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Heterogeneous facility location without money

Serafino, P and Ventre, C (2016) 'Heterogeneous facility location without money.' Theoretical Computer Science, 636. pp. 27-46. ISSN 0304-3975

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The study of the facility location problem in the presence of self-interested agents has recently emerged as the benchmark problem in the research on mechanism design without money. In the setting studied in the literature so far, agents are single-parameter in that their type is a single number encoding their position on a real line. We here initiate a more realistic model for several real-life scenarios. Specifically, we propose and analyze heterogeneous facility location without money, a novel model wherein: (i) we have multiple heterogeneous (i.e., serving different purposes) facilities, (ii) agents' locations are disclosed to the mechanism and (iii) agents bid for the set of facilities they are interested in (as opposed to bidding for their position on the network). We study the heterogeneous facility location problem under two different objective functions, namely: social cost (i.e., sum of all agents' costs) and maximum cost. For either objective function, we study the approximation ratio of both deterministic and randomized truthful algorithms under the simplifying assumption that the underlying network topology is a line. For the social cost objective function, we devise an (n-1)-approximate deterministic truthful mechanism and prove a constant approximation lower bound. Furthermore, we devise an optimal and truthful (in expectation) randomized algorithm. As regards the maximum cost objective function, we propose a 3-approximate deterministic strategyproof algorithm, and prove a 3/2 approximation lower bound for deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. Furthermore, we propose a 3/2-approximate randomized strategyproof algorithm and prove a 4/3 approximation lower bound for randomized strategyproof algorithms.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Algorithmic mechanism design; Facility location; Approximate mechanism design without money
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculty of Science and Health
Faculty of Science and Health > Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 09 Nov 2018 15:57
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2022 19:01

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