

Feeling the Life of the Mind: Mere Judging, Feeling, and Judgment

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Introduction

In Section 9 of the *Analytic of the Beautiful*, Kant raises a problem that he says is “the key to the critique of taste,” namely: “whether in the judgment of taste the feeling of pleasure precedes the judging of the object or the latter precedes the former” (CJ 5:216). His answer is that judging precedes feeling. What is less clear is why this is the case, as well as how this conclusion fits into the overall argument of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* and thus serves as its key. The task I take up in this chapter is to explain the relation between judging and feeling that makes distinctively aesthetic judgments possible. In order to establish the persuasiveness of Kant’s position it will be necessary to critically assess as well as develop his account.

The reason the priority of judging is so crucial for the project of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* is that, were it the case that the feeling of pleasure preceded judging, judgments of taste would express only the agreeableness of an object and would not qualify as subjectively universal. The judgment of taste is distinctively aesthetic because “mere judging” – his more precise title for “judging” and which Kant also refers to as the “free play” of the faculties, as we will see – is prior to our feeling of pleasure in an object. Thus, the rationale for the first part of the third *Critique* – the introduction of distinctively aesthetic judgments into the critical system – rests or falls on finding the answer to the problem posed in Section 9.

The broader picture is not, however, to simply demote feeling with respect to judging, but to establish the distinctive type of aesthetic feeling on which aesthetic judgments are based. In the earlier sections of the Second Moment of the *Analytic of the Beautiful*, Kant has

argued that aesthetic feeling is subjectively universal (CJ 5:211-16). In Section 9 he establishes the distinguishing criterion for – and the condition for the subjective universality of – aesthetic feeling, namely, that it has as its ground mere judging. Establishing the precise nature of the relation between feeling and judging is required if the “key” is to unlock the overall argument of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*.

The feeling operative in an aesthetic judgment is distinctive from other “relations” to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure – such as the agreeableness of gratification and esteem as moral liking (CJ 5:209-10). This reveals that for Kant there are other kinds of feeling in addition to the aesthetic feeling that arises in response to a beautiful object. Throughout this chapter, however, when I refer to feeling I intend only the distinctively aesthetic feeling that is dually directed *both* to the object *and* to the activity of judging. I explain this dual-directedness of feeling at the end of section two.

Having mere judging as its ground qualifies feeling as the ground for judgments of taste. There is a double determination of judgments of taste, the direct ground of which is feeling, while their indirect ground is, by extension, mere judging. I will establish the distinction between judging and judgment entailed by this formula in section one. Although Kant does not provide an account of double determination in Section 9, I show how the beginnings of such an account are provided in the First Introduction in the second section of this chapter.

I argue that in the *Analytic of the Beautiful* Kant introduces an account of feeling that operates as a non-cognitive and yet reflective form of awareness. The significance of this for Kant’s critical project cannot be underestimated. The range of modes of awareness – which hitherto comprised sensible intuitions, concepts of understanding and conceptually determining judgments, but also ideas and principles of reason – is extended to include a new distinctively aesthetic type of judgments that have feeling as their ground. This signals a

radical development in Kant's project. Crucially, Kant views this development as the condition of the integrity of his critical system (CJ 5:196). Although I cannot address the question of the coherence of Kant's system here, the emergence of reflective feeling, it would seem, is the key not only to the critique of taste but also to the coherence of the critical project as a whole.

Establishing that feeling can be reflective has very wide-reaching ramifications, stretching well beyond Kant studies. I will briefly mention only two examples. First, Kant's introduction of feeling has important implications for the relations between conceptually based cognition and pre-conceptual awareness. Feeling is usually considered as affective and as, at best, the object of reflection rather than as a variation on its form. Whether or not it is adequate to treat emotion as passive – as Kant typically does – he distinguishes feeling from emotion (CJ 5: 226). Feeling is a form of *pathos* that consequently turns out to operate not merely passively, but as a reflective form of consciousness. I show how the feeling of pleasure characteristic of taste qualifies as reflective insofar as it is a capacity both to differentiate and combine. I also argue that the intermediary status of feeling – between cognitive spontaneity and receptivity – allows it to operate as a reflection on the possibility of cognition without counting as an actual cognition. Kant's account of feeling as reflective – if it works – puts in question the fork between, on the one hand, cognition where concepts go “all the way down” and, on the other, a pre-reflective experience that excludes conceptualization.¹

Another way in which reflective feeling has broader philosophical bite is, as I show, that it affords a self-reflection on mental activity – what Kant calls “the feeling of life” (CJ 5:204). If this is right, aesthetic feeling offers an insight into the activity of consciousness. In particular, feeling shows up how the mind operates through a combination of both cooperative and distinctive orientations and that these orientations are intentionally directed.

1. The distinction between judging and judgment: A development of Kant's "key"

In this section I argue for a distinction between judging and judgment, which will allow for the solution of a series of problems, in particular, concerning the roles played in judgments of taste by feeling and objects, respectively.

The key to the critique of taste – the priority of mere judging over feeling within judgments of taste – implies a distinction between judging and judgment. Kant makes the same distinction – still unexplained – in the Deduction of Taste (CJ 5:289). In my ensuing argument I will show how employing this distinction allows us to understand that the "key" can, indeed, explain how mere judging and feeling are related so as to make possible distinctively aesthetic judgments. It is necessary, however, to adapt and develop Kant's statement of the "key." In the first instance, I restate it as a two-term relation between judging and judgment, before going on to incorporate feeling in a three-term relation, at which point the continuity with Kant's original formulation will be more apparent.

First, the adaptation to the relation between judging and judgment: judging precedes judgment. Next, the development of the account so as to bring out the role played by the dependent term: judgment expresses judging. Taken together: while mere judging is the grounding condition for aesthetic judgments, in aesthetic judgments we exercise or express mere judging. The aesthetic judgment "This rose is beautiful" is a linguistic expression of my mere judging, that is, the free play of my mental powers in response to a particular flower. Although the linguistic status of judgments is underdeveloped throughout Kant's *opus*, his account of taste in Sections 9 and 38 implies – and, I will argue, his overall argument requires – a distinction between having a mental state of free play and expressing this in a judgment. While he sometimes omits and never adequately accounts for this distinction, in section two I

will show that he requires it if his account is to avoid falling into a vicious circularity where mere judging grounds feeling and feeling grounds mere judging.

The relation between judging and judgment is reciprocal but asymmetric – there is no judgment without mere judging as its ground, while judging is expressed in a judgment. It is important to distinguish between these two directions of implication, because the distinctively aesthetic judgment qualifies as such because it is ultimately referred to the activity of mere judging as the meaning of that judgment. If the direction of grounding were reversed, the distinctive character of aesthetic judgments as subjectively universal would be critically compromised. Moreover, the distinction Kant requires can be defended, for to say that a judgment expresses or exercises mere judging is not equivalent to saying that judgments ground judging.

In the critical literature, there are a variety of ways of parsing the relation between judging and judgment. Two important – and highly contrastive – readings are proposed by Paul Guyer and Hannah Ginsborg. Guyer argues that reflective judgment comprises two acts: the first is an aesthetic estimate based on a harmony of the faculties, while the second is the aesthetic judgment proper which establishes the universal validity permitting the judgment that the object is beautiful.² Hannah Ginsborg argues to the contrary that the activity of free play is itself the judgment of taste, which already makes a claim for universal validity. There is thus no need for “two conceptually distinct acts of reflective judgment.”³ I agree with Guyer that it is necessary to make a distinction between a judgment proper and the harmony of the faculties, which is another cognate term for mere judging. I do not, however, agree that there are two discrete acts of reflective judgment, but hold, rather, that judging activity is expressed in an aesthetic judgment. The content communicated by an aesthetic judgment is, in my view, nothing other than mere judging – standing in some relation, yet to be established, to feeling – insofar as it is prompted by something beautiful. Thus, while I insist

against Ginsborg that Kant's account implies two levels, I agree with her – against Guyer – that subjective universality arises at the level of mere judging. My solution is that mere judging is the ground of judgments of taste insofar as mere judging establishes the universality condition for judgments.

Before moving on to a further development of the “key” in line with the distinction I have proposed, I should clarify the range of terms used for – as well as the meaning of – “mere judging.” In Section 9, the judging element within judgments of taste is referred to in a number of ways, which in this chapter will be treated as equivalent in their denotation – even if they may not be identical in their connotation. The judging that is prior in a judgment of taste is also called “merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object [*bloß subjective [ästhetische] Beurteilung des Gegenstandes*]” (CJ 5:218), while in the First Introduction it is referred to as “mere reflection on a perception [*bloße Reflexion*]” (FI 20:220). “Mere judging” is additionally referred to as a “mental state [*Gemütszustand*] that is encountered in the relation of the powers of presentation [*Vorstellungskräfte*]” (CJ 5:217, translation modified),⁴ as a “free play” of the cognitive or presentational powers (CJ 5:217), and as a “harmony of the faculties of cognition” (CJ 5:218). Provisionally, the meaning of all these terms is the activity of the subjective capacities necessary for what can variously be described as cognition, presentation, or determining judgment, but only where their exercise in a reflective judgment gives rise to no determination of an object or its constituent intuition (CJ 5:217). I return to the ultimate ground of mere judging in the subjective conditions of cognition in my final section. As mere judging is what establishes the judgment of taste as reflective, I will sometimes refer to it simply as “reflection.”

At this point – in order to address the problem of the role played by feeling in judgments of taste – it is necessary to develop the “key” into a three-term relation, comprising mere judging, feeling, *and* judgment. In short, feeling operates as the

intermediary term between judging and judgment. The solution I will implement in section two is the following: mere judging *grounds* feeling that, in turn, *grounds* aesthetic judgments. Meanwhile, aesthetic judgments *express* feeling that, in turn, *expresses* mere judging. The two levels of expression are distinctive in that feeling is consciousness of mere judging, while a judgment is an expression or exercise of the feeling of mere judging. Nonetheless, both expressive relations are dependent on and thus contrasted to their corresponding grounds.

The final (principal) problem I address in this chapter is the contribution of the object to aesthetic reflection. The formulation of the question in the title of Section 9 makes clear that both judging and pleasure are directed to an object. I am not concerned in this chapter with whether there are aspects of objects that make them apt for aesthetic reflection.⁵ However, I cannot exclude from the current discussion the way in which the presentation of an object initiates reflection. Mere judging is “set into play” through a given presentation (*Die Erkenntniskräfte, die durch diese Vorstellung ins Spiel gesetzt werden ...*) (CJ 5:217). Moreover, Kant claims that the enlivening of the mental powers arises through the “prompting” of the given presentation (*vermitteltst des Anlasses der gegebenen Vorstellung*) (CJ 5:219, translation modified). Both claims strongly imply that the object contributes to aesthetic reflection. At the end of the next section I argue that when I make the judgment that something is beautiful I do so *because* my feeling about it has mere judging as its ground.

2. Free play as a feeling of the life of the mind

So far we have seen that – in some sense still to be identified – mere judging precedes feeling. Nonetheless, feeling plays a crucial role as our consciousness of the free play of the faculties (CJ 5:219). Moreover, Kant claims that the mental state *is* a feeling: “Thus the mental state in this presentation must be that of a feeling of the free play of the powers of presentation” (CJ 5:217, translation modified). In what follows I will make sense of these

seemingly incompatible claims by showing how in free play the mind is implicitly self-conscious of its own activity and that such a mental state cannot be separate from consciousness of it.

In this section I argue that the “feeling of life” mentioned by Kant in Section 1 of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* refers to the free play of the faculties, which is the centerpiece of his discussion in Section 9 (CJ 5:204). This helps explain why free play and feeling may not be distinct. However, Kant claims that the feeling of life is the basis for judgments of taste, and this leads to the apparent contradiction that both mental state and feeling qualify as determining. Building on the distinction I made between judgment and judging in the previous section, I argue that this problem can be resolved with the help of the First Introduction’s account of what I call a double determination of judgments of taste both by mental state (or mere judging) and by feeling. I next argue that the determination of feeling by the mental state operates through reasons, not causes. Further building on the extended version of the “key” outlined in section one, I argue that the same mental state qualifies as mere judging when it is seen as ground and as feeling insofar as it affords consciousness of – or expresses – that ground. Finally, I explain why a self-reflective feeling of our mental state is only graspable through the pleasure we take in the presentation of a beautiful object.

How are we to account for Kant’s claim in Section 9 that the mental state “must be” a feeling of free play (CJ 5:217)? If feeling provides consciousness of the mental state, then why would he claim that the latter is a feeling? This is either incoherent or, as I will argue, puts in question the view that mental state and feeling are distinct. I propose that we can make sense of this apparently aberrant claim by linking the argument of Section 9 to the idea of the “feeling of life [*Lebensgefühl*]” introduced in Section 1 of the *Analytic of the Beautiful* (CJ 5:204).⁶ As I read it, the feeling of life is a feeling of the liveliness of the mind, which in Section 9 is referred to as “the enlivened relation between the two faculties [*die Belebung*

beider Vermögen]” and which is nothing other than the free play of the faculties (CJ 5:219, translation modified). We experience the life of the mind *as* a feeling of pleasure: “Here the presentation is related entirely to the subject, indeed to its feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure” (CJ 5:204, translation modified). I conclude that the free play of the faculties – as a feeling of life – is a feeling of pleasure.

A problem arises, however, in what might be called the genealogy of judgments of taste. In Section 1 Kant announces that judgments of taste are distinctive in that they have feeling as their ground: the “feeling of life, under the name of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure ... grounds [*gründet*] an entirely special faculty for discriminating and judging” (CJ 5:204). This claim appears to lead to two problems. First, it may sound as if feeling is the ground of judging and not the reverse, as is argued in Section 9. Even if this could be resolved, a further problem arises as to how both feeling and mere judging can be determining, for this sounds like a viciously circular claim. This second problem would be dissolved if it could be established that the mental state and feeling are determining in different respects.

The first problem could be resolved in the following way: when Kant says that feeling is the basis of the capacity for judging (*Beurteilungsvermögen*), the latter refers to the capacity for making judgments not for the mere judging exercised in such judgments. *Beurteilung* is the term Kant uses for mere judging, but he always does so with a qualifier such as “merely [*bloß*].” Moreover, *Beurteilung*, like “judging,” can be understood as the activity of making judgments, and Kant often uses the term as simply equivalent to *Urteil*, that is, judgment. Consistently, *Beurteilungsvermögen* is used to explain “taste [*Geschmack*],” which I understand as the power to make aesthetic judgments (CJ 5:203n, 211, 240, 295). The proposed solution is, however, tested by Kant immediately going on to say that the power in question “merely compares,” and this, I will show in section three, is a

further cognate expression for mere reflection. This transition in Section 1 thus tends to support Ginsborg's claim that there is no distinction between judgment and judging. However – apart from the fact that this seems to undersell the expressive aspect of judgments – the distinction is necessary if Kant is not to fall into the vicious circularity of claiming in Section 1 that feeling is the ground of mere judging and in Section 9 that mere judging is the ground of feeling. The distinction of levels he introduces in Sections 9 and 38 is required in Section 1 even though it is omitted.

I will now examine a distinction that makes the suggested solutions to both problems compelling. In the First Introduction Kant distinguishes two types of precedence operative in respect of aesthetic judgments of reflection and which correspond to the distinction of levels between judging and judgment that, I am arguing, his account requires:

the harmonious play of the two faculties of cognition ... produces [*bewirkt*] through this mere form a sensation that is the determining ground [*Bestimmungsgrund*] of a judgment which for that reason is called aesthetic and as subjective purposiveness (without a concept) is combined with the feeling of pleasure. (FI 20:224)

In this passage Kant claims both that mere judging produces – or brings about – sensation (*Empfindung*) and that sensation determines a judgment (*ein Urteil*). Despite the causal-sounding terminology of the first claim, I will argue that both claims refer to grounds or reasons not causes.

However, it is first necessary to establish the identity of the “sensation” that determines judgments. We have already seen that feeling plays this role in Section 1. Meanwhile, in Section 9 Kant, strictly speaking, says that we can only become conscious of free play through sensation (*Empfindung*) (CJ: 219). It is not remotely likely Kant is suggesting that we become aware of our mental state through the type of sensation that in the *Critique of Pure Reason* was defined as “the effect of an object on the capacity for

presentation” (A19-20/B34, translation modified). Immediately prior to the passage just quoted from the First Introduction, Kant provides the premise suppressed in Section 9 with the following definition of feeling: there is “only one so-called sensation that can never become a concept of an object, and this is the feeling of pleasure and displeasure” (FI 20:224). This sensation uniquely qualifies as a feeling in that it is not determinable under a concept, unlike the usual sort of sensation. This is why, earlier, I reported Kant as claiming in Section 9 that feeling affords consciousness of mere judging. Feeling is a unique sensation.

Seen in this light, the First Introduction’s account reveals the following double determination: first, the harmony of the faculties (or mere judging) produces or brings about – or, as Kant puts it in Section 9, “precedes” – the sensation (the feeling of pleasure), and, second, as Kant also says in Section 1, feeling is the determining ground of judgments of taste. The First Introduction’s formulation does not entail that feeling is the ground of mere judging and only that it determines judgments of taste, or as he puts it in Section 1, our capacity for such judgments.⁷ In Section 9 Kant adds a further layer to his account: “the judgment of taste ... determines the object, independently of concepts, with regard to liking and the predicate of beauty” (CJ 5:219, translation modified). Taking up the distinction between grounding and expressing I introduced in the previous section, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is determining of the judgment, which expresses our feeling that the object is beautiful. As a consequence of its determination by feeling, the aesthetic judgment non-cognitively determines the object to be beautiful. Thus, there is no vicious circularity, for while mere judging determines feeling, feeling determines aesthetic judgments. This means that there is a double determination of aesthetic judgments, which, in turn, determine the object. The unique so-called sensation or feeling thus has the peculiar status of being both undeterminable and the indirect ground for a non-conceptual determination.

So far I have argued that the feeling of life is the pleasurable awareness of mental activity in the particular guise of the enlivened activity of the faculties. Consequently, mere judging and feeling are not distinct mental events, though I will argue that they are distinguishable aspects of the same mental event. In order to show that the account I have given so far is viable, I now need to explain how it is consistent with the priority of mere judging with respect to feeling.

In what sense, then, does free play “precede,” “determine,” “ground,” “produce,” or “bring about” the sensation or feeling within the same mental event? Is the precedence that of cause to effect? Guyer reads the relation between the harmony of the faculties and the feeling of pleasure as causal.⁸ Henry Allison, meanwhile, insists that the feeling of pleasure is intentionally directed to free play.⁹ For Allison, at least in *Kant’s Theory of Taste*, the intentional status of feeling is compatible with its being caused by mere judging.¹⁰ In his earlier, more extended discussion of this issue, Allison insists that the feeling of pleasure is intentionally and not causally linked to the harmony of the faculties.¹¹ My view is that the precedence of mere judging cannot be causal in any sense. For Kant, a causal relation requires determination under a concept (A189/B234). As the unique so-called sensation cannot be determined under a concept, it cannot be caused by the mental state of free play or by anything else. Moreover, a causal relation would require the distinctiveness of cause and effect, and if the mental state *is* a feeling, then they are not distinct. The peculiarity of the intentional relation between mere judging and our consciousness of it through feeling is that it operates as a form of self-reflection in which the constituent terms cannot be distinct, although they are distinguishable. I propose that mere judging rationally grounds rather than causes feeling despite Kant’s causal-sounding term *bewirken*.¹² Correlatively, feeling grounds rather than causes judgments. Kant explicitly uses “determining ground [*Bestimmungsgrund*]” and “grounds [*gründet*]” for the second level of determination (FI

20:224; CJ 5:204), and his account entails that, although feeling is distinguishable from judgment, they are not distinct, as would be required for a causal relation. Thus Kant asks how we become conscious *in* a judgment of taste of mere judging (CJ: 218).

The solution I am arguing for is that mere judging precedes feeling insofar as the former is the reason for – not the cause of – the latter. The free play of the faculties explains why a distinctively aesthetic feeling of pleasure is subjectively universal. Free play secures subjective universality because it is a particularly harmonious exhibition of the coordination of the subjective faculties necessary for any cognition (CJ 5:218). Feeling, meanwhile, is the respect in which the play of the faculties expresses, that is, qualifies as consciousness of – not just the fact that there is – mental activity. It is thus not that first there is a harmonious relation between the faculties and subsequently a pleasure, but rather that the distinctively aesthetic pleasure arises as one *in* the harmony of the faculties. The same mental state can be regarded both as ground insofar as it exhibits the relation between the subjective faculties of cognition necessary for any judgment and *also* as consciousness of that mental state in a feeling of pleasure.¹³ This dual status is characteristic of a mental state in which the mind is conscious through feeling of its own mental activity: in aesthetic judgments of reflection “the mind becomes conscious in the feeling of its state” (CJ 5:204).

We now can understand how Kant can claim both that the mental state *is* a feeling of free play and that the mental state is the ground for the feeling of pleasure *in* that free play (CJ 5:218). Not only would we have no access to the mental state of free play if we had no consciousness of it through feeling; there *is* free play of the faculties only insofar as we are conscious through feeling of that playful relation. The distinctively aesthetic feeling of pleasure *is* the life of the mind in its free play. When we consider the mental state in respect of its subjective universality we see it as mere judging, but when we consider the same

mental state as a form of consciousness we see it as feeling. The same mental state qualifies as ground in the first case and as an expression of that ground in the second.

The reciprocal implications of mere judging and feeling are not viciously circular because I have distinguished the grounding term – mere judging – from the expressing term – feeling. The difficulty, rather, is how we get hold of – and hold onto – a reflection on our own reflective activity. This is where our contemplation of a beautiful object plays a necessary role in aesthetic reflection. As I mentioned in the previous section, the presentation of a beautiful object sets the faculties in play or prompts them into an enlivened and accordant (*einhellig*) relation (CJ 5:217, 219). When the object prompts or sets off free play, the former is neither the cause nor the occasion of the latter. It cannot be the case that the object causes mere judging, for free play could not be caused and remain free. If the object, on the other hand, simply occasioned reflection, this would result in a merely random correlation between object and mental state, not a determination through feeling. As a result, anything could and nothing would necessarily count as beautiful. This is not Kant's position, as I have argued elsewhere.¹⁴

If the object neither causes nor merely occasions mere judging, then what does it mean to say that it “prompts” free play? Although it is contingent whether we find something beautiful, once we do so the ground for our liking of the object is that it gives rise to a free play of our faculties.¹⁵ This non-causal reading allows for an asymmetric but reciprocal relation between mental state and object. While free play supplies the motivation for our finding something beautiful, it is only through the beautiful object that we get purchase on free play. It will be apparent that I am offering the same structural account of pleasure whether it refers to free play or in response to the object. This is because the pleasure we take in the object is aesthetic only insofar as we take pleasure in the object's prompting a free play of the faculties.

Mere judging not only precedes the feeling of pleasure in the object, but also is the basis (*Grund*) of a pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive powers (CJ 5:218). My solution is that pleasure in the object is at the same time pleasure in mere judging.¹⁶ This approach allows us to make sense of a fine – and, I believe, significant – detail of Kant’s account, namely, that when he first introduces the pleasure we take in the play of the faculties, he refers to it as “*this* pleasure [*dieser Lust*],” which suggests that it has just been discussed (CJ 5:218, emphasis added). Immediately beforehand, the discussion is, however, of pleasure in the object. Through the use of the demonstrative article, Kant shows that the two pleasures are one and the same, in the one case viewed in its intentional directedness toward the object, while in the other in its intentional directedness toward our mental activity in response to that object. There is, thus, a dual intentional directedness of one and the same pleasure, rather than two pleasures. An advantage of my account – in addition to making sense of the letter of Kant’s text – is that it avoids the difficulty that, were there two pleasures, it would be necessary to explain how they are connected. This difficulty falls away once they are recognized as two aspects of one and the same pleasure.

3. Feeling as a power to reflect

In the previous section I argued that mere judging and feeling are two ways of describing the same mental event. We have also seen that feeling is the basis for aesthetic reflective judgments. The question arises: how can feeling qualify as judging such that it provides the basis for judgments of taste? A feeling, we might think, belongs to the affective side of experience, with the consequence that it could only contribute to the content of judgment. In this section I argue that feeling qualifies as mere judging insofar as it is reflective. The relevant type of reflection only arises as consciousness of that reflection and thus must be

expressed in feeling, the condition of that consciousness. I first establish that the reflection in question is a capacity for comparison and then show how feeling is reflective insofar as it compares the presentational capacities of imagination and understanding. These faculties are compared both with regard to what they have in common and their difference. Both faculties contribute to presentation, but they carry out different roles: imagination combines, while understanding unifies.

Kant defines reflection as the ability to compare and hold together: “To reflect [*Reflektieren*] (to consider [*Überlegen*]) ... is to compare and to hold together [*vergleichen und zusammen zu halten*] given presentations either with others or with one’s faculty of cognition, in relation to a concept thereby made possible” (FI 20:211, translation modified). The first option covers the logical reflection operative in the genesis of empirical concepts (JL 9:92; VL 24:905). Meanwhile, the second captures the transcendental reflection of the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection in the first *Critique* (A260-92/B316-49). Both these uses of reflection are preparatory for determining judgment: logical reflection generates empirical concepts under which the sensible manifold can be determined, while transcendental reflection establishes a distinction between the faculties necessary prior to the determination of the presentation of an object (A269/B325). Neither of these types of reflection, however, is sufficient for judgment, whether reflective or determining. There is, however, another use of reflection that, like transcendental reflection, compares a presentation with our cognitive powers and yet qualifies as judgment. Judgment can be regarded either as “a mere faculty for **reflecting**” or as an ability to determine (CJ 20:211). I take this to mean that reflective judgment is the ability to make judgments that express mere reflection. Mere reflection arises when the activity of reflection is carried out for its own sake and is not directed to determining a presentation of an object under a concept. As I argued in section two, such reflection is inseparable from our consciousness of it. In reflective

judgments of taste, reflection and feeling converge, because the reflection that such judgments have as their ground is not merely a condition of cognition but also constitutes an alternative, non-cognitive form of awareness.

In aesthetic judgments – the ground of which is feeling – mere judging “only compares the given presentation in the subject to the entire faculty of presentation” (CJ 5:204, translation modified). Thus feeling is the basis for judgments that express the reflective comparison of the presentation of an object with our mental activity in determining an object as beautiful. As I argued in the last section, the play of the faculties is the ground of the feeling in the sense that mere judging establishes the subjective universal validity of this feeling. If feeling is the consciousness of free play and the mental state of free play *is* a feeling, then we can conclude that feeling is a conscious – although implicit – reflection that compares the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding in their free play.

Feeling as reflective is the capacity to non-cognitively discriminate – that is, differentiate – so as to make possible judgments as expressions of that mere judging (CJ 5:204). This implies that mere judging – as well as the judgments expressing it – is necessarily bound up with differentiation. Although Kant does not explicitly develop the idea of discrimination, he does not simply abandon it, as I will show. The link between comparison and differentiation is evident in Kant’s *Lectures on Logic*. In the *Jäsche Logic*, comparison establishes difference: “I see, e.g., a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing [*vergleichen*¹⁷] these objects with one another I note that they are different [*verschieden*] from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.” Reflection (*Reflexion, Überlegung*), meanwhile, establishes “that which they have in common [*gemein*] among themselves, trunk, branches, and leaves themselves” (JL 9:94-95). Reflection and comparison are distinguished in this discussion, although Allison and Béatrice Longuenesse are certainly right that they must be integrated in their use.¹⁸ In fact, Kant uses

the two terms interchangeably. The *Blomberg Logic* states that in logical abstraction we compare concepts in light of what they have in common (BL 24:255).¹⁹ In the *Blomberg Logic* and the *Vienna Logic*, comparison is directed *both* to what differentiates and to what is held in common (BL 24:274; VL 24:833-34). Finally, in the *Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection*, transcendental reflection differentiates the faculties of sensibility and understanding in light of the concepts that fall under them. This counts as a form of comparison: “all judgments, indeed all comparisons [*Vergleichungen*], require a **reflection** [*Überlegung*]²⁰, i.e., a distinction [*Unterscheidung*] of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong” (A261/B317). Comparison and reflection are clearly mutually dependent, and either term can refer to difference or to what is held in common. In what follows, I will show how the mere reflection characteristic of aesthetic judgments and of which we are conscious through feeling is oriented both to difference and commonality.

Through feeling we are able to reflect on the presentational powers relating to one another. My proposal is that this reflection is a comparison. In feeling a free play of the faculties, we are aware both of their commonality and their difference. Their commonality arises only insofar as we are also aware of the difference between the respective roles they play. There would be no playful relation were both faculties occupying exactly the same roles; there would be no harmony were both faculties singing the same notes. One way of highlighting their contrasting roles is through a consideration of the respective relations in which the two faculties stand to freedom in free play. Mere reflection is directed to the reciprocal relation between the faculties, but only imagination is predisposed to freedom from determination under laws (CJ 5:40-41).²¹ While Kant refers not only to “the **free lawfulness** of the imagination” but also to “the free lawfulness of the understanding,” we might say that in an aesthetic judgment the understanding is forced to be free (CJ 5:240-41).

The respective roles of the faculties in the relation of free play can be seen more clearly with the help of the Transcendental Deduction from the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Imagination's role within mere judging is the "combining [*Zusammensetzung*] of the manifold in intuition" without a determining concept (CJ 5:217, translation modified). In the first *Critique's* Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination, combination (*Verbindung*) is the activity of the pure transcendental synthesis of imagination and is a necessary but insufficient condition of cognition (A101). Meanwhile, the understanding's role that is compared to imagination within mere judging would be to provide "the unity [*Einheit*] of the concept" (CJ 5:217). This corresponds to the first *Critique's* Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept, where the role of the understanding is to establish the unity (*Einheit*) of an object under a concept, without which the manifold would not constitute a whole (A103). Thus to unify an object is to determine it by unifying its manifold under a concept. In the play of the faculties mere judging compares the activity of combining without a concept with the activity of unification under a concept. Aesthetic reflective comparison shows up the difference as well as the commonality of these ways of holding together the manifold in intuition. This comparison establishes the basis for aesthetic judgment – a mere judging that combines but does not unify and of which we are conscious as feeling.

4. Exhibiting the life of the mind

I have explained how in a judgment of taste feeling operates as a form of reflection that compares the faculties as to their difference as well as their commonality and thus is not aimed at unification. Still, it may seem that the harmony of the faculties models imagination's combining of the manifold on the unifying function of understanding and, as a result, aesthetic judgments are oriented toward cognition even though they do not achieve it.²² In this section I will argue that the commonality of the faculties in free play is not that

they both aim at unification, but rather that they both aim at exhibition (*Darstellung*): while the exhibition of a concept of understanding necessarily entails unity, imagination gives rise to an alternative exhibition that does not.

Kant uses “presentation [or representation, *Vorstellung*]” to refer to a range of types of awareness, including intuitions, concepts, and cognitions (see A140/B179-80, A320/B376-77). Meanwhile, “exhibition [*Darstellung*]” – when used as a technical term in the third *Critique* – refers strictly to the combination of two presentations, namely, the combination of an intuition with a concept.²³ Judgment is the faculty that carries out exhibition. Determining judgments exhibit a concept so as to give rise to cognition. In the First Introduction, judgment exhibits (*Darstellung* [*exhibitio*]) a concept of the understanding by finding for it a corresponding intuition (FI 20:220). Similarly, in the published Introduction Kant writes: “If the concept of an object is given, the work of judgment, in its use as exhibiting [*Darstellung*] (*exhibitio*) a cognition, is in placing beside a concept a corresponding intuition” (CJ 5:192, translation modified; see also RP 20:325-26).²⁴ While *Darstellung* is not used as a technical term in the Schematism, we can conclude that when a concept is exhibited so as to give rise to cognition, the concept is schematized with an intuition (A138/B177).²⁵

It is not the case, however, that all exhibitions are cognitive. In the published Introduction, Kant affirms that exhibition also arises in aesthetic judgments: “we can regard natural beauty as the exhibition [*Darstellung*] of the concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness” (CJ 5:193, translation modified). The more tentative statement in the First Introduction is that in the harmony of the faculties imagination “agrees [*übereinkommt*] with the exhibition [*Darstellung*] of a concept of the understanding” (FI 20:220-21, translation modified). In his later discussion of *hypotyposis*, symbolic exhibition is a procedure carried out by the power of judgment (*Urteilstkraft*) and is analogous with schematizing *hypotyposis* in terms of “merely the form of the reflection, not the content, which corresponds to the

concept” (CJ 5:351). My proposal is that an exhibition arises in our consciousness – the feeling – of merely judging the relation between the faculties in their purposiveness for one another. Judgments of taste express such an exhibition.

If both cognitive judgments and mere judging exhibit a concept, what is the distinction between them? Aesthetic exhibition is of a concept, “which concept this is being indeterminate” (FI 20:221, translation modified). In a cognitive judgment it could not be indeterminate which concept was exhibited, for only through the determination of an intuition under a specific concept or concepts can knowledge arise. On the other hand, it is not clear that an aesthetic judgment can exhibit any concept. I think the solution is that aesthetic exhibition is not so much of a determining concept indeterminately grasped, but of a principle which, broadly speaking, could be described as an indeterminate concept. Read in this way, mere judging in aesthetic judgment exhibits the principle that all judgments require a cooperative relation between the faculties of sensibility and understanding as the ground of mere judging. Aesthetic exhibition thus does not exhibit a schematized relation between a concept and an intuition, but rather exhibits the relation between the faculties that makes the schematisation of intuitions and concepts possible. The published Introduction sums this up in saying that what is exhibited is the “concept of formal (merely subjective) purposiveness” (CJ 5:193; see also FI 20:224). Aesthetic exhibition is of the mutually purposive coordination of the faculties that is, in principle, required for finding a corresponding intuition for a concept, whether or not that combination is schematized.

Aesthetic exhibition takes place in “the form of the reflection,” because it is mere reflection, or as I have argued, reflective feeling that exhibits the relation between the faculties (CJ 5:351). Thus the activity of imagination in its freedom within an aesthetic judgment is distinct from the exhibition of a concept of understanding both with regard to what is exhibited – an indeterminate concept or principle, rather than a determining concept –

and in how it exhibits – through feeling rather than through the determination of an intuition under a concept of understanding. While it is certainly the case that the exhibition brought about by a determining judgment entails unity, it is not the case that all exhibition aims at unification. An exhibition operating through feeling and aiming to exhibit the indeterminate principle of our mental activity is not apt for determinate unification or even for aiming at – and failing to achieve – unification. In the next section I will develop this argument further, showing how an exhibition carried out by feeling resists cognitive resolution. What can be concluded at this stage is that imagination harmonizes with the exhibition of a concept of understanding, for they have in common the coordination of the subjective faculties necessary for any judgment. Nonetheless, feeling carries out a distinctive form of exhibition not directed to unification of an intuition under a concept.

I have argued that reflective feeling exhibits the subjective powers of cognition in their free play: both natural beauty and beautiful art affect us in such a way that the mind “feels its own state.” In particular, I argued in section two that the beautiful object allows us to hold onto conscious activity in its free play. Thus, although aesthetic exhibition is a form of self-consciousness, it is one that arises through our response to the presentation of a beautiful thing.²⁶ We can draw a parallel with the Refutation of Idealism, where Kant says that “the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself” (B275-76). According to Kant, beautiful things set in play judging activity; that is, they prompt a response in judgments based on mere judging. In doing so, an artwork, for instance, offers a focus through which I can become aware of the activity of my mind. This is why Kant says that the aesthetic judgment – strictly speaking, mere judging – is referred to the subject and that “the subject feels itself” (CJ 5:204). But, although taste is subjective, it is not introspective and is, rather, an awareness of how “it [the subject] is affected by the presentation” (CJ 5:204, translation modified). Such

self-awareness can only arise indirectly – as in a sidelong glance – when, for instance, I am absorbed by an artwork. My claim is not that artworks operate so as to make possible a peculiar epistemological analysis of consciousness, but that they afford an existential insight into conscious activity.²⁷ Such insight will always operate at the limits of our experience, for it is an experience of the subjective conditions of that experience. For Kant, judging something to be beautiful involves a consciousness of the playful activity of my mental powers. Thus to make an aesthetic judgment is, for Kant, to be implicitly aware of the life of the mind.

An artwork prompts such implicit insight into the activity of consciousness when, for instance, it offers patterns that are not determinable under a unifying concept or within a conceptual scheme. When we respond to such emergent order it is possible to glimpse the activity of the mind responding in free play. Playfulness visible in the presentation of the artwork is apt for a playful response on the part of the mind.²⁸

I will now illustrate how an artwork can present an alternative order that initiates consciousness of mere judging. I will discuss briefly how the lighting effects of a particular painting display combination but not unity. Rembrandt's *The Night Watch* is a figurative portrayal of a group of influential Amsterdam citizens (see illustration below). Some of these men paid a commission for their inclusion in the mass portrait and, no doubt, the painting captures real historical relations in other ways. However, the painting offers its own vision of reality. A principal way in which it does so is through its use of lighting effects. *The Night Watch* shows figures appearing into the light or receding from view. The painting is very dark, so it is even more striking that certain – although by no means all – figures in the foreground are highlighted by their luminescence. This is most obviously true of the lieutenant, the brightness of whose light-colored uniform is intensified by the contrastive shadow of the captain's arm falling upon it. The girl to the left of the captain, the captain's

face, his decorative ruff, and the drum to the right of the lieutenant are also illuminated, even though their positions make it improbable that they share the same light source. Nor does it seem plausible that the figures left only partially lit in the surrounding darkness owe their darkness solely to their spatial positions. Rather than unitary lighting – either natural or artificial – the painting deploys combinations and configurations of light and dark – typical of *chiaroscuro* – which construct a series of relations that emerge only on the canvas and do not offer a reproduction of a determinate external reality.

[Insert illustration here.]

Rembrandt van Rijn, *Militia Company of District II under the Command of Captain Frans Banninck Cocq*, commonly known as *The Night Watch*, 1642. Oil on canvas. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.

When we contemplate this painting, that is, when we allow ourselves to become absorbed by it, we take up its combinations in our response to it. The painting's lighting effects encourage – in a non-causal sense, they require – a response that is free or open. Yet it is not the case that there is no order in the painting, just that the order is not determined by a unified external reality. Correlatively, the mind is not chaotic and, rather, makes sense without requiring unified sense. If, on the contrary, we tried to unify what is strictly a combination, we would experience neither the painting nor free mental activity.

Aesthetic judgments, such as those I have outlined about the lighting effects in Rembrandt's *The Night Watch*, express feelings – not cognitions – about the painting. Such judgments make explicit implicit discriminations and connections I make in looking at the painting. I explore the painting reflectively without coming to a definitive conclusion. Such judgments are not directed to determining a quality *in* the painting, nor to establishing

something internal to my mind. I give myself over to the painting – I am taken up with it – and, in return, I receive an awareness of my own mental activity *through* my awareness of the painting. Thus aesthetic judgment is not *either* a self-reflection *or* an observation of something external to the mind: it is, rather, an expression of a feeling of the life of the mind in response to a beautiful object.

5. Feeling as mediating reveals both the possibility and the limitation of cognition

I have argued that feeling affords an exhibition of the subjective conditions of cognition as a reflection on their difference as well as their commonality. I have also shown how such an exhibition does not aim at the unity necessary for cognition. I will now argue that the exhibition afforded by feeling offers an insight into the possibility of cognition, while simultaneously revealing its limitation. Only feeling can achieve this on account of its peculiar status as a unique sensation that is undeterminable and yet is the ground for non-conceptually determining judgments. I conclude that feeling is neither wholly active nor merely receptive.

As we have seen, reflective feeling compares the subjective conditions of cognition, yet precludes the determination of an intuition under a concept required for cognition. I think it is helpful to consider this as the distinction between possible and actual cognition. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant discusses these in the first and second postulates, respectively. The possible is “whatever agrees [*übereinkommt*] with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and concepts).” The actual is “that which is bound up with [*zusammenhängt*]²⁹ the material conditions of experience (of sensation)” (A218/B265-66, translation modified). How might this illuminate what Kant calls “cognition in general”? There are three main references to this notion in Section 9: (i) in mere judging the presentational powers “relate a given presentation to **cognition in general**” (CJ 5:217,

translation modified), (ii) “the mental state in this presentation must be that of a feeling of the free play of the powers of presentation in a given presentation for a cognition in general” (CJ 5:217, translation modified), and (iii) in free play the faculties “agree with each other as is requisite for a **cognition in general**” (CJ 5:218). While the first of these may only claim that free play and “cognition in general” are compatible, the others make clear that free play entails “cognition in general.” As it is evident that free play cannot be cognitive, “cognition in general” cannot be equivalent to cognition. I propose that “cognition in general” is the subjective formal condition of experience, with which any cognition must agree. The first postulate states the formal conditions of experience are intuitions and concepts. The subjective grounds of their possibility exhibited in aesthetic judgments are the faculties of imagination (for the combination of the manifold in intuition [CJ 5:240]) and understanding (for the unification of the manifold under concepts). Thus, “cognition in general” is the relation between these subjective formal conditions of experience with which any possible cognition must agree and which are exhibited or expressed in free play, that is, reflective feeling. “Cognition in general” – as the ground of mere judging – is, thus, the ultimate ground and the vindication of the distinctive status of aesthetic judgments. Meanwhile, “cognition in general” cannot be – just because it is free and not determined under a concept – “bound up with” the determination of a material sensation under a concept. “Cognition in general” is a necessary condition of the possibility of cognition, but cannot give rise to any actual cognition.

Claiming that “cognition in general” exhibits the subjective cooperation of the faculties necessary for the possibility of any cognition thus does not imply that aesthetic judgments are subordinated to the general project of cognition. Aesthetic judgments do not simply fail to become actual cognitions: they are incompatible with actual cognition. The subjective conditions of cognition operating in default of determination under a concept

amount to an alternative form of awareness, which although not, in principle, opposed to cognition is, in fact, incompatible with it. This is because aesthetic judgments are based on feeling, the unique “so-called sensation” that cannot be determined under a concept. Feeling is a form of reflective awareness that resists cognitive resolution. The unique so-called sensation thus exhibits the mere possibility of cognition *only* because it is undeterminable, that is, only because it cannot become an actual cognition. Distinctively aesthetic judgments with feeling as their ground serve as a demonstration that not every form of consciousness is cognitive, nor is oriented toward determination under a concept. Feeling and cognition coexist within a plurality of orientations that are, in principle, compatible with and yet irreducible to one another. It is thus not the case that aesthetic judgments belong to the general project of determining objects under concepts.³⁰

In resisting cognitive resolution, feeling operates as a distinctive form of awareness that is distinct from cognition and emotion (CJ 5:226). Feeling can only serve as a simultaneous reflection on the possibility and the limitations of cognition insofar as this form of awareness has something in common with, while being distinct from, cognition. Feeling is neither wholly spontaneous like understanding, nor is it merely receptive like intuition. Feeling is, nonetheless, allied to spontaneity insofar as it operates through mere reflection and, at the same time, allied to sensibility in that through feeling we are receptive to beautiful objects. Feeling allows the mind to feel its own state – the relation between spontaneity and sensibility – only because it is neither entirely active nor merely receptive.

For Allison, feeling is active. His initial account of feeling is that it both appraises and discriminates. We appraise “the capacity of a representation to occasion an enhancement or diminution of one’s cognitive faculties in their cooperative activity.”³¹ Discrimination, on the other hand, operates “in the reception or acceptance of representations conducive to free play and the rejection of those that are not.”³² Feeling is thus not merely receptive – in Allison’s

terms, not merely discriminatory – which leads him to conclude that feeling is an “active faculty.”³³

While Allison’s characterization of feeling as more than merely receptive is suggestive, I do not conclude that feeling is active rather than receptive. Instead, feeling has the peculiar intermediary status of combining the activity of mere reflection with receptivity to an object. If feeling were an active faculty, as Allison claims, it would be incapable of carrying out the role of mediating between receptivity (imagination as the capacity to combine what is given) and spontaneity (understanding as the capacity to unify under a concept). Instead, it would ultimately act in the interests of spontaneity, that is, understanding’s capacity to determine under a concept so as to give rise to cognition.³⁴ If, on the other hand, feeling were merely receptive, it would not qualify as a “unique so-called sensation” and would, like all other sensations, be determinable under a concept (FI 20:224). A merely receptive feeling would also be incapable of serving as the ground of the non-cognitive determination of objects as beautiful in aesthetic judgments (CJ 5:219). Only a form of consciousness that is neither entirely active nor merely receptive is capable of relating our spontaneous and receptive capacities, that is, of comparing them in their free play with one another. In doing so, feeling as the unique so-called sensation that is neither a concept nor a mere sensation is an alternative form of reflection, operating at the limits of sensibility and understanding.³⁵

Notes

1. See, for instance, the debate between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus on this issue in *Inquiry* (2007) 50, no. 4: 338-77.
2. Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 110-16, 151-60.

3. Hannah Ginsborg, "Reflective Judgment and Taste," *Noûs* 24, no. 1 (March 1990): 71-72; and Hannah Ginsborg, "On the Key to Kant's Critique of Taste," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (Dec. 1991): 292.

4. Throughout I adjust the Cambridge translation to render *Gemütszustand* as "mental state" rather than "state of mind," and *Vorstellung* as "presentation" rather than "representation."

My preference for the first is on account of the neutrality of its ontological implication, while the second avoids suggesting that Kant is committed to a representational theory of mind. On the latter issue, see also Werner Pluhar's note in his translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), Bxvii note 73.

5. For a discussion of this question, see Fiona Hughes, "Analytic of the Beautiful: Design and the Role of the Object in Taste," in *The Kantian Mind*, ed. Sorin Baiasu and Mark Timmons (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

6. See Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the "Critique of Judgment"* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), ch. 5, for a discussion of the importance of the idea of life for the third *Critique*. Makkreel insists that free play is not connected to synthesis (94, 106). For a criticism of his position, see Fiona Hughes, *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 156-60.

7. This is in contrast to an aesthetic judgment of sense, where the intuition of the object determines the judgment (FI 20:224).

8. Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 106-10; see also 205.

9. Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste: A Reading of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 53-54; and Henry E. Allison, "Pleasure and Harmony in Kant's Theory of Taste: A Critique of the Causal Reading," in *Kants Ästhetik/Kant's Aesthetics/L'esthétique de Kant*, ed. Herman Parret (Berlin: de Gruyter,

1998), 466-83. See also Richard E. Aquila, "A New Look at Kant's Aesthetic Judgments," in *Essays in Kant's Aesthetics*, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 87-114; and Hannah Ginsborg, "Aesthetic Judging and the Intentionality of Pleasure," *Inquiry* 46, no. 2 (2003): 164-81.

10. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, 53-54.

11. Allison, "Pleasure and Harmony in Kant's Theory of Taste."

¹² When I say that mere judging is the reason for our feeling pleasure, I do not mean that feeling is the result of a prior rational principle. Rather, *when* contingently we find something beautiful, *then* we feel pleasure that has as its ground mere judging.

13. Thus I disagree with Allison's distinction between reflection (or judging) and feeling. (*Kant's Theory of Taste*, 70). See Ginsborg, "Aesthetic Judging and the Intentionality of Pleasure," who also criticizes Allison on this issue.

14. See Hughes, *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology*, 284-90; and Hughes, "Analytic of the Beautiful."

15. See Hughes, "Analytic of the Beautiful" on the contingency of judgments of taste.

16. Melissa Zinkin argues that Allison is committed to two pleasures, one in the object and one "directed to the purposiveness of the mental state in reflection on an object" ("Kant and the Pleasure of 'Mere Reflection,'" *Inquiry* 55, no. 5 [2012]: 439-40). She refers to Henry Allison, "Reply to the Comments of Longuenesse and Ginsborg," *Inquiry* 46, no. 2 (2003): 182-94, where Allison himself criticizes Longuenesse for claiming that there are "two orders of pleasure involved in the judgment of taste: a first-order pleasure in the apprehension of the object and a second-order pleasure in the shareability or universal communicability of the first-order pleasure" (185-86). Allison refers to Béatrice Longuenesse, "Kant's Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of Taste: On Henry Allison's *Kant's Theory of Taste*," *Inquiry* 46, no. 2 (2003): 153.

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17. Kant uses the Latin term *Comparation* at JL 9:94.
 18. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, 22; and Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the "Critique of Pure Reason,"* trans. Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 116.
 19. Kant also links *Comparatio* to "the agreement [*Übereinstimmung*] and identity of things" in the *Vienna Logic* (VL 24:907-8).
 20. Kant also uses *reflexio* at A260/B316.
 21. See also CJ 5:203 on the priority of imagination in judgments of taste.
 22. See Avner Baz, "Kant's Principle of Purposiveness and the Missing Point of (Aesthetic) Judgments," *Kantian Review* 10 (Jan. 2005): 1-32; and my response in Fiona Hughes, "On Aesthetic Judgment and Our Relation to Nature: Kant's Concept of Purposiveness," *Inquiry* 49, no. 6 (2006): 547-72.
 23. When Kant uses *Darstellung* nontechnically, it is equivalent to *Vorstellung*.
 24. See also A713/B741 on mathematical exhibition.
 25. This conclusion is supported by Kant's account of schematic hypotyposis (i.e., exhibition) (CJ 5:351).
 26. Thus, although I agree with Ginsborg that judgments of taste are self-referential, I deny that they are "purely self-referential." See Hannah Ginsborg, "On the Key to Kant's Critique of Taste," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (Dec. 1991): 306.
 27. Kant clearly did not use this terminology, but this does not preclude that his insight can now be identified in this way.
 28. I have argued that this amounts to a "dual harmony." See Fiona Hughes, *Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment": A Reader's Guide* (London: Continuum, 2010), 21, 149-53.
 29. Although literally this means "connected," and that is how Guyer and Wood translate it in the Cambridge edition, Kemp Smith's "bound up with" better captures the strength of the

connection (*Immanuel Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason,"* trans. Norman Kemp Smith [London: Macmillan, 1933], A218/B266).

30. Aesthetic judgments thus do not appropriate the imagination into the project of understanding, which Longuenesse refers to as *Vermögen zu urteilen*. See Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 7, 208.

31. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, 69.

32. Ibid. Allison's account of discrimination is puzzling. Since judgments of taste are singular, a judgment comparing beautiful objects is not aesthetic (CJ 5:215).

33. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*, 69.

34. Makkreel remarks that aesthetic harmony qualifies as "pure spontaneity" (*Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, 92). Kant, admittedly, says – although does not develop the idea – that imagination, insofar as it is productive, is spontaneous (CJ 5:240). However, it must be the case that the productivity of imagination is distinct from the spontaneity of understanding, for the productivity of imagination in aesthetic judgments arises when there is no determination by the understanding.

35. I would like to thank Fabian Freyenhagen for helpful comments on early drafts.