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Policy Bargaining and Incompatibilities in Civil Wars: Intervention, Power-Sharing, and Preferences

Maekawa, Wakako (2018) Policy Bargaining and Incompatibilities in Civil Wars: Intervention, Power-Sharing, and Preferences. PhD thesis, University of Essex.

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Abstract

Civil wars in which conflict parties claim a regime lead to crisis at both domestic and international levels. Such claims for new regime have been a part of the democratization process throughout history. Thus, for both domestic and international participants in civil conflicts, bargaining is often a central issue. While conflict parties face pressure to cease civil war, salient issues at stake sometimes make parties less inclined to settle. Even if parties reach an agreement, in many cases, this is only a part of the long process of ending war. The outcome might also create incompatible situations for different parties, in some cases, causing another conflict. In other cases, such an outcome simultaneously solves other parties' incompatible situations. This dissertation investigates how and when politically incompatible situations in civil wars are resolved through the process of war termination. It re-examines the arguments used for international relations and civil conflict terminations with a particular focus on the subject of bargaining over political institutions, and the changing phases of termination process. Those theories are tested by using various potential outcomes as measures of conflict terminations in civil wars over government.

Item Type: Thesis (PhD)
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Wakako Maekawa
Date Deposited: 27 Jul 2018 14:31
Last Modified: 27 Jul 2018 14:31
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22746

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