Three Essays on Protest and Negotiations

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A thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Government

Department of Government

University of Essex

2019

Preface

This dissertation includes three main chapters, each of which were initially written in article form. Each addresses a specific problem, but an overarching question unifies them: what determines the consequences of protests?

The first inspiration for the dissertation came from my undergraduate thesis on Thai politics. Thailand has witnessed protests between pro- and anti-Thaksin groups since Thaksin Shinawatra first become the prime minister in 2001. These protests have occurred sporadically throughout this time, with some intervals, and sometimes become violent mobilising thousands of citizens and causing deaths and injuries. Nonetheless, no negotiation has taken place between the two competing groups, and leadership has sometimes changed hands in unconventional ways, such as the military coups in 2006 and 2014, and judicial decisions on party dissolution in 2008. The political climate of contemporary Thailand continued to intrigue me during my PhD. Although the dissertation does not study any particular country, the political instability in Thailand provided the motivating examples and stimulated me to undertake theoretical analysis on protests.

So many people have supported me as I have researched and written this dissertation. Quite a few of them pushed me to explore a much wider intellectual terrain than I had planned. My first thanks go to the members of my supervisory board at the University of Essex. Dominik Duell's patient, supportive, and sometimes challenging counsel played a significant role in the evolution of my ideas. At several key points, he guided me back on course when my efforts would otherwise have gone astray. Gina Yannitell Reinhardt supported my work with incisive comments, encouraging my enthusiasm while illuminating new challenges. Jonathan Slapin helped me clarify

rambling claims and inchoate ideas. Daniel Berger supported the very initial stages of my Ph.D. life at Essex and helped me build the underlying ideas of this dissertation. Hugh Ward graciously agreed to join my board, and his insightful comments on every aspect of my research strengthened my work.

Beyond recognising this immediate circle of advisors, I thank three close researchers at Waseda University. Masaru Kohno, Kubo Keiichi, and Shuhei Kurizaki have each offered me helpful guidance on writing academic articles since I was a Master's student and have responded to my rough drafts with sharp feedback even after I moved to Essex. They made it possible for me to complete the research.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Wakako Maekawa, the co-author of the paper that Chapter 3 is based on, for her wonderful collaboration. She implemented and wrote up the quantitative analyses and conducted a case study in Northern Mali, providing powerful empirical support to the formal analyses that I exclusively contributed. Without countless discussions with her and her great devotion to our project, the paper would not have been so successful. She also supported me as a friend, and the casual conversation with her over coffee sometimes inspired new research ideas.

I am also grateful to the Keidanren Ishizaka Memorial Foundation, the Tokyo Club, and the Japan Student Services Organization. The first two institutions financially supported me for my first two years at Essex, and the last institution offered me a scholarship for the third year. Without their generosity and support, I would not have been able to focus so much on my research project.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my parents, Takehiko and Tokumi Inata. My father has always encouraged and cared about me living far away from Japan. My mother passed away before I finished this thesis. I very much appreciate her for giving

me a strict upbringing and ungrudging psychological support throughout her life, not only for my PhD work but also every other one. Furthermore, and most importantly, they brought me up to think about things. I dedicate this thesis to them.

Abstract

This dissertation explores the conditions under which protests successfully coerce political leaders into compromise, and the causal mechanisms by which protests succeed or fail. Although the conventional wisdom suggests that protests mobilising more resources, such as people, money, facilities, and violence, are more likely to achieve their goals, this is now under increasing empirical challenge and needs theoretical refining. This dissertation is structured in three papers, all of which analyse the variance in the consequences of protests by emphasising their role as threats to governments. The first chapter examines how the effect of a protest as a threat changes depending on the presence or absence of rival groups. The second chapter investigates whether and how public opinion affects dissident groups' choice of resistance tactics, violence or nonviolence, and the government responsiveness to each type of resistance. The third chapter explores how third-party interventions following protests affect protesters' ability to pose a threat and promise a reward to a government and hence the probability of success of that protest. Due to the difficulty of measuring the size of resource mobilisation for protests and the impact of those resources, these questions have not been addressed systematically. Tackling this shortcoming, I have built on game-theoretic models to generate theoretical insights and guide alternative qualitative and quantitative analyses. I argue that the conventional monotone relationship between the size of resource mobilisation and the efficiency of threats holds only under limited conditions. Considering the real-world diversity in protest groups' preferences, actors who can threaten governments, and domestic audiences watching the bargaining between protesters and a government, less resourceful protests may have more bargaining power than those that have more resources. The findings provide a coherent

theory of the consequences of protests that bridges the conventional wisdom and phenomena that the conventional wisdom cannot explain.

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1. Introduction

Protests are the collective actions through which people attempt to exert pressure on authorities or power-holders to achieve political changes. They have indeed been one of the most common driving forces behind political changes. By participating in collective political actions including petitions, demonstrations, boycotts, riots, and violent campaigns, dissatisfied citizens have attempted to make their demands for political purposes such as policy changes, institutional reforms, better political representation, greater autonomy, leadership removal, and regime changes. Recent uprisings such as the Arab Spring, Colour Revolutions in the former Soviet nations and the Balkans, the occupy movement, and clashes between right-wing movements and liberals in Western countries evidence that protests remain an extraordinarily common channel for citizens to participate in politics. While scholars of protests have paid much attention to the questions of what makes them happen, why people join costly political actions, and how issues of coordination are solved, the question of what determines the consequences of political collective action has received disproportionately little scholarly attentions.

This thesis discusses a new framework to study protests. Hitherto, protests have predominately been discussed in the framework of collective action. Since coordination is a prerequisite for protests to emerge, studying the coordination phase helps in the understanding of the dynamics of protests. Nevertheless, whether coordination succeeds cannot by itself explain the large variance in the consequences of protests. A vast number of protests that successfully mobilise people have failed to achieve political changes. This fact suggests a need to shift focus to understand the aspect of bargaining if we are to know more about the determinants of the consequences of

protests. From this basis, this thesis provides a framework for analysing protests as threats. By taking political actions, citizens send threats to political leaders, thereby trying to make them to sit down at the bargaining table, and ultimately, to concede to their demands. Dissidents' tactics vary considerably in the levels of resources and efforts invested, ranging from nonviolent tactics such as marches, rallies, sit-ins, petitions, and demonstrations, to violent tactics which involve the use of force and which may result in damage to property, injuries, and even deaths. To make their threats credible, dissidents need to choose carefully how much resources to spend on pressuring political leaders. This thesis explores how mobilising different levels of resources to enact threats affects the consequences of protests, and thus attempts to determine under what the conditions the greater mobilisation of resources improves or undermines protesters' chances of winning political concessions.

The conventional wisdom that the entire thesis speaks to is that the more resources spent on protests, the more likely those protests are to succeed. McCarthy and Zald (1977) first theorise this as resource mobilisation theory, and several studies have followed their approach. In the literature on protests based on resource mobilisation theory, this conventional wisdom is explicitly contended, or often implicitly assumed (Bell, Bhasin, Clay, and Murdie 2014; Gamson 1975; Lake 2002; Lipsky 1968). For example, scholars on protest have examined what encourages participation in protests and what tactics increase the size of the resource pool available presuming that greater resource mobilisation makes protests more successful. The literature on international crisis bargaining also suggests this (Banks 1990; Fearon 1997; Powell 1990; Schelling 1960). In the international relations literature, for instance, military threats are believed to be more coercive than verbal threats (e.g., Slantchev 2005; Thyne 2010). The conventional position tends to argue that threats sent by paying costs such as mass

demonstrations, aggressive actions, and military threats work more effectively than threats posed with fewer costs such as small-scale marches, peaceful political actions, and verbal threats because the greater the costs are paid to enact threats, the more credible those threats become, and the more likely the bargaining is to reach agreement. Despite the widespread agreement on this, this conventional wisdom has faced theoretical scepticism and increasing empirical challenge: protests which were reported to be historically large do not always receive favourable responses from governments whilst relatively small-scale protests sometime make "a big splash" (Nie and Verba 1975, 24); demands which are peacefully expressed are put on legislative agendas whilst violent campaigns, including terrorist attacks, are sometimes completely rejected by the government and are prone to counter-measures. The consequences of civil resistance, therefore, cannot simply be accounted for by the magnitude of resources spent on pressuring political leaders.

The three chapters of this thesis display why this conventional wisdom does not always hold and examine under what conditions civil resistance mobilising greater resources are more likely to coerce political leaders into concessions. Although the previous literature on protests tends to highlight the interaction between two primary actors, a government and a set of protest groups (e.g., DeNardo 1985; Kitschelt 1986; Lindvall 2010; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Nikolayenko 2012; Schumaker 1975), each chapter of this thesis integrates another actor who may or may not influence the bargaining between the two primary bargainers. Specifically, each chapter takes into account a rival protest group, domestic audiences not participating in dissent, or a third-party actor who may pose a threat to the survival of government following protest. Compared to protests in which most of the populace coordinated to face a single, common enemy such as a Communist regime or a colonial power, recent protests have

shown the greatest dynamics ever with the growing diversification of public political preferences, ideologies, and values, involving new types of actors.

In this way, this dissertation focuses its discussion on domestic factors influencing the varying consequences of protests. In other words, it abstracts international factors from the formal analyses. Some may disagree with this stance since political conflict often diffuses across state boundaries. Furthermore, this tendency has been growing since today it is undoubtedly easier and faster for information about protests to be communicated than it was half a century ago, as epitomised by the Arab Spring and Colour Revolutions. Notwithstanding this, the consequences of protests are not uniquely determined by international factors such as the political situation in neighbouring countries, the climate of global economy, and global shifts in norms. The escalation of protests in one country may provoke protests in some countries but not affect in others. In addition, protests stimulated by events in neighbouring states may not necessarily follow the same path. For these reasons, this dissertation scrutinises what domestic factors cause the varying consequences of protests.

Methodology of Formal Modelling

The basic focus of this thesis has been determined: to understand why some protests successfully coerce political leaders into concession while others do not. The thesis seeks to achieve this goal by adopting three distinct methodologies: formal deductive modelling, quantitative analyses, and qualitative case studies. It particularly draws on formal modelling.

Formal models play a crucial role in constructing theoretical arguments. The analysis relies on a variety of game theoretic models, and it uses this deductive

approach for several reasons. One reason is that formal models are powerful analytical tools that require a clear specification of players' assumptions about their actions, preferences over possible outcomes, information they possess, constraints on them, and the like. Formal modelling makes it possible to piece together the accumulated research, stylised facts, and intuition so as to portray causal mechanisms that are otherwise difficult to pinpoint. Causal mechanism by which some protests succeed while others fail are given in formal language in a rigorous, transparent manner, thus representing a strong source of theoretical claims.

Formal models are also valuable when research deals with some variables that are not easily measured empirically. The impact of protests, which are the key variable of this thesis, is an example of such a variable. We can hardly know the exact number of people mobilised in a series of protests, measure the total economic and social damage caused by protests in a precise manner, or obtain perfectly comparable and accurate measurements of the violence employed in civil resistance. By using parameters that can proxy for the size of protests, formal models enable us to make theoretical inferences about how the size of protests affects their consequences. The use of parameters has an analytical advantage in that they can be interpreted in various ways depending on the actual cases we are attempting to explain. Parameter r, which is used as a proxy for the resource mobilised by a protest group in one chapter, could also be understood more specifically as the number of participants a protest group obtains for its activity or the level of violence it employs. Simplifying the facts with formal language helps combine the scattered case-based studies on similar political phenomena into one story.

Third, formal models provide us with empirically testable implications that could hold regardless of time, space, or cultural context. In Chapter 3, we statistically test

implications drawn from the formal model about the effectiveness of different campaign methods. In Chapter 4, meanwhile, three case studies are conducted to provide qualitative evidence with the formal results that third-party actors' threats behind protests matter. Case studies are also presented in Chapter 2 to illustrate that the investment of resources into building the organisational infrastructure of protest groups significantly affects the consequences of protest activity. The simplification and explicitness that underlie formal models suggest what variables should be taken into account in examining particular phenomena and also suggest several ways in which formal results can be applied to actual cases. Furthermore, formal models often yield counterintuitive propositions that other methods could seldom produce. Counter-intuitive inference is useful in that it can bridge gaps between inconclusive research findings thus far presented and in that it can provide theoretically coherent explanations to phenomena that have hitherto been deemed case-specific or anomalies.

Design of the Argument

Chapter 2 highlights a political environment in which two groups of citizens with different political goals are potentially in dispute. As contemporary examples of protests about immigration in Western Europe and the United States illustrate, once a group decides to protest to change the policies in a given status-quo, another group may organise counter-protests to oppose such potential policy changes, and a government needs to appeal to both groups of audiences who may affect its political survival. The specific question addressed is whether the greater mobilisation of resources improves a protest group's ability to send credible threats, as predicted by the conventional wisdom, in a context where a political leader needs to appeal to another protest group

with different political preferences. Formalising bargaining between two protest groups with different political aims and a government, it is found that if a protest group mobilises excessive resources for its protest activity, this will stimulate counter-protests by another group, making it harder for a government to concede to the original protest group. The analysis provides a counter-intuitive result that although spending all resources on protest activity should maximise protest groups' ability to threaten a government, it is actually allocating resources on building the organisational infrastructure of protest groups, as well as on protest activity, that most clearly improves a protest group's chance of winning government concessions since this decreases the probability of counter-protests. That is, the observability of investment in organisational infrastructure enables protest groups credibly to show their commitment to the de-radicalisation of their activity. Based on these formal findings, therefore, the de-radicalisation of dissident groups can be self-enforcing where domestic audiences have heterogenous political preferences, inconsistent with the conventional wisdom suggesting that radicalising means of resistance is always rational.

Chapter 3 addresses the question of what determines government responsiveness to violent and nonviolent civil campaigns and citizens' choice of dissident tactics. This is a joint work with Wakako Maekawa. Our answer to this question draws on three different sources. One source is formal analysis. The formal analysis decomposes public opinion into public attitudes towards campaign means and ends and reveals that levels of public tolerance to violence affects dissident groups' choice of campaign tactics and government responsiveness to each type of campaign tactic. That is, as the public becomes less tolerant of the use of violence, a dissident group is more likely to choose nonviolence since the government will incur more costs in making concessions towards violent groups. Yet, as the public's support for campaign ends lowers, a

dissident group needs to complement its poor support with the use of violence. The distinct effect of public opinion about dissident means and ends complicates a transition from a violence-dominated society, in which coercion is power, to a nonviolence-dominated society, in which mass pressure towards governments and dissident groups is effective. The second source is quantitative analysis to test observable implications obtained from the formal findings. We use AmericasBarometer, which directly measures respondents' views on the use of force for political aims, and our empirical tests support the main findings of our formal models. The final source is qualitative case studies. Their purpose is to display how the fundamental working of our model map onto actual cases of government concessions to different types of civil campaigns. We choose conflict in the Basque Country of Spain and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine to verify the applicability of our formal model to cases beyond the Latin American region.

Chapter 4 investigates how a third-party actor's threat following protests affects bargaining between protesters and a government. While people are protesting to call for a leadership change, another actor sometimes intervenes and threatens the survival of a political leader. Theoretically, such interventions should improve protesters' ability to threaten political leaders credibly because their protests are backed by another actor's support. Yet, simultaneously, such interventions can undermine protesters' ability to commit to rewarding political leaders when concessions are granted since some interventionists may not want to withdraw their threats even after political leaders have compromised. The analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrates that even when the size of a protest increases, the susceptibility of potential interventionists to that growth can either improve or undermine the effectiveness of protests. That is, the shadow of intervention by an undemocratic actor prevents an increase in protest size from

enhancing the probability of a protest successfully removing political leaders because less democratic interventionists become more convinced of the success of their removal threats and less willing to retract those threats even after political leaders have made concessions. Three case studies follow the formal analysis. Protests that a Thai protest group, People's Alliance for Democracy, conducted against three prime ministers that followed different paths. This analysis of within-country variation provides powerful support to the formal findings, and also several implications for empirical analyses that seek to identify the determinants of protest outcomes by focusing on attributes of protests, such as size, characteristics of participants, and levels of violence (e.g., Amenta 2006; Chenoweth and Stepan 2011; Gamson 1975; Scarritt and McMillan 1995; Schumaker 1975), and attributes of governments, such as political institutions and leaders' ideological proximity (e.g., Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Kitschelt 1986; Schumaker 1975; Tarrow 1993b).

This dissertation concludes by summarising the findings regarding the impact of resource mobilisation for protest activity on the consequences of protests. It also discusses what this thesis has not addressed but is potentially important for future research to consider in more detail.

2. Protest, Counter-Protest, and Organisational Diversification of Protest Groups

2.1 Introduction

To be successful, protest groups must back their demands with sufficient threats to sway political leaders. When civic groups seeking political change employ different forms of disruptive interference such as demonstrations and violent campaigns, the threats they pose are claimed to be enhanced when a bargainer can mobilise more resources (e.g., participants, money, facilities, violence) demonstrating its ability to attack a competing bargainer in case negotiations fail (Banks 1990; Fearon 1997; Schelling 1960). Consistent with these insights from bargaining theory, much of the protest literature explicitly argues or implicitly depends on the assumption that protest groups mobilising more resources have a higher ability to force political leaders to the bargaining table and are more likely to obtain concessions (Bell, Bhasin, Clay, and Murdie 2014; DeNardo 1985; Gamson 1975; Lipsky 1968; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Schumaker 1975).[1]

Although the assumption concerning resources is widely accepted, it is contradicted by two sets of empirical phenomena. The first puzzle is why some large-scale protests fail to win political leaders' concessions. Consider the cases of anti-nuclear protests in the 1970s. France and West Germany achieved higher levels of participant mobilisation than other anti-nuclear movements in Europe and the United States (Kitschelt 1986, 71–72)[2] but made little impact on government policies. Their

[1] Scholars on protest, for example, have examined what encourages participation in protests and what tactics increase the size of the resource pool available. Those questions implicitly assume that greater resource mobilisation makes protests more successful.

[2] While the anti-nuclear protests in West Germany and France, which are estimated to have respectively mobilised 175,000 and 280,000 participants in the 1970s, made almost no gains, their

American counterparts, however, succeeded in forcing the abandonment of several nuclear power plants planned or under construction (Kitschelt 1986, 71–72; Kolb 2007) although protests in West Germany and France should have posed greater threats to the governments and therefore won government concessions if the conventional wisdom is true. Further, one group's excessively large mobilisation promotes counter-mobilisation by another seeking to maintain the status quo (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 38), making bargaining with government less straightforward.

The second puzzle is why some protest groups reduce the amount of resources available for disruptive activity by investing in their organisational development. The anti-nuclear protesters in the US bargained with the government by spending some of their resources on building their organisational infrastructure rather than only on street demonstrations (Kitschelt 1989, 68). For unstructured, grassroots protest groups to transform into structured organisations, they must invest in organisational infrastructure. For example, the US recycling movement hired paid professional staff and incorporated key activists during its loose process of structuring into a national recycling association in the 1960s, rather than using volunteers (Lounsbury 2005, 77–83); successful antinuclear movements made efforts to win legal incorporation and transform from grassroots to regional or national groups founding umbrella and branch offices (Nelkin and Fallows 1978); and lobbyists are obliged to register and pay the fee in most US states. However, simply hiring full-time staff and acquiring office facilities does not immediately inflict damage upon governments. From a resource-mobilisation perspective contending that the more resources mobilised for disruptive interference in

US counterparts made substantial changes in the nuclear policies at the state level, before the Three Mile Island accident (Kitschelt 1989, 71–72; Kolb 2007, 200–205).

what governments are responsible for the more powerful a protest becomes, the allocation of resources to organisational development should not immediately improve a group's ability to influence the policymaking process. Moreover, the formation of organised advocacy groups can be threatening to political leaders in future periods as it may facilitate coordination among protesters with stronger leadership. Such long-term effects are not necessarily promising, however, due to a potential decrease in public support or issue salience compared with the effect of disruptive action that can punish political leaders. Notwithstanding, US anti-nuclear protests devoted considerable effort towards organisational development to great success. Moreover, civic advocacy groups investing in both protest activity and organisational development usually have a larger impact on the policymaking process than episodic protest groups with little organisational foundations.

Relatedly, it is also puzzling that despite several benefits of organisational development claimed thus far, not all protest groups mobilise resources for their organisational evolution. If organisational development benefits organised groups, every group should have invested in it.[3] Therefore, certain short-term incentives must cause civic advocacy groups allocate resources to organisational infrastructure.

By formalising a one-shot bargaining model of protests between a political leader and two sets of audiences to whom the political leader must appeal, I will clarify a mechanism by which those puzzling processes can go hand in hand and show that

[3] A series of protests against autocratic president Ben Ali in Tunisia, the so-called Jasmine revolution, lacked organisational foundation for their activity. Participants in the demonstrations and riots were mobilised through communication technologies, such as Twitter and Facebook, without clear leadership that is supposed to assign protest tactics or structured protest network to mobilise members (Rousselin 2014). By contrast, several studies find no evidence for the claim that organisational size has a positive direct effect on protest outcomes (e.g., Kolb 2007, 41; Scruggs 1999).

protest groups do have incentives to distribute some resources to building organisational infrastructure even in a one-shot game. This chapter proves that excessively high investment of resources in protest activity perversely undermines a protest group's ability to influence the government policymaking process because it facilitates a counter-protest that offsets the impact of the original protest. This result challenges the conventional wisdom that the greater the resources mobilised for protests the more successful the protests will be.

The findings demonstrate that protest groups can benefit from distributing resources between both protest activity and organisational development, although the more resources groups use for organisational infrastructure, the fewer costs they can then impose upon government today. Weakening a protest group's capacity to sway the government in a credible, observable manner (i.e. organising groups) makes a pivotal contribution to a competing protest group's willingness to stage a counter-protest and thereby improve its odds of winning concessions. This finding explains why the US anti-nuclear protests in the 1970s led to substantial government concessions despite their relatively low level of resource mobilisation for protest activity whereas those in West Germany did not. This result can also explain why radical civil resistance such as terrorism, tends to backfire by hardening the population's stance (Abrahms 2013; Fortna 2015; Gould and Klor 2010). This chapter presents, to the best of my knowledge, the first attempt to theorise the significance of a strategy to reduce counter-protests.

This chapter speaks to the literature on civic advocacy groups. Although how protest groups and interest groups attempt to influence policymaking processes are essentially the same (Berry 1999, 142), these groups have been examined separately:

sociologists have predominantly examined protests (e.g., Gamson 1975) and interest group politics have primarily been studied in economics (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994; Tullock 1980). With the premise that organised advocacy groups, including interest groups, and episodic protest groups are on a continuum representing the degree of organisational development and by endogenising civic groups' decision on their organisational forms, this chapter bridges several groups of literature that have often failed to talk to each other.

2.2 Literature

Protests are predominantly discussed in the collective-action framework (e.g., Gavious and Mizrahi 1999; Karklins and Petersen 1993). Although the resolution of coordination problems is essential for protests to emerge, the cases of unfruitful protests demonstrate that coordination does not always guarantee success. To better understand protest consequences, protests also need to be discussed in terms of threats. Protesters have opportunities to punish political leaders *ex post* if the leaders withhold concessions, for example, by voting against the leaders, cutting off financial support for state agencies, and resorting to violence.

Only a few studies formalise the bargaining aspect of protests (Lindvall 2010; Scartascini and Tommasi 2012). The inter-state bargaining literature, however, provides insights into the role of resource mobilisation as threats (e.g., Fearon 1997; Schelling 1960; Slantchev 2005) to suggest that protesters should impose a sufficient magnitude of threats towards government to make the government prefer the retraction of threats to their fulfillment. A number of studies on civil resistance depend on the assumption that the more resources a group mobilises for protest activity, the greater

the group's threat becomes (Bell et al. 2014; Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Schumaker 1975; Tenorio 2014). However, this conventional wisdom is now under increasing challenge.

First, the amount of resources mobilised for protest activity does not always positively correlate with protest outcomes. Empirical studies have yielded mixed (Colby 1982; Giugni 2004) and contradictory (Taft and Ross 1969) results concerning the efficacy of a high level of mobilisation. Cases question the applicability of a costly signalling framework to the context of protests. Some protests using significant resources failed to win political leaders' concessions and often provoked counter-protests to offset the efforts of the initial protests. For example, rightist protests such as segregationist protests (Andrews 2002) and anti-abortion protests (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996) often faced counter-protests, and anti-government protests in countless countries such as Russia, the United States, and Thailand have also propelled rival movements. Meanwhile, a small number of protesters have made "a big splash" such as those during the New York rent strikes (Nie and Verba 1975, 24) and *piquetero* (road blockade) protests in Argentina (Benclowcz and Breña 2011).[4]

Second, the literature on protests and on bargaining in general tend to overlook the possibility of counter-mobilisation when analysing the interaction between protesters and government, relying on the assumption that political leaders have only one set of audiences to appeal to. This assumption may likely hold in the context of inter-state bargaining in which domestic audiences uniformly do not want their home leader to concede,[5] but not in the context of domestic bargaining in which public preferences

[4] Some *piquetero* protests successfully pushed the government for social assistance programmes before spreading nationwide.
[5] Some studies do not necessarily support this assumption (e.g., Snyder and Borghard 2011).

about their leaders' concessions are diverse. The effects of concessions are essentially twofold (Schelling 1960, 34). Suppose that an incumbent leader modifies a given status-quo policy that she has implemented. Protesters dissatisfied with the policy may construe her concessions favourably, whereas people who prefer the previous policy may think that the leader has broken her prior commitment and may become suspicious of any new pretence at commitment. This situation indicates that, in domestic bargaining, larger mobilisation in protest activity aimed at increasing the probability of executive concessions may incentivise counter-mobilisation seeking to offset the impact of the initial mobilisation. Although a few exceptions directly deal with counter-protests such as Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) and Zald and Useem (1987), they do not analyse how the emergence of counter-protests constrain political leaders' decision-making. Little is known about such countervailing strategies that one group employs against another.[6]

Furthermore, a theoretical shortcoming of protest literature has yet to be solved. Most literature on protest takes it for granted that protest groups have already formed although a number of protests were staged without back-offices or clear leadership. In other words, people should have options regarding the formation of protest organisations, the extent to which they make their organisations institutionalised, and the amount of resources they will utilise for protest activities. One reason for the lack of perspective on endogenous institutionalisation is in part attributed to the fragmentation of scholarship. Traditionally, *ad hoc* protest groups and well-structured civic advocacy groups such as interest groups were studied in isolation though how

[6] One exception is Ward (2004), who argues that a lobbyist can push policies in an opposite direction if s/he prefers to cancel out pressure by another lobbyist.

those groups attempt to influence policies is the same in that both forms of groups pay costs to pressure governments and to influence their decision-making process (Berry 1999; Andrews and Edwards 2004). The major difference is how they distribute resources between protest activity and organisational development. Historically, some interest groups emerged as an institutional outlet for social movements such as those that arose after the 1960s in the US (Berry 1999, 142).

The second reason for this shortcoming is that the effect of resource mobilisation for protests and organisations is not clearly discerned. Protest literature assumes that using resources benefits protest groups no matter the purpose. Yet, protests and organisations are different in their observability and uncertainty. Protesting on the street is intended to be seen by the public and government to improve the policy influence and social presence whilst organising civil groups is less visible, often behind the curtain. Furthermore, groups' organisational development does not necessarily guarantee their future ability to threaten a government and to survive.[7] Given governments' limited ability to address threats, ongoing threats should be immediate threats to government unlike potential threats in future periods. Without dissecting the effect of protest groups' resource mobilisation, we may miscalculate the effect of protests.

Thus, the literature on protest may not have overcome the selection bias inherited in the categorisation of civic groups. Selection effects present an inferential problem because citizens should have incentives to form better organised groups such as lobbying groups if they provide better bargaining leverage. From a resource-mobilisation perspective, then, no persuasive answer to how civic groups rationally

[7] For example, the US Progressive Labor Party collapsed in a year (Gamson 1975, 284).

determine their organisational forms and what endogenous factors produce such different degrees of bargaining leverage between civic advocacy groups of different levels of organisational development has been found. If civic groups devote resources to organisational development are more likely to succeed than those that do not, it would follow that those protest groups that the protest literature analyses fail to achieve their goals despite mobilising all resources for protest activity. Placing episodic protest groups and organised civic groups on a continuum representing different degrees of organisational development, then, matters for more accurately assessing the effect of resource mobilisation and more coherently understanding ordinary citizens' political participation.

2.3 Formal Model

The model highlights strategic interaction between a political leader and two sets of audiences, which is sketched in Figure 2.1. Two groups of citizens are potentially in conflict over a given status-quo policy I has implemented (SQ: status-quo policy) represented by $x_{SQ} = 0$, and a political leader (I, shorthand for incumbent) who is in charge of policy choice and implimentation that may face protests by either or both. Let respective groups be called the anti-SQ group (A), which is potentially dissatisfied with the SQ and the pro-SQ group (P) whose ideal policy is identical to the SQ. Each ideal policy is defined as $x_A > 0$ and $x_P = 0$, respectively. Protesters can simultaneously set a wide variety of agendas in reality, but I assume that these three players are bargaining over a single issue at one time. Each group is assumed to be a unitary actor, and I refer to A as "she" and P as "he."



Figure 2.1. Sequence of play.

The game begins with Nature randomly selecting *I*'s type and *P*'s type. *I*'s type as c is drawn from a uniform distribution on interval $[0, \overline{c}]$. The parameter c measures the amount of technical costs *I* must pay such as the structural costs of taking legislative procedures and coordinating between coalition parties. Neither *A* nor *P* knows the true value of c, but they know that it is drawn from the aforementioned uniform distribution.[8] *P*'s type as m_P is drawn from a uniform distribution on interval $m_P \in (0, 1]$. m_P denotes *P*'s maximum capacity to mobilise resources. *P* and *I* know the true

[8] As the supplementary online appendix shows, *A*'s protest and *P*'s counter-protest never occurs at the same time in equilibrium when the players are completely informed.

value of m_P, but *A* does not. This is based on the fact that pro-status-quo-policy groups tend to work with a government to achieve their policy goals while attempting to hide their resource mobilisation capacity from their rival groups. Being a challenger to the status quo, *A* must engage in policy bargaining with these uncertainties.

Second, *A* decides whether to stage a protest as a threat to *I*; by staging a protest, *A* can show that she will punish *I* if *I* does not accommodate *A*'s demand. $m_A \in (0, 1]$ represents *A*'s maximum capacity to mobilise resources. Since a government is usually capable of collecting information about dissident activities for security reasons, the value of m_A is assumed to be common knowledge. m_A could be a parameter measuring her maximum possible impact on political, economic, and social issues: it could represent the number of participants, amount of financial resources, or damages from protest activity.[9] More resources allows *A* to pose a greater threat and provide an incentive for *I* to change a policy over which they compete. But mobilising also imposes costs directly on *A* in the form of time, lost resources and possible wages, and the like.

When *A* decides to stage a protest, *A* simultaneously makes two other decisions. One is the level of organisational development. *A* chooses how much resources to distribute to building organisational infrastructure, $\alpha \in [0, m_A)$. *A* spends α out of her resource pool of size m_A and spends the rest, $m_A - \alpha$, on pressuring *I*. Note that in this one-shot game, resources mobilised for protest activity, $m_A - \alpha$, will be translated into costs inflicted on *I* but those for organisational development, α, may not. *A* is not assumed to pay α when she does not engage in protest activity. α is assumed to be

[9] The maximum capacity to mobilise resources could depend on various factors, such as fundraising campaigns and protest groups' relationship with the government. I leave the further investigation of determinants of protest groups' resource mobilisation capacity to future work.

common knowledge. No matter how she distributes her resources, resource mobilisation always imposes costs. The other decision is on a policy proposal. *A* proposes a take-it-or-leave-it offer $x \in X = (0, x_A]$.

Third, *P* decides whether to organise a counter-protest by using his resources m_P. *P*'s counter-protest also serves as a threat to *I* and shows that *P* will punish *I* when *I* concedes to *A.* The cost of counter-protests also sinks. Neither *A* nor *P* is assumed to organise a protest when they are indifferent. Finally, *I* either accepts or rejects *A*'s offer and is assumed to accept when indifferent between accepting it and not.

The payoffs for both groups are determined by policy outcomes and costs of mobilisation. Benefits from policy outcomes depend on the distance between the final policy outcome and the ideal point of each group. If the game ends in the status quo, *A* and *P* get $-x_A$ and 0, respectively. *I*'s acceptance of the offer x brings $-|x - x_A|$ and $-x$ to *A* and *P*, respectively. Mobilisation costs are added to the benefits above if and only if each chooses to undertake a protest.

Since *I* is assumed to be an office seeker, *I*'s payoff consists of political costs inflicted by the protest groups and the technical costs of changing the SQ. When the game ends with no protest, *I* gets 0 since *I* neither increases nor decreases public support. When *A* organises a protest and *I* rejects the offer, *A*'s protest activity inflicts costs upon *I* as punishment, for the amount of $-(m_A - \alpha)$ to handle the destruction that mobilisation of size $m_A - \alpha$ could cause.[10] This cost could correspond to

[10] The political costs from the protest groups imply that *I* is accountable to *A* and *P*. I admit that the extent to which *I* is sensitive to such costs empirically varies between democracies and autocracies and among political leaders, and the variety can be captured by adding a coefficient to the cost term (e.g., $\theta(m_A - \alpha)$). Since this chapter studies protest bargaining only in democracies, however, θ is fixed and normalised to 1. θ is dropped from the analysis hereafter.

expenditures on policing, damage to the economy, and obstruction to the legislative process. Moreover, *A*'s investment in organisational infrastructure becomes a threat to *I* with probability p. That is, *I* also incurs $-p\alpha$ when rejecting *A*'s offer, where p means the exogenous probability of *A*'s organisational survival. Thus, *A*'s survival may be subject to unexpected shocks (i.e. $1-p$) but should be more likely as *A* pays more resources on organisational infrastructure. Meanwhile, accepting *A*'s offer imposes technical costs of changing the SQ on *I*, which is given by $c > 0$, regardless of whether *P* stages a counter-protest.[11] Accepting *A*'s offer also carries political costs from *P* as punishment if and only if a counter-protest occurs. The size of costs imposed by *P* are determined by the distance between *P*'s ideal policy and a new policy, $-x$.[12] This cost increases as *I* makes a greater policy concession because a greater decline in support from *P*'s members is expected in a next election.

Before turning to formal results, it is important to assess whether the model's structure and assumptions are sufficiently reasonable. One of the key assumptions is that *A* and *P* will use all resources when they decide to stage a protest. *A* is allowed to allocate her resources to protest activity and organisational development. That is, when *A* stages a protest, she will either use all her resources only for protest activity or allocate her resources between those two purposes and exploit them all. I make this

[11] Since *I* is assumed to be an office-seeker, *I*'s cost of changing the SQ is not dependent on the magnitude of policy change (i.e. $-x$). Even if policy-related costs are included in *I*'s payoffs (i.e. $-x-cx$), comparative statics with respect to c or x are not expected to change because a minus sign is still attached to each.

[12] I do not assume that *I*'s costs of accepting *A*'s offer in the presence of a counter-protest depend on levels of *P*'s mobilisation (e.g., $-m_P x$), based on the idea that violating the past commitment is lethal to *I*. A technical reason is that if I assume so, *I*'s cost of failing to commit to her past policy promise will inevitably be discounted by a multiplier $m_P \in (0,1]$ unless $m_P = 1$. Moreover, it is worth noting that $-x$ does not denote *I*'s antipathy to a new policy implemented because I is assumed to be an office seeker, not a policy seeker, and this chapter does not make an assumption about *I*'s ideal policy.

assumption because although an alternative structure may allow the groups to endogenously choose their size of investment in protest activity, allowing each group to choose the amount of mobilisation does not produce any substantively peculiar dynamics. Everything else being equal, protest groups tend to mobilise as much as possible to maximise their ability to control the bargaining.

The second assumption is that *A* is allowed to organise herself but *P* is not because it is often the case on the ground that the pro-status-quo-policy groups achieve much better organisational development than anti-status-quo-policy groups and are often backed by state institutions and industries. For example, as I will introduce later, the 1970s pro-nuclear counter-protesters in West Germany were mainly led by scientists and trade unions (Rucht 1990, 204). Similarly, the US pro-nuclear movements were often led by industry firms (Useem and Zald 1982). These episodes exemplify that pro-status-quo-policy groups indeed have an advantage over anti-status-quo-policy groups in terms of their organisational development. Given this, if I allowed *P* to invest in his organisation as well as *A*, *P* would gain a more advantageous position than actual pro-status-quo-policy groups, which may contradict the empirical fact that pro-status-quo policy groups tend to achieve organisational development before anti-status-quo-policy groups. Hence, my model seeks to describe such a common type of dispute between civil groups, rather than interaction between civil groups competing for a newly emerging issue on which government has no stance. In line with these, my formal model could be interpreted to assume that *P* has already organised when the game begins.

The third assumption is that α is common knowledge. It comes from the empirical observations that the foundation of interest groups is usually publicly revealed in

democracies and that organised advocacy groups disclose information on their membership, offices, asset size, and campaigns, and publicise their settlement reports and other information on their websites.

It should be noted that collective action problems are not assumed to occur for either side in this game. A theoretical rationale for this is elite leadership theory (e.g., Calvert 1992), in which members of each group are assumed to participate in protests if their leaders stand up. Furthermore, formal results of this model could capture elements of collective action problems in interpreting the results, despite not explicitly formalising.

Finally, *I*'s payoff structure needs justifying. Admittedly, the assumption that *I*, as an office-seeker, cares about support from *A* and *P* only is too simple, but not too unrealistic. Though *A* and *P*, in reality, seldom comprise the whole of the electorate in democratic systems, those not interested in a policy these two groups are bargaining over may not consider *I*'s reactions to the protests but, instead, emphasise other issues more in deciding whether to reelect *I*.

2.4 Equilibrium

To gain a better understanding of how domestic audiences' heterogeneous preferences affect equilibrium outcomes, I first solve the baseline model assuming that the audiences are monolithically against the SQ (i.e. no *P*) and that *A* maximises the disruptive influence of her protest activity without investing in organisational infrastructure ($\alpha = 0$). I then show the equilibrium of the entire game with the two protest groups in two steps. The solution concept employed is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. All proofs are in the online appendix.

2.4.1 Bargaining before an Audience

The equilibrium in which every citizen prefers the executive concession is equivalent to a simple take-it-or-leave-it game between *A* and *I*.

Proposition 2.1. Suppose that *P* does not exist and $\alpha = 0$. *A* undertakes a protest and proposes her ideal policy if $1 \leq x_A$; otherwise, she does not undertake a protest. *I* accepts any $x \in (0, x_A]$ if $c \leq m_A$ and rejects otherwise.

Proposition 2.1 provides simple comparative statics concerning the effect of resource mobilisation. The minimal amount of resources *A* needs to mobilise to make *I* accommodate increases as c becomes higher. This shows that investment in protest activity is always rational if the magnitude of *A*'s policy goal is worth the price of a protest. She does not stage a protest when her policy offer is sufficiently small. Since m_A is a sunk cost, it does not affect *A*'s decision. By contrast, *I*'s decision depends on m_A. As Figure 2.2 displays, *A*'s mobilisation capacity ensures the equivalent probability of success under limited but fairly reasonable conditions.



Figure 2.2. Equilibrium policy outcome in Proposition 2.1 if $x_A \geq 1$.

Consider a hypothetical situation in which all the populace has an identical preference over a certain policy and no group opposes *A*'s effort to change the policy, say, an ethnically homogenous society fighting for secession. If a secession movement uses violent tactics (high m_A) to acquire complete independence from the state (large x_A), the government probably considers its movement as rational and sufficiently threatening. Meanwhile, if the movement threatens to resort to violence to acquire a relatively small magnitude of political goals such as the government permission for the use of local languages in schools and offices, the government could deem the threat a bluff because the use of violence could not be payable. An anti-status-quo-policy group simply mobilises the minimum amount of resources needed to make *I* reluctant to reject and therefore pursue her political goal.

2.4.2 Bargaining before Two Audiences: The Escalation of Conflict

I now solve the entire game introduced in Section 3, in which two protest groups with different political goals bargain with the political leader. In this subsection, I solve the baseline model assuming $\alpha = 0$: *A* expends all her resources on protest activity.

Proposition 2.2. Suppose that no resources are spent on organisational infrastructure. *A* never undertakes a protest if $0 \leq m_A \leq 4(1-\sqrt{m_P})$ while she stages a protest if $4(1-\sqrt{m_P}) < m_A \leq 1$ proposing $x^* = \frac{m_A}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})}$. *P* undertakes a counter-protest if $x^* > \sqrt{m_P}$ and does not otherwise. In the absence of a counter-protest, *I* accepts *A*'s offer if and only if $c \leq m_A$ and rejects otherwise. In the presence of a counter-protest, by contrast, *I* accepts *A*'s offer if and only if $c \leq m_A - x$ and rejects otherwise.

When a potential opposition exists, the equilibrium behaviour of *A* and *I* are conditioned by *P*'s behaviour. Figure 2.3 displays *A*'s equilibrium offer when staging a protest, *P*'s strategy, and *I*'s strategy with sample parameters. The value of m_P and c is fixed. The vertical axis means *A*'s offer (x), and the horizontal axis means *A*'s resource mobilisation capacity (m_A). The solid line represents *A*' equilibrium offer (x^*). The dotted horizontal line, meanwhile, represents *P*'s indifference line between staging and withholding a counter-protest. P stages a counter-protest if *A*'s offer is above this dotted line while he does not do so when *A*'s offer is on or below this. The other two dotted lines mean *I*'s strategy. In the absence of a counter-protest, *I* accepts x when m_A is equal to or exceeds the vertical line while *I* rejects otherwise. In the presence of a counter-protest, by contrast, *I* accepts x when x is to the right side of the dotted positive

line. The dotted positive line means *I*'s indifference line between accepting and rejecting in the presence of a counter-protest. Comparing these two lines for *I*'s strategy, it is obvious that *I* is less likely to accept *A*'s offer in the presence of a counter-protest ($c \leq m_A - x$) than in its absence ($c \leq m_A$). That is, *P* has the ability to offset the effect of *A*'s protest by placing pressure on *I* through counter-protests.



(i) $m_P = 0.4$ (ii) $m_P = 0.7$

Figure 2.3. *A*'s equilibrium offer and equilibrium strategies of *P* and *I* with sample parameters.
Note: x^{CP} and x^{NP} respectively denote the maximum offer that I can accepts in the presence and the absence of a counter-protest. $\alpha = 0$, and $c = 0.2$.

Figure 2.3 shows that a nonmonotonic relationship between m_A and the probability of x^* being accepted can exist. When m_A is small, *A*'s protest does not provoke opposition from *P* but is not threatening enough for *I* to concede. Once m_A passes the dotted vertical line, *A*'s protest becomes a sufficient threat to *I.* Since a counter-protest is still deterred in this range of m_A and does not offset the effect of *A*'s threats, x will

be accepted. When m_A passes the horizontal line, however, a counter-protest always occurs. Because *I* finds it costlier to accommodate *A*'s demand in this circumstance, x will be rejected if $x > \sqrt{m_P}$ and if the other parameters take the value given in Figure 2.3.[13] That is, *I* accommodates only the middle range of x, which is bold in Figure 2.3. Therefore, even though *A* is resourceful enough to coerce *I* to compromise in the absence of a counter-protest, she cannot always translate her maximum resource mobilisation capacity into an equivalent level of threats to *I* in the presence of a counter-protest.



Figure 2.4. Equilibrium strategies of *P* and *I* and different magnitudes of *A*'s ideal policy with sample parameters.
Note: $\alpha = 0$, $m_P = 0.4$, and $c = 0$.

[13] $x = \frac{m_A}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})}$ is always equal to or above $x = m_A - c$ when $m_P > \frac{(m_A-2c)^2}{4(m_A-c)^2}$. That is, unless m_P is sufficiently small, *A*'s offer is always rejected in the presence of a counter-protest if $x_A > \sqrt{m_P}$.

Let me consider *A*'s maximum possible offer that *I* accepts. By definition, *A* does not propose an offer that exceeds her ideal policy x_A. The magnitude of x_A is significant because it determines the amount of resources *A* should have and whether it facilitates opposition from *P*. Figure 2.4 shows how two different magnitudes of x_A change bargaining outcomes. Each axis and line represent the same as before. The value of m_P and c is fixed. When x_A is lower than $\sqrt{m_P}$ (i.e. x_{ALow}), a counter-protest will not occur, and *A*'s capacity to mobilise resources can be minimal. In contrast, when *A*'s ideal policy is much further away from the status quo and higher than $\sqrt{m_P}$ (i.e. x_{AHigh}), she needs to mobilise much more resources. If she mobilises the necessary amount of resources to demand x_{AHigh}, which will provoke a counter-protest. Comparing Figures 2.2 and 2.4 shows that an increase in *A*'s resource mobilisation capacity does not always enhance *A*'s chance of winning *I*'s concessions. In the one-audience game, *A*'s offer is always accepted if $c \leq m_A < x = x_A$. As long as her policy goal is worth the price of protest, mobilising more resources is consistently rational. This sharply contrasts with the result of the two-audience game, in which *A*'s ability to mobilise resources are not necessarily positively correlated with *A*'s maximum possible offer to be accepted. Even though *A*'s capacity to mobilise resources is enough to extract concessions in the one-audience situation, the presence of a rival group prevents it from translating its capacity into an equivalent level of bargaining power.

Proposition 2.3. Suppose $\alpha = 0$. The probability of a counter-protest

(i) is increasing in m_A, and

(ii) is decreasing in m_P when $m_P < \frac{1}{4}$ and increasing in m_P when $m_P > \frac{1}{4}$.

Proposition 2.3 shows comparative statics regarding the probability of a counter-protest. For larger m_A, as Figure 2.3 shows, *P* is more likely to stage a counter-protest. This is intuitive because if *P* infers *A* has a larger amount of resources available for protest activity, *P* is more likely to fear that *I* might renege on her previous promise about implementing *P*'s ideal policy.

The effect of m_P on the probability of a counter-protest is more indirect. When m_P is sufficiently small, more resourceful *P* is less likely to stage a counter-protest. When m_P passes $\widehat{m}_P$, meanwhile, more resourceful *P* is more likely to counter-mobilise, which Figure 2.3 visualises. With an increase in m_P, the intersection of $x^* = \frac{m_A}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})}$ and $x^* > \sqrt{m_P}$ moves to the left, and the minimum m_A which provokes a counter-protest lowers. That is, the stronger the opposition becomes, an anti-status-quo-policy group will be exposed to more risk of counter-protests. As noted, the emergence of counter-protests not only has a negative effect on government willingness to concede to the anti-status-quo-policy group but also makes it more difficult for the anti-status-quo-policy group to achieve its policy aim.

Thus, *A* with larger m_A is more likely to face problems. *I* tends not to seriously consider a threat sent by more resourceful *A* because protests by *A* with larger m_A are more likely to fuel counter-protests that offset the impact of *A*'s threat at any rate. Accordingly, the occurrence of counter-protests has a negative effect on the probability of *I*'s concessions and the maximum offer that *I* accepts. This result is inconsistent with the conventional theory that protests mobilising greater resources are more likely to be rewarded. When both sides of the protest groups have high resource mobilisation capacity, resources will be inefficiently consumed.

The initial stage of anti-nuclear protests in West Germany illustrates the equilibrium when the investment of full resources in protest activity fuels counter-protests and undermines the protest group's odds of winning government concessions. The anti-nuclear movement in Germany began in the Wyhl area and fled to grassroots protest groups in many other cities (Rucht 1990, 204). Many anti-nuclear movements in the early and mid-1970s employed conventional means of protests. For instance, in the Brokdorf and Grohnde areas, the anti-nuclear groups mobilised mass demonstrations and even militant cooperation, but they ended in direct and violent battles with police (Karapin 2007, 115−121). Thus, the anti-nuclear protest groups gained a good deal of resources (high m_A) and exploited it predominantly for protest activity rather than making their groups more institutionalised ($\alpha = 0$). Prior to the mid-1970s, the anti-nuclear protest groups in West Germany believed that maximising the disruptive impact of their protests would lead to government concessions. As Figure 2.3 implies, in 1975 the anti-nuclear protests provoked pro-nuclear counter-protests led mainly by scientist and trade unions (Rucht 1990, 204). This coevolution of both sides of protests was responded with relatively low procedural impact.[14] The construction of nuclear power plants was, on average, delayed for 6.1 months in 1974 and 13.8 in 1977 whereas in the American cases, which is discussed further below, plant construction faced delays almost three times longer despite the smaller mobilisation of participants (Kitschelt 1986, 80).

[14] One might suspect that international factors affected the outcome of the anti-nuclear protests in West Germany such as geographical proximity to the USSR. However, the anti-nuclear protests in West Germany successfully coerced the government into compromise after they formed advocacy groups in the 1980s (Karapin 2007, 125−130; Kitschelt 1986, 80; Langguth 1984, 6−13). Given this, the influence of international factors can reasonably be controlled for.

Moreover, several other studies lend empirical support to the formal result that counter-protests impede political changes. Andrews's (1997, 2001) quantitative studies on the Mississippi civil rights movement show that white resistance had a significant negative impact on political change. McCright and Dunlap (2000) examine conservative movements against global warning issues in the US and contend that they successfully halted the government endorsement for the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.

Nonetheless, these equilibrium results call into question the considerable impact that civic advocacy groups with large resource pools can exert on the policymaking process. How can resourceful protest groups overcome the problem that their protests may provoke counter-protests?

2.4.3 Organisational Diversification: The Effective Deterrence of Counter-Protests

Comparing the following equilibrium, in which *A* allocates resources to organisational development ($\alpha > 0$), with Proposition 2.2 where *A* never invests in organisational development ($\alpha = 0$), demonstrates how investment in organisational infrastructure affects the impact of *A*'s protest on a policy change and the other players' decisions even in a one-shot game involving a rival group.

Proposition 2.4. Suppose that $\alpha > 0$. *A* never undertakes a protest if $0 \leq m_A \leq 2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P})$, whereas she undertakes a protest paying $\alpha^* = \frac{m_A - 2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P})}{1-p}$ for organisational infrastructure if $2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P}) < m_A \leq 1$. In staging a protest, *A* offers $x^* = \frac{m_A-(1-p)\alpha}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})}$. *P* undertakes a counter-protest if $x^* > \sqrt{m_P}$ and does not otherwise. In the absence of a counter-protest, *I* accepts any offer if and only if $c \leq m_A - (1 -$

$p)\alpha$ and rejects otherwise. In the presence of a counter-protest, by contrast, *I* accepts *A*'s offer if and only if $c \leq m_A - (1-p)\alpha - x$ and rejects otherwise.

Proposition 2.5. Suppose $\alpha > 0$. The probability of a counter-protest is decreasing in α.



(i) $\alpha = 0$ (ii) $\alpha = 0.5$

Figure 2.5. Players' best responses with sample parameters. $m_P = 0.6$, and $c = 0.2$.

Proposition 2.4 demonstrate the players' best responses when $\alpha > 0$. Intuitively, *A* never organises a protest when she is not resourceful enough ($0 \leq m_A \leq 2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P})$) whilst she stages a protest paying for building organisational infrastructure ($\alpha^* > 0$) when she has enough resources ($2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P}) < m_A \leq 1$). Figure 2.5 illustrates how different levels of α affects players' equilibrium behaviour. Each axis and line mean the same as before. Figure 2.5 demonstrates that all else being

equal, an increase in α moves all lines to the right. As a result, as the bold line in Figure 2.5 highlights, more resourceful *A* who could otherwise provoke counter-protests will be allowed to achieve her policy aim without provoking counter-protests.



Figure 2.6. An illustration *I*'s equilibrium behaviour.

Consider why more resourceful *A* who otherwise fails to coerce *I* into compromise succeeds in doing so by spending $\alpha > 0$. Figure 2.6 helps us understand the twofold effect of α. First, larger α makes counter-protests less likely (Proposition 2.5), which is attributed to the impact of α on *I*'s type because *I*'s type is determined by the magnitude of α^* and x^* relative to c. Larger α makes the two thresholds in the figure move to the left and *I* more intransigent. Even though neither *A* nor *P* knows the exact value of c, they know how an increase in α changes the expected probability that *I* concedes to *A*. Thus, *A* can manipulate *P*'s expectation about *I*'s willingness to accept *A*'s proposal by controlling the amount of α *ex ante* and thereby control the probability of *P* staging a counter-protest. Through the change in *P*'s expectation about *I*'s behaviour, spending α can benefit *A* though doing so seems at first glance irrational.[15]

[15] Inferring from the comparative statics so far, even though I allowed *P* to allocate his resources between the two purposes, that would not offset the advantage that *A* has by investing in her organisation, say, the deterrence of counter-protests. In short, *P*'s ability to invest in organisational infrastructure would not increase the probability of *P*'s challenge to *A*.

Yet, another effect of α is that larger α weakens *A*'s power to threaten *I*. The intersection of $x = \sqrt{m_P}$ and x^* in Figure 2.5 moves to the right with an increase in α. As a result of this move, the leftist range, in which *I* rejects *A*'s offer, expands. Figure 2.6 also demonstrates the same trend. That is, greater α makes *I* more intransigent towards even though organisational development may become a future threat to *I*. Without this effect, nonetheless, investment in organisational infrastructure cannot have the first effect of reducing counter-protests. Thus, the effect of investing in organisational infrastructure is indirect in that such investment does not straightforwardly strengthen *A*'s ability to send threats.

This result suggests that there is a trade-off between *A*'s ability to threaten *I* and *A*'s ability to deter a counter-protest. The greater resources *A* pays to establish her organisational infrastructure, the more likely she is to deter *P*'s interruption. Meanwhile, the larger resources mobilised, the lower the levels of her threats to *I* becomes. Put substantively, *A* needs to make a trade-off decision between pursuing ideal policies and bargaining smoothly without interruption from the outside. Instead of simply strengthening the levels of protest, contra the conventional wisdom, anti-status-quo-policy groups need to be aware of this trade-off.

Proposition 2.6. The amount of *A*'s equilibrium investment in organisational infrastructure is

(i) increasing in m_A,

(ii) increasing in m_P, and

(iii) decreasing in x^*.

Comparative statics in Proposition 2.6 reveal the trade-off that *A* faces more directly. If *A* is more resourceful, she needs to invest more in their organisational development (Proposition 2.6(i)) to deter counter-protests, but she needs to decrease the level of investment in organisational development if her policy goal is larger (Proposition 2.6(iii)) to keep her protests threatening enough. This result complements the findings in the previous section, namely a better ability to mobilise resources does not simply provide protest groups with greater bargaining power. That the effects of m_A and x_A on α^* are the opposite makes *A*'s decision-making harder. Furthermore, Proposition 2.6(ii) states that larger m_P is more likely to facilitate *A*'s organisational development. Thus, the presence of a potentially stronger pro-status-quo group is more likely to promote the formation of an organised anti-status-quo group and that anti-status-quo groups need to sacrifice their ideal policy goals. Thus, managing this tradeoff could be tricky. By deterring a counter-protest from a potentially strong opposition group, *A* needs to allocate more resources to organisational development but simultaneously runs a larger risk of failure. Yet, given the results of the two-audience game without organisational development (Proposition 2.2), the prevention of potential opposition matters unless *A* is considerably resourceful.

The formal results enable us to answer the second question: why does investing in organisational development have a positive effect on their bargaining leverage despite reducing the amount of resources available for protest activity? Proposition 2.2 demonstrates that making demands through protest activity without building an organisational foundation is not necessarily the best way to negotiate with *I*, given the diversified political preferences of the public, since doing so can trigger *P*'s interruption that negates *A*'s efforts to mobilise resources for protest. Particularly, this

tendency is higher when *A*'s resource mobilisation capacity is higher. *A*'s investment in her organisational development can remedy this problem since *A* will be able to bargain with *I* more smoothly without *P*'s opposition. It is worth noting that *A* still cannot resolve all the problems that she would face. One drawback with paying for the organisations is that it will restrict *A*'s ability to threaten *I*. If *A* is sufficiently resourceful, she might be able to achieve her policy goal, but the emergence of a counter-protest is inevitable, and the bargaining becomes harder. This tension between policy aim and bargaining smoothness has existed in many cases of domestic resistance.

The organisational evolution of the anti-nuclear movements in West Germany in the 1980s exemplifies how investment in organisational infrastructure contributes to the deterrence of counter-protests and the improvement of the organised protest group's bargaining power. As previously noted, the anti-nuclear movements in Germany in the 1970s were fragmented with a disruptive character. Through the repeated failure of winning government concessions, the activists started to shift their style of bargaining in the late 1970s, spending their resources not only on direct, assertive activities but also on organising themselves as a political party. By the time the Green Party first won seats in the parliament, the activists had devoted themselves in uniting the fragmented groups and establishing greater levels of association. Prior to others, anti-nuclear groups in the Wyhl area formed an umbrella organisation, the International Committee of Baden-Alsace Citizen Initiatives, in the summer of 1974 and effectively adapted peaceful approaches with only minimal property damage (Karapin 2007, 125−130). In March 1979, a nationwide organisation called Other Political Associations–the Greens was founded aiming to participate in the elections for the European parliament scheduled for June 1979 (Langguth 1984, 6−13). The rise of this tendency was followed

by the increase in the construction delays of nuclear-power plants. The government delayed the construction in 1980 for approximately five times as long as it did in 1974 (from 6.1 to 30.6 months on average) (Kitschelt 1986, 80). Note that this rapid increase occurred before the Green Party won in the national election for the first time in 1983 and that the Greens did not win even in city-state elections except two cases.[16] Consistent with the equilibria, comparing the anti-nuclear movements in the early 1970s with those in the late 1970s and 1980s suggests that the use of resources only for damaging the government is not always effective. The reduction of resource through the process of organisational development enabled the anti-nuclear protest groups to deter unnecessary battles with their rival groups and to enhance the chances of their preferences being reflected in bargaining outcomes.

US anti-nuclear movements also illustrate the significance of organisational development. Anti-nuclear protests prior to 1974 were fragmented, and the groups often conducted sit-ins in specific nuclear facilities and voiced their concerns mainly by participating in public hearings (Nelkin and Fallows 1978, 279). In the mid-1970s, they had changed from grassroots civic groups to regional or national groups (Nelkin and Fallows 1978, 280−281) and changed how they allocated resources. Instead of allocating resources to protest activity in their initial stage ($\alpha = 0$), they began to distribute resources between protest activity and organisational development ($\alpha > 0$). With this change, they gradually started to bargain more directly about energy policies through means such as using courts to tackle issues of administrative policy and lobbying state and local legislatures. For example, the Western Bloc, an umbrella

[16] The green party won seats in Bremen in 1979 and Baden-Württemberg in 1980. It failed to satisfy the five-percent threshold in the rest of local elections before 1980 (Frankland and Schoonmaker 1992, 70−71).

organisation that anti-nuclear groups in 19 states founded towards the end of 1975 contributed to getting the issue on the ballot for referenda held in eight states. Although all the referenda were defeated, some state legislatures voted for tighter standards to review and license nuclear-power plants (Nelkin and Fallows 1978, 282−284). As Proposition 2.3(i) implies, by the 1970s, the widespread organisational development of the anti-nuclear movement weakened pro-nuclear movements. Pro-nuclear forces started to shrink with the rise of the anti-nuclear lobbying groups in the mid-1970s. They were gradually decentralised, and no single organisation tied all the movements together in their final stage (Useem and Zald 1982, 153). This widespread organisational development had a substantial impact on the nuclear programmes. In 1974, the United States experienced 20-month delays in the construction of nuclear-power plants, compared with France (0.7) and West Germany (6.1) (Kitschelt 1986, 80). Cancellation of new nuclear reactor order increased after 1974: while the construction of only seven reactors was cancelled in 1972 and no cancellation was decided in the rest of the early 1970s. Despite the rapid increase in the orders,[17] more than 10 plans for building reactors were stopped constantly in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (Duffy 1997, 175).

2.5 Discussion

Comparing the propositions so far offers new insights regarding the effects of resource mobilisation. First, the amount of resources protest groups possess is not the most important determinant of protest success. As Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 show, counter-

[17] Between 1970 and 1974, the number of reactors ordered increased from 14 in 1970 to its peak at 41 by 1973 (Duffy 1997, 175).

protests can rarely be deterred when resourceful protest groups invest no resources in organisational infrastructure. What matters more is how protest groups allocate their resources between protest activity and organisational development. As Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 reveal, investment in organisational infrastructure helps protest groups deter potential counter-protests and increase the range of m_A, which will not facilitate counter-protests. As a result, paying for organisational infrastructure benefits more resourceful protest groups that would otherwise trigger a rival's interruption.

Second, the allocation of resources towards organisational development signals that the protest group will not undertake too assertive tactics. In equilibrium, *A*'s investment in organisational development decreases her maximum power to pressure *I*. When *P* recognises that *A* has reduced the amount of her resources available for protest activity, it makes a counter-protest less likely; otherwise, *P* might find *A*'s protest potentially too threatening down the road and attempt to impede a policy change. In this way, the de-radicalisation of dissident means can make protest groups more influential. Interestingly, investment in organisational development has an immediate effect on protest groups' policy influence. Existing studies often highlight the result of organisational infrastructure in the long run, such as stronger leadership, better coordination between members, more stable financial resources from membership base, and tighter informal political ties (Berry 1999; Boulding 2010). In contrast, my model proves that the process of organisational development in and of itself plays a role.

Specifically, what makes the process of organisational development inherently special? How is investing in organisational development different from simply burning resources? First, the strategy of burning resources cannot apply to every type of resource. Destroying banknotes and facilities is possible but not human resources. The

option to consume resources for organisational capacity is thus plausible and consistent with norms. Second, simply burning resources would not have a lasting effect on protest groups' ability to pose threats. As previously noted, organising protest groups can benefit them on a long-term basis despite weakening their ability to threaten governments, and governments' anxiety about protest groups' future capability will improve their bargaining leverage today.

Third, and most importantly, consuming resources through organisational development communicates the reduction of resources to other actors in more credible and observable ways than other means. Democracies emphasise information disclosure and ensure formal procedures. Once a protest group has obtained corporate status, they must publicly disclose information about membership and organisational size and issue settlement reports. High observability backed by institutional setup enables protest groups to credibly show their commitment to the de-radicalisation of their activity.

This implication provides a logical prediction that if the investment is made behind closed doors, it might not have such effects on potential opposition. Suppose that a protest group pays to make people stay home rather than joining counter-protests. It may reduce the number of potential protesters who will participate in counter-protests, but such a payment would not alleviate a competing group's fear concerning the original protest group's potential ability to force policy changes. The original protest group may not reveal that it has bought off potential protesters, and even if it does so, it would be difficult for a competing protest group to check all the individual payments made and accurately assess the remaining amount of resources the original protest group possesses. Another example is terrorist organisations. Lake (2002) and Abrahms (2008) indicate that terrorist groups often prioritise improving their organisational

survival over accomplishing their political goals; however, the organisational development of terrorist groups is unlikely to operate in the same manner since it occurs stealthily. Thus, the formal findings dovetail with empirical observations that more organised protest groups tend to gain more bargaining leverage without resorting to radical means.[18] [19]

Furthermore, the results above provide additional empirical implications. First, we cannot measure the strength of protest groups merely by observing the size of resources mobilised for protest activity or by observing the magnitude of policy changes demanded. As the bold line in Figures 2.3 and 2.5 show, protest groups with relatively intermediate resource mobilisation capacity successfully moderate a counter-protest and achieve their policy goals whereas those possessing high capacity cannot necessarily do so because of a high probability of fuelling counter-protests. Rather, the amount of resources spent on founding non-transitory protest groups would be a better proxy to infer protest groups' potential policy influence.

Second, protest tactics that include direct costs on political leaders, such as demonstrations and violent campaigns, give protesters only limited policy influence. Instead, protest groups' ability to influence policies can be enhanced by using resources in such a way that it does not directly attack political leaders. This implication comports with the empirical findings by scholars like those of Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), Franklin (2009), and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), namely that nonviolent resistance

[18] Protest groups with significant popular support in the US tended to lose the radical fringe as they were co-opted into more conventional forms of political participation (Berry 1999).

[19] Related to observability, one may think it is puzzling that *P* does not respond to a threat by *A* even though *A*'s investment in organisation infrastructure is observable. Yet, this is not that puzzling since as mentioned before, pro-status-quo-policy groups tend to structure themselves earlier than anti-status-quo-policy groups. Thus, what is empirically more puzzling is the fact that not all anti-status-quo-policy groups do not organise themselves even though their rival groups usually do and organisational development is said to benefit protest groups.

is more effective than violent resistance. The mechanism by which radical tactics tend to backfire by hardening the stance of the populace is also consistent with recent studies on terrorism that calls into question the conventional wisdom that violence allows civil resistance to achieve its policy aims (Abrahms, 2006, 2013; Fortna, 2015; Gould and Klor, 2010).

Although I highlight the importance of resource allocation to organisational development, my results could potentially be due to other causal explanations, like principal-agent issues. Protest groups that pay less in organisational infrastructure may be more likely to suffer from supervising their participants, which may lead to violent clashes and lower success rate. Admittedly, the strength of leadership is sometimes correlated with the levels of organisational development. However, several cases show otherwise. For example, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), an unorganised anti-government protest group in Thailand,[20] started to protest peacefully in 2006, changing to more radical tactics in 2008 such as seizing an international airport and government buildings. After successfully overthrowing Prime Minister Thaksin, the PAD leaders had been training security guards who could serve as shock troops when they chose to take the offensive (Ockey 2009, 322). Given that the number of PAD demonstrators had decreased dramatically in the two years (Ockey 2009, 322−332), it should have been easier for its leaders to facilitate coordination among the members. This episode demonstrates that the leaders did consider using violence for their political goal, rather than proving that such radical means of protesting were attributed to the

[20] Despite a clear leadership, the PAD lacked official membership. It was seen as an unorganised protest group until it formed a political party called New Politics Party in 2009.

failure of the principal control. Hence, violent protests and the lower success rate of such protests cannot simply be attributed to principal-agent problems.

Despite not explicitly formalising, this model could capture elements of collective action problems. The lower threshold of m_A for *A* to have for sending sufficient threats can be understood as the minimum amount of resources that *A* must have to mobilise enough participants. Considering that providing positive selective incentives is asserted to be an effective way to achieve coordination (Olson 1965), this interpretation is plausible. If sufficient resources should reduce the possibility of coordination failure, the equilibria discussed so far would not change critically.

2.6 Conclusions and Extensions

This chapter suggests a framework to scrutinise the effects of resource mobilisation on protest consequences. It does so by formalising a bargaining game between a political leader and two competing protest groups and by endogenising a protest group's choice about its organisational form. The model proves that the greater mobilisation of resources for protest activity does not consistently improve a protest group's ability to achieve policy changes because it raises the probability of a counter-protest offsetting the impact of original protest. This result suggests that protest groups' neglecting to consider the heterogenous preferences of domestic audiences can lead to inefficient mobilisation of resources.

The model sheds light on the double-edged effects of investing resources in organisational infrastructure. On the one hand, investment in organisational infrastructure reduces the amount of resources available for pressuring activities and hence decreases protesters' ability to carry costs on a political leader. On the other,

investment in organisations decreases the probability of counter-protests by affecting a competing group's expectation that the political leader is less likely to accept a policy change. By credibly showing that the amount of resources available for protest activity has been reduced, resourceful protest groups are more likely to translate much of their resource mobilisation capacity into equivalent levels of threats towards the political leader. Thus, protest groups would face a trade-off between the pursuit of ideal policies and smooth bargaining without rival groups' intervention. If protest groups seek extensive policy changes, they need to mobilise a larger amount of their resources for protest activity to pose greater threats to political leaders, but it occasions rival groups' interventions. Some protest groups might be better off by limiting the levels of protest activity and offering a compromise policy deal to government. A precise evaluation of the impact of organising protest groups on political leaders' decision-making would require further research, but differentiating the process from the product of organisational development conceptually and studying organisational evolution as commitment devices to choose de-radicalised dissent tactics could advance our understanding of the organisational diversification of civic advocacy groups.

Taken together, the findings challenge and are consistent with conventional wisdom: the more resources mobilised, the more powerful the protest. Better access to resources allows protest groups to afford to develop in an organisational sense and to commit to the de-radicalisation of their activities, not because a larger resource pool allows protest groups to impose heavier costs on political leaders. Maintaining the central idea of resource mobilisation theory, this chapter provides a new way of interpreting the formation of interest groups and bridges a gap between the literature on protest groups and on interest groups. While it is difficult to measure resources of organised groups and hence organisational development in any meaningful and

comparable ways (Berry 1999, 147), future research should overcome this difficulty to pursue systematic, empirical evidence for the formal findings.

A way to produce more insightful models would be to highlight structural effects on the levels of transparency in the process of organisational development. I assume that the amount of resources paid for organisational infrastructure is known to every player, but communicating resource consumption in credible ways may be not easy for some types of groups or in some types of regimes. Incorporating characteristics of dissident groups and regimes might further clarify the complicated diversification of civic advocacy groups and the effects of political rules on the consequences of protests.

2.7 Appendix

2.7.1 Proofs

Proof of Proposition 2.1

Solving backwards gives the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. *I* accepts *A*'s offer if and only if $c \leq m_A$; otherwise, *I* rejects it. In this way, *I* takes cutpoint strategy.

Then, consider *A*'s strategy. *A* knows that *I* accepts x with $Pr(c \leq m_A)$ and rejects it with $Pr(c > m_A)$. Since *I*'s type, c, is drawn from a uniform distribution on interval $[0, \overline{c}]$, I write $Pr(c \leq m_A) = m_A$ and $Pr(c > m_A) = 1 - m_A$ for analytical simplicity. If *A* stages a protest, her expected payoff is

$$Eu_A(x) = m_A(-|x_A - x| - m_A) + (1 - m_A)(-x_A - m_A)$$

$$= -x_A - m_A + m_A x.$$

Since the coefficient of x is positive, $x^* = x_A$ since $x \in (0, x_A]$. *A* also decides whether to organise a protest. She does so if and only if $-x_A - m_A + m_A x > -x_A \Leftrightarrow x > 1$. Taken together, if $x_A > 1$, *A* stages a protest and offers her ideal policy; otherwise, she never stages a protest.

Proof of Proposition 2.2

Provided that *P* stages a counter-protest, *I* accepts *A*'s offer if and only if $-x - c > -m_A$, which is equivalent to $c \leq m_A - x$. In the absence of a counter-protest, *I* accepts x if and only if $c \leq m_A$. Hence, I describe *I*'s equilibrium behaviour with a set of cutpoints. *I* always accepts when $c \in [0, m_A - x]$, accepts only in the absence of counter-protests when $c \in (m_A - x, m_A]$, and never accepts when $c \in (m_A, \overline{c}]$. Similar to the proof above, I write $Pr(c \leq m_A - x) = m_A - x$, $Pr(m_A - x < c \leq m_A) = x$, and $Pr(c > m_A) = 1 - m_A$ since the c is drawn from a uniform distribution on interval $c \in [0, \overline{c}]$.

Given *I*'s strategy, *P* decides to undertake a counter-protest if and only if $(m_A - x)(-x - m_P) + x(-m_P) + (1 - m_A + x)(-m_P) > (m_A - x)(-x) + x(-x)$. Solving for x yields

$$x > \sqrt{m_P}. \tag{2.1}$$

Finally, consider *A*'s choice. Provided that *A* stages a protest, *A* decides on a policy proposal x^*. *A* stages a protest if and only if $Eu_A(x) > u_A(0)$, which reduces to

$$-(1 - \sqrt{m_P})x^2 + m_A x - x_A - m_A > -x_A. \tag{2.2}$$

Let $F(x) = -(1-\sqrt{m_P})x^2 + m_A x - m_A$ denote equation 2.3. Taking the first derivative of equation 2.3 in terms of x gives us *A*'s optimal policy proposal:

$$x^* = \frac{m_A}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})}. \tag{2.4}$$

Consider the conditions under which *A* undertakes a protest. Substituting equation 2.4 into equation 2.2 gives us

$$-\frac{{m_A}^2}{4\bar{c}(1-\sqrt{m_P})} + \frac{{m_A}^2}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})} - m_A > 0,$$

$$\text{i.e. } \frac{{m_A}^2}{4(1-\sqrt{m_P})} - m_A > 0. \tag{2.5}$$

Rearranging the above expression, we have $m_A(\frac{m_A}{4(1-\sqrt{m_P})} - 1) > 0$. Since $m_A \geq 0$ by definition, $\frac{m_A}{4(1-\sqrt{m_P})} - 1 > 0$ must be satisfied for *A* to prefer staging a protest, that is, $m_A > 4(1-\sqrt{m_P})$.

Proof of Proposition 2.3

A counter-protest takes place when $\frac{m_A}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})} > \sqrt{m_P}$, that is, $m_A > 2(\sqrt{m_P} - m_P)$. Obviously, this is more likely to hold as m_A becomes larger. Suppose that $F(m_P) = m_A - 2(\sqrt{m_P} - m_P)$. Taking the derivative of this function in terms of m_P produces $\frac{\partial F(m_P)}{\partial m_P} = 2 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{m_P}}$. $\frac{\partial F(m_P)}{\partial m_P} > 0$ holds when $m_P > \frac{1}{4}$, while $\frac{\partial F(m_P)}{\partial m_P}$ becomes negative when $m_P < \frac{1}{4}$.

Proof of Proposition 2.4

Provided that *P* stages a counter-protest, *I* accepts *A*'s offer if and only if $-x - c > -(m_A - \alpha) - p\alpha$ and rejects otherwise. In the absence of a counter-protest, *I* accepts x if and only if $-c \geq -(m_A - \alpha) - p\alpha$ and rejects otherwise.

Given *I*'s strategy, *P* undertakes a counter-protest if and only if

$$\{m_A - (1-p)\alpha - x\}(-x - m_P) + \{1 - m_A + (1-p)\alpha + x\}(-m_P)$$

$$> \{m_A - (1-p)\alpha\}(-x).$$

Rearranging this for x yields $x > \sqrt{m_P}$.

Finally, solve for *A*'s best responses, x^* and α^*. *A* chooses x which maximises her expected payoff from staging a protest that is given by

$$Eu_A(x, \alpha) = -(1 - \sqrt{m_P})x^2 + \{m_A - (1-p)\alpha\}x - x_A - m_A. \quad (2.6)$$

Taking the first derivative of Equation 2.6 in terms of x reveals x^*, which yields

$$-2(1 - \sqrt{m_P})x + \{m_A - (1-p)\alpha\} = 0 \quad (2.7)$$

$$\text{i.e. } x^* = \frac{m_A - (1-p)\alpha}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})}. \quad (2.8)$$

α^* must satisfy Equation 2.8. Rearranging equation 2.8 yields

$$\alpha^* = \frac{m_A - 2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P})}{1-p}. \quad (2.9)$$

For this equation to hold in equilibrium, $x_A \geq x^* = \frac{m_A - (1-p)\alpha}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})}$ must be met. Rearranging this in terms of α reduces to

$$\alpha^* \geq \frac{m_A - 2x_A(1-\sqrt{m_P})}{1-p}.$$

This inequality indicates that if *A*'s ideal policy is larger, *A* is less likely to invest in organisations in equilibrium.

Finally, solve for the conditions under which *A* decides to protest. I assume that when *A* pays $\alpha^* > 0$, she always protests. That is, $\alpha^* = \frac{m_A - 2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P})}{1-p} > 0 \Leftrightarrow m_A > 2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P})$. Therefore, when $m_A > 2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P})$, *A* allocates her resources between protest activity and organisational development.

Proof of Proposition 2.5

A counter-protest takes place if and only if

$$x^* > \sqrt{m_P},$$

$$\text{i.e. } \frac{m_A - (1-p)\alpha}{2(1-\sqrt{m_P})} > \sqrt{m_P}. \tag{2.10}$$

Clearly, the larger α, the less likely equation 2.10 is to hold.

Proof of Proposition 2.6

According to equation 2.9, $\alpha^* = \frac{m_A - 2x^*(1-\sqrt{m_P})}{1-p}$. Since the coefficient of m_A and m_P is positive, it is obvious that α^* is increasing in m_A and m_P. Similarly, the coefficient of x^* is negative, the larger x^*, the smaller α^*.

2.7.2 Extensions

Equilibrium in Complete Information Setting

I show the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model in the main text. While it is assumed that *I*'s type as c and *P*'s type as m_P are private information, they are assumed to be common knowledge in this appendix. As a result of this modification, *A* and *P* never stages a protest within the same timeframe in equilibrium.

I's equilibrium strategy is already found in the previous proof: provided that *P* stages a counter-protest, *I* accepts *A*'s offer if and only if $-x-c \geq -(m_A-\alpha)-p\alpha$ and rejects otherwise. In the absence of a counter-protest, *I* accepts x if and only if $-c \geq -(m_A-\alpha)-p\alpha$ and rejects otherwise. Since $m_A-(1-p)\alpha-x < m_A-(1-p)\alpha$ always holds because of the assumption that $x>0$, *I*'s strategy is summarised as follows: when $c \in [0, m_A-(1-p)\alpha-x]$, *I* always accepts; when $c \in (m_A-(1-p)\alpha-x, m_A-(1-p)\alpha]$, *I* accepts only in the absence of a counter-protest; when $c \in (m_A-(1-p)\alpha, 1]$, *I* always rejects.

Consider *P*'s equilibrium strategy for three different cases: (1) $c \in [0, m_A-(1-p)\alpha-x]$, (2) $c \in (m_A-(1-p)\alpha-x, m_A-(1-p)\alpha]$, and (3) $c \in (m_A-(1-p)\alpha, 1]$.

Case 1: $c \in [0, m_A-(1-p)\alpha-x]$. In this case, *I* always accept *A*'s offer. Given that, *P* stages a counter-protest if and only if $-x-m_P > -x$, that is, $-m_P > 0$. This never hols by definition, which means that *P* strictly prefers not staging a counter-protest when $c \in [0, m_A-(1-p)\alpha-x]$.

Case 2: $c \in (m_A-(1-p)\alpha-x, m_A-(1-p)\alpha]$. In this case, *I* accepts *A*'s offer in the absence of a counter-protest while *I* rejects it in the present of a counter-protest. Given that, *P* stages a counter-protest if and only if $-m_P > -x$, that is $m_P < x$. If $m_P \geq x$, in contrast, he never organises a counter-protest.

Case 3: $c \in (m_A - (1-p)\alpha, 1]$. *I* always rejects *A*'s offer in this case. Given that, *P* organises a counter-protest if and only if $-m_P > 0$. This never holds by definition, so *P* strictly prefers withholding a counter-protest in this case.

Finally, consider *A*'s choice. Similarly, *A*'s equilibrium strategy will be solved for three different cases regarding the value of c.

Case 1: $c \in [0, m_A - (1-p)\alpha - x]$. In this case, *I* always accepts *A*'s offer and *P* never stands up. Given that, *A* stages a protest if and only if $-|x_A - x| - m_A > -x_A$, which reduces to $x > m_A$. Thus, when $c \in [0, m_A - (1-p)\alpha - x]$ and $x > m_A$ are met, *A* stages a protest and offers $x^* = x_A$; otherwise, she never protests. Since *A*'s utility from staging a protest does not depend on α, *A* pays any $\alpha \in [0, \frac{m_A - x^*}{1-p}]$ to make *I* accept.

Case 2: $c \in (m_A - (1-p)\alpha - x, m_A - (1-p)\alpha]$. In this case, *I* accepts *A*'s offer only in the absence of a counter-protest, and *P* stages a counter-protest when $m_P < x$. Hence, *A*'s best response needs to be solved for two subcases: (1) $m_P < x$, and (2) $m_P \geq x$. When $m_P < x$, *A* stages a protest if and only if $-x_A - m_A > -x_A$. This never holds by definition, so *A* strictly prefers keeping silent when $c \in (m_A - (1-p)\alpha - x, m_A - (1-p)\alpha]$ and $m_P < x$. When $m_P \geq x$, on the other hand, *A* stages a protest if and only if $-|x_A - x| - m_A > -x_A$, that is, $x > m_A$. Thus, when $c \in (m_A - (1-p)\alpha - x, m_A - (1-p)\alpha]$ and $m_P \geq x$, *A* stages a protest proposing $x^* = x_A$; otherwise, she never challenges. In this case, *A* pays any $\alpha \in [0, \frac{m_A - x^*}{1-p}]$.

Case 3: $c \in (m_A - (1-p)\alpha, 1]$. When c meets the condition above, *I* always rejects *A*'s proposal, and *P* never stages a counter-protest in equilibrium. Given that, *A*

stages a counter-protest if and only if $-x_A - m_A > -x_A$. As noted, this never holds. Thus, *A* strictly prefers withholding a protest when $c \in (m_A - (1-p)\alpha, 1]$.

The aforementioned sets of players' best responses consist of a subgame perfect equilibrium. As mentioned, *A* never stages a protest when a counter-protest is expected in equilibrium. Given that protests and counter-protests often occur within the same timeframe, this subgame perfect equilibrium might capture the real-world dynamics less nicely than the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the main text.

Consider the probability of a counter-protest. It happens when $c \in (m_A - (1-p)\alpha - x, m_A - (1-p)\alpha]$ and $m_P < x$ are satisfied. Accordingly, the probability is formally defined as $\frac{x(\bar{x}-m_P)}{\bar{x}}$. Obviously, whether *P* stages a counter-protest is irrelevant to α in the subgame perfect equilibrium. This implies that the formation of organised protest groups is necessary only when uncertainty over types of a government and a rival group exists.

3. Violence or Nonviolence: Campaign Tactics, Government Responsiveness, and Domestic Audiences

Kana Inata and Wakako Maekawa[21]

3.1 Introduction

Considerable work on civil resistance has explored which campaign method—violence or nonviolence—is more effective in inducing government concessions, though without conclusive results. While violent tactics are conventionally thought to have more coercive power and are thereby likely to spur desirable political changes (Gamson 1975; Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Kydd and Walter 2006; Pape 2006), recent studies contend that nonviolent approaches have a greater impact on campaign success due to the advantage of participant mobilization (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Franklin 2009; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Nonetheless, each type of civil resistance has shown a large variance in its consequences, and each theory applies to limited cases. One example that is inconsistent with the claim about violence supremacy is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which was entirely peaceful and successfully forced the government to rerun the presidential election. In contrast, some armed groups in the northern Mali conflict mobilised thousands of members and successfully coerced the government into concessions, while nonviolent protests in the same region were granted nothing.

[21] Introduction, formal model, case study in the Basque Country of Spain and Ukraine: Kana Inata; quantitative analysis: Wakako Maekawa; literature review, conclusion: Kana Inata and Wakako Maekawa.

In this study, we present a theory that bridges such contradictory findings about civil resistance through two lenses. The first lens is a formal model. We developed a model to highlight the role of public opinion in bargaining for political power between a dissident group and a government. Specifically, we decompose public opinion into public attitudes towards campaign means and ends. This contributes to finding conditions under which violent campaigns are more effective than nonviolent ones—or vice versa—and thus revealing that qualitatively different factors drive the success or failure of violent/nonviolent resistance. Our formal results show that public intolerance to violent means consistently makes violent campaigns less likely to be chosen since a government becomes more responsive to nonviolence based on democratic mechanisms that the public punishes a government yielding violent groups. Yet, even if the public is violence-averse, dissident groups need to choose violence when the public barely supports their goals to complement their bargaining power with force. This result implies the complexity of transitioning from a violence-dominated society, in which coercion is power, to a nonviolence-dominated society, where mass pressure towards governments is effective and dissident groups operate.

The second lens is statistical testing. We assess implications obtained from the formal models. We operationalise the public's intolerance towards violence using the AmericasBarometer. We found that (1) as more of the public becomes intolerant to the use of violence, the country becomes less likely to experience violent events by rebel groups and (2) in the absence of violent events by rebel groups, violent protests are less likely to be accommodated than in their presence.

3.2 Background and Theory

With an increase in studies of citizens' choice of dissident tactics (e.g., Butcher and Svensson 2016; Cunningham 2013; Moore 1998; Regan and Norton 2005), the question of what brings better government responsiveness to civil resistance has received scholarly attention. Violent resistance, such as riots, military threats, and terrorist attacks, and nonviolent resistance, such as sit-ins, verbal threats, and demonstrations, have been studied separately. However, recent work has pursued more systematic understanding of the effect of violence and nonviolence on government strategies.

A prevailing viewpoint is that violent tactics have more coercive power and are thus more likely to spur desirable political changes than nonviolent tactics (Horowitz and Reiter 2001; Kydd and Walter 2006; Lake 2002; Pape 2006; Slantchev 2005). Insights from bargaining literature contends that violence enhances the credibility of dissident groups' threats because it imposes larger costs both on the dissident groups that use it and the government against which it is waged (Schelling 1980). Gamson (1975) presents empirical evidence to show that groups adopting violence are more successful than those refraining from its use.

However, recent empirical studies yield opposite results. Nonviolent tactics are argued to have a participation advantage over violent tactics in that greater levels of participation are expected in peaceful resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; DeNardo 1985; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Thomas and Louis 2014). Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), Franklin (2009), and Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) offer empirical evidence that nonviolent campaigns have a more positive impact on the probability of campaign success than the others. Despite explicitly studying violent

approaches, Abrahms (2006, 2013) and Fortna (2015) question the conventional wisdom that violence allows civil resistance to achieve its policy aims.

Such disagreement over the efficacy of violent/nonviolent tactics is attributed to three shortcomings. First, literature supporting violence supremacy tends to overlook the role of ordinary people who are not participating in civil resistance but who can constrain government responses to violent/nonviolent resistance. Burstein and Linton (2002), Burstein (2003), and Louis (2009) contend that public opinion can substantially affect the success or failure of protests in achieving political changes. Experiments by Thomas and Louis (2014) show that nonviolent collective actions more effectively communicate to the public that the status quo is illegitimate.

In addition, several other studies show that the public can play a significant role in affecting government decisions. For example, Groseclose and McCarty's (2001) policy bargaining model and Ellman and Wantchekon's (2000) formal model of electoral competition reveal that incentives for political players to appeal to voters can change the course of bargaining. Blaydes and Lo (2012) present the significance of civil society by formalizing regime change in the Middle East. As these studies imply, government leaders need to gain public endorsement for their survival in many situations. However, the main focus of most literature on civil resistance has been the dyadic relationship between a government and a dissident group (or groups) or, at best, considered the public only as a constraint upon dissident groups' ability to gain community support and resources (e.g., DeNardo 1985; Schumaker 1975).

Second, literature supporting nonviolence supremacy does not consider the public's varying degree of intolerance to violence. Although Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) and Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) assume that nonviolent methods uniformly enhance the legitimacy of civil resistance, public opinion concerning the use of

violence varies over time and geography. The extent to which the public approves of the use of force in expressing its voices of dissent depends on factors, such as the present level of violence in a society (Gurr 2015), the presence or absence of experiences of successful violent resistance (Gurr 1970), and levels of corruption (Thomas and Louis 2014). People in politically stable states in which violent incidences rarely occur should not tolerate government repression against nonviolent protests, while those in politically unstable states may be more amenable to them. Moreover, the literature overlooks the impact of public attitudes towards campaign goals on government responsiveness. Even if the public prefers nonviolence but supports the campaign goal of a violent group, how does public opinion affect government responsiveness? The literature has not comprehensively theorised the role of the public.

Third, the literature does not marshal differences in mechanisms for claiming the supremacy of violent and nonviolent tactics. Literature supporting violence supremacy attributes the power of violence to its coercion, while literature supporting nonviolence supremacy attributes the power of nonviolence to mass pressure. The latter mechanism is democratic, while the former is unconventional and less institutionalised. Therefore, we first need to scrutinise causal mechanisms by which violent and nonviolent tactics are respectively chosen and granted concession, rather than trying to determine which is better than the other. Otherwise, the controversy over the effectiveness of each campaign method might not reach agreement.

3.3 Formal Model

3.3.1 Baseline model

The model involves two players who are potentially bargaining over political power. First, a challenging group (C) is potentially dissatisfied with a status-quo power-sharing

policy (x_{SQ} = 0) and chooses a type of campaign method, violence or nonviolence given its political demand, represented by $x > 0$. Second, a democratic government (G) chooses how to respond to C's demand. We adopt the convention of referring to the government as "she" and her adversary as "he." We assume that G prefers x_{SQ} best, and that G's ideal policy is implemented when the game starts. C and G could bargain over many types of political resources: the armed groups in northern Mali pursued greater political representation and political and cultural autonomy; the people in East Bengal protested the national language policy; and Southern Thailand, where most residents are Malay Muslim, has witnessed violent secessionist movements since the 1940s.



Figure 3.1. The baseline model.

Sequence. The game begins with C deciding whether to organise a campaign against a given status-quo situation. If he decides to do so, he simultaneously chooses the type of campaign methods. In particular, C chooses from the set of actions $a_C \in \{v, nv, no\}$: v is shorthand for violent resistance, nv is shorthand for nonviolent

resistance, and no is shorthand for no campaign. Resorting to violent or nonviolent campaigns inflicts costs on C, which is respectively given by c_v and c_{nv}. We assume that $c_v > c_{nv} > 0$. This assumption is in line with the conventional literature supporting violence supremacy (e.g., Gamson 1975; Horowitz and Reiter 2001) and corresponds to the literature claiming that the use of force causes inefficiency (Powell 2004). It also comes from our intuition that violent campaigns are often more costly than nonviolent ones since those involved in violent campaigns often risk injury, imprisonment, or arrest. Moreover, violence often requires more physical capability in terms of stamina and strength than nonviolence (Chenoweth and Lawrence 2010, 254). We assume that C chooses nv when he is indifferent between nv and v. Upon observing C's campaign, G either accepts or rejects C's offer.[22]

Payoffs. C's payoffs depend on policy outcomes and the costs he pays for campaigns. He obtains 0 when his ideal policy is implemented at the end, while he obtains $-x$ when x_{SQ} remains. In addition to this policy benefit, he needs to pay the costs of campaigns, either $-c_v$ or $-c_{nv}$, depending on the type of campaign tactics he has chosen.

G's payoffs consist of three components. First, she earns 0 when x_{SQ} is maintained until the end while he incurs $-x$ when he accepts C's offer. Second, costs from C will be imposed when G rejects C's offer. G incurs $-c_v$ when rejecting a violent group's demand while G incurs $-c_{nv}$ when rejecting a peaceful group's demand.

[22] Admittedly, governments could take various actions in rejecting campaigners' demands, such as mere ignorance, denouncement, and repression (e.g., Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998). However, in line with several formal models on peace negotiation, such as Cetinyan (2002) and Pierskalla (2010), we provide binary choices to G and put direct focus on the absence or presence of government concessions.

Finally, G may also incur costs from domestic audiences who are not participating in C's campaign.[23] This cost can arise in two cases. The first case is when G concedes to a violent group. As noted, yielding to violent, illegitimate groups may not receive public approval but provoke criticism. This cost from the public is given as $-t(1-g)$. $t \in [0,1]$, shorthand for tactics, represents the degree to which the public is intolerant to the use of violence for political aims. A lower t means that the public is more likely to approve of violent means.[24] Thus, the higher t becomes, the greater costs G will incur by yielding to violent campaigns. In contrast, $g \in (0,1)$,[25] shorthand for *goal*, represents the levels of public support towards C's political goal. Although the public may not like a campaign method that C has chosen, they may have political goals similar to those of the campaign groups. If g goes to zero, it means that more people disagree with C's political demand, and it becomes costlier for G to accommodate C. The second case is when G rejects demands that are peacefully expressed. Suppressing peaceful resistance can also cause public denouncement, while backfiring is less likely to occur against state repression of armed groups (Martin 2007; Sharp 2005). This cost is denoted by $-tg$ and increases when the public is less tolerant to violence (i.e. higher g) and/or when the public provides stronger support to C (i.e. higher g). We assume that the true value of t and g is known to both players.

[23] Note that what we mean by costs from domestic audiences is different from Fearon's (1994) theory of audience costs since costs inflicted by domestic audiences in our model are not produced because of political leaders' breach of their pre-commitment.

[24] Our formal model, as a first step towards theorizing the role of public opinion in civil resistance, integrates the public as a non-strategic actor. It is still controversial how successful experiences of violent campaigns make changes in public approval of violence, and it is indeed a significant question that we leave it for future research.

[25] We have two reasons for assuming this open interval. First, citizens' preferences over policies are rarely homogenous in the real world. To make the model as consistent as the real-world politics, we do not assume $g = 0$ or $g = 1$. Second, we assume this for analytical convenience.

All the parameters being common knowledge, we use subgame perfect equilibrium as our solution concept. We highlight some of the interesting results and compare how the players' equilibrium behaviour changes depending on parameters such as c, t, and g. All other details, including proofs, are provided in the online appendix.

Lemma 3.1. With an increase in t,

(i) C is more likely to choose nonviolent tactics, and

(ii) G is more likely to concede to nonviolent campaigns.

Lemma 3.1 summarises the effect of t on the players' responses in equilibrium (see Figure 3.2). The effect of t is straightforward. G concedes only to violent campaigns when the domestic audiences are sufficiently tolerant to violence (i.e. low t), regardless of the magnitude of x. G does so because for high t, yielding to violent groups is relatively cheap because it does not cause public denouncement. As domestic audiences become more violence-averse (i.e. higher t), G is more likely to concede to nonviolent campaigns than to violent ones to avoid being blamed for its soft stance towards violent groups.

Similarly, C's strategic choice is also conditioned by t. C is more likely to choose nonviolent tactics as t increases. Given that G is more reluctant to concede to violent protests when t is at high levels, C chooses peaceful tactics because peaceful campaigns prevent G from incurring the potential costs of being blamed for the violence. When domestic audiences find the use of violence justifiable, in contrast, it makes violence more attractive for C than nonviolence. These intuitive results can be understood to show the face validity of the formal model. Furthermore, the above-mentioned results are compatible with extant empirical works. For example,

Karakaya's (2018) examines the effect of globalization on citizens' choice of campaign tactics and suggests that liberal norms that spread through globalization make violent tactics a less preferable alternative.



Figure 3.2. Equilibrium strategies.

Figure 3.2 suggests comparative statics about campaign costs. It demonstrates that an increase in c_i, where $i \in \{v, nv\}$, makes tactics i more likely to be chosen and strengthens its threats towards G. Taken comparative statics about d and c_i together, the formal result supports different sets of literature: comparative statics about c_i imply the importance of coercion in bargaining and bolster literature arguing for violence supremacy whereas comparative statics about t proves the importance of domestic audiences and supports literature supporting nonviolence supremacy. However, the effectiveness of each campaign tactic does not simply depend on the monotone effect of c_i or t.

Proposition 3.1. With an increase in g,

(i) when x is low, C is more likely to choose nonviolent tactics than violent ones, and G is more likely to concede to nonviolent campaigns than to violent ones, and

(ii) when x is high, both violent and nonviolent campaigns are more likely to occur and be successful.

The effect of s on players' choices is more complex. Figure 3.3 displays G's responses to each type of campaign in equilibrium. As Lemma 3.1 suggests, the figure certainly shows that an increase in t has a linear effect of the probability of G's responsiveness to nonviolent campaigns. This means that an increase in t also consistently makes C choose nonviolence since C's choice of tactics depends on whether G concedes. Nevertheless, the effect of t is conditioned by modified by g. When g is high and everything else is equal (i.e. Figure 3.3(i)), domestic audiences supporting C's goal pressure G into accepting C's offer, and C does not have to rely its source of bargaining power on coercion. When g is low (i.e. Figure 3.3(ii)), G is less constrained by mass pressure and is less likely to concede regardless of C's choice of tactics. Given this, C attempts to complement low public support to his campaign goal with force. The gray areas in Figure 3.3 mean the possible conditions under which C chooses violence. Comparing the two figures, it is obvious that C is more likely to use violence as s becomes lower. Figure 3.3 also suggests comparative statics about x. As C's political goal becomes extreme (i.e. higher x), C begins to lose options other than violence to achieve his goal.

Therefore, the formal findings demonstrate that the two types of tactics are not complementary to each other, but one type of tactic can be substituted for the other depending on the political environment that C is in. Violence is chosen because of its

coercive advantage. When the public barely supports C's goal or C's goal is extreme, C needs to complement his bargaining power with force. In contrast, nonviolence is chosen based on democratic mechanisms that the public punishes a government unresponsive to its citizens, which includes protesters. Decomposing public attitudes thus reveals that qualitatively different factors drive the success or failure of violent/nonviolent resistance.



(i) $g = 0.8$ (ii) $g = 0.3$

Figure 3.3. Choice of tactics in equilibrium with sample parameters. c_v and c_{nv} are fixed.

3.3.2 Discussion and testable implications

The formal findings yield implications about how violence can terminate. The dashed line in Figure 3.4 shows a path to the de-radicalization process of a given dissident group when t increases. As the public's aversion to violence becomes stronger, a government becomes less responsive to violent campaigns, and dissident groups that otherwise must resort to violence gradually disarm themselves, cease violent actions, and finally change their dissident tactics into nonviolence. The demilitarization process

of armed groups often follows such a path. For example, as will be hereinafter discussed in detail, the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) was long engaged in violent attacks against the Spanish government to achieve a high degree of regional autonomy. Non-Basque Spaniards —as well as the Basque people—sympathised with the ETA during the Franco period, but they came to rethink their stance as the ETA's actions became violent (Funes 1998, 494). The Basque people kept their opinions about the ETA to themselves at the beginning of the 1980s (Funes 1998, 496–497), and violent attacks did not stop immediately. With the encouragement by several nonviolent groups, however, more Basque people came to show their dissent against the ETA and its use of violence (Funes 1998). The ETA finally started to show its intent toward a ceasefire and completely dissolved all its political structures in 2018.



Figure 3.4. A path to the de-radicalization process with an increase in t.

Nevertheless, improving public attitudes towards violence alone is insufficient to make nonviolent tactics attractive to every dissident group. As Figure 3.3 shows, a decrease in g increases the probability of government concession only to violent

campaigns relative to the probability of government concession to nonviolent campaigns and both types of campaign methods. This affects C's choice of tactics, which is displayed in Figure 3.5. As more domestic audiences support a status-quo policy (i.e. low g), the two bold functions move to the left towards the dashed ones. As a result, a government generally becomes less responsive to either type of campaigns. Campaign groups seeking extreme changes in a given status-quo policy are thus more likely to give up on challenging the government. In addition, if t is high, a government that otherwise concedes to both types of campaigns begins to concede only to nonviolent ones (i.e. the upper left area in Figure 3.5). Thus, if the public's violence aversion is already high, a decrease in g contributes to peace. At the same time, however, a decrease in g can urge some dissident groups that otherwise use nonviolence to use violence if t is low since the government then begins to concede only to violent campaigns (i.e. the lower left area in Figure 3.5). Those groups may begin to use violence to compensate for their poor support from the public. That is, the result has an empirical implication that where the public is relatively tolerant to violent means, some campaign groups will become armed even when others become unarmed, and violence will continue at a national level. Furthermore, the result suggests that a dissident group that used to use violence may do so again if they moderate their campaign goals (i.e. lower x). Therefore, considering the distinct effects of public attitudes towards campaign tactics and goals, a transition from a violence-dominated to a nonviolence-dominated society is not always straightforward. Little has been argued about such complexity regarding the determinants of government responsiveness and campaign groups' choice of tactics.

The Palestinian nationalist movement effectively illustrates the complex dynamics. Although violence was believed to be essential to fight against injustice until the 1980s

(Pearlman 2011, 73–74), Palestinian public opinion gradually became unsupportive of armed attacks (Shikaki 1996, 6). Polls conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) showed that half of the respondents supported the negotiations in 1994, and the support for peaceful conflict resolution reached 71 percent in 1995 (Shikaki 1996, 6). The 1993 CPRS poll also revealed that only 28 percent of Gazans approved of the use of violence if necessary (Shikaki 1996, 12). Despite this trend of nonviolence, incidences of nonviolent protest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip radically decreased in 1991. Instead, shooting incidents steadily increased from 158 in 1990 to 262 in 1991 and 344 in 1992 (Pearlman 2011, 106). This gap between public intolerance to violence and violent incidents is associated with unstable public attitudes towards the specific peace process. For example, 45 percent believed that the Oslo agreement would lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in 1993, and the figure slowly increased (Shikaki 1996, 7), but public support sharply dropped in 1995 (Pearlman 2011, 126). With this change, Hamas and Islamic Jihad performed several lethal and nonlethal armed acts against Israel after 1994. In this manner, high aversion to violence by the public does not straightforwardly result in a shift to nonviolence. Even if some groups react to it, a shift in public attitudes towards campaign goals may propel other groups' use of violence.



Figure 3.5. C's possible choice of tactics with sample parameters.

Note: The figure illustrates some changes in C's possible choice of tactics.

Therefore, the formal results have a significant implication for empirical analyses on the effectiveness of civil resistance. Existing studies on the effectiveness of violent/nonviolent campaign, as noted, have not directly evaluated the effect of public opinion. Their neglect of public opinion may be because of the mere focus on the structural factors and attributes of campaign groups but may also be associated with the fact that public attitudes towards campaign means and ends are difficult to measure. Where the norms of nonviolence have properly been consolidated, polls do not ask respondents' preference for violence in the first place. Meanwhile, where violence is frequently used for political purposes, polls are difficult to conduct. For instance, as will be explained in detail in a later section, only two cross-national surveys, AmericasBarometer and Africanbarometer, had such questions. Public approval of each campaign goals is also difficult to accurately estimate because of multiplicity of campaign groups and their goals. Polls about a few outstanding groups may be possible, but that prevents quantitative analyses. The existence of these omitted variables can

account for scholarly controversy over the effectiveness of violent/nonviolent campaigns.

Given the limited availability of data, we draw three testable implications about the public's violence aversion: (1) The more violence-averse domestic audiences become, the more likely nonviolent resistance should be; (2) The more violence-averse domestic audiences become, the more likely governments should be to concede to nonviolent campaigns than to violent ones; and (3) In a country where violent campaigns are ocurring, a government should be less likely to concede to nonviolent campaigns than in a country where violent campaigns are ocurring. The first two implications simply come from Lemma 3.1. Although data on public approval of each campaign goal is unavailable, Lemma 3.1 states that the impact of public's violence aversion (i.e. t) on campaign groups and government responsiveness is monotone regardless of the magnitude of campaign goals (i.e. x) or public's support for campaign goals (i.e. g).

The third implication is based on Lemma 3.1 as well but also considers uncertainty in real-world politics. While our formal model assumes that public opinions are observable, its accurate understanding is not always easy in practice because the public may hesitate to reveal its preferences due to peer pressure or fear; because public opinion is split between ethnic groups, classes, or regions, or because exogenous shocks, such as civil war in neighboring countries, may suddenly affect public opinion. Under such uncertainty, governments may attempt to estimate the degree of public tolerance to violence by observing the presence or absence of ongoing violent resistance: If violent campaigns are occurring, governments may overestimate the degree of public tolerance to violence and may find repressing nonviolent campaigns

less costly,[26] while if no violent campaigns are ocurring, the public's violence tolerance may be estimated to be low. This is consistent with Lemma 3.1, stating that C's choice of tactics is dependent on d, and with existing studies contending that the degree of public approval of the use of force in expressing its voices of dissent depends on the experiences of violence in a society (Gurr 2015). For example, a poll in 1996 revealed that almost one half of Salvadoran respondents either somewhat or very much agreed that citizens should neglect the law and resolve problems rather than waiting for legal solutions (Call 2000, 47). This can be associated with El Salvador's experience with a long civil war, which ended in 1992 after causing more than 70,000 deaths.

3.4 Empirical Analysis

This section examines empirical support for the implications obtained from the theoretical model, in two steps. First, we evaluate how public intolerance to violence affects the occurrence of violent campaigns. Second, we investigate how such public attitude towards violence affects the outcome of violent/nonviolent campaigns. In the second part, as explained in the later subsection, our empirical model considers the strategic setting that government faces in making concessions. Our sample includes Latin American countries. By doing so, we quantitatively test Implications 1 and 3 from the theoretical model and conduct qualitative case studies for Implication 2.[27]

[26] Consistent with this prediction, Chenoweth and Schock (2015) and Pearlman (2011) point out that simultaneous violent campaigns can weaken the leverage of nonviolent campaigns because they can provoke widespread state repression against all types of dissident groups.

[27] The difficulty of testing the effect of public attitudes towards violence empirically is implied in the formal model. For intermediate t, as Figure 3.2 displays, G concedes to both types of campaigns when x is low or never concedes when x is high. This indicates that public attitudes towards violence may not have a statistically significant impact on G's behaviour when the public opinion is split. Furthermore, descriptive statistics in Table 3.3 show that the mean value of its variable is middling. Taken together, we present qualitative evidence for Implication 2. To verify the applicability of our formal model to cases beyond the Latin American region, the supplementary appendix provides two cases of civil resistance from outside the region.

3.4.1 Research design

Campaign occurrences

Explanatory Variable: As the main explanatory variable—the degree of public intolerance to the use of violent means for political aims—we employed the following survey question in the AmericasBarometer:[28] "Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove … of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government." The answers provided are as follows: Strongly Disapprove, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Strongly Approve, Don't Know, No Response, Not Applicable, and Not asked in this country or year.[29] This question is suitable to operationalise parameter d in our formal model because this question asked about their respondents' generalised attitude concerning the use of violence for political purposes, not their attitude about particular groups' use of violence (e.g., police violence) or violence in broader contexts (e.g., intra-family violence). One may find the scenario in which this question describes violence somewhat unrealistic, but Latin American countries often saw violent removals of government, including military coups[30] and riots,[31] and some countries, such as Colombia, experienced violent conflicts until recently. A variable, *violence aversion,* reflects the weighted percentage of respondents

[28] The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org.
[29] The above-mentioned questions were asked in the AmericasBarometer survey in 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014. The precise wordings of questions differ slightly by survey year, but the points of the questions remained the same. The 2006 questionnaire asked, "how strongly you would approve or disapprove … [t]hat people participate in a group wanting to carry out a violent overthrow of an elected government." The 2004 questionnaire asked, "how firmly you approve or disapprove … [t]hat people participate in a group wanting to remove an elected government by violent means."
[30] Latin America experienced 21 coups between 1945 and 2010.
[31] For example, the Indian movement largely contributed to democratization in Ecuador by joining a group of military officers and then became involved in a coup attempt (Zamosc 2008, 2).

who chose "Strongly Disapprove." Therefore, a higher value for *violence aversion* reflects a higher level of public intolerance to the use of violence for political purposes. To account for reverse causality problems, we used lag for this indicator.

Dependent Variable: To investigate how the level of public intolerance to violence affects the occurrence of violent campaigns, we operationalised *violent campaigns* using data on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 18.1 (2017) (Sundberg and Melander 2013) and the UCDP/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). The *violent campaigns* variable takes the value 1 if there is at least one violent event initiated by some groups other than the state's government or if there is an ongoing armed conflict in a state in a given year.[32] As past violent incidents can influence the occurrence of present violent campaigns, we controlled for t-1's logged number of violent events.[33]

Control Variables: *Preference for democracy*: In Latin American countries, most armed conflicts in the region were non-secessionist conflicts. According to UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Allansson et al. 2017), only one case of civil war, which occurred between 1946 and 2016, claimed territory. Pursuing political goals with the use of force is inconsistent with democratic principles, which places the utmost value on peaceful ways of resolving conflict, such as elections, deliberations, and negotiations. Thus, support for democracy should be positively associated with intolerance of violence. Since excluding the preference for regime type would result in underestimating the effect of public opinion about violence, we

[32] For further definition of *violent campaigns*, see Appendix.
[33] Due to high multicollinearity problems, including the time since the last conflict, we include t-1's logged number of violent events.

controlled for *preference for democracy*. The specific question we used for this variable was as follows: "Which of the following statements do you agree with the most?" The answers provided were as follows: 1 = For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic; 2 = Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; 3 = Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one, .a = Don't Know, .b = No Response, .c = Not Applicable, and z. = Not asked in this country or year. As a value for *preference for democracy*, we calculated the weighted proportion of respondents choosing answer number two. The higher value of this variable implies higher public support for democracy.

Satisfaction with democracy: Satisfaction with the way people express politics can also influence challenging groups' decisions to conduct campaigns in the first place. In addition, high satisfaction with democracy may be related to lower approval of non-democratic ways of political expression. The specific question we use for this variable is as follows: "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?" The answers provided were as follows: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Dissatisfied, Very Dissatisfied, Don't Know, No Response, and Not Applicable. Satisfaction with democracy measures the weighted proportion of respondents choosing the answers "Very Satisfied" and "Satisfied," implying that a higher value corresponds to higher public satisfaction for democratic governance in the country.

GDP per capita (GDP): As a proxy for state capacity, we controlled for GDP per capita. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that weak governments make insurgency more feasible and present a statistically significant negative relationship between GDP per capita and civil war onset. In addition, population has been considered as an influential

factor for rebellions. Fearon (2004) asserts that populous countries enable insurgent groups to mobilise. Moreover, Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) demonstrate that large populations are positively associated with the onset of both violent and nonviolent campaigns.

Political Terror Scale (*PTS)*: Regan and Norton (2005) finds that higher levels of repression lead to less civil war onset and more protest onset. In relation to our main explanatory variable, violence aversion, we suspect that growing levels of repression may fuel public approval of political violence. To reduce this potential omitted variable bias, we controlled for government repression. Following the study by Regan and Norton (2005), we used the Political Terror Scale (Gibney and Dalton 1996; Wood and Gibney 2010). We relied on State Department data, which takes the discrete number from 1 to 5.

All control variables are lagged for one year. With regard to the first part of the analysis—the likelihood of campaigns—the unit of analysis is country-year when countries are unbalanced. There are 21 unique countries,[34] and the total number of observations was 97.

Government responsiveness

The second part of the analysis considers the selection process of campaign methods in analyzing government responsiveness. Many previous studies point out selection biases in analyzing data in the context of strategic interactions (Leemann 2014; Signorino 1999). Thus, in analyzing the differences in government concessions towards

[34] The 21 unique countries are as follows: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

nonviolent and violent protests, we consider the probability of no violent attacks by armed groups, which is what we operationalised in part one, we first operationalised government concessions as the variable *Accommodate*. Mass Mobilization Data (Clark and Regan, 2016) provides information on how states responded to protests by classifying their responses into seven types of actions: accommodation of demands, arrests, beatings, crowd dispersal mechanisms, ignore, killings, and shootings. In addition, the data provides information on how government responses have changed since the initial response. The *Accommodate* variable takes the value 1 if a government accommodated at least once during the campaign.

In order to consider how the probability of government accommodating nonviolent protests changes depending on whether or not the country is experiencing violent campaigns, we employed the probit model with sample selection. The sample selection model enables us to consider a two-equation system by dealing with non-random selection. The selection equation was as follows: Y_i^s(*No violent campaigns*) = $\beta_i^{s\prime} X_i^s + \epsilon_i^s$ while the outcome equation was Y_i^o (*Accommodate* |*No violent campaigns*=1) = $\beta_i^{o\prime} X_i^o + \epsilon_i^o$. Variables used in the first part of analysis (Table 3.1) were included in the design matrix for selection equation X_i^s. Estimating the effect of violent protests on P_r(*Accommodate* |*No violent campaigns*=1) reflects the second implication of the model: as the public becomes more violence-averse, the government becomes less inclined to concede to violent protests. We posit that when there are no violent campaigns, the public's attitude towards violence is different from that when there are violent campaigns. As the formal results imply, protests under conditions in which intense violent campaigns, including rebellions and armed conflicts, seldom occur would facilitate government responsiveness to protests more strongly than protests under conditions in which such intense campaigns are likely to occur. The logic behind

this is that, in the latter cases, governments may overestimate public tolerance towards violent means and find it cheaper to reject nonviolent groups' demands. Therefore, we estimated the likelihood of the government accommodating the demands of nonviolent campaigns given that there are no violent campaigns. To differentiate nonviolent protests from violent ones, we used the *protester violence* variable, which takes the value 1 if protesters used violence and 0 otherwise. In this dataset, protester violence involves violence used by some protesters rather than by all protesters. In some cases, protester violence was used as a reaction to a government action, such as the use of tear gas or water cannons. Even if the use of violence was a reaction to the government's action, we included cases such as involving *protester violence* because, from the government perspective, it is a fact that the government incurs costs from cases involving protester violence that would not otherwise arise, such as policing and handling the damages, and the government decides how to respond to such violent campaigns.

Control Variables: We control for campaign characteristics in the outcome equation by using Mass Mobilization Data (Clark and Regan 2016): the number of participants (*Participants*) and the logs showing campaign duration (*ln duration*). We re-coded the range of participants to "0-99," "100-999," "1000-9999," "10000-99999," and ">100000." Thus, the variable Participants uses five scales, from 1 to 5. The ln duration variable measures duration in a log of days. With regard to aims of campaigns, we created the variable Political, which takes the value 1 if demands included "political behaviour/processes" or "removal of corrupt or reviled political person."[35] Because the

[35] The dataset identifies seven categories of protesters' demands: labor disputes, land or farm issues, police brutality, political behaviour/processes, price increases or tax policy, removal of corrupt politicians, and social restrictions.

sample includes both political and non-political protests, we include interactions between *Protester violence* and *Political*.

Because selection models require that one variable be present in the selection equation that is also not present in the outcome equation (Sartori 2003), we removed violent event count variables from the outcome equation. In addition, variables related to protest characteristics, such as duration of protests, number of participants, and protester violence are only included in the outcome equation.

3.4.2 Empirical findings

Table 3.1 shows results for the first part of our analysis: investigating the effect of public intolerance to violence on occurrences of violent campaigns. To consider a small sample size, first, we only included the main explanatory variable *Violence aversion* in employing the probit model (Model 1). One of the main concerns with using *Violence aversion* as an explanatory variable is that the public's intolerance to the use of violence against the government can be affected by unobserved characteristics, such as traditional perceptions towards violence in politics, which can also affect the occurrence of violence. To consider this endogeneity problem, Model 2 uses three instrumental variables: the weighted proportion of male respondents,[36] the weighted proportion of respondents aged under 40 years, and the weighted proportion of respondents aged between 40 and 60 years.[37] These instrumental variables capture the

[36] Smith (1984) finds that the tendency of men to support more violent options is moderately stronger than that of women by nine percentage points on average. In addition, psychological literature has presented considerable evidence that boys engage in more aggressive behaviour than girls (e.g., Benbenishty and Astor 2005).

[37] Cotten et al. (1994) find a significant relationship between age and aggression. Their survey showed that older undergraduate students were more aggressive than younger students. Jimenez-Barbero et al. (2016) also find that in their study, the groups of 14-to-15-year-old children had more positive attitudes toward violence than those of 12-to-13-year-old children on average.

sample characteristics, and several studies imply that they have influence on the weighted percentage of respondents who chose “Strongly Disapprove” if the government is overthrown violently. Meanwhile, it is difficult to imagine intuitively that three demographical characteristics directly affect dissident groups’ choice of whether to conduct campaigns and of what dissident tactic to use. Because weak instruments can cause bias (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995), as a check for a validation of exogeneity, we first employed two stage least squares with the same formula used in Model 2 and obtained diagnostics for weak instruments. For the first stage F-test, we reject the null of weak instruments with p-value < 0.01. The marginal effect of violence aversion on violent campaigns obtained from Model 2 is -9.095 with 95 % confidence intervals of [-148.114, -0.041]. Finally, Model 3 shows the results of the logistic regression of violent campaigns with other control variables. Figure 3.6 plots the marginal effect of violence aversion on violent campaigns obtained from Models 1 and 3, respectively. These findings suggest that an increase in the public disapproval of violent campaigns leads to a lower likelihood of violent campaigns. The finding supports Implication 1.

	Violent Campaigns		
	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Violence aversion	-4.151 (1.105)***	-9.093 (4.618)**	-7.886 (2.282)***
Preference for democracy			5.931 (2.927)***
Satisfaction for democracy			1.453 (4.844)
ln GDP p.c.			-2.399 (1.210)**
ln Population			5.597 (2.402)**
PTS			-1.190 (0.911)
ln Violent event count			1.639 (0.801)**
Constant	1.648 (0.649)**	4.690 (3.210)	-60.832 (24.677)**
Observations	97	97	97
Log Likelihood	-49.554	-49.166	-16.073
Akaike Inf. Crit.	103.108	-45.667	48.147

Table 3.1. Occurrence of violent campaigns.
Note: Coefficients with standard errors (clustered by country) in brackets. (* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01)



Figure 3.6. Marginal effect of violence aversion on violent campaigns with 95 % confidence intervals.

Second stage: Accommodation		
Violence aversion	1.593	(1.960)
Preference for democracy	3.736	(1.520)**
Satisfaction for democracy	-5.384	(1.146)***
ln GDP p.c.	-0.375	(0.457)
ln Population	0.510	(0.671)
PTS	0.208	(0.247)**
ln duration	0.562	(0.108)***
Participants	0.270	(0.1058)**
Protester violence = 0, Political = 1	-0.649	(0.622)
Protester violence = 1, Political = 0	-5.382	(0.615)***
Protester violence = 1, Political = 1	-1.039	(0.492)**
Intercept	-7.234	(6.358)
First stage: No violent campaigns		
Violence aversion	12.662	(4.563)***
Preference for democracy	-12.224	(3.643)***
Satisfaction for democracy	-7.524	(3.989)*
ln GDP p.c.	2.360	(0.835)***
ln Population	-4.985	(1.440)***
PTS	1.845	(0.62)***
ln Violent event count	-1.090	(0.452)**
Intercept	53.609	(14.073)***
Observations (censored)	361	
	(151)	
Log pseudo likelihood (full model)	-126.130	

Table 3.2. Probit model with sample selection.
Note: Standard errors are clustered by country. (* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$)



Figure 3.7. Marginal effect of protester violence on conditional probabilities with 95 % confidence intervals.

Next, Table 3.2 presents the result obtained from the probit model for government responsiveness towards protests with sample selection. The bottom part of the table shows the result for the selection equation, while the top part of the table shows the result for the outcome equation. The marginal effect of protester violence on P_r (*Accommodation*=1 | *no violent campaigns*=1) is -0.023 with 95 % confidence intervals of [-0.045, -0.002] while the marginal effect of protester violence on P_r (*Accommodation*=1 | *no violent campaigns*=0) is -0.011 with 95 % confidence intervals of [-0.025, 0.004] (Figure 3.7). Combined with the findings in Table 3.1 and the selection equation in Table 3.2, these findings imply that public intolerance to violence leads to a lower likelihood of violent campaigns in the first place, and upon observing the absence of violent campaigns in a country, violent protests are less likely to be accommodated. The finding supports Implication 3. With no intense violent attacks in a country, which reflects high public intolerance to violence, a government is more likely to concede to nonviolent than violent protests. Because the sample size is 361, it

might not have been sufficiently large to implement the selection model. In the Appendix, we show the result obtained from a non-selection model. In this version, we estimated the second stage only—the effects of violent protest on accommodation within a sample in which no violent armed conflicts had occurred.

3.5 Case Studies

This section displays how the fundamental workings of our model map onto actual cases of government concessions to different types of civil campaigns. To verify the applicability of our formal model to cases beyond the Latin American region, we chose two cases from outside the region, which offer a clear contrast in terms of the effectiveness of violent and nonviolent campaign tactics. Furthermore, we qualitatively examine the effect of public opinion regarding campaign goals as well as campaign tactics. The first case concerns conflict in the Basque Country of Spain, and the other case concerns the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. These cases contrast in terms of the model's parameters, since the public's support for campaign goals and nonviolence was clear in Ukraine, while the people in Basque country initially sympathised with the pursuit of regional autonomy and were reluctant to reveal its opposition to violence.

3.5.1 Ukraine

Ukraine had moved into a political gray zone, which some scholars defined as "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way 2002). Whilst formal democratic institutions existed, they provided limited political competition and harbored abuse of power by the ruling elites (Kudelia 2009, 80). Anti-government movements initially started in 2000. Rallies, sit-ins in Kiev's Independence Square, and demonstrations

along the central streets of the capital were initially conducted to call for institutional change and the resignation of President Leonid Kuchama. Despite the successful mobilization of protesters in the initial stage, attracting 60,000 to 70,000 protesters (Wilson 2005, 122), the demonstrators' violent attacks on interior troops led to a sharp decline in protest participants and finally resulted in the dissolution of the movement (Kudelia 2009, 83).

Anti-government protests, which started in late 2004, are known as the Orange Revolution. The movements meant to express dissatisfaction with the presidential election that declared Viktor Yanukovych president. After the first round of voting on October 31, the protesters claimed that the results were marred by corruption and electoral fraud in favour of Victor Yanukovych and called for the rerun of the entire presidential election (Kudelia 2009, 94). On the first day after the other main candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, called for people to take to the streets of Kiev, approximately 100,000 protesters gathered at Independence Square (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006, 414). Contrary to government expectations, the movement continued to expand, eventually mobilizing hundreds of thousands more participants who came from outside of the capital city (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006, 414).[38]

Learning from the previous lapse into violent clashes, the leaders of the Orange Revolution were extremely careful not to incite their massive support into aggression (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Kudelia 2010, 183; Shukan 2011). They used less aggressive protest actions during the presidential campaign, such as meetings, concerts, and marches (Shukan 2011). The protesters also blockaded all main government

[38] Beissinger (2011) introduces several public opinion surveys about participation in the Orange Revolution.

buildings to paralyze the authorities (Kudelia 2010, 179). Furthermore, to avoid clashes between Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters and between protesters and police, human buffer zones were formed between rival camps and police and the crowds, and trained volunteers patrolled the crowds and the tent camps (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006, 415). Since social, cultural, and regional cleavages in Ukraine deeply divided the population between these two candidates' camps, they potentially constituted the opposition camp (Filippova 2009, 140). [39] A senior low enforcement official interviewed by Binnendijk and Marovic (2006, 415) reported that the Yushchenko camp made every effort to avert any kind of conflict because many activists, including Yushchenko, believed that the opposition's use of violence would ignite state repression (Kudelia 2010, 183). As a result of the strategic use of nonviolent tactics, the protesters successfully changed the government's actions. Although President Kuchma initially planned to use force against the protesters, he appealed for an end to their blockade of government buildings during the first round-table negotiation on 26 November, 2004 (Kudelia 2010, 180). A month after the first negotiation, the government reran the presidential election, and the final result was victory for Yushchenko.

The campaigners' choice of nonviolent tactics and the government's decision to accommodate the protesters can be ascribed to the public's belief that peaceful collective actions allowed the people to affect the political situation. The focus group interview that Sharma (2003, A4–22) conducted in 2002 found that most respondents approved of peaceful political actions, such as supporting the opposition, attending

[39] Twelve million Ukrainians did not support Yushchenko in the presidential election (Filippova 2009, 140).

protests and rallies, signing a petition, writing letters, and communicating with other people. In particular, many respondents believed that protests were the only efficient form of political action while signing a petition or writing a letter was found to be useless (Sharma, A4–22). In his report, Sharma (2003, A4–15) highlights one respondent who believed that taking up arms was necessary to make political changes. Yet, Sharma's in-depth report suggests that Ukrainian residents who actively supported violent means were fairly rare and that preferences for peaceful tactics, such as strikes and demonstrations, received higher approval. Moreover, a public opinion survey in 2004 revealed that almost two-thirds of respondents saw elite negotiations as acceptable means to resolve the crisis, and only 19 percent of respondents were opposed (Kudelia 2010, 182). If the protesters had resorted to physical force, the government could have easily legitimised repressive actions against the protesters because domestic audiences were violence averse.

3.5.2 The Basque Country of Spain

Violent conflicts have long been a political problem in the Basque Country of Spain. Although the Basque community has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy with regard to taxation, education, and the health system, the terrorist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) had directed indiscriminate attacks against the population since the period of Franco's dictatorship seeking complete independence. The ETA engaged in violent campaigns throughout the Spanish territory using tactics, such as bombings, assassinations of people against the independence of the Basque Country, including politicians, intellectuals, and journalists, and kidnappings of businesspeople. The Spanish government consistently maintained a hardline stance towards the ETA. The

Madrid Agreement in 1987 denounced the ETA for its lack of legitimacy and clearly stated that problems of the Basque Country needed to be resolved in parliament (Muro 2008, 145). Two other pacts were additionally signed to strengthen democratically elected parties and ostracise the ETA in the 1980s (145–147). When the Spanish Congress of Deputies voted in favour of holding talks with the ETA in May 2005, it stipulated that the ETA abandon its arms and renounce violence (Muro 2008, 184). Even when the ETA announced a temporary ceasefire in October 2011, the government offered nothing in exchange.[40]

The Spanish government's firm stance is attributed to its difficulty in yielding to violent campaigns. As the formal results indicate, ordinary citizens were negative towards the use of violence. While the ETA had enjoyed some understanding in the Franco years, Spanish opinion polls had shown a shift in the public's attitude towards the ETA. The poll revealed that violence in the Basque Country was considered as the biggest problem in Spain (Shepard 2002, 61–62). A survey by Spencer and Croucher (2008) demonstrated that Spanish residents outside the Basque Country had a less favourable opinion of the ETA than the residents within it.

Ordinary residents in the Basque Country were also not sympathetic to the ETA's approach. Their pacifist preferences first appeared in the formation of an anti-violent group, Gestro por la Paz (Gesture for Peace) in 1986. The pacifist group's formation was driven by the idea that Basque society itself was responsible for the violence. Gestro por la Paz's activities ranged from nonviolent protests to weekly vigils for victims of the ETA's attacks and kidnappings (Whitfield 2014, 83). Such pacifist

[40] BBC, April 7, 2017, "Eta: Basque separatists plan to unilaterally disarm on Saturday," https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39512637.

mobilization was also revealed in some surveys. According to Llera (2010, 226), only 20 percent of respondents showed their total rejection of the ETA's activity in 1981. The number of those respondents who did not support it gradually and consistently increased, such that more than one half of respondents disapproved of the violence between 1995 and 2009, with a few exceptions in the 1999 and 2000 January surveys.[41] More direct evidence can be found on this point. A survey in 1986 reported that eight out of ten Basque people rejected the use of violence (Jebb et al. 2006, 26). Public violence-aversion remained high. Funes (1998, 497–488) displayed that nearly 90 percent of people strongly or somewhat agreed with the statement that violence was unnecessary to achieve political goals in 1989 (80%), 1991 (88%), and 1997 (88%). These polls indicate the rise of strong opposition to the ETA's violent means after the late 1980s, which made bargaining between the ETA and the central government more difficult (Lemma 3.1(ii)), leading to complete disarmament in 2017.

Then, why did the ETA adhere to violence for so long? One reason is that the public did not reveal its opposition against violent means until the 1980s. At the beginning of the 1980s, approximately 40 percent of the Basque respondents refused to reply to a question about their attitudes towards the ETA, since many Basques believed that others supported the ETA and feared ETA retaliation (Funes 1998, 496–497). Another reason is that many Basques disagreed with centralism. The 1998 Eurobarometer showed that a third of respondents preferred regional autonomy and a fourth preferred independence (Llera 1999, 105). Different surveys in 1987, 1993, and 1998 reported that approximately 25 percent of the Basques were dissatisfied with the statute of

[41] These results depend on a series of opinion polls, *Euskobarometro*, led by the University of the Basque Country, which were originally issued in Spanish and Basque languages. For linguistic reasons, we refer to the secondary work.

autonomy and 30 percent of them were partially satisfied (Llera 1999, 106). This public sympathy for the ETA's goal, combined with the absence of clear opposition to violence, can be considered to have prolonged the duration of the violent conflict.

3.6 Conclusion

The analyses explore how the attitudes of domestic audiences towards dissident means and ends affect government responsiveness to different forms of civil campaigns. This chapter theoretically scrutinises the differing effect of public opinion regarding dissident means and ends and clarifies causal mechanisms by which violent/nonviolent tactics are chosen and improve government responsiveness to campaign groups. The empirical analysis using the AmericasBarometer provides considerable evidence that domestic audiences play a significant role in constraining the behaviour of both government and dissident groups in the manner we predict. Based on the findings, this chapter provides the policy implication that development in political institutions, which can reflect public opinion, will be needed for the prevalence of peaceful resistance. Our formal model assumes that a government should try to avoid public criticism about its intransigent attitudes towards peaceful demonstrations and cowardly attitudes towards violent groups, and the results are based on this underlying assumption. Nevertheless, in some countries, the public is prohibited from denouncing the state apparatus. Improving freedoms of speech and press, although in and of itself difficult to achieve, may contribute to making peaceful ways of resolving disputes more attractive to governments and dissidents.

Finally, our analyses are amenable to extension. Thus far, the public has been assumed to be a non-strategic actor in our model. Future work could allow the public

to strategically choose its level of support towards a government and violent/nonviolent campaign groups and allow campaign outcomes to affect levels of public approval for campaign means and ends. Campaign success may facilitate public approval of more democratic, less violent means on one hand, but the success of violent campaigns may encourage people to legitimise violent means on the other hand. Considering such possible complexity, future extensions would further broaden our understanding about the role of domestic audiences in civil resistance.

3.7 Appendix

3.7.1 Mathematical proofs

This section provides the proofs for all claims and propositions in the main text.

Proof of Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.1

Solving backwards gives us a subgame perfect equilibrium of the baseline model. We first solve for G's best response. Given that C uses violent tactics, G accepts x if and only if $-x - t(1-g) \geq -c_v$, that is

$$\frac{c_v - x}{1-g} \geq t. \tag{3.3}$$

Similarly, given the nonviolent tactics chosen, G accepts x if and only if $-x \geq c_{nv} - tg$, which reduces to

$$\frac{x + c_{nv}}{g} \leq t, \tag{3.4}$$

and G rejects it otherwise.

G's best response can be summarised as follows depending on the magnitude of x, visualised in Figure 3.2. Consider the possible configuration of cutpoints about d shown in Equations 3.1 and 3.2. When $\frac{c_v - x}{1-g} \geq \frac{x + c_{nv}}{g}$, that is, $0 \leq x \leq gc_v - (1 -$

$g)c_{nv} \equiv \hat{x}$, (1) G concedes only to *v* when $d \in [0, \frac{x+c_{nv}}{g})$, (2) G concedes to both *v* and *nv* when $t \in [\frac{x+c_{nv}}{g}, \frac{c_v-x}{1-g}]$, and (3) G concedes only to *nv* when $t \in (\frac{c_v-x}{1-g}, 1]$. When $\hat{x} < x$, on the other hand, (1) G concedes only to *v* when $d \in [0, \frac{c_v-x}{1-g}]$, (2) G concedes neither *v* nor *nv* when $d \in (\frac{c_v-x}{1-g}, \frac{x+c_{nv}}{g})$, and (3) G concedes only to *nv* when $d \in [\frac{x+c_{nv}}{g}, 1]$.

Given G's best response, C decides whether to conduct a campaign and, if so, chooses either violent or nonviolent tactics. There are four cases to consider. First, suppose that G concedes only to *v*. C prefers *v* to *nv* when $-c_v > -c_{nv} - x$, which is equal to,

$$x > c_v - c_{nv}.$$

C prefers *v* to *no* when$-c_v > -x$, that is, $c_v < x$. Since $c_v > c_v - c_{nv}$, C plays *v* when $c_v < x$. C prefers *nv* to *no* when $-c_{nv} - x > -x$, which never holds since $c_{nv} > 0$ by definition. Hence, C strictly prefers *no* to *nv*. It is also necessary to check whether $c_v < x$ holds when G concedes only to *v*. Comparing $\hat{x} \equiv gc_v - (1-g)c_{nv}$ with c_v, it turns out that $gc_v - (1-g)c_{nv} < c_v$ is always true since rearranging the inequality yields $-(1-g)c_{nv} < (1-g)c_v$. Taken together, when $0 \leq x < \hat{x}$, $c_v < x$ never holds and C always plays *no*. When $\hat{x} \leq x$, in contrast, C plays *v* when $c_v < x$ and plays *no* otherwise.

Second, suppose that G concedes only to *nv*. C chooses *nv* rather than *v* when $-c_{nv} > -c_v - x$, that is,

$$x > c_{nv} - c_v.$$

Since $c_v > c_{nv} > 0$ by definition, the right-hand side of this equation is always negative, and this inequality always holds. Hence, C strictly prefers nonviolent to violent means in this case. C prefers *nv* to *no* when $-c_{nv} > -x$, that is,

$$c_{nv} < x.$$

Similar to the proof for the first case, it is necessary to check whether $c_{nv} < x$ holds when G concedes only to *nv*. Comparing $\hat{x} \equiv gc_v + (1-g)c_{nv}$ with c_{nv} shows

that $c_{nv} < \hat{x}$ always holds. Therefore, when $0 \leq x < \hat{x}$, C plays *nv* when $c_{nv} < x$ and plays *no* otherwise. When $\hat{x} \leq x$, C always plays *nv*.

Third, suppose that G concedes to both *v* and *nv*. C prefers *v* to *nv* when $-c_v > -c_{nv}$, that is $c_v < c_{nv}$. This never holds by definition, so C strictly prefers *nv* when G concedes to both types of resistance. As already defined, C prefers *nv* to *no* when $c_{nv} < x$. Therefore, when $0 \leq x < \hat{x}$, C plays *nv* when $c_{nv} < x$ and plays *no* otherwise. When $\hat{x} \leq x$, by contrast, C always plays *nv*.

Fourth, suppose that G never concedes to either type of civil resistance. When no concessions are expected, C strictly prefers not conducting campaigns because $-x > -c_v - x$ and $-x > -c_{nv} - x$ are always true. Hence, when G never concedes, C always plays *no*.

3.7.2 Descriptive statistics

The table below displays descriptive statistics of the variables that we use. With regard to the definition of *violent campaigns* variable, as previously explained, this variable is taken from both UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) Global version 18.1 (2017) (Sundberg and Melander, 2013) and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 18.1 (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Allansson, et al. 2017). Thus, the definition of the *violent campaigns* variable does not necessarily mean that there were 25 battle related deaths. Even if the violence in a given year by non-governmental groups (rebel groups) involves fewer than 25 battle-related deaths, in this variable, it is coded as 1 because GED captures the violence that does not necessarily reach 25 battle-related deaths.

Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics.

	N	Mean	St. Dev	Min	Max
Sample for part 1 analysis					
Violent campaigns	97	0.247	0.434	0	1
Violence aversion	97	0.582	0.116	0.339	0.841
Satisfaction for democracy	97	0.539	0.131	0.200	0.894
ln GDP p.c.	97	13.060	1.688	9.588	17.020
ln Population	97	16.154	1.357	13.214	19.135
PTS	97	2.784	0.892	1	5
Preference for democracy	97	0.739	0.080	0.492	0.956
ln violent event count	97	0.618	1.306	0.000	5.617
Sample for part 2 analysis					
Violence aversion	361	0.548	0.093	0.339	0.841
ln GDP p.c.	361	13.836	1.942	9.588	17.020
ln Population	361	16.874	1.416	13.214	19.135
ln duration	361	0.272	0.784	0.000	4.771
Protester violence	361	0.191	0.394	0	1
Participants	361	2.169	1.248	0	5
Accommodation	361	0.086	0.281	0	1
Political	361	0.770	0.421	0	1
Preference for democracy	361	0.731	0.088	0.492	0.956
Satisfaction for democracy	361	0.521	0.125	0.200	0.894
PTS	361	3.111	0.859	1	5
Violent campaigns	361	0.418	0.494	0	1
ln violent event count	361	0.955	1.452	0.000	5.617

3.7.3 Empirical results without sample selection

Dependent variable: Accommodation		
Violence aversion	2.926	(3.132)
Preference for democracy	9.001	(3.379)***
Satisfaction for democracy	-10.494	(2.488)***
ln GDP p.c.	-1.094	(1.235)
ln Population	1.718	(1.983)
PTS	-0.025	(0.481)
ln duration	1.148	(0.227)***
Participants	0.373	(0.313)
Protester violence	-16.598	(1.399)***
ln violent event count	0.739	(0.449)*
Political	-1.210	(1.383)
Protester violence*Political	15.867	(1.736)***
Intercept	-20.697	(19.299)
Log likelihood	-30.032	
AIC	86.065	

Table 3.4. Empirical results without sample selection.

Note: Standard errors are clustered by country. (* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$)

4. When There is No Strength in Numbers: Protest Size, Interventionist, and Leadership Change

4.1 Introduction

Why are some protests successful in making political leaders step down, while other protests, even though they attract large crowds, are not? Protests calling for the resignation of Filipino President Estrada successfully coerced the president into resigning from office, whereas those against Egyptian President Morsi failed to do so, even though both protests mobilised large crowds. Although conventional wisdom suggests that protests mobilising more resources, such as people and money, are always more successful than those mobilising fewer resources, evidence on protest outcomes has been mixed. What factors, then, undermine power in numbers?

This chapter seeks to answer this question by examining interventions that often follow mass protests. In democracies, political leaders are vulnerable to interventions that may remove them from office, such as impeachment trials, non-confidence motions, judicial interventions, and coups. Although the forms of intervention can differ according to national characteristics and level of democratisation, such interventions are institutionalised to a varying degree in democracies to punish political leaders for performing poorly or unreliably, and to make them responsive to the public. The possibility of such subsequent intervention must be considered in assessing the

effectiveness of protests for the following reason: Protesters must not only commit to punishing governments when no concessions are granted (Fearon 1997; Schelling 1960) but also credibly promise the political leader that she will be rewarded for conceding (Abrahms 2013, 664). However, the possibility that protests may trigger a challenge from other actors to the same leadership can impair protesters' abilities to make promises because some actors might take advantage of the political instability caused by protests and may not retract their threats even when a government has conceded. However, the existing literature does not sufficiently explain such commitment problems.

By developing a simple, formal model, this chapter argues that even if the size of a protest increases, the probability that the protest successfully coerces a political leader into withdrawal from office does not necessarily increase. Rather, it shows that the susceptibility of potential interventionists to the growth of protests can improve or undermine their effectiveness. Demonstrations for leadership change can precede interventions by several other types of actors, ranging from impeachment trials to military coups. As will hereinafter be described in detail, the types of interventionists who could pose such threats to executives vary substantively. Where potential interventionists are fully constrained by the constitution, they are rarely willing to challenge political leaders who have compromised because they find it costly to

overcome their constraints. Meanwhile, those who are weakly constrained may possess fewer incentives to retract their threats to political leaders with the escalation of protests and may attempt to expand their political influence by removing the incumbent even though she has conceded. The findings of this chapter explain why the protests against Estrada in the face of an impeachment threat made the president spontaneously step down, while the protests against Morsi in the face of a coup threat failed even though military threats pose higher risks than impeachment threats. The military threat behind the Egyptian protests made Morsi suspicious that he would not be rewarded for conceding, while the impeachment threat behind the Filipino protests convinced Estrada that his concession would reward him by removing the impeachment threat.

My theoretical argument provides implications for empirical analyses on protests. First, executive constraints other than protests need to be incorporated to assess government responsiveness to protests more accurately. Controlling for the potential interventionists' involvement may contribute to assessing the validity of the conventional wisdom that more resourceful protests are more successful. Second, the *de facto* gradation of interventionist types who could threaten executives should be considered. A growing line of research examines leadership removal by contrasting legal and illegal channels through which leaders lose office (Goemans 2008; Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009; Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich 2017). It is often

assumed that interventionists who pose legal threats are less power-seeking than those who pose illegal threats. However, the demarcation between legal and illegal channels is not always clear. Impeachment decisions are sometimes made based on vague charges of misperformance (Pérez-Liñán 2014, 34). By contrast, armed forces sometimes reinstall democratic rule quickly (e.g., Argentina in 1962, Niger in 1999, Thailand in 2006) rather than prolonging military rule (e.g., Egypt in 2013, Thailand in 2014). My formal model seeks to capture such nuanced differences in executive constraints beyond the legal/illegal dichotomy.

4.2 Literature

4.2.1 Determinants of Government Responsiveness

The determinants of political leaders' responsiveness to citizens are a significant issue in political science. In their formal model, Besley and Burgess (2002) show that more informed and politically active voters facilitate government responsiveness. Using data from India, they test the implications of the model that mass media plays a key role in providing information to voters, increasing electoral turnout, and, in turn, making political leaders more responsive to voters. Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) examine the effect of electoral contestability and limitation on executive discretion concerning government rhetorical and budgetary responsiveness in Britain, Denmark, and the

United States and contend that responsiveness levels increase when executives are more uncertain about the probability of their remaining in office and when institutions constrain their power. On the other hand, Lax and Phillips (2007) show that policy-specific opinions significantly influence the adoption of gay rights policies when such issues are salient.

While their specific focuses differ, the abovementioned studies have in common the fact that their theories assume dyad interaction between a political leader and her electorate. Although their contributions to the understanding of government policy responsiveness are not negligible, their theories cannot directly apply to understanding government responsiveness to protests for several reasons. Many protests have demonstrated that high levels of insecurity or issue salience are not necessarily associated with a high probability of protest success. For example, both the Egyptian protests against President Morsi and the Thai protests against Prime Minister Thaksin failed to make the leaders resign, even though they were followed by coup threats. Threats of military coups are expected to pose the highest level of risk to political leaders, compared to impeachment or judicial threats, but these cases suggest that the threat level may not matter. In addition, issue salience may not necessarily explain different consequences of protests for leadership change because government rotation is indeed a big issue for the public, and such protests often receive much domestic and

international attention. The difficulty of applying these theories to studying government responsiveness to protests comes from the fact that these theories predominantly revolve around government responsiveness in established democracies in which institutional constraints on the executives exist and work effectively.

4.2.2 Determinants of Protest Outcomes

The consequences of protests have also become the subject of growing debate (e.g., Celestino and Gleditsch 2013; Cunningham 2011; Gillion 2012). Protest outcomes have been explained in three different ways. First, much literature has discussed protests in the framework of collective action (e.g., Karklins and Petersen 1993; Tarrow 1993a). Admittedly, coordination is a prerequisite for protests to emerge. However, studying coordination phases is insufficient to identify what determines the success or failure of protests because successful coordination does not always guarantee protest success.

Second, protest outcomes have been discussed from a resource-mobilisation perspective. Both protest literature (e.g., Dahlum and Wig 2019; Gamson 1975; Lipsky 1968; McCarthy and Zald 1977) and bargaining literature (e.g., Fearon 1997; Schelling 1960) suggest that to make political leaders responsive to protesters, protesters must

pose sufficient threats to leaders when their demands are not met. Such studies have asserted or implicitly assumed that protests mobilising more resources are more likely to extract political leaders' concessions because it signifies their stronger willingness to punish political leaders. Despite its appeal, such conventional wisdom is being increasingly challenged. Protests mobilising thousands of participants do not necessarily win political leaders' concessions, such as recent anti-government protests in Russia and the US, whereas a small number of protesters have made big political changes in some cases, such as the *piquetero* protests in Argentina (Benclowcz and Breña 2011). Empirical studies have also produced mixed results (Colby 1982; Giugni 2004).

Third, based on insights from bargaining literature, the failure of bargaining between protesters and a government can be attributed to incomplete information. They argue that it is only when actors have private information about their preferences, capabilities, beliefs, or other things that bargaining breaks down (e.g., Cetinyan 2002; Fearon 1995). However, explaining every bargaining breakdown with incomplete information can risk overlooking other factors of potential importance because uncertainty exists in all political systems on the ground.

4.2.3 Problems of Commitment and the Effect of Interventionists

One significant mechanism that is often overlooked in the protest literature is the commitment problem. To make political leaders responsive to protesters' demands, protesters must make two types of commitment. The first type of commitment is to punishment. Protesters must credibly show that they will execute their threat of punishing political leaders if they grant no concessions (Powell 2002, 4). There is widespread agreement among bargaining theorists that threat credibility improves as higher costs are paid to pose threats (e.g., Fearon 1997; Thyne 2010; Walter 2009). Resource mobilisation theory also suggests that protesters' abilities to send threats improves as they mobilise more resources. The second type of commitment is to rewards: Protesters must credibly commit to rewarding political leaders when concessions are granted (Abrahms 2013, 664). Protesters must commit to retracting threats once they win a concession so that political leaders can continue their political careers, for example; otherwise, political leaders should not have any incentive to concede. Nonetheless, the literature has yet to fully address how protesters can make the promise of rewards credible.

Interventionists who may threaten political leaders following protests have analytical significance because the possibility of their involvement can affect protesters' abilities to commit to reward and punishment. On the one hand, the possibility of

another actor's involvement should improve protesters' ability to threaten. Suppose that a political leader faces threats by protesters and an interventionist. The sum of both threats should be greater than that of protesters' alone. Protests that are backed by an impeachment or coup threat should be more threatening than those that are not.

On the other hand, the shadow of another actor's involvement can undermine protesters' ability to reward. Casper and Thyson (2014) and Johnson and Thyne (2016) reveal that larger protests are more likely to incur coups because larger protests signal lower government popularity and facilitate coordination among elites contemplating a coup. If it is the case that larger protests make coup coordination inevitable, protesters' efforts to expand their activities may perversely undermine their ability to reward because political leaders may think that they would be punished by coup conspirators anyway even if they conceded. Therefore, given that protests may facilitate another actor's challenge to the same leadership, protesters may confront a commitment dilemma.

Protests can precede several types of interventions other than coups. The variety of interventionists need to be considered since different interventionists are expected to affect protesters' abilities to credibly commit to rewarding political leaders differently. Table 4.1 displays some examples. For instance, interventionists in established democracies are formally constrained and given little discretion in carrying out

punishments against political leaders. Where democracy is fully established, prerequisites to ousting the executive are clearly stipulated in constitutions, and those who can initiate such threats to leaders' survival do not have incentives to deviate from certain procedures. On the other hand, interventionists in new democracies are not necessarily that strongly constrained. For example, in the impeachment of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo in 2012, the Congress completed all impeachment proceeding within 48 hours and removed the president from office on ambiguous charges of misperformance (Pérez-Liñán 2014, 34). Interventionists can also vary within countries in terms of their *de facto* power of overcoming formal constraints.

Interventions following protests	**Year/Country**	**Reports**
Impeachment	2001/Philippines	After the corruption scandals of October 2000, anti-presidential forces including the opposition parties and Catholic church started protesting against President Estrada. An impeachment court was formed with the consent of both houses in November.
	2002/Paraguay	The economic climate and scandals combined with unpopular policies escalated public unrest and provoked marches of thousands in March 2001. An impeachment attempt took place against President Gonzalez Macchi in December, but this trial failed due to the lack of a two-thirds majority (Pérez-Liñán 2007, 32–35).
Motion of no confidence	2013/Ukraine	During the Euromaidan pro-EU protests, some deputies in the Supreme Council called for a non-confidence motion against the cabinet and pro-Russian Prime Minister Azarov. This attempt was unsuccessful because of an insufficient number of votes (Portnov 2015, 10).
Judicial review	2008/Thailand	After a coup ousted Prime Minister Thaksin, anti-Thaksin forces continued demonstrations calling for the resignation of Thaksin's successor, Samak. During this movement, the Constitutional Court ruled that Samak was disqualified for the premiership. It also dissolved

		the People's Power Party (PPP), of which Samak served as leaders although the trials concerning the dissolution of the PPP for alleged electoral fraud were still in their early stages. It also prohibited Somchai from participating in politics for the next five years (Ockey 2009).
	2004/Venezuela	Anti-Chávez groups had collected more than three million signatures in favour of a referendum to remove Chávez by November 2003. The National Electoral Council disqualified 876,000 of those on technicality, however. The electoral chamber of the Supreme Court allowed the disqualified signatures to stand, whereas the constitutional chamber overturned the electoral chamber's decision (Taylor 2014).
Coup	2013/Egypt	Protests against President Morsi were widespread on the first anniversary of his election in June 2013. The armed forces issued a 48-hour ultimatum to ask the president to meet the people's demands (Housden 2013).
Assassination	2008/Philippines	The assassination plot of President Arroyo was made public in February (Conde 2008). The president had faced several mass protests calling for her resignation since several months after assuming office in 2001.

Table 4.1. Examples of interventions against incumbent political leaders that followed protests.

These examples demonstrate that a demarcation between legal and illegal channels is not always clear. Goemans (2008), Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009), and Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich (2017) analyse different channels of leadership removal and how leaders lose office by contrasting legal and illegal channels. However, these examples imply that even courts, which are believed to be one of the most democratic actors, may enjoy *de facto* discretion in punishing political leaders. The global trend of a politicised judiciary indicates that seemingly democratic actors are not always impartial (Chernykh and Svolik 2015, 409) and may rule against the government on ambiguous legal bases to gain greater political leverage, greater institutional autonomy, and promotion in the new regime (Ginsburg 2003; Sieder, Schjolden, and Angell 2005). These examples also suggest that we investigate the effect of subsequent challenges beyond their institutional labels (e.g., judiciary, military). Admittedly, whether unauthorised challengers can threaten leadership is closely associated with institutional factors such as the level of democratisation and constitutional arrangement. Yet, not all armed forces seek political power, and neither do other types of challengers.

Given this variation in interventions, it is expected that the type of intervention that follows protests affects protesters' ability to reward and punish political leaders. In terms of punishment, intervention by an active military or politicised judiciary should help protesters pose greater threats than those of rigidly bound actors. Nevertheless, in terms of reward, the shadow of intervention by weakly constrained actors may lower protesters' abilities to make credible promises for rewards because those actors are more likely to act arbitrarily than strongly constrained actors. Therefore, to gain a better understanding of how protest size affects political leaders' responsiveness, several types of interventionists capable of punishing political leaders need to be analysed

within a framework that locates actors on a continuum representing the degree to which they have abilities to carry out punishments against punish political leaders. Figure 4.1 illustrates the interventionist continuum.



Figure 4.1. An illustration of types of interventionists.
Note. The actors listed in Figure 4.1 are not always located at these particular points on the continuum.

4.3 Formal Model

To explore protesters' commitment dilemma, consider the following simple game: Consistent with previous studies, I focus on three actors who are bargaining over a pie of power, which is normalised to 1. First, an incumbent political leader (L, shorthand for *leader*) is assumed to hold power in the status quo and seek to maintain it ($x = 1$, x represents L's share).[42]

Second, an interventionist (I) may or may not execute the threat of ousting L after observing L's response to a protest. As Table 4.1 shows, the interventionist could be regime elites, opposition parties, judges, or the military and may be propelled by

[42] Popular protests may sometimes happen over issues about which popular participation is already allowed to some extent. I assume that L holds all the power in the status quo for analytical simplicity. Furthermore, it is not unusual that elected executives arrange to hold a substantive share of decision-making authority in new democracies. For example, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin was freed of many parliamentary constraints and independent scrutiny. He increased the number of political appointments to positions in the independent offices such as the Election Commission and the National Counter-Corruption Commission and exercised close control over significant appointments within the judiciary and military (Mérieau 2016, 453). President Fujimori of Peru collaborated with top military officers and suspended the congress, courts, and constitutional guarantees. He replaced the 1979 constitution and virtually "monopolised the electoral results" (Ellner 2003, 143).

cultural, ethnic, or demographical affinity to side with protesting citizens, the ambitions of a leader, or a personal or institutional desire for greater power. I assume that *I* is independent of a unit mass of citizens.[43] Furthermore, while different interventionists may simultaneously pose threats to the same leadership, I assume that only one interventionist poses a removal threat at a given time. *I* is assumed to hold no decision-making power at the beginning of the game and may attempt to reform the existing political order (e.g., Casper and Tyson 2014).

$y \in [0,1]$ represents *I*' s ideal division of power between *I* and a unit mass of citizens in the case that *I* successfully removes *L*. When *I*'s challenge succeeds, y is allocated to *I*, and $1 - y$ is allocated to citizens. The value of y is publicly observable. Alternatively, the magnitude of y can be understood as the levels of discretion that an interventionist can enjoy by overcoming the formal constraints imposed upon him or her. Interventionists with little discretion may not be allowed to hold much power after leadership removal while those with greater discretion may be able to manipulate power-sharing policies *ex post*. Accordingly, *I* is a more democratic interventionist if y is smaller, and threats by *I* with a smaller y can be considered as more conventional legal threats such as impeachments, non-confidence motions, and recalls. Conversely, a larger y represents a more power-seeking interventionist with fewer democratic constraints. Countries where actors with lower y mainly have change of punishing political leaders can be considered more established democracies, while countries

[43] Interventionists sometimes give explicit support to particular protest groups. For example, some opposition parties in Ukraine supported civil campaigns in the Orange Revolution. However, this collusion is not always the case. Military officers tend to prefer staying in barracks than challenging a government to ensure institutional survival (Nordlinger 1977, 141–142), and they do not automatically represent the interests of particular classes or social groups (Finer 1962, 39–60). Nor does legislative opposition always endorse anti-government campaigns in explicit ways. Certainly, protests can strengthen *I*'s willingness to intervene in my model, but that does not mean that *I* and citizens necessarily collude with each other.

where actors with medium or high y contribute to leadership changes are seen as new or transitioning democracies.

Third, the model involves, as a non-strategic actor, a unit mass of citizens who may stage a protest seeking to limit *L*'s political power. Citizens' ideal division of power is exogenously given by $x \in [0,1)$, which captures the proportion of power they can allow *L* to have. They could call for the nullification of electoral results, better political representation, or the resignation of the head of government. The size of their protests, which is represented by $r \geq 0$ (r: shorthand for *resources*), plays a role in threatening *L* and informing the levels of public dissatisfaction towards *L* (Casper and Thyson 2014; Lohmann 1993). r could be the proportion of the population supporting a given protest, the amount of resources mobilised, or the levels of damage caused by protests. I regard a unit mass of citizens as a non-strategic actor, and citizens are assumed to use the exogenously given amount of resources they have for their protest activities.

This simplification is justified for three reasons. First, there is a universal trend of protesters attempting to maximise the size of their protests to send the strongest possible threat to a government. That is, they would not have any rational incentive to save resources that they have in protesting or to prevent potential protesters from joining protests. Second, the size of protests hinges on countless factors that are beyond protesters' reach, such as access to financial resources, the demographic and educational characteristics of participants, government repression, and the political landscape in neighbouring countries. This formalisation of the model captures such random elements related to protests.[44] Third, the mechanism by which collective actions among dissatisfied citizens affect collective actions among regime elites who

[44] What determines protest size is a significant question on which several scholars have worked. Due to space constraints, I leave this question for future research.

are contemplating a coup against the same leadership is formalised as a global game of regime change by Casper and Thyson (2014). Building on their work, I employ a simpler formalisation and highlights interaction between a leader and an interventionist. My formal model differs from Casper and Thyson's (2014), in that it integrates the political leader's strategy in the face of a threat by an interventionist while their model of coup coordination does not integrate the possibility that regime elites may cancel a coup attempt when government concessions are made. Furthermore, despite not explicitly formalising it, we can interpret the equilibrium in terms of collective action issues. The results offer the minimum amount of resources a unit mass of citizens has to mobilise to coerce *L* into accepting its demand, which can be considered to be a threshold for a protest group to solve a coordination problem.

The game begins with a situation in which a unit mass of citizens may have already conducted a protest of size $r \in [0,1]$. $r = 0$ means the absence of protest. In this case, the game ends in the status quo where *L* retains all power. When $r > 0$, an ultimatum offer, $x \in [0,1)$, is given to *L*, and upon observing the size of the protest, *L* either accepts or rejects the citizens' offer. If the offer is accepted and no other challenge happens, x is allocated to *L*, and $1 - x$ is allocated to a unit mass of citizens. Accepting it imposes cost $c_L \in (0,1]$ on *L* since changing the status quo division of power involves the technical costs of following legislative procedures and coordination, if any, with parties and unsupportive MPs. The value of this cost is common knowledge. *L* accepts the protesters' offer when she is indifferent between accepting and rejecting it.

Finally, *I* decides whether to execute a removal threat to *L*. *I* needs to pay $c_I \in (0,1]$ when he does so. c_I could substantively vary between types of interventionists. Democratic interventionists such as political parties that try to impeach the president would need to coordinate with other MPs to initiate the trial, take some required legal

steps, and pay the opportunity costs of spending time and effort on the proceedings. Armed forces, by contrasta, would need to mobilise enough soldiers, vehicles, and weapons, and might damage some physical assets or the national economy, which cannot be recuperated. c_I is common knowledge. Whether the attempt succeeds is the function of protest size and *L*'s decision. If *L* accepts the citizens' offer, the attempt of removing L succeeds with a probability rx and fails with a probability $1 - rx$. Consistent with existing studies, the probability of success is increasing in the size of protests. It is also increasing in the size of *L*'s share of power because accepting a larger x (i.e. a better deal for *L*) is thought to be less likely to mitigate public dissatisfaction. If *L* rejects the offer, meanwhile, the challenge to *L* succeeds with a probability r and fails with a probability $1 - r$. Since $x \in [0,1)$ by definition, the probability of *L* being ousted is lower when she accepts the offer than when she rejects it. *I* does not challenge *L* if he is indifferent.

If *L* is not removed, *L* obtains $x - c_L$ when she accepts the citizens' offer and $1 - r$ when she rejects it respectively. If *I* rejects their offer, she will be penalised according to the size of the protest. If *I* successfully ousts *L*, *L* retains no power and cannot recapture the payment for concessions c_L when she has compromised.

I's payoffs are defined similarly. When he does not pose a threat of removing *L*, he receives a payoff of 0 because his political power is not improved. When he challenges *L*, by contrast, he receives $y - c_I$ when the attempt succeeds and gets $-c_I$ when it fails. The payoffs of the two players are summarised in Table 4.2.

L's payoff	Successful removal	No/failed removal	*I*'s payoff	Successful removal	No/ failed removal
Accept	$-c_L$	$x - c_L$	Challenge	$y - c_I$	$-c_I$
Reject	$-r$	$1 - r$	Don't challenge	0	0

Table 4.2. The players' payoffs.

4.4 Equilibrium

The solution concept I employ is subgame perfect equilibrium. The formal results below demonstrate that under certain conditions, a political leader rationally accepts being removed in an interventionist's challenge even though the game involves no uncertainty regarding the protesters' strength (i.e. *r*) and *I*'s desire for power (i.e. *y*). In the same manner as solving the game, I begin with *I*'s choice. All proofs are in the Appendix.

Proposition 4.1. *I* challenges *L* if and only if $\frac{c_I}{y} < r \leq 1$ when *L* rejects the citizens' offer and does not otherwise. When *L* accepts the protesters' demands, by contrast, *I* exercises a removal threat if and only if $\frac{c_I}{xy} < r \leq 1$ and withholds otherwise.



Figure 4.2. The interventionist's strategy.

Consistent with the findings of existing studies, Proposition 4.1 and Figure 4.2 reveal a positive relationship between the size of a protest and *I*'s willingness to

implement a removal threat: when r is sufficiently small, *I* never intervenes in the bargaining between *L* and citizens. For medium values of r, *I* challenges *L* in the event concessions are withheld while *I* does not challenge in the event concessions are granted. When the size of a protest reaches a certain level, the threat of removing *L* will not be retracted even after *L*'s concession.

What is noteworthy is the effect of y on the growth of r. The effect of growing protest size on *I*'s equilibrium strategy is conditioned by levels of discretion given to *I*. Recall that a larger y means an interventionist who is given wider discretion in punishing *L* and is seeking more power. As the value of y decreases, both cutpoints in Figure 4.2 move to the right, and *I* is less likely to intervene. With a decrease in y, *I*'s willingness to intervene becomes less susceptible to the growth of protests. That is, a smaller y mitigates the effect of an increasing r. When *I* is more eager to expand his power by removing *L*, *I*'s resolve to challenge *L* is more vulnerable to growing protests, and *I* will possess fewer incentives to retract his threat even after *L* conceded. When potential interventionists are given little incentive to act above and beyond their jurisdiction, they never take advantage of the political instability caused by protests.

Having identified *L*'s best responses, I now turn to *L*'s strategy.

Proposition 4.2. *L* accepts the citizens' offer if

(i) $r \geq 1 - x + c_L$ when *I* never challenges *L*,

(ii) $r \geq \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$ when *I* challenges if and only if *L* withholds concessions, and

(iii) $r \geq \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$ when *I* always challenges *L*.

Proposition 4.2 shows the minimum size of protest that makes *L* accept the protesters' offer given *I*'s equilibrium strategy. Figure 4.3 displays how equilibrium outcomes change depending on r and y. It shows that the conventional wisdom that larger protests are more likely to win government concessions can be overturned by considering *I*'s involvement. Whether this conventional monotone relationship holds depends on the extent to which *I* is allowed to behave arbitrarily. In equilibrium, interventionists are classified into three categories. When *I*'s discretion is fairly limited (i.e. $0 \leq y \leq \frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)}$), *L* concedes to a protest whose size is equal to or more than $\max\{\frac{c_I}{y}, \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}\}$ and rejects protesters' demands if their size is smaller than this. Let this range of *I* be called democratic *I*, which is represented by the bottom row in Figure 4.3. When *I* has relatively wide discretion (i.e. $\frac{2c_I}{x(1-x+c_L)} \leq y \leq 1$), on the other hand, *L* accommodates protesters' demands if the protest size is equal to or surpasses $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$ (see the top row in Figure 4.3). Let this range of *I* be called undemocratic *I*. In this case, protesters need to mobilise more resources to gain political concessions than when *I* is democratic.



Figure 4.3. Equilibrium outcomes.

When *I* is sufficiently democratic or undemocratic, as Figure 4.3 displays, there exists only one threshold dividing *L*'s actions.[45] Thus, the conventional monotone relationship between the size of a protest and its consequences holds when an additional threat *L* potentially faces is posed by interventionists with little or considerable discretion in punishing *L*.

When the value of *y* is intermediate, *L*'s equilibrium behaviour becomes more complex. Let this range of *I* be called hybrid *I*, which is illustrated by the middle row in Figure 4.3. When $\frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)} < y < \frac{2c_I}{x(1-x+c_L)}$, *L* makes a compromise when r is at the intermediate (i.e. $\max\{\frac{c_I}{y}, \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}\} \leq r \leq \frac{c_I}{xy}$) or high levels (i.e. $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \leq r$) while *L* denies compromise when r is very low (i.e. $0 \leq r < \max\{\frac{c_I}{y}, \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}\}$) or insufficiently high (i.e. $\frac{c_I}{xy} < r < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$). Different rationales exist behind each of *L*'s decisions. When the protest size is at an intermediate level (i.e. $\max\{\frac{c_I}{y}, \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}\} \leq r \leq$

[45] See Appendix for this proof.

$\frac{c_I}{xy}$), *L* concedes because the protest inflicts sufficient costs upon *L*, and *I* guarantees the retraction of the removal threat if *L* concedes. For this intermediate range of r, as Figure 4.2 shows, *I* hesitates to challenge *L* after *L* has conceded because a challenge to *L* who obtains public endorsement is likely to fail. Once r passes the largest threshold (i.e. $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \leq r$), rejecting the protesters' demand will be prohibitively costly. In this case, *L* accepts the protesters' offer to reduce her *ex post* costs from a unit mass of citizens although her concessions do not guarantee *I*'s retraction of threat. A situation where a group of protesters becomes extremely violent, like armed guerrillas, could correspond to this setting. Despite knowing that interventionists' involvement is inevitable, political leaders could at least avoid violent attacks by radicalised citizens by conceding to their demands.

Consider *L*'s choice of rejection. When the protest size is sufficiently low, she does not concede because protesters can inflict only a small cost upon her. When the protest size is insufficiently high, in contrast, *L* rejects the protesters' offer because *I* always challenges *L*, and the costs inflicted by *I* do not affect *L*'s decision. Instead, *L* compares the costs of rejecting the offer, r, with the costs of compromising, c_L, and rationally decides not to compromise because the former is smaller. Given that her responses will not change *I*'s resolve to challenge her, she is going to reduce the total costs by saving the cost of changing the status quo. In this way, as the value of y increases, protests are more subject to *I*'s intervention, and the bargaining between protesters and the political leader is more likely to fail even though the players are completely informed.

4.5 Discussion

A number of interesting results arise from the formal model. First, the formal results show that protest failures can be explained by two different mechanisms. See the light-grey zone in Figure 4.4. Regardless of the value of y, protests in this zone always fail. The failure of protests of this size is attributed to the insufficient mobilisation of resources. In other words, protesters fail to demonstrate that their resolve to punish *L* is strong enough.



Figure 4.4. Two mechanisms of protest failure.

In contrast, the failure of protests of intermediate size, which correspond to the dark-grey zone in Figure 4.4, is ascribed to the lack of credible reward. In this case, an interventionist always executes his threats regardless of the political leader's response to protesters. This shadow of an interventionist who is unwilling to retract his threat makes the protesters' promise hardly credible. This interpretation is based on the result that *L* concedes to a protest of intermediate size when an interventionist is democratic. In short, protests of intermediate size are potentially threatening enough to make *L*

concede, but the presence of interventionists who may be able to exercise great discretion in punishing a political leader prevents such protests from becoming equivalently influential.

Comparing *L*'s equilibrium strategies for different types of interventionists thus poses a paradox regarding the growth of protests. Larger protests enhance protesters' abilities to send threats but can simultaneously undermine their ability to promise rewards. Abrahms (2013) argues that escalatory acts potentially have this kind of paradox, defining it as 'the credibility paradox.' Mainstream bargaining theory and protest literature tend to overlook this subsequent risk that a greater mobilisation of resources may weaken protesters' promise to reward political leaders. They tend to assume that threats are naturally retracted once the sender's goal is achieved (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004). In contrast, the aforementioned formal findings suggest that the retraction of threats to political leaders is not to be assumed but to be committed to. This result suggests that protesters need to be responsible for the potential aftermath of their activities.

Second, the results provide implications for citizens' actions, although these are not explicitly modelled. Where the credibility paradox exists, citizens can take three possible actions. One is to limit the size of the protests. When protesters believe that the credibility paradox would deter government concessions, this would be rational. Limiting the size of protest that could otherwise grow does not seem empirically realistic, however. The second possible action is to mobilise resources in a way that encourages another party's intervention and solves the paradox with the power of numbers. Figure 4.4 indicates that organising larger-scale protests (i.e. increasing the value of r) will eventually be rewarded. The third option is to toughen formal constraints on the executive. Comparing the area in which *L* accommodates protesters'

demands in Figure 4.4, L is more likely to accommodate as y becomes lower. This empirically means that where formal punishment apparatuses are the most established, citizens need to mobilise the least amount of resources to gain political concessions. Taken together, everything else being equal, reducing the possibility of arbitrary punishment against political leaders (i.e. lowering the value of y) makes L more responsive to protesters' demands than enlarging the size of protests. This has a significant empirical implication concerning the credibility paradox: physical pain is not the most effective way to extract concessions from a competing party. Rather, the establishment of democratic punishment mechanisms to leadership whose severity cannot be modified *ex post* enhances the effectiveness of protests. This result challenges the conventional wisdom that the higher the costs of making threats, the more successful they become. In fact, however, it is not necessarily easy for citizens to influence the process of creating the mechanisms. The executive often has considerable power to manipulate formal institutions, and if so, citizens may call for informal mechanisms of punishing the executive although they are seemingly supportive of democracy. In this way, different degrees of institutional development determine not only the citizens' choice of channels of dissenting [46] but also government responsiveness to their dissents.

Third, the formal findings yield several implications for empirical studies on protests. As previously noted, protest size has a monotone positive impact on L's choice of accommodating protesters' demands only when potential interventionists are democratic or undemocratic whilst the relationship between the two is nonlinear in the shadow of a hybrid actor's threat. This result indicates that the empirical analyses of

[46] Machado, Scartascini and Tommasi (2011) and Scartascini and Tommasi (2012) investigate the relationship between different degrees of institutional development and the citizens' choice of making their policy demands heard.

protests without controlling for different types of subsequent threats may produce an incomplete evaluation of the effect of resource mobilisation. The effectiveness of protests is most likely to be underestimated in transitioning democracies where arbitrary challenges to the chief executive have not been effectively constrained yet.

4.6 Case Studies

This section includes a preliminary assessment of whether my formal findings provide a good description of protest consequences. I detail the main events of each series of protests and document the significance of protest size (i.e. r) and the level of formal constraints on interventionists (i.e. y). Three cases of anti-government protests in Thailand exhibit variations in terms of this model's key parameters and their consequences (see Figure 4.5). The three protests were organised by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) against three prime ministers in the same political camp: Thaksin Shinawatra, Samak Sundaravej, and Somchai Wongsawat. The anti-Samak protest achieved its stated goal, while those against Thaksin and Somchai failed despite attracting larger crowds and causing greater damage than that against Samak. I control the comparison for other potentially important parameters, such as regime type[47] and demographic and cultural characteristics. It is noteworthy that the king's influence over the series of protests is fixed because King Bhumibol was strict about Thaksin throughout Thaksin's tenure (Kazmin 2007; Phongpaichit and Baker 2009) and the two other prime ministers were Thaksin's successors.

[47] All the protests investigated here occurred under democratic conditions.



Figure 4.5. Case studies from Thailand with associated outcomes and parameter values for r and y.

Anti-Thaksin Protests and Military Threat in 2006

The socioeconomic policies of Thailand's prime minister Thaksin began to provoke opposition from middle- and upper-class voters while Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) enjoyed a victory in 2001 and 2005 based on the support from the lower class, which comprises the majority of the Thai population.[48] Accumulated dissatisfaction among anti-Thaksin voters turned into mass demonstrations in January 2006, when Thaksin's scandal came to light. The PAD spearheaded rallies and demonstrations, mobilising middle and upper-class crowds in and around Bangkok including university students, journalists, and white-collar workers, with protest sizes ranging from 50,000 to 300,000 demonstrators (Pye and Schaffar 2008, 40). Protests also arose in other parts of Thailand (Pye and Schaffar 2008, 40).

Although criticism spread throughout the capital, Thaksin did not resign. Instead, he called a snap election for April 2006, with three major opposition parties boycotting

[48] See Kitirianglarp and Hewison (2009) for more information.

it.[49] While the TRT coalition was struggling to satisfy its constitutional minimum seat requirement,[50] the judges of the Constitutional Court annulled the electoral result and scheduled a new election for October 2006.[51] The anti-Thaksin protests had continued during the electoral process (Pye and Schaffar 2008, 42–44, 54). The months of protest culminated in a military coup on 19 September.

The military began planning a coup with the progress of the anti-Thaksin movement. On 14 July, retired military officer Prem Tinsulanonda visited the military academy and encouraged the cadets' support for the anti-Thaksin camp.[52] He also delivered an address to the naval academy two weeks later (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 279). According to an interview by Shibata (2010), Thaksin seemed to be aware of the threat of an impending coup by August (Shibata 2010, 57).

It seems at first glance irrational that Thaksin did not spontaneously retire from office as demanded despite having sensed the coup threat which severely restrict his physical and political freedom. The formal results, however, provide an interpretation

[49] The Democratic Party, Thai Nation Party, and Mahachon Party boycotted the election.

[50] The TRT was struggling to win seats because the 1997 Constitution stipulated that a candidate had to get votes from at least 20 percent of the total eligible voters in constituencies with only one candidate. There were a total of 123 out of 400 constituents in which TRT candidates ran unopposed.

[51] The first round of the snap election did not fill the legislative quorum. Between the second the third round, on 25 April, King Bhumibol stated to the judges of the Supreme Court and Administrative Court that "[A] one-party election is not normal. The one-party situation is undemocratic" (Dressel 2010, 680). The Constitutional Court quickly responded to this royal remark and nullified the results of the snap election on 8 May. The legal basis of this decision is questionable, however. A rationale for this nullification was that the electoral results were not normal, democratic, or fair (Tamada 2008, 25). Nevertheless, the constitution had predicted such situations and permitted one-candidate constituencies with a 20-percent threshold. Another rationale was that a new type of voting booth used in the snap election did not allow for the protection of ballot secrecy (Tamada 2008, 24–25). The Election Commission argued that the same system had been commonly adopted and regarded constitutional in past municipal elections and that the chance of bystanders looking at voters' choice was unlikely, but the Constitutional Court disagreed.

[52] Prem addressed in the military academy as follows: "In horseracing, horse owners hire jockeys to ride the horses. The jockeys do not own the horses. They just ride them. A government is like a jockey, it supervises soldiers, but the real owners are the country, and the King. … Some jockeys ride well, and others don't. Governments re the same" (Phongpaichit and Baker 2009, 278–279).

of this puzzling behaviour. First, the protest size was large enough to stimulate the power-seeking officers' intervention but insufficient to make the political leader always concede to the protesters' demands. While the anti-Thaksin protests were reported to be of great size, the population was deeply divided along class lines, and a majority of the population, such as the poor and farmers, supported Thaksin.[53] Second, the interventionist had the ability to overcome his formal constraint in punishing political leaders. The Thai military was accustomed to launching coups, and coordination issues among the soldiers were resolved smoothly as the previous episodes show. Furthermore, the military was a high power-seeker under the Thaksin government. Their intervention was intended to take control of the government machinery, although temporarily, and to exhibit their power to future civilian governments. For this intervention, the military successfully expanded its budget and autonomy (Chamber 2010, 849).

Anti-Samak Protests and Judicial Intervention in September 2008

Fifteen months after the military coup, a civilian government was restored with Samak as the prime minister. Because the TRT was officially dissolved after the coup, Samak formed a new party, the People's Power Party (PPP), which served as the TRT's successor. Yet, the underlying tensions between pro- and anti-Thaksin camps remained. The PAD revived its demonstrations calling for Samak's resignation in late May 2008 (Pongsudhirak 2008, 141–144). It attempted to intensify its protests by sieging several state agencies and occupying the Government House (Pongsudhirak 2008, 144). However, because the former target, Thaksin, had already been exiled, 70 percent of

[53] The TRT assembled its supporters at Sanam Lunag in Bangkok to express their support for the Thaksin government in March 2006 (Pye and Schaffar 2008, 45).

the residents in Bangkok were opposed to attempts to remove the government, and another poll revealed that 90 percent were against it (Ockey 2009, 323). The PAD mobilised only a tenth as many participants as it did at its peak against Thaksin.[54]

When the anti-government movement reached its peak, the Constitutional Court began to intervene in Thai politics. In early September, it threatened Samak by disqualifying him for the premiership because he had violated the constitutional prohibition against outside employment. The Court did not prohibit Samak from running for prime minister again (Ockey 2009, 323). In the face of opposition, however, Samak finally declared he would step down on 12 September (Shibata 2010, 132).

The formal findings indicate why Samak resigned even though the size of protests was smaller than before. The success of PAD's demonstrations against Samak can be attributed to the credible promise to remove threats against him. Based on the results, the Constitutional Court can be considered as a hybrid interventionist because it seriously abused its judicial review power (Tonsakulrungruang 2016). Since Thaksin was in office, the legal background of decisions by the Constitutional Court had sometimes been questionable (Dressel 2010; Tamada 2008). It did hold much discretion over expanding the previous scope of judicial engagement *de facto*. Obviously, however, the judiciary could not serve as the head of government, unlike the army, due to the lack of physical or institutional power to govern a state by itself. If the military had threatened again, Samak could not have been convinced that his concessions would guarantee the removal of a military threat.

[54] It is estimated that 30,000 people participated in the PAD demonstrations against Samak (Ockey 2009, 323).

Anti-Somchai Protests and Judicial Intervention in December 2008

After the resignation of Samak, Somchai took over the premiership. Because he was a member of the PPP and Thaksin's brother-in-law, the change in leadership did not stop the PAD's activities. On the day the new government was to give its policy speech in October, PAD supporters marched on parliament and attempted to hold more than 300 legislators and senators inside the parliament building. The police clashed with the protesters and quelled them with tear gas. Since this incident had been the first severe clash between the PAD protesters and the police, causing two protester deaths and hundreds of injuries, this provoked widespread anti-Somchai sentiment (Ockey 2009, 324). After the march on parliament, the PAD continued sit-ins in the area next to the Government House for six weeks.

Still suffering from low numbers of demonstrators,[55] the PAD decided to strengthen its impact using violence. PAD supporters carried out the seizure of the largest international airport in the country, Suwanabhumi airport, on 25 November. They seized another airport on the following day, declaring that it would continue seizing airports until Somchai resigned. The airport seizures considerably damaged the Thai economy.[56] It was the largest economic decline for the Thai economy in recent history (Ockey 2009, 329). Notwithstanding this, Somchai ended up staying firm, being forcefully removed from office. Compared to the protests against Samak, the anti-Somchai protests were visibly larger in size. According to conventional wisdom, the anti-Somchai protests should have succeeded.

[55] Public support for the PAD slipped to 11 percent (Ockey 2009, 327).
[56] The Bank of Thailand estimated that the cost to the Thai economy equalled 290 billion baht (Shibata 2010, 146–147). Another report estimated that the airport seizure caused a loss of approximately 140 billion baht and 1 million jobs (Ockey 2009, 329).

The formal findings indicate why Somchai refused conceding. They predict that the growth in the PAD's protests would facilitate indiscriminate challenges by a hybrid interventionist, the Constitutional Court. Indeed, while Somchai could do nothing to remedy the damage incurred, the Constitutional Court actively exercised its power to expand its leverage over the Thai political landscape. Although the trials concerning the dissolution of the PPP and two coalition parties for alleged electoral fraud were still in their early stages, the Constitutional Court chose to directly close statements and moved to an immediate decision (Ockey 2009, 327). It dissolved all three parties and prohibited their executive members from participating in politics for the next five years.

This series of judicial interventions lacked a democratic basis. The Court's decision on the dissolution of the PPP and its coalition parties was denounced due to a procedural flaw because Section 237, which concerns the dissolution of political parties, was written so clearly that the Constitutional Court could find it unambiguous (Tonsakulrungruang 2016, 182). While it dissolved the TRT and PPP based on resolutions by the Election Commission, it turned down the Election Commission's request to dissolve the Democrat Party, the largest anti-Thaksin party, in 2010 (Mérieau 2016, 459). Some legal observers found it problematic that in the case of the PPP's dissolution, the Constitutional Court ignored crucial questions about how alleged vote-buying fit into the anti-democratic behaviour outlined in the Political Party Act or how to balance the dissolution of a political party with the constitutionally guaranteed freedom to form a party (Dressel 2010, 683).

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter proposes a new approach to the study of protest consequences. A key feature of this approach is the integration of interventionists who may threaten political

leaders following protests. By formalising interactions between a political leader, an interventionist, and protesters, two causal mechanisms by which protests fail have been elucidated. One mechanism regards insufficient punishment. Regardless of the types of additional threats behind protests, protests fail if they fail to mobilise enough resources. The other mechanism regards the lack of credible promises. Protests can also fail if they fail to credibly promise that threats by interventionists will be withdrawn when concessions are granted. Propelled by the growth of protests, some interventionists may decide to retract their threats even after government concessions are granted to protesters. Thus, the lack of a punishment apparatus for executives makes political leaders less responsive to protesters' demands. Where formal constraints on the chief executive are still under development, the impact of protest threats can be offset.

The findings thus identify a new, important variable for the empirical analysis of protests: Protesters must also commit to rewards and punishments for political leaders to make them more responsive while scholars have disproportionately highlighted mechanisms for coercing government concessions (e.g., Gamson 1975) and mechanisms by which political leaders credibly commit to citizens (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Fearon 1998). The difficulty of empirically engaging a question of when protests can successfully achieve political changes may stem in part from a lack of this perspective. Further empirical analyses should incorporate broader political contexts in which a government and protesters bargain, which would contribute to building a theory of protest consequences in both established and new democracies.

4.8 Appendix

4.8.1. Proofs

Proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2

Solving backwards gives the subgame perfect equilibrium. Given *L*' acceptance, *I* exercises a removal threat if and only if $rx(y - c_I) + (1 - rx)(-c_T) > 0$, which reduces to $r > \frac{c_I}{xy}$. Given *L*'s rejection, in contrast, *I* challenges *L* if and only if $r(y - c_I) + (1 - r)(-c_I) > 0$, which is equivalent to $r > \frac{c_I}{y}$. Since $x \in [0,1)$, $y \in [0,1]$, and $c_I \in (0,1]$ by definition, $\frac{c_I}{y} < \frac{c_I}{xy}$ always holds. Taken together, *I* never challenges when $r \in [0, \frac{c_I}{y}]$, challenges if and only if *L* rejects a protesters' demand when $r \in (\frac{c_I}{y}, \frac{c_I}{xy}]$, and always challenges when $r \in (\frac{c_I}{xy}, 1]$.

Consider *L*'s best responses for three cases. First, given that *I* never exercises a removal threat, *L* accepts x if and only if $x - c_L \geq 1 - r$, which is equivalent to $r \geq 1 - x + c_L$. Second, given that *I* challenges *L* if and only if *L* rejects x, *L* accepts x if and only if $x - c_L \geq r(-r) + (1 - r)(1 - r)$, which reduces to $r \geq \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$. Solving in a similar manner yields *L*'s best response for the third case in which *I* always challenges *L*. *L* accepts x if and only if $r \geq \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$.

Proof for Figure 4.3

Three cutpoints divide *L*'s strategy, and two cutpoints divide *I*'s strategy. The cutpoint configurations affect *L*'s equilibrium strategies. In particular, the location of $\frac{c_I}{xy}$ determines the number of thresholds that divide *L*'s actions in equilibrium. First, suppose $\frac{c_I}{y} < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$, that is, $\frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \leq y \leq 1$. There are three cases to consider: (1) $0 \leq$

$\frac{c_I}{xy} \leq \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$, (2) $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2} < \frac{c_I}{xy} < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$, and (3) $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \leq \frac{c_I}{xy}$. Figure 4.6 delineates the players' equilibrium strategies for each case.

Case 1: $0 \leq \frac{c_I}{y} \leq \frac{1-x+c_L}{2+x}$. Suppose that $0 \leq \frac{c_I}{xy} \leq \frac{1-x+c_L}{2} \Leftrightarrow \frac{2c_I}{x(1-x+c_L)} \leq y$. This inequality always holds when $\frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \leq y \leq 1$ because $\frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \leq \frac{2c_I}{x(1-x+c_L)}$ because $\in [0,1)$ by definition. When $\frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \leq y \leq 1$, as displayed in Figure 4.6(a), L rejects a protesters' demand when $0 \leq r < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$ and accommodates it when $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \leq r \leq 1$. For L's equilibrium action to be divided by this cutpoint, $0 < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$ must hold; otherwise, L always accommodates protesters' demands regardless of protest size. Since $c_L \in (0,1]$ and $x \in [0,1)$ by definition.

Case 2: $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2} < \frac{c_I}{xy} < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$. Suppose that $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2} < \frac{c_I}{xy} < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \Leftrightarrow \frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)} < y < \frac{2c_I}{x(1-x+c_L)}$. This inequality is consistent with $\frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \leq y \leq 1$ when $\frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \leq \frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)} \Leftrightarrow 0 \leq x \leq \sqrt{3}-1$. When y is at intermediate, as shown in Figure 4.6(b), L rejects protesters' offers when $0 \leq r < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$; and L accepts it when $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2} \leq r \leq \frac{c_I}{xy}$; L rejects it when $\frac{c_I}{xy} < r < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$; L accepts it when $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \leq r \leq 1$. For L's equilibrium action to be divided by these three cutpoints, the smallest one, $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$, must be positive. Since $c_L \in (0,1]$, and $x \in [0,1)$ by definition, $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$ is always positive. In this case, thus, L's best response to a protest has a nonmonotonic relationship with the protest size, r.



(a) When *I* has sufficiently democratic preferences (low *y*)



(b) When *I*'s preferences are at the intermediate level (medium *y*)



(c) When *I* has sufficiently dictatorial preferences (low *y*)

Figure 4.6. Player's best responses, supposing that $\frac{c_I}{y} < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$.

Case 3: $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \leq \frac{c_I}{xy}$. Suppose that $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \leq \frac{c_I}{xy} \Leftrightarrow 0 \leq y \leq \frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)}$. Similarly, in this case, the strategy outlined below is optimal when $\frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \leq \frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)} \Leftrightarrow 0 \leq x \leq \sqrt{3}-1$. When y is sufficiently low, as shown in Figure 4.6(a), L rejects a

protesters' offer when $0 \leq r < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$ and accepts it when $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2} \leq r \leq 1$. For this to be in equilibrium, $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$ must be over 0; otherwise, *L* would accommodate protesters' demands any time regardless of protest size. Since $c_I > 0$, $c_L > 0$, and $x \in [0,1)$ by definition, $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2}$is always positive.

Second, suppose $\frac{c_I}{y} > \frac{1-x+c_L}{2} \Leftrightarrow 0 \leq y < \frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L}$. In this case, two cases need to be considered to clarify equilibrium outcomes: (1) $\frac{c_I}{xy} < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$, and (2) $\frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \leq \frac{c_I}{xy}$. This is because $\frac{c_I}{y} > \frac{c_I}{xy}$ never holds because $x \in [0,1)$ by definition.

Case 1: $\frac{c_I}{xy} < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2}$. Suppose that $\frac{c_I}{xy} < \frac{1-x+c_L}{2-x^2} \Leftrightarrow \frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)} \leq y \leq 1$. This inequality is consistent with $0 \leq y < \frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L}$ when holds when $\frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)} < \frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \Leftrightarrow \sqrt{3}-1 < x < 1$. When this holds, *L*'s equilibrium strategy is summarised as follows: *L* rejects protesters' offer when $0 \leq r < \frac{c_I}{y}$, *L* accepts it when $\frac{c_I}{y} \leq r \leq \frac{c_I}{xy}$, *L* rejects it when $\frac{c_I}{xy} < \frac{1-x+c_I}{2-x^2}$, and *L* accepts it when $\frac{1-x+c_I}{2-x^2} \leq r \leq 1$. The minimum cutpoint, $\frac{c_I}{y}$, is always positive by definition, thus *L*'s best response to a protest has a nonmonotonic relationship with the protest size.

Case 2: $\frac{1-x+c_I}{2-x^2} < \frac{c_I}{xy}$. Suppose that $\frac{1-x+c_I}{2-x^2} < \frac{c_I}{xy} \Leftrightarrow 0 \leq y \leq \frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)}$. Similar to the previous case, the strategy below is optimal when $\frac{c_I(2-x^2)}{x(1-x+c_L)} < \frac{2c_I}{1-x+c_L} \Leftrightarrow \sqrt{3}-1 < x < 1$. In this case, *L* rejects protesters' offer when $0 \leq r < \frac{1-x+c_I}{2-x^2}$ and accepts it when $\frac{1-x+c_I}{2-x^2} \leq r \leq 1$. As already proved for Case 1, the minimum cutpoint, $\frac{1-x+c_I}{2-x^2}$, is positive by definition.

Taken the two set of cases together, it is revealed that *L*'s equilibrium action shows the same pattern when $y < \frac{2c_I}{x(1-x+c_L)}$, regardless of the magnitude of x. Therefore, the player's equilibrium strategy can be summarised as Figure 4.3.

4.8.2. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

Assuming that y is *I*'s private information, I solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. All other assumptions remain the same. First, consider *I*'s best response. *I*'s best response is already clarified in the proof of Proposition 4.1: *I* never challenges when $r \in [0, \frac{c_I}{y}]$, challenges if and only if *L* rejects protesters' demand when $r \in (\frac{c_I}{y}, \frac{c_I}{xy}]$, and *I* always challenges when $y \in (\frac{c_I}{xy}, 1]$.

Second, consider *L*'s best response. Since *L* is not known to *I*'s type, *L* determines her strategy by comparing her expected payoffs from accepting and rejecting protesters' demands, that is,

$$EU_L(Accept) = \frac{c_I}{xy}(x - c_L) + \left(1 - \frac{c_I}{xy}\right) rx(-c_L) + (1 - rx)(x - c_L)\},$$

and

$$EU_L(Reject) = \frac{c_I}{y}(1 - r) + \left(1 - \frac{c_I}{y}\right)\{r(-r) + (1 - r)(1 - r)\}.$$

L concedes to protesters if and only if $EU_L(Accept) \geq EU_L(Reject)$, which reduces

$$r \geq \frac{y(1-x+c_I)}{-x^2y+c_Ix+2y-c_I} \equiv r^*.$$

Thus, *L* accommodates protesters' offer if $r \geq$ r* and rejects otherwise.

Next, let me consider the effect of y on the probability of *L*'s acceptance. Suppose that $f(y) = EU_L(Accept) - EU_L(Reject)$, that is,

$$f(y) = \left(-x^2 + \frac{c_I x}{y} + 2 - \frac{c_I}{y}\right) r - 1 + x + c_L.$$

Taking the first derivative of $f(y)$ in terms of y yields

$$\frac{\partial f(y)}{\partial y} = \frac{c_I r(x-1)}{y}.$$

Since $x \in [0,1)$, $\frac{\partial f(y)}{\partial y} < 0$. That is, as y increases, $f(y) > 0$ is less likely to hold, which means that *L* is less likely to accommodate. Consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium, therefore, a greater willingness of *I* to remove *L* restrains *L* from being responsive to protesters' demands.

5. Conclusion

The three preceding chapters in this thesis proposed a theoretical framework for thinking about why some protests succeed while others do not. I emphasised the two related aspects of this question: (1) why some protests with a larger size of resources fail to achieve their political goals while some protests with fewer resources succeed, and (2) what determines the strength of protests as threats to a government. In this chapter, I revisit what this thesis learned, discuss potentially important factors or mechanisms which my formal analyses do not deal with, and consider why such parsimonious formal models still count.

Chapter 2 focuses on the interaction between mobilisation and counter-mobilisation. Using formal models, it reveals that protest group's ability to influence the policymaking process is not necessarily enhanced if a rival protest group exists that may organise counter-protests. If a protest group with huge resources mobilise all those resources to pose a sufficient threat to a government, that threat becomes great enough for a rival group to organise a counter-protest, which may, to some extent, offset the impact of the original protest. My formal findings show that investing resources in organisational infrastructure solves this problem that resourceful groups are more likely to have. By credibly showing that a protest groups has consumed some of its resources in organisational infrastructure that would not immediately turn into a threat to a government, it can commit to the de-radicalisation of its protest tactics. This credible commitment mitigates a rival group's fear that a government may modify their preferred policy and thus provides more bargaining power to the protest group. Accordingly, this chapter offers both the conditions under which the greater mobilisation of resources makes protest more successful and the conditions under which protest groups endogenously organise themselves.

Chapter 3 focuses on the impact of public opinion on violent and nonviolent resistance. It first shows a formal model which decomposes public opinion into public attitudes towards resistance means and ends and argues that the level of public approval of violent means affects dissident groups' choice of resistance tactics and government responsiveness to each type of resistance. Yet, the effect of public opinion on resistance means is conditioned by public opinion on resistance ends. If domestic audiences support a dissident group's goal, that pressures the government into accepting its goal, and the dissident group does not have to rely its source of bargaining power on coercion. If a dissident group's goal receives poor public support, in contrast, the government is less constrained by mass pressure and is less likely to concede regardless of resistance tactics. Given this, the dissident group attempts to complement its poor public support with force. The chapter then quantitatively tests the effect of public opinion on resistance means using a sample of Latin American countries. The chapter also gives two case studies from outside the Latin American region to illustrate that the mechanisms by which public opinion about resistance means and ends differently constrains governments' responsiveness and dissident groups' choice of tactics in an array of context. The findings of this chapter bridge a gap between conventional literature supporting the supremacy of violence and recent literature supporting the supremacy of nonviolence.

Chapter 4 considers third-party intervention behind the scenes of a protest. The classic studies of protest argue that a greater mobilisation of resources enhances the chance of protesters' success. Recent studies, however, have tended to argue that a greater mobilisation of resources makes coups more likely. Given the recent studies, greater effort to mobilise resources may not necessarily benefit protesters because protests that are large enough can make leadership change inevitable and fail to commit

to rewarding political leaders who have conceded. I construct a formal model that captures the diversity of third-party intervention that may threaten political leaders' survival following protests and clarify that the susceptibility of potential interventionists to a growth of protests can improve or undermine protesters' ability to commit to the reward or punishment of political leaders. When a third-party actor is not a power seeker, in other words, when he has democratic preferences, those political leaders are more likely to accommodate protesters' demands because they are certain that the removal threat will be retracted after their concessions. In contrast, when a removal threat is posed by a power-seeking third-party actor, political leaders may rationally accept being removed without conceding because their concession to protesters may not necessarily guarantee the retraction of the removal threat. Such third-party actors' resolve to challenge is more subject to the growth of protests than those with less incentives to improve power. In particular, when a third-party actor is neither democratic nor dictatorial, protest size has a nonmonotonic impact on protest success. This has a substantive interpretation that in transitioning democracies where arbitrary challenges to the chief executive have not been effectively constrained yet, the growth of protest size is less likely to improve the probability of protest success.

Overall, this dissertation contributes to the literature on protest and negotiations by showing that the consequences of protests may not always reflect protest groups' capacity to mobilise resources. The excessive mobilisation of resources can weaken protesters' influence over political leaders' decision making while protest groups seeking relatively small political changes can succeed despite having smaller amount of resources. This means that we cannot measure the strength of protest groups simply by observing the amount of resources mobilised for protest activity or by observing the magnitude of political changes demanded. These findings suggest that empirical

analyses on protests should consider factors that can offset the impact of resources mobilisation by protest groups; otherwise, we may underestimate the effectiveness of resource mobilisaiton or risk demanding more excessive mobilisation of resources for protest success.

As we have seen so far, my theory is highly parsimonious. To highlight mechanisms that I think are significant, I abstracted from many details and other potentially relevant mechanisms. This means that there are alternative approaches to some of the issues I addressed and that I excluded other factors that are potentially important to consider for a complete understanding of protest dynamics.

First, my framework concentrated on protesters' threats as the main driving force that leads to political changes. Changes in policies, political institutions, leadership, and others can occur not only because of negative incentives such as *ex post* punishment but also because of positive incentives and potential benefits. In Chapter 2, I briefly discussed special interest politics. Chapter 2 analysed civil advocacy groups of different levels of organisational development including unstructured protest groups and established pressure groups within the same framework. While Berry (1999, 142) argues that the ways protest groups and interest groups attempt to influence policymaking process are essentially the same and Chapter 2 relies on this, it should be admitted that lobbying on the street and in a room can be substantively different. For example, Austen-Smith (1993) models lobbying as a game of strategic information transmission. Special interest groups tend to have informational advantage over politicians in that they can acquire policy-relevant information that policy-makers may not know. Austen-Smith formally explores the extent to which lobbying by interest groups can be informative and influential. Coate (2004) also assumes, in his analysis of the impact of campaign spending on voters' behaviour, that campaign advertising

that politicians obtain from interest groups is informative about the quality of a candidate. Unstructured protests do not usually have such informational advantages that interest groups have, and therefore interest groups' better chance of successful bargaining may in part be attributed to this informational advantage over a government.

Second, the level of resource mobilisation capacity can be associated with the issue of leadership. Civil groups with more resource mobilisation capacity may have stronger leadership to facilitate coordination between members. Scholars such as Calvert (1995) and Dewan and Myatt (2007, 2008) discuss the significance of leadership to solve coordination problems. In other words, the failure of large-scale protests (Chapter 2, Chapter 4) and violent resistance (Chapter 3) might be attributed to their leaders' failure to monitor the behaviour of participants, leading to the occurrence of violent campaigns. Of course, not all violent campaigns are the result of leadership failure. Admittedly, some protest groups failed to monitor their participants and unintentionally became violent. As mentioned in Chapter 3, learning from their previous lapse into violent clashes, the leaders of the Orange Revolution achieved their goal with peaceful tactics in 2004. Although we believe that the major pattern of protest consequences cannot be explained only by this alternative explanation, the strength of leadership is a potentially complementary approach.

Another factor omitted from my analysis but clearly of central importance to understanding the consequences of protests is the variations of government. A large theoretical and empirical literature highlights the differences between different types of political institutions and of democracies: for example, democracies versus autocracies, and presidential versus parliamentary democracies (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Lijphart 1999). Although the magnitude of costs a government has to pay in conceding is incorporated in my formal models as reduced form expressions, the

more interesting approach is to relate the costs to the more detailed structure of political institutions. This also applies to Chapter 3, whose formal model gives a simple binary option－ accept or reject a campaign group's offer－ to a government. Authoritarian leaders may have options that democratic leaders usually do not such as repression. Incorporating the variation in political institutions is an important step for future formal work.

Nonetheless, we always face a trade-off between applicability and actuality. Simple formal models tend to have higher applicability to similar problems in different situations but are insensitive to factors that are unique to individual cases. While the formal models of this dissertation do not fully capture empirical complexity concerning protest dynamics, I believe their simplicity allows for application to future empirical work.

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