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Implications of the Different Experiences of Corruption on Police Confidence and Legitimacy in Ghana: An Exploratory Study.

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Summary

Based on 6 months of fieldwork and conducting 9 sets of observation in Ghana, this thesis explores the effects of the different corruption experiences upon confidence in the police as well as police legitimacy. Since Tyler published his seminal work *Why People Obey the Law,* legitimacy and confidence in the criminal justice system has become an important concept in criminological analysis. Various studies have sought to clarify the meaning of legitimacy and to examine the factors that influence public perceptions of police legitimacy and confidence. Studies have emphasized the importance of procedural justice, distributive justice, and effectiveness of legal institutions. What remains under-researched in Criminological discourse however, is the effects of police corruption upon public confidence and police legitimacy.

An important exception is Tankebe's (2010a) and Asif, Bradford and Zakar's (2014) study. Yet both construct their study on a simple distinction between direct and indirect experiences of public corruption with the police. This overlooks the fact that there could be different types of direct and vicarious experiences (e.g. negative and positive experiences), with different effects on confidence and legitimacy. This study addresses these issues by examining the effects of both perceptions and different experiences of public-police corruption in Ghana. The research is focused on the experiences of corruption at the street level. Data was obtained from the police and retired police officers, commercial drivers, and private entrepreneurs (market traders). These actors encounter the police more often than any other, and that their expectations in corrupt encounters are conflicting. For example, while some members of the public condemn police corruption at police checkpoints, others, or the same people, in turn criticise and get infuriated at commercial drivers for failing to pay bribes to the police resulting in, for instance, unnecessary journey delays. The impact of these experiences on citizens' perceptions of police legitimacy and confidence in the Ghanaian police are discussed.

….. **I dedicate this thesis to my late father….**

Henry Kwaku Seth Odei Addo

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INTRODUCTION

The practices whereby gifts are offered in clandestine ways for private gain is undeniably present, to some extent, in all societies. According to Transparency International (2010), some major indicators demonstrate that Ghana has made good progress in terms of government transparency, the effectiveness of the administrative system and control of corruption. It can then be argued that corruption in Ghana may not be perceived as extensive. This has raised significant concern for public institutions as well as members of the public, as the lived reality is that it remains a huge challenge in Ghana (*ibid* 2010) especially in relation to the police. Specific conditions, including financial difficulties and social change, family and ethnic ties, and overlapping and conflicting perspectives about what is legitimate public servant conduct has contributed to the normalcy of corruption in Ghana (Gould and Amaro-Reyes 1983; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Majumdar and Radner 2007).

My study sets out to explore police corruption in Ghana. Specifically, it focuses on how street-level police corruption influences public confidence in the police and perceptions of police legitimacy. Street level public-police corruption experiences are explored primarily through bribery and extortion events occurring between commercial drivers and private entrepreneurs and police officers. The primary reason for including drivers and entrepreneurs in my study were because it is perceived that the police commonly extract or demand money from commercial drivers or entrepreneurs in Ghana (Tankebe 2010a; Beek 2016; Norman et al 2017). This often occurs during their conduct of street-level police duties, in the full view of the public, and the drivers or entrepreneurs need not even

be violating traffic laws to be targeted.

As stated above, corruption is ever present in some, if not all, societies (Myint 2000; Mawby and Sutton 2002). It has many effects on social institutions. In the context of policing, corruption is a drain on the effective use of police authority, knowledge, resources, status and trust (Riaño, Hodess, and Evans 2009; IPCC 2012). Subsequently, trust in the police may be undermined through corruption (Syed 1997; Rose-Ackerman and Truex 2012). Trust is significant, as public trust may strengthen the legitimacy of the Ghanaian police to uphold the law and cooperate and comply with the law. Additionally, trust may also indicate that police are fair and effective when dealing with crimes and law violators or aiding those who require the services of the police. Some research states that in developed societies effective structures and measures have been developed to curb the incidences of police malpractices, whereas corruption in developing societies continues to be widely practised (Alam, 1989; Davis 2004; Canache and Allison, 2005; Tankebe 2010a).

A problem when studying corruption, however, is "conceptual confusion" (Punch 2000: 302). Corruption can be conceptualised from different approaches. For instance, in addition to the illegitimate use of power for private gain, it also covers the sanctioning of unauthorised behaviour by those in power (Werlin 1972). It can also be used as a broad-spectrum concept to cover all kinds of police deviant behaviour. Broadly, corruption has been linked to instances whereby payments are made, for example, to the police, either to carry out or not to follow through with services that they have been

tasked to undertake. It can be seen to include three elements. Firstly, accepting a bribe or some form of non-financial reward. Secondly, engaging in or not engaging in certain activities that are against one's duties. Lastly, receiving a reward from an external person for executing an illegitimate service (Punch 2000). Within the context of criminal justice practices, for instance, Bowles and Garoupa (1997) state that lawbreakers or potential lawbreakers might believe that it is likely they can escape conviction by paying bribes or providing some form of gift if they are caught. On this assumption, the maintenance of social order and legitimacy would be a challenge for police institutions in most developing states. It may also serve as an antecedent for individuals' propensity to follow the law (Tyler 2006b; Jackson et al 2012; Jackson et al 2014; Norman et al 2017). Police corrupt practices are thus destructive to the image as well as the authority of the police (Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Newburn 1999; Ivkovic 2005; Gerber and Mendelson 2008).

It can be argued that one may be more inclined to cooperate with the police and obey the law in states where there is less police corruption. The negative effects of corruption upon public confidence in the police and police legitimacy may be limited, if not totally prevented, because people would be altogether more inclined to cooperate with the police and obey the law in the first place. For instance, if one is caught in violation of traffic regulations, rather than opting to offer gifts or pay bribes to a police officer, the offender would comply with the police as the law demands. Arguably, such self-justifications of traffic violation may supersede any form of influential factors to engage in police corruption in the first instance. It can also be argued that police legitimacy would rest upon the ability of the individual as well the police to operate within the law and avoid

any form of corrupt practices (Jackson, Asif, Bradford and Zakar 2014).

In exploring the implications of the different experiences of police corruption on legitimacy and confidence, qualitative primary data was collected. The fieldwork for this project included six months (June-December: 2012) of field observation with Commercial drivers en-route from Accra to Kumasi and vice versa. Interviews with market traders, commercial drivers, and active as well as retired police officers were also carried out. The anticipation of interviewing active police officers as well as commercial drivers led to some discussion about this research with higher management and top-ranking police officers in Ghana. This aspect of the research was carried out within the host office (with his deputies also in attendance) to capture the aims and objectives of the research. This also facilitated access to and helped to establish trust with the participants, enabling me to conduct the interviews. Overall, as mentioned earlier, I was able to conduct 33 interviews and did seven observational trips with commercial drivers and one with the Ghanaian police. Four of the observational trips were conducted with commercial drivers travelling from Accra to Kumasi and back, each lasting on average, around five and a half hours. My observation with the police lasted three hours forty-seven minutes whilst the remaining four were conducted within the suburbs of the Greater Accra region, each of which lasting for about an hour. Altogether, these activities totalled 29 hours 47 minutes of participant observation.

My findings suggest that participants understanding of police corruption was enhanced by daily contextual issues framed either by direct or indirect experiences of retrospective

police corrupt practices. Contextual issues here make reference to police-initiated bribery, either as extorted or coerced; bribery to gain access through police checkpoint or barriers – a form of 'avoidance corruption'; money offered to the police which demonstrated an appreciation of police service delivery – an 'appreciating technique' or money offered as an influential factor to empower the police thereby enabling corrupt practices; and last but not the least, payment made for the police to overlook an offence or to a 'settle case'.

Participants also referred to different notions and aspects of police corruption. Behaviour that seemed corrupt to some participants meant a different thing to other participants. These inferences suggest that police corruption and how participants related with it would subsequently have different implications on police legitimacy and confidence for different people. Moreover, participants had developed street-level idiomatic expressions for coping, neutralising and denying police corruption. In turn, this structured and influenced their understanding of police corruption which had a tendency to override Western concepts of police corruption. In other words, these street-level idioms assimilated by participants denied and neutralised the legal status associated with police corruption. Hence, certain types of street-level police corruption experiences did not reflect or have much resonance with modern western concepts of police corruption. Additionally, my findings suggest that police corrupt practices hinged on some embedded cultural practices in Ghana such as the salience of extended family ties, informal social relations and the propensity for giving gifts.

The findings also demonstrate that there was a consistent but partial acknowledgement of

corruption by participants (including the police) within the Ghanaian police service. However, participants had developed a range of neutralisation techniques to deny or neutralise their activities, which enabled them to drift in and out of corruption. Overall, my findings suggest that while there was a recognition of the Ghanaian police as corrupt, this had none or little effect on police legitimacy. Participants' perceptions of police legitimacy to promote and maintain order, detect, and prevent crime superseded any form of negative inclination street-level police corruption may have had upon the police. In other words, participants did not resort to alternative means of reporting and resolving issues of crime, but frequently relied on the services of the Ghanaian police. Nonetheless, corruption did have some negative effects on participants' confidence in the Ghanaian police and it had knock-on effects to the effectiveness and parity of criminal justice in Ghana.

Summary of the research problem

Since Tyler (1990, 2006b) published his seminal work *Why People Obey the Law*, legitimacy and confidence in the criminal justice system has become an important concept in a criminological analysis (see also Mawby 2002). Various studies have sought to clarify the meaning of legitimacy (Sparks and Bottoms 1995; Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Carrabine 2005; Bottoms & Tankebe 2012) and to examine the factors that influence public perceptions of police legitimacy and confidence. On the latter, many studies have discovered the importance of procedural justice (referring to the transparency and fairness upon which decisions are made by the police and legal institutions), distributive justice (which makes reference to a fair allocation of resources or services within

society), and effectiveness of legal institutions (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Reisig and Lloyd 2009; Tankebe 2007, 2010a).

An important issue for police confidence and legitimacy which to date remains under-researched is, however, corruption. Corruption, by definition, violates the fundamental principles of democracy, such as accountability, equality, and openness. Partly for this reason, it remains an important topic for criminology. Various studies have outlined a great deal on the causes, nature, extent, and prevention of police corruption (Sherman 1974; Newburn 1999). However, what remains under-researched mostly in areas where corruption is said to be common - for example, in Sub-Saharan Africa states is the differing effects of experiences of police corruption upon public confidence and police legitimacy.

An important exception is Jackson, Asif, Bradford and Zakar's (2014) study and Tankebe's (2010a) study. Yet each base their study respectively on a simple distinction between direct (personal) and indirect (vicarious) experiences of public corruption with the police. These studies overlook the fact that there could be different types of direct and vicarious experiences of public experience of police corruption (including both negative and positive experiences), with different effects on police confidence and legitimacy. In a society where the practices of police corruption are described as common there is a dearth of research investigating different experiences of public-police corruption upon public confidence in the police and legitimacy. These are interpreted into the research questions below.

Research aims and objectives

The overarching aim of my research is thus to explore the nature of Ghanaian's differing experiences of police corruption and what such experiences mean for their confidence in the police and police legitimacy. My major research questions include:

1. What are the differences in the meanings connoted with police corruption in the context of Ghana?

2. How do people justify street-level police corruption?

3. What does it mean to have confidence in the police in Ghana?

4. How do the different public experiences and perceptions of police corruption interact with the legitimacy of, and confidence in, the Ghana police?

To provide a conceptual analysis of the data collected for this research, public-police experiences of corruption were divided into *direct* (*positive direct* and *negative direct*) and *vicarious* (*positive vicarious* and *negative vicarious*) experiences as per *figure* one, below:

Figure 1: Dimensions of Police Corruption as presented in this study

Contribution and originality

There is a plethora of research on street-level police corruption (Manning and Van Maanen 1978, Zimmer 1990, Weisburd et al 2000, Mastrofski 2004, Reuss-Ianni 2011). Street-level police officers deal with motorists daily, and this is not peculiar to Ghana (see also Oleinik 2016). However, in Ghana, most of such operations are in full view of the public and are often represented as a key form of public-police corruption. In Ghana, most motorists, as well as some police officers, lack the ability to avoid corruption. Corruption in the context of road traffic offences is commonly employed so that a traffic offence may be overlooked. Here a co-constructed ritual of street-level police corruption emerges which acts to neutralise the illegalities and immoral practices associated with

police corruption. Additionally, it can be argued that the perceived inevitability of street-level police corruption prompts the circumstances where most motorists see little need to trust or to obey traffic regulations in Ghana (Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register 2006). This is in the context where the probability of being stopped by the police is more likely with corrupt intent rather than enforcing the law (Oleinik 2016).

My research offers a new and original contribution to the debate on police corruption in several ways. Firstly, there is little, if any, empirical work that explores street-level positive or negative and direct or indirect corrupt experiences and its implications upon police legitimacy and confidence. Within the context of Ghana, this research will be the first of its kind. Secondly, the relevance of my research involves an exploration of police corruption in a society where police corrupt practices are considered as widespread and the police service deemed the most corrupt institution. As part of my research objective, the focus has been to provide an understanding of street-level police corruption. To this effect, this research demonstrates that participants had developed different concepts to represent corruption as opposed to utilising the term itself. Concepts which are non-existent in previous research, but which were used to interpret participants' daily experiences of street-level police corruption.

Police corruption was generally associated with extortion, bribery and other street-level idioms. Significantly, the usage of such street-level idioms meant that participants mostly superimposed or avoided the immorality associated with police corruption. Focusing on the implications of different experiences of police corruption on police confidence and

legitimacy, the findings also suggest that some of the underlying factors that supported and promoted street-level police corruption within Ghana, subsequently paved the way for neutralisation and the denial of the implications of police corrupt practises. It was these neutralising factors that had framed the continued activity of street-level corruption in Ghana and embedded it into everyday social practice.

Thesis structure

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One provides a social and cultural context for understanding police corruption in Ghana. It describes pre-colonial policing and considers forms of social control and policing prior to the colonial period. This leads onto discussions about policing during the colonial era and its impacts on the development of professional police during and after the colonial period. The discussion about post-Colonial police and police corruption also considers the many police anti-corruption measures introduced in Ghana. These discussions are provided to demonstrate that police corruption can be linked to the era of British colonial rule.

Chapter Two discusses the literature pertaining to police corruption, legitimacy, and confidence. Various understandings of police corruption as highlighted in the academic literature are discussed and evaluated. This subsequently leads to a discussion about causes and types of police corruption, including: ethics and police misconduct, and the effect that the 'culture of giving' had upon police corruption. Further, a consideration of normalization of police corruption, corruption and African culture and society are also provided. A discussion about neutralisation and denial of corruption in Ghana is also

provided, and these are then considered in terms of their impact on police legitimacy and public confidence in the police.

Chapter Three focuses on the research methodology and epistemological framework used for my fieldwork. It also describes the research design adopted for the study, the research sites, participants' information, data collection methods and analysis, and it concludes with ethical considerations of my research.

Chapters Four to Six are devoted to the research findings. Chapter Four focuses on participants' understanding of police corruption and it also considers police neutralisation as well as denial techniques associated with corrupt experiences. Understandings of police corruption interacted similarly or differently with participants' reactions based on the type of police corruption experienced. My findings suggest that most understandings of corruption were related to bribery and extortion. However, more significantly there were some understandings which were context specific and hid the legality or modern concepts related to police corruption.

Chapter Five focuses on data from two sources: participants who were commercial drivers, and market traders, and it presents findings based on the denial and neutralisation techniques that participants used to respond and react to street-level corrupt experiences. Contextual issues influencing police corruption are detailed and the argument is made that the commercial drivers and market traders lacked a full knowledge of their rights in relation to the police - and thus their views on what constituted corruption was quite

different to that outlined by Western audience. Hence, gaining any sort of Westernised or modernised perspective of police corruption from them was problematic. This, in turn, was related to a form of ambiguity had kept the wheel of street-level police corruption spinning.

Chapter Six discusses participants' experiences of corruption and its implications upon police confidence and legitimacy. It considered how participants conceptualised police legitimacy and their confidence in the police. The divergent understandings and reactions to police corruption within my study is presented, and I argue that police corruption experiences contributed to a limited public confidence in the Ghana police but had little or no negative implication on police legitimacy. Finally, Chapter Seven concludes my research. I draw the main themes developed from the chapters in correlation with my aims and objectives to argue the salient points of this research. Directions for future research is also considered.

Focusing on pre-Colonial, Colonial and post-Colonial police, and police corruption, the next chapter provides the understanding of police corruption in the context of Ghana.

CHAPTER ONE

UNDERSTANDING POLICE and POLICE CORRUPTION

in the CONTEXT of GHANA

Introduction

Until recently, knowledge and perception of the police and police corruption in most developing societies, including Ghana, was mostly reflected through the media (Stapenhurst 2000; Nogara 2009; Chêne 2010; Olken and Pande 2012; Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang 2015). Yet, of course, police corruption is an old and multifaceted issue. In Ghana it has historical roots extending to the period when professional policing was first introduced during the colonial era from 1831 onwards. Police forces established during British colonial rule in a range of countries, including Ghana, Nigeria and India, have been considered to be incredibly corrupt, violent and exploitative (Agozino and Head 2007; Alemika 1988, 1993; Verma 1999; Tankebe 2008b). As such, chronic corruption within the Ghanaian police service can be linked to the legacy of the British colonial authorities (Onyeozi 2005; Tankebe 2008b; Francis 2012a, 2012b; Fitch 2011; Mawby 2013). Hence, in order to present the vital social and cultural context for understanding police corruption in Ghana, this chapter considers forms of social control and policing in the pre-colonial era, its development under British rule in Ghana, and more recent developments in the post-colonial era. It also considers anti-corruption policies relating to police behaviour and seeks to argue that the present perception of police corruption in Ghana is rooted in the colonial era 'Gold Coast Constabulary'.

Pre-colonial police and policing

Ghana is located in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was formerly known as the Gold Coast during the British colonial period. However, prior to the arrival and influence of the British in the 1820s, the Portuguese were the first colonists to arrive in the early 1470s, in the name of establishing trade (Law 1997; Akyeampong and Fofack 2012). They established their initial post or trading colony, arguably, their trade control-point (C.P.) in 1482 at the coastal area of Elmina, a suburb of Cape Coast in the Central region (Appiagyei-Atua 2006; Gariba 2014).

Before the arrival of the colonists, pre-colonial Ghana was characterised by a heterogeneous and multi-tribal society, with different tribes or clans forming their own independent communities and religious beliefs (Murdock 1967; Dalgleish 2005; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2015). Their boundaries were maintained by ethnicity, language, traditions and varied cultural practices. These different groups were small political entities, with little bureaucratic forms of organisation and were instead organised along the lines of kinship (Kisangani, 2010). For instance, the Fante, Ewe, and the Ga communities lived in different locations without any political organisation beyond their villages. There was a relative lack of political domination (Osafo-Kwaako and Robinson 2013) and societies were largely organised under small chiefdoms (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013).

Conflict resolution was settled through a decision-making process within each clan or tribe (*ibid* 2013), and pre-colonial social orders were thus of a profoundly varied nature.

They could be either stateless, state-run or kingdoms, yet most were established on the standards of communalism in that they were self-governing and autonomous. All individuals participated, specifically or indirectly, in the daily activities of the clan. For example, pre-colonial concepts of land were that it was a gift from the gods and, as such, traditionally the land could not be purchased or sold. On the other hand, animals such as cattle, goats and sheep were owned exclusively (Du Plessis 2011; Boateng 2017). Members of each tribal society also relied on their ethnic traditional structures for safety and the provision of welfare and goods. The family was the fundamental unit for the provision of services, and this was, in turn, organised through the clan or tribal head and various customary laws.

One large tribal group, the Ashantis, did have a well-structured society in which various traditional units functioned through their linkages with the Ashanti Kingdom. They had an organised form of policing executed by traditional rulers who had the mandate to organise armed groups (also referred to as field marshals) or groups of able men to enforce the norms of the society (Boateng and Darko 2016; Stapleton 2016). They also built large-scale roads for increased communication and the provision of goods. In their endeavour for territorial expansion and authority, the Ashanti unified the fragmented Akan tribes and established the mighty Ashanti Kingdom, which at its peak had a population of three million. Although some other tribes in the region were not as well established as the Ashantis, across the region the maintenance of security, crime prevention and enforcement of the law were achieved through indigenous techniques. As Okafo (2007:7) suggests, ''The indigenous strategies of control, justice, and law in each

pre-colonial African society had grown out of the society's traditions, customs, and native laws.''

During this pre-colonial era, the many and diverse states and societies within Ghana generally did not have professional full-time law enforcers. Rather, tribal or ethnic rule was informal, and security and order were maintained via a dedicated small group of armed men to enforce societal norms and judicial decisions (Okafo 2007; Kisangani 2010). Maintenance of peace before the foundation of professional policing (established sometime in the 1830s), was carried out by customary powers of chiefs. They exercised their judicial powers and utilised the administrations of conventional envoys or committed individuals such as the 'ahenfie polisi' (palace police) to complete legal official capacities and security assignments in light of a legitimate concern for individuals from their respective traditional states (Killingray 1986; Tankebe 2008b). For instance, disputes were mostly settled via an oath before a shrine in the name of the ancestral spirit, under the guidance of a designated chief priest. No fees were demanded, other than, for instance, palm wine (Okeke 2013).

One of the primary functions of chief priests was to summon suspects and offenders for court hearings at the traditional council (Opolot, 2008; Igbo and Ugwuoke 2013). Additionally, the priest could also be ordered to perform traditional functionaries such as sending a message from the tribal chief to all community members (Opolot 2008). Thus, as Tankebe (2008b) suggests, prior to the 'professionalisation' of the Ghanaian police, policing in the form that we see it today did not exist in most African societies.

The highly organised traditional states, such as the Ashanti Empire, the most essential pre-colonial Ghanaian civil society (Charney 2016), were exemptional in setting up extraordinary units that were sometimes established to conduct policing duties. As stated previously, these groups were not paid for their duties, but the duties were carried out on voluntary basis. Some examples of such native institutions that were used by traditional states like the Ashantis were the 'Akwansrafo', 'Twafo', 'Adonten' 'Akwanmofo' and 'Kyidom'. For example, the Akwansrafo were superintendents who patrolled trade routes and ensured the security and control of the movements of merchants, and they collected income for the sake of the Ashanti State (Badong 2008, Tankebe 2008b; Boateng and Darko 2016). The Akwanmofo was another traditional administrative body that maintained and repaired roads, mobilised villagers' labour within the vicinity to do such work, and mainly removed obstacles to movements on the commercial roads (Charney 2016). During the era of pre-colonialism, maintenance of social order was the obligation of indigenous establishments in charge of, for instance, crime control and promoting social conformity (Inyang and Abraham 2013). There were few systematic laws and the social structure served to regulate conduct, which was to a great extent authorised by different traditional prominent figures in charge of dealing with criminal conduct in distinctive parts of the traditional society (*ibid* 2013).

It can be seen that in states such as the Ashanti, there was specific individuals who were extraordinarily vested with the obligation of maintaining law and order (see also Tankebe 2008b). There was no professional police force in the form that we know it today. However, Francis (2012a) suggests that during the pre-colonial era, the Akan society had

set-up systems of policing to react and deal with law violations and lawfulness. These communities thus had some type of customary police service, but they were very different from what was to be set up during the era of colonialism. Some studies also add that in most of these traditional states, the maintenance and enforcement of law and order were accomplished, for the most part, through informal social control from the family and larger community (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative – CHRI 2007; Tankebe 2008b), and thus specialist crime controllers were largely unnecessary. Additionally, the vast majority of traditional states relied upon the inescapability and omnipresence of ancestral spirits (Vold, Bernard, and Snipes 2002, *ibid* 2008b).

Pre-colonial societies were thus organised around traditional religious practices, spiritual beliefs and ensuing moral rules. Each member was his or her neighbour's keeper. Thus, all law-abiding members of the community had the opportunity to participate in community policing. Hence, many contemporary crimes such as corruption simply could not have existed (Igboin 2016). This is especially true since many acts of corruption were believed to have a detrimental effect on all members of the extended family. Additionally, traditional rulers such as chiefs, as well as spiritual beliefs, played a significant role in maintaining that sanctity of social and moral values. Since the ancestors were accepted to be exceptionally dynamic in the organization of pre-colonial life, the fear of repercussion from engaging in any form of crime or deviant act was sufficient to prevent most forms of crime and corruption (*ibid* 2016). Spiritual intervention and the concept of ancestral spirits compensating those who conformed to social standards and values with great

well-being and prosperity, and severely disciplining different corrupt or deviant conduct were ever present (Tankebe 2008b).

It is argued that a defining element of these traditional systems was the notion of a collective discipline. In other words, it was not just the individual offender who fundamentally endured the punishments of deviant behaviour but, in all likelihood, the whole family, lineage and, perhaps, the clan being inclusive in enduring the punishments (see for example, Agozino and Head 2007). Within this framework, policing was a collective obligation of all adults. This was maintained through the fear generated from the collective belief in ancestral practices, based on the idea that spirits and supernatural entities inhabited the communities (Anderson 1991; Gumo et al 2012). Such spirits could also work autonomously, doing the great work of healing, punishing offenders, and ensuring protection for those who revere them (Gyimah-Boadi 2002). These spirits were accepted as embodied in stones, streams, wind, seas, trees, mountains, rivers, and some animals (Opokuwaa 2005).

Through the ancestral spirits, blessings were received for prosperity, protection from dangers and difficulties, and direction and guidance for all aspects of pre-colonial life (Opokuwaa 2005; Gumo et al 2012; Awoyemi 2013). These spirits of pre-colonial religion played a powerful role in some traditional parts of Ghana, and perhaps still do in some instances today. There were a multiplicity of ancestral spirits and gods (Opokuwaa 2005; Bellucci 2010). For instance, one such god, Obosom Nana Abena Akonediand and her shrine (Bosomfie), located at Larteh Kubease in the Eastern region of Ghana, is

deemed to deal out justice and adjudicate disputes in relation to chieftaincy, property offences, land, family and other issues. Obosom Tano is the general name for a collection of ancestral spirits which had their spiritual divinity emanating from the River Tano. Their aim was to maintain the well-being of the family, as well as social order. They were considered as supreme healers of mental, physical and social diseases. Another example is the Mmoatia, who are referred to as dwarfs. They were perceived to have their feet facing backwards and were thought to have settled throughout pre-colonial or traditional societies in Ghana (Oduro-Awisi 2013; Asante, Kquofi and Larbi 2015; Lecouteux 2015). They resided in the forest and were considered to be very capable and proficient in the utilisation of herbs. It has been argued that the Dwarfs spent a significant time working with nature's spirits for healing the body, mind, and well-being of the people. They also addressed individual, family, social, economic and ecological related issues (Awuah-Nyamekye 2013). They were viewed as fun and mischievous, and considered to be extremely cruel to those individuals who endeavoured to break traditional norms or values (Akyeampong and Obeng 1995; Opokuwaa 2005; Lecouteux 2015).

As Tankebe (2008b) argues, the most recognisable aspect of customary pre-colonial retribution belief was the thought that the punishments of ancestral spirits and other gods had at their heart the triple components of 'promptness', 'escapelessness' and 'seriousness' (Tankebe 2008b; see also Abotchie, 1997; Assimeng, 1986). The thought of promptness relates to the conviction that the ancestral or god's disciplines were not subject to the postponements and red-tape that are regularly associated with judicial systems (Tankebe 2008b), and there was not really any procurement for appeal. "Escapelessness" implied

that the ancestral spirits were thought to be all-knowing; no violation of the standards of society got away from their observation. To this effect, people consciously or subconsciously subjected themselves to accountability and fair dealings with one another due to the omnipresence of various spirits. In addition, those in authority were perceived to be in moral alliance with powerful members of the traditional society and the Gods.

Colonial police and corruption

As mentioned above, prior to British rule, Ghana (then known as the Gold Coast) had already been colonised by the Portuguese in 1482 (Law 1997; Akyeampong and Fofack, 2012). Like the Portuguese, British activities during the colonial era were initially limited to the coastal areas of Ghana. In doing so, they endured some degree of resistance from the Ashanti empire. The Ashantis, as discussed previously, had well-structured traditions and regional autonomy through which they endeavoured to expand their territorial control from the interior part of Ghana to other parts, such as the coastal areas which were also occupied by the Fanti and Ga societies. The Ashanti expansion was made to consolidate other kingdoms for the primary aim of trade and, possibly to resist colonial rule (Abioye 2011; Kaoma 2016). However, this brought the Ashantis into conflict with other tribes.

After a series of confrontations between the Ashanti empire and others, such as the Fante states, the traditional leadership of the Fante were concerned about their safety and security in relation to the interests of the Ashanti state. Such instability arguably opened an opportunity for the British colonial authority to cajole the Fante state into becoming a comprador group (Fanon 1963) working with them against the Ashanti. In the process the

Fante signed the bond of 1844, which provided British colonial rule with a centralised judicial role as well as the occupation of Ghana (Allott 1960; Dennis 2000; Belmessous 2014). The bond of 1844 provided protection and security to the signatory states or tribes and, arguably, provided the political momentum for the British colonists to, to some degree, legitimise their existence and authority within the Gold Coast. The British had utilised the Bond of 1844 as a treaty for their convenience (see also Biswal 1992), until eventually British colonial rule was extended to other parts of Ghana, including the Ashanti state. In 1902, the British had established control over the interior and the northern territories in addition to the coastal areas and, in 1946, their position was well enforced as a centralised coloniser (CHRI 2007; Gariba 2014).

More specifically, in relation to police and policing, under the colonial leadership of the British, Captain George Maclean introduced a professional police force in the Gold Coast in 1831 (Gocking 1997; Tankebe 2008b). Initially employing just 129 officers known as the Gold Coast Corps and later as the Royal Corps, their duty was to patrol trade routes in the interest of the British. Studies suggest that the system of colonial policing was developed primarily through notion of protecting colonial officials, colonial merchants and controlling the conquered populace (Mawby 2008).

The established colonial police were disbanded in 1860 and replaced by what was considered as a more productive police force recruited from a West Indian Regiment. Moreover, when the British colonialists gained total control over the Gold Coast in 1871, it became necessary to create a police force to aid and manage rebellious ethnic tribes

(Mensah 2018). Here, the British brought an army of 700 Hausa men from Northern Nigeria and the West Indies into the Gold Coast (Mensah 2018). Out of that number, 400 served under the Gold Coast Constabulary in 1871, as part of the Police Force Ordinance, which was proclaimed around the same year. As the years passed, more Ghanaians were included into the force, and it later became called the Gold Coast Police Force (*ibid* 2018). However, all the commissioned officers as of that time were British.

In 1876, the name of the force changed to the Gold Coast Constabulary (Anane-Appiah 2011; Police.gov.gh 2018; Mensah 2018), and an Ordinance passed in 1894 provided lawful support to the development of a non-military police in the colony. By 1902, the police had been segregated into sections including General, Escort, Mines and Railway Police units, which were legislated by the Police [Amendment] Ordinance of 1904 (Police.gov.gh 2018; Mensah 2018). The composition and objectives of the colonial police were varied and hugely influenced by their colonial mandate (Maldar 2005). For instance, in 1896, the then Governor of the Gold Coast ordered that, "No police should be stationed where there were no Europeans." (Gillespie 1955 cited in Tankebe 2008b: 190).

It can be argued that as the professional police were first introduced in Ghana in 1831 by the British colonial authority. The principles which underpinned their introduction *should* have replicated the principles that governed the establishment of the police in England in 1829 by Sir Robert Peel. According to Peel's principles of law enforcement, the police should treat all citizens with respect, use only minimum force, and prevent crime and disorder - as opposed to repressing the citizens via military force. The Peelian police's

focus was on crime prevention by securing the willing cooperation of members of the community in a voluntary observance of the law in order to secure public trust and respect (Reiner 1992; Lentz and Chaires 2007; Mawby 2013). However, in the colonies, and Ghana in particular, it was mostly the case that police exercise of authority disregarded normative requirements or distributive fairness when dealing with indigenous members of the colony (see, for example, Tankebe 2008b). This was influenced by racial, ethnic and class positions, and colonial people's political affiliations. For example, Andvig (2008) states that one of the principles adopted by the colonists was to centralise any form of colonial administration. In this case, heads of administration (police) were accountable to the colonists, and not the colonised public. The system of colonial policing by the British was essentially to control, manage and repress the native populace (Mawby 2008; Gariba 2014) so that the British could expand their authority throughout the Gold Coast (see also McCarthy 1983). Some studies also consider the colonial period as an era that impeded the internal process of developing and nationalising traditional states by the introduction of alien and authoritarian leadership styles on native societies (Washbrook 1992; Emerson and Fieldhouse 2018; Fanon 1967).

In consideration of these historical developments, most corruption in Ghana during the colonial era involved the British and their compradors, rather than being spread throughout the Ghanaian population in general. Thus, later day corruption is likely to be an outcome of the colonial system of rule in their pursuit of monetary economy and cash taxation (Bell 2013; Emsley 2014; Igboin 2016; Boateng and Darko 2016). For instance, as Onyeozili (2005) posits, the development of the European police powers in Africa are

traceable to the way they were reflective of European interests in the continent where the primary objective of the police was to advance the interests of the colonial authority. In most instances, the police engaged in the brutal oppression of some members of the community and suppressed those found to be resistant to colonial authority. The use of violence and repression during the colonial era denoted a separation in the relationship between the police and the communities (Maldar 2005) which had a profound effect on the subsequent development of policing in Ghana.

Policing in Africa is a colonial legacy and in that capacity imperialism and its legacies have foreordained the nature and styles of policing and functions, structures, and accountability of the police in the post-colonial period (Francis 2012b). Thus, on the one hand, within a specific period colonial policing became a salient institution across most Sub-Saharan African countries. However, on the other hand, decentralised policing practices extant within the traditional states became obsolete. The structure and mode of operation of the colonial police was centralised and un-accountable to the colonised people. For instance, during colonial rule, local government was allocated to prominent 'comprador' individuals (such as local chiefs) who oversaw the administration of the judiciary, police, tax collection and so forth. Although they were designated chiefs, they were not accountable to the natives of the land but to the colonial administrators (Fanon 1963; Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2014; Williams and Le Billion 2017).

These basic foundations have characterised law enforcement within Ghana ever since. Given this background, it can also be argued that this contributed towards a lack of public

confidence in the police, with consequent effects on police legitimacy in the present day. The existence of a militarised colonial police in Africa has thus many ramifications. As Onyeozili (2005) contends, this model of policing was combined through a framework that subjected customary informal law to an authorization system with forceful concepts based in Western ideologies of policing. The colonialists presented new laws, which supplanted or truly debilitated the effectiveness of traditional laws and practices, as well as indigenous tribunals and justice. Additionally, with the advent of colonialism came the distortions of the customary foundations and qualities, which had from time immemorial supported and sustained relationships, maintained peace and promoted the security of lives and property in pre-colonial African traditional societies (*ibid* 2005). As a result, the colonial police in sub-Saharan Africa held very little legitimacy, but their foundations continue to contribute significantly to contemporary images and styles of policing in most of the region, including Ghana (Onyeozili 2005, Francis 2012a, Tankebe 2008b).

Some studies suggest that colonial policing had two main characteristics: firstly, in relation to the structure of the police force. It was to be centralised and militaristic, for example, recruits were selected often on the basis of their physical strength (Anderson and Killingray 1991; CHRI 2007; Gariba 2014). Secondly, the colonial police force was not characterised by legitimacy. They maintained and promoted – often through severe violence, the interest of colonial rule. The colonial police were loyal to the colonial government rather than being, for instance, a community-based service and they sanctioned a repressive system of law enforcement (Kratcoski and Celubak 2000). The system of colonial policing in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa thus provided a limited

opportunity for transparency and accountability (Walsh, Dickson and Ulster 1994; Mawby 2003; Reiner 2000).

Post-colonial police and police corruption: A product of history

One of the significant features of colonialism is the consolidation of territories and politics and the dissolution of traditional empires or kingdoms. Violence perpetuated by the colonialists was both inevitable and necessary. For instance, the colonialists' initial encounters with the colonised was mostly marked by violence and exploitation. "By dint of a great array of bayonets and cannons." (Fanon 1963: 35). Similarly, post-colonial Ghana was characterised by various coups, which is also a characteristic of post-colonies (Fanon 1967) and changes of government which inevitably influenced the subsequent organisation of Ghanaian politics and their police.

Independence for Ghana began in 1951, and one of the key policies set out for independence by the first post-colonial Prime Minister, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, was the Africanisation of the police force. This meant that in order for the public to be able to relate to the Ghanaian police, required some professional changes, this included positions already occupied by the British within the police force would have to be occupied by Ghanaians. When Ghana eventually attained independence in 1957, Mr E. T. Madjitey was the first Ghanaian appointed as the Head of the Ghanaian police.

S/No.	Name	Rank	Period of Service
A.	Captain George Maclean	Administrator	1831 - 1844[82]
B.	Commander Hill	Governor	1844 – 1859
C.	Captain Glover	Commander	1859 –
D.	Captain A. W. Baker	Inspector-General	1873 - 1876
E.	Captain J. S. Hay	Inspector-General	
F.	Mr. Alex Grant		
G.	Captain Bryden		
H.	Lt. Colonel E. B. McInnis	Inspector-General	1886 - 1890
I.	*Force under control of the Governor*		*1891 - 1893*
1.	Major AW Kitson	COP	1893 – 1910
2.	Mr. EV Collins	COP/IGP	1910 – 1917
3.	Mr. DRA Bettington	IGP	1917 – 1924
4.	Lt. Col. HWM Bamford	IGP	1924 – 1938
5.	Mr. EC Nottingham	IGP	1938 – 1944
6.	Mr. RWH Ballantyne	COP	1944 – 1948
7.	Captain P. Eckel	COP	1948 – 1949
8.	Mr. MKWEV Collins	COP	1949 – 1957
9.	Mr. AL Alexander	COP	1958 – 1958
10.	Mr. ET Madjitey, cbe	COP	1958 – 1964[83]

Figure 2: Previous holders of the office of Head of the Ghanaian police: 1831- 1964 (Aning 2006)

This appointment was a significant step in symbolising that the Ghanaian police was to focus on the expectations and the needs of the people of Ghana. The name Ghana Police Force was changed to Ghana Police Service in order to give the institution a human face and, importantly, to aid the police to be seen as serving in the interests of the public. Notably, when Dr Nkrumah was addressing the first graduation of police recruits in 1959 at the Police College, he stated that:

> There are colonial police forces, which exist to enforce authority of a foreign power on a colonial people. In such forces, this will be demonstrated by the fact that the police will be peremptory and even brutal in their dealings with the inhabitants of the colony while they will be ingratiating

> and subservient to those in authority. In a free and
> independent country, the conduct of the police must be the
> exact reverse of this. They must demonstrate to the people
> at large that the country is free and independent by
> behaving towards the ordinary man in the street with
> exactly the same politeness as they would behave towards
> those in superior positions (CHRI 2007: 12).

Based on the above, it can be argued that the statement was meant to convey to Ghanaians that the new political leadership of the nation was keen on setting up a police service that would serve, maintain and ensure the rights of the Ghanaian public. This reflected an inherent interest that Ghana should be regulated along acceptable values and norms of police conduct. Arguably, this was the era that marked the beginning of a form of post-colonial police professionalism and its aim to uphold the interests of the Ghanaian public (see also Gariba 2014).

After the attainment of independence, Ghana adopted a new constitution in 1960. This moved Ghana from a parliamentary system with a Prime Minister, to a republic with a President (Cyr 2001). However, in 1964, a new referendum initiated a one-party rule in Ghana (Aning 2006) and this changed the course of the policing once again. On the 2nd of January 1964, a police officer made an attempt to assassinate President Kwame Nkrumah but the attempt was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, in the wake of this attempted assassination, the Police Commissioner and other senior police officers and prominent members of the society, such as politicians, were captured and detained. In response, the President made it known that he did not trust the Ghanaian police. This led to the belief

that the Ghanaian police were hugely susceptible to political influence and corruption and it prompted President Nkrumah to reduce the size of Ghanaian police from 13,247 in 1964 to 10,709 in 1965 (CHRI 2007). However, after two years the one-party rule did not materialise as hoped by President Nkrumah and, on February 24th 1966 both the police and the military joined forces to overthrow Nkrumah's government (Annan 2016).

The police were heavily involved in the coup, and this could arguably be seen as another form of police corruption. In other words, a subjugated political class influenced the police as part of strategy to overthrow or plot against an elected government. Hence, in order not to experience a similar fate, the succeeding government (the National Liberation Council) included four police officers and four military officers in its ranks (Harvey 1966; Annan 2016). The National Liberation Council subsequently enacted the Police Service Act 1965, which made some provisions for, "The organisation of the police service, the appointment, promotion and retirement of police officers and the conditions of service, disciplinary proceedings and other matters relating to the police service." (CHRI 2007:13).

In view of police involvement in active post-colonial politics in Ghana, it can be argued that it became indispensable for the Police Service Act 1965 to be introduced, as it aimed to strengthen police oversight and make it possible for officers to account for police misconduct, such as corruption. In 1969, the National Liberation Council handed power to a new elected civilian government under a new constitution. The new 1969 Constitution established the Ghana Police Council, which also brought the police into the

folds of service for the general public (Aning 2006). A police legislation, which is still valid today, was then passed in view of the 1969 Constitution. The Police Service Act covered the functions of the Ghanaian police, structures and conditions for the administration of the police, police misconduct, unacceptable police services and complaints procedures (Quantson 2006; CHRI 2007). The Government kept on working towards police reform, assembled a committee to audit the police with particular attention on police structure and effectiveness as well as the condition of police equipment, establishing whether they were fit for purpose (Quantson 2006). By the 1970s, the Ghanaian police had tried to relinquish its oppressive past and attempted to gain increased legitimacy through being more accountable to the public.

The newly elected government was faced with economic hardships, which led to civil unrest, and the government was subsequently overthrown. This time, however, the coup was carried out by the Military in 1972 under the leadership of General Acheampong. The government was replaced with the National Redemption Council, headed by the coup leader, General Acheampong (Quantson 2006). The senior team for the Council were constituted by military officers, the head of the police and a civilian. However, Acheampong was uncertain about the stability of his leadership and the intentions of the Military, he equipped the Police with sophisticated weapons as a counter force to the military in case they attempted to overthrow him (U. S. Department of State 2011). This brought the Ghanaian police back into active involvement in politics. The Police Service Act was changed to the Police Force Act, and the police was renamed back to the Ghana Police Force (CHRI 2007).

General Acheampong's government was also faced with high levels of economic mismanagement and corruption (CHRI 2007; Briggs and Connolly 2016). In an attempt to introduce a non-party autocratic state, General Acheampong's regime was faced with civil unrest which led to his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Akuffo replacing him. Akuffo, however, could not reign in an atmosphere of corruption and civil unrest and was disposed of via a bloody military coup in 1979 under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, led by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings. Many junior police officers took part in the coup.

The nation's political upheaval, as well as the constant involvement of the police in politics, rendered the Ghanaian police in a state of paralysis (Aning 2006; Asamoah 2014; Beek 2016). Nonetheless, in September 1979, Jerry John Rawlings' government handed power to a democratically elected government, underpinned by a constitution heavily influenced by Western examples of democratic systems (Quantson 2006). The elected government lasted for a short period but was again overthrown by Rawlings in 1981.

> None of the civilian and military regimes during the mandate period [1957-1992], made any serious attempt to provide mechanisms that would enable the service to exercise its functions in the society efficiently and honestly, while respecting individual dignity, rights and liberties. (CHRI 2007: 14)

Under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), Rawlings held on to power until 1992, when a new Constitution was drafted and enacted after a referendum. This

subsequently led to a presidential and parliamentary election. Under his rule, the police experienced a renaissance, moving away from political influences and its autocratic tendencies, towards a more inclusive and transparent constitution. The 1992 Constitution also made provisions for the creation of a police service, setting out the procedure for appointing the Inspector General of Police (IGP) and it also provided the basis for the instigation of a Police Council (CHRI 2007; Aning 2015).

Policing in Ghana today

The 1992 Constitution provided the immediate foundations for today's Ghana and its police force. For instance, in addition to the Police Council, the 1992 Constitution also made provision for the Regional Police Committee, which has direct prominent advisory duties on the Ghanaian police and the possibility to function as an oversight to the Ghanaian police service (CHRI 2007). Contemporary Ghana has ten main administrative regions and each region has a police command structure. However, the overall command, control, supervision and management of police duties are carried out from the national headquarters in Accra, the capital city of Ghana. The head of the Ghanaian police is the Inspector-General of Police (IGP). In other words, the structure of today's Ghanaian police service is primarily a centralised system of policing under the leadership of the IGP.

Figure 3: The ten regions of Ghana

The president of the Republic of Ghana, in consultation with the Council of State, nominates the IGP for duty. The Ghanaian Council of State is a group of prominent citizens whose duty, as stated in Article 9 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, is to advise the president on national issues. The members of the Council of State include a former Chief Justice of Ghana, a former Inspector General of Police, and the President of the National House of Chiefs. The National House of Chiefs is the highest institution that oversees and serves as the highest judicial forum for all traditional rulers, including Kings, Chiefs and all traditional rulers (Oseadeeyo Addo Dankwa, 2004; Odotei and Awedoba 2006). Arguably, this was an important attempt to restore the traditional authorities that were dissolved under the colonialists as part of the many measures to legitimise the post-independence government.

In addition to the National Police Headquarters in Accra, the Ghana police has ten regional offices (Accra, Ashanti, Eastern, Western, Central, Brong Ahafo, Volta,

Northern, Upper East and Upper West). Each region has a commander who oversees both administrative and specialised operational units of the police. This includes Motor Traffic and Transport Units (MTTU), Highway Patrol Units, Public Affairs Directorate, Courts and Prosecution, Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit, Rapid Deployment Force, Mobile Force, Arms and Ammunition, Finance Officers, and Crime Officers. Each Regional Commander reports to the Inspector-General of Police via the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. There is also an office designated for policing the Railways and Ports.

Senior Officers	1. Inspector General of Police 2. Deputy Inspector General of Police 3. Commissioner of Police 4. Deputy Commissioner of Police 5. Assistant Commissioner of Police 6. Chief Superintendent of Police 7. Superintendent of Police 8. Deputy Superintendent of Police 9. Assistant Superintendent of Police
Subordinate Officers	10. Chief Inspector 11. Inspector 12. Sergeant 13. Corporal

Figure 4: Rank structure of the Ghana police service (Source: police.gov.gh)

ORGANOGRAM

INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF POLICE

CHIEF STAFF

- PERSONAL ASSISTANT
- ADC
- IGP'S SECRETARIAT
- POLICE COUNCIL
- AUDIT
- PRU

D-G SD | **D-G OPS** | **D-G L&P** | **D-G MTTD** | **D-G CID** | **D-G SER** | **D-G TECH** | **D-G PIPS** | **D-G HRD** | **D-G ICT** | **D-G R & P** | **D-G WEL** | **D-G FIN** | **D-G ADM**

*NPU *ANTI TERRORISM
*FPU *NPD
*MS *NDP *SWAT
*HPU
*PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE DEPT
*ARMOURER GENERAL

REG/DIV/DIST/ MTTU

*QM
*ESTATES *TPT
*PROCUREMENT
*POLICE HOSPITAL

REG PIPS

*IT
*COMM.

*SPORTS
*CHAPLAINCY
*MESS
*BAND

*REG/DIV/DIST/
*FINANCE *WSS
*PAYROLL
*PENSIONS
*BUDGET

*REG LEGAL OFFICES
*DIV LEGAL OFFICES
*CID PROSECUTION

*REG/DIV/DIST CRIME
*DTS *INTERPOL
*CDSB *CYBER
*FSL *CCU
*NARCOTICS *PROSECUTION
*AHTU
*NFRV & LA
*AARS
*HOMICIDE
*DOVVSU
*INTELLIGENCE
*SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

*PROJECTS
*SERVICE WORKSHOP

*EDUCATION
*POLICE ACADEMY
*COMM. STAFF COL
*PUBLIC SAFETY
*NPTS/RPTS (HO, KUMASI, WINNEBA & KOFORIDUA)

*RESEARCH
*PLANNING
*IU
*ME

*REGIONAL COMMANDERS
*PROTOCOL
*IRD *SE
*CPU
*PSO
*MARINE

*REGISTRY
*CON. REGISTRY
*WORD PROCESSING
*ARCHIVES
*RECORDS
*ORDERLY ROOM

LEGEND – POLICE UNITS
*AARS: ANTI ARMED ROBBERY SQUAD
*AHTU: ANTI-HUMAN TRAFFIC UNIT
*CCU: COMMERCIAL CRIME UNIT
*CPU: COMMUNITY POLICE UNIT
*DIV: DIVISION
*FPU : FORMED POLICE UNIT
*FSL : FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICES
*HPU: HIGHWAY PATROL UNIT
*IU: INTELLIGENCE UNIT
*MGT: MANAGEMENT
*MTTU: MOTOR TRAFFIC & TRANSPORT UNIT
*MS : MOUNTED SQUADRON
*NPD: NATIONAL PATROL DEPARTMENT
*NPU : NATIONAL PROTECTION UNIT
*DIR: DIRECTOR
*IRD: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
*PRU: PUBLIC RELATIONS UNIT

*PRU: PUBLIC RELATIONS UNIT
*QM: QUARTERMASTER
*REG: REGIONAL
*TPT: TRANSPORT
*WSS: WELFARE SCHEME SERVICE
*DTS: DETECTIVE TRAINING SCHOOL
*IRD: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
*PSO: PRIVATE SECURITY OPERATIONS
*NME: NATIONAL MONITORING & EVALUATION
*SE: SERVICE ENQUIRY

LEGEND – POLICE SCHEDULES
*ADM: ADMINISTRATION
*CID : CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT
*D-G : DIRECTOR-GENERAL
*FIN : FINANCE
*HRD: HUMAN RESOURCE & DEVELOPMENT
*ICT INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & TECHNOLOGY
*L&P : LEGAL & PROSECUTION
*MTTO: MOTOR TRAFFIC & TRANSPORT UNIT
*OPS : OPERATION
*PIPS: POLICE INTELLIGENCE & PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BUREAU
*R & P: RESEARCH & PLANNING
*SD : SPECIAL DUTIES
*SER : SERVICE
*TECT: TECHNICAL
*WEL : WELFARE

Figure 5: Organisational structure of the Ghana police service (Source: police.gov.gh 2018)

Overall, the supervision of operations of the Ghanaian police are held by the appointed minister who is responsible for the Ministry of Interior. Against this background, some argue that the extent to which the Ghana Police Service (GPS) could be independent from the state may be problematic, as the command structures as presented in *figure* five to indicate that the Ghanaian police is politically influenced. Moreover, traditionally, the Ghanaian public have also linked the Ghana police service to the government, and this has led to the popular nickname for the police - "Aban", which in the Akan Ghanaian language means 'government'. As Gariba (2014) suggests:

> The GPS is perceived as a branch of government that has become subservient to political authority instead of focusing on the provision of service to humanity. The GPS has therefore been tagged as insensitive to the people, politically biased, brutal in character, and not amenable to change even within the framework of contemporary democratic policing practice. (2014: 157).

This implies that the application of the concept of police professionalism as it was projected by Dr Kwame Nkrumah in his address during the graduation ceremony of the first police recruits at the Police College in 1959 has somehow not occurred or it has been wiped out by Ghana's turbulent political history (CHRI 2007, see also Gariba 2014). It is as if the colonial history of the Ghanaian police, despite more than half a century of reform, continues to influence its operation and how it is perceived by its public. Indeed Atuguba (2003) states that, the contemporary Ghana Police Service is still principally controlled by a political class and is used to ensure the security and safety of that class. It

also continues to be rooted in colonial styles that are often violent, repressive and militaristic.

This dilemma of the Ghanaian police might be ascribed to the circumstance in which most colonized nations in Africa ended up in the wake of attaining independence. On account of Ghana, the inevitable autonomy of the Gold Coast under the British rule has had a constructive effect, for example, influencing repressive policing and police brutality - which are a product of the colonialists (Young 1951). This suggests that when a colonized nation achieves independence, the institutions of the nation, in this case the police, change hands but certain political, symbolic and social foundations remain tied to the past (Clinard and Abbott 1973). Thus, the colonial militaristic introduction to policing, with its quintessential absence of accountability and respect for the rights of the people, continues to cast a shadow over Ghanaian policing, and this has created a degree of distrust and uneasiness with the police (Aning, 2002; Tankebe 2008b).

Police corruption and legitimacy in Ghana

Unprofessional policing in Ghana is typified by both high and low-profile instances of corruption, illegitimate arrest and detention, excessive use of police power and the inability of the police to follow up on complaints (CHRI, 2007). The populace's simple view about the Ghanaian police tends to be that it evokes images of an establishment filled with corrupt practices and an institution characterised by unprofessional police conduct, such as brutality and negligence of human rights (Gariba 2014).

This image has subsequently impacted on Ghanaian populace in relation to the effectiveness of the police. As Gariba (2014) argues the Ghanaian public have little trust or confidence in the police to deal fairly with criminal behaviour. For example, The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2007) found that ninety-two percent of Ghanaians have paid a bribe to the police at some stage. It also points out that illicit corruption practices, unreasonable utilization of police power and an inability to react to some public's needs has a devastating effect on the public:

> When cases are reported at police stations, it often becomes
> an opportunity to collect bribes. They create the impression
> that they cannot help much; sometimes advising victims to
> go home and let sleeping dogs lie. But immediately some
> few thousand cedis change hands they come alive with
> enthusiasm to attend to the work for which they are paid
> with taxpayers' money (CHRI 2007: 28).

As an example of this, studies on the police have portrayed the Ghanaian police as the most corrupt out of all Ghanaian institutions (CDD - Ghana 2000; Atuguba 2003; Ghana Integrity Initiative 2005, 2011; Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative - CHRI 2007; Armah-Attoh 2014; See table 1.1 below, which indicates a 10-year trends in corruption from 2002 to 2014).

	2002	2005	2008	2012	2014	Change 2012 - 2014	Change since question was first asked
The police	79	81	86	94	89	-5	+10
National government officials	--	66	77	91	86	-5	+20
Members of Parliament	--	59	74	90	85	-5	+26
Judges and magistrates	70	72	79	90	85	-5	+15
Tax officials of Ghana Revenue Authority	--	70	79	90	85	-5	+15
District chief executives	--	--	--	89	84	-5	--
President and officials in his office	47	56	70	87	83	-4	+36
Local government representatives	--	60	71	86	83	-3	+23
Officials of Electoral Commission	--	--	--	--	81	--	--
Business executives	63	--	--	--	82	--	+19
Traditional leaders	--	--	68	--	78	--	+10
Religious leaders	41	--	--	--	69	--	+28

Table 1.1: Trends in Corruption: *CDD & Afro-Barometer* **(Armah-Attoh 2014).**

Figure 6: Respondents who made contact with public Institution and Paid Bribe (Ghana Integrity Initiative 2011)

The above table indicates perceptions of corruption in some of the significant institutions in Ghana. It also demonstrates the perception of the institution that are mostly affected by corrupt experiences. *Figure* six indicates contact made to members of public institutions in Ghana, which subsequently resulted in bribes being paid. The Ghanaian police was perceived to be the institution most commonly engaging in bribery or corruption. The extent of corruption in some public institutions in Ghana is disturbing, focusing on various "hot spot" public organizations, such as the Judiciary and the Police (CDD 2000: 234). In the context of my study, the police are being viewed in a particularly critical manner as they constitute a vital aspect of an empowering environment for promoting public support and confidence as well as legitimacy for the police.

One of the most noticeable public-police corruption experiences in Ghana occurs at the street-level, mostly with junior ranking officers. In light of this, the CHRI (2007: 28) found that, "[Within the] junior ranks of the police, bribes are used to turn a blind eye or to grease the proper and efficient functioning of the police." They suggested that in their quest for effective management and implementations of traffic regulations, there is also the high probability of the police engaging in street-level corrupt practices. They cite a lamentation made by one Augustina Akwei in the Ghana Chronicle newspaper in relation to some corrupt police officers at the street-level.

> It is regrettable and a pity to see our police personnel who
> patrol our highways extorting money from drivers in the
> full glare of the public without shame instead of checking

> that traffic regulations are effectively observed by motorists
> (CHRI 2007: 28).

It is also significant to note that police corruption within Ghana is not limited to bribery. Linked to its colonial foundations, most policing in Sub-Saharan Africa takes place during paramilitary operations, in the use of force during the discharge of policing operations, rather than providing services to the community or dealing with criminal behaviours (Laguna et al. 2009; Obaro 2014). For instance, in Nigeria, the Police Force is known to operate under an arrangement of "fire for fire", in which most suspects caught die under police guardianship or are shot while endeavouring to get away. Years of police corruption coupled with the inability of the police to prepare officers appropriately for effective policing duties has prompted a situation where extra-judicial killing is an acknowledged way of managing individuals the police believe to be criminal (Obaro 2014: 424). This is very similar to the mandate of the police during colonialism where colonial police forces were mostly characterised by a para-military structure (see also Bradford et al 2016). Again, this is indicative of how the colonial past of many African nations continues to influence the present.

Anti-corruption policies relating to police behaviour

After two terms in office for President Rawlings (1992-1996 and 1996-2000), power was handed to another elected civilian government under the leadership of John Kufour. Ghana has since been considered as politically stable with a well-structured democracy in a region dominated by political insecurity and conflicts (Transparency International 2010). However, corruption has remained high on the political agenda. Kufour's

government had a 'zero tolerance' policy towards corruption. Moreover, after Kufour's two terms in office, the successive government under John Atta Mills, as part of his political campaign promises, pledged to root out corruption, increase transparency and improve living standards for the less privileged (Freedom House 2010). Against this background, the need for the Ghanaian police to act and promote professionalism via legitimate and professional police conduct cannot be overemphasised.

The discussion thus far suggests that the image of the police cannot be divorced from the existence of police corruption. As police corruption has become a central focus for the Ghanaian public, the standards and the regulatory measures that govern police officers' conduct and the disciplinary measures that may be applied if an officer fails to adhere to these standards are set out in several different policies and regulations in Ghana. Beginning with the Police Service Instructions (PSI), these are a set of conduct guidelines published by the Inspector General of Police (CHRI 2007; Ghana Police Service 2010), which are largely centred around checks on internal police conduct.

However, this means that there is not much scope for the public to use these guidelines to reinforce a charge against an officer (CHRI 2007; Ghana Police Service 2010). It also implies that the guidelines can only be adopted and implemented by more senior officers, to meter discipline for misconduct to relatively junior officers. The Police Service Instructions do not have any significant bearing on officers who are higher ranking than Chief Inspectors. Arguably, this is yet another heritage of the colonial foundations of the Ghanaian police (CHRI 2007).

A further example is the Police Service Act. The difference between the Police Service Act and the Police Service Instructions is that the Police Service Act is considered as more democratic, as the guidelines for police conduct are not limited to junior ranks but sets out the same standards for all police officers, regardless of the rank (CHRI 2007). Additionally, the Police Service Act sets out punishments that may be applied to officers who engage in police misconduct. The punishments that may be imposed include expulsion (which may include relinquishing all retirement benefits), removal (termination of the contract without a reduction in retirement packages), reduction in rank, postponement of increments, or a fine (not surpassing one-eighth of an officer's monthly pay). Constables may also be confined to police barracks for two weeks (*ibid* 2007).

In addition to these internal police investigatory processes, the Ghanaian police have sought to establish internal responsibility through different public complaint systems. These systems led from the prerequisite in section 23(1) of the Police Service Act that expresses that 'Any member of the public shall be entitled to make a complaint in writing, as to (a) any instance of bribery, corruption, oppression or intimidation (b) any neglect or non-performance of duty or (c) other misconduct by a police officer' (Ghana Police Service, 2010). Under the Act, instances of bribery, corruption, mistreatment, or intimidation are to be handled by the senior officer in the relevant unit (or the Inspector General of Police). Concerns for neglect, non-execution of police duties or engaging in police misconduct are to be addressed by any senior officer. After receiving a complaint, the officer is obliged under section 23(4) of the Act to make a full and unprejudiced investigation be made into the complaint. A report of the investigation to be made

available for the complainant and an action as required should be pursued (Ghana Police Service 2010). While this system is better than not having a public complaints system, it is not independent from the police and thus its effectiveness may be questionable. In addition, there is the Ghanaian criminal code, which contains offences recognised in the Ghanaian jurisdiction.

> The Ghanaian criminal code criminalises active and passive bribery, extortion, wilful exploitation of public office and the use of public office for private gain, irrespective of the nationality of the bribe payer or taker. Direct and indirect corruption is illegal, as well as attempting, preparing or conspiring to bribe and both agent and principal are liable (Transparency International 2010: 5).

There is also the Police Intelligence and Professional Standards Bureau (PIPSB), which was inaugurated in 2005 within the Ghana Police Service in order to deal with professional infringement and to ensure the efficiency of the Ghanaian police (see *figure* seven below) (CHRI 2007). Since its inception, the Bureau has conducted a sensitization programme aimed at raising its profile within the police service, and an education programme to raise its profile as a complaints unit that can be fully access by the public in Ghana.

> The Police Intelligence and Professional Standards Bureau's functions include the following:
> 1. Collate and co-ordinate the gathering of information and intelligence on crimes and criminals and prepare statistical data on prevailing crime trends.
> 2. Develop, in collaboration with the Criminal Investigation Department, police headquarters and regional and unit commanders a criminal intelligence apparatus for the police service.
> 3. Coordinate police training programmes in criminal intelligence in collaboration with the Criminal Investigation Department.
> 4. Monitor compliance with international police professional standards, human rights and the enforcement of democratic policing principles.
> 5. Conduct regular inspections of police stations, equipment, records, documents and other facilities in accordance with the guidelines provided in the relevant Service Instructions.
> 6. Investigate public complaints, instances of malfeasance and any other acts or omissions by police officers.
> 7. Conduct refresher courses for police officers in areas of identified knowledge or skills deficiencies in cooperation with the Schedule Officer for Training.
> 8. Investigate complaints referred by the Inspector General of Police or members of the Headquarters Management Advisory Board on matters of police corruption, misconduct or other offences (criminal and civil).
> 9. Act as an internal affairs unit for the service.
> 10. Undertake other assignments as determined by the Inspector General of Police.

Figure 7: Duties as detailed in the Professional standards Bureau- Ghana (Source: CHRI 2007)

Additionally, there are independent or external oversight bodies, such as the Ghana Integrity Initiative, the Police Council and Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, and an independent media. Arguably, the major independent oversight authorities in Ghana are the National Police Council and The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice. The Police Council, under the Constitution of Ghana, is an established body empowered to provide advisory services to the President on issues significant to the Ghanaian police (Aning 2006; CHRI 2007). The Council's obligations are clarified under section 10(6) of the Police Service Act. Under the Act, the Council is to advise on appointments of police officers and hear appeals from internal

disciplinary hearings. Additionally, the Council also provides advice on welfare and discipline, as well as enlistment into the service, and on police training programmes. There is also the Regional Police Council, which supports the role of the Police Council. Furthermore, the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which is Ghana's foremost human rights institution (Bossman 2006), is a constitutional body mandated with protecting human rights and examining administrative justice issues. It is empowered to investigate breaches of human rights, corruption, and police unfairness in their treatment with members of the public (*ibid* 2006).

These external bodies provide a medium or mechanisms by which the police, either as individual members or as an institution, can be held accountable for any action that does not conform to the standards of professional police work. The mechanism of police accountability, in this case, operates outside the police, however, it also operates in collaboration with police internal disciplinary procedures.

Despite these recent formal checks and balances, numerous studies suggest that these anti-corruption initiatives have done little to drive corruption out of the Ghanaian police (see CDD - Ghana 2000; Atuguba 2003; Ghana Integrity Initiative 2005, 2011; Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2007; Tankebe 2008b; Armah-Attoh 2014). Presently, the President of Ghana, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo has charged the newly constituted Police Council to ensure that public perception about the police is improved, stating that, "Citizens can only have confidence in the Police Service when

they are seen to be honest and would enforce the law without fear or favour.'' (Ghanaweb News, Online 2018a, p.4)

Furthermore, the President, during the swearing of the new Police Council on the 6th July 2017, added that:

> Governments have term limits, and in a multi-party democracy, parties win and lose power. It is good for the health of the nation that this is so, and this is why the Police Service should not tie its well-being or otherwise to the fortunes of the ruling party of the day. Doing so undermines your integrity, your professionalism, and puts all of us at risk in the long run (The Statesman 2018, p.5)

This approach was to admonish the Ghanaian police and encourage them to be neutral and professional in their duties as guaranteed under the 1992 Constitution. The president in his pledge states that he envisages the Ghanaian police service discharging its duties of protecting the public in Ghana with a zero interference from the government. Nonetheless, the President urged members of the Police Council to preserve their independence from political influence and possibly corrupt behaviours:

> We must ensure that the Police Service is left to focus on its core mandate, and not be an appendage of the ruling party. I envisage a Police Service that goes about its duty of protecting ordinary citizens confident that there will be no interference from the powers that be (The Statesman 2018, p.5).

The Ghana police service is being urged to place openness and transparency as a core aspect of their work. They are being encouraged to work with the community so as to provide an essential cooperative approach to combat crime. Arguably, this could be likened to a model of modern Western policing, which in my study refers to a policing system which is built upon a constructive relationship between the police and the public, which is problem-oriented and community-based (Ortmeier and Meese 2010, Emsley 2013), and which limits opportunities for police occupational misconduct.

Conclusion

In order to provide a comprehensive social and cultural context of police corruption, this chapter has analysed the history of policing in Ghana. It elaborated on indigenous strategies of social control and justice during the pre-colonial era and identified that there was no recognised, specially trained professional unit to oversee the daily maintenance of law and order. Policing was a collective effort of all members of the traditional state, and spiritual gods were considered as maintainers of social and moral order. The core element of social control that most of the traditional states depended on was the omnipresence of ancestral spirits. These spirits were depended on for surveillance, protection and to reward those conforming to the values of the society. Hence, policing was a collective effort of all members of the traditional state and spiritual gods were considered as maintainers of social and moral order.

This system was replaced by the British colonist's establishment of a form of professional police which usurped the traditional system of maintaining law and order (Tankebe

2008b). The colonial police service was primarily established to maintain the law and order of the colony, and to promote, defend and deliver imperialistic interest, such as protecting the properties and personal safety of the colonialists. Thus, colonial policing was carried out with little concern for fairness and accountability because these were not considered as part of police duties during the era of colonial rule. The chapter subsequently examined post-colonial police corruption and argued that the structure and style of colonial policing had impacted upon police corruption within contemporary police work within the Ghanaian police service which remained wedded to maintaining the security and safety for the propertied and political class. Thus, the Ghanaian police did change substantially during the post-colonial period, and it continues to be rooted in colonial styles that are often repressive, violent and corrupt.

Lastly, I considered contemporary police anti-corruption measures with inferences made to anti-corruption policies in Ghana. This indicates how although corruption and police legitimacy have been a regular part of public and parliamentary debates in post-independence Ghana, due to its political instability which is arguably closely linked to its past colonisation, Ghana remains a country in which the police are seen to be highly corrupt.

To further my critical evaluation of policing and police corruption in Ghana, the next chapter provides a review of the literature on corruption. It indicates, however, that studies of corruption are largely Western-centric, and they commonly fail to trace the exigencies of corruption back to the influences of colonialism.

CHAPTER TWO

POLICE CORRUPTION and PUBLIC CONFIDENCE:

REVIEW of the LITERATURE

Introduction

This chapter presents a review of the literature on different forms of police corruption. This will include but is not limited to police corruption initiated either by police officers or by members of the public, and it considers the impact of this on public confidence in the police. The literature review is split into two sections. The first section begins by presenting an overview of the existing concepts and approaches to understanding police corruption. Key indicators of police corruption practices from theoretical concepts relating to organisational and individual accountability in relation to police corruption are examined. Also included in the discussion are the contextual factors such as norms, values and attitudes that act upon police corruption. These are examined against the principle that some police conduct viewed as corrupt in one society may be considered normal in other societies (Bayley and Perito 2011).

In the second section, the literature review analyses debates related to factors that are deemed to undermine police confidence and legitimacy. These include corruption, procedural fairness, misuse of police legitimate power, distorting the course of procedural justice and tolerating or accepting bribes and liberal gifts from citizens. The literature review also evaluates various concepts that ground the theoretical context of my study. The key theoretical framework is a development of the techniques of Neutralisation.

Theory developed by Sykes and Matza (1957) and later developed by Cohen (2001) in his analysis of various forms of denial. These concepts will be discussed in depth throughout the thesis and developed in way which captures the social foundations and conditions underpinning police corruption in Ghana. The chapter concludes by drawing attention to the lack of empirical research on police corruption within Ghana.

Understanding police corruption

There is an array of literature that presents the definition of police corruption in diverse contexts, and these differ on the acceptability of the definition associated with corruption (Newburn 1999). It is not necessary to review all these definitions in this chapter; however, it is worth noting that there are two main approaches to understanding corruption, which underlie my thesis. Firstly, I examine different forms of police conduct and attempt to differentiate what could be considered as corruption or police misconduct. The second approach then adopts a theoretical understanding that can be used to differentiate corrupt practices from non-corrupt behaviour (Newburn 2015). Nonetheless, the comprehensive functional definition of police corruption considered for my thesis is taken from Hope (2015), whereby:

> Police corruption is any action or omission, a promise of any action or omission, or any attempt of action or omission committed by a police officer or a group of police officers, characterised by police misuse of official position and motivated in significant part with the achievement of personal gain, or organizational gain or advantage (Hope 2015: 5).

Corruption as presented above falls under the umbrella of police occupational deviance. This involves illegal use of professional power for personal gain and it may involve an officer or officers working in a coordinated effort (Sherman 1978). It also encompasses dishonest facilitation of payments made to the police to perform their work; improper or unethical behaviour, such as bribery, violence, extortion, and destruction of evidence; racism, and favouritism; excessive authoritarian policing; and nepotism (Newburn 1999; Arrigo and Clausen 2003; Douvlis and South 2003, Gerber and Mandelson 2008; Laguna et al 2009; Transparency International 2012; Punch 2013).

Amundsen (1999) explains that one of the factors that shapes or enhances how police corruption is understood and categorised is the concept of 'Incidental Corruption'. Incidental corruption denotes 'private' and 'collective' forms of police corrupt practices that occur as an offshoot of their work rather than a central part of it (*ibid* 1999). As De Sardan (1999) posits, the notion of the private does not mean that the act is carried out as a secret social exchange. Instead, it refers to the individual benefits generated, for example, monetary benefit gained from the practices of corruption. These benefits may also be to a group of police officers who act with coherence and unity, to elicit advantages (Amundsen 1999).

Causes of police corruption

Studies cite many different causes of police corruption. Corruption has been associated with the structure of the police organisation; societal culture, pessimistic views of police officers' moral attributes as well as the situational context and working environment of

the police (Sherman 1978; Kelling and Moore 1988; Newburn 1999; Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Sissener and Soreide 2000; Porter and Warrender 2009; Domoro and Agil 2012; Douvlis and South 2003; Rawlinson 2012; Punch 2013; Keane and Bell 2014). Additionally, police corruption can also be influenced by societal politics, as well as the culture and norms of the people or the society within which they operate (Newburn 1999; Treisman 2000; Tavits 2005; Tanye 2010; Domoro and Agil 2012).

Most police corruption studies have uncovered the lack of effective organisational accountability as having some implications upon police corruption (Chan 1999; Newburn 1999; Verma 1999; Punch 2000, 2009). Benson (1981), for instance, argued that officers' engagement in corruption is strongly linked to what is referred to as organisational incentives. Thus, an organisation may create an environment that may generate or foster integrity rather than tolerance for police corruption and vice-versa. Police corruption is often related to an absence of institutional accountability, in which police authority and supervisors endorse their officers' misconduct or stoop to it themselves. This can occur where the police structure turns a 'blind eye' to corrupt behaviour or neglects to mete fitting discipline for it. Police corruption is more likely where a police hierarchical structure chooses not to see or notice signs of corrupt police leaders. This can be exemplified by supervisory negligence as highlighted in 1999 USA, which according to Weitzer (2002) and Williams (2002), accounted for police corrupt practices within the Rampart division of the Los Angeles Police office.

In another example, the Center for Democratic Development (2000) contends that, in Ghana specifically, the reasons for public-police corruption practices incorporate a blend of factors. Namely, the perception from police officers that they are greatly underpaid, ineffective police internal management systems, like inadequate accountability, supervision, ineffective authorisation of the law, and ineffective anti-corruption measures. Beek, Göpfert, Owen, and Steinberg (2017) further contends that in Ghana, particularly at the street-level, police officers evoke the law by means of acting seriously and making inferences about the offence committed. Thereby, evoking the law, provides the opportunity for officers and some members of the public to drift in and out of corruption. Beek et al (2017) argues that the Ghanaian public are often a victim of police checks at police stops. In this context, members of the public anticipate that they must offer money to the police:

> Due to their monetary interests, police officers are interested in keeping cases at their level. They do not want to pass it on to the courts or to the appropriate police department. Such an approach thwarts the police officer's expectation of a money (*ibid* 2017: 10).

It has also been argued that if police officers in West Africa were to enforce the law diligently, they would overburden the courts. Against this background, most people in Ghana would prefer to avoid the time, energy, and cost of going to court, "They just waste your time." (Beek et al 2017:10). Nonetheless, although there is an effort to enforce road regulations, most people also attempt to circumvent these traffic regulations. For instance, drivers in general, but especially commercial drivers, also attempt to counter the

full enforcement of the law by inclining towards offering money to the police. There is an expectation that in receiving their incentive, the police would accommodate their situational interests. Furthermore, social relations in Ghana tend to operate on the notion 'We are all human beings.' (Beek 2017: 7). This arguably influences corruption on the pillars of a benevolent society. Additionally, according to Andvig (2008), due to the economic challenges in sub-Saharan Africa more generally, there is an expectation that corruption is rife. The primary underlying factor for such corrupt practices is seen as the connection between poverty and corruption.

However, police corruption affects all police services across the world. It is not just restricted to Ghana. For example, during the 1970's, Detective Frank Serpico found evidence of systematic corruption by his colleagues in the New York Police force whereby they were regularly accepting bribes (Gobert and Punch 2000; Fried 2001; Johnson 2006; Kilgannon 2010). In the UK, the Serious Organised Crime Agency noted over a period of two years, 73 police officers had been suspended following incidents of misconduct (Darbyshire 2016).

Furthermore, it became apparent that in 1999, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) declined to charge officers amid a police corruption investigation in view of the inadequacies in the law in the United Kingdom. Even though the officers concerned affirmed that they had taken part in corruption, the evidence collected was not seen to be sufficiently solid by the CPS for them to justify criminal charges. Police organisations

may also conceal some police conduct from the public and thus restrict evidence against them (Hope 2015).

Corrupt conduct has direct implications upon the moral standing of the police as well as the public trust in the police. Hence, some police organisations (for instance, Yokohama Police) limit sharing knowledge on internal corruption to avoid the reduction in public trust in the police (William 2002). In this case, it may be argued that police accountability becomes non-transparent – arguably a corrupt practice itself. Additionally, considering such lapses in institutional accountability where, for instance, the structure or the leadership of the police are derelict in managing police corruption, police officers under investigation for corruption commonly come off without any repercussions. This in turn may influence a decline in citizens reporting incidents of police corruption to the designated office. Consequently, this can facilitate increased occurrences of police corruption (Oleinik 2016).

Tolerance and passive reaction to police corruption

Research also suggests that within a society where there is public tolerance of, or passive reactions to corruption, this can be an influential factor for individual police officers in developing corrupt behaviour (Barry 1999; Newburn 2000). In other words, where there is tolerance of some members of the public towards, or the justification of police corrupt practices (Malmberg 2016), and where offering money to the police may be considered as an acceptable practise, for instance, as a means of appreciating the work of the police (Marché 2009), this may well encourage police corrupt practices. In such cases, police

corruption may be seen to be co-constructed by forces both within and outside of the policing system.

Officers' use of discretion is another influential factor in police corruption. This is because discretion allows police officers to act outside the purview of their supervisors (Goldstein 1975, 1977; Brown 1988). For instance, officers can decide whether to act in a situation. Police officers may, for example, avoid enforcing road traffic regulations in exchange for money or bribes from the public. Police discretion over where to conduct patrols, where and when to mount police stop barriers, or whether to stop traffic violators or anticipated traffic violators, thus provides enabling environments for corruption to seep into their work.

In addition, police are also in a position as a normal part of their work to decide when to apply the full force of the law. Police use of discretionary power, coupled with the roles that they perform within society, means that officers frequently encounter ethical dilemmas. As a result, police discretion is considered an age-old problem influencing corrupt practices (Goldstein 1960; Goldstein 1977; Newburn 1999; Mastrofski 2004). Legitimate power of the police can also be a source that facilitates corrupt practices. The authority of the police includes the power of officers to conduct investigations, to detain and arrest in connection with an offence, to issue a penalty or license, and the authority to direct persons and vehicles on public roads and in other public places, to mention but a few. However, the scope or limit of police use of legitimate discretion, for example, when

and how to temper enforcement laws solely for operational purposes can also facilitate corrupt practices (Bronitt and Stenning 2011).

Accountability and police corruption

Some studies indicate that low or lack of effective individual accountability and insufficient police supervision (that is, officers carrying most of their duties with little or no supervision), and limited police visibility (which relates to police duties that are mostly hidden from the public's view), are some of the most influential factors upon police corruption (Sherman 1974; Miller 2003; Aremu, Pakes and Johnston 2009).

Police officers who may be linked with common or shared values and dependent on contextual factors, such as individual ethical standards as well as officers' solidarity to commitments to things other than the police organisation may supersede that of the organisational ethics and values of the police (Marks 2007; Domoro and Agil 2012; Crank 2014). Such a common sharing of occupational values and perspectives may impact on officers' subcultural practices (Reiner 2000) and may serve to provide ready-made justifications for corrupt practices embedded in linguistic techniques of neutralisation (Sykes and Matza 1957; Prenzler 2009), which are discussed in detail below. Additionally, material benefits, either gained via a mutual understanding between some members of the public and the police, or by an individual willingness to initiate corruption could from the perspective of the police be regarded (or neutralised) as rewards or compensation for their undervalued work (Prenzler 2009).

Contextual factors of police corruption

Studies contend that police corruption persists because of certain functional characteristics connected with it. For instance, Sayed and Bruce (1998) suggest that police officer's personal or a group benefits gained via corrupt uses of legitimate authority are some of the constituents of police corruption. This can be exemplified by officers' acceptance of money to look the other way or turn their backs to crime; the falsification of reports; and participation or authorising the commissioning of bribes and nepotism - although these examples are not exhaustive. In Ghana, some argue that many public-police corruption practices are co-constructed by the public in their encounters with police. For example, Addo (2012) posits that drivers who offer bribes to police officers to abstain from being arrested in the wake of infringing upon road traffic regulations should be largely blamed for public-police corruption practices.

However, blaming one party for police corruption may have its limitations. According to Beek (2016), civilians (including commercial drivers) have criticised the Ghanaian police for what seems to be a circumvention of the law. Whereby most street-level officers were perceived as not enforcing traffic regulations in any meaningful way. Consequently, no case of traffic violation is sent to the relevant office or legitimately processed through the courts. Yet such police conduct seems to have become normative at the street-level public-police encounter in Ghana, as Beek (2016: 116) suggests, "In Ghana, traffic checks have become an allegory for corruption," and subsequently has shaped the perception of some civilians about traffic checks.

Addo (2012) argued further that drivers have constantly praised officers if they succeed in 'lubricating their palm' (giving gifts), and that some police officers are being inspired by the culprits. Beek (2016) also adds that civilians seem to share an understanding or a consideration of offering money to the police as a social act. Some individuals argue that both parties involved in the corruption have economic and welfare responsibilities. In other words, each of them needs to make ends meet (Beek et al 2017). Hence offering money to the police rests upon the notion of, 'I scratch your back and you mine.' (Beek 2016: 117).

Addo (2012) provides a practical understanding of some of the factors that promote public-police corruption at the street-level in Ghana. Instances where commercial drivers violate a motor traffic regulation, and having conferred that offence, there is a high probability of being given a hefty fine later in court. Hence, in such situations, upon the awareness of the ramifications of the offence, most commercial drivers would attempt to offer bribes to a police officer. This is aimed at perhaps three factors: firstly, the anticipation that the police will overlook the offence (Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Heckelman and Powell 2008; Insaidoo 2007; Pelling and Wisner 2012), secondly, to avoid a possible prolonged encounter with the police which may result in being given a hefty fine in court (cf. Addo 2012; Beek et al 2017; Vaishnav 2017); and lastly, to circumvent any charges.

Gift-giving and police corruption

Corruption is, of course, an age-old issue, and corruption within a police force organisation is not a new phenomenon. However, as noted by Amundsen (1999:5) police corruption in most African societies has a high tendency for "collectivisation". This means that to conform to the practices of police corruption in most African cultures is often less problematic than not doing so. Corruption may be socially accepted, and private citizens perceive it as inevitable and it thus becomes morally expected and normalised (Gould and Mukendi 1989; Amundsen 1999; Uslaner 2008). As some studies have argued, police corruption may reflect a culture that has its roots in the style of certain cultural or traditional practices, such as in less-contractual gift-giving societies (William 2002; Bayley and Perito 2011; Mills 2012; Hope 2015).

Gift-giving could be considered as a social instrument to coordinate and promote longitudinal trusting relationships between the parties. As Thiel (2010) suggests, giving gifts can be used to encourage and reinforce social networks. Here, giving promotes long-standing relationships without expectations of the exact return of goods or services. Nonetheless, if there is an expectation of a return, it is "temporally stretched, elastic, and moral" (*ibid* 2010: 453). Gift-giving strengthens social bonds, and as Tönnies (1925) suggests, in less contractual societies individuals become bounded by the predisposition of support and collectivity which encourages a sentiment of belonging or companionship, which is structured by the cultural practice of giving gifts (see Tanye 2010).

However, if what is reciprocated after the gift is given is to influence institutional resources (in this case, the police), then such gifts would most likely be considered as a corrupt practice (Graycar and Jancsics 2017). Gift-giving to and within the police can promote non-discretionary police trust, which may present a risk of personalised or privatised police service rather than a collective and social service (Newburn 2015; Human Rights Watch 2017).

Considering the relationship between gift-giving and its role in promoting long-standing relationships, gift-giving cultures are likely to have an influence on police corruption. Here, social attitudes towards gifts may influence or determine the level of integrity or the honesty that police officers' associate with their duties. In other words, community open-mindedness towards certain activities such as informal gift-giving may heighten police or institutional corruption (Hope 2015). Thus, the gift has a significant communicative role, and sends symbolic messages to the partakers of the gift. As William (2002) states, such cultural practices inhibit the professional standards of the police.

Contemporary Ghana is to a certain degree a gift-based reciprocal society rather than a contractual one (Tönnies, 1925, 1957). Hence, the evaluations of gift-giving and the conduct of the police may influence individual propensity to follow or abide by the law (Skogan 2005; Tyler 2005; Kenyon and Gossett 2009). Additionally, the notion of gifts as being tied deeply into the culture of Ghanaian life provides a powerful neutralisation for both police-initiated and public-initiated corruption in Ghana.

Gift-giving may be considered as a functional and significant aspect of social relations in Ghanaian culture. It can be used to establish social connections and long-term relations. In Ghana, gifts are generally linked to goodwill, hence to refuse a gift is considered unfriendly at best, even immoral and offensive. However, when giving gifts is used as a means of gaining access to the resources of the Ghanaian police service or establishing relations with the police to secure personal favours, gift-giving becomes synonymous with bribery and the gift becomes instrumental with a primary objective of obtaining a direct service or benefit from the police. Here, within the gift-bound culture of Ghana this can easily seep into corruptive practices. However, due to the morality surrounding the practice of gift-giving, this can serve to shield or neutralise the immorality of corruptive practices – an observation that I expand upon below.

Ethics and police misconduct

The notion of police ethics may be understood as connoting the framework of moral values underpinning the police organisation. Ethics play a significant part in policing and the police organization. This is partly on the basis that police officers are public officials and as part of their duties, they are expected by society or the public to deal with ethical and moral issues, make judgements and apply force to that end daily (Tyler 1990; Pollock 2012; Porter, Webb, Prenzler and Gill 2015). As Raines (2006) and Prenzler (2009) posit, the police are an exceptional organisation on the basis that they are expected by the public to prevent crime, as well as maintain and promote security and safety.

As Miller and Blackler (2005) found, public views about the police are also centred on the police acting professionally to protect the norms and values of the society. Nonetheless, for those moral values to be protected, they ought to be enshrined in the law. It is noteworthy that most police officers would carry out their duties effectively and honourably to the standards required as a law enforcement officer, but on some occasions their conduct contradicts traditional or foundational ethics of the organisation of the police.

Ethical misconduct refers to the moral challenges that police officers may encounter during the discharge of their duties (see McCafferty and McCafferty 1998). Researchers argues that the work of the police can be morally problematic because of certain demands that can be requested from them (Williams 2002; Ashforth and Anand 2003; Andvig 2008; Alexandra and Miller 2009; Gottschalk 2009). One example is the notion of just following orders. For example, this can be low ranking officers being forced into aspects of police corruption by senior officers. Additionally, sustainable policing, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, can also be morally challenging. For instance, upon joining the police force, some individuals may experience ineffective internal police accountability (as previously discussed), and hence they may exhibit some degree of fragmented values or loyalties on law enforcement effort.

Depending on the situational impact, such fragmented values may serve as a motivational factor for an officer to drift in and out of corruption. It could be argued that in Ghana there seems to be an ambivalence between police work and public demand for solutions

to crimes. The solution for crimes could either be the police overlooking a street-level offence committed or a request for a rapid police action (short-term prosecution) of offenders. In this case, bribing the officer can become a motivational element synonymous with a successful crime solution - either prosecution of offenders or for the offence to be overlooked.

Additionally, as the police service are there to enforce the law and protect the public, individual officers have been bestowed a significant legal authority (Miller and Blackler 2005). For instance, officers are legally required to conduct searches, and to stop or detain an individual or a group suspected of infringing the rules and regulations governing the society. As to whether such a legitimate authority is exercised according to the expectations of the police organisation as well as the society is another concept to comprehend. This must be viewed against the backdrop of seeking a successful crime solution, as discussed above. To take one example, when private citizens, for example, motorists, do not hesitate in offering money or bribes to street-level police officers after what could be perceived as their constant violation of traffic regulations. This in turn could lead to the situation whereby street-level public-police corrupt practices could literally be considered to be the norm as there is a collective interest in aiding the corrupt practices.

In this case there seems to be some evidence of a collective interest and thus the co-construction of corruption. For instance, private citizens' interest in bribing officers to seek their favour (Transparency International 2015). Ultimately, this regular practice,

imbedded in the above-mentioned culture of gift-giving, can be seen to normalize street-level public-police corrupt practices. This situation also makes it more challenging for daily road users to differentiate between practices that would be considered as corrupt and those which are not (Burbidge 2016).

Normalization of police corruption

Police corruption is said to be normalised when the corrupt practice become embedded in everyday behaviour to the extent that they are taken for granted (Quah 2015). It incorporates both petty or what could be referred to as 'survival corrupt' experiences (Lambert-Mongiliansky et al 2007). Survival corruption occurs when there seems to be a disparity or perceived sense of unsustainable 'police' income within the police culture, which introduces opportunities for micro level police corruption. Such corrupt practices are mostly associated with low-ranking public officers, as an example, street-level police officers (Quah 2015). It is also argued that a police deviant sub-culture that teaches the various moral and practical techniques for corruption, offers ready-made legitimization by which the negative character of the corrupt practice is neutralised. For example, by appeal to the moral nature of gift-giving in Ghanaian society or the necessary nature of survival bribes.

Quah further posits that low salaries of public servants as well as the limited means of police accountability, coupled with systemic corruption are contributing factors towards the normalization of police corruption (*ibid* 2015). A key factor in normalization is the rationalization procedures which people adopt to re-frame the significance of the corrupt

practices to safeguard his or her social status and neutralise the guilt of corruption (Ashforth and Anand 2003, Burke and Tomlinson 2016). Once institutionalised in the occupational culture, such corrupt practices become more morally and psychologically feasible to engage in (Faull 2007).

Therefore, it can be seen that police officers and private citizens who engage in such corrupt practices are likely to collectively develop rationalization techniques to neutralise any negative sentiments that could radiate from their involvement in public-police corrupt practices. Additionally, it is argued that rationalisation is regularly tied with socialization strategies through which, in this case, new recruits could be compelled (because of police occupational pressure), to acknowledge and subsequently, explore corruption and their related justifications (Anand, Ashforth and Joshi 2004).

According to Ashforth and Anand (2003), there are three main contributing factors that encourage and influence the normalisation of police corruption. Firstly, institutionalization, which refers to the process by which police corrupt experiences are authorised as an aspect of a police daily routine, mostly without any consideration of the implications of their corrupt conduct. Secondly, rationalization, referring to the process by which individual police officers rationalize their involvement in corrupt practices (Bratsis 2003; Granovetter 2004). Thirdly, there is socialization, which refers to how new recruits come to accept the techniques and practices of police corruption.

Corruption and African culture and society

Studies indicate that public views about some police officers who may be habitually involved in corruption are likely to develop less trust and satisfaction with the police (Alam 1989; Weitzer and Tuch 2005; Skogan 2006). However, an equally important issue for consideration which is significant in relation to my study are the pragmatic advantages related to public-police corruption practices. In some African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda, research suggests that stamping out police corruption is a difficult challenge amid low police remuneration (Charley and M'Cormack 2011; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2014). For instance, an officer may be the only member of his or her family (including the extended family) who is well educated with a 'good job', hence the rest of the family expect or depend on him or her for all kinds of emotional and monetary support. According to Garba and Mamman (2014), these dependencies sometimes cause public officers to dread retirement and low police remuneration inevitably influences corruption. Moreover, the informal, 'gemeinschaft' (Tönnies 1957) nature of many parts of sub-Saharan African society makes the role of the extended family especially pertinent in influencing corruption.

As De Sardan (1999), Muir (1979) and Reckwitz (2002) argue, in most African societies the practices of corruption have been extended to every aspect of social life. Hence, it is a challenge for most people and members of public institutions to avoid giving or receiving bribes. Corruption from this perspective may have two characteristics: on the one hand it promotes economic gain on the part of the officers and on the other hand, it promotes a quicker administrative means of resolving issues as picked up or reported to police

officers (Heckelman and Powell 2008). However, street-level police corruption, for instance, mean that there is an added cost involved in the transportation of food products and commodities and may negatively impact on trade or economic growth (Tanzi and Davoodi 2001; Duncan 2009; Quah 2014; Farooq et al 2013; National post 2017). Corruption also increases risks to public road safety, and the effectiveness of the police (Mbaku 1996; Newburn 1999; Lawal 2007; Kaufmann, Montoriol-Garriga and Recanatini 2008; Mohammed 2013), and anti-corruption reforms are also affected by police corruption (Newburn 1999). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, when an individual (in this context, a private citizen and the police) engage in corrupt practices, they both act as an agent of their pre-existing knowledge (Främling 2005) as well as fulfilling their immediate ambitions.

The Neutralisation and Denial of corruption in Ghana

Police corruption is a global concern (Bayley and Perito 2011; Transparency International 2012) but it may not be such a concern to those involved in it. In a society where there is a perception of widespread corruption, the processes involved in initiating or demanding bribes can usually arrive at an equilibrium (Lui 1985), in that the two parties involved in the transaction employ the "I-let-you-corrupt-me and-you-let-me-corrupt-you" syndrome (Hankiss 2002: 248). The above notion relies on Becker's study (1968) on economic influences on crime. However, to isolate economic influences as the motivational factor for criminal behaviour in this context, public-police corruption practice, is largely flawed because there are other factors that may equally influence police misconduct. For instance, growing up in Ghana I have had the experience on numerous occasions of

witnessing commercial drivers who upon being signalled by a police officer to stop, drive a few yards beyond the officer, and show any documentation related to the vehicle. On some occasions, the driver would ask his assistant (otherwise referred to as a driver's mate) for money. This is then added to the documents for the officer to 'inspect'. These encounters took place a few yards behind the vehicle. As a passenger in the same vehicle, I subsequently witnessed the driver returning to the vehicle with a beaming smile on his face. The driver's expression suggested a positive public-police encounter, and yet the encounters had been concluded without the officer even coming close to the vehicle, for instance to inspect whether the driver had the required number of passengers in the vehicle.

As I have suggested, several factors including cultural beliefs, personalised gain, the desire to personalise policing, environmental factors, and cultural neutralisation from peers within the police, and occupational set-up, all appear to influence police misconduct. To this effect, it can be argued that ill-gotten gifts or money, either initiated by the police or the citizen, could be a means of improving or simply enacting certain cultural, personal or collective conditions. These may become important motivational factors influencing some police officers to engage in corruption. This perceptive appears, in many sub-Saharan countries to have become normalised, to the extent that it becomes a simple taken for granted part of everyday life. Yet, in this way, the various problems associated with corruption become denied, making it incredibly difficult to break the cycle of corruption.

Sykes and Matza (1957) identify the following five techniques of neutralisation which served to release juvenile delinquents from the moral binds of the law and which have subsequently been applied to countless other forms of deviance, including corruption (see Thiel, 2015). The techniques include: denial of responsibility, whereby the perpetrator denies the responsibility for the delinquent behaviour by citing external measures that are beyond his or her control. Denial of injury, whereby perpetrators consider their actions as not causing any actual harm. Denial of the victim, where perpetrators consider their actions as having no actual victims or that the victim was deserving of what he got because he or she had, for instance, infringed on someone else's liberty. Condemnation of the condemners, where perpetrators shift the focus of their delinquent behaviour upon the condemners, citing them as not morally able to judge. Lastly, the appeal to higher loyalty, which denotes the violation of social norms and values because of stronger loyalty to a subgroup as opposed to the dominant culture (Sykes and Matza 1957; Heltsley and Calhoun 2003; Piquero et al 2005). Each of these five linguistic techniques enable people to commit immoral activity by replacing the immorality of the act with these other moral frameworks, thereby neutralising the deviant act.

Since Sykes and Matza (1957) developed their study on the techniques of neutralisation, the theory has been applied to many different forms of deviance. For instance, Strutton, Vitell and Pelton (1994) applied the theory in their study to establish the possible elucidation of how consumers may perceive their guilt for their misconduct in a retail setting. Piquero, Tibbetts and Blankenship (2005) also extended the theory to examine the role of neutralisation incorporate or white-collar crime. In policing research, the

theory has been used to examine how some police officers justify their deviant behaviour. Yet, as Matza and Sykes were at pains to highlight, it is important to grasp that neutralisation techniques are drawn from dominant morality and law. In this case, public-police corruption experiences are likely to influenced by local social practices and norms present in Africa, for instance, gift-giving and the prominence of the extended family. However, by appealing to such fundamental norms to neutralise corruption behaviour, these neutralisations can become full-blown forms of denial, which have the effect of totally normalising corruption by denying its harmful implications.

In the ground-breaking book *States of Denial* (2001), Stanley Cohen attempts to understand why it is that widespread global human suffering – that is most frequently caused by nation states - is largely ignored by Western humanitarian audiences. Cohen suggests that knowledge of human suffering is known (we see it on the TV almost every day) but at the same time, that information is somehow downplayed or ignored. In Cohen's terms, the knowledge of suffering is denied. Knowledge is available, but it is somehow put to the background and ignored.

For Cohen, part of the reason for widespread denial of human suffering is that states manipulate information about it through various types of denial which include: literal denial (the event is simply denied that it happened); interpretative denial (where the event is admitted as happening but not in way the public perceived it to be); and implicatory denial (where the event is admitted to be happening but its implications are downplayed or its intentions denied). In this last category, implicatory denial, Cohen draws primarily

on Matza and Sykes three neutralisation denials (of victim, injury and responsibility) but he takes this further to suggest that when harmful activity becomes captured by 'spirals of denial', its moral implications are hidden, and thus no public or agencies do anything about that activity. In this way it becomes legitimised and normalised through denial.

In the case of the co-construction of police corruption in Sub-Saharan African countries, denial may thus be a useful concept from which to grasp the everyday nature of corruption and to understand its apparently endemic nature. Thus, as outlined above, the culturally-embedded neutralisations used by both the public and police officers in Ghana, corruption – or its implications - have become denied, thereby locking the Ghanaian police into a cycle of corruption whose implications go unacknowledged.

Depending on the situational context, denial of police corruption could take the form of an enhancement technique for police effectiveness or the undervalued nature of police work (Cohen 2001; Transparency International 2011). Another dominant technique of denial about police corruption was 'implicatory' denial. For instance, in Ghana, according to Beek, Göpfert, Owen, and Steinberg (2017: 14) the public perceive police checkpoints as a zone whereby officers "collect money without checking papers" without any apparent repercussions or implications. Cohen (2001) further contends that denials have social dispositions attached to them. These could have some inclinations drawn from certain traditional practices, such as gift-giving and the necessity of survival. If the corruption is perceived as widely practiced in a society, then the attempt to initiate a bribe will be subsequently followed by an attempt to receive. It would be foolish to give but

more foolish not to take (Grødeland, Koshechkina and Miller 1998).

An equally significant factor for my study is the Matza's (1964) notion on drift. This suggests that delinquency is not based on alternative norms or values but that all individuals are bound by shared social regulations. However, when in particular situations and through the use of neutralisation techniques, people can drift into delinquent behaviour. Using Ghana as a case study and adopting neutralisation and denial theory, I apply these theoretical positions in a non-Western context. This gives a firm foundation from which to bring local meanings to the understanding of the different public experiences of police corruption in Ghana. In addition, because of officers' failure to adopt and implement or internalise police ethics over other affiliations held outside the Ghana police, neutralisation and the denial of corruption may also impinge on police legitimacy in the conduct of police work. Hence, given the foregoing discussion on police corruption, it then becomes paramount that my study considers the broader implications of police corruption upon police confidence and legitimacy.

Police corruption: Impact on Confidence and Legitimacy

According to Jackson et al (2011), trust and confidence in the police relates to the public conviction that the police have the right intentions towards individuals and act professionally within any circumstances. Police confidence generates support for the police establishment and constitutes a repository of goodwill, directed towards the organisation of the police (Cao and Hou 2001). Whilst police legitimacy relates to public perceptions or the acknowledgement of law enforcers' rightful authority over them, thus

whether the police conduct themselves in a more morally valid way (Beetham 1991, Coicaud 2002; Tyler 2006a; Tankebe 2007; 2008a; Jackson et al 2011).

Police legitimacy is important in most societies especially in Sub-Saharan Africa where the role of the police is mostly perceived to be associated with an element of an external influence (for example, bribery) (see Jackson, Asif, Bradford, and Zarkar 2014). Studies demonstrate that people are more motivated to collaborate with the police and comply with the law when they have confidence in them and regard the police as a legitimate organisation (Tyler 2006, 2008; Jackson, Bradford, Hough and Murray 2010; Jackson, Bradford, Hough, Myhill, Quinton and Tyler 2012).

It could be argued that public confidence or support for police institutions as well as recognition of police legitimacy is one of the significant indicators of a 'healthy' institution (Bradford, Jackson and Stanko 2009). The conduct of the police, as well as their performance and effectiveness, has been one of the facets of policing widely studied to measure as well as enhance public trust in the police (Bradford et al 2009; Hohl, Bradford and Stanko 2010; Boateng 2012). Importantly, as Sherman (1978) states, public reactions to police corruption practices may be the paramount indicator shaping public attitudes towards the police. Additionally, less oversight of the police and lower public interest in police accountability is another motivational factor for public-police corruption practices (Bayley and Perito 2011).

Police corruption, as some research suggests, is thus a significant underlying factor shaping public attitudes towards the police (Dowler 2003; Rosenbaum et al 2005; Avdija 2010; Boateng 2012). Where the public expresses a decline in confidence or lack of trust in the police, for instance, in most Sub-Sahara African countries, the way the police exercise their authority and indulge in corruption is a common public issue (Leys 1965; Newham 2002; Faull 2011). Moreover, it underpins less responsiveness and effective policing in society – as without support from the public, policing is almost impossible to do. These assumptions thus consider police corruption as both unethical and unhealthy. However, such an assumption could be derided within a 'culture of giving' society, especially where some members of the public benefit from the corruption of the police.

As I have emphasised, police corruption is not one-sided, but both sides partake with immediate or specific objectives. Additionally, no police corrupt practices can be successful without serving both immediate and specific objectives of public-police corruption. Furthermore, some corrupt practices of the police could be associated with a favourable response, and this response may have a stimulus motivated by a socially acceptable behaviour (for example, in Ghana, the culture of giving). This leaves a gap in the literature about the individual contextual implications of police corruption in non-Western nations such as Ghana. Hence, my research considers contextual cultural factors shaping police corruption in Ghana, as well as exploring direct and indirect, and positive and negative experiences of police corruption. It also considers whether these have implications upon police confidence and legitimacy.

Furthermore, the image of police officers abusing their legitimate authority for individual gain is aggravating, yet the issue of police corruption augments well past the abusive conduct of some officers. Police corruption practices are said to create a negative impression upon the police, supports the code of silence, promotes imperviousness to police accountability, and undermines police confidence and legitimacy (Ivkovic 2005, 2008). However, favourable public responses towards police conduct may not raise corruption as an issue (Independent Police Complain Commission 2012).

The literature suggests that even amidst the corrupt practices associated with the police, when police officers patrol neighbourhoods or conduct street-level duties (with the objective of individual, and or community safety, as well as to arrest violators), then, arguably, police corrupt behaviour in this context, may be of little concern to members of the public. The dominant (Western) literature may thus be wrong on this assumption and this thesis explores this potential gap within the context of Ghana.

Factors affecting police confidence and legitimacy

The pathway that the police utilise to expand the public view of police legitimacy and confidence is through the utilisation of procedural fairness or justice. Procedural justice refers to fairness in the process of police service delivery in resolving issues. It also makes inferences as to why people obey the law and cooperate with the police. It is argued that police institutional trust is primarily centred on these motivations which is largely influenced by the fairness, and the quality of police-public interactions. For instance, the police being sociable, friendly and approachable, dealing with people with

respect, making a fair decision, and explains police service delivery (Myhill and Quintin 2011; Mazerolle et al 2013). In this case, people would accept police decisions, even if the decision were not favourable (Myhill and Quintin 2011).

When the police fall short of an individual's expectations, the likelihood of the police risking public confidence and the legitimacy in them are stake. For instance, police confidence and legitimacy, according to Jackson et al (2011), can be affected if individuals in a democratic society feel or experience that the police are corrupt and not operating under the rule of law or not promoting procedural fairness. For the public to develop or have continual confidence in the police, as Ren, Cao, Lovrich and Gaffney (2005) state, the police need to work with individuals, address their concerns, and make a positive policing impression throughout the encounter, even within the context of a casual public-police encounter. However, when legitimate powers of the police are subjectively evaluated and perceived as having a low level of legitimacy because of police corruption, this may promote citizen's resistance, hostility, and resistivity [to policing decisions] increases (Alpert et al 2004; Tankebe 2008a) and they are less likely to follow the law (Tyler 1990, 2006b).

Most studies on the police state that types of police conduct that undermine public confidence are misuse of power, distorting the course of procedural justice and tolerating or accepting bribes or liberal gifts from the citizens (Sherman 2002; Goldsmith 2005; Bradford and Jackson 2011; Boateng 2012; MacQueen and Bradford 2015). In addition, police confidence and legitimacy might matter more in settings where the police have yet

to establish justification for the use of force and in which the democratic system of policing have yet to take root (Jackson et al 2014).

Research suggests that one incident of police corruption may have a devastating impact upon the public image of the police (Fuentes 2005; Tanner and Green 2007; Prenzler 2009; Jackson et al 2012; Siegel and Worrall 2014). For instance, in a study conducted in Ghana, Tankebe (2010b) links the experiences of police corruption with the undermining of the public view of police trustworthiness, procedural justice as well as police effectiveness. Additionally, Bayley (1995) contends that nothing is more damaging to the role and the image of the police than corruption. In another context, Bradford, Huq, Jackson and Roberts (2013) state that police misconduct has been a significant concern of late amid long-standing issues of police corruption. Such practices have undermined endeavours to legitimise the South African police. Within the UK, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (2011, 2012) argues that corruption is not at the highest level of public concerns about criminality. However, where it exists it is seen to erode public confidence in policing.

Based on the discussions above, there is a contextual gap in the literature in that police corruption is seen as having a negative effect upon the image of the police as well as undermining public confidence in them. This assumption lacks a consideration to some of potential multiple benefits and functions of police corruption. For instance, within a society where giving is fundamental to its culture. In other words, police corruption can be administered in a polite manner with an input from the offender in a manner that could

be considered almost procedurally just. Such corrupt practices may not thus have any negative influence on police confidence and legitimacy.

It is also argued that external influences, such as political corruption (frequently connected to the police), may significantly undermine trust within the police as well as weakening the capacity of the police to authorise their legitimate status (IPCC 2012). In other words, corruption and its impact on the police will depend on the type and the extent of corruption and on the cultural landscape in which it operates. This thesis strives to filling this gap by analysing the corruptive practices in Ghana through the screen of Ghanaian culture and the history of its state institutions.

Most of the literature on police corruption is focused on the UK and America. This then limits our understanding of police corruption in developing countries such as Ghana. Nonetheless, the reviewed literature presents studies on police corruption in a variety of contexts. For instance, within the US, Barker and Carter (1991) with their study on police deviance examines police corruption, drug misuse, misuse of power, and different types of police malpractices or misbehaviour and explores issues and methodologies included in addressing police unethical conduct. Also, within the US, is Sherman's (1978) scandals and reform, controlling police corruption. In Russia, Gerber and Mendelson (2008) tested public experiences of police violence and corruption upon predatory policing. Within England and Wales is the IPCC (2011, 2012) reports on corruption in the police service in England and Wales, as well as public views on police corruption in England and Wales. Also, within the UK is the study of Newburn (1999) on the understanding and

prevention of police corruption. Additionally, Punch (2000; 2013), cites police and corruption as inseparable, and investigate that worrying yet captivating discrepancy between police as law implementers and police as lawbreakers. Furthermore, in South Africa, Sayed and Bruce (1998) on inside and outside boundaries of police corruption, focusing on characterising and distinguishing police corruption and other issues in managing the police corrupt practices.

Furthermore, most of our understanding of police corruption, as presented by previous studies, are focused on abuse of legitimate authority for private gain, abuse against members of the public, and police misconduct. Some studies have also associated police corruption with lack of integrity as it tarnishes the general profile of the police. This limits a consideration for the different contextual influences of understanding public-police corruption. Furthermore, most studies on police have outlined police corruption as a direct implication of decline in police confidence and legitimacy. No study has taken account of the willingness of the public in offering money or bribes to a police officer as predicted by a perception of the legitimacy of the police, for instance, within the context public street-level safety or investigating a traffic violation. Furthermore, most of the studies focused on the general effect of police corruption and anti-corruption practices. Limited consideration has been given to the multiple benefits or functions of police corruption in relation to the practical as well as the economic advantages of police corruption in developing societies.

What can be seen through the above discussion of the literature is that what remains

under-researched in criminological discourse is the effects of the different experiences of police corruption upon public confidence and police legitimacy. As previously discussed, an important exception is Jackson, Asif, Bradford and Zakar's (2014) study and Tankebe's (2010a) study. Both construct their study on a simple distinction between direct (personal) and indirect (vicarious) experiences of public corruption with the police. There are some societies where corrupt practices may be seen to be a normative social practice, whereby some individuals would feel obliged to engage, initiate, or succumb to corrupt practices, in this case, involving police officers. Yet, the framing concepts of corruption and its implications on police legitimacy and confidence thus far overlooks the fact that there could be different types of direct and vicarious experiences (negative and positive experiences), with different effects on police confidence and legitimacy. Expanding on this line of research within the Ghanaian context, my study explores the relevance of corruption upon police legitimacy and confidence.

As mentioned above, the exception is the study by Tankebe (2010a) and Jackson, Asif, Bradford and Zakar's (2014). However, Tankebe identified and explored three dimensions of police corruption. These are the personal and vicarious experiences, as well as subjective assessments of police anti-corruption measures. However, what this thesis maintains as a critically important and largely unexplored gap by previous police corruption studies is the multiple functions of police corruption, and especially the implications of different experiences of public-police corrupt practices on the police. This gap is the primary objective of this thesis, achieved by focusing on the experiences of public-police corruption within Ghana. This research explores these experiences to

expand knowledge and promote understanding of this area of study by adopting and extending the neutralisation theory (Sykes and Matza 1957) and Cohen's (2001) development of this into his theory of denial. Hence, conducting this present study from the perspective of street-level police corruption is considered a significant step towards filling this gap by exploring the implications of corruption upon citizen's confidence and legitimacy upon the Ghana Police Service (GPS).

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed relevant debates within the literature with regards to police corruption and its implications for confidence and police legitimacy. Several salient issues in relation to police corruption have been discussed. Firstly, the understanding of police corruption and some causes or factors that promote public-police corruption were examined. This includes the perception of undervalued police work, internal police anti-corruption management systems, police accountability, and passive and tolerance reaction towards police corruption. Gift-giving, the concept of ethics and police misconduct and the factors that influence the normalisation of police corrupt practices were also provided. In addition, the functions of corruption focused on African culture and society were also considered.

It was argued that due to adherence or exposure to certain practices such as gift-giving, and the legacy of the colonial police (as discussed in the previous chapter), engagement in police corruption may be motivated through a just rational choice. These cultural practices translate into context specific public-police corruption (see also CHRI 2007;

Tankebe 2009a; Boateng 2012). The process of enacting police corruption comes across as a technique of neutralisation embedded within the Ghanaian culture. Indeed, individuals, as well as some police officers then become agents of neutralisation technique to engage in corruption. Thus, interaction between gift-giving, denial and corrupt opportunity is the major influential factor of public-police corruption.

The next chapter describes the methodology of the research project, focusing on the justification of the method adapted for my thesis.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The methodological discussions begin with an overview of the research sites, before focusing on methodological perspectives and how the research was carried out. The analysis will include a discussion of the sampling techniques, access to and respondent recruitment, the interview process, and then leading to a discussion on ethical considerations and consent by participants. After that, the method of data analysis is provided. The chapter concludes with a discussion on methodological problems.

Research Sites: Comparing Accra and Kumasi

Firstly, I chose Ghana for my study because it is the country in which I grew up. I spent the first 27 years of my life there and have developed some awareness of street-level public-police practices of corruption. Mostly, I became aware of police corruption through vicarious experiences, usually as a passenger on public transport. Hence, choosing Ghana as the case study was an inevitable choice for me. Ghana has 10 administrative regions (see *Figure* eight below). Accra is the capital city of Ghana, and it is within the Greater Accra region on the south coast. Kumasi is the capital town of the Ashanti region; the region is found in the midlands of Ghana. Greater Accra on one hand is the smallest (in total land surface) of all the ten regions, inhabiting a total land surface of 3,245 square kilometres, 1.4 % of the total land area of Ghana. It is the second most populous region, after the Ashanti Region, with a population of 3,909,764 in 2010,

accounting for 16.1% of Ghana's total population (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). The Ashanti region is much larger, occupying a total land area of 24,389 square kilometres 10.2% of the total land area of Ghana. It is the third largest region after the Northern and Brong Ahafo regions, with a population of 4,725,046 in 2010. The Ashanti region accounts for 19.5% of Ghana's population (*ibid* 2012).

Figure 8: Research site, Ghana

Both Kumasi and Accra are the most populous cities in Ghana and arguably are representative of Ghana's diverse urban population and culture. This makes these

locations ideal for this current research. Secondly, because of the many opportunities for trades or businesses and busy markets, almost every local regional population in Ghana is represented in the Greater Accra and the Ashanti regions. Finally, the likelihood of many police officers working in the Greater Accra and the Ashanti region is great as compared to other regions, hence people are more likely to encounter the police for various reasons.

Research design: A case study

Yin (1984) defines case study research as an empirical study that seeks to explore contemporary issues within the context of real life and utilises interviews and personal observations as the main research tools. In addition, Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) also state that qualitative research interviews, when incorporated in a study, aid to decipher the phenomenon from the subjects' perspective. These techniques lend themselves well to my study because they provided the framework solely depended on participants' thought processes, feelings as well as their actions through observations explored in my study (see Stake 1978). Qualitative research is a form of social enquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and make sense of their experiences and finds social processes that constitute a phenomenon (Morse, Denzin and Lincoln 1994; Holloway 1997). This view is supported by Darke et al (1998) and Hancock et al (1998). They both state that case study research mostly uses or answers questions necessitating the *why* and *how* of most social issues. Specifically, a social issue in this case, would relate to public concern about the widespread practices of police corruption within the context of Ghana (Onyeozili 2005, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative - CHRI   2007; Tankebe 2009b; 2009a; Armah-Attoh 2014; Braimah and Mbowura 2014).

As discussed previously, studies from the UK and US, primarily, have suggested that police corruption significantly affects or promotes a decline in public confidence in the police (Sherman 1978; Rix, Joshua, Maguire, Morton 2009; Jackson et al 2011; Hohl, Bradford and Stanko 2010). On the contrary, within the context of Ghana, one may argue that not all or most people would agree to such social conditions. In other words, police corruption in Ghana may not totally erode or promote a decline in police confidence and legitimacy. Hence, this underpins the significance of the *how* and *why questions* in this qualitative research so that we can more thoroughly explore the nature of street-level public-police corruption and its implications (see also Stake 1995).

Yin (2009) states that a Case Study remains one of the most challenging qualitative research approaches within the field of the Social Sciences. For instance, it is perceived to lack rigour and generalization. Nonetheless, it has excelled in aiding an understanding of complex social phenomena and can also be used to add strength to previous studies or knowledge. The data are gathered from a small number of groups or organisations via in-depth interviews, participant observation and longitudinal studies (Yin 1984; Gable 1994). It is worth noting that generalisability and representativeness are not one of the key objectives in my study. On the contrary, it is more about revealing meanings and detailed processes, as well as understanding perceptions of street-level police corruption. The objective is to explore the dynamics between corruption experiences, confidence and legitimacy within the Ghanaian police service.

As already identified, the overarching aim of this research is to explore different public

experiences of police corruption and the impact this has on public confidence and police legitimacy (see Research Aims and Objectives in the Introduction). This will be achieved by exploring the following four objectives:

1. What are the differences in the meanings connoted with police corruption in the context of Ghana?

2. How do people justify street-level police corruption?

3. What does it mean to have confidence in the police in Ghana?

4. How do the different public experiences and perceptions of police corruption interact with the legitimacy of, and confidence in, the Ghana police?

Sample population

So that I could obtain the required data in relation to the objectives of the study, it was necessary that the definition of the sample population is provided (see Creswell 2009; Olsen 2004). In addition, Patton (1990) states that one of the elements that remains imperative when conducting qualitative research is who to request formally to participate in the study. Nonetheless, as Patton further states, the researcher must have the authority to identify the appropriate participants to provide rich data (*ibid* 1990). In this context, the sample for my study were a small number of people within the Accra and Kumasi. As discussed previously, these cities (Accra and Kumasi) offers different opportunities for people to engage in various commercial activities. As well as commercial driving, people engage in an array of businesses in the market and its surroundings, from clothing of textiles to street hawking. There are also a higher number of active police officers present,

as well as civil servants and students.

Hence, selecting a case or collating data from these two cities was considered as a vital and logical step for the study. One respondent sample sought were active police officers, and retired police officers, who were or had been members of the Ghana police service. One of the reasons for targeting the police is that, for most people in Ghana but particularly commercial drivers and market traders, the police are the most likely to be first and last encounter they may experience with the Ghanaian criminal justice system. Another feature of the Ghanaian police service is that it is a centralised style of national policing service, with its headquarters in the Greater Accra region. I also targeted commercial drivers of the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (*GPRTU*) and private entrepreneurs. The GPRTU is an organisation which oversees the welfare and administration or management of private commercial drivers as well as vehicles within Ghana (Mock, Amegashie and Darteh 1999). The private entrepreneurs in my study (otherwise known as market traders), refers to individuals operating small to medium size businesses within a few industries, including textiles or fashion, provisions or foods and commodities, and electronics or electrical items.

To reiterate, my thesis is an exploratory study; the research adopted a multiple case approach, as the technique provided the study multiple sources of evidence for analysis (see Yin 2009).

Sampling and sample size

Within Ghana, the assumption of police corruption is widely understood with reference to street-level corruption experiences. More specifically, there is an expectation of officers on street-level police duties demanding and extorting or receiving money or bribes mostly from market traders and commercial drivers (Adefioye 2017). In addition, the Ghanaian police, are arguably the only criminal justice agency that one may encounter throughout the criminal justice process, and this may generate opportunities for corruption (Tankebe 2010b). It also appears that most prospective police officers view the police service or a division of the police service as a business avenue. This in turn may override the mandate of maintaining law and order, as most police officers would be inclined to promote their self-interests (Adefioye, 2017). Hence, including the police in my study was considered significant because when the police are unable to refrain from corruption, this may affect the ability of police to achieve its objectives of promoting safety and maintaining security. Their views on police corruption practices would provide some broader dimensions to the issue of street-level police corruption being researched. Whereas private sector business owners would encounter the police at checkpoints during the delivery of logistics, movements of capitalism across police checkpoints or may contact the police for background checks for prospective employees or for stolen goods. Hence, their inclusion in my study.

In addition to adapting to a multiple case study approach to gathering the data, the snowball sampling method of recruiting members of the public was also used. Snowballing refers to selecting respondents with desired traits or characteristics, and they

then give names or suggest further appropriate subjects to be interviewed (Black 1999). The rationale of adopting the snowballing method in addition to the multiple-case approach was based on the subterranean nature associated with the study of corruption. In other words, finding sources from which to collect the data would have been increasingly challenging. As Tankebe (2010b) argues, not many people would confidently discuss or directly reveal that they had been involved in police corruption. Hence, the traits that were specifically sought were respondents who may have experienced street-level police corruption and were willing to share their experiences, as well as nominate further potential primary sources for data collection. These respondents were likely to know of others who may be willing to speak candidly about their experiences or direct involvement (Leys 1965; Tankebe 2010b), or who have seen others engaging in corrupt practise with the police (vicarious experiences).

Access and respondent recruitment

Gaining access to a research environment is a significant key stage during a research process. Without permission, access to prospective participants and subsequently carry out the research may likely be jeopardised (Brewer 2000). A gatekeeper, as Lofland and Lofland (1984) state, denotes individuals who may have the influence to grant access or deny entry to the field of study. It is imperative to acknowledge the impact of gatekeeper; hence, gaining their confidence or trust from the outset is significant. On one hand, gatekeepers could be perceived as obstructive by most researchers. On the other hand, they promote the paramount interest of the participants, for instance, ensuring that the participants are not subjected to any form of risk (Lofland 1971) or on any hand, frame

the type of data collected.

Gatekeepers within an organisational setting are mostly identifiable due to the control or the authority bestowed upon them in their various institutions (Pettigrew 1972; Broadhead and Rist 1976). There may be different layers of gatekeepers within an organisation, and each gatekeeper may have some substantial amount of authority (Perel 2005; Barzilai- Nahon 2009). They may help or hinder the progress of the research. It has been suggested that gaining access into a secure institutional environment, such as the agencies within the criminal justice system, can be a lengthy process as well as cumbersome (Denscombe 2010; May 2011). It is also worth mentioning that some sectors can be easier to access than others. Moreover, to gain access to an establishment to conduct research may also depend on the benefits that the institution stands to gain from it (*ibid* 2010).

Indulging in, or the awareness of being involved in, public-police corruption practises may attract punishment as it is classed as illegal behaviour from the police perspective. It may also exhibit some degree of stigma. In relating this to this research, reaching out to such people who may have indulged in or witnessed police corruption can be problematic. To this effect, the snowballing technique adopted maximised prospective subjects' willingness to participate in the study. In other words, the technique provided the opportunity for well situated participants to provide information on police corruption and also linked or recommended key participants to share their experiences and perceptions on street-level police corruption. There were four groups considered and sought after to

constitute the sample, (active police officers, retired police officers, market traders and commercial drivers) and it was expected that, from each group, a sample of ten would be recruited, with a total sample of forty. It is worth noting at this point that there were a few limitations of the sampling technique. For instance, I had little control over the sampling method. This is because the data gained was largely determined by previous participants' influence in persuading another to participate in the snowball technique. Additionally, I also realise that I had no control over the distribution of participants, as introduction to another potential source of data may have been hugely influenced by an existing relationship, such as friends.

The Ghana Police Service (GPS)

Prior to the commencement of the fieldwork in Ghana, to overcome the challenges of gatekeepers as presented above, the initial task was to identify the gatekeepers so that I could gain access to respondents. For instance, with the Ghana Police Service, it was anticipated that getting access to collect data from the police would be a lengthy bureaucratic process. Hence, the initiative undertaken was to establish contact with significant personnel through family and friends prior to arriving in Ghana. One of the contacts was an active serving police officer in the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police (*ASP*), who was a member of the MTTU in the Greater Accra region, and the other two were retired police officers. One served in the role of a Detective Officer and the other also was Assistant Superintendent of Police (*ASP*), and both had retired in the Greater Accra region. Upon making these contacts, I made my intentions known in relation to my study. I was assured of their assistance in getting access, as well as a

positive response from the police headquarters. On the basis that police studies within the context of Ghana are limited, the police service supports as well as depends on studies such as this to enhance and develop knowledge about issues relating to the Ghanaian police service. My access to the Ghana Police Headquarters was through the Assistant Superintendent of Police (*ASP*), with whom I had already established contact with prior to my arrival for my fieldwork. Thereafter, the ASP made contacts with other officers and arrangements were made for me to visit the headquarters. It is worth noting that dependence on gatekeepers has some limitations. For instance, in this case due to the collaborative network of gatekeepers, and perhaps to avoid overlap of information to the right office at the police headquarters, police bureaucratic processes had to be followed and this contributed to a significant amount of 'waiting time'.

Subsequently, I sought a dispensation from the head of the organisation, the Inspector General of Police (IGP). As part of the process of being granted access to the secretary's office, I had to go through a rigorous security protocol. After the introductory process, I handed my request letter for approval to access police officers. In response, I was informed by the secretary for the IGP that they (the police) would respond to the request in no more than four weeks. Nonetheless, I had to depend on the influence of some senior police officers to facilitate an early response to my request from the IGP's office. Influence here was not manipulation, but I believe the senior officers were prepared to encourage an early response to my letter based on to the premise of contributing towards the success of my research. After a period of three weeks, I was advised to visit the police headquarters, and as discussed above, the police regarded the objectives of this research

as significant and beneficial to the police service, and on a positive note, was provided with the clearance letter (*see Appendix* one).

In addition to recruiting active police officers for my study, I also wanted to talk to retired officers. On the assumptions that: Firstly, they were once active police officers; Secondly, they would provide information for my study without any reservation as they might not be bound by any obligation to their employer. Nonetheless, it was also anticipated that recruiting responses from the retired police would be more challenging because most police officers when retired from the service were inclined to settle away from the cities, such as Accra and Kumasi. Rather, they are more likely to reside in their home villages, hence getting access to them would be problematic as travel to these areas would have stretched my limited resources.

Nonetheless, gaining access to retired police officers was possible through introductions made via active police officers already interviewed. In the process, I gained access to three retired police officers (two males and one female). To speak to one of the retired officers, I had to travel to his village in the Eastern Region of Ghana (popularly known as the Mountains). Unfortunately, however, upon arrival, I was informed that he had travelled away. This subsequently reduced the participants to just two retired officers, who were both based in the greater Accra region. These challenges echo with the general challenges of accessing retired officers, as discussed above. The table below provides a description of the police participants, their job profile, and the division they served. The names used for all participants as presented on the tables below are pseudonyms.

Pseudonym	Gender	Age	Division of police	Active/Retired	Business/Job profile
Akos Kumarlo	Female	61 and over	Administration	Retired	Akos was retired police officer, length of service 24years, Joined the police after her 'O' levels in 1976 in Accra and retired in 2000 as an admin staff.
Bill Nti	Male	61 and over	Criminal Investigation Dept.	Retired	Bill served as a police officer for a period of 31years and retired in 2001. Bill became a police officer 1970 in October, Accra, after his Senior High School certificate.
Abena Ezusah	Female	31 – 40	Criminal Investigation Dept.	Active	Abena was a serving police officer in the Greater Accra region, joined the police in 1996 after she had completed college.
Fiifi Benkoom	Male	41 – 50	Highway Patrol Unit	Active	Fiifi became a police officer in 1982, joined the police through recruitment at the depot in Accra, after his secondary school education. Initially joined as a Military police officer.
Grace Abena	Female	21 – 30	Motor Transport Traffic Unit (MTTU	Active	Grace, after attaining her senior secondary school certificate education (SSSCE), applied and got enlisted into the Ghana police service 2008 in Accra.
John Kwesi	Male	51 – 60	Criminal Investigation Dept.	Active	John, prior to being enlisted into the police service was a mechanic ('Fitter'). However, wanted to become a police officer. Responded to an advert, applied, and subsequently had his training at Ho police training depot in 1991.
Jojo Kobby	Male	41 – 50	Motor Transport Traffic Unit	Active	Jojo was a professional teacher at college, however opted to join the police. In 1983 Jojo responded to an advert, applied, and got enlisted, had his training at the police depot in Accra which lasted for 1year and 2weeks.
Kofi Jantuah	Male	41 – 50	Community Police Unit	Active	After completion of 'A' levels, Kofi applied to join the service in 1996 and passed out in Accra at the police depot in May 1997. Had served as MTTU.
Kwadwo Okai	Male	31 – 40	Motor Transport Traffic Unit	Active	Kwadwo applied after a job advert and was enlisted in 2001. This was after his tertiary education. Had his basic training at the Takoradi police depot, Western Region, and passed out in 2002.
Kwaku Atto	Male	41 – 50	Administration	Active – was serving in Kumasi	In 1991, after his national service, viewed the police as a better option in terms of job security. He applied and in September 1991, started his training at the Accra police depot. The training was supposed to last 6 months but ended up spending 9 months.
Kwaku Minka	Male	41 – 50	Administration	Active – was serving in Accra	Kwaku joined the Ghana police in 1990, after passing the initial entrance examinations and interview, had his basic training at the Accra police depot.
Kwame Abugri	Male	41 – 50	Community Police Unit	Active – was serving in Kumasi	Kwame got enlisted in the police in 1998 in Tamale (Northern region of Ghana). After he was interviewed in late 1998, then was given appointment letter in 1999. Had 7 months of basic police training in Accra.
Kwesi Junior	Male	41 – 50	Criminal Investigation Dept.	Active – was serving in Accra.	Got enlisted into Ghana Police Service in 1991 in Accra Police Depot at Tesano with 'O' Level Certificate. Spent 1 year at the training depot, and he passed out in October 1993.
Nana Yaw	Male	31 – 40	Administration	Active – was serving in Accra.	Nana Yaw got enlisted into the service in 1999, after his SSSCE (secondary school certificate in 1995). The enlistment began in 1998 and was called to Accra training depot in October 1999. The basic training lasted for 11 months.

Table 2.2: Brief description of 14 police participants

Commercial drivers

Within the Ghana Private Road Transport Union (*GPRTU)*, each lorry or bus station visited both in the Greater Accra and the Ashanti region is headed by a chairman (also known as the 'station master'). The chairman is the head of the bus or lorry station, and each chairman acted as a gatekeeper and permission to conduct the interview from the drivers was sought from them. Each chairman had a significant role in selecting prospective drivers who would take part in the research. During the initial contact with drivers on arrival at the bus stations, I was directed to the Chairman's office to seek access. Some requested that I returned at a convenient time or for me to come back the following day, whilst others granted access on the same day. For instance, at one of the bus stations in Achimota, a suburb of Accra, after the formal introduction between the chairman and myself, I was asked to return in the early hours the following morning. This I believe, was for the chairman to discuss my request with other senior staff of the GPRTU branch at that station as a formality prior to my conducting the interviews.

As I had already been through the formalities, on my arrival the following day as requested by the station chairman (branch chairman of the GPRTU), I went to the office of the chairman, knocked on the door and was invited to come in. I introduced myself once gain and proceeded with formalities. Later, I was invited by the chairman to one of their meeting rooms and in the presence of the other eleven senior members of the station, I formally discussed the aims of my research with them.

The meeting offered an opportunity for the senior staff of the GPRTU to discuss the areas

being explored in the study as well as their understanding and experiences of driving in relation to street-level policing. At this stage, I made my intentions known, that is, of conducting interviews and field observations with some of the station drivers. However, before access could be granted to collect the data from the drivers, one area of concern for each chairman was the type of questions that prospective participants would have to answer. For instance, whether there were any questions that could potentially pose a risk to the participants, for instance, revealing their identities. Hence, the chairman requested to read through the questions. Realising thereafter that there was not a question that was likely to pose any potential risk to the participants, they granted me access to the drivers. In addition, at some of the bus stations I visited, the chairperson requested to see the access letter I received from the Ghana police. By providing the letter, their cooperation to provide the data as required was secured.

To prevent data being lost in translation, I made the station chairman aware that the interviews were to be conducted in English. The deputy chairman played a significant role in selecting drivers who had the ability to communicate at least to some extent in English. Interpreting the data from a native language into English language would have been problematic. Such a challenge would have threatened the credibility of the data. For instance, an attempt on my part to have interpreted the data may have resulted in a non-accurate representation of participants' experiences of police corruption and valuable meanings could have been lost in data translation.

During the data collection process, each driver was advised to introduce me to other

drivers. Presumably, these other drivers had similar educational qualities or experiences. This process was carried out throughout the entire recruitment process. One of the motivational elements during the fieldwork was the response rate of the participants, particularly, the members of the GPRTU. Prospective respondents in their eagerness to share their experiences of the public-police encounter at the street level asked me which media organisation I was representing. In response, I explained the research aims and the potential contribution it would make towards understanding of police corruption in Ghana. In addition, one of the deputy chairpersons from the Union members (GPRTU) mentioned that studies such as this have the potential to help shape policies, even if such changes to policies do not occur during his time in office.

Private entrepreneurs

In relation to the private entrepreneurs, the approach I adopted was to visit business' during their working hours (from 9am to 5pm) both in Accra and Kumasi and elicit responses from the business owners. Potential respondents were approached and after introductions and sharing some information on the research, I then asked if they were willing to participate in the study. The process was not as bureaucratic compared to the other groups in the sample. However, some of the responses I received was, 'My master or madam is not in, can you come back later or tomorrow?'. This was often the initial response I encountered, perhaps as the shops were privately owned and managed, the 'madam' or 'master' acted as the gatekeeper granting access. When I encountered such situations, I expressed my appreciation and then moved on to another or a potential respondent and repeated the same process. If the owner of the was present, and felt

comfortable with the interview, then I was later offered a seat within the shop. Initially I discussed the questions, and subsequently commenced with the actual data collection process whist they were also working.

As part of the flexibility involved during the data collection, the interview process did not in any way impede the participants in managing the store or shop when they had to attend to their customers. I had to pause the interview each time the participant attended to a customer. Nonetheless, my anticipation of conducting an observational study on the private entrepreneurs' participants did not materialise. The reason being that the period in which I conducted my fieldwork did not fall within their stock wholesale purchasing period – as primary bulk purchasing was done periodically.

It is worth noting at this point that, as suggested earlier under the section *Sample and Sample Size,* the reasons for including commercial drivers and market traders in this research was based on the view that most understandings of police corruption seem to be associated with drivers as well as market traders (Addo 2012; Quah 2014; Norman et al 2017). Hence, these groups were sought based on the perception of their proximity or accessibility to street-level police corrupt practices.

Pseudonym	Age	Gender	Occupation	Business/Job profile
Yaw Owusu	41 - 50	Male	Commercial driver	Yaw: Was a bus/coach driver for VIP Transports and worked from Kumasi to Accra and vice versa. Has been a driver for 19 years.
Nii Kwaku	31 – 40	Male	Commercial driver	Kwaku: Had worked 12 years commercial driving experience. Worked as a mini bus driver mainly within Accra. But if it demands, to other destinations beyond Accra.
Kwame Assasko	41 – 50	Male	Commercial driver	Kwame: Has worked for a period of 17 years as a driver, both on short and long distance. He was a mini bus commercial driver and worked in Accra and to other destinations beyond Accra and vice versa.
Kwadwo Tumi	41 - 50	Male	Commercial driver	Kwakwo: Had 21 years of driving experiences, initially began his commercial driving business, by going on short distances only in Accra. But added other destinations such as Aflao, Nkawkaw, Asamankese, Kade, Suhum,
Kuku Seth	31 – 40	Male	Commercial driver	Kuku Seth: Was a mini bus commercial driver, who worked within the Kumasi Metropolis. He was a mechanic before he became a driver, had been a driver for 16years.
Kofi Berima	41 - 50	Male	Commercial driver	Kofi: Was a bus driver based in Kumasi, and worked mainly from Kumasi to Accra and vice versa, started driving professionally from 1987 and had 24 years of commercial driving experience.
Bright Kwesi	31 - 40	Male	Commercial driver	Kwesi: Was a mini bus commercial driver and worked in Accra, had 16 years driving experience.
John Santo	31 - 40	Male	Commercial driver	John: Was a short distance mini bus commercial driver in Accra, had 18 years driving experience.
Uncle Ernest		Male	Commercial driver	Ernest: Learnt the driver trade as a 'mate' – Driver's assistant. Had over 35 years of driving experiences, worked as a mini bus commercial driver from Accra to Nkawkaw and Kumasi and vice versa.
Jojo Akatchi		Male	Commercial driver	Jojo: Was a mini bus commercial driver and worked in the Accra metropolis. Learnt the driving trade after becoming a mechanic, and has driven commercially for 15years.

Table 2.3: Brief description of Commercial driver participants

Pseudonym	Age	Gender	Occupation	Business/Job profile
Awuraa Esther	41 -50	Male	Market trader	Esther: Owned and managed a shop in Accra. Sold textiles, provisions, food, and drinks and she had done the business for almost 20 years in Accra.
Daniel Opare	51 - 60	Male	Market Trader	Daniel: Sold electrical and electronic products, and managed his own shop or business in Accra. Had done the business for 30years. His products were imported from overseas, mostly from China and Dubai.
Madam Rose	41 - 50	Female	Market Trader	Rose: Managed a Fashion and footwear shop – mostly female shoes. Her products were imported from Togo and bought some of the products from Kumasi as well. Had 15 years of experience in her trade.
Kwame Sala	31 - 40	Male	Market Trader	Kwame: Managed a fashion business in Accra. The primary source of his products was Kumasi, and had been in the fashion businesses for 15 years.
Kwabena Ohene	51 - 60	Male	Market Trader	Kwabena: Owned a fashion business in Kumasi. His products were mostly imported from Italy, UK, US and Dubai, and had been in the fashion business for 35 years.
Nana Akosua	41 - 50	Female	Market Trader	Akosua: Private business was in Accra sold mainly provisions - food and drinks. Has had 16years experience as a trader. Her goods were imported from Europe, South Africa, some delivered from Kumasi, Accra, and Togo.
Kwesi Minka	31 - 40	Male	Commercial trader	Kwesi: Was a mobile business person who dealt in herbal medications. He mostly did his businesses in public transports, Accra to Kumasi, Takoradi, Volta, and Nkawkaw. But he also owned a shop in Accra.
Yaw Robert	31 – 40	Male	Market Trader	Yaw: owned a fashion (clothing) shop in Accra. His products were mainly from Nigeria, Benin, and Togo. Started his private enterprise in electronics, did not owned a shop/stall, hence he trekked to most of the regions, i.e. Ashanti region, Eastern region, Western and Accra to sell his electronic products. Had been in the business for 24 years.
Nana Ama Nancy	41 – 50	Female	Market Trader	Nancy started her entrepreneurship as a hair dresser. After 3 years bought a stall in Kumasi to buy and sell provisions. She had been in the business for 11 years.

Table 2.4: Brief description of Market trader participants

Informed consent and ethical consideration

Bachman and Schutt (2007) state that in qualitative research, the consent form and ethical consideration provides the opportunity for researchers to tread carefully to explore social issues. The exploration may involve obtaining a sensitive, richer and intimate views relating to social issues. In relating the ethical issues for this research, a significant aspect of the research involved gathering data based on street-level police corruption experiences with the public. Therefore, as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) state, it was vital to inform the participants about the purpose of the research and any benefits that may result of the study. In addition, the privacy of the respondents was an ethical issue encountered during the fieldwork. Hence the use of informed consent in this current study. This was provided to participants as part of the introductory phase prior to conducting the interview.

Informed consent ensured that participants were satisfactorily made aware of the type of information required from them. In addition, they were also told why the information was being sought, how they were expected to take part in the research, and how the information might directly or indirectly affect them (see Kumar 1999). For instance, in this research, respondents were initially verbally informed about the research and were also provided with written information. It was also made known to the respondents that participation in the research was purely voluntary, and that there would be no repercussions of not participating in the interview or deciding to withdraw at a later stage. As Kumar further states, the consent should be voluntary without any compulsion of any kind (*ibid* 1999). It is worth considering at this stage that, in all output from this research,

upon arrival for the interview, I introduced myself and informed every single participant about the significant of the research. In addition, I provided each participant with the informed consent (as presented in *Appendix* two). For confirmatory purposes, where appropriate, I presented a copy of the access letter from the IGP's office to each police participant.

Other ethical dilemmas considered were confidentiality and anonymity. As Miller and Brewer (2003) states, one of the significant aspects of conducting social research is the protection of respondents' identity. Relating to my study, all respondents were assured of their anonymity and confidentiality. Specifically, one of the steps taken to protect respondent's identity was that all names used in this research are pseudonyms.

It was made known to participants that the information being sought would be used for academic purposes only. In addition, only the researcher would have access to the data. Following this, almost all respondents requested a copy of the questions prior to the interviewing process. I believe that this was to avoid or detect any form of invasion, deception, or to familiarise themselves with the type of information that was to be generated. It is worth noting that having had clearance letter from the office of the IGP meant there were no restrictions to the data collection. However, taking part in the research was solely voluntary on the part of the individual officers.

Finally, I had to ensure compliance to the prerequisite research ethics. I also provided each respondent with a contact telephone number for the University in case they had any

concerns regarding the way the research was conducted. These steps taken fall into the guidelines of conducting research with human beings as stated in the British Sociological Association 2002; University of Essex Guidance for Ethical Approval of Research Involving Human Participants (2008), and the British Society of Criminology (2008). The comfort of respondents was also considered significant. Once access was granted, I turned on the digital recorder with the respondent's permission, and the interview was conducted within their various comfortable settings. At this stage, with reference to anonymity, I asked each participant to choose a pseudonym, since their real names were not required. Also, I asked each respondent how they felt about the research and if he or she was ready to take part in the interview. If they were comfortable to proceed, with the tape recorder on, I began the data collection process using a semi-structured interview technique.

Semi-structured interviews

Individuals mostly develop their lives in reference to values, beliefs and experiences and subjectively build or associate meanings from such experiences. It is through this framework that this current study is interested in probing. Hence, face to face interview technique was the instrument used to elicit this 'rich' analytical data (see Barbour 2008). The research reported here is gathered through semi-structured interviews and participant observation. Semi-structure interviews, as De Laine (1997) state, is a technique that, when adopted produces a positive response or communication between the researcher and the respondents. It is not limited to the participants, and it also provides an avenue to use own interpretations of social events or phenomenon. Additionally, semi-structured

interviews also allow for introducing comparability and structure to the analysis. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in Accra and Kumasi. The benefits of the approach offered were that it helped to develop rapport and an environment of trust between the participants and the researcher. The semi-structured interview ensured that I could operate with flexibility and developing genuine rapport with the participants in order to contribute actively throughout the data collection process. The choice of semi-structured interview in my study provided the framework for the interviewees to provide information based on their experiences, perceptions and opinions in relation to the study.

The interview instrument was developed in two dimensions; one was explicitly made to elicit responses from active and retired police officers. The second interview instrument was aimed at commercial drivers and private entrepreneurs. To strengthen or contrast the data to be collected, each interview instrument had similar questions, but also a few different ones relating to the respondents' profession. This approach enabled me to explore the dynamics of public-police corruption from two perspectives (police and public). The interview instrument comprised two parts. The first section constituted areas to be explored, whilst the second part entailed demographic questions, including age, gender, levels of educational experience, ethnicity, and years of occupational or professional experience. After the main interview, the demographic questions were issued to the respondents to complete the appropriate answers that applied to them. The details of interview schedules are presented in *Appendix* three.   Distribution of the interviews are as follows: 10 commercial drivers, 9 private entrepreneurs, and 14 active police

officers, including the 2 retired police officers, totalling 33. Each interview lasted between 40 to 60 minutes. Lastly, the field observations conducted involved a prolonged engagement with research participants. In this case, drivers during their commercial business, as well as police officers at stop or check points and at the community level, while in their natural setting (working), I examined them and collected data. I carried out a total of 8 observations, specifically 6 with commercial drivers traversing within and beyond Greater Accra region to Kumasi, and 2 with the police in Accra.

The data collection process

Police officers

The data was collected on a group by group basis. Beginning with the police, I had to present a copy of the access letter given from the office of the Inspector General of Police (IGP) to the office of the police regional commander for the Greater Accra and the Ashanti regional. This approach was for each regional commander to grant me access to the district commanders, and subsequently, to the individual police officers. Thus, granting the request or access had to be carried out through a chain of command. However, the day after receiving the clearance letter from the office of the IGP, with great excitement, I went to the police at the district level in Accra to submit a copy of the letter to the district commanders for the various police stations to seek access to conduct the interviews. But I could not proceed with the data collection. Although a formal access letter had been authorised from the IGP's office (which is the highest authority within the ranks of the Ghana police), this did not mean the I could immediately have proceeded with the data collection at the district level without going through the chain of command.

Hence, I was redirected to present a copy of the letter and seek clearance from the office of the regional police commander, before proceeding to the district level police offices. This process effectively demonstrates recognition and maintenance of police authority within the ranks and file of the Ghana police service. Following this these experiences I had in the Greater Accra region, upon arrival in Kumasi (the Ashanti region), with a copy of the clearance letter, firstly, access was sought from the office of Ashanti regional police commander prior to proceeding to the police at the district level.

Secondly, at the district level, both in Accra and Kumasi, clearance was sought from the district commanders and my intentions of conducting field observations were also made known. Where the commander was not available, I was asked to wait. After meeting the district commander to discuss the focus of the research, clearance was granted. The meeting was held in the district commander's office, either with the commander alone or with two or three deputy district commanders. The meeting provided an opportunity for me to formally introduce myself and present a copy of the access letter obtained from the office of the IGP in Accra. It also provided an opportunity to be enlightened about the some of the duties, as well as the number of districts under the jurisdictions of each police unit or station. During my visit to some of the police stations, I had the impression that the police might have engaged in a degree of impression management. On a few occasions, I was also taken on tour around the station by the district commander, and thereafter I was introduced to most, if not all, the senior ranking officers within the station and they offered to provide me with any necessary assistance.

After being taken through the protocols of the police station I visited both in Accra and Kumasi, I was then introduced to potential participants. This led to a discussion of formal issues, such as confidentiality, the voluntary nature of their participation in the research and anonymity (as discussed previously). The interviews were conducted in the comfort of respondent's offices, except in one police station, where the district commander offered his office for the entire duration of the interview whilst he attended to other issues out of the station.

Retired police officers

The interviews for the retired police officers were held in the greater Accra region. As discussed previously. after years of service in the police, many ex-service personnel retire to their hometowns (villages). Hence getting access to them was beyond my limit and would have entailed additional costs. Nonetheless, two retired police officers (Bill Nti and Akos Kumarlo) were recruited. Bill Nti was contacted via a family member and Akos Kumarlo was accessed through church membership. After the initial telephone contact, Bill asked me to meet him at his work place the following day to discuss the research further. Having retired from the police service, Bill was working for a private policing firm in Accra.

Akos, the second respondent asked that I visit her at her residential address to discuss the research further after the initial contact. An agreed date was set, and once again, upon arrival, I introduced myself and discussed the focus of the research. In addition, I presented a copy of the access letter from the office of the IGP. She subsequently offered

to take part in the research. The interview setting was in the comfort of her sitting-room and used the audio digital recorder with her permission. Having completed the interviews in the Greater Accra region, I later travelled to Kumasi, in the Ashanti region for the second phase of the interview with police officers. The distance between Accra and Kumasi is about 270km (about 168miles) and the journey should have taken about 4 hours on a coach. However, due to road construction work, the journey took about 7 hours. Upon reaching Kumasi, with the respondent's permission, all the data was digitally recorded. However, 4 officers felt uncomfortable with me recording the data and opted for the interview to be handwritten.

Hence, I took notes during the interview in a pocket size note book to the satisfaction of the respondents. Further, upon leaving I dictated the notes already taken using the digital recorder. Besides respondents (active and retired police officers) receiving calls on their personal cell phones during the interview process, most of the interviews were conducted with limited interruptions. Except for one, which the officer knocked and came into the office, wishing to witness how the data was being collected. However, she did not stay for the entire duration of the interview and I did not get the opportunity to interview her. Eight were recruited from Accra and five from Kumasi. It is worth mentioning that three out of the total fourteen police were females. See table 2.2 above for description of participant.

Private entrepreneur and commercial driver participants

There were different interview settings for the above participants. Some of the following

characteristics entailed an African bus or lorry station, prospective passengers being called via a megaphone to get on the right vehicles, different but loud music being played from records shops and the sounds of food vendors and street hawkers, and so forth. To minimize the impacts of these factors, the commercial drivers were interviewed in the comfort of their buses and lorries. With most windows shut, the interview took place whilst they were waiting their turn to take passengers at the various lorry stations I visited in Accra and Kumasi. There was one bus station that was not so noisy compared to those I had already visited. There, the interviews were held in an open trunk of respondent buses (an example is displayed below).

Figure 9: Depicting some of the interview settings used.

Participants' choice of taking part in the interview in an open trunk, may suggest that, they identified this setting as a paramount to their comfort, as well as their safety allowing them to fully express their views on issues related with street-level police corruption. Lastly, the interviews for private entrepreneurs were held within their business premises or shops, away from their customers. However, intermittently, the

interview had to be paused to enable them (the market traders) to attend or provide services to their customers. All the interviews lasted between 40 to 60minutes. However, I did not get as many participants as I originally expected. The audio recorded data was first transcribed or converted into a textual data prior to further analysis. It is also worth noting that the collection of the data expanded beyond the six months of fieldwork and continued through e-mail messages as well as telephone conversations with some of the participants. My fieldwork also included data collection through observations with commercial drivers within the suburbs of Accra, and from Accra to Kumasi and vice versa. I was assigned to a driver on the day of my field observation and conducted seven observations. The data collection tool used were pen and an 'A3' size notebook. I had a very positive field observation because I felt completely at ease as the drivers were very enthusiastic to contribute towards my data collection. However, these observations served as my first direct experience working with commercial drivers. A detailed reflection of my field observation is provided in Chapter four.

Transcription and data analysis

Using an ear-piece, the recorded data was transcribed verbatim from an audio digital recorder. This was to maintain the focus of the research and the emphasis made during the interviews. After the recordings were transcribed, thematic analysis seemed the most practical means of analysing the data. The themes developed aided this research to capture significant aspects of the data in relation to the focus or the objectives of this research (see Braun and Clarke 2006). In addition, it enabled me to consider the data in relation to the previous literature and elucidated any prior misconstruction of police

corruption within Ghana (see Silverman 2005).

The analysis began from the start of the data collection and the process transpired throughout and beyond the fieldwork. "Qualitative analysis transform data into findings," according to Bachman and Schutt 2007: 296). However, there are different modes that may be used to analyse interview data. In this case, once the data (recorded interview) was obtained, a cross data analysis was carried out to make a more distinctive comparison and contrast among the groups in the sample. The themes were categorised under two objective points. Firstly, the views from the public; and secondly, the views from the active and retired police. The objective was to strengthen the findings. As Northcutt and McCoy (2004) states, qualitative analysis involves a rigorous analysis and logical means where the data are assigned meanings. Throughout the analysis, I proceeded to the data description and subsequently, desegregate the themes into themes to see if they accounted for the same meaning in a previous or different context or form a foundation for a fresh discourse analysis. Whilst transcribing the interviews I noted any significant concepts that arose for a subsequent analysis of the data.

Step-by-step data analysis

The initial approach was to read the transcribed data obtained thoroughly, and this included field notes and other notes taken about each participant. This information was coded for each person involved. As research recommends (Betts 2005; Bell 2014), when reading the data, one has to take notes of the keywords significant to the area under study. The keywords served as a reminder in setting the themes for the analysis. Particular focus

was given to contextual issues and the terminologies used to describe the experiences, opinions and perceptions of public-police corruption.

Subsequently, in addition to making an audio recording of the data as it was gathered, I also made notes of any ideas and thoughts that developed as the interviews proceeded. Further, to establish a link between the initial themes and to group them appropriately, I used a spreadsheet on which I created a box for each respondent, where each response to the main concepts and themes was presented. In addition, a computer software package NVivo 10 was also used. It provided a framework or structure for the analysis of the data. It is worth noting at this stage that using the software did not replace my role in making a conceptual analysis of the data. However, it provided a means to organise and store the data, as well as making the developments of the themes less daunting. In addition, NVivo also sorts out the data to make them more easily accessible (see Miles and Huberman 1994). Nonetheless, I maintained the primary role of developing and providing the coding and conceptual analysis based on the data obtained.   Once these steps were carried out, the data was ready for cross case analysis. I began this stage of the analysis by coding the data and provided significant linkages between the themes that had already been developed. From this point forth, the triangulation technique was adopted to provide or guide cross theme analysis. This method provided the flexibility of analysing each respondent both as an individual and as well as a group, on the bases that each individual or group may have a different understanding of the same social event under study.

Triangulation of the data

For confirmatory purposes, based on the themes from the data, the views of each group in the sample were compared vis-à-vis on each theme or topic. To make a more distinctive comparison and contrast among the groups in the sample, the data was categorised under two objective points; firstly, the views from the public and, secondly, the views from the active and retired police. Subsequently, these formed separate chapters from which to present a critical analysis and discussion of the themes that emerged from the data. In addition to the theoretical framework adopted in my study, the research also made use of data triangulation. Data triangulation denotes gathering information from different sources either to explore or investigate a research subject in order to increase the validity of the research (Denzin 1970; Amaratunga, Baldry, Sarshar, and Newton 2002; Bryman 2004; Guion, Diehl, and McDonald 2011).

For instance, as Denzin (1970: 301) points out that when studying the meanings associated with some social phenomenon, "[researchers may] explicitly search for as many different data sources as possible which bear upon the event under study." In this current study, I examined different groups, although from a professional perspective, each group is significantly different from each other. However, the generic concepts of corruption can be extracted from their affiliations to their profession. Hence, by studying this concept from a different setting, I was able to analyse the views of the respondents and established areas of divergent as well agreeable notions. This was used in addition to the data gathered via direct participant observation as well as from secondary sources, thus operating upon the data triangulation technique (see Denzin 1970).

Conclusion

It is significant to acknowledge the methodological problems encountered in my study. Firstly, in relation to the sample size, although in total I managed to conduct thirty-two interviews, there is no likelihood of generalizing the findings since I cannot say that this is by any means representative of the population. Secondly, the sample was derived from a group of people perceived to be most likely to encounter the police during their everyday business. As discussed previously, some of these participants were obtained through the snowballing technique, whilst private entrepreneurs (market traders), were chosen based on their convenience and accessibility to me within the Greater Accra region. The effect that this has had on my data is my inability to draw a concrete and complete conclusion from my data in relation to all the facets of the Ghanaian society, since again the sample cannot be seen to representative. An additional issue encountered through this sampling method, as much as snowballing is that the researcher had little or limited control over the sample, since it is a chain referral process influenced by the judgement of the research participants. It also makes it likely that participants would have shared similar traits. Hence, opinions or views provided cannot be considered as a representative of the larger population.

It is worth noting that as there is more than one language or ethnic group in Ghana (an issue which is not by any means pertinent to Ghana alone), one significant aspect of data collection in these areas is the ability to speak or understand the language of the participants (see also Bulmer and Warwick 1993). Although Ghana has other native languages such as Akan, Ga, Ewe, Moshi, Dagomba, Hausa among other languages, to

prevent any difficulties in translating, the medium in which all interviews were conducted was English. My study necessarily narrowed its scope through participants' ability to communicate in English (Creswell 2003).

Furthermore, I also found that as the Ghana police service is based on a centralized policing style. This means that if future research on policing were to be conducted within any of the regions but Accra, one would have to travel to Accra and vice versa for clearance from the Police Headquarters. As the office of the police regional commander in Kumasi asked whether I have had clearance from Accra, this I believe would be time consuming as well as a logistical challenge. Some of the transcribing was incredibly time consuming. This was hugely influenced by the electric power rationing system in Ghana. This meant I had to pause for a day or a couple of days during the transcription and continued after the availability of power, as I spent most of the day collecting the data. Nonetheless, overall, I obtained data that detailed, and which described the processes and perceptions of low level police corruption in Ghana. Further, the interview data collected were solely dependent on what participants deemed fit to share (see also Dodge 2011). In other words, the shared data was limited to participants' perceptions, views, or personal or vicarious experiences of police corruption. Nonetheless, the triangulation approach was used to support the themes which emerged out of the data.

The following chapters present a thematic discussion and analysis of the views and findings from the interviews carried out with the various respondents from the sample. The subsequent chapter, as well as the first of the findings chapters, focus on the

meanings participants construct around public-police corruption practices.

CHAPTER FOUR

UNDERSTANDING and JUSTIFICATION of POLICE

CORRUPTION: In GHANA

> For the police, for example, sometimes I can tell them, 'officer take this, or this is for malt. If the person does not force you, in my view is not wrong, is not bribery. I sometimes say to the officer, this one is for coke or malt; to me, this is not a crime or corruption.
>
> (Yaw Robert: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 41-50)

Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, police corruption is a global concern (Bayley and Perito 2011; Transparency International 2012). However, it differs between and within countries and across different cultures. The focus here is Ghana, a country in sub-Saharan Africa. Like most developing countries, police corruption in Ghana is seen as widespread (Atuguba 2003; Ghana Integrity Initiative 2005, 2011; Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2007; Andvig 2008; Tankebe 2009b; Armah-Attoh 2014; Justesen and Bjørnskov 2014) and its legitimacy contested (see Andvig et al 2000). Therefore, it is imperative to explore the notion of police corruption. In this Chapter, I describe how participants, mostly market traders and commercial drivers, had developed different concepts to represent their daily corruption experiences as opposed to utilising the term itself. This is explored from two diverging views. Views from commercial drivers are examined first, and then those of the market traders. This is then followed by views from the police on their understanding of police corruption. Additionally, in attempt to address

the second research objective, the question of: '*What are the reasons used to justify street-level police corruption?'*, the chapter also considers police participants' reactions and justification for police corruption.

Notably, the understanding of public-police corruption was embedded at multiple levels and it shows some broader social and theoretical implications on public-police corrupt experiences. For the most parts, corruption was mostly related to the notion of bribery and extortion (see also Newburn 1999; Arrigo and Clausen 2003; Douvlis and South 2003; Gerber and Mandelson 2008; Punch 2013). However, most commercial drivers and market traders had other daily, street-level idioms for expressing corrupt practices, such as "take this", "tip", "settling yourself or case", "putting something in it", ''something small'', or "you give something" to the police. All were likened to payments of money to the police to achieve some anticipated desires.

Moreover, such street-level corrupt practices would oppose modern Westernised concepts of police corruption, because, these street-level idioms of corruption, were context specific or peculiar to participants daily experiences of police corruption. Thus, excluded the modern concepts associated with police corruption, as previously mentioned in chapter two. These street-level idiomatic terms representing corruption are considered a significant factor. I argue that renaming corruption by participants can seem to be influenced by certain practices embedded within Ghanaian traditional culture, such as gift-giving. This had the effect of hiding the illegality and immorality associated with police corrupt practices in Ghana, and subsequently aided in the neutralisation, denial,

and normalisation of police corrupt practices (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Quah 2015; Burbidge 2016).

Field observations: Reflection of my experience

Street-level corruption

The very first part of my field experience was interviewing participants, including commercial drivers, police officers, and market traders. My fieldwork experience involved accompanying commercial vehicles (popularly known in Ghana as 'Tro-tro') within Accra. The Fieldwork enabled me to become actively involved in the drivers' commercial environments, by both observing drivers in their natural commercial habitat and participating in various activities as passengers boarded the vehicle. Tro-tro originated from one of the Ghanaian languages, Ga. 'Tro', means three pence – referring to the currency used in the British colonial era. During the colonial period, three pence was the rate for public transport services and the common public vehicles used at that time were Bedford trucks, which were converted to take passengers seated on wooden benches (see *figure* ten: below). The name tro-tro is still actively used today in Ghana, mostly for commercial drivers on short distances or routes within Accra.

Figure 10: Tro-tro commercial vehicle

It is worth noting that commercial vehicles are provided as public transport, these include taxis, buses, and minibuses. Most of these taxis, as well as minibuses, are owned privately and given or rented to an individual as a commercial driver (Mock, Amegashie and Darteh 1999). The commercial driver is then required to make an account, either on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis to the owner of the vehicle.

As discussed in my methodology in Chapter Three I chose Accra and Kumasi as my research sites. I joined a number of commercial drivers on journeys between Kumasi and Accra as a driver's assistant – which was locally referred to as a 'driver's mate'. There was the primary mate who assisted the driver as an aspect of his trade, and I was an additional or second mate to the driver. On some occasions, I had to be at Lapaz bus station as early as 4am to accompany the designated commercial vehicle I was assigned to. I basically assisted in getting baggage loaded onto the vehicle, whilst the primary

assistant also did that in addition to managing the finances paid for the transport.

On one of my observational studies, at about 2.30pm on a Saturday, I had to make my way to the station in Achimota to meet the driver and his primary mate. It took me over just half an hour to travel from Lapaz, (where I was residing) to Achimota (where the station was). I had a seat reserved for me. When it was our turn to take passengers, the mate started touting to the different designated destinations on our route. He touted by 'yelling' Circle! Accra! Circle! Accra! The tro-tro, which was a Toyota Hiace, had to be full of passengers before we departed from the Achimota station. We did not have set or scheduled bus-stops to adhere to, but we had to alight and pick-up passengers along the route. I saw prospective passengers jabbing their finger up in the air as we approached them, indicating they were heading towards the city, either Circle or Accra. I also observed that some of the prospective passengers also jabbed their finger towards the ground, which indicated that they wanted a local service to alight at the next local stop or town. Passengers paid their fares to the primary mate.

During my observational trips, we had to pass several police control points. Street-level police officers were tasked with ensuring the safety and road worthiness of these vehicles. Mostly, when asked to stop by an officer at a checkpoint, drivers would be asked to provide license, insurance, certificate of road worthiness (as in the UK MoT certificate) and registration documents of the vehicle. In addition, the police can also check for mandatory items, such as a fire extinguisher and a warning triangle. Some officers would even go to the extent of checking for a driver's first aid box and car-jack.

Most of these commercial drivers did not have a set route to adhere to, rather they took routes perceived to be commercially viable. In this case, as soon as we got to our final destination in Accra Central we made our way back, the mate picking up passengers along the way. We did not head back to Achimota, where we initially departed from, but we went through Circle to the Airport from the 37 Military hospital. On our approach to the Ako Adjei interchange (formally, the Sankara round-about), I saw the driver communicating on a mobile phone, and suddenly two police officers emerged and ordered us to stop. It seemed that the officers had been hidden from public view as I did not physically see a police checkpoint. Nonetheless, the driver could not stop immediately as it was not safe. However, the police officers insisted that the driver stop. We drove about 20 meters to the next bus stop and the driver brought vehicle to a halt. The police officers came ranting at the driver for not stopping immediately after he was asked to do so, and they admonished him for using his mobile phone. The driver immediately got out whilst we and the passengers sat in the vehicle, anxiously waiting for the outcome of the encounter. The experience took about an hour and 45 minutes. After the police encounter, we headed for Lapaz, and lastly to Achimota.

When we eventually got to the last destination (Achimota station), the remainder of the passengers alighted from the vehicle. I subsequently approached the driver for a de-brief and, in the process, I enquired about what had transpired between him and the police officers. He responded by stating that:

> Oh, they [police] were charged because I was using my
> mobile phone whilst driving, as if they genuinely cared

about me. For them, it was a weekend and I was one of their fishes for the weekend soup. I couldn't provide my license when I was asked because it had expired. They told me I was going to be processed for court. So, they needed to take me to their office to bring charges against me. I knew what they were looking for and didn't want them to waste my time. I offered to give them 30ghc. They refused because it was too small. Their team leader and members of their team would have their share. In the end, I bargained with them in a quiet place for almost an hour- moving back and forth until they accepted to take 50ghana cedis (Kwadwo Tumi: Commercial driver, male, aged: 41 - 50).

Effective traffic regulation is a significant requirement for the safety of the Ghanaian public. However, the above description suggests two points: firstly, effective implementation of road safety regulations was impeded by street-level public-police corruption. In this case, according to the above participant, a bribe was demanded by the police as he had committed an offence by using his mobile phone whilst driving. The officers' initial response was to process the driver to court to be formally charged. However, bribery as provided in this case ensured that the offender escaped a legitimate stiffer punishment (see also Beek et al 2017). Lastly, the description also collaborates with the perception that corruption appears to be a regular occurrence at police check-points and it highlights some of the effects of discretionary power (as mentioned in Chapter Two) of some police officers in Ghana.

Furthermore, in Chapter Two, it was also mentioned that due to personal interest, some

police officers are interested in keeping cases at street level (Beek et al 2017), and when the public encounter the police, they use this stereotype to frame their interactions with police officers. This was manifested in the participant exclaiming: ''*...as if they genuinely cared about me. For them, it was a weekend and I was one of their fishes for their weekend soup*'' and ''*I knew what they were looking for and didn't want them to waste my time.*''

This situation indicates some of the image of police corruption and the public's expectations of it and shows how that contributed to the co-construction of police corruption in Ghana. The driver's expectation of being able to bribe the police grew from his experiences of how the police behaved. The participant may have considered that it was crime or an offence to bribe the officer(s), however, the driver's inclination to engage in police corruption was beneficial to him (he dd not hold an up-to-date driver's license) and was framed by the perception of corruption as widely practised in a Ghanaian society (Grødeland et al 1998; Tankebe 2010a). He might have also seen others adopt a similar approach as a rational response in such situations with the Ghanaian police without any repercussions (see Cohen 2001). Based upon this perception, the driver in this case interacted with the officers with the aim of bribing them in a situation where the corrupt experience would be problematic to monitor, and which befitted both parties – the driver and the police – but which inevitably contributed to the potential for increased road traffic accidents (the incidence of which is incredibly high in Ghana, (see Coleman 2014; Ghanaweb News, Online 2018b).

Social relations and their impact on perceptions of corruption

It worth noting that in Ghanaian culture, it is claimed that the younger generations respect their elders, and perhaps being an elder is something one aspires to, as there are some advantages for being old in a Ghanaian society (Ohene 2010). Most people live in joint extended families with elders as heads of the family unit. The younger members of the family have a duty of care for the elderly within the family. Outside of the family unit, Ghanaians are traditionally socialised to respect and show reverence to the elderly (Insaidoo 2011). These expectations arguably shaped beliefs and influenced how Ghanaians interacted and engaged in corrupt practices. They also illustrate how local culture could often override formal procedures in the Ghanaian public's encounters with the police. An extract from my fieldnotes provide a vivid example:

> Whilst conducting my observational study in a commercial mini bus filled with passengers from Accra en-route to Kumasi, upon reaching a police checkpoint, the driver, (Uncle Ernest - aged 60 plus) was signalled by an officer to stop. He drove past the checkpoint, about 10 to 15 meters and stopped. The driver did not step out of the vehicle; hence, the police officer came to him. The officer did not appear to carry out any checks or ask any questions and signalled for us to go. I further inquired from the 'Master' – the commercial driver, what the officer had said. The driver, Uncle Ernest, stated: "When he realised that I am an elderly man driving the bus he did not say anything.''

The police officer not carrying out his legitimate street-level police duty, such as

inspecting the vehicle documentation, or checking whether the vehicle was roadworthy, may have different implications. The officer may have perceived that he was unlikely to gain from the encounter. Perhaps because such corrupt practices may have been rejected by the older driver, Uncle Ernest. As such, this kind of corrupt police conduct would have been considered or viewed negatively by the participant. Additionally, the police officer may have anticipated that the elderly commercial driver would be uncooperative with regards to his wish of utilising the opportunity to solicit a bribe. In this instance, it can be argued that a co-production of street-level public-police corruption would have been unsuccessful or the participant who, in this case 'escaped' what potentially could have been a negative police corruption experience.

Within the tradition of most developing countries, such as Ghana, age is culturally important and has a significant impact on social relations (Ette 2009). The elderly are highly respected and revered as they are seen as a repository of cultural or social wisdom (Campbell 1995; *ibid* 2009). Considering this cultural assumption, it was likely that Uncle Ernest's age was a determinant factor for the police not to have proceeded any further with this encounter. Based on the age of the participant, an elderly commercial driver, the street-level police officer may have viewed him in a positive light, granted him respect, and perhaps considered him very unlikely to violate traffic regulations. The higher probability of Uncle Ernest conforming to traffic regulations is reflective of the stereotypes of younger commercial drivers as lacking in respect or are more likely to demonstrate non-compliance to traffic regulations (Siegrist and Roskova 2001; Barjonet 2011). This posed a problem for most street-level officers, as suggested by another of my

participants, John Santo:

> These small, young drivers, they are not discipline[d], we
> have to stop what we are doing to frustrate the police. If we
> stop it, we will understand the police better (John Santo: a
> commercial driver, male, aged: 31 – 40).

There is a perception of lack of road discipline associated with younger commercial drivers, and this was portrayed in their inability to conform to traffic regulations. Additionally, the lack of discipline may have also meant that young drivers lacked the initiative as well as the self-determination to comply with traffic regulations (see also Bates et al 2014). This arguably led to their exposure, which necessitated police attention. Thus, from the above perspective, it can be argued that most young commercial drivers' non-compliance to driving regulations influenced or necessitated daily encounters with the police. Physical signs (such as age) of most young commercial drivers coupled with their lack of street-level discipline were often depicted in a negative light by street-level police officers. As the participant above suggested, these drivers' consistent street-level misconduct often frustrated the police, and arguably, as a countermeasure, the police also have capitalised on such opportunities and extorted or solicited bribery from the culprits (Sayed and Bruce 1998; Dempsey and Forst 2009; Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2007). In contrast to the views held in relation to the elderly, such views about traffic regulatory compliance were limited to younger commercial drivers.

Understanding of police Corruption

When the police, market traders and commercial drivers were asked 'What does police corruption mean to you?', their responses indicated various levels of influence upon participants' understanding of police corruption. Their responses centred around the following notions: public trust, private gain, payment to avoid court action, bribes, a culture of giving, dishonesty, favour, and the police being biased (*see, Figure* five *below*). But for most parts, respondents expressed shared, contextualised sentiments on what constitutes police corruption. Therefore, it is argued here that participants' contextualised understandings of street-level police corruption occurred when they could make sense of their own frame of inference in relation to either their personal or vicarious experiences of police corruption. In this case, each participant would seek the meaning of police corruption in context by probing daily public-police experiences of corruption. The *figure* below is a heuristic illustration of the concepts participants associated with their understanding of public-police corruption.

Figure 11: Factors participants associated with their understanding of police corruption

Therefore, to grasp the concept of police corruption from the views of participants, an explanation of their understanding of police corruption is needed. While there is considerable overlap between these concepts, they are nonetheless reported as discrete entities and will be discussed in this chapter and the subsequent chapters under the themes identified.

Views of market traders and commercial drivers

Kwame Asasko, in expressing his view of police corruption, presented his daily experiences of street-level police corruption and how conversant he was with police corrupt practices. The core feature of his understanding of police corruption was street-level police bribery.

> I know they do it, bribery on the road is something we are used to. You meet them [the police] on the road and sometimes they take GH¢1.00 [Ghana Cedi] ...So far as the police take money from us, it is bribery, and it is something that is always there (Kwame Asasko: a commercial driver, male, aged: 20 – 30).

The above description suggested daily, negative personal and or vicarious experiences of street-level police corruption. Moreover, to state that 'the police take money from us' may, on one hand, suggest participant's unwillingness to participate or pay money to a street-level police officer. On the other hand, it may also suggest a predatory type of police extortion (Arrigo and Clausen 2003; Douvlis and South 2003; Gerber and Mandelson 2008). Where the police, based on the awareness and the recognition of his

legitimate authority, dictated the context of the encounter, in this case with the commercial driver and effectuate extortion or demand for money. The participant suggested that, they have become accustomed to it as it was such a typical street-level public-police experience: '*It is something that is always there'.* In other words, once you are a commercial driver, one can hardly avoid these types of street-level corruption experiences with the police. Street-level police corrupt practices appear to be a regular social encounter, encompassing a commercial driver's willingness to bribe the police (Pring 2015), to avoid the perceptions of police threats. Similarly, Kwabena, stated his understanding of police corruption, referring to payments obtained through intimidation to extort:

> [It] Is like taking something from somebody by force, you
> are not supposed to take [it] under the law, but you forced
> him to pay (Kwabena Ohene: a private Entrepreneur, male,
> aged: 51-60)

Police corruption via extortion (cf. Newburn 1999; Punch 2013; Arrigo and Clausen 2003) had a significant effect of enhancing the above participants' understanding of police corruption. Moreover, by stating that ''*It is something that is always there,*'' also suggests that participants' everyday experiences of police corrupt practices appeared to be a regular social encounter. The participant had some knowledge or awareness of the law governing corruption in Ghana (see previous discussions in Chapter One) but suggested that some police officers acted against the law and forcibly extorted from participants. This was the core factor he associated with police corruption. In this case, it can be

argued that street-level police officers' conformity to the law is just a tendency and lacked a comprehensive actuality. Reasoning along the notion of intimidation to extort (Dempsey and Forst 2009; Seigel 2009; Tankebe 2010a), the participant below also associated his understanding of police corruption to obtain under intimidation.

> Making deals unlawfully, at the end we can all say is stealing or corruption.... When they force you, like 'If you don't bring that money this will happen to you.' or when you are going to be locked up, and they push you here and there or maltreat you (Yaw Robert: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 41 - 50)

The understanding provided in the above discussion refers to the perception of police mistreatment of individuals who encountered the criminal justice system. The fairness of the police in dealing with private citizens (Newburn 1999; Jackson et al 2011), or how justly the police treated people, was the central factor which shaped the above participant's understanding of police corruption. Equally significant, the participant above did not make any technical differentiation between stealing and corruption. According to Yaw (above), stealing is synonymous with corruption, hence, for the participant not to have differentiated between stealing and corruption appears to be indicative that any public-police corrupt practices were perceived through a moral framework. Corruption (for instance, police extortion), arguably could be likened to stealing, on the basis that there could be no ethical or moral distinction between them, as both were considered as corrupt and anti-social acts. Hence the reason the participant did not attempt to make one a more serious offence than the other.

Some of the understandings provided were influenced by participants' experiences or contact with the police under a perceived sense of being held or treated unjustly (Ren, Cao, Lovrich and Gaffney 2005; Weitzer and Tuch 2006; Siegel and Worrall 2016) as a perpetrator for a crime. As the discussions below suggested, some of the participants perceived that the inability to add, pay or offer money when cases were reported to the police meant a high chance the individual who had initially reported the crime may subsequently be held as a suspect or as the offender. This goes against the principle of officers treating individuals positively within the law as a means of creating a positive outlook for the police (*ibid* 2005). Fundamental integrity or standards upon which the police provided services to participants varied. The nature of one's treatment was dependant on whether one was able to offer money or some form of payment from the onset of police contact (Arrigo and Clausen 2003; Douvlis and South 2003; Transparency International 2012). This implied that being able to meet the demands or the expectations of some of the police officers, possibly as an incentive, was a determinant of the level or quality of treatment an individual experienced from the police.

> If you get a case and you don't have money at the police
> station, in the end, the case will be turned against you. This
> is what I have seen and how I understand corruption (Jojo
> Akatchi: a commercial driver, male, aged: 31-40).

> You know, they can form ... they can put some charges on
> you and you cannot come out...you can't come out of it. So,
> you have to find a solution to get out of it. So, you give him
> money to settle yourself (Kuku Seth: a commercial driver,
> aged: 31 – 40).

The discussion above, suggested that officers anticipated some form of payments from participants to cover the 'cost' of the services being offered by the police, which sounds similar to the concepts of gifts or kickbacks, see previous discussion in Chapter Two (Roebuck and Barker 1974; Newburn 1999; William 2002; Bayley and Perito 2011). It can also be argued that participants may have lacked guidance on the standards of police conduct. In this context, even when one may suspect that they are being taken advantage of by the police, they may still opt to make payment to avoid any further contact with them. Payments offered to the police would be to the benefit of the individual, in order to avoid a perceived sense of experiencing procedural unfairness or frustration from the police (Tankebe 2009a). From the above narratives, it is also important to note that participants' perception of experiencing injustice from the police influenced them to drift in and out of bribing police officers, as is depicted by the notion of *'settle yourself'*.

The process of inducing police officers towards corruption (Transparency International 2012) was the core factor which influenced the understanding of the participant below. As the illustration below suggested, usually the attempt to induce a police officer was taken with the objective of having an offence overlooked or so that the officer would not follow through with a due process (cf. Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Norman et al 2017). The process involved the acknowledgement of the offence, and then deference demonstrated towards the officer. In other words, dependant on the degree to which deference was demonstrated towards the officer, enabling him or her (the police officer) to feel a degree of importance. For instance, the initial participant's salutation 'brother' towards the police (see below) may have demonstrated acknowledgement of police

authority (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Tankebe 2007, 2008a; Jackson et al 2011). On the other hand, the approach provided a subtle way of influencing the participant's freedom from the police, hence the notion of '*settling the case'*, as an anticipation of the offence being overlooked.

> If I do something and [it] is wrong and the police come to me and say, …I have to go with him because of this and that…, I will say, 'Oh bro [brother], I am so sorry that I did that, please let us settle the issue right here, and if there is something you want to take to settle the case (Kwame Salas: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 31 - 40)

The notion of 'brother' may be suggestive of a benevolent or a mutual society where each member of the society anticipates mutually benefiting one another (Downey 2011). Acknowledgement of an offence as suggested in the above quotes may be accompanied by a euphemistic approach adopted by some participants during their encounter with the police. Furthermore, addressing a police officer as *'bro'* may also have implied a recognition of the officer as a member of a brotherly or family society, thus inviting the police officer to serve his interests. Therefore, the police officer in this case possibly anticipated through this mode of address that they might not deal with the offence according to a more conventional method (Roebuck and Barker 1974; Newburn 1999; 2015; Norman et al 2017). It also suggested that the euphemistic approach was used to blunt the offence, and if the officer responded positively to the approach of the participant, then this paves the way for rewarding corrupt practices. It is worth noting that for some of the participants to develop such characteristics takes courage and offered psychological

comfort. To be able to initiate a bribe with an anticipation of a positive outcome may be an underlying factor shaping the encounter. For instance, the police may have displayed conduct which may trigger the necessity for corruption. This influenced some of the individuals' willingness to offer officers bribes (Transparency International 2012).

Police corruption, as discussed thus far, was widely understood as extortion as well as bribery, these understandings are well documented in Criminological as well as Sociological discourse, especially in the field of police studies as discussed in Chapter One (Roebuck, and Barker 1974; Quah 1979; Sherman 1978; Deflem 1995; Sayed and Bruce 1998; Newburn 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Verma 1999; Punch 2000; Ivkovic 2002; Douvlis and South 2003; Arrigo and Clausen 2003; Skogan 2005; Tavits 2005; Gerber and Mandelson 2008; Prenzler 2009; Tankebe 2010a; Rawlinson 2012).

It was also likened to giving '*something small*' or 'to *settle yourself or a case'* with the police. Depending on the situational context, these were either citizen-initiated, or an extortion or bribe initiated or demanded by the police. Further, the understanding of police corruption within Ghana was also described or presented through the phrase: '*take this*' or '*this is for malt'*. However, this was dependent on the context. Relating to the definition or understanding of police corruption as discussed in my literature review, it can be argued that the notion of 'take this' for instance, presents a blurring concept or a degree of ambiguity on the understanding of police corruption in Ghana. This is because the meaning attached to it was dependant on the situational context, a street-level idiom used by participants to deny and neutralise corruption. For instance, the term 'take this'

or 'this is for malt' may not necessarily mean to induce an officer, or as a form of investment for future favours from the officer, but simply a reasonable gesture. Furthermore, Yaw Robert (the participant below) had made some specific distinctions about 'take this' in his normative sense, as to why it was not corruption or bribery. Firstly, the money he would have offered would not have been provided or given under compulsion or upon the demand of the police officer. Secondly, after the acceptance of the money by the police, in the participant's view that would not have (under any circumstances) accounted for a breach of police integrity.

> For the police, for example, sometimes I can tell them, 'Officer take this, or this is for malt'. If the person does not force you, in my view [it] is not wrong, [it] is not bribery. I sometimes say to the officer, this one is for coke or malt; to me, this is not a crime or corruption (Yaw Robert: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 41-50)

The above comments can be viewed with reference to the notion of 'gifting' as previously discussed in Chapter One (William 2002; Bayley and Perito 2011; Mills 2012; Hope 2015), where participants would have felt at ease when they engaged in a citizen-initiated police corruption. In my study, citizen-initiated refers to positive personal police corrupt experience. However, if the police were to have demanded or extorted money from them, this may have generated participants' discontent about the experience which would have generated negative personal experiences of police corruption.

> Corruption, [for] example, if I do something bad and
> another person goes to the police station and make[s] a
> report. Then, I later go and report at the station and say to
> the policeman.... I am guilty of the case.... but you take this
> and drop the case or defend me..., this is corruption (Nana
> Ama Nancy: a private entrepreneur, female, aged: 41 -50).

In a different situational context 'take this' may well be a clear example of inducing the police to overlook an offence or not to follow through with a violation (see previous discussions above). It is worth noting that the notion 'take this', from the very onset of police corruption in Ghana was ambiguous, as it would have been understood in two different ways. However, when adopted and applied by participants and depending on the situational context, it had two separate underlying factors. These factors were independent of each other. Either as a reasonable gift, or in contrast, offered to influence the police officer's decision, as a symbol of omission to overlook an offence. It also worth noting from this point that the concepts of gift-giving, which from the above, confronted the police (culture of giving), presented daily moral ambiguity in the course of police duties in relation to corrupt practices. This is expanded further in the next chapter.

The understanding of street-level police corruption was largely inspired or influenced by commercial drivers and market traders' daily street-level experiences with the police. Understanding of police corruption was influenced by either a vicarious or an actual police corruption experience. Furthermore, to examine how meaningful corruption was understood by the police, the section below explores the understandings police participants associated with police corruption. This provides the basis for a useful

conception of how the police responded to and reacted to police corruption.

Understanding and reactions to street-level corruption: Views from the Police

Understanding police corruption

As discussed in Chapter One, studies suggest that many social and narrative dimensions contribute to the process of police corruption (Newburn 1999; Andvig and Fjeldstad 2000; Porter and Warrender 2009; Rawlinson 2012). To explore the meanings the police associated with their understanding of public-police corruption practices, below are some of the responses of police participants to the question: *'How would you explain police corruption*?'

> These are bribery between the police and drivers and rich people are also corrupting the police. Fiifi Benkum (an active police officer, male, aged: 41-50)

> Bribery …the drivers, they [the police] know when you are a driver in Ghana, all their vehicle if you see vehicle offences, the offences is more and more. The drivers themselves know that they have not got a real tax, and if the police check under the car, there will be something wrong under the car. He [a commercial driver] already knows that he has already committed an offence. So, he will give something to the police, but if the police want to check really, by all means, they will be found guilty... (Akos Kumarlo: retired police officer, female, aged: 61 and over).

These understandings suggest that bribery is the core factor in street-level corruption. For instance, Akos Kumarlo suggested that the vulnerabilities of some commercial drivers pushed them to habitually violate traffic regulations (Donkor 2016), and this situational factor buttressed her experiences of police corruption. A violation of traffic regulations was a major factor from which to drift in and out of street-level police corruption. In other words, the illegality of most commercial drivers, by failing to observe traffic regulations, provoked illegality from some members of the Ghanaian police service to partake or engage in corruption. In turn, police officers appeared to cash-in on the vulnerability of some of the participants.

Similarly, Grace Abena (an active police officer, female, aged: 21-30) stated:

> When they [the public] say, the police is corrupt, it comes to where police take money from people, be it complainants coming to the station, be it a driver committing an offence where he or she is supposed to be charged or arrested and taken to court.... I would say bribery....

Police participants substantiated their understanding of police corruption to *bribery* which was associated with public-police street level contact, and habitually with most commercial drivers. In other words, the perception of unaccountable vehicle offences in addition to some commercial drivers' self-recognition of the consequences of violating traffic regulations underpinned the meanings the police attached to police corruption. These perspectives on police corruption also suggested that police officers appeared to welcome illegal commercial drivers and illegal conduct of market traders, which

necessitated the attention of the police, as these may have led to opportunistic corruption by some individual officers (see Sayed and Bruce 1998; Corsianos 2012; Köbis, Prooijen, Righetti and Van Lange 2015). The influence of the rich on the police in Ghana was an additional factor. As participants' understanding of corruption have been explored already in the preceding section, it will not be given any further consideration within this chapter. However, during the data collection, the concepts of 'noble cause' corrupt experience was mentioned. For instance, Kweku Minka provided a broad explanation of police corruption, with some specific examples of corrupt practices similar to the notion of noble corruption.

> Police corruption, in general, is considered to be misconduct that abuses the office of constables such as bribes or false evidence. Whilst it includes noble cause corruption, police officers would not see a difference between selfish motives and altruistic reasons. They would not openly acknowledge such a difference. There is no open corruption and any that does exist is limited to small groups of like-minded individuals or senior officers who can act without any official oversight. (Kweku Minka: an active police officer, male, aged: 31 - 40).

The description above ascribed the participant's view of police corruption beyond bribery but under a general notion of police misconduct. More significantly, Kweku mentioned 'noble cause' corruption, referring to illegal practices such as police misconduct or practices undertaken to achieve laudable ends (see also Harrison 1999; Kleinig 1996, 2002; Caldero and Crank 2010; Bayley and Perito 2011). Noble corruption referred to

police engagement in corruption practices that was influenced by self-interest but not based on an organisational or a collective ethical system. It may be argued that such corrupt practices do not lead to any organisational benefit for the Ghanaian police. As in his explanation, the participant suggested that officers' engagement in noble corruption could be problematic, as most officers would be unable to distinguish between corruption for self-interest or altruistic reasons.

Another challenging issue in this case was that if the illegal practices are considered to be noble by the police, there is a high chance that it will not be viewed as a corrupt act. In this way, the use of the term noble served to neutralise and deny the broader implications of such corruption. Furthermore, according to the participant above, noble corruption was considered appropriate in some instances. However, like-minded police officers were subsequently driven by such a notion embedded in their learning of informal police culture. For these police officers, the concept of transparent or noble corruption presented the cognitive opportunity for them drift in and out of corruption and to neutralise and justify dirty means taken for their personal achievement (see Sykes and Matza 1957; Matza 1964). An influential factor in these circumstances may hinge on an officer's presumed knowledge of neutralising or denial any guilt they may have felt based on the core element of pursuing noble corruption. The concept of noble corruption in this case served as, a neutralisation technique that acted to deny the more problematic outcomes of police corruption (see Cohen 2001). Kwaku (the participant above) further states that such selfish desires did materialise within an environment where supervision or accountability were ineffective.

Neutralisation techniques in street-level police corruption: Police views

In Chapter One, it was mentioned that the Ghanaian public perceive the police as the most corrupt public institution in Ghana (see Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2007; Ghana Integrity Initiative 2011; Armah-Attoh 2014). Hence, it is crucial to explore the police officers' reactions and the explanations they attached to police corruption. Moreover, the denial and neutralisation techniques identified as having impacted on police corruption are expanded below.

Social weighting

Social weighting in my study refers to the police officer participants' admissions regarding their experiences of engaging in corrupt practices. Predictably, they tended to neutralise their involvement in corruption (see Smith 2010). For instance, they did this by suggesting that other public institutions were even worse in engaging in corruption, meaning that 'the Ghana police should not be criticised for corruption as there were other institutions that were far worse' (see also Anand et al 2004). From the illustration below, it can be argued that social weighting manifested in two forms. Firstly, by the participant's selective institutional comparison to reinforce their position to deny that the police were most. Secondly, such a comparative analogy from the police participant served to bolster against the threat of the police service being labelled as the most corrupt institution (see Anand et al 2004).

> If you are to talk of the most corrupt institutions in Ghana, I would not say the police is the worst offender. There are institutions who are more corrupt than the police (Kwesi

Junior: active police officer, male, aged: 41 - 50).

The police's sense of morality amidst police corruption had been mitigated by creating a neutral background for corrupt practice (cf. Sykes and Matza 1957; Muir 1979; Cohen 2001). This suggests implicatory denial by which participants could subdue, neutralise and justify their involvement and the effects of corrupt practices against the backdrop of it being part of a system, socially practised and or acceptable. In this way it earns the credit of sustainability (see Cohen 2001). This, in turn, provided a form of a naturalistic mindset for the participants to drift in and out of participating in police corruption, as Abena Enusa elaborates below:

> Corruption is across [the] board but not related to a particular division. It is everywhere, even in the ECG [Electric Company of Ghana], Hospitals, etc..... everybody eats from where he or she works, and officers eat from where they work too (Active police officer, female, aged: 51 - 60)

Stating that corruption is everywhere - '*across [the] board*' - suggests that participants denied their responsibility to intervene in corrupt practices, thereby developing a form of bystander ignorance or apathy (Cohen 2001). In this way, participants' denial of corruption inclined them towards 'condemning their condemners' and thus neutralizing the opprobrium directed at them (cf. Sykes and Matza 1957). The technique of 'condemning the condemners' posits that `delinquents' (in this case police participants) abdicate their involvement and responsibilities in public-police corruption. Rather, they

point to those who condemn the police. In other words, they were not the problem, it is 'not us but them' (Sykes and Matza 1957; Matsueda 1982; Piquero et al 2005). Corruption was perceived to be widely practised and deemed as not limited to the police. These excused police conduct in some types of corruption in Ghana. Hence, condemning the condemners by police participants became a technique adopted to aid the denial of police corrupt experiences (*ibid* 1957; Cohen 2001). As stated in the above quote, such a rationalization was embedded within the notion of ''*everybody eats from where he or she works, and officers eat from where they work too''.* In other words, what is the big deal? After all, everybody benefits from his or her occupational environment.

The illustration presented above also demonstrates that the police could justify and neutralise their involvement in public-police corrupt practices, thereby paving the way for some police officers to drift in and out of corrupt practices (Matza 1964; Downes and Pollard 1999). Arguably, such justifications had institutionalised, influenced or normalised police corruption within Ghana, meaning that corruption has gained increasing momentum (see Ashforth and Anand 2003).

Social practice*s*

Based on some of the responses provided by police participants, the notion of social practices refers to a perceived sense of corruption embedded within services required from almost or all public institutions in Ghana. This was used to neutralise and legitimise participants' involvement in police corrupt practices. The social practices as a form of denial attained the status of an insulator for public-police corrupt behaviours. This acted

as a framework for participants to evoke the contextual implications of corrupt practices and pass responsibility from themselves to the social collective. As the participant below demonstrated, the 'system' referred to appeared to be a significant factor considered to have promoted co-construction of corrupt practices.

> I don't think people adopt corrupt practices and other malfeasance when they join the police service. It is in the system which obviously involves the public and the police service, everybody (Kwame Abugri: an active police officer, male, aged: 41 - 50)

Corruption being illustrated as it '…. *involves the public and the police service, everybody,'* echoed the notion that within Ghana some types of corruption were acceptable and practised as an aspect of social conduct (Gould and Mukendi 1989; Mbaku 1996). Meanwhile the system, as presented above, also appears to refer to wider social practices, recognised or acknowledged as not limited to Ghanaian police. Corruption thrived upon this notion. The above explanation also suggested that police corruption was tailored by the system and, as a result, the police inescapably became embedded in it. This implies that police participants did not mean to engage in corruption – they were denying their intent. In this instance, it can be argued that the police denied their corruptive behavior be placing themselves asvictims of a corrupting public and society (see Quah 2015).

Attributing corrupt practices to the system also represents a neutralisation technique for officers to justify their inclusion and thus drift in and out of corruption. In this instance, ethically minded recruits often may forsake ethical conduct in favour of the dominant cultural norms. This notion also suggests denial of intent and responsibilities and indicates how new recruits become educated into corrupt practices (cf. Mars 1982).

Denial of responsibility

Denial of responsibility rests on delinquents positing that a crime or deviant act committed was not their fault; in other words, the act was accidental, or the delinquent had no option. He or she thus does not feel accountable for the resultant effect and action (Sykes and Matza 1957, Piquero et al 2005). Relating this concept to my thesis, a unanimous theme within the police officers' accounts was the denial of their intention to engage in corruption. This represents a special form of justification for neutralizing the guilt associated with violating social norms (Sykes and Matza 1957, Matsueda 1982, Piquero et al 2005). It should be noted that from this point onwards, wherever the notion of the technique of denial of responsibility as a form of denial or neutralisation is noted, reference will be made to the above explanation.

According the participant below, police corruption was embedded within the wider system and not confined to the Ghanaian police service. Corrupt practices were spoken about as prevalent within other public institutions, and it was seen to be endemic within Ghana (Kumsah 2017). The presence of corruption within the police service was reflective of systemic corruption already practiced under or within other public and,

possibly, private institutions. It can be argued that the police were well aware of the morality and legal requirements of the Ghanaian police, but to deny responsibility, they had convinced themselves that engaging in some amount of corruption was unavoidable as it was systemic or socially expected (Amundsen 1999; Smith 2010) and thus they did not have an actual intention to do it – they 'could not help it'. The technique of denying responsibility in this case provided the means for officers to suspend their commitment to the legalities associated with police corruption, and the moral ability to engage in corrupt behaviour.

> Right now, as [I] am talking, wherever you go, they will ask you, bring something, even a file at the hospitals, for somebody to pick your folder for you to see the doctor, he will take money. It is in the system, everywhere, everybody wants to get something so that he will live on, and I don't blame them, it is the system (Bill Nti: retired police officer, male, aged: 60 - over).

The prevalence of corrupt experiences requires compliance within any given civic engagement, where one takes an interest in sharing another's personal resources (see also Arghyrou 2010). For instance, within the police, if people were not able to gain access to services sought from the police legitimately without paying for it, then a participant's likelihood of paying or bribing to gain that service from the police increases. In other words, participants would opt to pay or feel inclined to bribe the police as a result of systemic corruption (Gobert and Punch 2000; Fried 2001; Johnson 2006; Kilgannon 2010).

Corruption in Ghana was practised at all levels of society, from a worker who may impede someone in their administrative duties unless a bribe was offered, to the medical attendant who apparently could not access an individual's health file but could suddenly find it once a bribe had been offered. Subsequently, the perception of many of the police was that one inevitably becomes corrupt. This view corroborates Merton's (1948) notion of a self-fulfilling prophecy, which suggests that when corrupt behaviour is socially accepted as part of a daily social routine, it then becomes expected that everybody would act corruptly but without a personal vindication to the corrupt practices. This is also a form of denial of responsibility.

Although the police acknowledged the presence of corrupt practices within the Ghanaian police service, participants generally denied having a direct impact or the intent to engage in corruption themselves. For instance, Bill Nti (retired police officer) illustrated that any study of police corruption should not only be focused on the police themselves, but on their pay and conditions. Bill suggested that some of the neutralisation and denial of officers who engaged in corrupt practices was based on systemic challenges which spurred from what he perceived as an inadequate police salary (cf. Barker 1977). He did acknowledge the increment in officers' wages, however, he also expressed some doubt as to whether it would be sustainable. Based on the view of Bill, an unfavourable police salary influences some police officers to engage in corrupt practices. It can be argued that this idea of an unsustainable income was also a form of denial used by some officers, allowing them to drift in and out of corrupt practices. The participant further suggested that officers were entitled to more of the salary than what was given.

But, when you talk about corruption, you only talk about

one side of it, you have to talk about the pay people take.

Whether if it is enough or not. Corruption is in every part of

the society, [it] is too bad. Now the police salary, it was

[only] recently they managed to put them on certain scales,

but even that, is it much? (Bill Nti: retired police officer,

male, aged: 60 - over).

When discussing corruption in a public office in Ghana, police offers almost always claimed that the focus should not be on the police or police as perpetrators of corruption. Not only was this because corruption was seen to be widespread in Ghana and not limited to the police but many of the responses suggested that members of the public were to be blamed. In other words, corruption that was already practised within the system by members of the public. This rationalisation is another form denying responsibility (Sykes and Matza 1957).

The explanation below acknowledges a noticeable inference in public-police corruption, by noting the readiness of members of the public to 'dip their hands in their pocket' to initiate a bribe with a Ghanaian police officer. This suggests that an officer's perception of their involvement in corruption was deeply reliant on members of the public. Denial of intent was thus facilitated by the perception that people were content to offer bribes to the police (cf. Bowles and Garoupa 1997), probably to grease the palm of the police or the functioning system to act upon issues reported to the police (see Commonwealth Human

Rights Initiative – *CHRI* 2007). Thus, police participants denied intent by suggesting that the public initiated the bribe, Akos Kumarlo and John Kwesi provide examples:

> But no officer will take money out of your pocket if you don't give it to him. It is the people who corrupt the police, if someone does not dip his hand in his pocket, the officer will not take the money out from the pocket. So, for me, corruption is encouraged by the public… (John Kwesi: an active police officer, male, aged: 51 - 60).

> In fact, sometimes, is not the police who even ask, and sometimes [a] complainant comes and makes a complaint to you to take action quickly, you will see the complainant will be happy and tip you... (Akos Kumarlo: a retired police officer, female, aged: 61 and over).

For the police to solicit for bribes, or members of the public to offer or pay money to an officer, was a response to the perception of limited police resources. Thereby bribing the police became a necessity prerequisite for cases to be handled effectively by the police (CHRI 2007). For instance, the police participants below suggested that the lack of police logistical supply (for instance, stationary and transport) had an impact on police corruption. Limited logistics in the police may be seen to pose an immense challenge for police service delivery. Hence, the provision of transport and other forms of stationary became fundamental to the police which enabled them to provide an effective service to the public. Officers' perception of limited or deficiencies in organisational logistics were thus further neutralisation techniques which influenced some officers to solicit or demand

that a complainant had to pay if services were required from the police. In other words, the initiative on the part of the private citizens to offer a bribe to the police, in principle, was to counter the perception of shortage of resources to aid in effectiveness of the police (CHRI 2007). Kwame Abugri elaborated:

> In the charge office, complainants are supposed to come and make their complaints, then officers are supposed to pay for or supply stationaries and everything available to pursue the case. But because sometimes, these things are not available, then they would ask the complainant to pay for stationaries and other things, they would ask the complainant to pay for transport for the officer to go and make the arrest. Because their pay is not enough, or the system is not very good, they would demand some money from the complainant again. (Kwame Abugri: an active police officer, male, aged: 41 - 50)

Sources of cultural neutralisation have enabled practices of police corruption to go unchecked by street-level officers. As Kwame Abugri explained, some officers were perceived to have taken advantage of the limited resources, and coupled with their perceived inadequate salaries, as a justification to solicit, demand or extort bribes from complainants. For instance, complainants must pay for police services for an officer to be able to mobilise resources within the police. A key notion driving police corruption in this case, as suggested by the participant, was a considerable amount of individualistic will rather than an organisational will. For instance, some officers did consider what in their view was unsatisfactory pay to indulge in further corruption within the context of

cases reported or brought for the attention of the police. Arguably, this was driven by self-interest, or perhaps to fulfil an appeal to higher loyalties by claiming that their income was used to support their entire family (see section below). Corrupt practices were thus enabled by claims made to the lack of police resources, such as stationary, as well as the lack of officers' accountability (see also Sherman 1978; Kelling and Moore 1988; Newburn 1999; Andvig et al 2000).

Appeal to higher loyalty

The next aspect of neutralisation theory to be discussed is that of appealing to higher loyalties. When an individual conducts his or her behaviour in fulfilment to the loyalties of another or to a specific group rather than to the norms of, in this case the Ghana police, then an appeal to higher loyalties occurs (Sykes and Matza 1957; Matsueda 1982; Piquero et al 2005). It should be noted that hereafter, wherever the notion of the technique of an appeal to higher loyalties as a form of neutralisation is noted, reference will be made to the above conceptualisation.

There were some other strongly held perceptions which addressed the possibilities of external influences or factors on police corruption. These influences had a significant effect on police participants' tendency to drift in and out of corruption. Such factors reflected on the technique of appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes and Matza 1957). The technique of appealing to higher loyalties referred to the police officers' participants' loyalty to their families, friends, and other personal interests (such as properties or houses and retirement packages). These were used as a neutralisation technique to explain police

involvement in corruption (Sykes and Matza 1957). It can be argued that in order to maintain a reputation or some form of self-status, pursuing these interests superseded that of the ethics and values associated with the institution of the Ghanaian police.

The ability for participants to manage and cope with what my study considers as complex sustainability had significant influence on some officer's participation in corrupt practices. Complex sustainability refers to the perceptions of living below subsistence level, and having to cope with economic challenges, as well as other external issues such as irregular prices or marketable regulations (Beek 2016). Participants' perceptions of this challenge of sustainability (for example, continual increases in fuel costs, school fees and other commodities) added some level of economic and social pressure on police participants. All these determinants served as forms of neutralisation which enabled police participants to drift in and out of corruption (*ibid* 2016). For example, Bill Nti, suggested that the high cost of living was the core factor for some police participants to engage in corrupt practices.

> Increase of fuel, there is no price tag, everything sells at whatever price everywhere…. this is not a defence to corruption but if you look at the system at the moment, let's say if a policeman has to pay school fees 20,000.00Ghanacedis for your child; at his first entrance to a secondary school, what will you also do at your field? (Bill Nti: a retired police officer, male, aged: 60 - over).

The form of neutralisation here is the increasing average cost for basic items, so the

participant's loyalty to higher appeals (to the family) also increased (Sykes and Matza 1957; Becker 1968; Barker 1977). If participants' income or salary were not on par with inflation, this means they would have utilised a greater amount of their wage to buy a few items. Living under these conditions led to a measure of anxiety and subsequently influenced their likelihood to engage in police corruption. It could be argued that increases in the cost of living undermined participants' ability to cope with purchasing essential commodities. Consequently, it served as a powerful neutralsiation for engaging in corrupt practices. These views were reiterated by another police participant:

> You know, corruption, can come from anywhere, when you are in the police it can come from anywhere. If you are a family man at home, you will be thinking about your children fees, your house rent money, your transport, and with what you are earning, if you pay your house rent, basically it is all gone. So, you will be thinking of how to support yourself and your family till the end of that month, the first week of the month your money is gone, what can you do? (Fiifi Benkoom: active police officer, male, aged: 41 - 50)

Police participants' perception of challenges to living costs, coupled with their perceived inadequate wages, was deemed as insufficient to cover the month to month costs of a family. Police participants, in turn, were morally enabled to cover whatever remains of their costs through street-level corrupt practices (Oleinik 2016). Corruption in this case aided participants to cope with living costs. It provided an unofficial income, meaning a supplementary but apparently necessary salary. In this context, participation in corrupt

practices may be linked to a participant's good faith. Thus, they could present themselves as a reasonable police participant acting in fulfilment of a loyalty to higher interest (Sykes and Matza 1957; Cohen 2001). Economic challenges thus became a prerequisite for some police officers to accept bribes as they provided a powerful technique of neutralisation to deny, justify as well as legitimize their behaviour (*ibid* 1957; Barker 1977).

Further responses also referred to perceptions of uncertainty surrounding life after retirement as further neutralisation techniques associated with police corruption. These included being able to cater for their family's welfare (Beek 2016), as well as being able to secure accommodation. As active police officers, some of the participants were unable to envisage how their official retirement package could be satisfying in terms of catering for their post-career welfare plans. This may have included catering for their immediate as well as the extended family, which is a huge feature of life in Ghana (see also Charley and M'Cormack 2011). Therefore, corruption became a precautionary measure adopted by some police participants in order to secure or be able to contribute towards retirement. Corruption in this case became an unofficial but also necessary supplement to their pension scheme.

> Life after you retire from the force, [for] example you need
> a house for you and family, salary may not be enough to
> achieve that (Jojo Kobby: an active police officer, male,
> aged: 41 - 50).

In Ghana most police retirees could experience post-retirement sundry issues. This included the loss of regular monthly wages that frequently occur as a result of mis-payment or delays in payment. This may also lead to untold economic hardship and anxiety about the security of the family home – a notion similar to the concept of appealing to higher loyalties. These factors meant that retirement was something to be dreaded by most officers (see also Garba and Mamman 2014). Furthermore, as most police officers in Ghana enter retirement without any personal plans or management of post-retirement conditions, most officers retire in destitution. Given this background, some officers rationalized their involvement in public-police corruption and denied that it was in bad faith (Cohen 2001).

Additionally, participants also rationalized their involvement in corruption in relation to factors such as the ability to possess or have a good home and to provide some level of comfort and stability. This resulted in a denial of corruption based upon the perception of insufficient police salaries. The police salaries themselves could be considered as unjustifiable, and consequently used as a neutralisation technique to justify participants' involvement in corrupt experiences (Sykes and Matza 1957). Additionally, participants overwhelmingly referred to inadequate accommodation as a major contextual factor perceived to influence police corruption. Inadequate accommodation – this referred to '*an officer in one room, a single room*' – perhaps with a family, depicted participants' uncomfortable home experiences and cramped lifestyle. Denial in a form of inadequate housing served as an excuse for officers to justify their involvement in police corruption.

Good pay and accommodation, comfortable home will not allow one [police officer] to be corrupt. But now accommodation is a big issue. You will find an officer in 1 room, a single room. This I believe is a source of corruption (Abena Enusa: an active police officer, female, aged: 51-60).

Accommodation in the service is very bad, a small room, not fit to contain a family. Psychologically it affects my work (Jojo Kobby, an active police officer, male, aged: 41 - 50).

Being hard-hit by insufficient accommodation coupled with what participants perceived as low salaries placed a substantial challenge on officers. These conditions enabled officers to drift in and out of corruption to support or improve basic living standards (Beek 2016). It can also be argued that, from a street-level corrupt practices perspective, this would have resulted in a comfortable position for commercial drivers and market traders to habitually break traffic regulations, against the perception of successfully bribing the police to overlook the offence.

The illustrations above also indicate that inadequate public servant housing systems in Ghana highlights two important factors. Namely: negative incentives for police participants, and the higher probability of police corruption (see also Hope 2015). In other words, officers might be less susceptible to corruption if they were provided with adequate accommodation during active service and as part of post-retirement plans, provide retired officers with an allowance towards a house. This suggest that police

participants would have had a contented mind as well as a higher likelihood of conducting their duties in total compliance with police ethical values (cf. Marks 2007; Domoro and Agil 2012). However, where these prospects fell short, police participants pursued other means for self-improvement, in this case corruption. It is worth considering that arguments to engage in or drift in and out of corruption would be supportive within a context where other officers may be inclined to share similar views as well as learn from each other about the fundamental reasons for officers to drift in and out of corruption (cf. Matza 1964) and subsequently consider them as legitimate.

Corruption was thus seen as an unofficial means for the police to gain extra money to maintain their welfare needs. In this context, corruption was an enhancement technique for welfare and economic development (Beek 2016). Corruption enhancement technique in my study can be referred to as the process adopted by participants (in this case, the police) in order to reach an expected or anticipated end. For instance, an officer's obligations to the family (such as an improvement on living or welfare standards) and post retirement plans became a powerful technique for neutralising as well as justifying police involvement in corruption (Matza and Sykes 1957; Charley and M'Cormack 2011; Garba and Mamman 2014; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2014). Standards and ethics of the police were masked by the demands and loyalty of the officer from another source (family or personal economic gain). Thus, police corruption was justified upon considering an officer's loyalty to the needs of the family, which became more significant than that of being loyal to the institutional ethics of the Ghanaian police. A key point to consider is that, there was a shift in morality or values (see also Miller and

Blackler 2005), depending on the contextual circumstances. This meant that some values were considered more significant than others, and such perceptions made participants more likely to drift in and out of corruption.

Pressure from the Top: 'Police 'Returns'

Police stops, ostensibly set up to enforce traffic regulations and combat crime, had been turned into a lucrative endeavour for the police in Ghana (CHRI 2007). For instance, some police participants suggested that junior officers were ordered to collect bribes from motorists, and subsequently accounted for the money gained and paid returns to their superiors via the chain of command. This view is similar to the notion of an autocratic police management style (see Hollyer and Wantchekon 2011). An autocratic police leadership style can be referred to as the utilisation police legitimate authority (mostly, by a high-ranking officer) to manipulate through the rank system to instigate street-level corrupt practices, purposely, for self-interest.

> Autocratic tendencies 'what I say whether good or bad it has to be implemented' doesn't help us to do our work effectively (Jojo Kobby: an active police officer, male, aged: 41 - 50)

This leadership style was considered as having negative implications on the effectiveness of the police. It created a sense of street-level bribes collected by the police as often being sent up through the rank structure of the police. Whether this was the case or whether it was simply a neutralisation was difficult to know. However, regardless of its reality, it

provided a powerful vocabulary of motive that denied personal intent.

> I quite remember I went with another police officer to do road checks; we were asked to bring a certain amount and we could not bring the said amount. So, when we got back to the station, the officer said, he also has to report to our superior officer….and he said, 'I have to take this to the officer at this station'… 'so as you didn't bring the expected amount, how am I supposed to go and give what I'm supposed to give to the senior officer? (Grace Abena: active police officer, female, aged: 21-30)

The implications of the autocratic leadership whether ethical or unethical, were that street-level police officers claimed to conform to the corrupt expectations of their superior officers (Hollyer and Wantchekon 2011). The suggests two factors. Firstly, police were held accountable not based on their street-level police duties but were rather held accountable through the rank system which ensured that the monetary target set for them (gained at the street-level) matched the satisfactory value demanded from the 'top' of structural command (see also Ditton 1975). Secondly, such police corrupt practices were a product of strong adherence to subcultural values, for instance, the code of silence (see Ivkovic 2005). In this case, police supervisors would not have the fortitude to conform to the ethics of the Ghanaian police. Experiences of corruption through this process was influenced by contextual factors embedded within police occupational subculture (Amundsen 1999; Domoro and Agil 2012; Crank 2014). Inevitably, some individual recruits subsequently maximised this new knowledge to suit their personal interest. It is worth noting as well that such corrupt practices may also involve the active

participation of innocent police officers, as they were simply following orders.

> This is hear say.... this is hear say, I understand some police men give accounts to their police big men. People have been saying it, but I don't know whether is true, so they are forced to take it, especially these MTTU on the roads (Daniel Opare: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 - 60)

> Look, I have heard that some of them [police] do sales after coming back from road-checks. I have not seen with my eye, but I have heard that is what they do, sales! (Kofi Berima: a commercial driver, male, aged: 41-50)

The quotes above suggest that street-level police corruption was influenced through the structural command of the Ghanaian police. Senior ranking officers were perceived to have enforced a perverse corrupt practice, thus, money gained from drivers or traders by street-level police officers were consequently compelled to account or pay up senior officers a share of the money gained.

Corruption was managed up the hierarchy of the police through an informal system of returns in which subordinates paid their superior officers the money they had gain or collected from bribes and extortion. Arguably, for the police to be able to meet the monetary expectations demanded by the superior officer, this required the police officers to exercise their authority by any means necessary to gain that amount (see also Gerber and Mendelson 2008). This may include random stops of commercial drivers, possibly requesting bribes in return for their release. However, on the odd occasion that the

targeted amount was not met, the officers had to find an alternative means to get the right amount and forwarded it up the rank structure of the police. This cycle of corrupt practices, as stated below - ''*the pressure comes from our people at the top*'' - a denial of intent*,* was perceived to have been driven by the top-ranking police officers who had enforced the scheme of street-level corruption (Oleinik 2016). Thus, corruption tailored by the command structure of the Ghanaian police, and as a result, street-level police officers became embedded in it. This implies that lower ranking police participants did not mean to engage in corruption – a denial of intent by street-level police officers.

> One major thing is that most of the time, the pressure comes from our people at the top. For example, my former station officer…. this man was just so desperate that, on market days, that is Mondays and Thursdays, you are supposed to go for road checks and when you go, bring this amount and he mentions the amount you are supposed to bring (Grace Abena: an active police officer, female, aged: 21-30).

The statement above suggests that senior police officers did set monetary targets for subordinates and, on special occasions, assigned them to police checkpoints to meet such targets. The money gained then proceeded up the chain of command, as the senior officer who collected the returns from the subordinates also had to pay his superior in return. On occasions such as market days, officers utilised the tolerance (Barry 1999; Newburn 1999) and interest in corruption by senior ranking officers, demanded or extorted money from commercial drivers and market traders. In this case, individualistic interest in corruption

was constructed 'as an order' down the chain of command.

Conclusion

Through the data analysed in this chapter, I have attempted to establish the meanings participants associated with their understandings of police corruption. Understandings of police corruption was revealed as relative and context-dependent. The analysis revealed some contextual factors which were associated with participants' understanding of police corruption. For instance, some of the participants considered that initiating or giving money to the police was a social norm intended to demonstrate participant's appreciation of police work. Other meanings were associated with inducing officers in an attempt to, or in anticipation of, settling an issue or for an offence to be overlooked. Most of the understandings of police-public corrupt practices provided were found to be associated with commercial drivers' habitual violation of traffic regulations, which subsequently prompted extortion or paying of bribes to officers for an offence to be overlooked.

Additionally, some of the explanations provided were embedded and constructed within the unprofessional conduct of the Ghanaian police service. Nonetheless, regardless of the group interviewed, in almost all the understandings of police corruption examined, it was identifiable that most daily street-level public-police corruption in Ghana took the form of bribery and extortion. However, there was additional concepts which were content specific.

The chapter further explored police participants' views or critique as well as the

justifications they gave which underpinned their experiences of corruption within Ghana. The core theme that emerged from this category was police participants' reactions and responses to public-police corruption practices. This can be seen to affect each of the sub-themes identified, which include: social weighting, social practice*s,* denial of responsibility, appeal to higher loyalty, pressure from the top (Police "Returns"). The sub-themes can be understood through the constructs of the theory of techniques of neutralisation and state of denial. It was identified that corruption was a regular experience within the Ghana police service. However, after a conception of themselves, officers had developed a rationalisation technique to deny and neutralise their involvement in corruption.

In order to provide further analysis of public-police corruption, the next chapter (Chapter Five) focuses on commercial drivers and market traders (private entrepreneurs) and examines public denial and neutralisation techniques of police corruption and how these participants justified street-level corruption.

CHAPTER FIVE
MARKET TRADERS and COMMERCIAL DRIVERS' VIEWS of POLICE CORRUPTION

> The [police] officer has left his office to come and stand in the sun; he will be there for a long time and if you are passing by and you say 'governor', take this ¢1.00Ghanacedi, or ¢2.00Ghanacedis, to me that is nothing. So, I don't agree that the police are corrupt.
>
> (Nana Akosua: a private entrepreneur, female, aged: 41 - 50)

Introduction

The understanding of police corruption explored in Chapter Four provided some definitive notions of street-level police corruption in Ghana, for instance: bribery, extortion, 'take this', 'settle yourself or the case' and police misconduct. It also provided police participants' views on some of the neutralisation techniques of street-level police corruption. The analysis so far leads this chapter to attempt to address the public neutralisation techniques of street-level police corruption. Hence, to explore the rationalization and justifications underpinning public-police corruption in this chapter, I focus on commercial drivers and market traders (private entrepreneur) participants. This chapter examines the contextual influences of public-police corruption, which according to participants influenced street-level police corruption. In relation to the focus of public-police corrupt experiences considered in this chapter, I also identify and discuss three distinct techniques. Firstly, 'avoidance corruption', meaning payments made mostly

to street-level police officers to promote or gain free movement of capitalism. Secondly, 'enabling techniques', which related to payments made to the police in order to empower, facilitate and enhance police service delivery in Ghana. Lastly, 'appreciative techniques', which were payments made to the police as thanks for positive experiences of police service delivery. The chapter discusses these characteristics of corruption in view of participants' concepts of citizen-initiated police corrupt experiences. This is done with a view to bringing some meanings to the types of daily public-police corruption experiences that, for participants, and arguably within the wider culture, were acceptable or justifiable. To this effect, the chapter further explores the effect of some embedded cultural practices (such as gift-giving) upon police corruption. The discussion on gift-giving also considers how modern or Western knowledge and concepts of police corruption (as presented in Chapter Two) can be overridden by daily context specific street-level corrupt experiences.

This chapter argues that it may be problematic to gain or secure a Westernised or modernised knowledge of commercial drivers and market traders' participants reaction and response to police corruption in Ghana, because participants may not have a common frame of reference of an accepted norm of understanding or tackling police corruption (see Yeboah-Assiamah, Asamoah and Osei-kojo, 2014). It is against the background that most commercial drivers, as well as street-level market traders in Ghana, may not have had any form of an accredited formal training program in relation to, for instance, police corruption and anti-corruption practices. The views from commercial drivers and likewise from private entrepreneurs (market traders), were noted as exercising their own discretion

in how they responded to police corrupt practices. In addition, participants associated street-level corruption with an effect of spurring different emotions and reactions. These include pessimism, referring to participants' coping technique to police corrupt practices (Sherman 1978; Punch 2013), and paranoia, in this case commercial drivers and market traders feared being charged by the police or processed in court (cf. Norman et al 2017; Addo 2012).

Data presented here is based on accounts from individualistic perceptions of daily street-level corruption that participants perceived to be regular partakers in police corruption. For public-police corruption to occur, the following perceptual but distinct factors (as illustrated in *Figure* twelve, the diagram below) had to be present because they had significant impact in shaping participants' perceptions of factors acting upon street-level corrupt practices. For instance, reflecting on the notion of legitimate police corruption (money or gift offered to the Ghanaian police that did not draw on the legal disposition of police corruption), as discussed in previous the chapter, participants sometimes felt it was necessary to bribe police officers because they thought of the practice as a social and personal gesture or benefit. Hence, included in this chapter is a discussion of the pragmatic and practical acceptance of some levels of police corruption by some of the participants.

The assumption is that the commercial drivers and market traders who participated in my study would be able to provide contextualised experiences of public-police corruption. Hence, to examine context-specific implications upon street-level corrupt experiences

this chapter further explores how the commercial drivers and private entrepreneurs related to police corruption. The views presented below were perceptions as enacted within participants' daily experiences of street-level police corruption in Ghana.

Figure 12: Perception of factors acting upon Police corruption

Factors influencing police corruption

Contextual factors influencing street-level police corruption were attributed to multiple factors. The perception of a police officer's personal gain implicit in the police corruption discourse as discussed in Chapter One (Sherman 1978; Newburn 1999; Douvlis and South 2003; Gerber and Mandelson 2008). It does not set the police apart from the participants in this research, as corrupt practices were established as having profound benefits, especially to the commercial drivers. For instance, most drivers' sense of journey productivity and 'easy' access through police barriers were some of the factors identified as influencing participants willingness to engage in, or drift in and out of street-level corrupt practices with the police. Almost all of the commercial driver participants appeared to find it challenging to cope with unproductive occupational periods ('*waste of journey tim*e'), which was mostly considered as instigated by street-level police officers (cf. Beek et al 2017).

Bribing: Avoid unproductive times and gaining access through check-points

During my fieldwork with the commercial drivers, one of the key factors within participants' occupational environment or routine was their daily commitment to meeting a set economic target within an anticipated period. Participants' daily success could be threatened by, for instance, regular police stops. The perceptions of participants' diminished chances of professional success or commercial productivity once they encountered the police was one of the contextual factors that mitigated street-level police corrupt practices. Kwame Salas provided an example:

> Sometimes when I am in a car and I see a driver giving money to the police, and I asked why? Then he will say, 'If I didn't give him the money, he will waste our time.'…. So, to avoid wasting time and for them to get on with their job, that is why they will give them [the police] let's say 5.00Ghanacedis... and continue with their work. (A private entrepreneur, male, aged: 31 – 40).

The above illustration suggests vicarious experiences of street-level police corruption, but it may also suggest a co-production of moral corruption (De Sardan 1999). Co-production of moral corruption can refer to corrupt experiences between, for instance, two individuals (for example, a commercial driver and a police officer). The individuals have shared values that are in each other's interests and they therefore collaborate in corruption (Punch 1985; Dobel 1978; Bratsis 2003; Granovetter 2004). Without a victim to bring charges, corruption thus become unavoidable. The action may not conform to accepted values, morality or even modern concepts of police corruption (as presented in Chapter Two). However, such street-level corrupt practices seem to be acknowledged and accepted within Ghana. In this sense both participants in the corruption would have benefited from the experience. On this basis, it can be argued that involvement or engagement in co-production of moral corruption may subsequently result in participants giving moral guidance, techniques or approaches to adopt about how one ought to conduct himself during a street-level public-police corrupt experience (De Sardan 1999). The provision of moral guidance or techniques to adopt and cope with corruption may also contribute to an increase in practices of co-production of corruption as a 'moral career'.

A 'moral career' in this context refers to the techniques adopted within an occupational environment to introduce another to police corruption, either directly or indirectly (see also Sykes and Matza 1959; Punch 2009). The account also provided an example of either a positive or negative vicarious experience of street-level police corruption. The participant seemed to note from a commercial driver's perspective that being stopped by the police was predictive of a decline in productivity, referring to the notion that the aim is '*to avoid wasting time and for them to get on with their job*' (see also Beek et al 2017). Considering this, it seems that most commercial drivers have developed some form of ritual (driving ceremony) into bribing street-level officers. It can be argued that, by offering money to police officers usually at check points or police barriers, this subsequently prevents the commercial driver from experiencing further charges or fines if the driver had in fact violated traffic regulations.

So, the aim was to minimise or prevent prolonged contact with the police so as to limit or avoid unproductive occupational periods. In connection to this, Yaw Osunu, another driver, provided a detailed account of his personal experience with the police which influenced his street-level police corrupt practices.

> Just imagine me driving from Kumasi to Volta; you will meet about 10 or more police checkpoints. If one officer stops you, he will say I want to check your boot, warning triangle, fire extinguisher, trafficator and brake lights, and so on. By the time he [the police officer] is done with you, you would have spent about 20 to 30 minutes. As soon as you leave, at the next police stop, you will be asked the

> same questions again. (A commercial driver, male, aged: 41
> – 50).

The explanation above highlights the cumulative impact of multiple check points on a single journey in terms of unnecessary wastage of journey time. To avoid experiencing the same or similar style of police interrogation at each checkpoint along a journey, participants drift into bribing street-level police officers for convenient access (cf. Matza 1964; BBC News, Online 2017a, 2017b; Addo 2012). In other words, some commercial drivers offer a bribe at the outset of contact with street-level police officers as a coping technique so as with the aim of curtailing any prolonged contact and maximising journey productivity.

> If they [the police] will check you at one checkpoint and
> give you a receipt or something as a proof to show at the
> next checkpoint, I think it will be better. Because, at every
> police checkpoint, they [the police] will ask the same
> questions. So, to avoid wasting time, the best thing is to
> give him the GH¢1.00 and you continue your journey, so
> that is how it is (Yaw Osunu: a commercial driver, male,
> aged: 41 – 50)

So, with the aim of maximising journey productivity it becomes necessary for participants to initiate paying bribes to police offers. However, it can be argued that such a perception seems to have encouraged and motivated regular street-level public-police corrupt practices (Andvig 2008; Dempsey and Forst 2009). Corruption in this case had a unique contextual process, on one hand, aided by commercial drivers' perceptions of

some officers' persistence in checking for the legalities of every available or known vehicle accessories at a checkpoint. On the other hand, it was also facilitated by the spontaneous reaction of commercial drivers to bribe officers so as to ensure easy access through check points.

The above description also demonstrates how it became less problematic for participants to engage in petty corrupt practices. To engage in street-level police corruption as suggested above, was done to avert any possibilities of intimidation and other forms of unimaginable accusation of traffic regulations offences. Additionally, the experience permitted drivers access through barriers without experiencing the formalities of traffic regulations. I refer to these types of corrupt practices as *an avoidance corruption* because when the public initiated such corrupt practices towards street-level police officers it was purported to gain convenient access through police checkpoints and promote free movement of capitalism. This is an instance when 'petty corruption pays' (cf. Vaishnav 2017). It can be argued that commercial driver participants may have had the option of waiting patiently till the officer completed the formalities of road safety regulations. However, most of the participants seemed to opt to bribe the officer from the onset. Bribing or inducing the officer in this case served as a rational action on the part of the commercial driver, as the participants stood to benefit from the experience (direct positive experience of street-level police corruption).

Furthermore, these perceptions of street-level experiences of corruption were understood as normal ('*so that is how it is'*, as stated in the above quote), consequently it became a

regular and acceptable practice instead of it being an exception (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Anand, Ashforth and Joshi 2004). In this case, participants were not forced to pay or bribe a police officer but were influenced by participants' attachment to work. Thus, neutralisation of street-level police corruption took the form of a desire and the drive to accomplish work within the time anticipated, thereby making ends meet. Additionally, it can be argued that participants' attachment to anticipated street-level police corrupt conduct, as well as participants' free will to induce street-level officers, may have provided them with the opportunity to act for their self-interest. This had the virtue of spontaneous responses, if not a ritual from participants to engage in petty corruption or offer bribes to street-level police officers (Anand, Ashforth and Joshi 2004). In addition to some of the preceding explanations given in relation to participants' perceptions of factors influencing public-police corruption, as briefly explored in the previous chapter, some of the participants also suggested that police corrupt practices appear to be underpinned by street-level laxity among most commercial drivers.

Laxity and lack of understanding of traffic regulation

Laxity in relation to traffic regulations amongst most commercial driver participants has been seen to account for some street-level police corrupt practices (cf. Siegrist and Roskova 2001; Barjonet 2011; Oleinik 2016; Norman et al 2017). In other words, drivers were perceived as lacking in discipline through their failure to comply with traffic regulations. This in turn seems to have provided the possibility for opportunistic street-level police corruption. For instance, the participant below acknowledged that the practices of corruption were an opportunity available to everybody. However, he made

with the comparison between his trade as a private entrepreneur and that of a commercial driver. Drawing from his trading experiences, the participant illustrated that he did not foresee the possibility of not conforming to social or road traffic regulations, which would subsequently result in offering or initiating a bribe to a police officer. The participants suggested that commercial drivers deliberately and persistently failed to conform to the normative traffic regulations (Barjonet 2011; Norman et al 2017).

> I don't know how to say it … corruption. But it is there to everybody, you understand me. As I am running my shop, what will I have to do, to give the police money to let me go? So, if the drivers can genuinely do what is expected and even, when you do something wrong because of your genuineness, you don't even need to give the police any money, not even a pesewa. (Kwame Salas: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 31 - 40).

Hence, his view is that it is this consistent violation of traffic regulations which subsequently result in their instantaneous involvement in such interactions to avoid a heavy fine as result of being formally charged (Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Addo 2012). The non-compliance as suggested above, arguably, could have been a result of a lack of education. If participants had developed some professional understanding of police corruption and knowledge about street-level police conduct, this would have constituted the framework for police procedural fairness and justice. However, the lack of accepted norms of understanding police corruption (for instance, the rightful processes) (Yeboah-Assiamah, Asamoah and Osei-kojo 2014) and perhaps, coupled with their

non-compliance with traffic regulations may have created situational ambiguity. Most

participants, as well as the Ghanaian police, seem to have capitalised upon this situation

to engage in corrupt practices.

> Many times, because the drivers don't know the laws and
> when he gets arrested for breaking the law, he thinks that
> when he gives or pay some money to the police he will let
> him go… (Kwadwo Tumi: a commercial driver, male, aged:
> 41 – 50).

> I went to a funeral at Affigyaisi. The bus I took was stopped
> by the police, and before the driver wanted to get down, he
> asked the mate to give him some money. But the mate was
> not fast enough. So, the officer came to the bus, and the
> driver said, 'Oh Dada, [referring to the police officer], I
> was just about coming to you o.' So, after the mate had
> given the money to the driver, the driver also gave it to the
> police. (Nana Ama Nancy: a private entrepreneur, female,
> aged: 41 -50)

Most, if not all, commercial drivers' response upon being signalled to stop (with or

without cause) was to attempt to initiate a bribe or induce the officer, even without the

police demanding or asking for it (Beek et al 2017; Norman et al 2017). It worth pointing

out that, the participants ignorance or naivety regarding the rightful process do not

impinge upon the officer's interest in exploring or engaging in street-level corrupt

practices. In this sense, a lack of professional understanding regarding police corruption

on the part of the commercial drivers seems to present itself as a gift or opportunity for

the police officers. It can also be argued that the lack of understanding or knowledge of the rightful process of traffic regulations could have generated fear of the police or excessive respect of police legitimate powers. For instance, in his reaction to street-level police corruption, the participant below added that, on some occasions, some drivers appeared to be intimidated by the conduct of the officers. This subsequently encouraged a voluntarily payment to the officer, mostly in the form of money, in order to avoid the officer or for the officer to overlook any irregularities associated with the vehicle (*ibid* 2003, *ibid* 2012).

> As soon as you hear, Massa [meaning Master] park! park! park!... you know you have to stop. Sometimes they [the police] demand money, sometimes too they don't, but for fear, drivers freely give to the police.... (Nii Kwaku: a commercial driver, Male, aged: 31 - 40)

The above quote seems to indicate that when asked to stop by a police officer, participants were influenced by the tone at which the command was issued, uncertainty of the encounter coupled with the authority or the perception of police legitimacy (Tyler 2004; Bradford and Jackson 2010; Myhill and Quinton 2011). As such they were more likely to willingly offer money to the police. Additionally, the fact that most drivers voluntarily gave officers money under the notion of fear as they encountered the police may also suggest their lack of trust in their dealings with the police (Newham 2002; Faull 2011). Hence, they would opt to voluntarily give money to the officer in order to avoid prolonged contact with the police. Even if the drivers were driving legally, it seemed less problematic to offer petty bribes to street-level officers as an avoidance technique so as

not to experience intimidation and unimaginable accusations of traffic regulations (cf. Norman et al 2017). Additionally, the above illustration may also have suggested that the willingness on the part of some commercial drivers to offer or pay bribes to the police voluntarily appears to be an indication of admittance to a violation of traffic regulations. This subsequently served as an incentive for public-police corrupt practices. Such an experience from the perspective of most commercial drivers may depict a positive direct experience of police corruption. On the basis that if the driver was at fault, such a corrupt experience from the driver's view would have been initiated to prevent being subsequently heavily fined by the police or court if the violation preceded beyond the street-level without being settled with the police officer (see also Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Addo 2012). However, this inevitably would have constituted a road safety risk (see Barjonet 2011; Norman et al 2017).

> …as a policeman, if you stopped a car, you have to check if everything is correct. But he didn't, so, is it because of the money he stopped the car? He collected the license but did not even check it. He should have looked, you [the police] did not ask the driver to give you money. So, he should have looked. He [the police] looked at nothing, nothing; I saw everything that went on. (Nana Ama Nancy: a private entrepreneur, female, aged: 41 -50).

Police corruption, as suggested in the above negative vicarious experience, appears to have fourfold elements: on the part of the driver, 'explore police authority to overlook offence', thus, offering money to an officer seem to be considered or served as a

guarantee, as it provided the police limited liability to charge the driver (Newburn 1999). 'Personal gain' – the officer gained from the encounter by offering the driver a favour (Sherman 1978; Punch 1985; Kleinig 1996; Newburn 2015; Ivkovic 2005; Hope 2015). This then leads to an 'escape', meaning that the driver avoided the severity of being formally charged by the police (cf. Tankebe 2008b, Addo 2012). It is worth considering that, for the police not to pursue the issue any further, such as the driver being held accountable for violation traffic regulations, also suggested that participants' street-level illegality provoked street-level police illegality. This would have contributed to participants' perception that traffic law enforcement was associated with the cost of bribing street-level police officers. The lack of effective implementation of traffic regulations as a result of corruption meant a road safety risk. Street-level corruption may have a contributed significantly to the high rate of traffic fatalities in Ghana (cf. Porter 2011; Norman et al 2017).

Relating to the lack of or the perceived limited understanding of police corruption, as previously mentioned, and its association to street-level police corruption, Nii Kwaku also stated that:

> One thing about we the drivers is that a majority of us our education is not good, sometimes how to communicate in English is a problem. I quite remember some time back I was coming from Tesano and one policeman thought that I used the wrong side of the road, but I didn't pass there. I heard him mentioning my car registration number and shouted for me to stop! As soon as I stopped, he said, 'Why

did you use the side of road?' I said, 'Sir, I didn't pass there,
I was using the main road', and I believe is because I was
able to express myself in English, he didn't worry me at all
and allowed me to go.... (a commercial driver, male, aged:
31 - 40).

English is the national or official language spoken in Ghana, as inherited from the colonial period under British rule. It is primarily through this medium that all correspondence and social activities are conducted. From the above explanation, it seems that being able to communicate or speak in English suggests some elements of modern heritage (see Anico and Peralta 2009; Mubaya and Mawere 2016). For instance, the ability to communicate with an officer in English seems to prevent further interest, harassment or exploitation from the police, as seems to be portrayed in the quote above. Furthermore, being able to communicate in English suggest that the police officer had perceived the participant as modern, which may have led to an awakening of his rights in relation to the work culture of the police (Armacost 2003; Mason 2010).

Moreover, for the police not to have proceeded any further in this instance may also illustrate that for those participants who managed to communicate in English would have been able to highlight their awareness or the real issues of street-level police conduct, which had the potential of developing into corruption (*ibid* 2010). Thus, participants' capability of communicating effectively with the police, according to Kweku, helped to prevent or reduced anxiety which often accompanied street-level encounters with the police. In this sense, poorer members of society and those who were not as well educated were more vulnerable to exploitation and corruption and were likely to experience greater

levels of anxiety in their encounters with the police. A level of communication skills as seem to be suggested by Nii Kwaku provided confidence and made it less challenging or intimidating to manage certain situations (for instance, how to respond to a police officer).

> But, some of us if they [the police] speak to us in English, and we cannot express ourselves back to them then we become afraid, and the only thing we can say is, 'Oh I beg you massa [master].' But when you start begging, then they would take the advantage. As soon as you start begging then they will think you are guilty of something and take the advantage to take something from you... (Nii Kwaku: Commercial driver, male, aged: 31 - 40).

The lack of communication skills could manifest uncertainty, such as lack of understanding of any form of explanation from the police. This could subsequently result in stressful circumstances for some participants. To communicate in English, even in a limited capacity were indicative of an individual's awareness of their rights as well as duties and requirements of the police (Mason 2010). However, where individuals were unable to communicate in English this may be perceived as suggesting a lack of awareness of street-level professional police conduct, hence, the increased probability for the participants to be exploited by the police (see Lobo 2001; Yeboah-Assiamah, Asamoah and Osei-kojo, 2014).

Furthermore, it can be argued that clarity on the role of the police would have reduced

uncertainty encompassing participants' view about the role of the Ghanaian police. For instance, the discussion from the participant below included a personal conviction that seemed to suggest that police corruption was ever present within the Ghanaian police service. However, it also appears that the participant felt a lack of understanding of police regulations (See Domoro and Agil 2012) and, possibly, driving regulations were the perceived causes of street-level police corruption.

> I believe that corruption goes on in the police and I think
> that the laws that the police work with are not open, look in
> Ghana, we the people, like me, I have to do something then
> after somebody will say that what I did is against the law.
> (Kwadwo Tumi: a commercial driver, male, aged: 41 – 50).

The above also appears to share a history of injustice, suggesting a lack of understanding of the rule of law, hence, the participant was unable to conform accordingly. Thus, he appears to be unclear as to when and how it was safe to act or conform to traffic regulation expectations. It may be argued that Kwadwo Tumi's experiences could be related to that of the indigenous people during colonial era of policing and dispossession in Ghana (Onyeozi 2005; Tankebe 2008b; Francis 2012; Fitch 2011; Mawby 2013). The participant seems to have experienced no basic rights of self-determination. As a member of the society, he was unable to contribute or determine the policing status as well as freely pursue procedural justice. Furthermore, what seemed to be apparent to Kwadwo Tumi is the inherent lack of understanding the nature of the police in Ghana. The participant also appeared to suggest that police institutional fix was mostly used to establish the ultimate legitimacy as well as the authority of the police (Roebuck and

Barker 1974; Newburn 1999). Based on Kwadwo Tumi's narratives, there seems to be some ambiguity pertaining to the rules and the complexities of the law.

A tactical police ploy was used to establish police boundaries and authority (Steinberg 2012). This, in turn, distinguished the police from the rest of the participants interviewed. Hence, thereby not being fully conversant with the nature of street-level policing regulations led him to feel unsure of the choices that were available to him (the participant), and a distorted sense of normative street-level policing regulations (see Cohen 1965). In other words, he could have been a potential victim to be exploited by the police. It seems that participants who were not aware of their rights were more likely to be exploited by the police. As without the participant having a clear understanding of the rule of law, police corrupt practices appear to reign unchecked.

Attitudinal pressure on police officers

Attitudinal pressure refers to when members of the Ghana police service or private citizens exert pressure upon police officers, inducing them towards corruption (see also Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2007). Some of my participants suggested that police attitudinal pressure seems to have an integral influence on other police officers to engage in corrupt practices. For instance, the following participant considered police corrupt practices as a 'kind of behaviour', this seem to suggest some sub-cultural influences within the service. This sub-cultural corrupt socialization experience appeared to be picked up or learnt after successful recruitment into the Ghanaian police service.

It has become like some kind of behaviour, that, as soon as

you join as a policeman, then you copy the behaviour. If you are at home, can you go and stand by the roadside and say you are stopping cars? You are not an armed robber, are you? People will even kill you, but as soon as you join the service, it's a behaviour they learn (Awura Esther: a private entrepreneur, female, aged: 51 - 60).

The views presented above were likewise shared by another participant, Kofi, as stated below:

This boy who is learning the trade from me, everything I show him about the job he will take some and add it to his own. Just like the police, someone will have some kind of different behaviour before joining the police but as soon as he is a member then he will copy the behaviour of others (Kofi Berima: a commercial driver, male, aged: 41-50).

The above quotes suggest the implicit process of learning techniques of corrupt practices for the police, commercial driving or market trading. The deviant behaviour, as seems to be demonstrated above, begins at the early stage of a career or trade, which entails subordination to the directives of the leaders and distancing from a modern or Western approach to police corruption. The above participants' view corroborates the concept that the behavioural characteristics of new recruits were often shaped by the expectations or the experiences of another or a senior officer (Sunahara 2004; Conti 2006; Henson et al 2010), after successful recruitment into an occupational environment.

The process of learning includes the essential skills as well as the techniques of initiating, soliciting and accepting bribes (Matsueda 1982). Furthermore, the quotes also seem to make a note of the authoritative nature of police conduct, which seem to influence a level of street-level corrupt practices. Additionally, some of the participants reaction to police corruption seem to suggest that the role seems to provide new officers an extension of the self (see (Prelinger, 1959). The authority gained through successfully obtaining the status of a police officer become an extension of the self, became more knowledgeable about the *do's and don'ts* of police conduct, this also suggested that the police had the ultimate authority over other people. Yaw provided an example:

> Some of the attitudes of the police on the roadside, you can't even understand them. Sometimes, when you want to suggest something to them, he will say, 'I know my job!', you don't have to tell me what to do (Yaw Osunu: a commercial driver, male, aged: 41 - 50)

In some instances, where the street-level conduct of the police was recognised as unacceptable or did not seem right, participants attempted to make a constructive criticism or suggestions to the officer. However, the above seemed to suggest that the police develop or adapt to what I refer to as a 'defence technique mechanism'. This defence technique when adopted by some individual street-level police officers was to neutralise their street-level police misconduct (Sykes and Matza 1957, Prenzler 2009). In other words, there seems to be an impression that the police had adopted an authoritarian toughness or dominance over other people who may condemn police corruption. Even if the participants knew their rights, the police seem to have used their legitimate authority

to defeat or overpower them.

In such instances, the officer deliberately ignored or refused to acknowledge participants concerns about his street-level conduct. The officer would assert that what the participants alleged was not accurate, this could be compounded with the officer's renunciation of participants' interest and knowledge of the rule of law.

> They [the police] only stop private passengers' cars and if you are a passenger and you see these things and you know about the law and you try to challenge them [the police] .... then the police will use that as an excuse to even waste your time more! Even if he will have to seize the vehicle for 1 hour and 30 minutes, he will do it. Just because of 5.00Ghanacedis! (Kwesi Minka: mobile trader, male, aged: 31 – 40).

Therefore, it became impossible for participants to constructively challenge street-level policing, since by doing so they could be perceived as undermining the authority of the police. This could have manifested as intimidation and a police officer might or might not exercise full police authority upon the individual. The above description also suggests that the more individuals attempted to challenge and possibly address perceived street-level unethical police conduct, the more likely the police were to exercise their authoritarian style of leadership and use force to discharge their duties (Laguna et al. 2009; Obaro 2014; Bradford et al 2016). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that such attitudes as exhibited by the police, which may have been personally or indirectly

observed or experienced, could necessitate bribery on two possible grounds. Firstly, to avoid prolonging an encounter with the police (cf. Norman et al 2017). Secondly, a bribe or payment might be made to avoid experiencing police display of superiority and control (Laguna et al. 2009; Obaro 2014; Bradford et al 2016). These views appear to be shared by Jojo, another participant who provided a direct experience and an explanation of his involvement in corrupt practices with the police.

> …. if a driver doesn't give the police money, and you are taken to the station that is the end. You don't get a lawyer or any help. Whatever the police have put on the paper.... that is what will be used in court against you, and you don't want to go court or prison. That is why. I have also done it before, I made a wrong move and I was stopped by the police, I took some money and went to beg them with it. (Jojo Akatchi, a commercial driver, male, aged: 31 - 40).

Participants' perceptions of police authoritarianism seem to have some implications within the legal justice system. Even without the participant being represented by a lawyer, the court can use evidence or notes brought forward by the police to reach a verdict. In other words, to avoid experiencing a perceived lack of procedural fairness (See Jackson et al 2011), some participants opted to bribe officers from the very onset of police contact. It can be argued that such corrupt practices, as presented above, could be linked to individuals' actions in order to gain a personal interest (see Sherman 1978; Punch 1985; Kleinig 1996; Ivkovic 2005). This interest could mostly be represented by certain moral benchmarks, such as, whether it is desirable or immoral (*ibid* 1978; Tyler

1990). Jojo Akatchi further stated that he had personally offered money or made some form of payment to the police and explained his reasons for bribing the police as follows:

> Yes, I do pay the police because we don't have any lawyer to defend us when we go to court and this is one of the reasons people say the police like bribery, but it is us who give it to them (Commercial driver, male, aged: 41 - 50).

Therefore, the decision to offer money or a bribe to the police upon an arrest appears to be influenced by certain contextual factors. Firstly, upon the perception of not being given the opportunity to be represented and defended in court by a lawyer. Secondly, the expectation that they will not experience a fair court proceeding (see Atuguba 2003; Tankebe 2010b). In other words, the legal or criminal justice system was perceived to have little procedural legitimacy. If participants perceived the legal system as having little legitimacy (see Ivkovic 2005) they were more likely to initiate a corrupt experience with the police.

It could be argued that corruption permeates through the whole justice system of which the police are a part, and not necessarily an issue perceived to be limited to the Ghana police. The perception of lack of procedural fairness during court proceedings served as a motivational factor for participants to bribe or influence the police officer to overlook the offence in the first instance. The ultimate objective then was to avoid a hefty fine in court (Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Insaidoo 2007; Addo 2012). Arguably, if the police officer accepts the bribe they can be seen as offering a favour on one hand, and yet on the other

hand, the police could also be considered as a *victim* of public corrupt practices.

Furthermore, participants perceived that the lack of police transparency or accountability had a principal influence on street-level police conduct (see also Newburn 1999; Punch 2000). It seems that discreditable police conduct, as well as the perceptions of police standards of work, looked significant – in the sense that a breakdown in participants' perceptions of police transparency had some effects of influencing corrupt practices (Newburn 1999; Chan 1999; Punch 2000).

Police transparency and accountability

Police transparency and accountability refer to participants' perceptions of the Ghanaian police being accountable to the people they serve. The lack of police transparency seemed to enable discreditable police conduct to occur, in this case, corruption (see also Newburn 1999; William 2002; Punch 2000). It seems that participants liked the notion of a glazed window through which they would be able to see and possibly understand how the police deal with them (cf. Insaidoo 2007). This implies the willingness of the police to demonstrate some transparency in work culture of the police at the street-level. It is noteworthy from the example below that in some circumstances, the fate of the participant depended largely on the officer's use of discretion. On one hand, the participant could be given a grace period or a police caution to obtain and or amend the deficiencies of documents related to the vehicle. On the other hand, the officer may seize the participant's vehicular documentations and ask the said commercial driver to come and report to him (the police officer) at a later date.

> Sometimes when the policeman checks your license and
> there is something missing, then is two things, he [the
> police officer] may ask you, the driver, to go and correct it,
> or he may take the license and ask you to come back later
> to see him. If it happens like that, then it is between you
> and the police, because nobody would know what would go
> on between them. (Nana Ama Nancy: a private
> entrepreneur, female, aged: 41 -50).

However, when the latter becomes the option for the police officer, according to the view of Nana Ama (above) the conduct of the officer largely escapes any form of police structural oversight (see Sherman 1974; Miller 2003; Aremu, Pakes and Johnston 2009). The perceived lack of street-level police transparency seems to have created an environment conducive to both the police and public in promoting corruption. For instance, on the notion of '*if it happens like that, then it is between you and the police'* as stated in the above quote, this appears to indicate a veil of secrecy over some of the conduct of street-level police duties. In other words, officers were perceived as being at a very limited risk of official punishment for misconduct. Although there are internal agencies (Police Intelligence and Professional Standards - PIPS) as well as external agencies (Ghana Integrity Initiative - GII, and the Centre for Democratic Development - CDD - Ghana) set-up to counter police corruption, countering street-level police corruption seems to have its own challenges which in turn counter the effect on police anti-corruption measures.

> There isn't any police officer who will stop you on the road
> and you will see his name or a badge number. Even if he

> has it, he wears a jacket to cover it. (Yaw Osunu, a
> commercial driver, aged: 41 - 50)

There was a deliberate attempt to conceal one's identity prior to engaging in street-level police corruption. For instance, Yaw suggested that most officers on street-level duties were not easily identifiable either by their names nor service number. In other words, even if the participants want to file a complaint, they were unlikely to be able to successfully associate the corrupt experiences to a particular officer (cf. William 2002; Insaidoo 2007). Some of the participants (in this case the market traders) also seem to share the view that such street-level corrupt practices, in turn, increases the cost of living, as police corruption seems to be factored into the cost of products (Quah 2014; National post 2017).

> The police have been harassing us, taken money from us.
> Even the duty at the port on the goods from abroad makes it
> even more expensive. So, if someone goes and clears the
> goods and meets such difficulties on the road then it makes
> everything else very difficult for all of us, goods become
> more expensive. (Ewura Esther: private entrepreneur,
> female, aged: 41 - 50).

Based on the following personal experience of participants' street-level corrupt practices with the police, there seems to be the expectation from participants to make some form of payments to the police. If street-level police officers did not receive such gifts from participants, such as market traders, there was a high chance that the police would either delay or refuse to offer clearance at police checkpoints. Hence, to gain easy or flexible

access through police stop barriers, participants had to comply to the perceived

expectations from the police by pay to gain access (see Beek 2016). Enforcement of the

law becomes limited or ineffective in such situations (see also Främling 2005).

> Most especially, when you come out from Togo, and maybe
> you have underestimated your goods and the police get to
> know of it, instead [of] taking the person to the police
> station to do the right thing. I give you something and the
> police will accept it and let me go... (Daniel Opare: a
> private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 - 60)

Togo, as stated above, is situated to the west of Ghana and to the east of Benin and seems

to be a rewarding trading point for market traders in Ghana. A typical contextualized

corrupt experience for a market trader would be influenced by, for instance, invoicing of

goods or seeking an import clearance to Ghana. Although, it can be argued that this

would be a duty for the Ghana custom officers, it also seems that some police officers

have capitalized on this opportunity and exploited market traders, either to extort or

demand bribes to grant the necessary access. The cost of such corrupt experiences could

be considered as a trade-economical loss. This in turn incurred an unofficial value added

tax onto the cost of products as a means of recouping losses from such street-level police

corrupt practices (Quah 2014; National post 2017). It can be argued that when the

payment and acceptance of such bribes goes unpunished it sets in motion a corruption

cycle, paving the way for the normalisation of street-level public-police corruption

(Ashforth and Anand 2003; Anand, Ashforth and Joshi 2004).

Additionally, like the notion of a benevolent society, as discussed in the previous chapter, coupled with the perception of unsustainable income in the Ghanaian police service, participants seem to have acknowledged such factors and almost accept and pay bribes demanded by some officers. '*They ask, we give, and you will be free',* as stated in the illustration below. Moreover, for the participant below to respond positively to police corruption also seems to be underpinned by his anticipation of being free from the police. Thus, the motive of avoiding any formal police structural proceedings seems a feasible reason to engage in police corruption (Faull 2007).

> … I don't know if it is part of their belt, they ask, we give,
> and you will be free. (Daniel Opare: a private entrepreneur,
> male, aged: 51 - 60).

The expression of '*I don't know if it is part of their belt*' may suggest the uncertainty surrounding the participant's psychological inception of police corruption in Ghana. Arguably, such an acknowledgement could have been rationalised into the normality associated with street-level corrupt practices (Ashforth and Anand 2003; Anand, Ashforth and Joshi 2004; Beek 2016). However, the experiences of such street-level corruption on one hand would seem to encourage savings on drivers who carried more goods than they were legally allowed. On the other hand, these added costs could jeopardize the trade sector's ability to provide satisfactory price levels of public goods (National post 2017). Subsequently, making the attraction of either internal or external investments in trade businesses uncompetitive, leading to less private trade sector development. As Daniel further suggested (below), street-level corrupt practices, on one hand, impacted

negatively on the state, on the other hand, the police personally gained from the encounter and the trader or driver had also escaped any form of police formal procedural experience (cf. Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Insaidoo 2007).

> ...they are not helping the state, but I will be free from them, the policeman has benefited but the government has lost (Daniel Opare: private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 - 60)

Corrupt practices as presented in these instances appeared to be influenced or facilitated by a set of contextual factors or pre-conditions, which encouraged participants to engaged in corrupt transactions. Examples of such pre-conditions as perceived by the members of the public, included low salaries for police officers (see Quah 2015). As already mentioned, the perceived opportunity to benefit from the encounter, coupled with the desire to influence the authority of the police, for instance, to give favourable treatment or access at police checkpoints. This is then manifest in an acceptable rationale for engaging in corruption (Faull 2007), since both parties stood to gain from the experience.

> I have lived in a barracks before; a police officer will buy things on credit always till the month ends… if he is being paid 2 million cedis [200.00Ghanacedis], and has bought things on credit totalling 2million, then that means his salary is even finished. So, what else is he going to live on? So, that is a big part of the corruption (Ewura Esther: private entrepreneur, female, aged: 41 - 50)

Based on the contextual factors illustrated above, the participant seems to the suggest that the inclination of a police officer to drift in and out of corruption was very much a necessity (a top up on an unsustainable income). Additionally, reasoning along the notion of street-level police corruption facilitating higher cost of products, it can be argued that police corruption impeded the growth of market or trade commercialism (see Tanzi and Davoodi 2001; Duncan 2009; Quah 2014; Farooq et al 2013). Financial revenue, possibly linked to the development of private entrepreneurship, were mostly diverted in the event of corruption – for personal gain or enrichment. It is worth noting that although participants suggested above that the state lost out in public-police corrupt experiences, nonetheless, some of the responses from participants seem to imbue and neutralise bribing police officers with such traditional practices such as gift-giving and perceived legitimacy associated to giving to the Ghana police (Bayley and Perito 2011; Mills 2012; Hope 2015).

Gift giving and perceived legitimacy of police corruption

Corrupt practices in Ghana can be seen to be linked with conflicting traditional values and values associated with colonial modernization (see also Mbaku, 1996). In this respect, corruption is partly a by-product of people caught in between existing traditional values and the Western norms that accompany modernization. For example, in Ghana, the rights of an individual are regularly subordinate to that of a family and the broader social group (Gould and Mukendi 1989; Mbaku 1996). Hence, loyalty to, for instance, an ethnic group, would be viewed as more significant than the individual responsibility within an organization. These connections have been referred to by some scholars as essential

determinants of public corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mbaku 1996). Family members are relied upon to share or provide support to friends, extended family, and their broader ethnic group (*ibid* 1996). In my fieldwork, these cultural norms were affirmed by some of the participants, who attributed these peculiarities to the effect of some traditional or cultural practices and family. For instance, Daniel, a private entrepreneur, told me.

> Our perception of gifts and our habits of giving and family help contribute to 90% corruption of the police. He will give you this and another time he will come and ask you [the police] for something, which you can't refuse. Because he has already given you something yesterday and the next day he comes to you, 'Oh papa [police], I need some help… (Daniel Opare: private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 -60).

It is worth considering that the terms of respect commonly used to address police officers, (for instance, 'oh papa' or 'oh dada'), as stated earlier, are similar and reminiscent of the notion of 'oh bro' as previously discussed in relation to the perceived notion of a benevolent society in Ghana (see Chapters Two and Four). Specifically, in addressing the officer as Papa or Dada the participant was drawing upon an informal, euphemistic approach to masking the authoritative or the legal status of the officer and thus deter any possible formal proceedings associated with police work that could follow a police encounter (see also Newburn 1999). The 'father' status accorded to the police may also seem to suggest a humble submission to police authority. Depending on the situational context in which it is used, this could be an approach to entice forgiveness, or to

de-escalate a tension, and therefore avoid formal charges that could have been merited by the offender. These characteristics are an example of normal cultural practice within a traditional family – indicating the highly informal and collective 'gemeinschaft' nature of Ghanaian culture (cf. Tönnies 1925).

The explanation provided by Daniel Opare above can also be associated with the concepts of family ties and the implicit norms and habits of gift-giving, referring to some of the traditional or customary practices of what I call a 'culture of giving' within Ghana. These practices suggest reliance on family members or friends for favours, support for well-being, and bringing social or material benefits. Individual members of the family cooperate to keep up their bond and, at the slightest opportunity, further their collective objectives. These concepts collaborate with, for instance, Tönnies (1925) analysis relating to pre-modern society and social interaction. According to his theory, individuals are described as bound by the tendency of support and collectivity which encourages a sentiment of fellowship and belonging rather than any contractual arrangement. A significant feature underpinning such relations is that the connections and bonds constructed depend on direct collaboration.

Within Ghana, the extended family system embraces the concepts of shared support, gift giving, and ethnic loyalty to assist or motivate members of the extended family to develop their collective potential (Tanye 2010; Yeboah- Assiamah et al 2016). This view is also shared by Gyekye (2015: 357), who states that, ''The extended family system with its web of relatives gives rise to patronage, the official is expected to find jobs (favours)

for some members of the extended family either his own outfit or elsewhere.'' From this perspective, it can be argued that such family practices served as neutralizing and, perhaps, motivational factors that amalgamated participants into public-police corrupt practices. This would influence behaviours of favouritism and nepotism, which, as previously discussed in Chapter Two, are a significant aspect of police corruption.

It can also be argued that the practices of gift-giving and acceptance of gifts play a significant role in strengthening collective relationships (Tönnies 1925, 1957) as well as serving as a recognition of traditional values. For instance, a gift of 'something' as suggested in the illustration above, can help build, strengthen, and facilitate relationships. In order words, gift-giving in Ghana was embedded in relationships and other forms of social encounters or interactions. It is worth noting that such practices are not pertinent to Ghana alone. The difference is the extent, morality, or the centrality underpinning the gift being offered. Giving gifts to public officials (in this case, the police), could be considered inappropriate in other cultures, especially Western cultures. However, in Ghana, it has come to seem very 'normal' and common.

> As human as we are, I don't know, but as much as the public want to give money to the police they should refuse it. But it is very difficult for them to refuse it, very difficult…they will term it as a gift (Daniel Opare: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 -60).

> There is always a good reason to give the police money, look as I am here in my shop and somebody comes to me

> and say 'Mum, I need some drinks for a program' - he pays
> for the goods and if I have to give him his change but says,
> 'oh mum, keep the change'.   Does this mean corruption?
> Who will say no to a gift?   (Nana Akosua: a private
> entrepreneur, female, aged: 41 – 50)

Gift-giving was central to Ghanaian culture and this, coupled with the perceived legitimacy of giving to a duty police officer as a necessary incentive, had overshadowed modern or Western concepts of police corruption (see also Chapter Two). Yet, as I have argued, the culture of giving played a significant role in determining the rate of corruption (see also Hope 2015). When money is offered, for example, as a bribe, it could be perceived or considered as a gift and it would seem culturally inappropriate not to accept it. It may therefore also be unclear whether corruption was being manifested, as most corrupt experiences would be perceived as gifts rather than bribes (see also Cohen 2001).

Additionally, participants' perceptions of police officers working under conditions perceived as challenging was synonymous with notions of patronage. In this case, denial of corruption took the form of appreciating the difficult and poorly paid nature of police work and offering money to street-level police officers as an acceptable praxis (see Cohen 2001; Marché 2009). In this case, it can be argued that patronage impels legitimate and justifiable police behaviour, which underpins much street-level police corruption in Ghana Nana Akosua provided an example:

> A police officer wearing his uniform, let's say those standing by the road side …. just imagine the heat from the sun and they have to stand in it and do their work. Standing alone in the heat is a hard work. So, if you are passing and you give the police GH¢1.00, that is nothing, there is nothing wrong with it. He sees to it that traffic flows correct and for people to cross the street safely. So, if you are passing by and give the police GH¢1.00 or something, I don't agree that the police is corrupt. (A private entrepreneur, female, aged: 41 – 50).

Denial and neutralisation of police corruption in some cases thus took the form of offering money to street-level police officers in appreciation of their harsh environmental working conditions. This in turn made some participants' attitudes towards paying or offering money to the police seem a natural and moral occurrence. Working conditions enabled legitimation of offering money to the police. These gifts then served as a motivational element on the capacity of the police to function effectively. These gifts were thus an *enabling technique for corruption.* Whereby a form of an enabling practices emerged. As *s*uch practices had a social disposition attached to them, they demonstrated participants' gratefulness, as well as influencing the police in the conduct of their duties (Marché 2009). Nonetheless, such street-level reactions to giving to the police allowed participants to distance themselves from the moral implications and the legal and modern concepts of police corruption (Cohen 2001). Yet, at the same time, these practices suggest a form of patronage for officers' commitments, encouragement to police duties, and an informal way of empowering the police in the interest of the participants' safety. Giving to street-level officers was almost synonymous with maintaining public safety.

Another explanation used to legitimate corrupt practices were based upon some of the participants' satisfaction of a case well handled by the police. This can also refer to contact initiated by the participant – where for instance, in order to report a crime, where a participant is satisfied with an officer's handling of the case and in the overall response received. These characteristics had legitimised participants' actions of 'giving something' in the form of money as a departing or goodbye gift for the officer, and perhaps, with the expectation of a long-lasting relationship or association. Hence, reflecting on the notion of a benevolent society, the participant was under no compulsion and yet still offered a gift to the police. This category of gift-giving discussed above can be considered as *appreciative technique.* However, a note worth considering in this context is that it was not an expectation from the participant for the officer to solicit or demand for the bribe, as that would have suggested an extortion.

> …if I report a case to the police, and I realise that the police have done a good job and I am happy about it after the case is settled, I can give something to the officer as a goodbye gift. In that case, I voluntary gave it to him, but it is not up to the policeman say that base on the job I have done for you, you must pay this or that, no! (Kwabena Ohene: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 - 60).

The Western way of thinking states unequivocally that police corruption makes the role of the police as an institution very challenging, undermining the status of the police and takes away from innovative police and policing ideas (cf. Sherman 1978; Newburn 1999; Ivkovic 2008; Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Prenzler 2009; Tankebe 2010b). However,

according to some of the participants, as illustrated below, offering money to the police actually enhanced or empowered the police. Explicitly, this can refer to the idea of an officer having to spend time on a case which could have otherwise been spent with his or her family. Participants thus considered giving to police officers as customary in order to necessitate effective police performance or expedite action on issues brought to their attention.

It can be seen that the practices described above function to neutralise modern concepts associated with police corruption, and simultaneously legitimatise corruption. For instance, where a participant had offered money to the police when reporting a case, it may imply police inefficiency can be circumvented, preventing any form of unofficial or bureaucratic delays (see Heckelman and Powell 2008). Based on the explanations as provided by the participants, one would be tempted to posit that the wilful gesture of offering money to the police as an appreciative technique may ensure that other forms of corruption which seem to be unappreciated by participants were not practiced or did not exist (for instance, police extortion or soliciting for bribes). Offering money voluntarily may have encouraged officers to use their legitimate authority to prevent any delays or barriers that would have existed in order for bribes to be demanded or extorted (*ibid* 2008).

> If you go and report someone to the police and say, officer
> this person has stolen from me and you give the officer
> ¢200.00Ghanacedis or ¢100.00Ghanacedi for his time and
> working on your case, is that corruption? So, I don't agree,

> no. For that one alone I don't agree... (Nana Akosua: a
> private entrepreneur, female, aged: 41 - 50)

Some amount of police corruption was apparently justifiable as it would enable the police to address social issues brought to their attention. It is worth noting that participants who may have engaged in such optimal corrupt practices with the police, tend to be content with that experience – suggesting a direct positive experience of police corruption. For instance, an on-line Ghanaweb News reported of the Acting Public Affairs Director of the Ghana police service (Deputy Superintendent of Police - DSP Cephas Arthur) that commercial drivers were to be blamed for most street-level police corrupt practices. DSP Cephas Arthur posits that, assuming a driver had committed a motor traffic offence and the driver knew that having committed that offence, there was a high chance of being sent to court, and the driver will end up paying about six thousand ghanacedis. The driver, knowing full well the implication of his offence, when the policeman tries to process the driver for court, the driver will also try his best to offer the officer something in order for the offence to be overlooked. The DSP further questioned that, if a driver offers about twenty Ghanacedis to avoid paying the six thousand, how much does the driver save? DSP Athur further stated that, 'Drivers have always applauded police officers if they succeed in greasing their palm' (Addo 2012: p7).

In order to fully understand the reasons behind public and police corruption, it is clear that it is imperative to consider the symbolism attached to certain cultural practices. In this case, gift-giving was embedded in Ghanaian culture. For indigenous people, this may have been used to interpret physical association or relation with one another, and it thus it

constituted a significant aspect of cultural identity as well as a social integrity. These traditional practices have thus impacted on the development or modern concepts of corruption attached to the police. Recognition and respect for these traditional practices had developed participants' inclination to offer bribes or money to the Ghanaian police. This ambiguity about the appropriateness of traditional practices of giving gifts have kept public-police corrupt practices alive in Ghana. Thus, within the culture of gift-giving and the dimensions of corruption, there emerges a form of 'enabling' scripts, that claim that aspects of corruption actually enable the police to do their job or for individuals (in this case, commercial drivers as well market traders) to function in their daily lives

These values had underpinned the factors that overshadowed most participants' understanding and well as their response to police corruption. The implications of these different views or understandings of police corruption suggest that, if some police conduct were not considered as corrupt, they, in turn, would contribute towards a less negative effect on a participant's confidence in the police and police legitimacy. However, where other conducts of the police were considered as corrupt, this too would have some effect on police confidence and legitimacy. Further discussions of the effects of police corruption on public confidence in the police and police legitimacy are provided in the concluding chapter. Additionally, the effect of cultural practices on the probability of participants adjusting their attitudes to police corrupt practices underpinned a common rationalization used to deny and thus normalize police corrupt practices.

Conclusion

In exploring the different implications of public-police corruption upon confidence and police legitimacy, there is a need to examine how participants (citizens) reacted as well as responded to police corruption. The analysis of corruption presented in this chapter have been focused on daily street-level contextual influences and views regarding the acceptability of police corruption from commercial drivers and private entrepreneurs (market traders). It emerged that, in Ghana, there were multiple social and contextual factors that influenced police corruption.

For instance, it seems significant that to avoid prolonged contact with the police and possibly the avoidance of a high or heavy police handedness, participants were inclined to offer money to the police at barriers and check points. Street-level corrupt practices were also attributed to limited educational experiences, which impacted on participants understanding of traffic regulations. Hence, due to their inability to comply with traffic regulations, commercial drivers relied on bribing or inducing the police from the onset of police contact. In this context, an officer on street-level policing duties was effectively an ally for many commercial drivers' who wanted to avoid formal prosecution even after being found violating traffic regulations. These practices and processes had normalised public-police corruption practices. It was acknowledged that police attitudinal pressure and the lack of police transparency or accountability also had an impact on police corruption. There were concerns raised about the secrecy of some conduct of street-level police. A significant reaction associated with street-level police corruption in this chapter was the additional cost levied on market goods, as street-level corrupt experiences

appeared to be factorised onto the prices of market goods, resulting in what my study refers to as unofficial value added tax.

A prominent underlying factor identified was the effect of the culture of gift-giving. As it emerged that perceptions and practices of gift-giving and characteristics usually associated with families, such as fellowship, a sense of belonging or shared support, contributed to police corrupt experiences. This also shaped participants' perception of legitimate police corruption. Additionally, denial of corruption was affected by appeals to the apparent challenges in the nature and the role of street-level police duties. In this manner, offering money to officers was viewed as a worthy or legitimate cause. Thus, money in a form of an *appreciating or enabling technique*, offered to the police enhanced immediate efficiency and boosted police performance.

In attempt to explore the effect of corrupt practices on police confidence and legitimacy in this thesis, the implications of participants experience of police corruption upon the Ghanaian police is assessed from the extent of confidence and legitimacy. This is the subject matter for the next chapter (six), which is the last but not the least of the finding chapters.

CHAPTER SIX

CORRUPTION EXPERIENCES: IMPLICATIONS on

POLICE LEGITIMACY and CONFIDENCE

[It] Is not that I don't like them at all, no, if I need help or assistance, I
will call the police.... I will call. They are there to help us to live in
peace. It is not because they do corruption and some things that [it] is
not good, so we also don't want to contact them, no. Is not like that at
all, if I need help, or anybody needs help from the police we should
contact them to come and help.

(Awuraa Esther: a private entrepreneur, female, aged: 51- 60)

Introduction

The discussions in the previous findings chapters were embedded in how participants
understood, reacted to, and the justifications associated with police corruption. These
chapters have taken account of the contextual determinants of, and responses to,
public-police corruption. Street-level (micro) police corruption attracted different
reactions and responses from respondents (see Bayley and Perito 2011). In other words,
depending on the contextual factors which acted upon police corruption, this in turn
generated different reactions from participants. Primarily, most respondents did not
actually consider all forms of micro police corruption experiences as examples of
corruption in Ghana. In this chapter it is argued that, even with the wider perceptions of
(street-level) corruption associated with the Ghanaian police, paradoxically, most of the
participants perceived the police service positively, or as having a significant level of

integrity (Benson 1981). The data largely suggested that police legitimacy was not affected overall.

Participants' perceptions of public safety as well as the role of the police as being responsible for the maintenance of public order underpinned participants' perception of police legitimacy within Ghana (see Beetham 1991; Coicaud, 2002; Tyler and Wakslak 2004). However, for participants who had either direct or indirect experiences of police-initiated corruption (such as extortion or police coerced bribes), these experiences were likely to have negative implications upon participants' confidence in the Ghana police (See also Sherman 1978). These instances of experiences of corruption contributed to what I refer to as 'limited police confidence', as there were some concerns that police corrupt practises caused mistrust in the Ghanaian police service. In contrast, participants' experiences of corruption had no impact on police legitimacy, this suggested that participants would not have adopted to any other means of resolving social issues, such as consulting traditional rulers (chiefs) or by vigilantism. But they would have obeyed or complied with the law and relied on the police (cf. Tyler 1990, 2006b; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Jackson and Bradford 2010; Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill and Quinton 2010).

It is worth noting that any form of discussion about police corruption is usually inherently focused on the negativity associated with it (Bayley 1966; Sherman 1978; Syed 1997; Sayed and Bruce 1998; Newburn 1999; Miller 2003; Ivkovic 2005; Faull 2007; Andvig and Fjeldstad 2008; Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Prenzler 2009; Dempsey and Forst 2010; Tankebe 2010b; Hope 2015). Based on my findings in this chapter, traditional

wisdom may imply that participants' confidence and police legitimacy would be eroded. The issue to explore in this chapter is the extent to which different public experiences and perceptions of police corruption affect legitimacy and confidence in the Ghanaian police. Firstly, this chapter will attempt to explore the meanings participants associated with police confidence and legitimacy. Secondly, discussions on corruption and its implications on confidence and legitimacy of the Ghanaian Police are discussed.

Perceptions of factors associated with the understanding of police legitimacy and confidence

This section looks at participants' responses to the question of, '*What does trust mean to you and how much trust do you have in the police*?' There were several factors participants associated with their confidence and legitimacy for the Ghanaian police. These factors were expected from a theoretical perspective. Firstly, public perceptions of the legitimacy of the police appeared to be influenced by the notion that the Ghanaian police was the foremost constitutional or lawful institution authorised to deal with crime. They were there to ensure public protection, by promoting the safety and security of the people, as well as reacting to emergency situations (cf. Beetham, 1991, Tyler and Wakslak 2004, Jackson et al 2011).

> …if I need the police I will call them they know their job,
> so yes, you will have to call them. (Kuku Seth: a
> commercial driver, male, aged: 31 – 40).

> ...the police are the only people who will help. If someone

> holds me at a gun point, can I say anything? But if the
> police is there, he will not be able to, so we need them a lot.
> (Awura Esther: a private entrepreneur, female, aged: 51 –
> 60)

Secondly, trust, faith, belief, non-bias and procedural fairness were all found to be associated with participants' confidence in the Ghanaian police. For instance (as illustrated below), some suggested that trust was linked to believing in the police. This notion of belief suggested readiness on the part of participants to trust that the police performed their duties with fairness as well as expectations of effective services (cf. Tyler and Fagan 2008; Jackson and Bradford 2010; Tnkebe 2010a).

> Trust is like putting your belief in something or someone
> with no disappointments, everything is fair. (Kofi Berima: a
> commercial driver, male, aged: 41-50).

Likewise, Akosua also shared a similar view:

> Trust to me, is to put your belief in something for good
> service. (Nana Akosua: a private entrepreneur, female,
> aged: 41 – 50)

Trust in the Ghanaian police was founded upon the duty of the police to deal with issues brought to their attention without favouritism or a feeling of discontent about how the issue was handled or administered by the police (see Ren, Cao, Lovrich and Gaffney 2005; Jackson et al 2011).

Figure 13: Public View: Factors associated with their understanding of police confidence and legitimacy

Figure thirteen displays the factors that needed to be present for participants (commercial drivers and market traders) to have confidence in the Ghanaian police, and to view them with legitimacy. For instance, participants' perceptions of non-bias or fairness may imply certain conditions of integrity from the police (Mazerolle et al 2013; Hope 2015). Thus, to prevent what participants may perceive as bias or unfairness in their encounters with the police, officers would have to adopt and maintain a culture of integrity (*ibid* 2013). Moreover, police effectiveness or performance may also suggest conditions of police competence, such as abiding by police procedural fairness, acknowledging, and valuing

organisational goals. When participants saw the Ghanaian police as following an established organisational or structural procedure, this contributed significantly towards building legitimacy and confidence in them (Miller and Blackler 2005). These factors were supposed to explicate what participants perceived as police confidence and legitimacy in the Ghanaian Police Service (GPS). However, where these expectations fell short or did not exist, or where the police were perceived to be corrupt during service delivery, it would inevitably generate public distrust for the police as well as the legitimacy of the police to deal effectively on criminal behaviours (Hohl, Bradford and Stanko 2010; Boateng 2012).

Corruption: Implications on police legitimacy and confidence

Relying solely on morality that could be associated with police corruption then it can be argued that it is bad or unacceptable. Furthermore, by taking such a tunnel view on police corruption within Ghana, this may lead to an inadequate understanding and reaction towards corrupt experiences (Syed 1997). Participants (commercial drivers and market traders) provided information which suggested that participants had at least some level of trust in the police and saw them as the legitimate institution to promote safety and solve criminal issues. Nana Ama Nancy provided an example:

> If I need help or assistance, apart from getting help from friends, for the police, I will say I have trust in them. Because they help us a lot and I will like to say that those who help us are more than those who do not help us. (A private entrepreneur, female, Aged: 51 – 60)

According to the responses in my study, overall trust in the Ghanaian police was impacted by participants' feeling of safety as well as the legitimate authority of the police to deal with criminal cases. Most of the participants interviewed expressed that they had some trust in the Ghanaian police. The trust levels had a reciprocal effect on participants' perception of police corruption. Police corrupt practices were used as a point of reference in evaluating trust in the police, as suggested by previous studies (Sherman 1978; Dowler 2003; Rosenbaum et al 2005; Avdija 2010; Boateng 2012). Yet, amidst the perception of police corrupt practices in Ghana, it can be argued that participants nonetheless had some level of confidence in the Ghanaian police, as elaborated below:

> I will call the police always, because I have the belief and trust that they are the people who can help me out of a situation (Kwadwo Tumi: a commercial driver, male, aged: 41 – 50)

> if I get a case now or something happens to me, I will call the police. Apart from you or somebody else who may come and help me, the police are the only people who will help (Awuraa Esther: a private entrepreneur, female, aged: 51- 60)

The responses above suggest that within the mindset of participants, they were under the obligation to obey the police. Hence, even with the perception of police corrupt practices, participants would largely defer to the police to deal with issues brought to their attention (Tyler 1990, 2006b). Specifically, my fieldwork suggested that perceptions of police corruption were more likely to impact on participants' confidence in the police but with

no or little impact on police legitimacy. It may thus be argued that the confidence and legitimacy of the Ghanaian Police Service represented two different aspects for participants. Legitimacy, from the perspective of participants, had a collective acknowledgement of the need, the authority as well as the legalities of having professional police in Ghana (see also Jackson et al 2011). Trust or confidence, in contrast, highlighted the extent of participants' satisfaction with services rendered by the Ghanaian police. Hence, perceived police corruption did not have much implication on participants' perception of police legitimacy, but rather highlighted its negative implications upon participants' confidence in the Ghanaian police. Madam Rose provided an example:

> My trust in the police? Some time ago, I was arrested by the police, just after I took a car to come back to Ghana from Togo. They asked me whether I have made duty on my materials. I said, I made on some but not all…later, I gave them all the money on me. So, because of what I have experienced I have some trust in them (Madam Rose: private entrepreneur, female, aged: 41-50).

In responding further to the question, '*Would you call on the police for assistance if you were a victim of crime? Why and why not?',* Madam Rose further stated:

> Oh yes! I will do that, because they are helping me, they are there to help people (ibid).

Initially, the Madam Rose's level of trust, had been generated as result of what could be

depicted as a negative personal experience of police corruption. The perceived status of police corruption, in this case, engulfed the officers who may have demanded, extorted, or solicited some form of value from the participant, as has been found by previous research (Newburn 1999; Arrigo and Clausen 2003; Douvlis and South 2003; Gerber and Mandelson 2008; Laguna et al 2009). However, the illustration above suggests that the participant may have violated traffic regulations or regulations in relation to the importation of goods to Ghana. Hence, these irregularities would have left the participant vulnerable to extortion or demand for some form of payments in order for the offence to be overlooked, and subsequently be granted access into Ghana (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative - *CHRI* 2007). In this case, the police disregarded their legitimate obligations in the face of law as well as to the public as the officer pursued a personal interest and benefited from the encounter (see Tankebe 2009a). Madam Rose may not have initiated the payments or may have been coerced into police corruption but offering the payment to the police avoided police formal proceedings.

Nonetheless, such police-initiated corruption breached participants' level of trust in the Ghanaian police. The above experience was viewed as bad or unethical police behaviour (see (Alam 1989; Weitzer and Tuch 2005; Skogan 2006). In this instance, perceived police misconduct or occurrences of bad police behaviour suggested that such experiences contributed to participants' level of trust or incomplete trust in the Ghanaian police service (Tankebe 2009b). As Kwadwo Tumi and Jojo Akatchi elaborates:

> For the police I have trust in them, because they are there to
> do a good job for us. But what will shake the trust I have

> for them is if I know someone [police officer] has not got a good behaviour. (Kwadwo Tumi: a commercial driver, male, aged: 41 – 50)

> …for me, trust…erm … is not full, no! But some trust - because there are some individual policemen who have a bad behaviour, but if I have a case I will definitely go to the police and nowhere else. (Jojo Akatchi: commercial driver, male, aged: 31-40).

The quote above further suggests that incomplete trust in the Ghanaian police could be associated with the lack of commitment on the part of the police officers to perform their duties in the interest of participants (see Tankebe 2009a). However, by suggesting that if he encountered an issue he would explicitly go to the police for help, this also demonstrated that his perception of police legitimacy was unaffected. It can also be argued that participants' perception of police legitimacy to deal with crimes and arguably maintain and promote safety override the implications corruption may have had upon the Ghanaian police (see also Tyler 1990).

> I have trust in the police, but sometimes they can a bit trick-ish. when you meet some of these young policemen, they want money here and there…sometimes it is very, very difficult to trust all of them… but if I need the police, yes, I will call them, and they can come and do their checks (Yaw Robert: private entrepreneur, male, aged: 41-50).

> There may be something wrong with the car or his license may not be the correct type…I believe is the duty of the

police to check for these things, but they don't, they are
only interested in this 1.00, 1.00ghanacedi…. Will I call
them? [the police], oh brother, I will call them without
delay, I will…. (Nana Ama Nancy: private entrepreneur,
female, aged: 41 - 50).

The police being 'trick-ish' suggests that some police officers were viewed as corrupt,
even to the extent that they might use specific techniques or ploys (for instance, extort or
solicit motorists for bribes) to benefit from their encounters with some members of the
public. The perception of the police being 'trick-ish' was also considered as problematic
as it made it challenging for the above participant to trust or have complete confidence in
the police.

Additionally, there was a perception of some police officers as risking public road safety
interest through their frequent involvement in street-level corruption. This had
contributed towards participants' limited confidence in the Ghanaian police (see also
Tankebe 2009b). For instance, the road worthiness of a vehicle coupled with whether the
license holder was qualified to drive a particular vehicle was considered as a contributory
factor towards public safety. However, as the illustration above suggests, some officers
were mostly interested in personal gain from their encounters with most commercial
drivers (Sherman 1978; Newburn 1999; Arrigo and Clausen 2003; Douvlis and South
2003; Gerber and Mandelson 2008). Many commercial drivers who gained access
through police barriers or stops may not have been qualified to drive the vehicles or the
vehicles may not be roadworthy. However, upon asking and subsequently being offered a
bribe, officers frequently granted access to these drivers, without the expected due

process being followed (Tankebe 2009b). Nonetheless, both Nana Ama Nancy and Yaw Robert also expressed that they would not hesitate to call the police, should there be a need to contact and possibly share information with the police. This view demonstrated participants recognition and awareness of the legitimate authority of the Ghanaian police, legitimate enough to enforce the law, prevent vigilante groups or actions as well as punish law violators (Tyler 1990, 2006b; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Jackson and Bradford 2010; Hough et al, 2010; Hough 2012).

In other instances, perceptions of police corruption impacted on participants complete trust or confidence for the Ghanaian police (Tankebe 2009b).

> The person you trust, like the police, they will tell you.... "Say this and when the accuse come, we will get him to do this…" So, you will be in a balance, you understand me. So, to trust the police whole heartedly, no, I can't do that. (Daniel Opare: a private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 - 60).

Police corrupt behaviour such as the lack of police transparency or clarity, thus, using deceptive means to interrogate suspects as suggested by Daniel above, implies that the officer was unreliable and not fair. Participants' perceived lack of police clarity on service delivery had largely contributed to his limited confidence in the Ghanaian police. Daniel from the illustration above, suggested the lack of openness in police service delivery meant a risk of complete trust in the police.

Furthermore, the participants below did suggest that their trust in the Ghana police was

totally reliant on the perception that the police were not corrupt. These participants'
propensity to have confidence in the Ghanaian police service was dependent on police
total disengagement in corruption. In this instance, it can be argued that self-awareness of
the participants coupled with their perception of police corruption had shaped how much
trust they extended to the police service (Newham 2002; Faull 2011). Additionally,
participants may have considered confidence as something that the Ghanaian police
would have to earn. As based upon their knowledge (either via a vicarious or personal
experience) of police corruption, they withheld their trust from the police until they were
certain that the police deserved their confidence. This suggests the significance of
contextual confidence within the Ghanaian police. Trust in the Ghanaian police context
was found to have a significant link with the police working in complete avoidance of
corruption (Tankebe 2009b). Police in active dissociation with corruption was a
contextualised strategy of sustaining participants total confidence in the Ghanaian police.

> For me to trust you [the police], I will have to find out that
> you [the police] have stopped taking bribes, that is my main
> concern (Kwesi Minka: mobile trader, male, aged: 31 – 40).

> …some of them [the police], they take bribes that will
> make me lose respect for the police.… (Kuku Seth: a
> commercial driver, male, aged: 31 – 40).

The authority of the Ghanaian police to secure order, in part, would have depended on a
participants' respect for the law (see Tyler 1999). However, the absence of respect, as
illustrated above, may have been influenced by participants' negative attitudes towards

police corruption. Perception of police corruption was an inference on participants' overall subjective evaluation of their confidence in the police (Newham 2002; Faull 2011). For those who lost confidence in the Ghanaian police, this suggests that corruption impacted on how the participant valued the police, in this case, it affected negatively on Kwesi Minka and Kuku Seth's confidence in the police, and arguably, the image of the police (see also Ivkovic 2005). On the contrary, their perception of police legitimacy was unaffected, both participants elaborated:

> ... my house is not far from Fadama police station or Tesano police station, so if something happens and I have to even jog to the station and report, I would do that, I will go to the station and report. (Kwesi Minka: mobile trader, male, aged: 31 – 40)

> Yeah, if I need the police I will call them they know their job, so yes you will have to call them… if I know anything about it, about a crime, I will contact them [police] and tell them what I know (Kuku Seth: a commercial driver, male, aged: 31 –40).

In Ghana, as in any other society where people break the law, the police are deemed to be empowered to bring about justice, punish or charge those who break the law (Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Tankebe 2007, 2008a; Jackson et al 2011). In this case, in participants' normative sense, the Ghanaian Police has the primary authority to deal with those who break the law. The perceived legitimacy of the police was primarily based on how officers responded to detecting and preventing crime. If the authority of the police is within and

supported by their perception of legitimacy, Kwesi Minka and Kuku Seth were more likely to cooperate with the police and help the Ghanaian police. Thus, if the police were to enforce the law fairly, this would encourage respect or trust and participants, in this case, commercial drivers would also obey the law (see also Tyler 1990).

> For the Ghana Police, they are the people who can help me out of a situation... I will say that I have belief in them, and I like what they do, [It] is good that we have the police, otherwise things will not go on well with us. (Kwadwo Tumi: a commercial driver, male, aged: 41 – 50).

What can be seen is that support for police legitimacy was not necessarily reflective of the perceptions of the police corrupt practices. Some participants, despite their experience of police corruption, viewed the Ghanaian police as the legitimate authority to enforce the law and deal with criminal issues. For example, the participant below indicated that the Ghanaian police was the foremost institution that she would contact for assistance if she needed help.

> Is not that I don't like them at all, no, if I need help or assistance, I will call the police.... I will call. They are there to help us to live in peace. It is not because they do corruption and some things that is not good, so we also don't want to contact them, no. Is not like that at all, if I need help, or anybody needs help from the police we should contact them to come and help (Awuraa Esther: a private entrepreneur, female, aged: 51- 60).

The illustration also suggest that participants viewed the Ghanaian police as the main authority to examine what was or was not legally acceptable behaviour, which would have encouraged compliance from respondents. One perspective in relation to participants' view about police legitimacy, was that the police service was considered to be the clearest, most visible representation of the criminal justice system in Ghana. This is clear in the way in which the above participant suggested their active dependence on the police despite the wider perception of police corruption. These views thus had a profound positive effect upon the legitimacy of the Ghana police as well the publics willingness to obey and depend on the work of the Ghanaian police (see also Tyler 1990).

As discussed in previous chapters, some police officers or members of the public did exploit opportunities for corruption from the very onset of any public-police contact. For instance, it is suggested that issues brought to the attention of the police became a motivational factor for the police to demand or solicit for a bribe (see also Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative - CHRI 2007). Based upon this, it could be argued that many participants would only contact or seek help from the police if they had something to give or offer to an officer.

Such instances of police-initiated corruption impacted negatively on participants' confidence in the Ghanaian police (Newburn 1999). The perception of police corruption meant a deterrent on participants to contact the police concerning certain types of criminal issues, thus, participants incentive to trust the police to deal effectively with crimes was low (Mbaku 1996). Therefore, the perception of police corruption reduced

participants' access to police services and impacted on participants' confidence in the police to deal effectively with certain types of criminal behaviours not meriting police attention. In other words, the police were perceived as satisfactory for more serious crimes but not for more minor offences.

> Because of money, do this, give me that, when someone is to be arrested, the police will say give me taxi money, or give me this. So trivial issues you don't have to go to the police, except murder or robbery. It is a waste of time…
> (Daniel Opare: private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 - 60).

> … Those who are so much interested in money and not doing their job well. You go to the station to complain or report a case, and they will ask you, 'do you have money?'… 'You need to buy me [police officer] a pen oh, because I don't have one, you need to buy this and this'….
> Is not nice ... (Yaw Robert: private entrepreneur, male, aged: 41-50).

In the above participant's encounter with the police, when an officer asked, '*Do you have money*?', this request was subsequently rationalised as reflecting a lack of police resources (for instance, stationery). The question did not literally mean that participants would have had to go out and shop for stationeries for the police. Rather, participants anticipated that they would need to make some form of monetary payment in order for a case to be given the necessary consideration and for further action to be taken (see also Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative - CHRI 2007). The participant viewed this request as an example of corruption. This perception of the police as having a foremost

interest in soliciting for bribes may also suggest that, upon reporting an issue to the police, the police may not have listened to the concerns of respondents with care and respect (see also Tyler 1990). Rather, they demanded bribes prior to giving any form of attention or providing the legitimate services required. Bribery, in this case, could have the potential to affect the quality of services delivered. Moreover, reflecting on the notion '[It] *is not nice'* as stated by Yaw Robert above, also suggested that such instances of police corruption could have been problematic for the police to gain or maintain participant's confidence in the police service.

Furthermore, police corruption could also suggest that access to the police would have been uneven and or police service delivery would have been largely affected. Officers' demands for bribes would have, firstly acted as a barrier for procedural fairness and secondly deterred some people (mostly the poor) to fully access or seek the services of the police (cf. Kaufmann, Montoriol-Garriga, and Recanatini, 2008). As previously mentioned, this also suggests that only some people would have contacted the Ghanaian police if they were able or had something to pay or offer the police. In this context, this gives the view of the police as a service for sale and only those who can afford would have patronised the services from the Ghanaian police. The expectation of bribery or some form of benefit meant there was a high probability that the officer would sway from an impartial and honest discharge of police service (Benson 1981).

> We are not saying that as soon as we report someone to you, you should straight away take them to the prison, no, but to make sure that the truth comes out correctly. Money

should not come in at all; if they don't take money, then we

will be okay (Ewura Esther: private entrepreneur, female,

aged: 41 - 50).

The discussion above is an example of how confidence based on police favourability in

their decision-making was less significant to the above participant. Rather, confidence

was linked to the fairness and effectiveness of how the Ghanaian police processed or

administered any issues brought to their attention (Sherman 2002; Skogan and Frydl

2004; Skogan 2005; Tyler 2008). Participants in seeking justice, expected it to be pursued

through the legitimate authority of the Ghanaian police with due consideration to values

such as procedural fairness.

In addition, the above quote from Ewura Esther also demonstrated that the perception of

respondents' procedural fairness based on police performance was equally significant

(Tyler and Fagan 2008). For instance, by stating that, '*if they* [the police] *don't take*

money from us, then we will be okay,' it is implied that where the conduct of some officers

was perceived to be unethical this does not meet the expectations of the participants and

may contribute towards doubt or instability of the participant's confidence in the police.

In other words, the participant's overall mindset of her confidence in the Ghanaian police

service would fluctuate because of frustrations upon perceived sense of police corruption

and their inability to promote procedural fairness. Additionally, it was also suggested that

police corruption created a contextual setting which led to officers, for instance, to

deviate from normal police duty. The illustration below depicts a participant's vicarious

negative experience of police corruption which may have led to the perception connoted

by a basic weakness of most officers to enforce the law. In other words, the capacity for officers to exercise control over some members of the public becomes problematic (see also Newham 2002).

> Well, more is bribery, because there was this Osofo [pastor], I don't want to mention his name. He went and struck Peace FM building with a heavy tool. When he was arrested, he said [I can use money and spoil this case!], he said it plainly. Who knows where or how he is going to do this? Is the police and other officials, do you see, so bribery and dis-trust (Daniel Opare: private entrepreneur, male, aged: 51 -60).

The above suggests that corruption correlates mostly with participant's distrust in the Ghanaian police (Dowler 2003; Rosenbaum et al 2005; Tankebe 2009b; Avdija 2010; Boateng 2012), since corruption restricted or hindered the Ghanaian police to perform its core objectives. It distorts effective implementation of the law. For instance, procedural justice could be hard to reach, subsequently damaging the moral status of the police (William 2002; Hope 2015). Participants' awareness of police corrupt practices would often create a negative reaction as well as portrays a negative image of the Ghanaian police. As in this case, boasting of bribing the police, as illustrated above, may have been considered by Daniel as aberrant, thereby leading to a generalised distrust of the police. Such a vicarious experience of police corruption would have provided the participant with the primary basis upon which his confidence in the police would have been low, if not totally eroded.

Conclusion

Police corruption in Ghana affected the ability of the police to effectively deal with some types of criminal issues. Nonetheless, in spite of the perceptions of corruption associated with the Ghana police service, it was also identified that most participants' confidence in the police was not totally eroded. However, corrupt police practises, either direct or vicarious experiences, contributed to participants' limited confidence in the Ghanaian police. Police corruption in Ghana affected the police in being able to gain or sustain a complete trust from participants.

The limited public confidence in the Ghanaian police as a result of perceived corruption may be attributed to the meaning participants associated with police corruption (as discussed in Chapter Four). It may well be that the street-level idiomatic terms that participants used to refer to police corruption had the effect of attenuating the influence of corruption on police confidence. In addition, the impact of localised cultural practices (such as gift-giving) had normalised and provided the basis to neutralise and deny the total effect of police corruption on participants' confidence in the police. Significantly, the perception of police corruption did not fundamentally affect the legitimacy of the Ghanaian police. Participants believed in, and attributed legitimacy of the Ghanaian police to enforce the laws and regulate behaviours deemed acceptable. In other words, even as the Ghanaian police were perceived as corrupt, this did not deter the them from contacting the Ghanaian police for assistance for at least more serious crimes.

Although the perception of micro police corruption in Ghana did not pose a complete risk to police legitimacy, I would not, of course, argue that police corruption should be encouraged. Rather, the impact on participants' trust in the police should be considered as significant, as loss of trust in the police is challenging to regain (Jackson and Bradford 2010).

The final chapter (Chapter Seven) of this thesis presents the conclusion of the research findings within the context of the questions underpinning this research.

CHAPTER SEVEN

# CONCLUSION

Many studies on the police have attempted to examine the significance of police legitimacy and to analyse the factors that negatively or positively impact on public confidence in the police (Bottoms and Tankebe 2008; Carrabine 2005; Sparks and Bottoms 1995; Tyler 2004), and it seems clear that perceptions of procedural fairness and justice have a significant impact upon police confidence and effectiveness (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Reisig and Lloyd 2009). However, as my study has established, a significant issue for police legitimacy and confidence which has received less academic attention is corruption – and, particularly, street-level forms of corruption that occur in Sub-Saharan African states like Ghana.

Police corruption has been described within much of the existing research as activity that bears on bribery, brutality, extortion, police dishonesty, favouritism, violence, fabrication and destruction of evidence (Wilson 1963; Roebuck and Barker 1974; Sherman 1978; Newburn 1999; Punch 2001; Arrigo 2003; Douvlis and South 2003; Gerber and Mandelson 2008; Transparency International 2010, 2011, 2013). Furthermore, research also suggests that when police officers partake in corrupt practices, it builds and expands the public's discernment and comprehension of police corruption and shapes the impressions people have towards police institutions (for example, see Reiss 1968; Roebuck and Barker 1974; Newburn 1999; Tankebe 2010b; May 2012).

Understandings of police corruption

My research found that many aspects of my participants' understandings of police corruption, regardless of the group interviewed, collaborates with many previous studies. The theme that reoccurred most frequently through my participants' understanding of police corruption were, bribery, abuse of entrusted power for private gain, and extortion. Other factors participants associated with street-level police corruption were: unethical police conduct; opportunistic corruption; and the high cost of commercial products, because of unofficial value added tax which surfaced after some participants had experienced street-level police corruption in relation to the transportation of goods. Some of my participants had also developed context-specific concepts to relate with police corruption. For example, some of my commercial drivers and market trader participants had adopted neutralising, street-level idiomatic expressions to represent public-police corrupt experiences. These included, '*settle yourself*', '*settle the police*', '*tip*', '*give something*', and '*put something in it*'. The use of such expressions was a strategic technique adopted by participants to reach a level of 'corruption equilibrium' with the police (cf. Lui 1985).

Figure 14: Participants' idiomatic expressions of street-level police corruption

The implications of participants' usage of various idioms in which to frame corruptive activity had the effect of overlaying the problematic morality of such practices and thereby neutralising them. Various neutralization and denial techniques ultimately had the effect of attenuating the influence of corruption on police legitimacy. Such techniques were driven by social or collective values wedded to extended families and even ethnic and tribal groups. These informal values had taken primacy over more formal procedural justice processes (see also Rawlinson 2012).

My findings also indicate that to understand police corruption from for instance, commercial drivers' perspectives, it was necessary to account for their responses or

reactions associated with police dealings. These included participants' adaptive strategies to police corrupt practices, and participants' fear of being charged by the police. For example, the inability of some of my participants to bribe or pay the police inevitably meant that the suspect would be charged or taken to court solely based the accounts of the officer in relation the incident. Hence to avoid any procedural unfairness equated with such experiences, coupled with the perception of corruption associated with the Ghanaian police (cf. Beek et al 2017), drivers mostly opted to pay or offered to bribe the Ghanaian police from the onset of their contact. As mentioned already, this was referred to in terms such as, 'settle yourself' or 'settle the police', which ultimately meant bribing an officer to totally avoid the experience of, for instance, being heavily charged in court.

Corruption was not usually considered in absolute terms, meaning that it was not always considered as wrong or right, but rather, it was a relative concept influenced by situational context. For example, in situations where a participant had been intimidated by the police and a bribe was demanded, then the act was considered wrong, unacceptable or corrupt. In contrast, other participants downplayed the implications of corruption in instances when money was offered to police officers as a willful gesture, under no compulsion or without any expectation of police favours. Within the context of police officers' responsibility for safeguarding street-level public safety, offering money to the police was not considered to be a corrupt activity but a means of appreciating the challenging role of the police officer. This was against the background that, by virtue of their duties, street-level officers primarily ensured road safety to members of the public. Hence, the awareness of that virtue paved the way to neutralise the risk of corruption and

offer money or gifts to the police officer. Additionally, even under public view, some participants considered it good etiquette or acceptable to offer money to a street-level police officer, and this was also identified as a symbol of appreciation – what I have called an 'appreciative technique'.

Furthermore, within the context of reporting a criminal issue to the police, some of my participants deemed it fit to offer money to an officer during the process of investigating a criminal issue – this I have conceptualised as an 'enabling technique'. Nonetheless, in both the above cases, a clear-cut sense of the police as corrupt is problematic and analytically obsolete because such practices were influenced by appeals to traditional values and norms within the Ghanaian culture.

Traditional cultural practices in Ghana, such as gift-giving, were also identified as having a significant influence on the experiences of public-police corruption. Participants drew on traditional notions of gift giving which both neutralised and denied the implications of their actions. For some of my participants, gift-giving was aimed at influencing police decisions or actions, when, for instance, one was caught violating traffic regulations, the willingness to offer gifts to street-level police officers was motivated by a desire to avoid going to court - something that I conceptualised as an 'avoidance technique'. Gifts given during corrupt encounters had the effect of avoiding the authority of the police and penalties for failing to operate within the legal requirements or to gain convenient access through a police barrier (see Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Newburn 1999; Insaidoo 2007). Yet, this did not seem to have much implication on the legitimacy of the Ghanaian police

and thus put into question a number of claims about the main factors involved in creating police legitimacy.

**Figure 15: Perceptions of factors influencing street-level police corruption**

Participants' actions were deeply rooted in such traditional cultural practices. This suggests that modern concepts of police corruption were yet to fully filter down to them. Hence their understanding of the legal implications of police corruption were superimposed overwhelmingly by their understanding and belief in the practices of such traditional values within the context of Ghana. It could then be argued that the lack of understanding of the modern notions of police corruption may have been caught up in transition between traditional practices and values, and modern Western concepts of police corruption. Hence, cultural practices provided an uncertain 'grey zone' that promoted, neutralized and, essentially, denied the implications of public-police corrupt practices (cf. Matza and Sykes 1957; Cohen 2001).

Additional factors involved in street-level corruption identified by my study were the

occupational environment of the Ghanaian police (their occupational pressure – pay returns, and police autocratic tendencies); social pressure or practices (informal interpersonal relations embedded in extended families); police use of discretion; yielding to family pressures; illegitimate use of police authority; economic or welfare challenges which included post retirement plans; and opportunistic corruption. Such findings corroborate previous literature, suggesting that there are a number of factors that influence police corruption, and that such factors comprise accountability measures in relation to the police (Sherman 1978; Newburn 1999; Miller 2003; Campbell and Kodz 2011; Cockcroft 2012; Wang 2015). Police corruption was identified as a regular experience with the Ghanaian police. However, it was also acknowledged that officers had developed neutralisation techniques to deny and rationalise their involvement in corruption. This led into my next major research question, which was to analyse the extent to which these corrupt practices impacted on police legitimacy and public confidence in the police.

Police confidence and legitimacy

My findings suggest that confidence and legitimacy were two significantly different concepts. Participants likened confidence with trust, faith, and belief as well as the police being non-biased. Perceptions of legitimacy of the Ghanaian police were equated with their authority to deal with and enforce the law (see also Tyler 1990; Tyler and Wakslak 2004; Tankebe 2007, 2008a; Jackson et al 2011).

Figure 16: Factors participants associated with police confidence and legitimacy.

I also ascertained that not all types of police corruption had the same effect on confidence in the Ghanaian police. Some types of corruption, for example, negative experiences of police corruption (either direct or vicarious) were found to have contributed to limited confidence in the Ghanaian police. This prevented participants from completely relying on the police to deal with certain types of criminal issues or behaviours considered as trivial.

However, police corruption had little or no impact on the legitimacy of the Ghanaian police. For instance, in response to the question 'W*ould you call on the police for assistance if you were a victim of crime? Why and why not?',* my participants generally acknowledged the legal status accorded to the Ghanaian police. The legal institution was viewed as having an important role in examining what was or was not legally acceptable behaviour, and this was found to have encouraged compliance from respondents (cf. Bottoms and Tankebe 2012; Jackson et al 2012).

Another perspective in relation to participants' views about the legitimacy of the Ghanaian police, was that the police service was considered as the clearest forefront representation of the criminal justice system in Ghana. This notion superseded any form of negativity that corruption may have had upon the Ghanaian police. As such, any concerns about micro or street-level corruption did not have an impact on participants' perceptions of police legitimacy. In other words, the responses from my participants suggest that they would not have resorted to any other means or forms of dealing with criminal behaviour (Jackson, Asif, Bradford and Zakar 2014) but, in the first instance, would contact the police for assistance.

Theoretical developments

The adopted theoretical framework for my study was the theory of techniques of neutralization (Matza and Sykes 1957) and Matza's (1964) notion on drift. Yet, these ideas have been developed in relation to corruption in Ghana and Stanley Cohen's (2001) work on denial has been added to better elucidate the problem. Furthermore, Douvlis and South (2003) assert that policing is operationalised in an environment where the probability of ethical ambiguity is high. Hence, "day-to-day evidence of public rule-breaking and contempt for the law" provides the flexibility to adopt techniques of neutralisation in order to deny or drift in and out of police deviant behaviours (*ibid* 2003: 181). This idea lent itself well to my study, where I see public-police corruption as being enabled and sustained by various forms of neutralisation and denial techniques

These theories were adopted as a framework from which to explore, analyse, and

understand the crucial factors which influenced the normalization of street-level public-police corrupt experiences. In the last couple of decades, a number of criminologists have argued for criminology to expand its geographical scope beyond North America and Europe (Agozino 2004; Lafree 2007). There is a growing literature on legitimacy, corruption, and public attitudes towards the police in Western Countries (Cao, Stack and Sun 1998; Carrabine 2005; Tyler 2005; Jackson 2010). However, as Tankebe (2008a) states, very few have been carried out in developing democracies. He explains the problem with this: "This reduces the scope for generalisation of current knowledge", leading to what could be referred to as *theoretical blindness* (*ibid* 2008a:186). Hence, by combining and adapting influential analytical frameworks, the *Theory of Techniques of Neutralisation* and Cohen's theory of denial to explore public experiences of police corruption, it made it possible to ascertain whether both criminological claims are more than local truths (Agozino 2004; LaFree 2007), and to adapt Western concepts to non-Western contexts.

Significantly, in the interests of increasing the scope of criminological knowledge, I have adapted, extended and explored the implications of denial and techniques of neutralization upon public-police corrupt experiences in Ghana. In so doing, I have demonstrated that the theory of techniques of neutralization developed in the US, after five decades, is still valid and applicable within the context of contemporary Ghana (see also Tankebe 2010b), thereby reducing, western theoretical blindness (see also Tankebe 2008a).

Limitations and future research

Previous literature has not fully considered the implications of the different experiences of police corruption on confidence and legitimacy of the police. Hence, this exploratory case study in Ghana provides a background upon which some dynamic association between corruption experiences, confidence, and police legitimacy could be examined. Whilst my participants provided a rich source of data, this does not imply at all that my study can be generalised to the wider population. Findings of my study are limited to the sample studied. Nonetheless, within a sociological and criminological understanding of police corruption, confidence, and legitimacy within the context of Ghana, my study contributes towards knowledge by providing primary data which examined different dimensions of public-police corruption experiences upon legitimacy and police confidence. The case study also enabled me to test more general Western theory within a non-Western context, and thus question if that set of theory was applicable to other contexts.

As my study recruited participants within Accra (Greater Accra region) and Kumasi (Ashanti region), one would also have to be cautious in generalising the findings to other large cities within Ghana. Furthermore, although most Sub-Saharan African societies may share a similar culture (similar street-level policing styles), views from this research may not reflect the views and experiences of other societies within Sub-Saharan Africa. An additional limitation on the generalisability of my study is that the typologies developed to understand corruption were based on the experiences and perceptions of the sample, and hence not representative of other populations.

It may have been beneficial for the study to have explored whether participants trusted the police not to take bribes from them, which may have yielded more analytical insights on the effects of police corruption on public confidence and police legitimacy. Whilst the exploration of police corruption in my study integrated theories that provided motivations as well as an association for police corrupt practices based on participants' experiences and perceptions of police corruption, as such my study may be subject to similar limitations as the theories adopted. As mentioned above, although my study had some limitations, however, as an exploratory study it has opened avenues for future research. The following recommendations are suggested for further research to explore street-level public-police corruption in Ghana, including factors that are likely to affect public confidence in the Ghanaian police

One of the constructs used to rationalize police corruption was framed by localized traditional practices, such as the notion of gift giving in Ghanaian society. Often, gifts may be provided in sincerity under the concept of a perceived benevolent society. Research questions such as, "To what extent does gift-giving to the police determine public propensity to obey the law?", "To what extent does gift-giving to the police affects officers to enforce the law fairly?", or "To what extent does gift-giving affect public trust in the Ghanaian police?" could assist in identifying whether the public trust the Ghanaian police to provide a fair or just police service delivery. These questions would benefit from being part of large representative survey.

Autocratic leadership style was identified in my study as having effects on police service

delivery, particularly street-level police duties. Street-level police officers had to act or perform their duties in a way that reflected the expectations or anticipations of their leaders. In this case, junior police officers are somewhat powerless in the organisation of their work. This, in turn, may limit guiding junior officers toward commitment to the goals or objectives of the broader police organisation. An area worth exploring would be the impact of police autocratic leadership style on police performance and police corruption. Research in this could identify whether compliance to street-level police corruption is learned on the job, authorised and thus normal and automatic.

In an effort to curb police corruption, education can change the very culture of a society and equip people with the necessary skills and knowledge to challenge corruption. Corruption, especially in developing societies, arguably impedes sustainable development (Lawal 2007; Mohammed 2013). Against this background, education could be the most, if not the only, means of curbing street-level corrupt practices, improve the understanding of traffic regulations and, reduce, if not prevent, the laxity in relation to traffic regulations amongst most commercial drivers, which as I have mentioned, accounted for much street-level police corruption. Longitudinal studies will be a significant approach to explore this area over a particular time period. As a future study, it would thus be worth exploring the impact of education on the understanding of traffic regulations and police service delivery.

Furthermore, future studies could also focus on the effectiveness police continuous professional training or education programs on corruption and ascertain their impact, if

any, on public confidence and police legitimacy. This will assist officers in acknowledging the implications of corruption, understanding its nuances, and, possibly provide officers with the strategic framework to address public-police corruption in meeting the needs and expectations for professional and ethical police work in Ghana.

Other potential research might explore to what extent public confidence in the Ghanaian police is important. The assumption is that public confidence in the Ghanaian police could ensure a strengthened social connection with the public and influence the public to be more likely to depend and cooperate with the police. In addition, it may be worth establishing whether the police are perceived to be dealing with the concerns of the public fairly. Lastly, another area worth exploring would be the implications of police anti-corruption policies on public confidence in the police. This could identify whether police anti-corruption policies provide a clear approach to contribute to increased public confidence in the police.

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Appendix 1

Access Letter

HEADQUARTERS
GHANA POLICE SERVICE
ACCRA

24ᵀᴴ AUGUST, 2012,

RE – LETTER OF INTRODUCTION – MR ADDO KOFI ODEI

I am directed by the Inspector-General of Police to refer to your letter dated 15ᵗʰ July, 2012 in respect of the above subject-matter and to kindly inform you that approval has been given to you to conduct the research.

2. Your department is therefore being advised to treat any information gathered by your student with outmost confidentiality and furnish this office with a copy of the research findings.

3. Best regards.

CHIEF STAFF OFFICER
[FRED ADU ANIM (ACP)]

DR. DARREN THIEL
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Appendix 2

Information of Consent

Kofi Odei Addo, is a postgraduate research student at the University of Essex in the United Kingdom. Under the supervisions of Dr. Darren Thiel (djthiel@essex.ac.uk) and Professor Pete Fussey (pfussey@essex.ac.uk) at the Department of Sociology, I cordially invite you to contribute to my study on how the Ghana police manage and maintain public trust and legitimacy in the course of their everyday work. This is an independent student project which aims to gain an understanding of how public experiences and perceptions of police activity may shape legitimacy and confidence in the Ghanaian police.

If you agree to participate in this research, your involvement will be to provide information during a one to one discussion with myself. All information will be anonymous and will only be used for educational purposes. Your names will not be needed and none and none of the information provided will not be linked to you. In addition, the records of the research will be kept private. Any concerns you may have about the research before after your consent, will be answered by Kofi Odei Addo (00447949111951, koaddo@essex.ac.uk. You can also contact my supervisors above.

Your help in this research is greatly appreciated.

Kofi Odei Addo
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Appendix 3

Interview Schedule

<u>Police (Active and Retired)</u>

SECTION A

1. So can you talk me through how you came to be a police officer? Will you explain briefly how you were trained?

2. Do you think that the police have any influence/authority on society? How do you do this? How do you maintain this influence?

3. In your view, how do you gain the trust of the people? And how do you maintain the trust you have gained?

4. What do you think people (the public) really want from the police?

5. How does police performance in terms of effectiveness and efficiency meet the expectations of the public?

6. If the police have the best of intentions, do they have the necessary resources to carry out their duties?

7. Do the police do the jobs that the people understand and values as appropriate, proper, or desirable?

8. In you view, what is your understanding of police misconduct? Any examples?

9. How will you explain (police) corruption? Recollect any corruption experiences? Is police corruption related to a particular division?

10. What are some of the approaches that the police leadership has adopted and implemented to tackle police corruption?

11. In your view, what are some of the difficulties facing the Ghana Police?

12. For corruption to come down, what are some of the things about the Ghana Police and its policies that need to be changed or implemented?

SECTION B

Could you please answer the following questions about yourself?

13. Please, indicate your age
[ ] 15 – 20
[ ] 21 – 30
[ ] 31 – 40
[ ] 41 – 50
[ ] 51 - Over

14. Please, indicate your gender
[ ] Male
[ ] Female

15. What is your highest level of educational attainment?
[ ] None
[ ] Junior High school
[ ] Senior High/Middle school
[ ] Nursing/Teacher training school
[ ] Tertiary (polytechnic/university)

16. Ethnicity/Tribe

17. Years of Service

Public/Private Citizen

SECTION A

1. Can you tell me how you became a driver/business lady/man and how long have you been in business/ a driver? Do you go on business trips? Are you a short distance or a long-distance driver?

2. Do you or your distributors come into regular contact with the police during the job? How often? In what situations?

3. How do the police treat you/them in these situations? Were they fair and polite? Could you give me some recent examples?

4. How does this make you feel about the Ghana police?

5. Would you call on the police for assistance if you were a victim of crime? Why/why not?

6. Outside your work, your business, have you had any contact with the police?

7. What does trust mean to you and how much trust do you have in the police?

8. How likely would you be to help the police to find someone suspected of committing a crime by providing them with information?" Why/why not?

9. In your view, what can weaken police influence in society?

10. What does police corruption mean to you?

11. Are you aware whether the police have different units/section? Do you think all Ghana police are corrupt, or are some types of police more corrupt than others?

12. What do you think could be done to improve the Ghana police for people like you?

SECTION B

Could you please answer the following questions about yourself?

13. Please, indicate your age
[ ] 15 – 20
[ ] 21 – 30
[ ] 31 – 40
[ ] 41 – 50
[ ] 51 - Over

14. Please, indicate your gender
[ ] Male
[ ] Female

15. What is your highest level of educational attainment?
[ ] None
[ ] Junior High school
[ ] Senior High/Middle school
[ ] Nursing/Teacher training school
[ ] Tertiary (polytechnic/university)

16. Ethnicity/Tribe

17. Years of Work