'No Smoke Without Fire':

Citizenship and Securing Economic Enclaves in Mozambique

Lars Buur, Roskilde University, Dept. Of Social Sciences and Business

Jason Sumich, University of Essex, Dept. of Sociology

Abstract. In this article, we explore the complicated interrelationship between economic enclaves, their associated security practices and the formation of national citizens in Mozambique. From the colonial era of company rule to the large-scale foreign direct investments (FDIs) of the present day, investors have feared the destructive fires of rampant 'mobs', unruly workers and the potentially rebellious populace more generally. Signs of smoke point to trouble for investors, who can draw on complex security arrangements, including corporate social responsibility programmes, unions, private security companies, community leaders, state police and specialized state and rapid response units with the latest communication and transport technologies, to try and protect their investments from labour unrest and political demands. Through the mobilization of a variety of ethnographic materials on mega-investments in the sugar industry over the last two decades, we explore the centrality of complex security arrangements to strategies of governance that use such arrangements in an attempt to produce disciplined national subjects.

Introduction

> In 2007 a wildcat strike broke out when four thousand seasonal cane-cutters at the Mafambisse sugar plantation in the central Mozambican province of Sofala demanded a wage hike, overtime pay and a reduction of what they regarded as their excessive workloads. This strike spread to other areas of the sector in the southern part of the country. The *greve* (strike) was 'pacified' by a combination of armed private security guards, state police and the feared *Polícia de Intervenção Rápida* (PIR or Rapid Reaction Police).[1] As a cane-cutter described the intervention of the PIR in 2008, 'They come out of nothing, don't ask any questions and just hurt you. When they come, you run – they know how to kill, they can take everything away from you. For them you are not *um homem* (a man)'. (Interview Sofala November 2008)

In this article, we explore how the security practices of economic enclaves in Mozambique are transforming citizen–subject relations by attempting to produce disciplined members of the national community. By invoking citizen–subject relations, we aim to challenge the common de Tocquevillean distinction between citizens as relatively self-governing participants in socio-political affairs and subjects as falling under the control of a power that subordinates them and restrains their ability to act freely. Scholars such as Abrahamsen and Williams (2011, 2017) and Duffield and Waddell (2004) have demonstrated how the complex security arrangements of economic enclaves in Africa, ranging from coercion to corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes, form part of wider global assemblages that influence practices of governance. Building on these insights, we explore how global security assemblages both shape and are shaped by governance strategies by being harnessed in the effort to produce national citizens and the ways in which such practices also erode the distinctions between citizens and subjects.

Specifically, we explore how inclusion and exclusion take place in the name of protecting rights and, by implication, how this effects the concept of citizenship for full-time workers as opposed to temporary labour, which is considered to consist of the unruly and uncivilized elements in society. In particular, when unruly workers threaten to burn down the investments that give those who are deemed 'full' citizens access to jobs and related perks such as education, the securitization of investments becomes visible and the discourses that legitimize the repressive violence that embodies such securitization become clear. We argue that security practices surrounding large-scale extractive investments have become a contentious issue in Mozambique and the global south more

---

[1] The PIR has officially changed its name to Unidade de Intervenção Rapida (UIR). However, we continue to refer to this unit as PIR because that is the name our interlocutors continue to use.

generally.[2] Large-scale investments in natural resources intensified dramatically after 2000 before slowly ebbing away after 2015, as the economic slowdown in China and Southeast Asia took their toll on investors' confidence in super-returns.[3] In much of the contemporary political rhetoric, large-scale transnational investments have been proclaimed as the key to prosperity through which nations can free themselves from aid dependency and utilize the resulting growth to strengthen national sovereignty, create jobs and become productive members of the global economic order, provided they get things right in terms of governance.[4] In practice, however, FDI and transnational investments are crucial factors in strengthening a logic of governmentality based on enclaving. Enclaving refers to the creation of zones of mixed and intertwined sovereignty that have unequal access to infrastructure and that operate under special legal regimes (Appel 2012; Ferguson 2006; Kirshner and Power 2015). This forms a complex assemblage capable of simultaneously producing and violating rights, sparking social unrest and political instability, and producing new citizen–subject relations.

Ferguson (2006) and Harvey (2003) argue that political mobilizations over resources are an aspect of the growing dissatisfaction with neoliberalism as both a strategy of economic growth and a model of citizenship (Grugel and Singh 2013: 80-81). Accordingly, this neo-liberal model of citizenship focuses on market relations and visions of access to a world of potentially limitless consumerism rather than on the rights to exert agency and control resources. In discussions over resource governance, the extent to which extractive investments are secured and protected and how this shapes citizenship has largely been overlooked. Security, especially the various forms of private security, play a crucial role in protecting large-scale transnational investments and in creating the resulting enclaved model of governance. As Abrahamsen and Williams note (2011: 122-123),

---

[2] We consider large-scale FDI in mining, oil/gas and agriculture to be 'extractive', as it is based on a capitalist logic of extracting surplus value from land or sea.

[3] The final commitments to a series of large-scale investments in iron, coal and oil/gas for East Africa alone run to US$ 100 billion. Foreign companies must honour these investment proposals if they are to keep control of the lucrative assets they have signed up to. However, by postponing taking final decisions due to low oil/gas and commodity prices, they are placing countries like Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya in limbo over their financial futures. Similar processes can be witnessed in Latin America.

[4] A range of reports pushed the resource agenda when resource prices for coal, precious stones, heavy sand, natural gas etc. continued in the aftermath of the financial crisis (see UNECA 2013; AEO 2013; UNCTAD 2013), but generally the land grab literature (see Hall 2013; Fairhead et al. 2012; Søreide and Williams 2014) and critical resource curse literature have been more cautious (Frynas et al. 2017; Macuane et al. 2017; Pedersen and Buur 2017).

during the present phase of neoliberalism private security companies have become 'key intermediaries' in shaping security environments around extractions of natural resources.[5]

However, we wish to take this focus on private security further by asking how investments are secured by means of *complex security assemblages* that span the spectrum of both coercive and inclusive methods of security that straddle the public–private divide, and how they both shape and are shaped by the types of citizen–subject relations upon which they are based. We draw on literature that focuses on inclusive approaches, exemplified by approaches to voluntary forms of global governance like the CSR and governmentality (Burchell *et al*. 1991; Rose 1999; Welker 2014) and on how multinational corporate businesses (MNCs) use 'hybrid security practices' (Hönke 2013: 9) to further their interests in and control over resources and territories by enlisting the state in the process. However, as Daley (2013) demonstrated for hybrid security practices deployed in the delivery of humanitarian aid in post-conflict contexts, this involves the management of fairly mobile groups of people through multiple security practices that shape citizenship, as do hybrid security practices in extractive enclaves. Building on this, we explore how security practices, both coercive and inclusive, play a central disciplinary role in a wider project of producing national citizens and disciplining unruly subjects. The literature concerning private security, like that related to governance, tends to downplay the role of the state. In contrast, we emphasize the fundamental role of the relationship between public and private security forces in creating mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion.

Private security companies, state police, military, special units and decentralized community governance are all active in securing enclaves. While these actors increasingly collaborate – whether directly or indirectly, by using inclusive approaches – with CSR personnel, development consultants, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and sometimes even the state's social and/or welfare agencies, such programmes are enacted under the shadow of more repressive forms of coercive security. These complex security assemblages, which are related to the enclaved model of extractive investments, are therefore both violent and 'humanitarian' in that they produce specific differentiated citizen–subject relations based on mechanisms of discipline, inclusion and exclusion. Scholars such as Appel (2012) and Ferguson (2006) have demonstrated how enclaving creates forms of graduated sovereignty, while Kapferer and Bertelsen argue that the state is being

---

[5] Several intertwined global processes have enabled the rise of private security firms, but prime among them is the downscaling and privatization of the state in general and the police and security sector in particular, as part of neo-liberal governance agendas (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Hönke 2013).

reconfigured along corporate lines, 'where the impersonal, equalizing social contract of Rousseau has been replaced by 'managerial, person-centred, even autocratic and hierarchical orders' (2009: 18). For Mozambique, Kirshner and Power argue that mining enclaves in Tete province are reshaping both economic life and urban planning, recreating deeply exclusionary colonial models of company rule on the one hand, while drawing local elites more tightly into international networks on the other (2015: 70). The above authors have quite rightly focused on how enclaving can transform the economic, political and social landscape. However, our evidence suggests that greater attention should also be paid towards the sometimes fragmented and contradictory ways in which enclaving bolsters existing political projects and strategies of governance. Instead of viewing the extractive sector and its associated security practices as the tip of the neoliberal spear, part of a vast project of transformation, we focus on showing how crucial this economic and security assemblage is to state-sponsored attempts to order society through the production of disciplined members of the national community for the state, in a manner reminiscent of the previous socialist period.

We therefore explore how both CSR governmentality schemes and the role of the security forces are providing new possibilities for the state and other *de facto* authorities to create a disciplined citizenry through a continuum that combines coercive and inclusive security practices as an emerging form of governmentality.

The authors have been collecting the interviews and observation materials relating to the sugar sector on which this article is based since 2008. Furthermore, both authors have also been engaged in research on Mozambique related to a range of 'closed contexts' (Kock 2013) such as elite and middle-class formation, political decentralization and administrative de-concentration since the early 2000s in different configurations. These materials have therefore been produced within the context of ongoing and sustained field research involving both interviews and participant observation, as well as institutional analysis.

In the next section, we discuss how we understand 'complex security assemblages' (CSA) and how this produces citizen–subject relations through mechanisms of discipline, inclusion and exclusion. Much of the analysis in Mozambique has focused on the high-value coal and natural gas sector. However, we demonstrate how the disciplinary and political aspects of securing extractive enclaves can create social 'value' for ruling elites that, in some instances, outweighs its ostensible

economic importance.[6] A key site in disciplinary attempts to produce national citizens is the sugar sector, which therefore plays a far more important role than its contribution to Mozambique's GNP would suggest. Accordingly, we end this article with a discussion of what the rehabilitation of the sugar industry suggests for securing enclaved extractive industries in both Mozambique and Africa more generally.

Complex security assemblages and citizen–subject relations

Our thinking related to the types of enforcement used in 'securing' natural resource investments is inspired in part by recent work on 'private security assemblages' by Abrahamsen and Williams (2017) and on the 'hybrid security governance' of transnational companies by Hönke (2013). In line with these approaches, we argue that, as transnational systems of meaning, global assemblages of governance constitute the different security practices of 'transnational business spaces' (Hõnke 2013), including both enclave economies and specific sites of extraction. Here we are referring to extractive spaces governed by a complex assemblage of actors, including statutory military units, police and special police units, private security, paramilitary, consultants, national and international NGOs, and governmental authorities (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Diphoorn 2015).

These insights from Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) and Hönke (2013) are important for the argument developed here, as they relate partly to shifting movements between mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. Such movements, as Tsing suggests, draw on complex strategies and practices that often exist in a paradoxical relationship within the 'shifting terrain between legality and illegality […] violence and law, restoration and extermination' (Tsing 2003: 5102). Studies of investments and security have shown how extractive spaces can become subject to what we call coercive security practices, thus turning them into semi-militarized zones (Le Billon 2001; Escobar 2006), as well as inclusive' security practices, including community involvement projects, local employment and social benefits (Grugel and Singh 2013; Hönke 2013; Welker 2014). Our use of coercive and inclusive security practices indicates a continuum and a multiplicity of uses of force, ranging from threats of violence to actual physical violence and killings, along with supposedly inclusive mechanisms that can include the solicitation of bribes and patronage, and the provision of benefits such as different types of empowerment programmes, the construction of schools, housing

---

[6] For an illuminating discussion, see a special issue of *Geoforum* (82, 2017), especially the Introduction by Goldstein and Yates (2017) and Discussion by Li (2017), pointing out how land can be rendered investable.

programs and introduction of health care. The specific configuration will always be an empirical question, but in many other cases the inclusive forms of security have 'consulted' local communities and local government using third-party companies, enrolled micro-credit facilitators and supervised housing construction using their own engineers. This has resulted in improved housing, schools being built and water systems being installed. Agricultural projects supporting food security have been mobilized using irrigation facilities aimed at cane production, potentially providing a better livelihood for populations that became part of outgrower schemes.

Coercive and inclusive security approaches are usually treated as separate or discrete from one another.[7] In contrast, we suggest that security related to extractive enclaves is usually provided by both types of practice, whether in combination or sequentially, and therefore they need to be seen as constituting a continuum (see also Abrahamsen and Williams 2017) creating complex security assemblages through a regime of 'inclusive exclusion' (Agamben 1998:6; Buur et al. 2007: 15).[8] Depending on their specific constellations of coercive and inclusive practices, complex security assemblages have different implications for the types of citizen–subject relations that evolve in respect of extractive investments.[9]

The discursive reframing of something as a 'security issue' legitimizes exceptional measures, which can involve a trade-off between security and rights (see Buzan et al. 1998). These exceptional measures have commonly been understood as increased surveillance, control, physical force and militarization, which, in the case of extractive spaces, has resulted in the emergence of concepts such as 'conflict diamonds' or 'blood diamonds' (Levy 2003; UN 2000), 'blood oil' (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011: 135) and 'blood coal' (Moor and van de Sandt 2014) to indicate the inherently violent nature of resource politics (Grugel and Singh 2013).[10] However, we argue that

---

[7] In earlier versions of this article, based on Buur et al. 2007, we considered conceptualizing this as 'hard' and 'soft' forms of security practices, but this tends to reduce it to a simple and clear-cut binary opposition between different concepts of organization, thus undermining the idea of a continuum. In doing so, the intertwined ways in which security practices operate by drawing on both coercive and inclusive practices may be lost.

[8] We follow Agamben in focusing on included bodies (citizens) and excluded bodies (naked bodies or *homo sacer*) as 'the original activity of sovereign power' (Agamben 1998: 6) where 'the exclusion of some*body* from the political community and the protection provided by its laws and rights' is what constitute sovereignty in practice and what becomes the foundational moment of sovereignty (Buur et al. 2007: 15; see also Buur 2015 on how this can be constituted for riots).

[9] However, whereas the literature as such points not only to competing rights but also to different types of citizenship relations (Holston 1999), it is rarely clear how different types of investment lead to different forms of struggle over rights (Hall 2013), nor how different ways of enforcing such investments lead to different types of citizen–subject relations.

[10] We realize that the use of security discourses to legitimize exceptional measures extends beyond the realm of natural resources alone. See Selby and Hoffmann 2014.

we need to grasp the more indirect practices of regulating and securitizing a specific investment. In particular, we suggest that investments are securitized in and through complex security assemblages by drawing on a continuum of coercive and inclusive practices, whose importance lies in the fact that they produce different types of citizen–subject relations that are the epitome of enclaved forms of governance. These developments suggest a newly spatialized archipelago version of Mamdani´s (1996) famous argument concerning the formation of citizens, whose civil rights were guaranteed by the state, and subjects, who were trapped in a form of 'decentralized despotism' in Africa. We also build on the points made by Mamdani and Cruikshank (1999) to argue that the democratic citizen is not a type set apart from the subordinated subject, as they are both subject to power, so that the line between citizen and subject may be indistinct. Our introductory vignette exemplifies this argument in that it shows how workers are seen as citizens with certain rights that can be revoked by complex security assemblages, thus turning them into excluded subjects with no rights. This is done in the name of protecting the rights and thereby the citizenship of the workers against the unruly elements in society that are threatening to burn down the investments that give citizens access to jobs, health and education.

The manner in which complex security assemblages transform citizen–subject relations both shapes and is shaped by pre-existing political logics. In the early socialist and post-independence period from 1975-1986, the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique or Frelimo, the ruling party since 1975) resembled what Mbembe termed the 'Theologian State'; that is, 'a state which is preoccupied not only with practices concerning the distribution of power and influence, social relations, economic arrangements and political processes. It is also [a state] which aspires explicitly at defining for social agents the way they have to see themselves, interpret themselves and interpret the world' (Mbembe 1988: 128). Thus, despite the lofty declarations of various constitutions, inclusion into the political community and being recognized as a national citizen has been dependent on political loyalty, social position and one's willingness to adopt the traits and behaviour that the party leadership officially affirms. Despite the fall of socialism (1990/91), the concept of meaningful inclusion in the national community in Mozambique continues to be a function of one's loyalty to Frelimo (Macuane *et al*. 2017; Sumich 2013, 2018). However, the early socialist period was characterized by a vast utopian ambition to reform the population of Mozambique as the first step in a project that would so utterly transform the nation that it would be unrecognizable in just a few short decades. While many disciplinary strategies remain, the capitalist period is characterized by a progressive narrowing of vision and

ambition. The dramatic recreation of Mozambique is no longer on the cards, nor is the whole nation any longer needed as foot soldiers in this project. Instead, the ruling elite prefers to employ disciplined and docile members of the national community in strategic sites as a pre-condition for reproducing their own power.

For our understanding of 'ruling elites' we draw on Whitfield *et al*. (2015: 24; see also Whitfield and Buur 2014; Behuria *et al*. 2017), who define this term as 'the group of people who wield power as a result of their position in government, where they occupy offices in which authoritative decisions are made'. We suggest that this definition is suitable for the sorts of investments we are focusing on, as it allows us to pursue the complexities that the term 'ruling elites' denotes in the Mozambican context. The paradox regarding Frelimo's ruling elites has been that, while the party has managed to stay in power since 1975, there are quite a number of volatile high-level factions and alliances within Frelimo, just as there are in the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) and the *Movimento Democrático de Moçambique* (MDM) Opposition. Briefly, two main ruling elite factions have dominated the scene since the first liberal elections in 1994.[11] First, the Joaquim Chissano coalition that ruled from 1994 to 2002 after the civil war that ravaged the country from 1977 to 1992 was a relatively broad alliance that to some extent tried to accommodate the interests of many different factions and people, both within and, to some degree, beyond the ruling party. This process of coalition-building gave rise to a more technocratic approach consisting of economic, political and administrative reforms involving the appointment to government positions of technocrats with little political influence. This broke sharply with Frelimo's earlier practice of emphasizing politics over technical matters, and it faced criticism from internal party factions, mainly consisting of Frelimo's hard-line socialist ideologues, liberation fighters and older members of the party who feared losing their grip over society.

In contrast, the Emilio Armando Guebuza coalition that began to entrench itself in power from 2003 'restored the notion of Frelimo as the ruler of the country and revived the foundational idea of national unity organized in and through the Frelimo party' (Macuane *et al*. 2017). Here membership of Frelimo again became a condition for access to 'citizenship', as well as to public office. This shift in the ruling elite's focus is important for the present account because this meant that 'the available economic opportunities were distributed among the narrow coalition of those

---

[11] We draw on Whitfield *et al*. 2015 and Macuane *et al*. 2017 for our specific discussion of ruling elite formation in Mozambique, as it is the most comprehensive works to date on this issue.

closest to Guebuza, who controlled the economy and rents with a tight fist, in contrast to the Chissano era' (Macuane *et al.* 2017: 15). Outside of the halls of power, Frelimo was once again refashioning practices of political inclusion. As we shall demonstrate, access to job opportunities in the sugar sector, for example, would be reserved for Frelimo members more or less strictly, just as other forms of the exclusion of opposition supporters or perceived opposition supporters would be intensifies.

Citizenship in Mozambique, as elsewhere, is graduated and is constituted by its relationship to power, rendering it precarious and making the line between citizen and subject indistinct (see also Cruikshank 1999: 3, 20, for a wider discussion). We do not want to do away with the distinction between citizen and subject because, as Jensen (2005: 226) has pointed out, it continues to contain important 'imaginative and symbolic ideas'.[12] Instead, we prefer to focus here on the processes through which the citizen/subject is disciplined and on how these graduated differentiations take place in and through complex security assemblages related to the protection of large-scale extractive investments involving mixtures of private and public security provision. In doing so, we are less concerned with the ideational or normative dimensions of citizenship as a political status attached to the community of the nation state, even though such framings can be highly important. Our approach to the differentiation between citizen and subject moves beyond the nation state as the sole producer of the disciplinary project of producing national subjects. We attend to both the governmental role of private and other non-state security actors and the rescaling of statehood as the latest instantiation of the continuing process of transformation that has shaped citizenship from independence to the present.

Drawing on Graeber's (2001) discussion of value, in which he points out that it usually refers to at least three different understandings that are often conflated,[13] we suggest that 'value' is, so to speak, not solely a matter of measurement or of the reduction of social relations to one type of measurement, the *economic*, which can be extracted. Instead, it refers equally to the *types of relations* that can be made discernible or visible by being potentially recognized by others, as well as more ideational concepts, such as what the socio-political order *should* be. Thus, we suggest that

---

[12] In particular the anthropological literature (Kabeer 2005; Dagnino 2010; Rasch 2012) has argued that exclusion does not imply that citizens/subjects are not active in trying to change their status or undermine power (see Nugent 2010). While we are in agreement with these approaches, we do not provide such an analysis here due to the more programmatic nature of this article.

[13] Graeber's concept of value encompasses valuation/measurement and the moral and differentiation aspects of value (2001: 1-3; 23-47; 75-76), which roughly refers to the sociological (moral), economic (valuation/measurement) and linguistic senses of the term.

value here, in addition to being strictly economic, is related to the kinds of relations that can be produced in and through the type of natural resource investment and the question of how they are secured, and not solely to the size of the investment or the relative value of the specific resources as such. Value is therefore intrinsically related to this potentiality and to the kinds of citizens Frelimo wants to produce, namely those who are aligned both to the party and to the specific ruling elite interests that the securing of different types of investment promotes.

The example we consider here is the rehabilitation of the Mozambican sugar industry, as it shows how security is enforced and how the complex security assemblages are organized, mixing private and public security provisions through a broader understanding of what is valued in respect of the priorities of the ruling elites and their relationship to investors. We therefore consider how sugar investments are protected through the coercive security of the state and non-state actors, as well as by using softer approaches, such as CSR programmes.

Complex security assemblages in the sugar sector

From the end of the 1990s, the Mafambisse sugar company mentioned in the introductory vignette was jointly owned by the South African Tongaat Hulett group and the Mozambican state, but was managed by the former. When cane-cutters on the Mafambisse sugar plantation demonstrated and threatened to burn the cane-fields and sugar mill in 2007, the company's security guards opened fire on them, killing one and injuring three others in an attempt to disperse them. The demonstrators, brandishing machetes, retaliated by destroying a company motorbike, setting cane-fields on fire and barricading the main national road (N4) between Manica and Sofala Province, thus interrupting traffic to the strategic port of Beira on which landlocked Zimbabwe and Zambia also depend. Although the ordinary police were present, it was only when the PIR intervened that they managed to 'pacify' the angry strikers by 'chasing us … like they were hunting us like animals', as a former worker described it in 2008. The PIR is a well-trained and well-equipped special police force that some commentators have considered a 'paramilitary' unit (Manning 2002), as its members were originally recruited from Frelimo special forces after the General Peace Agreement (GPA) and the demobilization drive agreed in 1992. The PIR has been used to deal with many serious social, political and economic 'disturbances' since the end of the civil war. More recently it has been active in fighting in the low-intensity conflict between the ruling Frelimo party–state and its old enemy, Renamo, the rebels in the civil war from 1976-1992 and now the major opposition party), which

spread to six provinces between 2013 -2016.[14] While the PIR is formally under the control of the police and the Ministry of the Interior, it is known to take its orders directly from the President's office. While such a violent response to a labour dispute may, at first glance, appear exceptional or dramatic, the manner in which the strike was dealt with is part of a standard pattern in relation to the securing of investments.

The revival of the sugar industry – which for the most part involved South African capital from the mid-1990s to 2000, together with the ruling Frelimo party – was the first major large-scale FDI investment after the civil war to be supported by state industrial policy and linked to a dedicated strategy (Buur *et al*. 2012a). As the sector rapidly became a flagship investment that the government used as a showcase to lure other investors, with its impetus on health, education, skills training and job creation – all issues of social discipline – the sector retained considerable socio-political value, despite its relatively low economic worth. Here the 'value', so to speak, is not solely a matter of measurement based on economic reasoning but instead seems to be related to the types of relations that can be made discernible through recognition by others or with the potential to be recognized by others, thus drawing new investors to Mozambique.

Creating relations

Far from being a unique or singular event, deployment of the PIR has been a consistent feature of the enforcement and protection of investments in the country. At least three out of four rehabilitated sugar estates all have state police stations on the company premises and, in the case of the remaining company, in close vicinity to it, just outside its gates. To a large extent it is the investing companies that bear the costs of maintaining these units, often including the provision of additional transport and communications equipment, as well as supplementing state salaries. Along with the police, each company also has its own security personnel. For workers and their families, access to security and state services (even when paid for by corporations) was like becoming included in '*a Nação'* ('the nation', a local way of speaking about the distant and elusive power that stems from the capital, Maputo). As a worker from the Maragra sugar estate in the south of Mozambique who was now living in one of the nearby villages built for the company's workers described it: 'Here we

---

[14] Frelimo and Renamo fought a bloody and devastating sixteen-year civil war that gripped Mozambique from 1976 to 1992. The war started as a Cold War destabilization war, with Renamo supported first by the Rhodesian regime and, after Zimbabwe's independence, by the apartheid regime in South Africa. During the 1980s the war developed into a civil war that destroyed much of the country's infrastructure and displaced up to 40% of its population.

have police and are protected from thieves. Here the state is present, I can get documents. With documents, I can vote. My children can go to school' (interview 2010).

Each company also has a CSR programme. One example is Marromeu town, where a sugar company with the same name is located on the banks of the Zambezi River in Sofala province. This company has a programme worth US\$ 100,000 a year. Marromeu was a heavily contested space during the devastating civil war from 1976-92, being where the Frelimo government lost its first Russian attack helicopter in 1986, when Renamo gained control of the strategic town. The Marromeu company's CSR programme paid for the rehabilitation of the roads in Marromeu town during the rainy season from October to March and made sure that Frelimo leaders from '*a Nação*' have access to proper accommodation in the company's guest house(s) when they visit the region. A considerable part of the CSR budget also paid for the relatively well-stocked and well-serviced hospital in this remote region, as well as providing free electricity to the city council, which sold it to 'citizens' in the town, allowing it to 'earn' much needed service fees and produce urban citizens with access to modern services. When, during the rainy season, the town and region were cut off from the road network, the barter service the sugar company used to transport its products to the port of Beira provided a weekly outlet to restock the shops. The company-run airstrip provided the region with an emergency facility whereby the town and local state authorities, including the police and PIR, could access the hospital plane, also paid for by the company.

While relations between companies, local populations and labour were often tense and conflictual, the attempt to 'secure' and enforce corporate investments through the PIR, local police and private security providers, as well as by purchasing assistance from international and national NGOs and consultancy companies, allowed very different ways of disciplining national subjects to emerge. This could create conflict between corporate actors and Frelimo cadres. While corporate actors wanted to gain the acquiescence of local populations, Frelimo cadres wanted services and housing to benefit 'trusted' party members alone. As the company's Director for Community Relations and Security argued, the CSR programme provided what we would call 'inclusive' security:

> 'CSR (the budget) is an investment in good relations with the authorities, labour and local populations. It is our first defence against strikes, violence and fire. Our security people work hand in hand with the police. We are sharing the same space – where

does Marromeu (town) and the company start (or end)? You cannot tell me. If we burn, they burn too'. (Interview September 2011)

This sugar-company director, and we suggest other company directors as well, see the 'embeddedness' of the national police in the company's premises as contributing to securing their investments and protecting them from the 'fire that destroys', as they vividly describe it. Workers and their families who live in housing or hostels owned or provided by the companies interpret access to usually absent policing as helping make them citizens of Mozambique. One former worker from Mafambisse in Sofala, who is now a provincial director for agriculture in one of the provinces, described the inclusion the companies provided to at least some of its employees as follows:

'My father worked for the Sena Company [before independence],[15] and I went to a company-supported school. Sena then gave me a bursary for an agricultural college in what was then Rhodesia [Zimbabwe since 1980]. Then came independence, and when I returned and after I had gone through political schooling, I was sent to one of the southern sugar estates [Maragra and Xinavane] to work there. [...] Through the work at the company, my family and I got access to education, housing and health, and later on jobs in the sugar industry when it was privatized, and because of the training and experiences [provided by the company], my family got good jobs in the state. You could say I owe everything to the industry and the party [Frelimo]'. (Interview 2011, Sofala)

Here is an exemplary case of 'citizenship' being extended to those who are included as beneficiaries, both men and women workers and their families, together with development provisions, such as access to education and health care. However, by being included as 'citizens' they simultaneously become dependent, disciplined 'subjects' at the will and discretion of the party-state upon which such inclusion depends. Even when services are provided by private companies, they are represented as being provided by the state, which grants access to rights for 'its' citizens/subjects or 'children', as they are often framed in popular Frelimo discourse. Thus, the practices underlying citizenship in the current neo-liberal economic model are not necessarily any less paternalistic than they were during the socialist period, nor, as the above examples demonstrate,

---

[15] The Sena company was the single biggest employer in Mozambique before independence, owning, among other estates, the Marromeu sugar estate (see Buur et al. 2011, 2012b).

are paternalism and dependence necessarily resented.[16] In fact, it can be a socially valued marker of inclusion. The major difference is that the current model has bene outsourced to such a degree that different forms of sovereignty become intertwined and overlapping (see Duffield 2005). During the socialist period, citizenship was often precarious in the face of frequent purges and never-ending hunts for enemies (Buur 2010, Sumich 2013, 2018). However, socialism also was based on a model of mass mobilization in which political loyalty offered an opportunity for inclusion. Loyalty remains important in the current period: good workers who conscientiously perform their duties and do not strike can expect some rewards, while those who flout these rules can always be re-designated as superfluous, undisciplined subjects who are a threat to the community.

Value and exclusion

Calling upon the PIR was about protecting not just the companies' assets, but also the rights of the included citizens. This was how the southern-based sugar companies at Xinavane and Maragra again justified calling upon the PIR to deal with burning road-blocks on the N1 in 2008 when seasonal cane-cutters protested against their meagre salaries and food rations. Formal negotiations broke down, as SINTIA, the Frelimo-controlled national union for the sugar industry, had little control over the seasonal workers (interview, President of SINTIA, 2008). The consequence was that, when the sugar companies did not give in to salary demands, workers retreated to the only language they knew would be heard, namely fire. While conducting fieldwork in the area, one of us witnessed how the burning barricades soon spilled over into the cane-fields, leading the sugar companies to criticize the tardiness of what they considered to be the crucial intervention of the PIR, which ultimately pacified the strikers after killing several protestors and wounding numerous others. The company's directors cited the need to protect the formal jobs and social services provided by their rehabilitated companies as the reason for their calling in the PIR from Maputo. According to local state officials this was influential in the corporate decision to fund the establishment of a PIR outpost between the two companies during the conflict with seasonal workers. They admitted to a genuine fear that the industrial plant(s) would be burned down, sending hundreds of millions of FDI investments up in smoke. However, as the director in Maragra pointed

---

[16] Here we follow Ferguson (2015), who argues that neo-liberal paternalism and dependence are not necessarily resented, since being included as a citizen often relies upon some kind of 'declaration of dependence', which also involves asserting claims to a share of resources and connections in many southern African contexts.

out, it was more than just a question of protecting the companies' physical assets against the seasonal cane-cutters:

> 'We are creating jobs, we train people, we export. The sugar industry is the single biggest formal employer outside the state. This is a fact. There is not a month when the Centre for the Promotion of Investments [CPI, the state entity for facilitating FDI], the government and embassies don't come to see Maragra or Xinevane further up the N1 with their business delegations. We are a showcase. We are proof that one can invest in Mozambique successfully. If we burn, then the public image of Mozambique burns'. (Interview, Maragra 2008)

Thus, calling on the PIR and the interventions of special forces is not just a reflection of the economic significance of expensive foreign investments, it is also connected with the importance of Mozambique presenting itself as an attractive investment prospect and as allowing those of its 'citizens' who ought to make progress with their lives to do so. The analytical paradox is that, when the PIR is used, other latent citizenship rights related to labour, land, freedom of expression and political mobilization, which are usually granted to those included in the state's conception of citizens and are protected by both public and private enforcement agencies, may be 'suspended', if only temporarily. This points to the contingent nature of citizenship in the 'closed context' (Koch 2013) of specific investments. In these circumstances 'suspension' takes place in order to protect the very same citizenship rights that are dependent upon such investments (Barkan 2013, drawing on Agamben 1998). Illiberal security practices that draw on classifications that evolved after independence suspend and temporarily replace liberal citizenship rights. This detour into illiberal understandings of 'the people' and individuals is necessary, as arguments invoking liberal notions of the 'citizen' and of 'rights' tend to be a 'blind spot' in many liberal and rights-based analytical approaches.[17]

We therefore suggest that acts of coercion are also framed as providing protection for services, jobs and access to the realm of state-guaranteed citizenship against the unruly elements of society who do not comply with either the law or the interests of the nation. The implication is that citizenship continues to be shifting and contingent, the inclusion of some parts of the population simultaneously meaning the exclusion of others by turning them into subjects who can be treated

---

[17] We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this important issue to us.

harshly. This is not to suggest that excluded population groups are without agency: as the low-intensity conflict from 2013-2017 suggests, resistance is indeed an option.

The 'suspension' and the security practices related to them come with a history. The seasonal cane-cutters who demonstrated by resorting to arson and barricades have historically been drawn from other regions, rather than from where sugar estates with stable work forces were located (Vail and White 1978, 1983). To some degree this is still the case today, even though Frelimo has tried to persuade the sugar estates to hire workers settled in the vicinity. Salaries and working conditions are not attractive for the more settled, Frelimo-aligned populations, who have expectations of a full-time job with all the associated benefits. The most pressing issue was therefore who should have access to job opportunities. What began as a relatively laissez-faire attitude evolved into a far more controlled approach throughout the 2000s. At the end of the civil war, very little official attention was paid to who got which jobs in the sugar industry, as South African and Mauritian companies entered Mozambique and took control of the rehabilitation process (in part because the foreign investors needed to be accommodated; see Buur *et al*. 2012b). The Mozambican companies that had been privatized had secured the formal right to vet job applicants based on 'previous qualifications and experience' (INA, national strategy 1996). However, as Frelimo faced a growing challenge from the opposition (see Macuane et al. 2017), the question of jobs and control over them became increasingly pertinent. As provincial state and government officials, most of whom were *pessoas de confiança* (trusted persons) and former employees of the sugar industry, put it to one of the authors, 'the Frelimo government could provide for those who support it', this being the ultimate goal of its control over jobs.[18]

Under these circumstances, every year the sugar companies have to draw on migrant labour from the surrounding countryside and from other provinces that the state administration and the lower levels of the Frelimo party consider 'unruly' and 'undisciplined'.[19] This caused unease, as migrant labour defied control. The sense of 'unruly' labour is also a reference to 'untrustworthy people' (*pessoas não confiáveis*), a phrase used for those whom the Frelimo party-state considers to

---

[18] This argument is based on observations in field notes and interview materials with union leaders, company directors and local state and Frelimo leaders from Marromeu, Mafambisse, Maragra and Xinavane from 2008-2012. Follow-up interviews were conducted in 2017-2018 in Xinavane and Maragra.

[19] In this paper we do not have the space to deal substantially with the important questions related to the political economy of migration and labour. For a profound engagement which we endorse, see in particular O'Laughlin 1996, 2000 and 2013.

be members of the opposition.[20] This distinction between trustworthy, disciplined members of the national community and unruly, undisciplined and untrustworthy migrant workers draws on Frelimo's post-independence ideology of forced village settlements for rural populations and mass organizations for the young, women and teachers in an attempt to create a '*Sociedade Nova*' (new society) inhabited by a socialist '*Homem Nov*o' (new man), all of whom would be subsumed by the party-state (Buur 2010). Frelimo saw the transformational capacity of these new social relations to be the key to its post-independence drive towards the idealized, modern and rational '*Homem Novo*', the agent who would transform the former colonial society and its social relations (see also Sumich 2013, 2016, 2018).

After independence, rural transformation took the form of 'collectivization': the state gathered peasants into large, state-organized villages or state farms with little consideration for their 'capitalist' livelihoods, which mainly consisted of cash-crop production and seasonal migrant labour. Similarly, Frelimo attempted to 'block' migrant labour practices, which were seen as a colonial form of oppression. Frelimo expected this forcible and often quite violent attempt to 'uproot' the populations of the rural hinterlands and to herd them into villages to bring with it access to education and health services, political training, access to the party-state authorities and so forth to create the conditions that would 'end the exploitation of man by man', as the party phrased it, and usher in a new world freed from all its previous divisions (Sumich 2018). By extension the 'untrustworthy' came to include at different times the 'backward' elements of the population that were steeped in tradition and unable to break the chains of colonial forms of authority (Bertelsen 2016), which therefore had to be done forcibly. Similarly, it also came to include economic 'saboteurs' as well, in the form of the '*bandidos armados*' ('armed bandits' was the regime's formal name for Renamo) who were attempting to undermine Frelimo's vision of a new society after independence during the sixteen-year civil war. These classifications are still in circulation today.

Present-day security practices therefore draw on such longstanding moral ideas about who are 'proper' people and who are not – who can be included in the polity with access to 'rights' and who cannot be trusted and therefore must be excluded.[21] Despite discursively relying on liberal

---

[20] It should also be mentioned that, besides its lower salaries and acceptance of less favourable working conditions, skilled migrant labour is considered more hard-working than fully employed labour secured and guarded by the Frelimo state, which can be difficult to discipline.

[21] Besides the overall moral distinctions mentioned here related to who is the enemy and who the friend, trustworthy and untrustworthy, in each region there are longstanding ethnic distinctions that are based on moral ideas about who are 'the real people'. There is no space here to take this up, as it would require a specific analysis of each region that has sugar companies.

democratic notions of the separation of state and society, the development of democratic market economies in southern Africa, which Mozambique exemplifies, is usually based on a model of democratic centralism and monism, which also seems to underpin the Frelimo state's understanding of a 'democratic being'. This notion of being, so to speak, makes no distinctions between party, state and *o povo* (the people). The party not only transcends the individual cadres in Žižek's terms (1989), it transcends all individual citizens as well. What we are witnessing is the corporatization of citizenship rights that were already precarious and contingent. Many scholars speak of the vast transformations wrought by neo-liberalism across the globe (Ferguson 2009; for a critique see Venugopal 2015). While we do not deny the potentially transformational effects of the current economic system, we suggest that this must be viewed in relation to the local context (Brenner *et al*. 2010). Socialism and neo-liberalism in Mozambique were both based on ideas of rights that certain citizens, those who proved themselves worthy members of the national community, could access, while others would be excluded, forcibly if necessary, as the 'backward', 'bandits', the undisciplined and the 'untrustworthy'. While Frelimo has long presented itself as a bastion of nationalism and as the guardian of national unity, historically it has been dependent on a range of powerful foreign forces, from Soviet advisors, Zimbabwean troops and East German advisors to international NGOs and donors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and transnational extractive capital, depending on the time period. The major difference, as we have suggested, between the current neo-liberal capitalist era and the early socialist period is less about specific practices and more about scope and ambition. Transnational corporations active in the extractive industries allow the party-state access to new resources and international connections. This paradoxically bolsters Frelimo's power, deepening its grip while narrowing its focus to specific strategic sites and population groups. The grand goal of utterly transforming Mozambique has been replaced by narrower ambitions on the part of the party elite related to their sheer political survival.

These findings, we suggest, have implications for the types of governance and disciplinary strategies we shall see in other large-scale investments. For example, those in the increasingly important coal and gas sectors also rely on the PIR and coercive security enforcement when investments create opposition and lead local populations to 'revolt'. However, not all corporations call on the state's coercive security in such circumstances.

Towards a conclusion

Even though coercive security practices are the most visible and therefore attract most of the attention from NGOs, academics and human rights activists, we have argued that the everyday practices of inclusive and 'softer' security technologies that refine forms of dependence, discipline and inclusion should also be taken into account. These inclusive security technologies include CSR programmes like community involvement, the construction of schools and other development projects. Inclusive forms of security paid for by multinational companies might strengthen the acceptance, credibility and loyalty of local communities regarding the 'intruding' investor, or they may establish shared (imagined) communities around the investment project. In a nutshell, inclusive forms of security both produce and discipline local populations, and in this sense they should also be seen as closely related to the securitization of investments, whose importance is often based on more than their economic value. As we have demonstrated, in practice value is also based on the kinds of relations that can be produced in and through the type of natural resource investment being discussed.

There is no doubt that foreign investments by both ruling elites and many local populations are economically valued, as they allow the Frelimo state to reproduce itself, as well as creating economic opportunities for populations that crave access to job prospects. But the investments also allowed the particular idea of a modern society to prosper, thus permitting new forms of citizenship (inclusion) and subject positions (exclusion) to materialize.

Enclaved investments and their associated security practices do not form a monolithic or seamless whole. As demonstrated above, corporations and the party-state's officials have, at times, diverging interests. These range from differing conceptions concerning the role and nature of the state to specific practices, such as the tension between buying off the local population more generally or funnelling jobs to trusted party supporters. However, despite these tensions, the interactions between corporations and the state tend to reproduce Frelimo's existing political project, even if in fragmented and sometimes contradictory ways. Frelimo has progressively narrowed its focus from grand, utopian forms of transformation to the reproduction of the current structures of power and the relationships upon which they rest. These relationships are situated in the shifting terrain of the frontier between legality and illegality, with its insistence on law under the shadow of violence. Understanding such processes involves an exploration of the relationship between investments and concepts of citizenship as a dynamic process of inclusion and exclusion, coercion and softer forms of producing national subjects. This provides a view of the complex

reality in which citizen–subject relations emerge and are produced through disciplinary practices under the always present spectre of violent action by the various security forces.

The current soft practices of investors are often linked to the possibility of violent action by these special forces when local communities present themselves as potential threats to investments. Using special police forces leads to the suspension of all other latent citizenship rights related to labour, land, freedom of expression and political mobilization. This is done in order to protect, by force, the very same citizen–subject rights, as well as supposedly protecting access to the realm of state-guaranteed citizenship, progress, services, jobs and peace in Mozambique. The inclusion of some parts of the population simultaneously means the exclusion of others, thus turning them into subjects who do not have such citizenship rights and therefore can be subjected to force. Based on these considerations, we argue that the study of complex security arrangements reveals insights into how national citizens are produced and disciplined through the mobilization of public–private security. By implication we also argue that a stronger focus is needed on how new (resource) investments are securitized and the kind of citizen–subject relations they give rise to. A privileged way of exploring such relations is through a focus on security and the specific ways in which extractive resource investments are securitized.

References

Abrahamsen, R and Williams, M. (2011) *Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Abrahamsen, R and Williams, M. (2017) Golden Assemblages: Security and Development in Tanzania's Gold Mines, in P. Higate and M. Utas (eds.), *Private Security in Africa: From Global Assemblages to the Everyday*, pp. 15-31. London: Zed Books.

Agamben, G. (1998) *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Appel, H. (2012) 'Walls and White Elephants: Oil Extraction, Responsibility, and Infrastructural Violence in Equatorial Guinea', *Ethnography* 13(4): 439–65.

Barkan, J. (2013) *Corporate Sovereignty: Law and Government under Capitalism*. London and Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Behuria, P., L. Buur and H. Gray (2017) 'Research Note: Studying Political Settlements in Africa', *African Affairs* 116(464): 508–525.

Bertelsen, B. I. (2016) *Violent Becomings: State Formation, Sociality, and Power in Mozambique*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Brenner, N., J. Peck and N. Theodore (2010) 'Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways, *Global Networks* 10: 182–222.

Burchell, G., C. Gordon and P. Miller (1991) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Buur, L., S. Jensen and F. Stepputat (2007) *The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in Southern Africa*. Uppsala and Cape Town: Nordic Africa Institute and Human Science Research Council.

Buur, L. (2010) 'Xiconhoca: Mozambique's Ubiquitous Post-Independence Traitor', in S. Thiranagama and T. Kelly (eds.), *Traitors: Suspicion, Intimacy and the Ethics of State-Buildin*g, pp. 24-47, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Buur, L., C. Mondlane and O. Baloi (2011) 'Strategic Privatisation: Rehabilitating the Mozambican Sugar Industry', *Review of African Political Economy* 38(128): 235-256.

Buur, L., C. Mondlane and O. Baloi (2012a) 'The White Gold: The Role of Government and State in Rehabilitating the Sugar Industry in Mozambique', *Journal of Development Studies* 48(3): 349–362.

Buur, L., C. M. Tembe and O. Baloi (2012b) *Mozambique Synthesis Analysis: Between Pockets of Efficiency and Elite Capture*. DIIS Working Paper: Elites, Production and Poverty subseries, 2012(2). http://www.diis.dk/sw114524.asp

Buur, L, (2015) 'Sovereignty, Riots, and Social Contestation: Excess and Domestication', *Conflict and Society: Advances in Research* 1(1): 165–181.

Buzan, B., O. Wæver and J. de Wilde (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Cruikshank, B. (1999) *The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dagnino, E. (2010) 'Citizenship: a Perverse Confluence', *Development in Practice* 17(4-5): 549-556.

Daley, P. (2013) 'Refugees, IDPs and Citizenship Rights: The Perils of Humanitarianism in the African Great Lakes Region', *Third World Quarterly*, 34(5): 893-912.

Diphoorn, T. (2015) *Twilight Policing: Private Security and Violence in Urban South Africa*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Duffield, Mark and Nicholas Waddell (2004) Human Security and Global Danger: Exploring a Governmental Assemblage. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=F82ACD427ECBA5FDB8D77A7387373E34?doi=10.1.1.116.141&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Duffield, Mark (2005) 'Getting Savages to Fight Barbarians: Development, Security and the Colonial Present', *Conflict, Security & Development*. 5(2): 141-159.

Escobar, A. (2006) 'Difference and Conflict in the Struggle Over Natural Resources: A Political Ecology Framework Development', *Society for International Development* 49(3): 6–13.

Fairhead, J., M. Leach, et al. (2012) 'Green Grabbing: A New Appropriation of Nature?', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 39(2): 237-261.

Ferguson, J. (2006) *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order*. Durham NC: Duke University Press.

Ferguson, J. (2009) 'The Uses of Neoliberalism', *Antipode* 41(1): 166–184.

Ferguson, J. (2015) *Give a Man a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution.* Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2015.

Frynas, J. G., G. Wood and T. Hinks (2017) 'The Resource Curse Without Natural Resources: Expectations of Resource Booms and their Impact', *African Affairs* 116, (463): 233–260.

Goldstein, Je and Js.Yates (2017) 'Introduction: Rendering Land Investable', *Geoforum* 82: 209–211.

Graeber, D. (2001) *Towards an Anthropological Theory of Value.* New York: Palgrave.

Grugel J. and J.N. Singh (2013) 'Citizenship, Democratization and Resource Politics', in J.N. Singh and F. Bourgouin (eds.) *Resource Governance and Developmental States in the Global South: Critical International Political Economy Perspectives*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. 61-86.

Hall, D. (2013) *Land*. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.

Harvey, D. (2003) *The New Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Holston, J. (1999) *Cities and Citizenship*. Durham NC: Duke University Press.

Hönke, J. (2013) *Transnational Companies and Security Governance: Hybrid Practices in a Postcolonial World*. London and New York: Routledge.

INA (1996) *Politica e Estratégias para o Desenvolvimento do Sector Acucareiro (Resumo Executivo),* Maputo: Ministério da Agricultura e Pescas, Instituto Nacional do Açúcar.

Jensen, S. (2005) 'Above the Law: Practices of Sovereignty in Surrey Estate, Cape Town', in T. B. Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds.), *Sovereign Bodies*, pp. 218-238, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kapferer, B. and B. E. Bertelsen (2009) 'The Crisis of Power and Reformations of the State in Globalizing Realities', in B. Kapferer and B. E. Bertelsen (eds.), *Crisis of the State: War and Social Upheaval*, pp. 1-26, New York: Berghahn Books.

Kirshner, J. and M. Powers (2015) 'Mining and Extractive Urbanism: Postdevelopment in a Mozambican Boomtown', *Geoforum* 61: 67-78.

Kabeer, N. (2005) *Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Kock, N. (2013) 'Technologising the Opinion: Focus Groups, Performance and Free Speech. *Area*', 45(4): 411–418.

Le Billon, P. (2001) 'The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts', *Political Geography* 20(5): 561–84.

Levy, A. (2003) *Diamonds and Conflict: Problems and Solutions*. New York: Hauppauge.

Li, Tania, M. (2017) 'Discussion Rendering Land Investible: Five Notes on Time', *Geoforum* 82:276–278.

Macuane, J. J., L. Buur and C. Monjane (2017) 'Power, Conflict and Natural Resources: The Mozambican Crisis Revisited', *African Affairs* https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adx029 Published: 31 July 2017.

Mamdani, M. (1996) *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Manning, C. (2002) *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000*. Westport: Praeger Publishers.

Mbembe, A. (1988) *Afriques Indociles: Christianisme, Pouvoir et État en Société Post-coloniale*, Paris: Karthala.

Moor, M. and J. van de Sandt (2014) *The Dark Side of Coal: Paramilitary Violence in the Mining Region of Cesar*. Utrecht: Pax for Peace.

Nugent, P. (2010) 'States and Social Contracts in Africa', *New Left Review* 63: 35-68.

O'Laughlin, B. (1996) 'Through a Divided Glass: Dualism and the Agrarian Question in Mozambique', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 23 (4): 1–39.

O'Laughlin, B. 2000. Class and the Customary: The Ambiguous Legacy of the Indigenato in Mozambique, *African Affairs*, 99 (394): 5–42.

O'Laughlin, B. (2013) 'Land, Labour and the Production of Affliction in Rural Southern Africa', *Journal of Agrarian Change*, Vol. 13(1): 175–196.

Pedersen, R. and L. Buur (2016) 'Introduction Beyond Land Grabbing: Old Morals and New Perspectives on Contemporary Investments', *Geoforum* 72: 77-81.

Rose, N. (1999) *Powers of Freedom.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Selby, J. And C. Hoffmann (2014) 'Rethinking Climate Change, Conflict and Security', *Geopolitics*, 19, 747–756.

Sumich, J. (2013) 'Tenuous Belonging: Citizenship, Democracy and Power in Mozambique', *Social Analysis*, 57 (2), 99-116.

Sumich, J. (2016, first published online 2015) 'The Uncertainty of Prosperity: Dependence and the Politics of Middle Class Privilege in Maputo', *Ethnos*, 81 (5), 821-841.

Sumich, J. (2018). *The Middle Class in Mozambique: History, State and Transformation in Southern Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Søreide, T. and A. Williams (2014). *Corruption, Grabbing and Development: Real World Challenges.* Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Tsing, A. (2003) 'Natural Resources and Capitalist Frontiers', *Economic and Political Weekly*, pp. 5100-5106.

UN 2000, *Conflict Diamonds, Sanctions and War*, http://web.archive.org/web/20121023004513/http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html, accessed 24-10-16.

Vail, L, and L. White (1983) 'Forms of Resistance: Songs and Perceptions of Power in Colonial Mozambique', *American Historical Review*, 88(4): 883-919.

Vail, L. and L. White (1978) 'The History of a Mozambican Song', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 5(1): 1-25.

Venugopal, R. (2015) 'Neoliberalism as Concept', *Economy and Society*. 44:2, 165-187.

Welker, M. (2014) *Enacting the Corporation: An American Mining Firm in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Whitfield, L., O. Therkildsen, L. Buur and A. M. Kjær (2015) *The Politics of African Industrial Policy: A Comparative Perspective.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Whitfield, L. and L. Buur (2014) 'The Politics of Industrial Policy: Ruling Elites and their Alliances', *Third World Quarterly*, 35(1): 126-144.

Žižek, S. (1989) *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.