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Military Coalitions and Crisis Duration

Chiba, Daina and Johnson, Jesse C (2018) 'Military Coalitions and Crisis Duration.' Journal of Politics. ISSN 0022-3816 (In Press)

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Abstract

Forming a military coalition during an international crisis can improve a state's chances of achieving its political goals. We argue that the involvement of a coalition, however, can have unintended adverse effects on crisis outcomes by complicating the bargaining process and extending the duration of crises. This argument suggests that crises involving coalitions should be significantly longer than crises without coalitions. However, other factors that affect crisis duration are also likely to influence coalition formation. Therefore, taking into account the endogeneity of the presence of a coalition is essential to testing our hypothesis. To deal with this inferential challenge we develop a new statistical model that is an extension of instrumental variable estimation in survival analysis. Our analysis of 255 post-World War II interstate crises demonstrates that, even after accounting for the endogeneity of coalition formation, military coalitions tend to extend the duration of crises by approximately 284 days.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Coalitions, Crisis, Military Cooperation, Bargaining, Instrumental Variable
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 05 Sep 2018 13:00
Last Modified: 05 Sep 2018 13:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22670

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