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A note on optimal allocation with costly verification

Erlanson, Albin and Kleiner, Andreas (2019) 'A note on optimal allocation with costly verification.' Journal of Mathematical Economics, 84. 56 - 62. ISSN 0304-4068

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We revisit the problem of a principal allocating an indivisible good with costly verification, as it was formulated and analyzed by Ben-Porath et al. (2014). We establish, in this setting, a general equivalence between Bayesian and ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms. We also provide a simple proof showing that the optimal mechanism is a threshold mechanism.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Optimal mechanisms, Costly verification, BIC and EPIC equivalence
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 29 Jul 2019 13:01
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2021 02:00

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