Erlanson, Albin and Kleiner, Andreas (2019) 'A note on optimal allocation with costly verification.' Journal of Mathematical Economics, 84. 56 - 62. ISSN 0304-4068

Text NoteBDL2019NewFigure.pdf - Accepted Version Restricted to Repository staff only until 15 January 2021. Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial No Derivatives. Download (431kB) | Request a copy

Abstract

We revisit the problem of a principal allocating an indivisible good with costly verification, as it was formulated and analyzed by Ben-Porath et al. (2014). We establish, in this setting, a general equivalence between Bayesian and ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms. We also provide a simple proof showing that the optimal mechanism is a threshold mechanism.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Optimal mechanisms, Costly verification, BIC and EPIC equivalence
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics, Department of
Depositing User:	Elements
Date Deposited:	29 Jul 2019 13:01
Last Modified:	29 Jul 2019 13:01
URI:	http://repository.essex.ac.uk/id/eprint/24995

Actions (login required)

View Item