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Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources

Erlanson, Albin and Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol (2015) 'Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources.' Journal of Economic Theory, 159. 137 - 162. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof, unanimous, consistent, and resource-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Young, 1987), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.

Item Type: Article
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 09 Oct 2020 14:43
Last Modified: 09 Oct 2020 15:15
URI: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/24994

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