

Transnational Dynamics of Civil War

Peace Processes

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To all victims of civil wars

To Ceylan Onkol and Cemile Cagirga ...

To those who never give up on working for peace ...

*To us, the Academics for Peace who have been persecuted,
imprisoned and exiled for our demands for peace...*

Abstract: *This Ph.D. thesis is about the pathways through which civil war actors find a peaceful solution to their long-standing armed conflict and the role that the transnational linkages, which rebel groups form with various state and non-state actors, play during different stages of peace processes. The thesis explains how rebel groups' transnational linkages affect the probability of peace settlements and the probability of peace settlement implementation in internal armed conflicts. Building on the pillars of the non-cooperative bargaining theory, most specifically on the bargaining with the outside option principle, the thesis conceptualizes the transnational linkages as constituting an outside option for rebels in their pathways towards reaching their political aims. As such, it argues that the ability of rebel groups to have another option to rely upon outside the main bargaining setting with their government, would pull the government side in towards making a peace settlement and implementing the peace settlement. However, since they have another option to rely upon, the rebels would only make and stay in the peace process bargaining if the payoffs of the peace settlement or the settlement implementation exceed the payoffs of their outside option. The thesis argues that while the transnational linkages would have a positive effect on the probability of peace settlement, on the contrary, they would have a negative effect on the probability of peace settlement implementation. The difference lies in what these two stages represent for rebels. Despite this background, the three separate Ph.D. papers by looking at different transnational linkages and by bringing both qualitative and quantitative evidence, test different parts of this theoretical proposition. The first paper looks at the impact of diaspora populations on conflict settlements, the second paper at the influence of permissive regional and global conditions on the implementation of peace settlements, and the third paper evaluates the influence of transborder ethnic kin groups on the civil war actors' willingness to make a peace settlement.*

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The idea of this project started to emerge in the context of my first research experience at the Kurdish inhabited regions of Turkey more than 10 years ago. Back then, I was a highly naïve and idealist graduate student at the Bogazici University, who for the first time, travelled to Diyarbakir to conduct interviews with politicians, human rights organisations, and people affected from the war. I was born and raised on the western side of the country where the news regarding the Kurdish conflict was filtrated and exposed to the indoctrination of the military tutelage and the national education system. As such, I could never imagine how a master's thesis would collapse my entire belief system, lead me to choose a career in conflict resolution, and hence make me the person who I am today. I still remember and feel how devastated I was, listening to the atrocities of the war from the victims who suffered enormous consequences. Since then, I co-founded, worked with various peace activist networks, human rights foundations, worked in conflict and post conflict contexts in Turkish Kurdistan and Ivory Coasts. And I still continue to study conflict and peace with their implications on the Kurdish conflict in particular, with a ceaseless hope that maybe one day the civil war that caused more than 40 thousand lives in my home country, can be resolved peacefully.

While the Kurdish conflict is yet to be resolved, these experiences made me think more deeply about the causes, consequences, and of course about the transnational dynamics and regional complications of the problem. That's how my research project and my path crossed with Professor Kristian Skrede Gleditsch who became my PhD supervisor and my mentor over the last five years. I am and I will always be highly grateful to him for his devoted efforts. Without his guidance, this research would have never been possible.

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. It wouldn't have been possible without you

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INTRODUCTION

This Ph.D. thesis is about the pathways through which civil war actors find a peaceful solution to their long-standing armed conflict and the role that the transnational linkages, which rebel groups form with various state and non-state actors, play during the different stages of peace processes. The thesis explains how rebel groups' transnational linkages affect civil war peace settlements and the implementation of peace settlements in internal armed conflicts.

Traditionally, civil wars and inter-state wars have been studied in separation (Gleditsch 2002, 2007; Cunningham and Lemke 2013). However, over the past decades, many studies have shown that civil wars and inter-state wars do not only have similar dynamics but are often inter-related (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008). For instance, scholars have shown that both inter-state wars and internal wars are plagued by similar bargaining problems (Fearon 1995, 1998; Water 1997, 1999, 2002; Thyne 2009). Studies have pointed out that while international relations influence civil war dynamics, civil wars can also create international rivalries (see Gleditsch and Salehyan 2007; Salehyan 2009; Salehyan et al. 2011; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Maoz and San-Akca 2012). In fact, what actually makes interstate and intrastate wars so interrelated; are the transnational linkages that civil wars actors possess with various external state and non-state actors.

Originated mostly from the seminal works of Professor Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and his colleagues, much has been written in the quantitative large-N literature about the impact of transnational linkages on the onset and duration of civil wars. Scholars have shown that when they side with rebel groups, transnational ethnic kin (TEK) groups, transnational rebel groups, international states; and diaspora populations alter the civil war dynamics.

The connections of civil war actors, which span national boundaries – hence, their transnational linkages – fuel civil wars and extend their duration to a great extent (Cunningham 2006, 2010). These studies have significantly contributed to our understanding of civil wars within their regional and global context. However, what remained unexplored mostly, was to elaborate on how civil war actors’ transnational linkages alter the peace process dynamics in civil wars. Since apart from very few valuable exceptions (see e.g. Gurses 2014, 2015; Furstenberg 2012; Jenne 2015); this literature on transnationalism of civil wars seems not to be translated into the peace process literature that still treats these processes isolated from their broader regional and global dynamics.

In this Ph.D. thesis, I aim to challenge this closed polity approach adopted in the peace processes literature (see Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). With three separate papers following this introductory chapter, my aim is to uncover the conditions under which transnational rebel linkages influence the probability of peace settlements and the probability of peace settlement implementation. As such, the three papers come under a common conceptual framework “the Transnational Dynamics of Civil War Peace Processes”. In line with the existing literature, I conceptualize peace processes in internal armed conflicts as bargaining between the governments and rebel groups that constitute two inter-related stages. The first stage is the actors’ willingness to make a peace settlement and the second stage is their willingness to implement their peace settlements.

Following the existing literature on peace processes, I use the insights of non-cooperative bargaining theory to explain both stages of peace processes. As such, the three Ph.D. papers also come under a common theoretical framework. I argue that while rebel groups’ transnational linkages with state and non-state actors would remedy the bargaining problems that inhibit peace

settlements; on the contrary, they would exacerbate the bargaining problems during the post-settlement implementation period. Consequently, I argue that while transnational linkages would increase the probability of peace settlements, they would also decrease the probability of their implementation.

My theoretical proposition stems from the conceptualization of the rebel transnational linkages as constituting an *outside option* for rebel groups. Bargaining with the outside option principle has been widely used in the study of inter-state wars, but it has not been translated much into the study of peace processes in internal armed conflicts. I argue that given rebel groups' starting position (the war) and set of demands (autonomy, power-sharing etc.), transnational linkages by helping the challenger; constitute an alternative pathway for them to reach their aims through other means; instead of receiving them through the peace process. I argue that transnational linkages by constituting an outside option for rebels alter the bargaining dynamics between the government and the rebels during civil war peace processes both positively and negatively depending on the particular stage that the peace process takes place.

The underlying rationale in the bargaining framework regarding the *outside option* available to one of the parties suggests that; the rebels' ability to have an outside option would pull the government side in towards giving more concessions both in the peace settlement stage and in the implementation stage. Because not only rebel groups' transnational linkages would increase the government's cost of disagreement -hence its expected cost of war - but also; they are hard to contain. As such; I argue that; it is the government's cost of war and the government's inability to contain these linkages that would make the peace settlements and their implementation more beneficial for government than it would be in the absence of such linkages.

However, since transnational linkages provide rebel groups opportunities; a different option to pursue their political aims outside the peace processes bargaining; rebels would only stick with the peace processes as long as the conditions are in their favour. Because the outside option gives them the possibility to refrain from the bargaining altogether or leave the bargaining anytime. Hence, while the rebel groups' outside option would make the government seek and implement the peace settlements to avoid costly consequences; unless the expected utility of settlement or the expected utility of implementation exceeds the expected utility of their outside option; rebels would not be making or staying in the bargaining. That's why the existence of rebel transnational linkages would have a contradictory effect on different stages of the peace process; positive on the settlement and negative on the implementation.

The difference lies in what these two stages represent for rebels. Because the expected value of the outside option would depend on the expected value of each stage of the peace process. And the expected utility of the peace process is not constant across different stages of the peace process for rebels. As widely documented by the existing literature; while peace settlements bring opportunities for rebels such as legitimacy, time to rest, rearm, positions in governmental and administrative posts that they can further exploit if they ever return to war; the implementation period brings them challenges. If rebels implement the agreements; they are faced with the government's potential exploitation of their disarmament. Still, if rebels implement their agreement, then they are faced with implementing an agreement that would not be so satisfying compared to what they can get with the renewal of violence given the new opportunities they have received with peace settlements.

The three Ph.D. papers following this introductory chapter aim at testing different parts of this theoretical proposition both quantitatively and qualitatively by looking at different transnational linkages that rebel groups have with state and non-state actors. The first paper by looking at 342 civil war dyads, explores the influence of transnational networks and diaspora groups on the probability of peace settlements when these transnational constituencies support the rebel groups. To date, transnational constituencies' role on conflict has majorly been the topic of single case studies. Only a few Large N studies have shown interest in the subject due to lack of data. As a result, the literature had controversial findings pointing on both these constituencies' peacemaker and peace wrecker roles. The first Ph.D. paper of this thesis, by operationalizing the transnational constituency support from two different data sources, looks at their effect on the probability of peace settlements in armed conflicts. As such, it argues that diasporas and transnational networks when siding with rebel groups constitute an outside option for rebel groups in terms of helping them to reach their political aims. The paper argues that these constituencies help challengers by two different mechanisms: one is *direct* and the other one is *indirect*. While the direct mechanism relates to their own influence on conflicts by providing tangible and intangible resources for rebels themselves, the indirect mechanism relates to their ability to influence conflicts through other state and non-state actors. As such; the paper argues that; it is by these two mechanisms that the transnational constituencies would remedy the information problems acute to civil wars and lead both actors towards a settlement. I argue that the government would be more likely to give concession due to its inability to contain these linkages and due to its willingness to avoid future costs. And rebels would be willing to make a settlement because as settlements bring them opportunities; the payoffs of a settlement would be greater than the payoffs of their outside option; at least for the time beginning.

The second paper of this Ph.D. thesis looks at the second stage of peace processes, namely the implementation of peace settlements by studying 196 peace agreements signed following an intra-state conflict. Previous literature on other contexts has widely documented that rebel linkages with external states especially their linkages with hostile neighbours; neighbours in civil wars and previous external supporters; do present various opportunities in their pathway towards achieving their political aims (see Karlen 2017; Salehyan 2004; 2007; 2009). However, to date; how these regional and global linkages can also shape the peace agreement implementation remained unexplored. And given the devastating consequences of civil wars, it constitutes an important research agenda. The paper argues that as with other transnational linkages studied in this Ph.D. thesis; the existence of previous rebel external hosts, hostile neighbours, and neighbours of civil wars surrounding the country in question would constitute an outside option to rely upon for rebels. As such; they would push the governments towards implementation by increasing its cost of disagreement- hence the cost of the future renewal of violence-. But in the presence of such linkages; the peace agreement implementation would be less likely because they would also exacerbate rebel groups' commitment problems acute to the civil war implementation period. Because unlike the peace settlements that bring them opportunities; implementation period brings them challenges. As such; in the presence of transnational linkages; peace agreements would be less likely to be implemented because the expected value of the outside option for rebels would be greater than the expected value of the peace agreement implementation.

Large N studies are of course highly useful to detect generalizable patterns in a large number of cases. However, correlational findings are just one part of the story and statistical studies cannot account for the theoretical causal mechanisms at work. This can only be provided by qualitative methods such as process tracing. Studying the causal process by which the outcome of interest is

produced; enables researchers to update their degree of confidence on the results of their statistical findings (Beach and Pedersen 2013). Despite this background, the third Ph.D. paper opens up the black box of the theoretical mechanism regarding the willingness to make a settlement as outlined above; and tests it on the 2012 peace processes conducted between the Government of Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (hereafter the PKK). Although the 2012 peace process did not end with an actual settlement, the opening of the peace process by no means indicates the actors' willingness to make a settlement. The paper argues that the decision to open up the peace process in Turkey was partly due to the rebel group's transnational linkages with their increasingly strong transborder ethnic kin group; Democratic Union Party (hereafter the PYD) in Syria. The paper traces and tests the existence of the causal mechanism with five inter-related stages:

- (1) The transnational linkages' ability to help the rebels to achieve their political aims through alternative means rather than expecting them through making a peace process;
- (2) The governments' increasing expected cost of the war in the presence of these linkages;
- (3) The government's inability and failure to contain the PKK's transnational linkages although it had tried with various other ways;
- (4) The opportunities that peace negotiations present for rebels;
- (5) The fate of the peace process also being inter-related to PKK's transnational linkages.

In sum, this Ph.D. thesis, with three separate papers following this introductory chapter, comes under both a common conceptual framework and a common theoretical framework. By looking at the effect of various transnational linkages that the rebel groups have with state and non-state actors, this thesis aims at broadening the scope of peace process research by studying peace settlements and peace settlement implementation in their wider regional and global perspective. Hence, it studies the transnational dynamics of civil war peace processes. As such; it aims to challenge the dominant paradigm in the peace process literature that treats states as independent entities – the so-called closed polity approach-.

By building on the earlier adaptation of bargaining theory, the main theoretical argument it aims to forward is that the rebel groups' transnational linkages alter the civil war peace process dynamics both positively and negatively depending on the particular stage of the peace process. Because they constitute an *outside option*; another alternative for rebels to reach their political aims. For this reason, they give the rebels the ability to refrain from or leave the bargaining any time. And this would push the government towards seeking a peaceful settlement and to implement the settlement to avoid costly consequences that it cannot contain. However; rebels' choice on whether or not making and keeping peace processes versus seeking their best interest through their transnational linkages would depend on the expected payoffs of their outside option versus the expected payoffs of each stage of the peace process. Since settlements are most of the time beneficial; the value of the outside option would be lower than making a peace settlement; hence we would be observing more peace settlements. Whereas since implementation brings challenges; the value of their outside option would be greater than the implementation and therefore we would be observing less implementation.

The next section will briefly outline the previous literature on peace settlement and peace settlement implementation and will underline why we need to see the peace processes in their broader regional and global contexts. It is then followed by the conceptual and theoretical framework sections where the proposed theory and concepts are further elaborated. The introduction section ends with the brief outlines of each paper and a section that identifies the key definitions. The introduction section is then followed by three distinct Ph.D. papers where each paper has its own literature review, theoretical framework, and methodology sections. Appendices of the papers can be found at the end of the thesis.

Previous Literature on Civil War Peace Processes and Limitations

Civil wars and armed conflicts have become the dominant form of organized political violence in international politics over the last decades (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Newman and De Rouen 2014). Statistics suggest that among 254 separate conflicts that started after the Second World War, more than % 80 of them happened within states involving the contestation between a government and an organized armed rebel group¹. While civil wars expanded in frequency all over the world, they also have longer durations and are very hard to resolve². However, despite their detrimental consequences, only a minority of these protracted conflicts end through negotiated settlements (Kretutz 2010, 2014 Licklider 1993, 1995). As armed violence within countries became an important threat to both domestic and international peace alike, the questions of how these wars can be resolved in peaceful ways and how we can establish durable peace have become a priority in both policy and research agendas.

Echoing mostly the findings of large-N quantitative research on civil war peace processes, empirical studies in the past decades often relied on the bargaining framework and explained the low rate of peace settlements in armed conflicts with the lack of information that civil war actors have about one another. It is often argued that since civil wars are costly, bargaining is a much efficient option than fighting (Fearon 1995). However, the lack of information about each other's' military capabilities obscures that bargaining range. Moreover, civil wars are also asymmetrical on behalf of the government. As such, it is the information on the rebel capabilities that signal the government's inability to win the war unilaterally, that increases the probability of peace settlements. Based on this theoretical background, the literature has suggested that as the civil wars get longer and intensify in violence; the governments are more likely to seek a peaceful solution (Wittman 1979; Mason and Fett, 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett, 1999). Similarly, others have

underlined the importance of a relative balance of power or the existence of a military stalemate in producing peace settlements (Clayton 2013; Organski 1968; Modelski 1964; Zartman 1993, 1995, 2001; Wagner 1993). Few studies also associated the opening up of peace negotiations with the government's electoral concerns and suggested democracy as an important determinant in the initiation of peace processes because democratically elected leaders would be more reluctant to continue unpopular wars³ (see Water 2002; Dixon 2009).

However, making a peace settlement is not the same as being able to achieve durable peace. Whether or not they experience settlements; existing research suggests that civil wars generally recur and civil war countries experience a “conflict trap” (Coellier et al. 2003). That is said, the countries that experienced one civil war are more at risk and more likely to experience another one compared to those that have never experienced civil wars (Kreutz 2014; Coellier et al. 2003). Especially conflicts that ended with negotiated settlements are more likely to recur (Quinn et al. 2007; Mason et al. 2011). Hence, peace agreements often break down (see De Rouen and Bercovitch 2008; Licklider 1995; Walter 2002, 2009; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002).

Existing research on conflict settlement attributed the low rate of peace agreement implementation; to actors' post-conflict commitment problems and therefore suggested many policy recommendations in order to establish durable peace. Suggestions ranged from factors related to the content of the peace agreements, county level conditions to third-party credible commitments. For instance, scholars have argued that power-sharing agreements (especially less costly ones) can strengthen and extend the durability of peace⁴ (see Hartzell 1999; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Hartzel and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; DeRouen et al. 2009). Others argued that comprehensive peace agreements that include all parties would be more successful⁵ (Hampson 1996; Rubin 2002; Licklider 2001). The success of implementation of peace

settlements is also attributed to country level conditions like democracy and state capacity because they can affect the civil war actors' security concerns or provide new incentives to resort to violence (see Walter and Snyder 1999; Walter 1999a; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Quinn et al 2007; Mason et al 2011).

Scholars also underlined the role of third-party interventions in affecting the outcome of civil conflicts. The third-party intervention comes in many forms, ranging from diplomatic to military (see Regan and Aydin 2006). It can be conducted in order to terminate the violence or to protect one's stakes in the conflict outcome. For instance, third parties can mediate during peace processes and help the belligerents to sign and implement peace settlements in deadlier conflicts. Mediators can reduce the information asymmetries and commitment problems by providing information and by adopting coercive measures (see Svensson 2014; Savun 2008) Especially mediation with "muscles" (mediators who can exercise leverage) are found to be more effective (Kathman and Shannon 2016; Sisk 2009; Svensson 2007; 2009; 2013). Third parties can also send peacekeeping forces. Existing research has shown that successful implementation depends on an outside state or an international organization willing to provide implicit or explicit promises or deploy troops (Walter 1997, 1999). Peacekeeping operations (PKO) in this regard are found to increase the duration and success of peace settlements because they reduce the belligerents' security fears and increase the costs of potential violation⁶ (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Walter 2002; Fortna 2004b, 2004c, 2008; Quinn et al. 2007). Third-party states can also militarily intervene on behalf of one side or the other. Yet the evidence suggests that these types of interventions increase the duration, the number of fatalities and are not effective for bringing the parties to the negotiation table (see Balch Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 1996, 2002, 2014; Hazen 2013; Lacina 2006; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Cunningham 2010).

However, the prevalent explanations on civil war peace settlements for instance, cannot account why the Turkish government has started the peace negotiations with the PKK at the end of 2012. The factors that the literature associated with the opening of peace negotiations were relatively constant before the process. Based on these factors; it could be rightfully concluded that the government's cost of the war was highly tolerable and that the peace process was not at all beneficial (see ICG 2012; Tezchur 2013b). In addition, the 2012 peace process came in a period when the domestic conditions were further reducing the benefits of a peace process⁷. It came in a period when the government desperately needed the support of the mass population to change the electoral system from parliamentary to a presidential one and while the masses have in fact nationalistic tendencies and would oppose the process.

Similarly, the existing literature remains inadequate to explain why rebel groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) returned to violence despite third-party support, various comprehensive peace agreements, power-sharing mechanisms, peacekeeping operations and two years of Demobilization and Disarmament (DDR) phase. In CAR between 2007 and 2012, many peace agreements have been signed between the government and three rebel groups (UFDR, APRD, and FDPC). Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC) supported the agreements, rebels' primary demand - appointing a new prime minister coming from Seleka leadership - was accepted. DDR process started (Zoumara and Ibrahim 2014). Moreover, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of an International Support Mission (MISCA). In addition, a French force (Operation Sangaris) that was composed of approximately 2,000 troops has been deployed. If the conditions that the literature associates with the implementation of peace agreements were present, then what explains the renewal of violence?

Although they have contributed greatly to our understanding of civil war peace processes, the prevailing explanations regarding peace processes fall short to explain success and failure of many peace processes because in most cases; they tend to treat civil wars, its actors and the states within which the wars take place as if they were isolated from the civil war actors' transnational linkages. Scholars studying peace processes in civil wars almost explicitly treat peace processes as a domestic phenomenon and except the third-party intervention literature they limit their explanations to factors emerging within states and hence, neglect the "transborder linkages and processes" that are often present in civil wars (see Cederman, Girardin, Gleditsch 2007; 2009). However, with the globalization and increasing interconnectedness among various domestic and international actors; we know that this perspective is no longer tenable.

Recent research has shown that most civil wars involve significant transnational dynamics because its actors are widely connected to actors around the world with transgressing bonds that span well beyond national boundaries (Gleditsch 2002b, 2007, 2009; Salehyan 2009; Checkel 2013; Jenne 2004, 2007; Rosenau, 1964; Modelski, 1964). In fact, many of these internal wars; are rarely internal and at least 55 percent of all rebel groups fighting in civil wars since 1945 have transnational linkages (Salehyan 2009; Bakke 2013; Checkel 2013; Zartman 1995). Conflicts in Turkey, Central African Republic, Bosnia, Syria are among just few examples where the rebel groups have formed transnational linkages and have been supported by various states, armed groups, and transnational constituencies from all over the world in multi-faceted ways.

As such, the transnational connections, do not only complicate the civil wars; but also, as a result, they influence the civil war peace processes in a way that challenges our traditional understanding regarding such processes.

Despite this background, this Ph.D. thesis argues that at least part of the explanation regarding civil war peace processes lies on the transnational linkages that rebel groups can form with various external state and non-state actors outside their main interaction with the government.

For instance, PKK is a truly transnational rebel group that has ethnic kin dispersed in four different adjacent countries. It uses transborder sanctuaries in Iraq and benefits from multifaceted support structures given by its diaspora and by numerous international states in order to achieve its aims of democratic confederalism – democratic autonomy- that covers four adjacent countries (see Marcus 2009; Gunter 1991; 2013; Adamson 2013; Ocalan 2012, 2015; Jongerden and Akkaya 2013). Hence, considering the PKK's transnational linkages and aims; the initiation of 2012 Kurdish peace processes cannot be studied in isolation from the broader regional dynamics such as the changing status of its ethnic kin, the PYD in Syria (Balta 2016; Candar 2012b). Because PYD possesses the same ethnic ties; as well as founded and run by the same political and military cadres as the PKK. Its changing geo political position due to the Syrian Civil War and the increasing cooperation among the two groups as a result of this change, constituted a security challenge for the Turkish government. And unlike the domestic factors that remained stable over time before the peace process takes place, PKK's transnational linkages and cooperation with its increasingly strong ethnic kin group PYD, unexpectedly increased the expected cost of the longstanding war that the Turkish government was unable to win over the last 40 years.

Similarly, in the case of Central African Republic, the willingness and the ability of rebels to return to violence -hence not implement their peace agreements- cannot be studied without referring to their transnational linkages with neighboring states such as Chad and Sudan as well as other transnational rebel groups operating in the area. Rebel groups in the CAR have returned their weapons during their DDR process following the peace agreements. However, their renewed

rebellion was supported by armed mercenaries coming from neighbouring countries as well as new weapons have been supplied to them by these countries. In fact, as noted by Zourmara and Ibrahim (2014); many Seleka fighters that fight in the UFDR, the APRD, and the FDPC ranks; do not even speak the native CAR language “Sango” but instead they mostly express themselves in Arabic, the language spoken in the Chad and Sudan. Showing why rebels in the Central African Republic are actually close and are supported by Chad or Sudan apart from these countries’ economics gains on oil reserves found in the Northern CAR. In fact, sources indicate that it is because of this unity that Chadian peacekeepers deployed in CAR instead of protecting the peace, acted on the side of the Seleka fighters, got involved in clashes with the government of CAR, and conducted massive human rights abuses (Amnesty International 2013; HRW 2013)

Yet the prevailing explanations do not capture these dynamics: how for instance the PKK’s relations with its transborder ethnic kin and the changing conditions in a neighboring country can be related to the opening up of a domestic peace process in Turkey. Or how the neighboring countries’ and the rebel groups’ common language should be related to peace agreement implementation in CAR. Even just these few examples show how these transnational linkages can affect the peace processes in civil wars. As such; they show that we need to better frame the peace processes in civil wars within their regional and global framework. Because peace processes in civil wars cannot be explained adequately without considering its actors’ transnational interactions and linkages. Hence, without mentioning the “transnational dynamics of civil war peace processes” that would be the main conceptual framework of this Ph.D. thesis.

Conceptual Framework: Transnational Dynamics of Civil War Peace Processes

As noted, many actors fighting in civil wars have a variety of connections with external state and non-state actors in the international arena that span well beyond the established nation-state borders. Civil war actors have connections with their transborder ethnic kin groups residing in adjacent countries, their diasporas populations that are dispersed all over the world; various international states, as well as with rebel groups and foreign fighters operating in different countries. Hence, civil war actors have transnational linkages.

Transnational linkages can simply be defined as any cross-border connection and interaction across the established state borders involving various state and non-state actors but that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments (Nye and Keohane 1971). This definition excludes the possibility of international relations (relation between states) but includes any cross- border connections that non-state actors have with any state and non -state actors all around the world.

Transnational linkages simply imply connections between the local and the global, the internal and the external, the domestic and the international actors. And these transnational linkages present a variety of tangible and intangible opportunities for rebels in their pathways through reaching their political aims. Rebel groups like IRA in the United Kingdom, FARC in Colombia, MNFL in the Philippines, Hamas in Palestine are among just a few examples that benefit from such transnational linkages⁸. And since transnational linkages present opportunities for rebels, they also have the potential to influence the dynamics of the peace processes in civil wars.

In this context, the conceptual framework of this Ph.D. thesis “Transnational Dynamics of Civil War Peace Process” simply refers to the process, the mechanism by which the civil war actors’ connections with states and non-state actors influence the outcome in peace processes⁹. By defining the peace processes as constituting two interrelated stages; namely the peace settlement and the peace settlement implementation, this thesis elaborates on how rebel groups’ transnational linkages affect the actors’ willingness to make a peace settlement and implement their peace settlement.

As noted in the introduction, apart from a common conceptual framework, the three Ph.D. papers also share a common theoretical framework. Following the earlier literature on conflict resolution; the Ph.D. papers also rely on the insights of the non-cooperative bargaining theory in order to explain the actors’ behavior regarding peace settlements and implementation of such settlements (see Fearon 1995; Walter 1997; Svensson 2007).

Next section, based on the revisions of earlier literature on non-cooperative bargaining theory; proposes a theoretical framework about how rebel transnational linkages might alter the dynamics peace processes by changing the actors’ incentives during different stages of peace processes.

Theoretical Framework: Theory of Transnational Peace Process Bargaining

Within the growing field of peace research since the 1950s, using the word “peace process” may be relatively new but it has become an extensively used catch-all phrase to define the sustained attempts of conflict resolution efforts (Tonge 2014:5). In the literature, there exist different definitions of what constitutes a “peace process” and variations on how scholars classify “the stages” of peace processes.

This variation is mostly due to how scholars define “peace” either as the absence/ cessation of violence as the realist school would define (negative peace as some would also call it). Or, as in broader terms; as the cessation of hostilities and change in the negative perceptions of communities towards each other based on the writings of Jonathan Galtung (positive peace) (Barash and Webel 2014)

Due to the availability of data, thus measurability concerns, as well as to make it coherent with the realist theoretical framework adopted in this Ph.D. thesis, I define “peace” as the absence of violence and the “process” as the conglomeration of attempts until the end of violence. Thus, I would follow the definition offered by Sisk (2009) and define a “peace process” as “a series of step-by-step, reciprocal, and self-reinforcing actions that are taken to steadily move a conflict away from violence toward regularized, consensual non-violent rules of interaction”. This definition that conceptualizes “peace process” as having different stages and “peace” as the cessation of violence; is compatible with the negative peace concept of the realist school of thought that would be the main theoretical lens adopted in this Ph.D. thesis to explain civil wars actors’ peace process bargaining, in the presence of rebel groups’ transnational linkages. It is also compatible with the definitions of the datasets that this thesis employs and it is much easier to statistically measure for instance the absence of violence than measure whether or not the communities’ perception towards each other has changed in a comparative perspective due to lack of data¹⁰.

Based on this definition, I propose to conceptualize the civil war peace processes as constituting two main stages: Accordingly, (1) the first stage is the willingness to make a peace settlement and (2) the second stage is the implementation of the peace settlement¹¹. Understanding the term peace process also requires understanding that the transition from violence to peace does not follow a linear path but more often is subject to a regression where belligerents do not

implement the terms of the settlement but resume the war (Tonge 2014). Therefore, including the implementation stage has crucial importance to see whether or not the violence actually stops. This way, this classification would capture both the beginning of the process as well as the end until the violence stops¹².

Despite this definitional background, and based on earlier studies in the conflict resolution field, I propose to theorize the peace process as “two actor bargaining” (see Walter 2002; 2009). As with the previous adaptation of bargaining models of war, I conceptualize two different stages of peace processes as interrelated and parts of a single continuing bargaining process (See Reiter 2003). Then outline different bargaining problems that can prevent these interrelated stages of the peace processes. In other words, describe the bargaining problems that may hinder the belligerents’ efforts to (1) make a peace settlement and (2) implement its provisions. And lastly, introduce my proposed theoretical framework on how the rebel groups’ ability to form transnational linkages with both state and non-state actors affect the two-actor bargaining during different stages of civil war peace processes by constituting an outside option¹³. And how these transnational dynamics as an outside option, can on one hand remedy and on the other hand exacerbate these bargaining problems depending on which stage the civil war peace process bargaining takes place. As noted, I am not the first one using the two-actor bargaining framework to theorize stages of peace processes in civil wars. Whether or not scholars use formal models or just apply the insights; the non-cooperative bargaining theory (see Nash 1951; Rubinstein 1982; Schelling 1960; Sutton 1986) has been first introduced to the study of inter-state war, and then heavily translated into civil war studies¹⁴. Ironically, the theory that provides a useful framework for understanding why wars start in the first place also gives powerful insights for understanding how peace settlements can be reached and how the settlements can be implemented in civil wars.

However, it should be noted that; while using non-cooperative bargaining theory in the study of war, originates from the international relations field; the adaptation of this framework into civil wars studies including the one that will be outlined below, differs heavily from its inter-state versions in a way that it takes the power asymmetry argument into consideration. As noted by many studies in the field; unlike most interstate wars, civil wars are plagued by problems of power asymmetry between the governments and rebel groups on behalf of governments (Clayton 2013, Zartman 1995; Gent 2011; Mason and Fett 1996:550). Not only at the beginning of the war when they first start to launch a rebellion but even at later stages of their violent campaigns when they gather significant military and human resources, the vast majority of rebel groups are far from attaining their government's military might in objective terms¹⁵. Therefore, bargaining between rebels and government in an intrastate war is significantly different from bargaining between two states in interstate war, because the actors' bargaining capability and availability of options are related to their power balances. However, while there exist differences between interstate and intrastate versions of bargaining framework due to civil war actors' power asymmetries; the literature on bargaining in civil wars and peace processes is also vast and there exist many variations how scholars apply bargaining framework to civil war studies¹⁶.

Hence, the main theoretical task I aim to bring in the next section is based on the revision of earlier scholarly work, to propose and present a coherent and inclusive theoretical framework on civil war peace process two-actor bargaining¹⁷. And then by integrating the existing transnationalism of civil wars literature, introduce my own theoretical proposition on how transnational linkages can affect the civil war peace process bargaining. So, before introducing my theoretical argument *the theory of transnational peace process bargaining*, the next section will outline the pathways and the bargaining problems that civil war actors experience in order to:

(1) make a peace settlement, and (2) implement their peace settlement¹⁸. I start with explaining from the very beginning -why civil wars start in the first place- to give a better picture on the bargaining framework and the bargaining problems that the belligerents experience in order to make a peace settlement and implement their settlement.

Civil War Peace Processes as a two actor Bargaining

Based on the widely used two-actor bargaining model; an intrastate armed conflict would never happen if the civil war actors had accurate information regarding the outcome of the conflict (Walter 2009). The underlying rationale behind that is; since both launching a rebellion (for rebel side) and militarily suppressing that rebellion (for government side) require massive human, financial, and military resources; if civil war actors would know the cost of attaining their preferred outcome they would always find a bargaining range that both would find more beneficial instead of absorbing these costs (See Powell 2002; Fearon 1995:387)¹⁹. Yet, actors benefit from withholding and misrepresenting the information regarding their own military capability from each other; because it may increase their probability of winning the war or the odds of getting a better outcome (Fearon 1995). As such, they do not have complete information about their adversaries' capabilities. Moreover, since the wars have longer durations and their resource bases are subject to fluctuations, they do not have a priori information about their own performance either (Walter 2009)²⁰. This creates a disagreement on their relative military strength and their expectation regarding the outcome of the war, as such, they tend to be optimistic (Blainley 1973). And it is this optimism due to the information asymmetries that obscures the possible ex-ante bargaining range that could happen before the war starts.

At the beginning of the war, one of the major reasons why governments refrain from making a peace settlement with the rebel groups, it's because they actually believe that they can win the war militarily (Bapat 2005, Hulquist 2013). Having a developed military resource base, most likely mandatory conscription as well as a well-trained army at their disposal, in most civil wars the governments already possess the ability to wage a conventional large scale war. Hence, they are the stronger actors²¹. On the other side, rebel groups start from starch. In order to start a rebellion, they have to resolve their collective action problems, be able to recruit among the population, and gather significant military might. Even so, most rebel groups are far from attaining the governments' military power even in later stages of the conflict. Still, weaker actors do also win or at least receive substantive concessions²² (see Arreguin Toft 2001; Mack 1975). And rebels know that if over time, they can gather adequate human and military resources, and be able to inflict significant costs, they may at least extract substantive concessions and attain their political goals.

So, an intrastate conflict only begins because parties in civil conflicts are optimistic about their own future gains and overestimate their probability of winning the war or inflicting greater costs on the opponents. Thus, civil wars happen because both sides do neither possess the perfect information about their own relative military strength, nor on their adversary (Thyne 2009). And it is this incomplete information regarding the future cost of the conflict and optimistic expectation about the outcome of the war that makes the wars more likely (Blainley 1973; Wagner 1994). And, in this context, civil wars serve as an information gathering mechanisms where the belligerents learn about each other's capabilities, develop an idea about the outcome and the cost of that outcome (Filson and Werner 2002; Christia 2012). Hence, civil wars constitute dynamic processes during which both sides mobilize resources, try to win the war but at the same time assess their

probability of getting defeated or achieving their preferred outcome and the cost of achieving such outcome (see Reiter, 2003; Werner & Yuen, 2005; Cunningham 2010).

Based on the information revealed through the battlefield, hence when the information problems are resolved, if they believe that a negotiated settlement may bring more advantages than continuing the war, then a bargaining range emerges. Put it differently, the way towards negotiated settlements in internal armed conflicts are plagued with information problems and highly dependent on how the belligerents assess the information revealed through the battlefield. And the choice between ending the war with a negotiated settlement versus continuing the war to reach their preferred outcome is a function of the belligerents' anticipation of the expected utility of each outcome (see Gurses 2015; Mason and Fett 1996). Consequently, if the expected utility the peace settlement exceeds, the expected utility of the war, then a peace settlement would take place and vice versa (Bueno de Mesquita 1985).

However, while both actors evaluate what is in their best interest; according to the previous literature, the asymmetric nature of civil wars dictates that making a peace settlement in civil wars is more advantageous for rebel groups compared to governments (Svensson 2007; Clayton 2013). Peace settlement negotiations do neither impose rebel groups any responsibility nor enforce them the treaty provisions²³. Most of the time; disarmament or cease-fire are not even preconditions of signing a settlement²⁴. In addition, peace settlements bring international political legitimacy for rebels and evaluate their status from outlaws to political figures (Guelke, 2003; Mitchell, 1993; Zartman, 1995). Moreover, peace settlements can give them the possibility to reach at least some of their political goals right after the peace treaty (such as a share in the central government, the authority over a territory and so on). And even if at the end, rebel groups end up not committing to its terms, peace settlements still grant them the time to rest, rearm, recover and recuperate.

So, regardless of their future intentions on whether or not they would implement its terms; rebel groups have incentives to agree to a settlement because not only they gain new opportunities with the peace settlements; but also, given these opportunities they also increase their power that they can use to extract more concession in the future (Svensson 2007:177). As noted by many scholars; negotiated settlements give rebel groups opportunities and increased positions to go back to full-scale war²⁵(See Wagner 1993; Fearon 1996). As such for rebels, the utility of peace settlements is de facto greater than trying to get their demands met in other means, at least before the settlements take place.

But, the situation is not the same for the government who already start with the upper hand. For peace settlements to happen in internal armed conflicts, the government has to relinquish some of its authority. In addition; making a peace settlement with one rebel group, thus granting them some concessions may signal other potential challengers that the violence is rewarded and may result with more groups taking up arms in order to attain their political aims. It is therefore not surprising that at the beginning of any civil conflict, no matter what their political orientations, or how democratic they are; all governments categorically refuse to make a political settlement with rebels but instead label the rebels as “terrorists” and try to win the war militarily (Powell 2014). Consequently; it is based on this background that the literature associates the peace settlements in civil wars with the government’s expected utility function (Hulquist 2013; Clayton 2013). And the government’s expected utility of a settlement depends on its expectation regarding the increasing future cost of the war (financial, military, human losses). Because such costs would have a diminishing effect over what they can expect from the outcome of the war and make the negotiated settlement a more favourable option.

As long as the government cannot deal with or minimize the rising cost of conflict, then it would prefer to make a settlement. Since given the increasing cost of war, settlements would be perceived as more beneficial. However, to increase the government's perception of the future cost of the conflict; rebel groups should either effectively challenge the government on the battlefield or should signal that they have a chance to do so in the future. So to avoid future losses and cost of war, the government should seek a negotiated settlement. As noted by Zartman (2001) peaceful settlements take place when "the upper hand slips and the underdog rises."

Therefore, for the (1) first stage of the peace process; namely, the peace settlements; rebel groups should be able to signal that they are able to close the power asymmetry and increase the government's expected cost of the war, and the battlefield should reveal this information. However, while the problem of information asymmetry constitutes an important concept to explain why the belligerents do not sign peace treaties (despite the possibility of finding mutually beneficial bargaining range given the high cost of the war); it remains inadequate to explain why settlements signed after long wars (when the information regarding the cost of conflict has been already revealed); end up not being implemented²⁶ (Powell 2006)

For the (2) second stage of the peace process, namely the implementation of peace settlements; for the belligerents to implement the previously agreed provisions, the expected utility of implementation should exceed that of resuming the war. While both belligerents would be better off with the peace agreement implementation since both of them win some concessions (governments; the cessation of violence and rebels; local or governmental administrative powers); the low rate of implementation is attributed to commitment problems that arise in the post-settlement phase (Walter 1997; 2002; 2009).

Commitment problems refer to a situation where the actors cannot credibly commit on promises and concessions that would be required by a peace agreement due to their inability to trust their adversaries as well as their willingness to renege the treaty for better outcomes²⁷ (see Powell 2006; Wagner 2000, Fearon, 1995, 2004; Schmidt, 2005; Walter, 1997, 2002). Since both of these apply mostly to rebels, it is the rebels that experience most commitment problems at the time of the peace agreements²⁸ (Svensson 2007). Hence, while the government constitutes the sole veto player before the settlements take place, this dynamic change in the implementation period, this time involving the rebel reluctance. Because unlike the settlements that are de facto beneficial for rebels, the implementation brings them challenges. In the post-settlement phase, it will be the rebels who will have the most difficulty to commit to the agreements because the post-settlement period brings them both defensive and offensive motives.

Defensive motives relate to rebel groups' security dilemma where they cannot implement the provisions of the peace settlement because their adversaries' likely defection would bring them more harm than their status quo ex-ante. Settlements in civil wars are acute to a security dilemma because they increase the military power asymmetries between the belligerents on behalf of governments. Thus, defensive commitment problems are the result of a negative shift from the pre-settlement balance of power between the belligerents on rebel disadvantage. According to Walter (2002, 2009), since two competing armies are rarely allowed after the civil wars, most of the time peace settlements require the disarmament of rebel groups²⁹ (Walter 1997, 2002; Fearon 1998, 2004). So, at the time of the settlement, some of the rebel demands can be met; such as control over governmental posts, autonomy, amnesties, and money from international donors and so on, in exchange of this, they have to demobilize and disarm even if that is postponed to a later date and takes time³⁰.

However, this is not the case for governments. Governments may share their political monopoly but they will still be able to preserve their military force. This increasing military power asymmetry between the belligerents makes the rebel group vulnerable to any attack if the government reneges on its promises. After all, the non-capitulation and the rebel ability to increase the government's anticipation of the future cost of the conflict were the primary causes for governments to open up the peace process in the first place. Therefore, disarmament of rebel groups would give the perfect opportunity for the government who could not succeed in getting a one-sided decisive victory previously. As a result, even if rebel groups sign a peace agreement they would be reluctant to implement its provisions because the possibility of post-treaty exploitation exists, and they would lack the military means to enforce the agreement provisions, and penalize the government (Walter 2002; 1997).

Yet, while the defensive side of the commitment problem is widely known, and cited in the literature (see e.g. Walter 1997;1999; 2002), a less pronounced aspect of the commitment problems relates to rebel groups offensive motives. Offensive motives or "predatory motives" as Snyder and Jervis (1999) put it; refers to exploitative desires of the rebel groups that would not diminish even if their defensive commitment problems are resolved. Offensive motives arise as a result of their ambitions of getting more from the deal, thus relates to their willingness to revise the peace treaty provisions after the peace settlements take place³¹. And including offensive goals in the list of commitment problems do not overrule the idea of security fears that was traditionally thought to be the main reason of non-implementation (see Walter 1997; 2002), but also adds another dimension that some groups may not be so satisfied already at the moment of the treaty or their demands may change the time (see Jenne 2007). And when they find the ability, they may find the renewal of violence more beneficial than the implementation in order to get more³².

Peace settlements can be reached between belligerents in civil wars even when one of the belligerent is dissatisfied with the outcome (Werner 1999). Negotiated settlements involve many compromises that rebel groups are unwilling to give, but end up accepting these terms because they want their demands to be met or even gain more time. In many bargaining situations bargainers accept agreements they find inadequate because even inadequate agreements are better than nothing for the time being until a better bargain would be reached (See Wagner 1994). Especially in the context of civil war peace agreements, even inadequate agreements can give significant advantages for post-treaty exploitation for rebels (Fearon 1996). Moreover, even if they accomplish to draft a peace settlement that can respond to all demands; negotiated settlements still leave many issues ambiguous and unresolved that can result in future contentions (Sisk 2009). And lastly, actors' expectations from peace can also transform over time. At the time of the treaty, rebel groups may not possess the ability to change or denounce these provisions because they don't possess the power to do so. However, right after the peace settlement, their relative power balance or their expectation regarding the cost, and the outcome of renewed violence may change, and they may want to reconsider what they have previously accepted. Werner (1999) notes that peace settlement provisions reflect the belligerents' relative military power balances at the time of the settlement and the power balances are subject to change over time. Similarly, Jenne (2007) notes that even the mere expectation of future resources can exacerbate rebel demands.

Not only rebels can secure new resource bases or suppliers over time, but also as noted previously; peace agreements bring rebels various advantages. Peace agreements increase rebel power. They can use their new governmental or administrative posts or international donations to advance in their war-making efforts³³. Since settlements present opportunities; such as time, access to official structures as well as international recognition, they can use these opportunities to renew

the violence in order to get better deals (Svensson 2007). Hence, a peace settlement may be sufficient to end the war for a while, but may not be so; when capabilities and the expectation regarding the outcome of renewed violence changes (see Reiter 2003; Powell 1996). Therefore, the implementation period is challenging for rebel groups. If they implement the provisions, they may end up being attacked after the disarmament. Still, if they implement the agreement, they may end up with agreements that are not satisfying compared to what they can get with the renewal of violence given their new opportunities.

Transnational Dynamics and Civil War Peace Process Bargaining

While the standard two-actor bargaining model outlined above provides a highly useful framework for understanding the bargaining problems during peace processes in civil wars, it only focuses at the dyadic interaction of the belligerents; namely the government and the rebel groups. Hence it mostly isolates peace processes in civil wars within the borders of nation-states. However, the governments and the rebel groups are not the only players or/ and stakeholders in civil conflicts. As previous research has pointed out; although civil wars happen inside the nation states; its actors are widely connected with transgressing bonds to various state and non-state actors around the world (Gleditsch 2007; 2009). As noted by Bakke (2013) “intrastate wars are not so intrastate after all.” Transnational linkages that rebel groups have with various state and non-state actors across the nation-state borders complicate both the wars and their peace processes in the traditional sense. Because they bring fundamentally different bargaining dynamics (see Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004; Salehyan 2009; Cunningham 2010; 2013). And, since transnational linkages complicate civil wars; the analyses that focus only on two actors’ interactions about civil war peace processes remain highly inadequate to explain neither the wars nor their peace processes³⁴ (see Salehyan 2009)

The existing literature on civil wars has accounted for this deficiency to a great extent by studying the effect of transnational dynamics on the onset and duration of civil wars. For instance, scholars have shown how the transborder ethnic kin groups (hereafter TEK) help the challenger to mobilize larger pool of human, economic, and military resources³⁵ (Cederman et al. 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch and Girardin 2009; Gurses 2015; Gleditsch 2007; Jenne 2004; Saideman and Ayres 2000; Salehyan 2007). Moreover, the existence of across the borders attract foreign intervention and is a predictor for any kind of foreign support for rebels in armed conflicts (Davis and Moore 1997; Saideman 1997; 2002). As such TEK groups are found to increase both the rebel demands (Jenne 2007) as well as the likelihood of internal armed conflict. Especially so, if the TEK groups are demographically strong (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch 2009).

Others have shown how long distance diasporas and transnational networks fuel civil wars³⁶ (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004; Gamlen et al. 2013; Ragazzi 2013; Adamson 2002, 2013, 2016; Roth 2015; Smith and Stares 2007). Because of their ideological, religious ties, their concern for the protection of their family members, psychological or emotional attachment as well as due to increasing interconnectedness in the post-Cold War era; these groups offer their support to rebels. They help they rebels not only by directly providing tangible or intangible resources themselves, but also by lobbying their host governments to support and militarily intervene in rebellions (Salehyan et al. 2011; Bove and Bohmelt 2017). In this respect, many studies argue that; since transnational constituencies do not bear the consequence of war and moving away makes them nationalize; they are less likely to support the peace but on the contrary support radicalization in homeland conflicts (Roth 2015; Coellier Hoefler 2004; Kaldor 2001; Koiniva 2011; 2017) That in turn; has detrimental consequences for the onset and duration of civil wars (Adamson 2002:166).

Others emphasized the role of international states in supporting rebellions. External states can support rebel groups because rebels serve as a foreign policy tool, a proxy to undermine hostile and rival governments (Salehyan 2009; Salehyan et al. 2011). External states can provide military or economic assistance, introduce new actors and increase the number of veto players (Cunningham 2006, 2010). As a result, they extend the duration of civil wars and decrease the utility of peace settlements (Balch Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2000; 2002; Mason Weingarten and Fett 1999 Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Cunningham 2006, 2010). And not only by their direct military and financial support; but also by signalling their intent of intervention; that the international states can affect the bargaining process between the belligerents (Thyne 2009). Moreover, civil war rebels can also form ties with other transnational rebels operating in different countries. The collaboration between rebel groups do not only increase rebel power by providing new fighters, but also can teach them new tactics (Bakke 2013)

However, while, these studies greatly contributed to our understanding of onset and duration of civil wars; we still don't know how they contribute to the belligerents' peacemaking efforts in different stages of peace processes³⁷. If the interaction of the challenger and the government within the nation-state borders is vastly affected by the existence of transnational linkages, then how does the peace process that constitutes an important part of this interaction can stay isolated and remain unaffected?

Despite this background, and by building on the pillars of the bargaining theories of war and the earlier studies on transnationalism of civil wars; my aim in this section is to establish a single unifying theoretical framework of transnational peace processes bargaining. My theoretical framework aims to show how both stages of peace processes are influenced by the presence of rebel groups' transnational linkages.

The main theoretical argument that I intend to bring with this PhD thesis; is that the rebel groups' transnational linkages with various state and non-state actors in the world politics that the previous literature has associated with fuelling the onset and duration of rebellion are also important in terms of affecting the peace process dynamics. I argue that the dynamics of peace processes would be vastly affected because such linkages would both remedy and exacerbate bargaining problems acute to peace processes. Yet, the effect of the transnational linkages would depend on the particular stage of the peace process. I argue that when rebel groups have transnational linkages that would have a positive effect on the probability of peace settlement and a negative effect on the probability of peace agreement implementation. The rest of this section will explain how this may be the case, but first, I will start with the definitions.

Following Nye and Keohane (1971:331), I define transnational linkages or transnational connections as any cross-border contracts and interactions across established state borders involving various state and non-state actors but that are not controlled by central foreign policy organs of governments. Through the thesis; when defining rebel transnational linkages, I emphasize the rebel groups' ability to connect with various state and non-state actors. As such for instance as it will be studied in the first paper of this Ph.D. thesis, I define rebel groups and their diaspora relations as a transnational linkage, or as in the second Ph.D. paper, I define rebel groups' ability to connect with their previous supporter states or any neighbouring states as a transnational linkage, or as in the third Ph.D. paper, rebel groups' linkages with their transnational ethnic kin group as another transnational linkage. As a result, I also define any tangible and intangible resources coming or expected from such connections as "transnational support" or "transnational opportunities".

After clarifying the definitions, based on the seminal work of Weiner (1971) and Brubaker (1996) and following recent application of this framework in the quantitative peace studies (see Jenne 2004; 2007; Cederman et al. 2013; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; Gurses 2015) I start my theoretical mechanism first by proposing to conceptualize rebel group transnational linkages as the third pillar of the two-actor intrastate bargaining process. In simplistic terms, while the peace process between the government and the rebel constitutes the two-actor dyadic bargaining; the rebel groups' transnational linkages with state and non-state actors external to the conflict, extends and influences this primary dyad by constituting a triadic connection.

And I argue that, this triadic connection alters the bargaining dynamics by constituting an *outside option* for rebel groups. Following the bargaining theory, as an outside option, I refer to an alternative option, outside the main dyadic two-actor bargaining setting between the government and the rebels. I argue that given that the rebels are already in a war (starting point) and set of demands they would like to achieve; such as control over the government, over a region and so on.. (future stage) rebels have set of options. One of these options is to reach such demands through making a peace process (through bargaining) with the government. Another option is to reach them through using their transnational linkages outside this main bargaining with the government. And transnational linkages with various opportunities they present; constitute an alternative option -and hence an outside option - for rebels to achieve such aims instead of expecting them to receive through the peace process³⁸. And the main theoretical argument that this Ph.D. thesis aims to forward with three different papers following this introductory chapter is that basically by constituting an outside option; rebels' transnational linkages simply alter civil war actors' calculations and behaviour within the two-actor bargaining framework.

The basic concept of *outside option* in the non-cooperative bargaining framework refers to the set of available alternatives that the bargainer has at his disposal outside the two-actor bargaining. Availability of an alternative, (hence an outside option) for one of the actors, alters the bargaining dynamics within the two-actor framework by changing the behaviour of both actors. For the actor who possesses it; having another alternative can give him the possibility to refrain from the bargaining or leave the bargaining anytime to pursue his interest elsewhere by other means if the conditions in the bargaining are not favourable. The actor that has the outside option does no longer have to maximize its gains within the two-actor framework. Given its starting point, his goals and having the ability to pursue them in other ways, the actor who has the option can stick to its outside option, easily walk away and maximize its profit in other ways if the conditions within the bargain are less favourable than its outside option. So, for the actor that has the outside option; in order to stay and pursue the bargaining the payoffs of the bargaining must always be greater than the payoffs he expects from his outside option. Otherwise, bargaining will breakdown.

Since the ability of an actor to have other an option; give him the possibility to leave the bargain anytime, this will strengthen his hand and its bargaining strength vis a vis the actor who lacks such opportunity (Spaniel 2014). As such, this will also change the behaviour of the actor that lacks this option. Because the option to walk away creates a highly credible threat and increases the cost of disagreement of the other actor who lacks this option. Hence; as long as the actor that lack that option cannot contain the other actors' outside option, and thus decrease his cost of disagreement in other ways, he will be willing to give more compared to the absence of such option. In other words, the actor who would be less dependent on the outcome (the one who has the outside option in this case) will pull the other actor in to give more concession.

As noted by Powell (2002) the ability to walk away “affect the players’ ability to make credible threats to exercise the outside option and thereby obtain a more favourable agreement”. As a result, the existence of the outside option eventually leads to better outcomes for the one who possesses it. Consequently, it leads to worse deals for the actor that is not holding such option. As such; the existence of an outside option available to one of the parties will affect the bargaining outcome (Sutton 1986; Powell 1996). Hence, the outside option alters the dynamics of the two-actor bargaining.

In the bargaining contexts of interstate and intrastate wars, whether or not scholars use formal models or just use the insights of this framework; the outside option principle has been conceptualized in various ways including the rebel groups’ one tactical choice over another, any alternative an individual may rely on instead of joining a rebel group, the actors’ ability to choose war instead of cooperating with one another, or the states’ ability to find another ally in the international system (see Fearon 1995; Powell 1996; 2002; Ammann and Leonhardt 2013; Nygård and Weintraub 2015; Gates 2002; Gent 2011; Bueno de Mesquita 2013; Wagner 1993; 1994). Basically, the outside option concept relates to any other alternative that one may choose outside the main bargaining context, given its starting point and what he would like to achieve.

As noted, transnational linkages that rebel groups can form with state and non-state actors can be conceptualized as rebel groups’ outside option because given that they are already in a war with the government (their starting point), and various demands they would like to achieve; ranging from seizing a territory, winning the war, international recognition etc. (their aims, the future stage)³⁹. They have a set of options to achieve these aims. One option would be to go into the peace process with the government and get what they want through negotiating. As another option, they can also choose to rely on their transnational linkages who can help them to achieve

their aims either by providing support themselves or attracting new actors to the conflicts who can support them. Simply put it, the challenger who would like to achieve its political aims can either make a peace settlement with the government (main bargaining setting) or use its transnational linkages (outside option). Such transnational linkages help the rebels to achieve their aims in an alternative pathway because with the opportunities they represent, rebel groups can mobilize abroad, escape from government repression, challenge more effectively and then they can finalize their political aims. As such, the rebel groups can win the war, control a territory. In this sense, transnational linkages serve as an outside option because they provide opportunities for rebels to achieve their aims without making a peace process. As such, they also give the rebels the ability to completely refrain from the bargaining or walk away from the bargaining when the conditions are not in their favour. This ability increases the rebel groups' bargaining strength and the governments' cost of disagreement.

As noted previously, many international states support or fight alongside of the rebels to affect conflict outcomes because they would like to undermine their rival governments or they would like to receive some concessions themselves (Salehyan 2010). In this sense, the hostile governments or the external states that have stakes in the outcome of the war, when they side with the rebels intentionally constitute an outside option for them. The underlying rationale is that such governments by providing military (i.e. equipment, money, shelter) and non-military (i.e. diplomatic support, training, transfer of know-how) resources, help the rebels to advance in their aims without making a peace process with the government. For instance, the Syrian Government's willingness to get concession over the Turkish dam project of Euphrates⁴⁰ led Syria to provide shelter, training, fraud identification documents, financial support, and logistic material to PKK. As a result, PKK could easily survive and adopt a much less peaceful language and aims.

Although this support structures from international states eventually come with a cost, and in most cases rebels lose some degree of autonomy over their own agendas; (Salehyan et al. 2011), the existing research has shown that even if rebels benefit from external state support, they can always choose to turn against their sponsors (Popovic 2014; 2015; 2017), as well as diversify their resources in multifaceted ways (Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed 2015). External states can also unintentionally constitute an outside option by providing opportunities for rebels. Existing research has noted that conflicts have spill-over effects. As a result of a conflict happening in a neighbouring state; rebels can find new shelters, new fighters and can buy weapons at a lower price due to increasing supply (Gleditsch 2002b). For instance, ISIS in Syria could export weapons as well as new recruits from the civil war in the neighboring Iraq (Gleditsch 2018). Similarly, the weapons given to Iraqi security forces by the US, have been seized by the PKK in the neighbouring turkey and end up being used in the Turkish soil during the Kurdish Conflict (Cloud and Schmitt 2007). Refugee flows coming from neighbouring states in civil wars; also increase the pool of recruits for the rebel armies.

Not only the international states but transnational networks and diaspora populations that are dispersed in various states also constitute an outside option for rebels. And they help the challengers to achieve their political aims both in direct and indirect ways. Thanks to their diasporas and transnational networks many rebel groups are able to collect vast amounts of money, military equipment, and new recruits. Apart from their direct involvement to conflict themselves; they can also indirectly help the challenger through state and non-state actors. By mobilizing state and non-state actors, transnational constituencies help rebel groups to build international legitimacy and attract international interventions on behalf of the rebels (see Bove and Bohmelt 2017). Moreover, transnational ethnic kin groups residing in the adjacent countries whether they

are dominant groups or not can provide material resources such as shelter, money, and man for the rebel army as well as increase the population's willingness to mobilize in the name of the rebel group. As such transnational linkages offer rebel groups another pathway to pursue in order to achieve their political aims instead of choosing to achieve their aims through making a peace process. As a result, the rebels that rely upon transnational linkages; do no longer need to find their best outcome within the framework of the peace settlement or settlement implementation. They can refrain from bargaining or leave the bargaining anytime if bargaining conditions prove unfavourable.

To apply this conceptualization and trace the effect of transnational linkages to the study of civil war peace process, I argue that by constituting an outside option, while transnational linkages would increase the probability of peace settlement; they would also decrease the probability of their implementation. Hence; they would have a positive effect on the first stage of the peace processes, namely the peace settlement but they would have a negative effect on the second stage of peace processes, namely the implementation.

The underlying rationale regarding the outside option available to one of the parties suggests that the rebels' ability to have an outside option would pull the government side in towards giving more concessions both in peace settlement stage and as well as in implementation stages because transnational opportunities would reveal the necessary information about increasing cost of war for governments. More importantly, they are hard to contain. The government would not have much choice to decrease the cost of disagreement apart from granting the rebels some concession and sticking to their implementation because the government's expected utility of settlements would be greater compared to what it would be in the absence of such rebel linkages.

However, since transnational linkages provide rebels the opportunities; a different option to pursue their political aims, this will also give them a choice in that matter. Since they have another opportunity, rebels would make and stay the bargaining as long as the conditions are in their favour. Hence, while the rebel groups' outside option would make the government seek and implement the peace settlement; unless the expected utility of settlement or expected utility of implementation exceeds that of the outside option; rebels would not be making or staying in the bargaining. That is why the existence of rebel transnational linkages would have a contradictory effect on different stages of the peace process; positive on the settlement and negative on the implementation.

The main difference lies in what these two stages represent for rebels. Whether or not the rebels will make a peace settlement and implement its provisions lies in the opportunities and the challenges that these two stages bring. Because the expected value of the outside option would depend on the expected value of each stage of the peace process. And the expected utility of the peace process is not constant across different stages of the peace process for rebels. Because while settlements bring opportunities, as noted in the previous section, the implementation brings them challenges and commitment problems due to their offensive and defensive motives.

As a result, while transnational linkages would remedy the information problems before the peace settlements, they would on the contrary, exacerbate the commitment problems after the settlements. Therefore, we would observe more peace settlement to take place but we would also observe less peace agreement implementation in the presence of rebel transnational linkages.

In the first stage of peace processes, the willingness to make a settlement is plagued with incomplete information problems. Its related to the government's reluctance and the government's expected utility of negotiations versus its expected utility of war assessed by the information revealed through the battlefield. The government is the sole veto player in this stage; simply, because the civil wars are asymmetrical. The availability of transnational linkages would make the peace settlements more likely because rebel groups' ability to pursue their aims in other means, increase the cost of disagreement, cost of war for the government. As such the information problems regarding the expected utility of war for governments would be resolved. Yet, the governments could still try to mount this challenge militarily however, transnational opportunities are also hard to contain and hard to resolve. For governments to oppress rebel groups with transnational linkages is much harder than repress groups without such linkages (Gleditsch 2007).

Due to their ethnic kin or state supporters, many rebel groups can run their operation from across state borders. These extraterritorial activities can range from hit and run attacks or establishing permanent bases in those countries (Salehyan 2009). For instance, when they were expelled by the US forces; the ability of Afghan Taliban to escape to Pakistani remote areas helped them to survive and find new recruits among the madrasa schools (Salehyan 2009). To prevent cross-border attacks; governments have to make cross-border operations. Or, as in the case of Israel did in 1982 in Lebanon; governments should occupy a foreign country. But the cross-border operations and as well as invasions are strictly prohibited by international law⁴¹. Moreover, such operations are also plagued with unreliable intelligence and unfamiliar environment problems. For instance, Turkish cross border operations to PKK bases in Iraqi territories were not only criticised by the US but also these operations were heavily dependent on the US intelligence.

As with the kin and external state support, the diaspora support for rebels as well is hard to control and hard to contain for the governments even if they cooperate with other states at the international level. Because diaspora groups conduct their financial activities in multifaceted and covert ways relying on informal clandestine channels that are exempt from international transparency. As an example; Somalian groups for instance, were using hawala system that is hard to detect (Hurst 2007). In addition, unless these communities are involved in terrorist activities in their host lands; these countries will have no intention and legal basis to pursue aggressive policies. As such, the majority of these groups that involve in homeland conflicts still enjoy varying degrees of tolerance and legitimacy (Byman et al. 2001). Moreover, these groups also bring additional complications to the conflicts. By making the conflict oppression public, they complicate the governments' ability to deal with their rebels and prevent the oppression to a large extent. They also attract new actors and new resources to the conflict. Existing research has shown that transnational constituencies attract international intervention and international military support for rebel groups (Bove and Bohmelt 2017; Salehyan et al. 2011).

As a result, since the government would not be able to deter the increasing cost of conflict arising from such transnational activities, they would be more likely to seek a negotiated settlement. Because the fact that governments' cost of war is increasing will have a diminishing effect over its utility of war. Thyne (2009) notes that if the opposition can secure third-party support, that will make the government to change its position positively on behalf of rebel groups and towards a negotiated settlement. The rebels' ability to pursue their political aims in a costly way, thus having transnational linkages as an outside option, would increase the cost of disagreement and reveal the necessary information for the governments about the increasing expected cost of conflict and will make the negotiated settlement a much beneficial alternative.

While the rebels' transnational linkages would pull the government side in and make the government seek a negotiated settlement, the rebels' decision to make a settlement versus try to rely on their transnational linkages would depend on the expected utility of each option. In the case of peace settlements; since settlements brings them power in the administrative and governmental posts, international legitimacy, time to rest and recuperate, the expected utility of settlement would be greater than their outside option at least for the time being. So, no matter what their true intentions, rebels would be willing to bargain and choose the settlement⁴². As such in the presence of rebel transnational linkages, we would be observing more peace settlements to take place⁴³.

However, the situation significantly changes in the second stage of the peace process. In the second stage of peace processes, namely the during implementation the rebels' ability to have transnational linkages as an outside option would decrease the probability of settlement implementation by exuberating their commitment problems. And this contradictory effect of transnational linkages lies in the challenges that the implementation period presents for rebels that make the expected utility of their outside option greater than the expected utility of their implementation.

As widely documented by the conflict settlement literature, the implementation stage is plagued with commitment problems that are particularly severe and important for the rebel groups. This is not to say that the governments don't experience commitment problems but following Svensson (2007), I argue that commitment problems are sequential and governments' commitment problems depend and come after the rebels' decision in this sequence⁴⁴. Rebels' commitment problem is due to two motives that are defensive and offensive that they experience in the post-settlement implementation phase.

During peace settlement rebel groups receive many benefits including international legitimacy, position in governmental posts; authority over a territory and so on.. and these benefits increase their status vis a vis the government. So; independent of their true motives, independent of whether or not they are satisfied with the outcome; rebels have incentives to agree on a settlement. Simply because its advantageous. Because even if they intend to renew the violence in the post-settlement, they would do so in a much advantageous position by using their new opportunities that they receive with the settlements. Yet as noted, this does not necessarily mean that they are happy with the outcome and even if they are; negotiated settlements leave many issues ambiguous but more importantly, actors preferences and demands change depending on their new balance of power (Werner 1999; Fearon 1996). As such, the peace settlement provisions that make them sign the treaty and stop the violence for a while, may not be so in the future because rebels may want to gain more (see Reiter 2003; Powell 1996). That's why many studies in the conflict recurrence and peace agreement implementation literature point out the opportunities that post-conflict country present in terms of facilitating this offensive motive (see Walter 2004; 2010; Quinn et al. 2007; Mason et al 2011; Snyder and Jervis 1999)

Yet even if rebels gain power right after the treaty, they gain them at the expense of demobilization and disarmament. Demobilization and disarmament may take years, may not even start right away but sooner or later rebels have to leave up their arms. In this case, disarmament of rebel groups would give the perfect opportunity for governments who could not succeed in getting a one-sided decisive victory previously. After all, the rebels' ability to increase the governments' anticipation of future cost and the governments' inability to contain this cost of conflict were the primary causes for governments to open the peace process to begin with. Therefore, both offensive and defensive motives lead to the same outcome: the implementation is challenging for the rebels.

Out of defensive motives; even if rebel groups sign an agreement that they would like to implement, they would be reluctant to do so because the possibility of a post-treaty exploitation exists and they would lack the military means to enforce the agreement provisions and penalize the government (Walter 2002; 1997). Out of offensive motives, even if rebels sign an agreement, they would be reluctant to implement because given their increased strength with the peace agreement, they will be stuck with an agreement that would be insufficient to cover their post-treaty demands. As noted by Werner (1999) peace agreements provisions reflect the balance of power at the time of the treaty, and balance of power and as a result, the actors' demands are subject to change over time. I suggest that under the challenges that implementation period presents for rebels and opportunities that transnational linkages present; the implementation of peace agreements would be negatively influenced. And not the government but it would be the rebels who would like to renew the violence right after the peace treaty.

On the government side; since the war has already revealed the information on rebel strength and the peace settlements granted rebels more power; the expected utility of renewal of violence for the governments would be less than their expected utility of implementation. Because by using their increasing positions in governmental and administrative posts; rebels would be more powerful to challenge the governments right after the peace treaties. As such, governments would not be willing to renew the violence because governments' cost of the war would further increase in the post-settlement period. This, in turn, would have a diminishing effect over the governments' utility of war. Therefore, I argue that it would not be the governments who would challenge the implementation right after the settlement; at least before the rebel demobilization takes place, but that takes a longer time period. So, unless rebels fully demobilize and disarm; the government would not have any offensive commitment problems. Simply because it is not advantageous.

However, on the rebel side, the time right after the peace agreements before the demobilization and disarmament start; creates a dilemma. Peace agreements require compromises from both sides; as such, unless they don't win the war unilaterally, rebels won't be able to accomplish all of their demands. However, the peace processes would still address their grievances and grant them many positions in the governmental and administrative posts as well as benefits. Some of these positions and benefits would be received right after the peace treaty, some of them would be received overtime after the finalization of their demobilization and disarmament. But even if their demobilization takes years, right after the peace settlements rebel groups would still receive at least of some positions and benefits that would increase their position vis a vis the government.

As such, right after the peace treaty, rebels have two options, they may either choose to:

(1) use their increased positions for renewing the violence and try to win the war unilaterally, so that they can reach to all of their demands which they can never have with the peace processes, simply because peace processes mean compromise. Because while with the peace processes they reach some of their demands in sequential stages (some of them right after the treaty, some of them after the disarmament), they also have to give up on many of their demands.

(2) or after the peace treaty when they receive some benefits, they can wait and receive some more benefits (what they have agreed on with the peace process) but this will require their demobilization and disarmament. However, in this case, they also have to risk themselves to the government's possible attacks. Moreover, such benefits would still not make them fully satisfied because the peace process requires compromise and they can never reach all of their demands with a peace process. For that, they need a unilateral victory.

I suggest that it's because of this dilemma that the value of the implementation stage is different, is lower than the value of the peace settlement stage. As noted, while rebels are to gain opportunities with the peace settlement, they are faced with difficulties in the implementation stage. Because given the high risk of attack and the inability to reach all of their demands with the peace process would already make the renewal of violence a much better alternative, especially when they are also able to use their new positions on their advantage.

It's in this challenging context that transnational linkages would further exacerbate the commitment problems because they would further lower the cost of renewal of violence, make the non-implementation a much better alternative. Simply because transnational linkages give rebels the opportunities to reach all of their demands in other means. It's in this context I argue that; since the implementation period is already challenging for rebels; rebel transnational linkages would seem a better option in order to get what they want compared to the implementation of the settlement. Because the decision of implementing versus trying to get their demands met through their outside option would be a function of their expected utility to each option. And since cost associated with each option would have a diminishing effect over the utility of that option, I argue that contrary to peace agreement stage, in the implementation stage, the expected utility of their outside option (relying on their transnational linkages) would be greater than the implementation. Therefore, transnational linkages would exacerbate the rebels' commitment problems because they provide rebels the ability to leave the bargaining anytime when the conditions are not favourable. When rebels do not commit, eventually the governments as well out of defensive measures would not commit to protect themselves. As a result, in the presence of rebel transnational linkages we would be observing less peace agreements to be implemented.

Ph.D. Papers: Content and Methodology

As noted in the introduction, each of the three Ph.D. papers following this introductory chapter looks at different types of transnational linkages that rebel groups have with state and non-state actors. And the theory of Transnational Peace Process outlined above gives background information on how the papers are linked by the same conceptual and theoretical framework and how the theories and hypotheses in these papers have been derived more in detail. But although the framework proposes a novel and useful way to understand the peace processes in the presence of rebel transnational linkages, especially why rebels choose to settle in one stage and not in the other; I have by no means intend to argue that papers are comparable because even if they talk about the rebel transnational linkages and how the actors' behaviour are shaped in the presence of such linkages; they study different types of linkages. This is an important shortcoming; and for this aim we surely need more research (see the limitation and further research section at the conclusion chapter)

Three Ph.D. papers following this introductory chapter will look at two different stages of peace processes as underlined above. The first two papers will consist of comparative large N studies that study first, the probability of peace settlement and then second, the probability of peace settlement implementation. Yet although useful, correlational findings are just one part of the story and we need more evidence to show the mechanism at work. For this aim, the third paper will open up the black box of the theoretical framework suggested in this introductory chapter. By adopting a mechanistic understanding of causality; it will study the willingness to make a peace settlement. Briefly;

- (1) The first paper will look at the impact of rebel groups transnational linkages with their diaspora and transnational networks. As such it will elaborate on how the various support structures given by these transnational constituencies affect the probability of civil war actors' willingness to sign a peace settlement (first stage of the peace process)

- (2) The second paper; will look at the existence of hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil wars as well as rebel groups' previous external state supporters. Paper will explain how the various opportunities that these states present for rebels affect the implementation of peace agreements. As such, the paper will elaborate on how even the mere expectation of such opportunities by presenting an outside option for rebels affect the probability of peace settlement implementation (second stage of the peace process)

- (3) The third paper will trace the causal mechanism by which the rebel group's linkages with their increasingly strong transborder ethnic kin affect the government's willingness to make a peace settlement. By using theory testing process tracing method and using meeting minutes and newspapers as data; the paper will test the proposed theoretical mechanism regarding the first stage of the peace process on the case of the 2012 Kurdish Peace Process between the government of Turkey and the PKK.

In sum, three papers look at the effect of various transnational linkages (diasporas and transnational networks, international states and transnational ethnic kin) in the peace settlement and in the implementation phases of peace processes by using both quantitative and qualitative evidence.

PAPER 1: Explaining the Role of Diasporas and Transnational Networks in Peace Settlements

The paper looks at the probability of peace settlements in all civil conflicts dyads between 1946 and 2008 in the presence of rebel groups linkages with transnational networks and diasporas. Previous literature on diasporas and transnational networks, mostly based on qualitative evidence have argued that since these communities remain more nationalistic and bear less cost regarding the civil conflicts at home, they are more likely to support the radicalization at home. As such, their support for rebels has been mostly thought of as conflict fuelling. Similar theoretical prepositions have been also suggested by the quantitative literature. Yet, the findings of these large N studies have relied on poorly operationalized; problematic proxies due to lack of data. (measuring the diaspora support as the number of foreigners living in the US divided by the total population of the country of origin or measuring transnational constituency support by looking at the actual number of immigrants, see Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Bove and Bohmetl 2017)

This paper challenges this dominant understanding. As such; it theoretically distinguishes itself from the dominant diasporas and conflict literature. It basically argues that quite on the contrary; once the conflict is on the way long distance diasporas and transnational networks by supporting rebel groups; increase the probability of peace settlements. Very similar to the theoretical framework used in the introductory chapter; it argues that the ability of rebels to rely on their transnational constituencies and diasporas constitute an outside option in their bargaining with the government. They constitute an outside option because they provide rebels an option to achieve their political aims in other means instead of bargaining and making a peace process with a government. The paper offers two mechanisms on how as an outside option they help rebels to reach their political aims. One is direct and the other one is indirect.

The first *direct* mechanism relates to the diasporas and transnational networks' ability to directly increase rebel's ability to challenge the government by providing tangible and intangible resources themselves (i.e. their ability to collect money, personnel, military resources). The second *indirect* mechanism relates to their boomerang effect through international state and non-state actors over the conflict. Transnational constituencies; by propagandizing, by making the conflict autocracies visible in the international arena and by increasing lobbying efforts are very successful to change their host states' foreign policies towards the rebel groups and towards their home state. Previous research has shown that the existence of transnational constituency support to rebel groups as one of the primary determinants whether or not rebel groups would receive external support from an international state (Salehyan et al. 2011). As a result, not only transnational linkages would reveal the necessary information regarding the expectation of the cost of war but at the same time it would be highly difficult for the governments to contain such effect. Hence the government would be more likely to look for a settlement. And as argued, since the expected utility of settlement is also greater for the rebels than their outside option; we would be seeing more peace settlements to take place.

While the theoretical proposition challenges the dominant understanding vis a vis the diasporas and conflict, the paper also has an empirical contribution. It uses two measures to test the effect of transnational linkages and diasporas support operationalized both from Non-State Armed Data and UCDP External Support Dataset. The empirics regarding both variables; support the theoretical mechanism and accordingly, in the presence of rebel linkages with diasporas and transnational networks; the odds of making a peace settlement increase by about between % 152 to % 188 depending on which dataset one employs. Results are also robust across different models.

Paper II: Transnational Linkages and Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars

The paper looks at the second stage of peace processes namely the peace settlement implementation. Previous literature on the implementation period was explaining the low rate of peace agreement implementation by the rebel groups' credible commitment problems. One is defensive, security-related and refers to the rebel groups' reluctance to disarm due to a possibility of the government attack in the implementation period (Walter 1997; 2002). And the other one is offensive and refer to their willingness to demand more and renege the treaty in the future (see Snyder and Jervis 1999; Quinn et al. 2007; Gurses et al. 2008; Karlen 2017; Mason et al. 2011; Werner and Yuen 2005).

To overcome these commitment problems; the literature has suggested many policy recommendations and pointed out ameliorating the post-conflict country conditions, peace agreement design, and establishing the third-party guarantee mechanisms as important determinants of peace agreement implementation. However, these mechanisms although useful were mostly related to domestic factors and the role of third parties are limited to providing security guarantees. While the peace agreement implementation literature treats the implementation period as if it was disconnected from a broader regional and global dimension, previous literature in other contexts have widely shown that rebel linkages with external states especially their linkages with hostile neighbours; neighbours in civil wars and previous external supporters constitute important factors for determining rebel groups' violent behaviour (see Karlen 2017; Salehyan 2007; 2009). Because such linkages constitute opportunities for rebels.

Despite this background, by looking at 196 peace agreements; this paper investigates how the existence of previous rebel support structures; hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil wars affect the probability of peace agreement implementation. Paper argues that as with other transnational linkages studied in this Ph.D. thesis; such linkages constitute an outside option to rely on for rebels.

As such they would push the governments towards implementation by increasing the cost of disagreement, hence the cost of the future renewal of violence making the implementation more beneficial. However transnational linkages would also exacerbate rebel groups' commitment problems acute to the civil war implementation period. Because unlike the peace settlements that bring them opportunities; implementation period brings them challenges. As such in the presence of transnational linkages; the peace agreements would be less likely to be implemented because the expected value of the rebel groups' outside option would be greater than those of peace agreement implementation.

Paper tests the proposed hypothesis by looking at 196 peace agreements consisting of full, partial and process agreements signed following an internal armed conflict. Yet since it could be argued that some agreements; such as the process ones, can be inherently different from others, following the previous literature; the paper also tests the argument on a subsample of 157 peace agreements; that covers only the full and partial agreements. Consistent with the expectation; results from both samples prove the argument. Results are robust in models that use different control variables as well as in models that use a different neighbourhood distance.

Paper III: Transborder Ethnic Kin and Dynamics of Peace Processes: Insights from the Kurdish Conflict

The paper looks at the start of peace settlement negotiations between the Government of Turkey and the rebel group The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, hereafter PKK). Although the Kurdish case hasn't ended with an actual settlement, starting peace negotiations with the rebels openly is by no means is an indicator of the willingness to make a settlement. The paper argues that despite the fact that all factors suggested by the literature as the indicator of the governments' "cost of war", remained relatively stable over the course of war, the decision to open up the peace processes was due to the rebel group's transnational linkages with its increasingly strong transborder ethnic kin group PYD (Democratic Union Party) in Syria. Paper offers and traces a theoretical mechanism that consists of 5 stages:

- (1) The cooperation of the challenger with its transborder ethnic kin was providing PKK an outside option to reach its aims of democratic confederalism –democratic autonomy-
- (2) As an outside option, PKK's linkages with its transborder ethnic kin was increasing the government's cost of disagreement; its expected cost of war
- (3) The government, even though it tried in various other ways; was unable to contain the expected cost of war created by this transnational linkage
- (4) Making a peace process was also beneficial for the PKK
- (5) The opening of the peace process and its fate were heavily linked to the developments regarding PKK's transborder ethnic kin in Syria

Paper then tests this theoretical mechanism with the theory testing processes tracing method by relying on meeting minutes during the peace processes and systematic investigation of all newspaper articles about "peace processes" and "resolution process" published in Hurriyet

newspaper, between July 2012 – September 2013⁴⁵. As such; it argues that the cooperation of the PKK with its increasingly strong transborder ethnic kin; was serving PKK to achieve its longstanding transnational aims of establishing a democratic confederalism structure that includes Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Hence, it was serving the PKK as an outside option to reach its aims instead of receiving them through a peace process. As a result; PKK's transnational linkage was increasing the cost of disagreement and the expected cost of the war for the Turkish government and therefore resolving the information problems acute to civil war peace processes. Because PKK's transnational linkages with its transborder ethnic kin had increased the government's security concerns.

The government, of course, had several choices; yet while containing this region through relying on other Kurdish groups proved to be inefficient, waging a full-scale war was too costly to do so; compared to trying to mount this challenge by giving up some concession. Therefore, transnational linkages by providing an outside option for rebels; increased the expected cost of war for the government and lead it towards seeking a peace settlement.

On the side of the rebels, making a peace settlement was also beneficial because given that its ethnic kin; was at war in Syria and PKK aimed at mobilizing its manpower to Syria, the peace negotiation was giving the PKK at least a time to rest and deal with its operations in Syria. The paper also shows that this mechanism was also evident in the discourses of Turkish policymakers as well as the meeting minutes between the rebel leader and the political representative of the Kurdish political movement.

Ph.D. Papers: Key Concepts, Definitions

Although through the introduction and in the following Ph.D. papers the definitions regarding the important concepts have been given either in-text or in footnotes; at the expense of being repetitive; it's important to specify them again. So, this section aimed at further clarifying any potential conceptual confusion. Throughout the Ph.D. thesis, in line with the definitions of the UCDP datasets used in this study, I use civil wars, armed conflicts, internal armed conflicts, internal wars interchangeably to define a “contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year”

In conflict research; many scholars reserve the concept of war, for armed conflicts that generate at least “1000” battle-related deaths in a given year (see Licklider 1993; Walter 1997). Some others distinguish wars from conflicts with “200” number of battle-related deaths (see Regan, Frank and Aydin 2009). And some others use the concepts interchangeably (see Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Forsberg 2015; Salehyan 2007; 2009; Gurses 2014). I do believe that unless the country characteristics such as country's size, population, democracy scores have been taken into account; there is no strong theoretical reason to expect a certain number of battle-related deaths by itself to create a difference. Because given a country's size, democracy scores etc., a certain number of battle deaths that can create a problem for many countries, may indicate a highly tolerable threshold for others⁴⁶. And since apart from the battle-related death conditions the literature agree on the content of above-mentioned concepts, I opt out to use them interchangeably.

Throughout the thesis; I use government and incumbent interchangeably to define the elected executive who owns the monopoly of violence in a given country. Similarly, I use the terms

rebels; armed groups; rebel groups; the challenger to define the groups that took up arms; resort to violence and are able to mount a significant challenge for governments in order to achieve their political aims. Although most civil wars are interrelated to terrorism and many armed groups resort to terrorism; as recent research has shown (Pollo and Gleditsch 2016), following Salehyan (2009; 2010); I refrain to use the term terrorist to avoid normatively and politically charged connotations.

I define transnational linkages to define the connections of rebel groups with states and non-state actors that span national boundaries. As such; I define diasporas and transnational networks as one type of rebel transnational linkage, rebel group to its transnational ethnic kin as another type of transnational linkage, rebel group's relations to their previous external supporters, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil war, as another type of transnational linkage. And while I define rebels that have such linkages as transnational rebels, I define any tangible and intangible support they receive from these linkages as transnational support or transnational opportunities interchangeably.

Following Shain and Barth (2013), I define diasporas as politically mobilized people that possess a common origin and live much or less on a permanent basis outside the territories of their homeland. Transnational Networks on the other hand are defined as people or groups that have common characteristics in terms of their beliefs or affiliation to an ideology, a religion, a sect or a language or alternatively to geography (Shefer 2013). Throughout the first paper of this thesis; to refer to these groups; I use transnational groups, transnational constituencies, transnational communities, transnational actors interchangeably.

Although the concept of transborder ethnic kin groups (TEK) seems very similar in form to the concept of diasporas, and it's in a sense possible to classify diasporas as TEK, to underline the difference between those two concepts, I opt out to define TEK groups; as groups that possess the same ethnic origin with the rebel groups and that live densely on the other side of the border, in the adjacent country of where the rebellion takes place. Hence my definition of TEK differs from the diasporas in a sense that it requires such groups to live in density and be separated from their ethnic co-brethren with the same border because when the borders have been drawn their ethnicity has been overlooked. Whereas when I refer to diasporas; I refer to migrated individuals who can live anywhere in the world, and as such, they represent dispersed populations. Since diasporas and transnational networks are formed by migrated populations, I refer to the country they come from as their homeland and the country they have migrated to; as their host land. Since the thesis is about conflicts, homeland also refers to the country where the conflict takes place and where diasporas and transnational networks get involved while they are living elsewhere. However, as many scholars in the field, I also do believe that the homeland / host land distinction does neither fully captures the interconnectedness of civil wars nor perfectly describes the concept of transnational communities as several studies pointed out migration shouldn't be seen in linear terms (King and Christou 2011, Smith 2007). However, as these concepts are often used in the literature and for the sake of simplicity, I stick with this definition.

I define peace settlements as any agreements signed following an intrastate conflict aimed at resolving some incompatibilities regarding the conflict. Throughout the thesis, I use peace settlements, settlements, negotiated settlements, agreements, peace agreements interchangeably. However, it's important to note that I use two different datasets to measure the peace settlements in the first and second papers. Hence, the definition of peace settlement slightly differs.

As it would be also discussed in the methodology section of each paper, in the first paper, when I measure the probability of peace settlement, as the main dataset I rely on the Non- State Armed Data and the type of termination variable (Cunningham, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2013). And my unit of analysis is dyad episode. The settlement variable is constructed (hence defines) using the first three categories of termination variable. As such, it includes dyad episode endings with (1) a ceasefire, (2) a ceasefire with conflict resolution or (3) a peace agreement. These categories should be considered as a settlement because they end the dyad episode and resolve at least some issues -if not all- related to the armed conflict. Using this definition, among 396 observations, 84 of them end with a settlement.

In the second paper, however, I aim to explain the peace agreement implementation so I rely on the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011). So, for my unit of analysis I rely on the actual peace agreements. Consequently, the sample of peace agreements in the second paper excludes any ceasefire agreements but include full, partial and process agreements. The number of observations, in this case, is 196. I also run the models with only full and partial agreements and therefore this number decreases to 157 in the robustness sample. So, as opposed to 84 cases in the first paper, that are identified by the Non-Sate Armed Data, I have more settlements because while the first paper looks at whether or not the dyad episodes end with a settlement, in the second paper I look whether or not the settlements are implemented and eventually each conflict has many settlements (on average 7 peace agreements signed per conflict). Lastly, since governments can fight with several rebel groups at the same time, to define the interaction between one rebel group and the government, I use the term dyad as existing conflict datasets employs.

Explaining the Role of Diasporas and Transnational Networks in Peace Settlements

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Abstract Why do some civil war armed groups end up becoming negotiating partners in peace processes while others do not? Existing research on conflict resolution has studied this question mainly by looking at domestic factors such as the balance of military capabilities, the duration of the war and the battle-related casualties. So far, quantitative literature on civil war peace processes treats civil war peace settlements as if they were isolated from their broader regional and global context. As a result, it neglects the influence of various transnational linkages that armed groups often rely for various kinds of tangible and intangible resources. This paper aims at challenging this closed polity approach and looks at peace settlements in internal armed conflicts when the rebels are supported by transnational networks and diaspora communities. Based on the insights of non-cooperative bargaining theory; it argues that transnational linkages that rebel groups have with diasporas communities and transnational networks consist of an *outside option*, an alternative option for rebels to accomplish their political aims outside the main peace processes bargaining with the government. Because when they support the rebel groups, diasporas and transnational networks both directly and indirectly help the challengers to achieve their aims. While their direct effect relates to their direct involvement in rebellions such as by funding; providing man to rebel army; their indirect effect relates to their ability to pressure various states and non-state actors to act on behalf of rebel groups. I argue that since they are hard to contain, transnational constituencies' support for rebels would increase the cost of disagreement for the government. As a result, it would resolve the information problems acute to civil war peace processes. I argue that since the peace settlements are also advantageous for rebels; when they support the challenger, diasporas and transnational constituencies would increase the rebels' ability to reach a peace settlement. The theory is tested using two different measures for transnational support on logistic regression. Consistent with the expectations, the data on all 342 intrastate conflict dyads between 1946 and 2008 proves the argument.

Keywords: Civil Wars, Rebel groups, Peace Studies, Diasporas, Transnational Studies

1. Introduction

Civil wars have become the most frequent type of conflict since the end of the Second World War. However, despite their detrimental consequences, only a minority of these protracted conflicts end through negotiated settlements (Kretutz 2010, 2014; Licklider 1993, 1995). More often than not, at the beginning of the conflict no matter what their countries or political orientations are, rebel groups have been repeatedly refused a political settlement (Powell 2014). Governments label rebel groups as “terrorists”, and try to win the war militarily¹. Yet, some rebel groups can still make their way through the peace negotiations and express and impose their demands on their opponent governments. But what explains this variation? Why only some armed groups are able to resolve their conflict through peaceful means while others keep fighting in a war that drags on for years?

The existing studies on conflict resolution, explain peace settlements in armed conflicts with non-cooperative bargaining theory framework and highlight the concept of “information asymmetries” as a bargaining problem that plagues the pathways of the belligerents towards resolution (see Walter 2009:253). Consequently; the current literature argues that if the battlefield conditions reveal the necessary information that the expected utility of settlement would be greater than the expected utility of the war, then, the belligerents would be looking for a settlement (Fearon 1995). And the cost associated with the war would have a diminishing effect over what one can expect from the utility of the war (See Gurses 2015)

However, since the civil wars are most of the time asymmetrical by nature and while governments are to relinquish power; rebels gain advantages from peace settlements; the literature points out the government as the sole veto player before the settlements take place. Consequently, the probability of a peace settlement is associated with the government’s cost of the war (see Sawyer, Cunningham, Reed 2015; Svensson 2007; Clayton 2013).

As such; it is often argued that; unless the governments would be effectively challenged; they would not be looking for a settlement². In this regard, many studies point out the military stalemate (Zartman 1989; Stedman 1991), strength of the rebel groups (Clayton 2013; Bapat 2005, Vaughan 2006; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009), the duration of the war, and the number of battle-related deaths (Thomas 2014; Walter 1997; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999) as primary determinants of whether or not a conflict would end with a peace settlement. Because these factors show to what extent rebel groups are able to challenge and impose a cost to the governments.

Although they present important insights to understand the peace settlements in civil wars, the prevailing explanations confine civil wars within the borders of nation-states as if they were isolated from their broader regional and global context. This closed polity approach does not only stand in sharp contrast with the realities of global developments in the last decades but also challenges the recently flourishing academic literature that points out how civil war actors' various transnational linkages significantly affect the dynamics of such wars. (see Gleditsch 2007, 2009, Checkel 2013; Cederman Girardin Gleditsch 2009; Cederman et al 2013; Cetinyan 2002; Salehyan 2007; 2009; Bakke 2013; Collier Hoeffler 2004). Modernity, globalization, displacement as a result of the increasing number of civil wars, recent advances in digital communication and financial flows have facilitated the interconnectedness among various local and global actors. Recent research has suggested that rebel groups fighting in civil wars are not immune to this fact but actually; quite on the contrary, they often benefit from the help of their transnational linkages with state and non-state actors to reach their political aims (Salehyan et al. 2011; Salehyan 2007, 2009; Jenne 2007). Among these linkages; especially since the end of Cold War; we see a proliferation of interest and involvement of diasporas and transnational networks in homeland

conflicts³ (see Cochrane 2015; Koinova 2011, 2017). And this engagement often results with transnational constituencies to provide both tangible or intangible resources to rebel groups who need these resources during their war⁴. Material resources include financial remittances, provision of military equipment, as well as providing men for the ongoing conflict. Non-material ones include their lobbying and campaigning efforts (Smith 2007; Byman et al. 2001). As such, the existence and mobilization of such transnational communities and their links with the rebels have complicated the traditional understanding of both civil wars and the peace processes as they bring different dynamics that should be taken into account when analysing civil conflicts and their outcomes. (Kaldor 2001).

Despite this background, this paper aims at challenging this closed polity approach in peace settlement literature by integrating the diasporas and transnational networks into the picture. Consequently, it looks at the probability of peace settlement in internal armed conflicts when the rebel groups are supported by such transnational constituencies⁵. The paper argues that the ability of the challenger to rely upon its transnational constituency's support will increase its chances of reaching a peace settlement in armed conflicts. Based on the insights of non-cooperative bargaining framework; the paper conceptualizes rebel groups' linkages with their transnational constituencies as constituting an *outside option* for rebels. Transnational constituency linkages constitute an outside option because they constitute an alternative pathway for rebels to reach their political aims instead of receiving them through a peace process with the government. And they do so by two mechanisms: one is direct and the other one is indirect. While the *direct* mechanism relates to transnational linkages' ability to directly contribute to rebel's ability to challenge their government by providing tangible and intangible resources themselves (i.e. their ability to collect money, personnel, military resources). The second *indirect* mechanism relates to their boomerang

effect, their ability to mobilize and pressure various state and non-state actors to act on behalf of rebels. Hence their ability to indirectly influence conflicts. As a result, by giving the rebel the option to pursue their aims by other means; they would reveal the necessary information regarding the expected cost of conflict for the government and decrease the utility of war. Since the transnational constituencies' support is also hard to pin down and hard to contain, this will make the government's expected utility of peace settlement greater than its expected utility of war; pushing the governments towards seeking a peaceful settlement. Paper further argues that what would make peace settlement possible in case of transnational support, is the rebel groups' evaluation of their expected utility of settlement versus the expected utility of their outside option. Since the settlements grant them legitimacy, positions in the governmental and administrative posts, and give them time to rest and recuperate, this will make the utility of settlement greater than their outside option. As such, no matter what their true intentions are, rebel groups would make the peace settlement. Hence in the presence of rebel groups transnational linkages with their diasporas and transnational networks, we would be observing more peace settlement to take place.

The paper speaks to the wider debate in the conflict settlement; bargaining, as well as diaspora studies. It contributes to the existing literature both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically; it contributes to existing studies of conflict termination by putting actors' willingness to make a peace settlement in a wider context by integrating the transnational networks and diasporas into the picture that were overlooked by the quantitative peace literature so far. As a second theoretical contribution, it uses the insights of bargaining theories of war and shows that an outside option available to the weaker actor in asymmetric warfare can result in outcomes in its favor. In the context of civil warfare, an outside option available to rebels can make the peace settlements possible. Although the outside option principle has been widely used in the context of

interstate wars, to my knowledge it hasn't been applied to the study of peace settlements in internal armed conflicts.

Empirically; the paper operationalizes and tests the effect of the diaspora and the transnational network support for rebels by using two different measures in a large sample. To date, the influence of transnational groups on conflicts and peace have majorly been the focus of qualitative research and very few quantitative studies have shown interest in the subject due to lack of data. Consequently, this literature had controversial findings on whether or not these networks act as peacemakers or peace wreckers when they get involved in conflicts (see Koivova 2017; Hazel and Smith 2007). My results on 342 conflicts dyad indicate that when they support the rebel groups, transnational groups increase the likelihood of peace settlements in civil wars by their ability to help the rebels directly from within and indirectly through third parties. Results are robust when using (1) alternative measures for transnational support from other data sources; (2) alternative control variables (3) different time values for control variables.

The next section reviews the existing studies on conflict settlement and points out the research gap in the literature. Then the following section discusses the role of diasporas and transnational networks in homeland conflicts and briefly discusses the research gap in this literature and explains why it's highly important to incorporate diaspora studies into the peace settlement research. The fourth section based on the insights of the bargaining theory of war describes the mechanism by which transnational support alters the dynamics of civil war peace settlements and push the actors towards seeking a peaceful solution. The fifth section of the article describes the data and research design and it's followed by the empirical analysis and discusses the robustness checks. The last section summarizes the main points, concluding observations, and as well as points out a direction for future research.

2. Peace Settlements in Armed Conflicts

Existing academic literature explains why some belligerents are able to end their war through negotiated settlements from the “non-cooperative bargaining theory” framework⁶. The model suggests that since the wars are costly for both sides; there will always be a bargaining range that the warring parties would find more beneficial than fighting, but it’s because parties have an intention to misrepresent their power for strategic purposes; they don’t have accurate information about one other. And it’s this “information problems” that make conflicts to happen and last for years (Lake 2003; Walter 2009). The war; in this context serves as an information gathering mechanism and when the information regarding the opponent’s capability and potential outcome of the conflict is revealed through the battlefield; the information problems would be resolved. Accordingly, if their expected utility of making a settlement exceeds the expected utility of war then they will be looking for a settlement (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Gurses 2015; Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999).

However, the literature on civil wars indicate that such wars are in fact asymmetrical by nature on behalf of the government side. The governments have better military capability as well as, a well-trained army at their disposal. On the contrary, rebels need to start from scratch; need to resolve their collective action problems, mobilize the population, and find equipment (see Gent 2011). As such, the governments do not only believe they can win the war militarily but at the same time, the opening of the peace negotiations bring challenges for the governments (Bapat 2005; Gent 2011). Making peace settlements requires the governments to relinquish some of their authority and take the rebel group as an equal negotiation partner. Moreover, making a peace process with one rebel group may signal other potential challengers that violence is rewarded.

However, while peace settlements bring challenges for governments, the literature suggests that peace settlements are almost always advantageous for rebels (Clayton 2013). Peace settlements bring them time to rest and recuperate, evaluate their status from outlaws to political figures, and can grant them positions in central government and the authority over a territory (Toft 2003; Walter 2006; Melin and Svensson 2009). All of which they can use in the future for their advantage if they ever choose to return to full-scale war⁷ (See Wagner 1993; Fearon 1996). So regardless of their true intentions, rebel groups have incentives to agree on a settlement (Svensson 2007). It is based on this asymmetrical nature of civil wars that the literature associates the peace settlements in civil wars with governments' cost of the war (Hulquist 2013; Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed 2015). And it is often argued that the rebel groups that can inflict higher costs to their rival governments are more likely to reach peace settlements (Clayton 2013, Gurses 2015). In this context, many studies highlight the importance of the duration and the intensity of the conflict, in terms of changing governments' behavior towards negotiations (Mason and Fett 1996, Mason Weingarten and Fett 1999, Water 2002, Brandt et al. 2008).

Another important factor that is expected to change governments' willingness to settle the conflict peacefully, is the balance of military capabilities. William Zartman, the pioneer of the concept of "Mutually Hurting Stalemate" (MHS) argues that the peace negotiation is only possible in conflicts when the parties find themselves in a deadlock that they can no longer escalate (Zartman 1989, 1995; 2000; 2001;2008). Although Zartman emphasizes the perception of the MHS rather than the actual material conditions; he points out the military power dynamics as important determinants of peace settlements (Zartman 2003). Accordingly, he defines a ripe moment as the time when "the upper the hand slips and lower hand rises, both parties moving towards equality" (Zartman 2001). However, as Zartman focuses on the perception of the concept

rather than actual material conditions; his concept is found hard to operationalize, measure (Licklider 1993) as well as highly tautological (see Kleiboer, 1994). Therefore, several scholars suggested a different operationalization for this concept. Rebel group strength vis a vis the governments, for instance, is thought to be strongly related to conflict settlements. Many scholars argued that when rebel groups are in parity or even stronger, government would find a peaceful settlement more beneficial than fighting since these groups are able to inflict greater costs during conflicts (Clayton 2013; Bapat 2005, Vaughan 2006, Walter 2009, Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009; Gent, 2011; Thomas 2014).

As it should be evident from this literature review, the prevailing explanations concerning the peace settlement in civil wars, present the government as the veto player; emphasizing the power asymmetry (Clayton 2013). They underline the importance of the factors that increase the government's expected cost of war weighted against the government's expected utility of peace settlements but they overemphasize the importance of domestic factors. As such, they neglect the "transnational linkages" that civil war actor possesses with various state and non-state actors (see Gleditsch 2007; 2009; Cederman, Girardin, Gleditsch 2009). However, recent research has shown that most civil wars involve significant transnational dynamics because its actors are widely connected to actors around the world with transgressing bonds that span well beyond national boundaries that can alter the balances and dynamics in civil wars (Gleditsch 2007, 2009; Salehyan 2009; Checkel 2013; Jenne 2004, 2007). Especially rebel groups; in order to support their rebellion vastly rely on these linkages. Among these transnational linkages, diasporas and transnational networks became highly dominant actors in the international arena in supporting rebellions on the side of the rebels especially since the end of Cold War. And this complicates and challenges our traditional understanding of such wars and their peace processes in significant ways.

3. Diasporas and Transnational Networks in Homeland Conflicts

As noted, even though internal armed conflicts happen within the borders of nation-states neither their actors nor their implications remain domestic (Gleditsch 2007, 2009; Checkel 2013; Harbom and Wallensteen 2005; Saleyhan et al. 2011; Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed 2015). More often than not, transnational actors such as; the diasporas and transnational communities get involved in homeland conflicts (Cochrane 2015). Many rebel groups including but not limited to: LTTE (Tamil Tigers) in Sri Lanka; PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) in Turkey; IRA (Irish Republican Army) in Northern Ireland; EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) in Eritrea; UIC (Union of Islamic Courts) in Somali; have extensively benefited from various support structures provided by their transnational constituencies (see Adamson 2002; McDowell 1996; Koser 2007; Adamson 2013; Hurst 2007).

Transnational constituencies involve diaspora groups as well as transnational networks⁸. Diasporas can be defined as politically mobilized people that possess a common origin and live much or less on a permanent basis outside the territories of their homeland (Shain and Barth 2013). Transnational Networks, on the other hand, refer to people or groups that have common characteristics in terms of their beliefs or affiliation to an ideology, religion, sect, language or alternatively to geography (Shefer 2013). Diaspora and transnational networks mobilization for homeland conflicts is undoubtedly not a new phenomenon. However, in the last decades; the increasing number of civil wars, lack of economic opportunities, and political repression have contributed to the growth and mobilization of such transnational constituencies for internal armed conflicts worldwide (Adamson 2004). While on one hand, globalization contributed to their sense of alienation from the host societies (Kaldor-Robinson 2002), on the other, as noted by Anderson (1992); the exile served as a “nursery of nationality⁹”.

However, more importantly, modernity and developments in the communication technologies increased the interconnectedness and helped them to sustain their identity through shared images of political repression and torture, thus, making the homeland affairs and rebel group ideologies more accessible and popular (Cochrane 2015). Transnational constituencies can support rebel groups for a variety of reasons including ideological, religious, and ethnic kin ties, concern for the protection of their family members and relatives, psychological or emotional attachment, a desire to shape the political outcomes abroad, and a desire to return (Lidow 2011; Adamson 2002). After all, some of the reasons behind their immigration are related to internal armed conflicts (Hurst 2007).

The diaspora involvement in conflicts up to date, have majorly been the focus of a large body of qualitative literature, only a handful large N studies were interested in the debate due to lack of data (see Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Gamlen et al. 2013; Ragazzi 2013; Adamson 2002, 2013, 2016; Koser 2007; Roth 2015; Smith and Stares 2007). Consequently, previous literature had controversial findings underlying the transnational communities' both conflict fueling and conflict inhibiting roles. For instance, several studies have suggested that since the diaspora members do not bear the consequence of war and they are emotionally attached to the homeland conflict as moving away makes them nationalize and radicalize; they are less likely to support the peace (Roth 2015; Coellier Hoefler 2004; Smith 2007; Kaldor 2001; Koiniva 2011). Accordingly; these studies have argued that this "long distance nationalism" as Anderson (1998:74) puts it, made them mobilize resources for rebellions and that in turn, has detrimental consequences for civil wars (Adamson 2002:166). Conversely, other studies have pointed out the reconciliatory roles played by these networks during peace processes or post-conflict periods. (Orjuela 2008; Smith and Stares 2007)

However, many of these claims are based either on single case studies or on Large N studies that used highly questionable proxies. Previous quantitative research, to measure transnational support relied mostly either on the number of foreigners living in the US divided by the total population of their country of origin (Coellier and Hoeffler 2000; 2004) or on the actual number of immigrants (see Bove and Bohmelt 2017). However, a higher number of immigrants does not by itself indicate their mobilization, because ethnic identities are constructed and the mobilization requires effective movement entrepreneurs that frame grievances. Moreover, focusing solely on the US or on single case studies do not generate generalizable results. This dilemma indicates the need to pay more attention to the dynamics created by the transnational constituencies in internal armed conflicts that became important actors in homeland conflicts.

3.1. Diasporas, Transnational Networks and Conflict Settlement

Following the earlier literature on the bargaining theories of war, this paper argues that when siding with the rebel groups, transnational constituencies constitute an *outside option* for rebel groups in achieving their political aims outside their peace processes bargaining with the government. The concept of “outside option” in the non-cooperative bargaining framework refers to the set of alternatives that the bargainer may have at his disposal outside the two-actor bargaining. Having another alternative outside the two actors bargaining framework alters the bargaining dynamics between the two actors significantly because it changes both actors’ expectations and behaviour. For the actor who possesses it; having another alternative give him the possibility to refrain from the bargaining altogether or leave the bargaining anytime to pursue his interest elsewhere by other means if the conditions in the bargaining are not favourable. Since it does have another alternative to reach its aims; the actor that has the outside option does no longer have to look his best interest within the two-actor framework. As such, unless the expected utility of bargaining is greater than

the expected utility of his outside option; the actor who has the outside option will walk away and stick to its outside option to maximize its profit in other ways. Consequently, the outside option will strengthen his hand and its bargaining strength vis a vis the actor who lacks it (Spaniel 2014). This, in turn, will change the behaviour of the actor that lacks this option. From the vantage point of the actor who lacks the outside option, the ability of the other actor to be able to walk away and impose a different alternative creates a highly credible threat and increase his cost of disagreement. And as long he doesn't have means to contain other actors' outside option and decrease his cost of disagreement in other ways, he will be willing to give more concessions than what he would actually give in the absence of such option. As noted by Powell (2002) the ability to walk away "affect the players' ability to make credible threats to exercise the outside option and thereby obtain a more favourable agreement". As a result, the existence of an outside option eventually leads to better outcomes for the one who possesses it.

In the context of civil war peace processes, diasporas and transnational constituencies' involvement in conflicts on the side of the rebels can be conceptualized as an outside option because given the rebels are already in a war and have set of demands they would like to achieve; they have various options to reach their aims. These demands can range from seizing a territory, seizing the government, winning the war, international recognition, and so on. They can reach these demands by making a peace settlement with the government or alternatively by choosing to rely on their transnational constituencies who help them to achieve their aims by providing them various multifaceted support structures¹⁰.

I argue that transnational constituencies consist of an outside option because they help the rebel groups to achieve their aims through direct and indirect mechanisms instead of receiving them through a peace settlement.

The *direct mechanism* relates to their ability to contribute to rebel groups' ability of fighting by mobilizing resources that they may need in the pathway to reach their political aims; such as financial donations, providing man to their army, military support. The *Indirect mechanism* stresses on their ability to pressure international state and non-state actors by pressuring them to change their policy to punish the government, to act on behalf of rebel groups, and even to mobilize international intervention. So; the indirect mechanism relates to their ability to help rebels through third parties.

As noted, diasporas and transnational networks can *directly* contribute to the rebel groups' ability to reach their aims by funding, finding recruits and military equipment. In this regard, transnational constituencies rely on various fund-raising strategies including but not limited to; taxation of individual donors or business owners, extortion, labor remittances, organized crime including drug and human trafficking¹¹. To give some example; Irish American diaspora has provided half of the budget of the IRA through the Irish Northern Aid during the troubles, (Adamson 2004), the annual diaspora budget of LTTE is reported to be 50 million dollars¹² (Adamson 2004). Hamas' diaspora contribution was exceeding 100 million dollars a year (Shefer 2013). Transnational communities can also provide recruits for armed groups and serve as recruitment hubs (Adamson 2002, Byman et al. 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). Transnational movement entrepreneurs can reframe migrant identities, exalt the notion of war and martyrdom so that by joining rebel groups, marginalized and socially excluded migrants can find self-worth, empowerment, and a sense of purpose¹³. For instance, the Eritrean Diaspora played a significant role in the mobilization of the EPLF (Al-Ali and Koser 2002). The Kosovar Albanians recruited fighters for Kosovo Liberation Army (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000). Similarly, the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe influenced many Kurds to join PKK ranks in Turkey

(Adamson 2013) and YPG ranks in Syria to fight against ISIS (Keles 2014). Transnational communities can also provide arms for homeland conflicts. Hoffman et al. (2007) note that Irish American diaspora was so successful in mobilizing arms that nearly 70 percent of the weapons found in the Irish soil by British soldiers were in fact American¹⁴.

Diaspora and transnational network support for rebel groups are especially vital for rebel groups' survival and ability to challenge the government to achieve their aims; especially when states no longer needed to sponsor rebels for their ideological and geopolitical reasons especially since the end of Cold War, as they used to do¹⁵. Rebel groups need resources in order to survive and accomplish their aims. Without resources, rebels cannot sustain a rebellion nor be able to significantly challenge the government. Transnational constituencies support in this regard is highly important for rebels to inflict a significant cost on the government. Moreover, they are more reliable in their funding and they do not try to exert control over the insurgency compared to external states. They rely on clandestine support structures that also make these resources hard to contain. In addition, when the support is not coming, it is much easier for rebel groups to exert pressure over the members of the transnational constituencies¹⁶ (Byman et al. 2001). So, the transnational network and diaspora groups' increasing capacity to secure all kinds of support, their ability to sustain covert financial and institutional structures made them indispensable supporters of the homeland rebellions (Smith 2007; Shefer 2013).

Apart from *directly* influencing the conflict dynamics between the government and rebels, transnational constituencies can *indirectly* help the rebel groups to reach their aims through third-party state and non-state actors. As such they create what Keck and Sikkink (1998) calls a "boomerang effect"¹⁷. Rebel groups need international support as much as they need material benefits. Since rebel groups in conflicts do lack legitimacy, often labelled as terrorists and don't

possess internationally recognized political representation such as UN membership or diplomatic missions, they are extensively dependent on the political support of their transnational constituencies for international lobbying and pressure (Demmers 2007).

Transnational constituencies often use publicity, propaganda and provide information about the conflict in order to alter the image that international actors may have about the rebel group's identity. In that sense, they challenge the government's monopoly of discourse over the conflict. The reframing of the conflict and group is essential for providing legitimacy, creating better opportunity structures for its diasporic activities as well as increasing international support¹⁸. Despite the fact that many rebel groups engage in terrorist activities (Findley and Young 2012; Polo and Gleditsch 2016), use of child soldiers (Haer and Bohmelt 2015), assassinations, and massacres (Byman et al 2001); transnational groups often underline the importance of peace, international human rights norms, and treaties. Human rights norms have special importance because good human rights record is a vital sign for others to identify one as a member of liberal world order (Risse and Sikkink 1999). Transnational constituencies effectively use TV and radio channels, printed and social media to underline economic, social, racial discrimination, torture, human right abuses that are often censored or underreported by the government. As such, they also rearticulate their identity as promoters of international norms (Risse and Sikkink 1999). Byman (2013:43) gives an example from the Tamil Diaspora and notes that their propaganda involves underlying the innocence of the group, mentioning that the group is the sole representative of the population as well as the indispensability of the independence as a prerequisite of peace. Likewise, members of Sikh diaspora regularly share information on disappearances and torture in Punjab (Axel 2001; Adamson 2002).

Transnational groups also lobby and pressure international governments. Due to their ability to use their ethnic vote, kin relations, increasing economic, political and social capabilities as well as their positions in the bureaucracy and political offices in the host lands since the late 20th century, they have been successful in providing international support and in influencing international governments' foreign policy. For instance, Huntington (1997) argues that the U.S. foreign policy is heavily influenced by skilled ethnic lobby groups whose interests strictly remain loyal to their imagined homeland¹⁹. As a result of this intense international lobbying; international state and non-state actors sometimes shame, in others, they exert significant pressure (Checkel 1997). They can push for a peaceful solution or establish sanctions or even menace with an intervention. Adamson (2001) notes that the international support provided by transnational constituencies, prevent national governments to forcefully suppress rebellions. In this sense, the cooperation of international state and non-state actors with the transnational constituencies coerce homeland decision makers, who at least instrumentally feel obliged to comply with the international norms and prescriptions²⁰ (Klotz 1995; Checkel 1997). Existing studies have shown a strong correlation between the international state support to rebel groups and the existence of rebel group transnational constituency (Salehyan et al. 2011; Davis and Moore 1997; Jenne 2007; Byman and Kreps 2010; Saideman 2002). Similarly, previous research has found that the existence of transnational constituency as an important determinant of international intervention (Bove and Bohmelt 2017)

As an example, Kurdish groups in the US have been very effective in terms of securing the US material support for the Kurdish Insurgency, the YPG in Syria. Kurdish groups have also effectively used the German Political institutions regarding the conflict between PKK and Turkey. As a result; several political parties in Germany including Bündnis90/Die Grünen and SPD have

taken critical stance against Turkey underlying the grave human rights abuses, as well as targeted the German arms trade (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001). Similarly, LTTE lobbied in South Africa to stop the arms sale to Sri Lanka; the Irish American groups could successfully block the US arms sale to the United Kingdom (Hoffman et al 2007). Likewise, Moluccan groups have pressured the Dutch government to call for a humanitarian intervention in Indonesia. The Afghan and Iraqi groups on the other hand, have been successful in changing the US foreign policy on their behalf. (Demmers 2007).

I argue that it is by these direct and indirect support mechanisms that transnational constituencies would help rebel groups to reach their political aims. As such; transnational constituencies would constitute an outside option for rebels because they constitute an alternative pathway for rebels to finalize their political demands instead of receiving them through peace processes. As such, following the bargaining literature; I argue that the transnational support would alter the bargaining dynamics between the belligerents. Given the asymmetric context of civil wars; transnational support coming from diasporas and transnational networks would increase the rebels' chances of reaching a peaceful settlement with the government.

Transnational constituencies while on one hand would give rebel groups the option to refrain from bargaining or leave it anytime, they would create a highly credible threat for the government. Rebels' ability to pursue their demands through the help of their transnational constituency would increase the government's cost of disagreement. As such; the presence of transnational support coming from diasporas and transnational networks would resolve the information problems acute to civil war peace processes by indicating that the government's expected cost of the war would increase in the future. Because not only these constituencies help rebels to effectively challenge the government but also attract new actors to the conflict.

Even if governments would like to minimize this cost, the transnational support is hard to trace and hard to contain (Salehyan 2009; Cochrane 2015). Because transnational groups' financial and military activities are often multifaceted and covert; relying on informal clandestine channels that are exempt from transparency (Hurst 2007). Even if the governments would like to rely on international cooperation, existing research suggests that; unless these communities are involved in criminal activities in their host lands, they would enjoy varying degrees of tolerance and legitimacy²¹ (Byman et al 2001). And because by supporting rebellions at home, they help the rebels to reach their aims in an alternative pathway, and because they are hard to contain, the governments would be more likely to look for a peace settlement.

On the rebel side since the peace settlements are more advantageous in terms of providing rebels international legitimacy, authority at the governmental and regional level, time to rest and recuperate, all of which can be used in the future in case they ever choose to return the war, no matter what the rebel groups' true intentions are; rebel groups have incentives to agree on a peace settlement. As such; I theorize that transnational support would increase the probability of peace settlements in internal armed conflicts. And rebel groups that have transnational support coming from diaspora and/ or transnational networks are more likely to reach a peace agreement with the government.

Hypothesis; *Rebel groups that have transnational support coming from diaspora or/and transnational networks are more likely to reach a peace agreement with the government*

4. Research Design

In order to test the proposed hypothesis; I estimate a series of cross-sectional logistic regression models of peace settlements in internal armed conflicts that are fought between 1946 and 2008. To identify the primary units, I relied on the Non-State Actor Data (hereafter NSA) version 3.4 (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013) that provides information on the political and military capabilities of non-state armed groups. NSA, so far, is the most comprehensive dataset regarding the non-state armed group attributes in terms of the coverage and time frame. An armed conflict, as compatible with UCDP, is defined as “an incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties of which at least one is the government of a state, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, 1)

Since the point of interest of this study is the existence of peace settlements between the government of a country and each non-state armed group fighting in that country, a dyadic approach is preferred. A dyad is formed when two parties oppose each other. When the government of a country (side a) fights with different rebel groups (side b’s), each non-state armed group create its own separate dyad with the government. For instance, while the Colombian government and FARC jointly constitute one dyad, Colombian Government and ELF constitute another dyad, and so on. However, since the conflict dyads can end and reoccur or their attributes may change over time, conflict dyads can also have different episodes. For instance, the dyad between Iran and armed leftist Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDPI) exhibits three different episodes between 1946 and 2008²². Therefore, to account for this reoccurrence and change; the primary unit of analysis is chosen as “dyad-episode” as the main dataset NSA employs.

Since this study focuses on peace settlements, the conflicts in which the settlement is impossible; such as the conflicts that are still going on and the coup d'états; are dropped from the dataset. Likewise, because the study concentrates on internal armed conflicts, the extraterritorial wars were further deducted from the main dataset. The resulting dataset covers the period between 1946 and 2008 and consists of 342 dyads among which 41 of them have at least two episodes that increase the number of total cross-sectional observations to 396.

4.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable **Settlement** is a dichotomous variable recording the existence of any peace agreement between a government and its rival non-state armed group for that specific dyad-episode. It is coded as 1 if the dyad episode ends with an agreement and 0 if otherwise. To be defined as a **Settlement**, an agreement has to (1) end that dyad episode and (2) should resolve at least one issue related to the conflict. To operationalize settlement; I rely on the *typeoftermination* variable of the NSA data. NSA does not code settlement specifically but differentiates conflict termination types into nine different categories. These categories involve (1) ceasefire agreement, (2) ceasefire agreement with conflict resolution, (3) peace agreement, (4) victory, (5) no or low activity, (6) other, (6.1) dyad ended when groups combined to form a new group²³, (7) end of anti-colonial wars, and (NA) category that indicates the conflicts that are still going on. Based on this classification, I have constructed a dummy variable **Settlement** by pooling the first three categories indicating conflict endings with (1) a ceasefire, (2) a ceasefire with conflict resolution, and (3) a peace agreement. I have pooled only these categories as settlements because these agreements both end the dyad episodes as well as resolve some issues -if not all-related to the armed conflict. Overall among 396 observations, only 84 of them ended with a peace settlement corresponding to 21% of all dataset²⁴

4.2 Independent Variable

The main independent variable for this study is the dichotomous **Transnational Support** variable taken from the NSA data. **Transnational Support** records any kind of military, financial, and diplomatic support given to rebel groups by diasporas or/and transnational networks anytime during the conflict²⁵. In line with the existing academic literature, I define diasporas and transnational networks as mobilized groups that have ethnic, kinship, ideological, religious geographical or language based connections with the rebel groups but reside more or less on a permanent basis outside their homeland yet still keep their contact with their homeland conflicts (Shain and Barth 3003; Shefer 2013).

NSA data has two variables measuring the transnational support given to the rebel groups. One is the ordinal *transconstsupp* variable that measures the non-military support given to rebel groups by transnational networks or diaspora groups. The second one is the ordinal *rebextpart* variable recording the military support given to the challengers by such transnational constituencies. These variables include major, minor, tacit, explicit, and alleged categories. Since the number of present cases in each variable does not allow for a meaningful comparison between those two categories of support; to operationalise the existence of support I pooled the two variables into a single binary **Transnational Support** (NSA) variable measuring the existence of all types of support in a given dyad episode. Moreover, since the proposed hypothesis theorizes that the existence of transnational support would increase the likelihood of peace settlements, the alleged category is excluded and counted as no support since it is not based on proved evidence.

As an alternative measure for the main independent variable Transnational Support, I have created a second dichotomous variable **Transnational Support II** from the UCDP External Support Project Disaggregated / Supporter Level Dataset v. 1.0-2011 (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011). UCDP External Support data provides information on the existence of any external supporter as well as on the identity of the supporter whether it's a state, a non-state armed group or a transnational network or diaspora group. Based on the UCDP actor ID's, I have selected transnational networks and diaspora groups. **Transnational Support II** (UCDP) variable records the existence of transnational support and coded as 1 if rebel groups have received support from diasporas or transnational networks at any time during the course of the dyad episode and 0 if otherwise. It replaces the **Transnational Support** (NSA) variable in different models. However, due to data availability, the models that include **Transnational II** (UCDP) variable are reduced to a subsample that covers the period between 1975 and 2008.

4.3 Control Variables

The models also include several control variables that previously shown to affect the probability of settlement in internal armed conflicts. Many scholars have formerly hypothesized that duration and intensity are important determinants of peace negotiations (see Mason and Fett 1996, Mason Weingarten and Fett 1999, Water 2002, Brandt et al. 2008, Vaughan 2006; Pearson et al. 2006). Duration and intensity can also create a spurious relationship by being the cause of transnational support and the settlement at the same time (i.e. longer and deadlier wars can not only result with rebel groups to receive more transnational support but also, they can be the cause of the peace settlements). In addition, duration and intensity can also be the result of the transnational rebel support itself creating a chain relationship between the main IV and the DV (i.e

rebel groups that receive this assistance can fight longer and inflict greater costs hence therefore, conflicts can end with a settlement).

To control for the duration, I added a numeric *ln Duration* variable measuring the log of the time elapsed (in years) since the beginning of the dyad until the end of that particular dyad episode. To control for the conflict intensity, I have used two different measures that replace each other in different models. The first one is numeric *ln Battle Deaths* variable measuring the log of the total number of battle-related deaths in the conflict and is taken from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset Version 3.1 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). However, although PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset Version 3.1 is the most comprehensive dataset in terms of time coverage, it includes the number of battle-related deaths belonging to both sides and not each of them separately. In addition, it also reports them on the conflict level rather than the dyad level. (i.e. rather than coding battle-related deaths belonging to the dyad between Colombian Government and FARC; it reports the total number of battle-related deaths generated in this particular conflict Colombia and that number also includes different rebel groups)

To account for some of these shortcomings, I have also used a dichotomous variable *Major Conflict*. Although it still includes the battle-related deaths belonging to both sides, at least it captures the dyadic interaction of the belligerents. It is coded as 1 if the dyad ever reached 1000 battle-related deaths from the beginning until the end of that particular episode and it is taken from the Dyadic version of the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset v1-2016 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).

Existing literature has also pointed out the importance of the belligerents' power balances for the initiation of peace negotiations (see Clayton 2013; Bapat 2005, Vaughan 2006; Walter 2009; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). Relative rebel strength can also be the intervening variable between the transnational support and peace settlement by creating a chain relationship (i.e. groups that receive transnational support can be much stronger and then reach a peace settlement). To account for the rebel groups' relative power balances vis a vis the government, I added an ordinal Rebel Strength variable corresponding to *rebstrength* variable of NSA data. A dummy Territorial variable is also included in the analysis since previous literature has suggested that territorial conflicts are less likely to end with conflict settlements (Ikle 1971; Walter 2004). It is taken from the from UCDP Armed Conflict Dyadic Dataset. (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008).

All of the estimated logistic regression models also control for the conflict countries' democracy level and GDP per capita. Previous literature has shown that the regime type is a strong predictor of civil conflict following an inverted U shape with consolidated democracies and consolidated autocracies experiencing less conflict. As a result, countries with anocratic regimes, defined as partly democratic and partly authoritarian are more susceptible to conflict (Hegre et al 2001). The conditions that lead to civil conflicts may also be associated with how they end. Similarly, GDP per capita (a proxy for the state capacity) that the previous literature has shown to affect the conflict onset, can also alter the government decision on whether or not to suppress the rebellion forcefully or peacefully (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Wealthier countries with established police and armed forces can choose to continue the conflict rather than seek a peace settlement. To measure the GDP per capita of each conflict episode, I have relied on the Expanded Trade and GDP Dataset v.6.0 (Gleditsch 2002a), and I have constructed a numeric variable In Real GDP pc²⁶.

For the level of democracy, I have relied on two alternative measures that replace each other in different models. One is a numeric Polyarchy variable from the V-Dem (Lindberg et al., 2014) and the other one is a dummy Anocracy variable from Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2002). Following Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) Anocracy is coded as 1 if a country's polity level ranges between -6 and 6 and 0 if otherwise.

For GDP pc, Polyarchy and Anocracy variables I have taken the lagged values of the last year of the dyad episode (t-1) in the main models reported in the paper²⁷. However, alternative models reported in the appendix 2A also report the results with the first-year values of these variables. Results don't change substantially²⁸.

4. Empirical Analysis and Robustness

I first start with the contingency tables of the relationship between the dependent variable Settlement and the two separate independent variables measuring the existence of Transnational Support.

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the peace settlement by Transnational Support variable operationalized from the NSA Data that covers the period between 1946 and 2008. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the peace settlement by Transnational Support II variable operationalized from the UCDP External Support Dataset and covers the period between 1975 and 2008. Both contingency tables show the frequency and percentage of the peace settlements in the presence / absence of transnational rebel support and thus they are roughly comparable.

Table 1: Frequency and Percentage of Settlement by Transnational Support (1946–2008)

	No Settlement (0)	Settlement (1)
No Transnational Support	209 (%82.28)	45 (%17.72)
Transnational Support	70 (%67.31)	34 (%32.69)

Source: NSA Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch, Salehyan 2012)
Percentages in parentheses sum to 100 across rows

Table 1 above indicates that between 1946 and 2008 peace settlements only took place % 17.72 of the time when rebel groups do not have transnational support. However, this percentage jumps to % 32.69 for the cases where rebel groups receive assistance from any transnational constituency. Table 2 yields to similar results. Between 1975 and 2008 while rebel groups that lack transnational support experience peace settlements only for the %23.59 of the time, this number rose to % 50 for groups that have such opportunity. Based on these simple bivariate association, it seems that rebel groups that receive support from diasporas or transnational networks tend to have more chance when it comes to securing a peace settlement with the government compared to those who don't have support from such constituency. Next, I run a series of cross-sectional logistic regression models to test the proposed hypothesis.

Table 2: Frequency and Percentage of Settlement by Transnational Support II (1975–2008)

	No Settlement (0)	Settlement (1)
No Transnational Support	217 (%76.41)	67 (%23.59)
Transnational Support	12 (%50.00)	34 (%50.00)

Source: UCDP External Support Data (Högbladh, Pettersson, Themnér 2011)
Percentages in parentheses sum to 100 across rows

Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, all models are estimated with logistic regression. Although binary dependent variables can also be analysed with linear probability models, these models suffer from out of bounds predictions, heteroscedasticity, non-normality of errors, and incorrect functional form problems (Long 1997). Logistic regression models avoid these problems and as such, they are the most frequently used models in the analysis of this type of data (Hosmer et al 2013). All models include robust standard errors clustered by conflict to account for the lack of independence between dyad episodes within each conflict.

The first model includes the core control variables that the previous literature has shown to affect the conflict settlements. In the second model, I introduce the main variable of interest Transnational Support operationalized from the NSA data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013) covering the time period between 1946 to 2008. As my first robustness test, the third model tests the impact of the transnational support with the Transnational Support II variable operationalized from the UCDP External support data (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011) covering the period between 1975 and 2008. The second and third models use the same control variables as the base model. As second robustness test, in the fourth and fifth models, I include different control variables measuring the level of democracy in the country in question and intensity of the war and then test both of the transnational support variables with these alternative measures. And finally, as a third robustness test, I also run the same models (from 1 to 5 in the Table 3) by taking first year of values of the grp pc, anocracy, polyarchy for the particular dyad episode (reported in the appendix 2A of the 1st paper at the end of the thesis).

Table 3: Settlements in Internal Armed Conflicts

	Model 1 (1946–2008)	Model 2 (1946–2008)	Model 3 (1975–2008)	Model 4 (1946–2008)	Model 5 (1975–2008)
ln Battle Deaths	-0.067 (0.09)	-0.063 (0.09)	-0.063 (0.09)		
Anocracy (t-1)	1.082*** (0.31)	1.069*** (0.31)	1.020*** (0.31)		
Rebel Strength	0.489** (0.21)	0.458* (0.23)	0.510** (0.22)	0.583*** (0.21)	0.608*** (0.20)
ln Duration	0.262* (0.14)	0.198 (0.15)	0.167 (0.14)	0.119 (0.14)	0.051 (0.14)
Territorial	0.359 (0.31)	0.087 (0.30)	0.478 (0.34)	-0.328 (0.34)	0.249 (0.35)
ln GDP pc (t-1)	-0.107 (0.14)	-0.200 (0.16)	-0.177 (0.15)	-0.177 (0.17)	-0.147 (0.16)
Transnational Support (NSA)		0.925*** (0.31)		0.910*** (0.33)	
Transnational Support II (UCDP)			1.057** (0.42)		0.900** (0.45)
Major Conflict				0.408 (0.32)	0.492 (0.37)
Polyarchy (t-1)				1.899** (0.85)	1.345 (0.82)
Constant	-1.751 (1.69)	-1.086 (1.87)	-1.080 (1.67)	-1.962 (1.32)	-1.825 (1.37)
AIC	374.2821	340.0816	322.0385	358.7743	338.6779
BIC	401.4848	370.3768	351.2864	389.5227	368.3613
N	360	326	286	345	302

Robust standard errors clustered by conflict are in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The regression results shown in Table 3, are highly compatible with the findings of the previous literature. In the base model, duration and rebel strength variables are both positive and significant indicating that conflicts with longer durations and stronger rebel groups have a higher probability of peace settlements. Governments are more likely to settle the war peacefully in longer wars and with stronger rebel groups as these indicators are heavily related to the governments' cost-benefit calculations in terms of showing that unilateral victory is -at best- difficult to achieve. Regime type is also significant and positively associated with the likelihood of conflict settlement. Results suggest that anocracies have a higher probability of conflict settlement. The finding is not surprising since anocracies also experience a higher likelihood of civil conflicts and lack the authoritarian mechanisms to suppress these conflicts brutally (see Hegre et al. 2001; Sambanis 2001). GDP per capita, Territorial Wars or Battle Related Deaths, on the other hand, seem unrelated to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Theoretically, the number of battle-related deaths should also be linked to the governments' cost of war argument presented in the current literature. However, due to data availability, this measure does not solely belong to the government side but also includes the number of battle-related deaths belonging to all rebel groups fighting with the government in the same conflict. Still, my findings are in line with studies that used the actual number of battle-related deaths (see e.g. Mason and Fett 1996, Regan 1996, Mason Weingarten and Fett 1999, Vaughan 2006, Pearson et al 2006; Gurses 2015)

The second model introduces the main independent variable Transnational Support operationalized from the Non-State Armed Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009) and covers the period between 1946 and 2008 as the base model. The estimate of the Transnational Support variable is both positive and significant at the $p < 0.01$ level indicating that transnational support increases the probability of peace settlement in internal armed conflicts. The model has

similar results for control variables as the base model with one exception. Introducing the transnational support variable changes the relationship between duration and conflict settlement. The estimate of the duration variable is no longer significant. As it will become more obvious in the models in the appendix, the effect of duration on conflict settlement is conditional upon the introduction of transnational support meaning that conflicts where the rebel groups receive transnational support from diasporas or transnational networks may have different durations. But maybe a more important finding is the coefficient and the level of significance of the Rebel Strength variable which doesn't change substantially. The results confirm the government's *expected* cost of war argument in a way that even if transnational support does not significantly contribute to rebel group's timely material might; transnational support increases the probability of settlement because it increases the expected future cost of the war for the government. Transnational support has its own direct effect on conflict settlement instead of creating a chain relationship with rebel strength. As such, rather than increasing the rebel power and then leading to settlement; transnational support contributes to the governments' perception of the future cost of conflict.

Model 3 introduces the alternative measure for the main independent variable, the Transnational Support II variable operationalized from the UCDP External Support Data. However, the lack of data availability on the independent variable restricts the sample size to the period between 1975 and 2008. The second Transnational Support Variable II is also positive and significant at the $p < 0.05$, meaning that the backing from a transnational constituency increases rebel groups' chances of securing a peace settlement. Significant estimates of two different transnational support variables from different datasets indicate that transnational support is an important variable that provides helpful information in predicting conflict settlements. The model

also includes the same control variables used in the previous two models. Results are similar.

The transnational support seems to influence the duration of conflict as the duration variable is no longer significant. Other results do not change substantially. Still, governments in anocratic regimes seem to be more likely to start a settlement with the rebel groups. Still, territorial wars, battle-related deaths and GDP per capita do not have much explanatory power as their estimates are not statistically different from zero. The estimate for the rebel strength does not change substantially further reinforcing the theoretical argument that the existence of transnational support for rebel groups changes the conflict outcome but not because it creates changes rebel group strength but because it changes governments' anticipation of the future cost of the conflict.

The fourth model uses the first measure of Transnational Support thus covers the period between 1946 and 2008 as in the first and second models, but this time combines it with two alternative proxy variables measuring conflict intensity and countries' democracy score. Major Conflict variable replaces the In. Battle Deaths variable in the previous models. While it is a better measure in terms of accounting for the dyadic interaction between the belligerents, it still covers the total number of battle-related deaths belonging to both sides. Therefore, not surprisingly its estimates are not different from 0 as it doesn't solely account for the government losses (hence does not necessarily measure the costs of conflict for the government). Another change in the fourth model is that Polyarchy (level of electoral democracy) variable replaces the anocracy variable in the previous models. Unlike the anocracy variable, it does not follow an inverted U shape (i.e. higher polyarchy scores indicating higher democracy levels) but it seems that higher democracy scores also have a positive and significant influence on conflict settlements. While there should be more research on this complex relationship between different democracy concepts, and conflict settlement, the preliminary findings suggest that not only in predicting the conflict

onsets (Hegre et al 2001) but also the conflict settlements, democracy is an important variable.

The most important finding in this model is that even in the presence of different control variables, the estimate of Transnational Support does not change and is still significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. The remaining variables remain unchanged compared to the model 3; rebel strength is still positive and significant. duration and intensity, territorial wars, and Gdp pc have no influence on peace settlements.

The Model 5 uses the same control variables as in Model 4 with the transnational Support II variable hence the sample is again restricted to the 1975-2008 period. Still, even with the introduction of alternative measures for democracy score (Polyarchy) and the conflict intensity (Major conflict), Transnational Support II Variable is positive and statistically significant with a p-value < 0.05 . In other words, conflicts are more likely to end with peace settlement if rebel groups have a transnational constituency that supports them. The estimates of the control variables remain similar to the previous model except for the polyarchy variable that is no longer significant.

Since logistic regression models cannot be compared based on their R^2 that explains how much variation in the dependent variable is explained by the current models, several measures have been suggested by the literature for comparing models (see Long 1997; Hosmer et al 2013). Among them, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics are included in Table 3 as a measure to compare different models. As it is presented, models that include transnational support variable have lower AIC and BIC statistics therefore, perform better compared to models that do not include the transnational support variables. Like many regression models concerning the categorical and limited dependent variables, logistic regression models are also non-linear and therefore model coefficients are hard to interpret

compared to linear models. In non-linear models, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable does not only depend on the main variable of interest but also on the values of all other variables in the model. In addition, a unit increase in the independent variable does not always result in a constant change on the probability but rather depends on the current value of the main independent variable (Long 1997).

Consequently, the most direct and practical approaches to interpreting the effect of the main independent variables of interest, the Transnational Support (NSA) and Transnational support II (UCDP) on the dependent variable Settlement, is to calculate how the predicted probabilities of settlement changes for different values of these variables. So, to facilitate the interpretation, and since the main Independent variables, the transnational support (NSA) and transnational Support (UCDP) are dichotomous, I have generated the discrete change to measure how a change in the main independent variables (changing both Transnational Support variables from 0 to 1) leads to a change in the probability that a conflict will end with a peace settlement. A second important way to assess the effect of these variables is to calculate how the odds of peace settlement change in the presence of these two transnational support variables. Table 4 below shows the discrete change, discrete change with the 95 % confidence interval, and odds change respectively.

Results suggest that changing Transnational Support variable operationalized from NSA data in model 2 from “0” to “1” increases the predicted probability of peace settlement by 0.17. Changing Transnational Support II variable operationalized from UCDP External Support Data in model 3 from “0” to “1” increases the predicted probability of peace settlement by 0.23. The discrete change is 0.17 for model 4 that includes the transnational Support (NSA) variables and 0.19 for model 5 that includes the Transnational Support II (UCDP) variables respectively.

Table 4: Discrete and Odds Change of Settlement by Transnational Support for models presented in Table 3

	Discrete Change (0-1)	Discrete Change %95 Confidence Interval	Odds Change (%)
Model (2)	0.17	[0.05 - 0.29]	152
Model (3)	0.23	[0.04 - 0.43]	188
Model (4)	0.17	[0.04 - 0.29]	149
Model (5)	0.19	[0.02 - 0.40]	146

Discrete change calculated using prchange and prvalue commands in Stata. All covariates are set to their means
Odds change calculated with listcoef, percent command in Stata

When we look at how the odds of settlement change in the presence of rebel transnational support, the Model 2 suggests that rebel groups that can receive support from their transnational constituency have % 152 more chance to reach a peace settlement with their government. Similarly, the Model 3 suggests that rebels that have a transnational constituency backing have % 188 more chance of having a settlement with their government. This percentage of change in the odds are %149 for the Model 4 and %146 for the Model 5 respectively. The results suggest that there is a much higher probability of peace settlements when rebel groups receive transnational support in internal armed conflicts.

So, the existence of transnational support on behalf of rebel groups has strong predicting power when explaining the probability of peace settlements in internal armed conflicts. Hence, including transnational support variable to conflict settlement models leads to better predictions on whether or not a conflict would end with a settlement.

7. Concluding Remarks and Direction for Further Research

Despite their long durations and devastating consequences, civil wars are the most common form of violence and they are hard to resolve. Yet while at the beginning of the conflict the governments repeatedly refuse to talk with rebel groups and settle their conflict peacefully, some rebel groups at the end, find themselves at the negotiating table and settle their war peacefully. Previous studies in conflict settlement literature have explained this variation among rebel groups by emphasizing the domestic battlefield conditions and the cost inflicted to the government side by these groups. Accordingly, the previous studies have suggested to look at battle conditions such as the balance of military capability, rebel group strength, war duration, and intensity to understand whether or not a conflict would end with an actual settlement. Yet while the current literature expanded our understanding on the dynamics of the peace settlement between the belligerents, what it failed to capture is that conflicts do not operate in a vacuum but rather they are surrounded by a wider regional and global environment.

As pointed out by many studies, even if civil wars happen inside the borders of nation-states, neither their implications nor their actors remain solely domestic (Gleditsch 2007; 2009). More often than not civil war belligerents interact with various state and non-state actors across nation-state borders and these interactions have the ability to change and challenge the existent status quo between the fighting parties. Based on this background, this paper suggested to expand our focus and investigate how the rebel transnational linkages with transnational constituencies affect the peace process dynamics. As opposed to the previous literature that has conflicting findings on whether or not transnational constituencies serve as peacemakers or peace wreckers; this paper argued that when they support the rebel groups, transnational networks and diaspora groups increase the probability of peace settlements.

Based on the insights of bargaining theories of war, most specifically on the bargaining with the outside option principle, the paper suggested that when they side with the rebel groups, the transnational constituencies both directly and indirectly help rebels to reach their political aims. As such, they constitute rebel groups' outside option to finalize their demands instead of reaching them through peace processes. They constitute rebel groups' outside option, simply because they constitute another alternative outside the rebel groups' main bargaining setting with the government. The direct mechanism involves their direct involvement and influence over conflicts by providing rebel groups military, financial, and human resources. The indirect mechanism stressed on their ability to influence the conflicts through mobilizing third parties. Transnational constituencies by reframing and rearticulating conflicts as well as benefiting from their increasing importance on the host lands provide international legitimacy and international support for conflicts. More importantly, they attract international resources and intervention on behalf of rebel groups.

As such, the paper argued that it is by these direct and indirect mechanisms that transnational constituencies help rebels in the pathways towards accomplishing their political aims. And as such, they alter the peace processes dynamics. On the government side, transnational constituency support pushes the governments towards seeking a political settlement. Simply because it increases the government's expected cost of war and this is hard to contain. And because of the inability of the governments to contain this cost and the willingness to avoid costly consequences that the governments would be looking for a peace settlement. On the rebel side, the transnational constituency support would give the rebels another option to pursue regarding their political aims and as such, they would also give them the ability to refrain from bargaining if the utility of bargaining would be lower than their outside option.

However, as widely documented by the previous literature; settlements are almost always advantageous for rebel groups in terms of granting them status and various benefits. As such not only the government but also the rebels would be looking for settlement because the expected utility of the settlement would be greater than their outside option, at least for the time being. Therefore, the paper argued that, in the presence of rebel transnational linkages with diasporas and transnational networks, we would be observing more settlements.

The paper had both empirical and theoretical contributions. Theoretically, it aimed to challenge the closed polity approach of the conflict settlement literature that explain settlements with factors happening within the nation-state borders. As a second theoretical contribution, it used the insights of bargaining theories of war and showed that an outside option available one of the parties, especially to the weaker side, can bring outcomes favorable to that side. In the context of civil warfare, it showed that an outside option available to rebels can make the peace settlements more likely. Although the outside option principle is widely used in the context of interstate wars, it hasn't been applied to the study of peace settlements in internal armed conflicts. Empirically; the paper operationalized and tested the effect of transnational support coming from diasporas and transnational networks by using two different measures in a large sample. To date, the diaspora and transnational network support on conflict had controversial findings and the literature lacked comparative studies due to lack of data. My results on 342 conflicts dyads indicated that when they support rebel groups, transnational groups increase the likelihood of peace settlement in civil wars. These findings are also robust with (1) alternative operationalization / measurements of Transnational Support, (2) alternative control variables, (3) as well as with different time values for control variables such as taking the first-year values of dyad episodes (see Paper 1, Appendix 2A for alternative models).

Yet while the paper aims at empirically assessing the influence of transnational constituencies support to rebel groups vis a vis the conflict outcomes, the diaspora and transnational networks relations to homeland conflicts are highly complex and multifaceted phenomena. So, far diaspora studies have been majorly the topic of qualitative studies due to data availability. However, in the future and in light of new data, one possible direction of research can be the diaspora involvement in post-conflict contexts and societies; especially during the transitional justice processes. These networks have so far actively taken roles in truth-seeking commissions in several states such as Liberia, Haiti, East Timor (Koinova 2017; Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2010; Hoogenboom and Quinn 2011; Young and Park 2009) or in mobilizing for the recognition of past autocracies and genocides. However, we still don't know to what extent their involvement affect reconciliation among communities.

Another area of future research agenda would benefit at exploring the transnational constituencies' relations with their host governments and how this relationship shapes transnational constituency's behaviour. Several studies have shown that diaspora behaviour is not static (Kostic 2012; Hall 2016) but rather this behaviour is constantly negotiated and renegotiated by the opportunity structures and securitization environments they live in (Koinova and Karabegovic 2017; Cochrane 2015; Demmers 2007). The literature has argued that same transnational constituencies can act differently in different country contexts or in different time periods within the same county context. Yet we still need more comparative studies in this area. Future research would especially benefit from comparing multiple contexts over time through quantitative methods.

Transnational Linkages and the Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars

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Abstract: Why do some civil war peace agreements end up being implemented while others do not? Previous literature on peace agreement implementation traditionally thought the post-settlement commitment problems as a domestic phenomenon and has approached this question primarily by looking at peace agreement contents or processes that take place within the countries that experience civil wars. Accordingly, the literature underlined the importance of drafting self-sustaining agreements that contain power-sharing stipulations or ameliorating the domestic country conditions. And the role of outside actors within the quantitative peace agreement implementation literature has been limited to providing security guarantees. Yet, what the existing literature fails to capture is that civil wars do not operate in a vacuum but rather surrounded by a wider regional and global environment. And states within this environment are not solely motivated with the intention of ending the conflicts or promoting peace but rather intentionally or unintentionally provide resources for rebel groups in their war-making efforts. Previous literature in other contexts has shown that hostile neighbours, neighbours in civil wars, and external supporters facilitate rebel mobilization and fuels the onset and extend the duration of civil wars. However, in the context of quantitative peace agreement implementation literature, we still don't know how these regional and global conditions affect the prospect for peace when the rebel groups have signed a peace agreement. Despite this background, this paper challenges this closed polity approach and proposes to look at the implementation of peace agreements within a broader perspective. Building on the pillars of the bargaining theory, most specifically on the bargaining with the outside option principle, paper argues that hostile neighbours, neighbours and civil war, and previous rebel supporters would serve an outside option, an alternative option for rebels to reach their aims instead of receiving them through implementing their peace agreement. And given the challenges of the implementation period, such outside option would exacerbate rebel groups' commitment problems by making the resumption of violence a much beneficial alternative. As such, the paper argues that in the presence of a permissive environment where rebels anticipate resources, the peace agreements would be less likely to be implemented. The theory is tested both on a full sample of 196 peace agreements including the full, the partial and the process agreements as well as on a subsample of 157 peace agreements covering only the full and the partial ones signed between 1975 and 2011. Consistent with the expectation, results from both the full and the subsample indicate that rebel groups' expectation to rely on their previous hosts, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil wars significantly decreases the probability of peace agreement implementation.

Keywords: Civil wars, rebel groups, peace agreement implementation

1. Introduction

While peace agreements are the most desirable outcome in civil wars, they are often short-lived; prone to collapse or never fully materialize (De Rouen et al 2010; Murshed, 2002). The unsuccessful peace agreements in Rwandan, Angolan, and Liberian civil wars showed that not only belligerents can sign peace treaties only to return to violence but also unless the implementation is ensured; civil wars can have devastating consequences (Stedman 2002). In this article, I seek to understand the conditions that can challenge the belligerents' commitment to the previously agreed provisions and question how we can ensure their successful implementation. Building on the pillars of the bargaining theories of war, I propose to look at the wider conflict environment that the peace agreements take place. And I argue that if the country in question is surrounded by a hostile neighbour, a neighbour in civil war, or if the rebels have been previously supported by an external state, this will significantly decrease the probability of the peace agreement implementation because such an environment would change the rebels' expectation regarding the renewal of violence by making it more less costly thus more advantageous. As such, it would also challenge their commitment to the previously agreed provisions. I suggest that any peace-making efforts at the international level can only be successful after the stabilization of these conditions¹.

The issue of post-conflict stability has seen great attention in the literature over the last decades. The previous literature has attributed the lack of peace agreement implementation and the conflict reoccurrence mainly to the rebel groups' two types of commitment problems arising either from their security concerns due to demobilization and disarmament, or their willingness to renege the peace treaty for better outcomes. As such; its often argued that peace agreements are less likely to be successful because rebel groups are afraid to demobilize due to governments'

possibility of defection or due to a permissive post-conflict environment that can provide greater incentives for renewed violence (See Walter 1997,1999; Quinn et al 2007; Mason et al. 2011)

Consequently, the suggestions revolved around the conditions that can reduce their security fears and their incentives for remobilization such as drafting self-sustaining agreements, ameliorating the domestic conditions or establishing third-party enforcement mechanisms (See Mattes and Savun 2009; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Walter 2002, 2004; De Rouen et al 2010). However, these mechanisms are most of the time related to domestic factors and the role of third parties is limited to providing security guarantees (Karlen 2017).

While the previous literature on peace agreement implementation and conflict recurrence shed light on our understanding about the causes of commitment problems and potential ways to resolve them; what it failed to capture is that civil wars do not operate in a vacuum but surrounded by a wider regional and global environment (See Modelski 1964; Gleditsch 2007, 2009; Salehyan 2009; Jenne 2015). Previous research in other context has shown that external states intentionally and unintentionally help rebels in their pathways towards reaching their political aims by providing multifaceted support structures (Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed 2015; Regan 2014, Regan and Aydin 2006). In fact, even if the resources never materialize, just the mere anticipation of these resources can change rebel groups' violent behavior (Thyne 2009; Jenne 2004, 2007, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005). In this context, hostile neighbours, neighbours in civil wars or previous rebel supporters are found to be important determinants of conflict onset, duration, and recurrence because they are highly easy to connect and offer greater prospects for rebels to intensify in violence (see Salehyan 2007, 2009, Karlen 2017; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005). However, we still don't know how they affect the rebel groups' commitment to peace once they have signed the peace settlements and once they have decided to resolve their conflict peacefully.

To complement the earlier literature on peace agreement implementation, I propose to focus on the wider environment that the peace agreement takes place and investigate the role that the rebel groups' transnational linkages with external states might have on the probability of peace agreement implementation. I argue that even if rebel groups sign a peace treaty, their expectation to connect with their previous supporters, hostile neighbours, and neighbours in civil wars would contribute and exacerbate their commitment problems.

Based on the insights of the bargaining theories of war, most specially with the bargaining with the outside option principle, I argue that rebel groups' expectation to form transnational linkages with neighbouring countries such as the hostile states or those are in civil wars as well as with their previous hosts, would constitute an outside option in their bargaining with the government. Transnational linkages with hostile neighbours, neighbours in civil wars as well as their previous supporters would constitute an outside option because such states; are not only highly easy to connect, but also provide great prospects for rebels to reach their political aims by other means instead receiving them through peace processes (see Karlen 2017; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Salehyan 2007). I argue that given the challenges that the implementation period layout for rebels and the opportunities that such transnational connections may bring; rebels would be more likely to choose to rely upon these connections to achieve their aims through their connections with such actors rather than implement the peace agreement provisions. As such, I argue if the county is surrounded by hostile and civil war neighbouring states as well as rebels have been previously supported; peace agreements are less likely to be implemented in internal armed conflicts.

The paper has both theoretical and empirical contributions; theoretically, it positions the implementation of the peace agreements in a wider regional and global context and shows how rebel groups commitment problems may also exacerbate when this wider environment presents opportunities for remobilization. Moreover, to date, the role of hostile and civil war neighbours as well as the role of previous rebel supporters, have been tested in other contexts with other datasets (Salehyan 2007, 2009, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Karlen 2017). This literature suggested that such opportunities for mobilization would make the civil war onsets and their recurrence more likely, and increase their duration. As an empirical contribution, this paper, uses different datasets such as the COW Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett et al 2002) for neighbourhood, Non-Sate Armed Data to measure previous rebel support (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013), and the most recent version of the interstate rivalry data compiled by Thompson and Dreyer (2010). Results suggest that these opportunities for mobilization also influence peace agreement implementation. And if the regional and global environment in the post-settlement period layout such opportunities, peace agreements are significantly less likely to be implemented.

Paper also has a policy contribution, since it underlines the importance of regional conditions in altering the actors' incentives to renew the violence instead of implementing their previously agreed provisions, it suggests that any peace processes and third-party conflict resolution attempts should be preceded by the stabilization of the wider regional and global environment. Otherwise, even the best-designed peace settlements may not bear fruit and are bounded to collapse due to the neighbouring spill over effects, neighbouring state interventions or by the interference of actors who has a stake in the conflicts.

2. Unpacking the Post-Conflict Period: Implementation as a Bargaining Problem

Bargaining theories of war have been widely translated into civil war studies including the peace agreement implementation, durability as well as conflict recurrence literature (see Fearon 1998; Cetinyan 2002; Lake 2003; Walter 2002, 2009, 2010; Gent 2011; Werner 1999; Mattes and Savun 2009; Hartzell 2017). Accordingly, civil wars are conceptualized as non-cooperative bargaining processes where despite the very existence of peace agreements and the detrimental costs of the renewal of violence, the belligerents cannot implement the provisions because of their commitment problems (see Walter 2009; Fearon 1998, 2004; De Rouen et al 2010).

In this regard, the peace agreement implementation and conflict recurrence literature either explicitly or implicitly make emphasis on rebel groups' two distinct commitment problems that exist in the post-conflict bargaining. One is defensive, security-related, and refers to the rebel groups' reluctance to disarm due to the possibility of a government attack in the implementation period (Walter 1997; 2002). And the other one is offensive and refers to the rebel groups' willingness renege the treaty themselves due to their changing demands and ability (see Snyder and Jervis 1999; Svensson 2007; Quinn et al, 2007; Karlen 2017; Mason et al. 2011; Werner 1999; Werner and Yuen 2005).

Consequently, the suggestions for the implementation of peace agreements revolve around mechanisms that can reduce the security fears and prevent opportunities to renege the treaty which can be roughly classified under three strands. Those that are related to the content of peace agreements; to the domestic environment that the peace agreement takes place, and finally to the third-party enforcement mechanisms.

The first group of scholars make emphasis on the agreement design and argue that if the agreements contain fear-reducing and cost-increasing provisions, then, they are more likely to lead to implementation and durable peace (see Mattes and Savun 2011; Fortna 2003, 2004a Werner and Yuen 2005; Hartzel and Hoddie 2003). Accordingly, power-sharing agreements extend the durability of peace because they prevent one party to take the full control of the state² (see Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Hartzell 1999; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Hartzel and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2003, 2005). Yet, these findings have been contested on the basis that costly power-sharing arrangements can actually lead to delays, paradoxically end up increasing the security concerns, and make the sustainable peace more difficult to achieve (see DeRouen et al 2009; Mukherjee 2006; Rothchild and Roeder 2005:49; Snyder and Jervis 1999).

The second group of scholars argues that the environment that the peace agreement takes place matters as much as the content of the peace agreement itself. Because the environment can create security concerns or provide new incentives and opportunities for violence (see Walter and Snyder 1999; Walter 1999b; Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001; Mason et al. 2011). Not only weak and undemocratic states can lower the opportunity cost of rebellion but also peace building efforts require massive state infrastructure and commitment to democratic principles. (see Walter 2004, 2010; 2014; De Rouen et al. 2010; Quinn et al 2007; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Coellier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Taydas and Peksen 2007; Peksen, Taydas and Drury 2007; De Soto and Del Castillo 1994).

The third scholarly camp argues that no strategy is likely to work unless an outside state or an international organization is willing to provide implicit or explicit promises, or deployment of troops (Walter 1997, 1999). The guarantees of third-party states or peacekeeping operations (PKO) increase the duration and success of peace settlements because they reduce the belligerents'

security fears and increase the costs of potential violation³ (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Walter 2002; Fortna 2004b, 2004c, 2008; Quinn et al. 2007).

As should be evident from this review, the literature sees the peace agreement implementation as a two-actor bargaining process within which rebel groups suffer from both defensive and offensive commitment problems to the previously agreed provisions due to their changing relative balance of power in the post-conflict period. Yet the conditions that can mitigate these commitment problems, are most of the time related to domestic factors. And the role of international actors in this literature is only limited to providing security guarantees (Karlen 2017). Although the Large N quantitative literature on peace agreement implementation and conflict recurrence is growing, it currently has two shortcomings.

The first one is, although it is argued that the environment that the peace agreement takes place affects the rebel groups' commitment problems, hence the bargaining process, by providing them the resources to reignite the war (see Stedman 1997; Walter 2004, 2010, 2014; Mason et al 2011; Quinn et al 2007; Lounsbury and De Rouen 2016), this environment is limited to nation-state borders. Conflicts whether or not they are fought over ideological or ethnic lines are not confined within the borders of a single state but rather nested in a wider regional and global environment where civil war actors have various cross-border contracts that can affect their bargaining positions and the prospects of peace agreement implementation (see Jenne 2015; Modelski 1964; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008).

Second, states within this regional environment are not solely motivated with the intention of ending the conflicts or promoting the peace, but rather intentionally or unintentionally provide various opportunities and resources for rebel groups in their war-making efforts (see Salehyan

2009, 2011). In fact, states rarely deploy troops to provide security guarantees, but more often, intervene conflicts by providing resources for rebels (see Salehyan et al 2008). Because many states have a stake in the outcome of the conflicts (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006). Previous research in other contexts has shown that bad relations with neighbours, neighbours in civil war or previous rebel supporters can fuel the violence (Salehyan 2009; Salehyan et al 2008; Gleditsch 2007; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). However, the literature on peace agreement implementation seems to overlook this transnational dimension so far⁴.

3. Transnational Rebels and Peace Agreement Implementation in Civil Wars

Despite this background and following the concepts of bargaining theories of war, this paper argues that the bargaining process between the belligerents during the implementation phase of peace agreements is also conditional upon the regional and the global environment that the peace agreements take place. It argues that given the challenges of the implementation period for rebels if the regional and global context is permissive for rebel groups to find resources by linking themselves to their previous supporters, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil wars, this will negatively affect their behaviour towards implementation by exacerbating their commitment problems. Simply because these regional and global conditions would offer a more beneficial alternative to reach their political aims compared to receiving them through the implementation and face up costly consequences and dilemmas that the post-settlement period could bring.

As widely documented in other academic context, conflicts whether or not they are fought over domestic aims, exhibit significant transnational dimensions (Gleditsch 2007, 2009). Many rebel groups fighting in civil wars form various transnational linkages with state and non-state actors to receive resources in order to reach their political aims.

Among these transnational linkages, especially external states offer the greatest prospect in terms of providing rebel groups military and economic resources that they need in order to accomplish their aims. As such, they enable and support the rebel groups in their pathways towards achieving their political aims. External states can both intentionally and unintentionally provide support for rebels. While the rebel support can be the outcome of a careful foreign policy decision, it could also be the by-product of the external states' permissive domestic conditions.

External states when they intentionally support rebellions do so because they have a stake in the conflict outcome (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006). External states in order to affect conflict outcomes on their advantage use the rebel groups as proxies, as a foreign policy tool because it is less costly than the direct confrontation and using their own military forces. Moreover, while supporting rebels often made in secrecy, total military intervention often met with serious international and domestic criticism (Gartner 2008; Salehyan 2010). Even if they choose to do so, they can still support rebels to complement their own forces because rebels possess on the ground intelligence and have the support of the local population (Salehyan et al 2011).

In this context, especially the existence of hostile neighbours is found to be an important determinant of whether or not rebel group would receive external support during civil wars⁵ (Salehyan et al 2011; Davis and Moore 1997; Saideman 1997; 2002). Hostile neighbours support rebel groups in order to weaken and destabilize their adversaries (Byman 2005; Salehyan 2010) especially so when they are dissatisfied with the status quo and when they expect a low risk of retaliation (Maoz and San-Akca 2012). By delegating their war to rebel groups, hostile governments can increase their own position in the international system (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005), as well as gain leverage over their rivals' policies and territorial issues (Salehyan et al. 2011; Salehyan 2010).

Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) getting the support of neighbouring Liberia or rebels in Darfur receiving the assistance of Chad are no exception but rather the rule (see Salehyan et al 2011). Similarly, Kashmiri rebels are supported by Pakistan, the Syrian rebels by Turkey. Kurdish rebels that Turkey is at war with; were supported by the neighbouring Syria who would like to gain the upper hand on Turkey's monopoly on the water supplies over Tigris and Euphrates (Jongerden 2010)

Even if the rebel support is unintentional; rebels can still benefit from the permissive regional conditions especially so if the neighbouring countries experience civil war. Previous research in other context indicated a strong neighbourhood contagion effect⁶. (See Forsberg 2015; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Anselin and O'Loughlin 1992; Most and Starr 1980; Starr and Most 1983; Sambanis 2001; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Ward and Gleditsch 2002). And suggested that if countries are located in bad neighbourhoods where they are surrounded in close proximity of states that experience civil wars, they are more likely to experience civil conflict themselves (Brown 1996). Evidence regarding the conflicts in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo suggests that even one country experiencing civil war is enough to destabilize the entire region. Neighbouring countries experiencing civil war can affect the rebellions because they can unintentionally create an environment where the rebels can benefit from the increasing supply of weapons, cross-border sanctuaries, as well as from refugee flows and foreign fighters that moves beyond their homeland (Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). When a neighbouring country experiences civil war, rebels can buy weapons at cheaper prices, recruit soldiers among the refugee camps (UN 2007; UNHCR 2004). Moreover, since the existence of civil wars results with the collapse of the state institutions; the states experiencing civil wars cannot effectively monitor their international borders and as such, permit rebel groups to base their

operation from their territories. That's why they create a highly permissive environment for rebel activities and render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak infrastructure, monitoring mechanisms, or inefficient counterinsurgency practices (see Salehyan et al. 2008; Buhaug and Gates 2002).

Existing research has suggested that even if external support from such permissive regional and global context never materializes even the mere expectation is enough to change rebel groups' violent behaviour. The expectation to benefit from transnational linkages affect the rebel groups' calculations when choosing between a cooperative or a non-cooperative behaviour (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004). If rebel groups expect to be supported by an external state, then they are more likely to intensify in their demands and violence (Jenne 2007) and therefore, conflicts are more likely to reoccur (Karlen 2017; Fürstenberg 2012). And the anticipation of support change the bargaining dynamics because both the government and opposition adjust their bargaining position based on the possibility of outside support (see Thyne 2009; Cetinyan 2002; Jenne 2007:189). In this context, especially the existence of hostile neighbours, previous rebel supporters, and neighbours in civil wars signals the rebels a strong possibility of transnational connections and resources⁷ (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Karlen 2017 Salehyan 2007, 2009).

However, while expectation to benefit from support by forming transnational linkages can explain the rebel groups ability to return to fight, it does not explain by itself why rebel groups, despite signing a peace treaty in order to resolve their conflict peacefully, are willing to undertake another cycle of renewed violence and return to war, when the bargaining is the most efficient solution (see Fearon 1995). As such; the expectation of resources coming from transnational linkages with these countries does not by itself imply a causal relationship.

3.1 Transnational Linkages as an Outside Option for Rebels

I argue that in the context of civil war peace processes implementation, rebel groups' expectation to receive resources from external states, especially those they can receive from neighbouring countries or from their previous supporters would affect their commitment to their previously agreed provisions because of the context in which they found themselves in the post-settlement stage. And because of what these expectations represent at this particular stage.

As widely documented by the literature on peace agreement implementation; peace processes do not follow a linear path but experience regression where the belligerents often choose to return to violence. Peace settlements that are signed after years of negotiations are often subject to collapse and are followed by the renewal of hostilities (Tonge 2014). The literature has attributed this precarious character of the post-settlement period to the belligerents' commitment problems. As Svensson (2007), I suggest that the commitment problems are actually more problematic and severe for rebel groups.

Since civil wars are asymmetrical by nature on behalf of the governments, making peace settlements is much more advantageous for rebels than for governments. Because with the peace settlements, rebels are to gain opportunities and time whereas the governments are to relinquish power. With the peace settlements, rebels gain positions in the governmental and administrative posts, and time to rest, recuperate, and rearm in case of their defection. All of which would make them more powerful in case they ever choose to resort to violence. However as previous literature notes, when actors increase in power, they demand more (Werner 1999; Jenne 2007). As such, the peace settlements that were enough to stop the violence for a while may not be so; considering their new demands and their increased position to achieve these demands (Werner 1999).

Yet, while the rebel groups would feel more powerful to challenge the status quo for better outcomes right after the peace settlements, settlements also require their disarmament and demobilization in certain time period to receive all the concessions they have agreed on with the peace settlement. However, as noted by Walter (1997, 2002) demobilization and disarmament open avenues for government exploitation. Because if the government decide to renege on its promises and attack; the rebels lose their ability to enforce the agreement provisions and penalize the government. After all, the rebel groups' ability to mount an effective challenge was the primary reason why the government granted the concessions. In this regard, demobilization and disarmament would give the perfect opportunity to governments who could not succeed in getting a one-sided decisive victory previously. As such, in the period right after the peace settlements, rebel groups are faced up with a dilemma: (1) they can choose to implement the peace agreement provisions and demobilize and disarm to receive all the benefits they have agreed on with the settlement. However, this would make them more vulnerable to government's potential defection. (2) Alternatively, they may choose not to implement and renew the violence because in any case they have gained time, more opportunities to challenge the government. And they already know that the more they challenge the more concessions they would receive (see also Bapat 2007). While in this changing context of the post-settlement phase the best option for rebels would already be the renewal of the violence, the anticipation of transnational opportunities would further complicate the picture by acting as an outside option, an alternative option to pursue outside the main bargaining setting with the government. And consequently, they would fundamentally alter the bargaining dynamics between the government and the rebels by making the implementation a less beneficial alternative. Simply because the transnational linkages would make the renewal of violence a less costly and thus more advantageous.

In the framework of the bargaining theory, the concept of the outside option refers to the availability of alternatives one actor may have outside the main bargaining framework. The outside option available to one of the parties changes the bargaining dynamics because while it pulls the actor who lacks this option towards giving more concessions by increasing its cost of disagreement, it gives a choice to the actor who owns this option. The actor who has the outside option would have a choice in that matter on whether or not to stay in the bargaining or to pursue its aims by relying on its outside option. As such, the actor who has the outside option would stick to its outside option unless the conditions in the bargaining exceed the payoffs of the outside option.

I argue that if the rebels have been previously supported, or the country in question have a rival neighbour, or a neighbour in civil war that would signal the rebels they have a better opportunity. Previous research suggests that such external countries are not only the easiest to connect but also offer great prospects for rebels to accomplish their political aims instead of receiving them through the peace process. If the rebels have been previously supported and even if that's no longer the case, previous support structures remain in place (Karlen 2017). Similarly, hostile neighbours are willing to offer their help to rebel for their own stake with the country in question. Civil war neighbours on the other hand, since they cannot monitor their borders, permit cross-border passages and enable rebels to base their operations from their territories as well as provide refugee flows to recruit among.

From the government side, since peace settlements already increase rebel power, in the post-settlement phase unless the demobilization would take place, the governments would be sticking with the agreements. Moreover, the availability of such opportunities for rebels would further make the implementation for the government side more attractive because it's much harder

to oppress a rebel group with such opportunities than repressing groups without such linkages (Gleditsch 2007).

As such in the period right after the peace settlements; the commitment problems would come from the rebels. Since having another alternative to pursue their aims would give them the power to walk away in unfavourable conditions and they would not remain in the bargaining unless the expected payoffs of the bargaining exceed that of their outside option, in the post-settlement implementation phase, any transnational linkages they expect to form with such states would exacerbate their commitment problems. Because such anticipation would make the renewal of violence even much attractive than the challenges of the implementation. As such, in the presence of permissive regional and global environment where the country in question is surrounded by a hostile state or a state in civil war or the rebels have been previously supported, the implementation of peace agreements would be harder (Salehyan 2009). As noted by Licklider (1995) if the parties can retain the capacity to continue to wage the conflict; the conflict erupts among former enemies. Since the existence of previous supporters, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil war would give opportunities to rebels, I argue that in the presence of such permissive regional and global conditions, the peace agreements would be less likely to be implemented.

H1: *Peace agreements are less likely to be implemented if the rebels have been supported previously*

H2: *Peace Agreements are less likely to be implemented if the conflict country is surrounded by hostile neighbours*

H3: *Peace Agreements are less likely to be implemented if the conflict country is surrounded by neighbours in civil war*

4. Research Design and Data

In order to test the proposed hypotheses, dataset covering all peace agreements signed following an intrastate conflict between 1975-2011 is constructed. Civil war, armed conflicts, internal armed conflicts, intrastate conflicts, and intrastate wars are used interchangeably and are defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (see UCDP database). To identify the peace agreements that are the primary units of analysis of this study, I relied on UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset 2.0 (Hogbladh 2011) that provides information on the contents, signatories, third parties, and the implementation of all peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011.

Following the UCDP definition, I define a peace agreement as “a formal agreement between warring parties, which addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility” (UCDP database). To date, UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset is the most comprehensive dataset regarding content and the time coverage of peace agreements, it also includes both intrastate and interstate peace agreement. Since the focus of this study is the peace agreement implementation in internal armed conflicts, peace agreements that are signed between sovereign states have been deducted from the dataset. The resulting dataset covers 196 peace agreements signed in 52 conflicts and in 45 countries (for the complete list of peace agreements, see Paper 2 Appendix 1A at the end of thesis)

Following earlier studies in the field; 196 agreements that constitute my full sample include all full peace agreements (% 29), partial peace agreements (% 51), and peace process agreements (% 20) signed to end the violence and to resolve the incompatibilities related to civil wars (see De Rouen et al 2009; Lonsbery and De Rouen 2016). A peace agreement can be signed between the government and multiple rebel groups fighting with the government (involving several dyads) or alternatively between the government and only one of the rebel groups (one dyad). *Full peace agreements* refer to an “agreement where one or several dyads agree to settle the whole incompatibility. A *partial peace agreement* is an agreement where one or several dyads agree to settle a part of the incompatibility. A *peace process agreement* is an agreement where one or several dyads agree to initiate a process that aims to settle the incompatibility” (UCDP database).

However, process agreements can be said to be inherently different from the full and partial agreements to the extent that they only outline a process rather than settle at least some of the incompatibilities regarding the conflict. To account for this potential deficiency, following other studies in my field (see Nilsson 2007; De Rouen and Chowdhury 2018) as first robustness, some of the models in the paper (5-7) test the proposed hypotheses in a restricted subsample that excludes the process agreements. This exclusion drops the number of overall cross-sectional observations to 157 peace agreements consisting of full peace agreements (%36) and partial peace agreements (%64) that are signed in 42 countries with the aim of settling 46 conflicts. Since the dependent variable is the implementation of peace settlements (dichotomously coded) in civil wars and the main dataset is cross-sectional, I estimated a series of cross-sectional logistic regression models. These models assess the probability of a peace agreement implementation after the civil war belligerents have signed it. All models include country-level robust standard errors to account for lack of independence between various peace agreements within countries

4.1 Dependent Variable

The main dependent variable used in this study is the *implementation* of an intrastate peace agreement. Implementation variable is a binary variable taken from the “ended” variable of Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreements Dataset compiled by Högladh (2011). Implementation of the peace agreements refers to a process which both former parties abide by the agreed peace treaty provisions and carry out their duties according to the previously agreed time frame (Stedman 2002). An intrastate peace agreement is coded as implemented, hence as 1, if former combatants did not question or contest the validity of the agreement, did implement provisions, are still keeping to be a part of the agreement. Consequently, implementation is coded as 0 if at least one of the primary parties withdrew from the agreement and is no longer part of it. Among 196 peace agreements in the full sample covering full, partial process agreements, 131 of them have been implemented, consisting % 66.83 percent of the whole dataset. Among 157 peace agreements in the restricted subsample covering only full and partial agreements, 107 of them, consisting %68.1 of the dataset have been implemented showing that implementation is not necessarily rare. And the implementation of process agreements is no less likely compared to the full and the partial agreements (to see which peace agreements have been implemented, see Paper 2 Appendix 1A at the end of the thesis)

4.2 Main Independent Variables

The first hypothesis of this paper states that peace agreements are less likely to be implemented if rebel groups who signed the agreement have received external assistance from an external state prior to signing the agreement. To operationalize previous external support, I have constructed a binary “Rebel Support” variable operationalized from the Non-State Armed Dataset (hereafter NSA) (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013). The External Support variable is coded as 1

if at least one of the rebels in the conflict has received an external assistance in the previous years before signing the agreement. Overall among 196 peace agreements consisting of the full sample %78 of them included at least one rebel groups that received external assistance before the agreement takes place. This percentage is %77 for the subsample consisting of 157 full and partial peace agreements.

Since the second and the third hypotheses predict the role of hostile neighbours and the neighbours in civil war, to identify the neighbouring countries surrounding the country in conflict, I have relied on the Correlates of War (COW) Direct Contiguity Data 3.2 (Stinnett et al 2002). Based on the distance between states in the international system between 1816 and 2016, COW Direct Contiguity Data identifies five different contiguity types between neighbours that are strictly not interrupted by any territory of a third state. These categories are as follows:

- (1) Land or river border: refers to the intersection of borders either by land or a river
- (2) 12 miles of water or less:
- (3) 24 miles of water but more than 12 miles
- (4) 150 miles of water but more than 24 miles
- (5) 400 miles of water but more than 150 miles

Since my hypotheses are related to the war-making opportunities that rebel groups anticipate from hostile and civil war neighbours; distance constitutes an important factor that determines their anticipation of benefiting from such resources. As such the main models in the paper (1-7) that test the proposed hypotheses both in the full sample and in the restricted sample identify neighbouring countries as “having strict land contiguity with the country in the conflict, whose territories are not interrupted by a third country and separated at most with a river”

Hence the models presented in the paper table 1, use the first category of the COW Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett et al 2002) as the neighbourhood definition.

However, as an additional robustness, I have also run the same models (1-7), both on the full and the restricted sample by taking the neighbourhood distance as 150 miles in the models presented in the Paper 2 Appendix 2B (for alternative model specifications, see Paper 2 Appendix 2B at the end of the thesis). As such, the neighbouring countries are defined as countries “that are surrounding the county in question within at most 150 miles of water distance and whose territories are not interrupted by the territory of a third country” Hence, models presented in the appendix 2B use the first four categories of the COW Direct Contiguity Data. The 150-mile distance for alternative models is chosen on the basis that it consists of the maximum distance that a sailing ship can travel in one day.

After identifying the neighbours, to define the hostile ones, I rely on the most recent version of the Thompson and Dreyer Interstate Rivalry Dataset (2010) that identifies the rival dyads and the years of the rivalry among international sovereign states between 1816 and 2010⁸. From this dataset, I have created a binary Hostile Neighbour variable that is coded as 1 if the country in question had at least one neighbour that it has a rivalry with on the year of the agreement. Among 45 countries that signed full, partial and process agreements, %44 of them had at least one hostile neighbour on the year of the peace agreement. This number is %45 for 42 countries in the subsample.

The third hypothesis predicts that neighbours in civil war can also contribute to rebel groups anticipation of resources. Not only the countries’ security systems collapse when experiencing civil war and this gives opportunities for the neighbouring rebels to easily conduct

their operation, but also civil wars have contagion effects, they create permissive environments for the transfer of weapons, refugees that the rebels may need in the war-making efforts. For identifying the civil war neighbours, I have relied on the UCDP / PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen 2012) and constructed a dummy Neighbours in Civil War variable. Consequently, a country is coded as having a neighbour in civil war, if at least one of its neighbours was at civil war during the year of the agreement. Among 45 countries in the full sample, %80 of them had at least one neighbour in civil war, this number is %78 for the 42 countries in the subsample. Neighbour is coded as having a civil war regardless of interim years of non-violence.

4.3 Controls

I control for the variables that previous literature has shown to affect the implementation and reoccurrence of conflicts that can act as potential confounders. I classify those relating to the attributes of the previous conflict, attributes of the country, agreement content as well as enforcement mechanisms. Among the attributes of the previous civil war. I control for the duration, intensity, incompatibility, and the relative power balances in civil war. Longer conflicts and conflicts that resulted with a higher number of battle deaths can result with a higher level of grievances and enduring rivalries that can result in feelings of insecurity and mistrust. This can result with non-implementation but instead resumption of violence (see. Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Walter 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Dubey 2002; Fortna 2004a; Quinn et al. 2007) Alternatively; as a competing mechanism; high number of battle-related deaths and long wars can also have a positive impact on implementation because they can minimize rebel groups' willingness and ability to remobilize and challenge the status quo by revealing the necessary

information about how costly the renewed violence can be (Mason and Quinn 2004; Quinn et al. 2007; Mason et al. 2011; Karlen 2011) .

To measure the conflict intensity, I have relied on the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset Version 3.1 (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) and constructed *ln Battle Deaths* variable measuring the log of the actual number of battle-deaths generated in the conflict prior to the agreement. For conflict duration, I have used UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012) and created numeric *ln Duration* variable that captures the log of time elapsed (in years) from the beginning of the conflict until the agreement year. Since both the duration and number of battle-related deaths are highly skewed, both variables have been logged. Similarly, the rebel strength can also be related to the implementation of peace agreements, rebel groups that have capacity to renew violence at the end can find non-implementation as a much beneficial alternative (see Lounsbery and De Rouen 2016). To control for rebel strength vis a vis the government, I have included an ordinal *Rebel Strength* variable consisting of much weaker, weaker, parity, stronger, and much stronger categories. It is taken from the NSA dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013)

Many studies highlighted that conflicts that are fought over secessionist or territorial causes can be more intractable to resolve, as such, peace agreements maybe less likely to be implemented in such conflicts (Collier et al. 2003; Kreutz 2010; Walter 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Kaufmann, 1996; Licklider 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Werner 1999; Diehl and Goertz 1988). For secessionist conflicts, I have relied on Kreutz (2010) who extended the data provided by Walter (2004). To control for territorial conflicts, I have relied on UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér & Wallensteen 2012) and included a dummy *Territorial* variable. *Secessionist conflict* variable replaces the territorial variable in alternative

models reported in the appendix. Again, as an additional robustness test, I divided my samples (both the full and subsample of peace agreements) over territorial/ non-territorial conflicts, results don't change substantially (for alternative models, see Paper 2 Appendix 2A-2B-2C at the end of the thesis).

Previous literature on peace agreements has also shown that power-sharing provisions and peacekeeping operations (hereafter PKO) can have a positive effect the actors' willingness to implement their peace agreements (Mattes and Savun 2011; Fortna 2003, 2004a Werner and Yuen 2005; Hartzel and Hoddie 2003). To measure whether or not the agreement included provisions regarding the deployment of PKO, I use a composite dummy variable PKO from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011). However, note that this variable relates to the agreement provision and not to the actual deployment of troops as the belligerents may renounce these provisions later on and as a result, the post-agreement period may not include any peacekeeping operations. To control for the power-sharing arrangements; following the definition offered by De Rouen et al (2009), I have created a composite dummy power-sharing variable that includes all kinds of power-sharing arrangements that is coded as 1 if the agreement stipulated at least one of the following categories:

- (1) Rebel military integration to the army (Military PS)
- (2) Provisions for extensive power-sharing in the new government (Political PS)
- (3) Legislative, executive and fiscal powers over a particular territory (Territorial PS)

As an additional control for the agreement contents, I have created three dummy variables; military provisions, political provisions and territorial provisions. An agreement is coded as having military provisions if it included any of the DDR, integration to the Army, withdrawal of foreign forces, or ceasefire. A peace agreement is coded as having territorial provisions if it included any

of the autonomy, federalism, independence, referendum local government, border demarcation, cultural freedom, regional development, or local power sharing. And a peace agreement is coded as having political provisions if it included clauses regarding rebel integration to government, civil service, interim government, elections, national talks, or power-sharing in the government. Dummy variables regarding agreement provisions replace the power-sharing variable in the alternative models (see Paper 2 Appendix 2A, 2B). All variables regarding the agreement contents are from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011).

In addition to the nature of previous conflict and the agreement content, previous literature has also suggested that the country characteristics such as the state capacity and regime type can be important determinants of post-settlement peace (De Rouen et al 2009; Walter 2004, 2010; 2014; De Rouen et al 2010; Quinn et al 2007). Implementation of the peace treaty provisions would be difficult for undemocratic states and states with a low level of economic development because implementation would require adequate infrastructure, resources, and established, and functioning institutions. Moreover, lack of economic opportunities and democracy would also create new grievances and in addition, lower the opportunity cost for joining the rebel ranks (see Gurr 2000; Hegre et al 2001; Elbadawi Sambanis 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Walter 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009; Sambanis 2004).

To control for the effect of state capacity, I have added In GDP pc variable from the Expanded Trade and GDP Dataset (Gleditsch 2002a) that measures the log of the GDP per capita of the country. To control for the effect of democracy on the peace agreement implementation, I have used two measures that replace each other in alternative models; one is the dummy Democracy variable and the other one is the dummy Anocracy variable. Both are operationalized from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2002). Polity IV Project codes countries'

polity2 scores from a scale ranging from -10 to + 10. Following earlier studies (see Regan 2010), Democracy is coded as 1 if the country's polity2 score is greater than or equal to 6 and coded as 0 if otherwise. Previous studies have also suggested that regime type follow an inverted U shape effect on civil conflict onset. Anocratic regimes, defined as partly democratic or partly authoritarian being more susceptible to conflict (Hegre et al 2001). Following Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) and Gurses (2015), Anocracy is coded as 1 if a country's polity level ranges between -6 and 6 and 0 if otherwise.

Similarly, the population can also be an important determinant whether or not a peace agreement would be implemented since countries that have larger populations face a higher risk of civil war onset (see Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre Raleigh 2006). Larger countries can also present more pool of human resources to recruit among for rebels. To control for countries with larger population, I have added a \ln Population variable measuring the log of the actual number of the population on the year of the agreement, it is taken from the Expanded Trade and GDP Dataset (Gleditsch 2002a) And lastly, since previous peace agreements can also create a learning effect and the belligerents can learn from their past mistakes, I have added a dummy Previous Agreement variable measuring the existence of former peace agreements.

Since the point of interest of this study is the post-agreement implementation, following earlier studies (see De Rouen et al 2009), for all the independent variables used in this study (except the rebel support variable that measure the existence of past support), I have taken the value of the peace agreement year and not their lagged value (t-1). (For the complete list of independent variables used in the full and the restricted subsample see Paper 2 Appendix 1B and 1C at the end of this thesis)

5. Results and Robustness

Table 1 shows the logistic regression results of peace settlement implementation in the presence of rebel support prior to the peace agreement takes place, hostile neighbours, and neighbours in civil war on the year of the peace agreement. Model 1 is the base model that tests the effect of control variables on the full sample, Model 2-4 test the three proposed hypotheses in the full sample of 197 peace agreements that include full, partial, and peace process agreements. As a first robustness test, Models 5 to 7 test the same proposed hypotheses on the restricted sample of 157 peace agreements covering only the full and partial agreements. In the tables presented in the Appendix 2A, 2B, 2C, I also run three different robustness checks. First, I have tested the same models (1-7) with different control variables and then second, I have tested the same models (1-7) by extending the neighbourhood distance to 150 miles thus including more neighbours. As a final robustness, I run the same models with non-territorial conflicts to see whether or not types of conflict makes a difference. The results don't change substantially. (See Appendix 2A, Appendix 2B, and Appendix 2C at the end of the thesis)

My results are highly similar to the previous literature. The first model in Table 1 is the base model that includes only the control variables. The results indicate that larger populations have a significant and negative effect on the implementation of peace agreements. As noted by Walter (2010), this may be due to the fact that larger populations present more opportunity for rebel organizations to recruit among as well as its harder for countries with a larger population to police its own territories making renewed violence for rebels a less costly alternative. The duration of the previous conflict is significant and positive also confirming the cost of war argument. When the previous conflict was longer that indicates that returning to the war for rebels would be more difficult and renewed violence may not be such a beneficial alternative (Quinn et al 2007).

TABLE 1: Peace Agreement Implementation in Internal Armed Conflicts // Neighbourhood Distance Strict Contiguity by Land or River

	Model 1 (Full Model)	Model 2 (Full Model)	Model 3 (Full Model)	Model 4 (Full Model)	Model 5 (Restricted)	Model 6 (Restricted)	Model 7 (Restricted)
Previous Agreement	0.270 (0.43)	0.248 (0.44)	0.086 (0.47)	0.220 (0.47)	0.067 (0.66)	-0.405 (0.67)	-0.429 (0.73)
PKO	0.052 (0.47)	0.239 (0.52)	0.013 (0.56)	0.100 (0.59)	0.001 (0.61)	-0.296 (0.66)	-0.326 (0.72)
Powersharing	-0.255 (0.41)	-0.453 (0.46)	-0.469 (0.51)	-0.295 (0.52)	-0.471 (0.55)	-0.448 (0.62)	-0.307 (0.68)
Rebel Strength	-1.072*** (0.25)	-1.120*** (0.24)	-1.227*** (0.29)	-1.255*** (0.29)	-1.170*** (0.25)	-1.212*** (0.29)	-1.156*** (0.26)
Territorial Conflict	-0.307 (0.88)	-0.008 (0.83)	0.335 (1.06)	0.464 (1.10)	0.504 (0.93)	1.176 (1.22)	1.386 (1.20)
ln GDP pc	-0.083 (0.23)	-0.111 (0.23)	-0.165 (0.23)	-0.157 (0.23)	-0.131 (0.26)	-0.230 (0.29)	-0.280 (0.30)
Democracy	0.188 (0.71)	-0.012 (0.64)	-0.273 (0.63)	-0.492 (0.62)	-0.076 (0.80)	-0.371 (0.89)	-0.793 (0.98)
ln Population	-0.332* (0.20)	-0.447** (0.21)	-0.388* (0.23)	-0.571** (0.26)	-0.531* (0.28)	-0.562 (0.34)	-0.857** (0.42)
ln Battle Deaths	-0.346* (0.19)	-0.231 (0.19)	-0.133 (0.21)	-0.155 (0.22)	-0.119 (0.19)	0.004 (0.21)	-0.042 (0.21)
ln Duration	1.059*** (0.36)	1.478*** (0.38)	1.491*** (0.40)	1.594*** (0.43)	1.625*** (0.42)	1.817*** (0.49)	2.036*** (0.57)
Rebel Support		-1.809** (0.75)	-1.586* (0.86)	-2.205** (0.95)	-2.452*** (0.88)	-2.764** (1.20)	-3.731*** (1.39)
Hostile Neighbour			-0.866** (0.44)			-1.013** (0.45)	
Neighbour in Civil War				-1.578** (0.74)			-2.292* (1.29)
Constant	7.577*** (2.79)	8.314*** (2.83)	8.043** (3.18)	10.975*** (3.60)	8.721** (3.39)	9.419** (4.08)	14.593*** (5.20)
AIC	213.6608	203.6281	195.3142	192.7608	158.0708	150.5054	148.7189
BIC	249.6638	242.8424	237.2489	234.6955	194.5919	189.6437	187.8572
Correctly Classified	(%76)	(%79)	(%79)	(%80)	(%81)	(%81)	(%83)
N	195	194	186	186	155	150	150

Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Moreover, conflicts that generated a higher number of battle-related deaths seem to be more intractable since peace agreements signed in these conflicts are less likely to be implemented, presumably because deadlier conflicts lead to more hatred, accumulated grievances and create psychophysiological barriers (Hartzell and Hoodie 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Previous agreement, Territorial conflicts, PKO; Gdp pc and Democracy seem to be unrelated to the implementation of the peace agreements as their estimates are no different from 0. These results are also similar to the previous literature that studied post-conflict peace and used peace agreements as a unit of analysis (see De Rouen et al 2009; De Rouen and Chowdhury 2018; Lounsbery and De Rouen 2016). Also, note that PKO relates to the agreement content and not the actual troop deployment. Power-sharing also seems to have no influence. To date, there is no consensus in the literature on the effect of power-sharing provisions. While some scholars find that more power-sharing arrangements would extend the duration of settlement (Hartzell 1999), some others found that only the military and territorial ones have a positive impact and political ones either having negative or no impact (see Glassmayer and Sambanis 2008; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005; De Rouen et al 2009). Hence, my findings may be due to using a composite indicator rather than disaggregated measures for each type of power-sharing arrangements. And lastly, rebel strength has a significant and negative impact in the implementation of the peace settlement. This is said, even if the peace agreements are signed between the governments and rebel groups when the rebel groups possess the ability to renege the war, the agreements are less likely to be implemented. This confirms the earlier findings by Lounsbery and De Rouen (2016). And although rebel strength is not the main variable of interest, this is a highly important finding considering that the stronger rebels are also more also likely to reach a peace settlement⁹ (Clayton 2013, Hulquist 2013, Zartman 2001). So, the effect of the rebel

strength changes in different stages of peace processes, positive on the settlement and negative on the implementation. This suggests that peace settlement and settlement implementation have inherently different bargaining dynamics¹⁰.

Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 introduce the three main variables of interest in a full sample of 196 peace agreements. The coefficients of control variables don't change substantially with the introduction of rebel support, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil war variables that indicate the possibility of transnational opportunities for rebel groups. Except that the Battle Related Deaths variable is no longer significant. This suggests that the effect of the number of battle-related deaths on the peace settlement implementation may be party conditional upon the existence of rebel previous support, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil war. Hence rebel groups' future expectation of transnational opportunities from such constituencies.

Model 2 introduces the first variable regarding the transnational opportunities, it tests the effect of the Rebel Support Variable measuring the existence of previous rebel support prior to the peace agreements. The model indicates that peace agreements are less likely to be implemented if at least one of the rebel groups received external assistance from a state before the peace agreement takes place, p -value < 0.05 . Since the variable Rebel Support measures the existence of past support structure and not the current one, this confirms the anticipation argument. When the rebel groups had a previous external supporter in the years prior to the peace agreement; they are less likely to implement their agreement compared to the rebels that previously lack this assistance. When rebels have been previously supported they anticipate future resources coming from their past supporters. In other words, they do not implement their agreement because they believe they can easily reconnect with their previous support structures and as such, they find the renewal of violence would be less costly for them compared to other groups that lack such opportunities.

My result is also compatible with Karlen (2017) paper. Although Karlen (2017) paper was looking at conflict recurrence and not the peace agreement implementation and used a different dataset and as a unit of analysis; it argued that previous support structures would be an important determinant in whether or not belligerents would choose to return to war. My results further reinforce this argument and suggest that this is the case even if the belligerents have actually signed a peace agreement.

Model 3 introduces the Hostile Neighbour Variable. Confirming the expectation, the coefficient of Hostile Neighbour is negative and significantly different than zero with a p -value < 0.05 . The results of Model 3 indicate that in the presence of hostile neighbouring countries, the peace agreements are less likely to be implemented. Given that the coefficient of rebel strength does not change with the introduction of hostile neighbours, results suggest that not because hostile neighbours necessarily contribute to rebels' ability to wage a war in quantifiable terms but because of the rebel expectation of their future support that non-implementation of peace agreements takes place in internal armed conflict. This result further reinforces the anticipation argument. Model 4 introduces the Neighbours in Civil War Variable whose coefficient is negative and significant with a p -value < 0.05 . Results suggest that similar to the existence of hostile neighbours, neighbours of civil war also affect the rebels' expectation of transnational opportunities hence their willingness to renew the violence. When the neighbouring countries experience civil wars, this gives the possibility to rebels to use their territories as their base, recruit among mention the refugee flows and benefit from the supply of weapons. The results confirm the proposed theory and consequently, neighbouring countries in civil war decrease the probability of peace agreement implementation. The expectation to benefit from the opportunities that neighbouring countries in civil war present; make the peace implementation less likely.

Models from 5 to 7 tests the effect of the main variables of interests; the previous rebel support, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil war in the subsample of 157 peace agreements that covers only the full and partial peace agreements. The results of the restricted subsample mimic the full sample in terms of the controls and as well as the main variables of interests. The Model 5, similar to the Model 2 tests the effect of previous Rebel Support whose coefficient is negative and significant, p-value is <0.05 . Model 6 tests the effect of Hostile Neighbours. The effect and sign of the Hostile Neighbours are similar to model 3; it is negative and significant with a p-value <0.05 . Model 7 tests the effect of Neighbours in civil war and even if the effect weakens $p < 0.1$, still the results show that neighbours in civil wars negatively affect the probability to peace agreement implementation in civil wars. Hence the results indicate that transnational opportunities that rebel groups expect from their previous supporters, hostile neighbours, and neighbours in civil war significantly and negatively affect their decision of whether or not honouring their peace agreements.

Table 1 also includes each models' Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistics as well as the percentage of correct classification. Since logistic regression models cannot be compared based on their R^2 as linear models, AIC and BIC statistics are commonly used to compare the fit of the logistic models with different number of parameters (Hosmer et al 2013:120). Results indicate that models that include the main variables of interests; the previous Rebel support, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil wars have lower values of AIC and BIC statistics as such, they are more likely to be the true model in explaining the implementation of peace agreements in internal armed conflicts. Given the correct classification rates in Table 1; models that include the main variables of interest also better predict the outcome in the data. While the correct prediction rate rose to %79 to %80 for the models using

the full sample, this number rose to %81 to % 83 for the subsample that includes the full and partial agreements. Since Logistic Regression models are also non-linear, the model coefficients are also hard to interpret. As such, the most direct and practical approach to measure the effect of each independent variable is to calculate the discrete change especially when the variables are dichotomously coded¹¹. Discrete change refers to change in the probability of an event given the increase in the main independent variable from $x=0$ to $x=1$ while other variables remain unchanged. Another useful way to interpret the effect of independent variables in non-linear models is to calculate the percentage change in the odds of an event (settlement implementation) with the introduction of the main variables of interest.

The Table 2 below shows the discrete change in the probability of settlement, along with their %95 confidence interval (All covariates are set to their means) as well as the percentage change in the odds of settlement with the introduction of the main variables of interest for the models (1-7) presented in Table 1.

Table 2: Discrete and Odds Change of Peace Agreement Implementation for Models Presented in Table 1

Models 1- 4 Full Sample of 196 Agreements (Full, Partial, Process)
 Models 5-7 Restricted Sample of 157 Agreements (Full, Partial)

		Discrete Change (0-1)	Discrete Change %95 Confidence Interval	Odds Change (%)
Model (2)	Rebel Support	- 0.28	[-0.46 , -0.11]	- % 84
Model (3)	Hostile NB	- 0.17	[-0.33 , -0.01]	- % 58
Model (4)	NB in Civil War	- 0.23	[-0.38 , -0.07]	- % 79
Model (5)	Rebel Support	- 0.33	[-0.50 , -0.15]	- % 91
Model (6)	Hostile NB	- 0.18	[-0.33 , -0.04]	- % 64
Model (7)	NB in Civil War	- 0.23	[-0.39 , -0.07]	- % 90

Discrete change calculated using `prchange` and `prvalue` commands in Stata. All covariates are set to their means
 Odds change calculated with `listcoef`, `percent` command in Stata

Table 2 indicates that; if at least one of the rebel groups that signed the peace agreement has been previously supported by an external state, that decreases the probability of peace agreement implementation by -0.28 for in the full sample that includes full partial and process agreements. This number is -0.33 for the subsample that includes only full and partial agreements. In the presence of previous rebel support, the odds of settlement implementation decrease by - % 84 for the full sample and - % 91 for the subsample holding all variables constant. When the country, that the peace agreements take place is surrounded by hostile neighbours, the probability of peace agreement implementation decreases by -0.17 for the full sample, and - 0.18 for the subsample. The odds of settlement implementation, on the other hand, decreases by - % 58 for the full sample and - %64 for the subsample. And lastly, if the country where the peace agreement takes place has at least one neighbour in civil war, the peace agreement implementation decreases by – 0.23 both for the full and the subsample. The odds of implementation in the presence of neighbours in civil war decrease by -% 79 for the subsample and - %90 for the subsample.

Results show that, not only on the onset or duration of the conflicts, but also in the post-agreement period that the transnational dynamics are important determinants in terms of affecting the rebel groups' violent behaviour. In the post-conflict period, transnational expectations change the rebels' decision on whether or not to honour their previously signed peace agreements. My findings imply that even if the support never actually materializes or doesn't contribute to their material strength, their anticipation leads them to renew the violence. Since the post-conflict peace agreement implementation period layout significant challenges for rebel groups in terms of defensive and offensive commitment problems; the groups that expect transnational opportunities find the renewal of conflict less costly and more advantageous than implementing the terms of the agreements.

7. Conclusion

While the negotiated settlements are the most desirable outcome in civil wars, they often break down and the implementation of the majority of peace agreements never fully materializes (Murshed, 2002; Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008; Walter 1997). More often than not, after long years of negotiations and renegotiations, the combatants finally reach a settlement, only to return to violence after what can be called a “short break of peace spell” (see Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001). The academic literature so far has suggested many policy recommendations on how to achieve peace agreement implementation in civil wars and avoid detrimental consequences. Scholars have explained the post-war durability of peace by looking at three different aspects of the peace processes: (1) the content of the peace agreements, (2) the capacity of the state to implement the content of the peace agreements, and lastly (3) the role that third parties play during the peace agreement implementation stage.

While large majority of these suggestions are related to domestic factors and the role of third parties are limited to providing security guarantees; research in other context show that third-party states rarely deploy peacekeepers or provide security guarantees but on the contrary, they are more likely support rebel groups because they have a stake in the conflict outcome. In fact, even if external states do not intentionally provide resources they can still help the rebels in their rebellion unintentionally if they are experiencing civil wars. Previous literature suggested that in the presence of hostile neighbours, neighbours in civil war as well as in cases where the rebel groups have been previously supported by an external state, civil wars are more likely to start, recur as well as would have longer durations. However, to date we didn't how they affect the belligerents' commitment problems once the belligerents signed a peace treaty and decided to resolve their conflict peacefully.

Despite this background, this paper analysed 196 civil war peace agreements signed following an intrastate war and investigated how hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil wars as well as the existence of previous rebel support structures affect the probability of peace agreement implementation. Paper argued that given the challenges that the implementation period present for the rebels, the availability of support structures that they can easily connect would constitute an outside option in their bargaining with the government. Consequently, it argued that the rebels' ability to have another option would pull the government side in towards sticking to its concessions by increasing the cost of disagreement. However, in this case, the rebels' commitment problem would be exacerbated. Because unlike the peace settlements that bring them opportunities; implementation period brings them challenges. As such in the presence of transnational linkages peace agreements would be less likely to be implemented because the expected value of their outside option would be greater than the expected value of peace agreement implementation.

The research has both theoretical and empirical contribution. As a theoretical contribution, while the influence of previous hosts as well as civil war neighbours and rival neighbours have been tested in other contexts; the implementation literature was treating the post-settlement period as if it was disconnected from a broader regional and global dimension, this paper aimed at challenging this closed polity approach by looking at the post-settlement period and the actors' willingness to implement their provisions in a wider perspective. Moreover, the researchers that studied the influence of previous hosts as well as civil war neighbours and rival neighbours have used different datasets. For instance; the seminal paper by Salehyan (2007) relies on the Minimum Distance Dataset and use 100 km as a neighbourhood distance as well as rely on the Thompson Data for the hostility variable. My sample of universe was slightly different from Salehyan (2007)

paper in a sense that it did use the COW direct Contiguity Data and took two different measures for neighbourhood distance; the first one as reported in the paper was the land contiguity and the second one as reported in the Appendix looks at 150 miles' distance. Moreover, I also rely on the recent version of the Rivalry Data. Similarly, the paper from Karlen (2017) although it looks at conflict recurrence and not the settlements, has studied the effect of previous external supporters by testing their effect on the UCDP external Support Dataset. Here I opt out to use NSA data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013).

Results indicate that existence of previous hosts as well as civil war neighbours and rival neighbours not only negatively affect the conflict dynamics on the onset or recurrence (Karlen 2017; Salehyan 2009) but also once the belligerents have decided to resolve their incompatibilities peacefully. Results are robust across samples of different types of peace agreements, across samples of different types of conflicts, different control variables as well as when extending the neighbourhood distance. (See Paper 2 Appendix 2A-2B- 2C -for alternative models) As such results do not only support the theory presented in this paper but also, they reinforce the idea about the need to expand our understanding about the effect of regional and global factors in the post-conflict period.

Transborder Ethnic Kin and the Dynamics of Peace Processes:

Insights from the Kurdish Conflict

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Abstract: Existing studies of civil war peace processes overplay the role of domestic factors at the expense of transnational ones. In fact, the very existence of the world “civil” implies the closed polity approach that confines such wars within the well-established and well-defined nation-state borders. However, although civil wars happen inside the nation-states; the civil wars have externalities. Most civil war actors possess transnational connections with various external actors including their transborder ethnic kin (TEK) groups. To challenge the closed polity approach often adopted in peace process research, this paper argues that the existence transnational linkages between the challenger and its transborder kin living on the other side of the border, can also increase the rebel groups' chances of negotiations by making the cost of the violence much higher for the government side compared to what it would be in the absence of such linkages. By looking at the 2012 Kurdish peace process in Turkey and by relying on meeting minutes and newspaper articles; the paper aims at tracing the sequential causal mechanism by which the rebel groups' transborder ethnic kin has changed the actors' perspective from a militaristic approach to a peaceful one during 2012 peace process.

Keywords: Kurdish Peace Process, PKK, Turkey, Peace Negotiations, Civil War

1. Introduction

The Turkish government and the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) that it has been fighting a civil war over the last 40 years, have decided to conduct another round of peace negotiations at the end of 2012¹. The announcement of the peace negotiation came as a surprise even for the Kurdish conflict experts that have been closely following the developments. The previous negotiation round that started in 2009 had created a nationalist backlash in public due to the mismanagement of the process by the government, who, even before carefully explaining the process to the public, invited the PKK fighters to Turkey with celebrations. As a result of this nationalist backlash, the government, in order not to lose votes, revert to its original military stance, adopted a hostile position and imprisoned over 10 thousand Kurdish activists and politicians.

In this context, the new round of peace process was not only unexpected but at the same time displayed particularities that the existing conflict resolution literature remains inadequate to explain. To date, the general conflict resolution literature to explain the civil war actors' willingness to negotiate made emphasis on the actors' lack of information about one and another's military capability and the potential outcome of the war. Consequently, the literature has suggested that when the information about the cost of the war would be revealed, the actors would be more likely to negotiate (Walter 2009). In this regard, the existing literature underlined the importance of duration of the war (Mason and Fett 1999), battle-related casualties (Mason and Fett 1999), the military balance of power (Clayton 2013, Zartman 1985, 2001). And suggested that since the civil wars are most of the time asymmetrical on behalf of the governments and while rebels are to gain opportunities, and the governments are to relinquish power (Svensson 2007), the opening of the peace negotiation would depend on the government's evaluation of the cost of war.

Yet what made the Kurdish Conflict particular and important case for the overall conflict literature, was the governments' enthusiasm regarding the process while all of the factors suggested by the literature remained relatively constant over time. Not only Kurdish insurgency was unable to mount an effective challenge on the military ground, display a military advantage or increase government's losses, but at the same time, the group was suffering on the political ground as many important figures were facing prison sentences. Moreover, making a peace process was not even advantageous for the government in terms of solidifying its electoral basis. The government needed the support of the 50 % of the votes to be able to change the electoral system, as such, due to the nationalist backlash, the Kurdish peace processes could make the government lose a significant percentage of voter support. As such, based on the existing literature, the Kurdish case constituted an outlier case where the cost of war seemed highly tolerable and the negotiations were less beneficial for the government.

In this context, main actors and several academics underlined the importance of the transnational dynamics of the Kurdish conflicts in terms of increasing the cost of war for the government. PKK was taking its support from the ethnic Kurds who were dispersed in four different countries, namely Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In all of these countries, PKK had founded offspring rebel groups. And due to the geopolitical changes arising as a result of the Syrian Civil War in 2012 one of these groups, the PYD (Democratic Union Party) in Syria had captured an autonomous region on the northern part of the country along the Turkish border. And the announcement of the peace process came right after the military success of the PYD who did not only gained strength but also increased cooperation with the PKK. For instance, the former deputy PM of Turkey, Besir Atalay who was the leading actor during the peace negotiations in Turkey said that "The developments in Syria are the most important factors that affected the peace process

in Turkey, the de facto autonomous region in Northern Syria under the control of the transborder kin group of the PKK in Turkey, strongly affected the peace process” A similar stance came from Selahattin Demirtas, the leader of the Pro-Kurdish political Party HDP that is the political wing of the rebel group PKK in Turkey. During a conference in Washington DC., Demirtas said that the peace process in Turkey is dependent on the developments in Rojava, mentioning the name of the de facto autonomous region in Northern Syria that recently passed under the control of the PKK’s transborder kin group PYD (Milliyet 2014). Likewise; Cemil Bayik, the executive council member of the KCK (Kurdistan Communities Union) that is the Pan Kurdish umbrella organization that subsumes both the PKK and PYD, declared that the peace process in Turkey is officially ended because Turkey supported the ISIS attacks against the PYD’s armed wing YPG in Northern Syria.² Similar statements were also made by several academics. For instance, Gunter (2013) argues that the peace process has started because the Syrian Kurdish group was able to declare autonomy next to Turkish borders. Likewise; Gurses (2015) argues that PKK was able to start a peace process with the Turkish government because its ethnic kin relations created leverage for the government. These examples clearly demonstrate that both the government officials, the legal wing of the rebel group and the representatives of the rebel group, namely all sides of the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey as well as the academics acknowledge the transnational dimension of the country’s domestic peace process. Moreover, recently flourishing transnationalism of civil war literature also acknowledges how cross border dynamics of civil wars are effective in terms of changing the actors’ violent behaviour on the onset and the duration of civil wars (Cetinyan 2002; Cederman et al 2013; Cederman et al. 2009; Jenne 2004; 2007; Forsberg 2017). But to date, we still do not know by which theoretical causal process a transborder ethnic kin group on the other side of the border can influence the resolution of a neighbouring country’s domestic ethnic conflict.

Despite this background, this study, by looking at the Kurdish Peace Process in 2012, will answer two research questions (1) how does rebel groups' linkages with their transborder ethnic kin groups shape the civil war actors' perception towards seeking a peaceful settlement in an ethnic conflict? And (2) since it seems to constitute an outlier case that does not fit the literature what inferences can we draw from the Kurdish Conflict for the overall conflict literature? In answering these questions, the paper will benefit from the insights of the non-cooperative bargaining theories of war as well as on the recently flourishing the transnationalism of civil wars literature (Cetinyan 2002; Cederman et al 2013; Cederman, Girardin Gleditsch 2009; Jenne 2004; 2007; Forsberg 2017).

Based on the pillars of the bargaining theories of war, most specifically on the bargaining with the outside option principle, the paper will conceptualize the transborder kin groups as constituting an outside option for rebel groups. Outside option in the framework of bargaining refers to the availability of an alternative that the bargainer has outside the two-actor main bargaining setting. The transborder kin groups can be conceptualized as constituting an outside option because when they cooperate with the challenger, transborder kin groups-especially if they are strong- can provide various benefits. They can increase the rebel groups' opportunities, help the rebels to overcome their collective action problems by ensuring mass mobilization. Since transborder kin groups help rebels to achieve their demands much easily; without needing to make a peace process, they constitute an alternative option, an outside option to reach their demands instead of bargaining with the government. The framework of bargaining with outside option suggests that; the ability of one actor to impose another alternative rather than to seek their best outcome within the bargaining; would pull the other actor in towards giving more concessions because it increases its cost of disagreement (see Powell 1996; 2002; Gent 2011).

Despite this background, the paper argues that in the context of asymmetric civil warfare; the ability of rebels to rely on their transborder kin and be able to reach their demands in an alternative way would increase the government's cost of war. Especially in ethnic conflicts like the Kurdish case, this cost would be more severe because it would trigger the fears of irredentism. Since the transnational linkages are hard to contain and hard to prevent, it would be the government's inability to resolve the rebels' linkages with the kin groups that would increase the government's willingness to make a settlement. In this context, what would determine the opening of actual negotiations would be the value of rebel groups' expected utility of settlement versus their expected utility of outside option. Since the peace processes are almost always advantageous for rebels no matter what their true intentions are (see Clayton 2013; Svenson 2007), this paper argues that in the presence of transborder kin groups that support the rebels, both actors would be more likely to start a peace process. By relying on meeting minutes recorded during peace negotiations; 1357 newspaper articles published between July 2012 and September 2013; as well as on previous literature on Kurdish studies, the paper traces and tests this theoretical causal mechanism with five interrelated stages. The first stage shows how PKK's increasing cooperation with its increasingly strong ethnic kin in Syria (PYD) was helping PKK to achieve its aims given the PKK's demands. The second stage shows how this cooperation was perceived by the government as a national security issue. The third stage shows how the Turkish government was unable to deter this cooperation although it tried with various other mechanisms other than the peace process. The fourth stage shows why the peace process was also beneficial for the PKK and the last stage shows how the fate of the peace process was also interrelated to PKK's ethnic kin. Results from the data indicates that the rebel groups' transnational linkages are important determinants of a country's domestic peace process.

I begin by describing briefly the Kurdish Question in Turkey and its transnational dynamics, then outline the existing literature on the willingness to make a settlement and why this literature remains mostly inadequate to explain the case at hand and why the Kurdish case is an important outlier case. Then, I will outline the theoretical mechanism and derive several observable implications. Theory section will be followed by the methodology section where I will discuss the data and the theory testing process tracing method that I will adopt in this paper. On the result section, based on the systematic investigation of 1357 newspaper articles published between July 2012 and September 2013, meeting minutes and the previous scholarly work; I will try to show and prove my theoretical mechanism on the 2012 Peace Process between the PKK and the Government of Turkey. The conclusion section outlines the concluding remarks and discusses both the implication of the research findings for the potential resolution mechanism of the Kurdish Conflict and for the overall conflict literature.

2. Brief History of Kurdish Question in Turkey and Its Transnational Dynamics

Kurds are an ethnolinguistic community living in the Middle East. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, they have been dispersed among four different countries; Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran³. Today, with a population of approximately 35 million, Kurds constitute one of the largest stateless nations in the world⁴ (see Gunes 2018; Gurses 2014; Gunter 2004). Kurds have rebelled many times for the recognition of their national identity, cultural rights, their demands for regional autonomy and independence as well as against the repressive and assimilationist policies adopted by the states they reside in⁵. Among these four countries, Turkey hosts the largest number of Kurdish population⁶ (see Mutlu 1996; Sirkeci 2000). In Turkey, Kurdish political mobilization has started after the 1950s and have been accommodated mostly within the highly fragmented socialist parties⁷. However, these political parties have been

crushed under the military junta during the 1980s. And the vacuum they have created is filled by the PKK who could escape and survive the government repression by conducting its operations from sanctuaries located in Syria and Lebanon and by securing the backing of various external states (Marcus 2009; Gunes 2018). During the 1980s PKK established itself as the dominant actor in Kurdish political scene and Kurdish Question in Turkey has turned into civil war under the leadership of the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan (Gunes 2012). Even after the imprisonment of the PKK leader; Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, despite several ceasefires and intermitted years of non-violence, the conflict did not terminate⁸ (see Candar 2012a). PKK today is estimated to have more than 10,000 armed insurgents based in Turkey (Barkey 1993) as well as 50 thousand in Syria (LSE 2016; Ocalan 2015). Group relies on recruitment not only from Turkey but also from Syria and Iran as well as is heavily supported by its diaspora and effectively uses its sanctuaries in northern Iraq⁹ (see Tezchur 2014:172).

Since PKK's first attack in 1984, the conflict in Turkey have caused over 40 thousand lives. It resulted with grave human rights abuses, forced displacement, disappearances, underdevelopment of region and confined people to poor living conditions¹⁰ (see Yegen 2009; Celik 2005; Jongerden 2001; 2007, Yadirgi 2017). The main causes of conflict mostly lie in political grievances¹¹. For many years, the government have denied the Kurdish existence, and framed the Kurdish identity as "errant Turks" who should regain their Turkishness either by assimilation; or in case it doesn't prove effective, by force¹² (Barkey 1993). As a result, the Kurdish movement first framed its demands around the Pan Kurdish ideals of the independence and reunification of the Kurdish inhabited lands (Gunes 2018). Then, after the imprisonment of the PKK leader, around the idea of democratic confederalism that foresees the accommodation of Kurdish cultural rights within the existing states borders but under a decentralized state system

that permits a unified Kurdish regional self- rule among these countries¹³ (see Ocalan 2011; 2012; Akkaya and Jongerden 2013; Jongerden and Akkaya 2014).

Since the beginning of the 1990s; Kurdish demands were also echoed on the political sphere and Kurds have established various political parties either by themselves or by unifying with socialists¹⁴. However, these parties have been abolished on the basis of supporting terrorist activities and many Kurdish political activists been subjected to imprisonment, torture as well as extrajudicial killings. Since 2015, Kurdish Question is represented in the parliament with the Pro-Kurdish party HDP that increased its votes above the 10 % threshold. However, its former leaders and many deputies are currently in prison.

Not only in Turkey; but also in Iran, Iraq, and Syria; Kurds have mobilized and often revolted along ethnic lines. They could also have some state-building experiences¹⁵. Even though the 1946 Mahabad Republic of Iran was a short-lived one, Kurds have been able to secure an autonomous region in northern Iraq¹⁶. In Syria, during the Syrian civil war; Assad regime's withdrawal from the Rojava Region on in the north along the Turkish border in July 2012; led to the establishment of a de facto autonomous region under the Kurdish control. Although the cooperation and relation of various Kurdish groups operating in different counties are not without its problems, this transnational ethnic mobilization along four different countries has presented various opportunities and gains for the PKK and other Kurdish groups. Because they could securely base their operation within the Kurdish Regional Government territories¹⁷. In fact, the very existence and survival of Kurdish insurgency in Turkey were greatly shaped by the availability of transnational political and logistical opportunities¹⁸ (Gurses 2014; 2015; Tezchur 2013a). Moreover, while the regional government in Iraq (KRG) has served as the first example of a state-building project (see Mansour 2012; Lowe 2014), the Rojava experience in Syria inspired

Kurds all over the world and further contributed to their mobilization (Gunes and Lowe 2015; Keles 2014).

Turkish government officials attempted to speak with the PKK leader various times since his imprisonment in 1999. However, these attempts were mostly conducted by the military officials and revolved around the security dimension rather than finding a peaceful political solution to the conflict¹⁹ (Candar 2012a). Even the 2009 “Democratic Opening” aimed at granting some rights to the Kurds; still, it did not include the government ministers but rather conducted by National Intelligence Agency²⁰(Candar 2012a, Dicle 2017). However, the nationalistic backlash following the Democratic Opening led to the collapse of the process. Because under the nationalistic climate; the government wanted to preserve its electoral basis²¹ (Candar 2012b).

After the failure of the Democratic Opening, the government adopted a harsh military perspective. The Pro-Kurdish political party DTP has been abolished, Kurdish activists and politicians were arrested, and those involved in the peace efforts were banned from the politics²² (see Candar 2012b). Prime minister, even brought up the issue of the death penalty in July 2011 for the imprisoned PKK leader²³. In this context, the peace process that was announced at the end of 2012 constituted a highly unexpected shift from the government’s hostile position. On the 28 December 2012, the former Prime Minister and the current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced on a TV program that the government started a peace process with Abdullah Ocalan to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict. His announcement was followed by the Kurdish party deputies’ delegation to Imrali Island (the island prison where the PKK leader is serving his life sentence). Subsequently, Ocalan declared a cease-fire during the Newroz celebrations on 21 April 2013. Not only, for the first time, the problem was defined in “conflict terms”, but also included the main actors.

3. Existing Literature on Peace Settlement in Armed Conflicts

Yet while Kurdish Question in Turkey exhibits a transnational dynamic due to the Kurdish rebels' transgressing bonds to their ethnic kin; and the main actors and several academics underlined the importance of this bond in terms of affecting the peace process, the existing literature on conflict settlements seems to overlook the actors' willingness to make a settlement from a transnational perspective (see Gleditsch 2007; 2009). The literature so far; approached the actors' willingness to resolve their conflict peacefully from the bargaining perspective. Accordingly, it is argued that although the bargaining is the most efficient solution, the actors' inability to reach a bargain arises because parties have tendencies to misrepresent their capabilities (Fearon 1995, 1998; Blainley 1973; Walter 2009). Consequently, it is suggested that war constitutes an information revealing mechanism where parties realize their cost of war. As such if they decide that their expected utility of negotiation would be greater than their expected utility of war; then; they would negotiate (Lake 2003; Wagner 1994, Thyne 2009).

However, since internal armed conflicts are asymmetrical on behalf of governments, scholars have associated the opening of peace negotiations and settlements from the governments' cost of war (Zartman 1995; Gent 2011). After all, the governments possess a well-trained army at their disposal, are militarily stronger and they believe they can win the war militarily. That is why "few bandits" as the Turkish government was defining the PKK in early stages of the rebellion; has bewildered the government (see Barkey 1993). Moreover, while during peace processes the governments are to relinquish power and take the risk of signalling other potential challengers that the violence is rewarded; the peace negotiations are almost always advantageous for rebels (Stenson 2007). Peace negotiations bring many benefits to rebels such elevating their status from outlaws

to political figures, bring them international legitimacy as well as some rights and time to rest. All of which would be advantageous even if they ever choose to resume the war.

Operating under this general framework, there are several factors that the literature associated with the willingness to make a settlement in internal armed conflicts. Accordingly, if the rebel groups can challenge the governments for longer duration; increase the number of deaths on the governments' side and close their military power asymmetry then they are more likely to reach peace negotiations. Because these factors reveal the necessary information and indicate governments' the expected cost of war (see Mason and Fett 1996; Regan 1996; Mason Weingarten and Fett 1999; Brandt et al 2008; Bapat 2005; Hultquist 2013; Zartman 1995; 2000; 2001; 2008).

However, based on the existing literature; the case of the Kurdish 2012 peace process presents a highly puzzling outlier case. As the factors that the literature associated with the willingness to make a settlement; were relatively constant over time. In addition, the opening of the peace process was a risky move on the part of the governing party who needed the parliamentary majority in order to change the parliamentary system to a presidential one. For instance, regarding the battlefield conditions, 2012 may be the year when the most casualties occurred since the 1990s but a data reveals that these casualties belonged to the rebel side (see Tezchur 2013b). According to Tezchur (2013b) the government casualties only rose by 42 soldiers compared to the previous year, reaching to 184 soldiers in 2012. As such the battle-related deaths were far from creating leverage for the government²⁴. A similar argument is made by Nihat Ali Ozcan who argues that the losses were highly tolerable, because for Turkish people; 500 soldiers dying each year could easily be absorbed (see ICG 2012).

While PKK battlefield conditions and government's battle related deaths not suggest any evidence regarding the group's rising military power, on the political arena as well the group has suffered. Right after the failure of the Democratic Opening, the government imprisoned many Kurdish politicians and Kurdish activists. Candar (2012b: 13) notes that even though their exact number is disputable; by the end of 2012 October, 11.000 people affiliated with the Kurdish activism have been detained²⁵ (see also Balta 2016). The organization, therefore, did not only suffer on the battlefield but also in terms of their political involvement; contradicting both the rebel strength or mutually hurting stalemate arguments.

Moreover, the conditions on domestic politics were further reducing the expected utility of peace negotiations for the government. The governing party; AKP (Justice and Development Party) for a long time wanted to change the Turkish electorate system from the parliamentary system to a presidential one. To this aim; it needed mass population support. While some authors suggest that the peace process may be due to governments' need for Kurdish votes (see Tezchur 2013b); this claim has several shortcomings. The first one is; Turkish population majorly votes for nationalist parties on different scales, and the recent peace talks with the Kurds already resulted in a nationalistic backlash on voter behaviour; as such, making a peace process with PKK constituted a risky move that could make the AKP to lose votes and endanger its ability to pass the presidential system²⁶. Secondly, The Pro-Kurdish party votes were only 2.8 million, as opposed to the Nationalist Party that had 5.5 million in the 2011 election. So, if the process was solely motivated by electoral concerns; the latter clearly presented a better option compared to the first one. And thirdly, since the beginning; the Kurdish approach was to support presidential system if and only if it is based on democratic pillars which fell short of the AKP proposal that does not allow checks and balances²⁷.

Despite this background, the existing studies of conflict settlement remain inadequate to explain the Kurdish Peace Process because it tends to largely ignore the civil war rebels' transnational connections. As noted by Gurses (2014) many ethnic groups involved in armed rebellions are spread well beyond their national borders, in fact, % 73 of all ethnic groups in internal armed conflicts have ethnic kin across in adjacent countries. The ability of rebels to effectively challenge the government can be the outcome of these transnational connections (see Forsberg 2008). Because these linkages enable the challengers to mobilize supporters, equip and inflict greater cost to their opponents (Buhaug, Gleditsch and Cederman 2014; Cederman et al. 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch and Girardin 2009).

One outstanding exception of this literature on the transnational linkages and conflict outcomes is the study conducted by Gurses (2015) that by looking at 142 ethnic civil wars between 1950 and 2006 argues that transnational ethnic kin groups can increase the probability of outcomes favourable to rebels including negotiated settlements²⁸. While this paper consists of a significant contribution to the highly narrow transnational dynamics of civil war peace processes literature, Gurses (2015) outlines a more generic theory and looks at “whether or not” the outcome of interest is in fact produced. By using the insights of bargaining theory of war, and testing it on the particular 2012 peace process between the PKK and government; I intend to first bring a slightly different theoretical mechanism and second trace step by step sequentially “how” this effect is produced. As such, this paper complements but also differs from Gurses (2015) in way that its more interested to unpack the black box of causal pathway; trace the sequence of events and the chain of intermediate stages from the independent variable towards the outcome of interest (see Benett and Checkel 2015; George and Benett 2005)

4. Theoretical Causal Mechanism

As noted, I aim to formulate a causal mechanism that step by step trace the process by which the rebel group's transnational linkages with its transborder ethnic kin may affect the civil war actors' willingness to make a peaceful settlement. A causal mechanism, however, has many different definitions in the literature (See Mahoney 2001, Gerring 2007, Checkel 2013). In line with Checkel (2013), I define a causal mechanism as "pathway or process by which an effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished". Since the causal mechanisms are unobservable entities (Checkel 2013; Mahoney 2001) I also derive their testable implications.

I define transborder kin groups as groups that possess the same ethnic origin with the rebel groups and that live densely on the other side of the border, in the adjacent country of where the rebellion takes place. Following Rothschild (1981:02), I define ethnic groups as "collective groups whose membership is largely determined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society". While these groups live in adjacent countries, on different sides of the existing national borders; they consider themselves as the members of the same ethnicity²⁹.

Based on the bargaining theories of war, more specifically relying on the bargaining with outside option principle (see Powell 1996; 2002), I aim to trace the pathways from the independent variable "rebel cooperation with its increasingly strong ethnic kin" to the dependent variable "willingness to make a settlement" consisting of five interrelated stages. I argue that each stage in this causal mechanism leads to another one. And then the effect is produced.

I start my theoretical mechanism first by conceptualizing the cooperation of armed rebel groups with its increasingly strong transborder ethnic kin as constituting an alternative pathway, an outside option to rely on; for the challenger to achieve its political aims. I argue that given the rebels are already in war with the government (their starting point) and have set of demands including; but not exhausted to; achieving a territorial autonomy, federalism, governmental positions (their aims, the future stage); they have several options to reach these demands. One of their options; involves making a peace process with the government, but then the government would also need to be receptive to this willingness. Alternatively, another option would be to directly bypass the peace process altogether but aim at reaching their demands through their transnational linkages and the various opportunities they present. In this context, rebel linkages with their transborder ethnic kin groups constitute a highly important alternative for helping rebels to accomplish their political demands. Especially so, if the transborder ethnic kin group that the rebel group cooperates is strong. The underlying rationale is that in the pathway towards reaching their demands; rebel groups need financial and military opportunities as well as a highly-mobilized population to rely upon. For instance, if groups want autonomy; they first need financial and military resources to effectively challenge the government and capture this territory. However, in addition, they also need the support of the population that would not challenge their rule and military efforts as well as support their rebellion and create additional challenges for the government.

In this respect, transborder ethnic kin groups especially if they are strong enough or dominant groups in their country and if they cooperate with the challenger they can provide all of what rebels need in order to reach their aims. Existing research on other contexts has shown that transborder ethnic kin groups can provide recruits, sanctuaries, financial and military opportunities

(Gurses 2015; Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch 2009, Cederman et al. 2013; Jenne 2004; 2004). Groups that are mobilized or fighting for the same cause can also learn from one another in terms of new tactics (see Bakke 2013).

But not only on the material front, but also on the mobilization front that transborder kin is important. Forsberg (2008) notes that polarization within a country between groups is conditional upon one group having ethnic kin in a neighbouring state. Simply because the group that has ethnic kin would identify itself with its kin rather than the other group that it shares the same borders. Transborder ethnic groups can also create a demonstration effect and lead the population to update their beliefs and calculations about their status (Davis and Moore 1997).

For instance; if the masses see their ethnic kin mobilized along their identity, they would be inspired and intensify in their demands (Lake and Rothchild 1998; Hill and Rothchild 1986; Hill et al. 1998; Forsberg 2013). In this regard, the collective action problem that rebel groups often experience in terms of public mobilization would be resolved because of the external stimuli that the transborder ethnic kin creates for the masses (see Olson 1965; Forsberg 2013). As a consequence; the transborder ethnic kin group can provide the mass mobilization that rebels need (see Kuran 1987, 1989, 1998). This pattern is also evident in the mobilization of Kurds in Turkey. For instance, during Al-Quamisli Kurdish uprising in Syria; even the non-mobilized Kurds rebelled in Turkey against the Turkish government (Kurwatch 2009). As such rebel group linkages with its transborder ethnic kin help the challenger in the pathways towards reaching its demands and therefore it constitutes an outside option for rebels.

As a second stage of the theoretical mechanism, I propose that by constituting an “outside option” for rebels; its linkages with transborder kin would increase the cost of disagreement for the government. Because the rebel groups’ ability to reach their aims with a different pathway would impose a cost (Gent 2011; Powell 1996, 2002). If rebels can get their demands met in their own way; then the government would be on the losing end of this bargaining. Because rebel groups’ ability to cooperate with their kin especially if this kin group is strong would intensify the government’s cost of war. And this cost would be exceptionally severe for ethnic conflicts because it would exacerbate the government’s fears of irredentism (Jenne 2004, 2007; Gurses 2015). As such; the information problems regarding the rebel capability that the literature associates as a bargaining problem would be remedied simply because the government would have an expectation regarding the potential outcome.

However, decision-makers when choosing an outcome evaluate all potential course of actions and then decide accordingly on what is in their best interests given their potential options. I argue that the challenger’s cooperation with its kin would lead the government to try to adopt different policy measures. Governments can rely on international cooperation, can conduct cross-border operations or even wage a war. However, the problem with rebel cooperation with transborder ethnic kin is that they are hard to contain and suppress. For instance; Turkey’s cross-border operations on Iraqi territories to attack PKK bases often created serious tensions between the US and Turkey (Keskin 2008). As such, as a third stage of the theoretical mechanism, I argue that what would change the government’s willingness to make a peace settlement would be the outcome of its inability to contain the rebels’ transnational linkages and its increasing cost of war.

But eventually, the governments are not the sole actors in the bargaining, so as the fourth stage of this theoretical mechanism; I propose that the rebels’ willingness to make a peace

settlement would be the outcome of their expected utility of bargaining versus their expected utility of their outside option. Because having an outside option gives the rebels the ability to choose what is in their best interests among their potential options. In terms of willingness to make a settlement, no matter what their true intentions are; I argue that rebel groups would choose to make a peace settlement. Because the negotiation phase gives the rebel group the possibility of recovery; during which they will be able to cut their losses, have time to rest and build stronger armies and military bases. Even if they do not want to settle in the future and keep the armed rebellion going on; they can always leave and use their increased position for better outcomes. For instance; the ceasefire declared during the “Democratic Opening” in Turkey, allowed PKK to focus on its linkages with PYD in Syria (LSE ME 2016). And in fact; what helped the PYD to get stronger and be able to capture the Rojava region was mainly the result of its PKK cooperation. And lastly; as the fifth stage of this theoretical mechanism, I propose that in the presence of rebel group linkages with their increasingly strong transborder ethnic kin, the fate of peace process would be dependent on rebel linkages.

If the theoretical causal mechanism outlined above is present in the 2012 Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey; the case and data should reveal that: first; given the PKK demands; its transborder kin groups should be able to present opportunities for PKK to reach its demands. Second: the PKK and transborder kin linkages should worry the government and we should be able to observe that. Third; the government should try to mount this challenge in other ways and its efforts should prove inefficient. Fourth; rebel groups should also see the peace process beneficial and benefit from the process itself. And lastly, if the actors’ willingness originates from the transnational rebel linkages then the conversation and debates during the peace process should also revolve around this transnational dimension.

5. Research Design and Data

Since the article aims at tracing and testing a causal mechanism at work, the best-suited method would be to benefit from the process tracing (George and Bennett 2005). As noted by Checkel (2015) “process tracing refers to the examination of the intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and how it generated the outcome of interests”. I make use process tracing method as it allows one to go beyond the correlations between the dependent and independent variables and helps to unpack “how” this correlation occurs in the first place (Beach and Pedersen 2013). Unlike the large N frequentist methods that look at the patterns of regularity (Beach and Pedersen 2013:145), process tracing enables us to study the causal chain between those two variables by locating the intermediate factors lying between them (Gerring 2007:45; Beach and Pedersen 2013:1).

Process tracing methods are well suited to operationalize, measure and test the hypothesized causal mechanism between the dependent and independent variable (Bennett and Checkel 2015) and it has been widely used in the literature of civil wars (See Checkel 2013; Lyall 2015). In the literature, there are three different use of process tracing methods³⁰. This research uses the theory testing process tracing³¹. In theory testing method, the researcher selects a single case where both dependent and independent variables are present; outlines a causal mechanism and tests whether or not there is evidence present for each part of the theoretical causal mechanism³² (Beach and Pedersen 2013). However, it’s important to note that in theory testing process tracing, there can be no claim regarding the proposed pathway is the only causal pathway towards the outcome; since many social science outcomes are not monocausal but have equifinality (see also Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2015).

Eventually, causal mechanisms should be supported by empirical evidence. As data, this research relies first; on the previous literature of Kurdish studies, second on the meeting minutes between the rebel leader and Kurdish politicians that reveal the content and the structure of the peace process (see Ocalan 2015)³³. And third, it relies on the systematic investigation of 1357 newspaper articles published in Hurriyet Newspaper between July 2012 and September 2013. The dates have been chosen on the basis that the 19 July indicates the date when the PKK's transborder kin has increased its strength and cooperation started to increase between them. Until the capture of Rojava region in Northern Syria, Kurds in Syria were consisting of a dormant group yet with the regime withdrawal from the region during the Syrian civil war they have gained a de-facto autonomous region along the Turkish border. 9th of October on the other hand; indicates the first-time actors experienced serious problems when PKK declared that it stopped its demobilization. The newspaper Hurriyet is chosen on the basis that it constitutes the mainstream media, provides best internet coverage, and easy access for the archives, and was somehow "relatively" less biased compared to the other options during the sampling period³⁴.

As the first stage, the newspaper articles (including columnists) have been searched with the keywords "peace processes" and "resolution process" as its also referred in Turkey. Overall there were 1357 newspaper articles either mentioned "peace processes" or "resolution process" between July 2012 to September 2013³⁵. Then as a second stage, the full sample consisting of 1357 articles, have been further searched with the keywords related to PKK's ethnic kin group. The keywords utilized were "PYD" (kin group), "Rojava" (the autonomous region under the control of PYD in Syria), "Saleh Muslim" (co-president of PYD) (See Paper 3, Appendix 1A,1B for the distribution of newspaper articles over time).

The data reveals that 242 Articles consisting the %18 of the full sample was related to PKK's ethnic kin, a percentage that is highly unlikely to observe if the peace process was solely related to domestic factors as the literature indicates³⁶. A similar dynamic is also evident in meeting minutes that were published under the name Abdullah Ocalan by the Mezapotamya Publishing house (see Ocalan 2015). Among 21 meetings conducted between the PKK leader and the Pro-Kurdish Politicians during the peace processes between 3 January 2013 and 14 March 2015; 19 of them contained these keywords. So, in %90 of the meetings PYD related matters have been discussed, especially given the fact that even during the peace process these actors are rarely allowed to meet one another by the government.

6. Transnational Dynamics of Peace Process in Turkey

In what follows; I aim to demonstrate how PKK's linkages with its increasingly strong transborder ethnic kin the PYD in Syria have altered the actors' decision making before the 2012 peace processes started in Turkey. This section is divided into five sub-sections that each of them will try to prove the existence of different parts of the causal mechanism proposed in the previous sections. The first section will show how the transnational ethnic kin consists of an outside option for PKK to reach its demands. The second section will show how PKK's cooperation with its increasingly strong kin group PYD has increased the cost of disagreement for the government and resolved the information problems. The third section will show the government's inability to contain such cooperation given its options. The fourth section will discuss why making a peace process was also beneficial for the rebels. And the last section will outline how the events during the peace process were also affected by the cooperation between PKK and PYD.

6.1 PKK- PYD cooperation and the Demands of Democratic Confederalism

The Kurds in Syria and in Turkey have strong ties one another. In fact, both look at the borders between Syria and Turkey as irrelevant and they see themselves as one people (Gunes and Lowe 2015). Up until the Syrian Civil War, the Kurds in Syria constituted a dormant group, their mobilization was largely suppressed by the autocratic Syrian regime³⁷ (Gunter 2014a). Although in 2003, former members of PKK have established their offspring rebel groups the PYD in Syria; up until 2012, the cooperation between the PKK and PYD remained to a large extent limited. The geopolitical changes as a result of Syrian Civil War, gave the ability to the PYD to capture the Rojava region on northern Syria along the Turkish borders on 19 July 2012 and to declare its self-rule on 12 November 2012. As a result, the increasing strength of the PYD brought Kurds to the fore and as well as increased cooperation and linkages between the two kin groups. While the PKK's demands have oscillated over time from independence to autonomy; the group since 2000 reorganized its demands around the idea of Democratic Confederalism (Gunes 2018). The idea of Democratic Confederalism emerged out the court hearings of the Abdullah Ocalan to the ECHR, Turkish Courts as well as to Greek courts. The idea originates from the writings of Murray Bookchin and bases its foundation on the idea of failure of nation-state and democracy (Ocalan 2011; 2012; Jongerden and Akkaya 2014; Akkaya and Jongerden 2013). It proposes the abolition of nation states, and suggests a borderless and bottom-up governance by communities. As such it aims at the transformation of nation-states by removing boundaries and by decentralization and by democratization (Jongerden and Akkaya 2013; Gunes 2018). The practical implication of the Ocalan's idea (2012; 2015) on the Kurdish Question is that he suggests the unification of Kurds (removal of the borders among Kurds) but without interfering the existing state boundaries as well as reorganization of Kurdish politics around radical community based governance.

To apply the Democratic Confederalism principle into all parts of the Kurdistan; the PKK founded the structure of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), an umbrella body that subsumes all PKK affiliated groups operating in different parts of Kurdish inhabited lands including the PYD in Syria. (Gunes and Lowe 2015). Consequently, PYD as the offshoot of PKK, was not only ideologically linked to the PKK and its imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan (Candar 2012b) but also constitutes a member of the main umbrella structure KCK that would put the idea of Democratic Confederalism into practice (Lowe 2014; Gunes and Lowe 2015).

For this reason, I argue that PKK's cooperation with its increasingly strong ethnic kin PYD to a large extent facilitated the PKK's ability to reach its aims of Democratic Confederalism other than expecting them through a peace process. First, it made the very basic idea of unified Kurdistan under the concept of Democratic Confederalism possible. It constituted Kurdish self-rule under the application of Ocalan's theoretical ideas of self-governance both in terms of groups' territorial gains and application of the proposed governing mechanism in the Syrian context. Second, it enabled PKK presence in Syria and gave it the ability to expand its sphere of influence to other parts of the Kurdish inhabited lands. And third, it created a mass mobilization around the Kurdish cause all around the world and the PKK highly benefited from this mass mobilization to advance in its aims. All of which was serving the PKK to accomplish its aims outside the peace process bargaining with the government. And therefore, the cooperation of the PKK with its increasingly strong transborder kin was constituting its outside option.

As noted, Rojava marked the first example of Democratic Confederalism ideals of the PKK (LSE ME 2016). In fact, the basic translation of Rojava indicates the Western Kurdistan complementing Eastern (Iran), Northern (Turkey) and finally Southern (Iraq) parts. Right after the capture of Rojava by the PYD; the major of Diyarbakir Osman Baydemir declared that the only

way to peace was to abolish the borders and to establish a unified autonomous region. Accordingly, he suggested Qamishli (Syria), Diyarbakir (Turkey), Erbil (Iraq) and Mahabad (Iran) should be the major cities (Hurriyet 2012a). On the Iranian front, PKK's offshoot PJAK has also proposed a similar canton model (Gunes and Lowe 2015). The imprisoned leader of the Pro-Kurdish political party, Selahattin Demirtas also suggested that the Syrian Kurdish region should also include Lattakia to have total independence from Turkey (Radikal 2013). According to Nihat Ali Ozcan "the idea of independent Kurdistan became much more feasible" (Hurriyet 2012b).

Its cooperation with PYD also enabled the group a stronger presence in Syria. Up until 2012; PKK had limited involvement in Syria however, with the capture of Rojava; PKK sent thousands of its militia. A report published by the London School of Economics on Rojava; notes that the PYD has 50 thousand fighters in Syria (LSE ME 2016). The meeting minutes between the rebel leader and the legal wing also confirm the accuracy of this number and include directives from Ocalan to Pro-Kurdish politicians about his willingness to send even more fighters to Syria (Ocalan 2015). As such; heavy PKK presence in Syria can be said to offer the group the ability to conduct its operations towards Turkey from these territories. PKK in fact heavily benefited from a similar structure in northern Iraq. For instance, the Qandil part of the Zagros Mountains located at the intersection of Turkey, Iraq, Iran has provided a suitable sanctuary for PKK where it can rest, organize, and a base their hit and run attacks (Gunes 2018).

PKK cooperation with its increasingly strong kin also increased Kurdish mobilization in the name of the group within Turkey as well as around the world. Nationalistic sentiments among Kurds helped the PKK in terms of public support. It also increased the number of recruits and provided more self-confidence to challenge the government on the battle-field. For the first time, to defend the Kurdish controlled regions, many young Kurds mobilized and joined the rebel ranks

(see Keles 2014). This confidence led the PKK to increase its attacks in an unprecedented magnitude in Turkey changing its non-conventional warfare to a conventional one in Semdinli province of Hakkari (Candar 2012b). With the inspiration of the Rojava success; on 23 July 2012, PKK for the first time conducted its attack by a large number of groups with the aim of capturing and controlling the towns inside the country. It also kidnapped a politician (Hurriyet 2012g). Moreover; on the mobilization front; in September 2012, hunger strikes started among PKK prisoners in Turkey. Their numbers quickly reached to ten thousand and included the Kurdish politicians. Even if PKK suffered both on the military as well as on the political arena, the hunger strikes; Semdinli siege and PKK presence in Syria dominated the Turkish political agenda for months and completely paralyzed the government (Zalevski 2012; Candar 2012b).

6.2 “It’s Impossible to tolerate PKK- PYD cooperation in Northern Syria”

The rise of PYD and its increasing cooperation with the PKK was subsequently perceived as a national security threat by the government (Gunes and Lowe 2015; Gunter 2014b). From the very foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkish politics have been largely dominated by separatist fears owing its existence to the Treaty of Sevres signed between the Ottoman Empire and the allied powers after the First World War. Although the treaty was never acted upon and replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne after the War of Independence, it was formalizing the division of the Empire including granting an autonomous region for the Kurds (Gunes and Zeydanlioglu 2014). The “Sevre Syndrome” as many scholars call it; has played an important role on how the Kurdish minority has been perceived and treated as a security threat both by the government as well as by the nationalist Turks (Gunter 2014b; Gunes and Zeydanlioglu 2014).

PKK’ s armed struggle had exacerbated these concerns. The conflict since 1984 is estimated to cause more than 40 thousand fatalities, including 7 thousand members of security

forces (ICG 2012; Werz and Hoffman 2014). Despite the fact that the Turkish military constitutes the second biggest in the NATO, at nights it was losing control over the territories in the southeast and replaced by the PKK fighters who descend from their hideouts and establish their own laws (Candar 2012b; Kirisci 2004). While the Turkish government was already unable to win the war militarily for over the last 40 years, the PKK cooperation with the increasingly strong PYD added another layer to the problem. Previously Turkey had to control a 331-km long border in order to avoid PKK attacks coming from the sanctuaries in Iraq. However, the rise of the PYD along the Turkish border and its cooperation with the PKK added another 900-km for control because it was giving the PKK easy access to Turkish territories. As such, it increased the security concerns (see Hurriyet 2012b; Fikret Bila 2012; Candar 2012b).

The newspaper articles from 19 July in 2012 onwards reveal that Turkish political discourse is dominated by the PKK presence in Syria. Articles as well as columnists were pointing out the government's security concerns and warning the government about the emergency of the PKK and PYD cooperation (see Gurcanli 2012; Akyol 2012; Dogan 2012; Gursel 2012; Hurriyet 2012I). Among them, analyst Nihat Ali Özcan wrote that the PKK's growing influence in Syria would provide the group recruitment, logistics, intelligence, and a second safe haven. As a result; it would be difficult to contain cross-border leaks because in Turkey, law, intelligence and organization are not regulated to deal with this issue (see Ozcan 2012). According to Ozcan (2012), the PKK- PYD cooperation in Syria would also help the PKK to obtain ammunition; explosives and arms and this will provide PKK the opportunity to reach its aims more aggressively.

Not surprisingly; this security fear was also evident in the politicians' actions and speeches. Zalevski notes that (2012) the politicians in Turkey believe that Kurdish autonomy in Syria could fan the Kurdish separatism by providing new bases to PKK and can transform to the idea of Greater

Kurdistan. Consequently, in July 2012, the leader of the main opposition party in a letter addressed to Prime Minister outlined the security concerns about the PKK's increasing presence in Syria and invited the parliament for an emergency meeting (Milliyet 2012). Similarly, right after the PKK's conventional attack in Semdinli Turkey, the opposition party spokesperson Haluk Koc pointed out the PKK presence in Syria as the main reason for PKK's increasing confidence and said that:

PKK would like to give the message that; not only the neighbouring countries but also, Semdinli is under our control (Hurriyet 2012e)

The biggest reaction came from Prime Minister Erdogan who said on July 2012:

it's impossible to tolerate PKK and PYD cooperation in Northern Syria.... there is nearly a Kurdish State in Syria ..this constitutes a terror structure .. intervening is our most natural right if terrorists threaten Turkey from the Syrian border.
(Hurriyet 2012h; Ergin 2012)

In a different conversation; Prime Minister Erdogan also stated: "Forget the Kurdistan we will never tolerate imaginary maps (Hurriyet 2012f). Similarly; Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu, on 31st July 2012 referring to the PKK's safe haven in Northern Iraq as well as to the PYD's statements about the level of their cooperation remaining on the ideological level, said that:

the cooperation between PKK and PYD no longer remains at the ideological level, there can be no second Qandil in Syria.... we have a right to intervene³⁸
(t24 2012; Hurriyet 2012j)

6.3 The Kurdish Spring and the Government

Due to its security fears and its willingness to create a homogenous nation-state after the dissolution of the Empire, the Republic of Turkey since its foundation applied policies of assimilation by force which to a large extent contributed to Kurdish mobilization (See Yegen 2009). After the PKK's armed struggle, the Turkish state formed both its domestic as well as foreign policy mainly around the containment of the Kurdish Question (Kirisci 2004).

On the domestic level, assimilation policies were complemented by the counter terrorism-measures. Massive number of soldiers deployed in Kurdish inhabited regions, special forces have been formed, "Village Guards" system compromising of members of the Kurdish community have been recruited, emergency rule in the Kurdish areas have been declared, forced displacement policies were adopted and the activities of paramilitary forces encouraged and overlooked³⁹ (See Burinnesen 1996; Gunter 1997, 2008; 2014b; Gunes 2012; Barkey and Fuller 1998; Cemal 2003). On the international level; the government relied massively on the cooperation with other states that have Kurdish minority; aimed at improving relations with other Kurdish groups in Iraq to use them against PKK, conducted numerous cross-border operation at the expense of international criticism⁴⁰ (Candar 2009). Yet, none of the securitization measures proved effective and the government was unable to contain the PKK⁴¹.

Despite this background, the PKK and PYD cooperation further complicated the government's ability to deal with the problem. Candar (2012b), a prominent journalist and expert on the Kurdish Question, notes that to be able to mount the security challenges arising from the transnational cooperation between PYD and PKK, the government could adopt four different measures.

The first one was to rely on the cooperation with Masoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq who had close ties with non-PKK affiliated Kurds in Syria. Although the government has long denied the existence of Kurdish Regional Government; at the end realized that it would benefit more by forming economic as well as a political relationship (Selcen 2016). As such, based on this relationship; the government aimed at exercising the Barzani's influence so that he could counter-balance PKK presence in Syria, as well as prevent the PYD to take full control on the Kurdish de facto region⁴²(Yildiz 2016). The second one; was to rely on the Syrian Opposition Forces fighting against the regime because Turkey would prefer any neighbour to a PKK affiliated one. The third one, was to wage a military offensive either by establishing buffer zones or by direct military intervention. The last one; notes (Candar 2012b): "Although not foreseeable in the near future, is to reach a deal with the PKK and its leader Abdullah Ocalan". In fact; the evidence suggests that Turkey tried to apply all of the above to curb the PKK-PYD cooperation and its presence in Syria. For instance, newspaper articles reveal that on 27th of July Erdogan said:

Prime Minister Davutoglu is going to Erbil and will tell Barzani our determinism (referring that PKK PYD cooperation is intolerable), a buffer zone is also among our alternatives, and our military is also working over the issue" (Hurriyet 2012f).

However, although Davutoglu conducted a visit to Erbil; Barzani had limited influence over the PKK linked Kurds in Syria⁴³. Then, Turkey tried to contact and pressure the PYD to operate under the Syrian National Coalition but this effort was also futile. Turkish government supported various Syrian Opposition groups like Free Syrian Army and jihadist groups (see Taspiar and Tol 2014; Idiz 2013; Gunes 2018) as well as adopted a more aggressive military approach on the winter of 2012.

For instance, 4th of October, the government approved the bill allowing the military operation to Syria (Radikal 2012a). On 8th of October, f-16s have been deployed to Diyarbakir, and 250 tanks have been sent to Syrian border (Hurriyet 2012k; Hurriyet 2012l, Hurriyet 2012m). However, a military intervention clearly lacked international legitimacy (t24 2012). And it carried the risk to wrath Turkey's allies as well as exacerbate both the Kurdish Question in Turkey and the regional dynamics (Cheviron 2012; Bakir 2012; Agos 2012). In fact, the Turkish request of establishing buffer zones and intervention to Syrian territories has been discredited by the international community (Tastekin 2015). In this context, Gursel (2013) notes that the choice of making a peace process on the side of the government was not an option because given the regional conditions, although the government actively tried, it didn't have any other choice to contain the PKK and PYD cooperation. In fact, not only on the regional level but also at the domestic level; the PKK resistance mostly motivated by its ethnic kin's success such as the hunger strikes and its newly adopted conventional warfare that government didn't have another solution other than to contact the rebel leader. As such as noted by Gursel (2012) peace process constituted an effort to stop the bill before it gets more expensive.

6.4 PKK and the Peace Process

Not surprisingly, the government reached Abdullah Ocalan both for the termination of the hunger strikes as well as to make a peaceful solution for the on-going conflict. The government's willingness of making a peace process was also reciprocated by the imprisoned rebel leader. First; with the Ocalan's call; the hunger strikes ended on 17 October and then the dialogue continued. On 28 December 2012, the prime minister declared openly that a new process is going on between the government and the PKK. On 3rd of January 2013; the first meeting took place between the imprisoned leader and political wing of the rebel group under the presence of the government

representatives (see Dicle 2017). Despite the spoilers that aimed at sabotaging the process by killing three PKK members in Paris; subsequent meetings followed the first one. On 21 of March Ocalan's letter addressed to the public was read during the Newroz Celebrations both in Turkish and Kurdish. The letter called for a cease-fire, demobilization, and disarmament (Balta 2015; Candar 2013). Consequently; PKK announced that the demobilization would take the start on 8th May 2013 (Hurriyet 2013).

Finding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict; had been demanded various times both by Ocalan himself as well as by the Kurdish politicians. So; there was already a willingness on the part of PKK to leave the armed struggle in exchange for the recognition of cultural and political rights. However, in addition, the prospect of a peace process was also beneficial for the rebel side from a realistic point of view. Even if the process wouldn't work out, it would improve his conditions, provide legitimacy but also it would bring the group the ability to receive some of its demands or at least discuss them on the public sphere without demonization. But most importantly; the peace process with the government would be giving the rebels the ability to concentrate on their ethnic kin without thinking about their conflict with the government and would enable Ocalan to transfer his directives to PKK.

For instance, although the 2009 Democratic Opening conducted between the belligerents didn't involve the main actors and didn't bring a satisfactory solution to the demilitarization of the conflict, still even so slightly did recognize some of the Kurdish cultural rights. The reforms conducted between 2009 and 2011 during the Democratic Opening; allowed a national TV channel to broadcast in Kurdish; allowed Kurdish people to defend themselves in courts in their mother tongue; permitted Kurdish education at the university level; abolished the national Oath mentioning one's devoted allegiance to Turkishness; allowed the prohibited Kurdish letters "x,

q,w” and permitted the return of original Kurdish village names (See Tezchur 2014). The 2012 process also aimed at improving democracy in Turkey by bringing a reform package (BBC 2013b). Moreover, it would also shift the status of the rebel leader from “terrorist” to “negotiation partner” for the first time. As such even if the process would fail or the improvements would remain on the “cosmetic” level as the Kurdish politicians often refer, the peace process would provide the group; at least legitimacy and a platform to discuss their demands and even receive few of them.

However, I argue that maybe a more important benefit of the peace process and the ceasefire for the PKK was that it would enable the group to concentrate on its ethnic kin PYD who was at war with various jihadist groups in Syria (Yildiz 2016; Kucuksahin 2013). The demobilization of the PKK from the Turkish soil gave the group the ability to mobilize its forces to Syria. In fact; during his meeting with the Kurdish politicians on 23rd of February Ocalan stated:

“I do not believe that demobilization would be harmful to guerrilla; whichever country we demobilize to; we will enlarge and expand the guerrilla there, don’t forget Syria, Iran, Iraq” (Ocalan 2015:26).

The outcome of this willingness is also confirmed by Calislar (2013) who said PKK’s three thousand demobilized fighters have been deployed to Syria to fight on the ranks of the YPG, the military wing of the PYD (see also Gurses 2014). Moreover, the leader of the PKK, Ocalan was not allowed to contact his family or his lawyers for over a year⁴⁴ (Dicle 2017; Tezchur 2013). As such; while the Syria issue was pressing for PKK, the peace process with the government was enabling the rebel leader to able to transfer its demands and orders to PKK and PYD through the Kurdish politicians⁴⁵. The meeting minutes strongly reveal this dynamic. Out of 21 published meeting minutes; 19 of them consists of Ocalan’s directives to PKK especially on how to organize in Syria. Just to name few, for instance; on 3rd of January and 23rd of February 2013 meetings

Ocalan gives directives to PKK through the Kurdish politicians about how to organize self-defence units as well as with whom to collaborate in Syria (Ocalan 2015). Similarly, on 3rd of April; Ocalan ask more PKK fighters to go to Syria, on 17th of August 2013; he requests KCK executives in Europe to organize the mobilization in Syria (Ocalan 2015). Ocalan also often explains his views regarding what political moves PYD should take regarding the peace conferences in Syria. His contacts with PYD and PKK and his involvement in Syrian politics would be impossible without the peace process. As such, the peace process, apart from trying to find a peaceful solution, would be able to grant some benefits for the group and its leader. During the peace process; the PKK could gain legitimacy; time to focus on its operations in Syria as well as be able to contact and execute the orders of its leader. So; no matter what PKK or its leader aimed at; making a peace process was beneficial at least for the time being.

6.5 The PKK- PYD linkages and the Fate of Peace Process in Turkey

The peace process that started at the end of 2012 experienced its first crisis when the government refused to make constitutional changes regarding the group's demobilization. However, although the demobilization stopped after four months in September 2013, the process continued with fluctuations until it is halted completely in 2015. During this process, both actors adopted a dual approach. While on one hand; they continued their dialogue; on the other; took securitization measures which undermined their ability to trust one another. For instance; during the peace process, the government constructed 189 additional police stations, started to the construction of a wall on the Syrian Border in order to cut all connections between PKK and its transborder kin group PYD. The rebels on the other hand; continued their mobilization within Turkey on the city level by digging tunnels and trenches as well as delegating the rebellion to some extent to their youth organization⁴⁶.

As with the willingness to open the peace process, the process itself was related to PKK's ethnic kin. Because both actors' willingness arises to a great extent from their stakes in the PKK-PYD cooperation in Syria. The meeting minutes reveal that although at the beginning they thought they would be better off cooperating; at the end, their perspective didn't converge because both wanted contradictory things. The meeting minutes strongly suggest that Ocalan often meets with the government side about forming a joint plan on Syria. For instance; on 3rd of April 2013, Ocalan notes that:

“(on Syria) we will be talking very soon with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu. There will be a democratic Syria, we will tell Assad to withdraw

Similarly, on 17 August 2013 Ocalan states that:

“(about Syria) I have spoken with the government representatives yesterday, I guess my ideas will be put in practice, they will discuss them in the National Security Council... we are working jointly with the government” (Ocalan 2015:130)

However, while at the beginning Ocalan was believing that a joint plan was possible; his stance changed over time. On 9th November 2013 Ocalan complains to the Kurdish politicians about the government's behaviour and notes:

“I have told them (to the government) let's make an alliance on Syria matters; but they have breached this point. Now they are constructing a wall on the Syrian Border. Are you crazy? What they really want is that the Kurds shouldn't have any power in Syria..... I have suggested to them that the national boundaries (Turkish borders) should start from northern Aleppo, so instead of reinforcing borders between Turkey and Syria, you should remove them” (Ocalan 2015:182)

During the meetings, the Pro-Kurdish Party delegates also transfer the Prime minister's messages to Ocalan. On 9th of November 2013 meeting; the Pro-Kurdish Party's Istanbul deputy Sirri Surreya Onder tells that Prime minister said he would do anything but he has one red-line; which is Syria; he will never allow an establishment like Northern Iraq in Syria. (mentioning the autonomous regional Kurdish government in Northern Iraq). Ocalan's answer is the same:

“then you tell him, we will never let Syrian Kurds remain under the Syrian regime and that's our red-line (Ocalan 2015:179)

Apart from the meeting minutes; the 6th article of the draft process agreement outlining the topics to be discussed on 4th of February 2015 reveals that the sides attributed great importance to the developments in Syria and aimed at finding a common strategy that would benefit both of them. (Ocalan 2015:413).

The relations severed especially when Turkey supported the jihadists groups fighting with the PKK's ethnic kin in Syria. Especially the battle of Kobane determined the fate of the process. The refusal of the government to help the Kurds in Syria, as well as the prime minister's comment about the fall of Kobane to ISIS, resulted with massive uprisings in Turkey including the AKP supporter Kurds (Balta 2015). The uprising lasted for 3 days and caused 42 lives. In order to contain the growing intensity of the protests; the government had to declare curfews (Balta 2016). Although the actors met few times after the Kobane crisis the relations were could never be repaired. And the process initially ended in 2015.

7. Concluding Remarks

The existing studies of conflict resolution have explained the civil war actors' willingness to seek for a negotiated settlement; from the framework of non-cooperative bargaining perspective and underlined the importance of domestic battlefield conditions in changing their behaviour. Yet in light of transnationalism of civil war, over the last decades; we know that even though civil wars happen within the borders of nation-states, its actors are widely connected with transgressing bonds to various external actors around the world (see Gleditsch 2007,2009). This paper aimed at challenging this closed polity approach often adopted in the peace process research. As such it aimed at showing how rebel groups' linkages with their transborder ethnic kin group can shape the civil war actors' behaviour towards seeking a peace settlement.

By adopting a mechanistic view of causality, it argued that rebel linkages with their transborder ethnic kin groups affect the civil war actors' behaviour by five interrelated stages. As a first stage, the paper argued that the transborder kin groups constitute an outside option for rebels in their pathways towards accomplishing their aims because they help the challenger to reach its aims without making a peace process. As such; in the second stage; it argued that as the rebel groups' outside option, the transborder ethnic kin groups would increase the government's cost of war. And this especially severe for ethnic conflicts simply because it fans the ethnic groups polarization, mobilization and government's fear of separatism. And as the third stage; it argued that it would be the inability of the governments to contain this outside option that would make the governments seek a negotiated settlement. However; since the governments are not the sole actors within the peace process bargaining, and the transborder kin groups constitute an alternative option for rebels to rely on; as a fourth stage; the paper argued that it would be the rebel group's expected utility of their outside option versus their expected utility of resolving their

incompatibility that would determine the actual peace process. Since the peace processes present various opportunities; the theoretical framework suggested that in the presence of transborder kin groups we would be observing more peace processes. As a fifth stage; paper argued that as the transborder kin groups are related to the willingness to negotiate then the discussions and debates during peace process would also be related to the rebel groups' kin group.

The paper, aimed at showing the proposed causal mechanism on the 2012 Kurdish Peace between the PKK and the government of Turkey. By relying on the actual meeting minutes recorded during peace negotiations; the newspaper articles and the previous studies; the paper argued that it was the PKK's cooperation with its increasingly strong ethnic kin group PYD in Syria that increased the Turkish government's willingness of making a peace process. The government of Turkey was at war with the rebel group PKK that it cannot win militarily. However, the battlefield conditions and the domestic factors were in favour of a militaristic stance right before the opening of peace negotiations. However, the geopolitical changes that increased the strength of PKK's ethnic kin group as well as the cooperation among the two groups; have complicated the government's ability to deal with the PKK. Although the Turkish government has tried with various other ways, it could not contain the cooperation among the two groups and as such, the government's willingness to initiate the peace negotiations was the result of its increasing cost of war as well as its inability to contain. On the PKK's side, although the group for long time expressed its willingness for a peaceful solution, the development in Syria regarding its ethnic kin were further increasing the benefits of a peace negotiation as such the peace negotiation happened. Yet since both actors' willingness to make peace to a large extent was related to the ethnic kin, the fate of the peace process was also heavily linked to the PKK's cooperation with the kin group.

The civil war between the Turkish government and the PKK is yet to be resolved but as briefly outlined in this paper, the peace processes cannot be considered in isolation from the rebels' transnational linkages. This proposition especially important for ethnic conflicts where the rebels' demands are related to their identity. In case of ethnic conflicts, a transborder kin outside the borders of the civil war country would contribute to the rebel's polarization from the nation state, intensify its mobilization. Moreover, it would provide the rebels material resources. Hence would help the rebel to reach their aims through other means rather than demanding them through the peace process. And as a result, this would increase the government's cost of war and hence we would see more willingness to negotiate on the side of the government towards the peace process. Simply because transnational linkages are hard to contain. And the Kurdish case showed while the government of Turkey had tried many different policy options to resolve the transnational cooperation, this proved highly ineffective.

However, the Kurdish case also showed an important implication regarding the rebels' demands. While the peace negotiations are beneficial and the rebels are willing to start the peace negotiations, in the presence of transnational linkages, they also increase in their demands. In the Kurdish Case, the cooperation of the PKK with the increasingly strong PYD in Syria led the PKK not to give up from this cooperation and from the regional autonomy that the Syrian Kurds could gain. Even if the PKK did start a peace negotiation, the data reveals that the PKK valued the regional expansion more than the peace process. Simply because it also has transnational aims. Similarly, even if the government started the peace negotiations, it did so because it could not contain the transnational cooperation in other means. That's exactly what led the peace process to collapse because while the government relied on regional cooperation with Russia and US on Syria to contain PKK influence, PKK wanted to keep this cooperation.

Then what does the research tell us about the potential resolution mechanism of the Kurdish conflict? And what are the implications of the research for the overall conflict literature in general?

As a first implication, research tells that even if the domestic conditions do not prove favourable for the initiation of the peace processes by the belligerents, transnational factors have the ability to change the actors' willingness towards a peaceful co-existence. While this is a positive finding for a peaceful solution, still it does pose some challenges and difficulties. The most important one is that this does not mean a genuine intention for the peace, actors can start the peace process to gain time or just because they could not mount the cost of conflict in other means. Moreover, the leverage that the transnational factors create is also highly volatile. In case of Turkey, when the government was able to contain this leverage by relying on the regional cooperation, it renounced from the peace process. Still in case of the PKK, the group further increased demands and that inhibit the peace efforts. Any policy recommendations, hence regarding the potential resolution mechanisms of the Kurdish conflict should take the transnational linkages and the regional cooperation opportunities into account.

The second implication of the research is regarding the overall conflict resolution literature. To date, peace processes have been studied from a domestic closed polity approach and policy recommendations were only taking the domestic conditions into account. Yet as discussed in the paper, civil wars cannot be studied in isolation from the actors' connections that span national boundaries. While this paper has contributed to the literature in a sense that it showed the importance of the cross-border linkages, there should be more research to investigate the different mechanisms how these linkages can affect the peace processes.

CONCLUSION

This PhD thesis is written with the aim of exploring the transnational dynamics of civil war peace processes. The thesis aimed at answering how the violent behaviour of the civil war actors during peace processes -hence the dynamics of civil war peace processes- are affected when rebel groups have transnational linkages with state and non-state actors in the world politics.

As also noted in the introduction section of the thesis, traditionally, civil wars and interstate wars are studied in separation (see Gleditsch 2007, 2009). As a result, civil wars have been elaborated mostly within the framework of domestic politics. In fact, even the very existence of the world “civil” implies that the study of civil wars is confined within nation state borders (Checkel 2013). However, over the last decades, the transnationalism of civil war literature and the developments at the international level, have challenged this understanding. Scholars have shown how civil war actors are interlinked with transgressing bonds to various state and non-state actors across the state borders and how these linkages can largely shape the onset and the duration of civil wars.

While much has been written in the quantitative large-N domain about the impact of transnational linkages on the onset and duration of civil wars. The peace process literature still approaches the belligerents’ interactions from the domestic perspective. To date, there are only few studies that elaborated on how such transnational linkages affect the conflict outcomes and resolution mechanisms (see eg. Furstenberg 2012, Gurses 2014,2015). Despite this background, this thesis is written with the aim of contributing to the peace process research by arguing that not only the conflict onset or duration but also the actors’ willingness to make a peace settlement and implement its provisions are can be dependent on the civil war actors’ transnational linkages.

By looking at various transnational linkages that rebel groups form with diasporas, transborder ethnic kin groups as well as neighbouring states and their previous supporters, the thesis aimed at showing that when they side with the challenger, the transnational actors can significantly alter the actors' incentives to make peace settlements as well as implement the peace settlements.

Building on the pillars of the non-cooperative bargaining theory, more specifically on the bargaining with the outside option principle (Powell 1996,2002), the thesis argued that the transnational actors by their ability to provide resources, alter the behaviour of both actors because they constitute an outside option for rebels in their pathway towards reaching their political aims. By offering an alternative way for rebels to reach their political aims that the government cannot contain, they increase the cost of conflict for the governments. As such, the transnational linkages would pull the government side in towards making a peace settlement as well as implementing the peace settlements. Simply because they make the peace process much more advantageous for the government compared to what it would be in the absence of such linkages. However, since transnational linkages constitute an alternative option to rely upon for rebels to reach their demands, rebel groups would only make a settlement and implement the settlement as long as the payoffs of these two stages of the peace process would outweigh the benefits of relying on their transnational linkages.

Despite this background, the thesis argued that transnational linkages would have a contradictory effect on different stages of peace processes. Simply because the value of peace process is not constant across different stages and the rebels' expectations and gains change during these two different stages. Since the settlements are almost always advantageous for rebels, in the presence of transnational linkages, conflicts are more likely to end with settlements. However,

since the implementation period lay out significant challenges for rebels, in the presence of transnational linkages the peace agreements are more likely to break down.

The three separate Ph.D. papers by looking at different transnational linkages and by bringing both qualitative and quantitative evidence; tested different parts of this theoretical proposition. The first paper looked at the probability of peace settlement in the presence of diasporas and transnational network support for rebel groups. The second paper looked at the influence of permissive regional and global conditions on the actors' willingness to implement their agreements. And tested the theoretical proposition by looking at the effect of previous rebel supporters, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil war on the implementation of peace agreements. The results showed that when the rebel groups are able to form transnational linkages, that would have a positive effect on the settlement, but on the contrary, it would also have a negative effect on the implementation of peace settlements. The third paper by looking at the 2012 Kurdish Peace Process, aimed at opening the back box of the theoretical mechanism regarding to willingness to make a settlement and looked at the effect of the rebel group's transborder kin groups on the Turkish government's and the PKK's willingness to make a settlement. By using theory testing process tracing method and by relying on the actual meeting minutes between the belligerents and systematic investigation of 1357 newspaper articles published during the peace process, the paper traced the stages of the proposed theoretical mechanism.

But how does this proposed theoretical framework is connected to a main social science discipline or a main school of thought in general? Eventually, theoretical frameworks regarding conflict resolution are not particularly conflict resolution theories per se, but in fact, the field is highly interdisciplinary. As such, especially theories tested in Large N studies originate from

different disciplines such as sociology, international relations, economics, political science and psychology and they are often linked to different school of thoughts within these disciplines.

The theoretical mechanism outlined in the Ph.D. thesis is by no exception, and it is intellectually linked to the international relations (IR) field and to the insights of several game theory assumptions that makes emphasis on the political environment / the structure in shaping the actors' behaviour. As such, it argued that it is the peace process structure and the opportunities within this structure that would determine the civil war actors' bargaining strategies during the peace processes (see Reiter 2003).

It could be rightfully argued that IR realist school only focuses on the states as the only actors in world politics and do not take the non-state actors nor transnational connections into consideration. However, as the states in the international system; civil war actors are also surrounded with anarchy and are subject to Hobbesian state of war because there is no longer an established order or a Leviathan in Hobbesian terms to create that order (Posen 1993; Salehyan 2009). Because civil wars result with the breakdown of the state and the collapse of the institutions that guarantee and enforce the order (Christia 2012).

Based on this background, my theoretical lens follows the work of Waltz (1959, 1979) who argues that it is the structure they interact that determines the actors' behaviour. I am also following Mearsheimer (1995:10) and I assume that the civil war environment as anarchic, the actors are rational, are not sure about the opponents' motives, thus are driven with survival and profit maximising motives. To this end they also possess both offensive and defensive motivations. My assumptions stem from Cetinyan (2002), and I argue that under an anarchical system, both civil war actors would choose their moves strategically regarding the current and the anticipated actions

of their opponents. And to explain how the actors' strategic behavioural change under the anarchical structure, I apply non-cooperative bargaining game theory assumptions such as information and commitment problems with the outside option principle to the study of civil war peace processes (see Sutton 1986; Powell 1996; 2002). As such, I also link the civil war two-actor bargaining literature to the recently developing transnationalism of the civil war literature (see Gleditsch 2007; 2009).

My theoretical lens conceptualizes peace processes as the outcome of strategic decisions of rational actors in an anarchical setting. As such, like all structural theories, it also treats the actors as unitary. It is also based on the assumption that civil wars are asymmetrical and the balance of power is on behalf of governments. It also assumes that when making their strategic moves, the belligerents did not have a priori complete information but this information is revealed and learned through the battlefield over time. This type of framing also brings a dynamic component (i.e. the effects of transnational linkages revealing the necessary information).

The thesis has several contributions; First of all, it contributes to the main body of recently flourishing transnationalism of civil wars, an aspect that has been long neglected by the previous studies. While following the seminal works of Gleditsch (2007;2009) on this topic; many scholars started to expand this field with great contributions over the last decades; most literature in this context was looking at how these transnational linkages affect either the onset or the duration of civil wars. And the many valuable insight they offer haven't been translated in the peace process literature. As such, there was a dearth of systematic studies on how transnational linkages influence civil war peace processes. So; this thesis that studies both qualitatively and quantitatively the impact of various kinds of transnational linkages on the peace settlement and settlement implementation, aimed at filling this gap.

As a second contribution, the proposed theoretical framework leads to a highly novel and dynamic understanding of civil war actors' behaviour during different stages of peace processes in the presence of transnational linkages. It leads us to understand under what conditions civil war actors prefer settlements and settlement implementation. Traditionally civil war studies cursed the existence transnational resources and argued that for instance that the increasing number of peace settlements over the last decades should be attributed to the end of Cold War where states no longer needed to support the rebel groups (Hartzell 2018; Hartzell Hoddie and Rothchild 2001). Similarly, civil wars are less likely to end in peaceful ways when rebels have sanctuaries and resources coming from their transnational linkages (See Furstenberg 2012). As a counter argument, there are also studies that argued that it's the very existence of these opportunities in fact, increases the probability of settlements in internal armed conflicts (Gurses 2015). Eventually both of these propositions cannot hold at the same time.

So, this theoretical proposition offers a framework to understand how these two different propositions can coexist together. Simple; transnational linkages would make the government more likely to seek and implement a settlement. However, rebels would choose the bargaining when conditions are favourable and would refrain from the bargaining when the conditions are not favourable. Rather than being tautological, the framework explains that this choice lies in the opportunities and challenges that the structure of peace processes stages brings to rebel groups. It argued that while making peace settlements are advantageous for rebel groups, the implementation period brings changes for rebels. And that's the reason why we observe different implications of the transnational factors at different stages of peace processes.

Apart from the main theoretical framework proposed, each paper has their own theoretical and empirical contribution to the topic they elaborate on. For instance, in the first paper, for long time the diasporas and transnational network support for rebel groups has been labelled as conflict fuelling. Yet, there were also few exceptions in the literature that also underlined their peace maker roles. The disagreement was mostly due to the lack of data that didn't permit a comparative analysis on transnational constituencies' role in conflict. This paper by operationalizing the transnational constituency support from two different data sources, found that once the conflict is on the way, the diasporas and transnational networks' engagement on the side of the rebels actually increases the probability of conflict settlement.

The second paper elaborated the role of permissive regional and global conditions during the implementation stage of the peace agreements. The literature on the implementation of peace agreements, so far, has underlined the actors' commitment problems and suggested many policy recommendations to overcome these problems. Suggestions revolved around improving county conditions, creating self-sustainable agreements and ensuring third party guarantees. The third-party roles in this regard was limited to providing security guarantees (Karlen 2017). Paper argued that third parties, more than providing security, intentionally and unintentionally provide resources for rebel groups. As such paper suggested to look at the broader regional and global environment where the peace agreements take place. The result indicated that transnational linkages not only on the settlement but also in the implementation period have a significant effect but this time a negative one on the actors' incentives. And that in the presence of hostile neighbours, neighbours in civil war, or previous rebel supporters, the peace agreements are less likely to be implemented.

The third paper aimed at opening up the black box of the theoretical mechanism regarding the willingness to make a settlement. As such, it adopted a mechanistic view of causality and explained the proposed theoretical mechanism by five interrelated stages. As such it contributed to the growing literature on Kurdish Studies, transnationalism of civil wars as well as on the literature on peace settlements in internal armed conflicts.

Of course, the Ph.D. thesis has weaknesses and limitations. The first one is; it aims to bring a more generic theory of transnational peace processes although it only looks at only few of them. Yet in light of my individual research practice and previous studies, the theory holds when looking at other factors too. Moreover, my framework treats the civil wars as if they consist only from one dyad: the government side and the rebel side and it allows only one actor to have an outside option which in this case; were the rebel groups. This approach is not tenable in many contemporary conflicts. Because the picture is much more complicated.

Not only many civil wars involve various distinct rebel groups fighting with the government but the governments also receive various support structures from other states, international diasporas and transnational rebel groups. So, the governments also have transnational and international linkages. For instance; during Syrian Civil War, there were approximately more than 200 armed groups fighting on the ground. And although the support structures are not clear cut and showed variations over the course of time, all sides have received support from various different state and non-state actors. For instance; while the Kurds were supported by the US, the Kurdish Diaspora, its transnational ethnic Kin group PKK; Syrian Regime was supported by Russia, Iran and by Hezbollah, on the other hand National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces were supported by various states in the neighbourhood such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. And there are also allegations that ISIS was supported by these last three.

Eventually not all civil wars are as complicated and involved so many factions as in Syria but it reasonable to assume that number of supporters, factions and the way they ally with each other would clearly have an impact on the likelihood of settlement and implementation (see Cunningham 2006; 2010; Nilsson 2007; Christia 2012).

In addition, as another complication; civil war actors are neither monolithic nor unitary yet they are actually made up from different cleavages. The governments in order to survive need to take population and national parliament's support. Hence its decision mechanism is heavily dependent on the political situation at the domestic level. The rebel side is by no means different. Rebels can be formed by temporary coalitions of fighters (Kreutz 2014;). These coalitions or fractionalizations can significantly affect rebel groups' ability to secure resources which is an important determinant whether or not the groups would be able to make a peace process (Christia 2012). In addition; existing research show that these coalitions also influence the fate of peace process making pro-peace moderates challenged by the extremist who does not want to demobilize or spoil the peace process with violence. (See Sisk 2009; Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2002)

However, as “all wrong” but “useful” theoretical models, my theoretical model makes simplifying assumptions regarding the peace processes and is designed to answer some questions and not others (Powell 2002). Yet, it nonetheless provides a useful starting point to think about the effect of rebel groups' transnational linkages as their outside option during different stages of peace processes. As such it contributes to the literature by proposing an alternative view “an outside option” regarding the role of transnational linkages that up to date mostly described as conflict fuelling.

Appendix for Paper 1:

Explaining the Role of Diasporas and Transnational Networks In Peace Settlements

This appendix is included as additional material for the first paper of the Ph.D. thesis and consists of two different parts. The first section presents the data and the second section presents the alternative specifications of the models presented in Table 3 and briefly compares the results.

Appendix 1A: Conflict dyads that experienced peace settlements

Appendix 1B: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables
(Table 3 in the paper)

Appendix 1C: Detailed explanations and coding decisions for all the variables used in this study

Appendix 2A: Alternative Model Specifications with first-year conflict values

Dyad ID	Government	Rebel Groups	Settlement
1	Algeria	FIS	Yes
7	Angola	UNITA	Yes
7	Angola	UNITA	Yes
11	Burundi	Palipehutu	Yes
13	Burundi	Frolina	Yes
14	Burundi	CNDD-FDD	Yes
15	Burundi	Palipehutu-FNL	Yes
21	Chad	CSNPD	Yes
24	Chad	FNT	Yes
25	Chad	MDD [-FANT]	Yes
26	Chad	FARF	Yes
35	Comoros	MPA	Yes
36	Congo	Ninjas	Yes
38	Congo-Brazzaville	Ntsiloulous	Yes
40	Congo/Zaire	RCD	Yes
41	Congo/Zaire	MLC	Yes
43	Djibouti	FRUD	Yes
44	Djibouti	FRUD	Yes
95	Liberia	LURD	Yes
96	Mali	MPA	Yes
99	Mozambique	Renamo	Yes
111	Niger	CRA	Yes
129	Senegal	MFDC	Yes
130	Sierra Leone	RUF	Yes
223	Bangladesh	JSS/SB/Shanti Bahini	Yes
225	El Salvador	FMLN	Yes
228	Guatemala	URNG	Yes
230	Mexico	EZLN	Yes
231	Nicaragua	FDN/Contras	Yes
247	Philippines	MNLF	Yes
248	United Kingdom	Real IRA	Yes
259	Georgia	Republic of Abkhazia	Yes
262	India	ATTF	Yes
281	Yugoslavia	Republic of Slovenia	Yes
286	India	NSCN	Yes
292	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes
293	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes
295	Yugoslavia	UCK	Yes
297	Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia	Yes
297	Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia	Yes
300	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbian irregulars	Yes
301	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatian irregulars	Yes
304	Myanmar	KIO	Yes
308	Myanmar	MTA	Yes
313	India	BDSF/NDFB	Yes
321	Myanmar	UWSA	Yes
337	Papua New Guinea	BRA	Yes
341	Macedonia	National Liberation Army (UCK)	Yes
343	Colombia	EPL	Yes
344	Indonesia	Fretilin	Yes
347	Indonesia	GAM	Yes
348	Russia	Republic of Chechnya	Yes
349	Nepal	CPN-M/UPF	Yes
352	Liberia	MODEL	Yes
353	Tajikistan	UTO	Yes
361	Azerbaijan	Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh	Yes
367	Moldova	Dniestr Republic	Yes
377	Israel	Fatah	Yes
378	Cambodia	KPNLF	Yes
379	Cambodia	FUNCINPEC/ANS	Yes
383	Lebanon	Lebanese Forces	Yes
427	Israel	PNA	Yes
435	Eritrea	EIJM	Yes
455	Chad	FUCD	Yes
516	South Africa	SWAPO	Yes
558	South Africa	ANC	Yes
570	Lebanon	Independent Nasserite Movement /Mourabitoun militia	Yes
616	Yemen [North]	Royalists	Yes
617	Yemen [North]	National Democratic Front	Yes
630	Sudan	NRF	Yes
631	Sudan	SLM	Yes
633	Chad	RAFD	Yes
645	Sudan	Faction of SPLM	Yes
646	Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire)	CNDP	Yes
661	Chad	FAP	Yes
676	Sudan	Anya Nya	Yes
684	Myanmar	MPF	Yes
712	Rhodesia	ZANU-PF	Yes
722	Lebanon	Lebanese National Movement	Yes
722	Lebanon	Lebanese National Movement	Yes
723	Lebanon	LAA/Lebanese Arab Army	Yes
762	Niger	UFRA	Yes
781	Israel	PLO/Fatah	Yes
799	Myanmar	Arakan People's Liberation Party	Yes

Appendix 1B: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables (Table 3)

Appendix 1B: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Transnational Support (NSA)	358	.2905028	.4546298	0	1
Transnational Support II (UCDP)	308	.0779221	.2684851	0	1
Rebel Strength	395	1.724051	.7555573	1	5
ln Duration	396	1.228225	1.045539	0	3.931826
ln Battle Deaths	391	10.26307	2.041364	3.555348	14.50866
ln GDP pc (t-1)	382	7.519049	1.039462	5.380542	10.9415
Territorial	391	.4092072	.4923175	0	1
Major Conflict	391	.2710997	.445097	0	1
Anocracy (t-1)	374	.5347594	.4994585	0	1
Polyarchy (t-1)	389	.2954677	.2117451	.0127043	.8975098

Appendix 1.C: Detailed Explanations and Coding Decisions for all the Independent Variables Used in This Study

Settlement: Binary variable measuring the existence of a peace agreement between the armed group and the government. Peace agreement refers to any agreement signed between the belligerents that ends the dyad episode and regulates at least one issue regarding the conflict. Its operationalized from the type of termination variable of the Non-State Armed Group Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013) by taking the first three values corresponding to dyad episode ending with (1) a ceasefire agreement, (2) ceasefire agreement with conflict resolution mechanisms, and (3) a peace agreement.

Transnational Support (NSA) is a binary variable that records any kind of military, financial, and diplomatic support given to rebel groups by diasporas and transnational networks anytime during the course of the dyad episode. It is also taken from the Non-State Armed Group Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013). The NSA data has two ordinal variables measuring the existence of transnational support given to rebel groups from their diasporas and transnational networks. First one is *transconstsupp* variable that measures the non-military support and the second one is *rebextpart* variable recording the military support given to the challenger from their transnational constituencies. While these variables also include major, minor, tacit, explicit and alleged categories; since it does not indicate real support I have excluded the alleged category.

Transnational Support II (UCDP) is a binary variable measuring any kind of military, financial, and diplomatic support given to rebel groups by diasporas and transnational networks anytime during the course of the conflict. It's taken from the UCDP External Support Dataset Project Disaggregated / Supporter Level Dataset v. 1.0-2011 (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011).

UCDP External Support Data does not specifically provide information on diasporas and transnational networks but provides information on the existence of an external supporter as well as on the identity of the supporter (whether it's a state, a non-state armed group or a transnational network and diaspora group). Based on the UCDP actor ID's, I have selected specifically the transnational network and diaspora groups. Transnational Support II (UCDP) variable records the existence of the transnational support and coded as 1 if rebel groups have received support from their diaspora or transnational networks at any time during the course of dyad episode and 0 if otherwise.

Rebel Strength: Ordinal variable measuring the strength of rebel military forces compared to the government's military forces. It contains 5 categories: 5=much stronger, 4= stronger, 3= at parity, 2=weak, 1 much weaker. Taken from the NSA Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013)

Territorial: Binary variable measuring the incompatibility of the conflict. Its coded as 1 for the conflicts that are fought for incompatibility over a territory and 0 for the conflicts that are fought for incompatibility over government. It is taken from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002)

ln GDP pc (t-1) Log of the GDP per capita of the country where the rebellion takes place. Since the unit of analysis is dyad episode, it measures the year before the end of particular dyad episode. It's taken from the Expanded Trade and GDP Data (Gleditsch 2002a)

ln Duration: The log of the time elapsed since the beginning of the specific conflict dyad episode until the end of that particular episode. It is calculated in years. For the first dyad episode, its calculated from the beginning of the dyad until the end of the first episode. For the second episode, its calculated from the beginning of the dyad until the end of the second episode and so on.. Note that its added +1 for episodes that have 0 years of duration. Beginning of the dyad episode refers to the first time the dyad generated a battle-related death.

ln Battle Deaths: Log of the "total" number of battle-related deaths generated in the particular conflict. Taken from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005)

Major Conflict: Binary variable measuring whether or not a particular dyad episode has ever reached the 1000 battle related threshold. (If dyad episode reached 1000 battle deaths ==1 if not ==0) It's taken from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002)

Anocracy (t-1) Dummy variable measuring the political regime of the country in conflict. Countries are defined as anocratic when their political regime is party democratic and partly autocratic. It's taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and. Jaggers. 2010). A country is coded as anocracy hence as 1 if its polity2 score ranges between -6 and +6 and 0 if otherwise. Since the unit of analysis in this study is dyad episode, it measures the year before the end of that particular dyad episode.

Polyarchy (t-1): Numeric variable measuring the level of electoral democracy. It's taken from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (Lindberg et al., 2014). Since the unit of analysis in this study is dyad episode, it measures the year before the end of the particular dyad episode.

Appendix 2A: Alternative Model Specifications with First Year of the Dyad Episode Values for Some of the Control Variables

In the paper from models 1-5, I have tested the effect of transnational support with two different variables operationalized from two different datasets. Then, I tested their effects also with alternative control variables. In this section, I test the same models in Table 3 (1-5) by taking the first-year dyad episode values of ln Gdp pc, Anocracy, and Polyarchy. Underlying rationale for taking the first-year values is that civil conflicts can change countries' economic development as well as their democracy scores.

APPENDIX 2A: Alternative models including control variables (ln Gdp pc, Anocracy, Polyarchy) measuring first year of dyad episode

	Model 1 (1946–2008)	Model 2 (1946–2008)	Model 3 (1975–2008)	Model 4 (1946–2008)	Model 5 (1975–2008)
ln Battle Deaths	-0.062 (0.08)	-0.059 (0.09)	-0.049 (0.09)		
Anocracy (first year)	0.925*** (0.29)	0.862*** (0.29)	0.931*** (0.30)		
Rebel Strength	0.481** (0.20)	0.461** (0.22)	0.508** (0.22)	0.556*** (0.20)	0.612*** (0.20)
ln Duration	0.322** (0.14)	0.261* (0.15)	0.202 (0.15)	0.154 (0.13)	0.050 (0.14)
Territorial	0.253 (0.31)	-0.081 (0.30)	0.400 (0.34)	-0.287 (0.34)	0.266 (0.34)
ln GDP pc (first year)	-0.081 (0.15)	-0.163 (0.16)	-0.160 (0.14)	-0.116 (0.16)	-0.098 (0.15)
Transnational Support (NSA)		0.919*** (0.30)		0.921*** (0.33)	
Transnational Support II (UCDP)			1.079** (0.44)		0.995** (0.43)
Major Conflict				0.287 (0.31)	0.445 (0.37)
Polyarchy (first year)				1.357* (0.81)	0.967 (0.76)
Constant	-1.920 (1.67)	-1.306 (1.80)	-1.266 (1.63)	-2.264* (1.30)	-2.084 (1.34)
AIC	381.2237	347.9283	323.6093	366.5539	340.0387
BIC	408.5038	378.321	352.7729	397.4857	369.7221
N	364	330	283	353	302

Robust standard errors clustered by conflict are in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Results mimic the models presented in Table 3. The estimates show that the Transnational Support variable operationalized from NSA data as well as the Transnational Support II Variable operationalized from UCDP dataset are positive significant at p<0.01 and p<0.05 levels. Furthermore, the estimates of the Rebel Strength variable suggest that the influence of transnational support on peace settlement does follow a separate path than making rebel groups stronger since the coefficient of rebel support doesn't change substantially. This gives more evidence on the government's expected cost of conflict argument. Hence, not because transnational constituency support contribute to rebel groups' timely material might but because as an outside option for rebels, transnational constituencies have the potential to increase the government's expected costs because they are harder to contain.

Appendix for Paper 2:

Transnational Linkages and Implementation of Peace Agreements

in Civil Wars

This appendix is included as additional material for the second paper of the Ph.D. thesis and consists of two different parts. The first section presents the data and the second section presents the alternative specifications of the models presented in Table 1 and briefly compares the results.

Appendix 1A: List of all peace agreements covered in the paper (1975-2011)

Appendix 1B: Descriptive statistics for the full sample (Table 1, Models 1-4)

Appendix 1C: Descriptive Statistics for the subsample (Table 1, Models 5-7)

Appendix 1D: Detailed explanations and coding decisions for all the independent variables used in this paper and in Appendix 2A- 2B

Appendix 2A: Alternative model specification with different control variables

Appendix 2B: Alternative model specification with 150 miles Neighbourhood Distance

Appendix 2C: Alternative model specification with Non-Territorial Conflicts

Government	Name of the Peace Agreement	Year	Implementation
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) - ZAPU	Declaration of intent	1975	No
Government of Philippines - MNLF	Tripoli Agreement	1976	No
Government of Chad - FAN	Basic Charter (Fundamental Charter)	1978	No
Government of Chad - FAN	Khartoum Agreement	1978	No
Government of South Africa - SWAPO	Western Contact Group (WCG) Settlement Proposal	1978	No
Government of Mauritania - POLISARIO	Algiers Agreement	1979	Yes
Government of Chad - FAN, Government of Chad - FAP	Kano Accord	1979	No
Government of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) - PF	Lancaster House Agreement	1979	Yes
Government of Mozambique - Renamo	Joint Declaration on a Cessation of Armed Activity and Conflict	1984	No
Government of Uganda - NRA	Nairobi Peace Agreement	1985	No
Government of Philippines - MNLF	Jeddah Accord	1987	No
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	DUP/SPLM Sudan Peace Agreement	1988	No
Government of India - TNV	Memorandum of Understanding with TNV	1988	Yes
Government of Uganda - UPDA	Gulu Peace Accord (Pece Peace Agreement)	1988	Yes
Government of Angola - UNITA	The Gbadolite declaration on Angola	1989	No
Government of South Africa - ANC	Pretoria Minute	1990	Yes
Government of Liberia - INPFL, Government of Liberia - NPFL	Banjul IV Agreement	1990	No
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	Agreement on Human Rights	1990	Yes
Government of South Africa - ANC	Groote Schuur Minute	1990	Yes
Government of Liberia - INPFL	Banjul III Agreement	1990	Yes
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	General Agenda and Timetable for the Comprehensive Negotiating Process	1990	Yes
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	Geneva Agreement	1990	Yes
Government of Liberia - INPFL, Government of Liberia - NPFL	Bamako Ceasefire Agreement	1990	No
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Oslo Accord	1990	Yes
Government of Liberia - INPFL, Government of Liberia - NPFL	Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement	1991	No
Government of Mozambique - Renamo	Basic Principles	1991	Yes
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	New York Act	1991	Yes
Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - Republic of Slovenia	Brioni Agreement	1991	Yes
Government of Mali - MPA	Tamanrasset Accord	1991	No
Government of Colombia - EPL	Acuerdo final Gobierno Nacional-Ejército Popular De Liberación	1991	Yes
Government of Papua New Guinea - BRA	The Honiara Declaration	1991	No
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	The Compressed Negotiations	1991	Yes
Government of Rwanda - FPR	The N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement	1991	No
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Mexico Accord	1991	Yes
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	Mexico Agreements	1991	Yes
Government of Liberia - INPFL, Government of Liberia - NPFL	Lomé Agreement	1991	No
Government of South Africa - ANC	CODESA Declaration of Intent	1991	Yes
Government of Mozambique - Renamo	Agreement on Establishment and Recognition of Political Parties	1991	Yes
Government of Angola - UNITA	The Bicesse Agreement	1991	No
Government of Mozambique - Renamo	The Protocol on the Agreed Agenda	1991	Yes
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	New York Agreement	1991	Yes
Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KR, Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - KPNLF, Government of Cambodia (Kampuchea) - FUNCINPEC	Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict "The Paris Agreement"	1991	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Querétaro Agreement	1991	Yes
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	New York Act II	1992	Yes
Government of South Africa - ANC	Record of Understanding	1992	Yes
Government of Mozambique - Renamo	Agreement on Principles of the Electoral Act	1992	Yes
Government of Rwanda - FPR	The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law	1992	No
Government of Mozambique - Renamo	The Acordo Geral de Paz (AGP)	1992	Yes
Government of Chad - FNT	El Geneina agreement	1992	No
Government of Mali - MPA	Pacte National	1992	No
Government of El Salvador - FMLN	The Chapultepec Peace Agreement	1992	Yes
Government of Rwanda - FPR	Arusha Accords	1993	No
Government of Israel - Fatah	Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements/ Oslo Agreement	1993	Yes
Government of Somalia - USC/SNA	Addis Ababa Agreement	1993	No
Government of Chad - CNR	Tripoli 1 Agreement	1993	No
Government of Rwanda - FPR	The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons,	1993	No
Government of Rwanda - FPR	The Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the integration of Armed Forces	1993	No
Government of Haiti - Military faction (Forces of Raoul Cédras)	The Governor's Island agreement	1993	No
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Jalalabad agreement	1993	Yes
Government of South Africa - ANC	Interim Constitution	1993	Yes
Government of Rwanda - FPR	The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government,	1993	No
Government of India - ATTF	Memorandum of Settlement - 23 August 1993	1993	No
Government of Liberia - NPFL	Cotonou Peace Agreement	1993	No
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Wahdat, Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Islamabad accord	1993	No
Government of India - ABSU	Bodoland Autonomous Council Act, 1993	1993	Yes
Government of Niger - FLAA	Paris Accord	1993	No
Government of Angola - UNITA	The Lusaka Protocol	1994	No
Government of Djibouti - FRUD	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale	1994	Yes
Government of Israel - Fatah	Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area	1994	Yes
Government of Georgia - Republic of Abkhazia	Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict	1994	Yes
Government of Niger - CRA	Ouagadougou Accord	1994	Yes
Government of Somalia - USC/SNA	Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation	1994	No
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights	1994	Yes
Government of Chad - CSNPD	Bangui-2 Agreement	1994	No
Government of Chad - FNT	Abeche agreement	1994	Yes
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	The Washington Agreement	1994	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Framework Agreement for the Resumption of Negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity	1994	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on a Timetable for Negotiations on a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala	1994	Yes
Government of Israel - Fatah	Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO	1994	Yes
Government of Liberia - NPFL	Akosombo Peace Agreement	1994	No
Government of Papua New Guinea - BRA	Honiara Commitments to Peace	1994	No
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement for the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer	1994	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict	1994	Yes
Government of Niger - CRA	Accord e 'tablissant une paix définitive entre le gouvernement de la republique du Niger et l'organisation de la résistance armée	1995	Yes
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian irregulars, Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina - Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina	The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement)	1995	Yes
Government of Israel - Fatah	Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip/ Oslo B	1995	Yes
Government of Tajikistan - UTO	Protocol on the Fundamental Principles of Establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan	1995	Yes
Government of Philippines - Military faction (forces of Honasan, Abernina & Zumei)	GRP-RAM/SFP/YOU General Agreement for Peace	1995	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples	1995	Yes
Government of Chad - MDD	The Dougia Accord	1995	No
Government of Croatia - Serbian Republic of Krajina, Government of Croatia - Serbian irregulars	The Erdut Agreement	1995	Yes
Government of Liberia - NPFL	Abuja Peace Agreement	1995	No
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the URNG	1996	Yes
Government of Liberia - NPFL	Abuja II Peace Agreement	1996	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace	1996	Yes
Government of Afghanistan - Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan	Mahipar agreement	1996	No
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime	1996	Yes
Government of Tajikistan - UTO	Agreement between the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, E.S. Rakhmonov, and the leader of the United Tajik-Opposition, S.A. Huri, on the results of the meeting held in Moscow 23 December 1996	1996	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society	1996	Yes

Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on Socio-economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation	1996	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements	1996	Yes
Government of Guatemala - URNG	The Agreement on a Definitive Ceasefire	1996	Yes
Government of Sierra Leone - RUF	Abidjan Peace Agreement	1996	No
Government of Mexico - EZLN	The San Andrés Accords	1996	No
Government of Philippines - MNLF	Mindanao Final Agreement	1996	Yes
Government of Bangladesh - JSS/SB	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord	1997	Yes
Government of Somalia - USC/SNA	The Cairo Declaration on Somalia	1997	No
Government of Israel - Fatah	Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron	1997	Yes
Government of Tajikistan - UTO	Statute of the Commission on National Reconciliation	1997	Yes
Government of Moldova - PMR	Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria	1997	Yes
Government of Tajikistan - UTO	Protocol on political issues	1997	Yes
Government of Chad - FNT	National reconciliation agreement	1997	Yes
Government of Tajikistan - UTO	The Moscow Declaration - General agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan	1997	Yes
Government of Israel - Fatah, Government of Israel - PNA	The Wye River Memorandum	1998	No
Government of Chad - FARF	Donya agreement	1998	Yes
Government of Guinea Bissau - Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	Abuja Peace Agreement	1998	No
Government of United Kingdom - IRA	The Good Friday Agreement	1998	Yes
Government of Chad - MDD	Reconciliation agreement	1999	No
Government of Congo - Ninjas, Government of Congo - Cocoyes, Government of Congo - Ntsiloulous	Accord de Cessez-le-Feu et de Cessation des Hostilités	1999	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD, Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Lusaka Accord	1999	No
Government of Yugoslavia (Serbia) - UCK	Kosovo peace agreement 1	1999	Yes
Government of Colombia - FARC	Common Agenda for the Path to a New Colombia	1999	Yes
Government of Israel - Fatah, Government of Israel - PNA	The Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II	1999	Yes
Government of Sierra Leone - RUF	Lomé Peace Agreement	1999	No
Government of the Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan	The Famboni Declaration	2000	No
Government of Sierra Leone - RUF	Abuja Ceasefire Agreement	2000	Yes
Government of Burundi - Palipehutu, Government of Burundi - CNDD, Government of Burundi - Frolina	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi	2000	Yes
Government of Djibouti - FRUD – AD	Accord Cadre de Reforme et de Concorde Civile	2000	Yes
Government of Philippines - MILF	Agreement on Peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front	2001	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD, Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Declaration of Fundamental Principles for the Inter-Congolese dialogue	2001	Yes
Government of Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of) - UCK	The Ohrid Agreement	2001	Yes
Government of the Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan	The Famboni II Agreement	2001	Yes
Government of Papua New Guinea - BRA	Bougainville Peace Agreement	2001	Yes
Government of Djibouti - FRUD – AD	Accord de reforme et concorde civile	2001	Yes
Government of Colombia - FARC	Los Pozos Agreement	2001	Yes
Government of Burundi - CNDD–FDD	Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the Conseil national pour la défense de ladémocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie	2002	Yes
Government of Chad - MDJT	Tripoli 2 agreement	2002	No
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Machakos Protocol	2002	Yes
Government of Uganda - UNRF II	Yumbe Peace Agreement	2002	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Political agreement on consensual management of the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	2002	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD, Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo	2002	Yes
Government of Indonesia - GAM	Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement	2002	Yes
Government of Angola - UNITA	Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Intent	2002	Yes
Government of Colombia - FARC	Los Pozos Accord	2002	No
Government of Burundi - CNDD–FDD	The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi	2003	Yes
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period	2003	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD, Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - MLC	Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations - The Final Act	2003	Yes
Government of Liberia - MODEL, Government of Liberia - LURD	Accra Ceasefire Agreement	2003	Yes
Government of the Comoros - MPA/Republic of Anjouan	Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros	2003	Yes
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPIGO, Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MJP, Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPCJ	Accra II	2003	Yes
Government of Burundi - CNDD–FDD	The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi	2003	Yes
Government of Burundi - CNDD–FDD	The Global Ceasefire agreement between Transitional Government and the Forces pour la defence de la democratie (CNDD-FDD) of Mr. Nkúrunziza	2003	Yes
Government of Liberia - MODEL, Government of Liberia - LURD	Accra Peace Agreement	2003	Yes
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPIGO, Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MJP, Government of Cote D'Ivoire - MPCJ	Linás-Marcoussis Peace Accords	2003	No
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Accra III	2004	No
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area	2004	Yes
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Framework on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period	2004	Yes
Government of Senegal - MFDC	Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la republique du Senegal et le Mouvement des forces democratique de la Casamace (MFDC)	2004	Yes
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on Power Sharing	2004	Yes
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States	2004	Yes
Government of Sudan - NDA	Agreement between the GoS and the NDA (Cairo Agreement)	2005	Yes
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in Côte d'Ivoire	2005	Yes
Government of Sudan - NDA	Cairo Framework Agreement between the GoS and the NDA	2005	Yes
Government of Indonesia - GAM	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement	2005	Yes
Government of Chad - MDJT	Yebibou agreement 2005	2005	Yes
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement	2005	Yes
Government of Nepal - CPN-M	Ceasefire Code of Conduct	2006	Yes
Government of Burundi - Palipehutu–FNL	Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of Burundi and the Palipehutu-FNL	2006	Yes
Government of Nepal - CPN-M	Decisions of the Summit Meeting of the Seven-Party Alliance and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)	2006	Yes
Government of Sudan - SLM/A (MM)	Darfur Peace Agreement	2006	No
Government of Chad - FUCD	Tripoli accord	2006	Yes
Government of Nepal - CPN-M	The Eight-point SPA-Maoist Agreement	2006	Yes
Government of Burundi - Palipehutu–FNL	Agreement of Principles Towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability	2006	Yes
Government of Angola - FLEC–R	Memorandum of Understanding on Peace and National Reconciliation in Cabinda province	2006	Yes
Government of Nepal - CPN-M	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2006	2006	Yes
Government of Uganda - LRA	Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army/Movement	2007	No
Government of Israel - Fatah	Israeli-Palestinian Joint Understanding on Negotiations	2007	Yes
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Ouagadougou Political Agreement	2007	Yes
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Third Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	2007	Yes
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	First Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	2007	Yes
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Second Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	2007	Yes
Government of Uganda - LRA	Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and Lord's Resistance Army/Movement	2007	No
Government of Central African Republic - UFDR	Birao Agreement	2007	Yes
Government of Somalia - ARS/UIC	Decision of the High Level Committee, Djibouti Agreement	2008	Yes
Government of Uganda - LRA	Agreement on Implementation and Monitoring Mechanisms	2008	No
Government of Cote D'Ivoire - FN	Fourth Complementary Agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement	2008	Yes
Government of Uganda - LRA	Implementation protocol to the Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions	2008	No
Government of Uganda - LRA	Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration	2008	No
Government of Uganda - LRA	Annex to the accountability and reconciliation protocol	2008	No
Government of Central African Republic - UFDR	Accord de Paix Global entre le Gouvernement de la Republique Centrafricaine et les Mouvements politico-militaires centrafricains designes ci-apres: APRD, FDPC, UFDR	2008	No
Government of Somalia - ARS/UIC	Djibouti Agreement	2008	Yes
Government of Uganda - LRA	Agreement on a Permanent ceasefire	2008	No
Government of Burundi - Palipehutu–FNL	Declaration of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Great Lakes region on the Burundi Peace Process	2008	Yes
Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - CNDP	23 March 2009 Agreement	2009	No
Government of Sudan - JEM	Doha Agreement	2010	Yes
Government of Sudan - SPLM/A-North	Addis Ababa Agreement	2011	No

Appendix 1B: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample // Table 1 (Models 1-4)

APPENDIX 1B: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
Full Sample: 196 Peace Agreements // Table 1 (Models 1-4)

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Rebel Support	195	.7846154	.412147	0	1
Hostile Neighbours	188	.4893617	.5012216	0	1
Neighbours in Civil War	188	.9042553	.2950265	0	1
Previous Agreement	196	.7346939	.4426267	0	1
PKO	196	.1887755	.3923323	0	1
Powersharing	196	.4438776	.4981126	0	1
Rebel Strength	196	2.80102	.9903115	1	5
Territorial	196	.2040816	.404061	0	1
ln Gdp pc	196	7.243931	1.084212	4.888995	10.19846
Democracy	194	.2886598	.4543118	0	1
ln Population	196	9.307255	1.210659	6.332338	13.74103
ln Battle Deaths	196	8.702863	1.9617	3.218876	12.2576
ln Duration	196	2.767046	1.002995	0	4.077538

Appendix 1C: Descriptive Statistics for the Restricted Sample // Table 1 (Models 5-7)

APPENDIX 1C: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables
Restricted Sample: 157 Peace Agreements // Table 1 (Models 5-7)

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Rebel Support	156	.775641	.418503	0	1
Hostile Neighbours	152	.4671053	.5005661	0	1
Neighbours in Civil War	152	.9276316	.2599535	0	1
Previous Agreement	157	.7643312	.4257742	0	1
PKO	157	.2038217	.404127	0	1
Powersharing	157	.5031847	.5015898	0	1
Rebel Strength	157	2.821656	.9968102	1	5
Territorial	157	.2038217	.404127	0	1
ln Gdp pc	157	7.202954	1.080383	4.888995	10.19846
Democracy	155	.283871	.4523365	0	1
ln Population	157	9.28798	1.251189	6.332338	13.74103
ln Battle Deaths	157	8.734395	2.024837	3.218876	12.2576
ln Duration	157	2.786144	1.020498	0	3.931826

Appendix 1D: Detailed explanations and coding decisions for all the independent variables used in this study (Table 1 and Appendix 2A- 2B)

Implementation: Binary variable taken from the “ended” variable of the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011). Implementation is coded as 1 if none of the signatory parties did contest the agreement and none of the signatory parties did question its validity and keep being party to the agreement. Its coded as 0 if one or more of the warring parties that signed the agreement contested its validity and are no longer party to the agreement or withdrew from the agreement.

Rebel Support: Binary variable indicating the existence of a previous external supporter to the rebels who signed the peace agreement. While peace agreements can include only one rebel groups fighting in conflict, they can also be comprehensive and include all rebel groups fighting in the conflict. Rebel support variable is then coded as 1 if at least one of the rebel groups that have signed agreement have received external support prior to the agreement year.

Hostile Neighbour: Binary variable indicating the existence of a rival state surrounding the country in question. Its coded as 1 if on the year of the peace agreement, at least one of the neighbours surrounding the country in question has a rivalry with that country. And coded as 0 if otherwise. While hostility is operationalized by using the most recent version of the Interstate Rivalry Data compiled by Thompson and Dreyer (2010), for the models in the paper and in the Appendix 2A, neighbourhood is operationalized by using the first land category of the Contiguity variable of the COW Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett et al 2002). In the Appendix 2B the neighbourhood distance is expanded to 150 miles and covers all countries surrounding the county in question within at most the 150 miles of water distance and whose territories are not interrupted by the territory of a third country. This definition corresponds to the first 4 categories of contiguity of the COW Direct Contiguity data (Stinnett et al 2002).

Neighbour in Civil War: Binary variable coded as 1 if the country in question has at least one neighbour that experienced civil war on the year of the peace agreement. And 0 if otherwise. Neighbourhood is operationalized by using the first land category of the Contiguity variable of the COW Direct Contiguity Data (Stinnett et al 2002), the civil war variable taken from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002). Neighbour is coded as experiencing in civil war regardless of interim conflict years. In Appendix 2B. the neighbourhood distance is expanded to 150 miles and covers all countries surrounding the county in question within at most the 150 miles of water distance and whose territories are not interrupted by the territory of a third country. This definition corresponds to the first 4 categories of contiguity of COW Direct Contiguity data (Stinnett et al 2002).

Previous Agreement: Dummy variable indicating the existence of a previous agreement signed in that particular conflict. The average number of peace agreements in a given conflict is 7, considering that parties can learn from past mistakes and previous agreements can influence agreement implementation, its coded as 1 if the belligerents have previously signed an agreement for resolving their incompatibilities regarding the conflict. It's taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011)

PKO: Binary variable indicating whether or not the peace agreements contained provisions regarding the deployment of a peacekeeping force. Note that having Peacekeeping provisions in the agreement does not necessarily mean its actual deployment (De Rouen and Chowdhury 2018). It's taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011)

Rebel Strength: Ordinal variable measuring the strength of the rebel military forces compared to the government's military forces. It contains 5 categories: 5=much stronger, 4= stronger, 3= at parity, 2=weak, 1 much weaker (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013).

Territorial: Binary variable measuring the incompatibility of the conflict. It is coded as 1 for the conflicts that are fought for territorial incompatibility, 0 for conflicts that are fought for government incompatibility. It is taken from the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002).

Secessionist Conflict: Binary variable indicating whether or not the conflict has an ethnic/secessionist dimension ==1 or not ==0. Since UCDP uses a broader category such as territorial / non-territorial war, and from this variable it's somehow impossible to assume whether or not such conflicts are fought on ethnic or secessionist dimensions, I have relied on the Data provided By Kreutz (2010) who extended the data from Walter (2004)

ln Duration: The log of the time elapsed since the beginning of the conflict until the year of the peace agreements. It is calculated in years. Note that +1 is added for conflicts that have 0 years of duration. Beginning of conflict refers to the first time the conflict has generated 25 battle-related deaths.

ln Battle Deaths: Log of the the actual number of the battle-related deaths generated on the year of the peace agreement in the country where the agreement takes place. Taken from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005).

ln Population: The log of actual number of population living in the country where the civil war agreement takes place. It measures the number of population on the year of the peace agreement. It is taken from the Expanded Trade and GDP Data (Gleditsch 2002a)

ln Gdp pc: The log of the GDP per capita of the country where the peace agreement takes place, it measures the GDP per capita of the year of the peace agreement. It's taken from the Expanded Trade and GDP Data (Gleditsch 2002a)

Democracy: Dummy variable indicating whether or not the country in question has a democratic regime. It is taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and. Jagers 2010). A country is coded as democracy hence as 1 if its polity2 score is equal to 6 or greater than 6. It is coded as 0 if otherwise.

Anocracy: Dummy variable indicating the political regime of the country where the peace agreement takes place. Countries are defined as anocratic when their political regime is party democratic and partly autocratic. It is taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and. Jagers. 2010). A country is coded as anocracy hence as 1 if its polity2 score ranges between -6 and +6 and 0 if otherwise.

Power-sharing: A composite dummy variable, It is taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011) and it measures all kinds of power-sharing arrangements. It is coded as 1 if the agreement stipulated at least one of the following categories:

- (1) Rebel military integration to the army (Military Power Sharing)
- (2) Provisions for extensive power-sharing in the new government (Political Power Sharing)
- (3) Legislative, executive and fiscal powers over a particular territory (Territorial Power Sharing)

Military Provisions: Dummy variable coded as 1 if the agreement stipulated at least one of the following criteria: ceasefire, demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, withdrawal of foreign forces. It is coded as 0 If otherwise. It is taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011).

Political Provisions: Dummy variable coded as 1 if the agreement stipulated at least one of the following criteria: right for rebel groups to form a political party, integration to government, integration to civil service, elections, interim government. It is coded as 0 if otherwise. It is taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011).

Territorial Provisions: Dummy variable coded as 1 if the agreement stipulated at least one of the following criteria: autonomy, federation, Independence, regional development, referendum, local power-sharing, cultural freedoms, border demarcations. It is coded as 0 if otherwise. It is taken from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Hogbladh 2011)

Appendix 2A, 2B, 2C: Alternative Model Specifications

After testing the effect of the main variables of interest: Previous Rebel Support, Hostile Neighbours and Neighbours in Civil War first on the full sample then on the restricted subsample (the table 1 models 1-7); I have run two additional robustness tests:

- (1) First in the Appendix 2A, I have run the models in the paper (1 to 7) both on the full and subsample by changing some of the control variables to see whether or not the proposed hypotheses still hold when changing the control variables.
- (2) Second in the Appendix 2B, I have run the same models as Table 1 (1-7) both on the full and subsample by expanding the neighbourhood distance to 150 miles. As such neighbourhood definition has been changed and the neighbouring countries are defined as all countries “that are surrounding the county in question within at most the 150 miles of water distance and whose territories are not interrupted by the territory of a third country” This definition corresponds to first 4 categories of contiguity of COW Direct Contiguity data (Stinnett et al 2002).
- (3) Lastly in the Appendix 2C, I have run the same models in Table 1 (1-7) with non-territorial conflicts to see whether or not the results hold under different types of conflicts.

Appendix 2A: Alternative Model Specifications with Different Control Variables

Logistic Regression results shown in the Appendix 2A, show the results of main variables of interest with different control variables. As can be seen in the regression output, the variable “democracy” has been changed with the “anocracy” variable (anocracy coded as polity2 score ranging from -6 to +6 and this is different from democracy variable that is coded as polity2 score 6 and 6+). The variable “territorial” conflicts have been replaced by “secessionist conflict” operationalized from Kretuz (2010) who extended the data provided by Walter (2004). “Power-sharing arrangements” that is a composite measure including territorial, political and military power-sharing arrangements have been replaced with Military Provisions, Political Provisions and Territorial Provisions.

However, the content of these variables expanded in terms of what they include hence they are coded differently. As such, rather than being just disaggregated measures for each power-sharing provision they include all kinds of provisions regarding territorial, political and military clauses included in peace agreements. For instance, political provisions do not only include share of government but also elections national talks... or Territorial Provisions also covers cultural freedom, regional development ... as well or military provisions, rather than including solely the integration to army as the military power-sharing means, also include withdrawal of foreign forces or ceasefire (See Appendix 1D for a detailed explanation of coding procedure)

The results are highly similar to the main models used in the paper. Both in the models 1-4 that tests the hypotheses on the full sample and in the models 5-7 that test the hypotheses on the restricted subsample; the coefficients of the main variables of interest are in expected direction and significant. They all negative and significant.

APPENDIX 2A: Peace Agreement Implementation in Internal Armed Conflicts // Alternative Control Variables

	Model 1 (Full Model)	Model 2 (Full Model)	Model 3 (Full Model)	Model 4 (Full Model)	Model 5 (Restricted)	Model 6 (Restricted)	Model 7 (Restricted)
Previous Agreement	0.227 (0.52)	0.331 (0.55)	0.118 (0.61)	0.233 (0.63)	0.043 (0.79)	-0.650 (0.80)	-0.464 (0.92)
PKO	-0.041 (0.54)	0.191 (0.59)	0.001 (0.59)	0.081 (0.61)	-0.264 (0.69)	-0.684 (0.74)	-0.614 (0.73)
Military Provisions	-0.822* (0.47)	-0.804 (0.50)	-1.205** (0.54)	-0.981* (0.53)	-1.061 (0.73)	-2.135*** (0.69)	-1.616** (0.67)
Political Provisions	0.111 (0.49)	0.007 (0.51)	-0.030 (0.60)	-0.167 (0.69)	0.814 (0.71)	1.612* (0.89)	1.299 (0.98)
Territorial Provisions	-0.539 (0.70)	-0.615 (0.62)	-0.242 (0.69)	-0.382 (0.70)	-0.328 (0.74)	0.348 (0.64)	-0.147 (0.84)
Rebel Strength	-1.065*** (0.23)	-1.105*** (0.25)	-1.138*** (0.25)	-1.223*** (0.28)	-1.071*** (0.30)	-1.069*** (0.35)	-0.985*** (0.30)
Secessionist Conflict	0.786 (0.78)	0.807 (0.75)	1.052 (1.00)	1.359 (1.14)	1.638 (1.02)	2.711* (1.46)	3.148** (1.60)
ln Gdp pc	-0.040 (0.28)	-0.010 (0.27)	-0.169 (0.29)	-0.182 (0.28)	0.039 (0.31)	-0.253 (0.34)	-0.180 (0.36)
Anocracy	0.773 (0.59)	0.571 (0.63)	0.894 (0.73)	1.323 (0.88)	0.685 (0.76)	0.764 (0.95)	1.148 (1.09)
ln Population	-0.288 (0.22)	-0.444* (0.24)	-0.456* (0.25)	-0.635** (0.28)	-0.574* (0.33)	-0.741** (0.33)	-1.034*** (0.40)
ln Battle Deaths	-0.360** (0.17)	-0.238 (0.18)	-0.156 (0.20)	-0.123 (0.22)	-0.108 (0.20)	0.141 (0.26)	0.079 (0.25)
ln Duration	1.154*** (0.37)	1.506*** (0.39)	1.489*** (0.41)	1.623*** (0.43)	1.739*** (0.54)	2.172*** (0.62)	2.323*** (0.64)
Rebel Support		-1.815** (0.72)	-1.715** (0.86)	-2.416** (0.95)	-2.763** (1.27)	-4.003** (1.56)	-4.857*** (1.65)
Hostile Neighbours			-0.683* (0.40)			-1.306* (0.68)	
Neighbours in Civil War				-1.822** (0.79)			-2.444** (1.11)
Constant	6.608** (3.00)	7.464** (3.16)	8.583** (3.43)	11.244*** (4.03)	6.944* (3.90)	9.464** (4.32)	13.307*** (4.36)
AIC	199.1202	190.4028	180.2619	175.0883	148.3543	135.5419	134.2421
BIC	240.7723	235.1817	227.5613	222.3877	190.1248	179.7733	178.4735
N	182	181	173	173	146	141	141

Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In the model2 and 5 that introduce the existence previous rebel support, the coefficients are negative and significant with a p-value is <0.05. Similarly, Hostile Neighbours variable introduced in the model 3 and model 6 coefficients are negative and significant p-value <0.1. The coefficients of Neighbours in Civil War variable introduced in the models 4 and 7 are also negative and significant with a p-value <0.05. Results indicate that peace agreements that are signed following an intrastate conflict will be less likely to be implemented if the rebels have previously received external assistance, if the country in question was surrounded by a hostile neighbour or by a neighbour in civil war. And the results hold even after changing the control variables.

APPENDIX 2B: Alternative Model Specification with 150 miles Neighbourhood Distance

For the second type of robustness test, I have expanded the scope of the neighbourhood to 150 miles. 150 miles is not chosen arbitrarily but this choice is rather based on the maximum distance that a sailing ship can make in one day, emphasizing that this is will be the maximum distance rebel groups can make in one day, the maximum that they can easily anticipate from a neighbour.

APPENDIX 2B: Peace Agreement Implementation in Internal Armed Conflicts // Neighbourhood Distance 150 Miles

	Model 1 (Full Model)	Model 2 (Full Model)	Model 3 (Full Model)	Model 4 (Full Model)	Model 5 (Restricted)	Model 6 (Restricted)	Model 7 (Restricted)
Previous Agreement	0.270 (0.43)	0.248 (0.44)	0.051 (0.45)	0.186 (0.44)	0.067 (0.66)	-0.304 (0.66)	-0.314 (0.69)
PKO	0.052 (0.47)	0.239 (0.52)	0.101 (0.54)	0.167 (0.58)	0.001 (0.61)	-0.219 (0.66)	-0.263 (0.71)
Powersharing	-0.255 (0.41)	-0.453 (0.46)	-0.477 (0.51)	-0.312 (0.49)	-0.471 (0.55)	-0.417 (0.65)	-0.269 (0.70)
Rebel Strength	-1.072*** (0.25)	-1.120*** (0.24)	-1.174*** (0.29)	-1.192*** (0.27)	-1.170*** (0.25)	-1.172*** (0.29)	-1.117*** (0.24)
Territorial	-0.307 (0.88)	-0.008 (0.83)	-0.002 (0.95)	0.336 (0.98)	0.504 (0.93)	0.884 (1.10)	1.390 (1.11)
ln Gdp pc	-0.083 (0.23)	-0.111 (0.23)	-0.149 (0.24)	-0.128 (0.24)	-0.131 (0.26)	-0.213 (0.28)	-0.244 (0.31)
Democracy	0.188 (0.71)	-0.012 (0.64)	-0.039 (0.65)	-0.192 (0.65)	-0.076 (0.80)	-0.176 (0.85)	-0.520 (0.92)
ln Population	-0.332* (0.20)	-0.447** (0.21)	-0.429* (0.24)	-0.567** (0.27)	-0.531* (0.28)	-0.597* (0.35)	-0.855* (0.44)
ln Battle Deaths	-0.346* (0.19)	-0.231 (0.19)	-0.198 (0.19)	-0.183 (0.21)	-0.119 (0.19)	-0.062 (0.20)	-0.056 (0.20)
ln Duration	1.059*** (0.36)	1.478*** (0.38)	1.567*** (0.40)	1.670*** (0.43)	1.625*** (0.42)	1.886*** (0.50)	2.089*** (0.58)
Rebel Support		-1.009** (0.75)	-1.691** (0.84)	-2.322** (0.94)	-2.452*** (0.88)	-2.831** (1.16)	-3.816*** (1.40)
Hostile Neighbours			-0.703* (0.42)			-0.862* (0.45)	
Neighbours in Civil War				-1.518* (0.80)			-2.199* (1.23)
Constant	7.577*** (2.79)	8.314*** (2.83)	8.508*** (3.23)	10.612*** (3.43)	8.721** (3.39)	9.754** (4.02)	14.007*** (4.83)
AIC	213.6608	203.6281	200.0694	197.4206	158.0708	152.6249	150.6853
BIC	249.6638	242.8424	242.3489	239.7001	194.5919	191.9353	189.9958
N	195	194	191	191	155	152	152

Robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Results show even when the neighbourhood distance is expanded to 150 miles hence the sample covers more countries than the models presented in the table 1 of the Paper, even if the effect weakens still it does not fully disappear. Still the coefficient of rebel support, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil war are negative and significant. Results indicate that across both full and subsample of peace agreements, with changing the control variables as well as when taking different neighbourhood distance, transnational factors are important determinants of implementation of peace agreements and explanations regarding the stability of post-conflict peace should include the effects of regional and global dynamics.

APPENDIX 2C: Alternative Model Specification with Non-Territorial Conflicts

For the third type of robustness test, I have run the same models (Table 1 Models 1-7) with a subsample of non-territorial conflicts to see whether or not the results hold in different types or conflicts and whether or not types of conflict alter the regression results.

APPENDIX 2C: Peace Agreement Implementation in Internal Armed Conflicts // Non-Territorial Conflicts

	Model 1 (Full Model)	Model 2 (Full Model)	Model 3 (Full Model)	Model 4 (Full Model)	Model 5 (Restricted)	Model 6 (Restricted)	Model 7 (Restricted)
Previous Agreement	0.758 (0.46)	0.644 (0.53)	0.590 (0.52)	0.689 (0.53)	0.488 (0.80)	0.479 (0.78)	0.391 (0.83)
PKO	-0.192 (0.62)	-0.018 (0.69)	-0.209 (0.70)	0.024 (0.72)	-0.427 (0.90)	-0.642 (0.90)	-0.418 (0.97)
Powersharing	-0.163 (0.48)	-0.284 (0.57)	-0.436 (0.59)	-0.198 (0.56)	0.078 (0.80)	-0.057 (0.75)	0.208 (0.88)
Rebel Strength	-1.082*** (0.28)	-1.061*** (0.24)	-1.195*** (0.31)	-1.097*** (0.25)	-1.066*** (0.25)	-1.173*** (0.28)	-1.014*** (0.22)
ln Gdp pc	-0.098 (0.27)	-0.173 (0.29)	-0.225 (0.29)	-0.115 (0.26)	-0.230 (0.29)	-0.297 (0.26)	-0.213 (0.26)
Democracy	0.616 (0.73)	0.606 (0.69)	0.427 (0.80)	0.632 (0.70)	1.250 (1.04)	1.273 (1.10)	1.497 (1.10)
ln Population	-0.285 (0.33)	-0.409 (0.36)	-0.249 (0.29)	-0.463 (0.36)	-0.610 (0.50)	-0.401 (0.35)	-0.833 (0.59)
ln Battle Deaths	-0.412* (0.22)	-0.260 (0.21)	-0.193 (0.21)	-0.207 (0.23)	-0.143 (0.21)	0.008 (0.21)	-0.030 (0.25)
ln Duration	1.141** (0.46)	1.750*** (0.50)	1.738*** (0.48)	1.835*** (0.53)	2.211*** (0.65)	2.183*** (0.59)	2.529*** (0.69)
Rebel Support		-2.387** (1.12)	-1.830* (1.09)	-2.603** (1.30)	-4.219*** (1.34)	-3.784*** (1.16)	-5.216*** (1.58)
Hostile Neighbours			-1.053** (0.52)			-1.318** (0.67)	
Neighbours in Civil War				-1.158 (0.85)			-2.072* (1.21)
Constant	7.224** (3.66)	7.801* (4.00)	6.789* (3.67)	8.405** (4.02)	9.185* (5.49)	7.195* (3.91)	11.811* (6.37)
AIC	165.3768	159.2914	158.1236	158.8844	121.1481	119.6296	119.9533
BIC	195.8754	192.8399	194.6447	195.4055	152.2595	153.5694	153.893
N	156	156	155	155	125	125	125

Robust standard errors clustered by conflict are in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Results mimic the Table 1 as well as the previous robustness tests. Accordingly, coefficient of rebel support, hostile neighbours and neighbours in civil war are negative and significant. This indicates that when the country in questions are surrounded by hostile neighbours, neighbours in civil wars or if the rebels that are part of the peace agreements have been formerly supported by an external state prior to the peace agreements, this will negatively affect their commitment. Results have important implications for the overall conflict literature because they suggest that we need to think conflict in their wider environment and any peace keeping efforts should come after the stabilization of the regional conditions. Otherwise even the best designed policies may not bear fruit.

Appendix for Paper 3:


Transborder Ethnic Kin and Dynamics of Peace Processes: Insights from the Kurdish Conflict

This appendix is included as additional material for the third paper of the Ph.D. thesis and consists of the statistics regarding the newspaper articles.


Appendix 1A: The distribution of all Newspaper articles that contain the words “Peace process” and “Resolution Process” between July 2012- September 2013

Appendix 1B: The distribution of all Newspaper articles that contain the words “Peace process” and “Resolution Process” along with the Keywords regarding the PYD between July 2012- September 2013

Appendix 1A: the distribution of all newspaper articles that contain the words “Peace process” and “Resolution Process” between July 2012- September 2013



Appendix 1B: The distribution of all newspaper articles that contain the words “Peace process” and “Resolution Process” along with the Keywords regarding the PYD between July 2012- September 2013



Notes –Introduction

¹ Statistics taken from UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Horbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008) and indicate the percentage of interstate wars versus intrastate wars.

² Checkel (2013) notes that % 20 of civil conflicts having at least 10 years of durations. Kreutz (2010) based on UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset reports the average length as 1647 days for civil war fought between 1946-2009 indicating that especially territorial wars have longer duration compared to those fought for governmental aims.

³ As noted by Dixon (2009) most studies fail to find statistical evidence for this claim except Bapat (2005) that argued that civil wars are less likely to be resolved with negotiated settlement in countries that have strong constraints on executive powers.

⁴ Scholars identify three types of power-sharing arrangements: political, territorial and military. Political power-sharing divides the executive, legislative and administrative posts between groups, territorial power-sharing refers to federalism or regional autonomy arrangements. And lastly, military power-sharing refers to share in the state's coercive military power (see Hartzell and Hoddie 3002; Mattes and Savun 2011).

⁵ However, some others like Nilsson (2008) argued that the fact that the excluded parties may engage in violence, will have no influence on the signatories' commitment.

⁶ Peacekeeping can be defined as the deployment of foreign military personnel with the consent of the state that they are deployed (Beardsley 2011)

⁷ See Ph.D. Paper Three that studies the peace negotiations between the government of Turkey and PKK for more information.

⁸ Dataset covering 342 separate rebel groups in civil wars between 1946-2008 indicates that while % 40 of rebels receives the external assistance of an international state, % 27 of them have diaspora and transnational network support (Source Non-State Actor Data Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013). These are of course highly correlated as noted by Salehyan, Cunningham and Gleditsch (2011) paper, the existence of transnational constituencies is an important determinant of whether or not rebel can receive external state support.

⁹ Of course, the governments can also have transnational linkages however due to the scope of this study I will only elaborate on the rebel groups' transnational linkages

¹⁰ The Ph.D. papers following this introductory chapter mostly rely on the Uppsala Conflict Database (UCDP) datasets. UCDP defines the termination of conflict when the armed conflict no longer reaches the 25 battle related deaths in a given year. Hence the definition of conflict termination is related to the cessation of violence rather than the change in the perception among the communities.

¹¹ There exists variations and different classifications of stages of civil war peace processes in the literature; for instance, some scholars use a tripartite version such as; negotiations, settlement, post-settlement (see Walter 2002) others also include exploratory phase, preliminary agreement, pre-negotiation agreement, roadmap in their definition and classification (see Fisas Armengol 2013). While all classification would be useful and appropriate; considering the scope of the study, theoretical framework, data availability and measurability consideration I opt out to classify the stages of peace processes as settlements and implementation. For a similar classification also see Hoddie and Hartzell (2003)

¹² This classification is also compatible with Hartzell (2018) argument. Accordingly; she says a conflict to be terminated (1) the civil war must reach a settlement // settlement stage (2) the fighting should stop// implementation stage. (See Hartzell 2017)

¹³ In the bargaining framework outside option refers to any opportunities that bargainer possess outside the main bargaining setting that alters the bargaining dynamics. Outside option alter the bargaining dynamics because it fortifies the hands and bargaining capabilities of the actor that possess it as such it pulls the other actor inn. Since outside option refers any opportunities outside the bargaining setting, the main bargaining between the belligerents is sometime referred as their “inside option” Many studies use the outside option principle in the framework of two actors bargaining both in the field of economics as well as political science. Whether they use formal models or not; in the study of politics and IR; the outside option is conceptualized in various ways sometime as the actors’ ability to go to war (See Fearon 1995; Gent 2011; Powell 1996; 2002; 2006; Wagner 1993; 1994; Gent 2011; Mogleiv Nygård and Weintraub 2015; Amann and Leonhardt 2013), sometime as any option (economic political) that prevent individuals from mobilizing in the name of rebel groups or sometimes as rebel groups’ tactical choices over other (see Mesquita 2013; Gates 2002) or even different allies to rely on (Voeten 2001). For the use of outside option principle in the field of economics; see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990); Perry (1986).

¹⁴ A very large literature exists on rationalist explanations of war that see wars from a bargaining perspective. For interstate version see Schelling (1960); Bueno de Mesquita (1981); Powell (1996; 2002); Blainey (1973); Fearon (1995, 1998); For the intrastate adaptation of the bargaining theory see; Ikle (1991); Pillar (1983); Cetinyan (2002); Walter (1997; 2002; 2009); Snyder and Jervis (1999); Regan and Aydin (2006); Werner and Yuen (2005); Thyne (2006)

¹⁵ Among 342 separate rebel groups that are studied in the first paper of this Ph.D. thesis, only 0.03% are stronger compared to their rival governments. 87% of them are either weak or very weak and 0.10% can attain the parity. Source Non-State Armed Data; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2013)

¹⁶ Non-cooperative Bargaining framework originally makes emphasis on the actors' 3 kinds of bargaining problems regarding incomplete information, commitment problems as well as the indivisibility of stakes when explaining the non-cooperation among belligerents (see Salehyan 2009:23). Yet some scholars argue that divisibility of stakes may not be such a problem in civil wars (Fearon 1995; Walter 1997; 2009) Some others argue that commitment problems and information problems are vital during all stages of civil conflicts (i.e. onset, duration, resolution) and overlook for instance the predatory commitment problems (see Walter 2009) that several scholars rightfully underline as the willingness to renege the treaty for better outcomes (see Snyder and Jervis 1999; Werner 1999) And alternatively, some scholars conceptualize the peace processes as a bargaining problem yet do not mention neither of these three problems (i.e. information asymmetries, the divisibility of stakes, commitment problems) which constitute the main pillars of this theoretical framework (see Sisk 2009).

¹⁷ Based on the earlier studies, my explanation includes both information and commitment problems and overlook the divisibility of stakes. This is also the dominant approach in the civil war research (see Kathman and Shannon 2016) Following Fearon (1995) I do believe that since civil wars involve multi-faceted and multi-dimensional issues and even in the most difficult cases, zero sum solutions rarely exist and many creative ways can be found such as offering side payments or ransoms when it comes to reach a compromise agreement. However, my version is slightly different from for instance Walter (2009) who argues that these problems are present in all stages of conflict. I argue that information and commitment problems are acute to different stages of peace processes. While information problem is relevant before the settlement take place, it will no longer viable after the negotiations start because the battlefield would have already revealed the necessary information otherwise they would not look ways to make a settlement. Moreover, both sides can also learn about each other during peace negotiations (see Schelling 1960, Pillar 1983, Slantchev 2003). As noted by Fearon (2004) since civil wars have longer durations both sides develop accurate understandings about each other regarding their capabilities. Similarly, commitment problems cannot possibly happen before the settlement takes place because the belligerents cannot possibly know what kind of propositions the opponents would make or what kind of guarantees would be presented. This view is also compatible with Walter (1997) article that notes that "Between 1940 and 1990; 42 percent of civil wars (seventeen out of forty-one) experienced some form of formal peace negotiation, and 94 percent of these cases drafted at least a cease-fire accord" as such the commitment problems come after the settlement and not before because even if the belligerents don't implement they at least make some sort of peace treaty.

¹⁸ This approach is compatible with the non-cooperative bargaining framework that focuses on how the change in setting shapes the bargaining strategies and outcomes in negotiations. The Non-cooperative framework first models the bargaining problem as a non-cooperative game then insert the changes in the bargaining setting then trace the effects of these changes on the equilibria (See Powell 2002).

¹⁹ Bargaining framework does not discredit the group level motivational arguments such as greed and grievance or resource mobilization that are highly cited in the literature as causes of political violence. As previous literature has shown existence of horizontal inequalities and grievances, low levels of opportunity cost of rebellion as well as resources and opportunities for mobilization are important determinants of civil wars (see Gurr 1970; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Buhaug, Gleditsch and Cederman 2014; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 2004). Bargaining perspective connects to and complements these explanations by arguing that these grievances, inequalities, desires for profit could have met from the beginning (*ex ante* rather than *ex post* war) at least to some extent if the information about motivation and resources or in other words long and how committed the opponents can fight and inflict cost would have been available before.

²⁰ Unlike interstate wars civil wars have longer durations as such the actors do not only have a motivation to misrepresent their power for strategic reasons (see Fearon 1995) but also; at the same time; they may not actually know their own resource mobilization capability over the course of time. Outcome of war can be perfectly determined by unforeseeable events (See also Thucydides 1951; Clausewitz 1948)

²¹ According to Non-State Armed Data (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013) In %87 of civil wars; governments are stronger compared to rebels. And only in % 0.03 of cases; rebels are stronger than their rival governments. But note that this relative strength is measured during later stages of conflict hence when the rebels could actually gather strength, and are able to effectively challenge the government. So, the ratio should be different and should be more in favor of the governments at the beginning of the conflict.

²² In the context of interstate wars, Arreguin Toft (2001) notes that in the 200-year period not only weaker actors wins in % 30 of the wars they have fought but also, they have won with an increasing frequency over time. For a similar argument see Mack (1975). Similarly, dataset covering 342 rebel groups in the first Ph.D. paper show that while only 0.03 % of rebels are stronger than the government; outcome the wars show that %10 of the rebels actually win the war and another % 24 received significant concessions. Hence, outcome of conflict and ratio of power balances are not the same.

²³ Walter (1997; 1999) notes that while the percentage of making a peace treaty is pretty high -around 94 percent in all peace negotiations-, only 47 percent of these signed agreements have been implemented.

²⁴ Crocker, Hampson & Aall (2004: 167) notes that demobilization is considered as a dangerous issue to take up during the peace negotiations hence its postponed to a later date. See also Svensson (2007), Walter (2002). Demobilization and Disarmament, hence the costly provisions for rebels are to be put into practice after the peace agreements take place and not before.

²⁵ Fearon (1996) notes that since concession today makes the adversary stronger and that leads to further demands and concessions in the future. Fearon (2004) and Cornell (2001) emphasizes the possibility of regional autonomy empowering radicals who can use this position to demand secession. With a similar reasoning both regional autonomy and power in the state apparatus can also lead the groups to get stronger and use this power to reengage on their treaty for better outcomes.

²⁶ Dataset covering 196 peace agreements in internal armed conflicts identified by the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset (Hogbladh 2011) show that % 34 of the peace agreements in civil wars are not implemented but instead followed by renewed violence.

²⁷ Although the concept of commitment problem is widely used both in the study of interstate and intrastate wars, how the scholars define commitment problems and attribute to the actors show variations. Its sometime defined as the actors' inability to trust the adversaries (see Walter 2002) sometime as the actors' willingness to renege to get more in the future (see Snyder and Jervis 1999; Svensson 2007) It's also not clear which actor actually has the commitment problem (for variations; see for instance Walter 2002; Schmidt 2005; Fearon 1998). Following Svensson (2007) I argue that it's the rebels that have the most commitment problems at the time of the agreement (time=t). And I argue that if rebels accept to demobilize they have a problem to trust the governments' willingness to renege so they don't commit (defensive motives), if they decide to implement the settlement since settlements already give them opportunities to renege for better deals still they have a problem to commit (offensive motives)

²⁸ This is not to say that governments don't experience commitment problems. But I believe this comes after and it depends on rebel moves. Hence unlike rebels that experience commitment problems at the time=t; government experience commitment problems at time=t+1. If rebels disarm governments can experience difficulties to not to exploit the rebel weakness. If rebel decide to renege the treaty then government will not commit to defend itself. Hence, I believe at the time of the peace treaty (time=t) it's the rebels that experience most difficulties. For a closely related argument, see Svensson (2007) who argues that commitment problems should be sequential and the rebels should be the ones who will experience commitment problems at the time of peace treaty.

²⁹ Walter (2009) notes that although its exception rather than the rule few peace agreements allow rebels to keep their weapons such as the conflicts in Burma. Wenner (1993) notes that in 1962-1970 civil war in Yemen both republicans and royalist could retain their arms. Similarly, Dayton peace agreement allowed both Republika Srpska and Bosniak-Croat Federation to maintain their separate armies (see Hartzell 1999) However these are exceptions rather than the rule.

³⁰ Walter (1999) notes that “demobilization can be postponed or it can be implemented incrementally.... but it cannot be avoided”

³¹ This proposition about rebel groups willing to renege the terms of the treaty to get more is also compatible with realist assumption that argues that militarily successful belligerents / the winners will expand in their war aims (Labs 1997) because victory convince the winner that its capabilities may be greater (Reiter 2003). Especially when coincided with opportunities that peace agreements present for rebels, it would be reasonable to expect they would like to get more.

³² Lounsbury and De Rouen (2016) finds that stronger rebel groups that have opportunities to renege the peace treaty given their strength and ability, return to violence

³³ Zoumara and Ibrahim (2014) notes that the money given to rebels in Central African Republic from United Nations Development Program for their DDR process was used to buy new weapons from countries like Chad and Sudan

³⁴ Christia (2012) notes that most civil war literature treat these wars as a contest between two actors (government vs rebels; incumbents vs. the insurgents) and one of the reasons why in civil war literature, the bargaining interaction more than two actors tend to be undertheorized is because adding more actors make the theoretical frameworks more cumbersome and more complicated

³⁵ TEK groups can be defined as ethnic groups that are separated with their ethnic co-brethren by the established nation-state borders as when drawn, most of the time these boundaries have overlooked the ethnic dimension.

³⁶ Diasporas refers to politically mobilized people that possess a common origin and live much or less on permanent basis outside the territories of their homeland (Shain and Barth (2013) Transnational Networks on the other hand, refers to people or groups that have common characteristics in terms of their beliefs or affiliation to an ideology, a religion, a sect or a language or alternatively to a geography (Shefer 2013). Diasporas and transnational networks are long distance dispersed populations and should be considered differently for instance than TEK groups that live densely on the other side of the border of where the rebellion takes place. As an example, while Kurds in the US or UK constitute Kurdish Diaspora, Kurds in Syria or Iraq constitute transborder ethnic kin groups.

³⁷ Especially the quantitative comparative peace literature on the effect of transnational dynamics on peace processes is highly scarce. In the literature of peace settlements in civil wars; one exception is Gurses (2015) paper that shows how the probability of peace settlements and outcome favorable to the rebels increase in the presence of Transnational Ethnic Kin. In the literature of peace agreement implementation or peace agreement duration, there is Lounsbury and De Rouen (2016) paper that look at the hostile or supportive military intervention towards government after the peace agreement takes place among other variables. In the post-conflict literature (note that this is not the same as the post-settlement literature conflict may end in various ways) two exceptions; one is Karlen (2017) paper that shows how the previous rebel support structures positively affects the rebels' anticipation of future renewed violence. And the second one Furstenberg, (2012) unpublished ISA Conference Paper that look at the rebel resources and sanctuaries in terms of increasing the probability of renewed violence in the post-conflict period. Eventually, the role of external states play in mediation or in provision of post-conflict "security guarantee" is vast however this cannot be defined as transnational dynamics since transnational dynamics by definition means the interactions that are not controlled by states and both mediation and security guarantees requires the government permission.

³⁸ Powell (1996) for instance gives an example from a legal case. Two disputants let's say are already in a disagreement. They can either get their demands met by bargaining among themselves or take the matter to the court to achieve their aims. Court in this case represent the outside option. Similarly, here rebels can reach their aims through making a peace process or use their transnational linkages to achieve their aims. In this case; transnational linkages represent the outside option, an alternative option through which they can achieve their aims instead of getting them through peace processes.

³⁹ It could be well argued that since rebels are weaker actors its highly unlikely for them to win the war or control a territory. The existing data tells otherwise. Among 342 rebel groups studied in the first paper of this Ph.D. thesis, while only %0.03 of rebels are stronger, % 25 of them actually have control over a territory, %10 win the war.

⁴⁰ The list of the support structures given to PKK by Syria; has been taken from the Turkish Government's list of demands in the Adana Protocol signed between Turkey and Syria in 1998 to end the hostility. See <http://www.mafhoum.com/press/50P2.htm>. While it could be argued that this does not indicate clear evidence, similar support structures transferred from Syria to PKK; have been mentioned in the accounts of previous PKK fighters who have left the organization (see Marcus 2009)

⁴¹ For instance; Turkey's willingness to conduct cross-border attacks on Iraqi territories in order to target PKK sanctuaries received serious criticism from the US.

⁴² It could be rightfully argued that rebels would choose the settlement but would not leave up their outside option hence their transnational linkages. And this way they would choose both. My reading on the peace agreement terms as well as when looking at the signatories, guarantors and mediators of peace agreements tells otherwise. Many peace agreements or draft agreements include clauses that strictly prohibit rebels to get support from their transnational linkages. As a very recent example is demands list of Syrian Regime for a peace agreement with Kurdish PYD in Syria. The article 6 demand rebels to leave up their international support structure. See Ozcan (2018) Hence the governments make peace agreements when there is no other way to contain this outside option and as such peace agreements include such clauses. Moreover, when independently looking at the peace agreements identified by the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset, the third parties are mostly the rebel supporters, hostile neighbors and civil war neighbors presumably because agreement aims to cover all parties to the conflict that can provide resources to rebels.

⁴³ Empirics also support this argument for instance as it will be elaborated in the First Ph.D. Paper in this Thesis there is between % 152 to %182 increase in the odds of peace settlement (based on two different data) in the presence of transnational network and diaspora support for rebel groups. Similarly, based on his study on the transnational ethnic kin Gurses (2015) notes that “there is a greater chance that armed conflicts fought by groups with transborder ethnic kin will come to an end in a settlement compared with those fought by groups without such ties.

⁴⁴ See Footnote 29.

⁴⁵ Dates has been chosen on the basis that 19 July represents the date when Kurds have captured the Rojava region of Northern Syria. And 9 September 2013 indicates the date when the Peace processes was the first time experienced a crisis when PKK announced that demobilization is stopped.

⁴⁶ For instance, 500 battle related deaths in a given year that some experts find “tolerable” in the Turkish context; would surely create huge problems for the British Government during Troubles. In an Interview that Ali Nihat Ozcan counter-terrorism analyst, TEPAV, told to Crisis Group:

“Turkish people can ignore this problem very easily. 500 soldiers could die [in a year], it would be absorbed”. See Crisis Group Report; footnote 262;

<https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/219-turkey-the-pkk-and-a-kurdish-settlement.pdf>

Notes – First Paper: Explaining the Role of Diasporas and Transnational Networks in Peace Settlements

¹ Powell (2014) notes that all governments declare that they will never negotiate with terrorists but end up meeting them at the Dorchester (referring to the Dorchester Hotel in London) Similarly Bapat (2007) gives example from Regan administration who declared that he will never negotiate with terrorists after the hijack of Trans World Airlines in 1985 but ended up carrying secret meetings for the release of hostages.

² Unlike interstate wars, civil war dyads are plagued by power imbalances. In civil wars, a majority of rebel groups are militarily weak. That is the reason why the governments are presented as the sole veto player by the literature in the opening of the peace negotiations since the negotiations do not only grant legitimacy to rebel groups and signal other potential challengers that violence is rewarded but also due to military superiority; governments think they can win the war militarily (See Clayton 2013)

³ Diasporas can be defined as politically mobilized people that possess a common country of origin and live much or less on permanent basis outside the territories of their homeland (Shain and Barth 2013). For instance, Tamil Diaspora in the UK, US that supports Tamil Eelam or Kurdish Diaspora in the UK that supports PKK. Transnational Networks on the other hand, refers to people or groups that have common characteristics in terms of their beliefs or affiliation to an ideology, a religion, a sect or a language or alternatively to a geography (Shefer 2013). For instance; World Anti Communist League that supported FLEC-R in Angola; International Islamic Relief Organization that supports FIS (AIS) in Algeria and Al Itahal al Islami in Ethiopia. People can choose to be a member of such transnational groups. And these categories are by no means mutually exclusive. One's membership to a diaspora doesn't end its membership to a transnational network same applies to its membership to a transnational network.

⁴ Through the article; I use transnational constituency/ Transnational actors/ transnational communities / Transnational groups interchangeably to define diasporas and transnational networks.

⁵ Through the article I use peace settlements, settlements, negotiated settlements interchangeably. As it will be more detailed in the dependent variable section of the article, I define a settlement as “any peace agreement between a government and its rival non-state armed group for that specific dyad-episode. To be defined as a Settlement, an agreement has to (1) end that dyad episode and (2) should resolve at least one issue related to the conflict. This definition includes peace agreements, ceasefire agreements with conflict resolution mechanisms and cease-fire agreements. Note That the definition of peace agreements does not cover the ceasefire agreements in the second paper of this Ph.D. thesis this is basically due to data concerns.

⁶ Derived from field of economics, the theory was first introduced to explain the interstate wars (see Fearon 1995) but then later on adapted to understand the actors' willingness to negotiate in different stages of intrastate wars (see Findley 2012, Walter 2009)

⁷ Fearon (1996) notes that since concession today makes the adversary stronger and that leads to further demands and concessions in the future. Fearon (2004) and Cornell (2001) emphasizes the possibility of regional autonomy empowering radicals who can use this position to demand secession. With a similar reasoning both regional autonomy and power in the state apparatus can also lead the groups to get stronger and use this power to reengage on their treaty for better outcomes.

⁸ As opposed to essentialist explanations that defines Diaspora groups and transnational networks as “the automatic and by default product of migration”, I choose to rely on constructivist perspective. Constructivist accounts underlines the mobilization factor since not all members of immigrant community consider themselves as members of a transnational constituency (Adamson 2008; 2012). Accordingly, Diasporas and transnational networks are defined as a result of careful political mobilization of movement entrepreneurs who have designed effective strategies to address population grievances (Adamson 2004)

⁹ Adamson (2004) explains how exile contributed in the emergence of Islamist movements; she stresses that while Sayyid Qutb radicalized during his stay in the US, Ayetollah Khomeini produced much of his writings in France, likewise many islamist groups linked to Al Qaeda have recruited among Muslims in Europe. Groups working for the liberation of Kashmir such as The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) have also been formed in the UK (Ellis and Khan 2002)

¹⁰ It's based on this background that bargaining sometimes is referred as “inside option”

¹¹ As an example, Adamson (2004) notes that Al- Qaeda used both legitimate business such as honey trade and but also criminal enterprises such as drug trade.

¹² It's hard to know the exact figures of diaspora contributions, other scholarly sources report it amounting to 450 million per year during 1990's (Demmers 2007).

¹³ For instance, LTTE diaspora coordinate events to celebrate Martyrs Day on November 27 (Byman et al 2001) and PKK often uses the slogan “Shehid Namirin!” (Martyrs don't die)

¹⁴ The military donations of Irish American Diaspora to IRA have also been documented by the interviews conducted with IRA ex-combatants. For an outstanding documentary about IRA; See Provos, Loyalist and Brits <https://topdocumentaryfilms.com/provos/>

¹⁵ In case of PKK for instance, while external state support to the group have significantly diminished in 1999 right after the imprisonment of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, group could be able to replace this with the diaspora support. Figures from UCDP External Support Data reveals that the most important supporter of PKK became its diaspora after 1999. (See Högladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011)

¹⁶ Several studies report the use of violence and coercion by the PKK and LTTE to collect donations from diaspora members who don't want pay up (see Gunaratna 1999; Human Rights Watch 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001)

¹⁷ Boomerang effect refers to groups in one country to seek the help of the citizens of another country to pressure their own government to change policy (see Keck and Sikkink 1998)

¹⁸ Adamson (2004) notes that what transformed Yasser Arafat or Nelson Mandela from being outlaws to world leaders, was not the material change per se, but instead, it was the change in their status from illegitimate to legitimate leaders.

¹⁹ These practices are often described as the “domination of foreign policy by transnational and non-national ethnic interests” (Huntington, 1997; Nye 1999; Adamson 2002; Adamson 2006).

²⁰ In this paper, I rely on the rationalist explanations on international actors creating domestic change since I believe when faced with security issues domestic actors would be more responsive to constraints. However, for a good literature review on social constructivist accounts of domestic change see Checkel (1997; 2001)

²¹ It is true that over the past decades especially since 9/11 several governments adopted new anti-terror legislations and even froze individual assets of their immigrant communities due to their contribution to terrorist activities (Hoffman et al Demmers 2007). However, it should also be noted that; unless members of these communities are involved in terrorist or criminal activities that can be considered as internal threat to their host lands; the host countries have no intention to pursue aggressive politics (Byman et al 2001)

²² The first one started in 1946 and ended the same year with Iranian victory. The second episode is between 1966-1968 and the third one is from 1979 to 1996. Both ended with low activity. Statistics taken from the Non-State Actor Dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013)

²³ Many rebel groups in civil wars splinter to form new groups. As an example; United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) had splintered to form both the ULIMO-K, Krahn faction under the leadership of General Roosevelt Johnson, and the ULIMO-K, Mandingo faction under the leadership of Alhaji G.V. Kromah in 1994.

²⁴ For the complete list dyad episodes that ended with a settlement see “Paper 1 appendix 1A” at the end of the thesis.

²⁵ Since, the data is cross-sectional, it could be argued that it is impossible to know when exactly the support has been given to rebel groups, since civil wars have long durations and rebel groups they may have received it at the beginning of conflict but resources could have dried up at the later stages. Therefore, transnational support can be said, not have an influence on government decision to negotiate at the end of the conflict. However existing research shows that even the mere legacy of support structures can in fact be important in terms of changing the calculations of the belligerents as not only the support structures will remain in place for rebels for future activation but also even the expectation about the future of the conflict is determined by past experiences (Karlen 2017) Adopting this view to the research, even if transnational networks ceased to support rebel groups; Governments will still be more likely to negotiate with rebels that received transnational support at any point in the conflict since they would expect that this support structure would create more cost for the conflict

²⁶ Expanded Trade Dataset starts from the year 1950; so, for the conflicts that started before this time, I have relied on the log GDP per capita of the year 1950

²⁷ For the descriptive statistics of independent variables used in this study please see “Paper 1 Appendix 1B” at the end of the thesis. For the Detailed explanations and coding decisions for all the variables used in this study, see “Paper 1 Appendix 1C” at the end of the thesis.

²⁸ See “Paper 1 Appendix 2A” for alternative models at the end of the thesis

Notes – Second Paper: Transnational Linkages and the Implementation of Peace Agreements

¹ For a closely related argument see Jenne (2015). Although Jenne (2015) doesn't look at implementation but more on the influence of international mediation of the likelihood of reducing the communal tensions between the dominant group and minority in the early stages of rebellion, she suggests that such third-party efforts must come after the regional conditions are stabilized.

² Scholars mostly identify three types of power-sharing arrangements: political, territorial, military. Political power-sharing divides the executive, legislative and administrative posts between groups, territorial power-sharing refers to federalism or regional autonomy arrangements. Military power-sharing refers to share in the state's coercive military power. (see Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mattes and Savun 2011)

³ Peacekeeping can be defined as the deployment of foreign military personnel with the consent of the state that they are deployed (Beardsley 2011)

⁴ For a similar argument and one exception of this see Karlen (2017)

⁵ For instance, Maoz and San Akca (2012) by looking at the period between 1946 and 2001 note that 25 % of all international state Non-State Armed Groups come from countries strategic rivals' and among all rivalries that happened in the International Politics 30% of them supported their rivals' rebel groups.

⁶ Forsberg (2015) notes that conflict in a neighboring country can increase the risk of civil wars for its neighbors both by clustering and contagion effects. Contagion effect refers to conflict spillover through its refugee flows; foreign fighters, arms transfer as well as strategic learning and inspiration. Whereas clustering refers to two conflicts independent one another are affected by the similar causes i.e. lower Gdp pc, regime type in the region leading the occurrence of both conflicts (see Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008) Here since I focus on the transnational dimension and rebels' ability to form transnational linkages and benefit from the neighboring countries, I focus on contagion effect.

⁷ For instance, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2005) notes that when Polish insurgent revolted against the Nazi Occupation, they continued fighting because they were expecting USSR to help them for the destruction of the common enemy. USSR was Germany's Rival at that time.

⁸ I am highly grateful to David Dreyer for sending me his data.

⁹ See also first Ph.D. paper results; stronger rebels are significantly more likely to make a peace settlement.

¹⁰ Although that's not the main variable of interest, the direction and significance of coefficients of rebel strength variable in both papers (1-2 of the Ph.D.) indirectly confirms the theoretical mechanism proposed in the introduction chapter of this Ph.D. thesis regarding the two stages of peace processes: the peace settlement and the peace settlement implementation having inherently different bargaining dynamics. Findings of the earlier literature and the findings of the first paper of this Ph.D. thesis regarding rebel strength variable on peace settlement (the first stage of peace process), indicates that stronger rebels are more likely to make peace settlement. When rebels can inflict significant cost to their government, this reveals the necessary information that peace making a much better alternative for governments that is the sole veto player in the settlement stage. Hence while the government would seek a peace settlement, despite their ability to continue the war stronger rebels also do sign peace agreements because settlements are beneficial (see Clayton 2013; Svensson 2007). However, findings of previous literature (see Lounsbury and De Rouen 2016) and the findings of this paper regarding rebel strength on settlement implementation (the second stage of peace process); indicates that stronger rebels are also less likely to implement peace agreements. Hence this indicates that bargaining dynamics change in the implementation stage. While rebel's ability to inflict costs pull the government inn, towards implementation, given their strength rebels would be less likely to implement because implementation period brings challenges, commitment problems.

¹¹ In non-linear models the effect of a variable does not only depend on solely on its own value but also on the values of all other variables in the model. In addition, a unit increase in the independent variable do not always result with a constant change in the probability but rather depends on the current value of the main independent variable (Long 1997)

Notes – Third Paper: Transborder Ethnic Kin and the Dynamics of Peace Processes: Insights from the Kurdish Conflict

¹ Although there are few rounds that could be called as “peace talks” before the 2012 process, the paper focuses on the 2012 process. The reason for that is the peace initiatives from 1990 to 2005 aimed to disarm the PKK but the government in exchange did not offer any concessions. In these rounds, PKK was neither taken as a negotiation partner nor its demands mattered for the state officials. There is, however, another round that started in 2005 during which the government was receptive to the group's demands. However, even then, neither the leader of the PKK nor the government ministers were allowed in the process. The 2009 process was conducted between the National Security Institution officials and few PKK leaders who reside in Europe. As such, if we define the peace processes as a compromise between the main leaders, then the 2012 process constitutes the first real attempt in this regard.

² KCK literally translates as “The Council of Communities of Kurdistan” (Koma Civakan Kurdistan) but on the group’ public statements, its translated as Democratic Communities of Kurdistan (Gunes 2012:141). PKK experienced many structural changes in terms of organization. KCK structure is founded on the basis to put its leaders’ democratic confederalism principle on practice that demands the unification of each Kurdish autonomous region while respecting the nation-state borders. As such, KCK subsumes all PKK affiliated organizations operating in different countries.

³ For an excellent account on the Kurdish Question in Turkey see Kirisci and Winrow (1997), also Gunes (2012)

⁴ Due to lack of census data it’s impossible to know the exact figures on the number of Kurdish population in the Middle East because as an assimilation policy, states have tendencies to misrepresent this information. For instance, in Turkey last population census that asked participant’s mother tongue was conducted in 1965. However, for the number of whole Kurdish population in the Middle East scholarly accounts give an estimate of 35-40 million people (see Gurses 2014; Gunes 2018)

⁵ For instance, since the foundation of the Turkish Republic; assimilation policies included the language bans, displacement, restrictions on political and cultural rights and as well as resulted with torture and disappearances. Similarly, other countries adopted similar measures such as denial of citizenship, Arabization of the Kurdish inhabited regions, forced displacement. In every country that they reside inn; Kurdish demands met with serious repressions. In Iraq, it even resulted with Anfal Operation and Halabja Massacre where; for the first time in history a regime attacked its own population with chemical Mustard and Sarine Gas.

⁶ Numbers are estimated to be approximately around 1/5 of whole population that corresponds to 16 million people.

⁷ Of course, there were many intellectuals during the Ottoman Empire who were mobilized along the Kurdish cause but this remained mostly on the intellectual level and lacked mass public support. There were also many Kurdish revolts during Ottoman times and Early Republican period but there is a serious academic discussion whether or not these revolts did actually carry a nationalist element on the large scale.

⁸ The group has declared various unilateral ceasefires and even one of them has lasted over 5 years from 1999 to 2004 during which the groups has dealt with its own internal struggles. However, after each ceasefires PKK resumed the violence due to the government’s unwillingness and inability to approach the issue from a political perspective. See Candar (2012a) and Dicle (2017)

⁹ Information on PKK's support structure is readily available in the UCDP External Support Database (Högbladh, Pettersson and Themnér 2011). Diaspora support to PKK is also confirmed by the author's personal interviews with former PKK members who currently reside in Europe and its diaspora members.

¹⁰ It is estimated that between mid 1980's to 2000's, approximately 3500 villages have been forcefully evacuated and around 4 million Kurds who were living in the conflict zones were forcefully displaced (see Bozarslan 2014; Gunes and Zeydanlioglu 2014; Jongerden 2007; Çelik 2005). Eventually this further contributed to the intensification of violence by creating new grievances and as such, it contributed to the rebel group recruitment.

¹¹ For a brilliant argument on grievance and conflict see Buhaug, Gleditsch and Cederman (2013)

¹² For a great account on Turkey's repressive measures on the Kurds; see Yegen (2009; 2010; 2014)

¹³ After the capture of Ocalan, during the 2000s, the PKK reinvented itself towards advocating an idea of democratic confederalism. The PKK's ideological transformation was based on the defence texts written by Öcalan and submitted to different courts around the world in which his case was heard. These were the Turkish courts' rights after his imprisonment, the Greek courts due to his expulsion from Greece as well as the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In all of these hearings Ocalan mentioned the nation-state as the 'Original Sin' in the history of humanity and rejected the notion of nationalism and suggested the democratic confederalism to replace the nation-state and its undemocratic practices. Ocalan's idea of democratic confederalism is based on the writings of Murray Bookchin (1982, 1992, 1993, 1996) and calls for a radical democracy that would not function at the nation-state level but at the community level. In that sense, Ocalan calls for communalism and radical politics that would be reorganized at tribal and village communities. As such he surely rejects the organization around the nation-state and dismisses the national liberation movements that trapped in the ideas of the state and state-making. While the philosophical roots of his ideas call for a radical democracy, on the practical level Ocalan rejects his former demands of secession and the Kurds having their own state-building practices. On the contrary he suggests a borderless unification that would apply to the Kurdish conflict. He demands the Kurds to be unified without separation from the countries they live in, but there should be no borders among them and that the Kurdish politics should be re-organized on the community level involving direct participation. (See Akkaya and Jongerden 2013)

¹⁴ Among them People's Labour Party (HEP) founded in 1990, the Democracy Party (DEP) in 1993, the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) in 1994, the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) in 1997, and the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in 2005.

¹⁵ Traditionally in Iran; Kurdish demands are represented by Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI); Society of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan (Komala) and in recent years by Party of Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) that is affiliated with the PKK. In Iraq; historically Kurdish demands are mostly represented by two dominant parties; the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), although their dominance has been largely challenged by the Goran (Change) Movement in recent years (see BBC 2010, 2013)

¹⁶ The Mahabad Republic of 1946 could only survive for a year because with the withdrawal of Soviet Army; Iranian government could recapture the areas under the Kurdish control (see Gunes 2018)

¹⁷ For instance, there is a historic rivalry between the PKK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq. In mid 1990's there was also an armed conflict between Iraqi Kurdish Groups the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). This conflict is often referred as "brakuji" (killing of the brothers). PKK had closer ties to PUK.

¹⁸ Candar (2012a) notes that PKK is the only Pan Kurdish group that have presence in all 4 countries under different names. In Iraq, PKK founded Kurdistan Democratic Solution party (Partiya Çareseriya Demokratîk a Kurdistanê PÇDK) in 2002. In Iran, it founded the Kurdistan Free Life Party (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê PJAK) in 2004. And lastly In Syria, it founded the Democratic Union Part (Partiya Yekîti a Demokratîk PYD) in 2004.

¹⁹ There are also two previous attempts but didn't result with actual talks. One was during the presidency of Turgut Ozal in 1993; the other one was during Necmettin Erbakan government in 1996. Yet while Ozal was deceased before the talks could even start, Erbakan government was overthrown by a military coup.

²⁰ The process that has been declared to the public in 2009 was the result of series of back channel talks that started in 2005, that over the time experienced several breakdowns. It majorly conducted between the PKK (Zubeyir Aydar, Sabri Ok, Adem Uzun; Remzi Kartal; Sozdar Avesta and Mustafa Karasu), DTP, the political wing of the rebels (Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk) and the heads of the National Intelligence Agency Emre Taner and Hakan Fidan. But oddly, the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's role was highly limited to just read and accept or reject the discussions conducted between these actors. It also involved serious mediation attempts from Jalal Talabani, facilitated by the Norwegian Government. It also saw the involvement of a second track diplomacy efforts both from London based and Geneva based conflict resolution centres. The meetings were majorly conducted in Oslo and therefore the process is also referred as the Oslo Process. The information was taken from Dicle (2017) but also confirmed by the authors' personal interviews with experts and peace process facilitators.

²¹ The 2009 Democratic Opening foresaw the return of 34 PKK fighters from the PKK sanctuaries in Iraq through the Habur border between Iraq and Turkey. This group is called as “the peace group”. Their return alleviated the nationalistic sentiments among the Turkish population.

²² Right after the collapse of the 2009 Oslo Process, government has faced with serious nationalistic backlash both from the public and from the opposition parties. Subsequently, the it adopted a more nationalistic and military perspective. The Kurdish politicians started to get arrested with the second wave of KCK investigations, Kurdish political party DTP has been closed down, Kurdish deputies that conducted the Oslo processes have been banned from the politics for 5 years, the peace group consisting of PKK members that came from Iraq from the PKK sanctuaries have been arrested.

²³ Abdullah Ocalan was imprisoned in 1999 and sentenced to death. His sentence later commuted to death penalty during Europeanization Reforms that took place between 1999-2004 in Turkey. On July 2011, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that if he was at the government when PKK leader Ocalan was imprisoned, he would apply the death penalty (see Milliyet 2011). This came right after the Oslo process when the government adopted a harsh military perspective. For a great account on the capture and trial of Öcalan (see BBC 1999)

²⁴ Tezchur (2013) makes this argument based on a recently collected data efforts. However, although his data measures both side’s casualties separately as opposed to current conflict datasets such as UCDP or PRIO and hence constitutes a great contribution; his data has an important shortcoming; is that it’s based on newspaper articles where both sides have tendencies to misrepresent their side of casualties (see also Tezchur 2014). The government and rebel casualties on the year of 2012 were also mentioned by International Crisis Group (2012) report, although the numbers are highly different than Tezchur (2013) still it confirms that it was the rebel casualties that were high and not the government’s.

²⁵ In the meeting minutes; Ocalan (2015) on 23 February reports this number as ten thousand.

²⁶ Although pro-Kurdish Party increased its votes over the last few years this happened years after the peace process not before. Latest general election before the opening of the peace process was the 2011 elections and Pro-Kurdish party was only represented by 36 independent candidates having a total vote share of 6.58 % constituting 2.8 million people. If the peace process was due to government party’s presidential system calculations; a better option would be to rely on the Nationalist Movement Party that had the %13 of the total vote share constituting 5.5 million people. In fact; as noted by Balta (2016) by adopting a military stance AKP increased its votes to 49.9 percent in the 2011 elections.

²⁷ In fact, from the very beginning of the peace process meetings rebel leader expresses his contention (Ocalan 2015:27).

²⁸ See also Cetinyan (2002) for a related argument. Although Cetinyan (2002) does not look at the conflict outcome but focuses on whether or not conflict erupts, he argues that in the presence of TEK groups, the violence wouldn't occur because the minority demands would be reciprocated already by the governments would like to avoid further costs.

²⁹ TEK groups can be excluded groups in the countries they live; such as Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Alternatively, they can be the dominant group in the others such as the Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece and their ethnic Kin in Macedonia after the Independence of 1991.

³⁰ To date, there are two main books on process tracing one is from Beach and Pedersen (2015) and the other is from Benett and Checkel eds. (2015). Due to different philosophical backgrounds, not only the application of the method differs but also how they classify process tracing is different. For instance; according Beach and Pedersen (2015) process tracing method can be classified in three; such as theory testing, theory building or explaining outcome methods. Whereas Benett and Checkel eds. (2015) classifies process tracing into two main camps; theory testing and theory building. They also have divergent views regarding equifinality. I mostly follow Beach and Pedersen (2013)

³¹ While theory testing process tracing is, inductive and tests each part of the proposed mechanism based on presence or absence of evidence, theory building is inductive and goes from the case towards the theory. Outcome explaining process tracing on the other hand is designed to explain a single case rather than deal with a theory that can be applied in general.

³² Therefore, as noted by Beach and Pederson (2013:15) the theory testing process tracing doesn't read like an analytical narrative but just shows whether or not there is evidence for each part of the causal mechanism.

³³ The initial idea when designing this study was to interview Besir Atalay, deputy prime minister who was the main actor from the government side; as well as Selahattin Demirtas who was the leader of the Pro-Kurdish party. However; although Besir Atalay agreed to give an interview, it was the author was not able to travel to Turkey at that time because it coincided with the "academics for peace petition" incident. The author is a member of 1128 peace petitioners who demanded return to the peace process and have been accused of a terrorist propaganda in Turkey (see Arslan 2016a, 2016b). On the other hand, while the interview with Demirtas was to be conducted in London, on the last minute, he had to cancel all of this London program including his talks. Demirtas has been imprisoned right after his London trip.

³⁴ Especially when access to Kurdish media outlets have been restricted and the rest of Turkish media is under intense government control.

³⁵ If an article both mentions peace process and resolution process, its counted as one article.

³⁶ If an article mentions more than one keywords related to PKK's transborder ethnic kin, that article is counted as one article.

³⁷ Of course; up until the foundation of the PYD; there were many Kurdish political parties in Syria that trace their descent to 1957 Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria. However, not only they were highly fragmented but also under regime's repressive policies they have always been illegal. PYD success came from the fact that it relied on the PKK expertise; training of fighters and logistical and military support (See Gunes and Lowe 2015). PKK also managed mobilize significant amount of financial resources from Kurdish business owners (Tejel 2012) For a good account on Kurdish political mobilization in Syria see Gunter (2014a); Gunes (2018); Lowe (2014)

³⁸ Although it's has been published years later; in 2018, a propaganda leaflet prepared by foreign affairs of the government party called "PYD= PKK" is also important to show the government party's perception of threat regarding the kin group cooperation. See AKP (2018)

³⁹ Village Guards system did not only include the Kurds that are opposing to PKK but also those who would like to benefit from the side payments. Barkey (1993) notes that while the number of village guards are estimated to be 40 thousand among which 8 thousand of them are suspected to be actual PKK supporters.

⁴⁰ Especially after the Iraqi Kurds declaration of federation Turkey regularly organized meetings with Syrian and Iranian ministers to discuss Iraqi territorial integrity and to coordinate policies to fight with PKK presence in all of these countries. Despite their strong differences, Turkey could cooperate with Saddam Hussein as well as improved relations with the Iranian Regime (Werz and Hoffman 2014) In 1998; Turkey threatened Syria with a military intervention unless it renounces to support the PKK, consequently two countries have signed the Adana Protocol to cooperate on PKK.

⁴¹ The intractability of the Kurdish Question was mostly due to the governments' refusal to see the Kurdish Question from an ethnic and political perspective. This view is also noted several times by the former General Chief of Staff Ilker Basbug who said that "we finished the PKK 5 times but we cannot prevent people to join the rebels and completely eliminate the group" (See Hasan Cemal 2016)

⁴² Although Barzani openly criticize PKK's armed struggle and there are clear hostilities between the Barzani and the PKK, as noted by Selcen (2016) since the civil war among Iraqi Kurdish groups during 1990's; there is a strong will on the KDP side to avoid fights among Kurds. In fact during the liberation of Shengal from ISIS, KDP Peshmerga forces avoid clashing with PKK even though they were more outnumbered (see Selcen 2016)

⁴³ The 15 Kurdish political parties coming under the "Syrian Kurdish National Council" have closer ties to Barzani (Tastekin 2015)

⁴⁴ Since its imprisonment, Ocalan was trying to lead the PKK from its prison (Gunes 2018). Turkish government

⁴⁵ While the peace process going on the PKK's transborder ethnic kin group PYD was at war first with Free Syrian Army groups, then with al Nusra Front, and then later on with ISIS (Yildiz 2016)

⁴⁶ Many analyst suggest that the YDG-H, the youngsters of the PKK is a self -founded group without any PKK interference. This view is also expressed by prominent Kurdish politicians during my numerous visits to Diyarbakir and Cizre in 2015. However, during my visits to curfew regions in 2015, I have had the chance to speak with a former YDG-H member who confirmed my argument and said that some YDG-H members have been formerly trained by PKK members. Not only the interview but also the ability of the group to dig an extensively long tunnel under the Diyarbakir city centre; where the population could easily cross suggests that the group possesses more ability than a bunch of unorganized youngsters.

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