

**A One-shot Deal on the Spot: How Vote Buying Affects Electoral
Behaviour. Experimental Evidence from Mexico**

by

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Abstract

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For the 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections, about 50 million voters went to polls to elect more than two thousand posts. The runner-up attributed the defeat to a massive vote-buying mobilisation in favour of the front-runner. Reports from electoral observers supported that version. Did vote buying modify voters choices? Although the literature has approached vote buying from several angles, there remain disputes and gaps in our understanding of the mechanisms involved and their direct implications for electoral outcomes. In this dissertation, I assess both, asking i) how are Mexican voters confronted by vote-buying strategies, ii) what mechanisms for targeting and buying votes do parties deploy, and iii) how strong are the effects on voting choices. First, I propose an extended two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation to frame the analysis and to resolve confluences and confusions in previous research. Second, I employ a mixed-methods research design, analysing thousands of phone calls reporting vote-buying to a national hotline service, a series of semi-structured interviews with brokers, and a list experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey in Mexico. Qualitative evidence from calls and interviews confirm the two-stage model: that activists begin to target voters long time before polling days by knocking on doors, proffering rewards as an exchange for votes and compiling lists of electors. Near and during polling days, activists conduct the second mobilisation strategy to monitor voters and ensure compliance by distributing benefits broadly across the country. Survey evidence shows that 15% of those electors switching voting choices near polling days were contacted by activists during the Election Day, which suggests that further research on vote buying should be more attentive to the timing of the exchange. This research contributes to the literature on vote buying in three ways. First, it extends theoretical approaches of models of vote-buying mobilisation. Second, it provides qualitative evidence from both citizens and brokers to understand mechanisms of targeting and buying votes. Third, it highlights some indirect questioning strategies – including but not confined to the list experiment– that are helpful for estimating vote-buying.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Whereas some campaign strategies rely on policies proposals and ideological manifestos to win elections, others distribute rewards to persuade voters. Academic literature has understood such clientelistic strategies as vote buying, which is a one-shot, direct exchange, in which the participants have no particular characteristics other than that the recipient is a voter (Schaffer 2007, Schedler 2002a). Mexican elections have dealt with accusations of vote buying –amidst other types of illegal transactions– in exchange for political support. Contemporary literature on clientelism (e.g. Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Gans, Mazzuca & Nichter 2009, Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005) suggests that vote buying requires three components, a party machine, brokers in the ground and electors willing to sell their vote.

The Mexican case is a good example of the problem in the Latin American region. After the Revolution, the Mexican government developed a national system of distribution of benefits strategically addressed to social groups and individuals. As a result, the dominant party (PRI) maintained the power with a vast political network of loyalists constituted of partisan, volunteers, public employees and high-level officials. The PRI and the government consolidated a national structure what literature on clientelism has called political machine (Stokes 2005, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter

2014). Such structure contributed to stabilise the regime and mitigate potential signs of nonconformity. But this corporatist model also shaped clientelistic ties between citizens and politicians resulting in individuals highly familiarised with deliveries from the government.

Gradually, electoral reforms –addressing free and fair contests– provided access to opposition groups, who began to influence the public agenda by occupying strategic political positions. The PRI, therefore, turned to other illegitimate methods to keep the power. Electoral fraud appeared to come to life. The party developed a national network of regional and local leaders –called by literature brokers (e.g. Larreguy, Montiel & Querubin 2017, Stokes et al 2013, Gay 1999, Schmidt 1974). These leaders were able to interact with people at ground level manipulating, at different degrees, election procedures, voters' choices and harass opposition groups. In addition, electoral officers, in line with government's interests, used to assist the PRI in conducting operations as stuffing ballots, miscounting votes and selectively denying access to polls. The PRI then established and consolidated a vast network of brokers working in the ground.

Finally, once Mexican voters removed the PRI from the Presidency after seven decades in power, the task of electoral reforms focused on undermining numerous fraudulent practices. Amidst other changes, new legislation provided electoral authorities with more legal tools to monitor closely campaigns, audit parties spending, control a fair access to media and even nullify anomalous elections. These measures have contributed considerably to remove fraudulent activities. However, these changes have

also pressured parties to conduct ground-level electioneering. Given that the regime had already developed a party machine, a national network of brokers and Mexican voters had already got used to receiving benefits from politicians, the presence of vote buying was a matter of time. Although there have been conditions for parties to perform vote-buying tactics, they have no incentives to do so, because other methods seemed to be enough.

Academic literature has largely study clientelistic exchanges (e.g. Diaz, Estevez & Magaloni 2016, 2012, 2007, Hagene 2015, De La O 2013, Hilgers 2008, 2005, Diaz-Cayeros 2008, Magaloni 2006, Shefner 2001, Cornelius 2000). However, studies still differ about the extent of the problem and its direct implications on electoral outcomes. Whereas qualitative evidence (e.g. Schedler & Manriquez 2004) suggest that voters reject clientelistic distributions of benefits from politicians, statistical evidence (Greene 2016) indicates that a fifth of voters entered such deals, exchanging votes for rewards. Why do conclusions differ? To answer this question, I approach vote-buying in Mexico by investigating four aspects, i) conditions of the case relevant to the Latin American region, ii) the way voters cope with vote buying, iii) brokers' mechanisms of targeting and buying voters, and iv) the relationships between the exposition of electors to vote-buying and voting choices. Although this difference of findings between methodologies has been addressed by literature (Gonzalez et al 2012), fewer attempts have studied vote-buying from a mixed-methods perspective. This study aims to fill this gap.

This Chapter is organised as follows, I first present the motivations of the research. Then, I discuss theoretical and methodological grounds of this

dissertation. The I describe the research design and, finally, I describe the dissertation plan.

1.1 Dissertation Grounds: The Motivations

In 2012, about 50 million Mexicans voters went to polls¹ to elect more than two thousand posts, the President, Federal and local Congressmen, governors, mayors and councillors. As the previous Presidential election, campaigns were fraught with mutual accusations of irregularities (Cantu 2014b) and malpractices (Alianza Civica 2006). However, in 2012, an unexpected margin between front-runner Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN) and runner-up, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) caused a series of public protests appealing official results.² Supporters of AMLO filled Mexico City's streets claiming a massive vote-buying mobilisation.³ EPN eventually claimed the victory with 39% of votes against 33% of AMLO. The Electoral Federal Institute (IFE) reported official results underlining a high turnout.⁴ The report also emphasised the contribution of more than half a million of volunteers, over 143 thousand polling stations, hundreds of thousand ballot boxes recounted, and millions of votes verified.

Amidst speculations, social organisations on electoral observation supported the version of an illegitimate mobilisation of vote buying (Alianza

¹ Source, Election Guide, Democracy, Assistance and Elections: <http://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/140/> (Mexico: 50,323,153).

² Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación (TEPJF), 'Juicio de Inconformidad SUP-JIN-0359-2012', Thursday 30 August 2012, http://www.te.gob.mx/Informacion_juridiccional/sesion_publica/ejecutoria/sentencias/SUP-JIN-0359-2012.pdf (accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015).

³ BBC News, 'Mexico's Lopez Obrador rejects presidential poll ruling', Saturday 1 September 2012, Latin America and Caribbean News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19440654> (accessed on Tuesday 28 May 2013).

⁴ IFE, 'La elección en números. Elecciones 2012, boletín de Prensa', http://pac.ife.org.mx/2012/eleccion_en_numeros.html (accessed on Wednesday 29 May 2013).

Civica 2012).⁵ Electoral observers reported thousands of activists proffering gift tokens to voters from a national chain of shops. In addition, hundreds of voters also claimed to be offered cash, materials for construction, bags of provisions and clothing for their vote. Most of these claims, however, were provided by newspapers and non-academic sources. For domestic analysts, post-election claims must be taken carefully since electoral preferences could misguide the real status of the election. Citizens' opinions captured after elections not only disclose the perception on the performance of the IFE but also disappointments. The truth is that unexpected election results and evidence against irregularities suggested a widespread vote-buying mobilisation. What did it happen then? Did final legitimate strategies of campaigns suddenly make voters switch choices? Did vote buying indeed switch abruptly parties' preferences? These are the initial questions of this project.

In a previous study on voting behaviour, Moreno (2003) examines influential factors of Mexican voters, i.e. sociodemographic conditions, party identity, religion, ideological position of parties, rational choices and party rotation. The study addresses the explanatory power of legitimate campaign strategies, clientelistic tactics are not even mentioned. I argue that surveys' questionnaires in Latin America omitting illegitimate campaign tactics from the set of answers tend to be reductionist. Evidence on the pervasiveness and prevalence of clientelism in the region (e.g. Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007) suggests that clientelistic exchanges are a political strategy to attract voters.

⁵ Alianza Civica, 'Boletín de Prensa', Monday 3 July 2012, <http://www.alianzacivica.org.mx/archivos/pub/4434Informe%203%20de%20julio%202012.pdf> (accessed Wednesday 29 May 2013).(accessed Wednesday 29 May 2013).

As a result, the fact of excluding such rewards as a pattern of voting choices is a limited approach.

There are several forms of distributing rewards for votes. Studies have employed the label of vote-buying to allude to a variety of conducts. This conflation can produce divergent findings. Given that publications on vote buying have proliferated in the literature on clientelistic ties, clientelism and patronage have been closely related to vote buying. Since scholars have used randomly these terms, in this dissertation, I assess and revisit the core attributes of the concepts to clarify definitions, aiming to alleviate potential diversions. This diversity can also affect empirical analysis particularly, those requiring the operationalisation of variables such as surveys. A fundamental distinction between clientelism, patronage and vote buying should help to mitigate the problem.

Specialised literature (Schuman & Presser 1996) demonstrates that the wording of survey questions influences respondents' answers. Vote buying is illegal and socially undesirable. Therefore, asking about the action in surveys might provoke attitudes of rejection; there is a risk for individuals to lie about admitting they have engaged in vote buying. Several efforts (UNDP 2006, Stokes 2005, Brusco et al 2004, Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002) have addressed the puzzle producing and testing questions on vote buying. Although these studies have contributed to our current understanding, experimental evidence (Gonzalez, De-Jonge & Meseguer 2017, Greene 2016, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015, Gonzalez et al 2015, De-Jonge 2015, Carkoglu & Ayac 2015, Palmer-Rubin & Nichter 2014, Gonzalez et al 2012, Corstange 2009) has reopened the debate, challenging findings about the

accuracy of the measurement. A recent study (Nichter 2014) underlines conceptual problems of vote buying, which affect results and findings. As a result, I review conceptual foundations of vote buying and make two significant refinements to the definition: the basis of the agreement and the benefits dispensed.

In addition, based on Nichter's (2008: 20) model of targeting reward of electoral mobilisation, in this dissertation, I develop an alternative two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation. My model contributes to research by dividing vote buying into the stages of targeting and buying. The former refers to individuals exposed to multi-offers and the latter denotes voters engaged in a transaction. Literature has tended to analyse vote buying employing indistinctly the actions of offering and giving. Because parties compete for voters, it is likely that one single voter is exposed to multiple vote-buying offers. Although the exposition to several offers depicts the intensity of parties' mobilisation, it omits the fact that voters might assess and select one offer over the others or even reject all of them. In contrast, the action of receiving rewards from brokers illustrates more closely that voters might have entered and closed a vote-buying transaction. In other words, the two-stage model offers an analytical framework to examine different aspects of vote buying.

1.2 Research Design

Studying vote buying is a complex task for three reasons. First, with regards to perpetrators, candidates and parties have no incentives to generate records about the strategy since its illegality but also, because judges could

nullify elections on the grounds of vote buying. Second, from the citizens' perspective, given that vote buying is contrary to democratic values and principles, it is unlikely that individuals acknowledge empathy or any engagement in such activity despite experiences. Thirdly, in terms of brokers, some actions they undertake during campaigns are punishable, there is a vivid risk of prosecution. As a consequence, a single method could partially drive research questions on vote buying towards solid answers. Mixed-methods then offer a viable option to explore some aspects of the phenomenon to understand its mechanisms, identify its processes and uncover its hidden structures. Additionally, they provide researchers with the versatility to move from one side to another comfortably following the needs of the research. In order to overcome some of the complexity of vote buying, the design of this research adopts a mixed-method approach.

This dissertation uses a mixed-method research design applied to Mexico constituted of two qualitative sources and an experiment. The case selection responds to the following reasons. The country has a wealth of experience in clientelistic transactions (Fox 1994), it also has a rich history of politicians manipulating elections (Balinski & Gonzalez 1996), voters' choices (Magaloni 2006, Cornelius 2004), and it is a traditional example of a political machine regime (Stokes 2005). In addition, Mexico has hosted numerous studies about electoral system (Nohlen 2005, Klesner 2005, Cornelius & Craig 1991, Molinar 1989), fraudulent elections (Magaloni 2010, Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2004, Lehoucq 2003, Schedler 1999, McCann & Dominguez 1998), electoral reforms (Serra 2009, Cordova 2008, Becerra, Salazar & Woldenberg 2000, 1997, Barquin 1987), and corporatist

national structure (Chapman 2012, Grayson 1998). Most of these studies have played a prominent role in the study of those areas, in particular, elections and clientelistic politics. As a consequence, in Chapter 3, I discuss how Mexico provides a good opportunity to investigate vote buying as its similar conditions to those political systems with highly institutionalised parties' machines and selective deliveries of benefits.

The first technique I use is an unconventional qualitative examination (Terry & Wong 2005, Arbon et al 2006) of thousands of phone calls from the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in Mexico reporting vote buying. In Chapter 4, I assess how Mexicans face vote-buying mobilisations based on the accounts of callers. I rely on information provided by non-recruited interviewees from across Mexico reporting vote buying for more than thirteen years of federal and local elections. I intend to capture crucial and sensitive details of vote-buying but more importantly how Mexicans face these strategies. In addition, records of calls help me to trace dates of the reports associated with campaign trends to establish the timing of the mobilisation strategies.

Secondly, I conduct a series of semi-structured interviews with brokers to understand how they devise and perform strategies. Different from other studies (Hegene 2015, Zarazaga 2014), I focus particularly on their tasks to buy votes. Brokers perform numerous duties that cover areas beyond elections or even politics. However, in Chapter 5, I essentially explore aspects as structures and networks, targeting and buying strategies, and mechanisms of compliance. I examine the methods political machines works by understanding structures between parties and brokers

and networks within brokers' teams. Furthermore, I investigate mechanisms and timing to deploy brokers to streets targeting voters, enforce individuals' voting choices. Finally, I ask brokers about their perception of the success of vote buying.

Finally, I conduct an alternative version of a list-experiment called LISTIT embedded in a nationally representative survey to test the effects of the exposition of electors to vote-buying on voting choices. This individual-level data collection is an unobtrusive technique providing respondents with anonymity and confidentiality to get truthful responses. Given that vote buying is illegal and contrary to democratic values, it is likely that individuals underreport their experience. LISTIT offers research a method to ask directly sensitive subjects. After uncovering how Mexican voters face vote-buying mechanisms, strategies and methods employed by brokers, I formulate hypotheses focused on timing and personal interaction. Given that strategies of vote buying seem to increase near and during polling days, the items and wording address such element. Hypotheses aim to determine whether switching voting choices respond to encounter with activists near or during polling days. Results indicate that one in six electors who switched choices reported interaction with activists, which suggest that the timing of the electoral mobilisations is crucial to manipulate voters.

1.3 Dissertation Plan

Overall, this research is organised in the following way. In Chapter 2, I review the broad use that literature has given to vote-buying. I categorise studies and dimensions. Consequently –following Nichter (2014)–, I discuss

the terms clientelism and patronage with vote buying by analysing the core attributes. I explain how scholars tend to allude to vote buying when they are, indeed, including attributes from patronage and clientelism and vice versa. I then present my arguments to develop a two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation discussing some benefits for research. By examining implications of the divergent uses of vote buying on empirical findings, I show how results can differ as a result of the conceptual ambiguity. To achieve it, I use the discussion of distinct attributes between clientelism, patronage and vote buying. Additionally, I use my two-stage model to assess traditional survey designs and innovative experiments. Finally, I present conclusions and final considerations.

Chapter 3 introduces the particular conditions that have driven Mexico to be a good case for studying vote buying. I explain how the transition from an authoritarian to a dominant-party regime favoured the context of clientelist politics. I discuss how policies implemented by the government on social welfare, distributing resources to individuals and social groups, shaped a paternalist state to guarantee political control. Such method, however, strengthened clientelistic ties for the success vote buying. In addition, emphatic electoral legislation to the government interests and a political operation at ground level created incentives for performing clientelistic transactions. I show that such distributive policies in combination with a national party structure and voters highly familiarised with deliveries from the government set an appropriate environment for vote buying. I also describe how the outcome of the 2000 Presidential Elections pressured other parties to deploy similar tactics during campaigns. I finally

examine how recent electoral reforms, addressing free and fair contests, in fact, enhanced practices of vote buying.

In Chapter 4, I discuss how Mexican voters face vote buying. First, I explain why the Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes serves as a source for qualitative evidence from a citizen's perspective of vote buying. I focus in particular on 2012 to examine trends of reports about the Presidential Election. Secondly, using theoretical literature about targeting, I analyse accounts reporting activists offering benefits as an exchange for their vote. Third, I examine calls reporting conditions and brokers' strategies to distribute benefits and voters accepting rewards to show timing and circumstances in which voters engaged in vote-buying deals. In addition, I analyse reports about negative vote-buying and calls received on polling days, focusing on tactics of targeting near polling stations. It is important to admit that, to the best of my understanding, this is the first study presenting evidence about negative vote buying in Mexico. Finally, I examine mechanisms for ensuring voters' compliance.

Chapter 5 discusses parties' mechanisms for targeting electors and buying votes from a broker's point of view. Firstly, I describe how brokers' structures and networks are connected, developed and shaped for vote buying activities. I discuss the extent and strength of these aspects and how the relationships between parties and brokers leverage. Secondly, I investigate methods and strategies for targeting electors and buying votes. I then explain how brokers and parties plan and implement such strategies for the success of vote buying. Thirdly, I describe how brokers close vote-buying deals, discussing relationships between the distribution of rewards

near polling days and the execution of mechanisms of compliance. Finally, I present the conclusions of the Chapter.

In Chapter 6, I conduct an alternative technique of a list-experiment called LISTIT embedded in a nationally representative survey in Mexico. I discuss the design and the data collection, advantages and shortcomings of the technique for studying vote buying. I also present the variables of the study and justify the items of control. Secondly, I discuss the results by presenting relevant descriptive statistics and conducting regression tests. I finally discuss results with other studies and present some implications and conclusions.

In Chapter 7, I conclude this dissertation by highlighting the main contributions of the research; summarising problems, methods, techniques and findings; discussing theoretical and methodological implications with an eye on future research agenda.

Chapter 2. A Conceptual Review of Vote Buying. Revisiting its Defining Attributes and Refining its Model of Mobilisation

Academic publications have used the term vote buying to refer a variety of conducts. Nichter (2014) argues that such diversity has the risk of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970) causing divergent empirical findings. In academic literature, vote buying might refer to sports governing bodies deciding over an organiser hosting the Football World Cup (Buttler 2002), representatives shaping lawmaking (Saiegh 2011) governments allocating discretionary state resources (Wyatt 2013), legislators developing projects of infrastructure within their constituencies (Golden & Picci 2008), and parties distributing rewards to influence voters' choices (Schedler 2002, Schaffer 2002). It is unlikely that empirical findings on a single term of vote buying apply to all these conducts. There is a need then to categorise such diversity and examine its conceptual foundations. In order to both locate my own work into the field and identify relevant previous findings, I review the term of vote buying and revisit its defining attributes.

This review concentrates on the field of electors' vote buying. Scholars investigating clientelist exchanges have shown a renewed interest in reassessing this field. Whereas traditional approaches (e.g. Stokes et al

2013, Kramon 2011, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, Stokes 2005, Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004) have focused on revealing parties' strategies to target electors and their mechanisms to enforce compliance, a recent trend (e.g. Gonzalez et al 2012, De Jonge 2015, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015) provides new methods to estimate more accurately its incidence, re-discussing previous results and findings. Given that academic literature on clientelism has dominated the research on vote buying, scientists have developed several definitions, alluding to a variety of clientelistic exchanges but calling all of them vote buying. Clientelism itself and patronage are terms interacting closely with vote buying in literature. Scholars seem to employ randomly the three related terms when stating only about vote buying. In this Chapter then, I deconstruct the concepts of clientelism, patronage and vote buying to revisit attributes, comparing similarities and differences. This analysis will serve to clarify whether studies allude to clientelism or patronage despite naming the acts as vote buying.

Also, literature concurs that electors' vote buying entails strategies of mobilisation conducted by parties based on personal interactions with voters through what theory traditionally calls *brokers* (Larreguy, Montiel & Querubin 2017, Larreguy, Marshal & Querubin 2016, Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Stokes et al 2013, Gay 1999). Research has examined such interactions to buy votes by exploring turnout and voting shares to estimate the effects of mobilisation strategies on voting behaviour. Although both factors depict electors' voting choices, this view is not able to describe what happens during the period when electors are exposed to multiple vote-buying offers and when they make the final decision. The problematic

aspect is the omission of the fact that electors are able to assess and reject vote-buying offers before making choices or even aborting a deal. Thus, in this Chapter, I develop a two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation (targeting and buying) to offer an alternative view to solve this problem. I compare traditional survey designs (Stokes et al 2013, Szwarberg 2012, Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004, Stokes 2005) with the growing area of experiments (Greene 2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015, De-Jonge 2015, Hicken et al 2015, Gonzalez et al 2014, Vicente 2014, Gonzalez et al 2012, Gallego & Wantchekon 2012, Kramon 2011, Vicente & Wantchekon 2009, Wantchekon 2003) to evaluate advances in research. In particular, I examine the wording of vote-buying items based on defining attributes and the two-stage model of mobilisation.

This chapter is organised as follows, I first review the use of the term vote buying from a broader view by categorising literature and placing research into appropriate dimensions of study. Second, guided by Nichter's (2014) study, I contrast the terms clientelism and patronage with vote buying by taking their attributes apart. I briefly discuss how scholars tend to allude to vote buying when they are actually including attributes from patronage and clientelism. Third, I develop the arguments of my two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation strategy and discuss its benefits for empirical research. Fourth, I assess implications of the conceptual development of vote buying on empirical research based on the distinction between clientelism and patronage and the two-phases of mobilisation. In particular, I focus the analysis on traditional survey designs and innovative experiments. I finally present conclusions and some implications I will

discuss against qualitative evidence in Chapters 3 and 4 and test statistically in Chapter 5.

2.1 Vote Buying: The Broad Scope

A variety of studies have employed the term 'vote buying' to refer to the exchange of personal benefits for individual choices. A majority of these works agree with the negative notion of the action since it violates principles of fairness, equality and undermines the foundation of electoral procedures. Although previous efforts (Hasen 2000: 1326) have identified five targets of vote buying, three individuals have prevailed in literature as shareholders, representatives and electorate. Schaffer (2007: 1) argues that 'instances of vote buying have reportedly taken place within the International Whaling Commission, among members of the US Congress, [...] between shareholders of large corporations [and within] popular elections'. Other studies (Nichter 2014) have classified the usage of the term vote buying into four categories as a) clientelistic vote buying, b) legislative vote buying, c) non-excludable vote buying, and d) non-binding vote buying. Researchers have examined shareholders vote-buying from a more business angle to understand the ways corporate governing bodies influence members of organisations to arrive at certain decisions. From the political angle, scientists have shown interest in representatives and electorate vote-buying as their detrimental effects on democratic values.

Shareholders vote-buying alludes to the bias towards business decisions in a corporate governance structure (Hu & Black 2006). For instance, when a voting system is established to reach decisions, all

shareholders are given with specific rights to vote, usually according to the size of their stocks (Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky 2008). Some of these members are more aware of situations in specific areas, which creates scenarios of incomplete information. Shareholders with bigger stocks have incentives to manipulate the choice of the others. The design of the voting system is also important to know the number of votes required to reach the decision. Shareholders usually offer money and business opportunities in exchange for support (Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky 2008). In contrast with the political arena, the fact of buying votes of shareholders is not fully illegitimate as a measure of persuasion since potential costs of the business decision (Clark 1978) and wealth-maximization principles (Cole 2001).

Representatives vote-buying refers to those voting arrangements made in legislative arenas to reach public decisions. Such type of vote buying is closely related to congressional norms commonly conducted in American politics known as logrolling, which is legal. However, its sensitive aspect lies in politicians reaching private arrangement about public affairs (Hall & Deardorff 2006). Lobbying is still an effective method to constitute majorities and serve as a channel for communication between social groups and congressmen despite the evidence against representatives selling the vote (Lewis 1998, Groseclose 1996, Hall & Wayman 1990), which undermines the foundations of the democratic representation. There is a diffuse boundary between legitimate lobbying and illegal vote-buying in the legislative arena. Studies on this area have examined the effects of vote buying on the formation of majorities (Wiseman 2004, Banks 2000,

Groseclose & Snyder 1996), the creation of coalitions (Haefele 1970) and particular cases as European Parliament (Rodden 2002), for example.

Electorate vote-buying alludes to the exchange of money and goods for votes. Politics implies an exchange of deliveries for support. From this perspective, politics is distributive by nature (e.g. public policies, national programmes or infrastructure), but the ways that politicians and governments deliver such benefits to people distinguish legitimate transfers from other types of exchanges. The study of electorate vote-buying has been mostly undertaken from clientelistic approaches. Nichter (2014), however, argues that literature on clientelism has employed the term “vote buying” referring to a variety of phenomena, which might drive research to a conceptual ambiguity and affect empirical results. I then review the literature on electorate vote-buying guided by Nichter’s (2014) study on the conceptualisation on vote buying. I discuss the development of the definition vote buying, focused on the attributes distinguishing vote buying from clientelism and patronage. Additionally, I develop a two-stage model of vote buying mobilisation, dividing the tactic of targeting from buying. Finally, based on surveys and experiments designs, I review the implications of employing distinct definitions on empirical research.

2.2 The Conceptual Development of Vote Buying

The conceptual development of clientelistic vote buying has been held by literature on clientelism. Although studies seem to agree that exchanges of benefits for votes illustrate an act of electorate vote-buying, there are particular aspects that require further revision. In fact, (Nichter 2014: 316)

argues that 'studies of clientelism often report survey or fieldwork evidence about the relative prevalence of clientelist vote buying, but it is sometimes unclear what specific attributes of benefits are considered'. To assess differences and similarities of the attributes of vote buying, I deconstruct related concepts treated by literature on clientelism, placing vote buying at the core of the analysis.

Vote Buying vs Clientelism: The Foundations of the Arrangement

Literature on clientelism has predominantly framed the study of vote buying as examining elites and citizens' ties. Between the 1950s and the 1970s, research on clientelism looked at two central factors of the dyad, its functional and structural aspects. First, literature has emphasised the instrumental-utilitarian incentive of citizens when engaging in clientelism. Whilst there are negative consequences for democracy that politicians distribute resources discretionarily, it is also a method for individuals to receive services, benefits and goods as an exchange of support. In some cases, clientelism is an easy way for deprived people to access to programmes of food, employment, housing, education or health as well as energy, water amidst other essential services. When governments allocate limited resources, they tend to subsidise supportive regions. Under these circumstances, the poorest see clientelistic exchanges as a 'strategic mechanism for achieving physical and economic security' (Hilgers 2009: 51).

Secondly, research on clientelism (Gay 1998, 1999) has focused on the structural aspect, assuming sincere sentiments between citizens and elites. For these scholars, solid norms of solidarity and reciprocity (Lawson & Greene 2014, Foster 1961) set the social system that makes clientelism work. This type of face-to-face socialisation encourages people to participate in activities for the community –beyond politics. It forges a local identity by building trust and collective cohesion. There is, indeed, a genuine individual sense of collective well-being. These conditions create mutual obligations for elites and citizens, which ease the establishment of clientelistic deals, benefits and type of support.

There is, however, an asymmetrical relationship in a patron-client tie. This notion is illustrated by Powell (1970), who describes peasants as powerless living violence, exploitation, and injustices at the hands of a powerful patron. But most importantly, despite the inequality, there is a little that peasants can do to change conditions. In addition, the author describes a clientelistic system as a relationship that involves '[an] interchange of noncomparable goods and services between actors of unequal socio-economic status ranks [...]' (Powell 1970: 413). This notion conceives clients as victims since the unequal social status as well as the inability to abort the deal.

The idea of subordination continued prevailing for a few decades in literature. As exploring authoritarian clientelism in Mexico, Fox (1994) argues that 'a wide range of political systems [...] oblige the poor to sacrifice their political rights if they want access to distributive programmes' (Fox 1994: 152). Electors, therefore, are deprived of the right of free elections as

they vote for the incumbent to not lose benefits from the government. Yet, an influential study (Auyero 1999) on clientelistic politics in Peronist Argentina observes that even though clientelism entails a type of domination, these networks are not necessarily an effective mechanism of electoral mobilisation. Poor people are not 'Pavlovian agents who vote and support candidates in exchange for favors and services' (Auyero 1999: 301). This idea suggests that the poor are able to make voting choices despite the domination. The fact of delivering goods, benefits, services and favours does not straightforwardly ensure support at polls.

Schaffer (2002) discusses the automatic connection between benefits and votes. Some academics assume that all materials exchanged within the political arena are addressed to influence electoral choices; however, the author argues that voting behaviour is not the only consequence of delivering goods. Such practice can, for instance, shape citizens' expectations about governments or switch negative perceptions about crises. In addition, given the variety of goods dispensed and methods employed to deliver them, research on vote buying should look at the contextual meaning for both givers and recipients. It is then necessary to clarify whether the distribution of benefits is truly a strategy of electoral mobilisation for parties and what such goods and services do certainly mean to people. Schaffer (2002) concludes that given the wide variety of goods, services and practices conventionally understood by literature, the category of vote buying has inaccurately covered a range of dissimilar phenomena.

The discussion about the causal connection between rewards and votes stresses two different characteristics of a current distinction between

clientelism and vote buying. First, concerning what politicians expect from people, voting is one, but not the only, form of support. Second, regarding its academic definition, vote buying is a subclass but not a synonym of clientelism (Stokes 2007). Recent studies of both clientelism and vote buying depict well this distinction. In her ethnographic investigation in Mexico City, Hilgers (2009: 52) defines clientelism as,

[A] voluntary, dyadic arrangement in which two individuals of unequal status, who have a long-term personal relationship that may include elements of friendship and affection, engage in diffuse reciprocal exchanges of non-comparable goods and services to mutual benefit. The alliance is informal but is governed by a set of norms based on reciprocity, integrity, honour, respect and obligation. The concept has been used to describe traditional relations between landlords and peasants or among villagers, links between politicians and the poor in modern societies and alliances among members of the middle class, elites, bureaucrats and politicians.

The preceding definition entails fundamental aspects for vote buying as the *exchange of goods and politicians*; nevertheless, it does not consider key terms as *elections, campaigns, electoral support* or even *votes*. Such conditions are constitutive elements in Nichter's (2014: 316) definition of clientelistic vote buying. As the author explains,

Clientelistic vote buying is the distribution of rewards to individuals or small groups during elections in contingent exchanges for vote choices. Rewards are defined as cash goods (including food and drink), and services. Post-election benefits, employment, public programs, and transportation to the polls are not considered rewards.

Such understanding of vote buying redefines three traditional attributes of a clientelistic relationship. First, the base of the arrangement. Whereas the definition of clientelism establishes the *long-term relationship* between the

two individuals as the foundation of the agreement, the definition of vote buying turns to the *reward*. Even though vote buying entails a link between two people, the relationship does not sustain –by itself– the transaction. Firstly, because a durable link is not a necessary condition for vote buying to succeed and, secondly because citizens engage in vote buying as a result of the utilitarian incentive they find in the reward. In addition, by focusing on rewards, the definition moves the preceding assumption of loyal individuals to more autonomous voters exposed to different offers, free to assess and take the best deal. In other words, it sees vote buying as ‘a contract’ Schaffer & Schedler (2007: 17). By understanding benefits as *rewards*, the definition superposes then the compensation onto affective sentiments in the exchange.

The second attribute is the restriction of the delivery to *election periods*. By enclosing the distribution of benefits in *electoral campaigns*, the definition excludes other clientelistic exchanges from the concept of vote buying. Such observation is illustrated by a study (Spalding 1981) about the corporatist regime in Mexico that explains how both government and the dominant party managed to regularly distribute cash and services to selective social groups beyond elections. This strategy was designed to perpetuate the political control since the electoral competition was almost non-existent in the seventies (Magaloni 2006, Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2004, Weldon 1997, Dominguez & McCann 1995). Mexican politicians created a structure of state rewards, binding selective individuals and groups to such system (see Chapman 2012). They expected loyalty to the regime from people rather than support at polls. Although deliveries used to

take place within electoral periods, buying votes was not the intention. Therefore, clientelistic exchanges outside elections are not vote-buying.

Thirdly, following previous ideas (e.g. Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007), Nichter (2014) adds the condition of *contingent* to the component of exchange, which entails uncertainty and opportunism to a vote-buying deal. By adding these features, the definition understands the exchange as a strategy subjected to the volatility and particular needs of each electoral contest. Also, successful deliveries of rewards are conditioned to electors' behaviour, especially those switching voting choices. But how parties overcome the secrecy of the ballot⁶ to monitor voters' choices at polls. Studies show that parties ensure voters compliance by conducting monitoring and enforcement activities through political machines (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2014, Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005). First, parties insert own networks into electoral authorities to violate the secrecy of the ballot. This strategy relates to an electoral malpractice that Birch (2011: 29) calls 'the manipulation of the administrative process'. Second, during the Election Day, parties send brokers to the ground (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013) who, amidst other tactics, ask bought electors to take a photo of the ballot paper marked (Vicente 2014) at the polling booth to prove voting choices. The condition of contingency to clientelistic exchanges arises questions about the implications of delivering rewards before or after polling days. Parties should perform tasks of monitoring and compliance to mitigate voters' opportunistic defection (Nichter 2014) when they distribute

⁶ At the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, only two political regimes –Bhutan and Iran– used public-voting systems (Przeworski 2015). However,

rewards before the Election Day. In contrast, voters should trust parties' promises if they accede to receive the benefits after turning out. The last dilemma is more commonly a patronage arrangement.

In conclusion, vote buying is a form of clientelism, but distinct from other forms of "relational clientelism" (Nichter 2010); especially, when translating concepts into measures. Vote buying succeeds with much thinner ties. Clientelism is based on long-term interpersonal relationships. Vote buying entails contingent individual transfers to voters in exchange for votes, restricted to election periods. Instead, clientelism assumes the distribution of continued post-electoral benefits to individual or groups of voters.

Vote Buying vs Patronage: Benefits Dispensed and Conditions of the Dispensation

Literature on clientelism has also related patronage to vote buying as studying clientelistic exchanges. Such association responds to two constitutive characteristics that patronage shares with vote buying, it is a strategy of electoral mobilisation to persuade voters and electors' support is expected at polls. However, two distinct aspects differentiate vote buying from patronage, the characteristics of benefits proffered and the promise of future deliveries. As vote buying, patronage is a subclass of clientelism (Stokes 2007); also called pork barrel, programmatic or redistributive politics. Pork barrel denotes mostly legislators biasing the allocation of benefits amongst supporters in their geographic constituency through public

programmes, hospitals or infrastructure projects (Lancaster 1986). Programmatic and redistributive politics allude more to strategies of state investments where allocations of expenditure respond to electoral risk (Diaz-Cayeros 2008).⁷ An influential definition understands patronage as ‘the proffering of public resources (*most typically, public employment*) *by office holders in return for electoral support*, where the criterion of distribution is again the clientelist one [...]’ (Italics in original) (Stokes 2007: 606).

As defining patronage, some attempts (Mainwaring 1999) have omitted the aspect of proffering benefits during election periods. However, literature seems to agree that these promises depend fully on candidates holding public offices coming from elections, to reward supporters with state resources. Firstly, given that democratic elections have been adopted worldwide as a method for politicians to access to public posts, candidates promise the allocation of resources during campaigns to persuade voters and win elections. As a result, patronage serves as a strategy of electoral mobilisation. Secondly, since candidates compete in electoral contests, they first need votes to win at polls and then secure resources to fulfil promises. Thus, as for vote buying, turnout is a necessary condition for patronage.

In contrast, patronage differentiates from vote buying in two central aspects, the promises of benefits and the conditioned fulfilment of such

⁷ Other labels related to patronage such as bureaucratic clientelism (Schmidt 1974), party patronage (Kopecký & Scherlis 2008) and, a recent one known as Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil about poverty (Sewall 2008), welfare (Bohn 2011, Hall 2012, Fried 2012, Zucco 2013), and education (De Janvry, Finan & Sadoulet 2012); as well as in Mexico (De la O 2013), Honduras (Linos 2013) and Philippines (Labonne 2013) are not discussed here.

promises. First, in patronage, candidates offer voters *promises of future benefits* instead distributions. Formally, there is no a clientelistic exchange during election periods but offers. Patronage strategies, then, imply two stages to close a transaction, one in which promises of benefits are presented to voters and another in which electors are rewarded. Whereas in vote buying rewards for voters depend only on their electoral behaviour, in patronage they depend on the electoral outcome. In addition, in a vote-buying transaction, there is no implication beyond polling days; in patronage, instead, once the candidate holds the public office, his permanence becomes a public good because an unexpected exit would cause the loss of the collective benefits allocated.

Second, fulfilling promises of future employment, for example, under the condition of winning a contest implies that electors should rely on a positive election outcome to access the benefits, which makes rewards intangible when they turn out. The fact of voters risking their benefits despite following through with their side of the agreement creates incentives for defection. On the contrary, by binding a prompt enjoyment of the benefits to voting behaviour, vote buying provides electors with more certainty over rewards regardless the results of the election (Nichter 2014). Another aspect here is the type of benefits traditionally proffered in patronage and vote buying. Whereas the former tends to distribute public goods, such as community services, infrastructure projects or social transfers, literature on vote buying seems to agree that contingent exchanges mostly include private goods, such as bags of provisions or money (Schedler 2002a). Economic approaches to elections (Deacon & Shapiro 1975) have warned

about assuming that individual behaviour at polls coming from collective goods⁸ is similar to those conducts coming from personal benefits. Empirical results ‘cast doubt upon the notion that individuals somehow alter their preferences (or behavior) away from selfishness and toward the social good as they leave the market [...] and enter the polling booth’ (Deacon & Shapiro 1975: 954).

As vote buying, patronage functions as a strategy of electoral mobilisation. But, offers of future state-related employment and promises of selective allocation of benefits from state resources during campaigns do not qualify automatically as a vote-buying deal. Nichter (2014) notes that literature on vote buying has lacked conceptual clarity about rewards. Whereas a majority of studies exclude this type of benefits from the concept of vote buying, others (Schaffer & Schedler 2007, Baland 2007, Lehoucq 2007, Desposato 2007, Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004) acknowledge both promises of employment and selective allocations of public programmes as a vote-buying agreement. Such conceptual imprecision could ‘distort descriptive findings and threaten the validity of causal claims’ (Nichter 2014: 315).

An illustrative review –rather than rigorous– about recent definitions of vote buying shows that literature supports Nitcher’s (2014) claims about conceptual consensus. For instance, guided by Stokes (2007), Jensen & Justesen (2014: 220) define vote buying as ‘the direct exchange at the individual level of rewards and material goods by political patrons in return for electoral support by voters’. Likewise, Gonzalez et al (2012: 202) see it

⁸ On this definition of collective goods, see Nichter’s (2014, 322-3) discussion on Non-Excludable Vote Buying and Non-Binding Vote Buying.

as ‘the exchange of goods for votes at the individual level’. Hicken (2007: 51) understands it as ‘the individual, immediate, and private exchange of goods, services, or cash for electoral support’. Finally, in a further study, Gonzalez et al (2014: 197), adding the time of the exchange, define vote buying as ‘[...] the exchange of private goods for votes during electoral campaigns’. Focusing on such observation, other studies have particularly restricted the exchange to campaigns, despite omitting the aspect of private goods. For example, Vicente (2014: F357) defines vote buying as ‘the exchange of cash for votes before the elections’. Likewise, Vicente & Wantchekon (2009: 293) see it as ‘votes-for-cash, or votes for other fungible goods, before the election’. As it can be seen, studies on vote buying, first, concur with restricting a vote-buying exchange to private rewards at the individual level and, second, they confine the time of the exchange to campaigns.

By contrast, a few studies, as Finan & Schechter (2012), adopt a broader definition of vote buying following ideas of a more clientelism approach.⁹ Authors assume that voters support candidates who have previously provided them with particularistic forms of redistribution. This definition, first, omits the condition of support at polls as an exchange of the reward and, second, by considering the condition of a particular form of redistribution, it turns to a long-term relationship as the basis of the agreement. As I have discussed, from an instrumental viewpoint of vote

⁹ Well depicted by Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes (2004: 67), who describe vote buying as ‘the proffering to voters of cash or [...] minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient’s vote’.

buying, instead affective sentiments between individuals (Lawson & Greene 2014), tangible rewards sustain the arrangement.


2.3 The Mobilisation to Buy Votes: A Two-Stage Model

What mobilises voters? This is a central question to understanding voting behaviour. A pioneer theory (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet 1948) has suggested two fundamental elements as individual-level influences (e.g. shaped by sociodemographic elements and attitudes) and environmental factors (essentially information and campaigns). With a focus on the latter, parties design messages and devise campaign structures to persuade and mobilise voters. Parties strategies to this purpose, then, play a key role in winning elections. They perform actions of canvassing and electioneering to influence choices and make voters turnout. Such patterns of electoral competition, however, are sometimes a welcome opportunity to conduct clientelistic strategies. Given that vote buying leverages the interaction between citizens and politicians during election periods, parties, therefore, develop tactics to buy votes and mobilise electors as electioneering and canvassing. But how are these particular strategies of mobilisation?

With nuances, literature (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015, Hidalgo & Nichter 2016, Szwarcberg 2012, Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005, Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes 2004) has agreed that vote buying is an effective strategy to mobilise voters. Scholars seem to measure the success of vote-buying mobilisation strategies by looking at voters' turnout and voting shares. Although these both measures illustrate well the effectiveness of such tactics, they are unable to describe what happens

during the period when electors are exposed to offers and when they go to polls to cast the vote. I argue that a successful tactic of mobilisation by buying votes entails two stages (see Figure 2.1). One, in which parties present voters with several offers and, another, in which voters accept or refuse the offer but also, accept one amongst a number of offers. Focusing exclusively on the behaviour of voters at polls, exclude the possibility for exploring that, under *multi-offer circumstances*, some voters could have rejected other deals despite responding to a vote-buying strategy. In addition, competing offers indicates that at least one could be rejected, which prompts a different angle about the effectiveness of vote buying.

Figure 2. 1 A Two-Stage Model of Mobilisation to Buy Votes



Source: Author

Literature has outlined a two-stage approach to the mobilisation of voters by treating targeted and bought electors separately. Nevertheless, the distinction is not explicit.¹⁰ For example, in a study conducted in Turkey entitled '*Who Gets Targeted for Vote-Buying? [...]*', Carkoglu & Aytac (2015) employ a broader definition of vote buying (Brusco, Nazaeno & Stokes 2004: 67), that understands it as the 'proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient's vote'. Authors associate the activity of proffering goods with the concept of targeting voters. The sensitive item of the list experiment is consistent with link¹¹ by asking respondents whether or not they were offered goods instead if they were given. Proffering goods to voters makes them targeted electors, which concurs with the first stage of my model. However, the study concludes about the 'prevalence of vote-buying [...] in Turkey' (Carkoglu & Aytac 2015: 16) rather than the incidence of targeting tactics. Proffering goods depicts the number of voters exposed to vote-buying offers but it does not necessarily mean that all those exposed voters engaged in the deal since it is neither clear whether the vote-buying transaction (the exchange of goods for votes) has been completed nor the vote choice of the elector.

By contrast, another study entitled '*Who Gets Bought? Vote Buying, Turnout Buying, and Other Strategies*' (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2009) uses a narrower definition of vote buying, stressing the distribution of

¹⁰ An initial observation about the difference between measuring "proffering" versus "receiving / delivering" a reward is made by Nichter (2014: 319) as analysing several implications of the concept for the empirical research.

¹¹ It is worded as follow, 'Someone offered you or your family personal services, a job, or similar material benefits in exchange of your vote for a party' (Çarkoğlu & Aytaç 2015: 4)

benefits to individuals. 'Political operatives frequently hand out not just cash, but also a wide range of goods and services such as bags of rice, chickens, whisky, clothing, soccer balls, Viagra, haircuts, and teeth cleaning' (Schaffer 2007: 2). By assuming that voters have received the reward, this study effectively associates the fact of delivering goods with the concept of buying electors. However, authors manage indistinctly both proffering and giving goods. By ensuring that electors do receive benefits from parties during election periods, provides feasibility of the consummation of a vote-buying transaction. The second stage of the expanded mobilisation model (i.e. voters potentially exposed to multiple vote-buying offers, deciding to take one of the offers) is in line with this assumption. But what happens between the two stages is uncertain.

The second stage of the mobilisation model is vital for vote buying as it is the period when the transaction is closed (benefits for votes). At this stage, both individuals, bought voters and buyers, must have fulfilled their side of the contract. Given that vote buying is an arrangement of contingent exchanges of tangibles benefits for votes confined in election periods, current studies seem to agree that vote buying intensifies as polling days approach. Studies in the Philippines coincide with the timing of vote buying. Abocejo (2015: 37) indicates that '[v]ote buying continues to be a widespread practice during election period more predominantly during election-day when voters are about to go to the polling centers to cast their votes'. Likewise, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne (2015: 8) argue that 'vote buying is prevalent and tends to take place a few days before the elections'. Similarly, another study in Africa (Lucky 2014: 11) suggests that 'Nigerian

politicians have been known to distribute food stuff and other consumable materials to voters shortly before the elections and sometime on Election Day [...]. Equally, Hilgers (2011: 572) agrees that vote buying can be reduced to '[...] a candidate paying a citizen a certain amount of cash on election day for his vote [...]'. In fact, for some authors (Hicken, 2007, Schaffer 2007) the timing is '[a] key defining attribute of clientelist vote buying [...]' (Nichter 2014: 317).

Other studies provide worldwide evidence about the timing of vote buying and electors mobilised during polling days. From Africa, Jensen & Justesen (2014: 221-2) report that, for the 1997 Kenyan Elections, 'in 13 percent of polling stations, secret voting was not guaranteed, and vote buying was quite common on the day of the election'. Similarly, Mares & Young (2016: 16) underline that '[m]ost election-monitoring interventions focus their resources [African parties] on having a large number of observers present on the day of the polls, engaging in very limited observation during the weeks or months prior to an election'. Additionally, Onapajo, Francis & Okeke (2015: 12) report that, in Nigeria, monitoring,

[C]ame as a new method after politicians realized that voters in most cases do not comply after payment for their votes. Therefore, politicians (in connivance with electoral officers) influence the creation of congested polling centers that would allow for monitoring of how people vote regardless of the fact that Nigeria operates a secret ballot voting method.

Studies in Latin America find similar strategies of mobilisation. Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin (2016: 160-1) argue that in Mexico, 'brokers typically implement voter mobilization strategies on election day because they are better informed about the preferences of individual voters than political

parties [...] political parties hire brokers to mobilize likely supporters that would not otherwise turn out [...]'. Similarly, Mustillo 2016: 21-22) explains that in Ecuador,

Organizationally, a vote-buying party is deployed to execute a quid pro quo transaction with voters, one at a time. The party–voter relationship is an ephemeral one, and an electoral vehicle that springs into action around election time can suffice. [...] Delegates of the central party quite literally ride into town very near election day and conduct their campaign or use local affiliates to execute the transactions on their behalf.

Research in Asia also shows patterns of vote-buying mobilisation during election days. In Taiwan, 'voters usually received money for the purchase of their votes on the eve of election day' (Wang & Kurzman 2007: 234). In the Philippines, Hicken et al (2015: 352) argue that '[m]ost of the vote-buying occurs in the last few days before the election'. A study in China, (Kennedy 2010: 617) reports that '[o]n Election Day [...] rural voters come to the polling site ready to vote. Before eligible voters cast their ballots, however, they are treated to an endless flow of beer and wine compliments of a wealthy candidate'.

These pieces of evidence shed light on the degree and intensity of parties' strategies to mobilise electors during polling days by buying votes. Despite the fact that these accounts support the last stage of my model - parties buying electors during the election day, those tactics employed by parties to present vote-buying offers to voters (targeting electors) is still unexplored. There is a considerable space for research at explaining what happens between targeting and buying to those electors engaging in vote buying. A recent effort (Greene 2016) has drafted this issue by estimating

the effects of vote selling on voting choices. The study employs mixed statistical methods to track electors along a campaign for the 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections. Although its conclusions suggest opposite trends to traditional approaches, further research to explore electors' attitudes and decisions between targeting and buying is still necessary.

Literature has acknowledged the coexistence of several strategies of electoral mobilisation employing the distribution of benefits to voters. However, (Nichter 2008: 20) observes that 'most studies fail to distinguish whether rewards are used to influence vote choice or induce electoral participation'. To tackle the issue, the author develops of a two-dimension model of electoral mobilisation constituted of four strategies (see Figure 2.2). Each tactic targets different types of voters and meets particular monitoring conditions. The first-dimension alludes to voting choices and it is divided into two categories, those electors who support the party and those opposed to the party. The second-dimension refers to turnout and it is also split into two categories, electors inclined to vote and electors unwilling to vote. Then, Nichter (2008) explains that in the strategy of "rewarding loyalists" (top left cell of the figure), parties reward electors who would vote for them regardless the benefit, which requires no monitoring actions. In the tactic "vote buying" (top right cell), parties target opposing or indifferent voters, intending to switch preferences, which requires monitoring activities of compliance. In a "turnout buying" strategy (bottom left cell), parties target non-voting supporters, ensuring they go polls; it requires monitoring actions of turnout. Finally, in the tactic of "double

persuasion” (bottom right cell), parties reward opposing or indifferent non-voting electors for both turning out and switching voting choices.

Figure 2. 2 Targeting Reward of Electoral Mobilisation

		Party Preference of Recipient vis-à-vis Party Offering Reward	
		<i>Favours Party</i>	<i>Indifferent or Favours Opposition</i>
Reward Recipient Inclined to Vote or Not to Vote	<i>Inclined To Vote</i>	Rewarding loyalists <i>Requires No Monitoring</i>	Vote buying <i>Requires Monitoring of Vote Choice</i>
	<i>Inclined Not To Vote</i>	Turnout buying <i>Requires Monitoring of Turnout</i>	Double persuasion <i>Requires Monitoring of Vote Choice and Turnout</i>

Source: Nichter (2008: 20)

Excluding first cell (rewarding loyalists), this model is in line with the final phase of the two-stage model, providing the reasons parties conduct tactics. Given that monitoring turnout and compliance are the two causes that trigger such strategies, the tasks undertaken by parties to fulfil these needs are addressed predominantly to polling days. Yet, the methods by which parties find out whether or not voters are supporters, opposing or indifferent and whether or not they are inclined or reluctant to turnout is still unknown. I argue that in order to obtain such information, parties require a first-stage mobilisation strategy to collect information and ensure that they approach the right elector with the right tactic. In addition, although Nichter’s (2008)

model contributes to literature on electoral rewards by looking at vote buying from four different angles, clarifying features and testing his mobilisation model, the author uses interchangeably the actions of offering and distributing rewards, which, as I have discussed, drive to distinct implications for vote buying. Going beyond these analytical refinements, I develop a two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation, trying to explain what happens during the period of electors exposed to vote-buying offers and electors making a final decision.


Existing research, therefore, has effectively equated targeting with vote-buying and ignored the question of whether someone decides between offer or drop the deal. It has also developed the two-stage process of vote buying implicitly. To fill this gap, in the following section, I fill this gap, I examine the implication of managing proffering and vote-buying indistinctly.

2.4 The Empirical Research on Vote Buying: Conceptual Implications and Theories of Mobilisation

Given that literature on clientelism has predominantly framed the empirical research on vote buying, I turn to previous efforts to review the literature to assess the state of field. Figure 2.3 shows a growing tendency of publications studying the subject, accelerating in particular after 2004. Despite of decades of publications –to the best of my knowledge–, there are only two systematic attempts aiming to evaluate the state of the research (Lande 1983, Lehoucq 2003). The first study, published in the eighties, makes ‘an assessment of the [...] state of research’ (Lande 1983: 435), surveying 25 articles. The second article, published a couple of decades

later, makes a critical assessment about ‘the handful of studies that discuss the types, magnitude, and determinants of electoral fraud [...]’ (Lehoucq 2003: 234) including 23 books and articles, focused more on patron-client empirical approaches. Both works concur with the predominance of historiographical and ethnological descriptive account in empirical research. In addition, Lande (1983) detected that those scholars studying less developed countries consistently associated informal political structures or political cultures with clientelism. By relating politics to clientelistic structures in undeveloped countries, this finding pinpoints the historical assumptions of clientelistic politics (Powell 1970) –benefits for support– and the origins of the asymmetrical dyad in clientelistic ties –poor, deprived and not well-educated people versus powerful, wealthier leaders.

Figure 2. 3 Publications on Vote Buying (1969-2014)



Source: Author (see Appendix 2.1 for details of the tabulation).

Notes: Google N-grams reports the relative frequency of mentions of the phrase ‘vote buying’. It represents the number of times that such phrase was printed in scanned books in each given period, per billion two-word phrases (“bigrams”). Data are from 5.2 million scanned books until 2008. Own data are reported on the secondary axis.

* ‘[A] steady increase in both the quantity and quality of this literature [...]’ (Landé 1983: 435-6); ‘A majority of the studies use historical accounts and contemporary fieldwork [...] a minority of the studies present models of political systems [...]’ (Landé 1983: 450-1);

^{**} 'Like ethnologists, historians and some social scientists concentrate on cataloguing and describing fraudulent activities. Historians, in fact, have been among the few analysts to move beyond the anecdotal or prurient interests of so many chronicles of the electorally illicit [...]' (Lehoucq 2003: 234).

Both efforts note a prevalence of historical accounts over formal models testing hypotheses. As Lande (1983: 438) describes, '[r]esearch methods used by the great majority of the authors of these articles were those of intensive field observation usually employed by social anthropologists, supplemented by a search of historical literature and the recollections of older informants'. Similarly, Lehoucq (2003) finds a small number of surveys covering the subject versus those using narratives. Interestingly, similar observations seem to remain in current publications. For example, Stokes (2007: 618) underlines 'a general lack of quantitative cross-country analyses of clientelism and vote buying'. Gonzalez et al (2012: 203) argue that '[m]ost of the existing knowledge on vote buying remains based on qualitative case studies that employ ethnographic techniques to study the ways in which clients interact with political brokers and how clients view such exchanges'.

Discussions on research designs have also opened a debate about competing methodological approaches and their implications for the study of vote buying. About disadvantages of qualitative designs, Landé (1983: 438) argues that,

While models of this sort [descriptive case studies] are useful to provide insight into the dynamics of complex political systems, they suffer from the facts that they are not definitive, and they cannot be falsified. Different scholars, examining the same political systems from other points of view, could produce different models that seem equally coherent and supported by selected descriptive material. Another shortcoming of such models is that each of them is designed to fit a specific country and therefore is of little use for the study of other political systems.

Empirical studies appear to concur with such arguments. Gonzalez et al (2012: 203) argue that '[a]lthough these studies [ethnographies] have greatly increased our understanding of the processes undergirding vote buying in specific contexts, this qualitative literature is limited by its inability to measure the extent of vote buying and test competing theories about party macrostrategy'. Likewise, Weitz (2012: 569) suggests that,

[S]cholars working in the tradition of ethnographic research have demonstrated with great richness how clientelism and closely related phenomena operate [...] Although this type of research illuminates the inner workings of clientelist exchange, the intense amount of fieldwork it requires makes replicating such studies for a large number of locations difficult.

In contrast, Lehoucq (2003: 234) underlines advantages of qualitative designs, '[t]he ethnographers of fraud help us understand what separated right from wrong to the people who participated in fraud-tainted elections [...] the anthropologists of fraud try to make sense of the dilemmas that fraud posed to its perpetrators, its audience, and its observers'. Likewise, as a more recent study (Munoz 2014: 95) argues that,

While survey research and experimental designs have made important contributions to the study of such an elusive phenomenon, many of these results cannot be adequately interpreted in the absence of in-depth knowledge of the political setting. In particular, much more attention should be given to studying the clients' point of view.

Both views demonstrating advantages of competing methods for studying vote buying suggest that mixed-method designs are essential for providing valid and reliable results of a complex phenomenon. Scholars select some methods over others to answer specific questions and understand different

aspects of the same object of study. But divergent definitions across disciplines might prevent research from examining vote buying more precisely. In order to explore whether the interchangeably use of offering rewards to refer to vote buying has affected findings, I turn to research designs relying on operationalisation process to explain this puzzle.

Traditional Survey and Innovative Experimental Designs in the Study of Vote Buying

‘Divergent definitions of clientelist vote buying affect not only conceptual clarity, but also, empirical analyses’ (Nichter 2014: 319). Given that the concept of vote buying emerged from the literature on clientelism, a variety of definitions have been employed by scholars, which have lead empirical research to actually conclude about patronage and clientelism when referring to vote buying. Additionally, such puzzle has driven scholars to explore two different stages of parties’ mobilisation strategies and equally allude to only one tactic. To examine conceptual implications for research in the ground, I turn to the proliferation of surveys and a growing field of experiments. These designs are particularly useful as a natural need of conceptual operationalisation of variables to construct items and indicators. I focus on the development of tools to measure vote-buying incidence in both surveys and experiments; the former especially in the Latin American Region.

Research has treated the distinction between proffering and distributing/receiving rewards in vote-buying transactions as a unit.

Whereas proffering rewards depicts a party's strategy making offers to voters, distributing/receiving such rewards suggest that targeted voters have accepted the deal. The discussion of the two-stage model of parties' mobilisation strategy (see Section 2.3) serves to clarify such difference. Empirical research on vote buying has tended to conclude about proffering as a consummated act of vote buying. The fact of proffering rewards illustrates more precisely, indeed, the degree of exposition of electors to vote-buying proffers from parties. Although measuring such action shed light on the problem, mobilisation strategies at this stage depict the interest of parties in buying certain electors rather than electors already bought. In his examination, Nichter (2014: 319) observes this point by arguing that '[t]he Nigeria study asks about whether an individual received a vote buying offer, not whether he or she actually received the reward'. The test of the observation shows that,

[R]egression findings can be sensitive to the particular definition of vote buying employed. Unfortunately, researchers who seek to test theoretical predictions about clientelism with survey data may conduct regressions using only one definition –and their findings may hinge on which definition they employ (Nichter 2014: 320).

Literature on vote buying has mostly been interested in revealing parties' strategies to target electors and the mechanisms to enforce compliance in order to overcome the secrecy of the ballot. However, scholars have also shown a novel interest in measuring the spread of the two tactics. Survey and experiment designs have mostly provided answers to the problem. At the beginning of the Twentieth-First Century, initial efforts published about Latin America generated compelling discussions. For example, a nationally

representative survey conducted in Brazil report that 6% of Brazilian voters were exposed to vote-buying offers during the 2000 Municipal Elections (Speck & Abramo 2001). The same research design was reproduced for the 2002 Municipal Elections, whose results show a considerable decrease compared to the previous survey as half of the respondents (3%) admitted to being exposed to vote-buying offers (Speck & Abramo 2002).

Similar efforts were conducted in the region; also, in Argentina, two influential studies were published about vote buying. The first (Brusco et al 2004) conducted two local surveys between 2001 and 2002, which show that 7% of Argentinian electors received something from candidates and parties. The second (Stokes 2005), employing same datasets in addition to other surveys conducted in the country, developed a breakthrough analytical strategy for the empirical examination of vote buying. The author compared measures between a direct question, i.e. did you receive [...], and an indirect question, i.e. did you know if in your neighbourhood a party distributed [...]. As expected, results show a difference. Whereas the direct question shows that 7% of the Argentinian voters received goods from parties, 44% of respondents admitted to knowing that parties distributed goods in their neighbourhood. Such analytical strategy guided a national representative survey conducted in Mexico for the 2006 Presidential Elections (UNDP 2006). Although the variation between direct and indirect questions is smaller than the Argentinian case, the difference still remains. Only 1.9% of respondents acknowledged to have been offered or rejected from a public programme; in contrast, 7.9% of them admitted to knowing about other people's cases. But what explains the differences between

countries? What are the implications of the type of questions? Do those numbers illustrate the spread of vote buying in each case?

There are two plausible explanations. Firstly, in connection with the design of questionnaires, previous discussions in this chapter (Sections 2.2 and 2.3) provide some answers. Based on the particular conditions¹² of the systematic definition of vote buying (Nichter 2014) and the two-stage model of mobilisation (targeting and buying) I assess potential implications of the items employed to measure vote-buying incidence on the results. Table 2.1 shows the literal wording for surveys conducted in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico. For both studies in Brazil (Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002), wordings succeed by restricting transactions to campaigns and rewards to voting behaviour; also, it emphasises excludable rewards as money. These conditions locate the question within a vote-buying arrangement. However, the item asks respondents to think of proffering rather than receiving rewards, which places the action into the targeting stage, depicting an uncompleted vote-buying transaction. The wording of the first publication on Argentina (Brusco et al 2004) also confines the transaction to campaigns, alludes to individual rewards and focuses on the physical exchange, which depicts a closed transaction. But the item unbinds the clientelistic exchange from electoral behaviour by omitting support at polls or votes. This aspect locates the measurement closer to a patronage transaction instead vote buying. The second publication in Argentina (Stokes 2005) also restricts the deal to campaigns, asks respondents about the reception of private rewards

¹² The four conditions as 1) the support expected from electors is confined exclusively to the polls, 2) vote-buying transactions are completed within election periods, 3) contingent exchanges, and 4) tangible, personal and excludable benefits distributed to individuals and small groups.

and conditions benefits to voting behaviour by detecting how much the transaction influence voters' decisions. Overall, this item fully locates the measurement into a completed vote-buying transaction. Finally, the wording of the item for Mexico (UNDP 2006) refers to a transaction outside the electoral arena, despite including key elements as parties, voting behaviour. By alluding to state programmes, the item works with future benefits which means promises rather than personal, tangible rewards. In sum, excluding Stokes (2005) the majority of these incipient attempts for measuring the incidence of vote buying in Latin America illustrate more patronage transactions and the degree of electors exposed to vote-buying offers. Although the spread of vote-buying across countries in the region varies, it is still discussed whether surveys' differences depict the dimension of electors bought or the number of clientelistic offers.

Table 2. 1 Items Employed by Survey-Based Studies on the Incidence of Vote Buying in Latin America

Study	Wording <i>Proffering versus Delivering/ Receiving Goods</i>	Stage of the Model* Measured Targeting versus Buying	Type of Exchange Measured**	%	Region
Speck & Abramo 2001	<i>During the campaign for the 2000 municipal elections, did any candidate (or go-between) offer you money in return of voting for him?' [...] 'If yes, how much was offered to you?' [...] did you accept it?' [...] did you vote for the candidate?</i>	Targeting (D)	VB	6	Brazil
Speck & Abramo 2002	<i>During the campaign for the 2000 municipal elections, did any candidate (or go-between) offer you money in return of voting for him?' [...] 'If yes, how much was offered to you?' [...] did you accept it?</i>	Targeting (D)	VB	3	Brazil

Study	Wording <i>Proffering versus Delivering/ Receiving Goods</i>	Stage of the Model* Measured <i>Targeting versus Buying</i>	Type of Exchange Measured**	%	Region
	‘[...] did you vote for the candidate?’				
Brusco et al 2004	<i>In the campaign, did you receive something from a candidate or party?</i>	Buying (D)	P	7	Argentina
Stokes 2005	<i>Did you receive goods distributed by a party in the last campaign? Did the fact of having received goods influence your vote?’</i>	Buying (D)	VB	7	Argentina
Stokes 2005	<i>[Did you know if] ‘a party distributed private rewards in [your] neighborhood during the campaign?’</i>	Buying (I)	P	44	Argentina
UNDP 2006†	<i>Have you been offered or rejected [from a public programme] as an exchange of your vote for a political party?</i>	Targeting (D)	P	1.9	Mexico
UNDP 2006†	<i>Have you known about some authority offering benefits or public services as an exchange of people’s vote?</i>	Targeting (I)	P	7.9	Mexico

Source: Author

Notes:

* See Figure 2.1 in this Chapter; (D) Direct question, (I) Indirect question.

** Clientelism (C), Vote Buying (VB), Patronage (P).

Bold and brackets in the wording are mine.

† Own translation from Spanish.

A second plausible explanation about the findings emerges from Stokes (2005) analytical strategy (i.e. comparing direct versus indirect questions). Survey-based initial attempts to measure the spread of vote buying in Latin America mostly used direct questions in face-to-face conversations. Given that there is a negative perception about vote buying and it is illegal in many democratic regimes, interviews might undermine the incentives of respondents to tell the truth. Therefore, social desirability bias, that is a systematic error in self-report measures, resulting from the desire of respondents to project a positive image of themselves to others, threatens

the validity of vote-buying measures.¹³ A typical tool employed by scholars to mitigate its effects is indirect questioning (Chaudhuri & Christofides 2013), which basically asks people to answer sensitive questions from others' viewpoints. As Table 2.1. shows, Stokes (2005) and UNDP (2006) word the item in both ways directly and indirectly to estimate potential bias. The studies stated the indirect question as did/have you know/known if [...] others [...]. As theoretical claims would expect (Tourangeau & Yan 2007), results showed sensitivity to the indirect wording since subjects reported a higher number of cases compared to the direct question. Although some issues have been addresses against indirect questioning,¹⁴ Stokes' (2005) findings advanced enormously research designs measuring vote buying. As a result, innovative methods and techniques have been developed to explore the level of bias from self-reported vote-buying behaviour (e.g. Gonzalez et al 2012).

Beyond the social desirability bias, depending on the regime, the illegality of vote buying entails official procedures and punishment going from offences to criminal prosecution. From this angle, respondents have incentives to hide the truth in order to escape from potential charges or avoid engagement in trials as reporting others' behaviour. Even though such idea relates to the strength and effectiveness of the rule of law in each country, subjects might reflect a reluctance to admit any engagement with vote buying. A common sense of individuals about what is good and wrong is enough to under-report vote buying in surveys. Therefore, for some

¹³ For a further discussion on social desirability bias, see Gonzalez et al (2012: 203-4).

¹⁴ Asking about other's behaviour might have some inferential problems about individual-level vote buying. Also, as respondents might support some parties more than others, they can over-report rival parties' strategies of vote buying.

authors (Wantchekon 2003: 402) 'survey methods do not provide reliable and unbiased measures'.

In contrast, experimental designs offer 'advantages for studying clientelism and vote buying' (Gallego & Wantchekon 2012: 177). A growing area of experiments have re-examined measures, results and findings; mostly, field and list-experiments. The first effort (Wantcheckon 2003) assess how clientelistic strategies affect voting decisions for the 2001 Presidential Elections in Benin, Africa. The experiment in the ground included real candidates in ongoing elections. It randomly selects villages and divides them into three groups,¹⁵ exposing voters from each group to selective information based *purely* on clientelistic, public-policy platforms and non-platform. Results demonstrate that vote buying is overall effective, but it tends to work better for local incumbent candidates in Benin. Another field-experiment (Vicente 2014) in Africa on vote buying is conducted for the 2006 Presidential Elections in Sao Tome and Principe. The study divides a national sample into two groups, control and treatment, exposing voters from the control group to anti-vote-buying messages, asking all the subjects to respond a few pre and post-election survey questions.¹⁶ Results show a

¹⁵ The study sampled non-competitive electoral districts, dominated by the incumbent and by opposition parties, and then divided each one into three subgroups: clientelistic treatment, public-policy treatment, and control one. Each subgroup was exposed only to certain type of messages to then compared electoral variability. Experiment's results indicated that voting behaviour was not determined by ethnic affiliation and clientelist appeals are not totally accepted among poor voters as believed. Although slightly differences vote-buying definition versus clientelism relationships, findings illustrate well a general view of the phenomenon. The questions are: given ethnic affiliation, do types of message (clientelism or public policy) have an effect on voting behavior? Is clientelism always a winning strategy? Under which types of message do incumbents or opposition hold a comparative advantage? Are female voters as likely to respond to clientelism as men? Are younger voters more likely to respond to clientelism than older voters? (Wantchekon 2003: 400).

¹⁶ The voter education campaign occurred in 40 enumeration areas of STP, with the sponsorship of the National Electoral Commission of STP. It was based on a leaflet distributed, read and discussed door-to-door. The leaflet was mainly legalistic in that it stressed the illegal nature of vote buying. Orally, the campaign underscored the idea that voting decisions should be conducted in good conscience, even if gifts were accepted. Measurement comes from a panel survey in treatment and control enumeration areas, and from the official electoral results per ballot station. The panel survey

significant effect of anti-vote-buying messages on voters' perceptions of such phenomenon and also suggest variations on voting behaviour resulting from vote buying.

List-experiments, based on the item count technique (ICT),¹⁷ have equally advanced research for studying vote buying (e.g. De-Jonge 2015, Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Çarkoğlu & Aytaç 2015, González et al 2014, 2012, Corstange 2012). List-experiments have successfully been tested in other sensitive aspects as, for example, racism (Kuklinski, Cobb & Gilens 1997, Kuklinski et al 1997). The first study using the ICT on vote buying (González et al 2012) in Latin America, conducted in Nicaragua, gauges the magnitude of social desirability bias. Returning to previous Stokes' (2005) findings of the differences between direct and indirect questions, the study introduces the ICT to traditional surveys questions.¹⁸ Results first confirm Stokes' (2005) observations as a higher number of respondents admitted to knowing about other individuals receiving gifts (17.84%) than those self-reporting receiving goods (2.39%). But an even higher number of respondents admitted to receiving goods through ICT (24.34%). The study demonstrates that list-experiments provide research on vote buying an alternative method to solve bias problems. The method offers respondents anonymity and confidentiality answer vote buying questions directly.

conducted before and after the elections included 1,034 respondents (more than 1% of the electorate of STP) (Vicente 2014: F357).

¹⁷ For a detailed methodological description of ICT, see Holbrook & Krosnick (2009); for a revision of the results from the technique, see Droitcour et al (2011).

¹⁸ The study splits the sample into random halves, a treatment and a control group; each group is read the same question and shown a card with the response options, which differs only in the number of response categories. The question does not ask respondents to reveal to the interviewer the specific activities parties or activists practiced. The respondents only have to tell the interviewer how many activities were carried out, so the question provides the respondent a high degree of anonymity since the interviewer cannot ascertain which activities the respondent indicates (Gonzalez et al 2012: 205).

However, as authors argue, the nature of the method prevents scholars from knowing which individual reported an act of vote buying.

Given that list-experiments offer a method to solve bias problems of self-reported vote buying, I now examine the wording of some sensitive items used by scholars to ask respondents about vote buying. To analyse the items, I employ the conceptual distinctions and the two-stage model discussed previously (see sections 2.2 and 2.3). As I have argued, there are four imperative conditions to distinguish vote buying from patronage and clientelism as a) the restriction of the expected support exclusively to polls, b) the transaction is confined to election periods, c) exchanges are contingent, and d) benefits distributed to individuals and small groups are tangible, excludable. In addition, the two-stage model divides the phase of targeting from buying (offering *versus* giving). It works on two main assumptions as a) electors are exposed to multiple offers of vote buying, assessing all the offers and deciding on one or even rejecting all of them, and b) once electors accept a gift, we can assume that they have entered the deal. Therefore, the first stage refers to targeted voters and the second stage refers to bought voters.

Thus, Table 2.2 shows the wording employed in seven list-experiment publications conducted in several countries. Firstly, several wordings used in the ICT (Greene 2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015, Palmer-Rubin & Nichter 2014, Corstange 2009) included jobs and access to public services as proffered rewards. As I have discussed, both benefits belong to a more patronage transaction as the enjoyment of the benefit is conditioned upon electoral victory rather than voting behaviour. Also, it is interesting that

the highest estimations of vote buying seem to be related to those wordings stated more openly, i.e. Corstange (2009) and Carkoglu & Aytac (2015) including benefits offered to respondents' relatives and family. This observation suggests a degree of sensitivity of individuals responding to wording, although further research in same countries should test this claim. Secondly, as the third row Table 2.2. indicates, excluding Corstange (2009), the items presented in the ICT are asked directly, which suggests the power of the technique to provide respondents with confidentiality and anonymity to answer the sensitive question. This observation is interesting when comparing ITC results (fifth row) to those items asked directly in traditional surveys (Table 2.1). Whereas the highest number estimated by ICT is 35% (in Turkey), the highest estimated by surveys rises 7% (in Argentina). Although such differences do not necessarily represent the level of effectiveness of the ICT over traditional surveys, they illustrate a degree of reliability of the technique. In particular, Gonzalez et al (2012), argue this claim. Thirdly, another observation of the wording is the stage in which studies locate vote buying (targeting versus buying). Excluding Cruz, Keefer & Labonne (2015), Carkoglu & Aytac (2015) and Corstange (2009), ICT's items employed the phrase have you received and been given, alluding to a consummated vote-buying transaction, referring then to the phase of buying of the two-stage model. By contrast, the majority of traditional surveys (Table 2.1) used the phrase have you been offered, alluding to the stage of targeting.

Table 2. 2 Wording of Questions Employed by Experimental Designs on Vote Buying in Latin America

Study	Wording <i>Proffering versus Delivering/ Receiving Goods</i>	Stage of the Model* Measure d <i>Targeting versus Buying</i>	Type of Exchange Measured **	%	Region
Gonzalez, De-Jonge & Meseguer 2017	Received a gift or favor in exchange for your vote	Buying (D)	VB	35	El Salvador
Greene 2016*	Receive a gift, favor, or access to a service in exchange for your vote	Buying (D)	P	21	Mexico
Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015	Did someone offer you money for your vote?	Targeting (D)	VB	14	The Philippine s
Palmer- Rubin & Nichter 2014*	Receive a gift, favor, or access to a service in exchange for your vote	Buying (D)	P	7	Mexico
Gonzalez et al 2015	They gave you a gift or did you a favor	Buying (D)	VB	20	Honduras
De Jonge Kiewiet (2015) †	They gave you a gift or did you a favor	Buying (D)	VB	6 to 22	Latin America
Çarkoğlu &Aytaç 2015	Someone offered you or your family personal services, a job, or similar material benefits in exchange of your vote for a party	Targeting (D)	P	35	Turkey
Gonzalez et al 2012	They gave you a gift or did you a favor	Buying (D)	VB	24	Nicaragua
Corstange 2009	Someone offered you or a relative, personal services, a job, or something similar.	Targeting (I)	P	55	Lebanon

Source: Author.

Notes:

* See Figure 2.1 in this Chapter; (D) Direct question, (I) Indirect question.

** Clientelism (C), Vote Buying (VB), Patronage (P).

† By asking *gifts*, campaign materials and clothing are excluding; Cross-country method, in which the estimation in Mexico is 14%.

¥ List-experiment embedded in a panel study. The results presented in the table refer to the highest number estimated in either of the waves.

Experiments have provided empirical research with more tools to measure a sensitive theme as vote buying. Direct questions work much better in the list-experiment than survey-based designs, which suggests more confidentiality and anonymity for voters. Overall this growing field of

research has contributed to overcoming shortcomings for studying vote buying.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have underlined that the variety of mentions of the term vote buying in literature have misguided some findings. Scholars have employed the concept vote buying to study three distinct fields, which has driven to a variety of definitions, affecting methodological procedures, as operationalisation of variables. For instance, whereas shareholders vote buying alludes to a set of payments and incentives given to owners of shares in companies towards manipulating business decisions in a corporate structure, the legislative vote buying refers to benefits distributed to representatives to shape bills and influence legislative power towards particular interests. By contrast, electorate vote buying alludes to the selective distribution of benefits to voters to influence voting behaviour. Although these activities entail the illegitimate exchange of rewards for voting decisions, legislative and electorate vote buying are located in the public arena. Located in the field of electorate vote buying, this study contributes to literature by reviewing the concept and revisiting its defining attributes. Such analytical tasks drive the development of the extended two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation.

Literature on clientelism has framed the study on electorate vote buying. However, scholars have used diverse definitions, which have driven research to conclude about vote buying when actually they are referring to clientelism and patronage. Three conceptual attributes distinguish vote

buying from clientelism, the foundation of the arrangement, the restriction of the transaction to election periods, and the condition of contingent to the clientelistic exchange. Whereas the tie of clientelism is based on the long-term relationship, vote buying is based on the reward. In addition, as a result of the long-term relationship, a transaction in clientelism can occur beyond election periods. In contrast, a vote-buying arrangement is restricted to campaigns and polling days. Thirdly, in vote buying, the exchange between rewards and votes is contingent and opportunistic. In clientelism, instead, the exchange is more consistent and durable; also, the support expected from electors goes beyond polls. As a result, in contrast with clientelism, vote buying requires more rigorous strategies for monitoring and compliance. Therefore, vote buying is a form of clientelism, but not a synonym of clientelism. Scholars have also associated vote buying with patronage. Both are strategies of electoral mobilisation; however, the characteristics of the benefits distinguish one from the other. Whereas vote buying relies on tangible, personal and excludable benefits, patronage works on promises of future benefits conditioned upon victories at polls. In addition, benefits in patronage include collective rewards as hospitals, roads or public programmes amongst other similar deliverables. Patronage transactions are called also pork-barrel, redistributive and programmatic politics.

Literature concurs that vote buying is an effective strategy of mobilisation. Scholars have turned to turnout and voting shares to explain the effectiveness of vote-buying strategies. What happens during the period when electors receive multiple vote-buying offers and they make a final

decision at polls, remains unexplained. My two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation provides some answers to this problem. Since parties are competing for votes, when devising strategies of vote buying, they first present offers to electors, once individuals assess multiple offers and decide to take one, parties conduct other mechanisms of monitoring and compliance. Literature has mostly emphasised this last stage. By omitting the first stage, research assumes that electors are not able to decide over several vote-buying offers but overlooks the possibility of electors aborting a vote-buying deal.

Survey-based methods initially offered some interesting answers to solve the problem of knowing the extent of vote buying. They worked first with direct questions and then they turned to asking respondents indirectly finding striking differences. Such results stimulated scholars to rethink research tools and re-discuss methods to collect sensitive information. A new area of experimental designs was developed, offering research innovative instruments to measure sensitive topics as vote buying. Direct questions have proven to work much better in the list-experiment than survey-based designs, which suggests, amongst other beneficial aspects, more confidentiality and anonymity to respondents. Although experiments have contributed to overcoming shortcomings for studying vote buying, there are two essential problems to take into account as external validity and randomisation. Field and list-experiments are unlikely to vanish social desirability bias. List-experiments have intrinsic problems as it is hard to know which respondent engaged in vote buying.

Having reviewed the use of the term vote buying in literature, deconstruct the concepts of clientelism, patronage and vote buying by attributes, developed the two-stage model of vote buying mobilisation, assessed the implications for empirical research, with an eye on surveys and experiments; in the following chapter, I discuss vote buying in Mexico and the characteristics of the particular case. I then contrast two sources of qualitative evidence against the implications of this review. I finally proceed to test some hypotheses statistically employing a list-experiment.

Chapter 3. Vote Buying in Mexico: Electoral Manipulation, Machine Politics and Constitutional Reforms

In Chapter 2, I underlined the variety of uses of vote buying and some of its implications on empirical research. By revisiting its attributes and refining its model of mobilisation, I showed how literature has employed indistinctly the terms of clientelism and patronage when alluding to vote buying. In addition, I showed the benefits of looking at the vote-buying model of mobilisation from two stages. In this Chapter, I outline how Mexico is a useful case for addressing such indistinct use of vote buying, clientelism and patronage. I also explain the social embeddedness of vote buying as a result of a political machine, electoral manipulation and competing constitutional reforms.

In Mexico, a political party ruled the country for seven decades employing non-democratic methods (Knight 1996, Camp 1993).

The PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] maintained its electoral hegemony mainly through a combination of manipulation of the rules governing elections and government-formation, abuse of state resources, media domination, and through a vast system of electoral clientelism—particularly strong in rural areas—involving both individual- and group-based particularism [...] (Birch 2011: 147)

From 1910 to 1970, executive and legislative branches managed to enact electoral laws, which restricted opposition from competing in elections. Until

1999, the government turned to fraudulent tactics to maintain the control by manipulating electoral institutions. Since 2000, another set of illegitimate activities have been employed –not exclusively by incumbent parties– as seats in local Congresses and other elected posts began to be shared. Although Chambers have amended legislation to deter electoral fraud and guarantee a fair competition (Balinski & Gonzalez 1996), I argue that law changes seem to be encouraging politicians in conducting other illicit exchanges. Based on the definitional approach to ‘electoral malpractice’ (Birch 2011), this chapter examines the three main methods of electoral manipulation in Mexico such as the law, the vote and the voter. I argue that the dominant party maintained its hegemony mainly through the manipulation of the electoral rules, the misuse of state resources, an overwhelming media control and a solid corporatist structure. Following the defeat in the 2000 Presidential Elections, however, politicians from all political parties have engaged in clientelistic tactics (Magaloni 2006) such as vote-buying to win elections.

Scholars have largely studied the Mexican electoral system (Nohlen 2005, Klesner 2005, Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2001, Cornelius & Craig 1991, Molinar 1989), its fraudulent elections (Magaloni 2010, Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2004, Lehoucq 2003, Schedler 1999, McCann & Dominguez 1998), corporatist policies implemented by the government (Chapman 2012, Grayson 1998), its distributive and clientelistic politics (Díaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2016, Palmer-Rubin 2016, Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2003, Shefner 2001, Fox 1994, Foster 1961), conditional cash transfers CCTs (Layton & Smith 2015, De la O 2013, Grimes & Wängnerud 2010,

Sewall 2008) and the foundations of electoral reforms since 1970 (Serra 2009, Cordova 2008, Becerra, Salazar & Woldenberg 2000, 1997, Barquin 1987). Whilst these studies have aimed to understand problems and implications to the political system, literature has partially analysed the effects of these aspects altogether on vote buying. I argue that after the revolution, the dominant party developed a national structure constituted of members, partisans, government officials, volunteers and people, which provided the party with solid networks to distribute state resources efficiently. Likewise, the legislative branch –responding somehow unconditionally to ruling party’s interests– submitted and approved bills designed to maintain the status quo. Equally, to contain the pressure of the opposition, the government implemented inclusive corporatist policies and national programmes on conditional cash transfers to persuade groups and recipients to vote for them. Additionally, electoral reforms addressed to deter electoral frauds and guarantee fair contests resulted in incentives for other parties to conduct vote-buying actions in the field; worsening the distrust and negative perception of parties, not just the ruling one (McCann & Dominguez 1998). Thus, a national machinery of party, voters highly familiarised with deliveries from the government and electoral reforms forcing parties to conduct work in the field set appropriate conditions for vote buying to succeed.

This chapter is organised as follows. First, I discuss Mexico’s transition from an authoritarian to a dominant-party regime by controlling and weakening the growth of an opposition institutionally and legislatively. I explain how contributing factors such as favourable electoral legislation and

political operation in the ground helped the government to maintain the power. Second, I analyse how the government turned to social welfare policies, distributing resources to individuals and social groups, shaping a paternalist state to extend the political control. Thirdly, I explain the transition from distributive policies into vote buying, through a national party structure and voters highly familiarised with clientelistic exchanges. I discuss how the results of the 2000 Presidential Elections pressured other parties to turn to clientelistic tactics as a method to campaign. Additionally, I introduce intuitive methods employed by politicians to make money, which potentially go to cover vote-buying expenses amongst other goals. Finally, I analyse the implications of recent electoral reforms for vote buying despite their conceptual foundations of fair competition.

3.1 The Manipulation of Elections in Mexico: How Electoral Fraud Shaped Parties Through Political Machine

Elections have been a crucial factor of stability of the Mexican political regime after the Revolution,¹⁹ though from 1910 to 1940 governments arrived by military power. In 1911, the dominant party was founded²⁰ claiming fundamental ideals of the Revolution. Although the establishment of an opposition opened the electoral competition in 1939,²¹ the dominant party had developed authoritarian methods to retain the power. Politicians

¹⁹ One of the legacies of the Revolution impacting the electoral system is the so-called slogan “Effective Suffrage–No Reelection” (see Weldon 2004) that prohibits the consecutive legislative and presidential re-election.

²⁰ Originally named as National Revolutionary Party (PNR), afterwards Party of Mexican Revolution (PRM) and then Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

²¹ Through the Revolutionary Party of National Unification (PRUN), resulting from the religious conflict called “Cristero War” 1926-1929 (see Wilkie 1966 for an introduction to political implications); named afterwards National Action Party (PAN).

shaped electoral rules, which rewarded disproportionately existing majorities, discouraging emerging majorities from strengthening. Clinically designed, the electoral system offered short-term political benefits to 'fractions of the opposition, in exchange of rules that would eventually make the incumbent party even more difficult to dislodge' (Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2001: 272). Equally, tight regulations on political freedom with low levels of electoral competition explain the success of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) as ruling party in Mexico (Díaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2004). There are at least four key moments in the history of the fraudulent elections that illustrate well the methods employed by the ruling party. These stages gradually moulded an authoritarian government into a clientelistic dominant party and delineated the basis for an expectant electorate to wait for deliveries during campaigns.

The first election held in 1940 with a multiparty model was rather conflictive. An opposition candidate pressed the incumbent President for democratic ideals, which caused repressive measures to guarantee public order (Shirk 2005). In response, opposition supporters turned campaign propaganda and rallies into violent acts, opting for using weapons. The opposition accused the government of repression asking, unsuccessfully, international support, mainly from the American Government. With constant confrontations along the campaign, a violent and anomalous Election Day favoured the dominant party for nearly 94%. Police officers presumably stopped opposition followers from going to polls and electoral officers removed them from the National Electoral Register. Authorities closed polling stations earlier arguing the risk of violence. A well-known Mexican

newspaper announced the electoral result before the official counting (Michaels 1971).

The second key moment was the 1952 Presidential Election. With more parties competing, it signified a serious challenge to the ruling party (Gillingham 2012). The government had already begun to deliver a public speech based on national progress, economic growth and democratic freedom to persuade electors. But opposition parties accused the government, again, of authoritarianism and repression. During campaigns, opponents claimed consistent harassment and bullying and throughout the Election Day, they also reported a number of irregularities conducted by the ruling party. Mainly, the deployment of intimidating brigades to lovable electoral precincts to stop voters from turning out (Weldon 1997). There was an increase of restrictions of polling stations access to representatives of opposition parties based upon undisclosed electoral procedures. The secret count of votes by officers, providing no record of the sum of votes, presumably stuffing ballots. Although this new sort of mobilisation gave a sense of victory among opposition supporters, official records favoured the candidate of the ruling party. The conditions of this stage, in fact, represented a need for the dominant party to constitute coordinated teams of loyalists to conduct actions in the ground.

The third moment took place in the 1958 Presidential Election. Repeatedly, opposition candidates accused the government of bullying and harassment but this time they added death threats, physical attacks and short periods in prison (Taylor 1960). On polling day, opposition parties reported numerous malpractices, such as voters holding several valid

electoral ballot papers, casting votes in different polls.²² Once again, electoral officers stopping opposition parties' representatives from performing their duties. Within anti-government areas, pro-ruling party's groups moved polling stations to a different building with neither notice nor legal reason. Also, they registered voters far away from the original address.²³ Electoral Registration Offices sent announcements of voting eligibility after the Election Day. Eventually, the candidate of the ruling party won the election with a vast majority of votes. This notable electoral success of the political-machine operation set the basis for the party to strengthen and consolidate such structure.

Finally, the fourth moment was the 1998 Presidential Elections. A 'crossroad' (Reding 1988) in Mexican electoral history, when the ruling party faced an unprecedented competition and the most controversial as regards as allegations of electoral fraud. A former member of the ruling party challenged the establishment. Leading a united opposition, this contender became a strong Presidential candidate. His campaign quickly expanded, capturing gradually and consistently new supporters. On the other side, the government faced international pressure for corruption, authoritarianism and repression. Additional factors such as high unemployment rates and cost of living upset people and discouraged own supporters from proving unconditional loyalty (Dominguez & McCann 1995).

This time, the method of the political machine began before polling day and went beyond (Maganloni 2006). Officers of the opposition party got

²² Known informally as 'carousel'.

²³ So-called 'crazy mouse', made voters spend considerable time seeking the right polling station, discouraging them from voting.

regularly intimidated, attacked and even killed (Cornelius & Craig 1991). During the Election Day, news reports suggested that the President realised that the ruling party's candidate could lose the election since early hours.²⁴ As a result, he instructed the Minister of Interior, serving as Chief Executive Officer of the National Electoral Commission (CFE), to withhold all the information about the election. Over two hours after the polling stations closed, the national voting computing system was struggling but reporting an overwhelming partial victory of the opposition candidate. But an apparent disruption stopped the system from continuing to deliver information on the election outcome. The CFE announced technical difficulties, which delayed partial information. While the system got fixed, national rumours of an opposition's victory spread quickly. However, a restored system –more than two hours delayed–, reported the candidate of the ruling party as the frontrunner.

Immediate protests and demonstrations against alleged electoral fraud took place for weeks demanding the call of new elections. In response, senior officials of the government met defeated candidates, persuading them to reach political agreements. Excluding one party, the principal demand of the opposition was to open ballot boxes and recount the votes. The Chamber of Deputies declared the ruling party candidate as the elect President, moderate opposition parties, however, admitted the decision on condition of substantial changes in electoral laws and administration (Magaloni 2010). Addressing fairness, impartiality and transparency, the

²⁴ La Jornada, 'De la Madrid me ordenó no informar que Cárdenas iba ganando, asegura Bartlett', Sunday 6 July 2008, Política, <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/07/03/index.php?section=politica&article=013n1pol> (accessed on Monday 14 July 2014).

runner-up announced the creation of a new unified opposition political party.²⁵ The president-elect signed a letter of intent promising to enact the reforms in exchange for his opponents' complicity in certifying the 1988 election (Eisenstadt 2004: 176).

Two years after the allegedly fraudulent election, the Congress enacted a new electoral legislation,²⁶ which impacted considerable four central areas (see Section 3.3 for a further discussion). Firstly, legislators transformed the Electoral Commission into an Electoral Institute, autonomous and independent from the government. Secondly, they created a new National Electoral Register with enhanced security measures in the process of application and confirmation of eligibility. Thirdly, they redesigned a 'sortition' procedure for electoral officers, making it more transparent and public. Fourthly, new criteria of electoral districting increased the number of polling stations distributed across the country, reducing the number of voters for each station.

As I have discussed the transition of Mexico from an authoritarian to a machine-party regime succeeded as a result of methods to control and weaken signs of opposition. Tailored electoral bills submitted and approved enhanced PRI's majorities in Chambers. Coordinated operations between the dominant party and governmental structures guaranteed success at polls. Fraudulent practices such as ballot stuffing, *crazy mouse*, *carousel*, electoral register *pregnancy*²⁷ and voting miscounting completed the work

²⁵ Named Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).

²⁶ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Codigo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales', Wednesday 15 August 1990, <http://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/Federal/OA/IFE/Codigos/15081990.pdf> (accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015).

²⁷ The number of votes counted in a polling station exceeded the number of eligible voters registered. Electoral officers, working for the ruling party, allowed disentitled supporters to cast the vote.

in the field. Although the dominant party fled to keep the power during the 1988 Presidential Elections, previous elections served to constitute a solid political machine.

3.2 Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) in Mexico: How Corporatist Policies Shape the Electorate Through Vote Buying

As I have discussed, electoral rules favoured the ruling party, lessening the opposition influence over political decisions. After 1946, as reshaping its structure, the ruling party developed a mass inclusive patronage policy known as 'corporatism' (Grayson 1998; Chapman 2012). Based on deliveries of benefits to social groups,²⁸ the method utilises government agencies to control the distribution of money and goods (see Lazaro 2014 for a description of the Mexican case). Such policy is structured as a pyramid (Stokes et al 2013), which seeks to create networks of loyal support (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012). Usually, activists constitute the lowest level of the pyramid, reaching neighbourhoods; some of them (Diaz-Santana 2011) are non-partisan individuals hired by parties to reduce legal risks.²⁹ Conversely, senior politicians running top positions in the public administration represent the top level of the pyramid.

²⁸ Organised into four sectors such as workers (Confederation of Workers of Mexico, CTM), peasants (National Peasant Confederation, CNC), state servants (Federation of workers in the State service, FSTSE) and civil organisations (National Confederation of Popular Organisations, CNOP).

²⁹ In some cities political parties hire fleets of taxi drivers to mobilise voters the Election Day. In some cases, taxi drivers increase fares, offering the service to the highest bidder or in exchange for other benefits. Diario Zeta, 'Distrito 12: compra de votos y taxis acarreando; se abrieron 112 paquetes', Monday 13 June 2016, <http://zetatijuana.com/2016/06/13/distrito-12-compra-de-votos-y-taxis-acarreando-se-abrieron-112-paquetes/> (accessed on Sunday 17 July 2016). Diario El Veneziano, 'Partidos acarrean a votantes en taxis hidrómilos', Sunday 4 July 2010, Coatzacoalco, <http://imagedelgolfo.mx/resumen.php?id=184696> (accessed on Thursday 17 July 2014).

Gradually, this method consolidated a solid structure with a capacity to meet social demands, monitor and, if the case, dissipate potential signs of dissent. This sort of relationship between government and people shaped a 'distributive coalition' (Dresser 1994: 145). It remained robust³⁰ for decades allowing the ruling party to hold the power and rule with some degree of stability. However, a growing opposition, increasing pressure to electoral equality and dissenting voices from the ruling elite urged the government to design new strategies to respond to social demands for assistance programs (see Grimes & Wängnerud 2010: 674). In 1973, the government strengthened conditional cash transfers (CCT), launching the State Investment Programme for Rural Development (PIDER) to eradicate poverty and funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Since then, all the administrations have held at least one anti-poverty national plan.³¹ A controversial programme regarding electoral clientelism was PRONASOL (De la O 2012) as its benefits distributed under discretionary criteria of allocation around the midterm 1991 elections (for further details of PRONASOL, see Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012: 52-60 and De la O 2012: 2). As a result, agencies decided to standardise processes of application, coverage and monitoring for all the following government programmes.³²

³⁰ Recent evidence (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015: 1190) from Mexico and Colombia has suggested 'that organizational membership is an important predictor of reported offers of vote buying: A typical woman who participates in no organizations has a predicted probability of being a target for vote buying of 8%, while a woman at the highest level of participation has a predicted probability of 32%'.

³¹ PIDER (1973-1976); the National Plan for Deprived Zones and Marginalised Groups, COPLAMAR (1977-1988); the National Solidarity Program, PRONASOL (1989-2002); National Programme of Food Supply, Health and Education, PROGRESA (2003-2006); Oportunidades (2007-2012); Prospera (2013-currently).

³² The main breakthrough was the creation of the Technical Committee for Poverty Measurement in Mexico, materialised by the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy (CONEVAL in Spanish) in 2003.

The delivery of the benefit is a sensitive stage of the policy as the personal interaction between officers of the CCTs and recipients. This interaction potentially develops clientelistic relationships (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, these deliveries have increasingly been the core of allegations against the government for manipulating electors (UNDP 2007). Procedures of these programmes allowed face-to-face enrolments and collection of benefits. Equally, schedules of deliveries have matched campaigns' agendas, supplying goods on condition that recipients voted for the incumbent party. Experimental evidence from Mexico and Latin America (Layton & Smith 2015, De la O 2012, Grimes & Wängnerud 2010, Sewall 2008) has confirmed those claims with a positive correlation between enrolments and vote shares. For this reason, the involvement of civil society associations in combating corruption (Grimes 2008) has been a key tool for monitoring the performance of the agencies managing CCTs.

Eradicating corruption in public welfare services has proven to be quite difficult in many contexts and the CCT answer to this challenge is transparency in the process of selecting recipients, direct transfers of cash to recipients from administrative offices protected from political interference, and precise expectations on recipients (Grimes & Wängnerud 2010: 674).

Birch (2011) distinguishes four strategies against CCTs corruption: a) adjusting the law, b) auditing resources, c) addressing officially state budget, and d) delivering more efficient policies. In other words, increasing the costs and reducing rewards of clientelism to make it less attractive to candidates and individuals. The first strategy entails sufficient political will to alter the electoral law. The purpose is to make illegal conducts such as

proffering rewards as an exchange of votes, intimidating electors reluctant to engage in clientelistic practices and conditioning the access to state services. 'While legislation can rarely eliminate clientelism, it can at least provide the legal standard against which the activities of electoral actors may be evaluated (Birch 2011: 136). Apparently, this strategy functions more efficiently in non-clientelistic systems. In some countries, politicians seem to be aware that these exchanges are a need during campaigns to stay in the contest.³³ In other words, patrons know no other forms of campaigning and there is nothing wrong with clientelism for clients. However, when these practices are illegal, governments laid grounds to act against them.

The third strategy entails the restriction of forms of rent-seeking naturally related to the elected official. Some public offices hold a significant amount of resources as the nature of their duties. These resources become sort of rewards to applicants for those posts. When the provision of office's resources is more significant than those benefits obtained from clientelistic practices, heads of the offices would not have incentives to engage in clientelism. 'If that cost–benefit relationship is altered by reducing the benefits of office, potential patrons may not feel it is worth the effort and may seek to enhance their wealth through more legitimate channels in the private sector' (Birch 2011: 137). In fact, national electoral bodies and tribunals in Mexico are well-known for offering higher wages to their employees than other public institutions.

³³ For the Peruvian case, Muñoz-Quirinos (2014: 79) demonstrates the extent in which the supply of goods is 'considered crucial to effective campaigning' despite knowing this practice does not guarantee the support of voters at the polls.

The fourth strategy assumes that providing people with more efficient public policies, they will find more incentives to engage in them, finding clientelistic transactions costlier and less attractive. However, achieving this requires three conditions such as changing the perception of clientelistic rewards, seeing direct benefits from democratic processes and feeling political parties and governments closer to people.

Mexican governments have designed anti-corruption programmes covering the four Birch's (2011) strategies. For example, the inter-government agreement of transparency and anti-corruption³⁴ sought to tackle corruption by standardising main guidelines on CCTs management, especially during campaigns. Amidst the goals, the agreement bound all government agencies to a) promote transparency by making public presentations about potential illegitimate links between CCTs and politics at a local level. The measure involved borough, state and federal governments, civil society associations and electoral bodies; b) organise workshops and summits for transparency and legality, consisting of meetings with officers and recipients; c) sign the programme 'clean hands' –an agreement of ethics code for the staff of all CCTs; d) schedule deliveries of CCTs and other activities for non-campaigns periods and non-polling days; e) work towards further agreements, when required, on transparency and anti-corruption; f) set up reliable hotlines to report malpractices and provide overall attention, especially to recipients (see Chapter 4); g) fund

³⁴ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'ACUERDO por el que se crea la Comisión para la Transparencia y el Combate a la Corrupción en la Administración Pública Federal, como una comisión intersecretarial de carácter permanente', Monday 4 December 2000, http://www.programaanticorruptcion.gob.mx/web/doctos/citcc/acuerdo_de_creacion.pdf (accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015).accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015).

and promote studies on the transparency and anti-corrupted performance of CCTs; h) develop plans to publish and distribute booklets, posters and flyers among recipients to disseminate essentials such as codes of conduct, guidelines and hotline numbers. A compulsory message has been appearing in all the deliveries indicating ‘this programme is public and unrelated to any political party. Law prohibits any misuse.’³⁵

Yet, international reports³⁶ have still pointed out discretionary gaps in the mechanisms of transparency, access to information and accountability in Mexico since 2001. CCTs’ officers with strong party ties can still misuse these programs with sophisticated methods, hampering detection, reporting and punishing irregularities. Additionally, the growing number of CCTs implemented at local level increases the complexity, lessening the ability of associations to monitor illegal activities and authorities to react promptly.

For instance, during the 2006 Presidential Elections, domestic electoral observation reports (Alianza Civica 2006) detected officers conditioning access and deliveries to vote for a party. Equally, records from the hotline for electoral crimes (FEPADE 2012) reported ‘different types of manipulation’ in the access and deliveries of CCTs. These records gave an idea about the different way in which boroughs and states perform CCTs locally. As Mexican Federalism, the report (Alianza Civica 2006) also suggested that the level of efficiency of a CCT is determined by local factors.

³⁵ Own translation. Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Ley General de Desarrollo Social’, Monday 20 January 2004, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/lqds/LGDS_orig_20ene04.pdf (accessed on Thursday 22 November 2012).

³⁶ UNDP for Mexico, Cuba and Dominican Republic, Bulletin 2881, ‘Informe sobre el cumplimiento de las recomendaciones emitidas por el Alto Consejo por la Transparencia de los Programas Sociales Federales’, <http://www.cinu.org.mx/prensa/comunicados/2006/06060PNUDIInformecumplimientodrecomendaciones.htm> (accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015).

Regions with weak authorities seem to be as well those reporting more problems of CCTs during campaigns, whereas those with stronger institutions seem to report fewer issues associated with the management of these programmes.

For the 2006 Mexican Presidential Elections, an international study about the perceptions of CCTs (UNDP 2006) surveyed thousands of recipients, non-recipients and officers from semi-urban and rural areas. Results show that most of the people knew procedures and rights. In contrast, they reported low levels of people's knowledge about other procedures. Non-recipient respondents lacked precision about eligibility criteria, procedures of application and rules of delivering, which reflects the need of meeting CCTs' officers personally. Although recipients knew well their rights and evaluated positively the procedure of the CCTs, they attributed the success of the programmes to government's kindness and will. This finding flagged a potential reciprocal arrangement between the ruling party and voters.³⁷ Results also suggested that recipients perceive the benefit of opening CCTs to transparency and accountability.

The study also demonstrated gaps of communication of recipients on particular procedures. Respondents struggled to describe mechanisms of complaints and, even more, reports on malpractices. This finding suggests failures on the methods to convey information at all levels. In rural areas of Mexico, there are speakers of other indigenous languages³⁸ who struggle

³⁷ Ethnographic work conducted in Mexico (Hagene 2015) provides evidence on how people perceived political clientelism as a legitimate action, whereas they saw vote buying as illegal. Furthermore, people assumed this sort clientelist tie as help and support.

³⁸ Mexican government itself recognises officially 68 national indigenous languages, 2nd Article, Constitution Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, <http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/htm/1.htm> (accessed on Wednesday 4 February 2015).

to understand official bulletins and communications but additionally, government agencies have noted that booklets and flyers contain copy-pasted content of the law, which hardens the comprehension even for Spanish speakers.³⁹

A majority of respondents reported a positive perception of the CCTs as they help people in need. These programmes appeared to have a positive impact on people's evaluation of the President, which substantiates the traditional idea of a paternalistic state. The main national CCT was associated more to the President's kindness than a right of people in-need, only isolated cases responded correctly when asked about the relationship between the programme and the ongoing administration. This finding supports the success of the change of names by governments to a similar CCT since 1973 described before. Results show a) unclear criteria for accepting or rejecting applications to a CCT, sometimes unfair and opaque; b) lack of information about the range of benefits of the CCTs and the way they work; c) small impact on the life of recipients despite the accessibility; d) cases of poor quality and slow reactions of authorities when reporting malpractices, crimes and offences. The study (UNDP 2006) also found inefficiency in attending reports of potential offences associated with deliveries; a considerable number of gaps of discretion over the management of state resources; and unclear recruitment criteria of the members of the staff. There was a little knowledge about the ways people—especially recipients—could report anomalies. The procedures seemed to

³⁹ See Direccion General de Simplificacion Regulatoria. Manual de Lenguaje Ciudadano. Mexico, SFP.
http://www.gobernacion.gob.mx/work/models/SEGOB/Resource/148/1/images/Manual_lenguaje_ciudadano.pdf

be complex as several authorities involved in the process of receiving and attending reports. This fact increases confusion to address appropriately any issue.

Despite established procedures to recruit officers, there has been a considerable mobility in posts, lessening staff's ability to develop long-term skills. People expressed different opinions about officers (UNDP 2006). Some respondents recognised their work beneficial for recipients, whereas others tended to stereotype them as egoistic, opportunistic and unprofessional workers. For the latter, officers were untrustworthy, willing to perform coercion or threat to manipulate electors. In contrast, some respondents found CCTs' staff closer to the community than majors, governors and deputies. Officers closer and more aware of local needs gives them more credibility, which is highly valued during campaigns. News reports have accused top officials of having strong party's background, and not having previous work experience in the area. Some of them have also been appointed by the Secretary of Social Development without a job advertisement.⁴⁰ This strategic selection is followed by the fact that these officials seemed to be more familiarised with electoral legislation than the implementation of CCTs.

Irregular deliveries reported over fifteen years suggest corruption and misallocations of CCTs benefits (UNDP 2007) but more importantly they have accustomed the electorate to the distribution of benefits during elections. The survey (UNDP 2006) found a negative perception of both

⁴⁰ El Financiero, 'Los cuadros priistas que llegaron a Sedesol', Monday 22 April 2013, Política, <http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/politica/los-cuadros-priistas-que-llegaron-a-sedesol.html> (accessed on Friday 6 June 2014).

recipients and non-recipients on how senior positions and officers misuse CCTs during campaigns. Non-recipients seemed to disregard parties' manifestos and feel unrelated to democratic values. Individuals targeted by CCTs' officers and politicians showed an even worse perception of the performance of the government. This finding goes beyond the electoral arena since it involves levels of trust in institutions and values. It also affects the credibility of the efficiency of the justice's system (Cornelius & Shirk 2007).⁴¹ Additionally, voters seem to have been learning to take the rewards offered during campaigns despite admitting to voting for another party.⁴²

Patterns of clientelistic rewards persist. Even though the protection of the secrecy of the vote has improved, there are concerns about the reliability and certainty of the elections' outcome. Although poor voters have learnt to face campaigns, their expectations of a good government remain low (UNDP 2006). People are more focused on short-term needs, solving daily life issues than long-term Democratic views. Moreover, in those places with high levels of criminality,⁴³ people tend to distrust more of elections than those places with higher levels of life. This fact relates to the method to manage CCTs (UNDP 2006), threatening electors. Poor people living

⁴¹ BBC News, 'Mexico's justice system on trial', Tuesday 1 March 2011, World News America, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/world_news_america/9410972.stm (accessed on Wednesday 19 November 2014).

⁴² Proceso Magazine, 'Presentan campaña "agarra lo que te dan y vota por el PAN" en Guanajuato', Friday 15 June 2012, Estados, <http://www.proceso.com.mx/311080/presentan-campana-agarra-lo-que-te-dan-y-vota-por-el-pan-en-guanajuato> (Accessed on Monday 4 February 2013).

⁴³ More than a hundred candidates and senior politicians have been reportedly killed and disappeared since 2006 in Mexican cities such as Juarez, Cuernavaca, Tijuana, Reynosa and Acapulco. BBC News, 'Mexican candidate shot dead on campaign trail', Monday 28 June 2010, Latin America & Caribbean News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10441619> (accessed on Wednesday 28 January 2015).

within areas with violence admitted fearing to go out,⁴⁴ which discourages them from involving in outdoors politics and turning out during polling days.

In conclusion, the ruling party reshaped its strategy of control by developing a national corporatists policy, which focused on deliveries of benefits to individuals and social groups. The government institutionalised clientelism by exchanging benefits not just during campaigns but throughout and employing government agencies to meet the needs. This policy strengthened government networks, going from high level officials to activists in the ground, to gain loyalty and electoral support. Additionally, ruling party extended the menu of manipulation (Schedler 2002) by taking away voting cards of recipients,⁴⁵ promoting CCTs during campaigns, appointing officers of CCTs with strong ties with the party and no related work experience, conditioning CCTs' access and deliveries, and using CCTs' registers for electoral purposes.

3.3 The Pluralisation of Vote Buying: How Parties Turn to Clientelistic Strategies

In Mexico, vote buying is not a strategy restricted to the ruling party anymore since the opposition has entered the game. There have been tens of reports and accusations of vote buying from all over the country (Alianza Civica

⁴⁴ BBC News, 'Mexico's Zetas drug gang split raises bloodshed fears' Tuesday 11 September 2012, Latin America & Caribbean News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-1954328> (accessed on Thursday 13 March 2014).

⁴⁵ The elector's voting card is a document with photography launched on July the 3, 1992. It is compulsory to show it to electoral officers at polling stations when voting. It is officially recognised as a national ID and equals the Passport to fulfil procedures besides voting such as acquiring a property, obtaining official documents and even for alcohol buying and entering to a nightclub. Manufacturing each item can cost up to 1.5 dollars as it holds 7 enhanced technological security measures (see credencial para votar con fotografia, INE, <http://www.ine.mx/archivos2/portal/credencial/> (accessed Friday 14 March 2014)).

2006, 2012). In addition, electoral trials in Mexico have progressively addressed vote buying as grounds of anomalies (Weinberg 2008). There is a growing concern about the conduction of elections with democratic values resulting of the perception of impunity. In fact, charging people with vote buying is very unlikely. There are no more than a few cases reported over the last thirty years (FEPADE 2012). For some scholars (Diaz-Santana 2011), reporting vote buying,⁴⁶ collecting evidence and prove it according to the criminal legislation⁴⁷ is a monumental effort. For these authors, this fact partially explains the small number of successful cases in tribunals. Additionally, since regulations allow candidates to hand giveaways, merchandise and promotional products during campaigns as a campaign strategy, voters get confused about what action is legal or illegal.⁴⁸

As a result of political machines, parties perform successfully tasks of electioneering and canvassing, covering the three areas of brokers' interest as partisan, rent-seeking and social (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015). According to this typology, partisan activists support a party for programmatic reasons. They find long-term benefits from the electoral outcomes, i.e. the expansion of party's power or incumbency. With similar sort of relationship but not tied to a one party, rent-seeking brokers employ party resources for more personal reasons. For example, local leaders pursuing political careers receive the support of a party in exchange for

⁴⁶ A study conducted in Mexico (Vilalta 2010) found correlations between electoral crimes reports and people's education level, indigenous background, income, as well as population size and ruling party.

⁴⁷ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette) 'Código Nacional de Procedimientos Penales', Wednesday 5 March 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/declara/cnpp/CNPP_orig_05mar14.pdf (accessed on Friday 26 June 2015). (accessed on Friday 26 June 2015).

⁴⁸ Evidence from Nicaragua (González-Ocantos et al 2012) shows that 12% of survey's respondents associated campaign giveaways to vote buying questions.

political returns such as rallies' attendance and turnout. The third type of brokers' interests refers to those who support activities of a party motivated by interests of the community. This sort of brokers neither have personal ambitions nor follow partisan goals. Instead, they support parties in exchange of preferential public policies, the delivery of collective goods or social benefits. In Chapter 5, I provide qualitative evidence about the interests of brokers by investigating structures and networks, and the way they employ them to attract voters. Such pieces of evidence are consistent with Holland & Palmer-Rubin (2015) ideas.

Parties have also developed methods to take advantage of a complex legislation. Due to the party machine discussed before, parties are also able to evaluate circumstances from a national to a polling-station levels (Alianza Civica 2012). They, first, map closely regions, compiling lists of voters manually⁴⁹ (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2014) and, second, they perform compliance tactics in the field to cross check these lists. On the Election Day, near polling stations, brokers match these lists with those voters who have turned up to cast the vote (Mercado 2013). Based on anonymous interviews, some studies have provided qualitative evidence on the Mexican case (see Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013). Equally, in Chapter 4, I discuss plenty of accounts from the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes, which support literature about monitoring tactics, the compilation of lists and matching names near polling stations. For instance,

⁴⁹ Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin (2014: 164) show visual evidence of the lists of promised voters to be completed by brokers in a given electoral precinct. *'The top of the sheet (first three rows) indicates the name of the broker, address, telephone number, and electoral precinct. Below this are the details of voters, including their name, electoral card number, electoral precinct, address, and phone number'*.

for the 2006 Presidential Elections a caller from a borough in Mexico City reported that 'PRI candidates are knocking doors offering bags of provisions as an exchange of their vote [asking] those residents who accept the deal to sign a list in which they commit to vote for PRI and they take voting card's details' (Call No.: 0000055, 13/01/2006). Also, for the 2003 Midterm Elections a user, calling from a capital city near the northern City Hermosillo, reported that 'outside the polling station located near the shopping arcade [...], there are a few people with lists of electors, giving provisions to people voting for PRI' (Call No.: 0000696, 06/07/2003).

Whereas parties have access to the National Electoral Register⁵⁰ and results of elections, brokers map neighbourhoods to estimate the number of votes they already have and the extra required to win an election. By doing this, they both visualise votes they might obtain at a polling-station level to set expectations from each precinct and evaluate the amount of work in the ground.⁵¹ Then, numerous private meetings between parties and activists take place to set a strategy. Activists attend these meetings with some potential voters. At this stage, parties have identified electoral precincts with adverse preferences to pressure activists to work harder (Ugalde & Rivera 2013).⁵² Commonly, this pressure entails the removal of individual privileges and benefits. On the contrary, successful work in the

⁵⁰ By law, political parties have full, permanent access to the Electors' National Register. Elections Law, Article 148: 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette) 'Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales', Friday 23 May 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_130815.pdf (accessed on Friday 26 June 2015).

⁵¹ Just to put it into context, for the 2015 Midterm National Elections, the Electors' National Register was constituted of 83 and a half million people fully eligible to cast the vote. Nearly 149 thousand polling stations were open. Each Polling station held up to 750 voters. The annual budget that year reached up to Mx\$18,500m, domestic currency (about £723m).

⁵² Clientelistic networks addressed to maximise the number of votes have been tested in Latin America (Schaffer & Baker 2015) showing social multiplier effects of one single pay-off.

field tends to provide extra bonuses and rewards. likewise, evidence from callers' accounts and interviews with brokers discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 supports these claims. For example, an anonymous broker tells that he is 'even doubled his income a few times when doing a good job but equally lost half of the expected money when things went wrong'.⁵³

When it comes to what happens during polling days, evidence from previous studies have suggested two types of parties' mobilisation, polling-station representatives and vote buyers (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). Parties firstly deploy a group of representatives to polling stations⁵⁴ whose job is to observe the legitimacy of the electoral outcome. In fact, these representatives sign the validity of the result for each polling stations. Additionally, parties deploy activists whose task is to corroborate the number of votes previously compromised for brokers by the lists (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). This method allows parties to screen closely minute-by-minute the volume of votes they are presumably getting. Also, this action gives them sufficient time, if it is the case, to conduct knocking-doors actions to make more voters go to polls. Although parties forecast with accuracy the potential result, the success of this tactic is based on the capacity to make all pieces work together.

Secondly, during the Election Day, parties send another set of brokers to streets. These teams usually go to more competitive precincts,

⁵³ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala (Tuesday, 23rd May 2017).

⁵⁴ By law, up to thirteen days before the Election Day, political parties can appoint representatives for each polling station. Elections Law, Article 259, Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette) 'Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales', Friday 23 May 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_130815.pdf (accessed on Friday 26 June 2015).

in which a few votes can make the difference (Mercado 2013). Their job is to buy votes. Civil society's reports (Alianza Cívica 2016) point out that these brokers are hanging around polling stations throughout the day targeting and buying voters. They intercept electors going to polls to make an offer. Equally, supporting examples of such tactics are discussed in Chapter 4. Once an elector engages in the transaction, they both enter into a process of negotiation about rewards. This talk is crucial for brokers as evidence suggests that vote-buying activities might represent a source of extra income for brokers (Mercado 2013). Interviews conducted have revealed that brokers have a room for more margin of profit during these negotiations (see Chapter 5 for a further revision). As parties and brokers have set up rates and rewards by the time negotiations begin, brokers can manage the budget freely once they have reached the bottom line of votes.

Once brokers and voters have verbally reached a deal, the former employ two essential tactics of compliance such as photographing ballot papers marked with mobile devices (Vicente 2014) and using children as witnesses (Alianza Cívica 2006, 2012).⁵⁵ These kids are known as 'little hawks' whose job is to attest voters' choice, accompanying adults into the voting booth. Although the literature has provided no conclusive evidence whether people receive the payoff after or before casting the vote, calls examined here (see Appendix 4) show voters complaining that they received no reward after selling their vote. On the contrary, I also found evidence against sellers and buyers closing the deal after casting the vote.

⁵⁵ Sin Embargo, 'PRI y PVEM utilizaron niños (#halconcitos) para vigilar que adultos votaran a su favor: Alianza Cívica', Wednesday 4 July 2012, Elecciones 2012, <http://www.sinembargo.mx/04-07-2012/285081> (Accessed on Wednesday 30 July 2014).

Depending on the tactic of compliance, voters show the photographed ballot paper or the kid (the attester) confirms electors' choice. Civil society's organisations (Alianza Civica 2012) have expressed serious concerns in connection with children's rights, as parents seem to agree with this activity and sometimes even force children to do it. For the 2012 Presidential Elections in Mexico, there were blistering discussions on the prohibition of using mobile devices at polling stations, currently, it is allowed, however.⁵⁶

As the illegality of the activity, it is hard to establish with certainty the sum of the money or type of reward in clientelistic vote buying. Yet, some studies have estimated it based on qualitative interviews and surveys (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Alianza Civica 2012, UNDP 2006, Cornelius 2002). These payoffs have varied along the time (see Table 3.1). These sums of money might sound low in British Pounds for the UK's rates but by January 2016, the minimum wage in Mexico had risen by Mx\$73.04 (£2.85) per day, so the lowest payoff might represent up to one and a half work day. Putting this into UK's minimum wage, the margin would be equivalent to something between £80 and £634 for turning out o polling day. The buying power and the level of electoral competition determine payoff rates by region (Ugalde & Rivera 2013). In Chapter 4, I also assess the delivery of rewards based on callers' quotes; however, rates found in these studies are consistent with my findings.

⁵⁶Proceso, 'Rechaza IFE prohibir uso de celulares en las casillas', Thursday 21 June 2012, Comicios 2012, <http://www.proceso.com.mx/311718/rechaza-ife-prohibir-uso-de-celulares-en-casillas> (accessed on Wednesday 30 July 2014).

Table 3. 1 Estimations of Vote-Buying Payoff

Presidential Election	Minimum	Maximum
2000	Mx\$100 [£4]	Mx\$500 [£20]
2006	Mx\$250 [£10]	Mx\$500 [£20]
2012	Mx\$200 [£8]	Mx\$800 [£31]

Source: Author with information from Mercado, 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Alianza Civica 2012, UNDP 2006, Cornelius 2002.

There is another question. Where does the money to buy votes come from? If a party needed to buy three thousand votes with the lowest rate, they would require at least Mx\$300,000 [£13,000] in cash, free of taxes and out of expenses' reports. In Mexico, parties are mostly funded by state resources and supervised when receiving private and international funds. As funding regulations have been tightened,⁵⁷ parties require other sources to buy votes. Senators, governors, mayors, deputies, top politicians and high-level officials start playing a vital role during campaigns (see Chapter 6 for a further discussion). Informally, when these actors acknowledge their support for a candidate, what it means is that they will be contributing financially to the campaign. In fact, politicians have been arrested at airports for carrying enormous amounts of cash without declaration.⁵⁸ Presumably, politicians embezzle state resources amongst other corrupt schemes to fulfil such promises (Ugalde & Rivera 2013).

⁵⁷ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Ley General de Partidos Políticos', Friday 23 May 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGPP_130815.pdf (accessed on Thursday 25 June 2015).

⁵⁸ Animal Político, 'Detienen a colaboradores de Duarte por trasladar 25 mdp en avión oficial', Monday 30 January 2012, Nacional, <http://www.animalpolitico.com/2012/01/retienen-en-avion-de-javier-duarte-con-25-mdp-en-efectivo/> (accessed on Friday 29 March 2013).

Exploring monetary effects of the elections in 85 democratic countries, Aidt et al (2015) argue that a systemic, large-scale vote buying has short-run aggregate effects since this action requires cash right before the election. 'This creates a spike in the demand for money with a very specific timing pattern' (Aidt et al 2105: 8). The correlation is stronger in low-income countries, which suggests that the demand for cash in certain time responds to systemic vote-buying actions.

A few studies (Singer 2009) and non-academic sources have suggested other methods employed by top politicians and high-level officials to make money through public procurement. It is believed that they tailor calls and tender notices to pre-selected companies, which increase the price of the project to distribute bribes. Some information suggests that by the time governments publish the notice, they have already discussed and agreed terms, conditions and rates –real and corrupted with corporations.⁵⁹ Newspapers have reported the creation of networks of shell companies closely related to governors through relatives and friends.⁶⁰ These manoeuvres entail the involvement of other actors such as solicitors, notaries public and magistrates. Furthermore, newspaper reports have accused companies of being paid for delivering no service, exposing the fact of having neither offices nor employees.⁶¹

⁵⁹ There are tens of news reports about corruption at all levels. A basic search of 'corrupción México' in Google News produced 1.7 million links. One domestic newspaper has created a web page gathering top cases of political corruption in Mexico, see El Economista, 'Corrupción en México', <http://eleconomista.com.mx/corruccion-mexico> (accessed on Tuesday 2 September 2106).

⁶⁰ Animal Político, 'Las empresas fantasma, creadas con irregularidades y por notarios ligados al PRI y a Duarte', Monday 30 May 2016, Nacional, <http://www.animalpolitico.com/2016/05/entre-los-notarios-que-legalizaron-las-empresas-de-veracruz-hay-diputados-del-pri-e-hijos-de-funcionarios-de-duarte/> (accessed on Tuesday 30 August 2016).

⁶¹ La Jornada de Oriente, 'Deslinda Corona Cremean a gobierno del estado de empresas fraudulentas', Tuesday 6 September 2016, Política, <http://www.lajornadadeoriente.com.mx/2016/09/06/deslinda-corona-cremean-a-gobierno-del-estado-de-empresas-fraudulentas/> (accessed on Monday 12 September 2016).

Another method to raise money is the trade of bureaucratic posts. Despite regulations established by the civil service,⁶² when the president, governor or mayor get the post, a new cabinet is appointed. Therefore, a considerable number of changes in middle positions take place throughout –usually negotiated before campaigns. Journalists have argued that people get a public post without any related work experience. Prospective employees presumably pay for the post in two ways. One is by sharing periodically an agreed proportion of the wage and the other is by making a one-off payment according to the rate of the position.⁶³ Although police have investigated cases over the years, just a few people have been sent to jail.

A similar method seems to be employed by parties when deciding candidates. The more abundance of office's resources (Birch 2011: 137), the more posts to trade. This is an extra motivation for people to want to be a candidate. Moreover, some reports have demonstrated similar practices adopted in legislative⁶⁴ and judicial⁶⁵ branches. As illegal, there are no records about the sum of money negotiated but these reports suggest between 10% and 50% of the wage of the post for monthly fees and up to MX\$200,000 (about £7,795) for the one-off payment.

⁶² Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Ley del Servicio Profesional de Carrera en la Administración Pública Federal', Thursday 10 April 2003, HYPERLINK "<http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/260.pdf>"ht (accessed on Thursday 25 June 2015).accessed on Thursday 25 June 2015).

⁶³ UNOTV, 'Lo agarran porque "vendía" plazas en el Gobierno de Oaxaca', Thursday 4 February 2016, Oaxaca, <http://www.unotv.com/noticias/estados/oaxaca/detalle/prometia-plazas-trabajar-gobierno-estado-detenido-326786/> (accessed on Sunday 10 April 2016).

⁶⁴ La Jornada Jalisco, 'Diputados cobran derecho de piso a supernumerarios', Saturday 10 November 2012, Guadalajara, <http://www.mediasolutions.com.mx/ncpop.asp?n=201210110740141915&t=7177> (accessed on Friday 29 March 2013).

⁶⁵ El Universal, 'En el Poder Judicial federal trafican plazas', Tuesday 22 September 2009, Nacion, <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/171432.html> (accessed on Friday 29 March 2013).

A third method to fund political activities is by laundering money. As more sophisticated, it usually implies robust networks between senior politicians, high-level officials and organised criminal groups (Lilley 2006, Richards 1998). Amongst scandals in Mexico from 2001 to 2016, there have been over seven former governors arrested for money laundering and drug trafficking by American authorities.⁶⁶ Some of them already convicted and others are facing trials. Although some studies have suggested this idea (Singer 2009), there is no evidence that money made under these schemes of corruption goes to vote-buying.

As I have argued, at the beginning of the Twentieth-century, the Mexican political system was highly familiarised with corporatist policies of deliveries and campaigns developed through clientelistic tactics. Whereas all parties have turned to clientelistic exchanges, brokers have begun to perform vote-buying actions without strong ideological ties with parties. This fact, has made brokers more opportunistic and more business oriented, selling services to the highest bidder. Brokers have also devised methods of targeting and buying in two main stages in which the Election Day is the most intense and crucial time. Politicians and high-level officials of the government engage in corruption to make money, which on one side, gives them incentives to hold public posts and, on the other side, helps them to make money for political needs.

⁶⁶ El Economista, 'En 15 años, 7 gobernadores ligados a la corrupción y la delincuencia organizada', Friday 15 January 2016, Sociedad, <http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2016/01/15/15-anos-7-gobernadores-ligados-corrupcion-delincuencia-organizada> (accessed on Sunday 10 April 2016).

3.4 Competing Constitutional Reforms: How Amendments Aiming Free and Fair Elections Have Boosted Vote Buying

As I have argued, elections have been a crucial factor of stability for the Mexican political system. The legislation of elections has changed as a result of political and social pressure, seeking legitimacy for the regime. After the Mexican Revolution, the establishment first shaped authoritarian, paternalistic rules to keep the power. Then, it developed strong corporatist mechanisms of control to rule the country with stability. Finally, vote-buying reached other parties, spreading itself as a campaign method. In this section, I review the path of vote buying in the legislation and how electoral reforms, pursuing ideals of fairness and equality, have deterred the government and ruling party from manipulating electoral institutions. Yet, the changes in the legislation have forced parties to conduct knocking-doors campaigns as a result of the media restriction, limit of spending and enhanced measures of inspection. These factors have incentivised personal interactions between voters and brokers.

Reforms on Political Pluralism

Since the 1970s, electoral laws, codes and legislations have been lively debated within the Mexican Congress, shaping the existing legal frame. The end of the prevalence of the one-party system (Solinger 2001) in Mexico began with the 1977 electoral reform.⁶⁷ There is a somewhat diffuse

⁶⁷ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Reforma y adiciones de los artículos 6, 41, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61, 65, 70, 73, 74, 93, 97 y 115 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos', Tuesday 6 December 1977,

reference to vote buying in the bill. In Chapter III, Sanctions, Article III specified that all those individuals who vote more than once or force other voters to vote for a candidate or party would be going to jail for up to a year with electoral crime. As it can be seen, there is no a direct reference to the exchange of benefits for votes, which it might illustrate the political circumstances of the period. By contrast, this reform allowed opposition parties to participate in elections more fairly and reducing considerably restrictions on the registry of new parties. Opposition groups had access to the Chamber of Deputies as 25% of the whole seats (400) were set to proportional representation. Parties also had the opportunity to broadcast propaganda by having access to media. Although this reform is known for giving representation to minorities and widening room of debate to antagonistic ideas, electoral colleges and voting counting were still jurisdictions of the Chambers. In other words, senators and deputies self-judged elections from which they were elected. Likewise, the Supreme Court settled elections controversies.

The 1986 electoral reform⁶⁸ introduced significant changes to the institutional design (see Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2001: 282-287). In terms of vote buying, the amendment drastically modified the criminal definition. Chapter Third, Sanctions, Article 340 states that public servants who force or induce electors to vote for a candidate or party would be fined, barred

http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_086_06dic77_ima.pdf (accessed on Sunday 15 November 2015).

⁶⁸ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Reforma de los artículos 52, 53 Segundo Párrafo, 54 Primer Párrafo y Fracciones II, III y IV, 56, 60, 77 Fracción IV y Décimo Octavo Transitorio de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos', Monday 15 December 1986, /www.sitios.scjn.gob.mx/constitucion1917-2017/sites/default/files/CPEUM_1917_CC/pdf/00130002.pdf (accessed on Sunday 20 December 2015).

and sent to jail for up to three years with electoral crime. The interesting side of the criminal definition is the restriction of perpetrator in the government arena. In contrast, the reform expanded the number of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies from 400 to 500, increasing also the share of proportional representation from 25% to 40% (for a further theoretical discussion see Balinski & Gonzalez, 1996). It also established a specialised jurisdictional authority in elections called Electoral Tribunal (TRICOEL) whose job was to conclude over acts and decisions of the Federal Electoral Commission. The electoral system, however, was still showing signs of unfairness since an overwhelming majority of the Commission's officials were members of the ruling party. This Commission, indeed, was accused of the 1988 electoral fraud (see Section 3.1). Equally, tasks of electoral colleges and voting counting were still under the jurisdiction of the Chamber of Deputies.

The 1990 electoral reform⁶⁹ switched the approach to vote buying. Legislators redefined the criminal structure of vote buying. Chapter XXIV, Electoral Crimes, Article 406 specified that all those party officials forcing or inducing electors to vote for a candidate or party would be fined and sent to jail up to five years. On the other hand, the reform transformed the Electoral Commission into an autonomous constitutional body called Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The governing board, still chaired by the Secretary of the Interior, included members of the legislative branch, parties and civil

⁶⁹ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales y se adiciona el Título Vigésimo Cuarto del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal en Materia de Fuero Común, y para toda la República en Materia de Fuero Federal', Wednesday 15 August 1990, [http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red/marco/PDF/O.%201995-2011/g\)%20COFIPE%20de%201990/01.%20COFIPE%201990.pdf](http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red/marco/PDF/O.%201995-2011/g)%20COFIPE%20de%201990/01.%20COFIPE%201990.pdf) (accessed on Sunday 27 December 2015).

society associations. Also, there were new rules for the National Electoral Register and the method to fund political parties (Diaz-Santana 2002). This reform also changed the TRICOEL into the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE), expanding its responsibilities and scope. The country was divided into four geographical jurisdictions, holding one local chamber each area. Yet, TRIFE had to work together with electoral colleges –senators and deputies, on voting counting and other affairs. Also, the Article 190, number 2 of the Electoral Code established that ‘it is forbidden electioneering, promoting and conducting party’s meetings and rallies during the period going from three days before the Election Day to the closing time of the polling stations (own translation).

Reforms on Autonomy and Institutional Strengthening

The work of electoral management bodies (EMBs) is to ensure free, fair and meaningful elections. To gain credibility, EMBs must demonstrate reliability to people (Birch 2011). The organisation of EMBs worldwide is diverse regarding their structure, attributions, competencies, and factual power within the state. Mexico has transited from a governmental to an independent model of EMBs (Wall 2006). There are three main models of electoral administration (Lopez-Pintor 2000): a) elections run by the government, in which a civil service is accountable to politicians; b) elections run by the government but subject to supervision by another body –usually independent; c) elections run by a wholly independent electoral

commission. For the Mexican state, the transition from the first to the third model signified a considerable challenge.

The 1993 reform sustained a similar structure of vote buying but it expanded the extent of perpetrators entitling any single individual conducting such activities (Diaz-Santana 2002). Thus, Article 403 states that all those asking for votes favouring a candidate or political party as an exchange of payment, gifts, a promise of money or any other reward during campaigns and elections days, would be fined and sent to jail up to two years. In addition, there was a restriction of electioneering and conducting rallies from Friday before polling days (voting day in Mexico is always on Sundays). In contrast, one of the features of the 1993 electoral reform⁷⁰ was the removal of electoral colleges from the jurisdiction of the Chambers (for a further description see Diaz-Cayeros & Magaloni 2001). This decision entailed, at last, the establishment of the TRIFE as a judicial body wholly attributed to decide the outcome of elections, voting counting, electoral controversies amidst other procedures (Nohlen 2005). It also introduced limits on the spending of campaigns, appealed to fairness between ruling and opposition parties.

Meeting expectations of democratic values for the 1994 Presidential Election (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012), the reform⁷¹ signified a breakthrough for the appointment of electoral commissioners. Called

⁷⁰ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Reforma y adición de los artículos del Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales', Friday 24 September 1993, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/abro/cofipec/COFIPE_ref03_24sep93_ima.pdf (accessed on Tuesday 12 January 2016).

⁷¹ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Reforma, adición y derogación de diversos artículos del Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales', Wednesday 18 May 1994, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=4696377&fecha=18/05/1994 (accessed on Friday 15 January 2016).

magistrate-directors, the change included for the first-time, non-party appointees and representatives of opposition parties in IFE's governing body. This change made citizens eligible to take over such duties. Such body was constituted by six magistrates-directors and four deputies of the legislature representing opposition parties, chaired by the Secretary of the Interior. Also, the reform introduced new regulations on national and international electoral observers. With this change, citizens and specialised groups took part more actively in monitoring the elections. The reform also denied winning parties' rights to get a legislative majority, giving opposition parties more access to media too. Finally, as a result of the complexity to punish electoral offences, legislators established a specialised agency in electoral crimes with attributions and technical autonomy to prosecute these offences. Called Attorney General Office Attending Electoral Crimes, since then, this office has been in charge of preventing, investigating and prosecuting vote buying among other crimes.

The 1996 electoral reform⁷² presented no change in vote buying. By contrast, it strengthened the autonomy of the IFE by detaching all the jurisdiction of the government on electoral affairs (Eisenstadt 2007). Nine citizen directors appointed by the Chambers (one of them serving as the President) and representatives from each party constituted the governing body of IFE, called the Council General. The restructuration widened faculties of the IFE considerably. It absorbed the control of the budget of political parties, being empowered to perform audits, request accountant

⁷² Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Reforma a diversos artículos de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos', Thursday 22 August 1996, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=4896725&fecha=22/08/1996 (accessed on Wednesday 20 January 2016).

reports, conduct inspections, establish procedures and more importantly fine parties.

Additionally, the reform gave the federal electoral court extra jurisdiction over appeals of local electoral disputes (Eisenstadt 2007). This fact empowered TRIFE as an authority of the judicial branch with full autonomy, increasing the number of areas to five with an equal number of regional chambers. This change expanded TRIFE's attributions over constitutional decisions, becoming the only electoral body to decide ultimately over elections. Other important changes were the access to Radio and Television, new rules of distribution of state funding, linked to the voting share obtained in the last election, and the control of party's private contributions from members and supporters. As discussed, the 1996 reform focused on strengthening the institutional design. IFE and TRIFE got attributions to conduct punitive binding actions over parties. In fact, the date of the reform was a fundamental factor since rules entered into force, just weeks before the official opening of the 1997 Midterm electoral process. A relevant outcome credited to this reform is on political pluralism as the ruling party lost the majority in both the lower Chambers and the upper House.

The 1996 rules served as bases for the 2000 Presidential Election, which represented the first political transition in recent Mexican political history (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez & Magaloni 2012). An air of foreboding prowled around the environment when polling stations closed. Around 11pm, the Mexican President acknowledged the adverse outcome on national TV and Radio, leaving seven decades of the dominance. The 1996 reform has received all credits of these moments of excitement. From 2000

to 2007, IFE recorded its threshold of people's trust (Mendizabal & Moreno 2010), its performance has received the credits of the political transition. The public perception on the executive board increased considerably beyond the political arena. They delivered speeches of fairness, transparency and reliability every day with hints of a celebration of democratic values. People rejoiced in the streets to see the ruling party losing the power.

In conclusion,

The 1990–6 electoral reforms involved the establishment of an electoral commission that was independent both *de facto* and *de jure*, and which thereby insulated electoral processes from manipulations of electoral administration by the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). These reforms ushered in a change of regime, when the PRI, which had ruled Mexico for seven decades, first lost control of the lower house of parliament in 1997 and then of the presidency in 2000 (Birch 2011: 147).

Reforms on Fair Elections

Rules coming from the 1996 reform remained for about a decade; the 2006 Presidential Elections, however, brought unexpected challenges. The electoral legislation seemed to be overtaken for the most competitive election ever recorded. After an unprecedented controversy, less than 1% of winning margin, legislative debates on a new electoral reform began to take place straightway after the election. Amongst other points, the bills focused on (not necessarily in this order of relevance):⁷³

- The regulation of access to media for political parties.

⁷³ Gaceta Parlamentaria (Parliamentary Gazette), año IX, número 2083-I, lunes 28 de agosto de 2006, 'Modificación del numeral 3 y adición de los numerales 4 y 5 del artículo 4 del Código Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales', <http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/Gaceta/59/2006/ago/20060828-I.html> (accessed on Saturday 30 March 2013).

- The re-establishment of the limits of campaign expenses.
- New rules and regulations of communication of governments.
- The appointment of the citizen director of IFE.

Vote buying remained firm for the 2007 reform.⁷⁴ Instead changes affect IFE, TRIFE and parties directly. A new regime of sanctions was created, giving to IFE full responsibility. Equally, a new set of offences against elections covered other political areas and individuals. The jurisdiction of TRIFE was adjusted, making regional chambers permanent and empowering the institution to declare the validity of a Presidential election, attracting and delegating cases from and to local chambers. These new rules also affected the traditional relationships between political actors and mass media. They restricted private negotiations on broadcasting's rates for electoral propaganda and inspected the contents of messages before broadcasting (Serra 2009). Claims of the defeated presidential candidate about unfairness and media attacks (so-called dirty campaign)⁷⁵ motivated these changes. A sensitive aspect was the restriction of non-political groups to influence the decision of voters. The runner-up candidate argued that wealthy groups funded thousands of media messages against him illegally. Also, they pressurised owners of broadcasting companies to manage with discretion rates of political propaganda.

In this aspect, the 2007 reform was considered rather radical since eliminated any possibility for anyone to access the media during political

⁷⁴ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Reforma de los artículos 6, 41, 85, 99, 108, 116 y 122; adición del artículo 134 y derogación de un párrafo al artículo 97 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.', Tuesday 13 November 2007, www.diputados.gob.mx/.../55_CPEUM_13nov07.doc (accessed on Tuesday 9 December 2014).

⁷⁵ La Jornada, 'Televisa impulsó la guerra sucia para impedir que fuera presidente: AMLO', Thursday 28 June 2007, <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/06/28/index.php?section=politica&article=008n1pol> (accessed on Saturday 2 February 2013).

campaigns (Serra 2009). Broadcasting political propaganda on radio and television is nowadays fully forbidden. Journalists and social groups have severely criticised this measure for infringing freedom of speech.⁷⁶ It is debatable the extent of such limitation, but these claims flagged something deeper. The quest for fair, impartial, transparent elections was conflicting other democratic interests (Serra 2009). There are no many examples of democratic regimes restricting free access to the media. Social groups have access to radio and television to support those candidates whom they believe are the best option.

Concerning the inspection, the reform also sought to foster sensible campaign messages and ruling dirty politics. It regulated the type and format of political messages. Subjectively, negative words, phrases and comments were fully forbidden. The reform, indeed, warned parties of issuing messages “denigrating” or “slandering” opponents. This enactment was meant to protect the reputation of candidates. Yet, these measures were rigorously disapproved by sectors for depriving citizens of their right to know the truth about politicians (Serra 2009). For them, instead of inspecting the negativity of the content subjectively, the reform must have focused on the reliability of the sources not to publicise false or incorrect information.

Related to media access, the 2007 reform impacted the limit of the spending of campaigns. Different from the 1993 reform, this change established a reduction of the amount of money given to parties. A new formula for calculating public funding to parties included the number citizens

⁷⁶ Cámara Nacional de la Industria de Radio y Televisión, ‘La ley electoral y los criterios de la autoridad atentan contra la libertad de expresión y limitan la actividad periodística’, Wednesday 15 February 2012, <http://www.cirt.com.mx/portal/index.php/comunicacion/desplegados/647-ley-electoral-atenta-contralibertad-de-expresion> (accessed Sunday 17 March 2013).

enrolled in the national register and the number of illegible parties. The method assigned 30% of the public funds evenly distributed to each political party, and 70% according to the number of votes each obtained in the last election. The reform also established new procedures for the liquidation of the extinct parties, in which assets and remaining resources should be given to the national treasury. There were new limits on private contributions additionally.

The communication of federal and local governments has usually been controversial since officials have used it to promote themselves and parties. For example, for the 2006 Presidential Elections, international reports suggested a meddling of the Mexican president in campaigns through government's messages, magnifying his successes intentionally (Arias 2007). The reform established limits on the dissemination of the communication of governments and recognised IFE as the sole authority responsible for distributing and allocating time in media for electoral purposes. The decision prohibited officials from using state resources to self-promotion, it restricted times for governments to advertise, from the beginning of the campaigns until polling day. It confined broadcasting geographically, depending on the election. It also impacted contents, excluding imperative themes such as education, health, safety and security, and emergency. For some authors (Serra 2009), the foremost point of the 2007 reform was the extension of IFE and TRIFE's faculties to impose sanctions to the executive branch. They both were fully allowed to order the removal of political spots from Radio and TV. Although there has been a consistent pattern in the decisions between the two authorities, some

conflicting decisions have reportedly confronted cases opened by IFE and revoked by TRIFE.⁷⁷

Staggered appointments entered equally into force for the nine members of the executive board. Three citizen directors were replaced immediately, including the director president; three more were meant to leave the post three years after the reform, in 2010, and the three remaining would complete the period until 2014. This rush caused uncertainty since restrictions for former parties' members and partisans to serve as citizen directors disappeared, creating doubts about IFE's neutrality, impartiality and autonomy (Schedler 2007). Likewise, the change reduced the waiting period for former candidates to be eligible for running a post at IFE from five to four years.

A Reform on Institutional Re-redesign

The 2014 reform⁷⁸ renewed the jurisdiction of vote buying but the essence of criminal definition remained. It also developed two new legislations such as the general law on parties, the general law of institutions and procedures. They empowered federal authorities to conduct binding actions over local elections. It also transformed IFE into the Electoral National Institute (INE), entitling it to fulfil electoral duties nationally and absorbing former states EMBs. Amongst other changes, the jurisdiction of INE was extended to the

⁷⁷ Files SUP-RAP-75/2009, SUP-RAP-82/2009, SUP-RAP-87/2009 and SUP-RAP-89/2009.

⁷⁸ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Reforma, adición y derogación de diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia política-electoral', Monday 10 February 2014, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5332025&fecha=10/02/2014 (accessed on Friday 30 October 2015).

organisation and decisions over local elections, employing local agencies as regional coordinators. To accomplish these duties, INE created a large liaison unit in charge of coordinating new local EMBs, although a sensitive aspect was the appointment of the executive boards of local EMBs. INE was also attributed to recruit and appoint up to 224 electoral officials. However, some newspapers have reported tough discussions in local congresses to allocate public resources to these EMBs.⁷⁹ This aspect has represented tensions between Federation and states about sovereignty.

The reform established criteria for grounds of the nullity of elections resulting from serious, intentional and decisive violations to fairness such as exceeding campaign spending (up to five percent of the amount authorised), accessing to radio and television through illegal individual negotiations and managing illegal resources in campaigns.

Legislators are allowed to re-stand for a seat and potentially re-elected for consecutive periods. With some restrictions, it was established up to two legislative terms for senators and up to four for deputies (12 years for both of them). Equally, local legislatures were allowed to enact similar changes to states' constitutions according to their circumstances but in any case, not exceeding terms of three years.

There was a new establishment of procedures and sanctions for electoral crimes, which were removed from the Federal Criminal Act to a new specialised general Act on electoral crimes. The definition of vote buying was modified. The reform prohibits vote buying at any time during

⁷⁹ Animal Político, 'Lo bueno, lo malo y lo incierto de la reforma electoral', Columna Invitada, Tuesday 27 May 2014, <http://www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-blog-invitado/2014/05/27/lo-bueno-lo-malo-y-lo-incierto-de-la-reforma-electoral/> (accessed on Saturday 15 August 2015).

political campaigns; previously it was focused on the Election Day. Another addition was the fact of establishing intangible goods as part of the rewards, stating ‘any remuneration’. Moreover, sellers of votes, not just buyers, are subjected to sanctions. One problem is that the fact of punishing both – buyers and sellers– restricts incentives for people to report crimes. Therefore, it is hard to assume that this change will contribute to prosecute perpetrators more efficiently or even more to deter vote buying from happening. This reform also set the autonomy of the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy, which is the agency in charge of evaluating misuses of CCTs with electoral purposes (see Section 3.2).

The 2014 reform also changed the procedure from which the head of the office is appointed. The legislative branch should now decide over candidates unanimously. Among other requirements, this new procedure entails a national recruitment call, face-to-face interviews between prospects and Congressmen and the ratification of the Senate. This new method also relates to a substantial coming change. In a three-years period, the Attorney General’s jurisdiction will be removed from the executive branch. The idea is to make the head of the office fully independent from the influence of the President. In theory, this change establishes an optimal scenario for prosecuting independently and more efficiently electoral crimes (Diaz-Santana 2013).

The reform ruled private contributions to political campaigns again. Newspapers have reported parties exceeding spending limits.⁸⁰ Most of the

⁸⁰ Reforma, ‘Acusan exceso en campañas de Guerrero’, Friday 17 April 2015, Estados, <http://www.reforma.com/aplicacioneslibre/articulo/default.aspx?id=517131&md5=e1f571040ecb4b52b8d3cadf99abe771&ta=0dfdbac11765226904c16cb9ad1b2efe> (accessed on Saturday 19 March 2016).

money presumably parties overspend comes from private funds and, a few times, from illegal sources.⁸¹ In fact, since then, EMBs have opened tens of investigations against parties and politicians for campaign misreporting.⁸² INE and TRIFE have spared an equal number of penalties. The new reform establishes new limits on private contributions and incorporates compulsory actions to take by political parties, which for some scholars, had been required years before (Díaz-Santana 2011).

Another change was the fact of making non-party candidates eligible to stand for elected positions. With specific criteria, singular citizens are now allowed to conduct and lead campaigns. Likewise, the rights of abroad voters were extended to senators and governors, potentially through electronic-voting in addition to post-voting. Despite existing for about ten years, the procedure of abroad voters seemed to be hard to comprehend concerning steps and stages, however, Mexicans abroad have consistently participated in elections (Lafleur 2011).

Although analysts have acknowledged positive aspects of these changes,⁸³ the 2014 reform increased the number of regulating electoral articles from 394 to 590. This rise represents 49.7% more rules in seven years. Just to place this point into context, whereas the American Constitution is formed of seven articles, the Mexican one contains 135. Furthermore, Mexican Congressmen have changed it about 200 times in 99 years, whilst their American counterpart has amended it 27 times in 229

⁸¹ El Universal, 'Hay dinero del narco en campañas políticas: González Garza', Nación, <http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/522422.html> (accessed on Sunday 11 November 2012).

⁸² La Jornada, 'Gastó el PRI más de \$4 mil 500 millones en la campaña de Peña Nieto en 2012', Wednesday 12 March 2014, Política, <http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2014/03/12/politica/008n1pol> (Accessed on Wednesday 15 July 2015).

⁸³ Nexos, 'Lo que hay que cambiar en las leyes electorales de México', Tuesday 1 November 2016, Política, <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=30061> (Accessed on Thursday 15 December 2016).

years (Mahoney et al 1986). Beyond the view of enforcement, the 2014 reform imposes practical constraints for the rule of law. The secretary of the interior has recognised the over regulation of the electoral legislation.⁸⁴ Equally, specialists have agreed with the high complexity to make it work.⁸⁵ As I have discussed, a problem of elections and politics in Mexico has been money (see Section 3.3). Despite hundreds of articles enacted against corruption, illegal money flows through campaigns (Singer 2009). Mexicans live corruption in daily politics, it is hard to believe that politicians will not find another method to make money. Although there are cases in which centralisation plays an important role to standardise procedures efficiently, the decision of concentrating authority does not guarantee that parties will run campaigns differently from what they have done (Jamieson 1993).

3.5 Conclusion

As I have argued, the transition of the Mexican political system from an authoritarian to a machine party is explained by mechanisms to control the opposition. Electoral bills helped the PRI to get more robust majorities in Chambers. In addition, by controlling electoral institutions and procedures, the government manipulated the vote with certain level of ease. They in combinations with the ruling party consolidated a solid complex network constituted of politicians, officials, partisan, volunteers and voters. Equally,

⁸⁴ Milenio, 'Con reforma electoral se acabaron los pretextos: Osorio', Monday 27 January 2014, Política http://www.milenio.com/politica/electoral-acabaron-pretextos-Osorio-Chong_0_234577049.html (accessed on Friday 3 September 2016).

⁸⁵ Cambio, 'Carlos Ugalde realiza aguda crítica a nueva Ley Electoral', Monday 20 April 2015, Zoon Politikon, <http://www.diariocambio.com.mx/2015/zoon-politikon/item/4877-carlos-ugalde-realiza-aguda-critica-a-nueva-ley-electoral> (accessed on Saturday 15 August 2015).

corporatist policies make Mexicans more familiar with clientelistic and paternalistic practices. Such relationship strengthened ties of loyalty and support to the government. The dominant party also devised effective tactics of manipulation performed during campaigns.

Clientelistic exchanges have been employed by all parties as an effective method for campaigning. Brokers are now more opportunistic and business oriented, devising more sophisticated methods of targeting and buying. Also, politicians and government high-level officials in Mexico have found corrupt forms to manage state resources.

Although legislators adjusted the criminal definition of vote buying in forty years of electoral reforms, the tendency towards free and fair elections has boosted spaces for vote buying. First, restricting the access of political parties to mass media has promoted a fair contest to all parties. However, it also pressed campaigners to develop more strategies in the field to get supporters. This fact leveraged face-to-face interaction, which can develop stronger ties between brokers and people (Powel 1970). Secondly, the prohibition for governments to broadcast messages during campaigns caused a similar outcome. Politicians need self-promotion in media (Nacif 1995); therefore, they need to develop effective methods of communication. Radio and television are natural means to reach more people cheaper and promptly. Although restricting the access to media might contain top politicians and high-level officials from promoting themselves with state resources, they inevitably need to find alternative methods to interact with voters. This measure encouraged politicians to conduct other illegal ways to continue promoting themselves. In Mexico, there have been scandals of

corruption involving considerable amounts of money during campaign periods (Morris 2009). Given that some local governments struggle to develop effective systems of accountability and transparency, the illegitimate fabrication of reports about the public budget is simple (Kind 2003). Thirdly, the regulation on limits of campaign spending enforced parties on accounting inspection. But it generates also motivations for them to find methods to underreport resources they use. Since politicians had already got tactics to deal with accounting matters, the reform just urged them to be even better at doing this.

Having discussed how Mexico provides a good opportunity to investigate vote buying as similar conditions of a highly institutionalised parties' machines, selective deliveries of benefits and constitutional reforms addressed to free and fair elections, I now turn to investigate how Mexican voters face vote buying, how parties and brokers conduct strategies of targeting and buying, and what are the effects of vote buying on voting choices in Mexico. In Chapter 4, I examine thousands of accounts of callers from all over the country reporting vote buying; in Chapter 5, I conduct a series of interviews with brokers; and in Chapter 6, I conduct an alternative technique of a list-experiment called LISTIT embedded in a nationally representative survey.

Chapter 4. Vote Buying, Campaigns and Polling Days in Mexico: An Account from the Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes

Given that this dissertation uses a mixed-method research design, it does not include a separate chapter outlining the data and method. Instead, I introduce and assess methodological implications in each chapter since data sources and analytical approaches differ across the three following techniques. Literature has largely study clientelistic exchanges from several angles and employing several techniques (e.g. Diaz, Estevez & Magaloni 2016, 2012, 2007, Hilgers 2011, Shefner 2001, Ayuero 2000, 1999, Gay 1994, Fox 1994, Lemarchand & Legg 1972, Powell 1970). However, empirical findings differ about the extent and intensity of the problem. Whereas qualitative evidence as focus groups, in-depth, semi-structured interviews and direct observation (e.g. Hagene 2015, Schedler & Manriquez 2004) suggest large operations of clientelistic distributions from politicians, statistical evidence as nationally representative surveys (Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002, Brusco et al 2004, Stokes 2005) indicates small numbers of voters entering such arrangements. Why does evidence differ from each other? I then approach vote-buying from two qualitative techniques and a statistical test to cover both angles of the problem. This study then aims to fill this gap.

Scholars have employed the two approaches for the empirical study of clientelistic vote-buying and other forms of distributive politics such as quantitative and qualitative in the Latin-American region. Quantitative methods have provided tools to measure the incidence of vote buying (UNDP 2006, Stokes 2005, Brusco, Nazareno & Sotkes 2004, Cornelius 2004, Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002), turn out buying (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Vicente 2014, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2014, Simpser 2012, Nichter 2008) and estimate vote-buying effects on election outcomes (Gallego & Wantchekon 2012) and voting behaviour (Hicken et al 2015). Qualitative techniques have theorised on campaign clientelism (Munoz 2014), contributed to the understanding of people's evaluation of political and electoral clientelism (Schedler & Manriquez 2004, Auyero 1999), the method relationships brokers–clients (Hagene 2015, Auerbach 2016) and state–citizens work (Lazar 2004).

Whilst interviews, focus groups, participant and direct observation have predominated in political science, innovative, unconventional methods (Terry & Wong 2005, Arbon et al 2006) have been developed in other disciplines to explore, for example, puzzles on victims and crimes (Meng 2001, Sherman et al 1992). Drawing upon an unexplored data set of the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in Mexico, in this chapter, I firstly assess some theoretical claims on 1) brokers' strategies for targeting people, 2) electors' engagement in vote buying and 3) compliance mechanisms, with a particular focus on the sort of goods distributed and the timing of these transactions. Extending qualitative tools, I develop an analytical framework based upon the accounts given by non-recruited

interviewees. The users of the telephone service call to report electoral crimes –amongst other electoral malpractices (Birch 2011)– sometimes in real-time. This fact offers an opportunity to capture crucial details of sensitive aspects of vote buying, which could be hard otherwise. Whereas traditional interviewing techniques have developed strategies to ask individuals about illegal and unacceptable actions with empathy to access to this sort of information, in this analysis, I rely on safety and convenience that the hotline offers callers to report relaxingly sensitive information and crimes anonymously (Novick 2008). The service provides callers with the two most important aspects that research on vote buying has faced as anonymity and confidentiality. It covers users' identity, it is guided by professional telephonists and it is a free service. Therefore, I expect those testimonies to serve as a rich source of information on how individuals face vote buying strategies. In addition, as mobile phones and landline services have improved in Mexico in recent years, rural and urban areas have easy access to the hotline. In some cases, in fact, telephone services are understood as the only channel of communication and response to help vulnerable people.

This assessment of the Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in Mexico contributes to qualitative literature on vote buying by providing a new perspective of analysis on the conditions voters cope with brokers along the electoral campaigns. This examination is unique in the sense that involves accounts from electors targeted and bought in ongoing elections and campaigns' periods. As a result, methods to help survey's respondents to remember facts, dates and other crucial information are not required. To

the best of my knowledge, it is the first ever hotline study on vote buying with these characteristics. Likewise, there is no previous exploration of this database with academic purposes.

This chapter is organised in the following way. I firstly discuss the origins and purposes of the Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in Mexico, exploring basic descriptive statistics of calls received in 2012 and introduce the contribution of this unexplored data set to the research on vote buying. Second, I analyse the content of calls focusing on strategies of targeting with a particular interest in the action of proffering. I also explore the implications of the difference between offering and delivering. Thirdly, I examine the conditions and methods that brokers reportedly employ to deliver clientelistic rewards and how voters accept the deal. Then, I evaluate some mechanisms of compliance against calls' reports. Most of these claims have come from newspapers and electoral observation reports. The following section analyses negative vote buying by selecting reports denouncing collection of voting cards. To conclude the Chapter, I assess the content of calls received on polling days, focusing on tactics of targeting and delivering near polling stations. I provide an extended report of the calls examined in Appendix 4.1.

4.1 The Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes

Governmental hotline services are meant to assist people in several ways. Some of these might include, for example, providing advice, support and immediate response, information provision, counselling services or A&E assistance (Rosenfield 1996). The national hotline service FEPADETEL (01

800 833 7233), provided by the Attorney General's Office Attending Electoral Crimes, is the only line specialised on electoral crimes. It began in 2002 as a free legal advice service on electoral criminal justice, operating under 24/365 basis (FEPADE 2005). Given that Mexicans do not usually report crimes in police stations for some reasons (Cornelius & Shirk 2007), this service intended to offer individuals with extra means to report electoral malpractices. Although it has served as grounds for launching some police investigations, just a few cases have been successfully proven in tribunals. As a result of criminal procedures, police effectivity amidst other factors, an imminent investigation from a call is not straightforward.

After a first year active, the hotline extended services to a broader set of supporting activities, for instance, the attention of general queries on elections and the reception of reports and information for ongoing investigations. A multidisciplinary team of telephonists has covered an extensive range of enquiries with powers to launch police investigations, substantiate trials with evidence and capture the social perception of electoral criminality. Since 2006, the team receives a standardised training concentrating essentially on electoral criminal law, elections' regulations, human rights, interrogation techniques and communication skills. Although other electronic-based services have been created to achieve the same purpose (e.g. FEPADENET, Fiscal en linea, PREDEF, interactive chat), the hotline continues to be the most robust source of information (see Customer Services Section, FEPADE 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 & 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016).

The records compiled by the hotline consisted of 26 data identifying user's details (with the option of anonymity), call location (borough and state), date and incident, additionally to internal codes (see FEPADETEL Diagram for further details, Appendix 4.9). The first analytical exercise of calls' classification was conducted for the 2006 Presidential Elections (FEPADE 2007). It produced figures about three main categories such as enquiries, complaints and reports. The first type comprised a diverse range of election-related questions, not necessarily misconducts. The category of complaints was constituted of potential minor offences, which despite not entailing prosecuting purposes, they were a matter of further interrogations. Occasionally, these calls were referred to competent authorities with the power to execute other measures. The last category included all suspected episodes of crimes that provided sufficient information to open a police investigation. This sort of calls, therefore, required referral to the specialised criminal team who officially began a binding procedure.

The second analytical effort was developed for the 2009 Mid-term Elections. This classification of calls -which remains active- went further. It set up types of incidents rather than the type of services provided, in which telephonists allocate calls into one of 52 categories (see Electoral Categories, Appendix 4.9). The data produced by FEPADETEL, then, provide scholarship with an opportunity to explore electoral incidents from a different perspective. As telephonists are trained for interrogating callers to discover potential crimes, the sort and tone of questions they ask to classify the call are rather relevant to academic goals. As the hotline has enabled the anonymous reception of criminal reports, both victims and

witnesses find more incentives to talk openly over the phone than by face-to-face means. Since users can call from remote and deprived places in Mexico, telephonists are assisted by translators⁸⁶ and other professionals provide a wider service to ensure communication. Different from other studies on hotline services (Sherman et al 1992), I do analyse the content of the call, focused on the “conceptualisation of vote buying” (Nichter 2014). Although records of FEPADETEL give information to develop a full study on electoral misconduct (Birch 2011), this analysis focuses only on vote-buying.

I requested formal access to 50,453 records of 15 years of service, from 2002 to 2016, to capture the activity of two presidential (2006 and 2012) and three mid-term elections (2003, 2009 and 2015). Although local elections provide FEPADETEL with interesting accounts on vote buying, federal contests such as senatorial, congressional and presidential have generated nearly two-thirds of the whole information (see Table 4.1). Overall, I examined 38,772 records with a focus on federal elections (2002-2015). Due to unclassified calls from 2002 to 2009, I employed a search of key words associated to vote-buying, for instance, sell, trade, money, goods and exchange to extract those relevant accounts. From 2009 to 2015, I used FEPADETEL’s classification to select those records related to vote-buying. As the access to this information was given by a governmental body, this data is classified as public. Callers’ accounts provide sensitive personal

⁸⁶ Data from the 2015 National Census (National Commission for the Development of Indigenous Peoples, CDI) and the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI) reported 25,694,928 self-identified indigenous people, constituting about 21% of the whole population of Mexico in 2015. Additionally, 68 indigenous languages are officially recognised by law. It is estimated by these two agencies that in Mexico there are over 6 million speakers of indigenous languages, representing about 5% of the population.

data of people' identity; as a result, names, addresses, email-accounts and other pieces of data, are not disclosed within the narratives. However, this prohibition does not affect the goal of the chapter.

Table 4. 1 Calls received through the Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes 2002-2016

Year	Calls	Elections
2002	101	10 local elections.
2003	944	Midterm Federal Elections; 12 local elections.
2004	1,088	14 local elections.
2005	686	9 local elections.
2007	1,904	15 local elections.
2008	1,348	6 local elections.
2009	5,708	Midterm Federal Elections; 17 local elections.
2010	3,768	20 local elections.
2011	1,998	10 local elections.
2013	NA	16 local elections.
2014	NA	7 local elections.
2015	5,879	Federal elections; 4 local elections
2016	5,820	16 local elections.
Total	50,453	

Source: Author with information from Attorney General's Office Attending Electoral Crimes, *Annual and Monthly Reports*, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010-11, 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016. Mexico City, PGR.

NA = Not available;

Shading: , presidential elections; , mid-term elections, , local elections.

The examination of calls generated from the FEPADETEL has some limitations and advantages regarding reliability and validity. Given that this dataset has produced thousands of reports uninterruptedly for more than sixteen years, I expect accounts to show some consistency and stability on the dynamics of vote buying since the periodic elections. By contrast, even though frequencies can illustrate a trend of the phenomenon, the dataset lacks accuracy and completeness as a non-randomised sample, which lessens statistical analysis at individual-level. As a result, I use the dataset for a qualitative exploration, expecting reports to provide a reliable picture

of the range of activities rather than a precise estimation of vote-buying incidence. Despite generating thousands of reports, it is likely that electoral malpractices are underrepresented in the dataset; nevertheless, I rely on the precision of the details in the accounts since anonymity and confidentiality.

In addition, there is some margin of bias. Given that telephonists tend to individuals with large experience and they type the vast majority of data, there is room for conformation bias (Nickerson 1998) as capturing and interpreting accounts (see FEPADETEL Diagram, Appendix 4.9). Although the hotline has adopted technological tools to provide the service (FEPADE 2016), the quality of the information depends largely upon skills of the operators. For example, the location of incoming calls is established by asking callers addresses and matching them with the codes of mobile-landline displayed on the screen of the PBX system (Private Branch Exchange, a telephone network). Likewise, the location of the incident reported is found by matching street names and postcodes reported by the users to a national database. There are callers who know places by unofficial names, report locations with missing words or simply they have no reference point about the place, which makes rely on callers and telephonists' communication. In some cases, operators even help callers to set times, dates and facts. Some fields are uncompleted, especially socioeconomic data coming from anonymous callers. Despite data source is not perfect, it can advance our knowledge significantly on vote buying. Finally, the responsibility of the translation is my own.

The team of telephonists increase considerably during presidential elections to guarantee a national coverage (FEPADE 2007). This support is usually provided by other offices of the Attorney General and private companies specialised in call-centre services. Although the agency undertakes the task of planning and implementing a standardised training programme, the supporting team of telephonists are neither expert in elections nor crimes. Additionally, despite the fact supporting team is constituted of professional telephonists, these operators do not necessarily have work experience in prosecuting agencies. Although the examination of the hotline is not representative, my findings serve to test theoretical claims about vote buying from a different angle.


4.2 Mapping the Contours of Reported Vote-Buying in Mexico

Since the 2012 Presidential Elections has generated the biggest number of annual records (16,026), I have selected this year to firstly explore the distribution of calls on vote buying amongst other aspects. Overall, the hotline classified 1,724 incidents as vote buying, 10.75% of the total. As Figure 4.1 shows, four weeks around the Election Day is the most intense period of attention; however, within the seven days before polling day, from June the 24th to the 30th, the hotline reported 847 calls denouncing vote buying (49%). Moreover, just on polling day, July the 1st, the service attended 666 calls (38%). In summary, in only eight days the hotline received 87.75% of the calls of the whole year about vote buying. This trend supports Nichter's (2014: 317) idea about timing as "[a] key defining attribute of clientelist vote buying [...]. Scholars typically emphasize that

exchanges are not only *ex-ante* in that benefits are distributed prior to voting, but also that exchanges occur on or soon before Election Day”. Also, it is consistent with Hagene’s (2015: 141) observation about the divergent characteristics of vote buying and political clientelism. For the author, whereas clientelistic ties require more than a year before polling days, vote-buying transactions do need just a few days before the Election Day. However, it is likely that the concentration of calls in eight days is overrepresented as during Presidential elections, the agency launches massive media campaigns. Such increasing trend near polling days might be influenced by individuals simply exposed to media campaigns.

A second aspect relates to those political parties involved in vote-buying incidents. Although there are missing data (67 records), I found 1,657 calls implicating a party in reports. So far, the PRI was the most mentioned party in 2012 with 1,206 references, 72% of the total, followed by PAN with 248 (14%), and PRD with 133 (8%). The rest of the parties, PVEM, Nueva Alianza and Convergencia, represented 4% altogether. Although this data is consistent with Greene’s (2016: 19) findings that “indicate that the PRI was the main vote buyer in the 2012 presidential election”, it is plausible an overrepresentation of PRI, given evidence from other studies in Mexico (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). As I discussed in Chapter 3, in Mexico practices of vote buying have spread to opposition parties. In addition, all these reports on vote buying do not necessarily mean automatic transformations into votes for PRI.

Figure 4. 1 Distribution of Calls Reporting “Vote Buying” to the Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in 2012 (by week)




Source: Author with information from The Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes (2012).

A third aspect is about the geographical distribution. Figure 4.2 shows that the State of Mexico was the main state emitting calls about vote buying. Although this state is the biggest one in terms of population and, therefore, more eligible voters, newspapers' reports suggest a considerable vote-buying operation in that region, particularly in the latest local elections.⁸⁷ Despite the fact that Mexico City and Jalisco appear in the figure, it is interesting that the third most important state, Nuevo Leon (the second state from the right to the left on the top) is far from the top callers reporting vote buying. Equally, Veracruz, the state by the Gulf of Mexico, and Chiapas recorded a fair amount of calls despite not being very populated states. On the contrary, six states, Baja California Sur, Sinaloa, Tlaxcala, Zacatecas,

⁸⁷ Proceso, Eleccion Edomex 2017, 'En Edomex, el operativo de compra del voto "más grande en la historia electoral del país": #NiUnFraudeMas' Sunday 4 June 2017, <http://liderweb.mx/autoridades-electorales-van-contra-la-compra-del-voto/> (accessed on Monday 5 June 2017).

Colima and Chihuahua do not record more than ten calls each. This finding supports previous research (Vilalta 2010) suggesting no correlation between population size and reports on vote buying. Moreover, this data substantiates qualitative evidence (Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013) from interviews with brokers who claim to use more sophisticated information to target electors rather than the number of voters. Whereas this data is neither representative nor significant to measure vote-buying incidence, it does provide research with an illustration about the location of the reports.

Figure 4. 2 Geographical Distribution of Calls Reporting “Vote Buying” to the Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes in 2012



The anonymity and confidentiality are fundamental factors for the service; telephonists usually record the gender of the callers without asking. However, this category has 519 missing data of calls on vote buying.

Removing missing cases, female users made 53% of the reports (641), whereas male made 46% (564). These numbers illustrate quite well national demographic data concerning the structure of the population, 51% and 49% respectively. This data supports previous findings (Vilalta 2010) for the 2006 Elections, in which gender did not have a strong effect on the decision of people to report vote buying activities.

4.3 How Electors Face Targeting Activities: Strategies of Proffering

As discussed in Chapter 3, after holding meetings to set the number of voters required and the strategy to follow for each electoral precinct, brokers go to streets to conduct knocking-doors activities (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). In this section, I assess targeting strategies reported by callers with a focus on timing and rewards proffered. With an especial focus on timing and rewards, I divide this analysis into i) the compilation of lists of electors, ii) the recollection of copies of voting cards, iii) the offer of goods and money as an exchange for votes, and iv) activists and parties conducting strategies of targeting.

The compilation of Lists as a Targeting Mechanism

Targeting potential voters by compiling lists is part of the “role of brokers” (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016). These lists allow political parties to verify that brokers are performing the task in the field and targeting favourable electors. Equally, the lists determine whom brokers commit to sending to polls during the Election Day. Eventually, brokers matched the

lists with those electors who have turned out (Mercado 2013). Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin (2016: 164) offer a photo of a list of promised voters for the PRI that broker must have completed in a given electoral precinct. This targeting process is confirmed by several callers from urban, rural, wealthier and poorer cities from central, northern and southeast Mexico who reported similar patterns.⁸⁸ As calls show, for 2004, 2005, 2010 local election and 2006, 2009 and 2012 federal elections, the hotline describes, while before polling day,

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood “El Salado”, PRI activists, Mr [...] amongst them, are knocking doors proffering people sacks of cement to vote for PRI on the Election Day. Activists are also asking people to sign a list, which states they’re willing to [vote for it] (Call No.: 0000210; 03/05/2005)

The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that Mrs [...] and Mr [...], PRI candidates, are knocking residents’ doors to give them bags of provisions as an exchange of their vote. The user also states that these people ask those residents who accept the deal to sign a list in which they commit to vote for PRI and they take voting card’s details [...] (Call No.: 0000055; 13/01/2006).⁸⁹

The user calls presumably from Campeche City, Campeche to report that Mrs [...] has knocked residents’ doors to proffer them MX\$500 [£22] to vote for a candidate; she’s doing this with a list, asking residents to sign it (Call No.: 0003089; 01/07/2006).

The user calls presumably from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that PRI activists go over the town, intimidating residents into voting for PRI and asking for a copy of their voting card; they take

⁸⁸ A considerable number of calls have identified government officials conducting targeting actions. As I discussed in Chapter 2, given that the involvement of state employees in electoral mobilisation strategies illustrates more patronage than vote buying (see Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2016), in this chapter I ignore patronage, where political leaders distribute favours, most frequently public employment, to party activists in return for their efforts and loyalty. I exclude these records from the analysis; however they are reported in full in Appendix 4.3 (calls No.: [2006] 0002557, 0002681, 0002760, 0002798, 0002892, 0002817, 00003332, 002917, 0002945, 0002596, 0003094, 0003106, 0003108, 0003143, 0003254, 0003564, 0003836, 0004831, 0004123, 0004674, 0004938, 0004944; [2009] 0000400; [2010] 0000028; [2011] 0000030; [2012] 0000029, 000189, 000281, 0000346, 0000360, 0000463, 0000531, 0000557, 0000709, 0001085, 0001193, 0001424, 0001542, 0001767, 0001887, 0001987, 0002033, 0002168, 0002218, 0001899; [2015] 0000018).

⁸⁹ Although I had access to both dates, the call and the incident, in this Chapter, I report only the date of the incident (for the whole record, see Appendix 4).

the details in there and threaten people with removing state programmes from the town (Call No.: 0000006; 11/09/2009).

The user calls from Lampazos de Naranjo, Nuevo Leon to report that PRI activists are asking people details of their voting card to compile registers of [favourable] voters for PRI gubernatorial candidate, on the Election Day (Call No.: 0000102; 08/01/2012).

An interesting finding here is that this targeting strategy starts a while before campaigns. In Chapter 5, brokers interviewed⁹⁰ suggest three explanations: a) the magnitude of work in the field, b) exploration of the electorate support and c) expectations of a tight contest (Mercado 2013). Even though electoral districts are same sized –regarding the number of voters– some rural areas are geographically remote, which requires a longer time to cover them. In some contexts, brokers seem to evaluate the type of campaigns and election they might expect by knocking doors to capture people's feelings about politicians and parties. With this information, they begin to count potential votes to forecast somewhat how tough elections will be. Finally, some brokers just start earlier as political parties have already estimated a tight contest. Another explanation could be just enforcing loyalty to reset the tie (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez & Magaloni 2012).

During the campaign and up a few days before polling day, callers report similar activities. However, it is interesting that as getting closer to the Elections Day, cash appears as a reward. This finding substantiates journalistic reports about the management of large amounts, resulting in politicians arrested.⁹¹ As record describe,

⁹⁰ Anonymous interviews with two brokers conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (2 May 2017) and San Pedro Tultepec, State of Mexico (10 June 2017).

⁹¹ Aristegui Noticias, 'Detienen a funcionario de Monreal y denuncian agresión de priistas' Sunday 4 June 2017, Política, <http://aristeginoticias.com/0406/mexico/detienen-a-funcionario-de-monreal-y-denuncian-agresion-de-priistas/> (accessed on Monday 5 June 2017).

The user calls from Zacapoaxtla, Puebla to report that [unknown activists] are asking residents to sign a list in which they commit to vote for PRI. As an exchange, these activists are promising bags of provisions. The user also states that residents who engage in the deal are giving a copy of their voting card for activists to take card's details [...] (Call No.: 0000772; 19/10/2004)

The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that within Onix Street, between Agatha and Conchita Roads, in a neighbourhood called "Jardines del Pedregal", [unknown people] are proffering residents MX\$200 [£9] and a bag of provisions to vote for a PRI's senatorial candidate; asking for, additionally, details of their voting card and handing a list for residents to sign it (Call No.: 0002778; 29/06/2006).

The user calls from Tenango de Doria, Hidalgo to report that within a town called "San Pablo El Grande", the two keepers of a primary and secondary schools are knocking residents' door with lists in hands, in which they note down voting cards' details of the people, promising some benefits to the community on condition that they vote for PRI's congressional and gubernatorial candidates [...] (Call No.: 0000344; 14/06/2010)

The user calls from Campeche, Campeche to report that within the area called "Ah Kim Pech", local political leaders have been taking residents to a campaign headquarters located in Ramon Pina Chan Street, proffering people MX\$1,000 [£43] and other goods for details of their voting card, increasing this reward MX\$500 [£22] for each extra copy they deliver. The user also states that these leaders make people sign for it [...] (Call No.: 0000294; 27/06/2012)

Collection of Copies of Electors' Voting Card

Despite the fact that other users mention lists of voters handed by activists, no call reports such compilation during the Election Day. I found, nonetheless, the match of lists near polling stations (CF. Section 4.7). Another point to make here is that even without the mention of lists, a big

number of calls⁹² report similar knocking-doors strategies. Instead, these records involve copies of electors' voting cards and electoral details. I assume that the reasons activists need these copies are for supporting evidence for political parties. Several months before polling day, records from central, northern and lowland cities in Mexico describe for different elections,

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report the that Council candidate Mr [...] has been giving residents –most of them native Otomi speakers– bags of provisions [...], asking for a copy of their voting card and forcing them to vote for him in the next elections [...] (Call No.: 0000058; 26/02/2003)

The user, who claims to be a self-employed trader, calls presumably from Ajalpan, Puebla to report that activists lead by Mr [...], a local leader of the association called “Antorcha Campesina”, are asking people to vote for PRI's federal congressional candidate, Mrs [...]; additionally, they're asking for copies of people's voting cards (Call No.: 0000368; 18/01/2012).

The user calls from Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City to report that within Colina Street in the neighbourhood called “Ampliacion Aguilas” [unknown people] are handing bags of rice and beans to people for them to vote for the PRD Council candidate, Mr [...] The user also that these people ask for a copy of the electors' voting card to take the official code (Call No.: 0000532; 01/02/2012).

The user calls from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to report that within the neighbourhood called “Acuario 2001”, PRI activists, Mr [...] amongst them, are asking people to vote for PRI as an exchange of a bag of provisions; asking for a copy of residents' voting cards (Call No.: 0001249; 10/02/2012).

The user calls from Valle Santiago, Guanajuato to report that within the village called “San Francisco Chihuindo”, PRD activists were encouraging people to support PRD mayoral candidate and now they're compiling copies of electors' voting cards as an exchange of blankets, bags of provisions and raffle tickets. The user also states that she knows this information by others [...] (Call No.: 0000940; 20/02/2012)

⁹² For an extended report of these records, see Appendix 4.7 (calls No.: [2006] 0002922, 0003243; [2012] 0000107, 0000737, 0000782, 0001007, 0001044, 0001281, 0001391, 0001547, 0001803, 0002084, 0002143, 0002182).

The user calls from Los Mochis, Sinaloa to report that PRI activists –Mrs [...] amongst them– are knocking residents' doors to ask for a copy of the voting card and their support to the PRI gubernatorial candidate Mr [...] (Call No.: 0001550; 25/03/2012)

In addition, I found similar accounts reported from weeks before up to polling days. For 2004, 2006 2009, 2010, 2012, 2015 Presidential, Midterm and local elections, records describe,

The user calls from Durango to report that PRI candidates and activists are knocking doors, asking for voting card's details and forcing residents to vote for their party [...] (Call No.: 0000327; 04/07/2004)

The user calls from San Francisco Huehuetlan, Oaxaca to report that a local party leader named [...] is asking people to vote for PRI; additionally, he asks for people's voting card to take the details in there, proffering as an exchange bags of provisions (Call No.: 0002855; 29/06/2006).

The user calls from San Luis Potosi City, San Luis Potosi to report that PAN activists are buying votes for MX\$500 [£22], delivering bags of provisions to people and asking for a copy of their voting card (Call No.: 000249; 03/07/2009).

The user calls from Chicontepec, Veracruz to report that borough employees forced electors to vote for PRI, proffering them money and other community benefits as an exchange for it; they also asked for a copy of electors' voting card (Call No.: 0000103; 14/06/2010).

The user calls presumably from Chiapa de Corzo, Chiapas to report that a person is giving [people] bags of provisions as an exchange of their vote and this person also asks for a copy of people's voting card (Call No.: 0000102; 02/07/2010).

The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that a tall, curly haired, brown skinned person, perhaps in her late 40s, using a walking stick, is buying votes for PRI for MX\$200 [£9]. The user states that this person knocked the door of user's cousins, proffering the money and asking for a copy of their voting card. The user also claims to know about other residents who have gone to some places to deliver a copy of the voting card and collect such amount of money [...] (Call No.: 0000240; 30/06/2012)

The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that right now, a gathering is taking place in a building with PRI's logos in which [activists] are collecting a copy of attendees' voting cards and giving them money in exchange for it (Call No.: 000039; 06/06/2015).

Offers of Rewards as an Exchange for Votes

As I have shown, a substantial number of callers provide accounts of targeting tactics mentioning the compilation of lists and voting card details. Such strategies have been associated by literature with mechanisms of monitoring (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). Nonetheless, another set of calls report activists proffering goods despite not mentioning any register. This tactic relates to the activities discussed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1), in the two stage-model of vote-buying mobilisation, as parties looking for/confirming information of electors and proffering benefits as an exchange of support at polls. As I argue, whilst activists proffering goods illustrates strategies of targeting, electors receiving benefits depicts the engagement of voters in the deals. I examine calls then from several cities reporting activists proffering goods and money.⁹³ For 2003, 2006, 2015 elections, about a month before polling days, records from industrial, trading and farming cities across Mexico describe,

The user calls from Guanajuato to report that five unknown people, presumably for PRI, offered him MX\$400 [£17] to vote

⁹³ For an extended report of these records, see Appendix 4.2 (calls No.: [2004] 000052, 0001076; [2006] 0000021, 0002464, 0002468, 0002471, 0002498, 0002504, 0002512, 0002571, 0002575, 0002699, 0002764, 0002856, 0002858, 0002943, 0002950, 0002977, 0003035, 0003041 0003075, 0003150, 0003185, 0003327, 0003469, 0003524, 0003772, 0003835, 0003859, 0004025, 0004032, 0004124, 0004335, 0004124, 0004335, 0004346, 0004525, 0004536, 0004550, 0004697, 0004811, 0004928; [2009] 0000009; [2010] 0000274; [2012] 0000199, 000268, 000325, 0000355; [2013] 000345; [2015] 0000354).

for PRI's federal congressional candidate [...] (Call No.: 0000206; 22/05/2003)

The user calls from Torreon, Coahuila to report that within the block of flats "Manhattan", PRD activists were offering [people] scholarships and pensions (Call No.: 0002502; 27/05/2006).

The user calls from Tuxpan, Michoacan to report that, around 3pm, PRD candidate's activists were proffering three vouchers entitling people to sacks of cement and [other materials for construction] to vote for PRD. The user also states that he's received these vouchers [...] (Call No.: 0000012; 06/06/2015).

Focused on the opportunistic aspect of vote buying (Hagene 2015, Nichter 2014), I analyse the following records focusing on the offer of rewards during the Election Day. Some studies argue that targeting tactics during polling days tend to be directed to poor, deprived communities as it is more likely for people in need to engage in vote buying (Udalge-Ramierz & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013). The following records are particularly focused on poor regions reporting activists proffering money as an exchange for votes on polling days. As narratives for the 2004 and 2006 elections describe,

The user calls from Tlaxcala to report that PRI activists are buying votes within the neighbourhood called "Nativitas", they are knocking door by door, offering MX\$200 [£9] (Call No.: 0001027; 14/11/2004)

The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz presumably, to report that within the neighbourhood called "10 de Mayo", some activists [not specifying party] are offering [people] between MX\$1000 and MX\$1500 [£43-67] to vote. The user also states that this has been happening since yesterday and these activists look like gangsters, which scare residents (Call No.: 0004461; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that five passengers in a new van, type pick-up Ford Lobo, number plate [...], are proffering [electors] money in exchange for people's vote; they've been doing this for a little while but the user states

he doesn't know what party they are promoting (Call No.: 0004039; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from Heroica Ciudad de Huajuapán de León, Oaxaca to report that within the neighbourhood called "Alta Vista de Juárez", Mr [...] is 'inviting' people to vote for PRI, receiving bags of provisions as an exchange (Call No.: 0004535; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from Acatlán de Pérez Figueroa, Oaxaca to report that Ms [...] is buying votes, proffering [electors] MX\$100 [£4] to vote for PRI. The user agreed to send a fax with further information (Call No.: 0004537; 02/07/2006).

Who Conducts Strategies of Targeting

Results here about what parties conduct vote-buying strategies support similar findings on the Mexican case (Greene 2016, Cornelius 2000, Nichter & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016), suggesting a prevalence of PRI's activists. Such studies have equally been cautious about the sort of conclusions we can state. Although I do not have statistical evidence to test it, examining names of parties involved in reports, the PRI is frequently mentioned. Nonetheless, some users report offers from other parties. Interestingly, those offers, according to callers' reports, describe divergent amounts of money. This fact suggests a market competition (Corstange 2012) rather a process of negotiation between vote sellers and buyers (Lehoucq 2007). But also, it supports the idea about the pluralisation of vote buying discussed in Chapter 3. Calls reporting offers from several parties for the 2006 and 2012 Presidential elections describe,

The user calls from San Pedro Actopan, Mexico City to report that within Hidalgo Street [...], PRI and PRD activists have been buying votes since Friday [...], offering MX\$500 [£22] the former and MX\$150 [£6] the latter (Call No.: 0003475; 30/06/2006).

The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that activists from several political parties have been giving people sacks of cement for them to vote for these parties. The user also states that the borough mayor is giving people bags of provisions and cash to vote for PRD (Call No.: 0004015; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from Copala, Guerrero to report that [activists] are proffering people money [...] and materials for construction to vote for a political party, asking for a copy of their voting card. The user also states that both parties PRI and PAN have been conducting these activities within the neighbourhood [...] (Call No.: 0000287; 29/06/2012)

In contrast with those claims assuming a difficulty of proving vote-buying in courts as a result of well-devised tactics unbinding politicians to vote-buying in the field (Diaz-Santana 2011), these records demonstrate quite the opposite. Whereas it is assumed that candidates hire brokers to perform vote-buying activities (Mercado 2013) –which leads them to an easy exoneration–, a number of calls provide names, addresses and other crucial details about candidates performing targeting activities. In addition, local Mexican judges have stated that one of the reasons vote-buying is hard to punish is due to police inability to patrol territory and catch brokers red-handed.⁹⁴ However, some of the reports demonstrate that users have called the hotline as being offered in several stages of the campaigns and during election days. Although these records provide information about candidates, most of the statements denounce borough, mayoral and congressional candidates but not presidential contenders. For 2003, 2006

⁹⁴ Lider Informativo, 'Autoridades electorales van contra la compra del voto' Friday 28 July 2017, <http://liderweb.mx/autoridades-electorales-van-contra-la-compra-del-voto/> (accessed on Saturday 29 July 2017).

and 2012 Presidential and Midterm elections, records from the countryside and mayor cities describe,⁹⁵

The user calls from Canutillo, Durango to report that PRI's candidates Mr [...] and Mr [...] have been buying votes within the community. They are proffering Day Nursery children's parents, materials for construction [...] The user refuses to go to a police agency to report this (Call No.: 0000314; 31/05/2003).

The user calls from Veracruz, Veracruz to report that PRI's federal congressional candidate Mrs [...] is offering breakfast for free and bags of provisions on July the 6th [in the area located] in Sur 11 between Oriente 20 and 22, City Centre (Call No.: 000436; 05/07/2003).

The user calls from, Magdalena Contreras, Mexico City to report that PRD's candidates, Mr [...] and Ms [...], located in [...], are inviting those who walk near them free meals today and proffering MX\$650 [£29] to vote for them (Call No.: 0002691; 01/07/2006).

The user calls from Housing Estate called "Providencia" to report that Mr [...], mayoral candidate, is pressing people and offering them MX\$700 [£30] to vote for him; he's knocking doors within the whole housing estate [...] The user states she's got a witness and evidence (Call No.: 0003017; 30/06/2006).

The user calls from Ayotlan, Jalisco to report that Mr [...], who works for the borough, and Mr [...], the PAN mayoral candidate, are knocking residents' doors asking for a copy of their voting card as an exchange of MX\$2,000 [£86]. The user also states that these men have already compiled quite a few [...] (Call No.: 0000853; 12/02/2012)

The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that about 9am, PRI activists –a candidate amongst them– were at the sports centre called "Gustavo Baz Prada" handing bags of provisions to people for them to support PRI and asking for a copy of electors' voting cards (Call No.: 0001242; 09/03/2012).

In conclusion, calls have shown that strategies of targeting begin from very early stages of the campaign. Users of the service have reported an ample variety of rewards proffered by activists as an exchange of their vote. Cash

⁹⁵ For an extended report, see Appendix 4.2 (Calls No.: [2003] 0000303; [2006] 0002671, 0003777, 0003802, 0004118; [2012] 0000192, 0000466, 0000561, 0001546).

begins to be a stronger reward offered as the Election Day approaches. A prevalent tactic of targeting developed by parties is the compilation of lists of potential voters by proffering rewards as an exchange of voting card's details and photocopies of the document. This targeting strategy seems to be only the first stage of the vote buying as activists tend to close the deal near polling days. Although the number of calls reporting candidates conducting targeting activities is not robust, these records contribute to the understanding of the type of relationships between parties and brokers. Moreover, these calls provide evidence against two aspects. First, the assumption of independent brokers opened to listen to several parties, accepting to work for the highest bidder. Second, the idea of much more restricted budget to hire brokers as candidacies are more local, making candidates themselves to conduct the work in the field. Although PRI was the party targeting more voters for the 2012 Presidential Election, these strategies are not exclusive to one party. Callers reported indistinctively names of political parties.

4.4 Who Gets Bought in Vote Buying: Deliveries to Close Deals

Guided by the conceptual distinction between targeting and buying voters developed in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1) in this section, I examine records reporting physical distributions of rewards. As discussed in Chapter 2, delivering, handing and receiving tangible goods entail aspects of closing vote-buying deals. Firstly, the physical exchange of goods between activists and electors provide conditions to assume that electors have engaged in a vote buying. The fact of electors receiving rewards provides a more reliable

scenario of a vote-buying deal already closed, they would not be receiving such goods, otherwise. Secondly, given that social desirability bias (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al 2012) and potential prosecution procedures threatens self-reporting vote buying, I analyse these records relying on the anonymity and confidentiality of the service and accounts from witnesses. As I have underlined in the introduction of this Chapter, the identity of the callers is hidden, resulting in rich testimonies of very sensitive aspects of vote buying. I then assess these calls with an eye on timing.

Records⁹⁶ from the 2006 and 2012 Presidential elections, received months before polling day, describe,

The user calls from Toluca, State of Mexico to report that within a rally of the campaign, [PRI activists] gave people gift tokens, which can be exchanged for goods in the chain of supermarket called “Soriana”⁹⁷ [...] (Call No.: 0000013; 08/03/2006)

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that in the block of flats she lives, located on Magnolia Street, within a neighbourhood called San Mateo Nopala, the administrator has asked tenants to attend a PRI’s rally, in which they would receive sacks of cement. The user also states that the rally will be held by the PRI congressional candidate, Mr [...] (Call No.: 0000846; 18/02/2012)

The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...] is giving people bags of provisions asking them to vote for PRI presidential, congressional and mayoral candidates (Call No.: 0001960; 17/04/2012).

As accounts show, clientelistic deliveries happening months before polling days are mainly based on physical goods. Although these exchanges include handy pieces such as gift tokens and bags of provisions, they also

⁹⁶ For an extended report of these records, see Appendix 4.4 (calls No.: [2006] 0002840, 0002894, 0002952, 0002953, 0003075, 0003086, 0003128, 0003132, 0003159, 0003173, 0003179, 0003212, 0003244, 0003333, 0003389, 0003426, 0003667, 0003801, 0003853, 0004137, 0004222, 0004399, 0004527; [2009] 000009, 0000339; [2012] 0000139, 0000251, 0000565, 0000798, 0000951, 0001002, 0001041, 0001104, 0001373, 0002220; [2013] 0000305).

⁹⁷ For a detailed study on “Soriana’s” gift tokens see Cantu (2014a).

incorporate materials for construction hard to transport and noticeable for people; for example, sacks of cement and water tanks. However, as polling days approach, users of the hotline service report the distribution of cash more frequently. This idea is consistent with Hagene (2015) as monetary rewards of vote buying are distributed just a 'few days before' election (Hagene 2015: 141). Records from seaside and central cities a day before polling day for the 2006, 2012 and 2013 Presidential and local elections, explain

The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that PRI [activists] are giving people bags of provisions, materials for construction and between MX\$ 300 [£13] and MX\$500 [£22] to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0003131; 01/07/2006).

The user calls from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that a neighbour of her has mentioned that within a parties' venue called "Grupo Varsa", opposite to Tabasco Memorial, PRI activists are handing bags of provisions and MX\$100 [£4] to attendees for them to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0003172; 01/07/2006).

The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that at the shopping arcade located in Ignacio Zaragoza Road, by the underground station called "Acatitla", within the supermarket "Soriana", PRI activists are giving people gift tokens to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0000208; 30/06/2012).

The user calls from Ajalpan, Puebla to report that PRI 'followers' are delivering bags of provisions and money to people. The user also requires police and army officers for [the Election Day] as a measure of security for residents (Call No.: 0000150; 06/07/2013).

Interestingly, the most significant amount of money recorded (£109) was reported on the Election Day. Since calls suggest an intensification of deliveries during polling days, further analyses of the dataset should separate calls during elections days to calculate, for each election, the proportion of reports involving the means amount. Such essential analysis

would confirm what these quotes suggest, the closer the polling day, the more intense the distribution of rewards. As records from a variety of cities for the 2006, 2011 and 2015 elections show,

The user calls from Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico City to report that, at the PRD's campaign headquarters located at the corner of "Benito Juárez" and "Guillermo Prieto" by a place called "Pepes", Mrs [...] is delivering bags of provisions and MX\$200 [£9], which meant to be distributed to mums as part of a public programme during Mother's Day (Call No.: 0004185; 02/07/2006).

The user calls [presumably] from Michoacán to report that, during the polling day, PRI activists handed MX\$2500 [£109] to people to vote for the PRI's candidate (Call No.: 0000028; 13/11/2011).

The user calls from Campeche City, Campeche to report that within the village called "Los Laureles", a PRI activist handed bags of provisions to people in the streets for them to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0000062; 01/07/2012).

The user calls from Calvillo, Aguascalientes to report that in the place of residence of Mr [...], [unknown people] are [buying] votes for PRI, paying MX\$500 [£22] (Call No.: 0000255; 07/06/2015).

Another particular aspect of brokers' role (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016) near the Election Day is the fact of getting appropriate venues for stocking up goods before delivering.⁹⁸ The job entails the search of buildings serving as warehouses located in strategic spots to ease the distribution. The size and conditions of venues varies according to the needs of each electoral precinct, for example, distances and times are important to reach remote places or discrete visibility of the venue are required in crowded urban areas. Although the action of collecting goods is not necessarily a crime, it represents a suspicious activity regarding vote buying. I have found a few records reporting to have seen Lorries

⁹⁸ Anonymous interviews with two brokers conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (2nd May 2017) and Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 2017).

transporting rewards and buildings serving as warehouses near polling days. Particularly for the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections, callers from diverse places describe,

The user calls from Bolanos, Jalisco to report that neighbours have found lorries full of sacks of cement and bags of provisions within indigenous areas. The user also states they presumably gather these people to buy their vote as handing goods [...] The user mentions that he's already reported this to a police station with the investigation number AP225/2006 but he doesn't trust local police bodies as he believes local state employees are involved in the delivery (Call No.: 0002647; 26/06/2006).

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that PRD activists are getting lots of bags of provisions into a parties' venue called "Pili". The user also believes that these activists will deliver such bags from this site (Call No.: 0002848; 01/07/2006).

The user calls from Huehuetoca, State of Mexico to report that the members of the family [...], two brothers and a man named Mr [...], who live in [...], within the neighbourhood called "Ex-hacienda de Xalpa", are handing bags of provisions to people from a warehouse, asking them to vote for PRI federal congressional candidate Mr [...] The user also states that he's reported this to a police station near them but officers don't want to investigate anything (Call No.: 0003131; 01/07/2006).

The user calls from Guerrero to report that someone has commented about a warehouse from which a local councillor whose last name is "Abundis", is handing roofing sheets and bags of provisions [...] (Call No.: 0003164; 30/06/2012).

In this section, I have shown evidence of brokers' strategies to close vote-buying deals by examining those records reporting the delivery of goods and money. I have described the implications of handing and receiving goods for vote buying. Firstly, the physical exchange of goods between activists and electors provide evidence to assume that a vote-buying deal has been closed. An interesting finding here compared to the activity of targeting is the fact of witnesses calling to report such actions rather than people engaged in the vote-buying deals. Different from the previous

section, a minority of these calls come from targeted electors. This fact suggests both social desirability bias to talk to people about sensitive themes and self-protection against prosecution procedures. The variety of rewards reported by callers in clientelistic transactions for the 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections seems to be consistent with previous findings (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Nichter & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Cantu 2014a).

4.5 Vote Buying and Some of Its Mechanisms of Compliance

Several reports on the 2006 parliamentary elections included references to the use of these techniques to ensure that vote-buying transactions were enforced. Namely observers reported that cell phones with camera devices had been supplied by vote buyers outside the ballot stations in order for the voters to take photographs of the filled in ballot paper. Note that both photos and blank ballot paper were serving as proof that the agreed voting action was taken. (Vicente 2014: F372).

A study conducted in Africa for the 2006 Parliamentary Elections provides evidence on mobiles phones with camera being supplied by vote buyers outside polling stations in order for voters to take photographs of the marked ballot paper (Vicente 2014: F372). This finding opens a path of examination as assumptions of trust, solidarity (Auyero 1999, 2000, Gonzalez et al 2014) and reciprocity (Lawson & Greene 2014, Finan & Schechter 2012) are necessary conditions to reach a vote-buying deal. In

Mexico, Newspapers⁹⁹ and electoral observation reports (Alianza Civica 2006, 2012) have reported similar tactics and also published evidence on the use of children to witness the sense of the vote. Children walk with electors inside polling stations to attest choices once voters have marked the ballot paper. However, besides such reports, a little is known about the conditions around these mechanisms of compliance and their prevalence in Mexico. Based on these ideas, I examine the following calls focusing on the use of children and cameras as tactics to ensure choices at polls.

Records from the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections explain,

The user calls from Orizaba, Veracruz to report that unknown people were buying PRI's votes for \$500 [£21]. To prove they do it, activists gave them as well a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked (Call No.: 0002603; 20/06/2006).

The user, who didn't want to provide the location [presumably from Hidalgo], calls to report that employees of DIF [a Federal institution] have asked for copies of electors' voting card. The user also reports that these employees have asked electors to take a photo of the ballot paper to prove they voted for PRI (Call No.: 0000582; 03/02/2012).

The user calls [presumably from Hidalgo] to report that Miss [...] and Mr [...], employees of [...] are proffering an increase of wage to those electors voting for PRI on condition that they take a photo of the ballot paper to prove their vote (Call No.: 0001208; 08/32/2012).

Guided by the trend discussed in Figure 4.2 in this Chapter, I analyse calls received close to polling days for 2004, 2006 and 2012 elections. Reports from a variety of northern, southern and central cities describe,

The user calls from Socorro de Jesus, Oaxaca to report that an official of a local government institution –omitting the name to protect the victims– compelled employees to gather twenty-two

⁹⁹ Sin Embargo, 'PRI y PVEM utilizaron niños (#halconcitos) para vigilar que adultos votaran a su favor: Alianza Cívica', Wednesday 4 July 2012, Elecciones 2012, <http://www.sinembargo.mx/04-07-2012/285081> (Accessed on Wednesday 30 July 2014).

electors each; invite them to have breakfast on Sunday 1st July [polling day] and then taking them to the polling station to vote for PRI. The official also asked them to ensure taking photos of the ballot paper already marked to prove electors' vote. Finally, the official threatened employees with dismissal if they didn't accomplish the task (Call No.: 000456; 01/08/2004).

The user calls from Sahuaripa, Sonora to report that activists were proffering electors MX\$500 [£21] to vote for PRI. They were actually giving voters a mobile phone with camera to prove their vote, [...] (Call No.: 0002462; 29/06/2006)

The user calls from Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas to report that in the shop called [...] located in [...], the owner's wife offers beers for free on condition that people vote for PAN. She is also asking them to take a photo of the ballot paper with a mobile phone's camera to prove it (Call No.: 0002880; 01/07/2006).

The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that activists were threatening him with beating him up if he didn't vote for their political party. They were also asking him to take a photo with user's mobile phone's camera of the ballot paper already marked to prove his vote [...] (Call No.: 0002909; 26/06/2006)

The user calls from Jalisco to report that campaigners from the candidate of PRI are proffering people MX\$800 (£34) to vote for PRI. They are also lending mobile phones with a camera for electors to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked (Call No.: 0003004; 01/07/2006).

The user calls from Nicolas Romero, State of Mexico to report that someone has offered MX\$800 [£34] the user to vote for PRI, asking as well to take a photo of the ballot paper as proof of the vote (Call No.: 0000275; 29/06/2012).

Callers also report activists lending cameras to electors and taking them back after casting the vote. Presumably activists want to keep the photo. This action suggests a method for activists to collect supporting evidence about the job done. Another interesting finding is timing of the reward. Callers report having seen activists giving electors rewards after casting the vote and looking at the picture taken inside the polling station. As calls from 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2013 from urban and rural cities describe,

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that an unknown woman representing PRD offered MX\$300 [£13] to vote for federal and local candidates of her political party. This woman was also given a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked. The user also states that a similar pattern happened to a relative of her, but the activist proffered MX\$1000 [£43]. [...] (Call No.: 0004884; 02/07/2006)

The user calls from Jalisco to report that PVEM activists proffered MX\$500 [£21] the user to vote for that political party, asking the user to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked to close the deal (Call No.: 0000100; 05/07/2009).

The user calls from Acapulco, Guerrero to report that by a polling station near the Hospital [...], a group of activists of the coalition “Tiempos Mejores” [...], are approaching electors proffering MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for the coalition. They are giving them as well a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked to prove the vote and receive the money. The user also states there are more witnesses of these facts (Call No.: 0000353; 30/01/2011).

The user calls from Pachuca, Hidalgo to report that near the polling station located in [...], there are PRI activists approaching electors buying their votes. They are paying them MX\$500 [£21] on condition that they [...] take a photo of the ballot paper already marked and show it afterwards to activists to receive the agreed amount of money (Call No.: 0000075; 01/07/2012).

The user calls from Acambaro, Guanajuato to report that someone has offered people MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for PRD; giving people a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked and show it afterwards to receive the cash [...] (Call No.: 0000184; 01/07/2012).

As described above, activists employ children as compliance mechanisms.

Human rights implications have come to the discussion as under-age individuals are involved. Although this hotline dataset does not provide evidence about the way children are recruited, some callers report tactics similar to those accounts from newspapers and electoral observation reports. However, I did not find more than a few calls associated with this practice. For the 2006 and 2009 elections in Mexico, records describe,

The user calls from Azcapotzalco, Mexico City to report that PAN activists are buying votes for MX\$300 [\$13], asking electors to take a kid with them within the voting booth to witness the way electors mark the ballot paper (Call No.: 0004741; 02/07/20006).

The user calls from Nuevo Leon to report that Ms [...]’s daughter, who is about 13 years-old has been walking with electors to polling stations to witness, within the voting booth, they voted for PRI. The user also states that days ago this woman and other unknown activists were presumably negotiating with electors a payment of MX\$1000 [£43] [...] (Call No.: 0000328; 05/07/2009)

4.6 Abstention Buying

Another strategy is abstention buying, which basically makes electors not turn out (Cox and Kousser, 1981; Schaffer, 2002; Cornelius, 2000). This demobilisation strategy, rather than adding, reduces votes for other candidates and parties. Amongst tactics, parties basically reward electors for i) staying at home on polling days, ii) being away from the polling stations and iii) buying voting cards, making people ineligible to cast the vote. In Mexico, this activity is a crime according to the Criminal Act.¹⁰⁰ In addition, electoral procedures force voters to show the original voting card to officers in polling stations, which makes this strategy a very effective method buy abstention. With this particular aspect in mind, I examine calls¹⁰¹ received from the 2003, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2012 elections. It is important to say that, to best of my knowledge, this is the first study in Mexico providing qualitative evidence about mechanism of abstention buying. Thus, weeks

¹⁰⁰ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), ‘Ley General en Materia de Delitos Electorales’, Friday 27 June 2014, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGMDE_270614.pdf (accessed on Sunday 27 December 2015).

¹⁰¹ For a full report of these reports, see Appendix 4.7 (Calls No.: [2004] 0000815; [2006] 0002483, 0004939; [2012] 0000121, 0000262, 0000469, 0000877, 0000927, 0000961, 0001057, 0001136, 0001157, 0001634, 0001727).

before polling days, records from countryside, trading and farming places describe,

The user calls from Saltillo, Coahuila to report that a member of the staff of a congressional candidate whose last name is “Rocha”, were collecting citizens’ voting cards as an exchange of materials for construction [...] The user also states he didn’t give them his voting card, but he saw a few others doing it (Call No.: 0000242; 02/06/2003).

The user calls from Tultepec, State of Mexico to report that a woman named Mrs [...] was knocking doors within A. Lopez Mateos cul-de-sac, a neighbourhood called “San Juan Tultepec”, proffering MX500 [£22] for residents’ voting cards. However, up to the date, this man has neither delivered the money nor returned voting cards [...] Amongst those affected are Mrs [...] and Mrs [...] (Call No.: 0001247; 10/01/1012)

The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the primary school called “San Carlos” located in Nuevo Laredo Street, two teachers and some students are collecting students’ voting cards, promising a higher mark and MX\$500 [£22] [...] The user also states that this has been happening over the last 15 days ish (Call No.: 0000520; 31/01/2012).

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that in the butcher’s called “Hueso de Oro”, [unknown people] are collecting electors’ voting card as an exchange of bags of provisions and other goods [...] (Call No.: 0000724; 14/02/2012)

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that in the shop called “Abarrotes Blanquita” located in Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez Street, neighbourhood called “El Coyol”, the owner whose name is [...], is offering people MX\$300 [£13] as an exchange of electors’ voting card, saying she’ll return them later. The user also states he knows three local residents whose voting card has been collected, Mr [...], Mr [...] and Mr [...] (Call No.: 0001163; 06/03/2012)

In contrast with other strategies analysed here, a particular finding is the presence of cash from months before polling days. As I have discussed, whereas the practice of handing goods has been more frequent in earlier stages of the campaigns, money tends to be used near election days. This is interesting as it suggests a difference in the way activists buy abstention

employing cash as a more persuasive handout. As the voting card is mandatory to cast the vote, collecting the document at any time produces the same result as long as it is conducted before polling days. Regarding goods of dispensation, the feature that remains in targeting mechanisms is the delivery of bags of provisions and materials for construction.

Another set of calls received just a few days before the polling days describe,

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that within surrounded rural areas from his place, a PRI activist is paying up to MX\$1,000 [£43] for electors' voting cards, saying they'd give them back to the legal owner after polling day [...] (Call No.: 0000559; 04/09/2004)

The user calls from Tijuana, Baja California to report that [unknown people] were collecting people's voting card for MX\$1,300 [£56]. The user also states she reckons these people have collected about 500 pieces (Call No.: 0004186; 01/07/2006).

The user calls from Zacatecas City, Zacatecas to report that within the neighbourhood called "Trinidad", PRD activists are proffering people MX\$200 [£9] to vote for PRD's mayoral candidate or give their voting card, promising to return them after polling day with extra MX£200 (Call No.: 0002622; 01/07/2006).

The user calls presumably from Campeche City, Campeche to report that [unknown people] have taken user's voting card as an exchange of MX\$600 [£26] (Call No.: 0000347; 03/07/2009).

The user calls from Donato Guerra, State of Mexico to report that a man is knocking doors proffering residents between MX\$1,000 [£43] and MX\$2,000 [£86] to vote for PAN; he otherwise offers such amount of money as an exchange of electors' voting cards. The user also states she refused to do so (Call No.: 0000351; 29/06/2012).

The user calls from San Francisco Tepeolulco, State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...], who owns the ironmonger's located in [...], asked user's grandson [...] his voting card as an exchange of MX\$500 [£22], which hasn't been returned yet (Call No.: 0001421; 11/03/2012).

As accounts show, as polling days approach, callers report cash as an exchange of the voting cards and consummated collections of cards, which implies a deal already completed. The following set of calls refers to reports received on polling days for 2004, 2006 and 2012 elections, which describe,

The user calls from Sinaloa to report that within the region called “Tamazula, Durango” [...] the borough mayor’s daughter was collecting electors’ voting cards in the morning. The user claims to have evidence such as videos, photos and witnesses (Call No.: 0000378; 04/07/2004).

The user calls from Juchitepec, State of Mexico to report that within the village called “San Matias Cuijingo”, PRI activists and the borough mayor Mr [...] are knocking doors to proffer residents between MX\$200 [£13] and MX\$500 [£22] for their voting card. The user also states that at this moment these people at the corner of Ignacio Zaragoza and Francisco I. Madero Streets (Call No.: 0003688; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mr [...] has collected electors’ voting cards [...] as an exchange of a cheque for MX\$5000 [£216] [...] But the bank account is fake. Amongst those residents affected are [twelve full names] (Call No.: 0001267; 12/03/2012).

In contrast with targeting mechanisms, abstention buying –by collecting voting cards– is not confined to electoral periods. As records show, the amount of cash and goods delivered are similar to those reported during earlier stages of contests. Although the largest amount of money reported happened on the Election Day, the user also stated that money was fake. However, some records demonstrate more precisely the foundations of abstention buying. Calls received for the 2004, 2006 and 2012 elections show a strategy constituted by an exploration of the parties’ preferences followed by a buying tactic.¹⁰² First, activists conduct vote-buying offers but

¹⁰² For an extended report of these calls see Appendix 4.4 (Calls No.: [2004] 000428; [2006] 0002472, 0004186, 0003528; [2012] 0001462, 0001834, 0000372, 0000132).

once electors have expressed a negative preference, activists turn to abstention buying, proffering even more money for voting cards. These accounts suggest an effective method for activists to ensure favourable or reduce negative votes in one attempt.

Records for the 2004, 2006 and 2012 elections from very diverse cities, towns and villages describe,

The user calls from Union Hidalgo, Oaxaca to report that within Emiliano Zapata and Matamoros Streets, there were outsiders at night delivering bags of provisions and money to people for them to vote for a political party; these people were otherwise collecting residents' voting cards [...] (Call No.: 000428; 31/07/2004)

The user calls from Atitalaquia, Hidalgo to report that Mrs [...], a PAN local leader, is proffering bags of provisions to those who vote for PAN or MX\$1,000 [£43] to those anti-PAN, collecting their voting cards (Call No.: 0002472; 30/06/2006).

The user calls from Santa Maria Jalapa del Marques, Oaxaca to report that [unknown people] are offering people a sack of cement to vote for PRI's presidential candidate, they offer otherwise 8 sacks of cement for electors' voting card (Call No.: 0003528; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from Juchitepec, State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are knocking doors offering residents money to vote for a political party; they collect their voting cards otherwise (Call No.: 0000372; 15/06/2012).

The user calls from San Martin Texmelucan, Puebla to report that Mr [...] who lives in [...] has collected electors' voting cards of PAN candidate' supporters [...]; however, the user states that this man was actually supporting PT's candidates, hence he collected those voting cards. Electors affected won't be able to cast their vote [...] (Call No.: 0001332; 14/03/2012)

The user calls from Xochimilco, Mexico City to report that [unknown people] are giving people money as an exchange of the voting cards of those electors who won't vote for Mr [...], threatening those who refuse to do it (Call No.: 0001462; 21/03/2012).

In this Section, I have discussed the way negative vote buying works by taking away voting cards from electors. Activists hand rewards to electors as an exchange of the mandatory document ensuring abstention for other contenders. Although Mexican authorities conduct campaigns about the importance of the voting card to cast the vote, hotline' accounts provide evidence about successful methods to take the document away from the holders. Despite not having data to test statistically the effects of this strategy on electoral outcomes, my exploration indicates an important prevalence of negative vote buying in Mexican elections since 2004.

4.7 Polling Days: The Last Opportunity to Win

Mexican electoral regulations prohibit electronic, post and other forms of voting, making turnout the only method to cast the vote. As a result, polling days are crucial for parties, –particularly in tight contests– for succeeding. Literature has agreed that vote buying happens near or during elections days (Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2016, Hicken et. al. 2015, Nichter 2014, Owen 2013). In fact, for some scholars (Hicken 2007, Schaffer 2007) timing is the differentiating aspect of vote buying from other concepts such as relational clientelism (Nichter 2014) and patronage. For these group of authors, election days represent a fundamental stage for deliveries.¹⁰³ Guided by this argument, I examine calls reporting activists buying votes

¹⁰³ Another considerable number of calls received reporting an old tactic for Mexican elections known as “*acarreo*”, which entails taking voters to polls. There have been studies exploring this practice (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013); electoral observation's reports (Alianza Civica 2006, 2012) have denounced a substantial proportion of taxis hired to fulfilling this task for the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections. In problematic areas to access to polling stations, this practice is usually seen as a daily activity despite the prohibition. However, in this study, most of the calls involving *acarreo* involve vote buying. In other words, *acarreo* is usually an extension of vote-buying mechanisms to ensure turnout (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016).

near polling stations.¹⁰⁴ For 2003, 2004 and 2012 elections, records from mostly urban places describe,

The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that near the polling stations 3075 and 3485, PRI activists were handing money and bags of provisions to electors (Call No.: 0000755; 06/07/2003).

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that, near the polling station 4413, PRI activists were buying votes (Call No.: 000591; 05/09/2004).

The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz to report that there are unknown people buying votes outside the polling station located within the Primary School “Miguel Hidalgo” at Vicente Beach. These people are giving electors between MX\$500 [£21] and MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for PAN [...] (Call No.: 0004125; 02/07/2006)

The user calls from Guanajuato to report that, at the polling station located in a place named “El Jacalon”, activists nicknamed “Camarones” who live in [...], are buying votes, handing electors up to MX\$100 [£43] [...] (Call No.: 0004285; 02/07/2006)

The user calls from Coahuila to report that close to the polling station, which the user cast the vote, there are PRI activists proffering people MX\$200 [£9], MX\$500 [£21], petrol vouchers, and pieces of meat to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0004730; 02/07/2006).

Repetitively, users report cash as part of the transactions amidst other goods. Different from other tactics, calls reporting both targeting and buying activities near polling stations come mostly from witnesses. I found just a few calls made by targeted electors. As an opportunistic strategy, institutively activists need less burden to carry in order to move around or run away if required. Indeed, voters reported being approach by people on their way to polls, as a couple of records describe,

¹⁰⁴ For an extended report of records, see Appendix 4.8 (calls No.: [2003] 0000572, 0000671; [2006] 0003495, 0003551, 0003699, 0003773, 0003839, 0004017, 0004063, 0004175, 0004196, 0004267, 0004641).

The user calls from Magdalena Contreras, Mexico City to report that, when walking to polling station 3872, an unknown person approached him, asking if he wouldn't want to vote for PRD in exchange for a certain amount of money (Call No.: 0003449; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from San Pedro de Acatama, San Luis Potosi to report that the mayoral candidate's staff are approaching people, proffering MX\$100 [£4]. They are managing to take blank ballot papers out from the polling station, marking them outside and giving them back to electors for them to cast the votes. This is happening in streets named Cactus and Acatama near the polling station (Call No.: 0004003; 02/07/2006).

Another tactic on polling day entails brokers moving around polling stations to match the lists compiled (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016) as voters turn out (Ugalde & Rivera 2013, Mercado 2013). Ethnographic work (Hagene 2015) in Mexico also describes a broker ticking the name of a woman just outside a polling station for the 2016 Presidential Elections. This strategy is, indeed, the completion of the targeting action discussed before (see Section 4.3). Records particularly from the 2003 and 2006 elections confirm,

The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that, outside the polling station located near the shopping arcade called [...], there are a few people with lists of electors, giving provisions to people for them to vote for PRI (Call No.: 0000696; 06/07/2003).

The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that near the polling station 1385, there are PRI activists, with green folders in hands, who are giving sanitary towels and pens to women and men, asking them their voting card [...] (Call No.: 0003422; 02/07/2006)

The user calls from Veracruz to report that Mr [...], PRI activist, is buying votes near the polling station the user's cast the vote, asking also a copy of electors' voting card (Call No.: 0003565; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that within the polling station located in Pantitlan street, Reforma

neighbourhood, an unknown person, wearing a green shirt, is offering elderly people MX\$400 [£17] to vote for PRI's candidates; after casting the vote, this person is asking them to sign a piece of paper stating they voted PRI (Call No.: 0003771; 02/07/2006).

The user calls from Calderitas, Quintana Roo to report that people wearing all red, presumably with lists of the official electors' register, are buying votes close to the polling station [...] (Call No.: 0004337; 02/07/2006)

4.8 Conclusion

Advancing qualitative approaches for the empirical study of vote buying, I develop an innovative, unconventional analytical framework to examine how electors face strategies of vote buying. By dividing tactics of targeting and buying, mechanisms to enforce compliance, I provided evidence from the unexplored Mexican Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes. Extending processes to recruit people experiencing clientelism to conduct interviews and focus groups, I provide an examination of this dataset focused on accounts given by callers exposed to vote-buying activities. I rely on the safety and convenience offered by a hotline to report sensitive information anonymously and confidentially, hence the scientific relevance of these accounts. Hotline's procedures for asking questions to users to set a report suit well academic methods to collect information in the ground. Equally, training plans for telephonists attending calls fulfil adequately conditions of qualitative research to interview people about sensitive phenomena.

This compilation of calls from across the country has offered a possibility to assess theoretical claims about several aspects of vote buying. I, therefore, provide research with an account of the phenomenon in Mexico

from a different angle by analysing the content of calls received between 2002 and 2016.

The PRI was reportedly the main vote buyer for the 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections. Additionally, the State of Mexico seems to be the most intense area from which users report vote buying incidents. Gender has no effect on the decision of callers to report vote buying.

The conceptual distinction between targeting and buying is supported by callers reporting being offered or given. The timing of targeting strategies responds to causes such as the amount of work brokers have to perform, the conditions of the electoral precinct and the level of the electoral competition is expected. There is an extensive variety of rewards, but bags of provisions are the most prevalent in clientelistic transactions regardless parties and area. Proffering cash is a strong reward but it is mostly offered as the Election Day approaches.

The compilation of lists of potential voters obtaining voting card's details is a targeting tactic conducted from early stages of the campaigns, which is not exclusive to one party. Although most of the targeting activities are conducted by brokers, some records demonstrate that candidates tend to perform the job in the field.

Tactics of delivering are mainly reported by witnesses rather than voters bought. Activists close vote-buying deals near polling days. Although further tests are required, the delivery of goods gets intensified as the Election Day approaches. The second stage of the compilation of lists entails matching names with those electors as turning out. Those opportunistic strategies for buying votes are performed near polling days.

There is a big number of callers reporting unknown people and outsiders delivering goods and money, which supports the idea about contingent vote buying and thinner ties compared to clientelism. Abstention buying is another effective method to guarantee abstention for opponents. Activists hand rewards to electors as an exchange of the voting card at any time once they know voters' adverse preference.

Having examined how voters face strategies of vote buying from a citizens' perspective by assessing timing of targeting, dispensation of goods, in the following chapter, I provide a full picture from a brokers' viewpoint to know how they relate to parties, create structure for operation and conduct vote buying strategies and mechanism of compliance in order to test empirically the implications of vote buying on voting choices.

Chapter 5. Vote Buying in Mexico from a Brokers' Perspective: Networks and Tactics of Targeting, Buying and Compliance

The previous chapter show how Mexican voters face tactics of vote buying from parties and activists by assessing thousands or reports from the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes. I discussed that vote buying is reportedly widespread across Mexico. Such clientelistic deals entail three central actions, offers, deliveries and compliance. Activists knock on doors proffering a variety of rewards as an exchange of support at polls. In some cases, they ask voters to sign lists and give copies of their voting cards to reaffirm commitment. This tactic is consistently conducted from months before campaigns to days before the Election Day. Also, it is not exclusive to a party. Instead, it is performed by many parties along campaigns. As having visited, voters get targeted by brokers but by signing lists and giving voting cards copies, electors engage in vote buying.

Voters are exposed to offers thoroughly as an exchange of support. The distribution of goods and money have some features though. Months before campaigns and up to election days, people reportedly receive several goods from different parties such as bags of provisions and materials for construction. However, as the Election Day approaches, activists hand cash as a reward and use sites as clientelistic depots to stock

up more goods and cash. Additionally, activists turn to negative vote buying once targeted electors have rejected the offer or admitted to supporting other parties. Activists give people money as an exchange of their voting card; as collecting them, activists make electors ineligible to vote, reducing automatically opponent votes.

Those electors who have engaged in vote-buying deals are equally expected to perform further actions of compliance. There are two essential mechanisms in Mexico, photos of the ballot paper marked and the use of kids. First, electors are required to take photos of the ballot paper –mostly with mobile phones– inside the booth to prove the way they marked it. Second, children walk with bought electors inside the polling booth to attest the option marked by voters. These actions allow activists to ensure votes. Nevertheless, evidence from the previous Chapter provided accounts about the way Mexican voters cope with vote buying. But some questions still remain unanswered, why activists conduct those strategies, how effective these tactics are and how they do them. In this Chapter, I provide some answers through semi-structured interviews with brokers. In order to address the questions, I explore how do brokers and parties organise this operation to achieve the goal successfully? What are the mechanisms to make targeting, delivering and compliance work together? What do brokers get from conducting these tasks? What are the incentives to do this work? How do campaign leaders assign roles to brokers? How do they ensure success? Based on semi-structured interviews (Leech 2002) with brokers, in this Chapter, I describe how clientelist networks are configured, moulded and executed. I also explain the ways tactics of targeting, buying and

compliance work. The Chapter contributes to the literature by offering narratives from brokers working in the ground about the duties they perform for parties and their implications for vote buying in Mexico.

Scholars have extensively studied clientelistic exchanges (e.g. see Powell 1970, Lemarchand & Legg 1972, Eisenstadt & Roniger 1980, Gay 1998, Shefner 2001, Hallin & Papathanassopoulos 2002, Lazar 2004, Stokes 2007, Hilgers 2008, 2011, Hicken 2011, Stokes et al 2013). In Latin America, influential ethnographic work (Ayüero 1999, 2000) conducted at the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, attributed the success of clientelistic politics to networks and ties established between local leaders and communities. Recent studies (Schaffer & Baker 2015) have also pointed social networks and the role of leaders of organisations (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015) as crucial factors of clientelistic exchanges. Literature has equally underlined the access of clientelistic networks to public funds for the benefit of clients. Such mechanism has been understood as the 'democratization of clientelism' (Hagene 2015: 157).

Qualitative efforts conducted in Mexico have mainly approached clientelistic vote-buying from people's views. Less evidence has come from brokers to understand their view and the reasons they perform these activities and the way they do it. For example, Schedler & Manriquez (2004) analyse the morality of clientelism by interviewing eighty-one citizens for the 2000 Presidential Elections. In contrast with traditional perspectives, poor people seemed to reject clientelistic exchanges as they threaten individuals' freedom to decide. A long-term ethnographic study (Hagene 2015) explores the problem from both sides –broker and voter– in a small community of

Mexico City for the 2006 and 2012 Presidential Elections. Clients seemed to accept rewards coming from clientelistic transactions as long as they feel neither force nor threat about the deal. A recent mixed-methods study theorises about the role of brokers for the 2012 Presidential Elections (Mercado 2013). Based on surveys, focus groups and interviews with brokers, the study develops a theory on how brokers organise, assign and execute tasks during campaigns and the Election Day to buy votes. Overall, the author identifies three stages of vote buying, i) brokers and parties holding numerous previous meetings to define strategies and duties, ii) brokers deployed in streets to target electors –not necessarily confined in campaigns period but sometimes much earlier–, and iii) brokers closing vote-buying deals during polling days by monitoring voters, enforcing compliance and reporting closely the status of the operation to parties.

Guided by this study, I conducted semi-structured interviews with brokers. I first established contact with federal deputies and senators from states holding elections in 2017, asking to refer me to people canvassing and campaigning with them. Thus, I had access to delegates –as they are called informally– working on the ground who, after exploring the type of questions I needed to ask, they put me in contact with seven brokers. To expand the sample, I contacted local politicians from Mexico City and Tlaxcala, who referred me to another set of delegates and twelve more brokers. From February to April 2017, I spoke to nineteen brokers about the dissertation and purposes of the interviews. Nine of them (from the State of Mexico, Mexico City and Tlaxcala) agreed to talk to me about vote-buying practices by providing anonymity. I conducted the interviews at locations set

by the interviewees. Since some activities they perform during campaigns are illegal, brokers chose the logistics of the meetings to self-protection, hence the decision to meet me first in a public place and then take me to different sites to hold the interviews (see Appendix 5.1).

From 19th May to 18th June 2017, I conducted nine semi-structured interviews with brokers claiming experience up to twenty-two years in canvassing, electioneering and campaigning for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), the Party of Workers (PT), Convergencia Party (PC) and the National Action Party (PAN), amidst others already dissolved. Four of brokers claimed to be currently employed by a state or local government, despite performing brokerage duties.¹⁰⁵ The rest of them admitted to having worked in such terms at some point. Even though the extent of brokers' job goes beyond elections and it covers other areas of politics (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Hegene 2015, Zarazaga 2014), in this study, I focus only on the duties they perform to buy votes. Interviews lasted between one and a half and two and a half hours; likewise, questions addressed three aspects: a) brokerage structures and networks, b) targeting tactics and c) strategies of buying and mechanisms of compliance. I had brief chats with brokers' friends and members of their teams in different points of the meetings, some relevant information coming from these conversations is reported as part of the interview. All interviews were conducted in Spanish.

¹⁰⁵ In Mexico, these practice is called informally *aviadores* (aviators). With unknown origins, the term refers to those people on the payroll of government agencies, who do not perform duties related to the post and, sometimes, do not even attend the office, see El Universal, 'Los pilotos que no vuelan, pero cobran' Wednesday 14 September 2016, Opinion, <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/entrada-de-opinion/colaboracion/mochilazo-en-el-tiempo/nacion/sociedad/2016/09/14/el-aviador-que> (accessed on Monday 15 May 2017).

In this Chapter, I present qualitative evidence coming from brokers' narratives to understand the way teams of brokers organise themselves to conduct vote-buying strategies, the method used to approach and persuade successfully electors to enter vote buying. The Chapter is organised in the following way. The first section describes how brokerage structures and networks are developed, shaped and interconnected for clientelistic purposes. I discuss the extent and strength of these aspects and how the relationships between parties and brokers leverage. The second section explores targeting strategies for buying votes. I explain how brokers and parties plan and implement such strategies, and the importance of the coordination for the success of vote buying. The third section describes how brokers close vote-buying deals. I explain the relationships between the distribution of rewards near polling days and the execution of mechanisms of compliance. Finally, I address some contributions of the study to research on brokers to understand operations to buy votes. I also present some of the missing answers.

5.1 Clientelistic Structures and Networks in Mexico: The Organisation and Strategies to Buy Votes

'Political machines around the world [...] have all relied heavily on networks of brokers to compete in the political arena' (Zarazaga 2014: 23). In Mexico, brokerage structures have worked in a similar way since the sixties. As implementing 'corporatism' (Grayson 1998; Chapman 2012), the government and the dominant party configured a pyramidal structure (Stokes et al 2013) constituted of three bands: brokers in the bottom,

delegates in the middle and –depending upon the task– high-level officials or candidates on the top. Despite the fact that local delegates perform ground-level brokers' activities, these people tend to be more influential or experienced middlemen with coordination duties. Current organisational methods employed by brokers in Mexico have inherited the dynamics of the Twentieth-Century arrangements. Such organisational structure does not seem to be exclusive to the Mexican case, as other studies have found similar patterns. In the Argentinian case, for example, Zarazaga (2014) illustrates the pyramid as,

At the apex are the mayor and an inner circle of two or three people who help build and control the network; these usually include the municipal secretary of government and secretary of social development. Beneath them is a group of municipal delegates or council members who deal directly with the brokers. Mayors' challengers run alternative networks of brokers, also with pyramidal structures. These compete with the incumbent mayor's network for supporters—although usually with substantially fewer resources (Zarazaga 2014: 6).

Studies on brokers' mobilisations (e.g. Larreguy, Montiel & Querubin 2017, Larreguy, Marshal & Querubin 2016, Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Hagene 2015, Zarazaga 2014, Lawson & Greene 2014) identify two main brokerage structures, a long-term, reciprocal, personal, affective and a short-term contingent, voluntary, opportunistic one. The first is based on close bonds and material benefits. It is the foundation of the pyramid and it refers to those brokers who reach households systematically and consistently to know precise details and about voters as well as preferences and needs. Such type of structure is also found in a study in Argentina

(Zarazaga 2014), which assumes that voters support brokers indefinitely as a result of their good reputation for accessing and delivering rewards.

This structure is configured by three types of networks. One is developed by well-known local leaders –some of them can be wealthy, small or medium-sized local businessmen but others respectable well-recognised advocates, who have bonded strongly with residents by aiding them. The support includes personal favours, relatives' assistance amidst other benefits. Ties are voluntary, personal and affective; norms of reciprocity and loyalties are solid. Rather than a brokerage strategy, it is a way of life (Mercado 2013). This bonding explains why brokers have access to privileged information, although it is usually sustained by an asymmetric relationship between leaders and people (Powell 1970). As an interviewee describes,

I've done business [campaigned] with a few town's loaded chaps [wealthy people] who have decided to play at candidates. They didn't belong to any party [...] they didn't even know anything about politics [...] I remember one of these men, who owned all the repair shops and garages here in town and a few tens of ha [hectares], asked help to run the campaign but by the time he did it, he'd given my wife and brother jobs in one of the shops and a garage. He also lent me a site for my daughter's 15th birthday celebration. How to say no, this guy has also been nice with me, he's shot me some bullets [invited pints of beer] a few times and offered some party for free [...] My wife speaks a lot with his wife and sister-in-law at shop, you know women's stuff, I think he [the leader] want to know about us but it's okay [...]¹⁰⁶

The second network is managed by corrupted, powerful, local leaders and based on influence peddling. This system relies on chains of favours and high-level relationships. These leaders can be local politicians or have

¹⁰⁶ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala (Tuesday, 23rd May 2017).

strong relationships with government officials by, for example, doing business with them or having close relatives working as bureaucrats. These connections allow them to access to exclusive resources to assist residents as an exchange for support. But such connections equally allow leaders exercise control over people by leading dismissals, school expulsions and benefit removals amongst other punishments. Even though there might be no direct threats, they have the power to do so and people know it. Moreover, these leaders are able to trade and purchase impunity locally. Brokers' accounts confirm it,

[...] Here [broker's town], there are some 'sultans' [powerful people] you know, sort of untouchables [...] I've campaigned a few times with them, I've seen them in action, the ways they get everything done [...] You wouldn't believe the kind of things they're willing and able to do. In the 2000 Presidential Elections [in Mexico], I met a 'heavyweight sultan' who was supporting a mayoral candidate [...] I remember that in the middle of a meeting, he suddenly received a call, which upset him badly; I didn't get quite well what the problem was but after hanging up, he straightaway phoned the local Security Commissioner to tell him off embarrassingly and then he called the borough Mayor, who didn't hesitate about dismissing him [Commissioner] Come on! How many mortals [ordinary people] do have Mayor's private number ready to sack public employees? [...] ¹⁰⁷

Amongst these claims, another interviewee describes,

[...] When campaigning for PRI many years ago, since the boss [a party's delegate] found me 'wrapping dessert to take away' [taking money] one of my kids was expelled from the school for disruptive behaviour [laughs] The boss is the Godfather of the school's principal, so I let you reflect upon my son's behaviour [...] ¹⁰⁸

In addition, a third broker states,

¹⁰⁷ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th June 2017).

¹⁰⁸ Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City (Tuesday, 6th June 2017).

[...] In 1994, I didn't have a job [...] A friend of mine told me about parties looking for dodgy snoopy lads [laughs] to work at polling stations [as parties' representatives] and compensating such services [paying money] so I talked to a coordinator [party's delegate] who gave me the job. A few months later, he made my cousins recipients of the local employment programme and my mum beneficiary of the national health programme [...] but the coordinator had his very hysterical moments. I've seen him pulling strings to add or remove people from these programmes based on his bipolar mood. I've had to work with him many times because of mum, she's diabetic, she needs everyday insulin, [without the medical service], she would be dead [...]¹⁰⁹

The last type of network is performed by more violent, criminal, groups and based on threat and fear. This system suits towns and villages with high levels of corruption, criminality and impunity. Local leaders have strong ties with criminal organisations or they can even belong to those groups, employing intimidation to achieve their goals. They have money and connections to corrupt authorities as well as have access to other resources such as weapons. These groups have the power to control local trading, markets and finances (Bailey & Flores 2007, Bailey & Godson 2000); in some cases, they influence significantly political appointments (Bailey & Taylor 2009) for their own benefit. Studies indeed suggest that violence is an important factor of political participation in Mexico (Trelles & Carreras 2012). These local leaders can also work as party's delegates. Influenced by this type of network, brokers conduct campaign activities by canvassing with intimidating questions and threatening requests. Despite the fact that brokers hand rewards, voters are aware about the extent of the damage,

¹⁰⁹ Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 2017)

hence their low incentives of rejection or negotiation. A particular broker's account confirms this fact,

[...] The "war against drugs" launched by the federals [federal government] has worsened off the region [near the State of Guerrero]. "Los Mañosos" [drug's barons, hitmen and members of cartels] have spread badly and now they rule towns; they decide everything. They say whom you must support and how. They decide borough mayors, town councillors, police officers and everybody really; at least, they have to give the consent; elections are just the feint. Residents know that if they aren't with them, they're against them. There have been many people shot dead around [...] Do you remember what happened to students in Iguala?¹¹⁰ [...] That's the way "Mañosos" hit it off [...]. Once people know you're the emissary [working with them], they hardly reject your request [...]. That eases the job [...]¹¹¹

The second structure is more volatile. It is designed to attend particular circumstances and meet specific goals. In the case of campaigns, this structure usually disappears after the Election Day or it is adjusted to fulfil other tasks. Mercado (2013) calls it the structure of promotion as during elections its fundamental goal is to get votes for a party or candidate. Narratives here support multitask views of brokers, which assumes that "brokers do not win elections only by rallying and buying votes; they campaign just like other party activists, plastering posters, painting graffiti, and organizing party meetings" (Zarazaga 2014: 2-3). For instance, a broker says "we quite fit for either of the circumstances [...] We know how to do many things [...] I've worked many times in my neighbourhood oiling bolts [convincing people] or handing treats [rewards] but also I've been sent to

¹¹⁰ BBC, 'Mexico missing students: Unanswered questions two years on' Monday 26 September 2016, World, Latin America, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37460455> (accessed on Tuesday 1st August 2017).

¹¹¹ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th June 2017).

[distant] places [...]”.¹¹² Another account confirms this claim, “[...] when I started a few years ago, I used to knock doors, but later I’ve started taking over commanding positions [laughs] at HQ to spur sneaky, lazy brothers on! [Laughs] Giving orders suits me quite well”.¹¹³

The promotion structure is similarly constituted of three bands. At the top, there is a coordinator, below, several regional coordinators and at the bottom activists and brokers. I found two fundamental networks that make this structure works. The first is based on more anonymous ties, especially between the general coordinator and brokers and between brokers themselves. Brokers perform precise tasks and are more likely to switch pairs for each activity. A couple of accounts here suggest that brokers from urban, populated cities are sent to targeted regions during local campaigns, sometimes a few months before in competitive precincts, to fulfil particular purposes. A broker narrates,

[...] I worked for PRD in the 2011 Gubernatorial Elections in [the State of] Guerrero, it was though as [federal] Government sent army officers to maintain public order [...] That was my second time working there but it was very different [from the first time]. It was more competitive as eventually the [PAN’s] candidate passed up the candidacy to PRD [...] I remember that most of my colleagues [brokers] went from Mexico City [...] They seemed to work for boroughs there [in Mexico City] as advisers, directors and so on; they said that supporting PRD’s candidate in Guerrero was just a Mayor’s superior instruction [...] These guys stayed in nice hotels in Acapulco for about two months, cool lads; they invited us drinks and food [...] Everything sponsored by the [Mexico City’s] Government [laughs!] In the end, we got it, we won the election, but I’ve never ever seen them again. That’s happened to me more than once with other bros [...]”¹¹⁴

¹¹² Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th June 2017)

¹¹³ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th June 2017).

¹¹⁴ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th June 2017)

Likewise, another broker's narrative supports this account,

[...] Look, I'm a very busy businesswoman [laughs!] When there's no election in Mexico City, I disseminate my extensive knowledge [work] in other areas with other delegates, [...] I've lectured [worked with] many rustic men in countryside [laughs!], someone has to; luckily, those types whom you don't see again [...]"¹¹⁵

The other network relies on teams of more experienced delegates and brokers working together. Likewise, there are brokers multitasking towards short-term goals but in contrast with the previous network, this one functions as a unit. In other words, it is an itinerant team performing similar activities in different elections and places. For instance, PRI, PRD and PAN strongholds such as State of Mexico (Rodriguez 1998), Mexico City (Hilgers 2005, 2008) and Monterrey (Barraza & Bizberg 1991) respectively, send teams of brokers to other states during elections. Interviewees report that competitive states for PRD and PRI such as Guerrero and Veracruz have hosted teams of brokers from Mexico City and the State of Mexico during campaigns. Equally, they confirm that strategic states for PAN such as Guanajuato and Guadalajara have hosted teams of brokers from Monterrey. Moreover, this method is employed from state to a borough level whenever necessary. As a broker describes,

[...] I'm from Mexico City, I've lived here all the time [...]. For about four months, I was sent with three colleagues to Guerrero to work for PRD for the 2005 Gubernatorial Elections. We were in charge of "La Montaña" [a Guerrero's region], very poor place! [...] Those days were different; drugs barons weren't a problem and you didn't get shot or killed [...]. We won, indeed [...] despite their [PRI] nasty tricks That was the first time we kicked them [PRI] out from the office. It was quite enjoyable! [...]"¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Anonymous interview with a broker (woman 1), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 19th May 2017).

¹¹⁶ Anonymous interview with a broker (woman 2), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 19th May 2017).

As another interviewee, who lives in Mexico City, tells


[...] I've worked many times in Veracruz, all of them for PRD with my sister [a former local deputy] and her colleagues, she introduced me to this business [...] It's a tough state as recent events [the arrest of a former Governor] but it's been like that for years [...] We were so close, but we didn't get it. He [former Governor] won the election by paying and delivering a lot of bits [rewards]. We [PRD] just couldn't cope with that. Next time! [...]¹¹⁷

In sum, brokerage systems in Mexico have worked in a pyramidal structure since the implementation of the corporatist policy: brokers, delegates and high-level officials or candidates. This method has been inherited from old political arrangements. Evidence here supports previous ideas about long-term, solid brokers' networks, but it also extends such views about another type of relationship. Accounts tell about more contingent, anonymous networks, working together. These do neither compete nor conflict with the other structure. Instead, they both work as a group when circumstances of the election dictate the need. Overall, there are two basic structures, a long-term, reciprocal, personal, affective and a short-term contingent, voluntary, opportunistic (see Figure 5.1). The former works out with personalised distribution of benefits and very close bonds amongst brokers and between brokers and voters. It is based on three types of networks, i) well-known, charismatic, local leaders, ii) corrupt, powerful, local leaders, and iii) violent, more criminal local groups. The second structure works out under more volatile basis and it is designed to meet specific goals. In contrast with the

¹¹⁷ Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City (Tuesday, 6th June 2017).

first structure, it is based on two itinerant networks, a thinner, more anonymous tie and unconnected cells of teams.

Figure 5. 1 Structures and Networks of Brokers-Parties' Relationships



Source: Author.

5.2 From Devising to Implementing Strategies of Targeting: Adjusting Ties between Parties and Brokers

The Planning Stage

Depending upon competitive and logistical factors, brokers can begin targeting activities while before the Election Day. At some point, such tactics work beside a legitimate strategy of the campaign. Some of these might be conducted by brokers but ordinary people help too, which might be partisan and share the ideology with parties, but this is not a necessary condition. Since those activities are legal, parties usually hire residents to support the campaign and people find incentives to perform those duties. Zarazaga (2014: 3) suggests that 'performing nonclientelistic roles better prepares

brokers to execute clientelistic strategies'. On the other hand, Hagene (2015: 11) reports how an interviewee admitted that 'nobody had offered him a job in return for his electoral work [...]'. Despite the variety of backgrounds of those people willing to help parties, these individuals usually have experience in the operation of campaigns (Mercado 2013).

There are two main legitimate duties of parties, representation and coordination. Representatives meet party's duties in electoral bodies along campaigns; during election days, they stay in polling stations to report incidents periodically to coordinators. Coordinators, on the other hand, are essentially in charge of the mobilisation in each electoral precinct. Along the operation, coordinators are the permanent contact between parties and brokers. Their duties are fundamental to make the machinery work (Stokes 2005). A broker, who claims to have stood as local candidate twice, narrates the way he has undertaken such duties,

[...] Yes, I've worked as a coordinator many times. It's quite tough as you have to be good at electoral legislation and other bits [...] You don't know how they [other parties] are, they just wait for you to make a mistake to kick your [#%\$/&] Honestly, in addition to your bosses [parties] and the rest of chaos [coordinate brokers], you've got to bear much more with annoying paperwork, journalists and those voters who suddenly want something from you. Whenever I can, I turn down those invitations [working as a coordinator], it's too much work, I'd rather be on the ground. You don't have to be accountable to anyone and there's more slot for making business [...]¹¹⁸

Coordinators' responsibilities seem to be associated with the needs of each election. Stokes et al (2013: 19) explain that they 'are agents of the party whose actions cannot be exhaustively observed or perfectly monitored by

¹¹⁸ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 21st May 2017).

the party.’ Therefore, they operate with some level of autonomy, which explains the type of relationships they establish with the campaign team; the more autonomous coordinators are, the less contact with the party they have. Brokers interviewed here acknowledged other aspects that influence coordinators’ duties, as coalitions, advisers and the type of elections (local, regional or national). As a broker narrates,

[...] I hate working with parties’ coalitions. They don’t let you work, [the fact of] sparing regions is a nightmare. My worst experiences have been with them [...] Other parties don’t give you anything, but they blame you for everything [...] Sometimes coalitions give you more votes but not all the time. Candidates love hearing pseudo-pundits who think they know everything [...] Don’t trust politicians, they’re bloody liar [laughs!] Believe me, many times we’d had everything under control and coalitions just f*#%ed it up [...] ¹¹⁹

Besides the account, another broker describes,

[...] As you know, intellectuals [pollsters] have recently failed badly to predict elections outcomes. After all these years, the truth is that you never know what to expect, I can tell. Sometimes candidates say [that] it’s going to be [a] very easy [campaign] and eventually is a mess, but other times they just don’t expect anything, and suddenly it’s done, you get it [...] For the 2015 midterm elections, I remember that at some point, we were very comfortable; surveys were giving us more than four percent of advantage and we were doing it quite well but swiftly, you know, inflated egos and #%&! internal mistakes just ruined everything [...] ¹²⁰

Likewise, a third interviewee narrates,

[...] I’d rather local elections over federal ones. Although they might be a bit boring, there’s no external atmosphere affecting your job [...] I’ve worked in a variety of circumstances and I’ve basically done the same [work] I don’t believe what the Gods of the Olympus [pollsters] say about tight campaigns. They just

¹¹⁹ Anonymous interview with a broker (a second man), conducted in Buenavista, the State of Mexico (Sunday, 4th June 2017).

¹²⁰ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala (Tuesday, 23rd May 2017).

... speak, they don't act [...] I think local elections are more intense as many people know better each other [...]¹²¹

Once structures, networks and strategies have been set, a brokerage operation to get votes commences with two central aspects (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). First, a schedule of meetings between campaign staff -or candidates themselves- and brokers. Along these meetings, the staff have already an idea about the conditions of the contest and, most importantly, the sum of votes required from brokers to win the election. Delegates, on the other hand, have already conducted some fieldwork to explore the number of votes they might get and, to some extent, the sentiment of people towards parties. These two aspects usually shape the level and intensity of the negotiation between parties and brokers.

Second, campaign staff and brokers engage in budgetary talks to set rates, numbers, dates and figures about the clientelistic operation (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). This point seems to be one of the toughest items on the agenda, which is discussed in two parts, the rate per vote and the dates of deliveries. Despite potential adjustments to the plan along the campaign, these meetings signify the starting agreement on strategies of the campaign and clientelistic exchanges. A similar agenda of discussions between parties and brokers was found in Argentina, Szwarberg (2012: 97) argues that '[i]n evaluating the ability of a party broker to mobilize voters on Election Day, bosses take into account how many voters the agent mobilized in the past adjusted by the popularity of the party's nominee, the economic situation, and certain contextual events such as media scandals

¹²¹ Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City (Tuesday, 6th June 2017).

that can affect the popularity of a party or candidate before an election'. The reason monetary discussions are tough is explained by the rates per votes. Zarazaga (2014: 24) argues that by 'paying to voters the minimum amount needed to assure their votes, party machines buy votes more efficiently and win elections more often than their rivals. Information means for brokers more accuracy at buying votes'. Evidence from the Philippines (Hicken et al 2015: 352) shows that 'the 'amount of money offered by candidates varied widely, both across races, and between candidates.' Whereas Mayor and vice-mayor candidates proffer between PHP\$250 [£3.47] and PHP\$500 [£6.95], councillor candidates offer PHP\$20 [£0.28] to PHP\$100 [£1.39].

All brokers interviewed here support previous claims, referring anecdotes about meetings and discussions about money and rates per vote, but some relevant narratives describe,

[...] We meet them [candidates or party officials] to clear things up beforehand. Although they tell us how many votes are required, we roughly know what they need [...] we have to be wise in those meetings because they are funny sometimes, they want you to get votes very cheap in tough regions or more wealthy areas [...] We usually set the rate per vote, which goes between MX\$250 [£10] and MX\$700 [£25] ish although there have been a few times in which I've given MX\$5000 [£200]. You should have two things in mind when attending these meetings, the intensity of the election, as you have to offer more money or deliver more goods, and the income rate of the neighbourhood so, as I said, you have to be careful otherwise you might lose business [...]¹²²

Additionally, another broker states,

[...] A boss I had [a delegate] used to take me to those meetings with candidates and parties [...] Quite a few [...] You feel like meeting Mafia members, a lot of people around, everything very secretive, they don't allow you even to take mobile phones or gadgets with you in there because of social media scandals [...]

¹²² Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 21st May 2017).

There's nothing else to talk but money. How much you need, when you'll get it, concerning the [number of] voters you have to persuade [buy], how much you'll pay voters, which is usually about MX\$500 [£20] but I've handed up to MX\$3000 [£120], it depends really on how broke people are, how much other parties are giving and how many votes you need [...]¹²³

Likewise, a third account describes,

Before wrangles [campaigns] start, we [brokers] must be as one with bosses [candidates or campaigners] on the fare [rate per vote]. A few things tune tariffs, but we mainly take into account community's cash flow, the mess of the race, people's mood with parties and, nowadays, insecurity notches for our 'bros' working in streets [...] I've had arguments with candidates about money and the number of votes. I give about MX\$500 [£20] but I've given MX\$20 [£0.8] [laughs!] and up to MX\$1000 [£40]. They [candidates] sometimes want you to get a fantasy number of votes for a ridiculous amount of money. There are "unwinnable" elections, you have to be careful. You're "sent to war without a rifle", otherwise [...]. My colleagues [brokers] have given to me up to 300 voters each, guaranteed! We have to set numbers and money carefully. If we do it well, we actually get extra tips for our remarkable effort [Laughs]¹²⁴

The Execution Stage

Amongst the diverse portfolio of targeting tactics performed by brokers during campaigns, in Mexico, the compilation of lists of electors seems to prevail over others (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013). Brokers knock doors, proffering rewards to residents as an exchange of support for candidates and parties. As performing this action, they compile lists of voters willing –or tempted at least– to engage in vote-buying deals. Visual evidence about such lists (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016: 164) shows

¹²³ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Pedro Tultepec, State of Mexico (Saturday, 10th June 2017).

¹²⁴ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala (Tuesday, 23rd May 2017).

a piece of paper with PRI's logo entitled "register of voters committed to taking to polls during the Election Day". The list also demonstrates that brokers fill in seven gaps as i) full name of the voter, ii) code of elector, iii) full address, iv) number of the voting card, v) number of the electoral precinct, vi) number of folio of the national register, and vii) telephone number. By law,¹²⁵ parties have access at any time to the national register of electors, which provides all details above described. Accounts of brokers confirm that parties match the information within the lists with the register. Undertaking such task suggests another method adopted by parties to monitor brokers performance.

Although in a different context, a study in Africa also finds tactics of compilation of lists. As assessing a party machine in Taiwan, Wang & Kurzman (2007) identify two types of targeted voters, i) partisans (member of the political machine) and their families, and ii) ordinary voters. Particularly, for the first group, authors argue that the party make a full list of members and their families and party officers monitor those lists by ticking names of those who voted to eventually reward them (Wang & Kurzman 2007: 234).

Whereas studies (Lawson & Greene 2014, Finan & Schechter 2012) have argued well-accepted norms of reciprocity and solidarity as factors to overcome the secrecy of the ballot when buying votes, others (Rueda 2014, Gingerich & Medina 2013, Stokes et al 2013, Smith & Bueno 2012) have discussed methods of systematic monitoring conducted by the machine

¹²⁵ Diario Oficial de la Federación (Official Gazette), 'Ley General de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales: Article 148, 2', Sunday 1 January 2017, http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/LGIPE_270117.pdf (accessed on Saturday 8 July 2017).

party (Magaloni 2014, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2014, Nichter 2008, Stokes 2005). Yet, findings of the lists bring another point to the discussion. Since personal information of voters is gathered and well organised, any broker with access to those lists can conduct further monitoring activities despite having no previous contact with electors. Strong ties between brokers and voters resulting from systematic interactions along the campaign is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for vote buying. Although framed by a different context, Zarazaga's (2014) findings of multitasking brokers suggest this pattern. In Chapter 4, I show records of callers reporting 'unknown' activists conducting targeting actions, suggesting no former contact between brokers and voters. This means that brokers develop and perform strategies mutually not exclusive. In this Chapter, all interviewees confirmed it, as a broker describes,

[...] As a way to prove the work you've done and ensure the vote, we go to streets. During campaigns but sometimes much earlier, we gather electors' information by hand, visiting householders. There are a few ways to do so. When we don't have much information about the area [working as outsiders], we just knock doors to ask. You straightaway notice people's mood, some of them don't even open the door. But other occasions, [working as insiders] you've already got a clue about the area and you know some information about them; the mission is to confirm it in the lists and explore people's attitudes [...]¹²⁶

Likewise, another account illustrates,

[...] We have to canvass for the party by collecting people's information. We ask for the voting card, voters just show them to us [...] then we take the essentials [such as] card's number, elector's full name and the registration code. Having done this, parties match those details with the full, updated electors national register they have to ensure you're not lying. They check up on

¹²⁶ Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), conducted in Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 2017).

address, names and codes; afterwards, they give you the money and goods to hand them to voters [...]¹²⁷

Along this claim, a third narrative tells,

[...] You're asked to get some info. Basically, the one within the voting cards. They [parties] give you a piece of paper with gaps to fill. Guess they [parties] just want to be sure you're doing the job right. Guys [brokers] sometimes take a picture of the voting card to have the info with them but I've met voters who feel uncomfortable letting you do so. I prefer to do it by hand on the spot, you have to double the work otherwise [...]¹²⁸

Exploring further the action of visiting householders, I asked brokers in particular about deliveries when compiling lists. The motivation behind this point arises from the interest of establishing the purposes of deliveries at several points of the race. Even though no interviewee denied the actions of distributing rewards during early stages of the campaign, 'not all gifts and incentives are provided in exchange for votes switching their vote intention' (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016: 163). Instead, some goods are addressed explicitly, for example, to "break the ice" when residents have the visit. Brokers here suggest that rewards handed during campaign –and while before– are mainly allocated to encourage people to listen to them. Early dispensations do not necessarily replace vote-buying rewards. Instead, they meet particular needs such as attending rallies (Munoz 2014) or meetings. Interviewees emphasised the relevance of deliveries conducted at the culmination of race. The dispensation of goods, however, seems to be slightly different. Whereas handy goods such as bags of

¹²⁷ Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 19th May 2017).

¹²⁸ Anonymous interview with a broker (woman 2), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 19th May 2017).

provisions, gift tokens amidst printed caps, t-shirts and other utensils are essentially managed earlier, cash and other major goods such as materials for construction are handed near the end of the race. Given that brokers might not know residents' preferences when knocking doors, the fact of being ready to distribute some goods would suggest a strategy of double persuasion (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2009, Nichter 2008). As a couple of the broker states,

[...] Yes, of course, we usually hand bits when knocking doors, householders wouldn't even listen to you otherwise. But it's more about the promises you make and the goods you give them later [...] These are the ones that make the difference [...] Also as we walk miles for a few days when filing the gaps [of the lists], you couldn't be doing it as carrying a heavy load[...]¹²⁹

Similarly, another interviewee explains,

[...] From time to time, we distribute bags of provisions and other goods as compiling lists, although the task is just to get the [voting cards'] information. You should manage to give [electors] something as long as it helps you to get the info but that's just for breaking the ice since eventually we give them the treat [reward] for voting [for] us [...] ¹³⁰

In addition, interviews here suggest that strategies of targeting do not get stopped but tailored and reshaped accordingly to the stages and needs of the campaign. Even though brokers might continue compiling lists up to a few days before polling day (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Mercado 2013), they turn to other tactics. Some of the interviewees underlined the importance of having alternative plans mostly in competitive elections. Not exclusively but essentially, they focus on two activities, knocking doors with

¹²⁹ Anonymous interview with a broker (a second man), conducted in Buenavista, the State of Mexico (Sunday, 4th June 2017).

¹³⁰ Anonymous interview with a broker (woman 2), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 19th May 2017).

rewards in hands and approaching people on streets to get more votes. As one broker describes,

[...] It depends on the case but almost the whole campaign, we've got to knock doors, I can tell; especially, knowing that we need more votes or when the others [parties] are getting more [...] But as the Election Day comes, we turn to other measures. We go to streets to do business [target people] It's riskier and tougher but sometimes it is necessary [...] On polling day, if we still need votes, we go to poorer places to make offers; this doesn't let you down; obviously, you've got to bear with bumpy roads, long distances, nasty people and additionally, you've got to be ready to hand cash on the spot [...] ¹³¹

With regard to targeting strategies, another interviewee narrates,

[...] Yes, once we've got our districts assigned, we don't stop, we visit residents all the time [to compile lists]. Just to make sure. But, as polling days approach, we enhance measures. We ask directly in streets [make vote-buying offers] during the Election Day, just you need to have cash with you. When you show the money, even the most decent person starts thinking about it. Everybody has a price [...] ¹³²

Overall, brokers begin targeting activities a while before the Election Day and perform legitimate campaign actions. They are helped by ordinary people. Parties assign legal activities to residents to support the campaign who have usually electoral background and experience in canvassing. Basically, representation and coordination are those duties for which parties need extra support. Brokers, on the other side, work autonomically and make their own decisions along the campaign. During the targeting stage, parties and brokers hold a series of meetings in which they both should agree on clientelistic strategies and their costs. By the time these meetings

¹³¹ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday 21st May 2017).

¹³² Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala (Tuesday 23rd May 2017).

take place, parties have already estimated the number of votes they need to win the election and brokers have generated an idea about the sum of voters they can mobilise. Money, for buying votes and paying brokers' fees, is the toughest item on the agenda. Once they both have agreed about rates and tactics, they turn to action.

Brokers knock doors, proffering rewards as an exchange of votes. They compile lists of electors attracted to sell their vote; the compilation of lists is a method mostly employed in Mexico to estimate the number of voters that brokers expect to mobilise during the Election Day and it also proves the work they are doing in the ground. These findings are support previous studies (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016, Mercado 2013) for the 2012 Elections. But they provide more details about the intimacy of tough meeting between parties and brokers. Additionally, evidence provides insights about the use of voters' personal details. By organising information of voters, brokers create a dataset, which can be accessed by any person to conduct further monitoring or targeting activities. Such argument contributes to the understanding of the idea about multitask brokers and provides an alternative explanation of how close ties between brokers and citizens work. The method of compilation of lists is consistently performed along the campaigns as it extends from a long time before the beginning of campaigns to a few days before polling days.

5.3 Closing Deals: The Distribution of Rewards and Mechanisms of Compliance

Mercado (2013) suggests that another crucial operation begins near polling days to ensure two fundamental aspects, a final distribution of goods and the execution of mechanisms of compliance. The aim of this late distribution of rewards is to close vote-buying deals (Mustillo 2016). Electoral observers (Alianza Civica 2006, 2012) and journalistic¹³³ reports have also denounced lorries transporting bags of provisions and sites employed as warehouses for stocking up goods near polling days. Such reports have equally addressed issues about activists carrying and distributing cash close to polling stations. Qualitative evidence from Thailand supports the timing of compensation. Some interviewees argue '[t]he night before the election is when most vote buying occurs. We call it the hound dog night' [...] 'the vote buyer's representative comes to talk with me before the election [...] then the night before the election, the representative comes and gives me money and tells me what number I need to vote, [sometimes] one day before the election [or] in secret three days before the election' (quoted by Owen 2013: 261). Although all brokers interviewed here related experiences supporting this point, there are two particular accounts that describe it more precisely,

[...] For the last week of the campaign, delegates must have "shelters" [warehouses] ready for receiving goods. Candidates' staff manage to set up the distribution, which is usually sorted by lorry, van and car. Sometimes they [delegates] use their own sites but others they need to rent them. Storehouse' locations are key as they have to be convenient for distributing goods or receiving electors to collect them [...] For the 2011 Gubernatorial Elections in [the State] Guerrero, I was appointed as logistical

¹³³ Milenio, 'Destamtelan Bodegas con Despensa de Morena', Thursday 1 June 2017, Política, http://www.milenio.com/politica/elecciones-estado-mexico/naucalpan-despensas-propaganda-operativo-elecciones-milenio-noticias-edomex_0_967103779.html (accessed on Sunday 4 June 2017).

manager [laughs!] I got the best site ever. An enormous, very nice building with a play area [laughs!] [...] a big kitchen, appropriate dining and living rooms and a huge parking zone. All these sections in addition to the storage area, which let us stack about 10 thousand bags of provisions, a few tons of sacks of sugar, seeds, cement and other materials for construction, plus tens of crates with cash [...] Women were in the kitchen cooking meals [offered to electors after casting the vote], the dining room held up to 100 voters altogether during the Election Day. The “lobby” [laughs!] allowed those people collecting goods to queue discretely [...] Taxi drivers hired for ‘*acarreo*’¹³⁴ parked cars just outside. It was just a paradise [...] ¹³⁵

Likewise, a second broker narrates,

[...] Between five and four days before polling days, we have to sort warehouses out to stock up the big delivery [...] These can be provisions, materials for construction, duvets or so, plus meals and drinks; it depends on the election, districts and deals you’ve made. We fill those [storehouses] at night as snoop people can see you. As we roughly know the number and type of goods, you can reckon how many hands [people] you might need and how much time it’ll take to complete the job [...] There are occasions in which you have to deliver the goods by hand straight to the communities but you can also give the address to people for them to collect the goods after casting the vote. Again, that depends on deals and regions [...]. The thing is that we have to get everything ready for the big days [...] ¹³⁶

Mercado (2013) argues that during polling days, brokers verify that those electors in lists do go to polls. To achieve it, delegates send brokers near polling stations with the lists previously compiled whereas brokers report periodically the status of such lists to delegates themselves and campaign’s

¹³⁴ *Acarreo* is another strategy conducted by brokers during polling days. Some studies on electoral mobilisation (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016) emphasise that *acarreo* is not an external tactic from vote buying and turnout buying. Qualitative evidence from Argentina confirms such claim. Zarazaga (2014: 34) explain ‘[b]rokers also provide transportation on election days to ensure that resource recipients turn out to vote. During the 2009 election, brokers in San Miguel hired everyone in the area who had a car. They gave them US\$15 and coupons for gas to drive people to the polls [...] Even though brokers invest in mobilizing their own followers [...], they use this as a complementary rather than an alternative strategy to vote buying in order to harvest every single vote in which they have invested. Also, evidence from Mexico City (Hilgers 2011: 577) supports the hiring mechanism, ‘politicians hire buses to transport citizens to the polls (an operation known as *acarreo*).

¹³⁵ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th June 2017).

¹³⁶ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 21st May 2017).

staff. Brokers set around polling stations tick names of voters as they turn out. Such activity has been confirmed by ethnographic work (Hagene 2015: 149) conducted in a borough in Mexico City for the 2006 Presidential Elections, which states '[o]utside one of [the polling stations] I struck up a conversation with Juan, an informant who was ticking off people on a list'. The status of the lists is essential for parties to perform, if it is the case, further strategies of mobilisation to make more voters turn out. Therefore, such active flow of information is vital for making decisions. Some interviews conducted here substantiate these claims. As a broker narrates,

[...] Brothers hanging around voting booths confirm [that] electors [in lists] have shown up and, occasionally, they also might verify the sense of their vote [conduct mechanisms of compliance] but it's risky since people can report you to police; it really depends on the case [...] After ticking their names, electors get rewards. [...]¹³⁷

Along these lines, another broker describes,

[...] We stick around polling stations all day to check who's cast the vote. Once they [electors] go out from the voting booth, we cross the name [...] We've got to report the progress every half an hour or so [...] This duty is quite important, if we don't do it well, it can cause a shamble [...]¹³⁸

Finally, a third broker's account narrates,

[...] Our duties don't conclude with the visits [compilation of lists], we have to corroborate that voters seal the deal [...] Just to track those lazy people [...] But we don't do everything; we're very busy businessmen [laughs!], sometimes we do but other occasions, delegates send other bros to do so [tick names] It's very boring and slow, I've got to say [...]¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Pedro Tultepec, State of Mexico (Sunday, 10th June 2017).

¹³⁸ Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City (Tuesday, 6th June 2017).

¹³⁹ Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), conducted in Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 2017).

Violating the secrecy of the ballot represents an alternative explanation to those approaches based on norms of solidarity and reciprocity (Lawson & Greene 2014, Finan & Schechter 2012) since brokers not relying on voters' loyalty, should develop mechanisms to ensure compliance (Nichter 2014). Literature (Serra 2016, Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013) and electoral observation organisations (Alianza Civica 2012) have supported the use of two main tactics in Mexico, the so-called "little hawks" to attest electors' choice and voters taking photos of the ballot paper marked. Whereas evidence collected in Chapter 4 confirmed both actions, brokers here acknowledged to having exclusively conducted the latter. However, some of them admitted to having heard about the "little hawks" system. The mechanism entails brokers hiring children, with parental consent, in order to accompany voters into the booth to corroborate voters' mark on the ballot paper. Given that these tactics are performed all parties, compliance systems become crucial for each party to ensure the expected number of votes. As some brokers' accounts describe,

[...] Not sure, but I think since 2006, once you encourage voters to work with you [agree with vote-buying deals], I ask them to take a photo of the ballot as casting the vote. At the beginning, we used to handle pocket cameras to do so but now, thanks to technology, handsets with cameras are the cheapest quickest and most effective way [...] At the current time, almost everybody owns a smartphone but with poor, old or novice electors who don't have mobiles or don't know how to use them, we provide such gadgets and they give them back to us with the photo in there afterwards; a bit riskier [...] Although police officers and electoral authorities [EMBs] have tried to prohibit electors from using mobiles when casting the vote, they haven't got it. It's a madness, can you imagine not letting people using phones [...]¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰ Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), conducted in Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 2017).

Along these lines, another broker states,

[...] Parties push us to do it. It's okay, they need evidence [about the votes obtained], fair enough [...] Voter must take a photo of the ballot paper [marked] if they want to receive the reward, otherwise, they don't get anything [...] They don't moan about that as they know it. That's part of the deal. Some colleagues [brokers] keep the photo for a few months in the mobile, just in case, but I think it's quite risky, if police or other parties find it, you might be in troubles [...]¹⁴¹

Likewise, a third broker states,

[...] Before, everything was based on trust but now, mobiles phones help us out [...] We can ask voters to prove the way they voted, with a photo [of the ballot paper marked] taken inside the polling booth and that's it! [...] When taking the photo, I usually ask voters to hold a personal item as showing the ballot paper and make the folio number visible; just to be sure they are the ones in the photo. Sometimes we're required to show all the set of photos [to delegates] but not all the time. When you've got to do everything [compliance mechanisms and distribute rewards], voters can delete the photo once they show you the proof. I've heard about some bros using children, who walk with voters inside the [polling] booth to attest the sense of the vote but it's risky and inefficient since they have to get changed a few times every hour to not be caught by polling station officers or other people. I haven't done it, though [...]¹⁴²

Another strategy brokers perform during the Election Day (Mercado 2013) entails the three activities altogether, targeting, buying and compliance. These tactics are more strategies of mobilisation (Larreguy, Marshall & Querubin 2016) contingent upon voting needs. Basically, as a result of the constant flow of information coming from brokers located near polling stations, parties assess the overall status of voting. When the status is not fulfilling original expectations, they decide to set up such strategy as the last

¹⁴¹ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala (Tuesday, 23rd May 2017).

¹⁴² Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 20th May 2017).

chance. Despite the fact that parties begin to plan it before polling days, the main targeting criteria of selecting areas are essentially deprivation and poverty (Jensen & Justesen 2014). Once parties decide to deploy brokers to regions, these go out with cash in hands ready to target, buy voters (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013) and ensure compliance. Such operation encompasses random targeting actions in streets. Brokers approach voters as walking presumably towards polling stations. Based upon accounts here, the largest amount of money given by the brokers to buy votes has been during polling days and within this operation. Such activity is essentially deployed in competitive contests or under scenarios of uncertainty (Mercado 2013). All brokers interviewed here relate experiences of this operation; four particular accounts, however, tell more precisely,

[...] Bosses decide whether we go to other places during polling days. I've done it a few times [...] We first go to HQ to collect the money and receive more instructions but there's no science rather than going to the poorest areas to offer cash to people in streets [...]¹⁴³

Additionally, another account tells,

[...] Sometimes you've got to take further actions [vote buying] to encourage voters on the Election Day. Going there [selected regions], if required, very effective though. Well, as long as you select the right district you might increase your support [...]¹⁴⁴

A broker who claims to have worked as a delegate in several elections confirms,

[...] Assessing the status of the voting, we might decide to take other actions. Roughly speaking, we send members of the team working on the ground to specific regions to persuade more

¹⁴³ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 16th June 2017).

¹⁴⁴ Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City (Sunday, 16th June 2017).

people on streets [...] I'm not proud of it but it always works out within poor places [...] Sometimes, getting the areas it's tough but effective [...]¹⁴⁵

Likewise, another broker narrates [...] Depending on how things are going on election days, we might be sent to push electors a bit more to specific areas; obviously, with incentives in hand [cash] just for them to make an effort [...]¹⁴⁶ Finally, a fourth broker explains,

[...] On some occasions, polling days can be annoying. Bosses change their mind and we switch our duties. I remember a few times in which I was sent to persuade electors on streets when I supposed to be handing bits or doing something else at the HQ [...]¹⁴⁷

Overall, a noticeable mobilisation constituted of a final distribution of goods and the implementation of mechanisms of compliance, takes place near and during polling days. Late handlings of rewards are primarily addressed to close vote-buying deals agreed during campaigns between brokers and voters. Sites storing goods and money as well as lorries transporting such goods are essentially employed near polling days to ensure the success of the mobilisation. During the Election day, brokers return to lists gathered during campaigns to supervise what voters have turned out. Delegates send teams of brokers near polling stations with the lists; brokers have two duties, ticking voters' names and report the status of the turnout periodically to parties. Brokers also perform compliance mechanisms to ensure that electors have marked correctly the ballot papers. Essentially, they employ two activities, the so-called "little hawks" and photos taken inside the polling

¹⁴⁵ Anonymous interview with a broker (a man), conducted in Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 23rd May 2017).

¹⁴⁶ Anonymous interview with a broker (a woman), conducted in Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 19th May 2017).

¹⁴⁷ Anonymous interview with a broker (a first man), conducted in Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 2017).

booth. Finally, brokers target and buy voters on streets during election days once parties have assessed the status of the election in a negative way. They send brokers mostly to poor places with cash in hands to persuade more voters.

5.4 Conclusion

Brokerage networks play a fundamental role in the success of the process of targeting, buying and complying with vote buying. In Mexico, brokers have developed two main pyramidal structures, a long-term, reciprocal, personal, affective and a short-term contingent, voluntary, opportunistic one. On top, high-level politicians, government officials or candidates make decisions and have access to resources, in the middle influential, local leaders work as delegates to fulfil coordination tasks, on the bottom, brokers and party activists meet ground duties. The first structure relies on close bonds and material benefits and it is constituted of a) well-known, charismatic, local leaders, b) corrupted, powerful, local leaders, and c) violent, criminal regional groups. The other structure is more volatile, and it is developed to meet concrete purposes; it is based on itinerant, anonymous contingent networks.

Brokers on the ground begin to conduct targeting activities before the campaign to explore voters' political preferences and attitudes towards parties; therefore, to estimate the number of votes they will get. They also meet legitimate campaign duties with ordinary people alongside. Brokers are autonomous and make their own decisions at different points of the race. Within the targeting stage, parties and brokers sustain numerous

meetings to discuss clientelistic strategies and rates per vote amidst other aspects; they also achieve an agreement about the number of votes needed to win the election. Money to buy votes and pay brokers' fees is the toughest item on the agenda of these meetings.

The compilation of lists is the most common method of targeting to buy votes in Mexico. Since brokers knock doors to proffer rewards as an exchange of votes, they write down personal information of voters willing to sell their vote. Most of the data come from voting cards, which is eventually matched with the information of the national register of electors. By gathering and organising the information of voters, parties implement monitoring activities. Compiling lists of electors is consistently performed by brokers from a long time before campaigns up to a few days before the Election Day.

A brokerage mobilisation takes place near polling days, constituted of a final distribution of rewards and the implementation of mechanisms of compliance. Late handlings of goods and money are primarily addressed to close vote-buying deals agreed between brokers and voters during the targeting stage. Sites storing such goods and cash as well as lorries transporting them are essentially employed to ensure the success of the mobilisation. During the Election day, delegates send teams of brokers near polling stations with the lists; brokers supervise that those voters targeted are turning out by ticking voters' names and report the status of the turnout periodically to parties. On polling days, brokers also perform compliance mechanisms to ensure that electors have marked correctly the ballot papers. Essentially, they turn to two activities, the so called "little hawks"

and photos taken inside the polling booth. Finally, once parties have assessed negatively the status of the election, brokers go to streets to target and buy voters during election days. Brokers go mostly to poor and deprived places with cash in hands to persuade more voters.

Consistent with previous research, in this Chapter I have offered some answers about how brokers and parties organise the operations to buy votes, the mechanisms employed to target voters, deliver benefits and enforce compliance. Additionally, I provide evidence about brokers' incentive to conduct these tasks and the way they assign roles. Advancing research on clientelistic networks, this Chapter contributes to the qualitative literature by offering narratives from brokers working in the ground about the particular methods for buying votes in Mexico. Having investigated citizens and brokers' perspective about vote-buying, some questions are still unanswered. What is the extent of the problem? What are the effects of vote-buying operations on voting choices? In the following Chapter, I outline some answers.

Chapter 6. Vote Buying, Voting Choices and Parties Activism During the Election Day

My two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation (i.e. targeting and buying, Section 2.3, Chapter 2), has offered an alternative theoretical framework to analyse evidence emerging from phone call reports on vote buying and interviews with brokers. Given that parties compete for voters with vote-buying strategies, my model assumes that as competing parties, voters are likely to be exposed to more than one offer, which they assess, and then make a choice. Different from traditional views of clientelistic strategies of mobilisations, my two-stage model suggests that voters are able to select one amongst several vote-buying offers but also, to reject these deals. This assumption is strong and hard to address but underpins two distinct scenarios. First, even though electors can enter into a vote-buying transaction, the fact of selecting one amongst multiple offers implies that they might have rejected at least a vote-buying deal. Therefore, although voting choices eventually respond to vote buying, not all the tactics conducted were successful. Second, the two-stage model understands vote buying as a process (see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2), in which the transition from targeting to buying focuses on voters' decisions rather than tactics of parties. The model then opens up the possibility of finding democratic voters

who reject vote-buying offers. It is unlikely that all those electors who get targeted automatically seal the deal.

How does this two-stage model work for examining evidence? In Chapter 4, I assess thousands of calls reporting vote buying from across Mexico. Although the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes is an unconventional source for research, it provides prolific quotes from targeted individuals and eyewitnesses to vote buying. Results confirm my conceptual distinction between targeting and buying. Parties' activists can begin to target electors from a long time before polling days. There are thousands of reports on activists proffering benefits to electors as an exchange for votes, compiling as well lists of voters tempted to enter vote-buying deals. However, despite hundreds of reports on deliveries along the campaign, the number of calls reporting vote buying near the Election Day is considerably higher (see Figure 4.2) than weeks earlier. This finding suggests that the second stage of my model of vote-buying mobilisation is crucial for parties to monitor turnout and voting behaviour. In addition, despite the variety of goods proffered during campaigns, the most prevalent benefits reported are bags of provisions, money and materials for construction, which confirms claims about excludable, tangible and personal rewards in vote-buying exchanges (see Chapter 2).

In Chapter 5, I report results of the semi-structured interviews with brokers. Equally, the set of questions about strategies, during targeting and buying phases, is based on my two-stage model. Accounts confirm my model. Targeting entail activities in the ground; brokers knocking doors and exploring voting preferences after agreements with parties. The compilation

of lists seems to be the most performed method of targeting as it serves for proving parties the job done and counting the number of potential voters. Buying tactics to close deals entail a massive distribution of benefits. Near polling days parties mobilise resources and brokers. Such deliveries are sometimes matched with the lists compiled earlier. On election days brokers also conduct mechanism to ensure compliance, entailing photos of the ballot paper marked and children walking with voters inside the booth to attest the sense of the vote. Another interesting finding in Chapter 5 is the constitution of brokers' structures and networks to perform targeting and buying activities. In addition to confirming traditional structures found in clientelism, accounts shown provide evidence about a more volatile, short-term structures built to fulfil specific tasks in elections. In Mexico, vote buying is sustained with two pyramidal structures, long and short-term. They consist of high-level politicians or government officials at the top, influential local leaders or parties' delegates in the middle and brokers and activists on the bottom.

Research questions of this dissertation involved the three elements of vote buying as voters, parties' activists and voting choices at polls. What are the effects of vote buying on voting choices in Mexico? Do outcomes of elections respond to vote buying? Why do parties perform such practices if they are not successful? Why do electors do engage in it? In order to answer each question, I use a mixed-method research design. Methodological decisions about techniques for answering each question respond to former studies using, for example, interviews to investigate on brokers and political elites (Auerbach 2016, Zarazaga 2014, Owen 2013, Szwarcberg 2010,

Schedler & Manriquez 2004), surveys to measure the incidence of vote buying (UNDP 2006, Stokes 2005, Brusco et al 2004, Speck & Abramo 2002, 2001), and innovative, unconventional techniques (Meng 2001, Sherman et al 1992) to examine how individuals face illegal or socially undesirable experiences. Thus, I conduct three methods, semi-structured interviews, assessment of thousands of reports on vote buying and a nationally representative experiment.

Having discussed qualitative evidence on strategies of parties to target voters and mechanisms to enforce compliance in the previous Chapter, I now present empirical evidence testing how vote buying affects voting behaviour. Given that parties' tactics near and during polling days are crucial to close vote-buying arrangements, this analysis focuses predominantly on the mobilisation of parties during this final stage. In addition, assuming that vote buying differs from turnout buying in targeting electors against or indifferent to parties (Nichter 2008), this study assesses voters switching choices near polling days. In order to test these aspects, I conduct an alternative method an unobtrusive technique called LISTIT. This chapter aims to determine whether switching voting choices respond to this last encounter with activists. Results contribute to a renewed debate about the effectiveness of vote buying (Greene 2016).

The Chapter is organised in the following way. I first show the methodological design and data collection by discussing the advantages and shortcomings of the method for studying vote buying, the justification of control questions and the selection of the case. Second, I show results by discussing relevant descriptive statistics, assessing initial tests and

conducting regression tests. I fourthly discuss results with other studies and present some conclusions.

6.1 Method and Data

The List-Experiment

As I have discussed (see Chapter 2), vote buying has a propensity to social desirability. In order to reduce such error, following a growing area of experiments (Gonzalez, De-Jonge & Meseguer 2017, Greene 2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015, De Jonge 2015, Gonzalez et al 2014, Corstange 2012, Gonzalez 2012), I employ an alternative variation of an unobtrusive measurement technique called List-experiment. Scholars have used the technique to reduce people's incentives to hide the truth. The method assumes that if a sensitive topic is asked anonymously and confidentially, respondents have more incentives to offer a truthful response, mitigating then underreporting. Political scientists first employed this method to explain racial prejudice (Kuklinski et al 1997, Kuklinski, Cobb & Gilens 1997) but also, they have studied other sensitive themes as religion (Kane, Craig & Wald 2004). Indeed, a particular study has already proven that the instrument works well by testing vote buying and social desirability bias (Gonzalez et al 2012). The analysis asks directly, indirectly and embeds the experiment in a nationally presentative survey in Nicaragua.

The method works as follows, a sample is split into two groups, the control and treatment. Respondents from control group receive a list of non-sensitive items, whereas those from the treatment group receive the same

list with the sensitive item added. Since the treatment group has one more option to choose, the difference in means test is bounded between 0 and 1 and represents the proportion of respondents from the treatment group admitting the sensitive item, they,

[A]re asked to tell the interviewer how many of the listed items they do/believe, and specifically not which items they are. Treatment group respondents, meanwhile, receive the same list as the control group, plus one more item that measures a sensitive topic, and receive the same instructions. Respondent anonymity is assured transparently because no one, not even the interviewer or analyst, can know whether or not a treatment group respondent's answer included or excluded the sensitive item (Corstange 2009: 48).

For instance, if the average number of items self-reported by the control group is 2.60 and one indicated by the treatment group is 2.75, we deduct that 15% of respondents admitted the sensitive item ($2.75 - 2.60 = 0.15$, and $0.15 \times 100 = 15\%$). Thus, if the sensitive item does not occur, we would expect no difference in the mean of items reported by each group. Also, the technique works with three main assumptions, i) randomisation of the treatment group, ii) no design effect, and iii) no liar for any respondent. However, list experiments have some problems. The data analysis is limited, the technique lacks multivariate regression estimators and the design hinders statistical analysis of characteristics of respondents who admitted the sensitive items. Glynn (2013) argue that limitations lie in the three aspects, the size of the sample –which determines the precision of the method–, there is no individual answer for a standard analysis, and the ceiling/floor effects.

In order to solve some of analytical restrictions, Blair & Imai (2012: 49) 'move beyond the standard difference-in-means analysis by developing new multivariate regression estimators under various designs of list experiments'. Authors argue that this method, called LISTIT, provides researchers with tools to examine who is more likely to answer sensitive items affirmatively. In this alternative method, there is no change in the procedure for the treatment group; however, respondents in the control group are asked to evaluate each item as a binomial process 'yes' or 'no'. By asking each of the items in the list individually to respondents in the control group, we can estimate the values of their corresponding covariates among the respondents in the treatment group. Guided by Blair & Imai (2012), I conduct this alternative version called LISTIT but, I employ this method to test one of the control items (see The Phrase of Timing within the Sensitive Question below). Carkoglu & Aytac (2015) have tested a LISTIT technique for studying vote buying in the 2011 Turkish Parliamentary Elections. By testing the ICT against the direct question on vote buying, authors find that whereas 35% of the people admitted being targeted through LISTIT, 16% acknowledged the exposition when asked directly.

Mexico provides significant insight into the renewed debate on vote buying. Mexican politics works with strong party's organisation, Mexican voters are highly familiarised with clientelistic exchanges and electoral reforms have encouraged personal interactions between politicians and voters. As I have argued in Chapter 3, Mexican parties and governments have traditionally delivered clientelistic benefits to individuals and social groups. At first, such distribution was addressed to win loyalty to the regime

but as opposition parties began to gain more spaces locally and federally, this distribution reshaped its forms, methods and objectives. Mexican citizens, on the other hand, have also got used to receive benefits from politicians, particularly during campaigns. Mexicans cope with promises of goods, policies, programmes and infrastructure plans most of the time. As a result, Mexico has developed a strong parties' organisation to ease clientelistic politics, what scholars have studied as *machine politics* or *political machines* (Larreguy, Montiel & Querubin 2017, Hidalgo & Nichter 2016, Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015, Schaffer & Baker 2015, Lawson & Greene 2014, Zarazaga 2014, Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2014, Nichter 2008, Hilgers 2008, 2005, Stokes 2005). In addition, constitutional electoral reforms have pursued principles of democratic pluralism, fairness and equality; however, such changes have set appropriate circumstances for vote buying to succeed. For example, whereas the restriction of access to TV and Radio has given more control to electoral authorities over parties' spending audit, it has forced them to develop more strategies in the ground contacting electors personally. It has been proven (Hagene 2015, Hilgers 2008, 2005) that face-to-face interaction enhances clientelistic ties. Therefore, theoretical discussion and research design might be extensive to those political systems with strong political machines, particularly in the Latin-American region. Finally, this analysis contributes to recent experimental evidence on vote buying in Mexico (Greene 2016, De-Jonge 2015, Nichter & Plamer Rubin 2014), which has re-opened the debated about the success of this strategy.

Based on the discussion and review of vote buying in Chapter 2 (i.e. its defining attributes, its distinct conceptual aspects from clientelism and patronage, and the implications on empirical research), I design the LISTIT instrument satisfying two conditions. First, the wording of the sensitive item, emphasising two factors, the timing and a consummated exchange. Therefore, I include explicitly '*Near the Election Day*'. This methodological decision is also based on the second phase of my two-stage model (see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2) and the prohibition of performing canvassing and electioneering three days before the Election Day in Mexico (see Section 3.4, Chapter 3). Second, I include the action of receiving rather than proffering. The fact of offering goods to voters during campaigns illustrates targeting but not necessarily a consummated action of vote buying. I ask explicitly '*they gave you money or a gift for you to vote for a candidate or party*'.

I set then the procedure in the following way, after dividing randomly the sample into two groups, I expose respondents in each group to two different cards. The treatment group received a card asking the sensitive item in third place as follows

A card of various activities will be hand out, and I would like you to tell me if candidates or activists carried them out during the last Presidential campaign (the one in which Enrique Peña Nieto won the presidency). Please, **DO NOT TELL ME WHICH ONES, ONLY HOW MANY.**

- They visited your home to talk to someone;
- They put up campaign posters or signs in your neighbourhood/city;
- *Near the Election Day, they gave you money or a gift for you to vote for a specific candidate or a political party.*
- They broadcasted campaign advertisements on radio or television;
- They communicated you in detail their candidates' manifesto.

The control group, in contrast, received another card with the list of the non-sensitive items with simple options of “yes” / “no” as follows, *a card of various activities will be hand out, and I would like you to tell me which ones candidates or activists carried them out during the last Presidential electoral campaign (the one in which Enrique Peña Nieto won the presidency)*. To overcome social desirability bias, instead of reading the list of items (as conducted by Greene 2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015), the interviewers gave to respondents of both treatment and control groups the cards for them to read it and then report their answers.

There is a limitation. The wording of the sensitive item phrasing ‘*near the election day*’ has not been tested in this Mexico. However, there is a study technique on vote buying using ICT in the Philippines (2013) demonstrates the effects of a similar wording. The examination focuses on the incidence of vote buying on polling days. Therefore, the experiment sets explicitly the phrase of timing in the overall question, *[h]ere are some things that can happen to people during election day. How many of these things happened to you? You don’t have to tell us which things happened, just how many [...]*. (cited in footnote 20, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015: 14). And the sensitive item is worded as follow, *[d]id Someone Offered you Money for your Vote?* Despite the fact that the study offers insights about sensitivity of respondents to the phrase of during the election day,

I elaborate a set of four non-sensitive items based on Glynn (2013). I first ask two items to avoid too much low-variance, one very likely and another very unlikely to occur. With this decision, I expect to balance the

ceiling/floor effects. These items were placed second (campaign poster or signs in the neighbourhood) and last (candidates' manifesto in detail) on both cards. In Mexico, posters and signs in streets during campaigns are very common strategies, in particular, after restricting parties the access to media broadcasting (see Section 3.4, Chapter 3).¹⁴⁸ In contrast, parties and candidates struggle to communicate their manifesto effectively during campaigns.¹⁴⁹ It is very unlikely that citizens know parties' proposals in detail. This idea also relates to those claims of democratic disconnections between politicians and citizens (Serra 2012). It has been argued that during campaigns debates focus on mutual accusations rather discussing manifestos and public policies.¹⁵⁰ Secondly, I set two more non-sensitive items based on media and personal strategies of communication. During elections, politicians conduct *ground* and *air* tactics. The ground refers to activists visiting electors, knocking doors, whereas air refers to broadcasting messages on radio and television. There are some reasons to conduct one tactic over the other, but it usually depends on the contest and particular conditions of the area (i.e. restricted access to areas with adverse geographical conditions versus restrictive access to electric energy to watch and listen to TV and radio). Air strategies are rather important for

¹⁴⁸ The fact of stuffing streets with political advert is indeed a problem in crowded cities since no politician accomplishes placing regulations, and additionally, removing these stuffs after elections implies high costs. Excelsior, 'Propaganda política invade las calles', Sunday 26 April 2015, Elecciones D.F., <http://www.excelsior.com.mx/comunidad/2015/04/26/1020808> (accessed on Wednesday 13 July 2016).

¹⁴⁹ Formato Siete, 'Carecen de propuestas las campañas de candidatos a gobernador: Ventura' Thursday 14 April 2016, Veracruz, <http://formato7.com/2016/04/14/carecen-propuestas-las-campanas-candidatos-gobernador-ventura/> (accessed on Thursday 14 July 2016).

¹⁵⁰ El Financiero, 'Hubo campañas sin propuestas ni diagnósticos, critica Córdova', Friday 3 June 2016, <http://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/nacional/hubo-campanas-sin-propuestas-ni-diagnosticos-critica-cordova.html> (accessed on Thursday 14 July 2016).

campaigns. It is usual for parties to broadcast messages.¹⁵¹ Parties also develop ground strategies to interact with electors, especially in those remote precincts, whose access to media is limited. As a result, I elaborate two non-sensitive items asking whether, during campaigns, activists visited households to talk to someone; and if they broadcasted campaign advertisements on radio or television.

To overcome problems of negative correlation, I worded the non-sensitive items avoiding mutual exclusion. They can concur at any time during campaigns up to polling days. Finally, the decision about the number of items in both, the treatment and the control groups, responds to Glynn (2013) and Tsuchiya, Hirai & Ono (2007) arguments regarding the risks of short (ceiling/floor effects) and large (measurement error) items list.

Control Questions

In addition to embedding the LISTIT in a nationally representative survey, I included two control questions. Both are based on two particular features of a vote-buying transaction, rewarding switching voters and interacting with activists to close the deal. Firstly, to test the effects of vote buying on voting behaviour, I develop a three-choice question, asking respondents which of these suited better their own experience. I worded the question and answers as follows,

¹⁵¹ Official reports confirm that for the 2015 Midterm Federal Elections, around 1.6 thousand broadcasters transmitted more than 23.1 million political spots across the country from January to June. Informe de resultados del monitoreo del primer semestre de 2015, INE, http://ife.org.mx/archivos3/portal/historico/recursos/IFE-v2/DEPPP/DEPPP-MonitoreoMedios/2015/inf_monitoreo_1er_sem_2015.pdf (accessed on Thursday 10 December 2015).

Regardless of what party you voted, could you tell me which of the following statements you would say suits better your own experience?

- I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day, and I DID VOTE for that option
- I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day, but I DID NOT VOTE for that option
- I had made NO choice BEFORE the Election Day
- DK/Prefer not to say

There is a consideration to note; the analysis focuses on switching voting decisions. As a result, I intentionally omit party' names from these questions to reduce external effects. In addition, I set the wording in two stages, the final voting choice versus a preference previously chosen.

Second, based on my two-stage model of the vote-buying strategy of mobilisation and the qualitative evidence discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, I assume that interactions of party's activists with voters a few days before and during polling days is crucial to seal vote-buying deals. Literature has agreed that timing a defining attribute that distinguishes vote buying from other clientelistic exchanges (Nichter 2014). For example, a study in Taiwan (Wang & Kurzman 2007) shows that successful electoral mobilisations to buy votes occurs during the Election Day. Also, evidence the Philippines shows that '[m]ost of the vote-buying occurs in the last few days before the election' (Hicken et al 2015: 352). Additionally, based on electoral observers' reports, another study demonstrates 'that vote buying occurs in the days before the election and that candidates and their brokers can re-target vote buying quickly' (Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015: 14). As a result, the second control quesiton assumes that this interaction between activists and voters is addressed to close transactions of rewards and votes.

Therefore, I ask respondents whether *during the Election Day any activist contacted them*. The assumption that sustains this question is that the reason activists contact voters during polling days is to close vote-buying deals.

In order to estimate effects of the interaction between activists and electors during the Election Day and along the campaign, I employ the first non-sensitive item of the ICT (i.e. during the last Presidential campaign [...] I would like you to tell me if candidates or activists visited your home to talk to someone) as control variable (see The Phrase of Timing within the Sensitive Question below).

The designs included another variable such as party identification. The question asked respondents to indicate the name of the party and the magnitude of their identification between two options such as 'strongly identified' and 'slightly identified'. Overall, respondents were given 20 options to choose (see the Spanish version of questions, 6.1 Survey Technical Report). Finally, guided by empirical studies analysing the relationship between demographics and vote buying (Jensen & Justesen 2014, Justesen & Bjørnskov 2014, Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Balafoutas 2011, Bratton 2008), I test predictors such as age, gender and education level.

There are a few aspects of the research design that can undermine the results. First, after modelling list experiments using LISTIT, Corstange (2009) has confirmed the limitations of this technique associated with the size of the sample. The simulations conducted show that using LISTIT with fewer than 1000 cases might lessen its explanatory power. The size of this

sample is constituted of 800 cases; therefore, this study is located in the bottom borderline.

Second, by asking differently to respondents, the list of items between the treatment and control groups (how many versus which ones), interviewees from the latter might over-report values. Both groups of respondents received the card, read the items and reported the answer. This procedure suggests that people in the control group can read more carefully the list of items since the question is which ones. Conversely, it might be the case that people in the treatment group could read more carelessly the items because the question states how many. Nevertheless, further tests are required to confirm these potential explanations.

Third, the wording of the sensitive item is different compared to other list experiments on vote buying (Greene 2016, Çarkoğlu & Aytac 2015, De Jonge 2015, González-Ocantos et al 2012). I specified more the vote-buying exchange, restricted the action to the Election Day, and removed the clientelistic factor (favours). As a result, respondents in the treatment group might understand the purpose of the card, underreporting vote buying.

6.2 Results

I gathered 11 variables divided into three categories as demographics, politics-related and experiment-related (see Table 6.1).¹⁵² Demographics

¹⁵² I embedded an alternative version of list-experiment LISTIT, in a face-to-face, nationally representative survey, conducted by Defoe, within the period 11-13 April 2015; including 800 cases. The survey employed a multistage random sample with 300 final sampling points (segments), including an average of 2-3 respondents per segment. Sampling proceeds as follows, the sample is framed by selecting electoral districts with proportional probability to each size of the states (32). The questionnaire was applied to one adult (18+) per household, randomly selected, with a valid voting id and chosen by the last birthday date. For full details, see Appendix 6.1 Survey Technical Report.

are constituted of gender, age education and household income. Politics-related variables are constituted of party identification, contacting electors and first versus final people's choice. The table also shows the list of items presented to the control group for the list experiment.

Table 6. 1 Summary of Variables Gathered

Variable	N
<i>Demographics</i>	4
1. Gender (Male=1 / Female=2 / DK=9)	
2. Age (18-99 / DK=9)	
3. Education (None=1 / P=2 / S=3 / PS=4 / T=5 / DK=9)*	
4. Household income Mx (-\$1500=1 / \$1501-\$3000=2 / \$3001- \$6000 = 3 / \$6001-\$12000=4 / 12000+=5 / DK=9)	
<i>Politics-related</i>	3
1. Party identification (Strongly/Slightly for each party=1-20 / DK=9)	
2. Electors contacted during the Election Day (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)	
3. First versus final choice (Did=1 / Did Not=2 / No choice=3 / DK=9)	
<i>Experiment-related (Control Group)</i>	4
1. Visiting households (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)	
2. Campaign posters or signs (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)	
3. Broadcasting advert (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)	
4. Communicating manifestos (Yes=1 / No=2 / DK=9)	
Total	11

Notes:

* P = Primary (Some high school or less); S = Secondary (High School); PS=Post-secondary and non-tertiary education (Some college; trade and technical education); T = First and second stage tertiary education (College and Postgraduate).

Descriptive Statistics

I first explore the reliability of the four non-sensitive items (control group), which worked moderately well. The frequencies (see Appendix 6.3 Experiment Related) show that more than a half (55%) of the respondents admitted to seeing posters or signs around their neighbourhoods, whereas less than 20% of the people admitted to knowing candidates' manifesto in detail. The other items measuring the field and air strategies of campaigning report similar values. Around 25% of the respondents reported being visited by activists at home, whereas nearly 60% acknowledged listened to or

watching party's advert on radio or television during campaigns. Unexpectedly, this value was higher than the posters or signs around neighbourhoods. The lower value of the posters and signs compared to the radio and television may cause floor effects, especially in combination with non-experimental items and demographics.

Preliminary results of the control questions (see Appendix 6.4 Control Questions) show that more than 20% of the respondents changed their first choice the Election Day. As there is no similar measure to compare, I may say the result is higher than I could expect. Likewise, surprisingly, 15% of the whole sample admitted being contacted by activists during the Election Day. Although a very basic test, this result is consistent with other recent estimations of vote-buying targeting in Mexico (De-Jonge 2015: 14%). Frequencies and distributions of the demographics (see Appendix 6.2 Demographics) are consistent with official national data.¹⁵³

In addition, I conduct a preliminary cross tabulation analysis to determine the level of correlation between those respondents contacted by activists and those who changed their first choice the Election Day. Results (see Appendix 6.5 Cross tabulation) are significant ($p < 0.01$) and show that more than 30% of the respondents contacted by activists also changed their first choice the Election Day. Additionally, to test collinearity problems, I examine the level of correlation between those respondents contacted by activists during the Election Day, and those respondents visited at home by activists during the campaign (the first non-sensitive item). Results are significant ($p < 0.01$) and show that more than one-third (37%) of the

¹⁵³ INEGI, <http://www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/mexicocifras/default.aspx?e=> (accessed on Monday 18 January 2016).

respondents reported both answers as yes. This value suggests an appropriate people's understanding of the questions.

Table 6.2 shows the frequencies of items reported in both treatment and control group. As I pointed out, there are floor effects since the nearly half of the respondents in both groups admitted zero and one item. Furthermore, more than 30% of the respondents of the treatment group reported only one item, whereas the control group reported two. Unexpectedly, there are four negative values overall.

Table 6. 2 Frequency Report of the List Experiment


Item count	Control Group (C)		Treatment Group (T)		Variance (T - C)
	N	(%)	N	(%)	
0	112	28.0	90	22.50	-22
1	68	17.0	135	33.75	67
2	124	31.0	107	26.75	-17
3	74	18.5	51	12.75	-23
4	22	5.5	14	3.50	-8
5	.		3	.75	.
N	400	100	400	100	

The Phrase of Timing in the Sensitive Item Question

As I have argued, LISTIT technique asks respondents in the control group the non-sensitive items individually. By accessing to separate measures of each item, I compare its frequencies with one of the control questions on the survey. As I have argued, in the first non-sensitive item I use the phrase *during the campaign* whereas in the control questions I worded *during the Election Day*. Both the non-sensitive item and the control question denote the interaction between political activists and voters, which is imperative for vote-buying. Figure 6.1 shows a difference of 13 percentage points between the item and the question. Activists seem to interact with voters more during

campaigns than during the election day. Theoretically, there are more reasons for activists to contact voters, some of these interactions are indeed legitimate activities of electioneering and canvassing. Results, therefore, might indicate some reaction of respondents to the different phrasing *during the campaign* versus *during the election day*.

Figure 6. 1 Proportion of respondents Self-Reporting contact with activists of the List Experiment



Source: Author.

Notes: (See Appendix 6.3)

* LISTIT: N = 393.

** Direct question: N = 400.

Statistical Analysis

I perform this analysis in two steps. The first estimates the number of respondents engaged in vote buying by using the difference in means test through the list-experiment. This analysis is straightforward since I just compare means values. But, as I employ the modified version of the list-experiment called LISTIT (Corstange 2009), I calculate the control group

mean by adding the individual 'yes' answers from the non-sensitive questions. Secondly, I also analyse variables coming from the control questions and demographic variables such as gender, age, education and income.

The control group mean was 1.57, whereas the treatment one was 1.46 (Table 6.3). Contrary to the basis of the list experiment, these values produced a negative result (-0.14). Respondents did not engage in vote buying overall. Most categories of analysis kept the same negative trend. The fact of asking the set of items individually to the control group appears to affect responses. Gender does not seem to affect vote-buying activities, as men and women reported similar values. More educated people also reported similar values to less educated. With negative values, poorer respondents seemed to engage in vote buying slightly more than wealthier people.

Table 6. 3 Difference in means test (treatment and control group)

	Control Group Mean (4 items)	Treatment Group Mean (5 items)	Std. Deviation		Var.	N
			Ctrl	Trtmt		
Sample	1.57	1.43	1.23	1.12	-0.14	800
<i>Demographic Variables</i>						
Gender (Female)	1.60	1.47	1.24	1.21	-0.13	374
Gender (Male)	1.53	1.40	1.22	1.04	-0.13	426
Age (-34)	1.54	1.48	1.12	1.18	-0.06	322
Age (35-54)	1.57	1.36	1.29	1.11	-0.21	344
Age (55+)	1.49	1.67	1.32	1.00	0.18	95
Education (Up to second.)	1.49	1.37	1.22	1.05	-0.12	456
Education (Post second.)	1.67	1.52	1.24	1.20	-0.15	313
<i>Household income*</i>						
- MX\$3,000	1.50	1.43	1.24	1.10	-0.07	216
MX\$3,001 - 6,000	1.43	1.32	1.23	1.05	-0.11	323
MX\$6,001 +	1.79	1.70	1.16	1.25	-0.09	180
<i>Control Variables (those...)</i>						
DO lean towards a party	1.47	1.47	1.30	1.24	0.00	368
DO NOT lean towards a party	1.76	1.59	1.18	1.09	-0.17	253
Who had already made a choice BEFORE the Election Day but DID NOT vote for that option	1.64	1.79	1.28	1.39	0.15	164

	<i>Control Group Mean (4 items)</i>	<i>Treatment Group Mean (5 items)</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>		<i>Var.</i>	<i>N</i>
			<i>Ctrl</i>	<i>Trtmt</i>		
Who had already made a choice BEFORE the Election Day and DID vote for that option	1.68	1.50	1.17	1.05	-0.18	377
CONTACTED by a candidate or activist during the Election Day	2.76	1.91	0.95	1.18	-0.85	118
NOT CONTACTED by a candidate or activist during the Election Day	1.40	1.31	1.17	1.08	-0.09	637

Notes: * Exchange rate: Mx\$24 = £1.

However, those people contacted by activists during the Election Day were 85 percentage points less likely of engaging in vote buying. While this result is unexpected, it may have two explanations. The finding can simply indicate that respondents of the control group were much more likely to have been contacted. Based on qualitative evidence from Chapters 4 and 5, personal interaction between electors and activists is a necessary condition of vote buying. Second, despite the fact that records of the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes show a considerably increasing trend of reports on vote-buying within the seven preceding days before the polling day (see Figure 4.2, Chapter 4), it is likely that respondents were exposed to non-party activists performing other duties and non-vote-buying activities.

Individuals self-reported as not lean towards a party were less likely engaged in vote buying tactics than those respondents lean-to. Even though Nichter' (2008) theory refers to voting choices instead voters' attitudes or sentiments, this finding of individuals lean to a party engaging more in vote buying suggests mobilisation of turnout buying.

Two categories report positive results. First, the fact of dividing age values switches the sense. The eldest people (+55) were 18% more likely to engage in vote buying, whereas the youngest group was less likely.

Secondly, respondents who did not vote for their first option were 15% more likely to engage in vote buying. Given that the main sources of shaping electoral preferences (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet 1948) as media, campaign and individual messages are restricted at this final stage of the election, this result suggests a positive effect of vote-buying on switching voting choices. This finding appears to be consistent with statistics frequencies. Cross-tabulation reports show that more than 32% of the people contacted by activists during the Election Day, eventually switched voting choices (see Appendix 6.5 Cross Tabulations). However, further tests are required to explore such suggestion more rigorously.

The results from the list experiment estimate averages of vote buying by socioeconomic and political categories. Positive results such as age (+55) and people eventually voting for a different option are theoretically related to vote buying. Additionally, the percentage of respondents rejecting being contacted the near the Election Day and the variance of those lean towards a party should say something about people getting targeted. To test this claim, I conduct an OLS regression analysis proposed by Holbrook & Krosnick (2010) predicting the count provided by respondents with a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent received the short list or the long list, the changing decision,¹⁵⁴ and the interactions of the list length dummy variable with each changing decision case. Additionally, I conducted a logistic regression analysing the effects of contacting electors during the Election Day, demographics such as gender, education level and income, and elector's identification to a party. These tests contribute to exploring

¹⁵⁴ Those respondents who had made their decision before the Election Day but eventually did not vote for that option.

conventional assumptions that poor people get targeted (Jensen & Justesen 2014, Justesen & Bjørnskov 2014, Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Balafoutas 2011, Bratton 2008) but poor, less educated and uninterested in politics people get bought.

Table 6.4 presents the estimated effects of respondents switching decision on vote buying. There was no significant effect of the interaction of variables on vote buying. However, the value is consistent with the number reported in the LISTIT (15%, Table 6.3), a positive effect for those respondents switching choices and vote buying.

Table 6. 4 Effects of Switching Choices on Vote Buying

	Item Count Technique	Std. Error	Beta	t
Changing decision	0.06	0.14	.02	.41
Interaction	0.15	0.19	.04	.80
(Constant)	1.59	0.06	.00	25.98
N	800			
Adjusted R ²	0.00			

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Whether the non-significance is explained by the experiment design, I conduct a logistic regression employing demographics and political variables. With the questions of control, I created two dummy dependent variables, one of those contacted by activists during the election day and another of the interaction of those contacted and those switching voting choices.¹⁵⁵ Based on my two-stage model, I argue that respondents contacted during polling day were highly likely to be exposed to a vote-

¹⁵⁵ A) During the Election Day, did any candidate or activist contact you? 1) Yes 0) No; B) Which of the following statements you would say suits better your own experience? 1) *I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day, but I DID NOT VOTE for that option* 0) *I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day and I DID VOTE for that option / I had made NO choice BEFORE the Election Day.*

buying deal and the interaction between people contacted and switching choices near the Election Day illustrates individuals closing vote-buying deals. In order to examine the effect of demographics in detail, I created dummy variables for age, income and level of education testing conventional assumptions about the eldest, poorest and least educated people more exposed to vote buying.¹⁵⁶

In models 1 and 3 I use the overall explanatory variables and models 2 and 4 I use dummy variables (Table 6.5) segmenting such variables. Table 6.5 reports only discussable segments of variables. There was, then, one significant effect of the demographic variables on people contacted during the Election Day, the eldest group of people (+55).¹⁵⁷ Nearly 60% of the elderly individuals are more likely to get contacted by activists. While this significant result is consistent with the experiment, it also suggests that elder people were more contacted but less likely to switch choices since the shifts from model 2 to 4. Equally, the age changes the direction and magnitude of the effect considerably in models 1 and 3, but they are not significant.

Even though the results of the lowest education level are also not significant, they totally swing the effects from negative to positive between people contacted and those switching choices. Consistent with studies on vote buying (Jensen & Justesen 2014), the least educated people were

¹⁵⁶ I analyse for age people 55<; for income >MX\$3,000; and for education level >secondary school.

¹⁵⁷ There is an interesting case for the 2010 Local Elections in Veracruz, in which 744 elderly voters were charged with lying to the National Electoral Registry when illegally they provided false addresses in order to vote for a party in electoral precincts they did not belong to. Despite not being vote buying, the case illustrates how the elderly targeted by parties. La Jornada Veracruz '744 órdenes de aprehensión contra turistas electorales', Monday 26 September 2011, Política, http://www.jornadaveracruz.com.mx/Post.aspx?id=110926_122444_591 (accessed on Monday 30 October 2017).

more likely to be contacted but, in contrast, less likely to switch voting choices. Moreover, the same pattern is observed between model 3 and 4. Contrarily to other studies (Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Balafoutas 2011, Bratton 2008), the effect of the income is different between people contacted and changing choices (models 2 and 4). The poorest people were equally contacted than the others; however, richer people were more likely to switch choices. Models 3 and 4 show a different story when analysing the lowest income group, results change totally but provide not significant evidence. Although party identification similarly presents no effects across the models, they are unexpectedly higher in model 3. The poorest and least educated electors strongly lean towards a party are less likely to switch choices.

Table 6. 5 Estimation Models of Vote Buying

	Contacted during the Election Day		Contacted during the Election Day / Switching choices	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Age (1-6)	0.05 (0.19)		-0.20 (0.31)	
Eldest group (1-0)		0.59* (0.33)		-0.01 (0.56)
Gender (1-0)	0.16 (0.24)	0.20 (0.24)	0.15 (0.39)	0.08 (0.37)
Education (1-5)	-0.13 (0.14)		-0.14 (0.42)	
Lowest Educ. Level (1-0)		-.21 (0.26)		0.18 (0.40)
Income (1-5)	-0.01 (0.25)		0.32 (0.39)	
Lowest income (1-0)		0.02 (0.28)		-0.34 (0.44)
Party Identification (1-0)	0.01 (0.24)	0.00 (0.24)	0.20 (0.40)	0.06 (0.37)
Constant	-1.50* (0.79)	-1.88*** (0.44)	-3.14* (1.06)	-2.87*** (0.67)
N	509	509	499	499
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00

Notes:

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Models are logistic regressions. Answers 'strongly lean towards PAN, PRI, PRD, PT, PVEM, Movimiento Ciudadano, MORENA' were aggregated for party identification (see Appendix 6.1 Survey Technical Report, the Spanish version of the survey, p3_1).

"No answer/prefer not to say" are excluded.

Standard Error in parenthesis.

In order to explore further the relationship between switchers and activists contacting voters during the Election Day,¹⁵⁸ I conduct a logistic regression, but I test the variables differently. This analysis uses as predictors the variable of political activists contacting electors, in combination with party identity and demographics. It also employs the variable of switching choices as the dependent variable. Although this model requires further tests, I work on the assumption of the Mexican case. If campaigning and organising rallies and meetings near the Election Day are forbidden activities (see Section 3.4, Chapter 3), the objective of contacting electors during that period is to manipulate voting choices.

Thus, I employ demographics and party identification variables similarly as explanatory factors. Overall, results from models 1 and 2 (Table 6.6) show that political factors are stronger predictors than demographics. They also show that more than 80% of the electors contacted by political activists during the Election Day changed their first choice. Moreover, the poorest, eldest and least educated people seemed to be slightly more persuadable than the rest of the respondents. Surprisingly, people reportedly lean towards a party were 60% more likely to switch voting choices near the Election Day. But the questionnaire does give limited information to know whether or not the final choice of respondents is the same than the one they feel lean-to. There is a negative relationship between age and choice changing. This result suggests that younger

¹⁵⁸ A first cross table analysis shows a significant relationship between these two variables $p < 0.001$ (see Appendix 6.5).

people were about 30% less likely to be persuadable to switch choices than elderly individuals. Such measure, indeed, doubles in model 2, up to nearly 60%, but the value is not significant.

The rest of the variables are not significant. However, consistent with notions about Mexican politics (Ugalde & Rivera 2013), men were 20% less likely to change their first choice than women when contacted by activists during the Election Day. Contrary to the multivariate analysis (Table 6.6), the education level shows a null effect on people's choices in both models. This finding would confirm clientelistic claims (Stokes et al 2013, Stokes 2005, 2007) that less educated electors are more likely be targeted for vote buying, but conversely, it also demonstrates that the least educated people were equally likely to switch choices than any other one. In model 1, the income shows no effect on people's choices, but this measure rises moderately in model 2 to nearly 10%. Differently from the education level, these results suggest that poorer people were fairly more persuadable than wealthier individuals. But further research is required to confirm this claim. Both values models 1 and 2 are not significant though.

Table 6. 6 Estimation Models of Voters' Decision

	Model 1	Model 2
Age (1-6)	-0.29*** (0.17)	
Eldest group (1-0)		-0.58 (0.37)
Gender (1-0)	-0.23 (0.22)	-0.23 (0.22)
Education (1-5)	-0.01 (0.13)	
Lowest Education Level (1-0)		0.01 (0.24)
Income (1-5)	-0.01 (.0.23)	
Lowest income (1-0)		-0.08 (0.26)
Party Identification (1-0)	0.64***	0.62***

	Model 1	Model 2
	(0.23)	(0.23)
Contact of political activists (1-0)	0.82***	0.85***
	(0.26)	(0.26)
Constant	-0.73	-1.20***
	(0.73)	(0.40)
N	467	467
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.06

Notes:

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.

Models are logistic regressions.

Answers 'strongly lean towards PAN, PRI, PRD, PT, PVEM, Movimiento Ciudadano, MORENA' were aggregated for party identification (see Appendix 6.1 Survey Technical Report, the Spanish version of the survey, p3_1).

"No answer/prefer not to say" are excluded.

Standard Error in parenthesis.

6.3 Discussion

The findings of LISTIT were unexpected. They suggest that respondents might be aware of the sensitive item but equally they can reflect that other activities involving activists can occur near polling days. Although my effort to test the wordings *during the election day* and *during campaign* suggests some sensitivity of respondents, further research is needed to confirm this idea. The interaction between activists and voters during polling days seems to have effects on voter's choices. These effects appear to be stronger on the poorest, eldest, least educated people. Alternative items retesting direct questioning appear to contribute to overcome potential effects of social desirability bias; however, they might present some inferential problems. Alternative items asking directly provide insights to turn to wording as potential methods for sensitive topics. In the case of vote buying, the fact of excluding phrases as "politicians", "money", "for your vote" when wording the question can provide people with anonymity. The 15% of individuals contacted by activists during the Election Day estimated by the control question provide some insights about the extent of electoral

mobilisation highlighted by literature (Greene 2016, Nichter & Palmer Rubin 2014) and electoral observation reports (Alianza Civica 2012). Although these measures can produce issues of external validity, they can be tested empirically in any context banning electioneering and canvassing near polling days as well restricted access to media.

Results from Corstange's (2009) multivariate regression were not significant. However, they suggest a similar number to the direct question (15%) of the electors switching choices. Equally, the overall results from the list experiment were unexpectedly negative, but they provided insights for conducting further with using the factors of timing and electors contacted by activists near polling days. Although LISTIT tends to work well when assessing vote buying (Carkoglu & Aytac 2015), there is some consensus about potential measurement error as it,

...is unlikely to purge all social desirability bias from responses and the point estimate is likely to constitute a lower bound. Vote buying may be such a sensitive topic that some respondents may be reluctant to "tell the truth" even when provided a forum where it is literally impossible to determine which individuals report vote buying (Gonzalez et al, 2012: 215).

One explanation could be the method of collecting data (LISTIT). It seems that phrasing the questions differently could guide respondents to think more carefully about each answer, for the control group, and more carelessly, for the treatment group, when exposed to a set of options. Another explanation may be the adjustment to the sensitive item wording. The fact of making explicit the exchange of money or goods near polling days for votes could also have triggered some bias.

Studies using list experiments in other countries have estimated an incidence of vote buying from 6% (De-Jonge 2015) to 55% (Corstange 2009). Although predictors such as demographics can explain better this level of incidence (Jensen & Justesen 2014, Weitz-Shapiro 2012, Balafoutas 2011, Bratton 2008), the proportion of people estimated with list experiment seems to respond to the wording (Kuklinski, Cobb & Gilens 1997). The two highest estimations, 55% in Lebanon (Corstange 2009) and 35% in Turkey (Carkoglu & Aytaç 2015), employed the more open wording for the sensitive items. They both read as follows, *'someone offered you or your family personal services, a job, or something similar in exchange of your vote'*. The reflection behind respondents' answers is that vote-buying rewards could include benefits for other people, which, in addition to open such possibility, it prompts voters to respond yes, more relaxingly. This pattern was found in UNDP (2006) when employing direct questioning but opening the item to a type of collective behaviour.

Non-academic claims (Alianza Civica 2012), domestic literature in Mexico (Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013) and evidence collected here (see Chapters 4 and 5) suggest that, averagely, a broker can buy effectively up to 100 votes. Besides particular strategies of mobilisation, Corstange (2009), for example, estimates 55% of the Lebanese voters exposed to vote buying. Given that the national electoral register for the 2009 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections rose about 3.25 million,¹⁵⁹ it means that more than 1.75 million voters were involved. To achieve these numbers, Lebanese parties would need about 18 thousand brokers in the ground. A similar

¹⁵⁹ Source, International IDEA, Voter Turnout Database: <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/439/169/ctr> (Lebanon: 3,258,573).

exercise can be done with the study in Turkey (Carkoglu & Aytaç 2015), whose estimation rises 35% of the voters exposed to vote buying. For the 2015 Turkish Parliamentary Elections, the national electoral register rose nearly 60 million,¹⁶⁰ which means that almost 21 million voters dealt with vote buying. Equally, to succeed in this numbers Turkish parties would need about 210 thousand brokers on streets. The question, how many brokers would parties need to cover our estimation of vote buying provides an opportunity to know the extent of the mobilisation and the validity of our method.

My findings of 15% switching voting choice (non-significant) differ from another list-experiment conducted in Mexico (Greene 2016) in 2012, estimating more than 21% of people selling votes. There are some potential explanations. First, instead LISTIT the study employed a standard list-experiment technique. Additionally, the experiment was embedded in a panel study with two waves of interviews. Second, although it succeeded conducting tests of designs effects (Blair & Imai 2012), the card presented to respondents had three non-sensitive items for the control group and four for the treatment groups. Third, the wording of the overall question and items phrase '*how many activities you have done*' (Greene 2016: 17) instead of *how many activities they have done to you*. Although it is untested, this small change could drive respondents to assume the responsibility for the actions, which might enhance bias.

In addition, the measure of the study (Greene 2016) does not differentiate between legitimate actions of campaigns and illegal activities

¹⁶⁰ Source, International IDEA, Voter Turnout Database: <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/439/287/ctr> (Turkey: 56,965,099).

of vote buying. Equally, it does not distinguish between vote-buying effects from other explanatory factors during campaigns (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet 1948). In fact, the author recognises that legitimate activities could persuade voters' choices. Moreover, he states that '[a]lthough the list experiment reveals that more than a fifth of the electorate was involved in vote selling in 2012, this does not mean that all 10.9 million vote choices were determined by these exchanges' (Greene 2016: 19). The wording employed to measure both targeting and buying contributes to overcoming the distinction between legitimate actions of campaigns and vote buying and isolate the effects of vote buying on voters' choice from other factors.

My results also differ from Greene (2016) on how effective vote buying is. The study concluded that this action 'flounders because the legitimate campaigns force brokers to target many of the wrong voters with selective benefits' (Greene 2016: 21). Overall, the model relied on self-reporting data of party's choices in two periods comparing the differences of the coefficients to assess the vote-buying effect. The study also incorporates other interesting explanatory variables as economic evaluations, assessments of the candidates' competence in managing the economy, fighting crime, reducing poverty, and diminishing government corruption. By contrast, findings here suggest that vote buying is considerably effective during the Election Day; more than 80% of the switching-choices electors were contacted by activists during the election day.

There are two substantial differences compared to that study. First, Greene (2016) measured a slightly different type of exchange. Given that

the sensitive item included the factor of *services* as rewards, the expected answer might drive conclusions closer to patronage (see Section 2.2, Chapter 2). In contrast, I restricted reward to voting behaviour during the Election Day. Also, the study gathered robust data at the beginning and the end of the campaigns, which allow the author to compare results between two waves. This study, instead, segmented a control item on the basis of previous preference against final choice. Although these variations in the design and distinct methods to collect data can explain the margin of 6% between both studies, it is also plausible that such difference is only the outcome of two different years. Studies were fielded in different electoral years and those number might represent, indeed, the level of vote buying for those elections.

My findings have some limitations. First, the fact of excluding the parties' names from the alternative measures restricts a wider analysis of voting behaviour. For example, this study does not give information about preferences of electors. Equally, even though some results are significant, the variable *party identity* limits the extent of responses to two options, *strongly / not strongly*, which eventually could affect the answer.¹⁶¹ Second, besides age, despite that demographic variables were consistent with some literature (Jensen & Justesen 2014), they were not significant. In this sense, Mexico has remote areas quite unreachable to empirical research. A proportion of these regions is deprived. It is likely that some of them are unrepresented in this study. Third, the alternative control items require more tests and they might present restrictions for comparative research.

¹⁶¹ These results, indeed, differ from another study conducted in Mexico on vote buying and partisanship (Vidal et al 2010).

6.4 Conclusion

This Chapter provided empirical evidence from an alternative technique of a list experiment, showing the degree of incidence of vote buying during Mexican elections. Vote buying is still prevalent across the country and personal interaction between voters and brokers is crucial for this activity. Although the overall estimation of switchers in LISTIT seems to be consistent with other estimations, more rigorous tests are imperative. Although LISTIT presents some shortcomings, it also provides advantages. The fact of asking non-sensitive items individually gives the opportunity to compare frequencies with other questions on the survey. The most prevalent strategies of the campaign are broadcasting messages and posters about candidates in neighbourhoods. In contrast, communicating contents of parties' manifesto is still the foremost drawback of parties.

Finally, given that one in five voters switched their final voting choice despite having a different option during the campaign indicates that further analysis is required to explore preferences of voters in connection with the sources to shape political preferences. Since one in six Mexican voters met personally activists during the election day, when it is prohibited by law, indicates the level of electoral malpractices in Mexico. Even more, considering that eight in ten voters contacted by activists were switchers, further examinations on vote buying should take into account the interaction between voters and activists over self-reported exposition to the rewards. Several sources illustrate a big face-to-face mobilisation of electors during polling days, but this evidence provides insights on the extent and power of

such mobilisation. Evidence of this Chapter supports the last stage of my model of vote buying. (i.e. targeting versus buying). As I argued (see Chapter 2), the last face-to-face interaction between electors and activists serves to close arrangements.

Chapter 7. Conclusions

This dissertation examines the effects of vote buying on voting choices by exploring how voters face and engage in clientelistic offers and how parties mobilise activists to conduct practices of targeting and buying. Significant contributions of this dissertation are the proposal of an extended two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation, the development of an unconventional qualitative technique for analysing thousands of records on vote-buying and the conduction of an alternative experiment design embedded in a nationally representative survey. The two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation extends previous efforts (Nichter 2008), which measure the success of vote buying against voters' turnout and voting shares. Although this effort reveals voters' behaviour, it is unable to describe the process between the exposition to vote-buying offers and the final choice. In Chapter 2, I argued that a successful tactic of mobilisation to buy votes implies two phases, i) parties presenting voters with several offers, and ii) voters accepting one amongst a number of offers or rejecting all the offers. In addition, competing offers of vote buying implies that voters could reject one offer despite responding to vote buying. The extended two-stage model alleviates this puzzle. It divides vote buying into the stages of *targeting*, (electors contacted by activists and exposed to vote-buying offers) and

buying (electors entering the deal, receive rewards and undergo compliance mechanisms). By employing the two-phases model, this study shows that rewards distributed along the campaign are not confined exclusively to buy votes. Whereas a systematic allocation of benefits during earlier stages serve activists to access voters, the delivery of rewards near polling days intends to ensure the completion of vote buying.

The analysis of over fifteen years of reports on vote-buying from the National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes extends qualitative sources (Terry & Wong 2005, Arbon et al 2006). By examining non-recruited interviewees quotes, in Chapter 4, I captured crucial details of vote buying, some of them in real time, which could be hard to access from other methodologies. Given that the service provides callers with anonymity and confidentiality, accounts report sensitive information and criminal activity. Overall, testimonies served as a rich source to understand how individuals face vote buying strategies. Whilst findings here support other studies on tactics of vote buying and compliance in Mexico (Greene 2016, Nichter & Plamer-Rubin 2015, Mercado 2013, Ugalde & Rivera 2013), they provide new evidence on three practices, i) the dispensation of different rewards in opening and closing stages of campaign, ii) strategies of abstention buying and iii) vote-buying mobilisations around polling stations. Such evidence advances research uncovering conditions of vote buying near and during polling days (e.g. Hicken et al 2015, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015), the way adverse voting preferences are mitigated at polls and the conduction of contingent strategies by polling station as the last attempt to buy votes. However, this is a first study of those calls. Further research, for example,

on socioeconomic, geographical factors of callers and classifying rewards exchanged by party and level of election is imperative.

The particular design of the experiment conducted here pinpoints extra advantages of LISTIT techniques against shortcomings. Measuring the level of incidence of vote buying has particularly been a challenge for scholars as its undesirability and illegality. Some efforts have developed methods to estimate the number of voters targeted by activists in several countries (Speck & Abramo 2001, 2002, Brusco et al 2004, Stokes 2005, UNDP 2006). However, recent studies using experimental approaches have disputed previous findings (Gonzalez, De-Jonge & Meseguer 2017, Greene 2016, Carkoglu & Aytac 2015, De-Jonge 2015, Gonzalez et al 2015, Cruz, Keefer & Labonne 2015, Nichter and Palmer-Rubin 2014, Vicente 2014, Gonzalez et al 2012, Vicente & Wantchekon 2009, Corstange 2009, Wantchekon 2003) addressing issues of social desirability bias and self-protection against prosecution when respondents answer face-to-face questions.

Following a growing area of experiments, in Chapter 6, I conducted an alternative technique (LISTIT), embedded in a nationally representative survey, to test the effects of vote buying on electoral choices. Instead using demographic and political variables as control items, I employed the interaction with activists and the changing voting choices near the Election Day based on the two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation. Such strategy differs from previous efforts (Carkoglu & Aytac 2015). Results were non-significant, although the overall estimation generated a number of 15% of those respondents switching choices admitting being given vote-buying

rewards near polling days. While LISTIT provides alternative questions of control to estimate direct effects of vote buying on voting choices, the design alters wording. Some assumptions of the design require more rigorous tests.

Overall, the previous contributions of this dissertation demonstrate the importance of parties' mobilisations near and during polling days to close vote-buying deals, influencing voters' choices. Activists target voters to obtain information proffering rewards and voters face contexts of more than one vote-buying offer. But what are the broader implications of these findings for literature on vote buying? How do advance our understanding of the clientelistic relations between voters and activists? What do these findings add to existing debates? To what extent can these findings generalise? In following sections, I present theoretical and methodological points, dividing these conclusions into three sections, a summary of the argument and analytical tasks of the dissertation, and implications for theory and methods.

7.1 Summary

What are the effects of vote buying on voting choices? Do outcomes of elections respond to vote buying? Why do parties perform such practices if they are not successful? Why do electors do engage in it? Despite decades of research, scholars still differ on the extent vote buying the way it affects voting behaviour. Whilst qualitative designs suggest citizens disapprove such exchanges, surveys and experiments tell an opposite story. In order

to solve the puzzle, I approach vote buying through a case study on Mexico by examining, i) voters' exposition to vote buying, ii) brokers' tactics for targeting and buying voters, and iii) the effects of vote buying on voting choices. Given that literature has agreed on the complexity of the phenomenon, I make certain methodological and analytical decisions in connection with theories and techniques.

Given than prevalent theories on vote buying are based on clientelistic ties, some of its defining boundaries with other concepts as patronage and clientelism are a little bit diffuse. In Chapter 2, therefore, I review the field and revisit its conceptual features to contribute to clarifying differences. In order to achieve the task, I first categorise studies and dimensions to, secondly, discuss the core attributes of clientelism and patronage. Resulting reflections indicate that scholars tend to state on vote buying as managing attributes from patronage and clientelism. By examining implications of the distinct uses of vote buying on empirical findings, I show that the conceptual ambiguity affects some conclusions, particularly, those from designs operationalising definitions. Although incipient attempts have contributed to our current understanding, some studies have assessed different dimensions of vote buying. Such reflections allowed me to develop the alternative two-stage model of vote-buying mobilisation.

Since Mexico has held plenty of studies on clientelistic transactions, I selected the case to answer guiding research questions. In Chapter 3, I discussed the extensive features of Mexico to other cases coping with vote buying. I first explored how the transition from an authoritarian to a

dominant-party system set conditions for clientelist politics. In addition, I showed that social welfare policies implemented by the government shaped a paternalist state strengthening clientelistic ties making Mexicans highly familiarised with deliveries from politicians. In addition, appropriate electoral regulations and political machines made vote buying settle comfortably. I show how from the 2000 Presidential Elections opposition parties have conducted similar tactics during campaigns. Finally, I assess the effects of electoral reforms on practices of vote buying. These tasks allowed me to decide on research techniques and methods.

Consequently, I selected a mixed-method research design constituted of two qualitative techniques and an experiment. In order to investigate how individuals are exposed to vote buying and given the sensitivity of the task, in Chapter 4, I conduct an analysis of thousands of phone calls from national hotline reporting vote buying. I showed how evidence collected from this source provided valuable quotes from a citizen's perspective. By using theoretical claims about targeting tactics, the accounts offer particular details involved in a vote-buying exchange, which could be hard to address otherwise (i.e. admitting engagement). After examining records reporting the distribution of benefits and voters accepting the rewards, I elucidate that voters' conditions as poverty or low education level do not seem to serve as fundamental features for targeting purposes. However, given that this is the first academic study assessing such unconventional evidence, I warn research that further analyses exploring other dimensions of vote buying are needed. Conclusions from this Chapter,

however, served to make some decisions about interviews and guiding questions in the following chapter.

In order to cover the factors involved in a vote-buying transaction as buyers and sellers, in Chapter 5, I conducted a series of interviews with brokers asking about structures and networks, and the extent and strength of their relationships with parties. By asking these questions, I provided evidence to explain how both brokers and parties plan and implement strategies. As I discuss along the chapter, with this information I confirm several pieces of the puzzle extracted from the phone accounts as, for example, the particular operation taking place during polling days. Additionally, by investigating methods and strategies for targeting electors and buying votes, I offer an explanation on how brokers close vote-buying deals, distribute rewards near polling days and execute mechanisms of compliance. Different from other similar studies interviewing brokers (Zarazaga 2014), I intentionally biased the selection of interviewees. This chapter, then, allowed me to decide over the design of the experiment.

In Chapter 6, I conduct an alternative technique of a list-experiment called LISTIT embedded in a nationally representative survey in Mexico to test the effects of vote buying on voting choices. As I discussed above, the instrument provided unexpected results, yet the design and data collection allowed to test other control items (see 7.3). Secondly, I discuss the results by presenting relevant descriptive statistics and testing two regression models. I finally discuss results with previous studies and present both implications and conclusions.

7.2 Theoretical Implications

In contrast to traditional views focusing only on clientelistic relationships, in Chapter 3, I provide new insights into theories addressing external factors enhancing vote buying. The discussion on the interaction between strong political machines, corporatist policies, and reforms on elections addressing non-vote-buying problems identifies hidden structures omitted by literature. The Mexican case provides a suitable scenario to understand the combined effects of the elements mentioned in vote buying. I showed that the transition of the Mexican political system from an authoritarian to a machine party succeeded by controlling emerging opposition. Electoral regulations eased the dominant party to strengthen its presence in the Chambers. In addition, as manipulating elections, the government and the party consolidated a solid complex network constituted of politicians, officials, partisan, volunteers and voters. Consequently, national corporatist policies make Mexicans more familiar with clientelistic and paternalistic practices, shaping ties between politicians and citizens through clientelistic arrangements. Finally, despite the fact that most of the electoral reforms have proven benefits for democratic values of free and fair elections, the criminal definition of vote buying show a much slower progress in forty years of electoral reforms. The combination of these elements has, in fact, forced parties to conduct campaigns at ground-level encouraging the interaction between voters and activists. As a result, all parties have turned to clientelistic exchanges as a campaign method. Brokers have reshaped traditional binding ties with parties. Now they have developed methods more opportunistic and business oriented, devising more sophisticated

mechanisms of targeting and buying. Such type of networks and encounters between voters and brokers set ideal conditions for vote buying to spread and succeed.

In Chapter 5, interviews with brokers clarified contrasting theoretical views about structures and networks. Whereas traditional clientelism is based on strong ties, modern approaches have suggested thinner relationships between brokers and citizens. However, evidence collected here demonstrates that both structures and networks are not mutually exclusive they can work together as long as they contribute to a campaign. As I discussed, networks play a fundamental role in the success of targeting, buying and complying. Both types of structures are pyramidal. Such finding offered insights about how brokers and parties organise operations to buy votes, the mechanisms employed to target voters, deliver benefits and enforce compliance.

The experimental technique called LISTIT identified alternative explanations of potential factors making voters switch choices near the elections day: money, goods and other benefits. These findings have implications for theories on voting behaviour. For example, for the 2012 Presidential elections in Mexico a defeated candidate attributed the outcome to vote buying in favour of the front-runner. Opposition parties and social groups supported the idea about a massive vote-buying operation. Traditionally, surveys explore theoretical factors from voting behaviour, which only include legitimate activities to persuade electors, i.e. media, canvassing, electioneering, rallies and meetings. Ignoring material benefits from voting behaviour in highly clientelistic contexts might fail to provide

adequate explanations. The evidence provided from LISTIT shows the degree of incidence of vote buying during Mexican elections through switching choices. Although theories on voting behaviour and vote buying respond to different interests, combining illegitimate and legitimate factors interacting during campaigns can distort measures of both voting behaviour. Future research should not discard illegitimate factors as alternative explanations.

7.3 Methodological implications

The review of defining attributes of vote buying, conducted in Chapter 2, alleviates the complexity of vote buying for empirical measures, identifying its boundaries. The variety of uses of the term vote buying has caused conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970) and driven empirical findings to divergent results. In chapter 2, I classified the diversity, examining its conceptual foundations. I then located this dissertation in the field of electorate vote buying to review defining attributes. Since scholars have included a variety of clientelistic exchanges into the vote-buying category, clientelism and patronage have been managed as synonyms of vote buying in literature. By conducting a revisit of defining attributes to compare similarities and differences served to clarify that clientelism is sustained by stronger ties between political elites and citizens, patronage includes promises of rewards conditioned upon victories at polls. Extending Nichter's (2014) observations, these conclusions warn further theoretical discussions to be attentive to the types of benefits proffered and the conditional delivery only upon voting behaviour when reflecting on vote buying. Given that vote

buying is a complex phenomenon, identifying more precisely its limits should help to alleviate doubts about measures.

Moreover, the distinction between the reception and the offer of rewards to refer to a deal already closed advances the operationalisation of concepts going from definition to measures. Vote buying implies parties' mobilisation strategies addressed to obtain voters. Scholars, however, have assessed these interactions as a unit. Such approach omits the fact that there is a period in which electors can assess an offer and decide upon it. In Chapter 2, I argued that, in fact, vote buying is a process constituted of two phases, a targeting and buying. As electoral contests entail competing parties, it is likely that voters are exposed to more than one offer during a campaign. They might, therefore, select a vote-buying deal over another. Looking at targeting and buying as a unit does not explain what happens between the proposal of an offer and the final voter's decision. Having assessed the two-stage model against surveys and experiments already conducted gave a clearer illustration of the effects I suspected. Focused on the wording of the vote-buying questions, the analysis showed that studies might have alluded to uncompleted vote-buying transactions as measuring offers instead the delivery of rewards. A physical interexchange depicts a closed arrangement than a proposition. Further research should test this interesting aspect. Conducting two experiments in parallel with a variation of wording, i.e. offering *versus* receiving, would provide evidence of the differentiation between targeting and buying. Moreover, such design would reveal other unexplored conditions such as multi-targeted-sold, multi-targeted-not-sold, not-targeted, not-sold electotrs.

As advancing qualitative techniques, the analysis in Chapter 4, also provided scholars with new sources of research. Relying on safety and convenience of the hotline to report sensitive information anonymously and confidentially, thousands of records offered a number of details such as full names, number plates or addresses to understand the full picture. The National Hotline Service for Electoral Crimes fulfils a series of procedures offering reliability. Hence the scientific relevance of these accounts. For example, the telephonists attending calls get information similarly to other qualitative sources interviewing people about sensitive themes (i.e. asking about attitudes rather than experiences to break the ice and make callers feel more relaxed). Despite the non-randomised process of selecting cases, these calls from across the country covered regions which could be hard with other methods to access. I, therefore, provide an account of vote buying in Mexico from a different angle between 2002 and 2016.

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Appendix

A.1 Studies Sampled

Albertus, 2013; Alvarez, 2012; Argersinger, 1985; Auyero, 1999; Balafoutas, 2011; Banks, 2000; Biais & Perotti, 2002; Birch, 1997, 2007, 2010, 2011; Bohn, 2011; Bowie, 2008; Bratton, 2008; Brusco, Nazareno & Stokes, 2004; Buchanan & Lee, 1990; Buchanan, Lee, 1986; Calingaert, 2006; Callahan & MacCargo, 1996; Callahan, 2005a 2005b; Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Candel-Sanchez & Perote-Pena, 2013; Carlson & Reed, 2013; Carreras, İrepöğlu, 2013; Casella, Llorente-Saguer, Palfrey & Nickerson, 2012; Casella, Palfrey & Turban, 2014; Collier & Vicente, 2012; Conroy-Krutz & Logan, 2012; Corstange, 2012; Cox & Katz, 2007; Cox & Thies, 2000; Cunningham, 2008; Dal-Bo, 2007; Daumann & Wassermann, 2009; De Janvry, Finan & Sadoulet, 2012; De la O, 2013; Dekel & Wolinski, 2012; Dekel, Jackson & Wolinsky, 2009; Desmond, 2006; Diermeier & Myerson, 1999; Dippel, 2012; Drazen & Eslava, 2010; Eldar, 2008; Enelow & Koehler, 1979; Epstein, 2012; Fell, 2005; Figuero & Sives, 2002; Finan & Schechter, 2012; Fortin-Rittberger, 2014; Fox, 1994; Fried, 2012; Friedman, 2010; Frost, 2000; Fujiwara & Wantchekon, 2013; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter, 2014; Gardner, 2008; Gay, 1998, 1999; Gersbach, 2011; Gerxhani & Schram, 2009; Gherghina, 2013; Giraudy, 2007; Goldman, 2001; Gonzalez-Ocantos, Jonge & Nickerson, 2014; Gonzalez-Ocantos, Jonge, Melendez, Osorio & Nickerson, 2012; Grimes & Wangnerud, 2010; Groseclose & Snyder, 1996; Groseclose, 1996; Haefele, 1970; Hall & Deardorff, 2006; Hall & Wayman, 1990; Hall, 2012; Hasen, 2000; Hawkins, 2010; Heckelman & Yates, 2002; Heckelman, 1998, 2000; Herron & Theodos, 2004; Herron & Wiseman, 2008; Hicken, 2011; Hilgers, 2009, 2011; Hoglund & Piyaarathne, 2009; Hopkin, 2001; Hu & Black, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Jensen & Justesen, 2014; Karlan, 1994; Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008; Keefer, 2007; Kennedy, 2010; King, 2001; Klaas, 2014; Knudsen, 2013; Kochin & Kochin, 1998; Koford, 1982; Komito, 1989; Krehbiel, 1995; Kuncic, 2011; Labonne, 2013; Lan & Heracleous, 2007; Lazar, 2004; Lehoucq, 2003; Levitt, 1998; Levmore, 2000; Linos, 2013; Lippert-Ramussen, 2011; Lust, 2009; McCann & Domiguez, 1998; McDonald, 1972; Miller & 1977; Mixon, Crocker & Black, 2005; Molina & Lehoucq, 1999; Mookherjee, 2014; Morgan & Vardy, 2012; Moser, 2008; Mulgan, 2010; Neeman & Orosel, 2006; Nitcher, 2008; Nyblade & Reed, 2008; Ockey, 2003; Olarinmoye, 2008; Orr, 2006; Owen, 2013; Persson, Tabellini & Trebbi, 2003; Phatharathananunth, 2008; Philipson & Snyder, 1996; Posadas, 2000; Post, 2010; Powell, 1970; Powell, 1989; Remmer, 2007; Resnik, 2012; Rodden, 2002; Schaffer, 2002; Schedler, 2002; Schmidt, 1974; Schwartz, 1975; Scimemi, 2003; Shefner, 2001; Simpser, 2012; Snyder & Ting, 2005; Stokes, 2005; Stovel, Golub & Meyersson, 2011; Sutter, 2003; Szwarcberg, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Takeuchi, 2013;

Taylor, 2008; Tucker, 2007; Ungpakorn, 2002; Van-de-Walle, 2003; Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009; Vicente, 2010, 2014; Vidu, 2002; Vilalta, 2010; Walker, 2008; Wallis & Dollery, 1997; Wang & Kurzman, 2007; Wantchekon, 2003; Weghorst & Lindberg, 2011, 2013; Weidmann & Callen, 2013; Weiss, 1988; Weitz-Shapiro, 2006, 2012; Wiseman, 2004; Wu & Huang, 2004; Wyatt, 2013; Ziblatt, 2009; Zimmer, 2005; Zucco & Power, 2013; Zucco, 2013.

A.1.1 Articles published on vote buying by journal's name and ranking

	<i>Journal Name</i>	<i>Articles</i>	<i>SCImago Ranking</i>
1	Public Choice	16	Q2
2	American Journal of Political Science	13	Q1
3	American Political Science Review	9	Q1
4	Latin American Research Review	6	Q2
5	Comparative Political Studies	5	Q1
6	Electoral Studies	5	Q1
7	Democratization	4	Q1
8	Latin American Politics and Society	4	Q2
9	Asian Survey	3	Q1
10	Commonwealth and Comparative Politics	3	Q2
11	Journal of Contemporary Asia	3	Q1
12	Journal of Democracy	3	Q1
13	Journal of Development Economics	3	NR
14	Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization	3	Q2
15	Journal of Politics	3	Q1
16	Theory and Society	3	Q1
17	American Economic Review	2	Q1
18	Annual Review of Political Science	2	Q1
19	Asian Politics and Policy	2	Q3
20	Comparative Politics	2	Q1
21	International Political Science Review	2	Q2
22	Journal of Interdisciplinary History	2	Q2
23	Journal of Modern African Studies	2	Q1
24	Perspectives on Politics	2	Q1
25	World Politics	2	Q1
26	Administration	1	NR
27	African Journal of Polit. Sci. and International Relations	1	NR
28	American Economic Journal: Applied Economics	1	Q1
29	American Politics Research	1	Q1
30	American Review of Public Administration	1	Q1
31	Annual Survey of American Law	1	NR
32	Anthropological Forum: A Journal of Social Anthropology and Comparative Sociology	1	Q2
33	Australian Economic History Review	1	Q3
34	British Journal of Political Science	1	Q1
35	Bulletin of Latin American Research	1	Q3
36	Business Lawyer	1	Q4
37	California Law Review	1	Q1
38	Canadian Slavonic Papers	1	NR
39	China Quarterly	1	Q1
40	Corporate Governance: An International Review	1	Q1

	<i>Journal Name</i>	<i>Articles</i>	<i>SCImago Ranking</i>
41	Crime, Law and Social Change	1	Q2
42	Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe	1	Q2
43	Developing Economies	1	Q2
44	Diplomacy and Statecraft	1	Q2
45	Eastern Economic Journal	1	Q4
46	Econometrica	1	Q1
47	Economic Development and Cultural Change	1	Q1
48	Economic Theory	1	Q1
49	Economic Journal	1	Q1
50	Economics and Politics	1	Q1
51	Economics of Governance	1	Q1
52	Electronic Government, An International Journal	1	Q3
53	Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology	1	Q1
54	Europe-Asia Studies	1	Q2
55	European Business Law Review	1	NR
56	European Business Organization Law	1	Q3
57	European Journal of International Law	1	Q1
58	European Revi. of Latin Americ. and Caribbean Studies	1	Q4
59	European Union Politics	1	Q1
60	Governance	1	Q1
61	Indian Growth and Development Review	1	Q4
62	International Journal of Middle East Studies	1	Q1
63	International Review of Law and Economics	1	Q3
64	Japan Forum	1	Q2
65	Journal of Asian Studies	1	Q1
66	Journal of Corporate Finance	1	Q1
67	Journal of East Asian Studies	1	Q2
68	Journal of Latin American Studies	1	Q1
69	Journal of Legal History	1	Q2
70	Journal of Policy Practice	1	Q3
71	Journal of Political Economy	1	Q1
72	Journal of Political Philosophy	1	Q1
73	Journal of Public Economics	1	Q1
74	Journal of the European Economic Association	1	Q1
75	Journal of Theoretical Politics	1	Q1
76	Legislative Studies Quarterly	1	Q1
77	Luso Brazilian Review	1	NR
78	Macroeconomic Dynamics	1	Q2
79	Oxford Review of Economic Policy	1	Q3
80	Pacific Affairs	1	Q1
81	Party Politics	1	Q1
82	Political Research Quarterly	1	Q1

	<i>Journal Name</i>	<i>Articles</i>	<i>SCImago Ranking</i>
83	Political Science Quarterly	1	Q2
84	Presidential Studies Quarterly	1	Q1
85	Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences	1	Q1
86	Qualitative Sociology	1	Q2
87	Quarterly Journal of Political Science	1	Q1
88	Review of Economic Studies	1	Q1
89	Review of Economics and Statistics	1	Q1
90	SAIS Review of International Affairs	1	NR
91	Social Science Journal	1	Q3
92	Southern California Law Review	1	Q1
93	Stanford Law Review	1	Q1
94	The Journal of Southern History	1	Q3
95	Virginia Law Review	1	Q1
96	West European Politics	1	Q1
97	Western Political Quarterly	1	Q1
98	World Development	1	Q1
Total		177	

Source: Author with information from *SCImago Journal & Country Rank*
(<http://www.scimagojr.com/index.php>).

Q = Quartile

NR = Not ranked

A.1.2 Distribution of empirical studies on vote buying by country fielded

	<i>Country</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>(%)</i>	<i>Accumulated</i>
1	United States	21	18.10	18.1
2	Cross Country	14	12.07	30.2
3	Argentina	12	10.34	40.5
4	Brazil	8	6.90	47.4
5	Mexico	8	6.90	54.3
6	Thailand	6	5.17	59.5
7	Africa (regional)	3	2.59	62.1
8	Japan	3	2.59	64.7
9	Latin America (regional)	3	2.59	67.2
10	Taiwan	3	2.59	69.8
11	Benin	2	1.72	71.6
12	Colombia	2	1.72	73.3
13	Ghana	2	1.72	75.0
14	São Tomé and Príncipe	2	1.72	76.7
15	Ukraine	2	1.72	78.4
16	Venezuela	2	1.72	80.2
17	Afghanistan	1	0.86	81.0
18	Albania	1	0.86	81.9
19	Australia	1	0.86	82.8
20	Bolivia	1	0.86	83.6
21	Costa Rica	1	0.86	84.5
22	Germany	1	0.86	85.3
23	Honduras	1	0.86	86.2
24	India	1	0.86	87.1
25	Ireland	1	0.86	87.9
26	Jamaica	1	0.86	88.8
27	Lebanon	1	0.86	89.7
28	Madagascar	1	0.86	90.5
29	Nicaragua	1	0.86	91.4
30	Nigeria	1	0.86	92.2
31	Paraguay	1	0.86	93.1
32	Philippines	1	0.86	94.0
33	Romania	1	0.86	94.8
34	Spain	1	0.86	95.7
35	Sri Lanka	1	0.86	96.6
36	Uganda	1	0.86	97.4
37	United Kingdom	1	0.86	98.3
38	Uruguay	1	0.86	99.1
39	Zambia	1	0.86	100.0
Total		116	100.00	

Source: Author.

A.1.3 Articles published about vote buying by journal's domain and method

<i>Journal's domain</i>	<i>Empirical method</i>	<i>Theoretical method</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>(%)</i>	<i>(%) Accumulated</i>
Political Science	33	15	48	26.6	26.6
Area Studies	32	7	39	21.5	48.0
Economics	12	24	36	20.9	68.9
Specific Affairs	19	4	23	13.6	82.5
Law	6	2	8	4.0	86.4
History	4	2	6	3.4	89.8
Business	4	1	5	3.4	93.2
Sociology	3	1	4	2.3	95.5
Public Administrat.	2	1	3	1.7	97.2
Anthropology	0	2	2	1.1	98.3
Multidisciplinary	0	1	1	0.6	98.9
Internat. Relations	0	1	1	0.6	99.4
Social Psychology	1	0	1	0.6	100.0
Total	116	61	177	100.0	

Source: Author.

A.2 Calls from the National Hotline Service (FEPADETEL)

A.2.1 Voting Cards and Lists of Electors

Official Folio number: 55

Date of the call: 13/01/2006

Date of the incident: 13/01/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that Mrs [...] and Mr [...], PRI candidates, are knocking residents' doors to give them bags of provisions as an exchange of their vote. The user also states that these people ask those residents who accept the deal to sign a list in which they commit to vote for PRI and they take voting card's details [...] [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2754

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 31/05/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Toluca, State of Mexico to report that, within Jose Martinez de los Reyes cul-de-sac, in the neighbourhood called "San Mateo Otzacatipan", the PAN mayoral candidate, Mr [...], was handing bags of provisions to people for them to vote for PAN, asking for a copy of the residents' voting card. [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 13

Date of the call: 03/01/2012

Date of the incident: 03/01/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City to report that, according to some neighbours within the neighbourhood called "Olivar de los Padres, Mrs [...] is asking people to vote for PRD local congressional candidates; additionally, she's asking for a copy of people's voting cards as an exchange of frost frozen turkeys [...] [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 102

Date of the call: 08/01/2012

Date of the incident: 08/01/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Lampazos de Naranjo, Nuevo Leon to report that PRI activists are asking people a copy of their voting card to compile registers of [...] PRI gubernatorial candidate's voters on the Election Day. [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 107
Date of the call: 09/01/2012
Date of the incident: 09/01/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that a thin woman, who's a local market's leader, is asking traders to collect at least five copies of electors' voting cards and ensure these voters will vote for Mrs [...] on polling day [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 368
Date of the call: 18/01/2012
Date of the incident: 18/01/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user, who claims to be a self-employed trader, calls presumably from Ajalpan, Puebla to report that activists lead by Mr [...], a local leader of the association called "Antorcha Campesina", are asking people to vote for PRI's federal congressional candidate, Mrs [...]; additionally, they're asking for copies of people's voting cards.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 394
Date of the call: 20/01/2012
Date of the incident: 20/01/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Coyoacan, Mexico City to report that within the neighbourhoods called "Carmen Cerdan" and "Emiliano Zapata", [activists] are knocking residents' doors to ask them to vote for PAN; in addition, they're asking for a copy of their voting card, compiling lists [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 466
Date of the call: 26/01/2012
Date of the incident: 26/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from Coxcatlan, Puebla to report that PRI mayoral candidate, Mr [...], is collecting copies of those electors' voting cards, who have promised to vote for him.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 532
Date of the call: 01/02/2012
Date of the incident: 01/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City to report that within Colina Street in the neighbourhood called "Ampliacion Aguilas" [unknown people]

are handing bags of rice and beans to people for them to vote for the PRD Council candidate, Mr [...] The user also that these people ask for a copy of the electors' voting card to take the official code.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 606
Date of the call: 06/02/2012
Date of the incident: 06/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato to report that the borough mayor, Mr [...] is visiting villages such as "Copales" and "La Lomita" to deliver bags of provisions to residents but he also asks for a copy of their voting card.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 737
Date of the call: 15/02/2012
Date of the incident: 15/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that in the Primary School "Juventino Rosas", Mrs [...] is asking for electors' voting cards as an exchange of bags of provisions.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 782
Date of the call: 16/02/2012
Date of the incident: 16/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Gustavo A. Madero, Mexico City to report that within Primavera Street and Verano cul-de-sac, a group of people, lead by Mrs [...] and her husband Mr [...], is giving bags of provisions to people, asking them to vote for PRD. The user also states that [...] they're asking for a copy of electors' voting cards.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 853
Date of the call: 18/02/2012
Date of the incident: 12/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Ayotlan, Jalisco to report that Mr [...], who works for the borough, and Mr [...], the PAN mayoral candidate, are knocking residents' doors asking for a copy of their voting card as an exchange of MX\$2,000 [£86]. The user also states that these men have already compiled quite a few [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 940
 Date of the call: 23/02/2012
 Date of the incident: 20/02/2012
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Valle Santiago, Guanajuato to report that within the village called "San Francisco Chihuindo", PRD activists were encouraging people to support PRD mayoral candidate and now they're compiling copies of electors' voting cards as an exchange of blankets, bags of provisions and raffle tickets. The user also states that she knows this information by others [...]
 [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1007
 Date of the call: 27/02/2012
 Date of the incident: 27/02/2012
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlahuac, Mexico City to report that within Benitez Street, there were outsiders saying that if residents wanted to receive benefits from PRI, they should give them the details of their voting card.
 [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1044
 Date of the call: 29/02/2012
 Date of the incident: 29/02/2012
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that a few neighbours are asking people to vote for PRI as an exchange of bags of provisions; asking for as well electors' voting cards.
 [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1118
 Date of the call: 04/03/2012
 Date of the incident: 04/03/2012
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Azcapotzalco, Mexico City to report that the local congressman Mr [...] has been at the local park since 9am asking people to vote for PRD and collecting copies of people's voting cards as an exchange of a bag of provisions.
 [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1198
 Date of the call: 08/03/2012
 Date of the incident: 08/03/2012
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tultitlan, State of Mexico to report that two men, apparently leader of the association of neighbours in “Ampliacion Buenavista”, are delivering bags of provisions to people for them to vote for PRI mayoral candidate and also they’re asking for a copy of electors’ voting cards; they don’t give them the bags otherwise.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1242

Date of the call: 10/03/2012

Date of the incident: 09/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that about 9am, PRI activists –a candidate amongst them– were at the sports centre called “Gustavo Baz Prada” handing bags of provisions to people for them to support PRI and asking for a copy of electors’ voting cards.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1249

Date of the call: 10/03/2012

Date of the incident: 10/02/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to report that within the neighbourhood called “Acuario 2001”, PRI activists, Mr [...] amongst them, are asking people to vote for PRI as an exchange of a bag of provisions; asking for a copy of residents’ voting cards.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1260

Date of the call: 11/03/2012

Date of the incident: 11/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuautitlan Izcalli, State of Mexico to report that borough employees are asking for electors’ voting cards and their support to PRI as an exchange of bottles of paint for their houses.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1281

Date of the call: 12/03/2012

Date of the incident: 12/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tultitlan, State of Mexico to report that the leader of neighbours’ association in “Las Llanuras” was asking for electors’ voting cards and the support to PRI as an exchange of bags of provisions.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1391

Date of the call: 17/03/2012

Date of the incident: 17/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Atizapan de Zaragoza, State of Mexico to report that PRI activists are handing baskets of food as an exchange of people's support to PRI and a copy of their voting card.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1491

Date of the call: 19/03/2012

Date of the incident: 10/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Salamanca, Guanajuato to report that in a farm called "La Capilla", Mr [...] and Mrs [...] were asking for a copy of residents' voting card and their support to PRI Council candidate as an exchange of sacks of beans, flour and tinned food.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1546

Date of the call: 25/03/2012

Date of the incident: 25/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Union de San Antonio, Jalisco to report that the PRI mayoral candidate, Mr [...], was asking for details of people's voting cards and their support; as an exchange, he was giving people glasses and money [...]

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1547

Date of the call: 25/03/2012

Date of the incident: 23/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that a neighbour collected a copy of the voting cards of user's mum, promising a bag of provisions. The user also states that this woman has done the same with other residents, but she hasn't delivered anything to anybody.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1549

Date of the call: 25/03/2012

Date of the incident: 25/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that Mr [...], who works for the borough [...], is compiling copies of people's voting cards,

asking them to vote for PRI presidential candidate [...]; he's delivering bags of provisions as an exchange [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1550

Date of the call: 25/03/2012

Date of the incident: 25/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Los Mochis, Sinaloa to report that PRI activists –Mrs [...] amongst them– are knocking residents' doors to ask for a copy of the voting card and their support to the PRI gubernatorial candidate Mr [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1803

Date of the call: 07/04/2012

Date of the incident: 07/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlalnepantla, State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...], who lives in [...] is asking for a copy of people's voting cards and their support to PRI mayoral candidate.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2017

Date of the call: 19/04/2012

Date of the incident: 19/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that of within the neighbourhood called "Evolucion", Mr [...] –who is a PRI activist– is gathering residents at his place, ask their vote for PRI and collecting a copy of voting cards.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2084

Date of the call: 24/04/2012

Date of the incident: 24/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that at the corner of Central Street and Cristobal Sanchez Street, PRI activists are delivering bags of provisions to people for them to vote for PRI, asking for a copy of their voting card.
[month s before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2143

Date of the call: 26/04/2012

Date of the incident: 26/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tapalpa, Jalisco to report that within a village called “Los Robles”, Mrs [...] and Mr [...] are asking for a copy of residents’ voting cards as an exchange of bags of provisions.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2182

Date of the call: 28/04/2012

Date of the incident: 28/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that in the local PRI campaign headquarters located at the corner of Chimalhuacan and Lago Garda Streets [...], Mrs [...] asked for a copy of user and other people’s voting cards [...]

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2237

Date of the call: 01/05/2012

Date of the incident: 01/05/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood called “Campestre Guadalupe”, PRI activists were asking for residents’ voting cards, taking the details in there and then registering such information in a folder.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 6

Date of the call: 11/09/2009

Date of the incident: 11/09/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that PRI activists go over the town, intimidating residents into voting for PRI and asking for a copy of their voting card; they take the details in there and threaten people with removing state programmes from the town.

[not clear]

Official Folio number: 118

Date of the call: 10/06/2009

Date of the incident: 10/06/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cordoba, Veracruz to report that within a neighbourhood called “San Jose de Abajo”, [unknown people] are handing bags of provisions to residents for them to vote for PRI’s federal congressional candidate, asking as well for a copy of electors’ voting card.

[a month before polling day]

Official Folio number: 327
Date of the call: 04/06/2004
Date of the incident: 04/07/2004
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Durango to report that PRI candidates and activists are knocking doors, asking for voting card's details and forcing residents to vote for their party [...]
[a month before polling day]

Official Folio number: 309
Date of the call: 23/06/2009
Date of the incident: 23/06/2009
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Zinacantepec, State of Mexico to report that PRI activists are pushing electors into voting for PRI's candidates, asking for a copy of people's voting card [...]
[a week before polling day]

Official Folio number: 344
Date of the call: 17/06/2020
Date of the incident: 14/06/2010
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Tenango de Doria, Hidalgo to report that within a town called "San Pablo El Grande", the two keepers of a primary and secondary schools are knocking residents' door with lists in hands, in which they note down voting cards' details of the people, promising some benefits to the community on condition that they vote for PRI's congressional and gubernatorial candidates [...]
[two weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 103
Date of the call: 02/07/2010
Date of the incident: 14/06/2010
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Chicontepec, Veracruz to report that borough employees forced electors to vote for PRI, proffering them money and other community benefits as an exchange for it; they also asked for a copy of electors' voting card.
[two weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 772
Date of the call: 19/10/2004
Date of the incident: 19/10/2004
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zacapoaxtla, Puebla to report that [unknown activists] are asking residents to sign a list in which they commit to vote for PRI. As an exchange, these activists are promising bags of provisions. The user also states that residents who engage in the deal are giving a copy of their voting card for activists to take card's details [...] [weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 58

Date of the call: 26/02/2003

Date of the incident: 26/02/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Council candidate Mr [...] has been giving residents –most of them native Otomi speakers– bags of provisions [...], asking for a copy of their voting card and forcing them to vote for him in the next elections [...] [days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2593

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 25/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from Zacatecas City, Zacatecas to report that Mrs [...], who works as a teacher for the Public Education Secretary, is knocking residents' doors proffering a bag of provisions to vote for PRD; additionally, she asks for a copy of their voting card [...] [days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2662

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ixtapaluca, State of Mexico to report that [unknown activists] are giving people materials for construction as an exchange of their vote for PRI; likewise, these activists are asking for a copy of electors' voting card. [...] [days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2741

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Teotitlan del Valle, Oaxaca to report that at the village's square, the borough mayor, Mr [...] is giving people bags of provisions, blankets and farm animals to vote for PRI; he also asks for a copy of electors' voting card [...] [two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2778

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 29/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that within Onix Street, between Agatha and Conchita Roads, in a neighbourhood called "Jardines del Pedregal", [unknown people] are proffering residents MX\$200 [£9] and a bag of provisions to vote for a PRI's senatorial candidate; asking for, additionally, a copy of their voting card and handing a list for residents to sign it.

[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2855

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 29/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Francisco Huehuetlan, Oaxaca to report that a local party leader named [...] is asking people to vote for PRI; additionally, he asks for people's voting card to take the details in there, proffering as an exchange bags of provisions.

[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2922

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Coacalco de Berriozabal, State of Mexico to report that PAN activists are giving people MX\$200 [£9] to give a copy of their voting card.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3039

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that unknown people have knocked her door proffering a bag of provisions for her to vote for PRI and give them a copy of her voting card. The user also states that she turned down the deal.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3089

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from Campeche City, Campeche to report that Mrs [...] has knocked residents' doors to proffer them MX\$500 [£22] to vote for a candidate; she with is doing this with a list, asking residents to sign it. [a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3243

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Sebastian Atlahapa, Tlaxcala to report that within Insurgentes Street, in a neighbourhood called "La Laguna", members of a family whose last name is [...] promised user's mum a bag of provisions to vote for PAN; they additionally asked for a copy of her mom's voting card to take the details in there. The user also states she knows about other residents who have given such copy of their voting card. [days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 39

Date of the call: 06/06/2015

Date of the incident: 06/06/2015

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that right now, a gathering is taking place in a building with PRI's logos in which [activists] are collecting a copy of attendees' voting cards and giving them money in exchange for it. [a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 102

Date of the call: 02/07/2010

Date of the incident: 02/07/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from Chiapa de Corzo, Chiapas to report that a person is giving [people] bags of provisions as an exchange of their vote and this person also asks for a copy of people's voting card. [two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 125

Date of the call: 29/06/2012

Date of the incident: 29/06/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Penjamo, Guanajuato to report Mrs [...] is proffering people MX\$1000 to vote for PRI's presidential candidate, asking for a copy of their voting card and promising to deliver the money after the Election Day. [days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 240
 Date of the call: 30/06/2012
 Date of the incident: 30/06/2012
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that a tall, curly haired, brown skinned person, perhaps on her late 40s, using a walking stick, is buying votes for PRI for MX\$200 [£9]. The user states that this person knocked the door of user's cousins, proffering the money and asking for a copy of their voting card. The user also claims to know about other residents who have gone to some places to deliver a copy of the voting card and collect such amount of money [...]
 [days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 249
 Date of the call: 03/07/2009
 Date of the incident: 03/07/2009
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Luis Potosi City, San Luis Potosi to report that PAN activists are buying votes for MX\$500 [£22], delivering bags of provisions to people and asking for a copy of their voting card.
 [two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 287
 Date of the call: 29/06/2012
 Date of the incident: 29/06/2012
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Copala, Guerrero to report that [activists] are proffering people money [...] and materials for construction to vote for a political party, asking for a copy of their voting card. The user also states that both parties PRI and PAN have been conducting these activities within the neighbourhood [...]
 [days before polling days]

Official Folio number: 294
 Date of the call: 27/06/2012
 Date of the incident: 27/06/2012
 Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Campeche, Campeche to report that within the area called "Ah Kim Pech", local political leaders have been taking residents to a campaign headquarters located in Ramon Pina Chan Street, proffering people MX\$1,000 [£43] and other goods for a copy of their voting card, increasing this reward MX\$500 [£22] for each extra copy they deliver. The user also states that these leaders make people sign for it [...]
 [days before polling day]

A.2.2 Proffering Rewards

Official Folio number: 206

Date of the call: 06/07/2003

Date of the incident: 22/05/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Guanajuato to report that five unknown people, presumably for PRI, offered him MX\$400 [£17] to vote for PRI's federal congressional candidate [...]

[two months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 303

Date of the call: 19/06/2003

Date of the incident: 09/03/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that the federal congressional candidate, Mrs [...], is visiting electors' places [...] proffering them MX\$1000 [£43] and MX\$2000 [£86] to vote for her.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 436

Date of the call: 05/07/2003

Date of the incident: 05/07/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz, Veracruz to report that PRI's federal congressional candidate Mrs [...] is offering breakfast for free and bags of provisions on July the 6th [in the area located] in Sur 11 between Oriente 20 and 22, City Centre.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 314

Date of the call: 04/07/2003

Date of the incident: 31/05/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Canutillo, Durango to report that PRI's candidates Mr [...] and Mr [...] have been buying votes of people of the community. They're proffering Day Nursery children's parents materials for constructing [...] The user refuses to go to a police agency to report this.

[about month and a half before polling day]

Official Folio number: 528

Date of the call: 05/09/2004

Date of the incident: 26/08/2004

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ignacio de Llave, Veracruz to report that PRI activists are buying votes, proffering MX\$300 [£13]. The user doesn't want to give names because of fear.

[a week before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1027

Date of the call: 14/11/2004

Date of the incident: 14/11/2004

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlaxcala to report that PRI activists are buying votes within the neighbourhood Nativitas, they are knocking door by door, offering MX\$200 [£9]

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 1076

Date of the call: 03/07/2005

Date of the incident: 09/12/2004

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the state of Mexico to report that within her neighbourhood, every time elections are held, PRI activists buy votes, offering bags of provisions, materials for construction, food and drinks. The user also states that she's never seen IFE, FEPADE and IEE [electoral authorities] punish these actions [...]

[unclear]

Official Folio number: 210

Date of the call: 03/07/2005

Date of the incident: 03/05/2005

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from a neighbourhood of the State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood "El Salado", PRI activists, Mr [...] amongst them, are knocking door by door proffering people sacks of cement to vote for PRI on the Election Day. Activists are also asking people to sign a list, which states they're willing to [...]

[two months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2464

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 28/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from a market of Mexico City to report that the PRD local candidate Mr [...] has proffered the user MX\$500 [£21] to vote for him.

[three days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2468

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 29/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from a neighbourhood of Jalisco to report that Mr [...] has offered MX\$500 [£21] to vote for PRI. The user states that he doesn't have more information [...]

[three days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2471

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tecate, Baja California to report that Mrs [...] offers [people] bags of provisions to vote for PRI within the neighbourhood called Terrazas del Rio.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2482

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 28/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tierra Blanca, Veracruz to report that Mrs [...], Mr [...], Mr [...] and Mr [...] are proffering [people] MX\$500 [£21] to vote for PRI. The user clarifies that the offer was given to her neighbour nicknamed "Poli" [...]

[four days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2498

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 30/05/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuernavaca, Morelos to report that the PRI's congressional candidate Mrs [...] is proffering [people] loans to vote for her.

[about a month before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2502

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 27/05/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Turreon, Coahuila to report that within the block of flats "Manhattan", PRD activists were offering [people] scholarships and pensions.

[about a month before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2504

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuautitlan, Jalisco to report that Mr [...] is proffering [people] money to vote for PRI on July the 2nd. The user also states that this person is being investigated by police for embezzlement as he was presumably a state employee.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2508

Date of the call:

Date of the incident:

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from General Escobedo, Nuevo Leon to report that within the neighbourhood called "La Unidad", [unknown people] are proffering residents bags of provisions and school supplies to vote for PRI.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2512

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...], who lives in [...] is proffering [people] between MX\$50 [£2] and MX\$500 [£21] to vote [for a political party] [...]

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number:

Date of the call:

Date of the incident:

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that PRI activists are knocking doors, proffering people money to vote for PRI's candidate.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2571

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Oyameles, State of Mexico to report that 'AMLO' [PRD's presidential candidate] activists are proffering bags of provisions and MX\$250 [£11]; they also made electors sign a list a few days before.

[one day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2575

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that PRD activists are offering [people] bags of provisions to vote for this party.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2681

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 28/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Champoton, Campeche to report that Mr [...], who is Secretary General of [...] offered unemployed teachers some job positions to vote for [...]

[a week before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2691

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from, Magdalena Contreras, Mexico City to report that PRD's candidates, Mr [...] and Ms [...], located in [...], are inviting those who walk near them free meals today and proffering MX\$650 [£29] to vote for them.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2699

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz to report that Ms [...], PAN's representative within the community, is proffering money to vote for PAN.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2760

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 28/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Acatlan de Perez, Oaxaca to report that the local mayor, Mr [...] is taken sacks of cement to a bunch of neighbourhoods within the borough, asking people to vote for PRI's candidates [...]

[about a week before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2762

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that a day ago within the Housing Estate called "Moctezuma", Ms [...], President of [...] offered people a five-gallon bottle of paint to vote for PRI's candidates. The user also states that she refused to accept such a reward, receiving threats from this woman as a result.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2764

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ixtapan de la Sal, State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are knocking doors proffering [residents] money to vote for PRI or threatening them otherwise.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2856

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 28/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that within the neighbourhood called "Mexico" in Loma de Madrid, local PRI activists are knocking doors, proffering [people] money to vote for such political party.

[four days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2858

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are proffering [electors] MX\$200 [£9] to vote for PRD's congressional candidate [...]

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2862

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that Ms [...] is proffering to elderly people house water tanks, bags of provisions and extra money in pensions to vote for PRD. She holds meetings, promising more rewards as she's got support from the local council.
[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2881

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Chihuahua to report that within the street "Agustin Melgar" [...], Mr [...] is proffering money to vote for PRD.
[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2892

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 28/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ixtamalteca, Veracruz to report that Mr [...], former Mayor and current employee of the Federal Agency [...], is offering cheques, which he'll presumably give to those electors who vote for PAN [...]
[four days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2910

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood called "Huicholes", Lazaro Cardenas, PRI activists are offering [people] between MX\$200 and MX\$500 [£9-22] to vote for PAN's presidential candidate.
[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2913

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Mexico City to report that unknown people knocked her door offering MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for PRI, clarifying she'd receive 50% before getting to the polling station and the rest after casting the vote.
[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2943

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Vicente Guerrero, Tabasco to report that in the street called "Poblado C 29", Mr [...] is proffering [people] money to vote for a party [name not mentioned].

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2945

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Acapulco, Guerrero to report that within the area of the Regional Military Hospital, opposite to the Preparatory School 17, Mr [...], presumably army officer, approached [people] for asking whether they were going to polling station; proffering electors MX350 [£15] to vote for PRI candidates.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2950

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Guaymas, Sonora to report that within the Guaymas Valley [...], Mr [...], Mr [...] Mr [...] and Mr [...] are proffering people MX\$200 [£9] to vote for PRI. The user also states that he's got witnesses, who are willing to formalise the report.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2977

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from El Salto, Jalisco to report that Ms [...], who is local PRI representative is offering people a bag of provisions, free meal and MX\$100 [£4] to vote for PRI in her place of residence, located the street called [...]

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3017

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Housing Estate called "Providencia" to report that Mr [...], mayoral candidate, is pressing people and offering them MX\$700 [£30] to vote for him; he's knocking doors within the whole housing estate [...] The user states she's got a witness and evidence.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3018

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Puebla City, Puebla to report that within the neighbourhood called "Libertad", [unknown people] are proffering MX\$600 [£26] to vote for PRI

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3028

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Coscosmatepec, Veracruz to report that Mr [...], who lives in Cordoba, is buying votes for PRI, offering money and promising public infrastructure. The user also states that this man has been conducting these activities from the beginning of the current State Administration.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3034

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon to report that within the neighbourhoods "Villareal" and "Francisco Cardenas", Mr [...] is buying votes for PAN, proffering [people] a certain amount of money. The user also states that the son of the candidate Mr [...] is buying votes as well.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3035

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tabasco to report that within the are called "Ingenio Santa Rosa", PRI [activists] are offering [electors] MX\$200 [£9] and a provisions' voucher as an exchange of their vote.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3041

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Chalco, State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are offering him MX\$250 [£11] and a, presumably, ballot paper already

marked for PRD. This is happening within Chalco and the surrounding areas.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3075

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Matamoros, Tamaulipas to report that PRI activists are giving bags of provisions and proffering [to people] and proffering free breakfast for tomorrow morning [polling day] [...]

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3108

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that Ms [...], who might work for the local government or at local PRI headquarters, is proffering [electors] up to MX\$500 [£22] to vote for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3139

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Madero City, Tamaulipas to report that within the neighbourhood called "Vicente Guerrero", Ms [...], who leads the local organisation of neighbours, is offering [people] MX\$300 [£13] to vote for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3150

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 21/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Atzalan, Veracruz to report that staff of the Municipality have used state resources to promote political parties. The user also states that these employees were proffering MX\$500 [£21] and materials of construction as an exchange of the vote.

[about two weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3159

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tecuala, Nayarit to report that within the indigenous community called "Paso Hondo", Mr [...] is handing beer in exchange for voting for PRI.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3185

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tizayuca, Hidalgo to report that within the community called "El Carmen", Mr [...] and Mr [...] are offering electors free breakfast to vote for PRI; these men have been knocking doors as well [...]

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3327

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zumpango, Tlaxcala to report that Mr [...], PAN activist, is proffering [people] bags of provisions to vote for PAN.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3426

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Santiago Totolimixpan, Jalisco to report that presumably PRI activists are [buying] votes, giving [electors] bags of provisions and MX\$100 [£4].

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3469

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that a group of people wearing red, presumably PRI activists, is proffering [electors] MX\$500 [£22].

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3475

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Pedro Actopan, Mexico City to report that within Hidalgo Street [...], PRI and PRD activists have been buying votes since Friday the 30th, offering MX\$500 [£22] the former and MX\$150 [£6] the latter.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3524

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that PRI activists, all women, are visiting people's places since early morning, proffering bags of provisions to vote for PRI.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3744

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Benito Juarez, Quintana Roo to report that within the Housing Estate called Framboyanes [...], PRI activists are visiting people's places, proffering [electors] bags of provisions [and] money to vote for PRI.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3772

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from The Port of Veracruz to report that Ms [...], nicknamed [...], is buying votes for PRI, proffering [electors] MX\$500 [£22].

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3835

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Axapusco, State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhoods named "Purificacion" and "Centro", two activists on a bike [approached] two people to ask their vote for PRD, offering a certain amount of money.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3859

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz to report that Ms [...] and Ms [...] are proffering [electors] MX\$200 [£9] and bags of provisions to vote for PRI.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 3916

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from El Grande, Jalisco to report that within the section 2453, between streets called "Huerta" and "Zaragoza", San Sebastian neighbourhood, a woman, chunky, short haired, brown skin, is proffering [electors] bags of provisions [and] MX\$200 [£9] to vote for the PAN candidate Mr [...].
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4025

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that Ms [...], who is a PRI activist, is [buying] PRI votes in exchange for money.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4027

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Toluca, State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood called "Tlacolpa" opposite to a pharmacy located in "Barranca" Street 140-A, the President of local Residents Association, whose last name is [...], is offering paint and roofing impermeable products to vote for PRI.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4032

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Torreon, Coahuila to report that within the neighbourhood "Eugenio Aguirre Benavides", [unknown people] are offering people MX\$500 to vote for PRI.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4039

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that five passengers on a new van, type pick-up Ford Lobo, number plate [...], are proffering [electors] money in exchange for people's vote; it's been doing this for a little while but the user states he doesn't know what party they are promoting.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4087

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Puebla City, Puebla to report that within the streets "21 Norte" and "52/54 Poniente", Ms [...] is making a group of men sign a list and offering them bags of provisions to vote for PRI.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4118

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Mexico City to report that the local congressional candidate, Mr [...], is proffering [electors] MX\$500 [£22] to vote for him.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4124

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tecamac, State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood called "Ojo de Agua", PRI activists are [buying] votes for PRI, offering people MX\$100 [£4] or bags of provisions.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4224

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cosoleacaque, Veracruz to report that within the neighbourhood "Patria Libre", an individual with a copy of the electors' register is knocking doors, proffering [electors] MX\$200 and MX\$500 [£9-22] to vote for PRI. The user also states that he's willing to make an official report on this.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4335

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that Ms [...] is knocking doors, offering MX\$200 [£9] and bags of provisions to vote for PRI. [polling day]

Official Folio number: 4346

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Juan Aldama, Tabasco to report that [unknown people] are offering bags of provisions and money in exchange for their vote for PRD. [polling day]

Official Folio number: 4347

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Puebla City, Puebla to report that within the communities "Huauchinango", "Huilaapixla" and "Cuaxinca", PRI activists are proffering [residents] MX\$300 [£13] to vote for PRI. The user also states that she's already sent a report by email stating she was offered roofing metal sheets [for the same purpose]. [polling day]

Official Folio number: 4377

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Puebla City, Puebla to report that within the community "Xalapa de Villas Oaxaca", about fifteen people are proffering [electors] MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for PRI. The user also states he fears for his own safety. [polling day]

Official Folio number: 4461

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz presumably, to report that within the neighbourhood called "10 de Mayo", some activists [not specifying party] are offering [people] between MX\$1000 and MX\$1500 [£43-67] to vote. The

user also states that this has been happening since yesterday and these activists look like gangsters, which scare residents.
[a day before polling day and ongoing]

Official Folio number: 4525

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Pedro, Veracruz to report that within the community called "La Concordia", [unnkonwn people] are proffering [residents] MX£30 [£1.3] and a bag of provisions to vote for PRI [...]
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4533

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Calderita, Quintana Roo to report that PRI activists are offering [electors] MX\$700 [£30] to vote for PRI.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4535

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Heroica Ciudad de Huajuapán de León, Oaxaca to report that within the neighbourhood called "Alta Vista de Juárez", Mr [...] is 'inviting' people to vote for PRI, receiving bags of provisions as an exchange.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4537

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Acatlán de Pérez Figueroa, Oaxaca to report that Ms [...] is buying votes, proffering [electors] MX\$100 [£4] to vote for PRI. The user agreed to send a fax with further information.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4550

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Martín Coapaxtongo, State of Mexico to report that within the town called “Millan Rogel” PRI activists are offering [electors] between MX\$500 and MX\$1000 [£22-43] to vote for PRI.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4679

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlalpan, Mexico City to report that when walking along “Paseo del Pedregal Street”, in the neighbourhood “Jardines de la Montana”, PRD activists offered her a blank envelope; then, after opening it, the user realised there was money in it. The activists asked her to vote for PRD. The user also states she gave the envelope back but there were many electors who agreed to the deal.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4697

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Puerto Chichulup, Yucatan to report that PRI activists are visiting people’s places, proffering them MX\$500 [£22] to vote for PRI’s candidates.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4811

Date of the call: 03/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that PAN activists are inviting lads to [...], promising money on condition that they mobilise and encourage people to vote for PAN during the Election Day.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 4831

Date of the call: 03/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Agualeguas, Nuevo Leon to report that within the shopping arcade called “Mager” located in town centre, Mr [...] Mayor of Agualeguas ordered Mr [...] to offer the user MX\$4000 [£173] to vote for PRI [...]

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 4928

Date of the call: 10/07/2006

Date of the incident: 29/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Hidalgo del Parral, Chihuahua to report that Mr [...], who lives in [...] was proffering people MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for PAN.

[three days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 4938

Date of the call: 11/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlaxcala City, Tlaxcala to report that Mr [...], Public Office [...], and his wife, Ms [...] were offering elderly people MX\$100 [£4] to vote for PAN on July the 1st.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 4944

Date of the call: 11/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ixtlahuacan del Rio, Jalisco to report that within the community called "San Nicolas", the Mayor of the town Mr [...] was supporting illegally PRI's candidates on July the 2nd [polling day]. He was offering [electors] MX\$300 [£13] to vote for PRI.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4959

Date of the call: 13/07/2006

Date of the incident: 05/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Chiapa de Corzo, Chiapas to report that within the central square called Angel Albino Corza, Municipality's employees are [...] proffering people MX500 [£21] to vote for the Coalition PRI-PVEM [...]

[about two months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 9

Date of the call: 03/07/2009

Date of the incident: 02/07/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Jalisco to report that the candidate Mr [...] met electors on July the 2nd in the main square, giving them bags of provisions and MX\$500 [£22] to vote for him.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 12

Date of the call: 06/06/2015

Date of the incident: 06/06/2015

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tuxpan, Michoacan to report that, around 3pm, PRD candidate's people were proffering three vouchers entitling people to sacks of cement and [other materials for construction] to vote for PRD. The user also states that he's received these vouchers [...]

[about a month before polling day]

Official Folio number: 21

Date of the call: 05/06/2006

Date of the incident: 05/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Teoloyucan, State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are offering brokers up to MX\$1000 [£43] to mobilise electors. There are about thousand people gathered [...]

[about a month before polling day]

Official Folio number: 199

Date of the call: 30/06/2012

Date of the incident: 30/06/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tihuatlan, Veracruz to report that the activists, presumably from the Organisation called "Antorcha", are offering [people] MX\$1300 [£56] to vote PRI.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 268

Date of the call: 01/07/2012

Date of the incident: 01/07/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that, a friend of him has [posted] on his Facebook page that within the electoral precinct 22, activists are offering elderly people MX\$3000 [£130] and a house water tank to vote in a special district [polling stations in which electors from different precincts are allowed to cast the vote], far away from their original places, helping them as well with the transportation.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 325

Date of the call: 01/07/2012

Date of the incident: 01/07/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Soledad de Graciano Sanchez, San Luis Potosi to report that the owner of the shop called "Los Cinco Potros", located in Captus

Street, is driving a black van with no number plate and offering [people] MX\$200 [£9] to vote for a party [...] [polling day]

Official Folio number: 354
Date of the call: 25/05/2015
Date of the incident: 25/05/2015
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Hueytamalco, Puebla to report that an [unknown] person offered the user MX\$5000 [£210] to gather people willing to vote for PAN [...] [about a month before polling day]

Official Folio number: 274
Date of the call: 24/06/2010
Date of the incident: 18/06/2010
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Pisa Flores, Hidalgo to report that within the neighbourhood "La Arena", [unknown people] are gathering settlers, proffering bags of provisions, materials for construction to vote for PRI. The user also states that these people are compiling lists of names of those settlers who have agreed to the offer [...] [about two weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 345
Date of the call: 01/07/2013
Date of the incident: 01/07/2013
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Andres Cholula, Puebla to report that [unknown people] are asking local residents to vote for PRI in exchange for money. [polling day]

Official Folio number: 355
Date of the call: 25/06/2012
Date of the incident: 25/06/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the square called "30-30", [unknown people] are collecting documents of those residents willing to vote for PRI, proffering materials for construction. [about a week before polling day]

A.2.3 Involving State Employees and Agencies

Official Folio number: 189
Date of the call: 12/01/2012

Date of the incident: 12/01/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Fernando, Chiapas to report that Mrs [...], who is a sister of the PRI's candidate Mrs [...], is using state resources and handing bags of provision to people on condition they vote for her sister.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 281

Date of the call: 16/01/2012

Date of the incident: 16/01/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user, who claims to work for the Direction of Protection Against Sanitary Risks at the Local Health Secretary, calls from Tapachula, Chiapas to report that deputy directors, Mr [...] amongst them, are forcing employees to contribute to PRI's campaigns by delivering bags of provisions, t-shirts and taking people to rallies. They threaten these employees with dismissal if they refuse to do so [...] The user also states that Mr [...] and Mr [...], who were threatened, are willing to appeal as character witnesses.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 360

Date of the call: 18/01/2012

Date of the incident: 18/01/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that [unknown people] are giving bags of provisions opposite to his house. The user also mentions that the place where this is happening is a local office of PRD.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 531

Date of the call: 01/02/2012

Date of the incident: 01/02/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlaquepaque, Jalisco to report that Mrs [...], who's in charge of the local DIF [a state institution], has given bags of provisions to elderly people enrolled on the institution's programmes, conditioning this delivery to the support to PRI [...]

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 557

Date of the call: 02/02/2012

Date of the incident: Unknown

Description of the Incident:

The user, who claims to work for the Local Environment Secretary, calls from San Bartolo Morelos, State of Mexico to report that his boss is forcing

[employees] to visit houses and compile lists of those state programmes recipients who support PRI, promising the delivery of bags of provisions.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1085

Date of the call: 02/03/2012

Date of the incident: 28/02/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Agua Prieta, Sonora to report that within a rally of the candidate Mrs [...], activists were handing bags of provisions presumably taken from DIF [a state institution].

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1193

Date of the call: 08/03/2012

Date of the incident: 08/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within Amapolas Street in a neighbourhood called "Golondrinas", Mr [...] is threatening recipients of state programmes with excluding them from the benefit if they don't support PRI.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1424

Date of the call: 19/03/2012

Date of the incident: 16/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Santiago Tulantepec, Hidalgo to report that about 10pm Mrs [...], Mr [...] and Mr [...], former Mayors, were knocking doors within the neighbourhoods called "2 de Mayo" and "Alvaro Obregon", giving bags of provisions, which apparently belong to recipients of state programmes, asking people to reflect upon their vote to PRI. The user also states that these people were encouraging residents to go to PRI local office to support campaign activities. The user wants to report that Mr [...], who works for a federal state programme called "Oportunidades" has said to recipients they would lose the benefits in case PRI's candidate didn't win as this party makes it possible [...]

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1542

Date of the call: 25/03/2012

Date of the incident: 25/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from the State of Mexico to report that a niece of him, who works for the local government, has commented about the campaign that provides single mothers with benefits; however, when her

niece applied for the benefits, an officer said that although recipients receive monthly MX\$500 [£22], this amount would increase up to MX\$800 [£35] if Mr [...], [the presidential candidate] won the election.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1767

Date of the call: 04/04/2012

Date of the incident: 04/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that [government officials apparently] are handing roofing metal sheets, which presumably belong to a state programme on earthquakes. However, they are giving these materials only to PRI supporters. The user mentions she doesn't know whether or not there is an official enrolment list [...]

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1887

Date of the call: 13/04/2012

Date of the incident: 12/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that outside of a state dairy, located in the neighbourhood called "Rio Hondo", a few [unknown] people were handing plastic buckets with PRI's logo, asking people to vote for this party.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1899

Date of the call: 13/04/2012

Date of the incident: 12/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Michac, Puebla to report that [apparently state officers] delivered state programme's bags of provisions to unregistered recipients who support PAN presidential candidate, Mrs [...]

[no polling day]

Official Folio number: 2033

Date of the call: 20/04/2012

Date of the incident: 20/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that an employee of DIF [state institution] named Mr [...] is delivering bags of provision –presumably from a state programme– only to PAN supporters, excluding legitimate recipients from the benefits.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2168

Date of the call: 27/04/2012

Date of the incident: 27/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that [unknown people] are giving people bags of provisions and materials for construction, promoting PRD. The one in charge of this is Mr [...], who is Director of Agriculture and Livestock Development.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2218

Date of the call: 30/04/2012

Date of the incident: 30/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that employees of the Direction General of Social Development are delivering children toys to people, promoting the PRI presidential candidate. The user requested the address of the email service to add to this report videos she's got.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2917

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Mazatan, Chiapas to report that mayor's staff are giving bags of provisions in the streets through a speaker, on behalf of a state programme called "Vivienda Digna".

[a day before polling day]

A.2.4 Delivering Rewards

Official Folio number: 604

Date of the call: 06/02/2012

Date of the incident: 02/07/2011

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that PRI activists visited his places to say that if they voted for PRI's gubernatorial candidate, Mr [...], they would give them a gift token called "La Efectiva" being worth up to MX\$1,800 [£79], which would be available once this candidate won the 2012 election. However, up to the date, they haven't fulfilled this promise.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2002

Date of the call: 18/04/2012

Date of the incident: 18/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Benito Juarez, Mexico City to report that since he runs a stand within a trading passage between the shops “Sam’s Club” and “Walmart”, opposite to the shopping arcade called “Plaza Universidad”, the leader of the traders’ association Mrs [...] asked the user to support PAN senatorial candidate Mrs [...] by handing household utensils such as vases, mops and brooms, which would be covered by candidate’ staff afterwards.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 400
Date of the call: 19/03/2009
Date of the incident: 19/03/2009
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlahuac, Mexico City to report that the borough mayor has organised a party in the night club called “EL Toro Loco”, asking borough employees to attend the party for free on condition that they voted for PRD. The user also states that this man has been using illegally state resources to help PRD’s [candidates].
[months after polling day]

Official Folio number: 28
Date of the call: 04/01/2012
Date of the incident: 13/11/2011
Description of the Incident:

The user calls [presumably] from Michoacán to report that, during the polling day, PRI activists handed MX\$2500 [£109] to people to vote for the PRI’s candidate.
[months after polling day]

Official Folio number: 90
Date of the call: 06/01/2012
Date of the incident: 06/01/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Hidalgo to report that PRI activists are handing gift tokens to partisans, which can be exchanged in several shops [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 709
Date of the call: 14/02/2012
Date of the incident: 14/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Kalacmul, Campeche to report that the delegate of the SAGARPA [a federal institution], Mr [...] has been using official cars to hand bags of provisions with the photo of the senatorial candidate Mr [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 798
Date of the call: 17/02/2012
Date of the incident: 17/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that the administrator of the block of flats she lives, Mrs [...], has said to tenants that local congressional candidate Mr [...] would hold a rally, in which he will deliver sacks of cement [...] The user mentions that this is happening in Magnolias Street, within a neighbourhood called San Mateo Nopala.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 846
Date of the call: 18/02/2012
Date of the incident: 18/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that in the block of flats she lives, located on Magnolia Street, within a neighbourhood called San Mateo Nopala, the administrator has asked tenants to attend a PRI's rally, in which they would receive sacks of cement. The user also states that the rally will be held by the PRI congressional candidate, Mr [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 951
Date of the call: 24/02/2012
Date of the incident: 24/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tonalá, Jalisco to report that Mrs [...] is delivering bags of provisions amongst other goods to residents of the borough.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1002
Date of the call: 27/02/2012
Date of the incident: 27/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that [unknown people] have been giving bags of provisions to electors for them to support PRD very early.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1041
Date of the call: 29/02/2012
Date of the incident: 29/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that [unknown people] were handing about half ton of cement to people for them to support a congressional candidate. The user also states that he knows neither where the material comes from nor candidate's political party.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1053

Date of the call: 01/03/2012

Date of the incident: 01/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that Mrs [...], who is an influential individual despite not holding any public post, is giving people materials for construction such as water tanks, roofing metal sheets as well as bags of provisions for them to vote for PRI.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1104

Date of the call: 03/03/2012

Date of the incident: 03/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that [unknown people] are delivering vegetables to people for them to attend a PRD's rally.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1503

Date of the call: 22/03/2012

Date of the incident: 21/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Villa de Allende, State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] were delivering gift tokens and bags of provisions to those who [on July the 7th, 2011] voted for the mayoral candidate Mrs [...]

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1708

Date of the call: 30/03/2012

Date of the incident: 30/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from the State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are delivering materials for construction such as cement on behalf of a candidate [the user ignores the name and the party].

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1960

Date of the call: 17/04/2012

Date of the incident: 17/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...] is giving people bags of provisions asking them to vote for PRI presidential, congressional and mayoral candidates.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1962

Date of the call: 17/04/2012

Date of the incident: 17/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Texcoco, State of Mexico to report that, in Reforma Street within the neighbourhood called "Tolantongo", Mr [...] and Mrs [...] are giving people bags of provisions for them to vote for PRI.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1987

Date of the call: 18/04/2012

Date of the incident: 18/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuautitlan Izcalli, State of Mexico to report that Mr [...], who works as a supervisor at the local borough [...], has offered a bag of provisions monthly to employees of a shop called "FAMSA" on condition of they voted for PAN.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2043

Date of the call: 21/04/2012

Date of the incident: 21/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls apparently from Guadalupe, Nuevo Leon to report that PRI activists are giving people bags of provisions and MX\$20 [£0.88] to support PRI by committing themselves to collect lists of at least 10 potential voters. The user also states that the vehicle, which activists are driving is a Silver Ford Escort number plate FEX 3217.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2220

Date of the call: 30/04/2012

Date of the incident: 29/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that within a religious mass, PRI activists were handing rosaries with the image of the PRI mayoral candidate.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 13

Date of the call: 29/06/2006

Date of the incident: 08/03/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Toluca, State of Mexico to report that within the closing rally of the campaign, [PRI activists] gave people gift tokens a, which can be exchanged for goods in the chain of shops called "Soriana" [...] [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 565
Date of the call: 02/02/2012
Date of the incident: 02/02/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Hidalgo to report that [unknown people] are handing bags of provisions, bed blankets and pennants. The user also states that about 500 people have gathered around a van that has just arrived, which is full of bags of provisions [...]

[weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 192
Date of the call: 20/06/2012
Date of the incident: 20/06/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Guadalajara, Jalisco to report that [a party's] gubernatorial candidate has been handing gift tokens called "La Jaliscience", which can be exchanged for MX\$1,500 [£66] from March 2013, only if he wins.

[weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 251
Date of the call: 27/06/2012
Date of the incident: 27/06/2012
Description of the Incident: 27/06/2012

The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that outside of a hospital, [unknown people] are handing buckets and caps to people for them to vote for PRI in the coming presidential elections.

[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 28
Date of the call: 12/05/2010
Date of the incident: 11/05/2010

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Pluma Hidalgo, Oaxaca to report that the borough mayor ran a rally, in which bought votes, paying MX\$500 [£22] and delivering bags of provisions. The user also states that this man offered students from the State Institute of A Level Studies to increase their mark to rally's attendees.

[a month before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2952

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Villa Nazareno, Durango to report that Mr [...] visited user's place, located on Morelos Street within the neighbourhood called "Ferrocarril", to deliver a bag of provisions on condition that he voted for PAN. This man also mentioned that on the Election Day the user could have breakfast for free after going to polls.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 29

Date of the call: 29/06/2012

Date of the incident: 29/06/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tomoac, Morelos to report that the borough mayor is visiting people's places to give them MX\$1,000 [£44] and promise them farm animals to those who vote for PVEM.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1373

Date of the call: 16/03/2012

Date of the incident: 16/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from Hidalgo to report that [officers] are holding intentionally deliveries of state programmes until the day after polling day once they ensure that recipients have voted PAN.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2557

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Centla, Tabasco to report that within the neighbourhood called "Alvaro Obregon", a teacher named Mr [...] and a councillor named Mr [...] are handing bags of provisions and MX\$1,000 [£44] to people asking them to vote for PRI. The user also states that about 150 people have already gathered there.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2596

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Salto del Agua, Chiapas to report that borough police [officers in] cars are delivering bags of provisions. The user ignores more details as someone else has mentioned in the street.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2647

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 26/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Bolanos, Jalisco to report that neighbours have found lorries full of sacks of cement and bags of provisions within indigenous areas. The user also states they presumably gather these people to buy their vote as handing goods [...] The user mentions that he's already reported this to a police station with the investigation number AP225/2006 but he doesn't trust local police bodies as he believes local state employees are involved in the delivery.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2669

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tecamachalco, State of Mexico to report that PRI activists are giving people sacks of cement and other goods for free as an exchange of their vote for PRI. This happened in Narciso Mendoza Street 5-L13, a neighbourhood called "Ampliacion".

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2671

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Abasolo, Guanajuato to report that Mr [...], who is a PRI candidate is handing cheques and other goods within the religious mass.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2798

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 25/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlacolula, Veracruz to report that Mr [...], who works as a councillor for the borough, gave materials for construction to those people who declared electoral support for PRI. The user also states he ignores where the goods come from.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2817

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Pedro Pochutla, Oaxaca to report that within the community called "La Pluma Hidalgo", Mr [...], who is the mayor, is handing bags of provisions and materials for construction to people for them to vote for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2840

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the public market of the neighbourhood called "Ciudad Azteca" [...], PRI activists are giving bags of provisions to people as an exchange of their vote for Mr [...], who is PRI local congressional candidate.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2848

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that PRD activists are getting lots of bags of provisions into a parties' venue called "Pili". The user also believes that these activists will deliver such bags from this site.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2894

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Villaflores, Chiapas to report that the mayor's wife Mrs [...] gave jackets and bed blankets for free to people, saying they should vote for the PAN presidential candidate.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2947

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that PRI activists, driving a newish green pick-up van number plate XP-63169, are handing bags of provisions to people, asking them to vote for PRI. The user also

states that this is happening within the area of “Banderillas” in a football pitch called “La Parcela”.
[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2953

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Valle de Bravo, State of Mexico to report that Mr [...] and Mr [...] are giving people gift tokens on condition that they voted for a political party; these tokens can be apparently exchanged in a local shop before 8pm.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2960

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Encarnacion de Diaz, Jalisco to report that PRI candidate, Mr [...], is paying people MX\$200 [£9] to vote for him. The user also states that [unknown people] will print fake ballot papers to this candidate.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3031

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zautla, Puebla to report that about 6pm within the area, there are some vehicles apparently full of bags of provisions, which have been handing to people walking around for them to vote for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3086

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tultitlan, State of Mexico to report that a house, located in the neighbourhood called “Prado Norte”, PRD activists are giving people bags of provisions to vote for PRD, making them signing lists.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3094

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Bolanos, Jalisco to report that within the are called "Sierra Huichola", the borough mayor, Mr [...], and Mr [...] are buying votes for PRI; they're giving people bags of provisions and materials for construction such as metal beams and sacks of cement.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3106

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Acatlan de Perez Figueroa, Oaxaca to report that the borough mayor, Mr [...], his wife, Mrs [...] and Mr [...], who works for the borough as well, are handing bags of provisions to people for them to vote for PRI [...]

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3131

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that PRI [activists] are giving people bags of provisions, materials for construction and between MX\$ 300 [£13] and MX\$500 [£22] to vote for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3128

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tijuana, Baja California to report that within Monte Tirich Sur Street, located in the neighbourhood called "Las Cumbres", the owner of a Local Pharmacy, Mrs [...], runs meeting with people and PRI candidates, in which they hand materials for construction.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3131

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Huehuetoca, State of Mexico to report that the members of the family [...], two brothers and a man named Mr [...], who lives in [...], within the neighbourhood called "Ex-hacienda de Xalpa", are handing bags of provisions to people from a warehouse, asking them to vote for PRI federal congressional candidate Mr [...] The user also states that he's

reported this to a police station near them but officers don't want to investigate anything.
[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3132

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Huehuetoca, State of Mexico to report that within the area of San Miguel Jagueyes, Mrs [...], PRI legislative council candidate's wife, is paying people between MX\$100 [£4] and MX\$1000 [£44] to vote for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3141

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Pueblo Juarez, Colima to report that within the neighbourhood called "Jardines del Llano" near the area "Higuera", PRI activists so-called "red wave" are knocking doors to deliver bags of provisions to residents, pushing them to vote for PRI. The user also states that he's taken photos of these people he wants to add to this report.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3143

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Zacatecas to report that Mr [...], who works as an official at the borough, is handing money as an exchange of people's vote for PRD.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3144

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Zacatecas to report that Mr [...], who's an official at the borough, is knocking doors and handing money [to residents].

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3164

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Guerrero to report that someone has commented about a warehouse from which a local councillor, whose last name is "Abundis", is handing roofing sheets and bags of provisions [...]

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3172

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Villahermosa, Tabasco to report that a neighbour of her has mentioned that within a parties' venue called "Grupo Varsa", opposite to Tabasco Memorial, PRI activists are handing bags of provisions and MX\$100 [£4] to attendees for them to vote for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3173

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tihuatlan, Veracruz to report that Mr [...], who's a member of the so-called group "Antorcha Campesina", is buying votes by delivering bags of provisions to people [...]

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3179

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that in Lino Celaya Luria Street 22, [unknown people] are handing bags of provisions to people for them to vote for a political party.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3203

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Acapulco, Guerrero to report that Mrs [...] and Mr [...] handed bags of provisions to people for them to vote for Mr [...], PAN candidate. The user also states he's reported this to a police station, opening an official investigation number AC/006/2006.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3212

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Durango to report that Mrs [...] is giving bags of provisions to electors for free.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3244

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz to report that PRI activists are giving bags of provisions to people and other goods as an exchange of their vote for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3254

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Etchojoa, Sonora to report that within the neighbourhood called "Guayparin", Mr [...] –who's a borough councillor– and Mr [...] are handing bags of provisions to people for them to vote for the PRI presidential candidate.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3332

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Jose Independencia, Oaxaca to report that Mr [...] –who works for the borough Cerro Clarin–, Mrs [...], Mrs [...] and Mrs [...] are knocking doors, delivering gift tokens to be exchanged for bags of provisions, plastic buckets and money once they've voted for PRI.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3333

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ahuacuotzingo, Guerrero to report that PRI activists are paying MX\$700 [£31].

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3853

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that, at the recruitment centre located in Adolfo Lopez Mateos Street, a neighbourhood with the same name, the owner of the place –who’s a tall, thin, brown skinned man– and other people are delivering bags of provisions and money.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 4393

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Juarez, Chihuahua to report that PAN activists were handing t-shirts, caps and bags of provisions to people for them to vote for PAN [...]

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 4527

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Santiago Atitlan, Oaxaca to report that Mr [...] –who’s originally from a town called “Santa Catarina” – and other PRI activists were knocking doors within the borough handing bags of provisions as an exchange of people’s vote for PRI candidates.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 208

Date of the call: 30/06/2012

Date of the incident: 30/06/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that at the shopping arcade located in Ignacio Zaragoza Road, by the underground station called “Acatitla”, within the shop “Soriana”, PRI activists are giving people gift tokens to vote for PRI.

[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 150

Date of the call: 06/07/2013

Date of the incident: 06/07/2013

Description of the Incident: 150

The user calls from Ajalpan, Puebla to report that PRI ‘followers’ are delivering bags of provisions and money to people. The user also requires police and army officers for [the Election Day] as a measure of security for residents.

[a day before after polling day]

Official Folio number: 305
 Date of the call: 06/07/2013
 Date of the incident: 06/07/2013
 Description of the Incident:
 The user calls from San Francisco de los Romos, Aguascalientes to report that PRI [activists] are handing bags of provisions to people.
 [days after polling day]

Official Folio number: 18
 Date of the call: 26/06/2015
 Date of the incident: 06/06/2015
 Description of the Incident:
 The user calls from Tapachula, Chiapas to report that within the neighbourhood called "Sam Jorge", the borough mayor, Mrs [...], handed bags of provisions to people, asking them to vote for the PVEM federal congressional candidate.
 [a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3389
 Date of the call: 02/07/2006
 Date of the incident: 02/07/2006
 Description of the Incident:
 The user calls from Atlacomulco, State of Mexico to report that within the Nursery School called "Ma. Trinidad R. De Sanchez Colin", PRD activists – Mr [...] amongst them – are delivering to people bags of provisions and around MX\$1,500 [£66].
 [during polling day]

Official Folio number: 3564
 Date of the call: 02/07/2006
 Date of the incident: 02/07/2006
 Description of the Incident:
 The user calls from San Salvador Huixcolotla, Puebla to report that Mr [...] borough mayor, is giving electors tanks of water for free to vote for PRI.
 [during polling day]

Official Folio number: 3607
 Date of the call: 02/07/2006
 Date of the incident: 02/07/2006
 Description of the Incident:
 The user calls from Tecamac, State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood called "Santa Cruz", [people on] a grey van, type pickup,

brand Ford, number plate JJ70-118, are giving bags of provisions to people for free to vote for PRI.
[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 3667

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Valle de Santiago, Guanajuato to report that Mr [...], from his house, is delivering money [to people], asking them to vote for PRD.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 3698

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Nicolas Bravo, Quintana Roo to report that Mr [...] is handing bags of provisions and food to people for them to vote for PRI. The user also states that this man is with other people wearing in red [...]

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 3801

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood called "Ciudad Cuauhtemoc", a big, black haired, white woman is gathering people to ask them to vote for PRD, giving them as well bags of provisions as an exchange. The user also states that this woman has been doing the same activity for about a week.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 3836

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Trinidad Zaachila, Oaxaca to report that at the main entrance of the town called "Santa Maria Roalo", the borough mayor Mr [...] is giving [people] bags of provisions for free and MX\$100 [£4], for them to vote for PRI.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 3933

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident: 02/07/2006

The user calls from Torreon, Coahuila to report that Mrs [...] was giving people money to vote for PAN from her place, located in Granados Street [...] neighbourhood called "Jacarandas" [...] [during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4015

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that activists from several political parties have been giving people sacks of cement for the to vote for these parties. The user also states that the borough mayor is giving people bags of provisions and cash to vote for PRD. [during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4060

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that at Nautla Street 14 within the neighbourhood called "Roma" [...], PRD activists are giving suspected parcels to fake taxi drivers, but it isn't clear that's inside. [during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4123

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlaxiaco, Oaxaca to report that, at the main square of the town with the same name [Tlaxiaco], Mr [...], who's a delegate of the borough government, is giving [people] bags of provisions for free to vote for PRI. [during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4137

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlaxcala City, Tlaxcala to report that, at this moment, Mr [...] is [delivering] bags of provisions to those people who go to vote for PRI. [during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4185

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico City to report that, at the PRD's campaign headquarters located at the corner of "Benito Juarez" and "Guillermo Prieto" by a place called "Pepes", Mrs [...] is delivering bags of provisions and MX\$200 [£9], which meant to be distributed to mums as part of a public programme during Mother's Day.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4222

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Puente de Ixtla, Morelos to report that within Reforma Street, Mr [...] is giving people bags of provisions as an exchange of their vote for PRI.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4672

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Valle de Chalco, State of Mexico to report that within the neighbourhood called "Independencia", PRD activists were giving [people] gift tokens, which can be exchanged for bags of provisions.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4674

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Valle de Elta, Oaxaca to report that an assistant of the former governor Mr [...] and the former borough mayor were giving suspicious papers and cards to electors after going to polls. The user states that these men were also taken electors to a restaurant called "Chefi" to have a meal; the restaurant is located in the borough market. The user knows these details as he claims to have followed them into such market.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4689

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tecamac, State of Mexico to report that her auntie Mrs [...], who's eighty years old [...], has received bag of provisions [...] [during polling day]

Official Folio number: 256

Date of the call: 05/07/2009

Date of the incident: 05/07/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that by a surveillance place, PRI activists are delivering bags of provisions and money to those electors who have cast the vote.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 339

Date of the call: 05/07/2009

Date of the incident: 05/07/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that PRI [activists] are giving people MX\$1,000 [£44] to vote for PRI's candidates.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 62

Date of the call: 01/07/2012

Date of the incident: 01/07/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Campeche City, Campeche to report that within the village called "Los Laureles", a PRI activist handed bags of provisions to people in the streets for them to vote for PRI.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 139

Date of the call: 04/07/2012

Date of the incident: 01/07/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Luis Potosi City, San Luis Potosi to report that [activists] were giving people boxes of fizzy drinks [...] as running rallies.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 359

Date of the call: 01/07/2012

Date of the incident: 01/07/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Antonio la Isla, State of Mexico to report that from his private place, the PRI's local delegate, Mr [...], is delivering money to those electors who have cast the vote.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 398

Date of the call: 07/07/2013

Date of the incident: 07/07/2013

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tijuana, Baja California to report that from a neighbour's place, [unknown activists] are delivering MX\$300 [£13] to people for them to vote for PRI. The user also states that from the same place, he's seen vans taking people [presumably] to the polls to vote for PRI.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 242

Date of the call: 07/06/2015

Date of the incident: 07/06/2015

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Emiliano Zapata, Morelos to report that [a man on] a van is giving people bags of provisions and money to vote the PRD's mayoral candidate. The user also states that other residents have witnessed this activity.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 255

Date of the call: 07/06/2015

Date of the incident: 07/06/2015

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Calvillo, Aguascalientes to report that in the place of residence of Mr [...], [unknown people] are [buying] votes for PRI, paying MX\$500 [£22].

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 7

Date of the call: 06/07/2006

Date of the incident: 06/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Gomez Palacio, Durango to report that within the borough supply centre, [unknown party] activists are giving gift tokens to people, which can be exchanged for pairs of shoes.

[days after polling day]

Official Folio number: 11

Date of the call: 07/07/2006

Date of the incident: 07/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlalnepantla, State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are delivering between MX\$2,000 [£88] and MX\$3,000 [£131] to electors who have cast their vote. The user also states that this has happened from 10am until 2.19pm. The site is a trailer park with a big black gate.

[days after polling day]

Official Folio number: 30

Date of the call: 03/07/2011

Date of the incident: 03/07/2011

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tulancingo de Bravo, Hidalgo to report that a local councillor is delivering money as an exchange of [people's] vote.

[days after polling day]

Official Folio number: 218

Date of the call: 02/07/2012

Date of the incident: 01/07/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cordoba, Veracruz to report that [a party's activists] were giving people between MX\$500 [£22] and MX\$1,500 [£66] as well as tinned food. The user also states that these activists hid in a shop called "Rosy" located between 10 Street and cul-de-sac 4 [...]

[days after polling day]

Official Folio number: 40

Date of the call: 06/06/2015

Date of the incident: 06/06/2015

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Banamichi, Sonora to report that [unknown people] are giving people sacks of cement and bags of provisions or MX\$7000 [£307] to vote for [a party] mayoral candidate.

[days after polling day]

Official Folio number: 106

Date of the call: 21/07/2015

Date of the incident: 21/07/2015

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that within the local sports centre, [activists from] Nueva Alianza Party are gathering people to celebrate their mayoral candidate's victory but also, they're paying money presumably to those who voted for them.

[days after polling day]

Official Folio number: 58

Date of the call: 02/07/2010

Date of the incident: 02/07/2010

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Juan Colorado, Oaxaca to report that the members of the Local PRI campaign are handing bags of provisions to people for them to vote for the PRI mayoral candidate.

[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 70

Date of the call: 02/07/2010

Date of the incident: 02/07/2010

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Guadalupe Victoria, Durango to report that according to people, a teacher from an A Level College is giving [people] between MX500 [£22] and MX\$1,000 [£44] to vote for PRI. The user also states that residents from the rural area called "Calixto" have mentioned that unknown activists are giving people money and bags of provisions to vote for PAN [...]

[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 161

Date of the call: 11/09/2009

Date of the incident: 11/09/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Monclova, Coahuila to report that within the town called "Ciudad Frontera", PRI activists are giving people paint buckets, bags of provisions and cash (MX\$150 [£7]) to vote for PRI mayoral candidate. The user also states that in addition to witnessing these activities, other people have confirmed it to her.

[months after polling day]

Official Folio number: 185

Date of the call: 19/07/2015

Date of the incident: 19/07/2015

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Arriaga, Chiapas to report that from his private place of residence, a [mayoral] candidate is giving people MX\$200 [£9], the place is located at the corner of 13 and 15 West.

[months after polling day]

A.2.5 Mobile Phone's Cameras as Mechanism of Enforcement

Official Folio number: 2603

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 20/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Orizaba, Veracruz to report that unknown people were buying PRI's votes for \$500 [£21]. To prove they do it, activists gave them as well a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked.

[eleven days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2909

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 26/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that activists were threatening him with beating him up if he didn't vote for their political party. They were also asking him to take a photo with user's mobile phone's camera of the ballot paper already marked to prove his vote [...]

[six days before polling day]

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 28/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user, who is an owner of a small business, calls from Juan de Sabinas, Coahuila to report that activists proffered one of the user's employee MX\$500 (£21) to vote for PRD on condition that the elector must take a photo of the ballot paper already marked with a mobile phone's camera. The victim didn't want to make the call as feeling fear.

[four days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 456

Date of the call: 02/08/2004

Date of the incident: 01/08/2004

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Socorro de Jesus, Oaxaca to report that an official of a local government institution –omitting the name to protect the victims– compelled employees to gather twenty-two electors each; invite them to have breakfast on Sunday 1st July [polling day] and then taking them to the polling station to vote for PRI. The official also asked them to ensure taking photos of the ballot paper already marked to prove electors' vote. Finally, the official threatened employees with dismissal if they didn't accomplish the task.

[three days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2462

Date of the call: 30/06/2006

Date of the incident: 29/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Sahuaripa, Sonora to report that activists were proffering electors MX\$500 (£21) to vote for PRI. They were actually giving voters a mobile phone with camera to prove their vote, [...]
[three days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2826

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlaxiaco, Coahuila to report that activists are trying to buy electors' vote for PRD. They're also handing electors mobile phones with cameras to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2880

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas to report that in the shop called [...] located in [...], the owner's wife offers beers for free on condition that people vote for PAN. She is also asking them to take a photo of the ballot paper with a mobile phone's camera to prove it.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3004

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Jalisco to report that campaigners from the candidate of PRI are proffering people MX\$800 (£34) to vote for PRI. They are also lending mobile phones with a camera for electors to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3091

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Jalisco to report a woman, who knocked the door, has invited the user to vote for PAN. This woman has proffered breakfast in a place located in [...], a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of ballot paper already marked, [...] and given the user MX\$500 (£21).

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3217

Official Folio number: 3489

Date of the call: 09/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mr [...] is giving blenders and irons for free to those electors who have voted for PRI. This person's also asking voters photos with a mobile phone's camera of the ballot paper already marked to prove their vote.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4043

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that unknown activists are at this time giving people 'tamales' [a traditional Mesoamerican corned, wrapped meal] and bags of provisions for free to those electors who have voted for PAN. They are also [...] lending them a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4207

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Nuevo León to report that Mr [...] is asking bus drivers to vote for the PRI's candidate, [...], asking them to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked to prove their vote.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 4884

Date of the call: 05/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that an unknown woman representing PRD offered MX\$300 [£13] to vote for federal and local candidates of her political party. This woman was also given a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked. The user also states that a similar pattern happened to a relative of her, but the activist proffered MX\$1000 [\$43]. [...]

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 100

Date of the call: 05/07/2009

Date of the incident: 05/07/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Jalisco to report that PVEM activists proffered MX\$500 [£21] the user to vote for that political party, asking the user to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked to close the deal.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 353
Date of the call: 30/01/2011
Date of the incident: 30/01/2011
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Acapulco, Guerrero to report that by a polling station near the Hospital [...], a group of coalition "*Tiempos Mejores*" activists [...], are approaching electors proffering MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for the coalition. They are giving them as well a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked to prove the vote and receive the money. The user also states there are more witnesses of these facts.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 582
Date of the call: 03/02/2012
Date of the incident: 03/02/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user, who didn't want to provide the location [presumably from Hidalgo], calls to report that employees of DIF [a Federal institution] have asked for copies of electors' voting card. The user also reports that these employees have asked electors to take a photo of the ballot paper to prove they voted for PRI.
[weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1208
Date of the call: 08/03/2012
Date of the incident: 08/32/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls [presumably from Hidalgo] to report that Miss [...] and Mr [...], employees of [...] are proffering an increase of wage to those electors voting for PRI on condition that they take a photo of the ballot paper to prove their vote.
[ten days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 75
Date of the call: 01/07/2012
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Pachuca, Hidalgo to report that near the polling station located in [...], there are PRI activists approaching electors buying their votes. They are paying them MX\$500 [£21] on condition that they [...] take

a photo of the ballot paper already marked and show it afterwards to activists to receive the agreed amount of money.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 184
Date of the call: 01/07/2012
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Acambaro, Guanajuato to report that someone has offered people MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for PRD; giving people a mobile phone with a camera to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked and show it afterwards to receive the cash [...]
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 275
Date of the call: 29/06/2012
Date of the incident: 29/06/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Nicolas Romero, State of Mexico to report that someone has offered MX\$800 [£34] the user to vote for PRI, asking as well to take a photo of the ballot paper as proof of the vote.
[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 307
Date of the call: 19/07/2015
Date of the incident: 01/07/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Suchiate, Chiapas to report that some neighbours told the user that unknown people were proffering electors MX\$500 (£21) to vote for [...]. Voters had to take a photo of the ballot paper already marked to prove their vote and receive the agreed amount of money.
[polling day]

A.2.6 Children (Little Hawks) as Mechanism of Enforcement

Official Folio number: 4741
Date of the call: 02/07/20006
Date of the incident: 02/07/20006
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Azcapotzalco, Mexico City to report that PAN activists are buying votes for MX\$300 [\$13], asking electors to take a kid with them within the voting booth to witness the mark of the vote.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 328
Date of the call: 05/07/2009

Date of the incident: 05/07/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Nuevo Leon to report that Ms [...]’s daughter, who’s about 13 years-old has been walking with electors to polling stations to witness, within the voting booth, they voted for PRI. The user also states that days ago this woman and other unknown activists were presumably negotiating with electors a payment of MX\$1000 [£43] [...] [polling day]

A.2.7 Buying Abstention with Voting IDs

Official Folio number: 242

Date of the call: 02/06/2003

Date of the incident: 02/06/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Saltillo, Coahuila to report that a member of the staff of a congressional candidate, whose last name is “Rocha”, were collecting citizens’ voting cards as an exchange of materials for construction [...] The user also states he didn’t give them his voting card but he saw a few others doing it.

[weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 378

Date of the call: 08/07/2004

Date of the incident: 04/07/2004

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Sinaloa to report that within the region called “Tamazula, Durango” [...] the borough mayor’s daughter was collecting electors’ voting cards in the morning. The user claims to have evidence such as videos, photos and witnesses.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 428

Date of the call: 01/08/2004

Date of the incident: 31/07/2004

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Union Hidalgo, Oaxaca to report that within Emiliano Zapata and Matamoros Streets, there were outsiders at night delivering bags of provisions and money to people for them to vote for a political party; these people were otherwise collecting residents’ voting cards [...]

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 559

Date of the call: 04/09/2004

Date of the incident: 04/09/2004

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that within surrounded rural areas from his place, a PRI activist is paying up to MX\$1,000 [£43] for electors' voting cards, saying they'd give them back to the legal owner after polling day [...]
[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 815
Date of the call: 04/11/2004
Date of the incident: 04/11/2004
Description of the Incident:
The user calls presumably from Morelia, Michoacan to report that Mrs [...] is collecting electors' voting card as an exchange of money and bags of provisions [...]
[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2418
Date of the call: 30/06/2006
Date of the incident: 26/06/2006
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from El Salto, Jalisco to report that the current borough mayor with other candidates is sending lorries of water to the region and handing bags of provisions to people, collecting their voting cards. They promise to give them back to the owners the Monday after polling day.
[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2472
Date of the call: 30/06/2006
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Atitalaquia, Hidalgo to report that Mrs [...], a PAN local leader, is proffering bags of provisions to those who vote for PAN or MX\$1,000 [£43] to those anti-PAN, collecting their voting card.
[days polling day]

Official Folio number: 2483
Date of the call: 30/06/2006
Date of the incident: 30/06/2006
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas to report that a party activist has turned up, offering MX£1,000 [£43] for his voting card.
[days polling day]

Official Folio number: 2622
Date of the call: 01/07/2006
Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zacatecas City, Zacatecas to report that within the neighbourhood called "Trinidad", PRD activists are proffering people MX\$200 [£9] to vote for PRD's mayoral candidate or give their voting card, promising to return them after polling day with extra MX£200.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3065

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz to report that in the neighbourhood called "Hidalgo", Mrs [...], leader of a local association and PRD activist, is proffering people bags of provisions as an exchange of their voting cards.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3528

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Santa Maria Jalapa del Marques, Oaxaca to report that [unknown people] are offering people a sack of cement to vote for PRI's presidential candidate, they offer otherwise 8 sacks of cement for electors' voting card.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 3688

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Juchitepec, State of Mexico to report that within the village called "San Matias Cuijingo", PRI activists and the borough mayor Mr [...] are knocking doors to proffer residents between MX\$200 [£13] and MX\$500 [£22] for their voting card. The user also states that at this moment these people at the corner of Ignacio Zaragoza and Francisco I. Madero Streets.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 3737

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Sierra Bonita, Linda Vista, Colima to report that a PRI activist named Mrs [...] is asking people to vote for PRI but also she's collecting electors' voting cards as an exchange of money.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4036

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Chetumal, Quintana Roo to report that near the butcher's called "12 de Diciembre" located at the corner of Bugambilias and Genova Streets, there are people paying up to MX\$500 [£22] and delivering bags of provisions for electors' voting cards.

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 4186

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tijuana, Baja California to report that [unknown people] were collecting people's voting card for MX\$1,300 [£56]. The user also states she reckons these people have collected about 500 pieces.

[a day polling day]

Official Folio number: 4930

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 30/06/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Rayon, San Luis Potosi to report that Mr [...], who is a PRI's candidate, has proffered the user MX\$500 [£22] and a bag of provisions for his voting card [...]

[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 346

Date of the call: 17/01/2012

Date of the incident: 17/01/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tecamac, State of Mexico to report that in cul-de-sac "Orea", a neighbourhood called "Urbi Villa del Campo", Mr [...] wearing a state office t-shirt, is collecting people's voting cards, promising some state benefits.

[polling day]

Official Folio number: 441

Date of the call: 24/01/2012

Date of the incident: 24/01/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...] is faking enrolments to the programme “Oportunidades”, collecting people’s voting cards, promising to return them after polling day.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 463
Date of the call: 26/01/2012
Date of the incident: 26/01/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Cajeme, Sonora to report that in the villa called “Quetchehueca”, officers from DIF [a state agency] are collecting people’s voting cards as delivering programme’ benefits.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 469
Date of the call: 26/01/2012
Date of the incident: 26/01/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Apodaca, Nuevo Leon to report that outsiders are knocking doors buying residents’ voting cards for MX\$100 [£4].
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 520
Date of the call: 31/01/2012
Date of the incident: 31/01/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Ecatepec, State of Mexico to report that within the primary school called “San Carlos” located in Nuevo Laredo Street, two teachers and some students are collecting students’ voting cards, promising a higher mark and MX\$500 [£22] [...] The user also states that this has been happening over the last 15 days ish.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 561
Date of the call: 02/02/2012
Date of the incident: 02/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from San Martin Texmelucan to report that the PRI’s mayoral candidate, Mr [...] is buying electors’ voting card for MX\$200 [£9].
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 577
Date of the call: 03/02/2012
Date of the incident: 20/01/2012
Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Venustiano Carranza, Mexico City to report that, within the neighbourhood called “Moctezuma”, Mrs [...] and Mr [...] are collecting residents’ voting cards as an exchange of bags of provisions and money. The user also states he witnessed these events.
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 724
Date of the call: 14/02/2012
Date of the incident: 14/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Cuauhtemoc, Mexico City to report that in the butcher’s called “Hueso de Oro”, [unknown people] are collecting electors’ voting card as an exchange of bags of provisions and other goods [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 877
Date of the call: 20/02/2012
Date of the incident: 20/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...], who works as a dentist, is proffering people bags of provisions for their electors’ voting card, promising to return them after polling day.
[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 927
Date of the call: 22/02/2012
Date of the incident: 22/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls presumably from Veracruz to report that the local congressman, Mr [...], went over to towns called “Arroyo Blanco” and “Papantla”, paying residents MX\$1,500 [£65] for their voting cards [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 961
Date of the call: 24/02/2012
Date of the incident: 24/02/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Metepec, State of Mexico to report that Mr [...] collected her voting card as an exchange of a bag of provisions [...] promising to return it after polling day.
[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1052
Date of the call: 01/03/2012
Date of the incident: 01/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mr [...] is [...] collecting electors' voting cards, promising to return them after the Election Day.
[polling day]

Official Folio number: 1057

Date of the call: 01/03/2012

Date of the incident: 01/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that [an unknown person] is collecting electors' voting cards as an exchange of sacks of flour, saying he will return them later.
[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1136

Date of the call: 05/03/2012

Date of the incident: 05/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that a man is asking electors' voting cards, proffering MX\$2000 [£86], saying he'll return them on July the 2nd [polling day] [...] [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1157

Date of the call: 06/03/2012

Date of the incident: 11/02/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...] and Mrs [...] are asking electors' voting cards [...] they offer people several goods for children as an exchange.
[weeks before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1163

Date of the call: 06/03/2012

Date of the incident: 06/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that in the shop called "Abarrotes Blanquita" located in Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez Street, neighbourhood called "El Coyol", the owner, whose name is [...], is offering people MX\$300 [£13] as an exchange of electors' voting card, saying she'll return them later. The user also states he knows three local residents whose voting card has been collected, Mr [...], Mr [...] and Mr [...] [months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1164

Date of the call: 06/03/2012

Date of the incident: 06/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Atlixac, Guerrero to report that Mr [...], who works as a teacher for the primary school named "Aguiles Serdan", is collecting electors' voting cards. The user also states that this man can be found in the local council headquarters.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1235

Date of the call: 09/03/2012

Date of the incident: 04/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that Mr [...] is proffering people money as an exchange of their voting card. She organises meetings with the local leader of neighbours' association named Mrs [...]. The user also states that on Saturday there was a meeting in which these people delivered clothing, food, [...] bags of provisions and money [...]

[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1247

Date of the call: 10/03/1012

Date of the incident: 10/01/1012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tultepec, State of Mexico to report that a woman named Mrs [...] was knocking doors within A. Lopez Mateos cul-de-sac, a neighbourhood called "San Juan Tultepec", proffering MX500 [£22] for residents' voting cards. However, up to the date, this man has neither delivered the money nor returned voting cards [...] Amongst those affected are Mrs [...] and Mrs [...]

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1267

Date of the call: 12/03/2012

Date of the incident: 12/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that Mr [...] has collected electors' voting cards [...] as an exchange of a cheque for MX\$5000 [£216] [...] But the bank account is fake. Amongst those residents affected are [twelve full names]

[during polling day]

Official Folio number: 1332

Date of the call: 14/03/2012

Date of the incident: 14/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Martin Texmelucan, Puebla to report that Mr [...] who lives in [...] has collected electors' voting cards of PAN candidate' supporters [...]; however, the user states that this man was actually supporting PT's candidates, hence he collected those voting cards. Electors affected won't seem to be able to cast their vote [...]
[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1421

Date of the call: 19/03/2012

Date of the incident: 11/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Francisco Tepeolulco, State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...], who owns the ironmonger's located in [...], asked user's grandson [...] his voting card as an exchange of MX\$500 [£22], which hasn't been returned yet.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1462

Date of the call: 21/03/2012

Date of the incident: 21/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Xochimilco, Mexico City to report that [unknown people] are giving people money as an exchange of the voting cards of those electors who won't vote for Mr [...], threatening those who refuse to do it.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1510

Date of the call: 23/03/2012

Date of the incident: 23/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Jocotitlan, State of Mexico to report that Mr [...] is collecting elderly people's voting cards, promising a bag of provisions and returning the cards later. The user also states that this man works for the local borough at the community centre [...]

[months polling day]

Official Folio number: 1634

Date of the call: 28/03/2012

Date of the incident: 28/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from the State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...] and Mrs [...], who used to work for a local borough, are collecting people's voting cards as an exchange of bags of provisions, promising to return them after the Election Day.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1727

Date of the call: 31/03/2012

Date of the incident: 31/03/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that Mrs [...] and Mr [...], who are PRI activists, are gathering people in the streets to collect their voting cards as an exchange of materials for construction [...]

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1834

Date of the call: 10/04/2012

Date of the incident: 10/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls to report that [unknown people] are asking electors to vote for PRD and they otherwise collect voting cards of those who won't do it.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 1838

Date of the call: 10/04/2012

Date of the incident: 10/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Netzahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that Mrs [...] and Mr [...] are collecting electors' voting cards as an exchange of materials for construction, which has been stocked up in these people's places, located in [...]; they say they'll return the cards after the Election Day. The user also states that he's got witnesses willing to talk.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2121

Date of the call: 25/04/2012

Date of the incident: 25/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Venustiano Carranza to report that opposite to the grocery "Lulu" located in Centenario Street 478, a neighbourhood called Merced Gomez, there are people paying MX\$200 [£9] for electors' voting cards.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2169

Date of the call: 27/04/2012

Date of the incident: 27/04/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Aguascalientes City, Aguascalientes to report that as an employee of the Electoral Federal Institute, he's seen people collecting electors' voting cards around the street market located in Argo Street

neighbourhoods called “Gomez Portugal” and “Villas de Nuestra Senora de la Asunción”.

[months before polling day]

Official Folio number: 2983

Date of the call: 01/07/2006

Date of the incident: 01/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Etchojoa, Sonora to report that borough employees offered and delivered materials for construction, bags of provisions and cash to people for their electors’ voting card.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 37

Date of the call: 04/07/2009

Date of the incident: 04/07/2009

Description of the Incident:

The user calls presumably from Monterrey, Nuevo Leon to report that PRI [activists] lead apparently by a brother of the head of State Court, are collecting electors’ voting cards, promising materials for construction and bags of provisions. The user also states that he’s seen some residents giving their voting card.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 121

Date of the call: 26/06/2012

Date of the incident: 26/06/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Pinos, Zacatecas to report that [unknown people] have just offered the user up to MX\$300 [£13] for his voting card.

[days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 132

Date of the call: 01/07/2012

Date of the incident: 01/07/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that a man is proffering people bags of provisions to vote for PRI; he collects otherwise electors’ voting cards with the same reward.

[a day before polling day]

Official Folio number: 262

Date of the call: 30/06/2012

Date of the incident: 30/06/2012

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tamalin, Veracruz to report that, within the town called “Piedra Blanca”, [unknown people] are handing sacks of cement as an exchange of electors’ voting cards [...]
[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 347
Date of the call: 03/07/2009
Date of the incident: 03/07/2009
Description of the Incident:
The user calls presumably from Campeche City, Campeche to report that [unknown people] have taken user’s voting card as an exchange of MX\$600 [£26].
[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 351
Date of the call: 29/06/2012
Date of the incident: 29/06/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Donato Guerra, State of Mexico to report that a man is knocking doors proffering residents between MX\$1,000 [£43] and MX\$2,000 [£86] to vote for PAN; he otherwise offers such amount of money as an exchange of electors’ voting cards. The user also states she refused to do so.
[two days before polling day]

Official Folio number: 372
Date of the call: 15/06/2012
Date of the incident: 15/06/2012
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Juchitepec, State of Mexico to report that [unknown people] are knocking doors offering residents money to vote for a political party; they are otherwise collecting their voting cards.
[days before polling day]

A.2.8 Vote Buying Near the Polling Stations

Official Folio number: 572
Date of the call: 01/08/2003
Date of the incident: 06/07/2003
Description of the Incident:
The user calls from Oaxaca City, Oaxaca to report that she’s got photos of an activist buying votes near the polling station she was a working as a representative for PAN during the last elections. She’s willing to report this to an official face-to-face.

Official Folio number: 671

Date of the call: 06/07/2003

Date of the incident: 06/07/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlaltizapan, Morelos to report that PRI activists are buying electors' votes by approaching them before entering the polling station

Official Folio number: 696

Date of the call: 06/07/2003

Date of the incident: 06/07/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Hermosillo, Sonora to report that, outside the polling station located near the shopping arcade called [...], there are a few people with lists of electors, giving provisions to people for them to vote for PRI.

Official Folio number: 755

Date of the call: 09/03/2003

Date of the incident: 06/07/2003

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, State of Mexico to report that near the polling stations 3075 and 3485, PRI activists were handing money and bags of provisions to electors.

Official Folio number: 591

Date of the call: 05/09/2004

Date of the incident: 05/09/2004

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz City, Veracruz to report that, near the polling station 4413, PRI activists were buying votes.

Official Folio number: 3260

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident: The user calls from Alvaro Obregon, Mexico City to report that about 10-15 people, near the polling station 3576, are handing 'tamales' [a traditional Mesoamerican corned, wrapped meal] to voters in exchange for their vote for PRD.

Official Folio number: 3422

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ecatepec, the State of Mexico to report that near the polling station 1385, there are PRI activists, with green folders in hands,

who are giving sanitary towels and pens to women and men, asking them their voting card [...]

Official Folio number: 3449

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Magdalena Contreras, Mexico City to report that, when walking to polling station 3872, an unknown person approached him, asking if he wouldn't want to vote for PRD in exchange for a certain amount of money.

Official Folio number: 3495

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ecatepec, the State of Mexico to report that right outside the polling station he went to cast the vote, there were PRI activists giving tamales [a traditional Mesoamerican corned, wrapped meal] for free to electors.

Official Folio number: 3551

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that right outside the polling station 4757, a PAN councillor was handing bags of provisions to electors [...]

Official Folio number: 3531

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Leon, Guanajuato to report that an unknown person is buying electors' vote outside the polling station, located within the Primary School called "Independencia".

Official Folio number: 3565

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Veracruz to report that Mr [...], PRI activist, is buying votes near the polling station the user's cast the vote, asking also a copy of electors' voting card.

Official Folio number: 3654

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Santiago Yancuitalpan, Puebla to report that two men, named [...] and [...], are outside the polling station 2301, buying votes for PRI for MX\$100 [£4.30] and fizzy drinks.

Official Folio number: 3699

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tlahuac, Mexico City to report that there are PRD activists around the polling station 3627 handing bags of provisions.

Official Folio number: 3763

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Coapa, Mexico City to report that Mrs [...] is offering MX\$100 [£4] to those who vote for PRD in the polling station located in Francisco I. Madero, Santa Ursula neighbourhood.

Official Folio number: 3771

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Nezahualcoyotl, the State of Mexico to report that within the polling station located in Pantitlan street, Reforma neighbourhood, an unknown person, wearing a green shirt, is offering elderly people MX\$400 [£17] to vote for PRI's candidates; after casting the vote, this person is asking them to sign a piece of paper stating they voted PRI.

Official Folio number: 3773

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Miguel Hidalgo, Mexico City to report that PRD activists are buying votes for MX\$250 [£10] around the polling stations.

Official Folio number: 3777

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Morelos to report that, as coming out from the polling station, the user saw the PRD candidate named [...] on a van handing bags of provisions.

Official Folio number: 3802

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Tonaya, Jalisco to report that within the polling station, the federal congressional candidate named [...] is buying votes for MX\$500 [£21], asking also electors' voting card [...]

Official Folio number: 3831

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Los Reyes La Paz, the State of Mexico to report a very influential local leader named [...] is giving electors money to vote for PRI. The user also states that there were lots of people outside this leader's office ready to go to the polling station.

Official Folio number: 3839

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from the State of Mexico to report that an activist is handing people alcoholic drinks to vote for PRI about 30 metres from the polling station.

Official Folio number: 4003

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from San Pedro de Acatama, San Luis Potosi to report that the mayoral candidate's staff are approaching people, proffering MX\$100 [£4]. They are managing to take blank ballot papers out from the polling station, marking them outside and giving them back to electors for them to cast the votes. This is happening in streets named Cactus and Acatama near the polling station.

Official Folio number: 4017

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Naucalpan, State of Mexico to report that unknown PRI activists offer electors official selling permissions for free within an outdoors market, presumably they have to vote for PRI. This is happening a few metres from the polling station located in Chalchihuites Street 1, Primary School “Mariano Matamoros”, San Jose de Los Leone's neighbourhood.

Official Folio number: 4063

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Ecatepec, the State of Mexico to report that, right behind the polling station 1685, two people named [...] and [...] are buying votes. The user states that these people are giving electors money to vote for PRI's Presidential candidate.

Official Folio number: 4125

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Xalapa, Veracruz to report that there are unknown people buying votes outside the polling station located within the Primary School “Miguel Hidalgo” at Vicente Beach. These people are giving electors between MX\$500 [£21] and MX\$1000 [£43] to vote for PAN [...]

Official Folio number: 4144

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Venustiano Carranza, Mexico City to report that about 20 metres from the polling station located in Xaltocan Street 149, Arenal neighbourhood, the staff of the PRD's congressional candidate [...] is proffering electors MX\$50 [£2] to vote for this party.

Official Folio number: 4175

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that around the polling station 3116, locate in Libertad Street 230, San Juan Octotan neighbourhood, there are people buying votes, offering money [...]

Official Folio number: 4195

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Chimalhuacan, State of Mexico to report that, near several polling stations within the streets “Pirules” and “Pozos” [...], PRI activists are handing gifts tokens that can be exchanged for food to those people who voted PRI. The user also states that these activists are conducting the activities on a white and yellow VW camper van.

Official Folio number: 4196

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Zapopan, Jalisco to report that in the polling station 3006 located in Emiliano Zapata neighbourhood, there are people buying votes for PRI [...]

Official Folio number: 4267

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from La Joya, Oaxaca to report that outside the polling station located within the Primary School “Leona Vicario” PRD activists are buying votes [...]

Official Folio number: 4285

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Guanajuato to report that, at the polling station located in a place named “El Jacalon”, activists nicknamed “Camarones” who live in [...], are buying votes, handing electors up to MX\$100 [£43] [...]

Official Folio number: 4337

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Calderitas, Quintana Roo to report that people wearing all red, presumably with lists of the official electors’ register, are buying votes close to the polling station [...]

Official Folio number: 4641

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:

The user calls from Iztapalapa, Mexico City to report that unknown people are paying residents MX\$100 [£4] and proffering bags of provisions to vote for PRD.

Official Folio number: 4730

Date of the call: 02/07/2006

Date of the incident: 02/07/2006

Description of the Incident:


The user calls from Coahuila to report that close to the polling station, which the user cast the vote, there are PRI activists proffering people MX\$200 [£9], MX\$500 [£21], petrol vouchers, and pieces of meat to vote for PRI.

A.2.9 Diagram FEPADETEL (SPANISH)


Sistema creado como herramienta de apoyo informática para la operación del proceso certificado “**FEPADETEL**”, que resguarda los datos de las llamadas recibidas por dicho sistema.

Arquitectura del sistema:

La arquitectura del sistema “**FEPADETEL**” esta basada en un modelo Cliente-Servidor que almacena los datos de manera remota y centralizada para su posterior consulta y análisis.



El sistema esta construido bajo una arquitectura de extracción, transformación y carga (ETL) con lo cual se almacenan los datos históricamente y de manera homogénea para su posterior explotación en los cubos multidimensionales.



Desarrollo:

I. Construcción del modelo de base de datos.

El diseño de la base de datos esta construido como un modelo relacional que se aloja en el manejador de base de datos SQL Server 2000 instalado en un servidor configurado con Windows 2000 Server.

El modelo y el diccionario de datos de la base de datos se pueden ver en el Anexo I y Anexo II respectivamente de este documento.

II. Diseño de pantallas.

El sistema FEPADETEL consta de dos pantallas principales en su interfaz gráfica, para el almacenamiento y la consulta.

a) Pantalla “Captura de llamadas”.

Interfaz de captura para los datos de los tres tipos de llamada que se reciben en el sistema (queja, denuncia, orientación e información).

The screenshot displays the 'FEPADETEL - Sistema de captura - [Captura de llamadas]' window. It features a standard Windows-style menu bar with 'Archivo', 'Registro', 'Herramientas', and 'Ventana'. Below the menu is a toolbar with icons for file operations and navigation. The main form area contains several sections for data entry:

- Top Section:** Includes a checkbox for 'Anónimo', a 'Folio' field with a dropdown for 'S/N', and text fields for 'Apellido Paterno', 'Apellido Materno', and 'Nombre(s)'.
- Search Section (Búsqueda):** Contains a 'Folio:' field, a year selector set to '2005', and a 'Pendientes' button.
- Personal Information:** Fields for 'Sexo' (radio buttons for Femenino and Masculino), 'Edad', 'Teléfono', 'Ocupación', and 'Domicilio'.
- Location and Time:** A dropdown for 'Entidad', and fields for 'Fecha' and 'Hora'.
- Call Details:** A 'Competencia' section with 'Si' and 'No' radio buttons, and a dropdown for 'Servidor al que se turnó la llamada'.
- Call Classification:** An 'Identificación de la Llamada' section with radio buttons for 'Denuncia', 'Orientación e Información', and 'Queja'. An 'Estatus' section with radio buttons for 'Pendiente' and 'Concluido'.
- Additional Fields:** A text field for 'Probable delito cometido'.
- Bottom Section:** Three large text areas for 'Información Proporcionada', 'Respuesta Ofrecida', and 'Seguidos'. A button with a '+' icon is labeled 'Para agregar un seguimiento a la llamada oprima +'.

The status bar at the bottom indicates the system is '-- Capturando registro', shows a user icon, the text 'CAPS', and the date '13/01/2005'.

b) Pantalla “Consulta de registros”

Interfaz de consulta para recuperar información de las llamadas y en el caso de proceder capturar el seguimiento que se le da a la llamada.

c) Transferencia de información por medio de archivos en formato de BD SQL

Se requiere de una interfaz de envío y recepción de información por medio de un formato de datos específico, para poder incluir archivos externos.

Recomendaciones:

Se requiere de tomar un número de folio consecutivo a partir de un número especificado de los 1000 en adelante para distinguir y diferenciar los que se generan a partir del sistema origen del FEPADETEL local.

Se requiere capturar los elementos base de la tabla principal para anexar el archivo en forma transparente para los usuarios del sistema.

La carga de los archivos será en forma de lotes (Batch) al final de la jornada normal para no interferir con la captura del sistema local.

La transferencia de información puede ser bajo transmisión FTP o por WEB a un mail definido como fepadenet@pgr.gob.mx.

Herramientas de desarrollo y lenguajes de programación:

Plataforma de desarrollo	----	Visual Basic v.6.0
Manejador de Base de Datos	----	SQL Server 2000
Lenguaje de consulta	----	SQL

Servidor:

- EQUIPO con Windows 2000 Server (servidor de base de datos)
- Base de datos ---- FEPADETEL

Avance:

- Módulos de captura, motor de búsqueda ---- 100%
- Estructura de la bases de datos ---- 100%

Estatus:

Implementado

Diccionario de Datos Tabla “FEPADETEL”

Campo	Descripción	Tipo	Longitud
Folio	Numero consecutivo de la tabla fepadetel	Numérico	9
Apaterno	Apellido paterno de la persona que realiza la llamada	Carácter	20
Amaterno	Apellido materno de la persona que realiza la llamada	Carácter	20
Nombre	Nombre de la persona que realiza la llamada	Carácter	20
Sexo	Sexo de la persona que realiza la llamada	Carácter	10
Edad	Edad de la persona que realiza la llamada	Numérico	5
Telefono	Teléfono de la persona que realiza la llamada	Carácter	18
Domicilio	Domicilio de la persona que realiza la llamada	Carácter	250
Ocupación	Ocupación de la persona que realiza la llamada	Carácter	90
Entidad	Entidad federativa de la persona que realiza la llamada	Carácter	25
Identificación	Identificación de la llamada, pueden ser tres tipos, denuncia, queja y orientación e información	Carácter	25
Competencia	Es de la competencia de la fiscalía	Carácter	2
Información	Información que proporcione el ministerio público que atendió la llamada	Carácter	16
Respuesta	Respuesta que le dio el ministerio público que atendió la llamada	Carácter	16
Seguimiento	Seguimiento que se la da a la llamada, en caso de proceder	Carácter	16
Servidor	Servidor público que atendió la llamada	Carácter	80
Area	Área a la que se turna la llamada	Carácter	20
Fecha	Fecha en la que se recibe la llamada	Fecha	8
Hora	Hora en la que se recibe la llamada	Fecha	8
Servidor1	Servidor público al que se turna la llamada	Carácter	80
Estatus	Estatus de la llamada, pendiente o concluida	Carácter	15

Figuras

FEPADTEL			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
FOLIO	decimal	9	✓
APATERNO	varchar	25	✓
AMATERNO	varchar	25	✓
NOMBRE	varchar	25	✓
SEXO	char	10	✓
EDAD	int	4	✓
TELEFONO	varchar	50	✓
DOMICILIO	varchar	250	✓
OCCUPACION	varchar	90	✓
ENTIDAD	int	4	✓
ID_ENTIDAD	numeric	9	✓
IDENTIFICACION	varchar	25	✓
COMPETENCIA	char	2	✓
INFORMACION	text	16	✓
RESPUESTA	text	16	✓
SERVIDOR1	int	4	✓
FECHA	datetime	8	✓
ANIO	int	4	✓
HORA	datetime	8	✓
TURNAR	int	4	✓
ESTATUS	varchar	15	✓
CONSULTA	char	1	✓
FECHA_CAPTURA	datetime	8	✓
REVISION	char	2	✓
FECHA_REV	char	8	✓
DELITO	varchar	80	✓

PRINCIPAL			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
FOLIO	numeric	9	✓
APATERNO	varchar	25	✓
AMATERNO	varchar	25	✓
NOMBRE	varchar	25	✓
SEXO	char	10	✓
EDAD	int	4	✓
TELEFONO	varchar	50	✓
DOMICILIO	varchar	250	✓
OCCUPACION	varchar	90	✓
ID_ENTIDAD	int	4	✓
ID_MUNI	numeric	9	✓
IDENTIFICACION	varchar	25	✓
COMPETENCIA	char	2	✓
INFORMACION	text	16	✓
RESPUESTA	text	16	✓
SERVIDOR2	int	4	✓
FECHA	datetime	8	✓
ANIO	int	4	✓
HORA	datetime	8	✓
TURNAR	int	4	✓
ESTATUS	varchar	15	✓
CONSULTA	char	1	✓
FECHA_CAPTURA	datetime	8	✓
REVISION	char	2	✓
FECHA_REV	char	8	✓
DELITO	varchar	80	✓

ENTIDAD			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
ID_PAIS	decimal	9	✓
ID_ESTADO	decimal	9	✓
ESTADO	varchar	25	✓
CORTO	varchar	10	✓

STATE			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
ID_PAIS	decimal	9	✓
ID_ESTADO	decimal	9	✓
ESTADO	varchar	25	✓

MUNICIPIO			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
ID_PAIS	decimal	9	✓
ID_ESTADO	decimal	9	✓
ID_MUNICIPIO	decimal	9	✓
MUNICIPIO	varchar	45	✓

OPCIONES			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
descripcion	varchar	250	✓

SERVIDORES			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
id_serv	decimal	9	✓
servidor	varchar	80	✓
habilitado	char	1	✓
usuario	char	15	✓
nivel	char	15	✓

REPORTES			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
reporte	char	10	✓
anio	int	4	✓
mes	int	4	✓

SEGUIMIENTO			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
id_segu	decimal	9	✓
seguimiento	text	16	✓
anio	int	4	✓
num	int	4	✓
fecha	datetime	8	✓
fecha_captura	datetime	8	✓

TURNAR			
Nombre de columna	Tipo de datos	Longitud	Permitir valores nulos
id_serv	decimal	9	✓
servidor	varchar	80	✓
habilitado	char	1	✓
area	char	20	✓

A.3 Interviews Conducted

- A. Anonymous broker (a woman), who has worked for PRD; Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 19th May 2017).



- B. Anonymous broker (a woman), who has worked for PRD, Morena and PT; Azcapotzalco, Mexico City (Friday, 19th May 2017).



- C. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI and PT;
Apizaco, Tlaxcala (Sunday, 21st May 2017).



- D. Anonymous broker (a man) who has worked for PRI, PRD, PT and Morena; San Bartolome Matlalohcan, Tlaxcala (Tuesday, 23rd May 2017).



- E. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI and PAN;
Buenavista, State of Mexico (Saturday, 3rd June 2017).



- F. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI and PAN;
Buenavista, State of Mexico (Sunday, 4th June 2017).



- G. Anonymous broker (a woman), who has worked only for PRD; San Miguel Topilejo, Mexico City (Tuesday, 6th June 2017).



- H. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI; San Pedro Tultepec, State of Mexico (Saturday, 10th June 2017).



- I. Anonymous broker (a man), who has worked for PRI; Tejupilco de Hidalgo, State of Mexico (Sunday, 18th June 2017).



A.4 The Survey

A.4.1 Survey Technical Report

Survey Firm:	DEFOE (http://www.defoe.com.mx)
Country:	Mexico (32 states)
Fielding date:	11-13 April 2015
Type of study:	Sate Household Survey
Method:	Omnibus face-to-face (74 interviewers and 7 overseers)
Sampling universe:	Nationally representative, adults (18+) settled in those selected areas at the time of the interview.
N:	Eight hundred (800) interviews fielded in 80 electoral sections reported by the Electoral National Institute (INE) 10 interviews each.
Sampling design:	The selection of electoral districts is systematic with probability proportional to each state's size. In the house selected randomly, an adult is chosen under the last birthday criterion. The systematic jump is three houses whether or not interviewed.
Confidence and error level:	Assuming a simple random sampling, the error associated with a statistical confidence level of 95% is +/- (3.46%)
Completion rate:	In the fielding is recorded a completion rate of 36.1%, estimated by formula RR1 published in standard definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys. 7th edition. AAPOR.
Non-sampling considerations:	Those as non-sampling errors phrasing of questions, unanticipated effects of pre or post-questions to other questions in the questionnaire, and contingencies that would eventually be presented in the field survey.

A.4.2 Spanish Version of The Survey Items (Control Group)

Encuestador	Cuestionario Encuesta Nacional Abril 2015 (SEMANA 0)	Folio																																																																						
	Calle: _____ # _____ Interior: _____ Colonia: _____ Municipio/Delegación: _____ Entidad: _____ Distrito: _____ Sección: _____ Tiempo de Inicio _____ Hora _____ Minutos _____	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; width: 100px; margin: 0 auto;"> TIPO A </div>																																																																						
ECHA: ____/____/____ DD/MM/AAAA																																																																								
Buenos (as) días / tardes / noches / Mi nombre es _____. Vengo de una empresa de opinión, estamos haciendo una encuesta para conocer los temas que le interesan a los ciudadanos de nuestro país. Quisiera hacerle unas preguntas. Su respuesta es confidencial y los datos serán utilizados con fines estadísticos.																																																																								
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th>Intentos para conseguir la entrevista</th> <th>1</th><th>2</th><th>3</th><th>4</th><th>5</th><th>6</th><th>7</th><th>8</th><th>9</th><th>10</th><th>11</th><th>12</th><th>13</th> </tr> <tr> <td>Tipo de intento*</td> <td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>*Códigos</td> <td colspan="4">1. Entrevista Completa</td> <td colspan="4">4. Sin contacto</td> <td colspan="5">7. No es casa</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="4">2. Entrevista Parcial</td> <td colspan="4">5. Zona insegura / inaccesible</td> <td colspan="5">8. Otro: _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="4">3. Rechazo</td> <td colspan="4">6. Casa desocupada / abandonada</td> <td colspan="5"></td> </tr> </table>			Intentos para conseguir la entrevista	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	Tipo de intento*														*Códigos	1. Entrevista Completa				4. Sin contacto				7. No es casa						2. Entrevista Parcial				5. Zona insegura / inaccesible				8. Otro: _____						3. Rechazo				6. Casa desocupada / abandonada								
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	3. Rechazo				6. Casa desocupada / abandonada																																																																			
¿Tiene usted credencial de elector para votar?) SI 2) No (Enc: agradezca y TERMINE la entrevista)) Ns/Nc (Enc: agradezca y TERMINE la entrevista) _____																																																																								
¿A usted le corresponde votar en esta localidad?) SI 2) No (Enc: agradezca y TERMINE la entrevista)) Ns/Nc (Enc: agradezca y TERMINE la entrevista) _____																																																																								
¿Género: (Enc: anotar SIN preguntar)) Masculino 2) Femenino _____																																																																								
¿Qué edad tiene usted? (Suspender si es menor de 18 años) _____ 99) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
PREFERENCIA ELECTORAL																																																																								
ENCUESTADOR: ENTREGUE LA BOLETA 1 AL ENTREVISTADO Y LEA: En estos momentos le voy a dar una hoja con una pregunta, por favor marque su respuesta yposite la hoja en esta urna. Como usted ve esta hoja es diferente a las boletaslectorales y se usará solamente en esta encuesta. Su respuesta es confidencial y seutilizará con fines estadísticos.																																																																								
ENCUESTADOR: PREGUNTAR DESPUES LA BOLETA 1) 1) Y si no votara por la opción que acaba de elegir, ¿cuál sería su segunda mejor opción?) PAN 5) PVEM 9) Encuentro Social) PRI 6) Movimiento Ciudadano 10) Partido Humanista 99) Ns/Nc (Esp)) PRD 7) Nueva Alianza 11) Otro _____) PT 8) MORENA 12) Ninguno (Esp) _____																																																																								
VOTANTES PROBABLES																																																																								
ERTEZA DE VOTO																																																																								
2_1) ¿Qué tan seguro está usted de votar el día de la elección para elegir diputado federal por el mismo partido que acaba de preferir hoy?) Muy seguro 3) Poco seguro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)) Algo seguro 4) Nada seguro _____																																																																								
OTO EN EL PASADO																																																																								
2_2) ¿Por cuál partido o candidato votó usted para Presidente en la pasada elección de 012? Encuestador: lea opciones) PAN-Josefina Vázquez Mota 5) No pude votar (Esp)) PRI-PVEM-Enrique Peña Nieto 6) No recuerdo (Esp)) PRD-PT-MC-Andrés Manuel López Obrador 7) Otro (Esp) _____) PANAL-Gabriel Quadri de la Torre 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
2_3) ¿Usted sabe cuándo van a ser las próximas elecciones para elegir diputado federal? Enc: Respuesta espontánea. Si la persona responde -Sí-, preguntar: ¿Cuándo?) Si, el 7 de junio 3) No) Si, otra fecha _____ 9) Ns/Nc _____																																																																								
2_4) En términos generales, ¿Qué tan interesado está usted en la próxima elección para elegir diputado federal?) Mucho 3) Poco 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)) Algo 4) Nada _____																																																																								
2_5) En una escala del 1 al 10, donde 1 es Nada probable que vaya a votar y 10 es muy probable que vaya a votar, dígame ¿qué tan probable es que usted sí vaya a votar en las próximas elecciones de diputado federal? <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th colspan="5">Nada Probable</th> <th colspan="5">Muy probable</th> <th>Ns/Nc (Esp)</th> </tr> <tr> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td> <td>6</td><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>9</td><td>10</td> <td>99</td> </tr> </table>			Nada Probable					Muy probable					Ns/Nc (Esp)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99																																																
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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99																																																														
2_6) ¿Usted diría que es una persona que se interesa mucho, algo, poco o nada en la política?) Me intereso mucho 3) Me intereso poco 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)) Me intereso algo 4) Me intereso nada _____																																																																								
2_7) La última vez que asistió a una casilla o urna para votar, ¿en qué momento decidió el partido o candidato por el cual iba a votar?) Con más de un mes de anticipación 4) Otro (Esp) _____) Una semana antes) En el momento que llegué a la casilla 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
2_8) Cada vez que hay elecciones ¿con qué regularidad acude usted a votar?) Siempre 3) Algunas veces 5) Nunca) Casi siempre 4) Rara vez 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
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IDENTIFICACIÓN PARTIDISTA																																																																								
3_1) Independientemente de por quién haya votado, ¿con cuál partido político se identifica usted más? (Enc. espontánea, insistir: ¿Mucho o poco?)) PAN mucho 9) PVEM mucho 17) Encuentro Social mucho) PAN poco 10) PVEM poco 18) Encuentro Social poco) PRI mucho 11) Movimiento Ciudadano mucho 19) Partido Humanista mucho) PRI poco 12) Movimiento Ciudadano poco 20) Partido Humanista poco) PRD mucho 13) Nueva Alianza mucho 21) Otro _____) PRD poco 14) Nueva Alianza poco 22) Ninguno) PT mucho 15) MORENA mucho) PT poco 16) MORENA poco 99) Ns/Nc _____																																																																								
p3_2) Independientemente de su participación y del partido o candidato que prefiera, ¿cuál partido cree usted que vaya a ganar la elección para diputado federal? (Enc: Esperar respuesta y codifique) 1) PAN 5) PVEM 9) Encuentro Social 2) PRI 6) Movimiento Ciudadano 10) Partido Humanista 99) Ns/Nc 3) PRD 7) Nueva Alianza 11) Otro _____ 4) PT 8) MORENA 12) Ninguno _____																																																																								
p3_3) Suponiendo que usted participara en la próxima elección para diputado federal, ¿qué influiría más en su voto, el candidato o el partido? 1) El candidato 3) Ambos (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) 2) El partido 4) Otra (Esp) _____																																																																								
RAZONES DE VOTO																																																																								
p3_4) ¿Qué tanto influiría en su decisión de voto el desempeño de los actuales diputados federales? 1) Mucho 3) Poco 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) 2) Algo 4) Nada _____																																																																								
p3_5) Para decidir su voto, ¿Qué tanto influyen en usted los anuncios de los partidos políticos en (...), mucho, algo, poco o nada? <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th>Enc: Rotar</th> <th>Mucho</th> <th>Algo</th> <th>Poco</th> <th>Nada</th> <th>Ns/Nc (Esp)</th> </tr> <tr> <td>a) La televisión</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b) Los periódicos</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c) El radio</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>d) Internet</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>e) Los Espectaculares</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>f) Bardas pintadas</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>g) Twitter</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>h) Facebook</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>i) Youtube</td> <td>1</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>9</td> </tr> </table>			Enc: Rotar	Mucho	Algo	Poco	Nada	Ns/Nc (Esp)	a) La televisión	1	2	3	4	9	b) Los periódicos	1	2	3	4	9	c) El radio	1	2	3	4	9	d) Internet	1	2	3	4	9	e) Los Espectaculares	1	2	3	4	9	f) Bardas pintadas	1	2	3	4	9	g) Twitter	1	2	3	4	9	h) Facebook	1	2	3	4	9	i) Youtube	1	2	3	4	9										
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p3_6) En política frecuentemente se habla de izquierda y de derecha, en una escala del 1 al 7 donde 1 significa muy de izquierda y 7 muy de derecha... <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th>Enc: Rotar</th> <th>Izquierda</th> <th>Derecha</th> <th>Ns/Nc (esp)</th> </tr> <tr> <td>a) ¿Dónde se ubicaría usted?</td> <td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>b) ¿Dónde ubicaría al PAN?</td> <td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>c) ¿Dónde ubicaría al PRI?</td> <td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>d) ¿Dónde ubica al PRD?</td> <td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>e) ¿Dónde ubicaría a MORENA?</td> <td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9</td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>			Enc: Rotar	Izquierda	Derecha	Ns/Nc (esp)	a) ¿Dónde se ubicaría usted?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9			b) ¿Dónde ubicaría al PAN?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9			c) ¿Dónde ubicaría al PRI?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9			d) ¿Dónde ubica al PRD?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9			e) ¿Dónde ubicaría a MORENA?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9																																																
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CULTURA POLÍTICA																																																																								
p3_7) En caso de que su partido perdiera las elecciones ¿usted participaría o no en una protesta? 1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_8) ¿Usted es miembro de algún partido político, sindicato u organización no gubernamental? 1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_9) ¿Alguna vez usted ha presentado alguna queja o denuncia ante la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos? 1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_10) ¿Alguna vez usted ha presentado alguna queja o denuncia ante la PROFECO? 1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
SOFISTICACIÓN POLÍTICA																																																																								
Ahora pasaremos a una sección de preguntas sobre el Gobierno Federal. Muchas personas no conocen las respuestas a estas preguntas, así que si hay respuestas que usted no conozca sólo dígamelo y seguiremos adelante con la encuesta.																																																																								
p3_11) ¿Usted sabe o no cuáles son los tres Poderes de la Unión? 1) Si 2) No (pase a p3_13) 9) Ns/Nc (pase a p3_13) (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_12) ¿Me podría decir cuáles son los 3 Poderes de la Unión? (Enc. Esperar respuesta y codifique los mencionados según sea el caso) <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th>(...)</th> <th>Sí mencionó</th> <th>No mencionó</th> </tr> <tr> <td>a) Ejecutivo</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b) Legislativo</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c) Judicial</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> </tr> </table>			(...)	Sí mencionó	No mencionó	a) Ejecutivo	1	2	b) Legislativo	1	2	c) Judicial	1	2																																																										
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p3_13) Ahora dígame por favor, ¿usted sabe cuál es el partido que tiene actualmente más diputados federales en el país? 1) Si 2) No (pase a p3_15) 9) Ns/Nc (pase a p3_15) (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_14) ¿Qué partido es el que tiene actualmente más diputados? (Enc. Esperar respuesta y anotar) 1) PAN 2) PRI 3) PRD 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_15) ¿Sabe o no sabe cuánto tiempo dura el cargo de Presidente Municipal (Delegado en caso de Distrito Federal)? 1) Si 2) No (pase a p3_17) 9) Ns/Nc (pase a p3_17) (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_16) ¿Me podría decir cuánto tiempo dura el cargo de Presidente Municipal (Delegado en caso de Distrito Federal)? (Enc. Esperar respuesta y anotar) 1) 3 años 2) Más de 3 años 3) Menos de 3 años 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_17) ¿Usted sabe cómo se llama el Gobernador de este estado? (Si es el caso del DF, el jefe de gobierno) 1) Si 2) No (pase a p3_19) 9) Ns/Nc (pase a p3_19) (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_18) ¿Me podría decir cómo se llama el Gobernador de este estado? (Si es el caso del DF, el jefe de gobierno) (Enc. Esperar respuesta y anotar) 1) _____ 99) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_19) ¿Sabe o no sabe cuál es la autoridad que organiza las elecciones federales? 1) Si 2) No (pase a p4_1) 9) Ns/Nc (pase a p4_1) (Esp) _____																																																																								
p3_20) ¿Me podría decir cómo se llama la autoridad que organiza las elecciones federales? (Enc. Esperar respuesta y anotar) 1) INE 2) Otro _____ 99) Ns/Nc (esp) _____																																																																								

V. POLÍTICA PÚBLICA Y GOBIERNO

4.1) De los siguientes programas sociales del Gobierno Federal, dígame por favor, si usted o algún miembro de su hogar es beneficiario de alguno de ellos:

Enc: Rotar opciones cada vez	Si es beneficiario	No es beneficiario	Ns/Nc (esp)	
) Seguro Popular	1	2	9	
) Madres solteras	1	2	9	
) Prospera	1	2	9	
) Niños y jóvenes	1	2	9	
) Estancias Infantiles	1	2	9	
) Despensas	1	2	9	
) Liconsa	1	2	9	
) Procampo	1	2	9	
) 70 y más	1	2	9	
) Piso firme / Vivienda	1	2	9	

VALUACIÓN DE AUTORIDADES

4.2) En general, ¿usted aprueba o desaprueba la forma en que (...) realiza su trabajo?
Enc: Insistir ¿Aprueba/desaprueba mucho o algo?

Enc: rotar opciones	Aprueba mucho	Aprueba algo	No aprueba nada	Desap. algo	Desap. mucho	Ns/Nc (esp)
) El Presidente de la República Enrique Peña Nieto	1	2	3	4	5	9
) El Gobernador de su estado (Jefe de gobierno)	1	2	3	4	5	9
) El presidente municipal (Delegado)	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Los Diputados Federales	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Los Senadores	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Los Diputados Locales	1	2	3	4	5	9
) El Ejército	1	2	3	4	5	9
) La Gendarmería Nacional Mexicana	1	2	3	4	5	9

4.3) ¿Cómo calificaría el desempeño del Presidente de México Enrique Peña Nieto en los siguientes aspectos, muy bien, bien, mal o muy mal? (Enc: Rotar opciones cada vez)

Enc: Rotar	Muy bien	Bien	Regular (esp)	Mal	Muy mal	Ns/Nc (esp)
) Combate a la corrupción	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Combate a la delincuencia	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Combate al narcotráfico	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Combate a la pobreza	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Generación de empleos	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Mejora de caminos y vialidades	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Mejora de vivienda	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Apoyo al campo	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Promoción del Turismo	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Apoyo a las mujeres	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Transparencia	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Apoyo a los jóvenes	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Manejo de la economía	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Educación	1	2	3	4	5	9
) Servicios de salud	1	2	3	4	5	9

VALUACIÓN DE DEPENDENCIAS

4.4) Ahora voy a leer una lista de dependencias. Por favor, dígame ¿qué nivel de confianza tiene en cada una de ellas, ya sea mucha, algo, poco, o nada?

	Mucha	Algo	Poco	Nada	Ns/Nc (esp)
) Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS)	1	2	3	4	9
) Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE)	1	2	3	4	9
) Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE)	1	2	3	4	9
) Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT)	1	2	3	4	9
) Procuraduría General de la República (PGR)	1	2	3	4	9
) Comisión Nacional del Agua (CONAGUA)	1	2	3	4	9
) Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)	1	2	3	4	9
) Banco de México (BANXICO)	1	2	3	4	9
) Caminos y Puentes Federales (CAPUFE)	1	2	3	4	9
) Instituto del Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores (INFONAVIT)	1	2	3	4	9
) Presidencia	1	2	3	4	9
) Secretaría de Educación Pública (SEP)	1	2	3	4	9
) Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE)	1	2	3	4	9
) Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información (IFAI)	1	2	3	4	9

4.5) De las siguientes instituciones que le voy a leer, dígame el nivel de corrupción que usted cree existe en ellas, ya sea mucha, algo, poca o nada.

	Mucha	Algo	Poca	Nada	Ns/Nc (esp)
) El ejército	1	2	3	4	9
) La policía federal	1	2	3	4	9
) La policía estatal	1	2	3	4	9
) La policía municipal	1	2	3	4	9
) Los jueces y magistrados	1	2	3	4	9
) El ministerio público	1	2	3	4	9

POSICIONAMIENTO DE PERSONAJES

p4_6) ¿Ha oído hablar o no de (...)?

→ Encuestador: si –Si- ha oído, pregunte:
p4_7) ¿Y cuál es su opinión sobre esta persona (...)?

Enc: Rotar cada vez	Si	No	Muy buena	Buena	Regular (esp)	Mal	Muy mala	Ns/Nc (esp)
a) Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
b) Luis Videgaray	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
c) Manlio Fabio Beltrones	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
d) Enríquel Ávila	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
e) Ernesto Cordero	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
f) Margarita Zavala	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
g) Gustavo Madero	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
h) Ricardo Anaya Cortés	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
i) Santiago Creel	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
j) Miguel Ángel Mancera	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
k) Ricardo Monreal Ávila	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
l) Andrés Manuel López Obrador	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
m) Manuel Velasco Coello	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
n) Rafael Moreno Valle	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
o) César Camacho	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
p) Carlos Navarrete Ruiz	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
q) Marcelo Ebrard	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
r) Enrique Peña Nieto	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9

PRINCIPALES PROBLEMAS

p4_8) Pensando en los problemas del país ¿Cuál cree usted que es el problema más importante en estos momentos? (Enc: Rotar opciones) (Mostrar TARJETA 1)

- 1) Inseguridad 5) Desempleo
2) Crisis económica 6) Educación
3) Narcotráfico 7) Otro (esp) ¿Cuál? _____
4) Mal gobierno/Gobernantes 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

EDUCACIÓN

p4_9) ¿Qué tan satisfecho o insatisfecho está con la educación que reciben sus hijos en las escuelas?

- 1) Muy satisfecho 4) Algo insatisfecho 6) No tengo hijos (esp)
2) Algo satisfecho 5) Muy insatisfecho 7) Mis hijos no estudian (esp)
3) Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

p4_10) ¿Cómo considera el nivel educación que se ofrece en (...)?

	Bueno	Regular	Malo	Ns/Nc (esp)
a) Escuelas públicas	1	2	3	9
b) Escuelas privadas	1	2	3	9

GASTO PÚBLICO

p4_11) ¿Usted cree que el Gobierno Federal ha gastado demasiado, lo adecuado, o muy poco en publicidad para dar difusión a sus programas y obras?

- 1) Demasiado 2) Lo adecuado 3) Muy poco 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

p4_12) ¿En su opinión, el actual Gobierno Federal ha administrado bien o mal el dinero de todos los ciudadanos?

- 1) Bien 2) Mal 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

TRANSPORTE

p4_13) De los siguientes medios de transporte público que le voy a mencionar, dígame por favor con qué frecuencia los utiliza, si mucho, algo, poco, o nada.

	Mucho	Algo	Poco	Nada	Ns/Nc (esp)
a) Combis	1	2	3	4	9
b) Microbuses	1	2	3	4	9
c) Camiones	1	2	3	4	9
d) Taxis	1	2	3	4	9

Preguntar sólo en el área metropolitana de la Ciudad de México

e) Metro	1	2	3	4	9
f) Metrobús	1	2	3	4	9
g) Trolebús	1	2	3	4	9

Preguntar a todos si existe algún otro medio de transporte que utilicen

h) Otro	1	2	3	4	9
---------	---	---	---	---	---

p4_14) ¿Cómo calificaría la calidad de los medios de transporte que utiliza?

- 1) Bueno 2) Regular (esp) 3) Malo 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

V. EVALUACIÓN DE LA ECONOMÍA**PERCEPCIÓN DE LA ECONOMÍA**

p5_1) Considerando todas las cosas, ¿cree usted que México va por el camino correcto por el camino equivocado?

- 1) Camino correcto 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

p5_2) Considerando la situación económica del país, ¿usted diría que la economía es mucho mejor ahora, mejor ahora, igual que antes, peor ahora, o mucho peor ahora que la que se tenía hace un año?

(Enc. si contesta -igual-, pregunte: ¿igual de bien o igual de mal?)

- 1) Mucho mejor ahora 5) Peor ahora
2) Mejor ahora 6) Mucho peor ahora
3) Igual de bien que hace un año (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)
4) Igual de mal que hace un año (Esp)

p5_3) Pensando en la situación económica del país para el siguiente año, ¿usted diría que la economía estará mucho mejor, mejor, igual que ahora, peor, o mucho peor que la que tenemos actualmente?

(Enc. si contesta -igual-, pregunte: ¿igual de bien o igual de mal?)

- 1) Mucho mejor 5) Peor
2) Mejor 6) Mucho peor
3) Igual de bien que ahora (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)
4) Igual de mal que ahora (Esp)

p5_4) Ahora quiero que piense en las condiciones económicas actuales que enfrenta el país. ¿Describiría el estado de la economía en este momento como Excelente, Bueno, Malo o Muy malo?

- 1) Excelente 3) Malo
2) Bueno 4) Muy malo 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

inc. Si p5_4 es "Excelente/Bueno" utilizar ["crédito"]. Si p5_4 es "Malo/Muy" malo utilizar ["culpa"]

5.5) Le voy a leer ahora una lista de personas o grupos, y quiero que me diga qué tanto **crédito/culpa** cree usted que merecen por las condiciones económicas actuales. Merece (...) mucho **[crédito/culpa]**, algo de **[crédito/culpa]**, poco **[crédito/culpa]** o nada de **[crédito/culpa]** por las condiciones económicas que enfrenta actualmente el país?

inc. Rotar cada vez	Mucho	Algo	Poco	Nada	Ns/Nc (esp)
) El Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto	1	2	3	4	9
) El ex presidente Felipe Calderón	1	2	3	4	9
) La bancada del PRI en el Congreso de la Unión	1	2	3	4	9
) La bancada del PAN en Congreso de la Unión	1	2	3	4	9
) La bancada del PRD en el Congreso de la Unión	1	2	3	4	9
) El Banco de México	1	2	3	4	9
) Los bancos y otras instituciones financieras	1	2	3	4	9
) La Secretaría de Hacienda	1	2	3	4	9

5.6) Pensando en la situación de su propia economía, actualmente ¿usted diría que es mucho mejor ahora, mejor ahora, igual que antes, peor ahora, o mucho peor ahora que la usted tenía hace un año?

Enc. si contesta –igual–, pregunte: ¿igual de bien o igual de mal?

-) Mucho mejor ahora 5) Peor ahora
) Mejor ahora 6) Mucho peor ahora
) Igual de bien que hace un año (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

5.7) Pensando en la situación de su propia economía para el siguiente año, ¿usted diría que su economía estará mucho mejor, mejor, igual que ahora, peor, o mucho peor que la usted tiene actualmente?

Enc. si contesta –igual–, pregunte: ¿igual de bien o igual de mal?

-) Mucho mejor 5) Peor
) Mejor 6) Mucho peor
) Igual de bien que ahora (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

I. EVALUACIÓN DE LA SEGURIDAD PÚBLICA

PERCEPCIÓN DE LA INSEGURIDAD

6.1) Cambiando de tema, si compara la seguridad pública en el país con la que había hace un año, ¿usted diría que la seguridad ha mejorado o ha empeorado?

Enc. Insistir: ¿Mejorado/Empeorado mucho o poco?

-) Mejorado mucho 4) Empeorado poco
) Mejorado poco 5) Empeorado mucho
) Sigue igual (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

6.2) Pensando en los próximos 12 meses, ¿usted diría que la seguridad pública del país mejorará o empeorará? (Enc. Insistir: ¿Mejorará/Empeorará mucho o poco?)

-) Mejorará mucho 4) Empeorará poco
) Mejorará poco 5) Empeorará mucho
) Seguirá igual (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

6.3) En su opinión, ¿quién tiene mayor responsabilidad de la seguridad de los ciudadanos como usted, la policía federal, la policía estatal, o la policía municipal?

-) La policía federal 4) Todas las policías (Esp)
) La policía estatal 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

6.4) ¿Usted fue o no víctima de algún asalto o robo en los pasados 12 meses, es decir, en el periodo de abril de 2014 a abril de 2015?

-) Sí 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

6.5) En su opinión, ¿mayores penas para quienes cometen delitos, ayudaría o no ayudaría a disminuir los delitos?

-) Si ayudaría a disminuir los delitos 3) Se mantendrían igual (esp)
) No ayudaría a disminuir los delitos 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

II. PLÁTICAS DE POLÍTICA

Digame por favor si usted se enteró o no de lo que pasa en la política por medio de (...)

7.1) Digame por favor si usted se enteró o no de lo que pasa en la política por medio de (...)

Encuestador: ROTAR cada vez

(...)	Sí	No	→	Diario	Una vez a la semana	Una vez cada 15 días	Una vez al mes	Cada dos meses o más	Ns/Nc (esp)
i) Las noticias en la televisión	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
ii) Periódicos	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
iii) Las noticias en la radio	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
iv) Revistas	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
v) Anuncios de algún partido político	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
vi) Declaraciones del Presidente de la República	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
vii) Declaraciones de diputados senadores	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
viii) Declaraciones de funcionarios le gobierno	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
ix) Programas sobre política	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
x) Familiares (padres, hijos, hermanos, suegro, primo)	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xi) Amigos	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xii) Profesores	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xiii) Compañeros de trabajo	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xiv) Sacerdotes	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xv) Compañeros de escuela	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xvi) Vecinos	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xvii) Internet	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xviii) Twitter	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xix) Facebook	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xx) Youtube	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
xxi) Mensajes de texto en su celular	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

7.3) ¿Usted considera que estas conversaciones influyen o no influyen en su punto de vista acerca de las campañas o de los candidatos?

- 1) Mucho 2) Poco 3) Ni/Nc (Esp)

VIII. CAMPANAS

MENSAJES DE CAMPANAS					
p8_1) Pensando en esta semana, ¿usted ha visto o ha escuchado anuncios del (...) o no?	He visto	He escuchado	He visto y escuchado	No	Ns/Nc (esp)
Enc: Si ha visto y/o ha escuchado pregunte:					
p8_2) ¿Qué es lo que usted más recuerda de estos anuncios?					
a) PAN	1	2	3	4	9
b) PRI	1	2	3	4	9
c) PRD	1	2	3	4	9
d) PVEM	1	2	3	4	9
e) MORENA	1	2	3	4	9

Enc: Si ha visto y/o ha escuchado pregunte:
 p8_2) ¿Qué es lo que usted más recuerda de estos anuncios?

IX. TEMAS DE INTERÉS

EVALUACIÓN DE PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS

Ahora vamos a hablar sobre los partidos políticos. De los siguientes partidos, dígame por favor ¿cuáles conoce y qué opinión tiene de ellos?

p9_1) ¿Ha oído hablar o no (...)?	Si	No	→	Muy buena	Buena	Regular (esp)	Mal	Muy mala	Ns/Nc esp
Encuestador: si ha oído sobre el partido, pregunte: p9_2) ¿Y cuál es su opinión sobre este partido: Muy buena, buena, mala o muy mala?									
a) Partido Acción Nacional	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
b) Partido Revolucionario Institucional	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
c) Partido de la Revolución Democrática	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
d) Partido del Trabajo	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
e) Partido Verde Ecologista de México	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
f) Movimiento Ciudadano	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
g) Nueva Alianza	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
h) Movimiento Regeneración Nacional	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i) Encuentro Social	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
j) Partido Humanista	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

9.3) Independientemente de qué partido se beneficie más con las alianzas y coaliciones, ¿la opinión que usted tiene del (...) mejora o empeora cuando va en alianza con otro partido?

(Encuestador: Rotar opciones e insistir mucho/algo)	Mejora	Ni mejora ni empeora (esp)	Empeora	Ns/Nc (esp)
a) PAN	1	2	3	9
b) PRI	1	2	3	9
c) PRD	1	2	3	9
d) PT	1	2	3	9
e) PVEM	1	2	3	9
f) Mov. Ciudadano	1	2	3	9
g) PANAL	1	2	3	9
h) MORENA	1	2	3	9
i) Encuentro Soc.	1	2	3	9
j) P Humanista	1	2	3	9

COYUNTURA

COYUNTURA A: RENUNCIA DE DAVID KORENFELD

A_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que esta semana el titular de la CONAGUA, David Korenfeld, renunció a su cargo, o no se enteró de esto?

- 1) Sí 2) No (Pase a A_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a A_3)

A_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la renuncia de David Korenfeld como titular de la CONAGUA?

- 1) Twitter 5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares
 2) Facebook 6) Periódico
 3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias
 4) Radio 8) Otro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

A_3) David Korenfeld renunció como titular de la CONAGUA después de que se diera a conocer que usó un helicóptero del gobierno para un asunto personal. ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que David Korenfeld haya renunciado a su cargo?

- 1) Muy de acuerdo 4) En desacuerdo
 2) De acuerdo 5) Muy en desacuerdo
 3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp) 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

COYUNTURA B: AGENTES EXTRANJEROS

B_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que esta semana el Senado aprobó una ley que permitirá que agentes extranjeros puedan portar armas en México, o no se enteró de esto?

- 1) Sí 2) No (Pase a B_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a B_3)

B_2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la aprobación de esta ley?

- 1) Twitter 5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares
 2) Facebook 6) Periódico
 3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias
 4) Radio 8) Otro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

B_3) El Senado aprobó una ley que permitirá que agentes extranjeros puedan portar armas en México para ejercer facultades en materia de migración, aduanales y de seguridad en visitas oficiales, a jefes de Estado, jefes de Gobierno o ministros. ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que agentes extranjeros puedan portar armas en México?

- 1) Muy de acuerdo 4) En desacuerdo
 2) De acuerdo 5) Muy en desacuerdo
 3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp) 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

COYUNTURA C: CARMEN SALINAS DIPUTADA

C_1) ¿Usted se enteró de que la actriz Carmen Salinas fue designada candidata a diputada federal por el PRI, o no se enteró de esto?

- 1) Sí 2) No (Pase a C_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a C_3)

1.2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la asignación de la actriz Carmen Salinas como diputada federal del PRI?

1) Twitter 5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares
2) Facebook 6) Periódico
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias
4) Radio 8) Otro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

1.3) ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que la actriz Carmen Salinas sea candidata a diputada federal?

1) Muy de acuerdo 4) En desacuerdo
2) De acuerdo 5) Muy en desacuerdo
3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp) 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

OPORTUNIDAD D: CUAUHTÉMOC BLANCO PRESIDENTE MUNICIPAL

1.1) ¿Usted se enteró de que el futbolista Cuauhtémoc Blanco fue designado candidato a la presidencia municipal de Cuernavaca, Morelos, por el Partido Social Demócrata, o no se enteró de esto?

1) Si 2) No (Pase a D_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a D_3) ☐

1.2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la asignación del futbolista Cuauhtémoc Blanco como candidato a la presidencia municipal de Cuernavaca?

1) Twitter 5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares
2) Facebook 6) Periódico
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias
4) Radio 8) Otro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

1.3) ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que el futbolista Cuauhtémoc Blanco sea candidato a presidente municipal?

1) Muy de acuerdo 4) En desacuerdo
2) De acuerdo 5) Muy en desacuerdo
3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp) 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

OPORTUNIDAD E: EL HIJO DEL PERRO AGUAYO

1.1) ¿Usted se enteró de que el mes pasado murió el Hijo del Perro Aguayo por un golpe en la cabeza en una función de lucha libre, o no se enteró de esto?

1) Si 2) No (Pase a E_3) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a E_3) ☐

1.2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de la muerte del Hijo del Perro Aguayo?

1) Twitter 5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares
2) Facebook 6) Periódico
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias
4) Radio 8) Otro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

1.3) ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con que se practique la lucha libre?

1) Muy de acuerdo 4) En desacuerdo
2) De acuerdo 5) Muy en desacuerdo
3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (esp) 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

OPORTUNIDAD F: 007 EN MÉXICO

1.1) ¿Usted se enteró de que la semana pasada se grabaron escenas de la película 007 en el zócalo de la Ciudad de México, o no se enteró de esto?

1) Si 2) No (Pase a G_1) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a G_1) ☐

1.2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar de esta grabación en el zócalo de la Ciudad de México?

1) Twitter 5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares
2) Facebook 6) Periódico
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias
4) Radio 8) Otro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

OPORTUNIDAD F: 007 EN MÉXICO

1.1) ¿Y usted se enteró de que esta semana se dio a conocer un video en el que la primera dama, Angélica Rivera, y sus hijas están de compras en tiendas de lujo de Estados Unidos, o no se enteró de esto?

1) Si 2) No (Pase a p10_1) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a p10_1) ☐

1.2) ¿A través de qué medio fue la primera vez que escuchó hablar del video de la primera dama y sus hijas de compras en Estados Unidos?

1) Twitter 5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares
2) Facebook 6) Periódico
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias
4) Radio 8) Otro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

TEMAS DEFOE

TEMA A: AEROLINEAS

10_1) En los últimos doce meses ¿Cuántas veces ha viajado en un avión comercial?

contando cada ida y vuelta como un solo viaje)

1) Ninguna 3) 3-4 veces 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

10_2) En los últimos doce meses ¿Cuántas veces ha viajado en un camión comercial?

contando cada ida y vuelta como un solo viaje)

1) Ninguna 3) 3-4 veces 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

10_3) ¿Ha oído hablar de la aerolínea en México:

10_4) Encuestador: si -Si- ha oído, pregunte: ¿Y cuál es su opinión sobre esta aerolínea (...)?

(...)	Si	No	(...) Muy buena	(...) Buena	(...) Regular (esp)	(...) Mala	(...) Muy mala	Ns/Nc
1) Aeroméxico	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
2) Interjet	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
3) Magnicharters	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
4) VivaAerobus	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9
5) Volaris	1	2	1	2	3	4	5	9

10_5) Además de las aerolíneas tradicionales, a partir del año 2005 se introdujeron las aerolíneas de bajo costo en México. ¿Cree usted que los precios bajos hacen más accesible el viajar por aire?

1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

TEMA B: CREDIBILIDAD EN LAS ENCUESTAS

10_6) Pasando a otro tema, dígame por favor: ¿Qué tanto confía usted en los resultados de las encuestas para diversos temas?

1) Mucho 3) Poco 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

10_7) En el caso de las encuestas del ámbito electoral, ¿usted considera que los resultados de las encuestas coinciden entre ellos o no?

1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

p10_8) Ahora, ¿usted diría que generalmente se enteró de los resultados de las diferentes casas encuestadoras en el ámbito electoral o generalmente no se enteró?

1) Generalmente sí me entero 2) Generalmente no me entero (Pase a p10_10) ☐

p10_9) ¿Por qué medio se enteró de los resultados de las diferentes encuestas?

1) Twitter 5) Conversaciones con amigos o familiares
2) Facebook 6) Periódico
3) Televisión 7) Sitio de internet de noticias
4) Radio 8) Otro 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

TEMA C: DEPRESIÓN

p10_10) Podría decirme si en la última semana ha experimentado alguna de las siguientes:

	Si	No	Ns/Nc (esp)
a) Preocupación	1	2	9
b) Felicidad	1	2	9
c) Tristeza	1	2	9
d) Gozo	1	2	9
e) Estrés	1	2	9
f) Satisfacción	1	2	9
g) Frustración	1	2	9
h) Enojo	1	2	9

p10_11) Pensando en su situación general de vida actualmente ¿usted diría que es mucho mejor, mejor, peor, o mucho peor que en los últimos 12 meses?

(Si CONTESTA IGUAL, INSISTE IGUAL DE BIEN O IGUAL DE MAL)

1) Mucho mejor 5) Peor
2) Mejor 6) Mucho peor
3) Igual de bien que hace 12 meses (Esp)
4) Igual de mal que 12 meses (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

p10_12) Pensando en su situación general de vida actualmente ¿usted diría que en los próximos 12 meses será mucho mejor, mejor, peor, o mucho peor?

(Si CONTESTA IGUAL, INSISTE IGUAL DE BIEN O IGUAL DE MAL)

1) Mucho mejor 5) Peor
2) Mejor 6) Mucho peor
3) Igual de bien que ahora (Esp)
4) Igual de mal que ahora (Esp) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

p10_13) En general ¿Qué tan satisfecho o insatisfecho se siente con la vida que lleva actualmente?

1) Muy satisfecho 4) Insatisfecho
2) Algo satisfecho 5) Muy insatisfecho
3) Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho (esp.) 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

TEMA D: CONSUMO DE PRODUCTOS MEXICANOS

p10_14) Cuando va de compras ¿Suele fijarse o no suele fijarse si los productos que compra tienen el registro de "Hecho en México"?

1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (esp.) ☐

p10_15) ¿Usted prefiere o no prefiere comprar productos hechos en México?

1) Si prefiero
2) No prefiero (Pase a p10_17) 9) Ns/Nc (esp) (Pase a p10_17) ☐

10_16) Cuando compra productos mexicanos lo hace por (...)?

	Si	No	Ns/Nc (esp.)
a) Calidad	1	2	9
b) Para apoyar a la industria mexicana	1	2	9
c) Precio	1	2	9
d) Porque sus amigos/familiares los compran	1	2	9
e) Por su imagen	1	2	9
f) Otro	1	2	9

10_17) ¿Cuál es la principal razón por la que compra productos importados?

1) Calidad 4) Por su imagen
2) Precio 5) Otro
3) Porque sus amigos/familiares los compran 9) Ns/Nc (esp) ☐

TECNOLOGÍA

DISPOSITIVOS

T_1) Ahora dígame por favor, ¿Cuenta usted con (...) en su vivienda o no?

Enc: Rotar	Si	No	Ns/Nc
a) Televisión de cinescopio (convencional)	1	2	9
b) Televisión de plasma, lcd, led (pantalla)	1	2	9
c) Teléfono fijo	1	2	9

T_2) De los siguientes artículos, dígame por favor ¿usted cuenta o no con (...)?

Enc: Rotar	Si	No	Ns/Nc
a) iPod o reproductor de MP3	1	2	9
b) Tableta	1	2	9
c) Cámara digital	1	2	9
d) Video cámara	1	2	9
e) GPS	1	2	9
f) Kindle (Lector electrónico de libros)	1	2	9
g) Reproductor DVD	1	2	9
h) Reproductor Blu-Ray	1	2	9
i) Computadora de Escritorio	1	2	9
j) Computadora Laptop	1	2	9
k) Consola de videojuegos (Play Station, X Box, Wii, etc)	1	2	9

ACCESO Y USOS DE INTERNET

T_3) ¿Usted utiliza Internet?

1) Si 2) No (Pase a T_11) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_11) ☐

T_4) ¿Para acceder a internet usted suele utilizar (...)?

Enc: No rotar opciones	Si	No	Ns/Nc
a) Banda ancha (WiFi, cable, satélite)	1	2	9
b) Conexión por cableado (Fax Modem interno/ línea telefónica directa a la computadora)	1	2	9
c) Conexión de banda ancha móvil (3G/4G)	1	2	9

T_5) ¿Principalmente en qué lugar suele conectarse a Internet?

1) En casa 5) En el trabajo
2) En un café internet 6) Otro
3) En casa de un amigo o familiar
4) En el lugar de trabajo de un amigo o familiar 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) ☐

T_6) ¿Con qué frecuencia utiliza internet?

1) Diario 4) Una vez al mes
2) Una vez a la semana 5) Cada dos meses o más

7) ¿Cuántas horas se conecta cada vez que utiliza Internet?
 _____ Horas 99) Ns/Nc (Esp)

8) Aproximadamente ¿Cuántos años lleva siendo usuario de internet?
 1) 6 meses o menos 4) 3 años 7) 6 años o más
 2) Un año 5) 4 años 8) Ns/Nc (Esp)

9) ¿Usted cuenta o no con correo electrónico?
 1) Sí 2) No (Pase a T_11) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_11)

10) ¿Con qué servidor tiene su cuenta de correo electrónico principal?
 1) Hotmail 4) Outlook
 2) Gmail 5) Otro: _____
 3) Yahoo 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

ELULARES

11) ¿Tiene celular propio o no?
 1) Sí 2) No (Pase a T_23) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_23)

12) ¿Paga su celular por medio de tarjetas pre-pagadas o de un plan?
 1) Tarjetas de prepago 2) Plan 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

13) ¿Aproximadamente cuánto gasta al mes en su celular?
 1) De \$100 - \$300 4) De \$1001 - \$1500
 2) De \$301 - \$500 5) Más de \$1500
 3) De \$501 - \$1000 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

14) ¿Con qué compañía tiene contratado su servicio de celular?
 1) Telcel 4) Nextel 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)
 2) Movistar 5) Unefon
 3) Iusacell 6) Otro (Esp): _____

15) ¿El celular con el que usted cuenta es un teléfono inteligente o no?
 1) Sí 2) No (Pase a T_18) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_18)

16) ¿Qué sistema operativo tiene su teléfono inteligente?
 1) iOS (Mac) 4) Windows Phone
 2) Android 5) Otro (Esp): _____
 3) Blackberry OS 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

17) ¿Accesó a Internet o no desde su teléfono inteligente ayer?
 1) Sí 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

18) ¿Su celular tiene o no acceso a internet?
 1) Sí 2) No (Pase a T_20) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_20)

19) ¿Usted accede a internet en su celular a través de WiFi o Red 3G o similar?
 1) WiFi 2) 3G o similar 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

20) A continuación le voy a leer una lista, dígame si alguna vez ha utilizado o no su teléfono celular para realizar cualquiera de las siguientes cosas. ¿Utiliza su teléfono celular ara (...)?

Enc: Rotar	Sí	No	Ns/ Nc	
a) Enviar o recibir correos	1	2	9	
b) Acceder a internet	1	2	9	
c) Jugar	1	2	9	
d) Chatear	1	2	9	
e) Escuchar música	1	2	9	
f) Ver videos	1	2	9	
g) Buscar información	1	2	9	
h) Hacer compras	1	2	9	
i) Participar en una video llamada	1	2	9	
j) Realizar pagos	1	2	9	

Enc: Pregunte T_21 si utiliza internet (T_3=1) y cuenta con acceso a internet en su celular (T_18=1). En otro caso pase a T_23

21) En general, cuando usted utiliza Internet ¿lo hace principalmente desde su teléfono inteligente o desde algún otro dispositivo como una computadora de escritorio, laptop o una tableta?

1) Desde mi teléfono inteligente (Pase a T_22) 4) Desde una tableta
 2) Desde una computadora de escritorio 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

Enc: Pase a T_23

22) ¿Cuál es la razón principal por la que usted usa Internet principalmente en su teléfono celular en lugar de utilizar algún otro dispositivo? (Enc: Esperar respuesta espontánea y codificar)
 1) El teléfono celular me es más conveniente
 2) Mi teléfono celular está siempre conmigo
 3) El teléfono celular es más fácil de utilizar que una computadora
 4) No tengo computadora en casa
 5) Sólo tengo acceso a Internet en el teléfono celular / No tengo acceso a Internet en casa
 6) Velocidad / teléfono es más rápido que la computadora
 7) Utilizo el teléfono para trabajar
 8) Otro: _____ 9) Ns/Nc

EDES SOCIALES

23) ¿Usted es miembro de alguna red social?
 1) Sí 2) No (Pase a X_1A) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a X_1A)

24) ¿Tiene usted o no la cuenta de...?	Sí	No	→	Diario	Una vez a la semana	Una vez cada 15 días	Una vez al mes	Cada dos meses o más	Ns/Nc
1) Twitter	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
2) Facebook	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
3) Myspace	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
4) LinkedIn	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
5) Tumblr	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
6) Youtube	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
7) Vimeo	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
8) Instagram	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
9) Google Plus	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
10) Pinterest	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
11) Hi5	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
12) Metroflog	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
13) Taringa	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

26) ¿Cuál es la cuenta que más utiliza? (Enc: Esperar respuesta espontánea)
 1) Twitter 4) Youtube
 2) Facebook 5) Otra: _____
 3) Myspace 9) Ns/Nc

T_27) Principalmente, ¿Para qué utiliza usted las redes sociales?

1) Platicar con los amigos 3) Hablar de política
 2) Informarse 4) Otro (Esp): _____ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

T_28) Aproximadamente, ¿cuántos amigos o "contactos" tiene usted en la cuenta que más utiliza?

1) _____ Amigos o "contactos" 9999) Ns/Nc (Esp)

T_29) ¿Con qué frecuencia escribe usted mensajes para que todos sus contactos los vean?

1) Menos de una vez por semana 6) Cinco veces a la semana
 2) Una vez a la semana 7) Seis veces a la semana
 3) Dos veces a la semana 8) Diario
 4) Tres veces a la semana 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)
 5) Cuatro veces a la semana

X: 'ITEM COUNT TECHNIQUE' (A)

X_1A) Le voy a mostrar una tarjeta donde se describen algunas actividades relacionadas con la última campaña electoral para presidente de la República en la cual resultó ganador Enrique Peña Nieto. Me gustaría que me indicara cuáles de las siguientes actividades fueron llevadas a cabo por algún candidato o representantes de partidos políticos (señala sinónimos como operadores políticos, activistas o militantes para asegurar la comprensión). (Entregar TARJETA 2)

Enc: No rotar opciones	Sí	No	Ns/Nc	
a) Visitaron tu casa para hablar con alguien	1	2	9	
b) Colocaron posters y pintaron paredes en tu colonia (Enc: señalar comunidad o vecindario, según área geográfica)	1	2	9	
c) Lanzaron promocionales por radio y televisión	1	2	9	
d) Te informaron detalladamente sus propuestas de gobierno	1	2	9	

X_2) En las elecciones para presidente de la República en la cual resultó ganador Enrique Peña Nieto, el día de las votaciones ¿algun candidato o alguien ligado a algún partido político lo contactó?

1) Sí 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

X_3) Independientemente de por cuál partido político o candidato votó, podría decirme cuáles de las siguientes frases aplica más a usted y su experiencia...

1) Había decidido mi voto antes del día de las elecciones y si voté por esa opción.
 2) Había decidido mi voto antes del día de las elecciones pero NO voté por esa opción.
 3) No estaba seguro de por quién votar antes del día de las elecciones.
 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

XIX. Socio-Demográficos

E) ¿Hasta qué año estudió usted?

1) Nada 3) Secundaria 5) Universidad o más
 2) Primaria 4) Preparatoria, bachillerato o carreras técnicas
 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

F) ¿Sumando todo lo que ganan en su familia, como cuánto ganan todos los que trabajan en su familia al mes?

1) Hasta \$1,500 3) \$3,001-\$6,000 5) Más de \$12,000
 2) \$1,501-\$3,000 4) \$6,001-\$12,000 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

G) ¿Cuál es su principal ocupación?

1) Sector público (no maestro) 8) Maestro
 2) Trabajador por cuenta propia 9) Desempleado
 3) Sector privado (no maestro) 10) Jubilado
 4) Sector agropecuario 11) Otro (esp) _____ (anotar)
 5) Obrero 99) Ns/Nc (esp)
 6) Ama de casa
 7) Estudiante

H) ¿Podría decirme cuál es su estado civil actualmente?

1) Soltero (a) 5) Separado(a)
 2) Casado(a) 6) Viudo(a)
 3) En unión libre
 4) Divorciado(a) 9) Ns/Nc

I) ¿Tiene hijos que dependan económicamente de usted?

1) Sí 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (esp)

J) ¿Practica usted alguna religión?

1) Sí, ¿Cuál? _____
 2) No
 9) Ns/Nc

K) Si usted recibe una solicitud para hacer una encuesta como ésta, ¿preferiría participar en una entrevista cara a cara en su vivienda, en una entrevista telefónica, en una entrevista a través de su teléfono celular o a través de una encuesta por internet?

1) Cara a cara en vivienda
 2) Por teléfono 5) Otro (Esp): _____
 3) Por teléfono celular 6) Ninguno en particular (Esp)
 4) A través de internet 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)

ENCUESTADOR: Pida y escriba el nombre del entrevistado

ENCUESTADOR EXPLIQUE LO SIGUIENTE "Para efectos de medir la calidad de mi trabajo, una persona de esta empresa se comunicará con usted. Para este fin le agradecería mucho que me diera su número telefónico o celular para que puedan realizar esta supervisión

Enc: Anote la hora en que terminó la entrevista:

_____: ____
 Hora Minutos

Enc: Anote la duración aprox. de la entrevista (en minutos): _____

	Nombre	Firma
Encuestador		
Supervisor		

Boleta 1		Diputados Federales		Abril 2015 (SEMANA 0)		Folio	
Calle: _____ # _____		Interior: _____		Colonia: _____		_____	
Municipio/Delegación: _____		Entidad: _____		_____		_____	
Distrito: _____		Sección: _____		_____		_____	

Marque con una cruz su respuesta a esta pregunta y deposite la hoja en esta urna. Como usted ve, esta hoja es muy diferente a una boleta electoral y se usará solamente en esta encuesta. Su respuesta es confidencial.

Si hoy fuera la elección para elegir DIPUTADOS FEDERALES,

¿Por cuál partido votaría usted?

 <p>PARTIDO ACCIÓN NACIONAL</p>	 <p>PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO INSTITUCIONAL</p>
 <p>PARTIDO DE LA REVOLUCIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA</p>	 <p>PARTIDO DEL TRABAJO</p>
 <p>PARTIDO VERDE ECOLOGISTA DE MÉXICO</p>	 <p>MOVIMIENTO CIUDADANO</p>
 <p>PARTIDO NUEVA ALIANZA</p>	 <p>MOVIMIENTO REGENERACIÓN NACIONAL</p>
 <p>PARTIDO ENCUENTRO SOCIAL</p>	 <p>PARTIDO HUMANISTA</p>

TARJETA 1

INSEGURIDAD
CRISIS ECONÓMICA
NARCOTRÁFICO
MAL GOBIERNO/GOBERNANTES
DESEMPLEO
EDUCACIÓN

TARJETA 2

VISITARON TU CASA PARA HABLAR CON ALGUIEN
COLOCARON POSTERS Y PINTARON PAREDES EN TU COLONIA
LANZARON PROMOCIONALES POR RADIO Y TELEVISIÓN
TE INFORMARON DETALLADAMENTE SUS PROPUESTAS DE GOBIERNO

A.4.3 Spanish Version of The Survey Items (Treatment Group)

T_7) ¿Cuántas horas se conecta cada vez que utiliza Internet?
) Horas 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_8) Aproximadamente ¿Cuántos años lleva siendo usuario de internet?
) 6 meses o menos 4) 3 años 7) 6 años o más
) Un año 5) 4 años 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_9) ¿Usted cuenta o no con correo electrónico?
) Si 2) No (Pase a T_11) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_11) _____

T_10) ¿Con qué servidor tiene su cuenta de correo electrónico principal?
) Hotmail 4) Outlook 6) Cinco veces a la semana
) Gmail 5) Otro: _____ 7) Seis veces a la semana
) Yahoo 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

ELULARES

T_11) ¿Tiene celular propio o no?
) Si 2) No (Pase a T_23) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_23) _____

T_12) ¿Paga su celular por medio de tarjetas pre-pagadas o de un plan?
) Tarjetas de prepago 2) Plan 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_13) ¿Aproximadamente cuánto gasta al mes en su celular?
) De \$100 -\$300 4) De \$1001- \$1500
) De \$301-\$500 5) Más de \$1500
) De \$501-\$1000 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_14) ¿Con qué compañía tiene contratado su servicio de celular?
) Telcel 4) Nextel 9) Ns/Nc (Esp)
) Movistar 5) Unefon
) Iusacell 6) Otro (Esp): _____

T_15) ¿El celular con el que usted cuenta es un teléfono inteligente o no?
) Si 2) No (Pase a T_18) 9) Ns/Nc (Pase a T_18) _____

T_16) ¿Qué sistema operativo tiene su teléfono inteligente?
) iOS (Mac) 4) Windows Phone
) Android 5) Otro (Esp): _____
) Blackberry OS 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_17) ¿Accesó a Internet o no desde su teléfono inteligente ayer?
) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_18) ¿Su celular tiene o no acceso a internet?
) Si 2) No (Pase a T_20) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a T_20) _____

T_19) ¿Usted accede a internet en su celular a través de WiFi o Red 3G o similar?
) WiFi 2) 3G o similar 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_20) A continuación le voy a leer una lista, dígame si alguna vez ha utilizado o no su teléfono celular para realizar cualquiera de las siguientes cosas. ¿Utiliza su teléfono celular ara (...)?

Enc: Rotar	Si	No	Ns/ Nc	
a) Enviar o recibir correos	1	2	9	
b) Acceder a internet	1	2	9	
c) Jugar	1	2	9	
d) Chatear	1	2	9	
e) Escuchar música	1	2	9	
f) Ver videos	1	2	9	
g) Buscar información	1	2	9	
h) Hacer compras	1	2	9	
i) Participar en una video llamada	1	2	9	
j) Realizar pagos	1	2	9	

Enc: Pregunte T_21 si utiliza internet (T_3=1) y cuenta con acceso a internet en su celular (T_18=1). En otro caso pase a T_23

T_21) En general, cuando usted utiliza Internet ¿lo hace principalmente desde su teléfono inteligente o desde algún otro dispositivo como una computadora de escritorio, laptop o una tableta?
) Desde mi teléfono inteligente (Pase a T_22) 4) Desde una tableta
) Desde una computadora de escritorio
) Desde una laptop 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

Enc: Pase a T_23

T_22) ¿Cuál es la razón principal por la que usted usa Internet principalmente en su teléfono celular en lugar de utilizar algún otro dispositivo? (Enc: Esperar respuesta espontánea y codificar)
) El teléfono celular me es más conveniente
) Mi teléfono celular está siempre conmigo
) El teléfono celular es más fácil de utilizar que una computadora
) No tengo computadora en casa
) Sólo tengo acceso a Internet en el teléfono celular / No tengo acceso a Internet en casa
) Velocidad / teléfono es más rápido que la computadora
) Utilizo el teléfono para trabajar
) Otro: _____ 9) Ns/Nc _____

REDES SOCIALES

T_23) ¿Usted es miembro de alguna red social?
) Si 2) No (Pase a X_1B) 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) (Pase a X_1B) _____

T_24) ¿Tiene usted o no una cuenta de...?

nc: Rotar	Si	No	→	Diario	Una vez a la semana	Una vez cada 15 días	Una vez al mes	Cada dos meses o mas	Ns/Nc
i Twitter	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Facebook	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Myspace	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i LinkedIn	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Tumblr	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Youtube	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Vimeo	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Instagram	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Google Plus	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Pinterest	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Hi5	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Metroflog	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9
i Taringa	1	2	→	1	2	3	4	5	9

T_26) ¿Cuál es la cuenta que más utiliza? (Enc: Esperar respuesta espontánea)
) Twitter 4) Youtube
) Facebook 5) Otra: _____
) Myspace 9) Ns/Nc _____

T_27) Principalmente, ¿Para qué utiliza usted las redes sociales?
 1) Platicar con los amigos 3) Hablar de política
 2) Informarse 4) Otro (Esp): _____ 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_28) Aproximadamente, ¿cuántos amigos o "contactos" tiene usted en la cuenta que más utiliza?
) Amigos o "contactos" 9999) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

T_29) ¿Con qué frecuencia escribe usted mensajes para que todos sus contactos los vean?
 1) Menos de una vez por semana 6) Cinco veces a la semana
 2) Una vez a la semana 7) Seis veces a la semana
 3) Dos veces a la semana 8) Diario
 4) Tres veces a la semana 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

X: 'ITEM COUNT TECHNIQUE' (B)

X_1B) Le voy a mostrar una tarjeta donde se describen algunas actividades relacionadas con la última campaña electoral para presidente de la República en la cual resultó ganador Enrique Peña Nieto. Me gustaría que me indicara si algún candidato o representantes de partidos políticos (señalar sinónimos como operadores políticos, activistas o militantes para asegurar la comprensión) llevaron a cabo dichas actividades. Por favor **NO ME DIGA CUALES. SOLAMENTE LA CANTIDAD (señalar 1, 2, 3, 4 o 5 para el grupo de tratamiento para asegurar la comprensión).** (Entregar TARJETA 3)

Por favor, dígame CUÁNTAS de estas cosas usted ha presenciado: cero, una, dos, tres, cuatro o cinco. _____

X_2) En las elecciones para presidente de la República en la cual resultó ganador Enrique Peña Nieto, el día de las votaciones ¿algun candidato o alguien ligado a algún partido político lo contactó?
 1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

X_3) Independientemente de por cuál partido político o candidato votó, podría decirme cuáles de las siguientes frases aplica más a usted y su experiencia...
 1) Había decidido mi voto antes del día de las elecciones y Sí voté por esa opción.
 2) Había decidido mi voto antes del día de las elecciones pero NO voté por esa opción.
 3) No estaba seguro de por quién votar antes del día de las elecciones.
 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

XIX. Socio-Demográficos

E) ¿Hasta qué año estudió usted?
 1) Nada 3) Secundaria 5) Universidad o más
 2) Primaria 4) Preparatoria, bachillerato o carreras técnicas
 9) Ns/Nc (esp) _____

F) ¿Sumando todo lo que ganan en su familia, como cuánto ganan todos los que trabajan en su familia al mes?
 1) Hasta \$1,500 3) \$3,001-\$6,000 5) Más de \$12,000
 2) \$1,501-\$3,000 4) \$6,001-\$12,000 9) Ns/Nc (esp) _____

G) ¿Cuál es su principal ocupación?
 1) Sector público (no maestro) 8) Maestro
 2) Trabajador por cuenta propia 9) Desempleado
 3) Sector privado (no maestro) 10) Jubilado
 4) Sector agropecuario 11) Otro (esp) _____ (anotar)
 5) Obrero 99) Ns/Nc (esp)
 6) Ama de casa
 7) Estudiante _____

H) ¿Podría decirme cuál es su estado civil actualmente?
 1) Soltero (a) 5) Separado(a)
 2) Casado(a) 6) Viudo(a)
 3) En unión libre
 4) Divorciado(a) 9) Ns/Nc _____

I) ¿Tiene hijos que dependan económicamente de usted?
 1) Si 2) No 9) Ns/Nc (esp) _____

J) ¿Practica usted alguna religión?
 1) Si, ¿Cuál? _____
 2) No
 9) Ns/Nc _____

K) Si usted recibe una solicitud para hacer una encuesta como ésta, ¿preferiría participar en una entrevista cara a cara en su vivienda, en una entrevista telefónica, en una entrevista a través de su teléfono celular o a través de una encuesta por internet?
 1) Cara a cara en vivienda
 2) Por teléfono 5) Otro (Esp): _____
 3) Por teléfono celular 6) Ninguno en particular (Esp)
 4) A través de internet 9) Ns/Nc (Esp) _____

ENCUESTADOR: Pida y escriba el nombre del entrevistado

ENCUESTADOR EXPLIQUE LO SIGUIENTE "Para efectos de medir la calidad de mi trabajo, una persona de esta empresa se comunicará con usted. Para este fin le agradecería mucho que me diera su número telefónico o celular para que puedan realizar esta supervisión

Enc: Anote la hora en que terminó la entrevista:

____ : ____

Hora Minutos

Enc: Anote la duración aprox. de la entrevista (en minutos): _____

	Nombre	Firma
Encuestador		
Supervisor		

TARJETA 3

VISITARON TU CASA PARA HABLAR CON ALGUIEN
COLOCARON POSTERS Y PINTARON PAREDES EN TU COLONIA
DÍAS CERCANOS A LAS VOTACIONES, TE DIERON DINERO O ALGO A CAMBIO DE QUE VOTARAS POR UN CANDIDATO O PARTIDO POLÍTICO
LANZARON PROMOCIONALES POR RADIO Y TELEVISIÓN
TE INFORMARON DETALLADAMENTE SUS PROPUESTAS DE GOBIERNO

A.4.4 Survey Reports

A) Frequencies Demographics

GENDER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Male	1	426	53.25	53.25	53.25
Female	2	374	46.75	46.75	100.00
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

AGE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
-24	1	124	15.50	16.29	16.29
25-34	2	198	24.75	26.02	42.31
35-44	3	193	24.13	25.36	67.67
45-54	4	151	18.88	19.84	87.52
55-64	5	69	8.63	9.07	96.58
65+	6	26	3.25	3.42	100.00
.	.	39	4.88	Missing	
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

AGE GROUPED

N	Valid	761
	Missing	39
Mean		2.90
Std Dev		1.33
Minimum		1.00
Maximum		6.00

DEGREE OR LEVEL OF SCHOOL

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
None	1	28	3.50	3.50	3.50
Primary (Some high school or less)	2	131	16.38	16.38	19.88
Secondary (High School)	3	325	40.63	40.63	60.50
Post-secondary and non-tertiary education (Some college; trade and technical education)	4	255	31.87	31.87	92.38
First and second stage tertiary education (College and Postgraduate)	5	58	7.25	7.25	99.63
DK/NO	9	3	.38	.38	100.00
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

HOUSEHOLD INCOME (MONTHLY)

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Less than MX\$1,500	1	67	8.38	8.38	8.38
MX\$1,501-MX\$3,000	2	149	18.63	18.63	27.00
MX\$3,001-MX\$6,000	3	323	40.38	40.38	67.38
MX\$6,001-MX\$12,000	4	159	19.88	19.88	87.25
MX\$12,000 or more	5	21	2.63	2.63	89.88
DK/NO	9	81	10.13	10.13	100.00
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

Exchange rate: £0.039

B) Frequencies Experiment-Related

ITEMS ASKED INDIVIDUALLY (CONTROL GROUP)

They visited your home to talk to someone

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	1	103	12.88	25.75	25.75
No	2	290	36.25	72.50	98.25
DK/NO	9	7	.88	1.75	100.00
	.	400	50.00	Missing	
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

They put up campaign posters or signs in your neighbourhood/city

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	1	219	27.38	54.75	54.75
No	2	169	21.13	42.25	97.00
DK/NO	9	12	1.50	3.00	100.00
	.	400	50.00	Missing	
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

They broadcasted campaign advertisements on radio or television

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	1	229	28.63	57.25	57.25
No	2	154	19.25	38.50	95.75
DK/NO	9	17	2.13	4.25	100.00
	.	400	50.00	Missing	
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

They communicated you in detail their candidates' manifesto

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	1	75	9.38	18.75	18.75
No	2	312	39.00	78.00	96.75
DK/NO	9	13	1.63	3.25	100.00
	.	400	50.00	Missing	
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

CONTROL QUESTIONS

...During the Election Day, did any candidate or activist contact you?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	1	118	14.75	14.75	14.75
No	2	637	79.63	79.63	94.38
DK/NO	9	45	5.63	5.63	100.00
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

...which of the following statements you would say suits better your own experience?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day and I DID VOTE for that option	1	377	47.13	47.13	47.13
I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day but I DID NOT VOTE for that option	2	164	20.50	20.50	67.63
I had made NO choice BEFORE the Election Day	3	136	17.00	17.00	84.63
DK/NO	9	123	15.38	15.38	100.00
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

...which party do you think yourself more lean to?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
PAN strong	1	82	10.25	10.25	10.25
PAN not strong	2	72	9.00	9.00	19.25
PRI strong	3	176	22.00	22.00	41.25
PRI not strong	4	100	12.50	12.50	53.75
PRD strong	5	54	6.75	6.75	60.50
PRD not strong	6	39	4.88	4.88	65.38
PT strong	7	13	1.63	1.63	67.00
PVEM strong	9	13	1.63	1.63	68.63
PVEM not strong	10	18	2.25	2.25	70.88
Movimiento Ciudadano strong	11	9	1.13	1.13	72.00
Movimiento Ciudadano not strong	12	7	.88	.88	72.88
Nueva Alianza strong	13	5	.63	.63	73.50
Nueva Alianza not strong	14	4	.50	.50	74.00
MORENA strong	15	11	1.38	1.38	75.38
MORENA not strong	16	8	1.00	1.00	76.38
Encuentro Social strong	17	2	.25	.25	76.63
Encuentro Social not strong	18	2	.25	.25	76.88
Partido Humanista strong	19	3	.38	.38	77.25
Partido Humanista not strong	20	3	.38	.38	77.63
None	22	160	20.00	20.00	97.63
DK/NO	99	19	2.38	2.38	100.00
Total	800	100.0	100.0		

C) Cross Tabulation

...which of the following statements you would say suits better your own experience?

<i>...During the Election Day, did any candidate or activist contact you?</i>	I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day and I DID VOTE for that option	I had already made my choice BEFORE the Election Day but I DID NOT VOTE for that option	I had made NO choice BEFORE the Election Day	DK/NO	Total
Yes	51.00	38.00	22.00	7.00	118.00
	43.22%	32.20%	18.64%	5.93%	100.00%
	13.53%	23.17%	16.18%	5.69%	14.75%
	6.38%	4.75%	2.75%	.88%	14.75%
No	315.00	119.00	107.00	96.00	637.00
	49.45%	18.68%	16.80%	15.07%	100.00%
	83.55%	72.56%	78.68%	78.05%	79.63%
	39.38%	14.88%	13.38%	12.00%	79.63%
DK/NO	11.00	7.00	7.00	20.00	45.00
	24.44%	15.56%	15.56%	44.44%	100.00%
	2.92%	4.27%	5.15%	16.26%	5.63%
	1.38%	.88%	.88%	2.50%	5.63%
Total	377.00	164.00	136.00	123.00	800.00
	47.13%	20.50%	17.00%	15.38%	100.00%
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
	47.13%	20.50%	17.00%	15.38%	100.00%

Chi-square tests.

Statistic	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Chi-Square	47.35	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	40.98	6	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	35.21	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	800		

Non-sensitive item from the ITC, *They visited your home to talk to someone* * *People Contacted by Activists*

	Contacted by Activists		
They visited your home to talk to someone	No	Yes	Total
Yes	64.00	37.00	101.00
	63.37%	36.63%	100.00%
	19.69%	72.55%	26.86%
	17.02%	9.84%	26.86%
No	257.00	14.00	271.00
	94.83%	5.17%	100.00%
	79.08%	27.45%	72.07%
	68.35%	3.72%	72.07%
DK/NO	4.00	.00	4.00
	100.00%	.00%	100.00%
	1.23%	.00%	1.06%
	1.06%	.00%	1.06%
Total	325.00	51.00	376.00
	86.44%	13.56%	100.00%
	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
	86.44%	13.56%	100.00%

Chi-square tests.

Statistic	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Chi-Square	62.78	2	.000
Likelihood Ratio	55.58	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	22.09	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	376		