The Logics and Limits of ‘Collaborative Governance’ in Nantes: Myth, Ideology and the Politics of New Urban Regimes

Griggs, Steven and Howarth, David and Feandeiro, Andrés (2020) 'The Logics and Limits of ‘Collaborative Governance’ in Nantes: Myth, Ideology and the Politics of New Urban Regimes.' Journal of Urban Affairs, 42 (1). pp. 91-108. ISSN 0735-2166

Preview

Text
JUA Logics and Limits Collaboration Nantes Griggs Howarth and Feandeiro 28 July 2018 Uploaded.pdf - Accepted Version
Download (210kB) | Preview

Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2018.1516508

Abstract

This article characterizes and evaluates a paradigm case of urban collaborative governance: the so-called ‘Nantes model’. Stressing its positioning in the particular tradition of French politics, and drawing on poststructuralist discourse theory, this article demonstrates how the myth of the ‘jeu à la Nantaise’ (the “Nantes game”) informs a discourse of urban collaborative governance with a distinctive triad of policy goals. In the context of fiscal tightening and multiple crises, this governance practice involves various strategies designed to incorporate neighbourhoods and communities in the co-production of public policies in a pragmatic way. Analyzing the grammar and forms of these practices reveals that ‘co-governance’ in Nantes functions as a ‘doctrinal abridgement’, leading to a growing managerialization in an increasingly codified system of community participation. We thus conclude that one line of flight in the ‘Nantes model’ signifies a movement away from an image of collaborative pragmatism as a complex praxis of governing to an ideology that conceals the complications and messiness of governing in a collaborative manner.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Collaborative governance; discourse; pragmatism; co-production; community participation
Subjects:	J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
SWORD Depositor:	Elements
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	05 Sep 2018 09:43
Last Modified:	06 Jan 2022 13:52
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/22754

Actions (login required)

View Item

Altmetric