On Not Learning Chinese:
Multiple Chineseness of the Chinese Schools in the Philippines
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Abstract

In light of the ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ of Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider (2006), this thesis aims to investigate the multiplicity of Chineseness produced in the Chinese schools in the Philippines. The study draws on participant observation based on my one-year teaching in a Philippine-Chinese school, on-site interviews with students, parents, administrators, educationalists and officials, and archival and documentary research. The major findings of the study reveal that: (i) viewed from different perspectives, three versions of Chineseness generated in Chinese school emerge: Huaqiao Chineseness with the nationalistic view of China as the motherland embodied by the traditional teaching approach involved in ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’; Huaren Chineseness which proposes to seek a balance between the younger generations’ Mandarin learning and Filipino outlook; ‘communal Chineseness for integration’ by which the younger generations are provided with community-based resources to enter the upper-middle class in the social stratification of the Philippine mainstream society; (ii) Mandarin education practised in Chinese schools is predominated by the view of Huaqiao Chineseness which not only has a devastating effect on the effectiveness of its teaching but also impedes the educational reform launched by the supporters of Huaren Chineseness from promoting the teaching approach fit for Chinese-Filipino identity of the younger generations by means of teaching Mandarin as a second language; (iii) As the current Mandarin education fails to be adapted to the local environment, it is ‘communal Chineseness for integration’ that plays a role in their integration into the mainstream and in helping them enter upper-middle class positioning in the Philippine social stratification; by contrast, Mandarin education has become increasingly irrelevant to their everyday life and career development. These findings have implications for further researches that (1) the eye of methodological cosmopolitanism can help explore the extent of cosmopolitanisation in an overseas Chineseness community’s Chineseness in general and Chinese education in specific; (2) the extent of cosmopolitanisation of an overseas Chinese education in constructing and projecting Chineseness can affect its cultural preservation in the destination country and forge a unique path of integration into the mainstream society for an overseas Chinese community.

Keywords: Cosmopolitanisation; Chineseness; Chinese education, the Chinese in the Philippines
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is derived from a negative experience of teaching Mandarin. In 2009, I was a Mandarin teacher at a Chinese school in the Philippines sent by the Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) of the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan), one of two governments – the other being the People’s Republic of China (PRC) – that claims to legitimately represent all of China, on a mission to counterbalance the PRC’s influence on the Philippine Chinese community. Before my departure, I had discovered that Mandarin ability among the Chinese in the Philippines was in decline, despite news of ‘Mandarin fever’ and ‘the rise of China’ prevalent in the media. In contrast to a growing number of non-Chinese eagerly establishing ties with China by learning Mandarin, studying abroad and working in China, it is particularly astonishing to me that these ethnic Chinese appear reluctant to learn it.

My one-year teaching experience furnished evidence of this decline in the form of students’ lack of interest in learning Mandarin. Their reluctance to learn Chinese made me put more pressure on them to conform to instruction, resulting in a troubled teacher-student relationship and a deeply frustrating experience. My own bitter frustration was shared by almost all fellow Taiwanese teachers in Philippine-Chinese schools. As the discussion over the raising global status of Mandarin emerges, such as a new ‘global language’ (Gil, 2011), ‘the language of future’ (Pak, 2012), and even one of the ‘G2 languages’ (along with English) (Zhang, 2011), it is particularly intriguing that the students had turned down this ‘global language’.
In addition to my personal inexperience and lack of proper teaching skills, some contextualised factors contributed to the students’ reluctance. The teacher supply program of which I had been a part was jointly developed by the ROC government and a group of local Philippine-Chinese educationalists. Between the two parties, there seems to be a tacit agreement that the former is still the ‘fatherland’ of the latter, at least culturally. Chinese schools’ complex relationships to the fatherland characterises the whole Chinese school system, resembling a father/son relationship of perplexity and contradiction. A similar tacit agreement also exists between the PRC and other local Philippine-Chinese and Chinese schools through ‘Teacher Volunteers’ programs, which also seek to confirm the ties between China and Philippine-Chinese. It seems that Mandarin teaching has become a vehicle by which both the PRC and ROC can pretend to be the fatherland of Philippine-Chinese and Philippine-Chinese can be overseas Chinese citizens. Yet students’ reluctance to learn Mandarin can be seen as an act that casts doubt on this pretence: to them, it is incomprehensible that they have to be ‘genuine’ Chinese (as defined by the fatherland) and learn Mandarin just because of their Chinese descent.

Defined by the proponents of Chinese nationalism, three ideas—a recognition of the eternal ties with the Chinese state, a sense of belonging to the Chinese nation, and the ability to speak the national language of China—together constitute the traditional definition of being Chinese. Therefore, the students’ reluctance can be seen to reflect a reserved attitude towards the China-centred view of ‘Chineseness’. Educationalists in the Philippines and Chinese-education researchers tend to attribute students’ turning away from Chineseness to failures in the Chinese school system. Thus, they focus on

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1 By Chineseness, I mean the nature and extent of being or identifying as Chinese.
analysing and solving the problems of Chinese education that they perceive to have contributed to this decline. The problems that they have identified are mostly technical and pedagogical ones, such as outdated teaching methods, textbooks unfit for Philippine students, aged faculty, students’ low motivation, and a lack of qualified teachers. Both governments, the PRC and ROC, are devoted to providing educational aids, such as teacher training programs, textbook and teacher supplies, student summer camps, and so on, to solve these problems for the Chinese schools in the Philippines.

Irrespective of Chinese students’ Philippine citizenship, it seems that the Chinese schools and both governments are committed to the ideal of ‘one nation (the Chinese nation), one people (the Chinese people), one culture (Chinese national culture), and one language (Mandarin)’, and seek to instil this in students by restoring their Chinese national identity and Mandarin ability. The decline of both of these, however, shows that the governments have had limited success. This decline causes considerable concern among the old generation of the Philippine-Chinese, who tend to equate the loss of Mandarin ability with the loss of Chineseness.

Considering these issues, a series of questions comes to mind, such as to what extent Chinese schools still cling to a China-centred view? Why do these Chinese students not seize the opportunity to learn Mandarin when, seemingly, the rest of the world does? In gradually losing the ability to speak Mandarin are they becoming less Chinese? What are the Chinese schools for if students do not learn Mandarin? And what kinds of Chineseness are the Chinese schools producing, if not a China-centred one?

The aim of the thesis is to illustrate the multiplicity of forms of Chineseness produced by the Chinese school in the Philippines. Exposed to various local, national, and transnational influences, Chinese schools show considerable potential to perform the
multiplicity of being Chinese, thus producing various versions of Chineseness. I suggest that the Chineseness defined by the Chinese governments is likely to represent only one version of Chineseness whereas, as my findings show, Chineseness in the Philippines varies from the China-centred, the destination country-centred, and the community-based. Each version of Chineseness reaches different levels of entanglement with Chinese nationalism. This thesis also focuses on how Chinese schools reposition Chinese education, specifically, and Chineseness generally to adapt to the changing contextual backdrop of the ‘two Chinas’ and to political, cultural and social life in Philippine society.

What makes this case special and worthy of investigation? The Chinese in the Philippines held Chinese citizenship until 1975, when a mass naturalisation took place\(^3\). Consequently, the old-generation Chinese have the strongest sense of being Huaqiao\(^4\) (overseas Chinese nationals) among their counterparts in other southeast Asian states, and so it is Huaqiao Chineseness that predominates in Chinese schools. Compared to Malaysian Chinese (who emphasise Malaysian national identity despite effective Mandarin teaching) and Thai Chinese (who have lost Mandarin ability and been assimilated into the mainstream), Philippine-Chinese schools, in teaching Mandarin as a national language, still cling to ‘Huaqiao education’.

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\(^3\) Chapter 2 will expand on the circumstances behind, and significance of, the 1975 naturalisation.

\(^4\) ‘Hua’, according to the Zuo Zhuan, an ancient Chinese narrative history was used to refer to the beautiful clothes that the Chinese people wore. In modern usage, ‘Hua’ represents the Chinese nation and civilisation as a whole. The word ‘qiao’ means a temporary stay. The literal meaning of the combination of the two words is ‘temporary Chinese expatriates’. The implication behind the term ‘Huaqiao’ is noteworthy, namely, that the people residing outside China are still considered Chinese and part of Chinese civilisation. Also, as China is seen as the only cultural centre of all Chinese, from the perspective of China itself, it is doubtless that Huaqiao will eventually return back to the homeland, either physically or spiritually.
The issue of Huaqiao Chineseness in Philippine-Chinese schools particularly deserves an investigation since the Philippine-Chinese were the latest to lose Huaqiao citizenship. Chinese citizenship was granted by the ROC (Taiwan) rather than the PRC (China) due to Cold War geopolitics. Compared to the Chinese in other Southeast Asian countries, who lost Chinese citizenship as early as the 1950s, Philippine-Chinese were legally Huaqiao until the 1970s. Still in charge of Chinese school affairs, a number of the old-generation Chinese are painfully aware of the rapid decline of Chinese education in the aftermath of the ‘Filipinization’ of the 1970s. They are thus particularly eager to revive Chinese education by inviting educational aids from China and Taiwan. Given that Taiwan formed such a close bond with Philippine-Chinese schools in the context of the Cold War, since the 1990s China has been committed to replacing Taiwan’s influence to ensure its status as the sole representative of China. The struggle between China and Taiwan for hegemony in the Chinese community thus not only accelerates the revival of Huaqiao Chineseness but also prolongs Philippine-Chinese people’s sense of being Huaqiao, and therefore to be taken care of by the two fatherlands. As a result, Huaqiao Chineseness has been revitalised in Chinese schools and has become an essential feature. Yet the dominance of Huaqiao Chineseness over Chinese education does not necessarily preclude the spontaneous development of other forms of Chineseness in Chinese schools. From the perspective of different geographic levels, alternative versions of Chineseness are likely to exist if we adopt varying viewpoints, such as that of the destination country and of the immigrant community, rather than merely of the fatherland. The diverse, wider geopolitical context that affects the production of Chineseness in Chinese schools, therefore, is worth an extensive analysis.

Beyond the monopoly of Huaqiao Chineseness in shaping identity for Chinese overseas, the thesis aims to rethink the meaning of being Chinese by investigating and
juxtaposing different versions of Chineseness in the context of Chinese schools: Huaqiao Chineseness, Huaren\textsuperscript{5} Chineseness and communal Chineseness. When we talk about the loss of Chinese identity, we need to take all versions of Chineseness into account. The waning of one version of Chineseness, then, does not imply the overall decline of Chineseness, but may entail the waxing of another version of Chineseness. Considering variations in Chineseness can yield a more robust and accurate perspective on the development of Chineseness.

1.2 From National Culture of the Fatherland to Minority Ethnicity in Destination Country

Huaqiao Chineseness refers to an ideal that all Chinese have to be part of the Chinese nation, behave as genuine Chinese people, learn Chinese culture, and speak Mandarin. In fact, this ideal presupposes the existence of a nation-state in that it imagines a synthesis of nation, people, culture and language. This is, however, an ideal type because there is no ‘pure’ nation-state, and each state contains ethnic minorities within its national territory (Connor, 1993; 2004). Nonetheless, a nation-state government can exercise nation-building policies to turn the people residing in its territory into a nation. To achieve this goal, national or citizenship education is the most common and effective means to encourage or demand loyalty to the nation and to modify a national identity and a common national language by stressing national homogeneity and ignoring ethnic and linguistic diversity (Osler, 2012: 354).

International migration, however, casts considerable doubt on the ideal. As Wimmer

\textsuperscript{5} Huaren refers to those of Chinese descent who have settled somewhere outside China and have also obtained foreign citizenship.
and Schiller (2002) discuss, migrants bring into question the notion of isomorphism in several ways: politically, including legally, between people, sovereign and citizenry; culturally, between people and nation; and socially, between people and solidarity groups. Expanding international migration in an age of globalisation fundamentally challenges the essentialist ideology of the nation-state. In the same vein, the focus of citizenship education in light of the principle of the nation-state also faces challenges from ‘increased cross-border movements and networks’ promoted by ‘the forces of globalization, new and intensifying international migration, and the activities of transnational communities and corporations (Osler, 2012: 354).

When it comes to the challenges immigrants pose to nation-states, scholarship tends to assume that these are mostly faced by receiving states (e.g. Castles, 1995; Joppke, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 1999). As immigrants join the state where they settle and often cause cultural plurality and political dissonance, they represent a challenge to prerequisite isomorphism between nation and people. This is particularly so for Chinese emigrants in Southeast Asia, who were purported to be associated with communist China and had been regarded as unassimilated.

The challenges faced by sending states, however, are widely ignored. While crossing national borders, the national culture and language promoted through the nation-building policies of the sending state will inevitably be transformed as emigrants adapt them to the local settings of the receiving state. This reveals that so-called national culture and language, which are seen as the essence of a nation, are actually variable and flexible, depending on the orientation of the emigrants as well as on local circumstances.
Some emigrants are eager to preserve aspects of their old national identity by transplanting the cultural and linguistic practices of their homeland into the receiving state, even forming immigrant enclaves (Wilson and Portes, 1980). Others are committed to integration within their new nation in the context of multicultural policies and ‘hyphenated identity’, in the process turning their homeland national culture into a minority group ethnicity in the host society (Bélanger and Verkuyten, 2010; Giampapa, 2001). Still others are principally concerned with community politics and pursue politics based on their communal identity inside the host society (Wang, 1988; Wang 1991b). Some migrants even freely flow across national borders, exploit the flexibility of global market, and embrace a transnational identity (Ong, 1999). Therefore, emigrants can translate a seemingly fixed national culture into a range of flexible cultural and linguistic practices, deconstructing isomorphism between nation, people, culture, and language in respect of sending states, too. Sending states can therefore no longer monopolise interpretations of culture and language that confine it to a single nation-state. In other words, the monolith of nationality can be loosened by various identity practices of emigrants.

Chinese emigrants offer a particularly fruitful case for understanding the processes involved in the transformation of national cultures. It is often argued that Confucian values, a common written language, similar social customs, and festivities form the core of the so-called ‘Chineseness’ that grants a sense of what it is to be, or cease to be, Chinese (Wang, 1988: 1). The ‘Chinese nation-state’ that emerged by the end of the 19th century helped build a strong notion of Chineseness around characteristics of nationalism, such as national territory, national pride, national language, and national education. This resulted in a rather essentialist view of ‘authentic Chineseness’: being Chinese meant recognition that one was part of the Chinese nation, had a certain degree
of historical identity (culturally) and nationalist identity (politically) towards China, had received Chinese education, and spoke good Mandarin. These criteria, criticised by Ien Ang (1998) as ‘Chinese essentialism’, demarcate ‘an absolutist oppositioning of authentic and inauthentic, pure and impure, real and fake’ (Ang, 1998: 225). In other words, those who cannot fulfil these essentialist criteria would be dismissed as ‘not Chinese enough’.

Moreover, there are two sentiments involved in the essentialist view of Chineseness (Wu, 1991). One is a culturalist sentiment that obliges Chinese people to hand down the cultural heritage from ancestors to descendants, to connect themselves to the fate of China as a nation, and to be separate from non-Chinese. Another is a racist sentiment that makes Chinese people see themselves as members of ‘the Chinese race’, sharing a feeling of what Rey Chow (1993: 24) refers to as the ‘myth of consanguinity’, as in the old saying: ‘all Chinese people are children of the Yellow Emperor’. As a result, those who have Chinese blood are expected to satisfy the essentialist criteria of being Chinese.

Chinese emigrants on the other hand by no means follow such criteria, having shown much more varied cultural and political orientations. As Wang indicates, even at the peak of overseas Chinese nationalism, around the time of World War II, there existed three groups of Chinese overseas: the China-oriented, the local Chinese community-oriented, and the receiving state-oriented (Wang, 1981: 147). In the age of globalisation, in which national borders are crossed more frequently, such orientations diversify even further. For example, facilitated by ‘internetworking’, a ‘global Chinese community’ consisting of transnational Chinese business networks has emerged, producing ‘globalized Chineseness’ which does not necessarily have interest in, or loyalty to, a certain territorial polity (Kwok, 1999).
Notwithstanding, China has still been a significant focus of identity, fuelled by the persisting policies of Chinese government(s) to preserve and revive Chinese identity, belonging, and cultural and linguistic literacy through Chinese education. There seems to be a tug of war for the orientation of Chinese overseas between the centrifugal force of the global market and the centripetal force of sending and receiving nation-state governments.

Hence, the issues of Chinese education raised by educationalists in the Philippines and Chinese-education researchers are deeply problematic. The Chineseness, Mandarin ability, and Chinese identity that they pursue are defined and produced by China, and are based on an overseas Chinese nationalism that stresses the nationalistic ideology of one nation, one people, one culture, and one language. Yet various forms of Chineseness may have been unfolding, facilitated by the local, national, and transnational practices of the Philippine-Chinese. Focusing on the original form of Chineseness would be to ignore other possibilities nurtured by the diverse environments in which Philippine-Chinese have settled. Masked by Chinese nationalism, the function of the Chinese school system, besides Mandarin teaching, would be neglected, too. These educational practices in the local circumstance are likely to gradually drive Chineseness way from a China-centredness, thus leading to a paradigm shift of Chineseness toward openness to others.

1.3 Setting the Framework for the Study of Chineseness Production in Chinese Schools

Despite great complexity, a study of the Chineseness of Chinese overseas could easily focus solely on Chinese nationalism. However, the focus of this thesis is the multiplicity
within, and the interaction between, different forms of Chineseness. Therefore, I derive a framework for the study of how Chineseness is produced from reviewing the literature. The following discussion interrogates and analyses the origin of Huaqiao, criticises the essentialist view, and expands all aspects of Chineseness generated at different levels. The process consists of three stages. The first is to trace how Chinese overseas became a single group with the obligation to follow the ideal of one nation, one people, one culture, and one language. The second is to explore the possibilities of multiple Chineseness(es) by employing some critics of single Chineseness. Finally, I introduce an illuminating methodological approach to challenge the myth of nationalism and to expand the scope of the study of Chineseness.

1.3.1 Huaqiao and Chinese Diaspora

The discussion necessarily involves a Chinese term referring to Chinese overseas as a single group: ‘Huaqiao’. The pioneering researcher in the area of overseas Chinese studies, Gungwu Wang (1981), rightfully notes that the term Huaqiao implies that all Chinese overseas, regardless of how many generations they have settled in a receiving state, will eventually return back to their hometown in China. The term thus has political, patriotic connotations: it suggests that all Chinese overseas ought to have loyalty to China rather than to colonial administrations or receiving states (Wang, 1981: 123; Wang, 1991a). The notion of Huaqiao makes Chinese overseas who have scattered around the world an integral part of the Chinese nation, turning those with a variety of cultural and historical backgrounds into a single group. The core point in Wang’s works is, however, that the term Huaqiao is overgeneralised and should be used carefully: it not only fuels suspicion about Chinese overseas’ loyalty to receiving states, but also
simplifies and neglects the local contexts and life experiences pertaining to the diverse locations in which Chinese overseas settle and live (Wang, 1981; Wang, 1991a; Wang, 1991b; Wang, 2001b; Wang, 2001c). Hence, although the term Huaqiao is commonly used of Chinese emigrants, we should keep in mind that it only represents one aspect of Chineseness and fails to exhaust all possibilities of their cultural and political orientations.

Another general term used to refer to Chinese overseas, ‘Chinese diaspora’, has a similar problem. Diaspora is a term originating from the Jewish community’s historical experiences of exile and dispersion. Now, diaspora has been universalised to refer to a variety of transnational communities, such as the Bangladeshi diaspora, the Filipino diaspora, the Haitian diaspora, etc. It also implies a transnational community’s continuing entanglement with homeland politics (Brubaker, 2005). In his work ‘A Single Chinese Diaspora?’, Wang (2004) suggests the term be used with reservation. Similar to the notion of Huaqiao, ‘diaspora’ is associated with the notion of ‘sojourner’ (Wang, 2004: 158) which implies Chinese emigrants’ ‘rootlessness’ — something likely to cause suspicion about the Chinese minorities’ lack of commitment to, and of sense of belonging with, receiving states. The term, in fact, overstates ethnic, if not nationalist or racist, connections between all Chinese, at home and abroad (Wang, 2004: 158). Wang also urges us to study overseas Chinese communities in the context of their respective national environment and to ‘avoid projecting the image of a single Chinese diaspora’ (Wang, 2004: 169).

While Wang reminds us that the association between Chinese overseas and the homeland should not be overemphasised, Mckeown (1999) refutes studies that confine their focus to the nationalist viewpoint. Mckeown points out that studies of the Chinese diaspora could easily get bogged down in discussing competing nation-based claims of
respective nation-states, such as the dilemma between China-centred and America-centred stances for Chinese Americans. Instead, McKeeown advances that studies should ‘complement and expand upon nation-based perspectives by drawing attention to global connections, networks, activities, and consciousnesses that bridge these more localized anchors of reference’ (McKeown, 1999: 307). In other words, studies should stress the mobility and dispersion of migration experiences, rather than fixed situations, such as nationality.

Gungwu Wang also notes that researchers with various stances could draw different conclusions from the same group of Chinese overseas. In his work ‘the Future of Overseas Chinese Studies’, Wang (2001) reviews the major studies of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. He categorises the studies into four approaches, each representing four paradigms. The first is policy reports by colonial officials, white settlers, and indigenous leaders. These reports aim to understand the economic position and the social and cultural dynamics of each Chinese community for safer governance of respective colonies. The reports, of course, serve the interests of European empires and tend to problematise Huaqiao as an issue to tackle. The second type of study is written by officials and scholars in China with a China-centred point of view. For the purpose of promoting Chinese identity, they tend to politicise the issue of Chinese overseas, stress their association with China, and see them as complete Huaqiao. The third type is writings by local Chinese who have trained as scholars in the West, and have identified themselves with the nation in which they live. These studies concentrate on overseas Chinese communities’ political loyalties to, and cultural integration with, respective nation-states. The fourth is led by two anthropologists, Maurice Freedman of the London School of Economics and G. William Skinner of Cornell University. Their work has been influential on generations of scholars, including some Chinese
overseas. Compared to the last three, this approach is relatively free from a nation-centred viewpoint, and is out of academic interest. As shown above, Wang’s review serves as a reminder that the stance of researchers, including their orientation toward colonisers, China, or receiving states, can affect the tendency of the studies and consequently their results. Therefore, while reviewing the literature about Chinese education in the Philippines, we need to pay attention to the standpoint of researchers.

From the discussions above, we can see that the viewpoints of researchers understanding Chinese overseas, as well as of Chinese overseas understanding themselves, can vary. Thus, the study of Chinese overseas necessitates a discussion about what being Chinese means – a question about ‘Chineseness’ that, among scholars in this area, inevitably becomes heated.

1.3.2 Chineseness as an Open Signifier

The discourse on Chineseness has faced a shift from uniformity to multiplicity, from centre to periphery. In imperial China, power was highly centralised to the emperors, and being Chinese meant acknowledging the authority of the geopolitical centre and accepting and learning the only civilised way of living (Shi, 2009). Since the second half of the 19th century, a series of droughts, famines and wars in China served as push factors causing waves of Chinese migration, mainly to Southeast Asia and North America. In the meantime, while China turned itself into a modern nation-state, Chinese people within and without the Chinese territory began to share a uniform and strong notion of Chineseness as a consequence of actions taken by the Chinese state. Yet the migration that followed historical events, such as the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989, and the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong
from the UK to the PRC in 1997, all witnessed a continuing process of de-centring from
China to respective receiving countries. In the aftermath of a series of calamities,
Chineseness has therefore become a controversial issue.

In the post-1949 era, interactions between Chinese people overseas and China were
interrupted. While residing abroad, Chinese overseas have been free to review the given
ties with China and their inherited Chineseness, and how these affect their actual lives
in respective countries. From the perspective of Chinese overseas, the meaning of being
Chinese continues to change along the lines of historical developments and actual
situations. Writing in the context of Singapore, for example, Eugene Tan (2003)
indicates a series of changes in views about Chineseness. The Cultural Revolution in
China and the communist threat from 1965 to 1979 prompted ‘de-Chineseness’ among
Chinese Singaporeans, who to keep a distance from being Chinese; the advent of the
Reform and Opening of China from 1979 to 1990 led to a ‘tentative high-profile for
Chineseness’; 1990 to the present marks an ‘assertion of Chineseness’ rekindled by the
economic achievements of East Asian capitalism of not only Mainland China, but the
Chinese in the periphery such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, and overseas Chinese
communities. As these developments indicate, the image of Chineseness hinges on the
situation of ‘Greater China’.

In terms of the discourse on Chineseness, the stage of ‘de-Chineseness’ has entailed a
shift from uniformity, hegemony and conformity (peaking at the Maoist period) to
multiplicity, autonomy and diversity occurring at the periphery. After the 1970s, the
Chinese periphery also played the role of bridging Mainland China and the West in
terms of the former's pursuit of modernity, and that internationally dominated the
production of discourse on Chineseness (Wu, 2015). China’s rise may have empowered
it to manipulate the official discourse on Chineseness, but the ‘reassertion of
Chineseness’ by Chinese overseas does not necessarily mean the resurrection of the China-centred view. As China as a state is fixed in one location, with the increase of migratory flows of Chinese people around the world has also come a rise in discourses on ‘global Chineseness’ that show detachment from the Chinese state (Reid, 2009). The discourse of ‘global China’ and ‘transnational Chinese’ adds a new dimension to Chineseness, namely, ‘fluidity’, one of the features of global capitalist modernity (Chu, 2008). Consequently, China’s status as the hegemonic centre of ancestral origin and rootedness, and its monopoly of the definition of Chineseness, encounter challenges and deconstructions. In the circle of scholars in the Chinese periphery there even appears a voice to ‘rescue Chineseness from China’ (Wu, 2015).

Tu Wei-ming, a remarkable ‘New Confucian’ scholar who grew up in Taiwan, advances as part of his mega-concept of ‘cultural China’ that China as the centre no longer has the ability, insight, or legitimate authority to dictate the agenda. Appalled by the brutality of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Tu stresses the element of culture, rather than political central power, among features of Chineseness (Tu, 1991). The proposal of ‘cultural China’ focuses on the cultural aspects of Chineseness to facilitate the de-centering of the legitimate authority of the Chinese central government and to seek an alternative to the political and geographic centre. For Tu, cultural China consists of three symbolic universes. The first comprises the societies predominantly populated by cultural and ethnic Chinese, such as mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The second is overseas Chinese communities throughout the world existing as ethnic minorities in respective countries. The third is those who have intellectual understanding of and interest in China, such as scholars, teachers, journalists, industrials, traders, entrepreneurs and writers. China’s hegemonic monopoly of Chineseness has been challenged not only by ‘residual China’, termed by Freedman
(1979), like Taiwan and Hong Kong, but also by those who live in the second and third universes. The Chineseness contributed by the latter two even has a more profound significance in shaping the intellectual discourse of cultural China. In other words, the traditional centre-periphery dichotomy can be reversed and the Chinese periphery also has great transformative potential.

Some diasporic scholars voice fierce criticism in light of poststructuralism and cultural studies. Allen Chun (1996), who is a Chinese American of Cantonese ancestry, for example, suggests that the dominant discourse on Chineseness is greatly influenced by the modern conception of the nation-state predicated on cultural boundaries. The homogeneous notions of Chinese civilisation and of China as an unambiguous political entity tend to erase the possibility of multiple identities and negate difference (Chun, 1996: 135). Rey Chow, an ethnic Chinese scholar in America originating from Hong Kong, thus suggests that it requires ‘a great deal of work to do to decouple ethnicity ... from its equivalence with nationalism’ (Chow, 1998: 8).

Ing Ang (1998), an Indonesia-born ethnic Chinese who grew up in the Netherlands, criticises the ‘centrist and organist’ conception of Chineseness as an ‘externally imposed identity...by practice of discrimination’ (Ang, 1998: 224). From the perspective of poststructuralism, she also indicates the authenticity of Chineseness is stereotypically and rigidly constituted by ‘Chinese essentialism’. ‘Authentic’ Chineseness is thus defined by one single standard of being authentic, pure and real, such as ‘belonging to the Han race, being born in China proper, speaking Mandarin, and observing the “patriotic” code of ethics’ (Ang, 1998: 228). Having often been criticised for being ‘not Chinese enough’, Ang also criticises the conception of Chineseness for ‘truncat[ing] and suppress[ing] complex realities and experiences that
cannot possibly be fully and meaningfully contained within the singular category of “Chinese” (Ang, 1998: 233).

Though they level fierce criticism against the traditional idea of Chineseness, the above scholars seem to have no intention of completely abandoning Chineseness, or of ruling out its possible function as a way of self-expression. Instead, they are commonly open to the possibility of alternative versions of Chineseness. Chun takes the Peranakan Chinese\(^6\) of Malaysia and Indonesia as an example to indicate that those who do not meet the one single standard of Chinese identity are still essentially Chinese, ‘as long as we can reject our modern, essentially nationalistic notions of identity based on definitions of ethnicity authorized by a cultural mainstream’ (Chun, 1996: 123). Ang (2001: 35) advances Chineseness as ‘an open signifier’ for constructing syncretic identities in accordance with local specificities. Even more boldly, Chow points out that there can be a multiplicity of Chineseness as well as ‘many Chinese identities’ (Chow, 1998: 24). Many kinds of Chineseness, each open to interpretation, thus appear desirable for those who cannot content themselves with the given ‘authentic’ Chineseness.

1.3.3 Methodological Nationalism versus Methodological Cosmopolitanism in Studies of Overseas Chinese Education

As discussed above, studies of Chinese overseas should be open to multiple perspectives in interpreting the production of Chineseness; they should also be attentive

\(^6\) Peranakan Chinese refers to people of mixed Chinese and Malay/Indonesian heritage. In terms of culture and language they are predominantly Malay-influenced, but preserve a certain degree of Chinese identity by practicing Chinese traditional rituals, like the wedding ceremony.
to nationalist bias. I suggest that studies demand an awareness of so-called ‘methodological nationalism’, which ignores the significance of nationalism in modern social science, naturalises the boundary of the nation-state as the unit of analysis, and confines the scope of study of transnational social processes to the political and geographic boundaries of a certain nation-state (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002; 2003).

In light of these critics, there are three reflections on methodological nationalism to which I intend to give a closer look when it comes to overseas Chinese studies. First, the existing approach towards Chinese-education research by Chinese and Taiwanese scholars tends to be ‘nation-blind’, and takes Mandarin learning as merely a neutral technical and pedagogical issue. Methodological nationalist agendas thus have been concealed under technical discussions of Mandarin teaching that simply address the decline as a technical issue. The advice that they give is thus nation-blind, such as editing better textbooks to fit students’ standard, sending Mandarin teachers from China or Taiwan to Chinese schools, updating teaching methods, and so on. They hardly consider that the problem may be with the national framing of Chinese education. Take, for example, the biggest annual conference held by the Overseas Community Affairs Council of Taiwan in Taipei, ‘the International Conference on Internet Chinese Education (ICICE)’. The aim of the ICICE is to ‘exploit Taiwan’s advantages of digital technology and to promote quality internet Chinese education based on Taiwanese culture’ (OCAC, 2017). The entire conference in 2017 centred on the application of e-learning to Mandarin teaching. The largest and most high-profile academic event dealing with overseas Chinese education in Taiwan thus implies that problems with Mandarin teaching can be solved by technology developed by the Republic of China, which is, from the perspective of some Philippine-Chinese, the fatherland. The national agenda of Taiwan is thus hidden from academic discussions.
Second, the approach also assumes a ‘deterritorialized nation’ in which the Chinese national government, whether this refers to the PRC or the ROC, tends to trans-territorially incorporate the loyalty, wealth and influence of Chinese emigrants into its nation-building. Overseas Chinese education thus becomes part of the national project. This approach adopts a fatherland-centred viewpoint from which historical events that threaten the isomorphism between nation and the people of the sending country would be negatively narrated. For example, Chinese and Taiwanese scholars have generally regarded the Filipinization policy, which aims to turn the Chinese into Filipinos, as detrimental to the development of the Chinese school system. However, these scholars simply attribute the decline of Chinese education to the Philippine government’s actions, rather than the natural process of Chinese integration into the mainstream; they also fail to recognise the benefits that access to Filipino citizenship gives to the Chinese (see Chou, 1994; Hsia, 1994).

Third, the unit of analysis in Chinese-education studies is confined by the boundaries of the nation-state. When it comes to the research topic of Chinese education in the Philippines, article or book titles usually mention one or two nation-states as the unit of analysis, such as ‘Taiwan Policy and Influence on Overseas Chinese Education in the Philippines’ (Jiang, 2011), indicating the influence of one nation-state over another. ‘Chinese Schools and the Assimilation Problem in the Philippines’ (Sussman, 1976), meanwhile, addresses the issue of Chinese schools as a domestic problem for the Philippine nation. The nation-state thus appears to be the most significant unit of analysis. Further, academic analysis of education policy, whether the policy was made by Taiwan, China, or the Philippine government, tends to serve either as part of the nation-building projects funded by national governments or as a persuasion tactic used by the Philippine Chinese themselves to be accepted in the Filipino mainstream (Chen,
The most problematic issue is that these studies seldom engage a viewpoint bigger or smaller than national framing, such as communal or global ones. In fact, as I will show, the formation of the Philippine-Chinese community and of this education system involves an array of transnational social processes over time, including: the transnational Philippine-Chinese community; the legacy of the Spanish and American colonial regimes; postcolonial Philippine nation-building and ethnic relations; Chinese-Philippine diplomatic relations; cross-strait politics between China and Taiwan; the rise of China and the ‘Greater China’ region; globalisation, cosmopolitanisation and the Chinese diaspora. Accordingly, methodological nationalism alongside any single national standpoint are too narrow to analyse the intricate transnational education system in which Chineseness is produced.

Therefore, the research approach that I adopt in the study to cope with the transnational education system draws mainly upon ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’, proposed by Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider in 2006 as a new reference point for transnational studies. Whereas methodological nationalism or the ‘nationalised methodology’ follows the ‘either/or’ logic of nationality—every issue is either a national one within a national boundary, or an international affair between nations—aiming at advancing respective national interests, this ‘cosmopolitanized methodology’ is an attempt to shift the ‘either/or’ logic to one of ‘both/and’, which concerns the dissolution and mergence of ‘the dualities of the global and the local, the national and the international, us and them’ (Beck and Sznaider, 2006).

Beck and Sznaider also suggest an empirical approach with multi-perspectival foci—local, national, transnational, and global—to investigate the cosmopolitanisation of
contemporary society. Indeed, the Chinese education system involves a variety of communities on different geographic scales—the local Chinese community, the Philippine national government, and two kin states (Taiwan and China). So, methodologically, it is to some extent essentially cosmopolitan. In this view, I would look at how the Chinese education and Chineseness have been ‘cosmopolitanising’, attempting to encompass all these perspectives geographically, as follows.

On the spatial dimension, a national focus must be a central point in this thesis, since nationalism is still a critical part of cosmopolitan analysis. Critics of methodological nationalism do not imply the end of the nation, but its transformation (Beck and Sznaider, 2006:22). Because the Chinese school system used to be an extension of national-language education in China, it is necessary to discuss the primordial type of Chineseness based on Chinese nationalism serving to incorporate Chinese overseas into Chinese nationality.

Further, from the perspective of the Philippine nation as the receiving state, it is noteworthy that all the Chinese schools in Philippine territory have become an institutionalised part of the Philippine national education system. When mentioning ‘national’ in this context, I will discuss the interactions between the Chinese schools, the Philippine government and any authorities, as well as how these interactions affect the status of the Chinese as a minority group and any ethnic relations.

Second, with a local focus, I bring a communal perspective into the analysis of the education system. This focus will be on the Philippine-Chinese community itself rather than only the nation-states concerned. I will argue that the Chinese education system is not merely an overseas extension of the education service, rolled out on behalf of the people of the modern Chinese nation-state resident in the host Philippine state. Instead,
the Chinese also have their specific aims and ambitions, seeking a living space among these greater powers, particularly in larger Philippine society.

Third, with a transnational focus, I look at how, in an education system, national borders can be transcended back and forth by flows and networks of human beings (teachers, students, experts, officials etc.), materials (textbooks, money, facilities etc.), and services (teacher training, summer camps, visiting groups etc.). These transnational flows can potentially shape and reshape the understanding of participants’ ethnicity, nationality, identity, and citizenship. By Bauböck’s definition (2003), at a national level, transnational relations are manifest in overlapping polities between independent states; at a personal level, transnational political phenomena can be observed in external and dual citizenship for migrants. Therefore, the interaction of the Chinese education system between Taiwan and China and the Philippines may best exemplify it. Although Portes (2001b) suggests that the subject of transnational activities are mainly non-governmental and civic associations or grassroots activists, I maintain that in this context the education-related activities and resources listed above can in fact be political and governmental (whether implicitly or explicitly), under the guise of cultural and economic affairs. Nevertheless, I still indicate that there exists a certain degree of agency or relative autonomy for the Philippine-Chinese, coming from their personal experiences and daily lives. Whereas before, at the heyday of nationalism, the nation-state's conduct could be politically taken for granted, nowadays its meaning is being reinterpreted among this increasingly ‘cosmopolitanised’ Chinese community and is deviating from the original agenda of any nation-states involved.
As Beck and Grande (2010) suggest, the entanglement and interconnectedness facilitated by human mobility through the globalising process have initiated ‘an age of cosmopolitanization’ in which ‘the “global other” is in our midst’ (Beck and Grande, 2010: 417). At the empirical level, cultural difference has become routinely incorporated into daily life, leading to ‘really existing cosmopolitanism’ or ‘the cosmopolitanization of reality’ (Beck, 2006). Casual encounters with different cultural forms are often experienced unintentionally: scholars refer to this in a variety of terms, such as the ‘banal form of cosmopolitanism’ (Skey, 2012), ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’ (Werbner, 2006) and ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah, 1997). Such terms emphasise cosmopolitanism at the ground level, rather than at the normative level, which implies a moral imperative.

Defined by Szerszynski and Urry (2002), ‘cosmopolitan’ means a general ‘openness to other people and cultures’. It is worth an investigation into what extent ‘cosmopolitanisation’ really happens when different groups encounter each other. While analysing people’s everyday engagements with otherness, Skey (2012) reminds us that cosmopolitan studies should not treat identities as the exclusive possession of cultural traits, but as processes of identification. He thus advocates that researchers need to pay attention to the dynamic of openness to others by exploring people’s ‘motivations, values and wider structural constraints’ (Skey, 2012: 240) in respective contexts.

Skey further points out the utility value of cosmopolitan practices, terming this ‘strategic cosmopolitanism’ (Skey, 2012: 240). In Weenink’s case study into the reason why parents in the Netherlands send their children to international schools, some parents regard a more open attitude toward others (who are, in this case, generally rich
and westernised foreigners) as a means of ‘ensuring future success in their children’s career or study’ (quoted in Skey, 2012: 240). In another study quoted by Skey (2012: 24), Kothari shows that the vulnerability and economic insecurity of some disadvantaged groups, such as illegal migrants, prompt them to possess better cultural skills to engage with others for their livelihood, such as selling their wares to tourists. These practices of openness to others are practical and utilitarian in that, through them, the individual pursues future development rather than progress in terms of aims or values.

As this thesis will show, the Chinese schools in the Philippines are likely to undergo the process of cosmopolitanisation while encountering a variety of communal, national and transnational factors. In projecting and constructing Chineseness, Chinese schools thus appear to gradually depart from the isomorphism between the nation, people, culture, and language of China. Shifting from being part of the national education system of China, Chinese schools increasingly unfold their openness to others, whether it is for progressive values or utilitarian ones. Therefore, this thesis aims to present a general picture of the extent to which Chinese schools cosmopolitanise Chinese education as well as Chineseness in the Philippines via a range of education practices.

As cosmopolitanism becomes not only a progressive value, but also an everyday practice, education which is used to presuppose the primacy of a national identity and to make individuals into national citizens faces challenges too. Educational researchers thus suggest a new teaching approach of ‘education for cosmopolitanisation’ which celebrates diversity, recognises difference, promotes social justice, and tackle the problem of racism (Osler and Starkey, 2015). Particularly, language education which inevitably contends cultural, ethnic, and international issues is also regarded as an ‘important site of citizenship education (Starkey, 2010)’. In a globalising and
multilingual world, language education based on nationalism and monolingualism can no longer fit into people’s increasingly complex identities, loyalties, and language varieties due to transnational migration (Shohamy, 2006). Therefore, a proposal for ‘language education for cosmopolitan citizenship’ emerges (Osler & Starkey, 2010; Starkey, 2007; Starkey, 2010).

I sum up this proposal in three points. First, it suggests that language education should de-couple language teaching from a single national culture (Starkey, 2007). Both the British Council, for instance, are established to promote the cultural values of the UK by language teaching (Starkey, 2010: 2). Instead, by admitting the reality of complex and multiple identities in its content, language teaching could be multicultural and open to multiple identities and wider loyalties.

Second, in contrast to nationalised language teaching which upholds the notion of nationality with a fixed, settled view about individual’s status, language education for cosmopolitan citizenship can instead instil students the notion of citizenship which emphases individual citizen’s autonomy, agency and rights to act collectively (Starkey, 2010: 11).

Third, language education should help students to be citizens of world. Skills for intercultural communication and knowledge about global issues that lift barriers between people can be foci in language classes in which learners might not only learn their rights as a human being but also foster a sense of responsibility for others’ sufferings and human rights abuse in the world. Thus a cosmopolitan perspective based on human rights as universal principles might help language education go beyond national agenda and move toward world citizenship.

In the context of this thesis, the idealistic values of language education for cosmopolitan
citizenship can help pose challenging questions about the Chinese education in the Philippines: whether this Chinese education promotes a single national culture or accepts cultural diversity? Whether it stresses a certain kind of national identity or recognises students’ potential multiple identities? Whether it pursues the political agenda of a certain nation or tackles some universal issues faced by all human beings? The gap between the ideal of language education for cosmopolitan citizenship and the reality of the case of the Philippine-Chinese schools is also a focus of this thesis.

1.4 Research Method

The research method that I use in the thesis consists of three parts. The first part is participant observation, informed by an anthropological approach. As mentioned above, some scholarly works about the Chinese school in the Philippines assume methodological nationalism because they are inspired, supported or even funded by national governments. Consequently, these studies are likely to maintain official stances towards the fatherland, exaggerating the contribution of respective national governments’ overseas Chinese policies to Chinese schools, rather than reflecting the real situation. It is thus pivotal to gain insight from insider perspectives in order to expose the interaction between the policy implementation and actual teaching effectiveness and to present the response of local people, including students, parents, teachers, school administrators, to the educational policies. Playing the role of a teacher gave me access to become an ‘insider participant observer’ and to obtain detailed insight into the everyday teaching practices at school level and real teacher-student interaction in a classroom.

My participant observation lasted one year, from May 2010 to April 2011. I was sent
by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (the OCAC) in Taiwan to a Chinese school, which I have given the pseudonym ‘St. Joseph High School’ (SJHS). The SJHS is located in the Santa Cruz district. Part of the so-called ‘Chinatown area’, it contains a cluster of Chinese schools around the northern part of Manila’s city centre. The SJHS is a large school, attended by approximately 2,000 students in its preschool, elementary school and high school.

In this one-year teaching placement, I had two duties, both of which helped me in the data collection. One duty was to be the Chinese secretary for the principal in the mornings. As part of this role I wrote school news to be advertised in Chinese newspapers, drafted Chinese speeches for the principal, and dealt with a range of administrative works in Chinese. Some first-hand information was thus available to me in tackling these tasks.

Another duty was Mandarin teaching in the elementary school in the afternoons. I was in charge of ‘Mandarin-language learning’ and ‘common knowledge about Chinese history, geography, and culture’ for two six-grade classes. I was also the ‘form teacher’ of a class of 43 students and was responsible for maintaining in-class discipline, organising teaching activities, and preparing the students to participate in a variety of events in the elementary schools, such as fieldtrips, flag-raising ceremonies, Chinese singing, recitation, and choir contests. Close contact and interaction with the students thus availed me of their first-hand experiences in learning Mandarin.

The central question of the thesis emerged mainly as a result of this one-year participant observation. The frustration that arose from trying so hard to keep my class in order and from teaching these reluctant students compelled me to probe the reason behind their resistance to Mandarin learning. The whole thesis is an effort to answer the enquiry.
For this part of the data collection, I mainly relied on fieldwork notes. From the day I arrived in Manila, I started writing notes to record the words, behaviours, activities, events, and other features during the one-year participant observation. As much as I could, I took advantage of every opportunity to talk to strangers, ask questions and make observations to expand the width and depth of the fieldwork. At the end of the year, my completed field notes, numbering 18,447 words, became an important data resources for the thesis. Following this whole year of stay, I also revisited Manila in February and July of 2012 for further data collection.

The second part of my data collection consisted of on-site interviews conducted from October 2013 to January 2014. For this stage, I purposively sampled interviewees ranging from school administrators, teachers, students, graduates and parents affiliated with a variety of schools. There are around 50 Chinese schools in Metro Manila. I reached 11 schools of different sizes, which are fairly representative of Chinese schools in Manila. The schools that I reached consisted of 5 large schools (>3,000 students), 3 medium schools (1,000~2,000 students), and 3 small schools (<1,000 students). With respect to the social and economic background of students, most of the Chinese families were middle class; the tuition fee rate of the respective schools that the children’s families could afford was a useful indicator of the families’ social and economic background. According to the tuition fee rate, I have divided these schools roughly into three classes: 1 school is for the upper class (>100,000 pesos per year); 9 schools are for the upper-middle class (approximately 40,000~70,000 pesos per year); 1 schools for the lower-upper class (<40,000 per year). The interviewees whom I approached and the schools to which these interviewees belonged are shown as the table below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population Size</th>
<th>Interviewees</th>
<th>General social and economic background of students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xavier Schools</td>
<td>Greenhill, Manila</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>1 student</td>
<td>Upper class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 parent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang Kai-shek College</td>
<td>Tondo, Manila</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>The Chinese director</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 teacher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 graduates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 parent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Cultural College</td>
<td>Tondo, Manila</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>The vice president</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 teacher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Jude Catholic School</td>
<td>San Miguel</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>1 graduate</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace Christian College</td>
<td>Quezon City</td>
<td>Large</td>
<td>The president</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 graduates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Joseph High School</td>
<td>Sta. Cruz</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>The principal</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Chinese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Interviewee</td>
<td>Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uno High School</td>
<td>Tondo</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>The Chinese director</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 teacher</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 graduate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope Christian High School</td>
<td>Sta. Cruz</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>The Chinese director</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 teachers (from China)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Institute of Quezon</td>
<td>Quezon city</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>The principal</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Chen Kuang High School</td>
<td>San Juan</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>The principal</td>
<td>Upper-middle class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Yat Sen High School</td>
<td>Sta. Cruz</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>2 teachers (from Taiwan)</td>
<td>Lower-middle class</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 Interviewees and Schools during my Fieldwork

All the interviewees can be roughly divided into two groups: first, educationalists, consisting of school administrators and teachers. Second, students, graduates, and
parents. Based on my research questions, I produced two versions of an interview guide for the two groups.

To investigate teaching practices at school level, I interviewed 9 administrators and 13 teachers from 9 schools. Based on an interview guide (Appendix 1), I asked them questions about their ideas for Chinese education, the textbooks that they use, and their general thoughts about the overseas Chinese policies of China and Taiwan. During these visits, I also arranged informal sessions with students to assess their standard of Mandarin.

To explore the students’ experience of learning Mandarin and how it affects their career prospects, I also interviewed 4 students, 10 graduates and 6 parents from 6 different schools. I used ‘snowball sampling’ to contact them, having been introduced by people I knew during my year of teaching there. Because I kept in touch with them, I was able to have follow-up sessions via Skype and Facebook after the fieldwork. The interview also followed a question guide, consisting of six sections (see Appendix 2): generation introduction, context and background, life in and after school, tutoring experience, career development, and experience about transnational education.

I visited four institutes for Chinese-education research and services during the fieldwork. They are the Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran (Kaisa), the Association of Chinese Filipino Schools in the Philippines (ACFSP), and the Philippine Chinese Education Research Center (PCERC).

The Kaisa is significant in promoting the idea of Chinese-Filipino identity for Philippine-Chinese. The founder of the Kaisa, Teresita Ang See, is also a leading researcher for Philippine-Chinese affairs. Interviewing her gave me insight into the complicated problem of the Chinese school system being haunted by the sense of being
Huaqiao: this inspired me to focus on Huaqiao Chineseness in schools. The ACFSP is the largest and most influential school association in charge of coordination between schools and general educational affairs. It was established with the support from the OCAC in Taiwan. In recent years, it also has asked for educational resources from China. I interviewed the administrative officer of the ACFSP about the cooperation between Chinese schools, China, and Taiwan in terms of teacher training programs, teachers, and textbook supplies. The PCERC is an institution for educational research with a strong and ongoing commitment to education reform based on ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’. Interviews with the vice chairman, Duanming Huang, and the director, Meimei Yang, helped me to fathom ‘Huaren education’ based on Huaren Chineseness.

Additionally, I conducted interviews with Philippine-Chinese who visited Taiwan to take part in education activities held by the OCAC, such as the Chinese Teacher Training Program in Taiwan in 2012, the Language Study Program for Expatriate Youth in 2012, and the School Principal and Administrators Visiting Tour in 2013. In doing so, I was able to receive their immediate feedback on these implementations by Taiwan. In 2012, I also interviewed the Chief Secretary of the OCAC of Taiwan, Liang-ming Chang, who was in charge of the policy formulation of overseas Chinese education, to enquire about Taiwan’s overseas Chinese policy.

I recorded my interviews, with consent, and transcribed most of them. I also organised and analysed the interview data by using qualitative data analysis software (MAXQDA 10). In the software, there is a section of code system by which I could identify themes emerging in the texts. According to the framework indicated earlier, themes about Chinese education are included in four categories that I created: Huaqiao Chineseness, Huaren Chineseness, communal Chineseness, and global Chineseness.
The third part of my data collection efforts consisted of archival and documentary research. I attended libraries in Manila and Taiwan, consulting the relevant collections of archives, documents, theses, and books. The collection of the Chinbin See Memorial Library concentrates on Philippine-Chinese studies; it holds extensive academic publications and doctoral and master theses about the Philippine-Chinese community in general, and about Chinese education in the Philippines in particular. Particularly significant in the collection of theses are works by graduates of some Philippine universities that are unique to this library. Tan Yan Kee Library holds the largest collection of Philippine-Chinese writings in Chinese; through these, I was able to gain awareness of the general Philippine-Chinese view on Chinese education. The Rizal Library of Ateneo de Manila University and the Library of Institute of Modern History in Academia Sinica in Taiwan have huge collections of Philippine studies; these are helpful in understanding the historical, social, and political background to the Chinese school system. These secondary resources helped me to illustrate the context and the historical development of the education system, and are particularly beneficial for chapter 2, the background chapter.

The whole research journey lasted around eight years. It started from the day I realised I was going to teach in the Philippines and ended with the submission of this thesis. To clearly outline the journey, I provide a timeline below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Research Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 2009</td>
<td>Receiving the application result of the substitute service</td>
<td>Beginning to figure out the possibility of doing study in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Enrolling in PhD program of draft a research proposal about the Chinese</td>
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*Table 1 Timeline of the Whole Research Journey*

1.5 Some Ethnical Considerations

My dual role as teacher and researcher may arouse ethical concern. Despite the fact that I came to the Philippines with the purpose of doing a study, I was aware that my primary duty is teaching for students. In SJHS, apart from the principal and a few teachers, students normally did not know my status as a PhD student. Yet I did not intentionally prevent students from knowing this. As a Taiwanese unfamiliar with Philippine language and culture, my work of being a Mandarin teacher itself was difficult enough. At work, I just focused on my teaching responsibility, forgot my role as researcher, and had no intention to be distracted by my PhD study. I carefully observed students’ response to my teaching and their everyday interactions, as what other dutiful teachers did for reflecting on their teaching. Given that, it would appear awkward and unnecessary to deliberately tell students I was doing a PhD study. Meanwhile, I only did my research-related work during off-working hours, such as remembering everything happened in school relevant to my research and writing field notes. Also, I never employed a certain teaching method for academic purpose and asked students a question irrelevant to teaching. In other words, I managed to be scrupulous in separating
PhD study from my teaching responsibility.

After I left SJHS and continued my PhD study in Taiwan and later in UK, I visited Manila three times subsequently for fieldwork and conducted online interviews with students and teachers. I therefore exposed my role as a researcher. In general, the interviewees hold supportive attitudes towards my study and my interest in the Chinese education in the Philippines.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

After the introduction, in chapter 2 I discover how the Chineseness of the Philippine-Chinese has been shaped and reshaped through a sequence of conceptions, corresponding with different governance stages and momentous historical events, specifically the Spanish and American colonisations, the independence of the Philippines, Cold War geopolitics, and the Reform and Opening of China. By reviewing the historical development of the Philippine-Chinese community, I particularly highlight the citizenship status of the Chinese, which has been essential in terms of adjusting the Chineseness produced in Chinese schools to suit their complex situation.

Chapter 3 then focuses on Huaqiao Chineseness and Huaqiao education. By illustrating the origin of Huaqiao Chineseness, overseas Chinese policies of China and Taiwan, and Mandarin teaching in the Chinese schools, I show that the primordial type of Chineseness motivated the building of the Chinese schools from the very beginning. Huaqiao Chineseness adheres to the expectations of Chinese overseas to acquire Chinese citizenship, learn Chinese culture, and speak Mandarin. Despite the younger generation’s loss of the legal status of being Huaqiao, Huaqiao Chineseness still has a great influence on current Chinese education in the schools, embodied by the pedagogy of ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’. Considering to students’ low academic
performance and poor Mandarin ability, however, I conclude that the pedagogy cannot be compatible with students’ identity.

Chapter 4 furthers the discussion of a second type of Chineseness, ‘Huaren Chineseness’. This is a proposal to localise Chineseness, including Mandarin learning, to accommodate the younger generations’ identification with local Philippine society and Filipino citizenship. Huaren Chineseness breaks the prerequisite of the isomorphism between nation and people, demonstrating overseas Chinese people’s transformative potential to produce Chineseness without Chinese nationality or Chinese national identity. Because Mandarin ability plays a central role in Huaren identity, a group of Chinese educationalists have proposed Chinese-education reform on the basis of Huaren Chineseness to balance Mandarin learning and Filipino national identity. I analyse and present the educational content of ‘Huaren education’ by illustrating the pedagogy and the presumption behind it. I also show how the idea and prospect of Huaren education face resistance from those who adhere to Huaqiao education.

Chapter 5 analyses a community-based Chineseness which is beyond Mandarin teaching and is substantially beneficial to people’s lives in the Philippines. ‘Communal Chineseness’ is the form that really occurs in the Chinese schools, and functions to help students integrate into the mainstream; for this reason it is contrary to the original intentions behind the establishment of Chinese schools. Given that Chinese schools in the Philippines fail to foster practical Mandarin ability, Mandarin learning in these schools serves rather as a symbol of being Chinese. This communal Chineseness is free from Huaqiao Chineseness, the Chinese national culture, and even Mandarin teaching, having further broken the isomorphism between people, nation, national culture and language. Through observing everyday interactions between students, teachers, administrators, and the school surroundings, I find that Chinese schools play a central
role in formulating community-based Chinese identity by symbolically distinguishing ethnic Chinese from the mainstream, by generating and distributing social capital for students, by facilitating class reproduction and social mobility, and by preparing a friendly ground for the cultural adaptation and national socialisation of students to nurture Filipino national identity. Communal Chineseness thus helps students to adapt to social life, build careers, and secure socioeconomic status in Philippine society.

The concluding chapter gives a comprehensive analysis of Chineseness produced in Philippine-Chinese schools. Although Chinese overseas have the potential for cosmopolitanisation in liberating Chineseness from Chinese nationalism, the extent to which cosmopolitanisation really occurs – indeed, whether it happens at all – depend on the context of respective overseas Chinese communities. In the case of the Chinese schools in the Philippines, the high level of entanglement with Huaqiao Chineseness impedes Chinese education from being further cosmopolitanised. By contrast, it is those education practices apart from Mandarin teaching that are commonly neglected by China-oriented educationalists that have substantially initiated the cosmopolitanisation of Chineseness in an unintended way.
Chapter 2

The Citizenship for the Philippine-Chinese and the Chinese-Filipino School System in Historical Perspective

2.1 Introduction

According to Ang See’s discussion (1997: 96), the Chinese migrants’ presence in the Philippine Islands can be roughly divided into three stages with respect to the degree of their attachment to the land: the immigrant sojourner stage, the permanent settlement stage, and the Chinese-Filipino stage. The three stages correspond with the pre-war period (prior to 1946), the Cold War period (1946 to 1975), and the post-Cold War period (1975 until now) respectively. The development of the Chinese school system also follows this staging. As the Chinese acquired different citizenship status at these stages, the characteristics of Chinese education also varied with the times.

This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the historical development of the Chinese school system in the Philippines. I pay particular attention to the interaction between the development of the school system, the citizenship status of the Chinese, and the larger political and social contexts surrounding the Chinese community. After introducing the general conditions under Spanish colonisation, I then divide the unfolding of the Chinese school system into four periods: the Spanish, the American, the Cold War, and the Post-Cold War periods\(^7\).

\(^7\) For the detained timeline of the development of the Chinese school system in the Philippines, please see Appendix 3
2.2 General Conditions and Education in the Spanish Period

The earliest Chinese arrivals in the Philippine Archipelago date back to approximately the 10th century. However, evidence shows that there existed the earliest small settlement of about 150 Chinese in the Manila area in 1570 (Wickberg, 1965: 4). Most of them were shipping merchants sailing across the South China Sea to the Philippines. Ang See (1997: 96) names the period 'sojourners or Huaqiao stage' due to the temporary nature of the merchants’ stay in the Philippines. The Chinese were just sojourners or so-called ‘commuting migrants’ going back and forth between Fukien Province of South China and the Philippine islands (Wilson, 2004: 69). Since the 1560s, the arrival of Spanish conquerors drew the Philippines into Western economy, making the Philippines involved in the Western economy, attracting more Chinese merchants to Manila where the trading centre between China and Mexico that exchanged Mexican silver for Chinese goods was located.

In addition to Chinese merchants, artisans, fishermen, and farmers, who would provide necessary services and goods not available from the natives, were also attracted by the sophisticated economy newly established at Manila and other centres of Spanish residence (Wickberg, 1965: 4). Yet most of them were oriented toward their places of origin in China. The popular idiom among the Chinese overseas, ‘fallen leaves return to their roots’ (Luo ye gui gen), meaning that the sojourners will eventually go back their homes, is an embodiment of their strong attachment to their Chinese origins. Thus seldom did Chinese men bring their families from China to settle in the Philippines and produce new generations.

Outnumbered by the Chinese, the Spaniards felt insecure about their presence. For the sake of the stability of the colonial rule, Spanish authorities imposed severe restrictions
on the number of the Chinese, controlling numbers by means of segregation, massacres, and expulsions. The Spanish authorities were also intent on Catholicising the Chinese. The Chinese who did not convert to Catholicism were forced to be segregated in a Chinese ghetto called 'Parian' outside of the Manila city walls. From the 1580s until 1790, they also underwent overt discrimination, such as limits on residence, extortion, higher taxation, restraints on mingling with the natives, and restricted movement. In addition, they suffered six massacres and several expulsions in the 17th and 18th centuries when the Spanish felt threatened. Sometimes eliminating the Chinese was merely for the purpose of controlling the population to within the 4,000 who were ‘necessary’ for the colony (Wickberg, 1965: 24). Throughout the Spanish colonisation, the Chinese population was usually fewer than 10,000, until the 19th century (Wickberg, 1965).

In order to cement their own status, the Spaniards created a social classification composed of ‘Spaniard,’ ‘indio’, and ‘Chinese’ on the basis of different levels of hispanisation and Catholicisation. The Spaniards saw the Chinese, whom they called ‘sangleyes’, unassimilable despised. Consequently, the mandates that the Spanish imposed on the Chinese such as segregation, discrimination, and social classification were to prevent them exerting pernicious influences, like ‘social malfunction, helter-skelter living, and perversion of customs’ (Wickberg, 1965: 7), on the newly converted natives. They were second-class Spanish subjects deprived of full membership.

Catholicisation was a major element of the colonial government’s Chinese policy. Spanish Catholicism was not only Spain's imperial philosophy, but also a means of governance on the assumption that ‘a good Catholic was also a good—and law-abiding—subject’ (Wilson, 2004: 32). The Spanish authority recognised cultural difference between ethnic groups under the premise that all people should accept ‘the
universal propagation of a culturally unifying religious doctrine’ (Wickberg, 2000: 8). Only the converted were entitled to free movement and intermarriage with the native women. Due to the absence of Chinese women, a high rate of intermarriage led to the assimilation and settlement of a number of the Chinese in the local society, giving rise, in the 17th century, to a Catholicised Chinese-Filipino mestizo community in Binondo, a settlement near ‘Intramuros’ (Today, Binondo remains the centre of the Chinese district’.). However, the offspring of Chinese mestizos were distant from non-Catholic Chinese and closer to Catholic natives, thus generating a hispanised, Catholic and pro-Spanish group of Chinese mestizos who were by no means simply Chinese in identity.

The Chinese, however, were unwilling to accept Catholic education. In 1675, there were more than one thousand parochial primary schools and a limited number of secondary schools, Sunday schools and night schools, run by the parishes (Lu, 2001). These Catholic missionary schools could neither completely meet the natives’ demand for basic education (due to huge population in the islands), nor could they target the unconverted Chinese residents. By and large, the Chinese were not that interested in Catholic education – one reason for this lack of interest being that it was unaffordable to some less wealthy Chinese. In 1855, according to the record enrolment in the University of Santo Tomas, the first university in the Philippines, none of the Chinese was enrolled in there (Lu, 2001: 13). The other reason might be that Chinese believed that in general China was the only true civilisation and Confucian education was the only true education, as discussed in chapter 3. Hence, the Chinese were considered by the Spanish as an ‘unassimilable national minority’ (Wickberg, 1965: 190). Moreover, given the sojourning nature of the Chinese as a whole, they rarely brought their family members to the Philippines, so the need for education was not of significance. Even when they had needs for education in the Philippines, wealthier families preferred to
either send their children back to China to receive Confucian education or hire tutors from China. Others taught the Chinese youths the rudiments of bookkeeping and commercial correspondence under the auspices of family and trade associations in traditional tutorial classes (See, 1985: 32).

Between 1750 and 1850, the control of the Chinese population was largely lifted to reinvigorate the declining galleon trade. The segregation of non-Catholic Chinese from Catholic Chinese, the natives, and Spaniards was abandoned, and ‘Parian’ was torn down in 1790. Despite the greater freedom that came with the removing of these external pressures, the Chinese in the early 19th century were less of a community than a group (Wickberg, 1965: 41).

2.3 Citizenship for the Chinese and the Origins of the Chinese School System under American Rule

The sense of a Chinese community began to emerge in the second half of the 19th century in response to the flaring up of anti-Chinese sentiment. This flaring up was a result of increasingly fierce market competition between Chinese and Filipinos throughout the Philippines (Wickberg, 1965: 152). The last three decades of the 19th century saw a series of Filipino nationalist movements against the Spanish colonial government; sometimes this evolved into anti-Chinese campaigns. These campaigns posed a threat to the properties and lives of the Chinese.

With a flickering concept of citizenship, the Chinese became more conscious of taking collective action to protect themselves when anti-Chinese campaigns happened. They were capable of employing the legal system by hiring Spanish
lawyers and engaging officials to defend their interests (Chu, 2011; Wickberg, 1965: 166).

Therefore, the upholding of the modern idea of the rule of law in the 19th century made the Chinese less vulnerable in preventing further massacres and revolts. In the mid-19th century, the push factors like wars in China and the pull factors like the new economic policies in the Philippines made more Chinese arrive (Zhuang, 2012: 672). The number reached 30,797 in 1876 and 100,000 in 1896 (Census of the Philippine Islands: 1902, Vol. 1, cited in Zhuang, 2012: 672).

Remarkably, the Chinese even began to appeal to the home government and imagine themselves and the Chinese in China as the one national entity to fight for their rights (Chu, 2011: 97). The Chinese longed for the protection from the Chinese government led by the Qing emperor. They envied the protection that expatriates of other countries enjoyed from their consulates in the Philippines. The approaching Philippine revolution made the Chinese feel even more threatened, and the demand for a Chinese consul became urgent. Although there was a ‘captain’ to lead the Chinese community, the captain was not strong enough to deal with the relations outside the community (Wickberg, 1965: 210).

As the same time, the Qing imperial state was eager to expand its power by incorporating the external resources of overseas Chinese. In the eyes of the Qing officials, the overseas Chinese communities were an alternative to China’s dependence on foreign capital and the providers of particular skills, such as making machines, steering steamships, and handling foreign firearms (Godley, 1981). In honour of overseas Chinese people’s substantial financial and technological contributions to the homeland, and in contrast to a previous attitude of indifference, the term ‘Huaqiao’
became an officially recognised and popular identity for overseas Chinese during this period (Kuhn, 2008: 243). In return, ‘Huaqiao citizenship’ was granted to overseas Chinese that could confirm the membership of being Chinese, though in a pre-modern way. Huaqiao citizenship differs from modern varieties in that the Qing government took overseas Chinese as ‘imperial subjects’ who were an inalienable part of, if not possessions of, China. The intention was revealed by the first Chinese nationality law in 1909 that unilaterally defined the natural possession of nationality for overseas Chinese on the basis of *jus sanguinis* regardless of the attitudes of the colonial authorities and of overseas Chinese themselves (Dan, 2009).

In fact, imperial China’s interests in overseas China might be a completely new phenomenon. In pre-modern imperial China, it was firmly believed that China was the centre of the universe and that Chinese culture was the only true universal culture. Those places beyond Chinese civilisation were all wildernesses and those unenlightened aliens from Chinese culture were all savages unworthy of the attention of the Chinese emperors. Since the core values of Confucianism, which stressed both filial piety' and sedentary agricultural values, inclined to attach to homelands (Yen, C. H., 1981: 264), emigration from China seemed to be a violation of Chinese cultural tradition. What is more, for security reasons, there was a sea ban on emigration and foreign trade and those Chinese who resided in the barbarian lands were 'undesirable subjects' (Zhuang, 2006: 98). This may explain the Chinese emperor’s indifferent response to the apology he received from the Spanish following a wanton massacre of Chinese settlers in the Philippines in 1603. The Chinese emperor considered the Chinese emigrants unworthy of any protection from the homeland; he replied that: ‘…those whom the Castillians have killed were wicked people, ungrateful to China, their native country, their elders, and their parents as they have not returned to China for many years’
This event reveals that overseas Chinese used to have no protection from China.

Since the 1880s things have changed greatly. Qing officials initiated plans to establish a Chinese consulate in Manila and then conducted investigations in the Philippines. The Philippine-Chinese also petitioned Chinese officials for the establishment of the consulate and expressed their grievance. Despite these diplomatic initiatives, the Spanish administration again and again refuted the proposal. The Spanish were reluctant to give up their control of the Chinese to a Chinese consul and to accord them equal taxation and fair treatment (Wickberg, 1965: 221).

Finally, on the eve of the defeat of the Spanish by America and their cession from the islands after the American-Spanish War, the establishment of the Chinese consulate was approved in 1898. The fund for the Chinese consulate came from the registration fee that every Philippine-Chinese had to pay in the process of registering in the consulate, as well as from a donation from the Chinese Charitable Association (Shan-ju Gong-suo). The fund was voluntarily generated by the Philippine-Chinese themselves because they realised that, as an immigrant group, however rich they are, state protection is doubtless stronger. On the suggestion of the consul, Chen Gan, after deduction of the consulate expenses, the rest of the fund would be applied to construct gunboats and to build a Chinese school inside the consulate (Tan, 1972: 160).

At the same time, overseas Chinese possession of Chinese citizenship was prescribed and confirmed by the legislation of the Law of Nationality by the ROC government in 1912. The Nationality Law followed mainly the *jus sanguinis* principle, upon which those of Chinese descent could acquire Chinese nationality regardless of their place of birth and residence. Nevertheless, their citizenship rights were poorly enforced due to
long-lasting political unrest in China.

As for their citizenship status in the Philippines, the Chinese were classified as ‘aliens’ in a two-way classificatory system of ‘Filipinos’ and ‘alien’ in which ‘alien’ to a large extent equated to Chinese. The classification was actually a racial divide by denying Chinese citizenship rights (Chu, 2010: 304). The nationalisation law passed by the Philippine Commonwealth Government in 1935 prevented most Chinese from naturalisation due to extremely high standards of property and of language qualification (Jensen, 1956: 292). Moreover, the Americans followed former colonisers' civil and criminal codes to restrict the freedom of Chinese in the name of respecting Spanish colonial law (Chu, 2010: 304). The Chinese Exclusion Act, which was extended to the Philippine archipelago in 1902, was a gesture by the American authority that they sought to keep the Philippines for the Filipinos rather than exploit the land and people’ It also prohibited the entrance of Chinese immigrants, with the exception of merchants capable of selling American goods to the Philippines (Go, 1996: 76).

Nevertheless, the Chinese immigrants had steadily arrived because of the political stability and growth of business opportunities during the American administration. The relatively higher level of freedom protected the rule of law, however, still attracted more Chinese migrants to come from mainland China, contributing to the growth of the Chinese population between 1899 and 1939 from approximately 40,000 to 117,487 and the actual number could be higher than that due to illegal immigration (Jensen, 1956: 149). Accordingly, the demand for Chinese education increased.

Also, benefiting from the Americans’ laissez-faire approach in their dealings with the Chinese community, the Chinese enjoyed the freedom to establish a series of institutions to form their national identity. Traditional organisations in the Chinese
community, like the family and hometown associations as well as chambers of commerce, were established in large number; the first Chinese school in the Philippines, the Anglo-Chinese School, was founded in 1899; and the first Chinese newspaper was published in 1888. On the basis of these ethnic institutions, the Chinese community thus took shape from this point on.

The establishment of the first Chinese school, the Anglo-Chinese School, was to cater to the growing birth rate of the local-born Chinese and rising Chinese nationalism in the second half of the 19th century. It was modelled on the literacy college that was prevalent in China which was based on Confucian teachings. Within 5 to 6 years of its establishment, it began an English curriculum. Those designing the initial curriculum of Chinese schools encountered a dilemma between modelling after the American public school or after the Confucian system (Tan, 1972: 160). The latter took as its educational content the Four Books and Five Classics, which were taught in private literacy colleges functioning to prepare students for the imperial examination. Despite being outdated, Chinese traditionalists believed that the Confucian system, instead of the American public school system, was the only way to preserve Chinese cultural heritage. However, some western-oriented Chinese preferred the westernised modern education which could cultivate skills relating to, for example, western business organisation and technique. A compromise was proposed: a dual system in which the Chinese section adopted the Confucian system and the English section followed the public education system. This moment marks the beginning of the ‘dual system’ by which Philippine-Chinese students acquired Chinese language to preserve Chinese identity and English to make a living in the local society.

The curricula of English and Chinese departments were respectively prescribed by the Philippine Department of Public Instruction and by the Chinese government in Beijing.
The dual system with both Chinese and English sections was, therefore, officially formed. While the curriculum of the English department used American textbooks, and was taught mostly by Filipino teachers, both the Chinese textbooks and most of the Chinese teachers were from China. Some subjects overlapped in two systems, such as maths and science, while using different mediums of instruction.

The building of the Chinese school system was stimulated by the emerging overseas Chinese nationalism. By the end of the 19th century Chinese modernists like the Reformists and Revolutionaries were active in overseas Chinese communities throughout the world. They were committed to disseminating national consciousness among the Chinese in the Philippines. Under the banner of Chinese nationalism, the Chinese community in the Philippines felt a greater degree of solidarity. The establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, the KMT’s promotion in 1926 and 1927, and the propaganda of Sun Yat-sen’s the ‘Principle of Three People’ since 1928 all boosted the demand for overseas Chinese education (Tan, 1972: 165). Beginning with the construction of the first Chinese school in 1899, Chinese schools saw phenomenal growth, with 7,214 students in 58 schools throughout the islands until 1935 (Tan, 1972: 157). In the six years following the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935, the number of Chinese schools reached more than 120, including about 21,000 students: this was because wartime chaos stimulated more Chinese to move to the Philippines (Huang, 2012b: 4).

2.4 Citizenship and Education during the Cold War

After the Pacific War, the permanent settlement stage came: in 1949 the government of the People’s Public of China (PRC) shut its gates to the outside world and to sojourners
wanting to return their hometowns. Second and third generations of immigrants, who lacked first-hand experience of China, began to grow up in the host country, while the first generation finally realised that, their returning to China being impossible, the Philippines was their only homeland. Thereafter, integration began in earnest, despite the lack of institutional support at that time.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) defeated the KMT in the Chinese Civil War and had, from 1949, begun to control mainland China, forcing the latter group to flee to Taiwan. The exceptional conditions of the Cold War resulted in the situation of ‘Two Chinas’: the PRC government led by the CPC in Beijing and the ROC government led by the KMT in Taipei. The menace presented by communism to the stability of the Asian-Pacific region brought Taiwan, the Philippines, and the U.S. together as part of the Western Bloc against the Eastern Bloc. This military deployment also turned mainland China, as the motherland of the Philippine-Chinese, into the regional opposing force.

Philippine anti-communism and belligerence towards the PRC had a great impact on the citizenship status and political standing of the Chinese. While the U.S. objected to the recognition of the PRC, especially after the breakout of the Korean War in 1950, the Quirino-led government followed the China policy of the U.S. in suspending any commercial and economic relations with the PRC. Instead, recognised by the Philippines as well as the United Nations as the sole representative of the whole of China, the ROC in Taiwan still claimed rule over the Chinese and granted them ROC citizenship because of the unique anti-communist strategic alliance between the ROC and the Philippines during the Cold War.

The recognition originated from the established relationships between the Philippines
and the ROC. On the eve of the KMT’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, President Chiang Kai-shek and President Quirino met in Baguio City in the Philippines, which was the only the Southeast Asia country he visited (See, 2004), to discuss the general Chinese-Philippine relations. The national security issues centred on the menace of communism were at the top of the agenda. After the discussions, Chiang and Quirino issued the Joint Communique to warn the ‘free Asian nations’ against the threat of Communism and propose the formation of an Asiatic alliance to combat the threat (Hsiao, 1975: 43). The Quirino’s successor President Magsaysay maintained an uncompromising stance against any official relations with the PRC. Therefore, allied with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, the ROC became an important part of the ‘containment’ strategy to stop the expansion of communists in Asia. In fact, the attitude towards the PRC had direct relevance to the Chinese in the Philippines, as Magsaysay stated in 1954:

We also have a sizable Chinese community in the Philippines, largely loyal to the cause and ideals of the free world. There is danger that they may be shaken in this loyalty if we should open diplomatic relations with Communist China, and may become fatally susceptible to propaganda inducing them to shift their allegiance, thus creating a serious problem for our Government and people (Philippine Embassy in Taipei, 1957: 73, cited in Hsiao, 1975).

In other words, the recognition of the ROC was part of the grand strategy of the US as well as the Philippines in terms of regional security. This was because the ROC, led by the KMT as a so-called ‘right-wing’ political party, was not only an ideologically accepted ally, but a more politically appropriate ‘homeland’ to impose controls on the Chinese community.

On the other hand, given that it was the KMT rather than the CPC which had long and close connections with, and extensive local branches in, the Chinese communities all
over the Philippines, assigning KMT to tackle overseas Chinese affairs became a natural and reasonable choice. Moreover, to prevent the infiltration of communists, the Philippine Bureau of Immigration in 1950 also issued an executive order to prohibit the Chinese from migrating to the Philippines and returning to the mainland. As a result, the Philippines reopened the Philippine embassy in Taipei and supported the ROC’s representation in the United Nations. The ROC-Philippine-US triangular relationship thus confirmed the trans-border ties between the ROC and the Philippine-Chinese.

Hence, the ROC could continue to enforce the Chinese Nationality Law based on *jus sanguinis* principle, exercising its jurisdiction over the Philippine-Chinese.

However, the situation of Chinese people in the Philippines during this period was particularly vulnerable, due to their inaccessibility to Filipino citizenship, the lack of substantial protection from their ROC citizenship, and their rumoured connections to communism.

In spite of speaking on behalf of all China, the ROC’s overall strength, including the population, size, and the political and economic power of Taiwan islands, was unlikely to take care of and protect the citizenship rights of all the Chinese citizens abroad – the of number which was, in fact, even greater than the population of Taiwan. For example, when the Philippine government in 1952 carried out Filipinization policies against the Chinese and ordered mass roundup of them (Miyabara, 1997), the ROC embassy failed to offer diplomatic intervention. President Carlos P. Garcia for the first time introduced the ‘Filipino First policy’, which from 1958 on aimed to expand Filipino-owned business over their foreign counterparts. It was followed by a series of Filipinization policies targeting mainly the Chinese that had negative impacts on their livelihoods, including nationalisation of public market, the retail trade, banking service, import, rice and corn industry, and the regulations of profession, land ownership. Seldom did the
ROC heighten the tension to a level that could be at the expense of the ROC-Philippine relationships, as the Philippines was an important ally and the ROC tended to give more priority to national security and the international relationships (Zhuang, 2012: 431). In reality, the enforcement of ROC citizenship was ineffective.

After achieving independence in 1946, the Philippines began to turn itself into a nation-state with full autonomy in light of Filipino nationalism. The conflict of interests between the Chinese and the Filipinos thus inevitably became fierce due to the fact that the former had a significant share of the business area in the Philippines.

Aside from business, the ‘Filipinization education policy’ also threatened to close all Chinese schools, as shown below. The Filipinization of the Chinese schools was not only part of the enforcement of the national assimilation policy, but also a response to the growing communist menace as there was an alleged association between the Chinese and communism during the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the beginning of the Post War era in the late 1940s, the Chinese school system continued to develop. Chinese people’s freedom to operate schools was further confirmed by the 1947 ‘Sino-Philippine Treaty of Amity’ between the ROC government in Nanjing and the newly independent Philippine government, which formed a general framework of ground rules for negotiation and cooperation. Of the 10 articles, article 6 in particular stipulated that:

The nationals of each of the high contracting parties shall be accorded, in the territories of the other, the liberty to establish schools for the education of their children, and shall enjoy freedom of peaceful assembly and association, of publication, of worship and religion, of burial and building cemeteries, upon the same terms as the nationals of any third country in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other.
The basic rights of the Philippine-Chinese, including the rights to operate Chinese schools, were insured in that the Philippine government recognised the ROC’s claim on the jurisdiction over the Chinese on the basis of their ROC citizenship. As a result, there was further growth in schools, with 1956 seeing up to 150 schools with 1,649 teachers and approximately 48,000 students (Huang, 2012b: 6).

Subsequent to the escalation of the communist menace since the 1950s, the Philippine government began to intervene in Chinese education affairs. When rumours spread of communists infiltrating Chinese schools, the government attempted to retake the authority to supervise Chinese schools on the grounds of national security.

A memorandum signed by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Ambassador in 1955 required all curricula under the supervision of the Filipino government’s Bureau of Private Schools as well as the ROC’s Ministry of Education to follow the curricular standards of both countries (Liu, 1969). The issues of whether to close down Chinese schools and end the Chinese teaching were frequently raised in the 1960s (Batnag, 1964; Pao, 1964; Hsiao: 1998). In Chinese schools in the 1950s and 1960s there existed a growing tension of ‘double sovereignty’ (Pacho, 1981: 132).

To prevent the Chinese community from communist infiltration, the U.S. also politically and financially buttressed the ROC’s overseas Chinese education, as part of American foreign aid policy. After 1949, the PRC revealed its ambition to exercise influence over the education of Chinese overseas by recruiting them to study in the mainland, selling textbooks to Chinese schools at a low price, and alienating the support of Chinese schools from the ROC and the KMT. The US aid project sought to use education to shield overseas Chinese students from the negative influence of communism. After Vice President Richard Nixon visited Taiwan in 1953, he urged the
ROC government to attract more overseas Chinese students to study in Taiwan and promised financial support. Accordingly, American aid for the project between 1954 and 1965 totalled over US$1 million and NTC300 million (Li, X. and Li, H., 1998). Taiwan thus followed the US plan to become not only ‘a bastion of military and economic strength for free China’, but also ‘a bastion of cultural strength, of spiritual strength, and a sample for all free peoples to see…’ (Nixon’s speech, cited in Li, X. and Li, H., 1998: 159).

Consequently, as the Chinese school system was ideologically supervised and controlled by ROC authorities, the political standing of the Chinese had been greatly shaped by the anti-communist system formed by both the ROC and the Philippines. All Chinese schools were thus under the inspection of the ROC government in Taipei. In accordance with ‘The Accreditation Regulations for Overseas Chinese Schools’ in Taiwan, all Chinese schools were required to register in the Overseas Chinese Affairs Council (OCAC) through the ROC embassy in the Philippines. The whole school system, such as administration system, school managements, and curriculums, generally copied those in Taiwan (Wang, Y. Y., 1998). It is noteworthy that Chinese schools raised and lowered the ROC and Philippine flags on a daily basis and sang two national anthems in the respective native languages (McBeath, 1970: 44). Up to the 1960s, the ROC flag and national anthem were even presented before the Philippine ones (See, 2004: 44).

The ROC government assisted to set up Overseas Chinese Teacher College in Manila merged with Chiang Kai Shek High School in 1955 and upgraded as Chiang Kai Shek College in 1965. The Chinese school system in the Philippines thus has become a complete one which includes primary, secondary, and higher education. To unite and control the Chinese schools, the ‘General Association of Chinese Schools in the
Philippines’ was established, assisted by the expatriate staff of the ROC following the ‘First Congress of Chinese Schools in the Philippines’ held in the Chinese Embassy in 1955.

Notwithstanding all these interventions, Chinese schools continued to expand. The growth of Chinese schools was steady, catering to an increasing Chinese population of about 500,000 in 1973, as estimated by the OCAC in Taiwan (Zhuang, 2012: 673). As a result, there were 154 schools with 68,000 students in 1973 (Huang, 2012b: 8).

2.5 Post-Cold War Citizenship and Education

The Chinese situation had been bettered as the tension of the Cold War eased in the 1970s, as a result of the rapprochement between the PRC and the Philippines. After the Philippines followed the U.S. to change its diplomatic recognition of China from the ROC to the PRC and normalised its relations with the latter in 1975, President Marcos, fearing that the Chinese in the Philippines would be manipulated by the PRC as a political convenience, was committed to the assimilation of the Chinese by granting them citizenship. In 1975 Marcos issued the Letter of Instructions No. 270, which gave all qualified Chinese the opportunity to apply for Philippine citizenship. According to it, the approval of the naturalisation application would be legally transparent, financially affordable, practical in term of qualifications, and simplified through presidential decree, replacing previous tedious judicial process (Pacho, 1981). It led to a ‘mass naturalization’ of the Chinese. Hence, the removal of institutional restrictions has greatly facilitated integration and allowed the Chinese to move to the Chinese-Filipino stage.
In the Chinese-Filipino stage, most of the Chinese descendants have successfully integrated into Philippine society. The tremendous difference in number between Chinese and Filipino inevitably leads to the former’s mingling with the latter in everyday life contributing to the integration of the two peoples. Unlike their counterparts in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Burma, who still suffer institutional discriminations, the Chinese enjoy the full citizenship to enter all professions, to go to all kinds of business, to have equal educational opportunities, and to exercise political rights. In short, they have gradually identified themselves as ‘Filipinos’, regardless of Chinese heritage and education in Chinese schools.

As a result of their being Chinese Filipinos, there are a number of the younger-generation Chinese who have successfully integrated into the Philippine society by having close native-Filipino friends, joining Filipino organisations, speaking Tagalog as a first language, attending Philippine universities, and working with Filipino colleagues. According to the surveys by Ang See (1997: 43), 93.9% of the Chinese are Philippine citizens; approximately 97% (96.8% in Metro Manila and 97.3% in provinces) said the Philippines is their home; 85% are fluent in Tagalog; more than 80% agree that the Chinese should actively take part in Philippine politics; and 75.9% would support the Philippine team against the Chinese team in sports.

More than 90% of the Chinese are Philippine born, consisting of the second, third, and fourth generations (Zhuang, 2012:674). 90% of them have origins in southern Fukien province, which accounts for the fact that 47% of them have the language ability of Hokkien (the dialect of southern Fukien) (See, 1997: 50), and 10% of Guangdong province and a few others (Zhuang, 2012:673). With respect to racial origins, pure Chinese account for 55.9% and Chinese Mestizos 32%; 9.8% are ‘other’ and 2.3% are reluctant to answer. The significant number of Chinese Mestizos is a result not only of
the previous imbalance of sex ratio\textsuperscript{8}, but also the increasing acceptance of intermarriage with native Filipinos.

Nowadays, according to the population projection conducted by OCAC (2011) in 2010, the Chinese population is approximately 1,459,083, accounting for about 1.55% of the total population in the Philippines. Despite the lack of statistical information, roughly more than half of the Chinese population reside in ‘Metro Manila’ and the rest live scattered in provinces.

In terms of socio-economic status in the Philippines, it is assumed that the Chinese have, on average, an economic advantage. Despite the lack of substantial statistics, Ang See (1990) admits that ‘most of the Chinese belong to the middle class and are comparatively better-off than the average Filipinos’, despite the fact that there are, indeed, few Chinese living in extreme poverty (1990: 39). Huang’s survey of Chinese students’ family economic status shows that 4% of them are upper-class, 8% are upper-middle-class, 82% are middle-class, 1% are lower-middle-class, 4% are unknown and none of them is lower-class (Huang, 2012b: 17-18). The same survey also shows that a large proportion (78%) of students’ fathers engage in industrial or commercial operation, and 54% of students themselves hope to get into business (Huang, 2012: 16, 20). The special occupational structure results from the long-established business tradition of the Chinese since colonial times (Go, 1996: 68). This particular interest in business might contribute to the Chinese families’ relatively higher economic status.

It is also widely believed that the Chinese as a whole have an enormous commercial significance in the Philippines. Accounting for less than 2% of the entire Philippine population, the Chinese share of market capital is between 50% and 55%. The Chinese

take an especially major share in areas such as textiles, banking, retailing, and wholesaling (Hodder, 2007: 89). In a country like the Philippines, where more than a quarter (26.3%) of the population was living below the poverty line in 2015 (Bersales, 2016), the economic advantage that the majority of the Chinese have, as an ethnic minority middle-class, is quite significant.

With respect to Chinese education, the Filipinization of Chinese schools since the 1970s is a turning point not only for Chinese schools but the Chinese as a whole. The aim of the Filipinization policy was to facilitate assimilation and integration by fundamentally transforming Chinese schools from being Chinese to being Filipino. According to the 1972 Constitution of the Philippines provided for the Filipinization of schools under Section 8 (7) of Article XV, regulations prescribe Chinese schools to be owned, controlled, and enrolled by mainly Filipino citizens. At first, it would be difficult to comply with these regulations; the Letter of Instructions No. 270, by which Filipino citizenship became accessible, would later provide the solution in 1975. As a result, Chinese schools have become ‘former Chinese schools’ and institutions for fostering Filipino citizens rather than Huaqiao.

As to the curriculum, Chinese schools are required not only to teach courses prescribed by the Philippine Department of Education, but also to make Chinese courses optional and reduce these to 120 minutes per day. Chinese schools then followed the Philippine education system, which takes 4 years in high-school level, rather than 6 years, as the ROC system does. The incompatibility between the Philippine and the ROC education systems makes graduates of Chinese schools less likely to attend universities in Taiwan. Also, all Chinese textbooks are required to be edited and published in the Philippines and inspected by Philippine authorities.
Moreover, Philippine symbols have been added and ROC ones have been removed in Chinese schools. A number of Chinese schools had to alter their names which implied their Chinese background. For example, the Philippine ‘Chinese’ High School was forced to amend its name to the Philippine ‘Cultural’ High School. Furthermore, where before both the ROC and Philippine flags were flown in schools, now only the Philippine one may be displayed. Additionally, speaking the Filipino language (Tagalog) is encouraged, the teaching of the New Constitution and the life of Philippine founding father (Jose Rizal) are included, and the education for citizenship is emphasised. After Filipinization, Chinese schools have become an integral part of the Philippine educational system for Filipino citizens rather than the extension of that of the ROC. While the Chinese have access to Philippine citizenship, Chinese schools thus have been mostly owned, managed, and attained by Filipino citizens, and become Filipino schools.

As of 2013, there were 119 Chinese schools with 68,856 students and 2,660 Chinese teachers throughout the Philippine Islands. Of all the Chinese schools, 42 schools (35%) and 37,557 students (55%) were based in the Greater Manila Area (Zhuang, 2012: 777). In terms of number, the whole Chinese school system seems to be stagnating due to the growing extent of the younger generation’s integration and assimilation into the Philippine mainstream. Consequently the Chinese school system has been in a steady decline in terms of student enrolment and Chinese language ability (Huang, 2012).

Therefore, two educational organisations were established in the 1990s to rectify the difficult situations. The Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools (ACFS) was established in 1993, and consists of 126 Chinese schools. The association plays an active role in general educational affairs and the coordination between Chinese schools. Another is the Philippine Chinese Education Research Center (PCERC), which aims to
launch education reforms by introducing ‘Teaching Mandarin as a Second Language’ to Chinese schools.

Unlike their counterparts in North America, Chinese schools in the Philippines are full-day rather than weekend-only language learning centres. Like other Philippine private schools, Chinese schools comply with the curriculum standards mandated by the Department of Education and have become part of the formal education system. Their English curriculum is the same as that of public schools. Although the Chinese curriculum has been made optional, it still occupies a certain proportion of teaching time. In the school in which I served, for example, there were 6 English classes in the morning and 4 Chinese classes in the afternoon. To a degree, then, the dual system remains.

From the beginning, all Chinese schools have been private, receiving no public funding from the Philippine government yet under the latter’s supervision. In terms of foundation, there are three general types of Chinese schools: ‘the chamber or community school’ founded by prominent figures and organisations within the Chinese community and managed by a board of directors; the ‘sectarian schools’, managed by religious groups; and the ‘Jesuit elite academy’ (McBeath, 1970). Despite differences in sponsorship, all three types must meet the standards for a Filipino curriculum, as established by the Philippine government. The last two types add religious education to their curricula.

Until 2011, the Philippine education system comprised 6-year elementary school (age 6~12) and 4-year high school (age 12~16). Since 2011, the Department of Education started to implement the new ‘K-12 education system’ which adds a 2-year ‘senior high school’ following 4-year ‘junior high school’. From 2011 on the Chinese school system
has followed the K-12 system.

In fact, the private school system is an indispensable part of the Philippine education system. Expenditure on public education is insufficient to meet the demands of a growing and huge Filipino population. In fact, the ‘public expenditure per pupil as a % of GDP per capita’ in the Philippines is 9.3% on average from 2008 to 2013, which is the lowest in six ASEAN countries (UNESCO, 2015)\(^9\). The per child spending in the Philippines is around $150 USD per child per year, which is one-sixth of that in Thailand and one-tenth of that in Malaysia (Luz, 2011: 32).

What is more, the public school system suffers a growing classroom shortage. The class sizes have ballooned to about 65 students on average – and, in some extreme cases, 90 (Luz, 2011: 81). Some of the most overcrowded urban schools are forced to adopt ‘double-shifts’ in which classrooms are used twice for two groups of pupils in a day.

Private schools can thus function to lighten the government’s financial burden. This is the reason why Chinese schools were not abolished despite suspicions about their loyalty in the 1960s (Pao, 1964). The formal education that Chinese schools offered for the Philippine citizens with Chinese backgrounds is a valuable supplement to deficiencies in the public school system and contributes in a significant way to the country’s talent development.

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\(^9\) The ‘public expenditure per pupil as a % of GDP per capita, 2008-2013’ of the six ASEAN countries is as follows: Indonesia (15.6%); Malaysia (32.6%); Philippines (9.3%); Singapore (17.2%); Thailand (31.7%); Vietnam (32.6%).
Chapter 3

Huaqiao Chineseness and Huaqiao Education

3.1 Introduction

‘In my dreams the sceneries so divine
So many years far from homeland
But nothing can ever change it
The Chinese heart of mine

Western outfits dress me
my heart will always be Chinese
My ancestors branded my heart
with a Chinese mark

The Yangtze River, the Great Wall, Huangshan, the Yellow River
They are irreplaceable in my heart
No matter when, or no matter where
My heart'll never leave

The blood that flows through my veins
Roaring -- “China”-- that's the name
Even I was born in a foreign land
It can't change my Chinese heart’—‘My Chinese Heart (我的中國心)’

This is a popular Chinese ‘patriotic song’ among Chinese Filipinos. At a karaoke party held by alumni of the St. Joseph High School, I was impressed by the clang and majestic melody of the song as it was sung, with an expressive face, by a senior Chinese teacher in her seventies. I also discovered this song in ‘Chinese talent contests’ participated in by Chinese students whose comprehension of the lyrics is doubtful. What surprised me more is that the lyrics imply a taken-for-granted tie between China and Chinese overseas. No matter where they are born, where they settle, and whether they are mixed-
blood, they are destined to be Chinese, because ‘my ancestors branded my heart with a Chinese mark’, and ‘the blood that flows through my veins roaring -- “China”’.

This song was staged in the 1984 CCTV New Year’s Gala (Chunwan), selected in the textbook of reading for Chinese elementary schools in 2005, and even brought into space by the ‘Chang’e 1’, a Chinese lunar-orbiting spacecraft, as a national symbol in 2007. It is a song with strong nationalist connotations. Thus, having a ‘Chinese Heart’ (Zhongguo Xin) is not merely a cultural identity expressed by an ethnic minority group, but, to a certain degree, an eternal commitment to a political entity, ‘China’ (Zhongguo).

The fixation with China might also result from the overseas Chinese policies implemented by the ‘two Chinas’. Both the PRC and ROC governments are dedicated to supporting overseas Chinese education in order to fulfil the symbolic role as the fatherland.

The teaching job that I did for Chinese school in the Philippine, for example, is an extension of this nationalist project. The Substitute Military Service in Taiwan normally consists of public safety and community service related works to serve our fellow-countrymen. Therefore, the service for Philippine Chinese gives a sign that they are also part of ‘us’. This experience in fact confused. Lacking of contact with Philippine Chinese in daily life, normally a Taiwanese teacher hardly feels Philippine Chinese are his compatriot. My actual interaction with them also proved we are the ‘Other’ to each other. Yet this ‘Huaqiao’ policy serves to make a symbolic gesture that Philippine Chinese are our ‘fellow-countrymen’, which is particularly meaningful to the old generation. As these overseas Chinese policies tend to conflate those Chinese overseas who have Chinese citizenship and those who haven’t, the relationships between the two Chinas and the Chinese who have been Philippine citizens thus appears ambiguous.
As a result, the old generation who used to have Chinese (ROC) citizenship still feel a special attachment to China, and retain a certain degree of the sense of being Huaqiao. It is astonishing that the trans-border ties between the Chinese and the fatherland have lasted longer than a century. The fact that we are now in the ‘post-Huaqiao period’, and that Philippine-Chinese lost Huaqiao citizenship (in a legal sense) in the aftermath of the Filipinization of the 1970s, seem by no means to have changed their nationalistic attachment.

Osler and Starkey (2005) offer an illuminating analysis about three elements of citizenships that might help account for the old generation’s mismatch between their citizenship status in legal sense and Huaqiao identity deep in the mind by three dimensions of citizenship: Citizenship as feeling, status, and practice. First, citizenship is based on a feeling of belonging to a community, such as a nation. Second, citizenship is a legal status derived from the laws that prescribe rights and duties of a person when acquiring a certain citizenship, such as nationality law. Third, citizenship is also everyday practice that makes a difference to, shapes and reshapes the community by political, social, cultural activities. Osler (2010) particularly indicates that ‘[t]he degree to which a person feels they belong is not necessarily related to formal status, although legal entitlements obtained through citizenship status may be among those goods which enable a person to feel they belong (Osler, 2010: 4)’. Therefore, despite their legal status of being Philippine citizens, the old generation may still have a strong feeling of Huaqiao identity and practice rights and duties derived from their Huaqiao status in Chinese schools, thus explaining the long duration of informal Huaqiao citizenship while losing Chinese citizenship in legal sense.

Because the Chinese schools in the Philippines are organised by the older generation, it is inevitable that this attachment to the fatherland is expected to be transmitted to the
younger generations by Chinese education. However, how the younger generations who are born to be Filipino citizens respond to the national sentiment embodied in Chinese education, and the degree to which Mandarin teaching entails this national sentiment, however, remain unclear.

Where does the notion of Huaqiao originate, and why does Huaqiao Chineseness still predominate in Chinese schools in the post-Huaqiao period? How does it affect the constitution of citizenship for Philippine-Chinese? How does Huaqiao Chineseness shape the characteristics of Chinese education in the Philippines? How do students respond to Chinese education that has the characteristics of Huaqiao education?

The aim of the chapter is to investigate how the notion of Huaqiao affects the understanding of Chineseness, the citizenship of Philippine-Chinese, the constitution of their Chinese education and its outcome. I refer to the Chineseness that is together shaped by the long-lasting trans-territorial ties between both Chinese governments and Philippine-Chinese as ‘Huaqiao Chineseness’; the tailor-made citizenship status for Philippine-Chinese with a China-centred view as ‘Huaqiao citizenship’; and the Chinese education to cement not only cultural, but political ties as ‘Huaqiao education’. I argue that current Chinese education in Philippine-Chinese schools is a legacy of the Huaqiao education of the past. It is not merely a language education, but an education allowing students to belong to a Chinese nation. Therefore, while Chinese education may have been a ‘citizenship education’ that instilled a sense of being Huaqiao when the Chinese were indeed Chinese citizens, in the post-Huaqiao period it has become a means through which the idea of ‘informal Huaqiao citizenship’

10 I refer the practice that brings Huaqiao identity into class as ‘citizenship smuggling’, rather than ‘nationality smuggling’, because it not only instils a sense of national identity in its teaching content,
class. This ‘citizenship-smuggling’ makes Chinese education, to a certain degree, remain Huaqiao education.

Part One investigates the origin of Huaqiao citizenship from historical and cultural perspectives, and then further analyses the essential components of Huaqiao citizenship. Part Two discusses the connection between Huaqiao citizenship and Chinese education. Part Three examines the legacy of Huaqiao education in current Chinese education. Part Four appraises how current Chinese education with the characteristics of Huaqiao education affects the outcome of Mandarin learning.

For investigating the historical and cultural origins of the notion of Huaqiao, I look at academic studies on how China forms its unique understanding of nationality and citizenship. Also I analyse Huaqiao policies of both PRC and ROC governments, including nationality laws and overseas educational practices, to further discover the meaning of Huaqiao citizenship. For the analysis of Huaqiao education, I mainly use my personal experience in Chinese schools to reveal how the notion of Huaqiao affects the Chinese teaching up to now.

I draw on the data for discussion about Huaqiao Chineseness from two parts. For providing a whole picture of Huaqiao Chineseness, I mainly use secondary resources, such as interviews and studies on Philippine-Chinese community in general. I also personally contact some of the old generation, the leaders of the Chinese community and officials from Taiwan and China who insists on the instilling the sense of being Huaqiao for the younger generations. For Huaqiao education, the data mainly come from my teaching experience in which I clearly felt I was transmitting a sense of being but also offers education services similar to citizenship rights that are normally exclusively accessible to citizens.
Huaqiao to students. My interviews with other teachers in the Philippines, Taiwanese officials, and teachers from China and my observations of teaching in Chinese schools also support the analysis of Huaqiao Chineseness.

3.2 Huaqiao Citizenship as Transnational Mobilisation System

When we talk about national citizenship, it usually refers to the membership of a national community with clear relationships of rights and obligations between its government and people under a certain ‘social contract’ (Stoer and Magalhães, 2002). From the perspective of the ‘two Chinas’ and some overseas Chinese of the old generation, however, the commitment to the fatherland can bypass the ‘contractual relationship’ derived from the newly granted citizenship. Like the old Chinese saying, ‘born to be Chinese person (中國人), dead as Chinese ghosts (中國鬼)’, informal, destined membership seems more influential than citizenship in overseas Chinese people’s sense of belonging.

A number of scholars are convinced that the long-lasting ties between China and overseas Chinese are an embodiment of so-called ‘overseas Chinese nationalism’ (Yen, 2008; William, 1960; Liu, 2005) meaning ‘an ideology and a movement which expressed a deep concern for China’s welfare and survival as nation-state’ (Yen, 2008: 339). The adjective ‘overseas’ implies the transnational nature of the Chinese nationalism through which nationalists conduct campaigns across multiple national borders. It is a nationalism that transgresses the principle of territorial sovereignty on which the Westphalian state system is based. Therefore, overseas Chinese nationalism is in fact beyond national borders and is essentially a ‘Chinese transnationalism’.

In contrast to transnationalism from below, as practiced by migrant social networks in a bottom-up manner, it is actually a ‘transnationalism from above’ initiated by a nation-
state to mobilise support from its expatriates (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Portes, 2001). The reason for which a nation state exploits transnationalism is, of course, to increase its national strength. Duara (1998) refers to the paradoxical phenomenon that, from the beginning of its nation building, China tended to employ transnational forces to expand its internal power as ‘transnationalism in the era of nation-state’. Thus ‘Chinese transnationalism’ simultaneously cements and bypasses the conception of territorial sovereignty. Salient is that Basch and Schiller (1994) refers to states that manage to exercise control over 'transmigrants' as a means of intensifying rather than attenuating the power of the sending state as a 'de-territorialised nation state'.

That China is ‘de-territorialised’ reveals that it, in fact, does not properly adhere to the rule of being a territorial nation-state even as it constitutes its citizenry. Instead, China tends to take the outreaching to the Chinese abroad for granted, even incorporating them into its citizenry. Also, the special understanding of belonginess among Chinese in the Philippines challenges the assumption of a presumed congruence between state territory, a people (nation) and state authority (Benhabib, 2008; Faist, 2004).

As mentioned in chapter 1, Huaqiao Chineseness is the primordial type of Chineseness. It is an official version of Chineseness produced and promoted by the central Chinese government, in a top-down manner, to shape a uniform Chinese national identity. Huaqiao Chineseness thus represents the nationalist ideology of one nation, one people, and one language. Chinese education which seeks to instil Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese overseas is so-called Huaqiao education. The aim of Huaqiao education is to raise their awareness of Chinese national identity and their holding of Huaqiao citizenship.

Huaqiao citizenship is an identity granted by China to confirm the relationship between
the Chinese government and Chinese overseas. In the context of the Philippines, it had been accessible for Philippine-Chinese from the establishment of the first Chinese consulate in Manila in 1899 until the implementation of mass naturalisation in 1975. Nowadays, despite the fact that most of the Chinese in the Philippines have acquired Filipino citizenship, a number of them still call themselves Huaqiao. Further, both the PRC and ROC governments call the Chinese ‘Huaqiao’ and thus implement so-called ‘Huaqiao policies’ for them, regardless of their citizenship status.

I consider this ‘de-territorialisedness’ is for the purpose of building a ‘transnational mobilisation system’ jointly formed by Chinese government and the overseas Chinese. Chinese government and overseas Chinese could benefit from the reciprocal relationships in which the former acquired political, financial, and educational supports from the latter and, in return, the latter obtained the formal or informal citizenship from the former.

I now turn to discussion of these concepts and policies in their historical and cultural context.

3.3 The Attributes of Huaqiao Citizenship

In the main, Huaqiao citizenship contradicts common historical understanding of citizenship. In discussing the historical and cultural context of Huaqiao citizenship in the Philippines, I would like to highlight three of its attributes that differ from the common understanding of citizenship.
3.3.1 Citizenship beyond Consent

Confucianism laid the foundation of the political system of the Imperial China Period in general, and of the ruler/subject relationship specifically. Confucian patriarchy placed the father at the centre of family and society. A father is loving to his son, and the son demonstrates reverence to his father. In terms of the political system, the state as a whole was seen as an enlarged family. The emperor, of course, was the father of the state, assuming absolute authority as the father of all Chinese people (Zhou, 2010: 138). Accordingly, China’s state/subject relationship was similar to traditional father/son relationships which enforced the patriarchal value of loyalty and obedience. Zhou (2010: 138) points out that while the Chinese patriarchal political system vanished, the Chinese patriarchal culture has remained. It still exists in China’s state/citizen relationships.

Modern citizenship theory presumes that the state/citizen relationship is based on the consent of citizens who are individual and autonomous. Citizens have rights to determine their belonging. As just discussed, there is an analogy between father/son and state/citizen relationships. Yet a citizen is free to join or resign the membership of a community, whereas a son is unlikely to choose his father. Thus there existed a hierarchy in the father/son-like state/citizen relationships which seemed to give China arbitrary power to claim the allegiance of those of Chinese descent. Once overseas Chinese were found to be valuable assets, China took outreaching to potential citizens in her favour for granted. China’s reaching out was as if a father found his long-lost sons to have returned, and subsequently provided them opportunities to repay his paternal love. Thus overseas Chinese were expected to be part of the transnational mobilisation system, financially, technically, and politically supporting their fatherland.
On the other hand, the wave of overseas Chinese nationalism made overseas Chinese tie their destiny to China. They believed all the suffering and discrimination of overseas Chinese in fact came resulted from China’s inferior and despised international status in light of it having been invaded and colonised China by Western powers. An independent and strong China, on the other hand, could protect them and improve their situation abroad (Tan, 1972).

The status of Huaqiao citizenship was initially confirmed by the earliest nationality law of the Qing Court in 1909. Based on an imagining of the whole nation as an enlarged family, the law made use of the *jus sanguinis* principle to relate those with Chinese blood to the nation, supplemented with the *jus solis* principle. The law automatically made overseas Chinese acquire Chinese nationality, thus rapidly expanding the number of Huaqiao citizens. The implementation of the law began the ceaseless relationship between China and overseas Chinese.

The definition of ‘who Huaqiao are’ was essentially controlled by Chinese central government. As Mak (1985) indicates, the term ‘Huaqiao’ was merely the Chinese government’s attitude toward overseas Chinese, and was not necessarily accepted by overseas Chinese themselves or the government of the destination country.

The arbitrary power of the Chinese government is shown in the National Law of 1929, which prescribes the ‘leniency to naturalisation, severity to renouncement’ policy (Lee, 1997b). Those Chinese citizens who intended to renounce their Chinese nationality were required to obtain permissions from the Ministry of Interior in China, which increased the difficulty of giving it up. This policy could also prevent the country of residence from arbitrarily forcing the overseas Chinese to renounce their Chinese citizenship. Hence, all Chinese are Chinese citizens regardless of their subjective will;
the citizen/son has no power to refute the granting of Huaqiao citizenship from China, much as a son should always obey his father. The renunciation of his citizenship of the ‘fatherland’ by a Chinese person appeared as unforgivable as a son’s breaking off of his father/son relationship.

The Chinese government’s arbitrary power can also be shown by the dramatic case of the Yuyitung Brothers in 1970. Quintin and Rizal Yuyitung were well-known publishers of a Chinese-language daily in the Philippines, the Chinese Commercial News. In their print, they actively promoted the idea of integration into Philippine society and questioned the legitimacy of the rule of the ROC regime over the Philippine-Chinese community. Both opinions fundamentally cast doubt on the enforcing of Huaqiao citizenship. Consequently, they were condemned by many Philippine-Chinese for abandoning their ancestors (Shudian wangzu) and being traitors to China (Hanjian).

Further, the Yuyitung brothers’ questioning of Huaqiao citizenship was also a significant challenge to the authority of the ROC regime in Taiwan. At that time, both were ROC citizens, so their doubt was seen as treason. Consequently, having been alleged in the spreading of Communist propaganda through print, the Yuyitung brothers were abducted by Philippine authorities in 1970 and deported to Taiwan for further interrogations by KMT authorities (Yuyitung, 1996: 326).

According to Chinese Nationality Law, the jurisdiction of the ROC regime over the Yuyitung brothers came from their Huaqiao (ROC) citizenship. Therefore, they attempted to avoid the consequence of deportation to Taiwan by publicly denouncing their ROC citizenship in advance. The attempt was in vain, because the granting of permission to denounce Huaqiao citizenship was subject to the subjective will of government rather than of citizens themselves.
The Yuyitung case demonstrates how the traditional authority of the Chinese patriarchal political system enabled the government to override citizens’ individual will on the issue of citizenship. Even now, both governments still take outreaching to those ‘non-citizens’ by ‘overseas Chinese policies’ and identifying them as ‘Huaqiao’ for granted.

3.3.2 Sinocentric Culturalism

What underlines Huaqiao citizenship is not only the father/son-like state/citizen relationship, but a ‘sinocentric’ cultural pride. Traditionally, Chinese people tended to disparage those who identified with non-Chinese culture as barbarians. Since ancient China, being Chinese meant being situated in a geopolitical centre, namely ‘the central plain’ (Zhong Yuan) of the Yellow River basin of North China where Chinese civilisation originated (Shi, 2009). China, which is ‘Zhongguo’ in Chinese, can be translated as ‘Middle Kingdom’; China was commonly acknowledged among Chinese as the centre of universe. The ancient Chinese believed they were the only civilised group (Xia) in a centre who were surrounded by uncivilised barbarians (Yi) at the peripheral areas. Thereafter, the concept of Chineseness had been gradually expanded so as to include inhabitants of peripheral regions – when these inhabitants were to be civilised. In other words, there was a conceptual boundary, defined by Chinese culture, between the civilised and the barbarians. This Sinocentrism can be seen as a sense of cultural pride at best, or cultural chauvinism and even racism at worst, in its tendency to look down on other civilisations and cultural groups.

The legitimacy of a ruler and government is not only a political issue, but also a cultural one. In ancient China, the emperor is the Son of Heaven (Tianzi), having received the mandate of Heaven as the ruler of the universe or ‘all under heaven’ (Tianxia) and the
whole civilisation. Those ethnic minority and foreign people on the fringe had to accept the mandate of the Chinese emperor and follow the Confucian moral order to be included into Tianxia – otherwise they remained barbarians, beyond civilisation. Since the central government represented both the political and cultural centre of Chinese civilisation, being Chinese, to an extent, needed official recognition. Therefore, acquiring Huaqiao citizenship was regarded as the recognition confirming that overseas Chinese people were part of Chinese civilisation.

Remarkably, Chinese cultural values were widely believed by Chinese to be the only true universal culture. Accordingly, being Chinese meant being part of the universal culture, accepting and learning the civilised ways of living and thinking (Shi, 2009); those who were outside Chinese civilisation were regarded as barbarians. Therefore, conversion from Chinese civilisation to others would be seen as self-disgrace. This civilizational way of thinking, which was common to many empires, has continued in the modern Chinese state and has had impact on some older generations of Chinese overseas as well.

Up to the present, some older generations of the Chinese in the Philippines call Filipino ‘hoan-á’ which means ‘foreign barbarian’. It is a derogatory term that evokes the ideology of Han racialism and cultural chauvinism. Richard Chu, a well-known Chinese-Filipino historian, remembered the dialect in Hokkien heard from his parents and family, ‘Di tio kong lān-lāng òe. Di bian hoan-á gōng ki’ (你該說咱人話, 你變番仔戆去) (Chu, 2010). In English, this means to ‘act like our own people, or go with the stupid foreign barbarians’. If a Chinese speaks Filipino language and acts like Filipinos, he may be seen as becoming a foreign barbarian. In contrast, being Chinese meant being a civilised person and being part of the only true universal culture. Hence, despite living abroad, holding Huaqiao citizenship represented not only citizenship rights enforced by
Chinese government, but an official recognition of being part of Chinese culture.

3.3.3 Borderlessness

China as a civilisation lacked definite notions of boundary. As Pye (1990) points out, ‘China is a civilization pretending to be a state’. Since there was a lack of specific geographical limits to the Chinese civilization, the Chinese government might justify the outreaching to overseas Chinese communities as an expansion of Chinese civilisation rather than an intentional crossing of national borders.

Ge (2011) indicates that, in ancient Chinese documents, China’s centre and its fringe were not altogether spatial and geographical notions. Instead, China is a cultural idea rather than a political and territorial entity with a clear border. While there existed a notion of Sinocentrism, whereby China took itself as the centre of universe, ‘the position of centre is clear, but the border is quite blurred’ (Ge, 2011: 45). What distinguished ‘Yi’ (civilised Chinese people) from ‘Xia’ (uncivilised barbarians) was not a geographical barrier, but whether Chinese culture was accepted. Boundaries are a result of military conquest, but ancient Chinese believed the attractiveness of their civilisation was based on Confucian culturalism, which could overcome barbarians with virtues. The ‘borderlessness’ of Chineseness endows China with flexibility in respect of defining who the Chinese are, and what China means. Those on the fringe or even in foreign lands can be Chinese by converting to Chinese civilisation. The acquisition, by a person of Chinese descent, of a certain amount of Chineseness could make him a potential Chinese citizen.

Therefore, extending Chineseness to those who reside abroad can be seen as an
expansion of Chinese civilisation. In other words, exporting Chineseness to overseas Chinese could be a means for China to expand its power without militarily invading foreign lands. The notion of national borders could only limit its power expansion, so China tended to emphasise non-territorial factors, like consanguinity and cultural ties, to maximise the uptake of Huaqiao citizenship.

3.4 The Connection between Huaqiao Citizenship and Huaqiao Education

The widespread nature of Huaqiao citizenship in the Philippines has little to do with its bringing of substantial citizenship rights to these overseas Chinese. In fact, the enforcement of Huaqiao citizenship was far from effective, whether it was exerted by Chinese governments in Beijing or Nanjing, due to political turbulence in China. In the absence of substantial citizenship rights to make them Chinese citizens, it was Huaqiao education that made Philippine-Chinese aware of their Huaqiao citizenship. As Tan (1972: 168) indicates, the Chinese schools became the centre of nationalist propaganda in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1911. Thus one of the ultimate goals of the Chinese schools was clear: turning students into Chinese (Huaqiao) citizens.

By the end of the 19th century the extension of Huaqiao citizenship and the promotion of Huaqiao education in the Philippines happened simultaneously. It was not a coincidence that the first Chinese school (the Anglo-Chinese School) and the first Chinese consulate in the Philippines were built in the same building and at the same time in 1898. The Qing government was aware of the necessity to make the Philippine-Chinese Huaqiao by means of Chinese education.

Before overseas Chinese nationalism landed, overseas Chinese people’s literacy in
Chinese language and knowledge of modern states were too low to lead to a meaningful Chinese identity (Wang, 1981: 154). A famous revolutionary who had visited Manila in 1911, Hu Han-min, was shocked by the loss of Chineseness among overseas Chinese except some shallow and superficial imperial Confucian culture (Hu, 1931). Hu reports that many overseas Chinese from Fujian found it strange that he asked them their Chinese names (Hu, 1931: 6). Chinese schools were to play a pivotal role in transmitting Chineseness and avoiding the undesirable possibility of assimilation of children into the local Philippine society. Therefore, the Anglo-Chinese School aimed to instil in Chinese youths ‘[t]he doctrines of our national sage, the ethics, etc. (Jensen, 1956, 52)’. The establishment of Chinese schools complied with 'the School Regulation on Imperial Permission' (Qin-ding Xue-tang Zhang-cheng) in 1902, which aimed to shape an identical sense of citizenship among all Chinese people by encouraging the establishment of modern schools not only in mainland China, but also in Chinese communities all over the world (Zhuang, 2012: 332). From then on, there was a basic principle in framing the policies of overseas Chinese education by all successive Chinese governments: make it identical – at least in appearance – to the education system in China.

The connection between Huaqiao education and Huaqiao citizenship was also endorsed by a well-known slogan of the ROC government in the 1950s: as said by Zheng Yanfen (1955), the minister of the OCAC at that time: ‘where there is no overseas Chinese education, there is no overseas Chinese affairs’. Without Huaqiao education to instil Huaqiao Chineseness, students of Chinese descent were unlikely to identify themselves as Chinese citizens, become part of the reservoir of Huaqiao and participate in the transnational mobilisation system.

Unity, as manifest in Huaqiao Chineseness, was centred on three aspects, as I will detail
3.4.1 Unity of National Language

Attempts to unify overseas Chinese began prior to KMT rule, immediately following the establishment of the ROC government in Beijing in 1912. It firstly worked on the unification of a national language, Mandarin. This was a crucial step not only in diminishing provincialism within and without the Chinese territory, but in providing a mutually intelligible language to make communication between mainland and overseas Chinese possible.

The ROC government, therefore, launched the Standardising National Language Movement step by step. The Ministry of Education established the Commission on the Unification of Pronunciation in 1912, attended by delegates from all provinces – including, remarkably, a delegate on behalf of overseas Chinese. The movement later saw Mandarin specialists being sent to overseas Chinese schools in order to replace dialects as the medium of instruction (Lee, 1997b: 484). In 1926, the leader of the Chinese school in the Philippines declared that all Chinese schools should comply with a directive of the National Board of Education of China to adopt Mandarin as the medium of instruction (Tan, 1972:172). Seminars, radio programs, Mandarin speaking contests and special Mandarin classes for adults were organised to promote Mandarin for the Chinese throughout the Philippines. The two Chinese dialect groups among Philippine-Chinese, Hokkien (Fujianese) and Cantonese, were replaced by one national language. The ability to speak Mandarin thus has become a clearly defined target for the overseas Chinese to pursue, and a simple indication of whether or not they are ‘genuine’ Chinese.
From then on, Mandarin ability became the key civic competence of Huaqiao citizenship, the very core of Huaqiao Chineseness to instil into students, and thus the goal with highest priority in terms of Huaqiao education.

### 3.4.2 Unity of Educational Pedagogy

World War II marked a watershed moment in Huaqiao education. Before the war, the Chinese government established educational goals but failed to achieve them. It, in fact, relied on individual Chinese schools to pursue the goal. During the anti-communist campaign after the war, the newly established ROC government in Taiwan began not only to exercise closer control over Chinese schools in the Philippines, but also to arbitrarily shape Huaqiao education in its favour. The ROC government developed a unified pedagogy and exercised it in the Philippines in the 1950 and 1960s: this included a standardised education system, curriculum, textbooks, and methods of language teaching necessary to uniformly transmit the official ‘package of knowledge’.

In terms of education system, the Chinese schools had to follow the guidance in the ROC’s ‘the Accreditation Regulations for Overseas Chinese Schools’, which strictly prescribed educational objectives, administrative organisation, teaching management, and curriculum (Wang, 1998). Under the ‘Sino-Philippine Treaty of Amity’ signed between the ROC and the Philippines in 1947, the Philippines would not intervene in the Chinese curriculum. Instead, all Chinese schools were required to register in the OCAC through the Chinese embassy in the Philippines, which was in charge of school inspection.

In terms of language learning, since the Philippine-Chinese community at the time was
ruled by the ROC, Chinese schools also followed the ROC version of Chineseness, teaching ‘Zhuyin’ (the Mandarin Phonetic Symbols) and traditional Chinese characters. In the aftermath of the separation in 1949, the PRC also developed its own version of Chineseness that adopts ‘Pinyin’ (the Romanisation system of Mandarin) and simplified Chinese characters. However, due to its monopoly in pedagogy until the 1990s, the ROC version has been seen as the preconceived orthodox Chinese culture among Philippine-Chinese.

The ROC’s supply of textbooks was another policy focus as it was a means defining the scope of Chinese teaching. From 1952, the OCAC in Taiwan edited and provided the ‘Textbooks for Schools in Southeast Asia’ (南洋華僑學校教科書). The Chinese school in the Philippines was the first among other schools in Southeast Asia to adopt it (Jiang, 2011: 67), demonstrating the special relationship between Taiwan and Philippine-Chinese schools. Of course both Zhuyin and traditional Chinese characters were taught in the textbook. It was later revised as the ‘Philippine edition’ to accommodate the local context environment in the Philippines (Yanyan Wang, 1998). In 1969, the ‘General Association of Chinese Schools in the Philippines’ even decided to directly adopt the same textbooks for Taiwanese students in the teaching of the Philippine-Chinese elementary schools (Jiang, 2011: 66). As Benedict Anderson (1983) argues, the circulation of books in a certain ‘national-print language’ can make readers speaking various dialects able to understand each other, thus forming a unified nationalist awareness among them. The use of unified textbooks facilitated a de-territorialised ‘imagined community’ among the Philippine-Chinese.

While working in a Chinese school, I was quite fascinated by some older generations of Philippine-Chinese who excitedly told me that ‘we studied the same textbooks as yours in Taiwan’. The common memory of textbooks not only immediately created a
sense of intimacy between those who come from Taiwan and them, but also enabled them to declare their former Huaqiao citizenship.

Teacher training was another policy priority. As part of the project of U.S. aid for overseas Chinese education following the visit to Taiwan of Vice President Richard Nixon in 1935, 485 Philippine-Chinese students graduated from Taiwanese colleges and universities between 1952 to 1993 (Y. Chen, 2004). The ROC also built the Overseas Chinese Teacher College in Manila, which operated between 1957 and 1967, producing 269 graduates (Yanyan Wang, 1998). The OCAC also provided 50 teachers from Taiwan between 1952 and 1968, and sent 57 educationalists to hold teacher training programs with more than 4,000 trainees in Manila between 1954 and 1968 (Yanyan Wang, 1998). Those who took part in these teacher training programs in the two decades tended to be more aware of, have a deeper understanding of, and feel connected to, the ROC version of Chineseness. Many of them, including the lady who was singing the song, later became the backbone of the Chinese school; some, now in their sixties or seventies, still are.

A head of the Chinese department of a school who studied in National Taiwan Normal University thanks to a ROC scholarship expressed her affection for Taiwan: ‘The ROC government treated me so well, so I cannot retire too early. I must serve and repay “my country” as much as I could (Personal communication with Miss Lim, 9/10/2010”.

As this case shows, the ROC has cultivated a group of the Philippine-Chinese who have familiarised themselves with the pedagogy of the ROC and worked in Chinese schools as teachers, directors of Chinese departments, school principals, and educational researchers. Some of them still do at present. These core elites of the Chinese schools have had a profound influence on the developing direction and pedagogy of Chinese
schools, having made them, to a certain degree, Huaqiao-oriented.

All in all, the huge impact that the ROC government left on the pedagogy of the Chinese schools has brought about an effect of ‘path dependence’. Even in the ‘post-Huaqiao period’, the pedagogy adopted in the Chinese schools still shows Huaqiao Chineseness with ROC characteristics.

3.4.3 Unity of National Identity

From the beginning, Chinese schools were integral to Chinese nationalism in terms of disseminating propaganda. By the late 1910s, Chinese schools began to serve as centres of overseas Chinese nationalism, incited by the ROC government in Beijing (Tan, 1972: 168). Chinese students thus became political activists who organised a series of patriotic movements and fundraising campaigns in response to almost all major political events in China and foreign imperialism against China, such as Yuan Shikai’s revival of monarchy, the Northern Expedition and invasions of China by the United Kingdom, Russia and Japan, and subsequently the Second Sino-Japan War (Tan, 1972).

The local branches of the KMT established in 1911 in Manila played a pivotal role in the overseas Chinese nationalist movement. A high-ranking KMT official from China, Lin Sen, arrived in Manila to supervise the setting up of the city’s general branch, arrange the publication of the ‘Kong Li Newspaper’ (the mouthpiece of the party), and establish two schools directed by the party, the Chinese National School in the 1920s and the Chiang Kai-shek High School in 1939 (Jensen, 1956: 279). The general branch was later joined by many devoted and capable followers, who in turn developed other local branches all over the islands (Jensen, 1956: 279). Further, a number of
intellectuals from China with KMT background came to the Philippines and worked as teachers in almost all Chinese schools, thus adding Huaqiao Chineseness with KMT ideology to Chinese teaching.

After the KMT came to power in China in 1928, its influence in the Philippine-Chinese community rapidly grew. To a certain degree, the Chinese school system had become the KMT’s propaganda machine. The KMT was also devoted to making the Three Principles of the People the foundation of Huaqiao education at all levels of Chinese schools (Lee, 1997b: 501; Tan, 1972: 247). The Chinese schools were thus a central part of the transnational mobilisation system in serving the KMT’s political agenda, especially after the eruption of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

After 1949, the centre of the transnational mobilisation system moved to Taiwan to continue the KMT’s political struggle against the CPC. Thereafter, the focal point of Huaqiao education shifted to ‘Anti-Communism and National Salvation’ in the 1950s and 1960s (Lee, 1997a), in order to denigrate the legitimacy of the CPC not only for its usurping of the mainland, but its destruction of Chinese traditional culture. To assure ideological unity, the KMT reconstructed organisations of the Chinese community – including Chinese schools – to align with its party organisation. It assigned party members to positions of influence on school boards in order to exercise control over schools (McBeath, 1970: 64). Against the background of the Cold War, the KMT’s control over the Chinese schools and the Chinese community as a whole was quite severe and overwhelming until the 1970s. The KMT’s coercive measures, enacted via Huaqiao education in order to command absolute loyalty among the Philippine-Chinese towards the ROC, did not necessarily produce loyal party supporters; nevertheless, they successfully created a sense that they are, and always will be, part of the Chinese nation.
Hence, the rule of the KMT in this period had significantly turned the Philippine-Chinese into Huaqiao with strong Chinese national identity. Despite the fading away of KMT ideology, such as anti-communism, after the 1970s overseas Chinese nationalism and Huaqiao Chineseness, as disseminated by the party, remained influential.

3.5 Underground Huaqiao Education in the Current Post-Huaqiao Period

The breaking off of diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1975 ended the legal basis of Huaqiao citizenship, and of the ROC’s rule over the Chinese. Since most of the Philippine-Chinese have legally lost Huaqiao citizenship and acquired Filipino citizenship, this began the post-Huaqiao Period, which continues up to present. To nullify the notion of Huaqiao citizenship, the Philippine government granted Philippine-Chinese access to Filipino citizenship and enforced the Filipinization of the Chinese schools. These policies aimed to erase the marks of Huaqiao education in Chinese schools.

The denial of the validity of Huaqiao education, however, could only make it go underground rather than eliminate it. Tan (1988: 185) argues that acquiring Filipino citizenship merely amounted to a ‘change of label’ on their citizenship status. Many of the ‘former ROC citizens’ who work in schools only pay lip service to legal requirements, changing educational content only in form (See, 1997: 98). Despite no direct ROC involvement, Chinese teaching in general still followed old Huaqiao Chineseness. As a result, regardless of Filipinization, the teaching of Chinese schools, to a degree, remains ‘Huaqiao’ in the post-Huaqiao time.

Despite their insistence of those who teach in the Chinese schools, in the absence of
institutional support, normally the sense of being Huaqiao would have continued to decline under the influence of Filipinization. China’s rise since the ‘Opening and Reform’ of the 1980s, however, has allowed overseas Chinese to contact their hometowns in China and rekindled their passion for the fatherland. The rapid economic growth of China as well as of ethnic Chinese business networks in the so-called ‘Greater China’ region has given rise to a ‘Chinese triumphalism’ among overseas Chinese that celebrates ‘Asian value’ by and large based on Confucianism (Ong, 1999). Chinese learning thus has become not only a symbol of cultural ties to the fatherland, but of access to Greater China.

Meanwhile, the PRC started to reach out to overseas Chinese after its the Reform and Opening policy. The PRC has been devoted to replacing the ROC as the true fatherland for overseas Chinese and the rightful heir of Chinese cultural heritage. To remedy the destruction of the cultural traditions of China in the Cultural Revolution, from the 1990s the PRC began to reassess Confucianism and started ‘the fever of traditional scholarship’ that emphasised Confucian studies (Peng, 2011). In terms of overseas Chinese policies, the PRC started to stress the great importance of overseas Chinese to ‘the great renaissance of the Chinese nation and people’ in 2001 (Liu, 2005). Qian Qishen, Vice Premier of the State Council, emphasised particularly the crucial role of overseas Chinese education for the younger generation Chinese (Liu, 2005: 303). Naturally, mainland China appears promising as a new and massive resource of Chineseness that can help remedy the awkward situation of Huaqiao education.

Due to the lessening of hostility against China, Philippine authorities have gradually loosened their control over the Chinese schools. Since China has gained growing economic significance, there has been a resurgence of Huaqiao education that involves the ongoing commitments of the PRC as well as the ROC. Unlike the previous mode
of Huaqiao education that was monopolised by the Chineseness of the ROC, Huaqiao education in the post-Huaqiao time is constituted by both the PRC and the ROC. As there are two versions of Chineseness to compete for the hegemony of Huaqiao education, the confrontation between pro-mainland and pro-Taiwan groups largely determines current Huaqiao education in the Philippines.

In the PRC’s view, support from overseas Chinese is not only an asset, in the era of the Reform and Opening up, to the ‘socialist modernisation project’, but also a symbolic resource to affirm its political legitimacy, to extend China’s political standing, and to reassert Chineseness. Hence, one of the PRC’s paramount concerns is to inhibit ROC influence among Philippine-Chinese whose allegiance the ROC claimed as evidence of its legitimacy (Barabantseva, 2011; Fitzgerald, 1972). Replacing the ROC version of Chineseness in overseas Chinese education with the PRC one is therefore the policy priority.

On the part of the ROC, without wide international recognition and the membership of the United Nations, those overseas Chinese who are ROC-oriented have become crucial strategic resources in the competition for legitimacy, foreign policy, and external trade (J. Chen, 2002). To avoid being taken over by the PRC, the ROC thus gives its priority to consolidating its existing network of Chinese schools.

The arms race for educational aids between the two governments, indeed, boosts the production of Huaqiao Chineseness and the spreading of Huaqiao education. Therefore, the loss of Huaqiao citizenship by no means put an end to the dissemination of Huaqiao Chineseness. To the contrary, with the agenda of both governments, Huaqiao Chineseness has extended, doubled, and gone underground through two versions of Huaqiao education. In the following, I will identify four forms of Huaqiao
Chineseness existing beneath the surface of educational aids.

3.5.1 Quasi-state/citizen Relationships through Education

The paramount concern in overseas Chinese education policies is to maintain the sense of being Huaqiao. As discussed earlier, China tends to bypass the notion of national citizenship in defining the citizenry. Therefore, it is natural for both regimes to continue to treat the Chinese as ‘quasi-citizens’ through educational aids. This shows that China (whether referring to the ROC or PRC) takes for granted its claim to the allegiance of overseas Chinese, regardless of the latter’s citizenship status. This policy orientation can be exemplified by the fact that China intentionally expands the definition of ‘Huaqiao’ to increase the recipients of quasi-Huaqiao citizenship and Huaqiao education.

Indeed, the ROC government has never discontinued the usage of Huaqiao in reference to overseas Chinese, whether they are, in fact, ROC citizens or not. It considers those Chinese with the memory of having been Huaqiao as potential compatriots, and does not take their true citizenship status into account at all (Wang, 1981: 126). The ROC’s unilateral entitlement to Huaqiao status is based on common, pre-1970s historical memory, imagining that the ROC is still the nominal and symbolic homeland of the Philippine-Chinese.

In fact, the ROC’s definition of Huaqiao is highly ambiguous. According to Yan (1991: 6), Huaqiao could refer to any person, regardless of his legal status of citizenship, who has Chinese blood, understands Chinese history, customs, culture, habits, language (to a certain degree), and has links with China. Another term for overseas Chinese as a
whole, Qiaobao (compatriots), which is commonly used by officials when calling overseas Chinese, can simultaneously refer to Huaqiao, Huaren (foreign nationals of Chinese descent), and Huayi (non-Chinese citizens of Chinese blood). When asked why the ROC offers educational services to non-citizens, an official of OCAC said:

To a degree, if he realises his ancestors were from Mainland China or Taiwan, if he also realises his mother tongue or his ancestors’ language is Mandarin Chinese, and if he realises he has the background of Chinese culture and feels admiration for it, I think the ROC government has the responsibility to satisfy the admiration and yearning for Chinese learning and the cultural inheritance. If the descendants of Huaqiao, whatever they are of first, second or third generation, despite the fact that they have acquired Filipino citizenship and enrol in the schools as part of the Philippine education system yet with only couple of hours of Chinese courses, I think the OCAC of the ROC government has the responsibility to meet the needs (Interview with the Chief Secretary of OCAC, Liang-ming Chang, the OCAC, Taipei, 24/8/2012).

The statement implies that it is self-evident that the ROC, as the orthodox inheritor, is responsible for any person, whether of more or less amount of Chinese background and of interests in learning Chinese. The flexibility in defining the relationships between the ROC and those of Chinese background, in a sense, coincides with the *jus sanguinis* principle of the Nationality Law of the ROC, which holds that those of Chinese descent could automatically acquire a certain status derived from the ROC. As long as the ROC is willing to offer services, and as long as the Philippine-Chinese are willing to receive the services of the ROC, the relationships can be of no problem and beyond any statutory restriction on the definition of national citizenship.

With respect to the PRC’s overseas Chinese policy, despite the statement in the Nationality Law in 1955 that disapproves of dual citizenship and advocates single citizenship of the host country, the law cannot, in the wake of the Opening and Reform, in fact prevent the PRC, from forming new relationships with the overseas Chinese
(Barabantseva, 2005). Wang (1991) notices that attitudes about whether to include ethnic Chinese who are foreign nationals in the PRC’s new policy on overseas Chinese are ‘blurred and undefined’ in a manner that can invite suspicion in the countries of residence. By creating a compound noun, ‘Huaqiao-Huaren’, which refers to all overseas Chinese regardless of their citizenship status, the PRC targets non-citizens alongside real Huaqiao. For example, in the official website, the Guoqiaoban (the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China) states that one of its major responsibilities is taking charge of ‘the guidance and development of the interaction of and the services for Huaqiao-Huaren and their organisations’.

When asked at a conference in Manila in 1991 by an overseas Chinese scholar why there are so many administrative offices in China with ‘Huaqiao’ in the name, a professor from Beijing answered ‘it is because there are still real Huaqiao residing abroad’ (Chang, T, 2009: 134). This is obviously an excuse to avoid questions about its ambivalent policy orientation; the truth is that, despite the fact that the majority of Philippine-Chinese have no Chinese citizenship, the Guoqiaoban nonetheless offers education services for the Chinese students to expand the PRC’s influence over the Chinese.

From the viewpoint of the ROC and PRC, the Philippine-Chinese still have privileged status. Receiving Huaqiao education can no longer be exclusive to Chinese citizens because most students, teachers, and administrators are now Filipino citizens. The only feasible way to increase the recipients of Huaqiao education is to make educational aids open to all of those who work for, or enrol in, Chinese schools.
Both the ROC and PRC have developed respective educational-aid supply systems in order to provide teachers, teacher training, textbooks, and educational activities. As the ROC and PRC governments can no longer directly reach out to ‘former’ Chinese schools, they instead have to rely on some intermediary bodies to provide the aids. The table shows a variety of educational aids provided by both governments.

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<th>Intermediary Bodies</th>
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<th>ROC</th>
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<td></td>
<td>The Philippine Chinese Education Research Center</td>
<td>The Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools in the Philippines</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the Philippine Jinjiang General Association</td>
<td>The Filipino Chinese Cultural and Economic Association</td>
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<td>the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<td>Teacher Supply Programs</td>
<td>Overseas Chinese Teacher Volunteer Programs</td>
<td>Substitute Military Service Teachers</td>
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<td>Teaching Adviser Programs</td>
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<td>Blood Transfusion Programs</td>
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<td>Teacher Training</td>
<td>Correspondence Courses for Bachelor of Chinese Teaching</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Sponsored by Guoqiaoban)</td>
<td>Zhongwen</td>
<td>• Summer Study Tour in China</td>
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<td>• Localisation of Chinese Teacher Program (2+2)</td>
<td>Hanyu</td>
<td>• Chinese Cultural Talent Contest</td>
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<td>• Chinese Education Workshop</td>
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<td>• The HSK Test (The Chinese Proficiency Test)</td>
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<td>(Sponsored by Philippine Jin Jiang General Association, INC.)</td>
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<td>• Language Study Program for Expatriate Youth (sponsored by OCAC)</td>
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<td>• Expatriate Youth Taiwan Study Tour (sponsored by OCAC)</td>
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<td>• E-learning Teaching Demo Center</td>
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|                                                            |                                               |                                                            |
|                                                            | School Administration and Management Programs |                                                            |
|                                                            | Correspondence Courses                         |                                                            |

Table 3 The educational aids provided by the PRC and ROC

Following the ROC’s breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Philippines, a new organisation was set up in Manila’s Chinatown in 1986: the Filipino-Chinese Culture and Education Service Center, which works directly under the OCAC and is in charge
of education affairs. It has a close partnership with the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools in the Philippines (ACFSP), which was established in 1993 with the assistance of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines (TECO), formerly the ROC embassy. The association, which consists of 126 Chinese schools, is in charge of coordination between Chinese schools and general educational affairs. It tends to give more cooperation on the events and activities organised by the OCAC, such as teacher training programs, administrator programs, and summer youth camps. These events are largely sponsored by the OCAC. Further, the OCAC provides free textbooks only to Chinese schools registering in the association. Therefore, via the association, the ROC can exploit the offering of educational aids to indirectly extend its influence to Chinese schools.

As for the PRC, it has launched a series of ambitious projects on overseas Chinese education – which it has, however, kept low-key. As the legitimate representative of China, the regional power, and the possessor of the mainland with the hometowns that emotionally resonate with the Philippine-Chinese, PRC influence is significant. It has, moreover, seen community growth as the PRC has formed relationships with the big Philippine-Chinese organisations, such as the Philippine Jinjiang General Association and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FFCCCII). PRC authorities closely cooperate with them in conducting educational affairs, such as the teacher training program with the former and the teacher supply program with the latter.

The Philippine Chinese Education Research Center (PCERC), established in 1993, is also closely affiliated with some PRC authorities in charge of overseas Chinese affairs,  

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11 It is the representative office alternative to the ROC embassy in the Philippines since the ROC has broken off the diplomatic relations with the Philippines under One China Policy since 1975.
such as the Guoqiaoban and the Hanban (the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language, NOTCFL). The local organisations thus have become the PRC authorities’ intermediary bodies in providing educational resources to the Chinese schools.

In short, both governments use the membership of Chinese schools as a replacement for Huaqiao citizenship in terms of qualifications for obtaining benefits. Those who enrol in the Chinese schools can still enjoy a variety of educational services by both governments. In a way, Chinese students’ educational opportunities for studying Chinese have not been compromised after acquiring Filipino citizenship. Without true Huaqiao citizenship, they can still make use of their studentship in the Chinese schools to enjoy educational resources.

On the other hand, some Philippine-Chinese appear to still see themselves as citizens, if not subjects, of China, taking educational aids from the fatherland for granted. When the need for Chinese education teaching materials emerges, Chinese schools tend to seek help from both governments. Former ROC citizens generally insist that the authenticity of Chineseness taught in schools has to be officially produced and recognised by the central power. They also believe the fatherland is obligated to provide educational aids for Chinese people to follow in a top-down manner. This dependence implies that, from the viewpoint of these Philippine-Chinese, Chinese nationals, despite naturalisation, always have the right to enjoy the services of Chinese government. In fact, it is educational aids from both governments that support the sustainability of Huaqiao Chineseness in the Chinese schools.

For example, while planning to start a new coordinating body, ‘the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools’, in 1993, Chinese schools requested the OCAC’s backup
rather than establishing it on their own. This is comparable to inviting to the ROC to influence the association.

Another example is that, in 1989, when the Chinese schools found the textbook edited in 1975 too outdated, they did not attempt to revise it on their own. Instead, they reported the issue to the OCAC, who set language-teaching experts to work editing a new version of the textbook (Chu, 1995). When I asked an officer of the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools about why they did not try to edit textbooks tailor-made for the Philippine-Chinese students themselves, she simply answered:

No way! We do not have money, and nobody is capable to edit it. No money, nor is expert. It is impossible to edit our own textbooks. There is no single person and group with the capability. This is too troublesome and requires expertise. Is there anybody who is capable to do so in the Philippines? Principals? Heads of Chinese departments? No way! (Interview with an officer of the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools, the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools, Manila, 15/11/2013)

As a matter of fact, those ‘former ROC citizens’ who work in the area of Chinese education are the most professional educational experts in the Chinese community. They are the most qualified people to conceive of a Philippine version of Chineseness due to their actual life experience in the Philippines as well as knowledge of teaching Chinese. Their dependence on the fatherland, however, precludes this possibility.

Along the same lines, following the build-up of the relationship between the PRC and some Chinese, the dependence of the latter on the former is manifest in their requests for more resources. When plans by Rongmei Li, a wealthy Philippine-Chinese businessman, to direct the future development of the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools in the Philippines (ACFSP) from being pro-Taiwan to being more pro-China failed to obtain full recognition from China, he wrote an article: ‘the ACFSP Needs the
Support from Parents’ (Li, 23/12/2013). Li called on China as follows:

Now the ACFSP has returned back to the right way. We are all patriots whether we are earlier or later……the issue of the ACFSP is not just our own business, but the whole Chinese community’s business, the PRC’s business and the PRC embassy’s business. It represents our allegiance to fatherland……without the support from the Chinese government, we are nothing.

In a sense, some Chinese still consider the development of Chinese education as an embodiment of their Chinese patriotism. As they are willing to give strong allegiance to China as their fatherland, it is China’s responsibility to take care of Chinese schools. This distinctive mentality can be also shown in the following speech by an officer of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, INC. (FFCCCII):

The ambassador said what he did is for us (Philippine Chinese), but I said it is patriotic sentiment of Huaqiao. The promotion of Chinese culture is the responsibility of the state (PRC). The Chinese government should not pass the responsibility onto Chinese schools. The Overseas Chinese Teacher Volunteer Program should be hosted mainly by the cultural counsellor of Chinese embassy and we just offer assistance as much as possible, because you are the official and we are people. It is you who need to promote Chinese culture, and it is you who should provide Chinese teachers for Chinese schools. So I can just encourage Chinese schools to cooperate with the cultural counsellor of Chinese embassy in terms of selecting textbooks (a speech by an FFCCCII administrator, FFCCCII, Manila, 10/10/2013).

A number of wealthy members of the FFCCCII are dedicated to Chinese education. In

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12 In PRC official discourse, relationships between China and overseas Chinese are often compared to relationships between parents and married daughters.

13 The FFCCCII is an ‘umbrella organization’ of all Chinese business associations and the Chinese community as a whole. It has close cooperation with the embassy of the PRC in sponsoring Chinese education in the Philippines in recent years, including the implementation of the Overseas Chinese Teacher Volunteer Program by the Hanban since 2004.
recent years, with increasing business partnership with the PRC, the FFCCCII has also turned to seek educational aids from the PRC. It cooperates with the Guoqiaoban and Hanban for teacher training (The 2+2 Project) and teacher supply (the Overseas Chinese Teacher Volunteer Program), serving as an intermediary between the Huaqiao affairs-related authorities of the PRC and Chinese schools. However, failing (from the local point of view) to accommodate the needs of the younger generation, the FFCCCII can only contribute financial aids to, and closely follow, the PRC’s ambitions in respect of overseas Chinese.

As a result, many of the Philippine-Chinese take the educational aids from the homeland for granted, retaining the traditional sense of being Huaqiao. As the Chinese schools heavily rely on both governments, the autonomy to interpret Chineseness from local perspective is inevitably restricted by external influences. Under the influences, their Chineseness remains Huaqiao.

3.5.2 Fatherland-centred Textbooks and Teacher Supplies

In the Huaqiao period, the Chinese schools had a tradition of accepting textbooks and teachers from the fatherland. In the post-Huaqiao period, however, the arms race for educational aids between China and Taiwan has further extended the tradition. Both China and Taiwan regard their textbooks’ being adopted by a Chinese school as recognition of their status as the fatherland. Because there are many classes being taught by teachers from the fatherland, using textbooks from there too, the fatherland gains leverage in terms of instilling Huaqiao Chineseness. Chinese education thus inevitably involves cross-strait politics.
The textbook is the medium of official knowledge. Edited by both governments, textbooks for Philippine-Chinese students also have agendas relating to the respective policy objectives of overseas Chinese education. The common agenda shared by the two governments is preserving a minimum degree of Huaqiao Chineseness by deliberately building links between students and the so-called fatherland. There are two forms of Huaqiao Chineseness in the textbooks.

First, the presence of a textbook from the fatherland itself is a form of Huaqiao Chineseness. Since the textbook is edited by the fatherland rather than a local publisher, students are reminded of their paradoxical situation: that, although they are Filipino citizens, a special link exists between them and China. This is why both China and Taiwan are competing to increase their textbooks’ ‘market share’ among the Chinese schools by providing free textbooks. The use of a textbook represents the school’s recognition of either the PRC’s or the ROC’s mutually exclusive versions of Huaqiao Chineseness. The competition between the PRC and ROC to provide textbooks increases the Chinese schools’ ‘textbook dependence’ on the fatherland, offering both governments opportunities to promote respective versions of Huaqiao Chineseness in the schools.

Second, the political agendas of the fatherland, as expressed in the content of the textbooks, also imply that the Philippine-Chinese are still Huaqiao and that their support is crucial to the national interests of both governments. Through the content of textbooks, both governments can publicise respective policy objectives.

The propaganda in the textbooks of the PRC can be divided into two categories. One is to stress its status as sole legitimate representative of China. Another is to advertise China’s greatness. The PRC gives priority to making overseas Chinese aware of the
‘One China Policy’ that claims Taiwan as part of its territory. In volume 11 of the Zhongwen (Mandarin Chinese Language) textbook edited by the Guoqiaoban, for example, there is a reading text on page 105: ‘I Love Taiwan Islands: A Note of the Book the Largest Island of China, Taiwan’. The text describes Taiwan’s beautiful scenery and of the recapturing of Taiwan from invaders by Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga). The author then expresses great affection for Taiwan.

Further, the PRC government through textbooks also emphasises its status as sole representative of the legitimate government of China. The Guoqiaoban hosted ‘the 2nd Chinese Cultural Contest for Overseas Chinese Teenagers’ in 2013 (observation, Manila, 23/11/2013). The contest included a quiz game based on three textbooks, Common Knowledge about Chinese History, Common Knowledge about Chinese Geography, Common Knowledge about Chinese Culture, edited by the Guoqiaoban. The books stress the legitimacy of the PRC government by highlighting the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party in the Second Sino-Japan War. In the quiz, for example, there is a true or false question: ‘the Chinese Communist Party led Chinese people to defeat Japanese Imperialism in the Second Sino-Japan War’. Certainly, the answer is true.

In terms of advertising the greatness of China, the Zhongwen textbook introduces many places of historic interest and natural beauty, such as Mount Everest (p.8, v.64), the Potala Palace (p. 66, v.11), the Tian Shan (p.75, v.12), and Tiananmen Square (p.60, v.11). The texts usually end with praise such as ‘You are the national icon of China’ (p.65, v.8), ‘You are the pride of the Chinese nation’ (p.83, v.12), and ‘You make Chinese people feel proud’ (p.78, v.12). The aim of the texts’ praise seems to be to arouse students’ patriotism towards China.
The contents of the ROC textbook, *the Philippine Version of Chinese Reading*, show no intention to get involved in the battle for legitimacy. Instead, this textbook focuses on promoting a positive image of Taiwan. The ROC textbook also introduces some Taiwan sceneries and customs, such as Yangmingshan National Park (p.50, v.11) and Taiwanese toys (p.14, v.12). There is also a lesson called ‘My Taiwanese Friends’ (p.22, v.12) describing the passion, hospitality, good manners, generosity, and happiness of Taiwanese people and their friendship with Filipino people.

These references to either mainland China or Taiwan can serve as a reminder for the Philippine-Chinese of the fatherland’s existence. No matter how removed China is for students, the textbooks still attempt to fill them with admiration for the fatherland and create a sense of familiarity. As long as students study a textbook from China or Taiwan, it is inevitable that the book serves as a medium to direct students’ identity to the fatherland, rather than the country of residence. Therefore, the impact of Huaqiao Chineseness remains.

Teachers sent by the fatherland are the incarnation of Huaqiao Chineseness. They are on a mission to confirm ties between the Philippine-Chinese and the fatherland that are beyond education.

The task for the ‘Overseas Chinese Teacher Volunteers Program’, which is sponsored by the Hanban, is to expand the presence of the PRC version of Huaqiao Chineseness and replace that of the ROC. Thus schools are forced into making ‘either/or’ choices between the ‘Teacher Volunteers’ from the PRC or the ‘Substitute Military Service Teachers’ from the ROC. As the sponsor that pays the salary for the Teacher Volunteers, the Hanban prohibits schools which apply for the former from simultaneously taking on the latter in order to exclude ROC influence from schools.
It is worth pointing out that in 2003 Chinese schools in the Philippines were the first in the world to receive ‘the Chinese Teacher Volunteer Program’. This reveals how much emphasis the PRC places on winning the symbolic support of Chinese schools as part of its grand strategy. In a concluding article for the achievement of the program written by Qihua Fan (2005), the Teacher Volunteers are likened to ‘Norman Bethune’, who was a Canadian physician and a world communist serving for the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army (Ba Lu Jun) during the Second Sino-Japanese War. He mentions that the program can function to strengthen the connection between not only overseas Chinese and the fatherland, but also China and the Philippines (Fan, 2005: 74). In the end, Fan also warns that they have to be alert to the interference and destruction of ‘separatist forces of Taiwan independence’ (Fan, 2005: 74). Fan’s article illustrates the tendency of PRC authorities to refer to ROC forces as part of the Taiwan independence movement, thereby attempting to delegitimise the presence of ROC authorities in the Philippine-Chinese community. It also reveals the political agenda of the Chinese Teacher Volunteer Program, that is, to combat ROC forces in Chinese schools.

Of course, the ROC government program ‘Substitute Military Service Teachers’ comes with its own political agenda, one which seeks to counterbalance the influence of the Teacher Volunteers. I myself observed such tensions between the two Chinese governments while teaching in Manila in 2010. In the official reception for Taiwanese teachers held by the OCAC and Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in the Philippines, principals of the Chinese schools were requested by the Deputy Representative not to ask Taiwanese teachers to attend any PRC-sponsored political events, because these Substitute Military Service teachers are a ‘special kind of ROC soldiers’ (observation, Manila, 11/5/2010). The OCAC official also required Taiwanese teachers to write articles and publish these in Chinese newspapers to advertise how they, and the ROC
as a whole, are committed to Chinese schools that they served (observation, Manila, 12/5/2010).

Further, in a special case the OCAC even asked Taiwanese teachers to ‘spy’ on Chinese schools. A Taiwanese teacher was assigned by the OCAC to work as an administrative assistant for the ACFSP. At that time the director of the Filipino-Chinese Culture and Education Service Center suspected that the ACFSP had private contact with PRC authorities and was likely to turn out to be pro-mainland. At a mandatory monthly meeting for all Substitute Military Service Teachers I witnessed him giving the following order:

You have to open your eyes and ears to note every single move of the ACFSP. And then you are required to attend the service center on a weekly basis and report everything to me. Remember, your boss is not the ACFSP, but the ROC (observation, Manila, 7/7, 2010).

It was the first time that I realised that, despite the name of the ‘Substitute Military Service’, our work was still ‘military service’ in a sense. Although we only held chalk instead of weapon, we also served to defend our ‘claim’ to Huaqiao against the ‘invasion’ of the Chinese community by the mainland China.

Moreover, Taiwanese teachers were also strictly required to teach only the ROC version of Huaqiao Chineseness. In an executive meeting of the ACFSP that I attended during my re-visit to Manila in 2012, the director of the Filipino-Chinese Culture and Education Service Center told the principals that,

Taiwanese teachers only teach traditional Chinese characters and Zhuyin. Although Hong Kong and Macau are ruled by the PRC, they still use traditional Chinese characters. It is not political ideology. It is because they (Taiwanese teachers) receive ROC salary, so they can only promote ‘our’ Chinese culture (observation, Manila, 25/7/2012).

It shows the extraordinary degree of antagonism between the two governments in
overseas Chinese education affairs. As long as the Chinese schools take receiving textbooks and teachers from the fatherland for granted, the chance that ‘Philippine-centred’ Chinese education will develop is slim.

3.5.3 Teaching Mandarin as a National Language

By and large, current Mandarin teaching resembles Huaqiao education of the Huaqiao period. To a certain degree, the Chinese schools still view Mandarin as a national language. I refer to the traditional approach of Mandarin teaching based on the pedagogy of Huaqiao education as ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’. As the Chinese school system is still dominated by China-oriented, former Chinese citizens in their sixties or seventies, they tend to believe that the best way to preserve students’ Chinese identity and to improve their Chinese-language ability is to teach Mandarin as if they were still Chinese citizens. Their younger colleagues and successors, reluctant to break with tradition, simply follow traditional teaching practices. It brings about an effect of path dependence whereby the development of Chinese schools is limited by the traditional approach of Mandarin teaching. In other words, the residual influence of Huaqiao Chineseness has extended to the post-Huaqiao period up to now.

As mentioned earlier, previously in the Standardising National Language Movement, the ROC employed national language teaching to build cohesion among Chinese nationals across all the provinces of China as well as international overseas Chinese communities. In the 1950s and 1960s, the whole package of knowledge about Chinese language teaching, such as written language, language use, pronunciation, teaching methods, and textbooks edited by the National Institute for Compilation and Translation in Taiwan, had been deeply rooted in the Chinese schools and became the immutable
standard shared by all ROC citizens in Taiwan as well as the Philippine-Chinese. Nowadays, some old-generation Philippine-Chinese in charge of the Chinese schools perceive the younger generation’s assimilation into the Philippine mainstream and the deterioration of their Mandarin language ability as unbearable deviations. They believe that the preservation and restoration of the traditional teaching approach is the only way to rectify the deviation (Ang See, 1997).

Due to the legacy of the ROC, language teaching in Chinese schools holds some features in common with national language education in Taiwan. While teaching in St. Joseph High School, I was surprised that the scene of Chinese class looked so similar to that in Taiwan; it reminded me of my tedious Chinese class in elementary school in the 1990s, during which teachers used supreme authority to discipline the class.

As my elementary school teachers had done, the Chinese teachers in St. Joseph High School stood before a timeworn, gigantic blackboard that covered the entire wall, monotonously delivering lessons to more than forty students, who were strictly required to remain absolutely silent except when asked to answer questions or read texts. The traditional approach towards educational practice was exercised at all times. Seemingly the teachers assumed that students were all native Mandarin speakers who acquired the ability to speak the language in everyday life, and did not need to practice speaking skills in class; this was not the case. An administrator of St. Joseph High School, in her early sixties, recalled that in the elementary school she attended in 1960s the teacher usually gave lectures entirely in Mandarin, regardless of the students’ ability to understand. The administrator persevered in trying to understand what the teacher said, understanding a small amount, yet finding herself unable to speak or read a Chinese newspaper (conversation with Miss Chu, St. Joseph High School, Manila, 9/12/2010).
One of the main factors contributing to the fixation with teaching Mandarin as a national language is the use of textbooks. For example, while I was in residence, the textbook adopted by the elementary school in St. Joseph High School was ‘the Philippine Edition of Chinese Reader’ provided by the OCAC in Taiwan, edited in 1997 and reprinted in 2010. Despite the lower depth in terms of content compared to the counterpart in Taiwan, the form and structure of the textbooks are remarkably alike. The textbook consists of texts written vertically, new words listed at the bottom of pages, traditional Chinese characters, national phonetic alphabet, sentence-making practice and questions with workbooks, all following patterns in Taiwan and differing from those in the mainland China. This is not surprising given that the editors of the Philippine Edition of Chinese Reader, including the chief planner Xuntian Ke, the chief editor Bingyao Yen, the contributors Zuoqin Ke, Xizen Zhang and Sonpei Lin are all prominent experts in the area of national language teaching in Taiwan. They clearly followed the same formula of national language teaching in Taiwan to edit the textbooks for students in the Philippines.

Accordingly, the textbook focuses on literacy skills, such as reading and writing abilities, instead of communication skills, like listening and speaking. There is no section in this particular textbook and associated workbooks for practicing listening and speaking skills. The examinations also followed the pattern of textbook and workbooks, asking questions about reading comprehension, close text, memorisation of specified texts, and pinyin and explanation of words. Listening and speaking tests accounted for only a negligible amount of the total grade, and was therefore naturally ignored by students, teachers, and parents.

In fact, as I observed during my teaching, Chinese language education in Chinese schools is remarkably ‘exam-oriented’. The exam result determines the students’
ranking and honour in the entire semester, something greatly valued by most students and their parents. Thus, many teachers and students’ tutors would rather devote time to enhancing grades by pushing students to memorise the content in textbooks than teach them listening and speaking skills. As a result, the grade that students receive in the report card hardly represents their true language ability. As an elementary Chinese teacher, the head brought pressure to bear on me if my class did not get good grades. When preparing lessons, I felt my primary purpose was helping students answer exam questions, instead of enhancing their Mandarin proficiency.

Chinese schools also see the literacy of classical Chinese (Wenyen), a traditional style of written Chinese, as one of the key competences of being Chinese. At high school stage, St. Joseph High School places more emphasis on the learning of classical Chinese: accounting for twenty-two of eighty-four lessons, it includes two lessons of the ancient poem, twelve lessons of Tang Poetry, two lessons of Song Poetry, two lessons of Yuan Poetry, and four lessons of ancient literature. All classical Chinese texts selected from textbooks have to be memorised. However, former ROC citizens do not regard the teaching of Mandarin as a national language as problematic, but rather as necessary to preserve Chinese identity. Some teachers, administrators, and alumni who are influential in St. Joseph High School still believe that these teaching methods and materials are the most instructively beneficial for students. For example, Miss Zeng – an experienced, senior teacher who herself was an overseas Chinese student (僑生) studying in a Taiwanese university – expressed her dissatisfaction with the attempt to reform the traditional approach of Mandarin teaching:

The reason that the past students can learn Mandarin well is that they behaved themselves more appropriately than those at the present. And Chinese education in the past was regulated by Taiwan government. It was authentic Taiwanese
Taiwanese education is the best. It adopted traditional teaching methods. But nowadays they have shifted the focus to ‘innovative’ teaching (conversation with Miss Zeng, St. Joseph High School, Manila, 24/9/2010).

During my residence, a new Taiwanese textbook ‘the Living Mandarin (Shenhuo Huayu)’, comprised of hummable Chinese verses and dialogue, was introduced. The textbook emphasises learning basic listening and speaking skills instead of literacy. Even though the principal preferred promoting this new textbook in St. Joseph High School, the head of the Chinese department said, ‘I do not want to adopt it in high school, because it lacks profound content’ (conversation with Miss Lim, St. Joseph High School, Manila, 19/88/2010). An alumnus told me,

this textbook is way too easy for students to effectively learn Mandarin. If they really want to acquire Mandarin proficiency, they should only adopt the textbook that Taiwanese students are using (conversation with Mr. Ku, St. Joseph High School, Manila, 6/8/2010).

He also suggested:

Students should learn Chinese history, but a lot of teaching materials in textbooks about Chinese history have been erased. Now they are learning Mandarin as a second language, but these materials are sterile. They can’t learn anything about Chinese culture by it (conversation with Mr. Ku, St. Joseph High School, Manila, 6/8/2010).

These teachers and alumni tended to believe that the decline of Chinese education is because teaching Mandarin as a national language has not been fully realised; they did not consider that the teaching style, the applied pedagogy, might itself be the problem. The mode of teaching Mandarin as a national language may have made sense in the context of Huaqiao citizenship, but it emerges as outdated and inappropriate for Chinese students as Filipino citizens. Yet, because those who dominate Chinese schools are accustomed to teaching Mandarin as a national language, fundamental change
remains unlikely.

To sum up, the ‘underground Huaqiao education’ that considers Philippine-Chinese as Huaqiao contributes to the following outcomes. First, the overseas Chinese policies whereby both China and Taiwan treat the Philippine-Chinese as ‘quasi-citizens’ creates an illusion for them that they have a fatherland government to depend on in terms of building a Chinese school system. It inevitably invests the Chinese education with a touch of Huaqiao citizenship, thus confusing students about their citizenship status.

Second, by the same token, as the fatherland provides textbooks and teachers, it determines what and whom to teach. The teaching content of Chinese education is thus controlled by China or Taiwan – which are, in fact, foreign countries to the students – rather than the Philippines, from which the students acquire citizenship. As a result, both governments hardly take the national identity and citizenship status of the students into account, but continue inculcating Huaqiao Chineseness, while editing textbooks and sending teachers.

Third, ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’ is, in fact, a projection of the former Chinese citizens’ Huaqiao identity onto the younger generation. The teaching approach which teaches students as genuine Huaqiao overlooks the fact that the students have learned Mandarin as a second, even a foreign, language, neglecting their cognitive ability and the linguistic context of the Philippines. In terms of teaching methodology, the ‘second-language teaching method’ is fit for the Philippine-Chinese students. Notwithstanding, there exist some irrational factors in the decision-making around language teaching due to the old generation’s national sentiments.

Preserving the imagination of being a Chinese citizen through being treated as a Huaqiao, receiving textbooks and teachers from the fatherland, and teaching Mandarin
as a national language, however, come at the cost of effective teaching in Chinese education.

3.6 Chinese Education as Undesirable Citizenship Education

As the last section put it, current Chinese education appears to be an ‘underground Huaqiao education’ to preserve a special citizenship-like relationship between the Chinese and the fatherland. To a degree, Chinese education looks like a ‘citizenship education’ to foster a sense of identification with, and loyalty to, the fatherland. In reality, the ‘education for Huaqiao citizenship’ produces only negligible effects.

Indeed, despite almost four decades’ effort to instil Huaqiao Chineseness in the post-Huaqiao period, students are well aware of their Filipino citizenship and Filipino national identity. A survey of 2,021 Philippine-Chinese high school students’ identity by Zhang Shi-fang and Lu Fei-bin (2009) shows that 97.3% of the students are Filipino citizens and feel strongly about it, and only 2.7% are Chinese citizens. 61.6% of them feel obligated to serve the Philippines, 14.6% do not feel obligated to serve the Philippines, and 23.8% think it doesn’t matter. From the survey it is apparent that the Chinese students’ identity strongly remains Filipino. It seems in vain to direct their political identity to the fatherland through providing textbooks and teachers from the fatherland.

Why has the result deviated so significantly from the expectations of the old-generation Chinese and both governments? I suggest the major cause is that ‘education for Huaqiao citizenship’ contradicts the students’ Filipino citizenship status and national identity.

Indeed, there exists a generational gap between the old generation, who are eager to
develop the education for Huaqiao citizenship, and the younger generation, who are thoroughly Filipino citizens. As Ang See (1997) suggests, while the former tends to be China-oriented, the latter is quite Philippine-oriented. From the perspective of the former, from which party a Chinese school receives textbooks and teachers may demonstrate its political commitment to either China or Taiwan. From the perspective of the latter, however, the issue between China and Taiwan is beyond their knowledge and interests. As a result, the whole package of pedagogy, including textbooks, teacher supplies, and teaching methods, appears inappropriate to the students.

In terms of textbook content, my fieldwork suggests that the nationalistic agendas within it are not only incomprehensible to the students, but also insignificant in learning Chinese. According to my interviews with 21 graduates of the Chinese schools, 15 of them were aware of the fact that the textbooks come from China or Taiwan. When I asked whether they know why China and Taiwan provide the textbooks, all of them were confused by the question and stayed silent. They could easily tell the difference between the traditional and simplified Chinese characters, and between the Zhuyin and Pinyin systems, because most Chinese schools teach both characters and systems. They also had their personal preferences for the traditional or simplified Chinese characters, and for the Zhuyin or Pinyin systems. Yet when I interviewed them it was awkward to broach the subject of the agenda behind the educational aids. The reason that they study the textbook from China or Taiwan is because it is adopted by the school that they go to, and teachers require them to study it hard, and they want to achieve good grades. Chinese politics is not their concern at all. Therefore, contrary to the expectation of the old-generation Chinese as well as both governments, the nationalistic agendas are hardly delivered to the students.

Further, both the pedagogy and textbooks adopted seem to make it difficult for them to
learn Chinese. Lacking knowledge of and interest in China, students find no direct connection to the textbook content. It is largely irrelevant for students to refer to the place names of China or Taiwan and the greatness of the Chinese nation. While those who have Huaqiao identity consider textbook contents based on Huaqiao Chineseness to offer a connection to the fatherland, students who identify as Filipino might view it merely as material to memorise to pass exams. Whether the lesson is about the Yangtze River or Yangmingshan National Park, students consider it merely a place name of a foreign country. Along the same lines, given that the issue of China’s sovereignty is complicated and far removed from the local context, it appears as a foreign affair to them. As the educationalist Dee Fink puts it, a significant learning experience is one ‘resulting in something that is truly significant in terms of the students’ lives’ (Fink, 2003: 6). In the absence of a real connection to the students’ lives, textbook content based on Huaqiao Chineseness is unlikely to lead to this kind of experience.

In terms of teacher supply, both the Teacher Volunteers and the Substitute Military Service teachers (who are in fact foreigners to students but have to act as compatriots), also confront enormous teaching difficulties. Looking back on my personal teaching experience in the Philippines, teaching difficulties such as language usage, cultural difference, and life adjustment all resulted from a simple fact: that I and my students were foreign to each other.

Lacking common language and local knowledge, the biggest problem teachers from China and Taiwan share is poor class management. During my year of teaching, myself and fellow Taiwanese teachers often complained in our private gatherings about disorder in the classroom. Frustrated by my own poor classroom management, I requested some experienced teachers to let me observe their teaching. Miss Zeng, for example, who was described as a master of classroom management was quite ‘heavy-
handed’ in class: all students were forced to follow her order and keep silent (observation, Manila, 22/10/2013). In my observations, I found that as a result of their knowledge of student culture and language use, the old-generation Philippine-Chinese teachers naturally have the authority and communication skills to teach students in an orderly manner. give teaching order to students. Yet it is a great challenge to a teacher from China and Taiwan. Philippine-Chinese students are accustomed to speaking with each other mostly in Tagalog and English; some are able to speak Hokkien. The teachers from China and Taiwan, however, hardly master these common languages of the students. Moreover, due to the insistence on ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’, the schools in general tend to require teachers from China and Taiwan to adopt a ‘Mandarin only’ policy in class. There is therefore a common scene in classrooms: teachers give a one-man show in Mandarin on the platform, and students either appear indifferent to the teaching or mess around with classmates in Tagalog.

Teacher Volunteers from the PRC faced similar difficulties. A Teacher Volunteer at the Hope Christian High School, Miss Huang, also pointed out that ‘it is difficult to keep order in her class’ (Interview with Miss Huang, Manila, 13/11/2013). An investigation on cross-cultural adaption of Teacher Volunteers to the Philippines from 2009 to 2012 indicates which factors are the major causes of problems in teaching (Wang, 2014). 58.33% of the teachers had problems in lack of teaching ability, 48.33% in maladaptation for the local education system, 45% in lack of educational resources, 43.33% in poor classroom order, 36.67% in lack of local knowledge, and 20.15% in language barriers (Wang, 2014: 25).

A member of the FFCCCII in charge of education affairs frankly commented on the teaching effectiveness of the ‘Teacher Volunteers Program’ as follows:
What is the outcome after the Teacher Volunteers come here? Everybody is clear in mind. You must know what does ‘chicken ribs’ (雞肋) mean. The program is like in vegetable state. Do you still want to maintain it? (observation, the FFCCCII, Manila, 10/10/2013)

The teaching effectiveness of the Substitute Military Service teachers is likewise limited. Taiwanese teachers share a feeling of frustration. In my class in St. Joseph High School, if I did not fiercely demand that students sit quietly and listen to me, they were often unwilling to pay attention, instead walking around and talking; on occasion these disturbances meant my classes could not proceed smoothly. In conjunction with students’ ‘learned helplessness’ 15, almost all my fellow Taiwanese teachers felt hopeless and frustrated while teaching Mandarin.

In general, the considerable investment in teacher supply by China and Taiwan cannot match limited learning effectiveness in the students. The expectation of both governments and the old-generation Chinese that a Mandarin native speaker could automatically provide the Philippine-Chinese students proper Mandarin teaching has proven overly optimistic. This is because they tend to deny the fact that teachers from China and Taiwan and the Philippine-Chinese students are different not only in terms of language usage, but also citizenship status and national identity. It is unlikely for a teacher, who comes from another country, knows not much students’ language, lack knowledge about local culture, and receives no training for teaching Philippine-Chinese students, to properly conduct Mandarin teaching in Chinese schools.

Finally, the pedagogy of teaching Mandarin as a national language has a devastating

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14 ‘Chicken ribs’ (ji-le) is a classic Chinese slang referring to something of dubious worth that one is reluctant to give up.

15 Learned helplessness is when people feel helpless to avoid negative situations because previous experience has shown them that they do not have control.
effect on teaching effectiveness. For a language to be a national language it must meet several conditions: a certain number of people using it as their mother tongue, institutional supports to ensure its official status, and a proper language environment in which to naturally acquire the ability to speak it. Mandarin in the Philippines does not meet these favourable conditions at all. Without these conditions in the local context, teaching Mandarin as a national language cannot work in the Philippine-Chinese schools.

The traditional approach to teaching does not allow students to talk without the teacher’s permission, hence it is unlikely for students to be able to practice speaking skills in class. It is feasible in Taiwan because Mandarin is the national language most commonly used within and without classrooms; while students therefore do not have to practice speaking skills in class, they acquire speaking ability anyway. However, if asked to be silent in class, students have no chance to speak Mandarin outside classroom at all. Hence, the adoption of the approach is at the expense of students’ practical communication skills. An officer of FFCCCII in his fifties referred to Chinese education in Chinese schools as ‘dumb Mandarin’ (Yaba Zhongwen) which requires students to remain silent (interview with Mr. Li, the FFCCCII, Manila, 26/7/2012). Unable to practice speaking in class, students can by no means acquire Mandarin speaking ability. The abovementioned survey conducted by Zhang and Lu (2009) corroborates these observations. In their survey, 63.4% of student respondents stated that they felt diffident about their Mandarin ability.\footnote{When asked the question ‘how would you rate your Chinese-language ability’? 27.9\% of the respondents answered ‘very bad’, 35.5\% answered ‘bad’, 22.3\% ‘so-so’, and 14.3 \ ‘good’ (Zhang Shifang and Lu Fei-bin, 2009).}
The poor level of Mandarin speaking might be due to the lack of motivation among students, partly because of the traditional approach of Mandarin learning which greatly relies on memorisation. When I asked some students at St. Joseph High School personally about the reason why they did not like to learn Mandarin, almost all of them cited distaste for the rote memorisation of texts.

When I taught in St. Joseph High School, students’ poor academic performance in Mandarin even needed to be covered up by a ‘floor price’ system under which the students were given forty points in a one hundred point exam even before they answered a single question, in case the marks looked too awful. The floor price system is, in fact, a common practice in a number of Chinese schools (Wang, 1997): This shows not only how reluctant students are to learn Mandarin and memorise for preparing exams, but also how reluctant Chinese schools are to face unpleasant truths about the decline of Chinese education.

Despite all the efforts of the Chinese and Taiwanese governments to revive Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese schools through Mandarin teaching, according to students’ academic performance in Mandarin learning as well as their real Mandarin ability, teaching has proven ineffective. The younger generations are able to learn neither Huaqiao identity nor Mandarin practical skills because of an outdated traditional pedagogy geared towards teaching Mandarin as a national language and because of the teacher and textbook supplies that correspond with this view.

3.7 Conclusion

The notion of ‘Huaqiao’ presumes an eternal centripetal force toward the fatherland.
Huaqiao education is expected to uninterruptedly bring the younger generations towards it. In Mandarin teaching in the Chinese schools, Huaqiao education is persevered with regardless of real citizenship status. Yet it is doubtful if Chinese students can really feel the sense of being Huaqiao.

It was the passion for the fatherland that gave rise to the whole Chinese school system in the Philippines. The keystone allowing Chinese schools to uninterruptedly conduct Huaqiao education is also the importing of educational aids from the fatherland. Therefore, it is the fatherland, rather than Philippine-Chinese themselves, that determines the content of education for students.

Notwithstanding, given that the Chinese ceased being Huaqiao after the 1970s, Huaqiao Chineseness now has the opposite effect on the effectiveness of Mandarin teaching. The strong attachment to the fatherland that motivated the Philippine-Chinese to learn Mandarin in the past, paradoxically, at present makes students resistant to it.

In and of itself, educational aid is constructive in terms of language learning. However, educational aid, with Huaqiao Chineseness, can distort the essence of language learning, that is, enabling learners to speak it. Textbooks contain some ‘fatherland-related’ contents entirely irrelevant to students’ life experience. Teachers from the ‘fatherland’ lack the experience and communication skills to teach ‘foreigners’. Teaching methods do not aspire to effectiveness, but rather continuity with teaching in the fatherland. In fact, all these teaching practices block students from learning practical Mandarin skills or generating an interest in Chinese culture.

All in all, the chapter answers the question of why Philippine-Chinese students are reluctant to learn Mandarin in an age reportedly experiencing ‘Mandarin fever’. The answer is that the current Huaqiao education as practised in the Chinese schools still
pursues the idea not only of one nation, one people, and one language, but also one pedagogy. Yet it is a mismatch to adopt the pedagogy of Huaqiao education for non-Huaqiao people. The next chapter discusses how a group of people have committed themselves to remedying the situation by proposing another version of Chineseness. Their efforts, however, have been still impeded by Huaqiao Chineseness.
4.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 may have given the impression that Huaqiao Chineseness dominates in Chinese schools; this is not the case. Despite substantial educational aids from China and Taiwan, as well as the old generation’s dedication, the foundation of Huaqiao Chineseness has been challenged by two sources. A significant amount of scholarship by those of Chinese overseas background casts doubt on the one single standard of Chineseness authorised by the Chinese nation-state. This standard, critics assert, negates the multiple life experiences of overseas Chinese people within the context of their respective countries of residence (Chun, 1995; Ang, 1998; Chow, 1998). But more importantly, the changing identity of the Philippine-Chinese younger generation makes Huaqiao Chineseness increasingly irrelevant. This chapter therefore addresses an alternative form of Chineseness in the Philippines: ‘Huaren Chineseness’.

In contrast to ‘Huaqiao’, which implies a close and enduring attachment to the fatherland, ‘Huaren’ as an identification simply refers to ‘foreign nationals of Chinese descent’. To become Huaren is to pursue a localised meaning of being Chinese without the outside interference of Chinese nationalism. It aims to seek a balance between being Chinese as an ethnic minority and being a citizen of one’s country of residence. In the context of the Philippines, Huaren Chineseness is represented by a new identification, ‘Chinese-Filipino’, ‘Feilubin Huaren’ (菲律賓華人) in Chinese, or, in Tagalog, ‘Tsinoy’, which is a portmanteau of ‘Tsino’ (meaning ‘Chinese’) and ‘Pinoy’ (the slang word for Filipino).

Below, I present a table to illustrate these two ideal types of Chineseness in
contradiction to each other.

<table>
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*Table 4 The Comparison between Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness*

Huaqiao Chineseness is Chinese in outlook, in that it used to focus on Huaqiao identity in accordance with Huaqiao citizenship. By contrast, Huaren Chineseness is Filipino in outlook, in that it has arisen in response to the younger generation’s rapid shift in identity (from being Huaqiao to being Chinese-Filipino) and in citizenship, from Chinese to Filipino citizenship. Significantly, despite differences in orientation between Chinese-centredness and Philippine-centredness, both versions of Chineseness regard Mandarin learning as the core of Chinese identity and as the common ground among Philippine-Chinese. Accordingly, Chinese education can also be classified into two types according to positioning, teaching objectives, and pedagogy. ‘Huaqiao education’
based on Huaqiao Chineseness adopts ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’ to make learners genuine Huaqiao. ‘Huaren education’ is tailor-made for the younger generation, whose (presumably poor) Chinese ability can only be recovered by means of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’. Each projection has its corresponding aims of teaching and specific teaching methods, representing differing understandings of how to shape future Chineseness for the younger generation.

How did Huaren Chineseness emerge in the Philippines? How does Huaren Chineseness affect the trajectory of the Chinese school system? How is Huaren Chineseness realised in Mandarin teaching? How do the administrators and teachers of the Chinese schools respond to the call for reform in accordance with Huaren Chineseness? How do Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness clash with one another, and how do these clashes affect the future of Chinese education in the Philippines?

In this chapter, I seek to answer these questions by focusing on the discussion of Huaren Chineseness and Huaren education. I argue that the debate over what teaching methods should be employed in Chinese schools in this context is not just a neutral, technical issue, but has been highly politicised and is relevant to the contradiction between Chinese and Filipino outlooks. First, I look into the context in which Huaren Chineseness emerged in the first place. Second, I show how Huaren Chineseness is embodied in the education reform of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’. Finally, I demonstrate the fierce resistance that the proposal for Huaren education has encountered from the old generation as well as both Chinese governments.

For clarifying the conception of Huaren Chineseness, I mainly interviewed some scholars, leaders of the Chinese community who support the idea of integration into the

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17 A person’s second language is a language that is not the native (first) language of the speaker.
mainstream, and elaborate their ideas to construct the discourse of Huaren Chineseness. The analysis of Huaren education focuses on the educational practices of the PCERC. I interview some educationalists from the PCERC and participate in their teaching activities to understand their practices. I also evaluate the outcome of these practices by interviewing the participants.

4.2 Huaren Chineseness and Huaren Education

The emergence of Huaren Chineseness is a result of the spontaneous development of the Chinese community alongside mass naturalisation. For one thing, as the Chinese have increasingly realised that the Philippines represents their only homeland (See, 1997), Huaqiao Chineseness that serves to direct their allegiance to China appears outdated and becomes an obstacle to integration into mainstream society. For another, Huaqiao education, embodied by teaching Mandarin as a national language, has reached a dead-end as Chinese education has been deteriorating. Huaren Chineseness is thus a proposal that some Philippine-Chinese take into account and consider as a solution to both issues, as I discuss in the following.

4.2.1 Emergence of Huaren Chineseness in Chinese Community

To facilitate the community-wide trend of integration, and to prevent Chinese education from deterioration, some Philippine-Chinese advocate transforming Chineseness from Huaqiao to Huaren. I therefore refer to the proposal to shift to a Filipino outlook while preserving an innovative, localised Chinese identity as the building of ‘Huaren Chineseness’.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the ambivalent citizenship status of the Chinese led to a proposal of integration by some Philippine-born Chinese. Using the case of the Yuyitung brothers, chapter 3 has already shown how the Chinese government was able to override the brothers’ own decision-making on the issue of citizenship. This same case presents some valuable insights in respect of the attempted building of Huaren Chineseness. Due to the uncertain situation whereby Filipino citizenship was inaccessible and Chinese citizenship from the ROC in Taiwan was unable to provide security, Rizal Yuyitung suggested as early as the late 1960s that Chinese in the Philippines transferring loyalty to the Philippines (Yuyitung, 1996; Yuyitung, 2000).

Growing up in the Philippines with a natural emotional attachment to the land, Rizal indicated that the Chinese could be a valuable asset to the Philippines, and should be involved in making contributions to the state. Integration would not only reduce friction between the Philippines, the ROC, and the PRC, but also allay the suspicion that Chinese were ‘the fifth column’ of the Chinese Communist Party (Yuyitung, 1996: 330). To serve the best interests of the Chinese, Rizal urged that their struggle towards equal citizenship extended to the Chinese via political integration (Hau, 2014: 93). Rather than assimilation through a passive and coerced process, integration for the Chinese, in Rizal’s viewpoint, would involve their active study of the Philippine language, culture, and history while retaining their own language and culture; integration would instil ‘new blood’ and ‘new cells’ into Philippine society leading to its constant cultural innovation (Yuyitung, 2000).

However, in the view of many of the old generation, integration presented a challenge to the foundation of Huaqiao Chineseness as a whole and its hegemony over the Chinese community and Chinese schools. Therefore, the proposal provoked fierce criticism. Rizal was sharply criticised for omitting his ancestors (Shudian wangzu) and
for being ‘a traitor to China’ (Hanjian) (Yuyitung, 1996: 330). The proposal for integration especially undermined the authority over the Chinese community of the ROC government in Taiwan. As previous chapters have shown, during the Cold War, the legitimacy of the ROC as the sole representative of China rested upon its ideological rule over overseas Chinese throughout the world. As Philippine-Chinese were the most committed and faithful supporters of the ROC among other overseas Chinese communities, the integration of the Chinese would mean a loosening of the ties with the ROC, and the alteration of the ROC’s version of Chineseness. As Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese schools and in the Chinese community as a whole developed mainly on the basis of the ROC version of Chineseness, in the eyes of the old generation, the changes of integration could shake the foundations of the whole community. Integration could be, therefore, a threat to the interests of the old generation and of the ROC government.

In addition to Rizal Yuyitung’s advocacy in the media, a civil society organisation, Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran (Unity for Progress), established in the mid-1980s by a group of middle-class, well-educated Philippine-Chinese of the second or third generation, was active in bridging the gap between the Philippine-Chinese and the mainstream, seeking, in doing so, to coexist with mutual understanding in the Philippines. Although they had possessed legal Filipino citizenship status since the 1970s, Philippine-Chinese were not fully accepted by the mainstream as part of their people. On the other hand, moreover, some Philippine-Chinese were reluctant to identify with the Philippines. Aware of this identity confusion (especially among the younger generation), Kaisa began to promote a new identity indicating a cultural middle-ground, ‘Chinese-Filipino’, which refers to ‘the young, mostly native-born ethnic Chinese who identify themselves as Filipinos first, but still maintain their Chinese cultural identity’ (Kaisa,
as cited in Hau, 2014). In Wickberg’s description, Kaisa was committed to the ‘revival of Chinese culture with full integration of Chinese into the larger society as Filipinos of Chinese heritage’ (Wickberg, 1992: 55). Its credo is as follows:

The Philippines is our country. It is the land of our birth, the home of our people. Our blood may be Chinese, but our roots grow deep in Philippine soil, our bonds are with the Filipino people. We are proud of the many cultures which have made us what we are, it is our desire, our hope and aspiration, that with the rest of our people, we shall find our rightful place in the Philippine sun (Kaisa).

Inspired by the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, Kaisa has actively participated in civil society activities, such as writing articles to produce discourses concerning Chinese-Filipino identity; conducting research on the China-Philippine relationship and the role of Chinese, and of policies surrounding it, in identity; building the Kaisa Heritage Center to document and display the historical and cultural legacy of the Chinese in all aspects of Philippine life; publishing periodicals to enhance mutual understanding between Chinese Filipinos and the mainstream; holding conferences on Chinese-related issues; organising charity events to show the generosity of Chinese Filipinos; and speaking out on behalf of the Chinese community to protect their rights.

All these practices aim not only towards the claiming of citizenship rights as Philippine citizens, but also towards shaping a Chinese-Filipino version of Chineseness.

Kaisa’s struggles in advocating integration have greatly enhanced the protection of Chinese citizenship rights. However, while Kaisa succeeded in cementing the relationship with the mainstream, it has failed to influence the conservative Chinese community leadership due to the latter’s disinterest in integration. Therefore, it has hardly had any impact on Chinese schools which are, on an institutional level, the most effective and influential producers and transmitters of Huaqiao Chineseness for the younger generation. When it comes to turning the old Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese schools into a new ‘Chinese-Filipino’ identity, one that is feasible and teachable in
Chinese school, it is unlikely that Kaisa will devise a practical scheme: most of its members are businessmen and professionals without a professional background in education or profound Chinese cultural knowledge. One of the founders of Kaisa, Teresita Ang See, suggests that ‘Hokkien Chinese’ – the lingua franca of the Philippine-Chinese community, brought from Fujian Province in South China – should replace Mandarin Chinese as the language taught in schools (Ang See, 1997: 100). Ang See and her colleagues in Kaisa even attempted to create a new Chineseness, based on Hokkien Chinese, by producing a weekly children’s television show called ‘Pin-Pin’ which used Tagalog to teach Hokkien Chinese. (Due to costs, however, the show had to go off-the-air.)

In absence of the support of the entire Chinese community, Kaisa’s efforts seem to have been ineffective. Kaisa’s greatest achievement seems to be the promotion of Chinese-Filipino identity. When I asked my students how they identify, presenting them with three options (Chinese, Filipino, or Chinese-Filipino), most of them chose ‘Chinese-Filipino’. Through the natural and spontaneous process of integration, the younger generation has gradually accepted the new identity. However, the ‘Chinese part’ of their Chinese-Filipino identity remains under the influence of Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese schools, resulting in the disparity between the educational content in Chinese schools and the students’ Chinese-Filipino identity outside of it.

4.2.2 Huaren Education and Teaching Mandarin as a Second Language

Huaren education has emerged as a reform movement with the goal of preventing the decline of Chinese education. Although it is a commonly held belief that the decline of Chinese education is a consequence of the Filipinization of Chinese schools, in fact even before the 1970s a number of Philippine-Chinese educationalists had noted the
gradual loss of Chinese-language ability among the younger generations (See, 1997). From 1949 on, during the period of interrupted contact between mainland China and the Philippine-Chinese, a lack of first-hand experience led the post-war generation to find Mandarin-learning increasingly irrelevant to the reality of their local environment (See, 1997: 99). From this point of view, maintaining younger generations’ Chinese-language ability seems unrealistic due to their tendency to integrate regardless of the enforcement of the Filipinization policy.

Huaren education has been seen by some educationalists as the right direction to take to rectify the misdirected efforts of Huaqiao education. The Philippine Chinese Education Research Center (PCERC) is an institute committed to producing a new teachable Chineseness to replace Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese schools. The PCERC is mainly staffed and sponsored by the teachers and administrators of Philippine Cultural College (PCC), which is seen as a left-leaning Chinese school, and is sponsored by its alumni. The close and special relationship between the PCREC and PCC creates the impression that the former is owned by the latter, yet the PCERC firmly denies this.

Concerned for the decline of Chinese education, a group of people who either taught in or graduated from PCC have, since the late 1980s, begun to seek a new pedagogy of Chinese education. Dissenting by nature from the ROC version of Chineseness in Chinese schools, they looked for an answer to another source of Chineseness, mainland China. After consulting a well-known expert of Chinese-language education, Bisong Lu (one of the founders of the International Society for Chinese Language Teaching in Beijing), they decided to initiate education reform in accordance with the model of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’ (TMSL). They established the PCERC in 1991, subsequently inviting Lu to the Philippines for three weeks to give nine speeches
about the theory and practice of teaching Mandarin as a second language.

Under Lu’s advice, the PCERC firstly gave priority to the repositioning of Chinese education. They divided the development of Chinese education in the Philippines into two stages. Before Filipinization, given the fact that the Chinese school was an extension of the education system of China, Huaqiao education had naturally adopted ‘teaching Mandarin as a first language’; after Filipinization, Huaren education might focus on language teaching by means of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’ (Huang, 2012; Shen, 2011). While Huaqiao education aims to foster Chinese citizens living abroad, Huaren education is committed to nurturing Philippine citizens with Chinese characteristics. Doubtless the PCERC considers Huaren education more suitable for Philippine-Chinese students as they have become Filipinos in terms of language ability, identity, and citizenship in general.

The proposal for Huaren education by means of TMSL poses enormous challenges not only to the teaching method, but also to the foundation of the existing Chinese education system. It calls for changes as follows.

First, it changes the aim of education in Chinese schools. As shown in chapter 3, the aim of Huaqiao education is entangled with nationalistic sentiment and cultural pride that are intended to instil in students a sense of Chinese nationality. Thus Huaqiao education stresses the inculcation of Chinese cultural knowledge and traditional values, taking Chinese education as a cultural and moral education (Shen, 2011: 41). By contrast, Huaren education sees Chinese education simply as a language education. It upholds a pragmatism that stresses the importance of communication skills. Presupposing that the younger generation are beginners of Mandarin at first, Huaren education aims at teaching basic language skills (Lu, 1992: 35). Lu (1992) also points out that Chinese education is to teach Chinese language: while cultural knowledge is
necessary for correctly understanding a language, the priority is still communication skills (Lu, 1992: 66). In other words, supporters of Huaren education aim to enable students to speak Mandarin, and this is believed to be the raison d’être of the Chinese schools.

Second, Huaren education rebelliously redefines the status of Mandarin as the second language – rather than the first or national language – of the Chinese community. As chapter 3 indicates, national language (that is, Mandarin) education played a central role in spreading overseas Chinese nationalism. Therefore, Mandarin, in the perspective of supporters of Huaqiao education, reaches a position of unchallengeable supremacy. Despite the fact that Mandarin is by no means the first or national language of the Chinese community in general, this move has received fierce criticism. Supporters of Huaqiao education refute the idea of Mandarin as the second language on the grounds that this implies it is ‘second-class’, and its supremacy is therefore challenged (Shen, 2011: 40); they also equate teaching Mandarin as a ‘second language’ with teaching Mandarin as a ‘foreign language’. Mandarin as a foreign language and teaching Philippine-Chinese students as if they are foreigners to China are, for sentimental reasons, entirely unacceptable. The members of the PCERC, however, take an educational and technical position on the second language, rather than a political one. Mandarin is a second language because most Philippine-Chinese youths learn it once their first language – Tagalog, English, or Hokkien Chinese – is established.

‘Second-language acquisition’ (SLA) refers to the process through which a person learns a second language. The process of SLA is very different from that of first-language acquisition (FLA) in terms of learning motivation, methods, environment, and process. FLA is a quintessential human instinct happening in a natural environment of native language when a person grows and develops his/her cognitive abilities (Lu, 2005:
17. FLA continues to elaborate on reading and writing skills after a person begins to receive schooling. Yet he/she does not have to learn the pronunciation, basic vocabulary, and basic grammar of his/her first language because he/she has comprehended its language structure (Lu, 2005: 19). In other words, FLA is a natural process stimulated by human instinct. By contrast, SLA demands a systematic and well-organised instructional design to motivate pupils and to create opportunities for communication in the classroom (Lu, 2005: 19). In the case of Philippine-Chinese, SLA is for the purpose of preserving Chinese culture for future generations.

Accordingly, TMSL designed by the PCERC adopts the principles of ‘listening and speaking is priority, reading and writing follow later’ (Tinshuo linxian duxie genshang) and ‘less lecture, more practices’ (Jinjiang duolian) in order to provide more opportunities to enhance students’ communication skills. It also employs multiple teaching methods other than lectures such as visual teaching, catechetical method, and situational language teaching, making the classroom a place for practising communications skills (Kotah, 2009; Wang, 2009). In a classroom where communication is encouraged, students would have higher learning motivation, spontaneously developing their communication skills.

Third, the PCERC carries out comprehensive planning for Mandarin teaching. Unlike FLA, through which a person acquires first-language ability regardless of whether or not there is any instructional design, teaching for SLA requires systematic planning (Lu, 2005: 38). Accordingly, the PCERC first conducted a series of studies not only on the nature of Chinese education in the Philippines, including teaching objectives and targets, but also in some local settings, such as the relationships between first language (Tagalog, English, or Hokkien) and target language (Mandarin) within the Philippine school system. Based on the results of the studies, the PCERC developed a whole new package
of pedagogy that met local needs and put them into practice, such as training teachers to familiarise them with the new pedagogy based on TMSL, completing ‘the Ten-year Syllabus of the Chinese Teaching in the Philippine Primary and High School’ to assure curriculum articulation, and editing ‘the Chinese Course Book for Filipinos’ (Feilubing Huayu Keben) in cooperation with the Beijing Culture and Language University. It is the first and most systematic teaching planning for Chinese education.

Fourth, Huaren education shifts from a teacher-centred to a student-centred approach. As discussed in chapter 3, the traditional approach of Mandarin teaching gives teachers supreme authority to discipline students and to operate teaching activities in a top-down manner; these are not conducive to the acquisition of communication skills. Bisong Lu (2005: 65) instead proposes a student-centred approach in Mandarin teaching. The design of teaching planning, materials, and methods should take the nature of students into account, including age, intellectual level, relations between first language and target language, learning target, and practical needs. In his article, ‘Advocating the Key Theme of Chinese Education Reform’ (Quanmian changxiang huawen jiaoyu de zhuxuanlu), another leader of the PCERC, Duanming Huang (2012: 77), also introduces the student-centred approach that confirms ‘teacher as director, student as major character’, facilitates classroom interaction, gives priority to the enhancement of language ability, encourages students’ initiative and creativity, accommodates students’ physical and mental growth, adds rich content and a liveliness to teaching materials, utilises advanced teaching methods, and improves the language learning environment.

While Huaqiao education confines itself to a package of the traditional approach, unified aim, and outdated methods of top-down Mandarin teaching, the proposal for Huaren education to a certain degree challenges the former’s traditional authority. From a local perspective, the PCERC’s pragmatic and student-centred approach towards
Mandarin teaching is likely to create a wider space to imagine an alternative of Chinese education tailor-made for the Philippine-Chinese community, diminishing the hegemony of Chinese essentialism in the form of Huaqiao education.

The outcome of the PCERC’s plan can be exemplified by the practice of PCC, which fully implements the reform of TMSL. PCC teaches directly in the target language (Mandarin) instead of other inter-languages such as Hokkien Chinese, Tagalog, and English. The vice-president of PCC proudly told me that over 80 or even 90 percent of their students would be able to talk in Mandarin if I were to speak to one at random (interview with Sining Marcos Kotah, Manila, 21/10/2013). Apparently no one at St. Joseph High School has the same confidence in their own students’ Mandarin ability.

Since 1994, PCC has evaluated the level of students’ language ability and the quality of teaching through the results of the HSK, the Chinese Proficiency Test for non-native Chinese learners, which is administrated by Hanban. Over 80 percent of sixth-grade elementary students have passed the Basic standard of the test since 1994 (Gan, 2009). In 2008, the pass rate of the fourth-grade high school students taking the Elementary/Intermediate test rose from 33 to 53 percent (Gan, 2009). Compared to those Chinese schools which only ask advanced students to take the test (in case the embarrassing truth comes to light), it shows remarkable progress.

Apart from PCC, however, there is a lack of consensus regarding the building of Huaren education. Although the PCERC has initiated the project of Huaren education, the pursuit of Huaren Chineseness through education reform is hardly a community-wide movement. In fact, the project has not widely spread beyond PCC and a few schools that cooperate with the PCERC. Huaqiao Chineseness, the dominant factor in Chinese schools, remains the major impediment to the promotion of Huaren education.
4.3 The Predicament of Huaren Education

Huqiao Chineseness, with its tendency towards a Sino-centrism that belittles local experiences, however, becomes the major obstacle to the building of Huaren Chineseness. There are three forms of Huqiao Chineseness that have an adverse impact on the growth and spread of Huaren education. The first comes from the old generation who stick to Huqiao education. The second is from the ROC government which is devoted to making its presence felt by exporting Huqiao education. The third is from the PRC government which also has its own agendas to pursue.

4.3.1 Clashes between Huqiao and Huaren Education in School

Huaren education reform is hampered by Huqiao Chineseness and Huqiao education, which are deeply rooted in Chinese schools and based on the ROC version of Chineseness. As reform aims to transform not only the usage of Zhuyin and traditional Chinese characters, but also the pedagogy of ‘teaching Mandarin as a national language’ as a whole, the proposal is refuted by those who are accustomed to Huqiao education. The ambivalent relationships between the PCERC and the PRC make those loyal to the ROC version of Huqiao Chineseness reluctant to accept the reform, too.

Moreover, the reform to turn Huqiao education into Huaren education directly threatens the Huqiao identity of some of the older generations. TMSL in the Philippines operates on the assumption that Mandarin is no longer the first and national language, but rather a foreign language for the Chinese. According to the assumption of Huaren education, the Philippine-Chinese are foreigners to China and no longer ‘overseas Chinese’. It not only questions the aim and the pedagogy of the current Chinese education, but also overthrows the identity of the old-generation Chinese as a
whole. From the viewpoint of those who have deeply rooted Huaqiao identity, the reform represents a fundamental change to the Huaqiao Chineseness that is familiar to them, including teaching Mandarin as the national language, Zhuyin, traditional Chinese characters, and everything they have been accustomed to for decades. Therefore, they would rather stick to old Huaqiao Chineseness to guard their Huaqiao identity. For example, an administrator of Chiang Kai-shek College answered me straightforwardly when asked how she felt about TMSL:

    I don’t like the idea of teaching Mandarin as a second language at all. We are not foreigners. Once the publisher of ‘Living Mandarin’ promoted the textbook here. I told him that the book is good, but it is more suitable for foreigners to learn Chinese. If you adopt teaching Mandarin as a second language, it is just a waste of time of our students. (Interview with an officer of the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools, the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools, Manila, 15/11/2013)

In St. Joseph High School is another example: when a young teacher was keen to promote TMSL based on her knowledge learnt from the Correspondence Course for Bachelor of Chinese Teaching, a senior and experienced teacher who had graduated from National Taiwan University in the 1970s vehemently objected. Given that, to an extent, the senior teacher’s professional authority came from her previous study experience in Taiwan, she considered the reform as a challenge not only to the ROC version of Chineseness, but also to her authority as a senior teacher. Her superior status among the faculty presented an obstruction to reform. She said, ‘There is no problem with my class at all. If you want to reform, do it in your own class. We don’t change’ (interview with Ms. Liao, Manila, 2/10/2013).

In defence of their Huaqiao identity, the old generation would rather preserve the ambiguous status quo, namely, that the students are factually Huaren but are taught as if they are Huaqiao. Therefore, the proposal of Huaren education is by no means a
necessary reform to them, but a threat to how they define what being Chinese means based on Huaqiao Chineseness.

4.3.2 Entanglement with the PRC version of Chineseness

The effect of the educational reform is counteracted by suspicion that the Chinese education of the PCERC merely follows the PRC version of Huaqiao Chineseness, rather than creates a new Huaren Chineseness. This is because the PCERC, the founder of Huaren education, maintains dubious relationships with the most influential provider of Huaqiao Chineseness, the PRC. Although it purports to create Huaren education exclusively for Chinese Filipinos and independently, through the Chinese community’s own efforts, the PCERC in fact receives a great deal of educational resources from the PRC to achieve this aim, as was shown in chapter 3. As a result, the PCERC is inevitably under the influence of the PRC version of Chineseness, which is exemplified in its use of Pinyin and simplified Chinese characters in its pedagogy.

The PCERC’s ‘Ten-year Syllabus of the Chinese Teaching in the Philippine Primary and High School’, for example, requires elementary-school students to master the Pinyin system (Shen, 2011: 58). The textbook that is based on this syllabus, and which the PCERC edits, ‘the Chinese Course Book for Filipinos’, also adopts Pinyin, rather than Zhuyin, to teach Mandarin pronunciation. Further, the textbook has simplified Chinese as well as traditional Chinese versions. Due to the fact that most Chinese schools are used to traditional Chinese characters, the latter is more popular than the former. Nevertheless, the PCERC’s publishing of the first simplified Chinese textbook can be seen as an act of promoting the PRC version of Chineseness in the Chinese community.
From the viewpoint of some educationalists, then, the pedagogy of, and educational reform led by, the PCERC is merely for the promotion of the PRC version of Chineseness, which is actually a new form of Huaqiao Chineseness provided by mainland China. As a result, the educational reform is widely seen as a transformation from the ROC to the PRC version of Chineseness, rather than as the building of Huaren Chineseness. The alleged link between the PCERC and the PRC inevitably affects Chinese schools’ willingness to follow educational reform, since adopting the pedagogy of the PCERC would be considered ‘pro-China’. For example, an administrator of Chiang Kai Shek College said: ‘the Philippine Cultural College is all following mainland China. Their textbook is PCERC’s, using simplified Chinese characters’ (interview with Ms Go, Manila, 8/10/2013). Using simplified Chinese characters, teaching Pinyin, being pro-China – these all can become general grounds for refusing the PCERC’s pedagogy.

It is inconsistent to assert that Huaren Chineseness and education are produced by, and exclusively for, the local Chinese, when they are still receiving aids from the PRC and complying with the PRC version of Chineseness. Hence, having become entangled in another form of Huaqiao Chineseness, the PCERC’s educational reform is recognised by the community only to a limited extent.

4.3.3 Crossfire between the Two Chinas' Huaqiao Chineseness

The involvement of the ROC and the PRC, the two governments that produce and provide Huaqiao Chineseness, also hinders the progress of building Huaren Chineseness. As a project, producing Huaren Chineseness represents the abolishing of the fatherland’s influence. It clearly acts against the geopolitical strategies of both
governments; certainly, neither country would be supportive of the project. To the contrary, their policies of overseas Chinese education tend to seek to undermine it.

In the early 1990s, the Chinese schools were in relative harmony with each other. Almost all Chinese schools, including not only the PCC but also the Chiang Kai-shek College (CKSC), attended Bisong Lu’s speech and were enthusiastic about TMSL. There was, then, an opportunity to develop Huaren education (interview with an administrator of the PCERC, Manila, 11/11/2013). However, the involvement of both governments soon complicated the situation.

The ROC government naturally considers the practices of the PCERC a threat to their control over the Chinese school system, as the reform led by the latter targets the ROC version of Chineseness. Also, as the PCERC tends to problematise Huaqiao education and seeks the answer to this problem from the PRC, the ROC has to react against this tendency and prevent Chinese schools deviating from the status quo, that is, their favouring of the ROC version of Chineseness.

The speeches of Bisong Lu received rave notices in 1991 and aroused enthusiasm for TMSL in Chinese schools. Lu suggested that there should be comprehensive planning and a syllabus for TMSL; the PCERC was established to take on this responsibility. Despite the lack of solid evidence, it was believed by some organisers of the PCERC that the aim behind the establishing of the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools (the ACFSP, detailed in chapter 3), with assistance from the OCAC in Taiwan, was to counterbalance PCERC influence and to prevent the latter from uniting Chinese schools under its control.

During several interviews with the PCERC and the ACFSP, I could tell that the tension between the two organisations had caused conflict and friction between Chinese schools.
The struggle between the ROC and PRC may have had an impact on this tension. Who instigated the tension remains unclear to me, but the timeline is as below.

After Bisong Lu’s speeches, the principal of PCC, Changcheng Yan, initiated the establishment of the PCERC in May 1991. Thereafter, Yan began to contact some Chinese education-related organisations of the PRC – Xiamen University, Beijing Language College, and the Office of Chinese Language Council International – to bring about educational reform. At that time, the PCERC was seen as a PCC-affiliated association for educational research. At the beginning of 1993, seven of the largest Chinese schools in Manila, including PCC and CKSC, went on school visits to Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The Chinese schools of these four countries proposed the forming of a league of Chinese schools in Southeast Asia; this prompted Philippine-Chinese schools to establish an association on behalf of the Chinese schools in the Philippines. In the same year, therefore, the principal of CKSC, Janyin Shou, proposed the establishment of the ACSFP. The ACSFP was established with the assistance of the OCAC of the ROC. In October 1993, Yan held a conference on Chinese education, inviting all Chinese schools to discuss educational reform. From the viewpoint of Shou and that of his colleagues in the ACSFP, it was disrespectful that Yan himself, an executive director of the ACSFP, held the conference on Chinese education without informing other members of the ACSFP. Shou thus held a meeting with members of the ACSFP on this issue, including most big schools in Manila, and made a decision to opt out of the PCERC’s conference. In turn, the decision upset Yan since only a few schools from provinces attended the conference. The ACSFP condemned the PCERC for underhand tactics. Because of the PCERC’s associations with some institutes in mainland China, its efforts to organise the conference perhaps aroused suspicion that PRC authorities were involved. In the same vein, the PCERC
believed that the ACSFP’s ‘boycott’ was incited by ROC authorities. The two associations were thus seriously divided from this point on.

Excluded by many member schools of the ACSFP, the PCERC and the pedagogy it developed have been labelled unorthodox and dissenterious. The PCERC’s influence is thus limited to a few small schools. Nevertheless, ROC authorities continue to provide Chinese schools with a series of educational aids to counterbalance the PCERC’s influence, such as textbooks, teacher supplies, and teacher training programs, which are still popular among Chinese schools. While only member schools of the ACSFP can enjoy all these educational aids from Taiwan, the ACSFP has become the most influential Chinese-school association in the Philippines, having far more member schools than the PCERC. To a certain extent the efforts of the ROC authorities to foster the ACSFP therefore inhibit the PCERC from extending its influence. In other words, the development of Huaren Chineseness is impeded by the effective deploying of the ROC version of Huaqiao Chineseness.

On the other hand, the equivocal relationships between PRC authorities and the PCERC have also had a subtle, negative impact on the latter’s development. In the beginning, the PCERC had its own vision for future development and, from the 1990s on, merely cooperated with some educational institutes for Chinese education, like Xiamen University, Beijing Language College, and the Office of Chinese Language Council International.

From the 2000s on, China has been gradually unfolding its global strategy for reaching out to overseas Chinese, as well as potential Mandarin learners throughout the world, mainly through the Hanban and Guoqiaoban. The PCERC’s pursuit of the reform of building Huaren Chineseness, to a large extent, hinges on the resources provided by the PRC, such as supplies of teachers and advisers. Accordingly, the PCERC’s cooperation
with PRC authorities is inevitably subject to the latter’s grand strategy. While the PRC’s policy focuses on the promotion of the PRC version of Chineseness, rather than on the development of Huaren Chineseness, a tension could nevertheless exist between the PCERC and the PRC authorities.

The tension between the PRC and the PCERC – as well as between Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness – appears in some aspects of teaching practice. That both the Hanban and Guoqiaoban have respective official packages of knowledge to connect all overseas Chinese throughout the world contradicts the PCERC’s proposal to develop a tailor-made pedagogy exclusively for the Philippine-Chinese. The PCERC considers the textbooks provided by the Hanban and Guoqiaoban unfit for the language ability, education system, and local environment of the Chinese schools in the Philippines. For example, the two versions of textbooks that Guoqiaoban promotes in the Philippines, ‘Hanyu’ and ‘Zhongwen’, are edited for the students of new Chinese migrants residing in Japan and Western countries respectively, and are too difficult for Philippine-Chinese students. Some of the books’ contents, referring to things not seen in the Philippines (such as jumpers and snow), might confuse Philippine-Chinese students; these are not even taught in the PCC’s class (interview with an administrator of the Philippine Culture College, Manila, 21/10/2013). The Hanban’s textbooks such as ‘Contemporary Chinese’ (Dangdai Zhongwen) consist of only four books that are not suitable for ten years of Chinese learning in Chinese schools. Some schools use the textbooks provided free of charge by the Hanban and Guoqiaoban because they want to form relationships with them to gain more support. However, these schools cannot really put reform into practice without absorbing the TMSL practices that the PCERC proposes, thus achieving limited improvement of their Chinese teaching. From the viewpoint of the PCERC, the PRC approach to Chinese education in the Philippines is fundamentally
misguided.

Furthermore, the teaching adviser program by Guoqiaoban and the volunteer teacher program by Hanban are to a large extent subject to the PRC’s international political agenda and in some respects at odds with the PCERC’s education reform project. Some of the teaching advisers provided by Guoqiaoban, who are in fact high school teachers in China without TMSL background, are unlikely to follow the PCERC’s pedagogy. Also, the volunteer teachers do not receive PCERC training, and therefore would not practice new pedagogy.

On the one hand, the PCERC needs the educational aids from the PRC to undertake its ambitious and costly reform project. On the other hand, while approving parts of the PCERC’s plan for educational reform, the PRC still has its own agenda to pursue and might not entirely comply with the PCERC’s ideas. To a degree, the PCERC is in an awkward position in that it is labelled ‘pro-China’ while not enjoying full support from the PRC. All these complicities present difficulties to reform.

4.3.4 Lack of Support from the Community

When the community and the schools are generally controlled by those who have Huaqiao identity, and are therefore under the overwhelming influence of the two versions of Huaqiao Chineseness, the project of building Huaren Chineseness can hardly expect to receive support. The focus of the debate on Chinese education is usually on accepting Huaqiao Chineseness from either China or Taiwan, rather than on building Huaren Chineseness in the Philippines. When major Chinese associations, such as the Philippine Jinjiang General Association and the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, intend to fund Chinese education, they
do not necessarily fund the PCERC’s project to build Huaren Chineseness; rather, they tend to cooperate with PRC authorities producing Huaqiao Chineseness. For example, Lucio Tan, a Chinese-Filipino billionaire businessman who is enthusiastic in promoting Chinese education, chooses not to directly fund the PCERC despite his close relationship with the latter. Tan has commissioned the PCERC to organise educational events and provides venues for the PCERC, but has never given a dollar to its project class (interview with an administrator of the PCERC, Manila, 11/11/2013). Instead, Tan tends to fund educational activities based on the PRC version of Huaqiao Chineseness: since 2001, he has paid for thousands of students and teachers to participate in summer study tours in China. As a result, while Huaqiao education still casts a large shadow over teachers and students, Huaren education remains rudimentary.

4.4 Conclusion

Caught by the two governments’ versions of Huaqiao Chineseness, the building of Huaren Chineseness and Huaren education has made little progress. A senior teacher and administrator of the PCERC, who has been dedicated to the education reform for two decades, bemoaned the little that has been achievement despite ongoing commitment:

There are political disturbances, partisan disturbances, and the clashes between old and new ideas. They are all obstructions. In my opinion, for education my idea is, we are alive, and we still have the affinity for Chinese culture. We believe it can make contribution to the world civilisation, so if we do not do it, nobody would. We just do as much as we can. Maybe there will be successors to keep going after we made the first move. If not so, to be honest, there is not much improvement and achievement of what we have done for twenty years (interview with an administrator of the PCERC, Manila, 11/11/2013).
All in all, the entangled complexity of Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness leads to confusion about the meaning of being Chinese in the Philippines. Deeply implicated in Chinese politics, a pedagogy of Mandarin teaching based on genuine Huaren Chineseness is unlikely to come about; in turn, the natural growth of a new meaning of what it is Chinese in the Philippines is impeded. As the younger generation has gradually integrated into Philippine society and as Chinese schools still struggle to clarify their raison d’être, in the foreseeable future Chinese education in the Philippines will continue to decline due to its entanglement with Huaqiao Chineseness.

As was discussed in the last chapter, Huaqiao Chineseness and Huaqiao education have proven detrimental to the effectiveness of Mandarin teaching. The current era favours Huaren Chineseness and Huaren education, but those who support Huaqiao education, however, deny the fact that Huaqiao Chineseness is outdated. Thus they continue to allocate all resources to Huaqiao education, while resisting, if not directly combating, Huaren education.
Chapter 5

Communal Chineseness for Integration into Domestic Philippine Society

5.1 Introduction

In contrast to ‘assimilation’, which implies a minority group giving up its cultural traits, integration means that an immigrant can absorb the major cultural elements of a mainstream society while preserving his or her minority ethnicity (Joppke and Morawska, 2003). Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) indicate that there can be different spheres of integration whereby an immigrant may be well integrated into one sphere but not equally integrated into another. For example, a person of immigrant background can receive education and pursue a career in the mainstream while developing a social network mainly within his or her own community. From this perspective, integration has occurred among Philippine-Chinese, especially among the younger, local-born generation (See, 1997), who might identify themselves as Filipino while preserving Chineseness. Although the younger generation are increasingly aware of their Filipino citizenship, live very ‘Filipino’ lives, speak fluent Tagalog, attend Philippine universities, and pursue their careers in Philippine society, they remain Chinese by taking part in Chinese schools as ethnic institutions within the Chinese community.

As previous chapters have shown, however, Philippine-Chinese are divided as to what ‘being Chinese’ and Chineseness mean. In some Chinese-oriented people’s view, for example, integration is no different from assimilation in that they perceive the younger generation’s inability to speak Mandarin as a feature indicating the loss of Chineseness. For those who are in favour of Chinese-Filipino identity, integration is inevitable and the main concern should be how to revitalise Chinese education by means of teaching
Mandarin as a second language (See, 1997).

On the one hand, Huaqiao education contradicts the Chinese-Filipino identity of the younger generation. On the other hand, Huaren education is yet to be accepted by, or to exercise influence over, the whole Chinese school system. The Chineseness that both Chinese governments and the old generation intend to build appears increasingly irrelevant to students’ surrounding environment. But is the whole Chinese school system in the Philippines as irrelevant to each aspect of the students’ lives as Mandarin teaching? What kinds of Chineseness are Chinese schools producing, in addition to Mandarin teaching by means of either Huaqiao or Huaren education? Which version of Chineseness most influences Philippine-Chinese people’s everyday life and career development in Philippine society? And what role do Chinese schools play in promoting social mobility and social reproduction?

This chapter aims to discover the kinds of Chineseness, apart from Mandarin teaching, that Chinese schools provide. It also looks into the Chineseness which is functional in domestic Filipino society. Opposing the commonly held view among some Filipinos that the Philippine-Chinese are unassimilable due to the existence of the Chinese school system (see Batnag, 1964; Sussman, 1976), I argue that Chinese schools have transformed so that their institutional role in fact fosters integration into the Philippine mainstream, and does so with the support of the whole Chinese community, particularly after the processes of Filipinization for all Chinese schools and naturalisation for the Chinese in the 1970s.

I advance that the decline of Mandarin learning in Chinese schools has been overemphasised, while, by contrast, the schools’ function in preparing the younger generation for integration is a raison d’être that has been relatively underemphasised. I
propose the possibility that Chinese schools are producing their alternative version of Chineseness not only to bypass the Chinese national outlook, but also to help the younger generation adapt to Filipino society. The Chineseness produced, disseminated, and practised in Chinese schools is initiated and generated neither by the Chinese nor the Philippine governments, but by the Chinese community in the Philippines. I highlight the role that the Chinese school system plays in bridging the gap between life in the Chinese community and in larger Philippine society. In turn, the achievements of Chinese school graduates in terms of their career development within Philippine society can also benefit the Chinese community’s prosperity.

Therefore, I refer to the distinct ethnicity produced in Chinese schools as ‘communal Chineseness for integration’. It is a version of Chineseness that makes the students not only genuine Chinese (from the perspective of the local Chinese community), but also full Filipino citizens with certain advantages that follow from integration into Philippine society. In other words, the Chinese schools have transformed into Filipino ones to help Chinese students adapt to their Filipino citizenship.

In this chapter, I first discuss how Chinese schools nurture Chinese students’ sense of Filipino national identity to lay the foundations for integration. Second, I show how Chinese schools have facilitated integration into upper-middle class Philippine society through community-based resources that do three things: shape ‘Chinese-school identity’, upholding ‘symbolic Chineseness’ to distinguish students from the lower class Philippine majority; offer students access to the ethnic networks of the Chinese community to generate ‘selective acculturation’; provide education that not only complies with the national curriculum of the Philippines but also maintains high-quality teaching to facilitate class reproduction through education.
After Filipinization, the Chinese school system became an integral part of the Philippine education system. Access to Philippine citizenship meant that a wide variety of trades, occupations, and professions, which were exclusively the preserve of Filipino citizens, were now opened to the Chinese. With the lifting of such institutional restraints on integration, ‘structural assimilation’ – a concept of Milton Gordon’s (1964) referring to the outcome when the minority has been integrated into the social customs, institutions, and social groups of the host society – thus began to happen. With the Philippine-Chinese having greater educational and career opportunities, it became possible for Chinese schools to really nurture the next generation of Filipino citizens.

As I show below, the Chinese school system is able to play an active role in facilitating, rather than restricting, the younger generation’s integration into Philippine society. Filipinization does not necessarily cause a further decline in the students’ ability to speak Mandarin, but it greatly promotes the conception of Philippine citizenship among the young generation, something which proves beneficial to the development of the Philippine-Chinese community.

The data for the discussion of this chapter based on my observation during the one-year teaching experiences in which I found the high degree of the Chinese students’ intimacy with ethnic Filipinos in Chinese schools and of their integration into the mainstream.

5.2 Filipinization and Banal Nationalism at School Level

As mentioned in chapter 2, following the Filipinization policy of the 1970s, Chinese schools have, in a legal sense, become nationalised. Even with this enforcement, however, Chinese students would not have automatically become Filipino or integrated
into the Philippine nation without the complement of everyday practices at school level. In fact, it is through immersion into a series of practices of Filipino nationalism in ordinary life (including inside Chinese schools) that all the Philippine-Chinese have been turned from ROC citizens into Philippine citizens. Chinese students are turned into Philippine citizens.

Michael Billig (1995) emphasises the impact of daily routine on the formation of national identity, referring to it as ‘banal nationalism’. In contrast to the commonly-held view that the practice of nationalism can only be discovered in extremist expressions like extreme nationalism, independence movements, and xenophobia, Billig focuses on the everyday representations of a nation. He suggests that symbols, habits, and other things that people take for granted in daily life can actually reproduce a sense of nation.

Below, I offer a complete picture of how Chinese schools nurture students’ Filipino national identity through everyday practices. Beyond institutional factors like the Filipinization policy and Filipino citizenship, ‘banal nationalism’ at school level can make students increasingly ‘Filipino’ and facilitate the process of full integration into Philippine society. Integration thus can truly happen on the premise of the younger generation’s solid Filipino national identity.

5.2.1 Ritual Display

When I taught in St. Joseph High School and lived in the dormitory on campus, I was usually woken up by the national anthem of the Philippines, Lupang Hinirang. The students and I both began the day with the flag ceremony; it was the first thing students
did in school. Following that, all students recited the patriotic oath (Panatang Makabayan) concerning the love and duty for their beloved motherland and the Pledge of Allegiance to the Philippine Flag. They looked not particularly passionate, but none of them forwent the ritual: it was just part of their everyday life. Ethnic Filipino pupils in other Philippine schools begin their school day similarly, so, of course Philippine-Chinese pupils, as co-nationals, are no exception.

To many Philippine-Chinese people, the Philippines is their sole motherland. When a sample of people – students, civic organisations, and alumni and parents ranging from 17 to 60 years old – was asked in the 1995 Identity Survey ‘what country do you call your home?’, 97.3% (496) of the 510 respondents answered ‘the Philippines’ (Ang See, 1995). Another survey of 2,021 Philippine-Chinese students’ identity (Zhang and Lu, 2009) suggests that 97.3% of them have a very clear sense of their Filipino citizenship; only 2.7% answered that they were Chinese citizens. When asked ‘do you feel obligated to serve the Philippines in the future?’, the majority of these same students (61.6%) answered ‘yes’, only 14.6% said ‘no’, and 23.8% answered ‘it doesn’t matter’ (Zhang and Lu 2009). Since 1975, the Filipinization of Chinese schools prescribed that only the Philippine flag can be flown in schools (See, 1997: 48). The Philippine flag hung high and at the most noticeable place of St. Joseph High School, reminding everyone (including me) that this school had become a Filipino school and that the students were Filipino.

Although I thought the students did not care about repetitive ritual displays, I was proven wrong. During a flag-lowering ceremony that Chinese teachers need attend only once a month, I let my arms hang naturally and stared indifferently as the Philippine flag was lowered, accompanied by the national anthem. A girl in my class discontentedly asked me to salute the flag and said, ‘you should do like this to show
your respect’. She then showed me how to salute by repeatedly placing her right hand over her heart. It seems that I had unintentionally completed a ‘breaching experiment’ revealing the social rule that a patriotic Filipino should not only respect the national flag, but also have the duty to remind those who do not.

5.2.2 National Curriculum

While the Chinese curriculum’s function in shaping Chinese identity is widely emphasised, the role of the national curriculum that is prescribed by the Philippine Department of Education in significantly producing the national identity of the Philippines tends to be ignored.

The 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions of the Philippines all advocate that schools should aim to develop civic conscience and teach duties of citizenship, love of country, patriotism, and nationalism (Almonte-Acosta, 2012). Chinese schools are by no means an exception. According to the Reconstructed Basic Education Curriculum (RBEC) initiated in 2002, students of Chinese schools are required to systematically acquire the value of patriotism through the new subject of ‘Makabayan’ (patriotism). From elementary to secondary school level, all students must take Araling Panlipunan (Social Studies) and Edukasyon Pagpapahalaga (Values Education), patriotic-relevant subjects which are components of Makabayan. Further, to build a common language among Filipino nationals, the national language of the Philippines, Tagalog, is a required subject for all Filipino students from elementary to high school.

The national curriculum, consisting of the idea of Filipino citizenship, patriotic values, common national language, and knowledge of Philippine society, can help students of
Chinese descent forge a shared sense of belonging to the Philippine nation and shape Filipino national identity.

5.2.3 The Use of National Language

The most commonly heard language in the St. Joseph High School is neither Chinese (Mandarin or Hokkien) nor English, but Tagalog. While working in the school office, I could immediately feel that I, as a native Mandarin-speaker without any Tagalog language ability, was completely an outsider. All staff there, whether they are ethnic Chinese or Filipinos, communicated, chatted, and joked with each other in Tagalog. In the so-called Chinese school, Tagalog is apparently the lingua franca which almost everyone feels comfortable speaking.

This is even more apparent among students, who speak Tagalog in the rough and tumble both inside and outside of the classrooms. If they wanted to tease a foreign teacher like me and say something to each together without me knowing what was being said, Tagalog is the most effective tool. Thus language use in school constantly reminded both the students and me of two things: that we come from, and belong to, two entirely different nations, and the salient fact that it is actually a Filipino school.

Ironically, Tagalog, the language students use most commonly when playing and having fun, is the language they learn the most effectively in Chinese schools.18 Although the majority of students of the Chinese schools are native Tagalog speakers, a few students (either conservative Chinese who are not fond of speaking Tagalog or new migrants

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18 A survey conducted in 2009 suggested Tagalog (54.1%), over Hokkien (25.3%), English (18.1%), and Mandarin (1.6%), was Chinese students’ most-used language while communicating with family and friends. See Zhang & Lu (2009).
from other overseas Chinese communities) were not confident speakers of the national language at the beginning of their education. However, they were able to acquire Tagalog later on in school.

Russel Co was a quiet, gentle, and hardworking boy in my class. Among his classmates, he was not the most sociable, though he was able to speak Tagalog well. After interviewing his mother, I learned that Russel basically did not speak Tagalog at home: Russel spoke Hokkien and English to his parents, and just English to the ethnic-Filipino helper at home (interview with Mrs. Co, Manila, 2/10/2013). At the start of his studies in St. Joseph High School, Russel did not know how to talk to classmates without Tagalog ability. However, he started to speak Tagalog comfortably in the third grade of elementary school after years of everyday conversations with classmates.

Another case is Shuya who was born in mainland China and then brought to Manila by her parents when she was three years old. She can speak perfect Mandarin and Hokkien because they are the languages used at home. Shuya can speak Tagalog, too. When asked ‘is her [Shuya’s] Tagalog any different from yours?’, a student responded that while her Tagalog is occasionally ungrammatical, this does not affect communication (personal communication, Manila, 2/7/2011). When I asked Shuya how she could speak Tagalog, she simply answered, ‘just frequent conversation with my friends’ (personal communication, Manila, 2/7/2011). As she communicated with most of her friends in school, obviously her Tagalog was learnt there.

Chinese schools to a degree have turned themselves into staunchly Filipino environments in which students can practise their Tagalog language skills. As language is the primary symbol of a nation, fully grasping the language represents a sense of ‘being part of the nation’.
5.2.4 Interethnic Intimacy in School

Chinese schools may be the first place in which Philippine-Chinese youths have close and extensive contact with ethnic Filipinos other than helpers at home. Harmonious interpersonal relationships based on education can spontaneously bypass ethnic and class boundaries. St. Joseph, for example, is staffed with a number of ethnic Filipinos from various social backgrounds, such as classmates\textsuperscript{19}, teachers, administrators, sport team coaches, librarians, janitors, guards, and cleaners. As a result of having worked for a Chinese school for years, these fellow Filipinos have common characteristics: they know how to get along well with Chinese students, feel familiar with the Philippine-Chinese way of thinking and of doing things, and tend to interact with them with goodwill. Closer social distance between the ethnic Chinese and Filipinos can help forge a sense of belonging to one nation based on mutual understanding and can reduce ethnic barriers.

I could readily sense a close interethnic intimacy between students and staff in St. Joseph. Students often joked in Tagalog with Filipino teachers, coaches, janitors, and guards, laughing loudly. As I observed, students were even closer to Filipino teachers than to Chinese ones, even though it is a Chinese school. This is not just because students pay more attention to English subjects (which are normally taught by Filipino teachers), but also because Filipino teachers tend to be younger, funnier, more approachable, and more knowledgeable about Filipino things – and, of course, they

\textsuperscript{19} Typically only a few Filipino parents send their children to Chinese schools due to the heavy burden of learning a new language. However, being aware of the growing importance of the Chinese language, an increasing number of Filipinos want their children to study it in Chinese schools.
speak better Tagalog.

In a sense, Chinese schools generate a simulation of wider Philippine society, one that is free from external discrimination: in school, Chinese students can practise Filipino ways of socialisation and thereby increase their adaptability to the mainstream. As their experience of interaction with Filipinos is generally positive, they tend to feel less psychological pressure when encountering larger society. Automatically expecting a harmonious interethnic relationship, they eventually becoming an integral part of the Filipino nation.

Hence, all these everyday practices of Filipino nationalism in Chinese schools help to shape a sense of national identity and reproduce next generations of Filipino nationals. It is evident that the schools established by the Chinese community are no longer Chinese national schools, but Filipino ones. In other words, the Chinese school system based on community-based resources in fact provides Chinese students a ground for building Filipino national identity.

5.3 Chinese Schools for Integration

Under the influence of Filipinization, Chinese schools function as institutions of integration in the following three aspects.

5.3.1 Symbolic Chineseness

Given that integration is a state of identifying with the mainstream in general, and preserving a certain kind of ethnicity in particular, I want to firstly indicate how
Philippine-Chinese maintain their ethnic/communal identity via Chinese schools in a symbolic way. Regardless of Filipinization, Chinese schools are still pivotal to the production of Chineseness for the Chinese community. This Chineseness, however, serves as a symbol rather than an economic utility.

Gans (1979) refers to the expressive use of ethnicity among temporary American ethnics as ‘symbolic ethnicity’, describing how the young generation can maintain their ethnic identity on the basis of newly-interpreted cultural traditions without this really interfering with their everyday life. If we apply Gans’ analysis to Chinese schools in the Philippine, three characteristics of symbolic ethnicity can be drawn to illustrate the features of Chineseness in Chinese schools.

First, symbolic ethnicity needs to be easily expressed and highly visible to the extent that both insiders and outsiders can clearly identify what kind of ethnic identity the symbol aims to represent. Symbols or ‘ethnic goods’ can be foods, written materials, holidays, and rituals, etc.

Second, the expression of symbolic ethnicity should be at low cost. In fact, symbolic ethnicity happens when the younger generation has realised upward mobility. It is their roles and positions in the upper-middle classes of the local and national hierarchical social structure that make them feel secure expressing their ethnic identity. Thus its practice cannot be at the expense of the current life that they are satisfied with.

Third, the outcome of the practice of symbolic ethnicity depends on the ethnic relations between the ethnic group and the mainstream. It is viable only when the mainstream society has a positive impression at best or a neutral impression at the very least. If so, sometimes it can be beneficial for the members of the ethnic group to distinguish themselves from the mainstream.
In light of these three characteristics, I discuss what sorts of ‘symbolic Chineseness’ Chinese schools produce and how they function, as follows. First of all, attending Chinese schools itself is the most common and crucial practice of symbolic Chineseness. Of course, attending Chinese schools has instrumental functions, but the symbolic functions of this are less touched on. Remarkably, the Philippine-Chinese community’s commitment to Chinese education is based on the belief that Chinese school can reproduce the next generation of Philippine-Chinese, thereby assuring the persistence of the community. Sending their children to Chinese schools thus signals parents’ endorsement of the belief and support for the Chinese identity shared by the whole community. Therefore, despite the ineffectiveness of Mandarin teaching, according to the survey by Zhang and Lu (2009), 89.6% of Chinese school students responded that they were still willing to send their children to learn Mandarin in Chinese schools, while only 10.4% were not. This result corroborates the study conducted by Tilman in 1974. Tilman points out a mentality among Philippine-Chinese that ‘it is the right of the child to resist Chinese education, but it is the duty of the parents to demand it’ (Tilman, 1974: 46). Accordingly, although Chinese students complain about Mandarin learning when they are in school, they still expect next generations to enrol in Chinese schools with few exceptions.

To a degree, a kind of informal membership of the Philippine-Chinese community can be exclusively obtained for those who are enrolled in Chinese schools. There is a Hokkien word, Lán-lâng, which literally means ‘our own people’, and is commonly used by the Philippine-Chinese to refer to themselves. Who are Lán-lâng? Lán-lâng simply are those who have attended Chinese schools. When defining the scope of his study on Philippine-Chinese, Chu (2010: 4) takes ‘attend[ing] one of the several “Chinese schools in the Philippines”’ as one of the indicators of being Lán-lâng. Tilman
(1974) also indicates that, however burdensome they felt when studying in Chinese schools, the Chinese will nevertheless tend to send their children to Chinese school because it is the most important instrument to perpetuate Chinese identity.

It is noteworthy that the definition of Lán-lâng excludes Chinese ‘mestizos’ who have Chinese blood, have been assimilated into the mainstream prior to the emergence of Chinese nationalism in the late 19th century, and are unlikely to attend Chinese schools. It also excludes ‘new migrants’ from mainland China since the 1980s who did not attend Chinese schools and whose Chineseness is based on the PRC version of Chineseness\textsuperscript{20}. In other words, Lán-lâng is a local, ‘Chinese-Filipino’ identification that can be recognisable by the symbol of attending Chinese schools.

Moreover, attending Chinese schools is the easiest and least costly way of being Lán-lâng, and the most effective way of demonstrating symbolic Chineseness. Although attending Chinese schools takes time (up to 14 years from kindergarten to high school) and higher tuition fees, it guarantees students’ symbolic Chineseness, and with it, the life-long membership of being Lán-lâng and local Chinese. With the studentship of Chinese schools, the students are even not required to speak good Mandarin to be Lán-lâng.

To a certain degree, students’ enrolment in Chinese schools is merely for symbolic Chineseness. Although Chinese education is in decline, when I asked the head of a sectarian Chinese school, which planned to reduce the hours of Chinese curriculum and

\textsuperscript{20} Recently more and more ‘new migrants’ from China have settled in the Philippines and sent their children to Chinese schools. However, as far as I know Philippine-Chinese of this generation rarely refer to themselves as Lán-lâng. It is unclear whether this next generation of new migrants will be included into Lán-lâng if they integrate into the mainstream, as well as the Chinese community, by attending Chinese schools.
put more emphasis on English ones, about whether they had thought about closing the Chinese department, he simply answered, ‘no, if we do so, there will be no students to come’ (interview with Mr. Huang in St. Peter High School, 16/11/2013). The Chinese curriculum, regardless of its effectiveness, is still the most important resource of symbolic Chineseness for the Philippine-Chinese. Abandoning the Chinese curriculum means the absence of symbolic Chineseness, no differentiation with other private Filipinos schools, and thus the undermining of students’ and parents’ incentive to attend the schools.

In the view of Philippine-Chinese, graduation from Chinese schools means similar school experiences and shared values based on Chineseness. United by the shared experience of having attended Chinese schools, the Federation of Filipino Chinese Alumni Associations was established to unify all alumni associations of Chinese schools and to promote a sense of community and ethnic solidarity. It has even opened a branch in North America (joined by 24 alumni associations of Chinese schools) to gather the Philippine-Chinese residing there together. Hence, a distinct community-based ‘Chinese-school identity’ has been commonly formed among Philippine-Chinese.

Further, the symbolic function of attending Chinese schools is exceptionally visible not only to Philippine-Chinese, but also to other Filipinos. Mainstream Philippine society can also identify the Philippine-Chinese by the fact of their attending Chinese schools. Despite Filipinization, the association between Chinese schools and the Philippine-Chinese is widely known by ethnic Filipinos: whether the Chinese symbols in their names have been removed or not, these ‘former’ Chinese schools are undoubtedly ‘Chinese’ schools still. Many Chinese schools are quite well-known not only for their distinct Chinese background but for their good reputations. It therefore presents no difficulty that graduates of Chinese schools will be automatically identified as Chinese
via their curriculum vitae when applying for university or a job. In addition to Chinese surnames and facial features, the Chinese-school diploma is, to the mainstream, the most visible symbol of being Chinese.

To outsiders, the visibility of symbolic Chineseness is sometimes beneficial and can lead to ‘positive discrimination’, through which Philippine-Chinese can achieve a distinct advantage. Upon being identified as ethnic Chinese by ethnic Filipinos, some commonly-held stereotypes may appear, such as being ‘business-minded, good in mathematics, rich, industrious, thrifty, dynamic, and persevering’ (See, 1990: 26). Nevertheless, in a capitalist society like the Philippines, these qualities are not necessarily negative, and in a sense account for the upper-middle class status of the Philippine-Chinese. When I asked Chinese-school graduates who had just started their careers whether their Chinese background was an advantage or a disadvantage, one of them (a graduate from Chiang Kai Shek College) answered:

    Some advantages. People tend to look up on you. If you look like Chinese, they will assume you know many languages and something beyond their knowledges, so they will think highly of you (Interview with Ms. Tan an alumni of Chiang Kai Shek College, Manila, 9/23/2013).

The Chinese teaching and extracurricular activities of Chinese schools substantially enhance the distinctiveness of symbolic Chineseness. Writing their own Chinese names, greeting people in Mandarin, singing some well-known Chinese songs, reciting Chinese poems, telling Chinese historical stories and mythologies, and indicating the meaning of Chinese traditional festivals are some of the ways that these symbolic resources act as distinguishing markers for young Chinese.

A weekly television program, ‘Chinoy TV’, to introduce Chinese-Filipino lifestyle and culture for the Chinese community, as well as the Philippine mainstream society, for
example, is used as a vehicle for the display of the distinctiveness of symbolic Chineseness. Both of the two hosts, Willord Chua and Gretchen Ho, are alumni of two well-known Chinese schools, Hope Christian High School and Immaculate Conception Academy, respectively. The program contains basic Mandarin teaching, introductions of Chinese culture and customs, such as the ‘ghost month’, a Chinese talent competition, etc("Chinoy TV,"("Chinoy TV,"). The hosts might master these Chinese cultural symbols when attending respective Chinese schools.

In particular, Chinese schools’ celebrations of traditional Chinese traditional festivals play an important role not only in manifesting symbolic Chineseness to the public, but also in creating a special Chineseness that is exclusive to the Philippine-Chinese. For example, every year the Chinese community have a ‘Chinese New Year Solidarity Parade’ in the Chinatown area. This special event is joined in only by the Chinese, but also by some mainstream governmental officials and politicians, such as mayors of the city of Manila, as a gesture of friendship with the Chinese. Most Chinese schools send a group of students to increase the momentum, raising the public’s (as well as the students’) awareness of the uniqueness of the Philippine-Chinese community as an ethnic minority (observation, Manila, 04/02/2011).

This public display of symbolic Chineseness could only be possible under the condition of a sense of security. In terms of citizenship, upon obtaining Philippine citizenship the Chinese have enjoyed equal status in almost all areas, including educational opportunities, career choice, political participation, and economic development. Equal political rights (derived from Filipino citizenship) have particularly facilitated the political participation of Philippine-Chinese, who have had unprecedented input in many significant political events, such as the People Power Revolution (EDSA 1) against the dictatorship of Marcos in 1986, and the EDSA 2 Revolution against the
corrupt Estrada administration in 2001. When a spate of kidnappings targeting Philippine-Chinese escalated in the early 1990s, the Chinese mobilised to collectively demonstrate against the Philippine government’s lack of action towards solving the problem (See, 2013). Political participation by the Philippine-Chinese continues to grow not only through voting but also through participation in local politics as candidates for congressional districts, city mayors, and councillors (See, 2013). For example, in 2011, there were 26 senators and representatives of Chinese origin in the Congress of the Philippines, accounting for more than 12% of the total seats (Zhuang, 2012: 571). This active political participation by the Philippine-Chinese shows their commitment and ties to the Philippine nation. As a result, the public display of Chinese symbols is widely accepted by the mainstream.

At an official level, Chineseness has become a welcome symbol that receives explicit recognition, especially when China has been growing as a regional power and has normalised relationships with the Philippines. President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino’s public claim to Chinese ancestry and her visit to her family’s ‘hometown’ in Fukien Province in China in 1988 was a breaking point: Chineseness in the Philippines received an open acknowledgement. Following this, President Fidel Ramos also publicly recognised the contribution of the Chinese to Philippine society. In her second visit to the Chinese community for a pre-Independent Day celebration held in St. Stephen High School in 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo attended the Philippine flag-raising ceremony, recited the Patriotic Oath (Panatang Makabayan) with Chinese students, and gave a speech regarding the importance of Chinese education in the Philippines (Rappa and Wee, 2006: 73). These symbolic actions are important to signal the harmonious coexistence of Philippine-Chineseness and Filipino patriotism. It also indicates official recognition of the Chineseness of the Chinese community in general, and of Chinese
On an everyday level, racial bias and prejudice between Chinese and Filipinos do exist, but are likely to be gradually reduced by increased personal contact. The image of the Filipino in the minds of some old-generation Chinese is biased because their personal contact with Filipinos is limited to the working class, such as the labourers and housemaids whom they employ, corrupt officers such as policemen, firemen, and tax gatherers, and unscrupulous politicians (See, 1997: 39). On the contrary, the younger generations who master Tagalog, attend Philippine universities, join Filipino groups, and work and socialise with Filipinos have closer personal contacts with Filipinos (See, 1997: 110). Compared to the status quo ante, in which the Chinese were labelled by the mainstream as disloyal, unassimilable aliens and avaricious ‘economic animals’ who controlled the Philippine economy but transferred what they earned there to their hometowns in China (See, 1990; Go 1996), equal citizenship status, intermingling, and shared Filipino identity and outlook between two groups might help in lowering the ethnic barrier, paving the way for integration.

The relatively favourable conditions nowadays allow the Chinese to manifest symbolic Chineseness and to form a kind of Chinese-school identity. It is the symbolic Chineseness produced in Chinese schools that unifies the community of the Philippine-Chinese. The making of a sense of Chinese community and ethnic solidarity that is allowed by attending Chinese schools may be the foundation of integration into the mainstream.

5.3.2 Social Capital for Upward Mobility
Classic assimilation theory (which focused solely on instances of assimilation in North America) assumes that immigrants need to abandon the ethnicities they bring from their homelands to successfully become an integral part of mainstream. The conception of ‘selective acculturation’, by contrast, emphasises the importance of the family and community in providing resources to support the younger generation of immigrants in adapting to larger society (Portes and Ruben, 1996; 2001). As illustrated in Portes and Ruben’s in-depth empirical studies of second generation immigrants, this path proves likely to direct the younger generation to upward mobility while they retain their home languages and cultural traditions.

Further, Portes and Zhou (1993) indicate three different paths through which immigrants adapt to the host society: the first leads to the classic mode of integration into the middle class in the mainstream; the second leads to downward assimilation into the lower class; the third leads to upward mobility by intentional preservation of ‘the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity’ (Portes and Zhou, 1993: 83). Portes and Zhou (1993) refer to the difference in the path of integration as ‘segmented assimilation’.

In the case of the Philippine-Chinese community, the preservation of communal Chineseness is likely to facilitate upward mobility. In terms of this third path of integration towards upward mobility, ethnic community plays a pivotal role in providing ‘social capital’ to the younger generation. The accessibility of social capital determines the likelihood of their upward mobility. Social capital, in this context, means ‘the ability to gain access to resources by virtue of membership in social networks and other social structure’ (Portes and Ruben, 2001: 353).

Social capital can function in a variety of forms. For the younger generation, social
capital can refer to some intangible supports, such as higher expectations for achievements, positive cultural orientations and social norms, and also to some organisational resources, such as ethnic institutions and organisations (Zhou, 1997).

The Chinese school system, as a community-based institution, also serves as a mechanism for generating, assembling, aggregating, and distributing social capital. With the backing of the entire Chinese community, parents and schools need not go alone while educating the next generation. Given that Chinese schools are private schools that offer a formal curriculum while receiving no funding from the Philippine government, and given that they are mainly supported by the local Chinese community, to a degree the Chinese younger-generation has been raised by the entire community. As mentioned above, community-based resources are accessible only to those who have attended Chinese schools and thus acquired membership of the Chinese community. The Chinese school system therefore acts as an intermediary institution between the community and students to distribute social capital. This social capital aims to help students attain the highest possible levels of educational and occupational achievement.

As is the case with various other groups of Asian immigrants throughout the world, the educational culture of the Philippine-Chinese community falls under the influence of Confucian values. It heavily emphasises educational achievement and academic performance, thus mobilising all possible resources in education\textsuperscript{21}. Positive qualities

\textsuperscript{21} It is noteworthy that the extremely strict and intensive educational culture of the Philippine-Chinese has been much discussed in public, with the best-selling book ‘Battle Hymn of Tiger Mother’ (2011) sparking off heated debates. Amy Chua, the author, is herself a second generation Chinese-Filipino immigrant living in America. The book depicts Chua’s strict but loving Chinese parenting style with her two daughters, both of whom have grown up to be healthy, sound, and brilliant. The last part of the book recalls that her father, who grew up in the Chinese community in Manila, earned his BA degree in the Philippines and emigrated to America, adopted similar parenting when raising her.
for learning like self-discipline, hard work and obedience are greatly encouraged. A word in Hokkien, ‘piánn thâu-miâ’ (competing for the first place), is often heard among parents and teachers. The ranking of high-grade students represents not only excellent academic achievement, but also ‘face-saving’ for parents and families in front of their friends and relatives. In the annual commencement in St. Joseph High School at the end of every academic year, parents of the top three-ranking students in the Chinese and English curricula are invited to attend an award ceremony. They step onstage to take photos with their children – under the gaze of other, off-stage students, who no doubt harbour mixed feelings (observation, Manila, 25/3/2011). Even after graduation, a graduate’s outstanding academic achievements, such as accepting ‘Magna Cum Laude’ in a university, doing well in licensure examinations, or receiving scholarship from a prestigious foreign university, are heavily advertised as honours of the school and parents: congratulatory banners are hung on the school gate and the good news is published in local Chinese newspapers. The considerable emphasis on academic performance can heighten students’ educational expectations.

Figure 2  News about a son’s ‘passing the exam for the qualification as a lawyer’ in a local Chinese newspaper
(The World News, 6/5/2017)
This educational culture leads to a daily pattern of student life which is highly intensive and burdensome. Consider the teaching schedule of St. Joseph High School. Elementary school students start their first class at 7:30 am. There are 6 40-minute classes in English until 12:55 pm. After lunch there are 4 classes in Chinese from 1:25 pm to 4:05 pm. They then attend tutorials, where schoolwork is reviewed under tutors’ supervision until around 7 pm. They might therefore leave home at 7 am and return at 7 pm daily. Some of them even have tutorials on Saturday.

Despite the pressure to learn, this educational culture assures students of an all-embracing learning environment: completely surrounded by the co-ethnic school setting, there is little or no space for anything outside. Students may not necessarily do well in exams, but they are prevented from external ‘bad influences’ likely to orient them towards downward mobility.

As other scholars have noted, the Philippine-Chinese have the most extensive ethnic

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22 Tutorials are special, informal after-school programs for those who want to achieve better grades. Many tutors are schoolteachers who work for the Chinese schools in the daytime. The aim of the tutorial is to prepare for both English and Chinese exams at school. The tuition fee is also an important extra bonus for schoolteachers to compensate for the relatively small salaries they receive from the schools.
networks of all overseas Chinese communities (Wickberg, 1992). There are approximately 1,000 Chinese community-based organisations, including associations (whose names consist of surname (clan) and locality (district, hometown)), such as the Philippine Chinese Wei Due Fraternity and the Philippine Lam An Association; chambers of commerce, such as the FFCCCII and Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry; brotherhoods, such as the Progressive Mason Club, INC. Philippines; alumni associations, such as St. Stephen High School Alumni Association; educational associations, such as the ACFSP; and religious organisations (Wickberg, 1992: 45). These organisations also provide a variety of educational resources for students of Chinese schools.

Study tours in China to enhance Mandarin ability and to expand students’ horizons are the most popular educational activities among students and parents, especially when tour fees are partly sponsored by some organisers. For example, the Tan Yan Kee Foundation, set up and funded by a Chinese-Filipino ‘Taipan’ Lucio Tan alluded to in chapter 4, has since 2001 organised 55-day educational tours exclusively for students of Chinese schools. The tour takes place in South Fukien province, the hometown of most of the Philippine-Chinese. Annually Lucio Tan sponsors flight tickets for every tour participant, as well as covering all fees for 200 low-income students. To 2015, there have been 11,015 participants in total. Others, like the Philippine-Chinese Education Research Center (PCERC), Philippine Jin-Jiang General Association, Hong Meng bodies, and a number of alumni associations and locality associations, have similar summer camps for Chinese students to take part in. In addition, various Chinese art classes, talent contests, and extracurricular activities are frequently held and sponsored by Chinese organisations. All these activities provide a supportive, sociable, inspiring, and caring learning environment for students surrounded by co-ethnic friends and
teachers who share similar educational values.

As shown in chapter 4, the Kaisa, an unconventional Chinese organisation built by some middle-class, well educated, second-generation Philippine-Chinese, has a unique contribution to the younger generation. The aim behind the establishment of Kaisa was to bridge gaps not only between mainstream Philippine society and the Chinese community, but also between older and younger generations of Philippine-Chinese, and to advocate integration into the mainstream. To relieve the identity crisis among the younger generation, Kaisa promotes a new self-appellation, ‘Chinese-Filipino’, that aims to ‘revival of Chinese culture with full integration of Chinese into the larger society as Filipinos of Chinese heritage’ (Wickberg, 1992: 55); to enhance the mutual understanding between the Chinese and Filipino community, Kaisa effectively employs the media as an information campaign tool by publishing an English periodical, ‘Tulay’ (meaning ‘bridge’ in Tagalog), along with a Chinese edition, ‘Ronghe’ (‘integration’ in Chinese); to promote Chinese-Filipino identity, Kaisa has constructed ‘Bahay Tsinoy: a Museum of Chinese in Philippine Life’, and conducts some Chinese-related events for Chinese youths; to bring in some academic perspectives, Kaisa conducts research, issues publications, and organises conferences on ethnic Chinese issues; to raise public awareness and to protect the rights of Philippine-Chinese during the 1990s kidnapping epidemic mentioned above, Kaisa participated in anti-crime efforts and organised a mass demonstration against the Philippine government’s inaction (See and Go, 2004). Kaisa may not directly contribute to the upper mobility of Philippines, but it lays out a broad vision of integration for the next generation.

As a number of Chinese businessmen regard donating to Chinese education as an honour and a gesture exemplary of the ‘Confucian entrepreneur’ spirit, Chinese schools also greatly benefit from other financial contributions to school construction, teacher
In terms of financial support, some organisations offer scholarships to students of Chinese schools from low-income family backgrounds in the event that they cannot afford the relatively higher tuition fees of Chinese schools. The rationale behind the existence of these scholarships is that, were these students forced to go to Philippine public schools, they would gradually lose their Chinese identity. Due to concerns about the Chinese schools’ recent falling enrolment figures, the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FFCCCII), for example, collects funds from the community to sponsor hundreds of students in financial difficulties to the amount of 10,000 pesos per year; in 2015, for example, the FFCCCII sponsored a total of 949 students (FFCCCII, 15/9/2015). Meanwhile, locality associations such as Quanzhou Association, clan associations such as Liu Kwee Tang, surname associations such as Xihe Lim Association, and alumni associations such as Alumni Association of No.2 Middle School of Shishi have provided scholarships exclusively for children of fellow members.

One of the most important functions of Chinese schools is cementing co-ethnic networks within the Chinese community. Within this closed learning environment, Chinese students tend to mostly socialise with co-ethnic schoolmates of similar cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds and with similar educational and career expectations. As Huang (2012: 28) indicates, while the notion of clanship and locality among the younger generation has faded away, Chinese schools nevertheless have become the centre of social gatherings through school organisations like alumni associations, trustee boards, student unions, and parent associations. Graduates are likely to translate the associations and companionship gained from Chinese schools into social ties and connections in universities, and, later in their lives, possibly the marketplace (See,
There are Philippine-Chinese student associations in a number of Philippine universities, including the ‘Big Four’, that is, UP Chinese Student Association (UPCSA) in University of the Philippines (UP), Ateneo Celadon in Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU), the ‘Englicom’ in De La Salle University (DLSU), and the SCARLET in University of Santo Tomas (UST). Mainly consisting of Chinese-school alumni, this sort of association helps students build social ties and connections with fellow members of Chinese-school background and further community-based networks. The UPCSA in UP, for example, states that ‘it [the association] aims to encourage concern over problems of the Chinese community and enhance fraternal cooperation among them (the official website of UPCSA)’. It therefore extends to the university the ethnic networks built by Chinese schools, serving to maintain Chinese communal identity after graduation.

Meanwhile, almost all Chinese schools have alumni associations to preserve the ties and connections built in Chinese schools. Alumni gatherings function not only to cultivate friendship between alumni, but also to establish business networks. I was invited several times to attend dinner parties before the monthly meetings organised by the alumni association of St. Joseph High School. The members appeared quite keen active to participate this kind of gathering. When I asked the organiser how they maintained interest among members to take part in gatherings, he answered: ‘we are all old friends. It’s good to meet our friends regularly. Sometimes we share information about business and talk about business cooperation’ (personal communication with Mr. Go, Manila, 1/9/2010). Thus alumni association can sometimes serve to expand ethnic networks and integrate resources between Philippine-Chinese businessmen. In other words, the social capital derived from Chinese schools can be furthered and embodied
by organisations affiliated with the schools, such as student and alumni associations.

Worth noting is that the UPCSA also recruits Filipino members who are interested in Chinese culture to encourage friendship between the two communities:

While most members are from Chinese schools, there have been and there still are Filipino members in the roster who are interested in the Chinese culture as well as maintaining the bond between both the Filipino community and the Chinese community (the UPCSA official website).

The shaping of Chinese communal identity is therefore not necessarily at the expense of the younger generation’s integration into the mainstream.

Social capital thus gives Chinese students certain advantages in seeking educational achievements. Benefiting from community-based resources provided by co-ethnic networks that are mostly upper-middle class, Chinese students have better opportunities to maintain their socioeconomic status and even achieve upward mobility. As a result, Chinese students tend to move towards integrating into the upper-middle class of Philippine society.

5.3.3 Mechanisms of Class Mobility and Social Reproduction

As mentioned above, social capital gathered and distributed by Chinese schools can facilitate the path of integration toward upward mobility. But how does the social capital that is derived from Chinese schools lead to upper mobility and social reproduction that, in turn, allow for integrating into the upper-middle class of Philippine society? Wickberg (1992) depicts a model of socio-cultural stratification and mobility, as the graph below shows.
The boxes in the centre represent the community core of Philippine-Chinese made up of four social strata, stratified by economic and cultural success (Wickberg, 1992: 60). The broken-line boundaries between the strata refer to the likelihood of up or down movement. Also featured is a loosely-connected ‘Chinese society’ around a community core that is surrounded by larger Philippine society. The boundaries between the Chinese community, Chinese society, and Philippine society are penetrable through certain paths indicated by dashed lines.

From Wickberg’s diagram it is apparent that there are two paths of integration into Philippine society. One leads to success in Philippine society (from the top right), whereas another leads to failure in Philippine society (from the bottom left). The top-half of those in the community core, who are culturally and economically successful, are likely to move horizontally to get out of the community core, to enter successful Chinese society as well as successful Philippine society, and to become an integral part
of the Filipino elite. Notably, as these Philippine-Chinese obtain symbolic Chineseness from Chinese schools, they are still identified as Chinese no matter the extent of their integration.

By contrast, while losing not only economic capability but also Chineseness, the bottom 20% of the community core face the possibility of leaving the Chinese community and dropping out of sight of organised Chinese society. They are likely to eventually disappear into the great mass of Filipino poor and completely lose Chinese identity.

In the mechanism of class mobility, I advance that Chinese schools play a central role in maintaining, increasing, or deducting advantage. People’s positions in the stratum can determine their intention in respect of school selection. As depicted by Wickberg, at the top are the leaders of the most important organisations (5%); beneath them is the ‘Prospectively Emergent Community Core’, consisting of those with prospects of moving to success in Chinese as well as Philippine society (45%); beneath them is the last layer, the ‘Non-emergent Community Core’ (30%), who are the ‘hard core’ of the Chinese community with little or no prospects of movement. The 80% of the Chinese population in the above three strata are the main participants in Chinese schools. The bottom 20% are the unsuccessful who are less likely to attend Chinese schools due to struggles with the higher tuition fees and higher standards of academic performance.

In the following, I introduce what roles the different types of Chinese schools play in the stratification of the Chinese community, as well as in larger Philippine society, in correspondence to the four strata shown above. Accordingly, I first classify Chinese schools into three types according to their tuition rates, academic standards, and educational resources, as shown in the table below. I argue that school selection between the three types can affect not only students’ future class mobility and social
reproduction, but also the path that they each individually follow to integrate into the Philippines.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese School Types</th>
<th>Type A</th>
<th>Type B</th>
<th>Type C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tuition Rates (annual)</td>
<td>Highest (&gt;100,000 pesos)</td>
<td>High (40,000~70,000 pesos)</td>
<td>Modest (&lt;40,000 pesos)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry Requirements</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as well as Chinese Teaching Quality and Level</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolees</td>
<td>Leaders; Prospectively Emergent Community Core</td>
<td>Leaders; Prospectively Emergent Community Core; Non-emergent Community Core (fewer)</td>
<td>Non-emergent Community Core; Unsuccessful(fewer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Resources</td>
<td>Highest</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Performance</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Mediocre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood of Class Mobility</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5 Three Types of Chinese Schools*

Among the three types of Chinese schools, Type A has the strictest entrance requirements, the highest tuition fees (>100,000 pesos per year), the highest standard of academic performance in English, and largest educational resources. Xavier School and Immaculate Conception Academy are the only two schools of Type A. Totalling 7,618 enrollees, their students in 2012 accounted for 13.9% of all Chinese students (54,658) in the Greater Manila Area (Zhuang, 2012). Take Xavier School as an example. A Chinese Catholic school (having been established by the Jesuits), it stresses academic excellence and targets an elite enrolment, yet its formation differs from other traditional Chinese schools. Xavier School generally pays more attention to English learning and has only one Chinese class (40 minutes) a day. In a sense, it serves as an international school. It is worth mentioning that Xavier School was granted ‘International Baccalaureate (IB) World School’ status in 2012, enabling its selected graduates to gain access to study in overseas universities. One of my interviewees, who studied in Xavier School, told me that English is the common language among students and that they rarely spoke Chinese and Tagalog in the school.

Besides the highest tuition fees, Type A also has the toughest entrance exam. Those parents who can afford the tuition fees may still be rejected if their child receives a failing grade in the exam. Two of my students in the elementary school of St. Joseph,
for instance, intended to study in Xavier School and took the ‘Xavier High School Entrance Examination’; one of them was one of the best in terms of English ability. That both of them failed to meet the requirements shows the difficulty of entering Type A schools. The exam, however, does not test Chinese ability, so it is open to students with limited Chinese background; it therefore attracts a number of ethnic-Filipino students from prominent families (such as those of politicians and wealthy businessmen), and some international students.

Type B are those with high tuition fees (approximately 40,000–70,000 pesos per year), a high standard of English, and the highest standard of Chinese ability. They are so-called ‘Manila schools’, mainly located in the old downtown district of Manila where the majority of the Chinese reside. Included here are the oldest Chinese schools with the highest enrolments and the strongest tradition of Chinese teaching, such as Chiang Kai-shek College, Philippine Cultural College, St. Stephen High School, Grace Christian College, and St. Jude Catholic School. In terms of directing the development of Chinese education, they are the most influential in the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools in the Philippines as well as in the whole of the Chinese community. 44.4% of students (24,288) were enrolled in Type B in the 2012-2013 academic year (Zhuang, 2012).

Compared to the other two types, Type B spends the most time on Chinese teaching, thus enabling its students to acquire the highest Chinese ability of all three types. St. Joseph High School, for example, has four Chinese classes out of the daily total of ten. In order to maintain its high standard of Chinese ability, the entrance exam for Type B also tests students on Chinese comprehension, thus effectively excluding students without Chinese background.
Type C are those with the lowest tuition fees (<40,000 per year) and a modest standard of academic performance in both Chinese and English curricula, such as Philippine Sun Yet Sen High School. Those students whose parents are unable to afford the tuition fees of Type A and Type B but still want to maintain at least a minimal amount of Chineseness tend to attend Type C. In general, its standards of Chinese as well as English teaching are the lowest of all three types. Philippine Sun Yet Sen High School, for example, does not require Chinese ability and recruits a number of ethnic-Filipino students. Students can waive the Chinese curriculum at their request. In 2012, 22,752 (41.6%) students had enrolled in Type B (Zhuang, 2012).

Given the high tuition fees, Type A schools are affordable only to the ‘Leaders’ and better-off among the ‘Prospectively Emergent Community Core’. Those of the ‘Leaders’ and the ‘Prospectively Emergent Community Core’ who want their children to spend less time on Chinese and focus on English tend to choose Type A – if their children can pass the entrance exam. Of course, Type B is still a possibility, should they want their children to acquire greater Chinese ability. As a ‘leader of the Philippine Chinese’ (qiao ling23) told me, the rich Chinese who prioritise English tend to send their children to Xavier School (a Type A school), which is commonly seen to have the highest standard of English teaching, while those who value Chinese ability would choose St. Jude Catholic School (a Type B school), which has the reputation for having the best Chinese teaching as well as good English teaching (personal communication with Mr. Kwong, Manila, 07/10/2013). It is a common practice among most of the ‘Prospectively Emergent Community Core’ to choose Type B as a means of keeping balance between

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23 ‘Qiao-ling’ (‘leader of the Philippine-Chinese’) is a common usage among Philippine-Chinese to refer to figures who are, because of achievements, affluence, and power, the most influential in the Chinese community.
Chinese and English learning. A few choose Type A, if their economic situation allows it, in order to open up better educational opportunities.

The ‘Non-emergent Community Core’ would prefer Type B as they are the ‘hard core’ of the Chinese community and value its higher standard of Chinese learning. They are also likely to choose Type C in cases where the tuition fee of Type B is unaffordable or its academic standard is too high. The ‘Unsuccessful’ Chinese are highly unlikely to afford the tuition fees of Chinese schools and might be forced to attend public schools, thus raising the possibility to move to the underclass of Philippine society.

In fact, there had been a decrease of 10% in the number of students attending Chinese schools between 2001 and 2006 (Huang, 2012: 113), and this decrease still continues. As mentioned earlier, in response to the younger generation’s gradual loss of Chinese identity, some scholarships have been made available for students who suffer financial hardship to help them continue to study in Chinese schools. These supports, however, cannot completely prevent a substantial number of the unsuccessful from attending public schools and being assimilated into the underclass of Philippine society.

With respect to social capital, given the fact that those who attend Type A already come from a privileged class in both the Chinese community and Philippine society, they tend to have greatest access not only to community-based resources but also resources from mainstream elite-class networks. Because some enrollees are of elite Filipino background, graduates of Type A may possess a wider network in the future. The community-based resources owned by students of Type B and Type C mostly obtain from the Chinese community. The more successful graduates Chinese schools are able to nurture, the larger and more powerful their alumni associations, and the greater social capital the students can have access to. Thus Type A offers the greatest accessibility to
social capital. Type B has greater access to the resources from the co-ethnic networks, whereas Type C has less. Those Chinese who attend public schools basically isolate themselves from their co-ethnic networks and have no community support.

When it comes to ‘social reproduction’, both Type A and Type B (which are, as noted, attended mainly by the upper-middle class) sustain advantages in educational opportunities to maintain their superior status. In addition to their Chinese curriculum, the quality of their teaching of the core curriculum (as prescribed by the Philippine Department of Education) outclasses that of public schools and at least matches that of elite Philippine private schools and top specialised public high schools (e.g. Philippine Science High School). Type A and Type B have gained a reputation for excellent academic performance not only among the Chinese community, but also in Philippine society. Despite the lack of substantial statistical information, graduates of both Type A and Type B are known for doing quite well in the entrance exams of the Philippine ‘Big Four’ universities. Their teaching quality and level is well recognised by these prestigious universities. Among the 200 recipients in 2014 of the ‘Director’s List Scholarship’, which awards those who have achieved top grade in the ‘Ateneo College Entrance Test’, 70 had graduated from Type A (36) and Type B (34) Chinese schools (ADMU, 2014). Another example is that, when DLSU planned to form teaching partnerships with certain high schools to prepare the graduates of partner schools for the requirements and challenges of higher education, 7 of the 11 partner schools were Chinese schools of Type B (DLSU, 2016).

The higher the tuition fee that Chinese schools charge, the more funds they can allocate for improving teaching facilities, faculty, and educational activities, and the more educational opportunities they can offer students to help them enter good universities. Type A especially maintains the highest quality of English teaching since it has the most
international faculty and student base, something which creates a rich multilingual environment. Type B also has high teaching quality to help students reach good academic performance. Due to the association between academic performance, career achievement, and social class, in terms of social reproduction, Type A is the best, Type B the second best, and Type C can little help students to move up.

Despite the lack of official statistics, my fieldwork allows for the making of a crude comparison of the academic performance of Type B with that of Type C, as follows. When I was a Chinese teacher in St. Joseph, a Type B school, there were four sixth-grade classes, of which I taught two. In 2009 and 2010 they accounted for 86 students, or around half of all sixth-grade students. I have kept in touch with most of them since then. Deducting those who have since transferred and those with whom I have lost touch, 72 students remain. Since 2015 all 72 have begun university studies, with 61 of this number attending one of the so-called Big Four universities. It is clearly an impressive achievement that 87% of them can enter the Big Four. In comparison to the performance of Type B, Type C’s performance is mediocre. One of my friends taught a graduating class of 8 students in Philippine Sun Yet Sen High School, a Type C school. 7 out of the 8 students entered universities in 2014, and one began working. None of the 8 students attended Big Four universities; the best result was one who entered Philippine Normal University. My friend also mentioned that the best of his 2015 graduates entered Chiang Kai Shek College, and that no one attended the Big Four this year either. From this information, the gap between Type B and C in academic performance appears quite large.

As for class mobility, except for the ‘Non-emergent Community Core’ stratum, the movement seems larger for the top half and the bottom stratum. As mentioned earlier, the two paths of integration, movement towards success as well as failure in Philippine
society, represent upward and downward mobility, respectively. For the former, because most of the top half send their children to Type A and Type B, which have wider access to social capital and higher academic standards, they have greater opportunities to enter the elite Philippine universities and become professionals, thus being part of the successful side of larger Chinese society and of the Filipino elite class. As a result, they are most likely to ultimately achieve ‘structural assimilation’. Again, the university that a Chinese-school graduate attends can affect the way that he/she integrates into the Filipino upper class. While mingling with a group of ethnic-Filipino classmates of the same age during university, he/she can establish his/her first ethnic-Filipino connections. Better universities provide students more opportunities to interact with the higher class of Filipino connections, thus increasing their social capital to create opportunities for upper mobility or class reproduction. Therefore, as Type A and B schools can help Chinese students enter better universities, they also can enhance students’ possibility of upward mobility or class reproduction.

Most of the ‘Non-emergent Community Core’, who might enrol in Type C (with a minimal amount of Chineseness that allows them to stay in the community core, and limited access to co-ethnic networks), face little risk of downward mobility, but have little opportunity of upward mobility either. The unsuccessful Chinese who live in poverty and who cannot afford Chinese schools are at serious risk of downward mobility, and of absorption into the underclass of Philippine society.

As discussed above, the socio-cultural stratification within the Chinese community is not a closed system, but is highly embedded in the social structure of larger Philippine society. Attending Chinese schools can help Philippine-Chinese secure their upper-middle class status (at least in the Philippines), and can even generate upward mobility to enter Filipino elite class, achieving the third path of integration as indicated by Portes

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated how Chinese schools produce a spontaneous, highly Filipinized, community-based, Chinese-Filipino version of Chineseness, a mixture of Chinese, Filipino, and modern values, within the domestic and national Philippine setting. The Chinese students might develop Filipino national consciousness by the specific route of attending Chinese schools, shaping their identity, mobilising educational resources, and achieving class status in Philippine society. All these practices ultimately lead to integration.

The formation of national identity and Filipino nationalism through the everyday practices of Chinese schools make the Philippine-Chinese younger generation thoroughly Filipino, and remove the ethnic barrier between the two communities. In respect of Filipino national identity, integration has been happening. Rather than inculcating Chinese nationalism, as was the case in the past, the Chinese-related content acquired by students in schools serves to symbolically form a Chineseness by which Philippine-Chinese can preserve a sense of Chinese community. With this sense of Chinese community, the Philippine-Chinese can deploy and distribute community-based resources to the younger generation to aid in their achieving better academic performance. Better academic performance allows them to either move up to higher class or maintain their superior status in larger Philippine society. Despite differences in social class, the Philippine-Chinese do not isolate themselves from the mainstream, but strive to enter the Filipino elite class.
Hence, after Filipinization, Chinese schools have transformed themselves from a ghettoized institution to an institution that facilitates integration into mainstream Philippine society. By the same token, through the effort of Chinese schools, the Chinese community in the Philippines have also become an ethnic minority open to integration into, rather than isolation from, larger Philippine society.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

Based on the findings, this concluding chapter of the thesis aims to elaborate the characteristics of the Chineseness constructed by the Chinese schools in the Philippines. As noted, the thesis originates from my own frustrated experiences of teaching in a Chinese school in the Philippines. To an extent, the bitterness between students and teachers in Chinese schools has been caused by the presumed oneness of Chineseness that is propagated by Chinese nationalistic ideology. This bitterness, one that can be shared by Chinese both inside and outside of China, inspired me to understand this oneness of Chineseness – and examine the possibility of transcending it. Therefore, in light of the discussions in previous chapters, this concluding chapter indicates two main characteristics of Chineseness in the Philippines. They are ‘multiplicity as cosmopolitanisation’ and ‘entanglement and complexity’. Finally, I discuss some implications for further research related to immigrant groups and citizenship education.

6.1 Multiplicity as Cosmopolitanisation

An array of factors has contributed to the emergence, within the Chinese schools of the Philippines, of multifarious forms of Chineseness: the Philippine-Chinese people’s long-lasting involvement with ‘fatherland’ politics, as well as tangled cross-Strait relations, complicate the elements of Mandarin teaching in Chinese schools; the shift in citizenship status has led to transnational commitments and multiple identities among Philippine-Chinese; and their increasing integration into the Philippine mainstream has prompted them to transform Chineseness to adapt to the local context. As a result, there are three main ideal types of Chineseness: Huaqiao Chineseness, Huaren Chineseness,
and communal Chineseness for integration. Together, they demonstrate the multiplicity of Chineseness.

These three versions of Chineseness represent a shift of the meaning of being Chinese, from a China-centred (even ethnocentric) view to an attitude towards otherness that is more open-minded. If cosmopolitanism generally means openness to others, the multiplicity of Chineseness contained within Philippine-Chineseness testifies to the potential of Chineseness for cosmopolitanisation. Cosmopolitanisation in this context might refer not only to embracing difference and otherness, but also to adjusting Chineseness to suit the context of the local environment in which Chinese live. These three versions of Chineseness thus demonstrate three different levels of cosmopolitanisation.

Huaqiao Chineseness, based on overseas Chinese nationalism, takes a China-centred viewpoint to stress the oneness of the meaning of being Chinese. This sense of oneness comprises the notion of one nation, one people, one culture, and one language among those of Chinese descent. Overseas Chinese education, aided by ‘the two Chinas’, aims to cultivate this sense of oneness in order to unify Chinese overseas. It takes as a given China’s dominant role as the fatherland, thus authorising the Chinese governments to define Chineseness and Chinese education for Chinese overseas. To attract the contributions of Chinese overseas to the ‘transnational mobilisation system’, the two Chinas uphold the everlasting bond between China and a people linked by common ancestry, shared cultural traits, and a collective historical memory. A perfect isomorphism between nation, people, culture, and language is thus assumed. As ‘Huaqiao’ is defined by some essentialised characteristics, there is a set of permanent, immutable, and indispensable principles relating to how to be Chinese abroad, what and how to teach in Chinese schools, who are Chinese and who are ‘others’, and how
to handle the relationship with Filipinos. The ideological foundation of Huaqiao Chineseness is close to the conception of ‘ethnic nationalism’ which, in defining a nation, also emphasises essentialised characteristics, calling into question existing political boundaries to unify all the co-ethnics across state borders, as 19th-century German nationalism did (Roshwald, 2015). Because Huaqiao Chineseness sets the hardest boundary between Chinese and non-Chinese, Huaqiao education also serves to ensure that the younger generations remain ‘one of us’ and are prevented from becoming ‘others’. Moreover, as Huaqiao education requires students to learn Mandarin as a national language (something which, to a certain extent, appears less inviting to non-Chinese), the Chinese schools centred on Huaqiao education are mainly reserved for those students of Chinese descent. Huaqiao Chineseness is therefore the most nationalistic and the least cosmopolitanised version of Chineseness among these three. In short, Huaqiao Chineseness is the essentialised one against the possibility of multiplicity.

Huaren Chineseness represents not only a departure from the essentialised, China-centred view of Huaqiao Chineseness, but also a more open attitude towards the Filipino nation and Filipinos, people who were, in the past, deemed others or even ‘barbarians’. Huaren Chineseness embraces Chinese-Filipino identity, calling for recognition of the reality that the Philippines is these people’s first and foremost home, and that they should fulfil the commitments inherent in their Filipino citizenship. Where Huaqiao Chineseness tends towards ‘ethnic nationalism’, Huaren Chineseness displays an ‘elective affinity’ with ‘civic nationalism’, emphasising the common rights, obligations, and values of citizenship regardless of any ethnic and cultural differences among the citizenry (Roshwald, 2015). Though its ideology remains nationalistic, Huaren Chineseness is relatively more open to others. In terms of Chinese education,
recognising the fact that Mandarin is no longer their first and national language, a group of educationalists proposed ‘Huaren education’ reform that would accommodate the younger generations’ Chinese-Filipino identity and Filipino citizenship. Furthermore, Huaren education exploits the pedagogy of ‘teaching Mandarin as a second language’ (TMSL), thus teaching the younger generations of Philippine-Chinese through methods which had previously been used to teach non-Chinese foreigners. In other words, a person can be still Chinese even if he or she identifies as a Filipino and learns Mandarin as a second language. Consequently, Chinese-Filipino identity and TMSL together call into question the aforementioned isomorphism between nation and people as well as between nation and language; they demonstrate a possible and desirable combination of Chineseness and Filipino citizenship. Therefore, despite cultural and education ties to the fatherland, Chineseness in the context of the Philippines shows its potential to become an ‘open signifier’ that adds Filipino characteristics to the constitution of Chineseness. It also encourages Philippine-Chinese to examine their own othering of Filipino and raises the level of flexibility in defining Chineseness with Filipino characteristics. Compared to Huaqiao Chineseness, Huaren Chineseness is far more cosmopolitanised in respect of citizenship values.

Communal Chineseness for integration embraces the utility value of being Philippine-Chinese. Despite the sense of being ‘our own people’ (Lân-lâng) that is formed through Chinese-school identity and displaying symbolic Chineseness, the Chinese in general have no intention of isolating themselves from the mainstream. In contrast, their ultimate goal is to make the Chinese an integral part of Philippine society, despite their targeting of only the upper-middle class. As most Philippine-Chinese come from the upper-middle class of Philippine society, being ‘our own people’ means access to a range of social capital and the community-based resources to achieve better academic
performance, brighter career prospects, and eventually social reproduction. In other words, to be Lán-lâng is to be Filipino with higher socioeconomic status. Therefore, communal Chineseness for integration serves as a tactic of resource allocation for facilitating social reproduction and upward mobility. Thus it can be seen as a ‘strategic cosmopolitanism’ by which Philippine-Chinese engage with otherness for the future livelihood prospects of the whole Chinese community in the Philippines. As this communal Chineseness for integration rarely entails substantial Mandarin ability – indeed, it detaches Chinese language from Chineseness – it fundamentally destroys the isomorphism between being Chinese and speaking Chinese language. It implies that a person can be Chinese even when he holds non-Chinese citizenship, speaks little Mandarin, and actively strives for integration into the mainstream of the destination nation. Communal Chineseness for integration thus fundamentally challenges what being Chinese means, as previously defined by Huaqiao Chineseness. It is cosmopolitan because not only does it adjust Chineseness to the context of the Philippines in order to achieve ‘structural assimilation’, but it transforms itself by being a culturally and socially integral part of Philippine society. Due to its pragmatic approach, among the three versions of Chineseness, communal Chineseness for integration is the most cosmopolitanised one.

In all, this thesis juxtaposes three versions of Chineseness to reflect a general trend towards the cosmopolitanisation of Chineseness, one that gradually transcends the primordial, essentialist, and monolithic view about the meaning of being Chinese.

### 6.2 Entanglement and Complexity

Although there is a chronological order in the time of occurrence of these three versions of Chineseness, the cosmopolitanisation of Chineseness in the Philippines does not
simply follow a linear progression from Huaqiao to communal Chineseness for integration. Instead, different versions of Chineseness overlap, display great complexity, and do not necessarily fulfil the potential for cosmopolitanisation.

Huaqiao Chineseness still predominates in Chinese schools, especially in terms of Mandarin teaching. Its predominance can be largely attributed to the presence of educational aids from China as well as Taiwan. As each of the two Chinas regards support for overseas Chinese education as of geopolitical importance in terms of operating systems of transnational mobilisation, they will continue to provide educational resources to cement these given transnational ties. The resources they provide (such as textbooks, teacher supply programs, teacher training programs and so forth) are the very embodiment of Huaqiao Chineseness, manifestations of the long-lasting ties between Philippine-Chinese and the fatherland. The educationalists in Chinese schools with Huaqiao identity also embrace these resources for two reasons. On the one hand, Huaqiao Chineseness has characterised the Chinese school system from the beginning and, to a certain degree, has been enshrined as an essential element in Chinese education. Any attempt to change it would be regarded as a threat to the foundation of the school system. On the other hand, these educational resources substantially assist in the maintenance of Chinese schools, reducing the responsibilities to be borne by the schools. Therefore, preserving Huaqiao Chineseness is the path of least resistance for Chinese schools, despite its devastating effect on Mandarin learning and the inherent contradiction with the younger generations’ identity and citizenship status.

So entrenched is Huaqiao Chineseness in Chinese schools that Huaren Chineseness has generally failed to establish itself as the core conception of the Chinese school system. Likewise, the PCERC lacks support in implementing Huaren education. Since the
proponents of Huaren education claimed independence and detachment from any
government authority, almost all parties concerned refute its agenda for educational
reform. China, the largest provider of Huaqiao Chineseness, has no interest in Huaren
education; Taiwan regards the reform as a campaign against the impact of the ROC
version of Chineseness on Chinese schools; the old-generation educationalists in charge
of Mandarin teaching take the reform as a challenge to their authority; the Philippine
government may welcome Chinese-Filipino identity and stress the importance of
Mandarin learning in the Philippines, but will not offer any substantial resources for it,
apart from paying lip service; even those in high places in the Chinese community value
the relations with China in the form of receiving educational aids. While independence
and detachment from a China-centred view as well as Huaqiao Chineseness can be a
progress in terms of cosmopolitanisation, it also means maintaining critical distance
from all national governments. As a result, the reform has endured great hardship due
to lack of source of education aids to maintain itself.

At an everyday level, it is communal Chineseness for integration that exercises an
influence and has put cosmopolitanisation into practice. It is not involved in the political
entanglements between Huaqiao and Huaren Chineseness which have no real-world
help. In the process of integration, Mandarin learning plays only a symbolic role in
helping Chinese students achieve social reproduction and upward mobility. This is not
to say that practical Mandarin skills are useless in the Philippines. Rather, Mandarin
can only hope to be symbolic of being Chinese: current Mandarin teaching in Chinese
schools, deeply entangled with Huaqiao Chineseness and Chinese nationalistic ideology,
hardly helps Chinese students to master practical Mandarin skills. Therefore, communal
Chineseness for integration translates some elements of Chineseness into substantial
community-based resources, such as social capital and educational culture, to achieve
higher socioeconomic status in the Philippines. This pragmatic use of Chineseness and Chinese education is often ignored by those who limit their focus to Huaqiao education, yet it is the most cosmopolitanised because it distances itself from nationalistic ideology. In fact, the Chinese school system necessitates a process of cosmopolitanisation that removes the nationalistic ideology from Chinese education because its entanglement with overseas Chinese nationalism and Chinese politics proves meaningless to the Chinese’s actual lives – indeed, it has a negative impact on their integration into domestic Philippine society. Therefore, communal Chinese for integration turns to maximise the utility value of Chineseness in schools for the prosperity of the whole Philippine-Chinese community.

In general, the Chinese school system in the Philippines can be divided into two parts. The Mandarin teaching part is thoroughly enmeshed with Chinese nationalistic ideology, inculcates in the younger generation a sense of being Huaqiao, and tends to otherise Filipinos and the Filipino nation as a whole. Mandarin teaching is thus far less cosmopolitanised and fails to prepare the younger generations for the increasingly cosmopolitan settings of Philippine society. The part that is not Mandarin teaching is orientated toward cosmopolitanisation to a considerable extent, opens up the younger generation’s opportunity for their settlement in the Philippines, advances mutual understanding between Chinese and Filipinos, and will eventually contribute to a high level of Chinese integration into the Philippines.

6.3 Implications for Further Research and Citizenship Education

Finally, from the empirical data of this thesis I would like to draw two implications for further research related to immigration and one practical implication for citizenship education.
For further research, first, methodological cosmopolitanism is a promising lens through which to understand cultural diversity in the education of an ethnic group and their multiple identities as a result of their changing citizenship status. Two approaches to probing the cosmopolitanisation of Chineseness of Chinese overseas specifically, and the ethnicity of an immigrant group in general, are involved in this thesis.

On the one hand, the study of an ethnic school system of an immigrant group should focus on the interplay between transnational ties to the group’s nation of origin and struggles not only to preserve cultural identity but, simultaneously, to seek recognition from their nation of destination. Cosmopolitanisation might occur when an immigrant group turns the national culture of their nation of origin, such as cultural practices and national language education, into a minority group’s ethnicity in the context of their nation of destination and when they in turn exploit the resources deprived from transnational ties to their ‘fatherland’ in order to enrich their ethnicity and their language education system in the nation of destination. It necessities dual perspectives on how an immigrant group copes with their relationship with the nation of origin and with the nation of destinations to project and construct their ethnicity and identities. Only insights from methodological cosmopolitanism, which attempts to grasp the meaning of cultural and educational practices from different angles, can provide a comprehensive account of the process of cosmopolitanisation; methodological nationalism, by contrast, considers the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis and follows only the fixed and rigid either/or logic of nationality, separating one nation from another in dealing with issues interconnected to a variety of nations.

On the other hand, corroborating Ulrich Beck’s differentiation between ‘normative cosmopolitanism’ and ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’, in some cases cosmopolitanisation results mainly from the benefits to which having an open attitude
toward others leads. Therefore, cosmopolitan studies should pay special attention to the utility value, rather than the moral value, of the cosmopolitanisation that stimulates an immigrant group to embrace openness. Although moves towards intermingling with others such as social and political integration, selective acculturation, and structural assimilation may be strategic in meeting existence needs in the beginning, they have the potential to evolve later into outcomes with progressive values, thus ultimately transforming actually existing cosmopolitanism into normative cosmopolitanism.

Second, on immigrant-related research, the findings of this thesis suggest that the level of cosmopolitanisation of an immigrant group’s ethnic culture (such as their language education) can determine opportunities for their cultural preservation in the context of their country of destination. The lower the level of the cosmopolitanisation of language education, the lower level of openness toward the local settings, and the less likely the language is preserved from generation to generation. As Mandarin teaching of the Chinese schools in the Philippines is so little cosmopolitanised and densely interwoven with nationalistic ideology, it lacks the flexibility to adapt to the local circumstances of Philippine society as well as the ability to accommodate the changing needs of younger generations. From the perspective of these younger generations, the given Mandarin teaching in Chinese schools is not only irrelevant to their everyday lives and future prospects, but also incapable of developing their practical Mandarin skills, so they are reluctant to learn Mandarin. Their reluctance might eventually contribute to the further decline of Chinese education and jeopardise Mandarin learning’s chances of survival in the Philippines.

In respect of practices of citizenship education, I will highlight three principles for young people of immigrant background to foster an open attitude towards others. First, apart from discriminatory practices due to racialist or nationalistic ideologies of a host
nation against immigrant groups, the ethnocentrism of an immigrant group itself to also needs to be addressed. In the case of the Philippine-Chinese, their ethnocentric view is likely to lead to isolation from the mainstream and the maintenance of strong political ties with their fatherland, both of which can hinder younger generations from nurturing an open attitude towards others and cultural diversity, and from developing multiple and dynamic identities. Therefore, citizenship education should serve to challenge essentialist views of identity which regard ethnicity as permanent and immutable. Instead, citizenship education can include the idea and historical facts that identity and ethnicity are likely to be constructed through interaction with others, thus being reshaped, multiplied, and even cosmopolitanised in the long run.

Second, from the perspective of an immigrant group, equal citizenship rights are the best citizenship education: through them, young people automatically come to acknowledge the value of justice and equity in a democratic state. The younger generations can only acquire a well-developed sense of citizenship, with all the institutional protection that comes from equal citizenship rights, when benefiting from it. On the contrary, they cannot feel commitment and loyalty to a nation which does not treat them equally in terms of education and career development. In respect to the host nation, it necessitates a shift of its nation-building from ‘ethnic nationalism’ to ‘civic nationalism’, valuing the common rights, obligations, and values of citizenship mentioned above, rather than nation-centrism and ethnocentrism.

Third, citizenship education needs to emphasise not only the moral value, but also the utility value of cosmopolitanism. Based on equal citizenship rights, the younger generations of an immigrant group are likely to make a good living on their own merits rather than on skin colour or other ethnic features. While pursuing good living in the host nation, integration and cosmopolitanisation may occur spontaneously as people of
different cultural backgrounds closely interact with each other. Remarkably, it is often ignored that the inner drive that directs an immigrant person to embrace others is the attraction of good living rather than morality.

All in all, academic study on, or educational campaign for, cosmopolitanisation needs to be as open-minded as cosmopolitanism itself to pay attention to each transnational, border-crossing, intercultural practice that has the potential to make an ethnic group more open to others, whether for progressive or utility values. By so doing, for one thing, the understanding of cosmopolitan modernity that characterises the coming global risk society can be gradually broadened, deepened, and enriched. For another, citizenship education can achieve what Osler (2010: 247) refers to as ‘education for cosmopolitan citizenship’ which instils in young people the value of respecting diversity and cultural heritage, and of promoting solidarity and equity at national and international levels.
Appendix 1: The Interview Guide for Teachers and Administrators

Aims:
- To explore the function of Chinese school system at domestic and national level (social mobility and multiculturalism).
- To identify the experience of participating in transnational education practices (transnational community, space, and social field)
- To explore the 'cosmopolitanisation' of the school system with respect of both macro(institution) and micro(person) level.

Research Questions
- How do Chinese schools affect students' educational aspiration and career development?
- How do Chinese schools affect younger generations' integration into the Philippine society?
- How is the transnational education system being put into practice?
- How does these transnational practices affect Philippine Chinese's citizenship
- In what aspects cosmopolitanisation is happening in the Chinese education system?

1. Introduction
- Introduce the study, its aims and the researcher
- Brief discussion of ethical issues i.e. confidentiality, anonymity and recording

2. Context and background
- Details of family background (immigration history, where they stay, family structure)
- Education background (Chinese school? study abroad? why?)
- Language use at home and Language ability (Chinese, Hokkien, English, Tagalog)
- Citizenship
- Religion

3. Life in school
- What the Chinese schools do you teach? why you make this choice?
- What subjects do you teach there?
- What language do you use during class and after class?
- Do you know why parents send their children to Chinese schools? Do Chinese schools successfully fulfill the aim?

4. Tutoring
- Do you tutor students after school?
- What subjects do you teach?
- What language do you use?
- How do you enroll your student?
● What do you do in tutor place?

4. Career development
● What kind of college will you attend after graduation?
● Why do you choose to be a Chinese teacher?

5. Transnational education and the possibility of cosmopolitanisation of education
● What kind of activities hold by China or Taiwan have you attended?
● How do you feel about the teachers from Taiwan (or China)?
  ■ language teaching
  ■ class management
  ■ private communication
● Do you know why China and Taiwan offer the educational aids?
● How do you think the competition between China and Taiwan in education affairs?

6. The possibility of cosmopolitanisation of education
● What identity would you like to be called? (Chinese? Filipino? Chinese Filipino? both/and?)
● How often do you make use of your Chinese language ability other than school works?
● What kinds of popular culture do you identify with more? (dancing, music, movie, TV series; Chinese, English, Filipino)
● Who are friends you usually hang out with in and after school? What language do you speak with them?
● Who are your neighbours?
● If you can choose, where do you want to stay for life?
Appendix 2: The Interview Guide for Students and Parents

Aims:
- To explore the function of Chinese school system at domestic and national level (social mobility and multiculturalism).
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4. Career development
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   - Why do you choose to be a Chinese teacher?

5. Transnational education and the possibility of cosmopolitanisation of education
   - What kind of activities hold by China or Taiwan have you attended?
   - How do you feel about the teachers from Taiwan (or China) ?
     - Language teaching
     - Class management
     - Private communication
   - Do you know why China and Taiwan offer the educational aids?
   - How do you think the competition between China and Taiwan in education affairs?

6. The possibility of cosmopolitanisation of education
   - What identity would you like to be called? (Chinese? Filipino? Chinese Filipino? both/and?)
   - How often do you make use of your Chinese language ability other than school works?
   - What kinds of popular culture do you identify with more? (dancing, music, movie, TV series; Chinese, English, Filipino)
   - Who are friends you usually hang out with in and after school? What language do you speak with them?
   - Who are your neighbours?
   - If you can choose, where do you want to stay for life?
**Appendix 3: The Timeline of the Historical Development of the Chinese School System in the Philippines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>The Chinese Community</th>
<th>The Philippines</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Spanish Period</td>
<td>1560s</td>
<td></td>
<td>The building of Spanish colony</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>150 Chinese in Manila</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1580s</td>
<td>The establishment of Parian (the Chinese ghetto)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1790s</td>
<td>The demolition of Parian</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The American Period</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>The establishment of Chinese Consul and the Anglo-Chinese School</td>
<td>The cession of the Philippines to U.S. after the Spanish-American War</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>The extension of the Chinese Exclusion Law</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The first Chinese nationality law</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1912</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The founding of the Republic of China; the 1912 Chinese nationality law</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1928</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Establishment of Nanjing Government by the KMT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>58 Chinese schools with 7,214 students</td>
<td>The establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The breakout of the Second Sino-Japanese War</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>The establishment of the Chiang Kai Shek High School</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>The breakout of the Pacific War; the Japanese occupation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>The independence of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Sino-Philippine Treaty of Amity</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>The establishment of the PRC government in Beijing by the CPC; the ROC government in Taipei by the KMT</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>The executive order to prohibit the Chinese from immigration; The breakout of the Korean War</td>
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<td>1952</td>
<td>The mass roundup of the Chinese</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>The beginning of the policy of overseas students education in Taiwan</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>The establishment of the Overseas Chinese Teacher College; First Congress of Chinese Schools in the Philippines; A memorandum signed by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Ambassador</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>the ‘Filipino First policy’</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>the Filipinization of Chinese schools</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Mass naturalization; the Letter of Instructions No. 270</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>The establishment of the Philippine Chinese Education Research Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>The establishment of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>the Association of Chinese-Filipino Schools</td>
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