

University of Essex
Department of Government
Doctoral Thesis

LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOUR IN CHILE: THREE ESSAYS
EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF PRESIDENTIALISM AND
PARTY POLITICS ON CHILEAN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Department of Government
University of Essex

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Acknowledgments

The author thanks Royce Carroll, Lawrence Ezrow, Ricardo Gamboa and Jonathan Slapin and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful guidance, comments and suggestions.

The author is also indebted to Nicola Rowley and Nelson Fernandez.

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation analyses the effects of presidential and party politics on Chilean members of the National Congress. The motivation for this research comes from a couple of simple observations. Worldwide, legislative scholars, journalists and the public all make similar judgements about members of democratic assemblies' motivations: legislators are viewed as electorally opportunistic individuals, ready to take advantage of the chance to foster their electoral interests when they arise, sometimes regardless of principle or ideology. Indeed, the cornerstone assumption of legislative studies is the 'electoral connection': legislators are viewed as single-minded seekers of re-election (Mayhew 1974). The above has exerted an enormous influence on explanations for why legislators spend time and effort on activities to satisfy the goal of re-election (members' strategies) and why legislators support some policies and not others (policy outcomes). However, the conventional 'electoral connection frame', upon which the scholarly understanding relies to explain behavioural dynamics and outcomes in democratic assemblies, has two main shortcomings. Firstly, it is too simplistic to assume that members of democratic assemblies are equally opportunistic individuals. In fact, both anecdotal evidence and previous research show that while some legislators allocate more resources and effort to activities that please their constituents back home (such as case work, constituency service etc.), others spend more time and effort on national issues, lobbying government officials and drafting policy. Secondly, it is analytically crude to draw a direct line between electoral incentives and policy outcomes in democratic assemblies. Indeed, in some legislative environments, institutions make the translation of legislators' electoral incentives into policy difficult.

Certainly, the motivation above is not completely new. Indeed, decades ago, Richard Fenno (1973) already suggested that legislators may have different goals. Alongside re-election, Fenno includes other aims such as implementing good public policy and gaining influence within the assembly. Legislative studies, however, has been focused on the first goal listed above, and legislators' activities are usually viewed by political scientists as instrumental in achieving the primary goal of keeping office. Indeed, electoral insecurity has been advanced as an explanation for why legislators adopt a constituency focus in plenary activities such as speeches and parliamentary questions (Kellerman 2016; André et al., 2015). By the same token, in analysing why legislators spend time drafting policy proposals, previous research also suggests that bill initiation is a tool used by lawmakers to construct personal votes (Bowler 2010; Bräuningner et al., 2012; Williams and Indridason 2018). Similarly, the question of how bills initiated by members of the legislature move forward and become law is usually answered from a distributive perspective by focusing on idiosyncratic factors shaping the exchange of bills. Specifically, the focus of the latter is on the formation of fleeting partnerships of members around pieces of legislation that serve their electoral needs by providing benefits to their constituencies given a committee system that ensures those exchanges take place (Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Shepsle 1978; Weingast and Marshall 1988).

If one accepts the 'electoral connection' and distributive views, both legislators' behaviour and legislative outcomes would be understandable by paying attention to aspects such as the electoral system, electoral vulnerability or how institutions allow members to procure benefits for their districts. However, if those factors are removed from the equation, models

attempting to explain both members' strategies and policy outcomes in democratic legislatures would yield an inaccurate picture. For illustrative purposes, think of a legislative environment with the following features: (i) all legislators are elected under the same electoral system (formulae, magnitude, list type); (ii) legislators careers are controlled by strong national parties and their fortunes depend on being disciplined loyalists highly unlikely to break with the party line to foster their own agendas; (iii) legislators are not allowed to initiate bills targeting voters and providing benefits to their constituents. As it stands, the traditional views on distributive politics and electoral stimuli abovementioned seem insufficient to explain behavioural dynamics at the individual level, party strategies and legislative outcomes. But this is precisely the reality of Chilean politics, the case which this dissertation explores.

Three main questions are discussed in this study: What explains variance in constituency service when electoral rules have a constant effect across members and parties control lawmakers' careers? Why do legislators devote considerable energy to legislative activities when those actions do not allow them to communicate to their voters back home that they are working for them? And what explains the passage of legislators sponsored bills in parallel to the government when institutions do not allow for particularistic exchanges?

The models I put forward in this dissertation provide answers to those questions, suggesting an alternative rationale for explaining legislators' behaviour, party strategy and legislative outcomes. The models are tested in Chile, an institutional environment with the features outlined above: constant effect of electoral rules on legislators; a party-constrained legislative environment; and absence of legislative particularism. Firstly, constituency service or when legislators represent their voters is said to be an important aspect of the legislative world. In

this dissertation, it is argued that constituency focus in Chile is better understood by the parliamentary role framework. Secondly, initiating pieces of legislation is part of a lawmakers' job description. Bill initiation is usually understood as a form of constituency service. In this research, legislators' legislative activity (bill initiation) is conceived as a form of party service of Chilean deputies with ambition of promotion to higher office. Thirdly, the legislature production of policies sponsored by the lawmakers is better understood here as investments in the organization institutionalization rather than as sub products of legislators' particularistic exchanges.

Research Design

I focus on trying to analyse the effect of presidential and party politics on Chilean members of the National Congress. The empirical analysis that unfolds in the dissertation is based on a two-level design. In a first level (chapters 1 and 2), the unit of observation is '*Legislator*'. In a second level, the unit of observation is '*Legislators' bills*' (chapter 3).

In relation to the first level, we know that democratic legislatures offer legislators opportunities to participate in different kinds of activities, most notably roll call voting. For example, it is not an exaggeration to say that assemblies and legislators' activities receive more attention from the media when they are about to vote on a crucial bill than when members deliver speeches about their constituencies, draft private bills or debate those bills at committee level. Indeed, TV or press reports on important votes are a frequent part of media coverage. Similarly, political science scholars have paid a great deal of attention to legislators voting behaviour. From that source of data, scholars have extracted legislators' ideological

positions (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) and generate comparative estimates of party discipline, unity and cohesion records (Carey 2009; Hix 2002; Kam 2009; Morgenstern 2004).

Nevertheless, voting records provide only a partial understanding of legislators' behaviour. In the first instance, parties' efforts are oriented to limiting individual ambitions in order to protect collective goals (i.e., Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Snyder and Groseclose 2000), which ultimately makes the voting arena severely constrained for individual position taking strategies (Rocca 2007). Secondly, roll calls suffer from potential selection bias (Hug 2010).

The empirical strategy of this research turns to other mechanisms. It focuses on other activities that members carry out, such as non-legislative speeches, constituency service and the drafting and discussion of members' proposals. Indeed, legislators' behaviour is examined in the literature on arenas such as legislative and non-legislative speeches (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Proksch and Slapin 2012; Rocca 2007), parliamentary questions (Chiru 2018; Kellermann 2016; Martin 2011; Proksch and Slapin 2011; Russo 2011) and bill introduction (Bräuninger et al., 2012; Bowler 2010; Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon et al., 2004; Rocca 2010; Williams and Indridason 2018). By looking at mechanisms other than voting, the research design overcomes potential selection bias in the voting record. At the same time, those activities allow us to disentangle the strategic use that parties make of their backbenchers' records of legislative activity. For example, roll call records offer party leaders with information for eventual punishment rather than reward. In turning to legislative activities other than voting proposals, different explanations for parties' strategies arise. Similarly, the analysis of non-legislative speeches and chamber resolutions shows how some Chilean legislators overcome the restrictions imposed by the party enforcement of voting decisions.

At the second level, the research design allows us to disentangle how democratic legislatures pass into law their own proposals in parallel to the government. Legislative scholars have paid attention to how chief executives secure the success of their policy initiatives (e.g., Alemán and Navia 2009; Cheibub et al., 2004; Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011). However, legislative scholars have paid less attention to why, for example, Private Member Bills in the UK House of Commons or legislators' *mociones* in the Chilean National Congress are tabled for consideration and enacted law. Taking members' legislative proposals as the unit of observation, this part of the dissertation focuses fundamentally on trying to develop good estimates regarding the process of production of legislators' own policies in parallel to the executive agenda.

In focusing on behaviour related to those activities and outcomes as described above, this dissertation contributes to a research agenda on legislative behaviour that goes beyond roll call votes and party discipline, in the first place, and the government legislative success, in the second.

Case Selection

I collected a new data set from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. Chile represents a suitable case for testing the set of hypotheses that this study puts forward. Some features of the case selected provide an excellent legislative and partisan environment to test my expectations. Firstly, in the period under examination in this study, all candidates were elected under the same electoral rules (magnitude, type of list, candidacy and voting rules). This characteristic

is especially important in Chapters 1 (constituency service) and 2 (party service), where the focus is on disparities at the individual level.

A second key feature is the role exerted by the strong Chilean parties in the nomination of candidates to the national assembly. As suggested by previous research, legislators need to provide proof of loyalty in order to keep the party nomination. This is not inconsequential, particularly in the model of party service that we put forward in the second chapter. A third characteristic of the case selected here is the absence of legislative particularism. By constitutional mandate, Chilean lawmakers are banned from introducing bills including spending. Given that, it is not surprising that most of the bills initiated by Chilean members of the Chamber of Deputies have a national scope and only a tiny proportion of them are written to connect with constituents (Marenghi 2009). The above implies that it would be incorrect to model the passing of members' proposals in the Chilean assembly by focusing on particularism/pork barrel considerations. This allows the testing of a different set of factors explaining legislators' success in passing their own policy proposals. In general, learning about the Chilean case might help us to understand other places in Latin America and beyond.

Plan of the Dissertation

The plan of the dissertation is straightforward. The first chapter introduces the constituency focus model. Three main hypotheses are tested: legislators who were born and raised in the province where the district is located, inexperienced deputies and those from thinly populated constituencies are more likely to embrace a constituency focus. In this chapter, the analysis focuses on non-voting activities such as non-legislative speeches, parliamentary questions

and private bills. The coding strategy allows discrimination between a general positioning toward the constituency and the actual 'constituency member role'. The results of the analysis confirm that Chilean legislators born and raised in the region where their districts are located and those with smaller constituencies are more likely to adopt the role of constituency servants.

The second chapter puts forward a theory where legislative activity, or bill authorship, is better conceived as a form of party service. The model specification puts emphasis on how parties take notice of members' legislative activities, other than voting. Specifically, the model advances the argument that parties look at legislative records to promote competent members to higher offices. The hypothesis is that legislators who introduce more bills are more likely to be promoted by their parties to higher offices within the legislature and the party.

In contrast to Chapter 1 and 2, Chapter 3 emphasizes the role of information about bill quality in explaining why those policies initiated by the members of the legislature move forward and are enacted law in parallel to the agenda of the strong Chilean presidents. The chapter tests the hypothesis that legislator's aggregate information about proposals quality by looking at the names of the authors of the bills. Authorship reveals information about proposal quality, or legislation side effects, at a low cost, enhancing informational efficiency in the process of producing non-government bills. Both support across the aisle and policy specialization are indicative of good public policy. The findings have implications for our understanding of how legislatures advance their own policies in parallel to strong chief executives and when legislatures are supposed to act as merely reactive bodies.

Taken together, the chapters of this dissertation seek to provide new insights on both legislators' behaviour and collective choice in party-controlled democratic assemblies where classical explanations based on electoral institutions and distributive politics do not hold in explaining both legislators' behaviour at the individual level and legislative choice.

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CHAPTER I

WHEN DO LEGISLATORS RESPOND TO THEIR CONSTITUENCIES IN PARTY CONTROLLED ASSEMBLIES? EVIDENCE FROM CHILE

Abstract

Previous research suggests that legislators respond to their constituencies when they are vulnerable electoral candidates. This article argues that the legislators that focus on their constituencies (perhaps at the expense of the broader national constituency) will be *born and raised in the region* where their district is located (biographical factors), *junior* members of the assembly (intraparty position), and from *thinly populated districts* (district density). I analyze new data from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies that supports these theoretical expectations. These findings have implications for our understanding of political representation and when legislators represent their districts.

Keywords: parliamentarians' role, District Representation, Constituency Focus

Chilean deputies deliver thousands of speeches, submit written questions and draft private bills in each legislative session even though these activities ultimately have limited influence in shaping policy. In this light, the question emerges: given that members can spend their time and (limited) resources on other activities, why do legislators devote considerable energy to these activities? Informed by the parliamentarians' role framework, this article provides evidence that legislators that focus on their constituencies are *born and raised in the region* where their district is located (biographic factors), *junior* members of the assembly (intraparty position), and from *thinly populated districts* (district density).

Previous research explains the rationality of constituency service by paying attention to members' electoral circumstances. It is well known that institutions provide different incentives for legislators to cultivate the personal vote (Crisp et al. 2004; Cox 1997). Furthermore, attention to constituencies has been argued to be related to electoral insecurity (Kellermann 2016; André et al. 2015; Lazarus 2009; Peskowitz 2018) and election proximity (Fukumoto and Matsuo 2015). Legislators' roles within the legislature are also thought to matter for when legislators pay more attention to their districts (e.g. Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012; Ciftci and Yildirim 2017; Haughey 2017; Patzelt 2007). Following the studies above and the "good constituency member" framework (Searing 1994), this article explains when legislators' respond to constituents from their districts. This study argues that legislators' biographies and socialisation, institutional positions and the population density of their districts matter for when they represent their districts. This study represents a new contribution by moving beyond "electoral" explanations that are common in this literature.

To test the implications of the argument proposed here, I have collected new observations from the Chilean Congress.¹ The data set contains thousands of written questions, non-legislative speeches, chamber resolutions and parliamentary bills. The coding process is theoretically driven towards estimating the constituency orientation of each individual legislator. The analysis of Chilean deputies suggests that they respond to their districts when they are born and raised in the same province in which their district is located; when they are junior in the organization and when they represent small constituencies. These observations have significant implications for our understanding of how legislators represent their constituencies in presidential party systems where national parties control legislative offices and members' career prospects. From a comparative perspective, this research shows how behavioural strategies in parliamentary and certain presidential settings, can exhibit similarities.

1. Explaining District-Based Representation

A reasonable starting point for explaining district-based representation is to assume that legislators are motivated by their desire of re-election (Mayhew 1974). Scholars have suggested that the frequency and intensity with which legislators engage in constituency-oriented actions is a response to their electoral vulnerability (André et al. 2015; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Kellermann 2016; 2013). Legislators in the UK Parliament, for example, are likely to introduce more parliamentary questions (Kellermann 2016) and Early Day Motions (Kellermann 2013) when their electoral margin decreases.

¹ Note to reviewers: this data will be made available on the author's website upon publication.

Some studies show, however, that electoral insecurity is not always a predictor of constituency-based representation. Recent research shows that the engagement on constituency effort can be explained due to individuals' role orientation rather than electoral insecurity or direct electoral incentives (Haughey 2017). Recent research on the European Parliament shows that members' responsiveness to their constituencies may be guided by intrinsic factors in isolation to the electoral arena (De Vries et al. 2016). Martin (2011) finds that narrower results in the previous election do not explain why members tabled questions with a constituency focus in the Irish legislature. In the same token, a study from the Australian Parliament shows that members from vulnerable seats do not provide more constituency service in comparison to those members in safe seats (Studlar and McAllister 1995). The studies above suggest that "electoral" explanations are not wholly satisfactory.

Introducing the notion of legislators' *roles* within their party and the legislature helps provide a more comprehensive explanation. Existing research highlights the importance of legislators' roles and their behaviour (Akirav 2015; Blidook and Kerby 2011; Ciftci and Yildirim 2017; Clarke 1978; Haughey 2017; Mcleay and Vowles 2007; O'Leary 2011; Russo 2011; Strøm 1997; van Vonna 2012). For simplicity, political roles can be defined as "(...) particular patterns of interrelated goals, attitudes and behaviours that are characteristic of people in particular positions" (Searing 1994:18). Searing (1994) identifies four roles: policy advocate, ministerial aspirants, parliamentary men and constituency member. The last role, constituency member, suggests that legislators who adopt this role have, as a priority, provided services and casework to their constituencies (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Norton 1994; Searing 1994; 1985).

Following this literature, I view representative actions that legislators may undertake in the plenary (i.e. a constituency member delivering services or speeches to their voters) as analogous to the adoption of the ‘constituency member role’. It is worth emphasizing that my model specification only controls for behavioural (observable) aspects of the parliamentary role definition. This empirical choice follows previous works that have traced a parallel between the notion of roles and actions adopted by members of the assembly (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012). Furthermore, I conceive that those behavioural patterns may flow from: rational choices guided by the environment where the legislators operate; social and cultural predispositions; and institutional positioning.

The next illustration shows the underlying intuition of the theory proposed here. Let’s envisage two legislators. Legislator A is an electorally vulnerable member. Another legislator – Legislator B – is a member from a safe seat. Legislator A has good reasons to be concerned about his electoral prospects, however, the adoption of a constituency focus/role is not mechanically given. According to our theory, that decision will be dependent on factors such as deeply rooted biographical and social factors and the resources at their disposal (position within the party, access to funding, etc). For example, if Legislator A is a senior member with expedited access to funding or policy influence/visibility, spending time and resources in adopting a constituency focus is less likely to be an optimal strategy. Equally important are other factors such as personal biographies. If these hypothetical members were born or raised in the district or the province where the district is located, we can expect a powerful predisposition to adopt the role of ‘good constituency member’. On the contrary, if Legislator A has a weak personal attachment to the constituency (absence of ad hoc socialisation), finding a constituency orientation would be more unlikely. The reverse logic would apply in the case of Legislator B in the safe seat. Following electoral connection

driven theories, Legislators B has fewer incentives to spend time and effort in their constituency. However, it could be the case that Legislator B was born and was raised in the region where the constituency is located. This may create an intrinsic inclination to perform a constituency service. Suppose also that Legislator B does not have access to key (and scarce) resources within the party and the organization. In this example, Legislator B is also an inexperienced member. Thus, embracing constituency matters may constitute an avenue to develop a reputation within the party and the organization as well as keeping in touch with voters back home.

Three sets of factors are identified in the literature that helps to explain why legislators, operating under the same electoral institutions, adopt a constituency focus. Firstly, the constituency orientation is dependent on biographical factors. Members' identity and self-definition of what their role is has been said to explain why they embrace a constituency orientation (Searing 1994; Searing 1985). It is worth noticing that the legislators' role framework was originally centered on the importance of norms and social group dynamics (Wahlke et al. 1963). Indeed, social and political backgrounds shape members initial understandings of their roles and their self-definitions of parliamentary roles (Best and Vogel 2012). Legislators' biographies reveal vital information that may reflect different degrees of attachment with the district and explain the orientation towards the constituency through socialisation. For example, in their study of French deputies representative roles, Costa and Kerrouche (2009) suggest that members who were born in the district they represent may have stronger ties with the constituency. Similarly, Russo (2011) demonstrates that Italian deputies who were born in the district they represent are prone to resort to parliamentary questions with a constituency orientation. Research on the Australian House of Representatives has also explored how residence in the district does impact on the

engagement on constituency work (Studlar and McAllister 1995). By the same token, in analysing how legislators from outlying regions are more likely to embrace a constituency focus in Ireland and England, scholars have suggested that the above may be rooted in ‘political cultures’ (Martin 2013:117) which creates a sense of obligation to members of being ‘here, among us’ (Wood and Young 1997:226). In sum, biographical factors such as being born, raised or having lived for a long time in the district explain an orientation toward the constituency given social and cultural features.

Secondly, constituency orientation is dependent on the position members have within the organization. Russo (2011:294) points out that: “(...) there are sensible reasons to think that junior parliamentarians, without national visibility or recognized policy expertise, can try to reinforce their credibility by championing the interests of the constituency.” Junior members have greater incentives to adopt this role (Searing 1994; 1985). Tenured members can resort to firmly established constituency networks and name recognition. On the contrary, both freshmen and backbenchers are in the ‘expansionist’ phase of their careers (Fenno 1978). They have greater incentives to adopt a home style to foster their recognition (Fenno 1978). In the same vein, Norris (1997) finds that younger members resort more to constituency service, in comparison with experienced legislators. It is important to note that previous research highlights that the behaviour described above is analytically different from electoral vulnerability. Indeed, Martin (2013:117) hypothesizes that newcomers have greater incentives to focus on their constituencies to secure re-election notwithstanding their previous electoral margin while senior members can redirect their focus to international affairs. Similarly, Searing (1994:135-136) finds that electoral marginality does not explain why MPs at Westminster spend more time in their constituencies while inexperience within the organisation does explain so.

Thirdly, previous studies have recognised the link between the size of the district population and constituency representation. By keeping electoral institutions constant, those studies provide an alternative angle to explanations focused on district magnitude (Cox 1997) and electoral institutions disparities (Carey and Shugart 1995). The size of the population to represent has an effect on the communication link between legislators and their constituencies (Frederick 2008:359; Taagepera and Shugart 1989:179-83). Oppenheimer (1996) pointed out the importance of the ‘representational experience’ (contextual dimension), of which the population of the constituency appears to be crucial. Scholars have pointed out that legislators from smaller constituencies are more likely to adopt a constituency member role. Empirical evidence shows that U.S senators from more populated states resort more to indirect communications with their constituents and the latter feel more distant to their representatives (Oppenheimer 1996). In the same token, Frederick (2008) shows how constituents from more populated districts in the U.S House of Representatives have less contact with their representatives and tend to view them as not responsive to the districts’ demands. Studies from the U.S Senate also provide evidence on those lines. Constituents from less populated district in the U.S Senate view their Senators as performing a ‘pork barrel’ role and report having contact with them (Hibbing and Alford 1990). Senators from more populated constituencies resort less to pork barrelling strategies (Atlas, Hendershott and Zupan 1997). Evidence from Latin American settings shows that when voters are more spatially concentrated within the district, legislators are more likely to spend time and effort on constituency service activities and pork barrel politics because it is physically easier for them to contact supporters and build name recognition (Ingall and Crisp 2001).

In light of the previous discussion, this article advances three hypotheses:

Biographical Factors Hypothesis (H1): Members who were born and raised in the region/province where the constituency is located are more likely to adopt a constituency focus.

Institutional Disadvantage Hypothesis (H2): First term legislators are more likely to adopt a constituency focus in comparison to legislators with more seniority.

Size of the Constituency Hypothesis (H3): As the size of the population living in the constituency increases, the adoption of a constituency focus will decrease.

2. Case Selection

The case of Chile presents a suitable case to the hypotheses described above. Information obtained from parliamentary surveys reveals that the Chilean deputies preferred role is serving their constituents (Marenghi 2009; PELA 2005). In the Latin American context, Chilean deputies manifest the strongest ‘territorial conception’ of their roles. Qualitative information I gathered as part of this research confirms that Chilean legislators have strong incentives to perform a ‘constituency member role’.

‘It is important that voters understand your role as legislator. You represent them from a territorial perspective, however they vote for you to legislate and oversee the government. They do not vote for you to build bridges or roads. While this confusion still exists, there is no clarity so, because the legislative work is difficult to show, there is no other way than... to be re-elected, adopt those practices.’ (Former Party Whip and deputy).

Those incentives to perform a role as constituency member appear to be at odds with the main institutional features of the Chilean legislative environment. Chilean legislators cannot use the budget to respond to constituency demands, unlike other presidential polities. In fact, the Chilean Constitution does not allow deputies and senators to introduce bills or amendments having budgetary implications (Article 65, Constitution of the Republic).

The Chilean assembly is the most institutionalized in Latin America (Palanza Scartascini and Tommasi et al., 2016). In Chile, the legislative process is centred on strong political parties. Comparatively high levels of party discipline and coalition unity in voting records constitutes one of the main features of legislative politics (Campos-Parra and Navia 2017; Toro 2007). The Chilean Congress is also characterized by a highly stable and institutionalized committee system, strong parliamentary groups and leadership system (Carey 2002). Chilean members of the Chamber of Deputies construct careers within the organization (Morgenstern 2002). However, on average 42,2% of the candidates elected in the six parliamentary elections held between 1993 and 2013 were newcomers (PNUD 2014).

Electoral institutions have a constant effect on members. All Chilean deputies were elected under the same electoral rules and district magnitude. Until 2016, the electoral system to elect members of the National Congress was technically proportional (with D' Hondt formulae), but with the lowest possible magnitude in each district ($M=2$).² According to the electoral system, an individual party or pact could only win both seats in a given district if the list doubled the second list's total vote (Salas 2016:215). Nevertheless, this was a very infrequent scenario (PNUD 2014). The recurrent outcome was that each coalition (the Chilean party

² The Chilean electoral system to elect deputies and senators underwent a major reform in 2015. The binominal system was replaced by a proportional system in which district magnitude increased and the number of districts decreased (Gamboa and Morales 2016).

system was organized around two major coalitions) obtained one seat. Consequently, electoral competition occurred within each list (Rabkin 1996). This is not trivial. To the aforementioned we should add that the candidate nomination process is biased in favour of loyal incumbents (Morgenstern and Siavelis 2008:373). Parties orchestrate candidate selection in a sophisticated and complex way, for example including the consideration of cabinet offices to the losing candidates within their lists (Carey and Siavelis 2003).³

Territory also matters in Chilean politics. Chile is one of the longest countries in the world from north to south, with a longitude of 4,329 km. The size of the constituency shows high variation. A deputy from district 59 has a constituency of approximately 39,000, according to the 2005 electoral results. Meanwhile, a legislator from district 23 has a constituency of more than 200,000 voters. Interviews that I conducted with Chilean members of the Chamber of Deputies suggest that constituencies present high variation in their socio-demographic characteristics and such variation has an effect on legislators' strategies and position taking choices.

‘I believe that there are two types of districts. The aerial districts which are highly populated, you need TV advertisement and propaganda on the streets. There you have Las Condes, populous communes from Santiago, (both from the Metropolitan Region), maybe Concepcion (the second larger city in the country). In other districts, more regional, rural maybe, to increase your vote share you need face-to-face work’ (Former Party Whip and deputy).

³ It is worth mentioning that to be elected deputy, the aspirant needs to have his or her residence in the region where the district is located for at least two years before the election day (Constitution of the Republic, Article 48). However, it is well known that this is more or less a formality. In fact, strong and centralised parties usually nominate candidates without previous connection with the district.

A caveat needs to be mentioned. Some evidence shows that Chilean legislators from remote districts are more inclined to support decentralisation bills to please their constituents (Mardones 2007). Although the above may lead to a more idiosyncratic prediction on its own (i.e decentralisation hypothesis), our model specification and corresponding coding strategy, explained below, set in motion a different prediction and corresponding measurement. Put simply, those idiosyncratic factors, such as being born and/or raised in the constituency, are better conceived as part of the social and cultural backgrounds that shape choices and actions that constitute the constituency role.

3. Measuring Constituency Focus/Role

To observe constituency oriented behaviour one may turn to face to face local constituency service or case work. For example, one week of the month (the “district week”) is intended to allow legislators to perform constituency service. However, in some contexts, public, accurate and systematic records of travel logs, district office hours⁴ and similar data are not available, imposing formidable measurement challenges. For example, available qualitative research on the Chilean ‘district week’ is based on a few observations only (Toro 2017). This data availability problem is something common to most of the Latin American legislatures.⁵ Other studies rely upon self-reported role conceptions obtained from parliamentary surveys and interviews (André and Depauw 2018; Deschouwer and Depauw 2014; Mcleay and Vowles 2007). However, in addition to potential selection bias, behavioral strategies can be

⁴ Surgeries in the UK legislative terminology.

⁵ For an exception: See Crisp and Desposato (2004).

endogenous to self-reported conceptions (von Vonno 2012:120), compromising the generation of accurate estimates of constituency orientation.

Parliamentary role-based studies have examined constituency focus by analysing mechanisms other than voting, such as parliamentary questions (Blidook and Kerby 2011; Kellermann 2016; Russo 2011; Martin 2011).⁶ In order to test the hypothesis formulated above, this research resorts to data obtained from written questions, speeches, chamber resolutions and parliamentary bills from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. Members of the Chamber of Deputies spend lots of time on activities other than voting (Chamber of Deputies 2016). A brief description of all the mechanisms examined here is provided below:

1. **Written Questions (oficios).** The Constitutional Congressional Organic Law (18,918) establishes that individual deputies can submit *oficios* requiring information to the government. Members are allowed to send *oficios* at any time, including times when the Chamber of Deputies is not holding sessions. This mechanism is part of the oversight privilege of the Chilean deputies. Petitions for Information established in Law 18,918 are different to the *oficios* that deputies require as a part of their intervention in another section of the session, which is called the *Hora de Incidentes*, and most of the time are simply a copy of the speech delivered.
2. **Non-Legislative Speeches.** The equivalent to the U.S House of Representatives one-minute speech in the Chamber of Deputies. This is a 60 minute forum at the end of the

⁶ In the Latin American context, one recent work (Alemán, Ramirez and Slapin 2017) examines speech participation but focused on how parties orchestrate participation in different type of speeches during the session.

session twice a week. No rules or germaneness are provided for the Incident Hour.

Speeches can address any subject or topic chosen by the legislator.

3. *Parliamentary Bills*. The 1980 Chilean Constitution states that parliamentary bills (*mociones*) can be initiated by a minimum of one deputy to a maximum of ten. Chilean congressmen are not allowed to sponsor bills after the proposals are introduced. According to the Chilean Constitution, legislators are banned from introducing bills or amendments including spending (Constitution of the Republic, 1980 Article 65).
4. *Congressional Declarations (proyectos de acuerdo)*. Between one and ten deputies can introduce a declaration which then sent to the President of the Republic, who must reply within 30 days through the respective minister. This instrument is part of the oversight privilege of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies granted by the Constitution of the Republic. Once presented, chamber declarations are immediately scheduled for consideration (*Orden del Dia*).

The data collected corresponds to the period between the 354th and the 357th Congress (2006-2010). Firstly, 2,370 *oficios* were collected from Legislative Records (*Fichas Parlamentarias*). Also, I review 285 sessions of the *Hora de Incidentes* taking place between 2006 and 2009, where almost 4,000 individual speeches were delivered. *Fichas Parlamentarias* were read in order to obtain the number of events and the speech content. The same data collection process was undertaken for bill initiation data and congressional resolutions.

To obtain estimates from the data reflecting actual constituent focus, each written question, speech, resolution and bill was hand coded and classified under the following coding rules. I

build upon the six categories proposed by Martin (2011) in the analysis of parliamentary questions in the Irish case (See Table 1 for examples). According to Martin's coding rules, each question, speech and bill delivered must mention at least one of the following: 1) Member district by name; 2) A geographical location that corresponds to the legislators' constituency; 3) A particular individual or case from the district; 4) Specific public services and facilities located in the members' district; 5) Organizations, companies or interest groups specific to the district; 6) A specific event taking place in the district (festivity and the like). As it stands, the bar is set very low for what constitutes constituency service. Indeed, it is not really informative about how constituency orientated is a given speech, question, resolution or bill by simply looking if the name of the district, a place or geographical location, and/or certain facilities are mentioned. Instead, what really matters in this research is how the constituency is invoked. Therefore, to the aforementioned categories, an additional one was added. The code C 3.1 (See Table 1 below) includes those acts that invokes a particular group of constituents or refer to a case affecting more than one individual from the constituency. This additional code allows me to capture those actions that do not mention a specific member of the constituency, but demand action about groups clearly identified. This category covers, for example, a group of neighbours or a group of families. I believe that this more compelling theoretical coding allows me to differentiate between general orientation towards the district and actual focus on constituents. Furthermore, this hand coding allows me to avoid potential problems related to automatic coding. As Kellermann (2016) noted, automatic coding (using a computer algorithm) works well capturing geographical location and the district name, but performs with less success when capturing mentions of organizations, individual constituents or cases, interest groups and events.

[Insert table 1 about here]

Finally, I have good reason to believe that petitions for information, declarations and speeches and bills are not alternatives of one another, providing accurate estimates of legislators' constituency orientation instead. The activities examined here are not subject to agenda control or time scarcity, as legislative debates and voting are. In the case of *Written Questions*, no vote is needed for submission to the executive and no plenary restrictions exist. In the same token, as the examination of the Daily Sessions Diary and Legislative Records reveals, deputies frequently deliver more than one speech in the same session. Chilean deputies also submit parliamentary bills in a relatively deregulated context. Therefore, participation in non-voting activities exhibits a completely different dynamic in comparison to the voting arena.

4. Analysis and Results

Four dependent variables are used to test the expectations. The first response variable is the number of speeches with a constituency focus delivered by each member during the term. The second response variable is *Written Questions*, which is the number of *oficios* with an explicit constituency focus sent by each legislator in the congressional period under examination. Both variables consider only the sum of categories C.3 and C3.1. A third response variable is the number of Chamber Resolutions cosponsored by each legislator that mentions the district province. The last response variable is *Bill Initiation*, which account for the number of bills initiated by each member of the Chamber of Deputies that mentions the province where the constituency is located.

The independent variables are as follows. Our hypothesis, suggesting that those legislators who were born and raised in the region where the district is located are more likely to adopt a constituency focus, is tested with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for those deputies who were actually born and attended primary school in the district province, and 0 otherwise. In our sample, 40% of the legislators were born and raised in the region where the district they represent is located. ⁷ *First-Term* is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for members in their first term and 0 otherwise (33% of our sample correspond to freshman deputies). The hypothesis regarding the incentives of members from more populated constituencies is inspected with the variable *Size of Constituency*, which captures the number of people living in the constituency that voted in the last parliamentary election. Descriptive inspection of the data shows that there is high variance in districts' populations who voted in the election where the deputy was elected. The smaller district has 39,481 habitants who voted, while the biggest one has 239,067. Several controls are included in the models. *Vote Share Less than 20%* is a control variable capturing the vote obtained by each deputy in the last election (percentage). *Non-Government* is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for members of the opposition and independents and 0 otherwise. Previous research on Chile has argued that policy know-how and committee assignment serve members electoral needs. Thus, *Committee Chair* is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for Committee Chairs and 0 otherwise. Prior research has also shown the effects of partisan disagreements on speech participation in the Chilean case (Alemán, Ramírez and Slapin 2017). To control for that, *Party Disagreement* reports the ideological proximity with the party mean (roll calls). ⁸

⁷ Following our theoretical frame, we consider as *Born and Raised* only those deputies who were born outside the Capital City, Santiago. Additionally, it is worth mentioning that alternative operationalizations, for example having a political career in the district may be endogenous to institutions and parties and not a reflection of role self-definitions built from social and cultural aspects.

⁸ To discard the existence of ideological factors, Roll Call is a control variable capturing the distance to the party mean of each legislator using NOMINATE scores. For example, Shogan and Glassman (2017) show how ideologically extreme members are likely to deliver more One-minute speeches in the U.S Congress.

Our response variables are non-negative integers, meaning that we require a count model. A Negative Binomial Regression Model (NBRM) is used as diagnostics tests reveal evidence of over dispersion on the response variables *Written Questions, Speeches and Chamber Resolutions*. The NBRM addresses the problem of unobserved heterogeneity or over dispersion (Long and Freese 2014). As a matter of fact, the Alpha LR test is significant in Models 1 and 2 and 3.

[Insert table 2 around here]

In Model 1 (See Table 2), the response variable is the count of non-legislative speeches delivered by Chilean deputies falling into categories C.3 and C3.31. As described above, those two categories represent a more convincing sign of constituency service. In fact, running models against the rest of the categories separately does not produce major significant results.⁹ In Model 2, the dependent variable is the count of written questions falling in the same two coding categories abovementioned. In Models 3 and 4 the outcome is the number of chamber declarations and bills, respectively, that mention the region where the district is located.

Model 1 shows that the predictor *Born and Raised* correlates positively with the response variable. The coefficient is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. The variable *Size of Constituency* correlates negatively with the response variable, as expected, but the coefficient is not statistically significant. The predictor *First-Term* is not statistically significant, although the coefficient goes in the expected direction. The variable *Vote Share Less than 20%*, is negatively correlated with the response variable, and it is statistically significant. That is suggesting, apparently, electoral vulnerable members turn out to other activities to

⁹ The only category that produces both general and specific significant results is C.2.

foster their electoral prospects. The rest of the controls do not have a statistically significant effect on the response variable.

In Model 2 (Written Questions), the variable *Size of the Constituency* (logged) is, as anticipated, negatively correlated with the response variable (statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level). That means that, for each unit increase in the logged number of voters, the expected log count of written questions decreases by the corresponding coefficient. In Model 2, however, no confirmation is obtained with respect to our predictor *Born and Raised*. This result may be suggesting that for members who have a personal attachment to the district, such as those natives from the province, delivering speeches (Model 1) constitutes a more powerful, and maybe direct tool than submitting written questions. The control variable *Non-Government* has a positive coefficient, indicating that the log count increases when moving from the reference group (Government legislators) to those in the opposition and the independents. This may be the case because members of the opposition feel more inclined to use the written questions to adopt national stances and carry out government accountability. In any case, this result is only collateral to adoption of the constituency member role.

[Insert figure 1 around here]

[Insert figure 2 around here]

More substantive interpretation of the models is obtained from the predicted number of events. Confirming the Biographical Factors Hypothesis, Figure 1 shows that the predicted number of events (speeches) for those legislators that were born and raised in the district province is about 1.30, holding the covariates at their mean. The predicted number of events for the reference group is lower at 0.59. Figure 2 confirms that members from more populous constituencies are less likely to perform a constituency role by resorting to Written Questions

in comparison to those from districts with smaller constituencies. The predicted number of events decreases monotonically as the district population increases, holding the rest of covariates at their mean.

In Models 3 and 4, the response variables correspond to those resolutions and bills that mention the district region. The bar was set lower for what is considered constituency focus. In comparison to Models 1 and 2, both Resolutions and Bills are collective activities most of the time. In fact, even after relaxing the coding rule and allowing mentions of the province where the constituency is located, the positive count is extremely low. Model 3 shows the effect of the predictors on the count of Chamber Resolutions. In this case, the three predictors hold into the model. The coefficient of both First-Term and Born and Raised are positive and statistically significant, confirming hypotheses 1 and 2. Also, as expected, the expected log count Chamber Declarations decreases as the district population increases.

[Insert figure 3 around here]

Figure 3 provides more substantive interpretation of the results. For example, the predicted number of events for those deputies who were born and raised in the district and belong to a small constituency (or the baseline in the prediction) is 5.36 holding the rest of the covariates at their mean. The predicted number of events for those deputies in the reference group and also from highest reference value of Size of the Constituency is .31. However, it is worth noting that Models 3 and 4 results should be interpreted with caution, due to the relaxation of the coding rules for what is understood here for constituency service. In Model 4, the response variable is Bill Initiation.¹⁰ A Poisson regression shows that the predictor Born and Raised is positively correlated with the count of bills with a general constituency orientation

¹⁰ Statistical tests show that there are no substantive signs of overdispersion, and a comparison of the estimates and standards errors shows that the NBRM is not better than a Poisson model.

and it is statistically significant. Both variables Size of the Constituency and First-Term are not statistically significant.

5. Discussion and Implications

We have introduced a model that informs us that legislators' decision to focus their activities within the assembly in their constituents is better conceived as a reflection of social-institutional factors and also as a response to certain district idiosyncrasies other than magnitude. This article adds to the literature exploring the link between legislative roles and observable behaviour within the assembly. The main finding is that Chilean deputies born and raised in the region where their districts are located and those with smaller constituencies are more likely to adopt the role of constituency servants. These findings are surprising in an environment which is not likely to reward this choice.

Several implications arise from the previous analysis. Firstly, by building from the legislators' role framework, this research goes beyond previous research that focuses on immediate electoral incentives or electoral institutions. Secondly, the findings suggest that members from parliamentary systems and presidential settings can adopt a constituency focus by resorting to relatively similar mechanisms. When party discipline is fiercely enforced, as it is in many parliamentary environments and in the presidential case examined here, the existence of instances, such as written questions, petitions for information, non-legislative speech and parliamentary bills, allows members to maximize their utilities without becoming rebels or breaking with the party.

From a methodological perspective, the strategy adopted in this article avoids the limitations of the data provided by self-reported behaviour and preferences from elite surveys.

Unsurprisingly, previous studies based on comparing parliamentary surveys, self-reported roles and legislative orientation, have noted incongruence between what members say to represent themselves and the content of their bills (Marenghi 2009). This research shows that examining behaviour disparities in non-roll call arenas may provide direct estimates of constituency focus. The coding effort pays off. By setting a high bar for what constitutes constituency orientation, I was able to differentiate between different general orientation towards the district and actual focus on constituents. This coding strategy results in more accurate estimates of constituency orientation. My results show the potential of the coding used here, and the importance of taking into consideration variants of representation styles that may account for more convincing signs of constituency focus.

Finally, the findings provided in this article add to the discussion about representation in Latin America. By focusing on avenues other than floor voting and policy, members appear to be more responsive to constituents' demands than is usually assumed in critical analyses of Latin American legislatures. More importantly from a theoretical perspective, members orientation towards their constituents appear to be more complex than deterministic electoral connection assumptions imported from what the U.S Congress literature suggests. In a region where democratic assemblies rank very low in terms of public confidence and legitimacy, legislative studies should do more in providing theories and estimates on how members of the assemblies represent their constituencies. Further research may look, for example, into how constituents respond to those legislators' efforts to embrace constituency causes and how, in general, individuals' constituency orientation contributes to democratic representation in ways that our lack of research on the topic is obscuring.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Coding categories

Coding categories	Examples Speeches (Incident Hour)
C1. District name	‘District 33, which I represented, including Mostazal, Rengo and Machali, excluding Rancagua(...)’ ‘As a District 3 deputy, I am here to voice my concern due to the increasing number of suicides...’
C. 2 Geographical location	‘Assaults and robbery have increased in the Villa 2000, in Pozo Almonte(...)’ To the Ministry of Defence. Require the report about the works of sand extraction in the sector of “Playas Negras”, commune of Coronel and if this work has been legally authorised.
C. 3 A particular individual or case	‘In March 2005, Ms Teresa Ray and Ena Vidal were murdered. Until now there are no suspects or (...)’
C.3.1 Added category: A particular Group or collective case.	[Speech] Praise the Oveja Tome Union as result of their economic effort in order to keep their jobs. (Speech) ‘Solution to families affected by the selling of a property of the Public Rails Company located in the zone of Huellehue.’ ‘Increase in the social benefit to 12 families from the villa El Triangulo in Los Muermos’.
C. 4 Public services and facilities	‘When the Autopista del Sol was constructed, both the access and the toll of Penaflor were left open(...)’ ‘The problem arises because the Antofagasta city judges have not been appointed (...)’
C. 5 Organizations, companies or interest groups	Provide a loan in Padre Hurtado Street, in the city of Melipilla, to the Pentecostal Church. Responses with respect to the environmental problems caused by the company Conyment, in the city of Calama,
C. 6 Specific event	‘This and the next week, city of San Fernando celebrate its anniversary (...)’ ‘I express my greetings to all my people, because of the creation of the new region of Arica and Parinacota, which will include the provinces of Iquique and Tamarugal’

Table 2. Constituency Role/Focus Model

	(Model 1) <i>Speeches</i> NBRM	(Model 2) <i>Questions</i> NBRM	(Model 3) Resolutions NBRM	(Model 4) <i>Bills</i> Poisson
First Term	0.427 (0.29)	0.374 (0.44)	0.479** (0.220)	0.260 (0.31)
Born and Raised	0.771*** (0.26)	-0.589 (0.41)	0.468** (0.22)	0.897** (0.43)
Size of Constituency(ln)	-0.431 (0.39)	-2.089*** (0.53)	-1.470*** (0.29)	-0.290 (0.31)
Committee Chair	-0.368 (0.32)	0.464 (0.39)	0.301 (0.22)	0.309 (0.34)
Non-Government	0.139 (0.31)	1.993*** (0.43)	0.295 (0.22)	-0.670** (0.32)
Vote Share Less than 20%	-1.619** (0.69)	-0.356 (0.500)	0.377 (0.34)	-1.253 (1.07)
Party Disagreement (Nominate)	-2.037 (4.09)	1.344 (4.275)	2.206 (2.75)	1.706 (3.45)
log likelihood	-156.36	-122.944	-193.42	-87.296
lnalpha	0.2394	0.924	-0.564	
lnalphaSE	(0.27)	(0.299)	(0.32)	
alpha	1.270	2.520	0.568	
alphaSE	(0.35)	(0.755)	(0.18)	
Observations	120	120	120	120

Robust standard errors in parenthesis in Model 1 and 2. Standard errors in parenthesis in Models 3 and 4.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1. Constituency oriented speeches by Born and Raised (dummy)




Figure 2. Constituency oriented written questions by Size of the Constituency(population)





Figure 3. Resolutions by Constituency Size and Born/Raised



CHAPTER II
WHO IS READY TO CLIMB THE HILL?
THE EFFECT OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY ON PROMOTION TO HIGHER
OFFICES IN CHILE

Abstract

Previous research suggests that bill initiation is a mechanism used by legislators to foster personal votes. This article puts forward a theory whereby legislative activity is understood as a form of party service. Bill initiation records are used by parties to inform their decisions on who is ready to be promoted. The theory is evaluated using an original data-set from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. Our empirical findings make a strong case for the hypothesis according to which parties reward those deputies who have shown to be effective legislators.

Keywords: legislative activity- progressive ambition- intra-party politics

Introduction

Chilean deputies initiate hundreds of bills each year even though these bills have a low chance of being enacted or, for that matter, even receiving discussion on the floor of parliament. Only nine percent of the parliamentary bills initiated between 1990 and 2010 became statutory law. More puzzling is that legislators spend a lot of time writing bills even though the Constitution does not allow them to initiate particularistic or clientelistic legislation (e.g. spending proposals, omnibus bills, etc.). Given the impossibility of cultivating a personal vote by initiating proposals, this paper asks why legislators spend time and energy on such legislative activities. This study finds that bill initiation records affect the probability that parties choose members of the lower house to run for a Senate seat or a leadership position (party whip and/or chamber directorate).

Previous research suggests that bill initiation is a mechanism used by legislators to foster personal votes by signalling to constituents that they are working for them (e.g. Bowler 2010; Bräuninger, et al., 2012; Crisp 2007; Williams and Indridason 2018). However, those theories seem insufficient to explain the rationality of legislative activities if the constituency link is removed. Following new literature from parliamentary settings, legislative activities are also thought to matter for when legislators are promoted by their parties (e.g. Høyland, Hobolt and Hix 2017; Marangoni and Russo 2018; Sieberer and Muller 2017). Our research provides an alternative to constituency-based stories. We propose a theory where bill initiation is better understood as a form of party service. Parties resort to bill initiation records as an indicator to decide who is ready to advance in their career to a higher elected office.

To test the expectation that bill initiation leads to career advancement, we have collected new observations from the Chilean Congress (*Note to reviewers*: this data will be made available on the author's website upon publication). Until now, we knew little about how, or if, members' legislative activity related to promotion to higher offices in centralised party systems within presidential democracies. Our empirical findings offer support for the hypothesis that strong and centralised Chilean legislative parties promote deputies who initiate more bills and those with more experience. This simple observation has significant implications for our understanding of the importance of a neglected dimension of the legislative activity (i.e. private bills) members carry out in democratic assemblies. These results are telling of how parties orchestrate a sophisticated mechanism of access to higher offices considering factors such as ability and competence. We contribute to recent research on the effect of legislative activities on career advancement based mostly on parliamentary political systems. Both the theory and the empirical analysis provide a counterpoint to previous research on Latin American polities linking legislative activity to the building of personal votes (Crisp Escobar-Lemmon et al., 2004; Crisp, Kanthak et al. 2004) and the targeting of prospective constituencies in systems where legislators display ambition for subnational offices (Samuels 2003; Chasquetti and Micozzi 2014; Micozzi 2014). Our work has implications for the study of legislative behaviour, intra-party politics, democratic institutions and political representation beyond the Latin American context, providing comparable estimates of the relationship between legislative performance and career advancement.

Why legislative activity relates to promotion to higher office

Producing legislation is the *job description* of members of democratic assemblies. Following Mayhew's (1974) work on the electoral connection, most of the literature conceives bill initiation as a mechanism to build personal reputations with constituents (Ames 2001; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006; Bagashka and Clark 2016; Bräuninger, Brunner and Däubler 2012; Bräuninger and Debus 2009; Crisp 2007; Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, et al. 2004). The initiation of parliamentary bills by incumbent legislators has been said to be positively associated with electoral success (Bowler 2010; Loewen, Koop, Settle and Fowler 2014). Put simply, according to these studies, bill initiation is understood as a form of constituency service that helps members to signal to voters that they are working for them.

However, Chile presents a case where legislators cannot initiate constituency-oriented legislation by constitutional mandate. In extremis, electoral connection-based theories would predict that representatives ought to submit zero bills. Instead, legislators might focus their attention on other activities that allow them to connect with their constituencies (e.g. case work, surgeries, speeches etc.). Because this is not the case—Chilean members do initiate lots of bills under the circumstances described—the link provided by the constituency-based theoretical set up appears to be imperfect. Instead, we argue here that bill initiation can be better understood as a form of party service. All else equal, parties prefer high ability representatives in more important offices within the party and the assembly. Bill initiation records provide parties with an indicator, although imperfect, of legislative capacity and readiness for promotion, reducing parties' uncertainty about potential agency losses. In this theoretical set up, legislators seeking higher office have incentives to please the party and they do so by resorting to legislative activities.

The literature has shown that legislators are not single-minded individuals' focused on their re-election only. In fact, legislators may seek higher elected offices or leadership positions within the organization (Allen and Cutts 2017; Hall and Houweling 1995; Herrick and Moore 1993), including party offices and cabinet positions (Martin 2016; Kam, Bianco et al. 2010). However, having the ambition for climbing the hill is a necessary but not sufficient condition for career progression, especially in contexts where party organizations control scarce political resources that members consider valuable (Hazan 2006; Strøm 1997). In fact, promotion to higher office in the chamber or outside of it is one of the most important incentives that leaders can offer to members (Saalfeld and Strøm 2014:390; Strøm and Müller 2009:30).

Parliamentary studies explaining the rationality of promotion pay attention to the interaction between parties and members with ambition for promotion. Higher office seekers must please the leadership to be promoted to executive posts. Ministerial selection literature reveals that 'ministerial aspirants' in the UK Parliament: "(...) must somehow make a mark, make a reasonable impression in the House" (Searing 1994:100-101). The importance of parties in managing their members' ambitions for higher office is also observed in Latin American contexts. Local party leaders control legislators' career advancement in Argentina (Jones *et al.*, 2002; Jones and Hwang 2005). In Costa Rica, where re-election is forbidden, party leaders control legislators' career prospects outside the assembly (Carey 1996).

One of the main activities members can resort to in order to impress their peers or the party leaders is initiating pieces of legislation. Recent evidence from European Parliamentary settings suggests that legislative activity correlates with career advancement. MPs seeking higher office in parliamentary democracies try to focus on legislative activities to obtain *the*

love of the party leaders (Høyland, Hobolt and Hix 2017; Sieberer and Müller 2017). In the same token, Marangoni and Russo (2018) suggest that parties evaluate members re-selection based on their scores of legislative activity in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Research from the Dutch Tweede Kamer also proposes that those members seeking promotion to higher offices within the organisation are more active in initiating motions, although the authors did not find statistical confirmation for the hypothesis (Louwense and Otjes 2016). Studies from the U.S Congress, where individualistic assumptions portray members controlling their own career prospects, surprisingly show how advancing legislative goals is a prerequisite to seeking higher office (Mayhew 1991). On those lines, for example, Victor (2011) shows that members of the U.S House of Representatives with progressive ambition have greater incentives to show legislative specialization in comparison to members who are not seeking higher offices. Volden and Wiseman (2014) show how first-term legislators who are more efficient in passing their bills are more likely to achieve higher offices.

For illustrative purposes, the basic intuition underlying our theory is developed here as a counterpoint to stories linking legislative activity to electoral connection incentives. Also using the Chilean case as an illustration of their model, Crisp, Kanthak and Leijonufvud (2004) think of ideological positions that legislators adopt by cosponsoring bills, as '*currencies*' that members can use later to obtain support in their constituencies. According to their research, voters can extract legislators' positions from both the content of the proposals and from whom legislators cosponsor with (p. 703-704). As it stands, however, having complete and accurate information about voters' preferences on each major policy (and issue), and its potential impact on the electoral competition, is unrealistic most of the time. Assuming that constituents are aware of their representatives' policy ties is also problematic.

More importantly here, this is not informative of the rationale explaining what more bills indicate to the party and the effect of bill initiation records on promotion to higher offices.

Following our theoretical intuition instead, we can think of members' legislative activities as providing parties –not constituents— with a measure of members' ability and talent for the legislative work.¹¹ We assume that parties have incentives to reward with promotions to those members who are not only loyal but also demonstrate extra abilities. The underlying logic is simple. As Miquel and Snyder (2006:347) point out: 'As a law-producing organization, an efficient legislature allocates talent to where it is needed and productive. It also employs incentives schemes that reward lawmakers who are diligent, skilled, and effective'. As highlighted in the literature on delegation, in promoting members to higher –and more influential— offices, parties want to avoid delegation losses or adverse selection. They can do so, for example, by 'pre-screening' members on the basis of their previous performance (Fernandes 2017; Depauw 2003) in order to obtain information on the aspirants' qualities and skills (Müller, 2000:327). Because initiating legislation requires effort and time in collating information, drafting proposals and building a coalition of sponsors (Woon 2009:29), those records provide parties with information of representatives aptitudes and readiness for promotion. Our theory predicts that higher office seekers expend more effort, through greater levels of legislative activity, in order to convince party leaders that they are of extraordinary ability.¹²

This measure of legislative capacity as an indicator used for promotion is superior to alternatives measures such as party discipline/unity using roll calls. Those stories would

¹¹ Note that in doing so, we allow bill initiation to operate as an intraparty signalling mechanism analogous to the notion that bill cosponsorship is used by legislators to signal policy positions to other members of the assembly, or specifically to the pivotal legislator (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996).

¹² The allocation of non-elected position of influence within the organisation (or 'mega-seats') have been said to influence legislators behaviour, as Martin (2014) shows in his research on the Irish case.

explain upward mobility as a function of factors such as an aspirant discipline in following the party line. Research linking both shows mixed results (Depauw and Martin 2009; Kam 2009) and the link remains ambiguous. Moreover, in scenarios characterised by high levels of party discipline and cohesion, loyalty on roll calls or *toeing the party line* is insufficient to explain upward mobility (Yildering et al. 2017). More plausible, roll call voting monitoring provides information to the leaders for eventual punishment (career regression) rather than for reward.

The theory this article advances seeks to be applicable to the general phenomena of legislators' upward mobility. The empirical examination of the argument focuses on offices within the party/legislature and higher elected offices within a bicameral assembly. In the case of higher elected offices, a run for the upper chamber, we are not merely downplaying the importance of personal votes. It is well known that parties often poll districts to see who they should nominate or promote. More convincing, however, is conceiving aspirants' electoral competitiveness as an intrinsic quality rather than as the underlying mechanism of promotion. *Ceteris paribus*, parties always prefer to nominate candidates with higher chances of winning. Therefore, it would be misleading to model electoral competitiveness as the exogenous component explaining promotion to higher elected office. Parties, as we advance here, look for something else members can offer.

In summary, the theory this article advances conceives bill initiation as a form of party service. Under the conditions examined here, progression to higher office is an intraparty driven mechanism whereby parties decide on who is going up based on members' legislative visibility. We hypothesize that legislators who introduce more bills are more likely to be promoted by their parties to higher offices within the legislature and the party.

Bill initiation and progressive ambition in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies

Bill Initiation

The Chilean case provides a good illustration of our model. Parliamentary bills (*mociones*) can be initiated by a minimum of one deputy to a maximum of ten. Chilean members of Congress are not allowed to sponsor bills after the proposals are introduced. Thus, bills are a good indicator of effort and attention. The ability of legislators to perform constituency service is severely restricted by the constitutional provisions regulating the legislative activity.

According to the Chilean Constitution, legislators are banned from introducing bills including spending. Omnibus legislation is also banned. The limitation of private bills, as a mechanism to connect with constituents, is contained in other disposition of the Chilean legislative institutions: the exclusive initiative. Legislators are not allowed to initiate legislation on the following matters: loans; wages; pensions; taxes; collective and social security; budget; creation of public services, among others (Constitution of the Republic, Article 65). Not surprisingly, given those institutional incentives, just a small portion of the bills introduced by Chilean deputies (2.13%) are constituency orientated (Marenghi 2009). Case work, local activities and speeches appear to constitute mechanisms exploited to connect with constituents (Alemán, Ramírez and Slapin 2017). As a matter of fact, every last week of the month is reserved for constituency work, in what is known as the *district week* (Chamber of Deputies Regulation Code, Article 38). A quote from an interview conducted with a former deputy and party whip is illustrative of the point:

‘There are several cases of former deputies who were recognized for their legislative work. But most of them lose the re-election. The legislative work is unknown and it matters little. More important is solving daily problems of your constituency. When they vote for you, they do not vote for who is the most talented lawmaker’ (Former Deputy and Party Whip; author’s own translation).

At the beginning of the 2000’s, both national and regional press started to monitor legislators’ legislative activity more systematically. *El Mercurio*, one of the main and influential Chilean newspapers, published an article weeks before the 2013 congressional election that reported a ranking with the ‘hardworking’ legislators according to the number of bills they initiated in the last legislative term. The report also named those deputies running for a Senate seat and their respective records of bill initiation as a measure of productivity. The same newspaper reported in 2017 how parties care about their position in the ranking. According to one Chilean deputy interviewed, “parliamentary party groups tell their staff: We (the party) are short of bills, let’s build a package”. A quote from an interview with a Chilean politician we interviewed as part of this research is illustrative of the aforementioned: “The increase in the bill initiation numbers is explained by the press effect. Since 2003, the press started monitoring legislator’s attendance number, productivity and so on (...)” (Chilean Senator, Former Deputy and Party Leader interviewed by the author).

The above does not mean that legislators can just initiate lots of nonsensical bills. Legislators and parties’ reputations may be damaged by being associated with bills lacking originality or quality. As the case examined here shows, press monitoring includes periodical checks on bills content and quality. Press reports include pieces of analysis on parliamentary bills quality, using plagiarism software to detect copy-paste from other bills or even from

Wikipedia (El Mercurio 2014). By introducing poorly drafted bills, legislators risk becoming well known as ‘*Senator or Deputy Wikipedia*’. Press articles report that only 14% of the bills present a certain level of plagiarism (El Mercurio 2013). On the contrary, almost 80% of the bills initiated by Chilean deputies between 2006 and 2011 can be classified into specific policy areas, such as: education, health, foreign policy, political institutions, economy, transportation, labor, etc (UNDP 2014).

Progressive career patterns in the Chilean assembly

Career advancement in Chile is hierarchical, resembling in that regard, other political systems where legislators do not return to subnational or local posts, as in Spain (Montero 2007) or the U.S. The Chilean political system is also unitary and strongly centralised. In Chile, subnational offices are not elected ones. The most frequent outcome is that Chilean legislators *do not look back*. That scenario contrasts with cases like Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

Strong legislative party organizations play a crucial role in shaping legislative outcomes.¹³ Political parties are fundamental in crafting legislators’ careerism (Samuels 2008). National leaders retain nomination control, office access, Committee assignment and several political resources within the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The candidate nomination process is biased in favour of loyal incumbents (Alemán and Navia 2016; Navia 2008; Morgenstern and Siavelis 2008:373). Chilean electoral institutions appear to strengthen the importance of party labels (Chaisty, Cheeseman and Power 2018: 148). Up to 2016, the electoral system to elect both deputies and senators was technically proportional (D’Hondt procedure), but with

¹³ The Chilean party system is one of the most institutionalized in Latin America alongside the party systems of Costa Rica and Uruguay (Mainwaring 2018). In the legislative arena, parties from the government coalition in Chile coordinate with the executive in the legislative process (Toro and Hurtado 2016).

the lowest possible magnitude in each constituency ($M=2$). Parties had strong incentives to be organized into two coalitions (Rabkin 1996).¹⁴

An important number of deputies build careers in Congress. Not surprisingly, Carey (2002:234) believes that it '(...) is entirely appropriate to apply theories premised on re-electoral assumption to the Chilean Congress'. Nevertheless, Chilean deputies also build careers within Congress in a progressive fashion. In every election, a significant number of deputies run for a Senate seat after being nominated by their parties. For example, between 1993 and 2013, 34% of the elected senators were deputies in the previous term (UNDP 2014). Chilean senators' mandate lasts for 8 years. Presidential and Congressional elections are held simultaneously every four years. Senators' term in office is double of the term of the President of the Republic and the term of deputies. Half of the Senate is renewed every general election, and the other half is renewed the next election. The criteria are that, in one election, those senatorial districts from regions with an even number (II, IV, VI, VIII, etc.) are renewed, while in the next elections those seats from odd regions (I, III, V, etc.) are renewed.

The Chilean Senate has a long-term tradition of greater influence and policy power (Agor 1971). According to the literature, the Chilean Senate has been recognized as a deliberative body isolated from the political conflict of the Chamber of Deputies. Paused and calm deliberations are expected to be held in the Senate committees and crucial agreements about the legislative agenda take place in committees and on the floor (Nolte 2002). Interviews with members of the Chilean Senate show that Senators define the Senate as an arena of reflection and moderation more focused on long-term policy implications. In comparison to the

¹⁴ In 2015, a comprehensive electoral reform was passed in the Chilean Congress. The binominal electoral system was replaced with a more proportional system. The first elections under the new electoral system will take place in 2017 (Gamboa and Morales 2016).

Chamber of Deputies the Senate is a more technical chamber where more serious policy making takes place (Nolte 2002). Thus, political experience is a main factor describing the composition of the Chilean Senate in comparison to other Latin American assemblies (Llanos and Sanchez 2006). In previous decades, the Senate has incremented its formal power over the nomination of authorities and its influence over policy (Berrios and Gamboa 2006).

Specialization within the Chilean Chamber of Deputies is comparatively high (Carey 2002; Palanza et al., 2016). In the Chilean Congress, position within the organization matters. Leadership positions and committee chairs grant important influence to those members (Carey 2002) and regularly, the press reports how members fight for access to such positions. Leadership spots and chairs in important committees are subject to intense bargaining at the beginning of each legislative session and, as said, are usually a motive for intense intra-party and intra-coalition conflict.

In sum, ambition for higher office and careerism within the assembly coexists with centralized and dominant national parties that are much stronger than their counterparts in Latin America and in the U.S Congress.

Legislative Data and Results

Our legislative data corresponds to the period 1994-2010. Information to build the dependent variable – Promotion – was obtained from official sources. Legislative profiles and electoral records were obtained from the Congress National Library website (www.bcn.cl) and the Chamber of Deputies official website (www.camara.cl).

This study focuses on the factors that influence whether legislators are promoted to higher offices. Two types of higher office are considered here: firstly, promotion to run a campaign for the Senate and, secondly, promotion to higher offices within the lower chamber (party whips and the directorate). Our response variables present a dichotomous setup, assuming the values of 1 (success in obtaining a promotion) and 0 (failure) only. A logit model seems the appropriate strategy to apply to these data. The unit of observation is each legislator. Because we have repeated observations in our data (with some deputies appearing more than once in the sample), we resort to clustering the standard errors (Rogers 1993).

Our predictor is *Legislative Activity*. This is the (logged) number of bills initiated by each deputy. Legislative records (“*Fichas Parlamentarias*”) at the individual level were read in order to obtain the number of proposals initiated by each deputy. Several controls were included in the models. A first control is *First-Term*, which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for those newcomers members and 0 otherwise. The literature shows how promotion to ministerial posts relates to factors such as tenure and experience in parliamentary systems (Searing 1994; O’Malley 2006). A third control is the total vote share (%) obtained by each deputy in the last election (*Vote Share*). *Non-Government* is a dummy variable taking the value for those members from the opposition and independents, and 0 otherwise. *Women* is also a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for female legislators, and 0 otherwise. Both *Party Whip* and *Chamber Leader* are dummy variables that capture the members’ position within the party in the assembly and/or the organisation directorate.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

The main results are reported in Table 1. In Model 1, the response variable is capturing whether a given member is nominated by the party to compete in a race for a Senate seat. According to Model 1, the coefficient of the variable *Legislative Activity* is positive and goes

in the expected direction (statistically significant at the 0.01 level). In general, the predictor holds in the model after controlling for other factors. However, more substantive interpretation is obtained by examining predicted probabilities. As Figure 1 shows, those legislators who more actively initiate legislative proposals have a greater chance of seeing their names on the electoral ballot in the elections for the Senate. As the number of bills increases, this probability rises. The predicted probability of being nominated for a Senate race is .02 for those less visible members and .13 for the maximum value observed in our data. The coefficient of the variable *First-Term* is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. This result can be interpreted as follows. In legislative environments where specialisation and careerism are fundamental characteristics, it is difficult to picture parties promoting newcomers to advance to higher offices in the organization. Given such scenarios, parties have incentives to block those less experienced members from having their names in the electoral ballot for a senatorial seat. The logic in this case fits our theory: parties' incentives to reduce adverse selection explain why less tenured members are less likely to be promoted. We can think of this result as complementary with our model.

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

According to Model 1, *Vote Share* (a control variable) in the previous election has an effect on the probability of being nominated for a Senate seat competition. *Vote Share* has a positive coefficient and it is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Marginal effects confirm that those deputies obtaining greater share of the vote in the previous election are more likely to be promoted to the Senate. This result endorses that parties nominate competitive candidates. However, we model electoral competitiveness thinking of it as an intrinsic quality of the promotion process rather than the underlying mechanism explaining it. Political parties are highly unlikely to shoot themselves in the foot by nominating electorally weak candidates.

After taking into account electoral competitiveness, our predictor holds in the model, and more importantly, further analysis confirmed the effect of *Legislative Activity* on the response variable.

[Insert Figure 2 about here]

Model 2 examines a different type of career advancement. Here, the response variable is promotion to higher offices within the lower chamber (whips and leadership).

The outcome is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for success and 0 otherwise. Model 2 keeps the same covariates used to analyse the factors explaining promotion to the Senate in Model 1. As Table 1 shows, *Legislative Visibility* has a positive coefficient and it is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Among the rest of the covariates, only *Non-Government* and *Party Whip* are statistically significant. So, those members that serve as a party leader in the previous period are more likely to be promoted again to the same position or to the chamber directorate. Again, more substantive interpretation of the effect of our predictor is obtained from predicted probabilities. As Figure 2 shows, those legislators who more actively initiate legislative proposals have a greater chance of being promoted to higher offices within the party or the Chamber of Deputies. The predicted probability of being promoted is .04 for those less visible members and .14 for the maximum value observed in our data.

In sum, we find statistical confirmation for our hypothesis. In spite of not serving the purpose of building personal votes, Chilean deputies spend time initiating tons of bills and the parties do care about the party legislative record.

Our empirical findings make a strong case for the hypothesis according to which parties reward those deputies who have shown to be effective legislators. The results demonstrate

that Chilean deputies who introduce more bills are also promoted at a higher rate. After taking into account for *Vote Share*, as a proxy for electoral competitiveness, Model 1 confirms that legislative activity is considered by parties when they nominate legislators for a higher office race. The fact that inexperienced members are less likely to be promoted to the Senate confirms our theoretical story. Model 2, in turn, shows that advancement within the low chamber, to leadership positions, also correlates with legislative activity.

Discussion and Implications

In some environments, bill initiation may be unlikely to constitute an avenue for members to build up constituency support. This study provides an answer to the puzzling question of why legislators spend time drafting bills when they cannot signal constituents back home that they are working for them. In examining the factors that affect the probability that members of the lower house would be chosen to run for the Senate or promoted to leadership offices, this article advances an innovative proposition: members' legislative activities are better understood as a form of party service. In party controlled legislatures, promotion to higher offices is best explained as the outcome of the interplay between progressive ambitious members and their parties. In this game, parties' decisions are informed by members' legislative records. Our empirical findings make a strong case for the hypothesis according to which Chilean legislative parties promote deputies who initiate more bills and those with more experience. The underlying mechanism here is not the bills themselves, but rather bill initiation records, as an indicator of legislative capacity and readiness that bill initiation counts are measuring. Parties make strategic use of records on members' legislative activities

to curb adverse selection. Past records of legislative activity (bill initiation here) provide party leaders with information on members' skills and competence.

From a comparative perspective, this study shows that intraparty dynamics in certain presidential systems other than the U.S Congress can exhibit similarities to parliamentary democracies. This is under certain conditions, such as strong national parties controlling career advancement and enforcing high levels of party discipline. Individualistic assumptions, well-established in the study of the U.S Congress, are not necessarily applicable to other presidential democracies. On the contrary, as in parliamentary systems, in presidential democracies parties can play a decisive role shaping legislators' futures. This article also provides a contrast with settings where legislative activity relates to subnational ambition in the Latin America context. We add to this literature providing original evidence from a case where career advancement shows a territorial ladder in a bicameral system in which higher office within the assembly represents a substantive increment of political influence and power.

Some implications about the Chilean case need to be mentioned briefly. Firstly, Chilean legislative parties are not only important in terms of legislative outcomes and the fate of the powerful Chilean president's agenda. They are crucial for orchestrating political careers and the legislative organization. A second implication is related to previous research on legislative careers and ambition in the Chilean Congress. Conventionally, political ambition in Chile has been characterized as static. Empirical works on bill sponsorship in Chile also departs from that assumption of legislators as 'singled minded seekers of re-election' (Carey 2002; Crisp, Kanthak and Leijonhufvud 2004). This article provides a different image, disputing the exclusive focus on the static nature of political careers in the Chilean Congress.

There are no convincing reasons to expect a relationship between static legislative careerism and bill drafting in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies.

The findings provided in this article suggest new paths for further research on intraparty politics in Latin American legislatures. This research highlights the importance of including the analysis of intraparty politics in settings where the importance of legislative parties is assumed to be irrelevant or secondary, as is the case with presidential democracies. This study also shows the importance of examining data other than roll call voting. From the perspective of members, we need to analyse how such legislators with complex ambitions fabricate sophisticated legislative portfolios to take advantage of different prerogatives within the assembly.

Further research needs to consider other types of career advancement, such as ministerial selection, high offices within the national bureaucracy and other positions within the party. Such disaggregation could provide us with a complete picture on what occurs and why, generating comparable estimates.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1
Determinants of Promotion to Higher Office

Independent Variables	(Model1) DV:Promotion to Higher Elected Office	(Model2) DV:Promotion to Whip/Chamber Leader
Legislative Activity/Bills(ln)	0.721*** (.19)	0.461*** (.17)
First-Term	-0.656** (.26)	0.147 (.25)
Vote Share(%)	0.042*** (.01)	0.012 (.01)
Non-Government	-0.044 (.30)	-0.617** (.25)
Women	-0.551 (.52)	0.151 (.41)
Party Whip	0.424 (.30)	0.630** (.27)
Chamber Leader	0.163 (.35)	0.113 (.36)
Constant	-4.485*** (.81)	-3.562*** (.86)
Log pseudo likelihood	-230.38	-221.00
Hosmer-Lemeshow's (p-value)	.31	.47
Observations	472	472

Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities Promotion to the Senate





Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities Promotion to Party/Chamber Offices



CHAPTER III
BILL CO-AUTHORSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT
EVIDENCE FROM THE CHILEAN CONGRESS

Abstract

Making laws is the most important activity of democratic legislatures. Yet surprisingly, research on why some members of parliament get their bills passed while others don't is scant. The hypothesis we explore is as simple as it is consequential: who signs the bill matters when it comes to the level of the support that the proposal receives. This article argues that legislators look at the authors of a bill as a heuristic to infer the quality of a bill. When those names indicate that the proposed bill has cross-partisan support or is signed by specialists then legislators are more likely to pass it. We use an original data-set from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies to test this hypothesis.

Introduction.

A reasonably large percentage of non-government policy proposals pass and become law in democratic assemblies. Available estimates show that, on average, around 20% of the policies initiated by members of democratic assemblies worldwide become statutory law (Saiegh 2014). However, we do not have a good understand of when and why legislators' policy proposals became law. Whilst there is an abundance of comparative research on how chief executives secure the passage of their policies (e.g., Alemán and Navia 2009; Cheibub, Przeworski et al., 2004; Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011; Saiegh 2009), legislative scholars have paid less attention to the conditions that may foster the passing of legislators' own bills in parallel to the government legislative agenda.

Information is thought to be central to the process of drafting and passing new policies (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Krehbiel 1991). Indeed, research conducted by Zelizer (2018) shows how legislators at state level in the U.S increase their co-sponsorship activity when they receive policy research in a randomized experiment. Similarly, Iaryczower and Katz (2016) present a model explaining the circumstances under which legislators include information about a proposals' quality in their voting choices. Despite its centrality in the law making process, we still know relatively little about how, or if, information about legislators' proposal quality relates to the passing of members bills in parallel to the government. The same can be said about how legislatures aggregate information about members' bill quality. Some related questions arise: How do legislators decide which proposals are worthy of being translated into new legislation? Does information about

members' bill quality ultimately have an effect on the passing of new policies? Those questions are even more puzzling in institutional settings where the legislature does not control the agenda and lacks informational and technical resources (in the hands of the government) that play a crucial role in the process of formulating high quality proposals and passing new policies.

Typically, the informational literature postulates that democratic assemblies' aggregate information about proposals potential consequences by delegating to committee members for specialization (e.g. Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990). Recently, however, researchers have advanced alternative mechanisms of information aggregation, such as previous voting records (Iaryczower, Katz and Saiegh 2013) or past legislation (Ryan 2018). In the model we put forward in this article, the legislature seeks to foster the institutionalization of the organization by producing its own policies in parallel to the government. Legislators aggregate information about the quality of the proposals (or legislation *side effects*) by looking at the names of the authors of the bills. This study hypothesizes that when authorship data exhibits support across the aisle and policy specialization (committee chairs), the chances of moving forward in the legislative process and being enacted law increases. To test the argument, we have collected new observations from the Chilean Chamber of Deputies. The results confirm that support across the aisle and policy expertise both predict the passing of non-government bills.

Our findings may not only contribute by providing fresh evidence to informational debates. From a comparative perspective, the results are surprising in light of the conventional view that pictures Latin American legislatures as 'reactive' organizations (Morgenstern and Cox 2001; Morgenstern 2002). Legislatures in the region have also been pictured as unable to

generate policies on their own given presidents' exclusive ability to generate high quality policies (Londregan 2000) and Congress limited access to information and policy expertise (Siavelis 1997). We show how legislatures circumvent those institutional disadvantages. From a different angle, our findings also contrast with previous studies about Latin American assemblies that follow a division of labour perspective where legislators' policy activities are conceived as fundamentally oriented to the conference of geographically targeted benefits. This is not the case here. The Chilean Constitution rules that legislators cannot initiate and pass bills which have budgetary implications. Therefore, legislators do not have the ability to provide pork-particularistic benefits to their constituencies via legislation. In spite of all the above (technical disadvantage and absence of distributive incentives), the Chilean assembly works and produces its own agenda and policies in parallel to the government.

Overall, our study not only develops a model to explain why non-government proposals move forward and eventually become law, but also provides a mechanism explaining what legislatures do in order to increase the production of their own policies parallel to the executive while lacking the control of the agenda and, more importantly here, being at an informational disadvantage with respect to the government proposal capacity.

Explaining the production of legislators' own bills.

Highly prominent among the existing models of lawmaking are distributive theories focusing on the logrolling dynamic explaining how particularistic coalitions formed to pass bills are ensured by an ad hoc committee system (Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Shepsle 1978; Weingast and Marshall 1988). If one follows the above, a seemingly appropriate

strategy would be modelling the passing of legislators' policy proposals by paying attention to idiosyncratic factors shaping the exchange of bills, such as the formation of transitory coalitions around particularistic pieces of legislation. However, if we remove distributive incentives, the reasons why some legislators get their bills passed while others don't are less clear. This is not inconsequential here. In certain legislative environments, such as in the case examined in this study, legislators do not have the ability to provide pork-particularistic benefits to their constituencies via legislation, making the predictions of distributive models largely irrelevant.

Another prominent theoretical body of literature is the partisan model. The procedural cartelization of the legislative agenda by a majoritarian party who control gatekeeping positions (leadership and committee chairs) envisages that the majority is able to control legislative production by preventing those bills that the majority party dislikes from reaching the floor. A central prediction of those theories is that the majority party will never be rolled. (Cox and McCubbins 2005). The above, however, is less clear when agenda powers are exogenous to the majority party or coalition in the legislature. Whereas in the U.S Congress the agenda control is allocated to the majority party, in Latin America the president controls the legislative agenda (See: Alemán and Tsebelis 2016; Cox and Morgenstern 2001). To this exogenous monopoly of proposal power, we may add the fact that most of the Latin American legislatures are characterized by several parties and in some cases a high degree of fragmentation and volatility (See: Mainwaring 2018). Therefore, given that agenda powers are exogenous to the organization and also the existence of a majority party or coalition is infrequent, partisan stories, which would predict members of the majority party passing their bills at a higher rate, provide an incorrect specification for the modelling of members' bill success.

Our model moves away from both the traditional distributive perspective and partisan theories above and links more closely to the intuition of informational views. Before making our case explicit, however, we need to explain the underlying incentives of congressional production of policies in parallel to the executive. Following literature on policy making and congressional institutionalization (Scartascini and Tommasi 2012; Palanza et al 2016; Saiegh 2010; Squire 1992), we assume that the legislature has incentives to show effectiveness in producing their own policies in parallel to the government legislative agenda. Adopting a financial market analogy, we conceive that legislatures, like firms, take decisions to raise the capital they need to foster expansion (here: institutionalization). Specifically, the legislature passes its own policies in parallel to the government as *investments* to increase the value of the organization. However, as we will explain below, legislators are a particular type of investor: risk averse or conservative. They have incentives to invest on *safe portfolios*. The risk is the chance of incurring losses for the organization (the legislature) relative to the expected returns of those *policy investments*. This may be the case when policies have disastrous consequences or side effects.

The above highlights the importance of the proposals quality. A wide range of literature involves assumptions and propositions about the quality of the proposals (e.g. Hirsch and Shotts 2012; Hitt, Volden et al. 2017; Woon 2008). For example, in their model of information transferability, Hirsch and Shotts (2012) propose a conceptualization of policy quality that includes a number of non-spatial attributes of good public policy such as: policy coherence, appropriateness, cost-effectiveness, etc. Hence, recent research provides evidence of the link between information about proposals technical quality and legislators' choices such as co-sponsoring bills or casting votes (Iaryczower and Katz 2016; Zelizer 2018).

The problem arises because in the real world, legislators' access to systematic information about policy proposals is far from ideal. Indeed, legislators are frequently *in the dark* about the expected outcomes of the policies they debate and eventually implement. To be precise, a core assumption of the informational literature is the existence of uncertainty over the results of policy proposals (e.g. Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; 1989; 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Minozzi and Woon 2016). The above is not inconsequential: legislators/parties are risk adverse. Thus, minimizing risks in the process of producing policies is a collective good (e.g. Epstein and O'Hallaran 1999). At this point it is important to note that in the original informational frame, uncertainty about policy outcomes is conceived principally in reference to preferences within the legislature rather than the non-positional attributes of the proposals (e.g., quality).

However, as noted by Londregan (2000:30), analytically the consequences are similar and in some cases can be exchangeable. We extend the assumptions above to the dynamic by which the organization aggregates information about non-positional components of the proposals (quality or side effects).

When addressing the question about how legislators learn about proposal policy outcomes, or how they deal with their risk aversion, the literature focuses on the delegation process by which the floor delegate on committees for specialization or the acquirement of private information (Krehbiel 1991). Nevertheless, delegation is costly. In the models above, the legislature needs to provide the committee with selective incentives (for example: closed rule for bill consideration). As Austen-Smith and Riker (1987) noted, committee members, or specialists, can manipulate the concession of information to maximise their informational advantage over the rest of the members. In turn, the legislature, given its inclination for

maximising the ideal point of the median legislator, is unenthusiastic to give up rule and command over law making to a reduced group of members (Groseclose and King 2001).

Previous literature already develops on alternative mechanisms to the delegation on committees to explain how the legislature aggregates information about the quality of the proposals. Those include prior voting records and previous legislation (Iaryczower, Katz and Saiegh 2013; Ryan 2018). At this point, we offer an alternative angle to understand how the legislature produce risk assessments over the expected consequences of the policies they pass while minimizing asymmetries of information and delegation losses. Recall that in our model the legislature motivation is maximising the aggregation of information (uncertainty reduction) about bill quality rather than about the location of those policy outcomes with respect to the median legislator. Specifically, we argue that legislators aggregate information about proposals quality by looking at the names of the authors of the bills. Authorship reveals information about proposal quality, or legislation *side effects*, at a low cost, enhancing informational efficiency in the process of producing non-government bills. Following different literatures, we focus on two set of properties of the authorship information that are indicative of proposal quality or, following our financial analogy, the risk of adverse effects that the organization is assuming in investing in a given policy proposal: (i) support across the aisle; (ii); policy specialization.

Firstly, previous empirical research shows how legislators who reach across the party lines in the U.S House of Representatives are more successful in passing their proposals (e.g. Kirkland and Kroeger 2018; Kirkland 2011). Bills supported by a more diverse range of legislators reduce uncertainty about the outcomes of the policy (Kirkland 2011). Evidence from Argentina supports the premise that larger co-sponsor coalitions increase the chances of

passing members' proposals (Alemán and Calvo 2008). At a theoretical level, the informational literature postulates that when committee specialists are from both sides of the policy divide, delegation is more informative (Battaglini, Lai et al. 2016; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Krehbiel 1991). The legislature obtains 'confirmatory signalling' (Epstein 1988; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). As Krehbiel (1991:85) noted: "Two informed opinions are better than one, especially when the informants are natural adversaries". Taking into account the above, our model specifies that when authorship reports support across the aisle, the chamber obtains corroborative, although imperfect, information on the bills quality, or discounts more risk in investing in a given proposal. As such, successful bills will then be supported by members across the aisle or a more heterogeneous range of parties.

Secondly, the literature shows that legislators' success increases with factors such as specialization (Anderson et al. 2003; Miler 2017; Miquel and Snyder 2006; Volden and Wiseman 2009). A major source of policy specialization is committee chairmanship. As a matter of fact, committee chairs are more successful in passing their proposals (Volden and Wiseman 2014). Indeed, Berry and Fowler (2018) show committee chairs greater influence and power traduces, amongst other indicators, in higher rates of legislation passage. An option would be interpreting the above in light of committee chairs gatekeeping powers. Instead of focusing on institutional factors, we follow an informational intuition: legislators do care about the quality of the informants (Bianco 1997). The logic is simple: legislators with more expertise and access to legislative resources can adapt their bills to challenge the intrinsic quality of the status quo (Londregan 2000:30). Therefore, those bills initiated by policy specialists, such as committee chairs, provide more information on the quality of the proposals or the level of risk that the organization is discounting by passing a given bill.

In sum, we argue that cross partisan support and the policy expertise of the authors are all indicative of bill quality, providing non-positional confirmatory signalling.

The organization resorts to that information to give *green light* to a proposal initiated by its own members. Extrapolating from the above, we lay out the following hypotheses:

Support Across the Aisle Hypothesis: Legislators' bills probability of being tabled, move forward in the legislative process and being enacted law increases when authorship information reveals heterogeneous (across the aisle) support.

Policy Specialization Hypothesis. Legislators proposals probability of being tabled and enacted law increases when proposals are initiated by a greater number of policy specialists (here: committee chairs).

Before proceeding to test our model using data on bills introduced by members of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies, it is worth briefly considering two simple reasons why authorship data enhances information efficiency and productivity. Firstly, authorship data is more transferable in comparison with other sources of information which legislators can learn from. Consider how information about proposals is transmitted at the different stages of the legislative process in a bicameral environment, for example the typical setting in Latin American legislatures.¹⁵ It is intuitive to think about the specialization generated at committee level in a lower chamber as less informative for the upper chamber. Meanwhile, those models of communication through voting do not inform us about why bills are tabled for consideration in the first place. Authorship information, on the contrary, is an attribute of legislators' own bills that *travel* with the bill through the legislative process, from the initial reading of the project until the last voting procedure before enactment. Secondly, we know that legislators and parties confront an endless stream of bills for consideration and they are

¹⁵ The bicameral structure is typical of several countries in Latin America (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay), in a region in which bicameralism has a long history (Llanos and Nolte 2003).

time constrained (Hall 1996). Thus, careful consideration of each proposals' technical quality and specifics (non-positional quality side effects or negative valence) would be a complex task even for a dedicated lawmaker. In addition, in settings where the legislative agenda is controlled by the government and there is a notorious imbalance between the government and the legislatures technical capabilities, one may reasonably expect that committees are permanently stuck with government proposals reducing opportunities for the consideration of members' bills. Authorship enhances efficiency by providing shortcuts in the process of producing policies that allow the organization to deal with time restrictions and institutional constraints.

Case Selection

Archetypically, a division of labour perspective conceives members' of Latin American assemblies legislative activities purely as a strategy with an exclusive constituency orientation while the executive focuses on national policy (e.g. Amorim Neto and Santos 2003; Crisp et al., 2004; Crisp, Kanthak 2004; Mejia-Acosta, Perez-Liñán and Saiegh 2005). For example, Ames (2001) shows how Brazilian legislators use their bills when campaigning for re-election. However, other scholars have challenged the notion that Latin American legislative politics can be characterised by a division of labour as such. Indeed, Taylor-Robinson and Diaz (1999), by examining the case of Honduras, show how legislators' legislative activity focuses on national policy rather than local and constituents demands. Now, suppose an extreme case: legislators are not allowed to initiate bills targeting voters and providing benefits to their constituents (omnibus legislation, fiscal particularism, etc.), as the case selected to test our argument—the Chilean National Congress—provides. As it stands,

the traditional view on distributive politics and legislative particularism seems insufficient to explain legislative outcomes.

Indeed, the case of Chile is a good choice for testing the argument outlined in the previous section. The Chilean Congress is recognized as the most institutionalized in Latin America (Stein and Tommasi 2008). At the same time, it is worth noticing that since the transition to democratic rule in 1990, legislative politics can be characterised by the existence of two stable policy-based coalitions which in turn explain high levels of cohesion in voting records (Alemán and Calvo 2007; Toro 2007).

The Constitution of the Republic contemplates substantive policy areas that are under the exclusive domain of the executive: such as political administrative organization, taxes, creation of public services and loans, among others. As mentioned above, Chilean institutions do not allow legislative particularism. Chilean legislators are banned from introducing bills or amendments including spending and cannot engage in legislative particularism by providing benefits to voters in their law initiatives (Constitution of the Republic, Article 65).

Legislators are not allowed to initiate important public policy projects or bring pork to their districts, as was common in the democratic period before the democratic breakdown in September 11th 1973 (Valenzuela 1977; 1978). Not surprisingly, the immense majority of the bills initiated by Chilean deputies have a national orientation instead of a local focus (Marenghi 2009).

The institutional design is strongly biased in favour of the executive branch (Alemán and Navia 2016; Siavelis 2000). In the Chilean legislative system, the chamber leadership is granted with formal authority over certain aspects of the legislative agenda, such as the power

to refer bills to committees. Also, a bill admission for consideration is a competence of the president of the Chamber or the committee chair. However, as Carey (2002:238) pointed out, “These measures of agenda control, however, are regularly overridden in practice by the president’s constitutional authority to dominate the legislative agenda by declaring his proposed bills urgent (...) the existence of strong constitutional agenda powers in the executive mitigates the effectiveness of this authority by the *mesas* somewhat”. In effect, the executive controls the legislative agenda. The government can simply declare an executive bill a matter for urgent consideration. The power of declaring a bill a matter of urgency has a substantive effect on the approval of the executive legislative agenda (Alemán and Navia 2009; Bronfman 2016). There are three types of deadlines: 6, 15 or 30 days (Law 18.918, Article 26). Furthermore, scholars have pointed out the existent asymmetry of technical resources and information access between a strong executive and a reactive legislature. For example, as Siavelis (1997:361) noted, “(...) In order to initiate quality bills and perfect and influence those originated by the executive, the organization need improve access to information and expert advisor”.

Parliamentary bills (*mociones*) can be initiated by a minimum of one deputy to a maximum of ten. Chilean legislators are not allowed to sponsor bills after the proposals are introduced. In Chile members of the legislature tend to work together by co-authoring bills. Between 1990 and 2010, more than 30% of the bills initiated by Chilean deputies were co-authored by the maximum number authorised by the Chilean Constitution (ten deputies). Only 13.5% bills were signed by one member alone (Ampuero 2013). The National Congress has increased the production of its own policies in parallel to the executive (Visconti 2011). Since 2006 there has been a drastic increase in the number of proposals initiated by Chilean legislators every year. As Toro and Valenzuela (2018) suggest, the executive increases the practice of

considering members bills when drafting their own policies, may explain the increasing productivity of Chilean legislators. Anecdotal information from the case selected here suggests that when legislators cross the aisle looking for cross partisan support, the chances of success increases. The Chilean deputy Pepe Auth noted in a press interview that “the bills with more chance of moving forward are those initiated with the support of different parties. Those elaborated by one sector (coalition) tend to lose” (El Mercurio 2017).

In sum, the Chilean case provides an environment where, by institutional virtue, members cannot provide particularistic benefits to their constituents. Given the information above, there is no reason to expect the formation of temporary coalitions around particularistic legislation. However, according to our theory, legislators have incentives to invest in the institutionalization of the organization. If our intuition is correct, they ought to advance their own agendas (*mociones*) in parallel to the powerful Chilean president. Because members initiate thousands of proposals every legislative session, careful consideration of each bill is highly unlikely. We believe that those *mociones* demonstrating support across the aisle and policy specialization are more likely to be tabled for consideration and move forward in the legislative process.

Authorship Data

Bill initiation data from Chile was collected for the 354th through the 357th Congress (2006-2010). The unit of observation is bills (N=1,665). A general description of the legislative process in Chile is as follows. Bills can be initiated both before the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies (First Constitutional Procedure). Once a bill (*mensaje* or *mocion*) is formally initiated, it is sent to one or more specialized committees. Bills receive a first reading and

then, if passed by the committee and the floor, receive a second reading at committee level. After the second reading, the floor votes whether to accept or reject the proposal. If voted favourably, the bill passes to the other chamber (Second Constitutional Procedure). If the other chamber then approves the bill, the legislation is returned to the original chamber. In case of agreement in the latter with the version approved by the other chamber, the bill is passed. In case of disagreement, a referral committee is formed.

Our outcome is measured at three stages of the legislative process: (1) bills report from committee; (2) floor approval and (3) final enactment (See Table 2). In each case, the response variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for success, and 0 otherwise. A logit model seems an appropriate strategy to apply to this data.¹⁶ To be sure about the model specification, and the incentives of the executive, another dependent variable is *Urgency for Consideration* (dummy), taking the value of one for those proposals granted by the government as Urgency Motions and 0 otherwise (See Table 3).

We build two specifications for the predictor capturing our Support Across the Aisle Hypothesis. The first specification of our predictor, *Party Range*, corresponds to the array of parties represented in each bill.¹⁷ The second specification *Cross-Coalition* is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for those bills supported by legislators from both coalitions and 0 otherwise.

¹⁶ We also run an Ordered Logit Model but only the logit estimates are reported here.

¹⁷ In the period under analysis, the Chilean party system had multiple parties, but it is structured around two major stable coalitions. The Alianza por Chile includes two main parties: the Democratic Independent Union (UDI) and National Renewal (RN). The centre-left coalition (Concertación) includes the following parties: the Democratic Christian Party (PDC), the Party for Democracy (PPD), the Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD) and the Socialist Party (PS).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Independent Variables/Controls	Mean	Standard Deviation	Max	Min	Observations
Party Range(ln)	.595	.615	1.79	0	1,665
Committee Chairs	3.294	2.339	10	0	1,665
Cross-Coalition	.282	.450	1	0	1,665
Seniority	1.312	1.295	7	0	1,665
Christian Democratic Party	.029	0.169	1	0	1,665
Urgency for Consideration	.0612	.239	1	0	1,665
Women	.548	.497	1	0	1,665
Higher Quorum	.081	.273	1	0	1,665

Several control variables are introduced in the models. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for our predictors and the rest of the covariates. A first control is a dummy variable, *Women*, capturing the presence of female legislators amongst the bill's author. The variable takes the value of 1 for those proposals sponsored by female legislators only and 0 otherwise. Secondly, *Seniority* is a variable that captures the presence (the number) of party whips and chamber leaders among the authors of the bills. We also control for institutional factors. We control by *Urgency for Consideration*. This covariate takes the value of 1 if the bill was declared to be a matter of urgent consideration at any point of the legislative process and: 0 otherwise. Another covariate capturing institutional factors is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bill requires a *Higher Quorum* of legislators in order to pass, and 0 otherwise.¹⁸ Partisan factors are also included as covariates in the models. A dummy variable was created, taking the value of 1 for those bills initiated exclusively by legislators from the Christian Democracy Party and 0 otherwise. The Christian Democracy Party has been historically recognised by voters and

¹⁸ Constitutional reforms require 2/3 of the legislators in each chamber. Bills that include interpretation of the constitution require a majority of 3/5 of the legislators holding office. Organic Constitutional Laws require 4/7.

scholars as a centrist party (Scully 1992). The above has been confirmed by parliamentary surveys (PELA 2005). In doing so, we control for the possibility of members' proposals passing at a higher rate given pivotal factors.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Bill Success} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1[\text{Support Across the Aisle}] + \\
 & \beta_2[\text{Committee chairs}] + \\
 & \beta_3[\text{Women}] + \beta_4[\text{Quorum}] + \beta_5[\text{Urgency}] + \\
 & \beta_6[\text{Seniority}] + \beta_7[\text{Centrist Party}] + \varepsilon.
 \end{aligned}$$

For illustrative purposes, the equation above displays the basic model for bill success valid for every stage of the legislative process examined here. The next section presents the results of our models of bill success at different stages of the legislative process. Also, we include a model to display the factors explaining the scheduling of bills.

Results and Analysis

Results are reported in Table 2 below. As said before, the models track success at three decisive stages of the legislative process: committee reporting to the floor (Model 1 and 4); floor passing the bill to the Senate (Model 2 and 5); and final passing/approval (Model 3 and 6). Following our model specification, a separate analysis was conducted to test whether our predictors hold to explain why the executive granted members proposals with *Urgency for Scheduling* (See Table 3).

Table 2. Legislators' Bill Success at different stages of the legislative process.


Independent Variables	(Model 1) Committee Reports	(Model 2) Advance to The Senate	(Model 3) Final Approval	(Model 4) Committee Reports	(Model 5) Advance to the Senate	(Model 6) Final Approval
Party Range(ln)	0.508*** (.15)	0.458** (.18)	0.660*** (.22)			
Cross Coalition (dummy)	-- --	-- --	-- --	0.821*** (.17)	0.867*** (.19)	1.137*** (.25)
Committee Chairs	0.084 (0.04)	0.105** (.42)	0.154** (.06)	0.097** (.04)	0.109*** (.04)	0.163** (.06)
Seniority	0.075 (.06)	0.064 (.07)	-0.013 (.10)	0.104 (.06)	0.091 (.07)	0.030 (.10)
Woman	0.224 (.18)	0.160 (.21)	0.038 (.29)	0.236 (.18)	0.186 (.21)	0.099 (.29)
Centrist Party(PDC)	-0.300 (.71)	0.135 (.58)	-0.575 (.68)	-0.337 (.72)	0.137 (.59)	-0.709 (.67)
Urgency for Scheduling	4.744*** (.42)	3.462*** (.26)	3.047*** (.26)	4.803*** (.42)	3.527*** (.26)	3.128*** (.26)
Higher Quorum	-0.507 (.33)	-0.732 (.44)	-1.148 (.80)	-0.510 (.33)	-0.732 (.43)	-1.129 (.80)
Constant	-2.959*** (.18)	-3.493*** (.20)	-4.545*** (.32)	-3.000*** (.18)	-3.514*** (.21)	-4.672*** (.34)
Log likelihood	-534.19	-434.76	-254.49	-528.65	-428.64	-248.945
R2	.26	.25	0.26	0.27	.26	0.28
Observations	1,663	1,664	1,664	1,664	1,665	1,665

Table shows logit estimates. Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In general, we found confirmation for our hypothesis. Model 1 shows the effect of the covariates on the response variable capturing the reporting of bills from the committee to the Chamber of Deputies floor. *Party Range*, capturing our Support Across the Aisle Hypothesis, has a positive coefficient and it is statistically significant, even after controlling by *Urgency for Scheduling* (positive and statistically significant). Predicted probabilities show that when moving from the baseline value to the maximum value of the predictor *Party Range*, the probability of being reported from the committee increases from .09 to .20, or an increase in 11% in the chances of being reported (See upper left plot in Figure 1).

In Model 2 (Reported to the Senate), the coefficient of *Party Range* goes in the anticipated direction—positive— and it is statistically significant. The predictor holds into the model even when controlling by *Urgency of Scheduling*, *Quorum*, *Seniority* and the other covariates. Again, a more substantive and tangible interpretation of the results is possible by examining predicted probabilities. The probability of being voted favourably by the Chamber of Deputies increases from a probability of .05 to a probability of .12 when moving from the baseline value of the predictor to the maximum one. In other words, the chance of partial success increases by 7%. Our predictor *Committee Chairs*, capturing our Policy Specialization Hypothesis, now holds in the model. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant. The probability of being reported to the Senate increases from .05 to a probability of .15 when moving from zero to the maximum number of chairs signing a bill (See bottom left Plot in Figure 1).

Figure 1 Predicted Probability of Success by Party Range and Committee Chairs




Model 3 shows the dynamic that leads to final approval of legislators' own bills. The coefficient of *Party Range* is positive (as anticipated) and is statistically significant. The same can be said about our predictor *Committee Chairs*. Meanwhile, the control variable *Urgency for Scheduling* has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant. The covariates *Higher Quorum*, *Gender*, *Centrist Party* and *Seniority* are not statistically significant at any level.

The upper and bottom right plots in Figure 1 allow more visual interpretations of the predicted probability of success for both *Party Range* and *Committee Chairs*. When *Party Range* increases from the baseline value to the maximum one, the probability of bills becoming statutory law effectively increases by almost 5%, holding the rest of the covariates at their means. Our predictor *Committee Chairs* has a similar effect: the probability of a bill approval increases from .01 to .07 when moving from the minimum value of the variable to the maximum value.

For a more robust confirmation of our results, in Models 4, 5 and 6, we change the specification of the variable measuring our first hypothesis (Support Across the Aisle). *Cross-Coalition* is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for those bills signed by members from both coalitions, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient is statistically significant and goes in the expected direction in the three models. The same can be said about the second predictor, *Committee Chairs*. For example, in model 4 (Advance to Senate), both *Cross-Coalition* and *Committee Chairs* are statistically significant and go in the expected direction. Predictive probabilities for each level of our predictors show that when moving from the reference group to those bills signed by members of both coalitions the probability of being reported from the committee to the floor rises by 10% (Left Plot in Figure 2).

Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of Success by Cross-Coalition



Predicted probabilities from Model 6 (Final Approval) show that the probability of being enacted law increases by 4% when moving from the reference group to those bipartisan bills. So far, we have found statistical confirmation for our two hypotheses in our analysis of the legislative sequence involving bills being reported from committee, approved by the Chamber of Deputies floor and finally passed by the legislature. It is worth mentioning that, given the sequential nature of the outcome, we also run an Ordered Logit Model which, preliminary, yielded similar results.

Our previous analysis (Table 2 and figures) confirms that the agenda power controlled by the executive in Chile plays a major role in explaining why members' bills became law. The covariate *Urgency for Scheduling* is positive and statistically significant in all the models. We place *Urgency for Scheduling* as the dependent variable to test whether the factors that explain the passage of members bills also account for why bills are included in the agenda by the executive, through urgent bill consideration (See Table 3).

Table 3. Motions of Urgency

Independent Variables	(Model #1) Urgency for Scheduling	(Model# 2) Urgency for Scheduling
Party Range(ln)	0.714*** (.20)	
Cross-Coalition	--	0.517** (0.21)
Committee Chairs	0.070 (.05)	0.119** (.05)
Seniority	0.102 (.09)	0.151 (.09)
Woman	0.475 (.24)	0.474 (.24)
Centrist Party(PDC)	1.090** (.46)	0.762 (.46)
Higher Quorum	-0.771 (.52)	-0.729 (.52)
Constant	-4.004*** (.25)	-3.903*** (.24)
Log likelihood	-357.23	-361.28
R2	.06	.05
Observations	1,664	1,665

Table 3 shows logit estimates. Robust Standard errors in parenthesis,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In model 1 our hypothesis *Support Across the Aisle* is measured with *Party Range(ln)* and in Model 2 with *Cross-Coalition*. The two specifications show results in line with our expectations. Predicted probabilities from Model 1 show that, when moving from the baseline value of *Party Range* to its maximum value, proposals' likelihood of being attached with *Urgency for Scheduling* increases from .03 to .10. In Model 1 our variable *Committee Chairs* is not statistically significant. In Model 2 *Committee Chairs* is statistically significant and predicted probabilities show that there is 7% more chance of observing the executive attaching a motion of urgency to a given bill when comparing the baseline and the maximum value of our predictor.

Discussion and Implications

We have introduced a model that informs us on the mechanism explaining why some policies authored by members of the legislature in parallel to the executive became law. Our model yields predictions about the success of legislators' own bills. The model we put forward proposes that legislators learn about the quality of a bill from the authorship information of each proposal, which ultimately guide legislative choice. This article provides evidence that both support across the aisle and specialization provide a 'confirmatory signal' about the quality of the bills (or the risk of incurring losses for the organization given poor policy). Ultimately, our results show that those bills are more likely to be tabled for consideration, move forward in the legislative process and finally enacted in law.

This study illustrates one way that informational intuition can be agreeable with empirical evidence in settings where both distributive and partisan theories have been the predominant focus in the literature. This is not to say that both individuals and partisan incentives gently retreat into the background when modelling legislative outcomes. We may have introduced a different angle to the analysis of legislative politics by focusing on the informational factors explaining, exclusively, the passing of legislators' policies in parallel to the government. Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, our model and results suggest the importance of taking into consideration factors other than individuals' preferences in the process of generating new policies in democratic assemblies.

Our results are robust to different specification and hold even after controlling by covariates capturing institutional factors usually assumed as determinants to explain government

legislative success, such as the scheduling powers in the hands of the presidents and supermajorities required to pass bills (i.e., Alemán and Navia 2009).

Our results show that the informative and technical imbalance between the executive and the legislature in the formulation of their policy proposals does not stop the legislature from crafting their own policies. The Chilean parliament is usually dismissed as a weak organization in terms of the generation of their own policies in parallel to powerful governments (Londregan 2000; Siavelis 1997; 2000). Against that picture, our model and results show that the organization manages to overcome institutional constraints and reduce uncertainty about the merit of their proposals. If our intuition is right, the organization does so efficiently, taking an alternative path to the costly delegation to committees.

Another implication of our study should be noted. Recall, as we explained above, that proposal's agenda power in presidential settings other than the U.S Congress is allocated outside the organization. Thus, we do not model the passing of members' proposals as if the executive is exogenous to the process. Another more straightforward angle is thinking of the scheduling of members initiatives as a sub product of exchanges between the government and congress over the policies of the former, as our results appear to suggest. Then, the scheduling of legislators' proposals in this somehow "secondary market" of policies can be better understood as negotiations between chamber leaders and the executive rather than an imposition of the latter. Given that, it is plausible to envision the executive having similar concerns about members' proposals quality, and illustrating her decision to include a given bill in the agenda by the same factors supporting our two predictions.

Our result also puts into question the conventional view that Latin American assemblies are purely reactive organizations (e.g., Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Morgenstern 2002). Our evidence shows that the Chilean Congress is not only a workable institution in introducing amendments to the executive proposals. In pursuing functional differentiation and specialisation, apparently reactive legislatures can advance their own policies. Therefore, the Chilean assembly works in spite of the institutional constraints.

Those modest observations also have significant implications for our understanding of how policies proposed by members of democratic assemblies became law and enhanced our understanding of law making in Latin America's presidential systems.

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CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation starts with two simple observations that are worth consideration: Firstly, it is too simplistic to assume that legislators are equally opportunistic individuals ready to do anything to foster their ‘electoral connection’. Secondly, policy outcomes in democratic legislatures cannot always be understood as the result of logrolling dynamics based on particularistic exchanges. We present different theories to understand three dynamics within the Chilean assembly: legislators’ behaviour toward their constituencies, parties’ strategies, and legislative outcomes in a party-dominated assembly. The results have implications for our understanding of legislative representation and the functioning of democratic assemblies in settings where parties are stronger and dominant and where a significant imbalance between the government and the legislature is usually interpreted as a restriction of the second in the performance of its role as a policy making institution.

Overall, the results confirm that electoral incentives do not matter in the ways that are frequently believed to with respect to (1) most incumbent behaviour and (2) the passing of new laws –or policy outcomes— in democratic assemblies.

Constituency Focus: Role-Based Explanations

The first chapter borrows from the legislators’ role framework (i.e., Searing 1994; 1985; Strøm 1997) providing evidence that members’ decisions to concentrate on their plenary activities other than voting in their constituency are a response to personal biographies, position within the organisation and idiosyncratic factors of the district. As it stands, the role

framework allows observance of behavioural disparities that do not flow from electoral institutions or electoral marginality. The main finding is that Chilean legislators who were born and raised in the provinces where their districts are located and those with smaller constituencies are more likely to adopt the role of constituency servants. These findings are unexpected in an institutional setting which is not likely to reward this choice.

The results illustrate one way that the role framework can be acquiescent with empirical evidence in settings where electoral incentives and distributive theories have been the predominant focus in the literature. From a comparative angle, the results suggest that members from parliamentary systems and presidential settings can embrace a constituency orientation by resorting to relatively similar mechanisms, such as parliamentary questions, speeches, chamber resolutions and private member bills (*mociones* -- the Chilean terminology). In settings where party discipline is strictly enforced, as in parliamentary environments and in the separate power regime-case examined here, the existence of such opportunities, allows members to foster their careers without becoming rebels or breaking with the party. This also confirms the importance of looking beyond roll calls votes in order to explain behavioural patterns in party-controlled assemblies.

The approach adopted in this chapter also avoids the limitations of the estimates extracted from self-reported roles provided by parliamentary surveys (i.e., PELA 2005). It is worth mentioning that this study also contributes a theoretically compelling coding effort. Building from Martin's (2011) coding strategy used to capture constituency focus in a parliamentary setting, the bar was set very high in order to discriminate between what constitutes a general orientation towards the district and actual focus on the constituents. The results of Chapter 2 are telling of the existence of different representational styles that need to be taken into

consideration when modelling behavioural aspects such as constituency service in order to generate more theoretically driven estimates of such orientation.

Legislative Activity and Promotion to Higher Offices

Chapter 2 examined the factors that affect the probability that members of the lower house would be chosen to run for the Senate or promoted to leadership offices in the Chilean Chamber of Deputies, a highly constrained party environment. Here, promotion to higher office is best explained as the outcome of the interplay between progressive ambitious members and their parties. The argument highlights the relation between bill initiation and promotion to higher offices in a context where members' policy proposals are unlikely tools for building personal votes. The results confirmed the hypotheses that those Chilean deputies who introduce more pieces of legislation and those with more experience are promoted to higher office more often. In the model Chapter 2 puts forward, legislative activity is better conceived as a form of party service. Parties want to curb adverse selection and the potential negative consequences for the parties' reputation of bad choices. This in turn explains why legislators spend time crafting pieces of legislation that ultimately do not help them to build reputations among their constituents. Rather than bills policy consequences, parties focus on individuals' records of legislative production as an indicator of readiness for promotion.

Overall, the results above show that parties orchestrate career advancement in a more sophisticated way than usually assumed, considering factors other than the electoral potential of the aspirants or their voting records. Intraparty dynamics in separate powers regimes, other than the U.S Congress, show resemblances to parliamentary democracies. This suggests a similar implication as discussed in Chapter 1 but now with a focus on party politics. A second conclusion of this chapter is a counterpoint to other stories from Latin American legislatures

where legislative activity appears to be related to legislators with ambition for subnational offices (Micozzi 2014; Chasqueti and Micozzi 2014; Samuels 2003). The evidence provided here shows how career advancement in the Chilean assembly follows a territorial hierarchy instead. This result is surprising in a context where legislative careers have been characterised as static (Carey 2002; Crisp, Kanthak and Leijonhufvud 2004).

Future research should consider other types of career progression (e.g. ministers, high level offices in the national bureaucracy, posts in local administrations, and other positions within the party). Such disaggregation could provide us with a better notion of the general phenomena of career advancement and intraparty politics at different levels.

A Model of Legislators' Policy Success

In contrast to Chapters 1 and 2, the third chapter introduced a theory to model legislators' success in passing their own bills in parallel to the government agenda. The model that Chapter 3 puts forward proposed that legislators look at the authors of a bill as heuristics to infer the non-positional quality (or side effects) of the bills under consideration. When authorship indicates that the proposed policy has support across the aisle or is sponsored by policy specialists, legislators are more likely to pass it. Those results represent a different angle with respect to the predominant distributive (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Shepsle 1978; Weingast and Marshall 1988) and partisan models (Cox and McCubbins 2005) explaining why some members of the legislature get their bills passed while others don't.

Chapter 3 provides fresh evidence on a topic neglected by legislative scholars: the success of non-government proposals. The success of chief executives in passing their policy goals has

been largely examined in the literature. By focusing exclusively on the factors explaining the approval of members' sponsored proposals, Chapter 3 advances our knowledge in an important, though neglected, dynamic within democratic assemblies. The comparison of the factors explaining both the approval of government legislation and members' bills provides interesting cues about the effect of institutions and the underlying incentives of congressional production. For example, previous research on Chile highlights the importance of institutional factors such as the presidents' agenda power to declare a certain bill a matter for urgent consideration, the quorum and the president's exclusive power over financial policy (i.e., Alemán and Navia 2009). Those institutional factors have less prominence in the model advanced in Chapter 3. In fact, the results show how even controlling for institutional factors such as the agenda powers in the hands of the strong Chilean government, the predictors capturing our informational intuition are significant in predicting the probability of a bills' success. The above is related to the basic assumption explaining why legislators want to pass their own bills in the first place. The pursuit of the organisations' institutionalization explains why members of democratic assemblies have incentives to spend time and effort on producing their own policies. Legislators do care about those proposals quality or side effects. While partisan and institutional factors matter for most of the congressional production of government bills, in advancing their own proposals legislators appear to focus on indicators of quality that reduce their uncertainty about the consequences of those '*policy investments*'. Our results also highlight a different dimension of how legislatures work in the Latin American context. In comparison to the U.S Congress, democratic assemblies in the region have been characterised as reactive organisations (Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Londregan 2000) unable to formulate a policy agenda on their own. At best, they focus on particularistic benefits to their districts. Our results challenge such a picture, showing that legislatures work in producing their own policies in parallel to powerful presidents. Indeed, the Chilean

legislature is not only a workable institution in introducing amendments to the executive proposals. This suggests how an apparently 'reactive legislature' works.

The Chilean assembly is able to overcome institutional and technical restrictions and aggregate information in the process of producing their own policies in parallel to the government. But as results from Model 2 in this chapter show, the informational intuition explaining how members process information about non-government bills may explain how the executive learns about members' proposals quality.

Overall, the dissertation provides new evidence on the effect of the presidentialism and party politics on legislators' behaviour and policy outcomes in the Chilean legislature. The models and results provide new insights into legislative dynamics in a party constrained environment. Conventional explanations are taken aside in order to test a different set of factors accounting for behavioural disparities and the results of the lawmaking process in a case of a separate power regime.

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