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Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization

Garriga, Ana Carolina (2009) 'Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization.' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (5). pp. 698-726. ISSN 0022-0027

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How does domestic regime type affect bilateral cooperation, and one of its most visible manifestations, bilateral treaties? This article explains how domestic political regime affects bilateral cooperation and, contrary to the expectations of some scholars, why autocracies should be expected to be more likely than democracies to enter into bilateral treaties. If the preferences of a pair of states are not identical, the sets of agreements that each party would consent to (win-sets) need to overlap for a bilateral treaty to be acceptable. Because additional domestic constraints reduce the size of a country’s win-set, autocracies should have broader win-sets than democracies. Therefore, autocratic dyads should be more likely to formalize bilateral treaties than other pairs of states. Based on an original data set, I present empirical evidence showing that pairs of autocracies are more likely than other pairs of states to enter into agreements formalizing bilateral cooperation.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: regime type, domestic constraints, bilateral bargaining, treaties, two-level games
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2019 10:17
Last Modified: 06 Jan 2022 13:54

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