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Strategy revision opportunities and collusion

Embrey, M and Mengel, F and Peeters, R (2018) 'Strategy revision opportunities and collusion.' Experimental Economics. ISSN 1386-4157

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This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Strategy revision opportunities, Cooperation, Repeated games, Complements versus substitutes
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 19 Jul 2018 12:24
Last Modified: 08 Feb 2021 19:15

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