Research Repository

Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games

Ferraioli, D and Goldberg, PW and Ventre, C (2016) 'Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games.' Theoretical Computer Science, 648. 96 - 115. ISSN 0304-3975

[img]
Preview
Text
618521.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, in the absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, have been defined in order to predict the outcome of such situations. In multi-player settings, it has been pointed out that to be realistic, a solution concept should be obtainable via processes that are decentralized and reasonably simple. Accordingly we look at the computation of solution concepts by means of decentralized dynamics. These are algorithms in which players move in turns to decrease their own cost and the hope is that the system reaches an “equilibrium” quickly. We study these dynamics for the class of opinion games, recently introduced by Bindel et al. These are games, important in economics and sociology, that model the formation of an opinion in a social network. We study best-response dynamics and show upper and lower bounds on the convergence to Nash equilibria. We also study a noisy version of best-response dynamics, called logit dynamics, and prove a host of results about its convergence rate as the noise in the system varies. To get these results, we use a variety of techniques developed to bound the mixing time of Markov chains, including coupling, spectral characterizations and bottleneck ratio.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Algorithmic game theory, Convergence rate to equilibria, Logit dynamics
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculty of Science and Health > Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 08 Nov 2018 15:42
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2018 15:42
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/23431

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item