some extent spatialising) the systematicity of nature as a unity. How this happens, however, remains to be seen.

In order to see how Kant spatio-temporalises the systematicity of nature, and to be able to come to an end, it will be important to bear in mind the questions with which this section began (of whether an uncategorised schema was possible in transcendental philosophy and whether, if it were, it would be able to ground a synthetic a priori principle that would justify the unity of experience). What was just seen is that:

“The transition to physics, consequently, is the predetermined (praedeterminatio) of the inner active relations of the subject that combines perceptions to the unity of experience (...) namely, [through] a principle of the a priori division of the moving forces according to their relations –as ponderable or imponderable, coercible or incoercible, cohesible or

\textsuperscript{145} “Space and time are products (but primitive products) of our own imagination, hence self-created intuitions, inasmuch as the subject affects itself and is thereby appearance, not thing in itself. The material element –the thing in itself- is=x, the mere representation of one’s own activity” (AA22:37); (AA 22:439-442);
\textsuperscript{146} (AA 21:551)
incohesive, finally as exhaustible or inexhaustible matter with its moving forces"\textsuperscript{148}.

What then is that supposed principle of the \textit{a priori} division of moving forces? As Eckart Förster has argued, it is in answer to this question that Kant’s doctrine of self-positing, the infamous Selbstsetzungslehre, comes in\textsuperscript{149}. It was seen in the second Chapter that the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of unity are interdependent. This meant that even if the ‘I think’ preceded experience in some way, it still would be the case that empirical experience would have to be given of one’s self as carrying out some kind of synthesis. But as Förster notes\textsuperscript{150}, in the \textit{Opus Postumum}, this is shifted slightly: “The first act of the faculty of representation is the consciousness of oneself through which the subject makes itself into an object”\textsuperscript{151}. This is to say that the very act of transforming one’s self into an object is pure self-consciousness. Kant then goes on: “The consciousness of oneself (apperceptio) is the act of the subject to make itself into an object”\textsuperscript{152}. Now, since pure apperception is not yet a given object at all but rather only the act of transforming one’s self into a giveable object in the first place, Kant thinks the task is to show how exactly the ‘I’ as object of thought (cogitabile) becomes an empirical object (dabile). In words more in line with the second Chapter’s discussion of self-affection, the question to be asked becomes ‘how does one move from the ‘analyticity’ of the ‘I’ to the ‘syntheticity’ of the ‘I’?’

Note that, again with Förster\textsuperscript{153}, the first, the analytic unity of self-consciousness, would not take place were it not because of the second, the synthetic unity of consciousness. Förster calls the first step ‘explicative’, insofar as it implies the determinability of self-consciousness, but the second step he calls ‘ampliative’, insofar as it implies that one posits one’s self in space-time relations as pure intuition\textsuperscript{154}. But even looking at the movement thus, the question, even if moved, would remain for, how exactly does one go from a synthetic unity in pure intuition to any kind of empirical knowledge? In Kant’s doctrine of self-positing, the world-system is posited alongside the self: since being is not a ‘real’ predicate, knowledge

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{148} (AA 22:337)
\textsuperscript{149} Förster, Eckart. \textit{Kant’s Final Synthesis}. Harvard University Press, MA, 2000, pp. 94-98.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid. pp. 102ff.
\textsuperscript{151} (AA 22:77)
\textsuperscript{152} (AA 22: 413)
\textsuperscript{154} (AA 22:420)
\end{footnotesize}
of one’s own being must consist in determining the manifold, positing a series of representations, under the concept of one’s empirical self while maintaining something ‘outside the concept’. That ‘outside the concept’ are the forces which make up the world-system in relation to the self. But if this ‘outside the concept’ status of forces is not to breach the boundaries of transcendental philosophy, then it needs justification. By this point, in the *Opus Postumum* that is, Kant has resources that were unavailable during the first *Critique*: organic forces.

If together with thinking of how to transform the analytic unity of consciousness into a synthetic unity of consciousness one questions how is it possible to think of the empirical self in the first place, the relevance of organic forces comes to the fore: the self will begin thinking of itself as containing intuitable properties of its own doing. One can think of spontaneous intentional action by means of organised beings, in other words, because one’s self is one such organised being. This provides Kant with an answer: “Because man is conscious of himself as a self-moving machine, without being able to further understand such a possibility, he can, and is entitled to, introduce a priori organic-moving forces of bodies into the classification of bodies in general”\(^\text{155}\). So, because one is a corporalised or embodied organic system, one can be affected by the forces affecting matter in general; but only insofar as one represents one’s self as being affected does one appear as an object. In other words, these are two sides of the same coin: “Positing and perception, spontaneity and receptivity, the objective and subjective relation, are simultaneous; because they are identical as to time, as appearances of how the subject is affected –thus are given a priori in the same actus”\(^\text{156}\).

> “The subject –says Kant– affects itself and becomes an object in appearance for itself in the composition of the moving forces”\(^\text{157}\). It affects itself by means of two principles: a mechanical one and a dynamical one. The mechanical principle, one which seems to presuppose some level of activity even within sensibility, answers to pressure (the lever force), traction (the pulley force), and shear (the inclined plane force). This is why, and this is crucial, space and time have to become, then, not only forms of sensibility but “forms of our effective forces [Formen unserer

\(^{155}\text{(AA 21: 212-213)}}
\(^{156}\text{(AA 22:466)}}
\(^{157}\text{(AA 21:364)}}
Wirkungskräfte]"158. In other words, space and time become here forms through which one acts and reacts in the affectivity of the senses. The dynamical principle, one which seems to presuppose the forces grounding solidity and cohesion, answers to ponderability, coercibility, cohesibility, and exhaustibility. And that which grounds both principles, as seen before, is the infinite and original continuum known as the world-system. This is why Förster characterises the doctrine of self-affection, in this sense, as the doctrine of how the logical act of self-consciousness becomes and empirically loaded act159.

"The representation of apperception which makes itself into an object of intuition contains a twofold act: first, that of positing itself (the act of spontaneity); and, that of being affected by objects and combining the manifold in representation to a priori unity (the act of receptivity)"160.

One posits one’s self as a duplet subject-object, the duplet appears in sensibility as attached to mechanical and dynamical forces because it has been posited in accordance with four ‘acts’ (ponderability, coercibility, cohesibility and exhaustibility), and in doing so, self-affection becomes part of an empirical system of representation the unity of which lies, on one side, with pure subjectivity, and on the other, with pure objectivity (the world-system or collective unity of the continuum)161.

The brief sketch given above of the Selbstsetzungslehre illustrates neatly two things. It illustrates the newly acquired role of the forms of intuition as unified locus of motive forces, first, and it illustrates Kant’s attempt at overcoming the paradox of matter enunciated above. This is what makes the Opus Postumum a ‘transition’ from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics: the subject has been provided, by itself, with the blueprint or guidelines to continue its investigation of nature according to the general categorial distribution of forces manifest in self-affection162. The spontaneity of the understanding willingly163 makes itself into an object –this is the first step referred to above that ultimately starts everything: “The

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158 (AA 21:38)
160 (AA 22:31)
161 (AA 22:508)
162 (AA 22:566)
163 (AA 22:22)
understanding begins with the consciousness of itself (apperceptio) and performs thereby a logical act. To this the manifold of outer and inner intuition attaches itself serially, and the subject makes itself into an object in a limitless sequence”\textsuperscript{164}.

Along with the former, and by implication, if the world-system is the “supreme [and in virtue of its essence ‘sensible’] condition of the possibility of experience of objects in general”\textsuperscript{165} then the answer to whether there is an uncategorised schema must be in the affirmative. The unity towards which a system of laws is directed is not in this case an idea of reason as it was before but is, rather, the objective correlate of the unity of apperception that, in its own self-positing as subject-object, constitutes the continuum itself:

“I am an object [Gegenstand] of myself and my representations. That there still is something outside of me is only a product of myself. I make myself. Space cannot be perceived (but nor can the moving forces in space insofar as the body that effects them as products does not represent them). We make it all ourselves [Wir machen alles selbst]”\textsuperscript{166}.

By ‘expanding’ or ‘extending’ the spatio-temporal continuum, by transforming it from being the form of intuition into being the form of actual effective forces, Kant opens transcendental philosophy to the possibility of thinking of nature as constitutively systematic –not just for reflective judgment, but for determining judgment, too. There is a purpose inherent to matter that can only be made intelligible through thinking of the organisation of matter as the systematic and purposeful product of a self-affecting subject-object. Because, in other words, the forms of intuition have been displaced –moved sideways, as it were, towards the ‘ausser uns’ (or, rather, because the ‘ausser uns’ has been moved sideways towards the ‘in uns’)\textsuperscript{167}, and because the unity to be met with in those forms of intuition just is the unity of subjectivity posited as subjective-objective unity, the forces by which matter abides

\textsuperscript{164} (AA 22:82) Because of the difficulty of the doctrine, a literary image might be helpful. In H.G. Wells’ Time Machine, the traveller describes time travelling as “an excessively unpleasant sensation”: the intersection of corporality and temporality is beautifully illustrated in these passages: the organic body becomes disoriented and nauseated because the progress of its own self-constitution, as it were, does not match the immediate progression of time.

\textsuperscript{165} (AA 21:554, 551, 559)

\textsuperscript{166} (AA 22:82)

\textsuperscript{167} It can only be conjectured whether this is the product of the power of imagination since the imagination itself loses, in the Opus Postumum, its Critical prevalence. That having been said, Kant does claim that “Space and time (…) are only given in the subject, that is, their representation is an act of the subject itself and a product of the imagination” (AA 22:76). Vid. (AA 22:37)
confer upon it its own aim or end. The world-system is an all-encompassing schema the sensible and affective nature of which determines not only the time-relations, as it did in the first Critique, of the functions of the understanding; it now, also, determines the space-relations that ultimately constitute whatever and however matter might be encountered: “The Transition is the Schematism of the composition of moving forces insofar as these constitute a system adequate to the form of the a priori division of general physics, hence, an architectonic of natural science”\textsuperscript{168}.

This point leads to my last remark in this section. Although in the previous reconstruction Förster’s reading of the Selbstsetzungslehre was followed closely, there is yet a point to be made: Förster’s interpretation needs to be complemented by something Mathieu has rightly mentioned, i.e. the centrality of the schematism in the Opus Postumum\textsuperscript{169}. Förster is doubtlessly correct, as was mentioned before, in pointing out that Mathieu misconstrues the insufficiency of the principle of purposiveness. Indeed, it is not the ‘as if’ character of the principle that became problematic for Kant but, rather, the fact that the principle fails to grasp the almost infinite specificity of natural empirical laws that are supposed to be governed by it\textsuperscript{170}. In light of the argument developed above, it is also true, however, that it is impossible to ignore the aspect of the Opus Postumum whereby Kant seeks to provide a “Schematism of the power of judgment through the principles of subsumption of appearances under the law of perception”\textsuperscript{171} (principle through which Kant tries to answer the question of how the so-called transition is possible in the first place). Indeed, Kant speaks repeatedly of such a thing as a schematism of the system of forces\textsuperscript{172}, a schematism of concepts\textsuperscript{173}, or, even, of a temporally mediated system of perceptions\textsuperscript{174}. Förster, not unaware of this, claims, first, that a spatial schematism had been developed in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science because the schematism doctrine of the first Critique had only provided the necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the applicability of the categories\textsuperscript{175}. And claims, second, that because the Metaphysical Foundations failed to provide a non-circular definition of matter, Kant would supplement that spatial schematism with the

\textsuperscript{168} (AA 21:263)
\textsuperscript{171} (AA 22:491)
\textsuperscript{172} (AA 22:265); (AA 22:330); (AA 22:487); (AA 22:505)
\textsuperscript{173} (AA 21:169)
\textsuperscript{174} (AA 22:466)
Selbstsetzungslehre in the *Opus Postumum*: that “Selbstsetzung thus provides the schema for outer sense, the condition under which something can be given as object, or ‘the sensible concept, of an object in agreement with the category ’(A146)”\(^{176}\).

But as was seen moments ago, if self-positing brings anything into the equation, it must be by means of blurring the erstwhile ‘clear’ distinction between what makes up the spatial and what the temporal as such. That the world-system emerged as a schema in the first place answers precisely to the fact that inner and outer sense in the *Opus Postumum* can no longer be clearly distinguished from one another: “Space and time are forms of outer an inner intuition, given a priori in one synthetic representation; that is, they are inseparable, mutually dependent representations”\(^{177}\). It is undoubtedly true that without a schema, understood as the temporal determination that works as sensible condition for the validity of concepts, transcendental philosophy would be unable to connect the pure concepts of the understanding with the general principles. But given the previous argument, from the *Opus Postumum* it seems equally true that without a schema the metaphysical principles would moreover be unable to connect to specific empirical laws. In light of this, the stronger path answers again the question of whether transcendental philosophy allows for an uncategorised schema to ‘govern’ appearances. Unlike the weaker path where purposiveness presents a transcendental but only subjectively constitutive future-oriented schema for which no concept is suitable, the *Opus Postumum*’s stronger path suggests that the world-system presents an equally transcendental but objectively constitutive schema for which, also, no concept is suitable\(^{178}\). Unlike the first quasi-schematic symbol that is a product of the imagination in relation to reason, quasi-schema the nature of which is merely problematic; the schematic world-system, the existence of which can be predicated categorically, is a product of one’s self-positing as an organic, embodied being.

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\(^{176}\) Ibid. p. 114.

\(^{177}\) (AA 22:98)

\(^{178}\) “There is not a merely regulative, but also constitutive formal principle, existing a priori, of the science of nature, for the purpose of a system” (AA 22:240) and “(…) metaphysical principles exhibit a tendency towards physics understood as Empirical System to which formal principles a priori belong, and to which a Schema that signals beforehand the a priori physical loci for the empirical also belongs (…)” (AA 21:485). This is why Duque characterises the general task of the *Opus Postumum* as follows: “La tarea que el O. P. se propone, consecuentemente, es la de hacer pasar a la física de agregado a sistema. Lo cual quiere decir, en profundidad, demostrar la validez y fecundidad de la filosofía kantiana” Duque, Félix. “Física y filosofía en el último Kant” *Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica*, Vol. 9, No.9, 1974, pp. 61-74, p. 65.
This chapter departed from noting that, while transcendental philosophy maintains that time is the form of all appearances whatsoever, it also maintains that there are appearances independently from the functions of the understanding. This was taken to signify, in accordance with the general spirit of a critical project, that one must be able to provide an a priori synthetic principle governing such appearing without necessarily appealing to the pure concepts of the understanding. Based on Franks’ and Tuschling’s readings of the aftermath of the Critique of Pure Reason, it was argued, therefore, that critical philosophy found itself in the position of having to justify an uncategorial mode of appearing and that it pursued such justification in two distinct ways.

The first of these ways, characterised as the weaker of the two, departed from looking back at the nature of judgment itself and asked whether or not judgment has, in its reflective capacity, resources to justify the syntheticity of its own principle. It was argued that, because the principle of purposiveness is brought about by Kant precisely in opposition to the principles of the understanding, and because the former is itself a synthetic a priori principle that partakes in the form of striving towards an end, the exhibition of a future oriented tendency is manifest in purposiveness hypotypically. Indeed, the principle of purposiveness was seen to be grounded on the symbolic exhibition of future orientation derived from the spontaneity of the will. It was seen, moreover, that the imagination ‘uses’ this principle to reconfigure the structural relations in which it will find appearances and allows judgment to engage with such appearances by referring back to its own activity. Thus, in virtue of the form of the subjective faculties and by means of referring back to its own activity, the imagination makes way for an alternate set of relations in which one can inscribe objects such as living beings and artworks. From this it was seen, finally, that although something schema-like is in fact operating as the validating condition for reflective judgment (without being subordinate to the concepts of the understanding), the case remains nonetheless that the most one can say about the principle that makes use of such uncategorised schema is that it might be constitutive, but for reflective judgment only.

The second way, characterised in this Chapter as the stronger of the two, does
not postulate a synthetic *a priori* principle problematically but offers, instead, a unitary system of nature that acts as the validating condition for the transition from metaphysical principles to empirical laws. It was argued that, partly in response to a paradoxical definition of matter, and partly in an effort to account not for the aggregative, but for the systematic unity of the laws of nature, Kant introduces the world-system as the schema-like structure that confers matter itself with objective validity as it is constituted through forces. In this sense, the relevance of the *Opus Postumum*’s doctrine of self-positing is difficult to overestimate: in showing how the ‘I’ goes from being the subject of thought to being an empirical object, Kant is forced to introduce an empirical unity that is divided systematically in accordance with the divisions of the understanding. Thus, in this account, the systematic division of forces follows the systematic division of the understanding. This implies, in turn, that the locus of those systematic forces can no longer be characterised merely as a form of intuition in the subject and must, instead, be characterised as a spatio-temporal empirical continuum within which forces first and foremost come to constitute matter. Even though this makes it, as an outcome, increasingly complicated to distinguish between the spatial and the temporal in the world-system, it is warranted to speak of this world-system itself as a schema to the extent that, in spite of the shifts through which it undergoes, it still operates as the sensible condition that grants objective validity to concepts. The question after these elucidations is not so much whether transcendental philosophy manages to accommodate such a thing as an uncategorised schema. The question, in light of the stronger path developed in the second section of this last chapter is rather whether transcendental philosophy can indeed accommodate such a notion—or if, alternatively, this already falls beyond its limits—.
Conclusion

For an investigation that defends the triple thesis that time is affection of the self, that in the activity of affecting one’s self there is positive determination of content, and, finally, that this determined content may exceed what is captured in the concept, a problem looms on the horizon. The issue is related to the permanence of the matter of appearances and the exact nature of the content, as opposed to the form, of objects. The problem resides, specifically, in that transcendental philosophy requires that something be permanent in perception if it is not to descend into absolute idealism. In what follows, by making use of the conclusions reached so far, it will be seen that the preceding investigation illuminates Kant’s often obscure remarks about this supposed subsistent but it will be seen, also, that this interpretation has limitations. Whereas adequately conceiving of time in transcendental philosophy helps in dissipating some of the worries related to Kant’s doctrine of permanence and matter, it will be noted that, in fact, the doctrine confirms more than anything the importance of receptivity in the subjective constitution of objectivity. But from this limitation an interesting question will be seen to arise for further philosophical investigation. The fourth Chapter bracketed the discussion of the way in which one ought to conceive of the relation between the two possible paths, the weaker and the stronger, articulating uncategorised appearances, or the supposed ‘excess’ of content in intuition provided by self-affection. This issue is directly related, as will be seen below, to the problem of the permanence or subsistence of something that lies beyond intuition. It will be seen in what follows, and to be able to come to an end, that conceiving of self-affection as a provider of content in and for experience can orient inquiries into the relation between Critical and post-Critical philosophy in new, philosophically interesting directions.

Soon after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason, an anonymous review appeared in the Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen explicitly likening Kant’s and Berkley’s idealisms. In 1782 Christian Garve wrote, and Johann Feder endorsed by editing, that a “(...) basic pillar of the Kantian system rests on these concepts of sensations as mere modifications of ourselves (on which Berkeley, too, principally

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1 One can think, therefore, of the problem of permanence as being most immediately related to what was defended in the second and third Chapters and think of the questions this problem elicits as being most immediately related that what was defended in the fourth Chapter of this Dissertation.
builds his idealism), and of space and time.” Because the Critique defends that both time and space are merely subjective forms of intuition, the reviewer reasoned, the same work must also be committed to accepting the further thesis that no external criterion for determining the veracity of sensations exists. This, in turn, although problematic at the level of being unable to differentiate between reverie and reality, is devastating when one wants to uphold a division between inner and outer sense. If all is but a modification of the mind, or so the argument goes, what difference is there between something occurring in one’s self and something occurring out of one’s self? The incapacity to uphold the distinction, the reviewer pointed out, inevitably led Kant to confuse what legitimately pertains to inner sense and what pertains to outer sense and, ultimately, led him to confuse transcendental idealism and any other form of idealism that preceded it.

To say that Kant was unimpressed with the review, in light of the Appendix to the Prolegomena, is somewhat of an understatement. Kant thought the reviewer had completely misconstrued transcendental philosophy, had failed to understand exactly in what way transcendental idealism opposes traditional idealisms, had passed judgment on the Critique ‘en gros’ and not ‘en détail’ – as would have been fair in Kant’s view, and overall “understood nothing of the work and perhaps of the spirit and nature of metaphysics itself.” The worries enunciated by Garve, after all, had been rendered neutral, in Kant’s view, precisely by having articulated the problem of general metaphysics as being reducible to demonstrating the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. Indeed, the Critique had shown that “metaphysics is absolutely nothing [ganz und gar nichts ist] without the apodictic certainty of these [synthetic a priori] propositions.”

Garve’s gross misinterpretation of the general aim of transcendental philosophy, a misinterpretation that confuses the thesis that “All cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion, and there is truth only in the

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3 Ibid. p. 58.
4 (AA 4:372-383)
5 (AA 4:374)
6 (AA 4:374-375)
7 (AA 4:376)
8 (AA 4:376)
9 (AA 4:378)
ideas of pure understanding and reason” with its opposite, namely that “All cognition of things out of mere pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and there is truth only in experience”\textsuperscript{10}, merited in Kant’s eyes an elaborate response. Thus, in answer to Garve and to similar worries that might have emerged from misconstruing transcendental idealism, Kant responds in the Introduction to the second edition of the first Critique, in reformulating the fourth Paralogism, in the aforementioned Appendix (“On what can be done in order to make Metaphysics as Science actual’) of the Prolegomena, and, briefly but crucially, in the Refutation of Idealism (the only “new argument, properly so-called, in the new edition of the Critique”\textsuperscript{11}).

Because of its conciseness, elegance, and power, and because the argument presented there can be read as most directly challenging the interpretation developed in Chapters II and III of this dissertation, the discussion of the problem will centre on the Refutation. The thesis for which Kant offers a one paragraph proof reads thus: “The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me”\textsuperscript{12}. This is the case because consciousness of one’s own existence is determined in time and determination in time presupposes permanence in perception. Now, since permanence itself is not something one can derive solely from within one’s self, and instead is something the nature of which appeals to something without one’s self, it then follows that determination of one’s own existence in time is possible only through the actual, or real, existence of something beyond mere representations.

From a first reading the challenge that the Refutation of Idealism poses for the argument developed in the preceding investigation is obvious: time, it was defended in the second Chapter, is affection of the self through that self’s own activity of synthesis. In the third Chapter it was further defended that this activity is objectivising in the sense that it provides the understanding with a specific configuring frame that renders objects possible. If that is the case, then, it surely must be the case that anything beyond representations must be altogether forfeited on the grounds that, again, inner sense is the form of all intuition. The Refutation, however, claims that there is indeed something beyond one’s representations, i.e. permanence,

\textsuperscript{10} (AA 4:374)
\textsuperscript{11} (Bxxxixfn)
\textsuperscript{12} (B275)
and that only that permanence provides the sufficient condition for empirical determination in time. It would seem, furthermore, that if the Refutation advocates anything, at the very least it must advocate the dependence of inner sense on outer sense. As the B-Introduction makes clear, “outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something actual outside me, and the reality of outer sense, in its distinction from imagination, rests simply on that which is here found to take place, namely, its being inseparably bound with inner experience, as the condition for its possibility”\textsuperscript{13}. This amounts to saying, in short, that inner experience is possible only mediate so, that is, mediated through outer sense or experience of something that lies beyond one’s own mere activity\textsuperscript{14}. How is this, therefore, compatible, if at all, with what has been argued throughout this investigation?

Before addressing the challenge ‘frontally’, it is worth making three contextual remarks about the Refutation of Idealism\textsuperscript{15}. The first is that the Refutation has a history behind it that justifies its existence. As was mentioned above, the Garve/Feder review of the first Critique’s A-Edition tended to overemphasise transcendental idealism’s idealist claims (it made Kant sound Berkleian by referring to the former’s system as an idealist of the ‘higher order’\textsuperscript{16}). In response to that, Kant downplayed the idealist claims in the Prolegomena by addressing Berkleian idealism and in the B-Edition of the Critique by addressing problematic, i.e. Cartesian, idealism. This matters because it shows that Kant thought, by 1787, that dogmatic idealism had been dealt with already (in the Aesthetic of the first Critique and, presumably, in the Prolegomena) and considered it pertinent to address problematic idealism only. The second contextual remark has to do with the location of the Refutation in relation to the rest of the Analytic: it appears as a corollary to the second Postulate that, importantly, reads as follows: “That which hangs together [zusammenhängt] with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual [modified]”\textsuperscript{17}. This is related to the previous point but is worth mentioning independently because in the 1782 review, Garve had written that he was unable to comprehend “how the distinction of what is actual from what is imagined and merely

\textsuperscript{13} (BxIfn)  
\textsuperscript{14} (B277)  
\textsuperscript{15} For good contextual literature on the Refutation of Idealism specifically, see Bader, Ralf. “The Role of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism” in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 94:1, 2012, pp. 53-73. For a good reconstruction of the argument see Förster, Eckart “Kant’s Refutation of Idealism” in Holland, A.J. (ed.). Philosophy, its History and Historiography. Reidel, Dodrecht, 1985, pp. 287-304.  
\textsuperscript{16} Feder/Garve Op. Cit. pp. 53-54.  
\textsuperscript{17} (A218/B266)
possible, a distinction that is generally so easy for human understanding, could be sufficiently grounded in the mere application of concepts of understanding without assuming one mark of actuality in sensation itself [my emphasis]. Because of the terminology employed by Garve (e.g. actuality/possibility), and because of the specific problem he is raising here, it is important to note where Kant thought it adequate to add the Refutation of Idealism, viz. after the second Postulate. Indeed, the Refutation accompanies the Postulate of Empirical Thought that relates to the schema of actuality and does not accompany, in spite of what the Refutation itself discusses, the Analogy that relates to the schema of permanence. Lastly, the third contextual remark, and the most important to bear in mind, is that what Kant is discussing in the Refutation is not the possibility of perceiving things outside of one’s self, but the possibility of experience. Kant describes ‘perception’ as “consciousness in which sensation can be found” and describes ‘experience’ as “a synthesis of perceptions, not contained in perception but itself containing in one consciousness the synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions.” Experience, that is, is rendered possible in the first place through representing a necessary connection of perceptions. This means, in turn, that Kant’s concern in the Refutation ought to be understood as partly addressing the problem of the external correlate of perception but partly addressing, also, the problem of being able to transform such perceptions into actual, objectively valid experience.

With the previous remarks in mind, the challenge posed by the Refutation of Idealism is not rendered inert, certainly, but it does become easier to tackle. The Refutation departs from announcing that “The required proof must, therefore, show that we have experience, and not merely imagination of outer things; and this, it would seem, cannot be achieved save by proof that even our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only under the assumption of outer experience [Kant’s emphasis].” What, then, does experience mean here? And why would Kant feel the need to emphasise that specific noun? It was argued earlier, in relation to the distinction between mathematical-constitutive and dynamical-regulative judgments, categories, schemata, and principles, that Kant considers

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19 (A166/B207) Kant is ambiguous with the term ‘perception’, but the above definition may be corroborated in (A120); (B147); (A225;B272).
20 (A177/B219)
21 (B275)
22 (Ch. III, §ii, pp. 116-120)
‘experience’ only that which is governed by the four subsets of principles. This ruled out, for example, figments of the imagination that do not necessarily abide by the regularity imposed by the Analogies. It did not rule out but reinforce, however, that whenever there is a relation of two or more existing appearances at stake, the relational and modal judgments, categories, schemata, and principles must be in operation. In this light, what the Refutation is stating is that if (note the hypothetical) experience will be had, then, it will be had only on the assumption [Voraussetzung] of an externally existing correlate of one’s representations. If the question were, as it was discussed in Chapter II, about merely affecting one’s self then, as was proved before, the problem would not arise since one need not differentiate between concoctions of imagination and an external realm. After all, Kant is clear in the fourth Paralogism (re-written for the second edition of the Critique) that “External objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my representations”\textsuperscript{23}. The question in the Refutation, however, is not about merely affecting one’s self but about having secure experience of outer things and, in this sense, mere perception of external objects does not suffice. Instead, the claim must be much stronger: for experience to arise, the existence of these objects must factor in the equation –factored in, in fact, in a peculiar way: namely by assuming their existence–. The bar for something to count as experience, strictly speaking, is set very high by Kant: not all imaginative association amounts to experience and thinking that it did would have catastrophic consequences for transcendental philosophy. Only orderly, i.e. Analogy- and Postulate-governed, appearances amount to experience. This is why Kant draws a contrast between experience and representation in the Introduction when he claims that “through inner experience I am conscious of my existence in time (consequently also of its determinability in time), and this is more than to be conscious merely of a representation of myself [modified]”\textsuperscript{24}. Kant, in other words, does not think that dreams and perceptions of outer things differ essentially, for they do not\textsuperscript{25}. They differ, rather, in that dreams lack the order and regularity generated in the rule according to which one combines several different representations that will eventually transform mere perception into full-blooded experience\textsuperscript{26}. In sum, the argument in the Refutation should be read as providing proof that, to have experience even of one’s self –but, again, only experience of one’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[23] (A370)
\item[24] (Bxxxix-xlfn)
\item[25] (A375-376)
\item[26] (AA 4:290)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
self–, existence and permanence must be assumed as adding something to the associations of the a priori relations in the imagination.

And what about the claim that outer sense is ‘the condition for the possibility of inner experience’ cited above? In a note to himself Kant made in relation to the Refutation, note that has come to be known as the Leningrad Fragment, Kant claims “I am immediately and originally conscious of myself as a being in the world and only thereby is my own existence determinable as a magnitude in time”27. Unlike pure apperception, empirical apperception includes existence in its determination: if pure apperception “merely asserts ‘I am’”, empirical apperception asserts “that I was, I am, and I will be, i.e., I am a thing of past, present, and future time”28. The claim about outer sense being the condition for the possibility of inner experience, therefore, cannot mean that one must presuppose outer sense or, rather, the matter that belongs to it as conditioning a priori all that may appear in inner sense. It must mean, instead, that insofar as empirical determination is concerned, a material correlate must be posited alongside the act of determining if one is to account for experience (inner or outer). As soon as existence is factored in, that is, the ‘externality’ of the empirical has to also be factored in. This is why keeping in mind that Kant is addressing problematic, and not dogmatic, idealism was important. Descartes himself had linked experience and externality by affirming, in the Règles pour la direction de l'esprit, that the matter of experience consists of both what one perceives from the outside and what one derives from reflection29. But this is also why it was equally as important to bear in mind the position of the Refutation of Idealism in relation to the rest of the Analytic. Although appearing as a corollary to the second Postulate, the Refutation appeals to permanence, itself the schema of a relational, and not a modal, category. This should be telling of the fact that, although certainly concerned with the way in which appearances relate to one another, as Heidegger says in Being and Time30, the Refutation itself is more concerned with differentiating actuality in relation to thought than permanence of an appearance in relation to other appearances. Differently put, although it certainly is the case that the Refutation of Idealism presupposes the Analogies of Experience and the way in which these dynamically regulate experience

28 (Leningrad Fragment I, P.i)
29 “The matter of experience is what we perceive by sense, what we hear from the lips of others, and generally whatever reaches our understanding either from external sources or from that contemplation which our mind directs backwards on itself” (Descartes, Oeuvres, p.422).
30 (GA 2, §43)
of several objects, it is also the case that the Refutation is concerned with those objects’ relation to thought. In this sense, what the Refutation of Idealism adds to the discussion that comes before it is important: the Postulates govern the way in which existents relate, not to one another for that is Analogical, but to the thinking subject (and yet adding nothing to the intuition of that existent)\(^{31}\).

It was important for Kant, when discussing the proper meaning of *actuality*, to bring in what the material conditions of thought should amount to because otherwise, he would have risked being misinterpreted as claiming that existence of things in themselves was dependent on what appears as actual to thought. Philosophical tradition, from Aristotle onward\(^{32}\), thought of the modal predicates of possibility, actuality, and necessity as being at the same level. This is to say that of any given thing one may predicate its modality in relation to thought as being possible, or actual, or necessary—but not all at the same time. Kant, however, does not think this is the case. As the Appendix to the third Chapter illustrates, the category that lies between possibility and necessity, according to Kant, is not actuality but *existence*. Actuality is, instead, a schema, i.e. a determination of self-affection that works as the sensible condition for the application of the predicate ‘existence’. That schema, in turn, finds its culmination in the Postulate of Empirical Thought that links the connection amongst appearances to the thinking subject that is doing the connecting. Specifically, it states that one will be entitled to claim something as existing if, but only if, that something hangs together with the material conditions of experience.

Thus, Kant could have answered to Garve’s criticism about the impossibility of distinguishing between the actual and the imagined in two ways. The first, if somewhat facetious way would be by simply stating that, in the strictest of terms, because of the fundamental role of the power of imagination in both its transcendental and empirical guises, *the actual is imaginary* –to the extent that schemata are products of the power of imagination–. This answer, however, is insufficient. A hypothetical Garve could have simply responded that, even if it were true that actuality is an imaginary determination of self-affection, it still is the case that an appeal to something *permanent* in perception is necessary for the argument in the Refutation to work. A hypothetical Kant could respond, in similar veins to before, that *permanence itself is imaginary* to the extent that permanence is the schema of

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\(^{31}\) (Ch. III, §ii, p. 125-129)

\(^{32}\) (*Metaphysics*, Δ, 1017a)
substance but, yet again, this would be problematic since the permanent in perception spoken of, and appealed to, in the Refutation of Idealism is not itself an intuition or in any way in us. The second way in which Kant, specifically the interpretation of Kant developed in this investigation, could answer the charge is by referring the accuser back to the first analogy and its respective schema, i.e. subsistence. Self-affection provides the condition under which the application of the concept of substance takes hold. But this is not the only identifiable condition for the application of the concept. That something exist is, also, a condition for the applicability of the category of substance to the extent that the first analogy is not mathematical-constitutive but dynamical-regulative. Thus, two seemingly different conditions are necessary in order to be able to predicate substantiality: the temporal, schematic subsistence and the categorial, modal existence of something. But, because substance is a relational category, it presupposes existence. It thus turns out that the modal category of existence is the pre-condition for the schematic, relational condition of subsistence to be able to do the conditioning in the first place. This, in turn, yields that Kant is using ‘permanence’ in two clearly distinct ways: permanence understood as subsistence, i.e. the schema that works as the sensible condition for the application of the category of substance, and permanence understood as the external enduring correlate of the pre-condition of existence that warrants determination in perception. Although the investigation developed here can, and does shed much needed light on the first use of ‘permanence’, it is limited in what it may say about the second. Indeed, the most it can say is that the permanent in perception that does not reside in us, while being radically other to the self and self’s activity, is that to which cognition is receptive.

The results of this investigation, especially the thesis that self-affection provides determinate content in intuition, should not be read, therefore, as defending that Kant is committed to an Ovidian “est deus in nobis”. It should be read, instead, as indeed defending that “All outer perception, therefore, yields immediate proof of something real in space, or rather, as being the real itself” but only to the extent that the finitude and receptivity of subjectivity are acknowledged. If the game

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33 (B275) 34 The relation between the Analogies and the Postulates is explained by Kant when discussing the first Postulate in (A221/B268). 35 (Ovid, Fasti, VI, 5-6) 36 (A375)
idealists play\textsuperscript{37}, of only granting immediacy and reality to inner experience, has been turned against itself, it is only because inner experience itself consists of a complex bundle of activity and passivity. It would be wholly in line with the basic tenets of the present investigation to advocate in favour of an infinitely creative imagination bound only by the condition of time insofar as the latter characterises the activity through which subjectivity gives rise to its own affectivity. It would be a mistake, however, to think that this investigation is committed to accepting that subjectivity generates \textit{ex nihilo} the totality that affects it. The departure point was, from the very outset, that of a receptive subject the nature of which precludes it from creating that which it intuits. Claiming, therefore, that such subject’s activity provides \textit{some} content, indeed content that structures all further content to be met with, does not amount to saying that the subject’s activity provides \textit{all} content.

This last point leads, however, to an important avenue for further philosophical inquiry. Although there is much ongoing debate in the literature concerning the kind of relation that Kant’s transitional project holds to critical philosophy\textsuperscript{38}, and although the debate is of extreme importance, engaging with it in much detail falls beyond the scope of this Conclusion. Yet, a few remarks on the matter are pertinent for two reasons. The first reason is, as the discussion in Chapter IV made obvious, that the Transition as such is difficult to separate from Kant’s earlier critical works. The second reason is that this admittedly difficult point is related to what was just discussed about the Refutation. The first thing to note regarding the first is something Jean Grondin insisted on when reviewing François Marty’s French edition and translation of the \textit{Opus Postumum}: because of the scope and size of the work, because also of its systematic pretentions, it is clear the \textit{Opus Postumum} stems from worries left unresolved by critical philosophy and especially by the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations} programme\textsuperscript{39}. This should not be taken to mean, however, that the \textit{Opus Postumum} must therefore be a necessarily smooth, organic continuation of what had come before or to mean, as Félix Duque reminds anyone approaching the work, that the \textit{Opus Postumum} is successful in providing the sought-for transition to physics\textsuperscript{40}. It should be taken to mean, however, that even Kant

\begin{footnotes}
\item[37] (B276)
\item[38] A clear picture of the dimensions and importance of the debate emerges from the following, few sources: Tuschling, Mathieu, Förster, Friedman, Duque, and Hall. See Bibliography.
\item[40] Duque, Félix. “Física y filosofía en el último Kant” \textit{Logos: Anales del Seminario de Metafísica}, Vol. 9, No.9, 1974.
\end{footnotes}
himself perceived some kind of deficiency or inadequacy in the 1786 *Metaphysical Foundations* and that, moreover, such deficiency must have been present, even minimally, in the propaedeutic project undertaken in the three *Critiques*.

The question may be boiled down to one about the compatibility between the regulative systematicity of nature as it is conceived in the third *Critique* and the systematic unity of nature as it is conceived in the *Opus Postumum*. The interpretation developed in this Dissertation offers a way to approach this extremely difficult problem\(^41\). Recently, Bryan Hall has identified a dilemma that emerges from a twofold desideratum in Kant’s critical doctrine of substance. The twofold desideratum consists in that Kant needs to maintain, both, that empirical objects are substances to the extent that they endure and are subordinated to causality, and that there must be a general Substance the lasting of which guarantees that empirical substances do not arise or disappear outside of the unity of time. The desideratum, in turn, gives rise to the following dilemma: if the general Substance is substantive in the categorical sense, then there would seem to be little resources, in Critical philosophy as Hall conceives it, to then go on and identify individual empirical substances; but if it is substances that are substantive in the categorical sense, then there would be no resources to conceive of the general Substance as a single substantive whole\(^42\). The dilemma will be resolved by Kant, in Hall’s view, by trying to overcome the infamous ‘gap’\(^43\) generated by the dilemma through positing a new *a priori* concept of general Substance in the *Opus Postumum*, namely, the ether.

This general reading of what the ether deduction in the *Opus Postumum* is supposed to be doing is directly connected to the Refutation of Idealism as it was reconstructed above. Hall cites, in fact, the second note that accompanies the small addendum to the second Postulate as support for his argument that Kant not only was aware of the dilemma, but was perhaps, also, trying to think of the solution\(^44\). Thus, when in that note Kant claims that “…we do not even have anything persistent on

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\(^{41}\) Which is not to say that the *Opus Postumum* is a monolithic endeavour, for it is not. There are significant variations within the work and it would be foolish to overlook the several ways in which Kant articulated his theses on, e.g. the system of elementary forces. On this point and also on the relation of the different doctrines contained in the *Opus Postumum* with those found in the third *Critique* see Rüeger, Alexander. “Brain Water, the Ether, and the Art of Constructing Systems” in *Kant-Studien*, 86, 1995, pp. 26-40.


\(^{43}\) A lot of what one takes the *Opus Postumum* to be addressing depends on where one decides to place the ‘gap’ in transcendental philosophy. Contrast, for example, Hall’s reading with Förster’s.

which we could base the concept of a substance, as intuition, except merely matter, and even this persistence is not drawn from outer experience, but rather presupposed a priori as the necessary condition for all time-determination (...) Hall takes him to be anticipating the dilemma that the Transition would be addressing a few years later. If Hall is correct in this regard, and if the reading of the Refutation developed above holds, then important philosophical questions arise that need to be explored. Is it, first and foremost, adequate to characterise the Refutation of Idealism as Kant’s anticipation of a theory of general Substance? It would seem as if the reading developed towards the end of this Dissertation showed that Kant’s concern is not so much with elaborating a coherent theory of Substance but, rather, with providing a spatio-temporal continuum able to justify the constitutive and not only regulative systematicity of nature. To the extent that one can differentiate between the two, then, it is not so much by means of positing an all-pervasive Substance as such that Kant seeks to accomplish such justification, but by means of externalising the subjective forms of intuition and merging them as to form one world-whole. But how can Kant, achieve such externalisation without doing violence to some of transcendental philosophy’s basic commitments? Would the transcendental ideality and empirical reality theses of the forms of intuition have to be sacrificed in the endeavour? Moreover, space and time were characterised in the section of Chapter IV discussing the Opus Postumum as themselves products of the power of imagination. If this is right, does that mean that this power is being characterised anew? And, if so, is Kant revising the general doctrine of self-affection that he had developed in between 1781 and 1790?

Without being able to go further –for now– in the direction these questions indicate, it is worth noting, nonetheless, how closely intertwined the original restriction placed by transcendental philosophy onto itself and transcendental idealism’s subsequent development are. A clear thread links the idea that “if all that is manifold in the subject were given by the activity of the self, then inner intuition would be intellectual intuition” with the further thought of a systematic unity that ought to be posited for nature, properly so called, to arise. The terrain gained in this investigation –by means of elucidating the possibility of affectivity, exhibiting the specific layout transcendental philosophy displays for understanding the constitution of objectivity, and clarifying, lastly, the conditions that would have to be in place to

45 (B277)
46 (B68)
go beyond the singularity of that objectivity—, this terrain, then, offers a new way to conceive of that thread and to think, in following it, of the role self-affection plays in the process whereby “the understanding makes the cogitabile a dabile”⁴⁷.

At the beginning it was stated that this investigation would be answering to a Heideggerian challenge. Heidegger’s challenge consisted in the need to show that Kant not only envisaged the possibility of general metaphysics but to show that he managed to solidify such possibility. What the preceding investigation showed is that it is indeed the case that Kant actualised his general metaphysical project: the system of judgments, categories, schemata, and principles found in the Critique of Pure Reason is not itself derived from any special metaphysical domain but is, instead, derived from the activity of subjectivity when this activity is understood as self-affection, i.e. understood as time. This insight, in turn, yielded a prospect for inquiring as to whether such activity might provide subjectivity with other content, beyond that of the schematism and principles, exceeding the concept. It was seen that towards the end of the Critical period Kant responds affirmatively, but problematically, by articulating a principle of purposiveness derived from the future orientation of freedom. But it was seen, further, that Kant’s post-Critical answer, unsatisfied with the problematic nature of the principle of purposiveness, seeks to unearth a determination of self-affection in answering affirmatively again: the world-system is a schema the existence of which has to be affirmed categorically. Much work remains in trying to clarify the nature of each one of these two possible answers, no doubt, but already a stride forward has been made – stride made possible, in the first place, by having recognised that “without the presupposition of time, nothing can be thought of/ohne ihre Voraussetzung gar nicht denkbar ist”⁴⁸.

⁴⁷ (AA 22:385)
⁴⁸ (AA 8:333)
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AA 2: Vorkritische Schriften II: 1757–1777
AA 3: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2. Aufl. 1787)
AA 4: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1. Aufl. 1781), Prologomena, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft
AA 5: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kritik der Urteilskraft
AA 6: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Die Metaphysik der Sitten
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AA 8: Abhandlungen nach 1781
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AA 10: Briefwechsel 1747–1788
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49 List of Kant’s works referenced following the Prussian Academy of Sciences edition (cited throughout this work as ‘Akademieausgabe’ or ‘AA’). The exception is the Critique of Pure Reason where the standard A- & B- format for referencing was followed.
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