On chiefs and peace:

Examining the role of traditional governance in sub-Saharan African conflict dynamics

by

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Summary

What role do traditional governance structures play in countries' internal peace and conflict dynamics? While dominant approaches in conflict studies understand governance mainly through the lenses of state capacities, governance scholars have increasingly payed attention to non-state governance structures. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, traditional governance structures, e.g. traditional and indigenous leadership, chieftaincies, kings and headmen, are de facto relevant in providing governance and exercising political influence alongside and beyond the state. This thesis expands research on hybrid governance by examining comparatively how traditional forms of governance influence sub-Saharan African conflict dynamics. I argue that in order to understand this relationship, we need to discern the variation in the institutional context and internal composition of traditional institutions.

Three chapters build on and develop this theoretical approach: The first chapter focuses on the institutional interaction between the state and traditional governance. The chapter builds a typology of this interaction and demonstrates that a country's intrastate peace stands on a firmer ground when the state accommodates and integrates traditional governance structures. The second chapter zooms into local political dynamics and analyses the way contested traditional authority structures fuel local unrest by increasing grievances and providing opportunities to mobilise against the incumbent authorities. The third chapter maintains the disaggregated approach and looks at how local strength of customary institutions influences the vulnerability of a locality to armed violence against civilians.

The thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of governance and conflict dynamics by 1) placing theoretical focus on the conditions shaping the contemporary role of traditional governance, 2) deploying novel data on traditional governance structures in sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa in particular, and 3) analysing the relationship between traditional governance and conflict at multiple levels of analysis.

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1. Introduction

This thesis examines the role of traditional governance in countries' internal peace and conflict dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa.[1] Specifically, it focuses on traditional authorities as rational political actors that have considerable governance and mobilisation potential. Key readings of Mamdani (1996), Ntsebeza (2005), Englebert (2002b, 2002a), Sklar (1999), Baldwin (2015), and others shed light on the broad political influence that traditional governance can have alongside the modern state. They also point to considerable ambiguity and variation in the societal implications of traditional authorities. However, the conditions leading to this variation in the role of traditional governance remain less explored. Moreover, thus far little comparative research has studied the political influence of traditional governance with regard to countries' internal peace and conflict dynamics.[2] Therefore, this dissertation investigates the varying empirical conditions under which traditional governance structures influence contemporary societies and the way these shape peace and conflict dynamics.

To illustrate the complexity of the subject, consider South Africa (the country of focus in the third chapter). There are over 800 chieftaincies and approximately dozen kingships in the post-apartheid South Africa. These governance structures continue to shape both local and national politics (Oomen, 2005; LiPuma and Koelble, 2009; de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). Moreover, chiefs and headmen are often vital in a

[1] As clarified later in this introduction, traditional governance is understood as institutions, rules, and authorities that derive their legitimacy from communities' context-specifically constructed customs and norms, rather than from the modern state. See Holzinger, Kern, and Kromrey (2016) for a literature overview.

[2] Wig (2016) and Wig and Kromrey (2018) stand out as exceptions in this regard. Yet their focus is on hierarchical versus decentralised precolonial legacies in traditional governance structures while this dissertation captures contemporary systematic variation in traditional governance.

range of governance issues from land allocation to resolving theft, as reported by focus group participants during my field research in the country.[3] Yet even more pronounced than the relevance of traditional governance are the ambiguities attached to its role. On the one hand, the state has formally accommodated traditional authorities and considers them crucial for local development. On the other hand, empirical accounts of traditional authorities in some parts of the country highlight the corrupted and conflict-inducing nature of individual chiefs and kings (Ntsebeza, 2005; Mnwana, 2015b). Depending on with whom one is talking or which accounts one reads, traditional governance structures are portrayed as either corrupted, irrelevant, instrumental for peace, or detrimental for democracy.

It is this variation in the narratives concerning traditional governance in South Africa and more broadly in sub-Saharan Africa that forms the general puzzle for this thesis. An underlying argument that this thesis makes is that rather than their mere presence having a positive or negative effect on peace, the influence of traditional governance is more complex. One needs to consider which internal and external conditions shape the forms that traditional governance takes in contemporary societies and how this affects peace and conflict. In this thesis I identify and examine three of those conditions, each of which I focus on individually in the three chapters that form the collarbone of this thesis. First, I examine the institutionalised interaction between traditional governance and the state, i.e. whether and how the state recognises traditional authority. Second, I focus on the internal structural aspects of traditional authorities, namely whether they are contested. Third, I analyse the strength of traditional institutions, understood as their legitimacy and efficiency. In the dissertation

[3] See chapter 3 and its Appendix A3.11 for more information on the conducted interviews and focus group discussions in South Africa, in April-June 2017.

I demonstrate that these conditions shape the way traditional governance structures affect internal conflict dynamics.

This dissertation is motivated by the aims of 1) taking traditional governance theoretically and empirically seriously in conflict models, 2) disentangling the conditions that shape the way traditional governance structures influence peace and conflict dynamics, and 3) contributing to comparative research concerning the societal effects of different constellations of hybrid governance. As will be shortly clarified, employing the lenses of hybrid governance, i.e. acknowledging the simultaneous presence of multiple state and non-state governance structures and actors, is vital for understanding contemporary governance realities in the context of sub-Saharan Africa.

This dissertation contributes to the study of conflict and governance by demonstrating that 1) traditional governance structures can have considerable influence on national and subnational conflict dynamics, and 2) this influence depends on the institutional context and internal composition of these structures, rather than their mere presence. Furthermore, the dissertation accumulates understanding of processes and consequences of elite interactions and the relationship between state and non-state governance in general. With regard to this the dissertation constructs and presents new data on the contemporary traditional governance structures and their institutional context in sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa in particular. This thesis also contributes to a growing awareness of local institutions and how these shape conflict processes. This is done by tackling the research problem at three levels of analysis: first, by comparing countries' intrastate peace at a national level; second, by investigating low-intensity conflict outbreaks at a local level, and third by analysing the realities of local communities in an armed conflict context. Before outlining the chapters more carefully, I will proceed to motivate the thematic focus on traditional

governance and conflict, clarify the main concepts, and outline the overarching theoretical framework adapted in each chapter.

1.1.(Hybrid) governance and peace and conflict dynamics

Governance capacity[4] strongly influences countries' internal peace and conflict dynamics. Thus far, research on this governance-conflict nexus has focused on the political, coercive, administrative, and economic capacities of the state (Hegre *et al.*, 2001; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Hendrix, 2010; Hegre and Nygård, 2015). The efficiency and integrity of a state's bureaucratic and administrative apparatus, the stability of its political institutions, and the quality of its rule of law are seen as particularly critical for the prospects of peaceful societal relations. With regard to intrastate peace, stable and consolidated bureaucratic and political institutions are seen to alleviate both motivations and opportunities to rebel against the state. In turn, weak governance capacities are seen to endanger civil peace and heighten the risk of organised political violence (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Hegre and Nygård, 2015). Whether through increasing the lucrativeness of joining an armed group or through eroding the capacity of the state to quell an emerging insurgency, regions and countries with limited state capacity are found to have relatively high risk of internal armed struggles. Locally, efficient governance institutions are seen to mitigate the adverse effects of other conflict-inducing factors, such as extreme weather patterns, and to help maintain a subnational region more secure from inter-communal

[4] Governance capacity is understood as the capacity to enforce public order and provide public services, such as judicial and socio-economic services. As discussed in this introduction, while often connected solely to the state, governance is often provided by multiple state and non-state actors.

and other types of political violence (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2015; De Juan and Wegner, 2017; Witmer *et al.*, 2017).

The comparative research on state governance capacity and conflict has generated crucial insights on how states' central and local institutions influence conflict vulnerability. Yet this strong focus on the modern state and its apparatus has saved little attention to other critical dimensions of governance realities in the contemporary nation-state. Particularly in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa there are multiple governance actors and structures, e.g. traditional authorities, that the existing measures of state capacity do not easily capture. It is here where the state emerged through a complex interplay between colonial and pre-colonial institutions and where the state's administrative and bureaucratic capacities remain symptomatically limited (Mengisteab, 2017a). Concepts such as *hybrid political order*, *mediated state*, or *governance without government* have arose to better grasp the empirical reality in polities where multiple non-state and informal institutions govern alongside, within, or beyond the modern state (Menkhaus, 2008; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008; Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2011). Notably, these 'other' governance structures vary in their capacities, historical trajectories, and relations to the state and therefore induce differing governance realities both within and across countries.

Building on this notion of governance hybridity, this dissertation adopts a broad understanding of governance as 'the various institutionalised modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, and/or to provide collective goods' (Börzel, Risse and Draude, 2018, p. 8). Governance can be and is performed by a multitude of state and non-state actors whose relative capacities and interactions differ over time and space (Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009; Mac Ginty,

2011; Risse, 2012; Krasner and Risse, 2014; Meagher, de Herdt and Titeca, 2014; Richmond, 2014). Notably, the concept of non-state actors is not to be equated here solely with actors aiming to replace or challenge the state (e.g. non-state armed groups). In this thesis non-state actors refer to governance agents, e.g. traditional chiefs, that have their origins outside the state's apparatus but that co-exist with the state, often supporting and even cooperating with it. The concept of hybridity, then, refers to the nature of governance as constituted by various institutionalised modes of social coordination that include but are not limited to the formal state structures.[5]

Some form of governance hybridity takes place even in the most consolidated Weberian states (Mac Ginty, 2011; Börzel, Risse and Draude, 2018). However, from a peace and conflict studies perspective, recognising the hybridity or mixed nature of governance is particularly important in countries where the state is weak, that is in the context of limited statehood (Sklar, 1999; Herbst, 2000; Hagmann and Péclard, 2010; Meagher, 2012; Fearon, 2013). Following Börzel, Risse, and Draude (2018, p. 5) limited statehood refers to areas 'in which central authorities (governments) lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which they do not command a legitimate monopoly over the means of violence'. Within this framework a vast majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are defined as either limited or extremely limited in their statehood. As the state lacks the capacity to quell violent expressions of grievances and mobilisation, areas of limited statehood are considered to be at a higher risk of organised political violence (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Fearon, 2013; De Juan and Pierskalla, 2015).

[5] For a discussion on hybridity in peace and conflict dynamics, see Mac Ginty (2011) and Boege, Brown, and Clements (2009). Some authors define hybridity explicitly as the co-governance of liberal and illiberal institutions (Jarstad and Belloni, 2012). While traditional governance structures can be considered illiberal, I refrain from attaching any labels on the nature of the governance forms present in hybrid polities and rather focus on empirically capturing these.

Nevertheless, as the concept of hybridity allows us to acknowledge, countries with limited statehood can still differ considerably with regard to their governance capacities. Recognising the difference between statehood and governance enables one to see that state weakness does not necessarily equal failure of governance. Instead, the overall governance capacities in hybrid political orders depend on the interactions and different constellations of local, national, and sometimes also international forms of governance (Mac Ginty, 2013; Lee, Walter-Drop and Wiesel, 2014). Influencing the quality and effectiveness of governance, non-state actors and structures should be able to influence the grievances and opportunities that give rise to conflict and violence. A growing number of studies investigate the role of non-state actors, namely traditional and religious leaders, in shaping inter-group dynamics and conflict outcomes, particularly at a communal level (De Juan, Pierskalla and Vüllers, 2015; Wig, 2016; Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017; Wig and Kromrey, 2018). This thesis contributes to this research field by focusing on the contemporary variation in the internal dynamics and institutional context of traditional governance and the influence of this on both national and local conflict dynamics. In doing so, this thesis strives to contribute to a more empirically grounded understanding of the nexus between governance capacities and conflict.

1.2.Traditional governance

The societal influence of traditional authorities – such as chiefs, queens/kings, and headmen – and institutions and norms – such as kinship rules, conflict resolution practices, and land management institutions – has gained considerable scholarly interest amid the broader trend to approach African governance and political

institutions as hybrid.[6] Two perspectives can be identified in the previous literature concerning the role of traditional governance alongside the state. On the one hand, traditional governance structures are seen as essential components of hybrid political orders, often more salient in the everyday governance than the state structures (Williams, 2010; Baldwin, 2015; Mengisteab, 2017c). Rather than approaching traditional governance structures as necessarily incompatible with the modern state and democratisation, this perspective emphasises the intermediary role of traditional governance between the state and its citizens (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Baldwin, 2015; Klick, 2016). On the other hand, some scholars see the continued salience of traditional governance as part of the problem of a weak state in sub-Saharan Africa. This perspective views the influence of traditional authorities as a continuum of despotic rule that erodes political accountability and stands in the way of democratisation (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005).

These competing frameworks can be extended to the existing literature on the influence of traditional governance on peace and conflict dynamics. Traditional governance structures are on the one hand found to facilitate bargaining processes within and between communities, thus supporting nonviolent resolution of conflicts (Krause, 2018; Wig and Kromrey, 2018). However, research also suggests that traditional authorities can serve to increase local grievances and decentralise political conflict (Bennett, Ainslie and Davis, 2013; Mnwana, 2015b; Boone, 2017). Pertinent in much of the previous research is an underlying assumption of the effects of traditional governance as somewhat static across contexts and groups, either as positive or negative with regard to the wider societies. This dissertation seeks to respond to a

[6] For a general overview of the literature, see Holzinger, Kern, and Kromrey (2016). For recent comparative studies on the societal effects of traditional governance structures, see Goist and Kern (2018), Baldwin and Mvukiyehe (2015), and Henn (2018).

demand for more nuanced empirical research that examines how different constellations of contemporary traditional governance structures alongside the state influence overall governance and outcomes of peace and conflict at different levels of analysis.

Defining traditional governance and authority

The term traditional governance is defined here as modes of governance that derive their legitimacy from historically and context-specifically constructed, albeit altered sociocultural customs (Ubink, 2008; Muriaas, 2011; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016). Traditional institutions can be understood as non-state in that they are highly institutionalised and guide social interactions without originating from the formal, state-codified system. Notably, this does not prevent traditional governance institutions from being recognised by and integrated into the state's formal system, as shown in chapter 2. Nevertheless, even when integrated into the formal state structures, the mode of legitimisation of traditional governance remains distinct from the state. Further, even though traditional forms of governance often have their roots in precolonial forms of political organisation, traditional governance is not static but susceptible to change. The contemporary forms of traditional governance are constantly re-invented and adapted in a specific political context (Englebert, 2002b; Tieleman and Uitermark, 2018). It follows that the core attribute in the definition is the identification of governance institutions as traditional rather than the ability to trace back the current institutions to the historical origins of the tradition (Ubink, 2008; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016; Tieleman and Uitermark, 2018). The identification of an institution as traditional concerns both the actors performing an institution perceived as traditional and others making sense of it.

This dissertation focuses empirically on the institution of traditional authority, i.e. authority that derives its legitimation ultimately from context-specifically constructed customs and norms and that is identified first as traditional rather than as state-based.[7] Traditional authorities considered in this thesis include chiefs and headmen (headmen are usually below chiefs in leadership ranks), kings, queens, and principal traditional leaders (the highest rank traditional authorities), as well as structures such as traditional leadership councils. The rationale behind the focus on traditional authorities stems from their pivotal role in implementing and enforcing customary rule and practices as the actors entrusted with authority within traditionally organised communities (Baldwin, 2015). I identify two sets of attributes that are critical in the conceptualisation of traditional authorities. First, I maintain that traditional authority is separable from albeit interrelated with the state, that it bases its legitimacy in customs, and that it is de facto relevant in the political organisation of societal groups in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, traditional authorities are rational and inherently political actors that, like other political actors, can have incentives to act in accountable or unaccountable ways.

As defined above, traditional authority is primarily justified on the grounds of customs and political organisation of an indigenous, ethnic, or native group rather than the social contract between a state and its citizens. The evolution of state – particularly through colonialism –, parallel to the political organisation of indigenous groups, made traditional authority 'traditional' (Mamdani, 1996; ECA, 2007). That the institution of

[7] As with traditional governance more broadly, I recognise traditional authorities as traditional even if they are formally recognised by the state, as long as they are perceived as traditional by their subjects, themselves, and the state empowering them. The definition here highlights the identification of something (and someone) as traditional (see Förster and Koechlin, 2018). This is also somewhat different from conceptualisations that see the institution of traditional authority to have lost its legitimacy (and customary basis) upon any co-option or empowering by the state (see Mamdani 1996). Traditional authorities can be state-empowered authorities without the institution losing its significance.

traditional authority resonates particularly strongly in countries with a history of European colonialism is no coincidence then, even when traditional governance is found across the world. The colonial period significantly shaped the subsequent role of traditional authority. It stripped existing authorities their autonomy by imposing an over-arching state structure on different groups, but it also often deployed traditional authority structures in governing the nascent states (Mamdani, 1996; Englebert, 2000; Beall and Ngonyama, 2009). As chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, different colonial legacies with regard to the interaction between traditional authority structures and the state remain visible today.

I approach traditional authorities as inherently political and not necessarily uniform actors. As representatives of communities whose customs their legitimacy ultimately builds upon traditional authorities can have strong incentives to safeguard the interests of their subjects in order to avoid grievances and negative repercussions against themselves. Simultaneously, traditional authorities can also have incentives to act in unaccountable and self-interested ways in their efforts to maintain political power and privileges. Underlying both scenarios is an assumption of the rational and political nature of traditional authorities (de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). Furthermore, traditional authorities are not uniform actors either across groups or within communities (Englebert, 2000). There are different types of traditional authority structures – hierarchical versus decentralized – and traditional authorities differ in terms of their internal cohesion and the influence and legitimacy they enjoy among their subjects. This dissertation pays special attention to this variation in the internal cohesion and local strength in explaining the role of traditional authorities in shaping local peace and stability.

Finally, a note on the terminology. The terms traditional and customary governance are often used inter-changeably within the field of political science.[8] Nevertheless, there are some differences in the connotation of these two terms that deserve a short discussion. Specifically, the term traditional is sometimes avoided for its reference to a long-established and even static or linearly developed institution. For example Boone (2017) refers to neo-customary leaders, with the emphasis on the changed nature of the institution. Also Hobsbawm (2012) draws a clear separation between the two terms and argues that while tradition is invariant customary is inherently variant.

Despite its challenges, this thesis adopts the term traditional as the mode term to refer to governance institutions that draw their legitimacy from customs of societal groups rather than from the state. The term traditional is widely used both by academics and public officials in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, as the conceptualisation in this introduction clarified the term is not taken to signify a static, unaltered institution. However, in chapter 4 I draw from a broader discussion on civilians' collective agency in conflicts and adopt the term customary institutions in an effort to emphasise the multitude of civilians' local institutions that are based on customs and that shape the way armed actors interact with civilians.

Traditional authority in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond

As Holzinger et al. (2018) demonstrate, traditional governance and authority structures are not unique to the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Traditional authorities are

[8] For example, Wig (2016, Wig and Kromrey, 2018) uses the term customary authorities to refer to the same political actors as the term traditional authorities in this dissertation.

persistent among indigenous groups in North and South America and other continents as well. For example, the Sámi in northern Europe (Finland, Sweden and Norway) adhere to traditional governance (Persson, Harnesk and Islar, 2017). While naming of these institutions differs from traditional and customary to indigenous or tribal, the differences remain semantical as long as the mode of legitimacy builds around context-specific and historical customs that are identified as separate from the state or other alien structures.

Nevertheless, this thesis restricts its empirical scope to traditional governance and traditional authorities in sub-Saharan Africa. This decision is partially pragmatic and driven by constrains in data collection process. More importantly, there are two interrelated factors that make focus on the continent justified. First, sub-Saharan Africa is identified as a region that is particularly prone to violent conflict; five out of ten most conflict-ridden countries between 1989 and 2017 are located in the region (Petterson and Eck, 2018). It is important to study variation in governance and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa as its challenges with weak state institutions and for example climate change will likely induce further vulnerabilities in the future (Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Ansorg, 2014; Witmer *et al.*, 2017). Second, and interrelatedly, the limited statehood in the region makes the study of the effects of non-state governance structures such as traditional governance structures especially important. As previous literature on the influence of traditional authority structures in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates, traditional authorities play critical roles in land management, conflict resolution, and public administration of rural communities across sub-Saharan Africa, and they can yell considerable influence in national political arena (Beall and Ngonyama, 2009; Tronvoll and Hagmann, 2012; de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). The geographical and demographic relevance of traditional governance is also

particularly clear in sub-Saharan Africa where communities that maintain some form of traditional governance form majorities (Holzinger *et al.*, 2018).[9]

1.3.Peace and conflict

This thesis is interested in how traditional governance influences peace and conflict dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. As commonly used concepts, both peace and conflict require some clarification. Starting with the latter, conflict is understood as the presence of an incompatibility over an issue at stake between (at least) two adversaries (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005, p. 27). While conflicts can and often are interpersonal, the focus here is on conflicts that can be understood as political in that they involve parties mobilised around an incompatible political issue. Furthermore, excluding conventional political competition, I am interested in conflicts that involve the use of contentious and nonconventional means, particularly the use of political violence (Bosi and Malthaner, 2015).

In chapters 2 and 4, this thesis is interested in countries' internal armed conflicts. The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) defines armed conflict as a 'contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths' (Gleditsch *et al.*, 2002, pp. 618–619). For an armed conflict to be considered countries' internal, one of the parties needs to represent the state actor in the country while the other party is a formally organised non-state armed group (see Gleditsch *et al.*, 2002; Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). In chapter 2, I am interested in comparing the risk of onset of

[9] Again, this does not mean that traditional governance would be irrelevant outside this particular context. The conclusions discuss the relevance of the findings outside sub-Saharan Africa.

intrastate armed conflict, that is the onset of a country's internal armed conflict as defined above. In chapter 4, rather than estimating conflict onset, I examine the determinants of the use of violence against civilians in an armed conflict context (see Fjelde, Hultman and Sollenberg, 2016).

While chapters 2 and 4 define conflict perhaps more conventionally as the use of armed force either between rebel and government groups or by these against civilians, chapter 3 stretches the notion of conflict to include non-lethal and less organised means of political violence and conflict. Specifically, chapter 3 studies a more vertical conflict between informally organised constituents and their local administration (which in this case comprises of both state and traditional authorities). Here incompatibilities refer to perceived malfunctioning of the local governance institutions or injustices in the local authority-society relations and become expressed in protest and riot activity that targets the local state (Alexander, 2010; De Juan and Wegner, 2017). Admittedly, the chapter somewhat distances us from political violence both with regard to conflict intensity and in terms of the organised nature of groups involved in conflict. However, the chapter still deals with conflict processes, as the phenomena of interest consists of contentious and nonconventional means of striving one's political cause (involving often also the use of non-lethal violence).

These definitions of conflict bear important implications for our understanding of peace. This thesis is mainly interested in the maintenance and failure of negative peace, i.e. the absence of direct forms of violence (Galtung, 1969). Notably, the concept of peace could also be extended to include positive peace; the realisation of social justice, and the absence of structural violence (e.g. structures that impede welfare, equality, and development) (ibid.). It is important to recognise the observable implications of these two forms of peace: the absence of violent conflict does not equal

the realisation of positive peace. This means that any attempt to infer how traditional governance structures influence countries' positive peace based on this dissertation (especially chapters 2 and 4) would be misleading. This is particularly important to acknowledge since, as implied in chapters 2 and 3, traditional governance in specific institutional context can have a systematic positive influence on negative peace at the intrastate level but still contribute to existing social injustices (failure of positive peace) at the local level. That said, failures of negative peace are often related to problems with positive peace, as the underlying grievances behind an outbreak of a conflict can be thought to imply some failure of positive peace (Hegre *et al.*, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Nevertheless, the theorised effects of different constellations of traditional governance on the absence or presence of negative peace should not be conflated with their effects on realisation of positive peace.

Furthermore, it should be noted that this thesis approaches countries' internal (negative) peace as multi-layered, exhibiting different realities depending on the approach taken towards aggregation or disaggregation of the analysis. Peace measured as the absence of a violent conflict between organised state and non-state armed groups might not translate to peace (either negative or positive) at a subnational level, and vice versa. Theoretical and methodological advancements, including the development of georeferenced data projects and geocoded information systems in general, have enabled a more disaggregated approach countries' internal conflict and the institutions shaping it (Raleigh *et al.*, 2010; Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Raleigh and Linke, 2018). I build on the insights of this research agenda in all three chapters focused on different levels of countries' internal conflicts.

1.4.Theoretical argument

This dissertation approaches conflict as a function of existing grievances and opportunities that give rise to overt challenges against the political status quo. The basic theoretical premise of this thesis is – given the hybrid nature of governance in sub-Saharan Africa – that traditional governance structures can influence both of these dimensions giving rise to conflict and violence. More importantly, however, this thesis proposes that the way traditional governance influences the prospects for peace and conflict is conditional on the institutional context in which traditional governance structures find themselves as well as their internal dynamics and strength at the local level. These dimensions shape both the concrete governance capacities and political influence embedded in traditional governance as well as the rationale of traditional authorities.

As outlined earlier in this introduction, traditional governance structures – and particularly traditional authorities – are argued to have considerable mobilisation and political influence. Studies demonstrate (in growing volume) the practical importance of traditional authority structures for the outcomes of development interventions (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Klick, 2016) and general economic development (Englebert, 2000; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014). Moreover, studies show the continuing adherence of communities to traditional authorities and institutions (Logan, 2009, 2013). Indeed, traditional authorities are found to have considerable mobilisation power among the people that adhere to traditional governance structures (de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018; Goist and Kern, 2018). As rational actors trying to advance their own interests, traditional authorities can use this mobilisation potential and render it into political influence. Previous research finds traditional governance to be particularly pertinent in rural areas, mobilising people and

providing crucial public goods and services in areas such as land management and dispute resolution (ECA, 2007; de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). More recent research further acknowledges that traditional governance structures are not trivial in more urban areas either (Mengisteab, 2017b; Tieleman and Uitermark, 2018).

However, the way this practical relevance and political mobilisation power of traditional governance demonstrates itself should not be approached as static or invariable across contexts (or over time to that matter). While the presence of traditional governance is ubiquitous in sub-Saharan Africa, it differs in regard to its institutional interaction with the state (chapter 2), its historically modified unity (chapter 3), and the strength it has within a specific subnational area (chapter 4). These conditions induce variation that helps us understand the complex role that traditional governance structures take in countries' internal peace and conflict dynamics.

First, the institutional context of traditional governance structures can enable or hinder their contribution to the overall governance capacities and make them more or less inclined to use their political influence in support or against the central state. While the state is often limited in its own capacities to provide effective governance, it nevertheless remains the primary rules-setting actor with regard to the structures and actors participating in de facto governance. It follows that the state's approach to traditional governance institutions influences the way traditional governance can be practiced. Simultaneously, however, the way traditional governance structures can function influences the overall governance capacities and the mobilisation opportunities among the population.

When traditional governance structures exist in parallel to the state – without any institutional recognition of their role – the concrete governance capacities of traditional governance structures are less likely to benefit the state's efforts to govern. This is

because the two forms of governance perform in parallel without any guarantees of coordination and cooperation. Moreover, traditional authorities embedded in this context are less bound to the state and therefore less obliged to support it. In fact, being left out of the state-recognised governance framework can induce grievances among traditional authorities and make them adversarial towards the central state. In contrast, accommodation of traditional governance structures alongside the state can facilitate coordination on the ground between the limited state structures and traditional forms of governance. More so, the state's positive approach to traditional authority can convince traditional authorities to support the central state by giving them stakes in maintaining state stability.

As chapter 2 demonstrates, there are different ways the institutional context of traditional governance can be set in a state's constitutional framework, thus creating different state–traditional governance interactions. I argue that this variation has implications for intrastate peace via the mechanisms of shaping the overall governance capacities and inducing mobilisation in support or against the central state. I propose that intrastate peace can be expected to stand on a firmer ground when a (limited) state accommodates traditional governance structures and facilitates concrete governance coordination and cooperation between the state and traditional authorities. By leaving traditional governance structures outside the constitutional framework the state risks to alienate traditional authorities from its grip and lose their concrete governance capacities.

However, the theorised positive implications of this type of institutional context for traditional governance are not expected to automatically spread from an intrastate level to a local level. In fact, outsourcing of governance functions to territorial authorities such as traditional leaders can decentralise political tensions and direct these

against the local rather than central authorities (Claassens, 2011; Boone, 2014). This dissertation argues that when studying the role of state-recognised traditional governance structures at the local level, one needs to consider the internal cohesion of the traditional governance structures being accommodated.

Specifically, chapter 3 explores how internally contested traditional authority structures can decrease the accountability and efficacy of the local administration – in particular when traditional governance structures are state-recognised. The incumbent traditional leaders that are contested have stronger incentives to act in a way that maximises their own private interests even if this means acting in an unaccountable way towards their communities. This weakens the quality of governance at the local level by fostering inter-elite alliance and elite capture of public goods. Simultaneously, the contested nature of traditional leadership induces mobilisation potential against the current local power holders, as the contesting authority candidates are incentivised to mobilise against each other. These processes increase local grievances and opportunities that give rise to outbursts of local unrest. Thus, while the theorised influence of institutionally accommodated traditional governance structures on intrastate peace is positive, at the local level this institutionalised hybridity can ultimately contribute to conflict-inducing processes.

A third element considered in more detail in this dissertation is variation in the local strength of traditional authorities, understood as their efficiency and their legitimacy among their subjects. Even more directly than the two other conditions, this dimension reflects the concrete governance capacities and mobilisation potential of traditional governance on the ground. This thesis considers the strength of traditional authorities in all chapters. However, I place special emphasis on its variation in chapter 4 when investigating the spatial variation in violence against civilians in armed

conflicts. The general importance of local strength of traditional authority can become accentuated during times of violent conflict, when the state's capacities to provide order and maintain social cohesion are evermore undermined. Specifically, I argue that while the mobilisation potential and the concrete capacities of efficient and legitimate traditional authorities are generally beneficial for local communities during civil conflicts, they attract strategic civilian victimisation as a means to weaken local alternatives to armed groups' control.

1.5.Outline of the dissertation

The three main chapters employ the theoretical premises set in this introduction and examine how traditional governance influences peace and conflict dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter 2 extends the literature on countries' intrastate peace by bringing in the role of traditional governance in estimating the risk of conflict onset. Departing from the binary debate of positive versus negative implications of traditional governance, I argue that the effect on national peace is dependent on the type of institutionalised interaction between the state and traditional governance. Building on previous research on hybrid governance, I construct a typology of state-traditional governance interaction and build a theoretical framework on the expected implications of concordant and discordant interactions. A statistical analysis of sub-Saharan African countries supports my theoretical argument that concordant interaction in the form of integration of traditional authorities into the public administration fosters peace. Accommodation of traditional authorities can strengthen the concrete governance capacities and buy in the minimal support of traditional authorities. The results also highlight the significance of colonial legacies in influencing countries' intrastate peace and the role of traditional governance structures. Aside its theoretical contribution, the

chapter contributes to empirical knowledge of hybrid governance structures more generally by introducing new data on state-traditional authority interaction in sub-Saharan Africa.

In chapter 3 I focus on South Africa, a country characterised by institutional hybridity (e.g. accommodation of traditional authorities). I zoom into the subnational level where, I argue, internal dynamics of a traditional authority structure should make a difference. Challenging the notion that competition over political power increases accountability, I suggest that internally contested traditional authority structures struggle with weakened accountability and credibility. This, again, leads to increased grievances and opportunities that give rise to protests against the local administration. I test the theoretical framework through a statistical analysis of South Africa's municipalities, using new data on the contested versus uncontested nature of traditional authorities and local protest data. The results support the theoretical claims: municipalities with contested traditional authority structures have experienced higher protest rates. The theoretical mechanisms are further explored using qualitative data from semi-structured interview and focus group discussions in South Africa. The chapter contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the local political dynamics in contexts where traditional leaders yield public authority alongside the local state. The chapter also highlights the spatial variation in local authority structures, which have their roots in historical continuities and discontinuities of local forms of governance.

Chapter 4 maintains the disaggregated focus but moves to examine governance dynamics during periods of armed conflicts. Contributing to and extending the literature on wartime governance institutions, this chapter examines the effects of customary institutional strength on civilian victimisation during intrastate conflicts. Thus far, the focus of the wartime governance literature has been on the emerging rebel

governance structures as a result of different types of local institutions. My interest is in the outcome of violence against civilians as a function of the strength of existing customary institutions, e.g. traditional authority structures. Specifically, I posit that the mobilisation potential and capacity to govern more effectively renders localities with strong customary institutions more threatening and harder to co-opt from the perspective of armed groups. This leads to increased use of one-sided violence in the area. I use the newly geocoded Afrobarometer survey data to capture the strength of traditional authorities and use multivariate statistical analyses to estimate the relationship between this measure and one-sided violence in a locality. The results indicate that non-state armed groups use one-sided violence in areas with relatively strong traditional authority structures. The chapter demonstrates the significance of civilian agency in shaping armed groups' strategies during conflict. While making communities generally more cohesive and resilient, strong customary institutions can make a locality increasingly vulnerable to violent targeting by groups that wish to weaken their enemies.

Finally, chapter 5 returns to the main theoretical discussions and the empirical findings of the dissertation. It identifies the contribution of the dissertation, discusses the main limitations in this research project, and suggests areas of future research.

2. Including chiefs, maintaining peace? Examining the effects of state–traditional governance interaction on civil peace in sub-Saharan Africa

2.1.Abstract

The continued influence of traditional governance in sub-Saharan Africa has sparked increasing attention among scholars exploring the role of non-state and quasi-state forms of governance in the modern state. However, little attention has been given to cross-country and over-time variation in the interaction between state and traditional governance structures, particularly in regard to its implications for intrastate peace. This chapter examines the conditions under which traditional governance contributes to state capacity to maintain peace. The chapter argues that the type of institutional interaction between the state and traditional authority structures influences a country's overall governance dynamics and its capacity to maintain peace. By combining new data on state–traditional authorities' interaction in sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2012 with intrastate armed conflict data, I conduct a systematic comparative analysis of whether concordant state–traditional authorities' interaction strengthens peace. The empirical results support the argument that integrating traditional authorities into the public administration lowers the risk of armed conflict in comparison to when they remain unrecognised by the state. Moreover, the analysis suggests that the added value of this type of interaction is conditional on the colonial history of a country.[10]

[10] A version of this chapter is published in the Journal of Peace Research, 2019, 56(2).

2.2.Introduction

State capacity is found to be among the key components contributing to the maintenance or collapse of intrastate peace (Hegre *et al.*, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010). Existing research has focused on examining state governance capacities (e.g. economic, bureaucratic and administrative) as well as their formal political institutions and ability to coerce order (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Hendrix, 2010; Hegre and Nygård, 2015). Yet besides the modern state structures, other actors and structures often influence a country's governance realm. Traditional governance – defined as context-specifically constructed and identified authorities, rules, and institutions – continues to influence society amid other non-state and quasi-state governance forms; particularly in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. In Malawi, local chiefs contributed to maintaining stability in the country's transition from a one-party rule to multi-party political order (Eggen, 2011). In South Africa, while the recognition of traditional authorities has faced criticism from the perspective of democratisation (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005), it also played a role in restoring intrastate peace in the post-apartheid political order (Beall, Mkhize and Vawda, 2005; Beall and Ngonyama, 2009). Overall, in many regions there is a growing perception of political reality as a hybrid system of different forms of governance, rather than as an unchallenged prominence of the state.

Despite the increased awareness of the role of traditional governance alongside the state, its impact on the maintenance of intrastate peace has so far received little systematic and comparative academic scrutiny.[11] Therefore, this chapter investigates

[11] Wig (2016)'s article is an exception, yet his focus is on the implications of different types of pre-colonial governance structures. Eck (2014) finds that the coexistence of customary and formal legal systems makes countries more prone to conflict. However, her focus is on communal conflict and she does not consider the relationship between state and traditional authority systems.

traditional governance in sub-Saharan Africa by asking: under what conditions does traditional governance contribute to state capacity to maintain intrastate peace? Specifically, I argue that the type of institutional interaction between the state and traditional governance shapes the overall governance framework of a country and the odds for peace.

Drawing upon research on the contemporary role of traditional governance (Oomen, 2005; Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013; Baldwin, 2015), I test a theoretical framework proposing that a concordant interaction between the state and traditional governance reduces the risk of intrastate armed conflict. This is argued in relation to discordant types of interactions that are defined by lack of accommodation and clear recognition of traditional governance. Specifically, I advocate the relative advantage of institutional hybridity where traditional authorities are incorporated into the public administration. This theory is tested on new data that cover sub-Saharan African countries between 1989 and 2012. The empirical results provide support for the hypotheses. They also highlight the variation in the effects of concordant interaction subcategories and the conditioning influence of colonial legacies in particular.

This chapter contributes to the literatures on intrastate peace, mixed governance and traditional governance. Recent research on traditional governance has shed light on its resilience but lacked in comparative approaches to examine the effects of mixed governance on particular outcomes. In response, this study draws inferences from systematic, cross-country and over-time observations investigating one specific outcome. By doing so, the chapter offers a novel perspective to the study of intrastate peace. Moving the focus beyond pure state capacity, the chapter introduces a typology on state–traditional governance interaction and investigates the role of non-state actors (specifically traditional authorities) in shaping a country's civil peace.

2.3.State governance capacity and peace

The potential influence of traditional governance in a state's capacity to maintain peace has attracted little systematic attention. Most studies have focused on the central state and its political, economic, and security capacities to maintain peace (Hegre *et al.*, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010; Hendrix, 2010). This state-centric approach has linked well-governed, bureaucratically and economically efficient states with a lower risk of armed conflicts.[12] Similarly, past research has identified unconsolidated and unstable political regimes (Gates *et al.*, 2006; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010), past armed conflicts (Thies, 2010), reliance on primary commodities (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Humphreys, 2005), and unequal access to state power (Cederman and Girardin, 2007; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011) as factors that challenge a country's stability. Even with the emphasis on good governance (i.e. bureaucratic and administrative quality and the state's capacity to implement policies that benefit the larger society), the scholarly focus has been constrained to the state apparatus (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010; Hendrix, 2010; Thies, 2010; Hegre and Nygård, 2015).

However, recent literature on governance emphasises the presence of multiple forms of governance that co-exist with the state without constituting the modern state itself (Levi-Faur, 2012). The lack of scrutiny on the role of these (e.g. traditional governance) in shaping intrastate peace is problematic in contexts such as sub-Saharan Africa, where the formal state capacity is often relatively low and other forms of organisation have remained resilient alongside the state (Englebert, 2000; Herbst,

[12] The relationship between military strength and conflict onset is more dubious: Large military spending correlates with corruption and lower state capacity (Henderson and Singer, 2000; Gupta, de Mello and Sharan, 2001) and bureaucratic and political institutions are found to better proxy capacity to coerce order (Sepp, 2006).

2000). Despite the challenges related to state capacity, many of these countries with 'limited statehood' also remain peaceful.[13] The state capacity and conflict onset literature explains convincingly why bureaucratically strong and democratically governed states should remain peaceful. Yet, the challenge is to explain why many states with limited economic and political institutions also maintain their civil peace.

Nevertheless, one should not equate the continued salience of traditional governance solely with the notion of weak states. Evidence from different parts of developing countries suggest that traditional governance remains resilient across contexts (Englebert, 2002b; Oomen, 2005; Eggen, 2011; Baldwin, 2015; Klick, 2016). Generally governance is performed by a hybridity of state and non-state actors whose relationships vary from competition to collaboration and integration (Boege, Brown and Clements, 2009; Levi-Faur, 2012).[14] While the impact of state strength on intrastate peace is not questioned here, the chapter expands the focus to the interaction between the state and traditional governance and contributes to a broader understanding of a country's capacity to maintain intrastate peace.

2.4.Traditional governance in sub-Saharan Africa

Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey (2016, p. 2) define traditional governance as 'a form of governance understood and validated through narratives or procedures deemed "traditional" by constituents'. Accordingly, while traditional forms of governance have roots in the pre-colonial period, the concept does not rely on an untransformed or linear

[13] Risse (2012) conceptualises limited statehood as reduced state capacity to provide governance across the sovereign territory. A majority of nation-states are limited in terms of their capacities and hybrid with regard to the impact of non-state structures.

[14] In this light governance is understood as 'social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods' (Risse, 2012, p. 700).

historical evolution of governance. Instead it focuses on people's perceptions of certain rules, institutions, and authorities as traditional (Ubink, 2008). The concept refers to a wide variety of public authority figures (e.g. chiefs, kings and headmen) and procedures and institutions (e.g. conflict resolution mechanisms and land management practices). This chapter restricts its empirical focus to the role of traditional authorities.

Traditional governance remains relevant in the majority of contemporary nation-states.[15] Yet in sub-Saharan Africa the colonial and post-colonial periods have shaped societies in ways that make the study of state–traditional governance interaction particularly urgent. The colonial period both marginalised and re-authorised traditional institutions, triggering tensions between the different governance systems while also assigning powers to traditional authorities (Mamdani, 1996). Traditional governance continues to play a *de facto* role across sub-Saharan Africa today (Englebert, 2002b; Baldwin, 2015). Chiefs, kings, and headmen yield significant influence; particularly in rural areas and on issues regarding the allocation of land, resolving local conflicts, running customary courts, enforcing contracts, and maintaining cultural values and practices (Herbst, 2000; ECA, 2007; Baldwin, 2015). Crucially, what varies is how the state interacts with traditional governance and defines its institutional role (Ubink, 2008; Muriaas, 2011). For example, in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire traditional authority structures largely exist in parallel to the state without clear recognition or accommodation by the state. However, in countries such as Malawi, Ghana, and Mozambique, chiefs have constitutionally recognised roles within the state-steered governance system.[16]

[15] Citing JuriGlobe (2016), Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey (2016) note that 57% of the world's population live in countries where customary law coexists with other types of legal systems.
[16] See the research design and Appendix A2.14 for clarification of the empirical data.

There is considerable scholarly debate surrounding the sources and implications of the resilience of traditional governance. Proposed explanations on the former range from the continuation of colonial indirect rule (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005) and state weakness (Herbst, 2000; Koelble and Siddle, 2013) to democratisation (Baldwin, 2015), decentralisation (Koelble and Li Puma, 2011) and the recognition of group rights (Oomen, 2005). While Logan (2009, 2013) and Williams (2010) emphasise the continued trust towards traditional governance, Mamdani (1996) and Ntsebeza (2005) contend that, similar to the colonial period, traditional governance structures are used to spread undemocratic state control. Oomen (2005) posits that both its continued practical relevance and political incentives have influenced the resilience of traditional governance.

The research field is equally divided over the societal implications of maintaining a role for traditional governance alongside the state. For some, the recognition of traditional governance structures contributes to jeopardising democratic accountability at the local level (Mamdani, 1996; Lund, 2003). Scholars emphasise the threat of unaccountable chiefs that abuse their authority at the expense of the constituents (Ntsebeza, 2005; Buur and Kyed, 2007b). The seminal work of Boone (2014) suggests that traditional authorities' rule can contribute to decentralising political tensions and inducing local-level grievances.

Others align with Sklar (1994) who maintains that cooperative, mixed governance between state and traditional governance structures can contribute to stability. Baldwin (2015, p. 5) suggests that self-interested traditional authorities can act as intermediaries between the state and its constituents in their capacity to 'organise responses to rural problems that elected politicians and state institutions lack in weak states'. Comparing the implications of coordination versus competition between state

and traditional governance structures, Pula (2015) and Klick (2016) suggest that cooperation is beneficial for development and peace.

The majority of past research stresses the empirical relevance of traditional governance while acknowledging the challenge of its democratic accountability (Osaghae, 2000; Herbst, 2000; Menkhaus, 2000). The relevance of traditional governance can make its neglect backfire on the state itself (Pula, 2015). Notably, Englebert (2000) and Wig (2016) show that the type of traditional governance structure can influence its relevance and strength. Englebert (2000) finds that consolidating state power has been a challenge for countries with more heterogeneous and centralised traditional authority structures. Wig (2016)'s results suggest that centralised pre-colonial institutions give groups better capacity to negotiate with the state.

Existing literature recognises the continuing influence of traditional governance in sub-Saharan Africa but differs in its implications. I suggest that this can be partially explained by the differences in the outcome variable (democratic ideals or intrastate peace) and limited scrutiny towards the variation in the institutional conditions under which traditional governance operates vis-à-vis the state. Disentangling the implications of the different types of state–traditional governance interactions for intrastate peace can help to understand the competing findings in previous literature.

2.5.Theory: state–traditional governance interaction and intrastate peace

Building on the assumption that traditional governance matters de facto in the countries of interest, I argue that the type of state approach vis-à-vis traditional governance influences the risk of intrastate conflict onset. The argument rests on a notion that even in the context of limited statehood the state has a profound influence on other forms of

governance. The state's institutional design influences the manner in which traditional institutions can operate (i.e. entrench customs), justify authority, and provide order. Simultaneously, the relevance of traditional governance means that the state's approach to traditional governance structures influences its own capacities to govern and maintain peace.

The theory views a country's formal institutional design as an important element in defining state–traditional governance interaction. The act of allocating roles and functions to certain actors in the institutional design is regarded as a process of 'recognition and enforcement [that] strengthen the institutions that play these roles' (Claassens, 2011, p. 178). While this does not imply that the institutional design would run uninterrupted from the constitution to the grassroots of governance, it nevertheless shapes the public space in which different actors and institutions make claims for power and participation (see Horowitz, 2002).

Post-apartheid South Africa is a case in point. When analysing the democratisation process, scholars have noted that the institutional status of traditional authorities has had tangible consequences on the stability of the governance realm (Beall, Mkhize and Vawda, 2005; Oomen, 2005; Koelble and Siddle, 2013). Negative consequences (e.g. interruptions of local elections) have occurred at times when the status of traditional authorities has been unclear (Oomen, 2005, pp. 51–59). In reverse, the recognition and incorporation of traditional authorities into the state administration has contributed to gaining minimal support of traditional authorities for the post-apartheid state and restoring peace in volatile regions (e.g. Kwazulu-Natal) (Beall and Ngonyama, 2009).

Mozambique's pre-civil war period represents a different type of institutional design. The Frelimo-led government that came to power in 1975 formally abolished

the institution of traditional authority (Seibert, 2003, p. 276). The alienation of traditional authorities is suggested to have contributed to the emergence of the rebel movement Renamo as some of the alienated chiefs turned to support it (Ntsebeza, 2005, p. 273). Post-war Mozambique has instead re-integrated traditional authorities into the state-recognised governance realm.

Post-apartheid South Africa and pre-war Mozambique represent different types of state–traditional governance interactions. The interaction in the former is characterised by recognition and integration, whereas the latter represents a system of exclusion. Adapting Goodfellow and Lindemann (2013)'s conceptual framework, the two examples can be categorised into concordant and discordant interactions. Figure 2.1 displays four types of state-induced interactions that are expected to shape a country's intrastate peace differently: *Exclusion* and *symbolic recognition* under discordant interaction and *institutional multiplicity* and *institutional hybridity* under concordant interaction.



Figure 2.1. State–traditional governance interaction types

Four types of state–traditional governance interactions

Concordant interaction refers to institutional designs in which traditional governance is either synthesised into the state-steered system or its authority is recognised and demarcated as a parallel structure in certain functional areas. The core of concordant interaction is that the relationship is cooperative and demarcated (Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013), whereas discordant interaction is defined as interactions without integration or state recognition regarding the functions of traditional governance.

Under concordant interaction, *institutional hybridity* refers to the incorporation of traditional governance into the state realm by integrating traditional authorities into the local and/or national public administration (e.g. by allocating seats in local councils or permitting representation in the national administration). Besides South Africa, examples of countries that have been characterised by institutional hybridity include Angola, Botswana, and Cameroon. *Institutional multiplicity* refers to the recognition of traditional governance as a separate governance realm with legitimacy in certain areas of governance (Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013, pp. 6–8). Namibia, Uganda, and Burkina Faso are examples of institutional multiplicity. Under discordant interaction, *exclusion* of traditional governance refers to a situation such as Mozambique during the 1970s with a total absence of recognition for traditional governance.[17] *Symbolic recognition* refers to the recognition of the presence of traditional forms of governance without defining their relationship to the state (e.g. Burundi and Sudan).

The drawback of discordant interaction is that it fails to deal with parallel and competitive claims over authority (Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013). Discordant

[17] Exclusion refers to situations where traditional authorities are either formally abolished or where there is no reference to them in the institutional design. While the former is arguably a more hostile approach, the latter also excludes traditional governance effectively from the recognised governance realm.

interaction does little to guarantee coordination between different realms of governance. The influence of traditional authorities is left outside the state-recognised realm. As a consequence, discordant interactions can increase the risk of conflict through two mechanisms. First, the lack of coordination with traditional governance implies a failure to take advantage of the intermediary role of traditional authorities in the provision of public goods and services (see Baldwin, 2015). This makes the country more vulnerable to grievances caused by ineffective governance. Second, leaving traditional governance outside the state realm leaves the country more vulnerable to tensions between the two competing forms of governance (see Englebert, 2000). This can encourage traditional authorities to turn against the state (e.g. Mozambique).

Concordant interaction alleviates both of these problems. First, as implied by previous studies (Eggen, 2011; Baldwin, 2015; Klick, 2016) coordinating with traditional governance can add to a state's concrete governance capacities and enhance its efficacy in providing public goods and services. This decreases grievances and motivations to mobilise against the state. Second, concordant interaction can reduce the risk of conflict by decreasing the opportunities for traditional authorities to compete with the state or potentially even support a rebellion against it. This proposition underlines the power-seeking nature of traditional authorities that become less threatening towards the state when recognised by it rather than left unchecked (Mamdani, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2005). Concordant interaction is argued to stimulate a system that can 'increase the intervention capacity of the state by bringing non-state actors into the making and implementation of public policy, thus making the latter more efficient and less fallible' (Offe, 2009, p. 555). A first hypothesis follows:

H1: Concordant state–traditional governance interaction leads to lower risk of intrastate armed conflicts than discordant state–traditional governance interaction.

Furthermore, institutional hybridity can be theoretically expected to better guarantee the added value of recognising traditional governance.[18] Institutional multiplicity has equal theoretical potential to add to a country's governance capacities by institutionalising coordination between the two parallel governance structures. Yet it leaves more room for competition and confrontation between the state and traditional authorities (as traditional authorities remain outside the state realm). Institutional hybridity binds traditional authorities more closely to the state and gives them stakes in the maintenance of state stability. Thus, an addendum to the first hypothesis concerns the two concordant interaction types in relation to the discordant relationships:

H2: Institutional hybridity decreases the likelihood of conflict onset more than institutional multiplicity relative to the discordant interaction types.

2.6.Research design

Dependent variable

In order to measure the continuance or collapse of intrastate peace I turn to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, version 4-2015 (Gleditsch *et al.*, 2002; Petterson and Wallensteen, 2015). The dataset covers all onsets of intrastate armed conflicts, defined as armed conflicts that take place between a government and at least one armed

[18] The two discordant interaction types are not expected to differ in terms of their influence in conflict likelihood for the reasons outlined in the theoretical discussion.

group and result in a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (Petterson and Wallensteen, 2015).[19] The dichotomous variable receives the value 1 if there is an onset of intrastate armed conflict during a specific year and 0 otherwise. As the focus is on a country's overall capacity to maintain peace (and avoid conflict onsets), the ongoing conflict years after the onset are dropped from the models. A new conflict outbreak is coded if the same conflict has fallen below the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths for the period of two years before a new onset. There are 53 conflict outbreaks in the data used in the main analyses.[20]

Independent variable

Regarding the state–traditional governance interaction types, new cross-sectional time-series data have been compiled that code the formal constitutional role of traditional authority in 44 sub-Saharan African countries in the period of 1989–2012.[21] Traditional authorities are the general focal points of traditional governance (Ubink, 2008; Logan, 2013; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016). As a tangible institution, traditional authority can be similarly identified across the studied region even when different countries and communities use different names and have different types of authorities. As discussed in the theoretical section, the formal institutional design is argued to set the basis upon which traditional authorities build their claims regarding their role vis-à-vis the state. The constitutional and legal status of traditional authorities is assumed

[19] For a more detailed description of the dataset, see the UCDP Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Dataset codebook (2017).
[20] These 53 conflict onsets are out of the 835 country-years after the on-going conflict years have been dropped out.
[21] See Appendix A2.14 for clarification on the coding for the independent variable. I have excluded the small island states that have less than 1 million inhabitants and do not have traditional governance structures present.

to have similar systematic implications on the relationship across the country even when local realities would influence the concrete roles of individual authorities.

The data for the independent variable have been systematically collected and coded through reviewing the constitutions and other relevant legal instruments that were in place and/or became adopted during the time period in the countries under analysis. Other relevant legal instruments refer to local government acts and chieftaincy acts that specify the principles of the constitution. Secondary sources such as the Food and Agriculture Organization's database on gender and land rights and case specific studies have been triangulated for background knowledge and case-specific understanding.[22] The coding is based on calendar years, meaning that a constitution adopted in December 1996 is coded as having taken place in 1996. In order to take into account the time lag between changing the institutional design and its effects on the governance framework the independent variable is lagged one year.

The coding process proceeds in two stages. First, a binary variable of concordant interaction takes the value 1 if there is a constitutionally explicit recognition of traditional authorities as a parallel structure of governance or part of the public administration, and 0 otherwise. The term constitutionally explicit refers to an emphasis on the constitution in a situation where a new constitution raises ambiguities in relation to older legal documents: If a new constitution lacks all explicit reference to the role of traditional authorities (or to the legal instruments guaranteeing their role) the interaction is coded as discordant even if it has been concordant in the past.[23]

[22] See FAO (2016) http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/country-profiles/en/.

[23] For example, in Nigeria the constitution of 1989 recognises the institution of traditional authority as a parallel governance institution and calls for the establishment of traditional councils, outlining the functions of these councils. However, in the absence of any further clarifying legal instruments the 1999 constitution is silent on the role of traditional authorities and Nigeria moves from concordant to discordant interaction.

Table 2.1. Definitions and number of observations of different state–traditional authority interactions

Discordant vs. concordant	**Sub-category**	**Definition of the type of interaction**	**N= 835***
Discordant	Exclusion	No constitutionally explicit formal recognition of traditional authorities	402
	Symbolic recognition	Constitutionally explicit recognition of the institution of traditional authorities. No definition of the functions or role within public administration present.	84
Concordant	Institutional multiplicity	Constitutionally explicit recognition of traditional authorities as responsible for certain governance functions, separate from the public administration organs	42
	Institutional hybridity	Constitutionally explicit recognition of traditional authorities, including role/representation in the public administration	307

*The number of observations is the number of country-years after the on-going conflict years have been dropped from the data.

Second, in order to grasp the specific subcategories within concordant and discordant interactions, all country-year observations have been coded according to the four groups of *exclusion*, *symbolic recognition*, *institutional multiplicity*, and *institutional hybridity*. Following the theoretical framework, the subcategories constitute a series of mutually exclusive binary variables taking the value 1 according to the definitions in Table 2.1. The difference between the two concordant categories derives from the presence versus absence of integration into the public administration. Therefore, a case of institutional hybridity can include traits of institutional multiplicity (but not vice versa). For example, in South Africa traditional authorities have both their own formally recognised bodies as well as allocated roles to participate in the public administration. Post-Apartheid South Africa is coded as institutional hybridity. In Uganda prior to 2005, the institution of chieftaincy was recognised, and chiefs were

treated as cultural leaders with functions defined outside the state administration, making this a case of institutional multiplicity.[24] Figures 2.2-2.3 illustrate the categorisation of the examined countries into the specific state–traditional authority categories in three time points.



Figure 2.2. State–traditional authority interaction in sub-Saharan Africa, 1991 (left) and 2001 (right)

[24] In the 2005 constitution, traditional leaders are made titular heads of the regional governments, and the coding changes from institutional multiplicity to institutional hybridity.



Figure 2.3. State–traditional authority interaction in sub-Saharan Africa, 2011

Control variables

I control for a number of covariates that can influence the likelihood of intrastate conflict outbreak and can be argued to influence the conditions under which specific state–traditional governance interaction takes place.[25]

First, the legacies of different colonial powers with their distinct approaches to the pre-colonial (e.g. traditional) governance hierarchies can intervene in the relationship between state–traditional governance interaction and intrastate peace. Research suggests that the British indirect rule left traditional authority structures and

[25] Some of the control variables can be regarded as post-treatment controls (i.e. GDP per capita, polity score, ethnic exclusion) as these are mostly measured after a change in the state–TA interaction. Including post-treatment control can induce estimator bias and Appendix A2.13 reports model specifications that exclude these variables. However, since the same variables can also influence the independent variable in a later time period, they are included in the main models to avoid omitted variable bias.

existing governance structures more resilient than elsewhere in colonial Africa (Ubink, 2008; Englebert, 2002). In the indirect rule traditional authorities were relied upon in maintaining order and implementing colonial policies. This differed from, for example, the more direct French rule, which paid less attention to the correspondence between the colonial administrative boundaries and the boundaries of the pre-colonial communities (Ubink, 2008). Consequently, traditional authority structures in the former British colonies may have remained more intact and accustomed to collaborating with state actors than elsewhere in colonial Africa. In order to control for the colonial legacies, I include a binary variable that captures whether a country is a former British colony. The additional analysis further examines the conditioning influence of colonial legacies.

Moreover, the regime type can influence the effect of concordant state–traditional governance interaction for intrastate peace, while also affecting the likelihood of intrastate conflict. The hypothesised added value of traditional authorities builds upon their concrete governance capacities and support to the state that complement the states' own governance capacities. However, there might be less of a need to utilise these capacities of traditional governance structures in more consolidated democratic countries as these states are better able to govern the entire sovereign territory. Subsequently, the effect of concordant interaction might be conditional on the type of political institutions and the absence of consolidated democracy in particular.

In order to control for the influence of political institutions, I use the Polity IV project's polity2 score that ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly

democratic) (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2016).[26] I include a squared polity2 score to capture the difference between consolidated and unconsolidated regimes in consideration of the risks facing unconsolidated regimes that lack both the capacity to enforce order and the capacity to appease potential challengers (Hegre *et al.*, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In the additional analysis I use a binary measure of democratic regimes in order to examine whether the influence of the independent variable changes in this regime type. I also use the polity index to construct a decay function of time since a major institutional change to grasp the influence of past political instability (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, p. 521).[27]

I include a log of per capita gross domestic product which is taken from the expanded trade and GDP data by Gleditsch (2002b). Per capita GDP is systematically reported across countries and its negative correlation with conflict onset is found fairly robust in large-N studies.[28] As with stable political institutions, per capita GDP can be argued to influence the context in which the state formulates its approach towards traditional authorities. In order to control for the potentially destabilising effects of state dependence on primary commodities (see Humphreys, 2005), I use a dichotomous variable that receives the value 1 if more than one-third of a country's export earnings come from oil, and 0 otherwise.

Furthermore, I control for the (log) population size. Previous research has found more populous countries to be at higher risk of armed conflict (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Bruckner, 2010). Populous countries might also rely more on the presence of

[26] See Appendix A2.1 for the descriptive statistics of the control variables. All time-variant control variables are lagged one year in the analyses.
[27] A major institutional change is defined as a three-point change in the polity index between two years. The decay function is formulated as follows: 2^(-durable/0.5).
[28] However, while GDP per capita is strongly correlated with many other measures of economic and bureaucratic capacity, its causal link to peace remains contested (Hendrix, 2010).

traditional authorities in the rural areas. I also include a measure of the share of people belonging to ethnic groups excluded from power. Inter-ethnic tensions over political power increase the risk of conflicts (Cederman and Girardin, 2007) and they can influence the way the state interacts with traditional authorities. The variable comes from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) country-year data (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). For similar reasons and following Fearon and Laitin (2003) I include a measure of ethnic fractionalisation as well as its squared term. I also control for the log share of mountainous terrain of a country since rough terrain is argued to be conflict prone as it offers potential rebels cover (Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

With regard to the capacities of traditional governance structures, I follow Wig (2016) and control for the level of centralisation of the pre-colonial governance structures. The variable receives the value 1 if the average pre-colonial centralisation score, which ranges from 0 (stateless society) to 4 (centralised society), for the ethnic groups in a country is above the overall mean, and 0 otherwise.[29]

Finally, following Carter and Signorino (2010) I control for a country's conflict history by including the duration and polynomials of years since the last conflict onset. Moreover, considering the findings on conflict diffusion (Gleditsch, 2002a) I include a measure of conflict incidents in the neighbouring countries. I also control for the time since independence.

[29] I also consider the informal strength of traditional authorities as a robustness check. See the results section and Appendix A2.12.

2.7.Results

Table 2.2. Discordant versus concordant state–traditional authority interactions and conflict onsets in sub-Saharan Africa in 1989–2012

Interaction type	*No onset*	*Conflict onset*	*Total*
Discordant	441	45	486
Concordant	341	8	349
Total	782	53	835

The number of observations here is the number of country-years after the on-going conflict years have been dropped from the data. Chi-square test p-value < 0.001.

Table 2.2 presents a simple tabular relationship of intrastate conflict onset and discordant versus concordant state–traditional authorities (hereafter state–TA) interactions. Approximately 9.2% of the discordant interaction years have escalated into armed conflict. Only 2.3% of the concordant interaction observations have experienced conflict onset. This variance is different from null at the 99% confidence level. Disaggregating the independent variable into the four subcategories reveals a more nuanced picture: 8.5% of the exclusion observations have escalated into conflict compared to only 2.0% of the institutional hybridity observations. On the other hand, 4.8% of the institutional multiplicity cases and 13% of the symbolic recognition years have experienced conflict outbreak. First, this suggests that conflict onsets are rare in every interaction type. Second, while there is a negative correlation between concordant interaction and conflict onset, examining the subcategories suggests interesting variation among the concordant and discordant groups.

Table 2.3. Logit-regressions of intrastate conflict onset in sub-Saharan Africa, 1989–2012

	Model 1	*Model 2*	*Model 3*	*Model 4*
Concordant interaction	-1.296*	-1.192*		
	(0.538)	(0.502)		
Institutional hybridity			-1.379*	-1.145*
			(0.687)	(0.552)
Institutional multiplicity			-0.498	-1.190
			(0.796)	(1.010)
Symbolic recognition			0.360	0.0976
			(0.554)	(0.537)
Polity2 score, $_{t-1}$		0.0221		0.0213
		(0.0353)		(0.0341)
Polity2 squared, $_{t-1}$		0.00705		0.00689
		(0.00801)		(0.00805)
Regime past instability		1.077*		1.075*
		(0.494)		(0.495)
(log) GDP/capita, $_{t-1}$		-0.231		-0.223
		(0.270)		(0.282)
Oil		1.011*		0.998*
		(0.490)		(0.500)
(log) Population, $_{t-1}$		0.297†		0.304†
		(0.153)		(0.161)
Ethnic exclusion		-0.0440		-0.0483
		(0.610)		(0.596)
Ethnic fractionalisation		7.252†		7.308†
		(4.408)		(4.330)
Ethnic fractionalisation, sq.		-7.034†		-7.110†
		(4.218)		(4.117)
(log) Mountainous		0.349†		0.341†
		(0.195)		(0.194)
Neighbour conflict incidents		1.442**		1.460**
		(0.485)		(0.467)
Time since independence		0.00681		0.00645
		(0.00435)		(0.00460)
British colony		-1.225*		-1.214*
		(0.577)		(0.558)
Pre-colonial centralisation		0.649†		0.632†
		(0.356)		(0.371)
Constant	-1.336***	-6.939*	-1.409***	-7.071*
	(0.346)	(2.974)	(0.338)	(3.087)
AIC	374.0	349.4	376.2	353.4
Log-pseudolikelihood	-182.0	-155.7	-181.1	-155.7
Wald chi^2	30.86 (4)	50.84 (18)	31.20 (6)	52.46 (20)
Pseudo-R^2	0.0780	0.178	0.0826	0.178
Countries	43	42	43	42
Observations	835	795	835	795

Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses; † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; peace years, peace years2, peace years3 excluded from the table.

Table 2.3 reports the main logit-regression models of intrastate conflict onset with the coefficients and clustered standard errors of the explanatory variables. Models

1 and 2 treat the key independent variable as a binary variable of concordant versus discordant interaction, while models 3 and 4 examine the effects of the different state–TA interaction sub-categories with exclusion as the baseline category.

Models 1 and 2 give cautious support for the first hypothesis. Concordant interaction is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of conflict onset, with its coefficient statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. In terms of the substantive effects, estimates based on the full Model 2 imply that concordant state–TA interaction – ceteris paribus – decreases the likelihood of conflict onset from 11% to 4%, in relation to discordant interaction.[30]

However, when we move to the subcategory models, notable variation emerges. Supporting both hypotheses, the coefficient of institutional hybridity is negative and statistically significant.[31] Based on the estimates of Model 4, institutional hybridity decreases the probability of onset by more than 60%, from 0.113 (11.3%) to 0.042 (4.2%), holding everything else constant. However, contrary to the expectations Models 3 and 4 demonstrate that institutional multiplicity does not have a significant influence on conflict onset likelihood. A model specification that includes the two concordant interactions against a baseline of discordant interaction further demonstrates that institutional multiplicity is no different from discordant interaction in its relation to conflict onset likelihood. The different model specifications imply that the distinct effect of specific state–TA interactions derives from the conflict-reducing effect of institutional hybridity in relation to the discordant types.[32]

[30] The predicted probabilities are estimated with the Clarify software program (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).
[31] Removing the variable decreases the explanatory power and fit of the model. See Appendix A2.2.
[32] See the model specifications in Appendix A2.3.



Figure 2.4. First difference estimates of main explanatory variables

Figure 2.4 portrays the estimated effects of a number of key explanatory variables, holding other variables at their median values. The figure exemplifies the variation in the effects of the different state–TA interaction types. While institutional hybridity is significant and negative, both institutional multiplicity and symbolic recognition are insignificant. As expected, recognising traditional authorities symbolically without defining their role is found to have no effect in relation to the baseline of exclusion. Moreover, countries seem to gain the added value of traditional authorities only by incorporating them into the state administration rather than recognising their authority alongside the state administration (e.g. institutional multiplicity). While surprising in terms of the first hypothesis, this supports the theoretical consideration of institutional multiplicity's vulnerability towards competition between the different governance realms. The results corroborate Goodfellow and Lindemann's (2013) account of the problems associated with

institutional multiplicity in the context of Uganda. There ambiguities concerning the frontiers of traditional authorities' powers and their grievances against the state for not having access to public power have induced disputes and confrontation rather than better coordinated and cooperated governance (Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013).

With regard to the control variables, the only directly governance-related, statistically robust variable is the decay function measuring proximity to past regime instability. The results support earlier findings implying that proximity to a major institutional change increases the likelihood of conflict onset (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). The probability of conflict in the wake of a major change – ceteris paribus – is 0.27 (27%), more than 15 percentage points higher than the median onset risk. In a country with institutional hybridity the estimated conflict risk decreases. Figure 2.5 presents the conditional effects of institutional hybridity as proximity of regime instability grows. The closer the institutional change the larger the estimated effect of institutional hybridity.



Figure 2.5. Conditional marginal effects of institutional hybridity

The case of institutional hybridity in Malawi and the country's peaceful transition from one-party rule to multiparty democracy in the mid-1990s supports these findings. Chiefs whose recognition had already supported the stability of the one-party rule were instrumental in maintaining order during the transition as the dissolution of the old state structures and the malfunctioning of the new local government structures created a governance vacuum at the local level (Chiweza, 2007; Eggen, 2011). Interviewing Malawians on the country's stability, Eggen (2011) found many to name traditional authorities as a primary reason behind the maintenance of peace. Institutional hybridity in Malawi portrays both of the mechanisms expected to strengthen intrastate peace. While it has helped the state to co-opt and gain the support of traditional authorities, chiefs seem to have also added to the country's concrete governance capacities as the intermediaries between the state and the constituents in policy implementation (Chiweza, 2007).

Concerning the other control variables, the results are mostly in line with earlier findings. Conflict incidents in neighbouring countries increase the risk of conflict outbreak. However, a country's own conflict history (peace years) is not significant in the full model. Countries appear to be more vulnerable to instability in their surroundings than trapped in their own conflict history. Time since independence does not significantly influence the risk of conflict outbreak.

There is evidence for a conflict-inducing effect of oil dependency. The risk of conflict increases from around 11% to 26% in oil dependent countries, keeping everything else constant. Also in line with earlier research, mountainous terrain and ethnic fractionalisation correlate positively with the risk of conflict outbreak, yet both of the measures are significant only at the 90% confidence level. Moreover, the latter shows a curvilinear effect on conflict onset implying a greater risk of conflict in

ethnically polarised societies. The coefficients of logs of per capita GDP and population size have theoretically anticipated signs; yet they do not have statistically significant explanatory power.

Pre-colonial centralisation has a positive and weakly significant coefficient ($p < 0.1$). This can reflect the capabilities of highly centralised (e.g. hierarchically structured) traditional authorities to confront the state or even mobilise against it (see Englebert, 2000), increasing the odds of (armed) challenges against the state. However, the low confidence in this finding renders it speculative at best. Moreover, while pre-colonial centralisation has been used to capture the bargaining strength of traditional leaderships vis-à-vis the state (Wig, 2016), the informal aspect of traditional authority strength (e.g. the relevance of and trust towards traditional leaders within their communities) should also be considered.[33] Accordingly, I compile a measure of informal strength of traditional authority using the Afrobarometer data (round 4). Similar to pre-colonial centralisation, traditional authorities' informal strength has a positive and significant coefficient, which nevertheless becomes weaker when the state–TA interaction types are excluded from the model. While this might imply that states with strong traditional authorities that are not given public recognition are more conflict-prone, the lack of data on this variable for many conflict-ridden countries introduces systematic bias that renders the results ambiguous.[34]

Finally, the coefficient for British colonies is negative and significant across the models. Former British colonies appear to have a lower risk of intrastate conflict than countries with other colonial histories. In light of this and the theoretical consideration on the potential interference of colonial histories in the relationship between the

[33] Stronger authorities can be expected to have a greater overall influence in the governance realm. Informal strength can also influence the relationship between traditional authorities and the state actors.
[34] See Appendix A2.12 for the variable description and the model specifications.

independent variable and conflict onset likelihood, the chapter now turns to additional analyses that further test the theoretical propositions.

2.8.Additional analyses and further discussion

Table 2.4. Colonial history interaction terms and conflict onset

	Model 5	*Model 6*
Concordant TA interaction	-0.945†	
	(0.516)	
Symbolic recognition (SR)		0.405
		(0.611)
Institutional multiplicity (IM)		-0.288
		(0.843)
Institutional hybridity (IH)		-1.019
		(0.659)
Former British colony	-0.938	-0.682
	(0.656)	(0.762)
Concordant TA * British colony	-0.906	
	(1.062)	
SR*Former British colony		0
		(.)
IM*Former British colony		0
		(.)
IH*Former British colony		-0.490
		(1.253)
Pre-colonial centralisation	0.692†	0.594
	(0.357)	(0.399)
Regime past instability	1.088*	1.096*
	(0.489)	(0.499)
Oil	1.010*	1.189*
	(0.511)	(0.534)
Ethnic fractionalisation	6.954	8.711†
	(4.297)	(4.669)
Ethnic fractionalisation, sq.	-6.812	-8.708†
	(4.161)	(4.657)
(log) Mountainous	0.308	0.296
	(0.204)	(0.195)
Neighbour conflict incidents	1.380**	1.501**
	(0.475)	(0.468)
Constant	-6.637*	-6.506*
	(3.013)	(3.070)
AIC	350.6	350.0
Log pseudolikelihood	-155.3	-153.0
Wald Chi^2 (df)	44.44 (19)	46.36 (21)
Pseudo-R^2	0.180	0.186
Countries	42	42
Observations	795	773

Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses; † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; in an effort to save space the remaining control variables (also included in the model 4 are not shown in the table).

Table 2.4 presents two models interacting the different state–TA categories with the former British colony variable. Model 5, which interacts the colonial history variable with the concordant binary variable, shows a weakened negative effect for concordant state–TA relationships. The interaction term itself is not significant. However, Model 6 changes the results considerably. Interacting the former British colony variable with institutional hybridity renders both variables insignificant in their coefficients, while the interaction term is negative but insignificant. Moreover, the interactions between institutional multiplicity and symbolic recognition with former British colonies are omitted as these have not experienced any conflict onsets. A pairwise comparison shows that while institutional hybridity correlates positively with former British colonies, there are relatively few observations of institutional multiplicity and symbolic recognition in former British colonies. This selection bias, while interesting with regard to the continuities between colonial and post-colonial periods, blurs the relationship between state–TA interaction and intrastate peace and calls for closer examination.

Accordingly, I investigate subsets of former British colonies and other colonies.[35] A subset of former British colonies indicates a conflict-decreasing effect of institutional hybridity. Thus, while former British colonies seem to present a preferable context for institutional hybridity to evolve in the first place, this has a decreasing effect on conflict onset when it does take place. Excluding traditional authorities has a significant conflict-inducing effect in former British colonies. However, as anticipated the robustness of the effect of institutional hybridity diminishes in countries with other than British colonial history.[36] Examples such as Niger, a former French colony with a

[35] See Appendix A2.5 for the model specifications.
[36] With the control variables included, institutional hybridity's coefficient is negative at the 90% confidence level. Model specification with concordant interaction binary variable estimates a negative and significant ($p<0.05$) coefficient.

history of both conflict and institutional hybridity, exemplify this ambiguity in the relationship between recognition of traditional authorities and civil peace. In Niger, the institutional recognition of traditional authorities (from symbolic to institutional hybridity) introduced considerable discontinuity from the French' colonial rule that had stripped traditional leaders of their authority and later explicitly politicised them (Miles, 1993). This considerable discontinuity in the institutional role of traditional governance structures in many countries outside Anglophone Africa may have altered the necessity and potential of institutional hybridity in the post-colonial era.

Besides the colonial context, we have considered democratic regimes as potential interveners in the relationship between state–TA interactions and intrastate peace. Concordant interaction's effect may differ in consolidated democracies and the recognition of traditional authorities can be part of a democratisation process. In order to better control for the relationship between concordant interactions and democratic regimes, I interact the state–TA interactions with a binary measure of democratic regime type.[37] Crucially, the pacifying effect of institutional hybridity grows stronger in this model specification, while the interaction term does not have a significant effect on conflict onset. Institutional hybridity appears to have a significant conflict-reducing effect in non-democratic states. Yet validating the theoretical concerns, its effect seizes to be separable from the null hypothesis in democratic regimes. Figure 2.6 illustrates this.

[37] See Appendix A2.6 for the model specification.



Figure 2.6. Marginal effect of institutional hybridity in non- democratic versus democratic regime types

Finally, I test the strength of the results with further robustness checks.[38] First, in order to examine the possibility that the effect of institutional hybridity is explained by a generally more inclusive society, the state–TA interaction types have been interacted with the ethnic exclusion variable. Institutional hybridity remains significant and negative in this model specification. Notably, the interaction terms of institutional multiplicity and symbolic recognition with ethnic exclusion are positive and significant. Recognising traditional authorities symbolically or defining their role outside the state administration might be an (often unsuccessful) effort to accommodate the elites of politically discriminated groups in states with higher levels of ethnic exclusion. Considering the relatively low share of ethnic exclusion in institutional hybrids, I have also excluded all observations with a value higher than the 75th

[38] Model specifications available in Appendix A2.7-11.

percentile in ethnic exclusion. Institutional hybridity remains negatively correlated with conflict onset (p-value < 0.01).

In order to scrutinise potential biases brought by outlier cases I have dropped every country in the data one by one from the analysis and the results remain fairly robust. The results remain unaltered when using a skewed-y logit model and when relaxing the operationalisation of conflict onset to include all onsets after one year of ceased conflict. A measure of the heterogeneity of the pre-colonial communities has also been added to the models without significant changes to the interpretation of the main results.

2.9.Conclusion

This chapter has examined the role of traditional governance in maintaining intrastate peace alongside, within, or parallel to the state in sub-Saharan Africa. The results indicate that recognising and incorporating traditional authorities into the public administration can be beneficial for peace, particularly in the midst of politically unconsolidated periods. I find support for the claim that institutional hybridity decreases the likelihood of intrastate conflict onset. However, this pacifying effect is not seen with the second concordant interaction, institutional multiplicity. Recognising the legitimacy of traditional governance structures as parallel institutions does not bring about additional value from that of disregarding them.

The results contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of a country's governance capacities and intrastate peace. Deploying the capacities of traditional governance structures can strengthen the state's capacity to prevent violent conflict, particularly when traditional authorities are given incentives to support the state. The

empirical findings also suggest that colonial legacies influence the context in which different types of state–TA interactions emerge and operate. This highlights the importance of understanding the continuities between colonial and post-colonial governance institutions. Institutional hybridity is more frequent in former British colonies and its decreasing effect on conflict onset is only robust in Anglophone Africa. To what extent this variation is explained by the relative strength of traditional governance structures in former British colonies and their relative weakness and corruption in other environments should be examined.

Furthermore, research should examine the over-time development of the benefits of institutional hybridity. The findings suggest that giving traditional authorities a say in public administration pacifies non-democracies. Yet the added value becomes unclear with democratic countries. How the benefits and risks of institutional hybridity and other concordant and discordant interactions evolve when a state becomes more consolidated is a crucial question in democratising countries where traditional authorities continue to claim their right to govern.

The results in this chapter suggest that governments interested in preventing armed conflict may want to consider incorporating traditional governance more explicitly to the state. However, as the next chapter demonstrates, the accommodation of traditional governance structures does not automatically transfer to peaceful state-society relations at a local level. Furthermore, this chapter has pointed to the potential influence of grassroots level strength of traditional authorities. Chapter 4 returns to this topic and examines how customary institutional strength influences civilian victimisation in armed conflicts.

2.10. Appendices

A2.1 Descriptive statistics of the control variables

	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev.	Source
Polity IV score	-10	+10	.453125	5.85897	Marshal et al. 2016
Polity IV score, ^2	0	100	34.4916	26.368	Marshal et al. 2016
Past political instability	0	1	.167803	.350701	Marshal et al. 2016
(log) GDP per capita	4.8889948	9.5548091	7.24758	.899443	Gleditsch 2002
Oil dependency	0	1	0.1034	0.3046742	Fearon and Laitin 2003
(log) Population	6.2163666	11.947872	8.80004	1.24694	Gleditsch 2002
Ethnic Exclusion	0	0.91500002	.133992	.221478	Cederman et al. 2010
Ethnic fractionalis.	.00126101	.85568929	.472278	.22373	Fearon and Laitin 2003
Mountainous	0	4.421247	1.41377	1.36192	Fearon and Laitin 2003
Pre-colonial central.*	0	1	0.4526946	.0172359	Wig 2016
Former British colony	0	1	0.424	0.4944791	Author's own data
Peace years	0	52	20.2862	13.3916	Petterson and Wallensteen 2015
Neighbouring conflict	0	1	0.5882	0.4924697	Petterson and Wallensteen 2015
Time since independ.	1	165	41.2623	23.5527	Gleditsch 2002
Informal strength of TA	.87923437	1.8280885	1.44514	.277862	Afrobarometer 2008

***** Wig (2016) constructs this variable for Sub-Saharan African ethnic groups using the Ethnographic Atlas (Gray, 1999) and the EPR data. The variable ranges from 0 (stateless society) to 4 (centralised society). In order to grasp the average level of pre-colonial centralisation in a country, I have calculated the mean score of pre-colonial centralisation for all ethnic groups in a given country. A dichotomous variable, "pre-colonial centralisation", receives the value 1 if the average pre-colonial centralisation score for the ethnic groups in a country is above the mean value of the variable. Hence, pre-colonial centralisation = 1 if pre-colonial centralisation score for the country is >1.46657.

A2.2 Model 4 without institutional hybridity[39]

	Model without IH
Institutional multiplicity	-0.825
	(0.912)
Symbolic recognition	0.444
	(0.499)
Polity score	0.0174
	(0.0341)
Polity score squared	0.00310
	(0.00796)
Prox. regime instability	1.031*
	(0.494)
(log) GDP per capita	-0.162
	(0.260)
Oil dependency	0.967*
	(0.476)
(log) Population size	0.327†
	(0.171)
Share of ethnically excluded population	0.0615
	(0.589)
Ethnic fractionalisation	6.336
	(4.301)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.	-6.514
	(4.167)
(log) Mountainous	0.296
	(0.186)
Neighbour conflict	1.702***
	(0.480)
Time since independence	0.00392
	(0.00476)
Former British colony	-1.317*
	(0.515)
Precolonial centralisation	0.313
	(0.319)
Constant	-7.460*
	(2.945)
AIC	356.2
Log pseudolikelihood	-158.1
Wald Chi^2 (df)	72.36 (19)
Pseudo-R^2	0.165
Countries	42
Observations	795

- Area under the ROC curve without institutional hybridity = 0.7958 < Area under the ROC curve in Model 4 = 0.8046

[39] In all models presented in the Appendix, standard errors, clustered by country, are presented in parentheses; † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; peace years, peace years2, peace years3 sometimes excluded from the tables to save space.

- Likelihood ratio test assuming the model without institutional hybridity is nested in Model 4: Prob > chi2 = 0.0282

A2.3 Different state–TA interaction subcategory model specifications (coefficient of the sub-categories only

	Model 4	IH only	IM only	SR only	IH excluded	IH and IM
Institutional hybridity	-1.145*	-1.037*				-1.180*
	(0.552)	(0.513)				(0.526)
Institutional multiplicity	-1.190		-0.936		-0.0442	-1.221
	(1.010)		(0.844)		(0.944)	(0.918)
Symbolic recognition	0.0976			0.529	1.243†	
	(0.537)			(0.482)	(0.642)	
Exclusion					1.145*	
					(0.552)	

A2.4 Models 5 and 6 with all covariates (interaction terms with British colonial history)

	Model 1	Model 2
Concordant TA interaction	-0.945†	
	(0.516)	
Former British colony	-0.938	-0.682
	(0.656)	(0.762)
Concordant TA* Former British colony	-0.906	
	(1.062)	
Symbolic recognition (SR)		0.405
		(0.611)
Institutional multiplicity (IM)		-0.288
		(0.843)
Institutional hybridity (IH)		-1.019
		(0.659)
SR * Former British colony		0
		(.)
IM * Former British colony		0
		(.)
IH * Former British colony		-0.490
		(1.253)
Polity score	0.0222	0.0110
	(0.0363)	(0.0358)
Polity score squared	0.00773	0.00900
	(0.00816)	(0.00812)
Prox. regime instability	1.088*	1.096*
	(0.489)	(0.499)
(log) GDP per capita	-0.234	-0.366
	(0.273)	(0.300)
Oil dependency	1.010*	1.189*

	(0.511)	(0.534)
(log) Population size	0.269†	0.316†
	(0.160)	(0.172)
Share of ethnically excluded population	0.0918	-0.0484
	(0.651)	(0.654)
Ethnic fractionalisation	6.954	8.711†
	(4.297)	(4.669)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.	-6.812	-8.708†
	(4.161)	(4.657)
(log) Mountainous	0.308	0.296
	(0.204)	(0.195)
Neighbour conflict	1.380**	1.501**
	(0.475)	(0.468)
Time since independence	0.00724†	0.00519
	(0.00431)	(0.00501)
Precolonial centralisation	0.692†	0.594
	(0.357)	(0.399)
Constant	-6.637*	-6.506*
	(3.013)	(3.070)
AIC	350.6	350.0
Log pseudolikelihood	-155.3	-153.0
Wald Chi^2 (df)	44.44 (19)	46.36 (21)
Pseudo-R^2	0.180	0.186
Countries	42	42
Observations	795	773

A2.5 All colonial history subsets:

	British colonial history	British colonial history	Other than British col. history	Other than British col. history
Institutional hybridity	-4.011***	-6.261***	-0.455	-1.137†
	(0.796)	(1.670)	(0.788)	(0.666)
Institutional multiplicity	0	0	-0.213	-0.632
	(.)	(.)	(0.789)	(0.758)
Symbolic recognition	0	0	0.892	0.422
	(.)	(.)	(0.549)	(0.585)
Neighbour conflict	-2.142*	-1.802†	2.159***	2.208***
	(0.974)	(1.008)	(0.648)	(0.604)
Polity score		0.0593		0.00956
		(0.111)		(0.0423)
Polity score squared		0.00846		0.0110
		(0.0130)		(0.0100)
Prox. regime instability		0.948		0.777
		(1.460)		(0.623)
(log) GDP per capita		-0.332		0.411
		(0.811)		(0.366)
(log) Population size		-0.992		0.633**
		(0.741)		(0.208)
Share of ethnically excluded population		4.219†		0.193
		(2.321)		(0.748)
(log) Mountainous		-0.514		-0.0216
		(0.489)		(0.161)
Time since independence		-0.00318		0.0135*
		(0.0455)		(0.00653)

Precolonial centralisation		1.155		0.989†
		(1.044)		(0.531)
Constant	0.649	11.90	-3.529***	-13.49**
	(0.967)	(10.63)	(0.684)	(4.210)
AIC	76.43	86.86	278.6	270.6
Log pseudolikelihood	-32.21	-28.43	-131.3	-118.3
Wald Chi^2 (df)	40.45 (5)	254.9 (14)	20.22 (7)	48.37 (16)
Pseudo-R^2	0.208	0.301	0.108	0.168
Countries	17	17	25	25
Observations	308	308	481	478

A2.6 Intrastate conflict onset model specifications: interacting the independent variable with democracy binary variable

	Model 1	Model 2
Concordant TA interaction	-1.556*	
	(0.610)	
Democratic regime	-0.417	
	(0.719)	
Concordant TA interaction * Democratic	1.480	
	(1.002)	
Institutional hybridity		-1.745*
		(0.811)
Institutional multiplicity		-0.514
		(0.956)
Symbolic recognition		0.877†
		(0.532)
IH * Democracy		1.551
		(0.968)
IM * Democracy		0
		(.)
SR * Democracy		0
		(.)
Democratic regime		0.363
		(0.560)
Prox. regime instability	0.937†	1.023*
	(0.496)	(0.498)
(log) GDP per capita	-0.246	-0.0506
	(0.271)	(0.264)
Oil dependency	0.955†	0.866†
	(0.519)	(0.468)
(log) Population size	0.352*	0.356*
	(0.153)	(0.153)
Share of ethnically excluded population	-0.294	-0.792
	(0.570)	(0.634)
Ethnic fractionalisation	6.438	5.532
	(4.181)	(3.962)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.	-6.339	-5.663
	(4.080)	(3.740)
(log) Mountainous	0.341†	0.471**
	(0.186)	(0.172)
Neighbour conflict	1.415**	1.440***
	(0.468)	(0.434)
Time since independence	0.00526	0.000433

	(0.00458)	(0.00461)
Former British colony	-1.333*	-1.652**
	(0.548)	(0.502)
Precolonial centralisation	0.609†	0.427
	(0.332)	(0.324)
Constant	-6.654*	-7.811**
	(2.880)	(2.826)
AIC	348.1	339.0
Log pseudolikelihood	-155.1	-148.5
Wald Chi^2 (df)	49.40 (18)	74.70 (20)
Pseudo-R^2	0.181	0.202
Countries	42	41
Observations	795	748

A2.7 Interacting state–TA categories with ethnic exclusion variable + excluding observations with high values of ethnic exclusion (higher than the 75 percentile value of 0.14)

	TA categories and ethnic exclusion	Excluding ethnic exclusion if >0.14
Symbolic recognition	-1.401†	-2.253*
	(0.758)	(1.011)
Institutional multiplicity	-5.052†	0
	(2.756)	(.)
Institutional hybridity	-1.373*	-1.607**
	(0.684)	(0.531)
Share of ethnically excluded population	-1.286	5.690
	(0.852)	(4.709)
Symbolic recognition * Share of ethnically excluded population	5.494*	
	(2.198)	
Institutional multiplicity * Share of ethnically excluded population	8.059**	
	(2.957)	
Institutional hybridity * Share of ethnically excluded population	0.408	
Symbolic recognition * Share of ethnically excluded population	(2.156)	
Polity score	0.0356	0.0437
	(0.0351)	(0.0330)
Polity score squared	0.0112	0.0144
	(0.00796)	(0.0120)
Prox. regime instability	1.145*	1.069
	(0.494)	(0.705)
(log) GDP per capita	-0.256	-0.643†
	(0.272)	(0.357)
Oil dependency	1.000*	1.140*
	(0.471)	(0.557)
(log) Population size	0.181	0.123

	(0.146)	(0.190)
Ethnic fractionalisation	6.310	6.298
	(4.472)	(4.269)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.	-6.212	-7.166
	(4.325)	(4.359)
(log) Mountainous	0.422*	0.395*
	(0.169)	(0.188)
Neighbour conflict	1.473***	1.853**
	(0.447)	(0.712)
Time since independence	0.0124*	0.0111†
	(0.00556)	(0.00586)
Former British colony	-1.082*	-1.076**
	(0.540)	(0.375)
Precolonial centralisation	0.438	0.757*
	(0.412)	(0.373)
Constant	-5.728†	-2.737
	(3.245)	(3.823)
AIC	345.6	223.1
Log pseudolikelihood	-148.8	-91.57
Wald Chi^2 (df)	265.0 (23)	138.9 (19)
Pseudo-R^2	0.214	0.219
Countries	42	37
Observations	795	566

A2.8 Excluding individual countries

	Gambia excluded	Sierra Leone excluded	Liberia excluded	Niger excluded	South Africa excluded	Sudan excluded	Nigeria excluded	Malawi excluded
IH	-1.129*	-1.401*	-1.110*	-1.881*	-1.090*	-1.137*	-1.361*	-1.082*
	(0.555)	(0.580)	(0.536)	(0.812)	(0.534)	(0.545)	(0.679)	(0.535)
IM	-1.187	-1.239	-1.132	-1.149	-1.206	-1.149	-0.393	-1.211
	(1.012)	(1.018)	(1.107)	(1.013)	(1.000)	(1.006)	(0.750)	(1.026)
SR	0.102	0.0422	0.118	0.111	0.0882	0.0865	0.0238	0.104
	(0.536)	(0.551)	(0.675)	(0.589)	(0.537)	(0.541)	(0.576)	(0.536)
Constant	-6.990*	-8.175*	-5.813	-7.564*	-7.772*	-5.942*	-5.976†	-6.934*
	(3.113)	(3.221)	(3.589)	(3.345)	(3.364)	(2.948)	(3.159)	(3.093)
AIC	353.2	339.4	334.6	325.4	352.5	348.7	336.1	352.5
Log pseudolikelihood	-155.6	-148.7	-146.3	-141.7	-155.3	-153.4	-147.1	-155.2
Wald Chi^2 (df)	50.13 (20)	73.10 (20)	138.6 (20)	39.17 (20)	52.10 (20)	51.85 (20)	45.45 (20)	52.52 (20)
Pseudo-R^2	0.171	0.200	0.199	0.188	0.173	0.178	0.194	0.173
Countries	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
Observations	771	781	775	773	771	794	773	771

A2.9 Skewed-y logit models (scobit)

	scobit model 2	scobit model 4
Concordant TA	-1.143*	
	(0.478)	
Institutional hybridity		-1.068*
		(0.517)
Institutional multiplicity		-1.127
		(0.984)
Symbolic recognition		0.170
		(0.487)
Polity score	0.0228	0.0211
	(0.0335)	(0.0323)
Polity score squared	0.00656	0.00630
	(0.00722)	(0.00723)
Prox. regime instability	1.009*	1.007*
	(0.474)	(0.474)
(log) GDP per capita	-0.198	-0.185
	(0.257)	(0.265)
Oil dependency	0.986*	0.962*
	(0.470)	(0.476)
(log) Population size	0.271*	0.288†
	(0.133)	(0.148)
Share of ethnically excluded population	-0.0115	-0.0221
	(0.564)	(0.554)
Ethnic fractionalisation	6.449†	6.642†
	(3.852)	(3.669)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.	-6.193†	-6.420†
	(3.678)	(3.476)
(log) Mountainous	0.314†	0.302†
	(0.174)	(0.167)
Neighbour conflict	1.368**	1.400**
	(0.465)	(0.453)
Time since independence	0.00506	0.00456
	(0.00384)	(0.00379)
Former British colony	-1.178*	-1.161*
	(0.579)	(0.556)
Precolonial centralisation	0.611†	0.577
	(0.339)	(0.357)
Constant	-19.75***	-20.02***
	(2.907)	(3.183)
Lnalpha	13.03***	13.02***
	(1.114)	(1.132)
AIC	350.3	354.1
Log-pseudolikelihood	-155.1	-155.1
Countries	42	41
Observations	795	795

A2.10 Intrastate conflict onset model specifications: pre-colonial heterogeneity included

	Including precolonial heterogeneity
Institutional hybridity	-1.170*
	(0.559)
Institutional multiplicity	-1.306
	(1.032)
Symbolic recognition	0.0769
	(0.537)
Polity score	0.0190
	(0.0354)
Polity score squared	0.00626
	(0.00797)
Prox. regime instability	1.054*
	(0.511)
(log) GDP per capita	-0.225
	(0.278)
Oil dependency	1.033*
	(0.490)
(log) Population size	0.300†
	(0.174)
Share of ethnically excluded population	-0.0246
	(0.590)
Ethnic fractionalisation	6.963
	(4.467)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.	-7.053†
	(4.228)
(log) Mountainous	0.326†
	(0.195)
Neighbour conflict	1.341**
	(0.498)
Time since independence	0.00850
	(0.00542)
Former British colony	-1.281*
	(0.590)
Precolonial centralisation	0.673†
	(0.363)
Precolonial heterogeneity	0.321
	(0.343)
Constant	-6.987*
	(3.241)
AIC	354.7
Countries	42
Observations	795

A2.11 All onsets after one peace-year:

	Model 1	Model 2
Concordant TA interaction	-1.441***	
	(0.414)	
Institutional hybridity		-1.422**
		(0.468)
Institutional multiplicity		-1.437
		(0.888)
Symbolic recognition		0.0424
		(0.428)
Polity score	-0.00696	-0.00741
	(0.0322)	(0.0315)
Polity score squared	0.00143	0.00140
	(0.00734)	(0.00720)
Prox. regime instability	0.779†	0.778†
	(0.403)	(0.401)
(log) GDP per capita	-0.0826	-0.0785
	(0.309)	(0.320)
Oil dependency	0.697	0.691
	(0.558)	(0.570)
(log) Population size	0.376*	0.379*
	(0.164)	(0.167)
Share of ethnically excluded population	-0.404	-0.406
	(0.582)	(0.572)
Ethnic fractionalisation	4.589	4.602
	(3.868)	(3.827)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.	-4.234	-4.255
	(3.842)	(3.794)
(log) Mountainous	0.334†	0.329
	(0.197)	(0.201)
Neighbour conflict	0.668	0.676
	(0.425)	(0.416)
Time since independence	0.00311	0.00297
	(0.00489)	(0.00488)
Former British colony	-1.244*	-1.238**
	(0.493)	(0.479)
Precolonial centralisation	0.680†	0.673†
	(0.370)	(0.367)
Constant	-6.498*	-6.555*
	(2.815)	(2.926)
AIC	419.8	423.8
Log pseudolikelihood	-190.9	-190.9
Wald Chi^2 (df)	72.71 (18)	74.76 (20)
Pseudo-R^2	0.174	0.174
Countries	42	42
Observations	811	811

A2.12 The influence of traditional authority strength on intrastate conflict onset

	(1) TA strength included Model 1	(2) TA strength included Model 2	(3) TA strength included Model 3	(4) TA strength included Model 4
Concordant TA	-2.981**	-13.947†		
	(1.017)	(7.214)		
Institutional hybridity			-2.857**	-56.714*
			(1.074)	(28.923)
Institutional multiplicity			0.000	0.000
			(.)	(.)
Symbolic recognition			0.398	-48.814†
			(1.296)	(27.755)
TA strength	2.454	35.446†	2.696	40.799**
	(2.216)	(19.950)	(2.182)	(13.817)
Polity score		0.027		0.046
		(0.155)		(0.149)
Polity score squared		0.076**		0.087*
		(0.024)		(0.038)
Prox. regime instability		0.959		0.838
		(1.235)		(1.224)
(log) GDP per capita		9.454		13.759**
		(5.973)		(4.617)
Oil dependency		40.520†		118.913**
		(23.612)		(38.767)
(log) Population size		-3.297		-16.396**
		(2.146)		(6.343)
Share of ethnically excluded population		-32.422		-1.117
		(24.598)		(21.289)
Ethnic fractionalisation		10.872		107.599
		(34.553)		(197.060)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.		-6.947		-129.009
		(34.491)		(171.205)
(log) Mountainous		4.084		19.466**
		(3.018)		(6.361)
Neighbour conflict		1.716		4.612**
		(1.367)		(1.581)
Time since independence		0.255†		0.594*
		(0.132)		(0.254)
Former British colony		-18.187†		-41.096***
		(10.229)		(11.168)
Precolonial centralisation		1.882		-28.161
		(3.473)		(18.885)
Constant	-5.853	-122.712†	-6.327†	-62.902
	(3.659)	(69.100)	(3.736)	(56.946)
AIC	102.049	68.427	103.716	56.212
Log pseudolikelihood	-45.024	-22.214	-44.858	-18.106
Wald Chi^2 (df)	24.923 (5)	. (11)	24.555 (6)	. (9)
Pseudo-R^2	0.171	0.591	0.158	0.660
Countries	19	19	19	19
Observations	413	413	380	380

The data for traditional authority strength come from the Afrobarometer data round 4 in 2008.[40] The round 4 data merges Afrobarometer surveys in 20 African countries in 2008. All the country surveys are based on the principles of random selection and representativeness of the sampling in relation to the wider population of a country. For more information about the Afrobarometer surveys, visit http://afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/sampling-principles.

I have compiled the measure of traditional authority strength using four specific questions in the surveys. The first question (Q27b) concerns the salience of traditional authorities and asks how often the respondent has contacted their traditional authority over the past year (0 = never → 3 = often). The second question (49I) captures the respondent's trust towards traditional authorities (0 = not at all → 3 a lot). The third question (Q65) asks how much influence traditional authorities have in the local community (1= none → 4 = a great deal) while the fourth question (Q54C) inquires how well traditional leaders listen to the constituents (0 = never → 3 = always). The variables traditional authority strength is the mean score of these four variables, aggregated into a country level. The variable ranges from 0.88 to 1.83 in the sample data and has the mean 1.44 and standard deviation of 0.28. Mali has the highest average score for traditional authority strength while Tanzania and South Africa have the lowest.

[40] Afrobarometer data and questionnaires (2019), available at http://afrobarometer.org/surveys-and-methods/questionnaires.

A2.13 Intrastate conflict onset model specifications: excluding post-treatment control variables:

	Model 1	Model 2
Concordant TA interaction	-1.225*	
	(0.517)	
Institutional hybridity		-1.145†
		(0.592)
Institutional multiplicity		-1.114
		(0.803)
Symbolic recognition		0.294
		(0.513)
(log) Mountainous	0.174	0.166
	(0.158)	(0.156)
Ethnic fractionalisation	3.340	3.938
	(3.479)	(3.460)
Ethnic fractionalisation sq.	-3.195	-3.854
	(3.287)	(3.145)
Time since independence	0.008*	0.007†
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Former British colony	-1.179*	-1.148*
	(0.556)	(0.518)
Precolonial centralisation	0.720†	0.669†
	(0.380)	(0.363)
Neighbour conflict	1.400**	1.456**
	(0.490)	(0.491)
(log) Population size	0.356**	0.378**
	(0.128)	(0.144)
Constant	-7.290***	-7.643***
	(1.624)	(1.815)
AIC	353.394	356.949
Log pseudolikelihood	-163.697	-163.475
Wald Chi^2 (df)	82.211 (12)	79.064 (14)
Pseudo-R^2	0.164	0.165
Countries	42	42
Observations	811	811

A2.14 Coding Rules for State–Traditional Authority Interaction Types

This part of the Appendix explains the coding rules for the variable state–traditional authority (TA) interaction in the chapter 'Including Chiefs, Maintaining Peace? Examining the Effects of State–Traditional Governance Interaction on Civil Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa'. The Appendix moves from clarifying the coding of discordant versus concordant interactions and explaining the general data collection process to

specifying the sub-categories under these two main interaction types and discussing the main challenges of the coding process.

The variable state–TA interaction is coded on the basis of the status of the institution of TA in the constitutional framework of a country. The reliance on this formal status of TAs is justified on two grounds. Firstly, TAs are the general focal points of traditional governance (Ubink, 2008; Logan, 2013; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016; Muriaas, 2011). TA is a tangible institution that can be similarly identified across the studied region even when different countries and communities use different names and have different types of authorities. Secondly, while it is recognised that the formal, constitutional role of TAs does not determine the variation in the actual interaction in different sub-national regions, it does set the basis upon which traditional leaders build their claims regarding their role within and alongside the state. The constitutional and legal status of TA is assumed to have similar systematic implications for the relationship across the country, even when local realities would influence the concrete roles of individual authorities. This macro-level operationalisation of the interaction types suits analysis on the nature and implications of the role of TAs at the national and inter-elite level, while a more disaggregated approach to the role of TAs is required to study variation in local-level conflict dynamics.

Operationalisation of discordant versus concordant interaction binary variable:

0 = Discordant interaction

No constitutionally explicit recognition of the institution of traditional authority that would define its role vis-à-vis the local and/or national state actors.

- A new constitution is either silent on the institution of TA or refers to it in vague terms without defining the role and authority of TAs. Moreover, local

government or traditional authority acts that recognise the role of TAs are absent after the constitution has been introduced.

- The interaction is also coded as discordant if the constitutional framework formally abolishes the institution of TA.

1 = Concordant interaction

Constitutionally explicit recognition of the institution of traditional authority that defines its role either within the public administration or as a parallel structure of governance.

- A new constitution recognises the institution of TA and defines its role vis-à-vis the state
- And/or legal framework on local governance and/or TAs defines a role for the institution of TA vis-à-vis the state within the constitutional framework.

The binary variable of discordant versus concordant state–TA interaction is coded based on public legal documents of the countries under examination, most importantly their constitutions. For each country, the constitutions in place or adopted during the examined period have been analysed using a set of key words referring to the institution of TA. These key words are *traditional*, *customary*, *local*, *authority*, *chiefs* and *chieftaincy*.[41] When applicable, specific terms for TA institutions, such as the Council of Bashingantahe in Burundi, have been utilised in analysing the constitutions. Using these key words, the constitutions have been closely studied with

[41] French and Portuguese equivalents have been used when English translations of the constitutions were unavailable. In the actual search, the key words have been cut (e.g. tradi?, custom?) in order to capture all forms of their appearance in the text.

regard to the presence versus absence of reference to the institution of TA and in the case of presence, the type of this reference.

If a constitution lacks any reference (e.g. explicit mentioning) to the institution of TA, the country is coded as discordant from the next calendar year onwards until a new constitution (or an amendment to the constitution), local government act, or law regarding traditional authorities specifically recognises the role of TA. The term constitutionally explicit refers to the primacy of the constitutions in setting the basis for the coding of the variable. A new constitution modifies the institutional design of a country and, thus, sets a new ground also for the country's state–TA interaction. In practice this means that if a new constitution lacks all explicit reference to the role of TA (or to the legal instruments in place to define this), the interaction is coded as discordant even if it has been concordant in the past.

In the event that a new constitution mentions the institution of TA but does not define its role within or in relation to the state's public administration (and does not refer to a law in place that does this) the interaction is coded as discordant from the next calendar year onwards until a new constitution (or an amendment to the constitution), local government act, or law concerning TA specifically changes the coding.

For example, the 1992 constitution of Angola refers to TA (while the country's first constitution in 1975 is silent on the topic). However, this is done in terms of authorising the legislative assembly to settle the role of TA later in law: "*Participation of traditional authorities and citizens in local government"* is mentioned in Article 30 as belonging to matters under the legislative powers of the National Assembly. The local government law in 2007 then recognises TA and gives it representation in the local government bodies. The constitution in 2010 recognises the role of TA more

clearly and refers to the legal framework defining its role. Thus, Angola moves from discordant to concordant interaction in 2007 and remains there after the constitution in 2010.

In some cases, the constitution itself defines the role of TA and sets the value of state–TA interaction as concordant. For example, in the 1992 constitution of Ghana the institution of TA is recognised and empowered both in terms of its independent organs (National House of Chiefs) as well as its inclusion in the public administration (both at the national and regional level).

A majority of the constitutions have been retrieved from the Constitute Project website[42] that maintains a large database for constitutions around the world. National legislation websites, international organisations' websites and non-governmental organisations' websites have also been used as sources for the constitutions. With regard to the secondary laws used in the coding process, the focus has been restricted to local government and TA-related acts. These legal instruments are directly linked with the governing role of TAs. Moreover, these acts are widely used across countries under examination as institutional spaces to define the relations of different governance actors. The relevant secondary laws that have been adopted in-between constitutional acts and amendments have been identified using national legislation websites and internet search engines, using the key words *local government act/law, local administration act/law, chieftaincy act/law, traditional authorities act/law*. Databases such as the Gender and Land Tenure Database by the Food and Agriculture Organisation, Landwise, and the USAID Land Portal[43] as well as secondary sources, such Country Profiles of Land Tenure by Bruce (1998) and country-specific studies

[42] https://www.constituteproject.org/

[43] FAO: http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/en/; Landwise: http://landwise.resourceequity.org/; USAID: https://www.usaid.gov/land-tenure.

have been used as a help in identifying, collecting information about and interpreting the secondary laws.

Clarifying subcategories of discordant and concordant state–TA interactions

Discordant (0 = Exclusion, 1 = Symbolic Recognition):

0 = No recognition: No constitutionally explicit formal recognition of TA

- A new constitution is entirely silent on the institution of TA

1 = Symbolic recognition: Constitutional recognition of the institution of TA. No further formal specification of the role of TA

- A new constitution or a local government act refers to TA but does not assign it any clear role

Concordant (2 = Institutional Multiplicity, 3 = Institutional Hybridity):

2 = Institutional multiplicity: Constitutionally explicit recognition of TA as a parallel structure to the public administration that has authority over specific realms of governance.

- A new constitution and/or local government/traditional authority act (that is in line with the constitution) recognises the institution of TA and defines its role outside the local and/or national state administration. TAs have recognised authority in certain governance functions, such as communal land or properties.

3 = Institutional hybridity: Constitutionally explicit recognition and definition of TA as an integrated institution within the public administration

- A new constitution and/or local government/traditional authority act (that is in line with the constitution) recognises the institution of TA and defines its role

within the public administration by giving it some level of representation in national and/or local bodies.

The concordant and discordant state–TA interaction types have been further coded into the four sub-categories in order to capture the empirical variance within the two main groups of interactions. The resulted typology that moves beyond a binary variable of discorant versus concordant interaction produces a more nuanced tool for empirical analyses concerning the role of TA.

Out of the four categories, exclusion is the baseline category with the most observations. A country-year is coded to fall under exclusion if the constitution in place does not mention the institution of TA and if there are no relevant secondary laws (in line with the constitution) that would recognise the role of TA. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, TAs do not enjoy any formal, institutional recognition from the state despite their practical importance at the local level (Crook *et al.*, 2007). Again, the primacy of constitutions should be emphasised. A new constitution sets the basis for the institutional design and thus old legal instruments that are in controversy with the constitution are outweighed.

Symbolic recognition differs from the baseline of exclusion in that TA is not entirely absent from the constitutional framework, but the constitutional framework mentions the institution. However, unlike the two concordant interactions, symbolic recognition is coded to be present when the reference to TA does not involve definition of its role within or parallel to the state. On this basis, Niger, for example is coded as symbolic recognition between 1989-1993, before the adopted legislation concerning the role of TA in 1993. In Niger, the 1987 National Charter recognised TA and outlined

the options for its involvement in the governance structures and the 1991 constitution referred to traditional leaders without defining their role.

With regard to coding of the two concordant interactions, the core line of demarcation is drawn between constitutional frameworks that give representation to the institution of TA within the public administration and those that keep the chieftaincies and their organisational bodies (such as the National or Regional House of Chiefs) outside the state system. For example, the 1995 constitution in Uganda recognises TA as a parallel authority/governance system that has authority over the customary communities' affairs as assigned to it by customs. However, in 2005 the constitution gives representation to TA also in the state organs, thus transferring the country into institutional hybridity. Notably, as in the case of Ghana or South Africa, institutional hybridity can include traits of institutional multiplicity, as traditional leaders have both their own, recognised governing bodies and representation in the public administration. It should not be interpreted, however, that institutional hybridity signifies a more substantive recognition of TA than institutional multiplicity. Indeed, it is emphasised here that the four categories are designed to be analysed as nominal categories rather than as an ordinal scale.

Challenges

Difficulties in accessing the primary sources and drawing clear distinctions between the different forms of recognising TA in a few cases are identified as the main challenges in the coding process. While all country-years have been coded along the four categories, in a couple of instances this has been done on the basis of secondary material providing information on the constitutional framework. For example, the years

1989-1991 in Niger, with its rapidly changing regimes and constitutional frameworks presented challenges to identify the institutional design concerning TA. In this case, secondary literature on the constitutional frameworks during these years was used to determine the value of the independent variable.

Furthermore, a few institutional designs have presented challenges in determining which type of recognition of TA the case belongs to. In the case of Uganda, for example, TA is recognised in the 1995 constitution as having authority "in accordance with the culture, customs and traditions or wishes and aspirations of the people to whom it applies" (Article 246). Traditional authorities are seen as the leaders of their communities with the capacity to hold assets and properties in trust for the community they represent. The 1995 denies any public administrative powers for TA and thus recognises TA as a parallel system of governance, in charge of the customary communities. However, the amended constitution in 2005, while identical in its understanding of the role of TA, also makes traditional authorities titular heads of the regional governments. Although TA is still explicitly denied any administrative or executive powers within the state, the constitutional framework in 2005 changes Uganda's status to institutional hybridity, since there is some level of representation given to traditional authorities as the titular heads of the regional state bodies. In Burundi, a TA institution, the Council of Bashingantahe, is recognised constitutionally from 1998-2005 with the function of contributing to peace and unity in consultation with the president. On the basis of the transitional constitution in 1998 Burundi is coded as institutional multiplicity for this time period. However, it can be questioned whether the Council of Bashingantahe in this case falls under the institution of TA, as the Bashingantahe are nominated by the President and no explicit mentioning to their nature as traditional leaders is present. However, as the institution of Bashingantahe

does derive its legitimacy from traditional governance, the institutional design is seen to constitute an attempt to utilise traditional forms of governance and TA in the search for national coherence.

Finally, an issue of information bias that has rendered the coding of some countries more straightforward than others should be acknowledged. With regard to countries such as South Africa, Ghana, Mozambique and Botswana the integration of TA into the modern state has attracted a fair amount of previous research and reports. This has helped the author in identifying and analysing the source material, particularly in terms of the secondary legislation. However, countries such as Mali, Chad or Cameroon have received considerably less attention in previous studies. Indeed, the data collected and coded present valuable new material that cover also these previously less studied countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, the imbalance in the material available may have led the author to miss-read or miss out some relevant material, such as secondary legislation, concerning countries that have received less attention earlier. While a tedious data collection process and careful reading and triangulating of a wide range of sources have been undertaken to avoid this problem, the author is aware of the challenges related to this data imbalance.

Coding map for state–traditional governance interaction



3. Game of thrones? The implications of traditional authority (TA) contest for local-level stability – Evidence from South Africa

3.1.Abstract

How do state-recognised traditional authorities (TAs) influence local-level stability? Policies that recognise and give TAs public authority, particularly in many sub-Saharan African countries, have attracted growing scholarly interest in TAs. However, much disagreement prevails over the virtues and risks of maintaining a role for TAs alongside the state. This chapter proposes that the unity of traditional leadership is an overlooked but important factor in determining how TAs shape local governance and the prospects for stability. Drawing empirical evidence from South Africa, I test a proposition that contested TA structures contribute to local-level grievances and opportunities that give rise to outbreaks of social unrest. The statistical analysis combines spatial data on municipality and TA structures with local protest data and new data on contested and uncontested traditional leaderships. The results support the theoretical argument. Municipalities with contested TAs have experienced a higher rate of protests, particularly with regard to violent protests. Qualitative data further demonstrates how contested TAs can reduce the accountability and credibility of local governance institutions and facilitate mobilisation against the current power holders.[44]

[44] A version of this chapter was awarded the runner-up price for the Jacek Kugler Political Demography and Geography Student Paper Award at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, 2019, Toronto. The chapter is currently under a review and resubmit process.

3.2.Introduction

The remote Xolobeni village in Eastern Pondoland, South Africa, broke international news in early 2017 as tensions escalated between the Amadiba community and the local authorities. Protests and sporadic violence were triggered by opposition against a proposed mining initiative (Burke, 2016; Pearce, 2017). Notably, a historical contest regarding the traditional leadership in Eastern Pondoland further fuelled the dispute. While the traditional leaders enjoying state recognition supported the mining initiative, the community's rival traditional leaders aligned themselves with the local resisters. The contested nature of the traditional leadership contributed to the escalation of the dispute. It undermined attempts to resolve the situation and provided mobilisation power to each side of the land incompatibility.

The situation in Eastern Pondoland illustrates two intriguing phenomena often present at the local level in developing countries: low-scale violence and protests targeting alleged malfunctioning or injustices in local institutions and the participation of *traditional authorities* (TAs) in governing local affairs alongside the state.[45] Considering the former, empirical analyses have often concentrated on local state capacities and state-centred grievances as sources of variation in local-level political violence and protests.[46] Considerably less comparative attention has been paid to the influence of the latter (e.g. traditional authorities) in fuelling or mitigating local social unrest. The role of traditional authorities has attracted growing interest among scholars examining the interaction between state and traditional institutions (Englebert, 2002a;

[45] As the next section clarifies, the concept traditional authority refers to indigenous and ethnic communities' leaders who derive their legitimacy from traditional governance structures rather than from the modern state. For a definition, see Holzinger et al. (2016, p. 2) and Osaghae (2000, p. 205). Local level here refers to municipality and communal stages.

[46] For example, Wig and Tollefsen (2016) find high quality local government institutions to prevent political violence. De Juan and Wegner (2017) find evidence that horizontal social inequalities across ethnic groups increase the propensity of political protests.

Ntsebeza, 2005; Williams, 2010; Baldwin, 2015; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016). Yet these studies vary considerably in their inferences regarding the implications of TAs: while some expect TAs to exacerbate corruption and induce tensions at the local level others argue that TAs can play an instrumental role in the implementation of public goods and development policies (see Ntsebeza 2005; Williams 2010).[47] The contrasting findings present an intriguing puzzle for political scientists: Why do TAs seem to fuel disputes and protests in some contexts while in others they appear instrumental for maintaining local stability?

This chapter proposes that the structural cohesion of TAs, specifically whether the incumbent leaders are contested or uncontested, is an overlooked but important factor in determining how traditional leaders influence local-level stability. As the opening example suggests, TAs are at times factionalised into contesting leadership wings. Traditional leadership succession remains most often hereditary and is governed by written or oral customary law. Contest over traditional leadership occurs when two or more individuals claim to have a *customarily justified* right to the same traditional leadership position of a community. TA contest commonly dates back to historical moments such as colonial interventions that removed and replaced leaders or succession disputes that induced competing narratives of the rightful holders of specific leadership positions (Oomen, 2005; Picard and Mogale, 2015). TA contest is particularly evident in contexts where the state recognises the institution of traditional leadership and TAs have access to public power. This is when decisions over the rightful traditional authorities of a specific community have concrete implications for individual leaders' benefits and privileges. Challenging the general view that contest

[47] By state-recognised I refer to a constitutional recognition of TA structures in a country. I restrict my focus to these contexts where TAs have been somewhat integrated into the local state institutions and given some public authority.

over political leadership positions always increases accountability, this chapter contends that TA contest has a deteriorating influence on the accountability and credibility of the overall local administration. This contributes to local grievances and political opportunities that give rise to social unrest. Given a context of state-recognised TAs, I expect localities with contested TAs to experience more episodes of local protests than localities with uncontested TAs.

I test the theoretical framework on cross-municipality data of protests in all South African municipalities that have at least one TA structure geographically present. Information for the dependent variable comes from the South African Police Service's Incident Registration Information Service and captures local protest events in 2011-2013. The explanatory variable, uncontested versus contested TAs, is operationalised as the presence and proportion of formally contested TA structures in a municipality. The results of the statistical analyses support the theoretical proposition. Municipalities with contested TAs have experienced higher rates of protests, particularly with regard to violent protests. Furthermore, qualitative data from semi-structured key informant and focus group interviews suggest ways that contested TAs reduce the efficacy and credibility of local governance institutions and facilitate mobilisation against the current power holders.

This chapter contributes to research on mixed or hybrid governance by moving beyond the binary debate of whether the accommodation of traditional institutions alongside the state has negative or positive societal implications. Focusing empirically on South Africa, I show that the way traditional authority institutions influence local governance is shaped by the nature of the integrated traditional leadership. South Africa makes a suitable country of focus for three reasons. First, there has been an upward trend in the scale of local protests that target the alleged malfunctioning of local

governance institutions, albeit to different extent in different municipalities (Alexander, 2010). Second, as elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions with a history of European colonisation, traditional leaders maintain significant societal influence in South Africa. However, there is variation in the type of traditional leadership structures across the country. While some have uncontested leaderships, others are internally contested; inhabiting competing historical narratives over the rightful leadership.

Third, South Africa is a typical case of institutional hybridity. TAs co-exist alongside the state and are constitutionally recognised and integrated into the local government framework. The state considers TAs vital in improving local governance in areas where the institution of traditional leadership is present. [48] The empirical resonance of this type of hybrid governance in sub-Saharan Africa makes it important to study traditional institutions as part of the local governance structures (Raleigh and Linke, 2018). The results call for a careful consideration of the historically constructed, locally embedded institutions in the study of local conflict and governance dynamics.

3.3.Previous literature on TAs

Traditional authorities (TAs) alongside the modern state

Traditional authorities (TAs) refer to community leadership structures that derive their legitimacy from historically and context-specifically constructed customs and norms rather than from the modern state. The key aspect in defining traditional authority is the perception of a leadership role as traditional: ‘The term mainly refers to a mode of

[48] In the Annual report of the Traditional Affairs Department, Minister Pravin Gordhan (2014, p. 9) states: “We recognise the important role played by traditional leaders in rural areas. It is therefore fundamental that they collaborate and cultivate harmonious relations with municipalities to advance development and service delivery”.

legitimisation of political institutions' (Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016, p.2). In practice, the concept encompasses kings, queens, chiefs and headmen that the general public identifies as traditional. TAs remain particularly salient in sub-Saharan Africa, where the imposition of colonial state structures on the existing kingdoms and chieftaincies created dual systems of state and pre-colonial, traditional structures (Herbst, 2000; Koelble, 2005; Ntsebeza, 2005; Baldwin, 2015). TAs maintain significant socio-economic and political influence that ranges from shaping voting decisions to managing and allocating land and resolving communal disputes (ECA, 2007; Buur and Kyed, 2007b; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015; Meriggi and Bulte, 2018). Recently, the role of TAs has attracted the interest of scholars examining armed conflict dynamics (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017; Wig and Kromrey, 2018).

The resilience of TAs in sub-Saharan Africa is often explained by the continued state weakness and the subsequent need to co-opt traditional leadership (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2005). Empirical studies demonstrate considerable levels of public trust in traditional leaders (Logan, 2009, 2013; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015). The Afrobarometer surveys imply that TAs enjoy higher levels of public trust than the state administration, particularly in the rural areas (Logan, 2009, 2013). Yet trust in TAs and the concrete importance of traditional institutions vary both across and within countries. For example, De Juan (2017) shows that traditional conflict resolution instruments remain relatively resilient in the historical strongholds of the pre-colonial kingdoms and chieftaincies, in comparison to other regions.

The organisational structure of a traditional leadership is also found to influence its contemporary capacities (Wig, 2016; Wig and Kromrey, 2018). Cross-country studies indicate that states where the pre-colonial societies had more centralised leadership structures (e.g. more centralised TA structures) have performed better in

terms of growth and administrative development than states with more decentralised pre-colonial communities (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015). These studies suggest that rather than solely depending on the continued weakness of the state, TAs' societal influence is dependent on their structural nature that vary across communities and regions.

Societal implications of state-recognised TAs

One of the most pressing questions with regard to TAs alongside the state is whether the policy of accommodating traditional leadership institutions has positive or negative implications for societal outcomes such as peace and democracy (Englebert, 2002b; Ubink, 2008; Baldwin, 2015). Across sub-Saharan Africa in countries such as South Africa, Niger, and Gambia the state has recognised traditional leaders and made efforts to integrate their authority into the local state (see Englebert, 2002b). The research field remains deeply divided over the expected implications of actively preserving this type of dualism.

Some scholars remain deeply sceptic about empowering TAs in the administration of the local sphere (Mamdani, 1996; Herbst, 2000; Ntsebeza, 2005; Claassens, 2011). Approaching the issue from the perspective of democratisation, they argue that traditional leaders use their powers as state-agents for their private interests rather than for the benefit of the public. In-depth case studies illustrate how traditional authorities can contribute to elite capturing of development and democratisation processes (Ntsebeza, 2005; Mnwana, 2015a). A close relationship between TAs and local state administrators is argued to induce corruption and lead to diminishing returns of public goods (Clayton, Noveck and Levi, 2015; Acemoglu *et al.*, 2016).

Other studies propose that TAs have the potential to act as intermediaries between the state and its constituents (Sklar, 1994, 1999). Coordinating with traditional

authorities is seen to improve the efficacy and accountability of the state as TAs can help to implement policies in areas where state institutions remain weak (Baldwin, 2015). Rather than necessarily leading to more corruption and bad governance, cooperation between local councillors and traditional leaders can channel communication between rural communities and the state (Williams, 2010). Involving TAs in governance can also play a vital role in maintaining national stability in politically unstable periods (Eggen, 2011) and improve the outcomes of development interventions at the local level (Klick, 2016; Pula, 2015; Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst, 2015; Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014). Studies on peacebuilding and transition processes suggest that taking traditional authorities into account in conflict resolution and negotiation processes is crucial for the prospect of peace (Osaghae, 2000; Koelble and LiPuma, 2011).

Variation in the type and internal dynamics of traditional institutions might explain some of these seemingly contrasting findings. For example, Ntsebeza's (2005) region of focus in South Africa (Xhalanga, Eastern Cape) has a particularly ambiguous history with regard to TAs. British colonial rulers intervened strongly in the imposition of specific leaders and the institution has never been unambiguously embedded in the region (Ntsebeza, 2005). On the contrary, William's (2010) focus region is situated in an area (Kwazulu-Natal) where TA structures are generally more embedded and have faced fewer disruptions concerning their authority. These different historical conjectures may have contributed to the variation in the societal influence of TAs today. In connection to this, studies by De Juan (2017), Wig (2016), and others (Englebert, 2002b; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015) demonstrate how variation in the pre-colonial forms of organisation continues to influence traditional governance institutions.

The interest here comes close to these studies. Yet instead of assuming that TAs with a history of a certain type of pre-colonial organisation would have remained more or less capacitated throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods, I explicitly focus on the presence of structural contest in the contemporary traditional leaderships. As the South African example illustrates, focusing solely on the pre-colonial structure of TAs would undermine all later time points (e.g. intervention by colonial powers in the leadership structure or succession disputes after the death of a leader) that may have induced contested TA structures.

3.4.South Africa as a country of focus

TAs in South Africa

Heterogeneity and complex history define the institution of traditional leadership in South Africa. Home to numerous ethnic groups, such as the Xhosa, Zulu, and Tswana, South Africa also accommodates several types of traditional governance systems ranging from highly centralised authority structures (Zulu, Sotho) to more localised hierarchies surrounding individual chiefs (Tswana) (Picard and Mogale, 2015).[49] The colonial and apartheid periods left an ambiguous mark on the institution of traditional leadership in South Africa.[50] On one hand, the colonial powers stripped TAs their autonomy and imposed significant modifications on TA structures, albeit to different extent in different regions (Picard and Mogale, 2015). On the other hand, TAs were instrumental in enabling control over the so-called homelands where South Africans belonging to ethnic African groups were forcedly moved to during the apartheid era.

[49] The organisational structure of TAs will be proxied in the analysis by including a measure of the pre-colonial centralisation of the dominant ethnic group in the municipality.

[50] For an in-depth analysis on the influence of colonial and apartheid eras for South Africa, see Oomen (2005) and Ntsebeza (2005). For an overview of the effects of colonialism on African pre-colonial/traditional societies, see Mamdani (1996) and Herbst (2000).

Those TAs that were recognised by the colonial/apartheid administration gained significant powers in relation to their subjects. As a consequence, the institution of traditional leadership suffered heavily in terms of its reputation and integrity during the colonial and apartheid periods (Koelble and LiPuma, 2005; Oomen, 2005).

While the post-apartheid constitution and the subsequent legislation introduced wall-to-wall democratically elected local governments, it also recognised the institution of TA and outsourced some governance authority to it (Claassens, 2011). Figure 3.1 depicts the municipalities where traditional authority structures are present. The approximately 800 recognised chieftaincies are located in the same geographical areas as the apartheid-period homelands, making Western Cape the only province without traditional authority structures. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) recognises 'the institution, status and role of traditional leadership according to customary law' and defines its role among other things as 'supporting municipalities in the identification of community needs' and 'participating in the development of policy and legislation at local level' (Republic of South Africa, 2003). Traditional authorities are to be represented and consulted at the municipality and district level administrative bodies in the areas where their communities reside. Headmen, senior traditional leaders (chiefs), principal traditional leaders, and kings/queens receive salaries from the state for their services as TAs. The TLGF Act aligns with the popular notion of the gatekeeper or an intermediary role of TAs (Baldwin, 2015).



Figure 3.1. Local municipalities in South Africa: with and without TAs

Participation of traditional leaders in local administration has made urgent the question over the legitimate holders of specific TA positions within communities. State-recognition of TA accentuates a contested traditional leadership structure as it divides the competing factions into those with state-recognition and those without it. The TLGF Act in 2003 set to establish a Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims Commission in order to investigate and make recommendations in situations concerning 'traditional leadership position where the title or right of the incumbent is contested'. It is precisely in these contested versus uncontested structures of traditional leaderships – which date back years (or decades) to specific customary successions or removals of leaders by colonial and/or apartheid powers (see Osaghae 2000) and that can therefore be considered relatively exogenous to contemporary local politics – that

I focus here. Contested TA structures are not specific to South Africa.[51] The implications of contested TA structures have gained research attention for instance in the context of Sierra Leone, where contested chieftaincies are seen to have fuelled local-level violence during the civil war (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017).

Local-level protests in South Africa

With regard to local stability, post-apartheid South Africa has experienced a worrying development concerning localised political protests. Despite the African National Congress-led (ANC) governments' developmental agenda and the achieved improvements in the access to basic services across the country, protests concerning service delivery and other governance-related shortcomings have been on the rise since the mid-2000s. Moreover, the number of violent protests has increased over the last decade (Alexander, 2010; De Juan and Wegner, 2017). Notably, protests in South Africa are often localised to the extent that they primarily target the local authorities and the malfunctioning of local governance – rather than the national government (Alexander, 2010). Atkinson identifies three municipality-level causes for the protests: 'municipal ineffectiveness in service delivery, the poor responsiveness of municipalities to citizens' grievances, and the conspicuous consumption entailed by a culture of self-enrichment on the part of municipal councillors and staff' (Atkinson, 2007, p. 53).

Despite the recognised association between protests and the quality of local governance, the role of TAs in mitigating or fuelling protests by influencing the problems of service delivery and equal distribution of goods and resources has not been

[51] The variation in the TA structures and the availability of systematic data on the internal rivalries within them make South Africa a suitable country of focus.

systematically examined. The presence and variation of protests across municipalities in South Africa calls for a more comprehensive analysis of the actors involved in shaping the subnational governance realities. Given the perceived importance of traditional authorities within the local governance and the contrasting arguments on their role, it is necessary to take a closer look at the conditions determining their implications for local stability.

3.5.Theory: contested versus uncontested TAs and local protests

The scale of local protests and violence is understood to be a function of the existing grievances and opportunities to challenge the status quo at the local level (Buhaug and Rød, 2006; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Wig and Tollefsen, 2016; De Juan and Wegner, 2017). Notably, in a context such as characterised in South Africa, rather than associating the source of local grievances and institutional weakness solely with the local state actors, the role of TAs has to be considered. The constituents recognise TAs' public authority and expect their leaders to be involved in the implementation of development and public goods-related policies for the benefit of the community (Williams, 2010). What vary are the internal structures of these state-recognised TAs: while some have uncontested leadership structures others are contested with regard to specific TA positions.

Given this context, contested TAs are expected to increase the scale of social unrest that challenges local stability for two underlying reasons. First, the presence of customary contest can decrease the accountability of the current incumbents, inducing elite capture of local public goods and services. Contrary to making TAs more accountable to their constituents, the contested nature of the leadership structure exacerbates a winner takes it all-situation in which allegiance to the state elites

outweighs the downward accountability of the traditional leaders. This, in turn, translates to increased local grievances. Second, contested TAs can decrease the overall credibility of the local governance institutions as the traditional leaders in charge (e.g. the incumbent TAs) do not enjoy unambiguous acceptance, but face challenging claims for power from within the community. This creates mobilisation opportunities to challenge the public administration. A contested traditional leadership gives the state, the constituents, and potential external actors room to forum-shop between the competing TAs and question the legitimacy of the incumbent TAs. Figure 3.2 summarises the theoretical argument:



Figure 3.2. Theoretical framework

To specify, the presence of internal contest over traditional leadership positions is expected to exacerbate the problem of unaccountable local leaders that act in the favour of the elites' private interests rather than that of the overall public. Facing contesting claims for power from within the community, the contested incumbent leaders face more uncertainty in terms of the future of their power position and rely increasingly on the state in order to maintain their authority. The prospects of losing the incumbent privileges make the contested traditional leaders more prone to act in a manner that maximises their own short-term goals rather than in consideration of the long-term implications of their actions. This makes the incumbents more vulnerable to

co-option by the local councillors or external actors, who might otherwise switch their support to the rival TAs.[52] Hence, it becomes more rational for the incumbent leaders to act in the advantage of state elites who ultimately enable their privileges. This fosters inter-elite alliances that neglect the needs of the general population and lower general accountability. This, again, will further strengthen existing grievances and opposition against the local administration.

On the contrary, when a TA structure is uncontested, i.e. when there is no contest over the customary rightfulness of the state-recognised TAs, the accountability of the local leaders stands on firmer ground. Facing no imminent threat from within the traditional hierarchy, the incumbent leaders have less pressure to make decisions in a manner that maximises their own short-term gains (at the expense of the public good). Instead, the prospects of long-term responsibility over the well-being of their community – and the potential repercussions from the community in the face of major grievances – should make the traditional leaders inclined to balance between the needs and interests of the wider population and the different elites. Furthermore, lacking overlapping candidates for a traditional leadership position, the local state actors have fewer possibilities to forum-shop between different leaders to see who would be more inclined to advance the elites' interests.

In addition to decreasing the accountability and increasing grievances, contested TAs contribute to a decrease in the credibility of the local administration. As the rightfulness of the incumbent traditional leaders is by definition challenged, the decisions and processes undertaken by them are likely to suffer from weakened credibility in the eyes of their constituents. This erodes the capacities of the local

[52] Raleigh and De Bruijne find that contested TAs were more frequently co-opted by state and non-state armed actors in the Sierra Leonean civil war. In Ntsebeza's and Mnwana's empirical focus areas abuse of power and privileges by TAs coexists with contested TAs (Ntsebeza, 2005; Mnwana, 2015b; Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017).

administration and increases opportunities to stand against it. With contested traditional leadership, the incumbents face rivals in whose interest it is to de-legitimatise the status of the current leaders and mobilise against them.[53] For the constituents (and the state) the situation offers increased possibilities to forum-shop between the different TA factions. Rather than depending on the intermediary role of the current incumbents, the constituents can direct their allegiance to the rival TAs. These, in turn, are in an ideal position to support or manipulate any overt opposition against the current power holders.

The problems with accountability and credibility – which translate to increased grievances and opportunities to mobilise against the local administration – are expected to increase the prospects of local protests in those areas where TAs are contested, comparative to areas with uncontested TAs. This leads to the general theoretical proposition of this chapter.

H1: Local municipalities with contested TA structures experience more protests than local municipalities with uncontested TA structures.

The hypothesis does not imply that uncontested TAs would have a significant, absolute positive impact on local-level stability. There is a range of idiosyncratic factors that influence the ways TAs affect local governance dynamics. When asked about the influence of TAs, several interviewees emphasised individual capacities, integrity, and the personality of traditional leaders in yielding any influence at the local level.[54] However, what is argued is that contest over specific TA positions systematically

[53] See Berenschot (2011) for a case study on the importance of patronage networks for mobilisation.
[54] Interviews with civil society activists and public officials from Pietermaritzburg and Pretoria in May 2017.

exacerbates the problems of accountability and credibility of the local administration, as outlined above. An alternative mechanism would posit that contest within a TA structure can increase accountability as intra-elite competition makes individual leaders more responsible towards the constituents (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014). While theoretically plausible, this chapter argues that the characteristics of life-long power position and hereditary nature of power change the implications of leadership contest (see Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015, for influence of introducing elections in TA structures).

3.6.Research design

Dependent variable

In order to test the theoretical proposition empirically, I use protest data originating from the South African Police Service's Incident Registration Information Service (IRIS). The IRIS database covers all crowd control events reported by the police that involve more than 15 participants. The data include information on the motivation and the nature (peaceful or violent) of the event as well as the location and time of the event. As the unit of analysis in this chapter is local municipality, I have aggregated the number of protest events on municipality level. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the variation of protests across the municipalities under examination.



Figure 3.3. The scale of protests (log) per municipality (with at least one TA structure) in South Africa, 2011-2013

For the purposes of this chapter I use De Juan and Wegner's (2017) recoding of the IRIS data. The authors' coding of the number of protests for the time period of 2011–2013 fits well with the methodological and theoretical framework of this study. In regard to the institutional context, the TLGF Act that defined the role of TAs in South Africa had been in place for eight years in 2011, thus ensuring time for efforts to implement it. Furthermore, the first commission to investigate contested TA structures has finished its mandate and the contested structures have become public. Finally, the 2011 census provides many control variables that enable the consideration of confounding factors. Adopting De Juan's and Wegner's (2017) categorisation of peaceful and violent protests, I first estimate all protests and then restrict the focus to those protest events that are coded as violent. As a robustness check, I further restrict the focus to specific categories of protests. The median number of all protests per

municipality with TA structures is 74 in the period under examination. As the number of protests is a highly skewed variable, I use natural logs of protests in the analysis.

Independent variable

The main independent variable, contested versus uncontested TAs, is operationalised as the presence of formally contested traditional leadership positions in a given municipality. The data for the variable derives from the Southern African Legal Information Institute (SAFLII) that allows search for all legal claims in South African high courts, including those that deal with contesting claims over traditional leadership positions.[55] For a TA to be coded as contested, a legal dispute over the customary rightfulness of an incumbent to hold a certain formal TA position in a given community must have been brought to a state's high court sometime after the 2003 TGLF Act but before 2011. The upper limit is to make sure that the public emergence of the structural contest within a TA precedes and is different from the outcome of interest, local protests in 2011–2013. There are 34 cases of contested TAs that fit the above criteria.

In order to locate the contested TAs in the correct municipalities, the following steps were taken. First, the legal disputes were matched with spatial data received from the South African Demarcation Board concerning all TA structures in the country. Based on information gathered from the legal proceedings each contested leadership position was assigned to a specific TA/chieftaincy. The spatial data of the chieftaincies were then matched with spatial municipality data from GADM. As a result, a dataset with 111 municipalities with at least one TA structure (contested or uncontested) was constructed.[56] Out of the 111 municipalities, 23 municipalities are home to at least one

[55] SAFLII (2017), available at http://www.saflii.org.
[56] I also test the hypothesis using an empirical scope including all South African municipalities (n = 234), including those without any TA structures. See Expanding the analysis for the discussion.

TA structure coded as contested. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the empirical scope of this study, i.e. municipalities with at least one TA structure and the spatial division of the main independent variable across these municipalities, i.e. the presence versus absence of contested TA structures in a municipality.



Figure 3.4. TA municipalities with contested versus uncontested TA structures (only municipalities with TA structures included)

The independent variable is first understood as a binary variable of presence versus absence of contested TAs in a given municipality. This results in 23 municipalities being coded as contested. However, this approach induces two problems. First, some municipalities have more than one TA structure in place and can thus have both contested and uncontested TA structures. In fact, there are on average six TA structures in a municipality. Hence, in a given municipality some TAs might be contested while others are uncontested. In order to take this into account, the independent variable is transformed into a proportion of contested TAs in a given municipality. A municipality with two TA structures out of which one is contested gets

the value 0.5 while a municipality with 10 TAs out of which 3 are contested gets the value 0.3. If the contest over a TA occurs within the highest level of authority (kingship/principal traditional leaders), the municipality gets the value 1 as the contest over the kingship is likely to influence the different chieftaincies in the municipality.[57]

Second, TA structures are matched with specific municipalities based on their spatial centre points (longitude-latitude centre points). However, the influence of contested TAs might not be restricted to the municipality where their centre is located. Many TAs are spatially spread across municipality borders and the borders of TAs are ambiguous in the first place. In order to consider the influence of contested versus uncontested TAs across neighbourhood municipalities, a spatial lag of the independent variable is included in the empirical tests.

Control variables

As control variables, I consider covariates that can influence the main independent and dependent variables of interest. First, I include a measure of the number of TA structures in a municipality, as this affects the odds for contested TAs to emerge and can contribute to the general potential for local protests. I also take into account the pre-colonial organisation of the dominant ethnic groups in the municipality. Previous literature suggests that this can influence both the type of TA structures today and the general stability of a region (Wig, 2016; Wig and Kromrey, 2018). The data for this variable comes from Wig (2016). I use data from the U.S geological survey (2005) to capture the presence of mines in a municipality. While the presence of mines can

[57] The most common type of TA contest takes place at the chieftaincy level between two or more competing senior traditional leaders. Aside these and contests over the kingship, disunity can take place between competing headmen (the lowest level recognised traditional leaders). See the Appendix A3.1 for a table of the types of disputes.

contribute to local social unrest in general, it can also increase the stakes in potential TA contests as TAs have considerable powers over communal land.[58]

Furthermore, economic development can influence the general propensity for local social unrest and motivations for escalating customary disputes between leader candidates. As municipality level economic data remains sparse, I use the DMSP OLS night-time light to capture general economic development (Elvidge *et al.*, 2014). Specifically, I measure the average nightlight levels in a municipality. In order to control for the demographic structural factors that influence both the context in which TAs are structurally contested or uncontested and general mobilisation for protests I refer to the 2011 population census. Specifically, I consider the population density and the share of black Africans in a municipality. I also consider the share of ANC support in the 2011 municipality elections. I take the temporal and spatial dependencies into account by including a measure of past protest rates (2001–2003) and the sum of protests in adjacent municipalities. Finally, I include province dummy variables to account for region specific dynamics.

3.7.Empirical results

Table 3.1 portrays the average scale of protests (logs of total protests and logs of peaceful and violent protests) for municipalities included in the main analysis.[59] The descriptive statistics support the theoretical proposition: On average, municipalities with at least one structurally contested TA have experienced more protest events than municipalities without contested TAs in the period 2011-2013. Notably, there is some

[58] For an in-depth analysis of the implications of traditional leaders' rule over land in sub-Saharan Africa, see Boone (2017).
[59] To reiterate, the empirical scope of this study covers municipalities that have state–TA dual structures in place. The scope is relaxed later in the analysis to include all South African municipalities.

variation in the significance of this variance. Municipalities with contested TAs have a significantly higher rate of violent protests (p-value = 0.004) while the difference in means for peaceful protests fails to reject the null hypothesis of equal means at the 95% confidence level (with a p-value of 0.06).

Table 3.1. Protest levels in municipalities with contested versus uncontested TAs

Municipalities with contested versus uncontested TAs	*Mean log of protests in 2011-2013*	*Mean log of peaceful protests*	*Mean log of violent protests*
Contested TAs	4.743248	4.596535	2.669559
Uncontested TAs	4.143374	4.04188	1.798034

t-tests: p-value for all protests = 0.04, for peaceful protests = 0.06, and for violent protests = 0.004

In order to examine the hypothesised relationship beyond simple binary tabulations, Table 3.2 estimates seven multivariate models of local protests in South African municipalities with at least one TA structure present, using the OLS method. Models 1, 3, and 5 treat the main independent variable as a binary variable of presence versus absence of contested TAs while models 2, 4, 6 and 7 use the proportion of contested TAs in a municipality as the main independent variable. Models 1–4 examine all protest events, models 5-7 restrict their focus to violent protests, and model 7 includes a spatial lag of the independent variable in order to examine the diffusion of the effect of contested TAs in neighbour municipalities.

Table 3.2. OLS-regression models of local protests, 2011–2013

	Model 1 All protests	*Model 2* All protests	*Model 3* All protests	*Model 4* All protests	*Model 5* Violent protests	*Model 7* Violent protests	*Model7* Viol. Prot. SLX
Presence of contested TA	0.518*		0.312*		0.411*		
	(0.259)		(0.145)		(0.167)		
Number of TAs	0.033	0.033	0.021†	0.021†	0.025	0.025	0.012
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Proportion of contested TAs		1.296**		0.464*		0.494*	0.626**
		(0.407)		(0.199)		(0.214)	(0.224)
Average nightlight			0.382	0.381	2.448	2.649	2.812
			(3.065)	(3.052)	(3.995)	(3.997)	(4.129)
(log) Population density			0.181*	0.181*	0.112	0.109	0.132
			(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.096)
Share of black South Africans			-0.816	-0.613	-3.279*	-3.024†	-1.992
			(2.114)	(2.082)	(1.621)	(1.577)	(1.773)
Mines			0.429**	0.392*	0.398*	0.362†	0.350†
			(0.159)	(0.152)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.197)
Pre-colonial centralization			-0.198†	-0.205*	-0.159	-0.165	-0.173
			(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.128)
ANC share			-1.538*	-1.527*	-0.627	-0.619	-0.915
			(0.614)	(0.619)	(0.850)	(0.864)	(0.842)
(log) Past protests			0.488***	0.498***	0.402***	0.417***	0.400***
			(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
Neighbour protests			-0.026	-0.026			
			(0.016)	(0.016)			
Neighbour viol. protests					-0.071*	-0.073**	-0.062*
					(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Spatial lag of contested TAs							-0.171
							(0.171)
Constant	3.963***	3.947***	1.639	1.476	2.695	2.529	1.601
	(0.195)	(0.190)	(1.885)	(1.868)	(1.928)	(1.933)	(2.330)
Observations	110	110	110	110	110	110	103
R^2	0.053	0.087	0.750	0.747	0.678	0.671	0.662

Standard errors clustered by municipality, province dummies not reported in the table. †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001.

The results of the core models support the theoretical hypothesis. The coefficient for contested TAs is systematically positive and statistically different from null across the models, both when the independent variable is understood as a binary variable and

when it is operationalised as a proportion of contested TAs. The estimated influence of contested TAs is somewhat more substantive for the proportion of contested TAs than for the simple binary variable of the presence of contested TAs. Moreover, the correlation between contested TAs and protests is particularly strong with regard to violent events. Based on model six, a ten-percentage point increase in contested TAs increases violent protests by 4.9 percent. Figure 3.5 illustrates the coefficients of the main independent variable and other key explanatory variables.



Figure 3.5. Coefficients of key independent variables for (log) protests in 2011–2013

That a higher proportion of contested traditional leaderships increases the estimated scale of local protests and violent events in particular supports the theoretical framework. As discussed, the proportion of contested TAs might better grasp the variation induced by multiple uncontested and/or contested TAs in a municipality, in

comparison to the simple binary variable. Furthermore, while estimating all protests can include events where mobilisation is motivated by other than low accountability and credibility issues, the events that are coded as violent indicate that the local authorities struggle to prevent outbursts of social unrest.

Aside the protest-inducing effect of contested TAs, the simple number of TAs in a municipality is positively correlated with the scale of protests. However, this correlation is significant only at the 90% confidence level and when estimating all protests. Moreover, the substantive effect of the number of TAs is small. Considering the potential spatial diffusion of the independent variable, model 7 shows an insignificant coefficient for the spatial lag of the proportion of contested TAs. The influence of contested TAs does not travel across municipality boundaries. Notably, testing the robustness of the results by examining spatial interdependence of the dependent variable and including a spatial lag of the residuals implies that there is significant spatial clustering of the residuals in the model. However, the protest-inducing influence of contested TAs remains robust when adding the spatial lags in the model.[60]

With regard to the control variables, the measure of past protests has a substantially and statistically significant positive coefficient across the models. The scale of protests in a municipality is dependent on the scale of past protests, implying strong historical continuities in the stability versus instability of local municipalities in South Africa. A ten-percentage point increase in past protests is estimated to increase protest levels in 2011–2013 by approximately 4–5 percent. The scale of violent protests in the neighbourhood municipalities has a negative and significant coefficient, implying that a higher total number of violent protests in the neighbourhood is

[60] See the Appendix A3.6 for the regression tables of the spatial regression models.

associated with lower scales of violent protests in a municipality. A possible explanation for this is that municipalities with relatively high scales of violent protests increase the neighbourhood protest value for municipalities with modest levels of violent protests and induce this correlation. Investigating the spatial correlation of protests further indicates that significant clustering only occurs around a few municipalities.

With regard to all protests, more densely populated municipalities are estimated to have experienced significantly higher rates of protests. This makes intuitive sense: the denser the municipality is populated the easier it is to mobilise people. However, population density does not seem to be driving violent protests as indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficient estimate. The share of ANC voters has a considerable negative and statistically significant effect on all protests. Yet the standard error of this variable is rather large, and the variable loses its significance when estimating violent protests. This might imply that there are more peaceful, political protests in municipalities where the opposition parties challenge the dominance of the ANC, but that party politics do not have as clear influence on the variation of violent protests.

General economic development, captured by the nightlight emissions, does not appear to explain local-level protest scales in municipalities. However, the presence of mines has the anticipated positive and significant effect on protests. The economic importance of mines in South Africa and the disputes surrounding labour rights and distribution of the wealth produced by the mine industry explains these results. Notably, controlling for mines does not alter the interpretation with regard to the main independent variable. Finally, municipalities with a history of more centralised pre-

colonial communities are estimated to have lower scales of protests, yet this correlation is not robust.

Expanding the Analysis

I use several additional tests to assess the strength of the results (see Appendix A3.3–3.10 for the model specifications). First, I include a measure of local state capacity (municipality staff per capita) as the overall strength of the local state can influence the weight of TAs in the municipality and the motivations and opportunities to protest. While the indicator has a negative, substantially small effect on protest rates, its inclusion does not change the results regarding the main independent variable.

Furthermore, I exclude all metropolitan areas from the baseline models. Metropolitan municipalities have generally higher protest levels and motivations to protest there can differ from other local municipalities. Excluding these areas in fact increases the substantive effect of the proportion of contested TAs on protest levels. The core results remain robust also when excluding other possible outliers with particularly high rates of protests. In order to further examine the neighbourhood effects, I include a simple control of the neighbouring municipalities' proportion of contested TAs instead of the spatial lag of the independent variable. The results remain unaltered in this model specification.

Table 3.3. Modelling protests across all municipalities in South Africa

	Model 8 (log) total protests	*Model 9* (log) violent protests
Proportion of contested TAs	0.596*	0.743**
	(0.256)	(0.244)
Presence of TA	-0.042	-0.108
	(0.192)	(0.206)
Number of TAs	0.010	0.006
	(0.013)	(0.017)
Average nightlight	1.704	2.654
	(2.187)	(2.193)
(log) Population density	0.181***	0.199***
	(0.045)	(0.044)
Share of black South Africans	0.073	0.062
	(0.572)	(0.552)
Mines	0.074	-0.043
	(0.131)	(0.151)
Pre-colonial centralization	0.001	-0.038
	(0.068)	(0.072)
ANC share	-0.518	0.114
	(0.505)	(0.630)
(log) Past protests	0.553***	0.428***
	(0.064)	(0.062)
Constant	-0.448	-2.330***
	(0.627)	(0.629)
Observations	217	217
R^2	0.709	0.623

Standard errors clustered by municipality, province dummies not reported in the table. †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001.

Furthermore, while the primary focus of this chapter is on municipalities with dual structures of local state and TAs (thus comparing municipalities with contested TAs to those with uncontested TAs), it is intriguing to examine whether the effect of contested TAs holds when the empirical analysis is expanded to cover all South African municipalities (e.g. including also those that do not have any TAs). Table 3.3 replicates models 4 and 6 but expands the analysis to cover all South African municipalities. Notably, widening the geographical scope does not diminish the effect of the proportion of contested TAs in a municipality. As models 8–9 illustrate, the estimated influence of the proportion of contested TAs increases when including all municipalities. Interestingly, the coefficient of presence versus absence of TAs is not statistically significant. While the presence of TAs does not itself influence the

prospects for protests, the presence of contested TAs has a distinct protest-inducing effect – even when including municipalities that do not have any TA structures in place.

Finally, in order to test the robustness of the findings across different operationalisations of the dependent variable, I estimate protest levels in all municipalities using a more conservative approach to what counts as a protest. First, I restrict the focus to those peaceful and violent protests that De Juan and Wegner (2017) have coded under the categories of state, service, identity, and elections-related protests. The results remain in line with the core models. Second, I focus solely on state and service-related protests as these can be seen to derive most directly from malfunctional and illegitimate governance. The effect of contested TAs remains robust.

Third, I turn to the ACLED dataset and its protest and riot categories. Notably, ACLED codes significantly fewer incidents of protests and riots in the time period than the South African Police Incidents Registration Information Service. Different coding schemes explain this difference.[61] Due to the high rate of zero events in municipalities I use protest/riot incidents between 2011–2013 as the dependent variable while controlling for the number of protests in 2003. The results of the analysis using logit models estimating the likelihood of protest/riot incidents in a municipality are in line with the results from the main analyses. Contested TAs increase the likelihood of a protest and/or riot event taking place in a local municipality (both when the analysis is restricted to municipalities with TA structures and when all South African municipalities are examined).

[61] ACLED (2010) collects and geocodes events of political violence, demonstrations, riots, and other politically significant events defines protests as "a public demonstration in which the participants do not engage in violence", while rioting refers to "violent form of demonstration where the participants engage in violent acts, including but not limited to rock throwing, property destruction, etc.". ACLED's data collection is based on news reports, which explains the considerably lower number of events reported in many municipalities. Smaller events in rural areas can be easily left unreported in news agencies and, thus, many small events captured by the IRIS-data have been left out in the ACLED-data.

Qualitative Evidence: Contested TAs Undermining Governance

While the statistical analysis points to a systematic correlation between contested TA structures and local protests, it does not directly tackle the mechanisms through which contested structures contribute to increasing local unrest. In order to examine the issue more in-depth, I use qualitative evidence from semi-structured key informant interviews with policy-makers, representatives of TAs, and civil society members as well as two community focus-group discussions in South Africa in April-June 2017.[62] The qualitative evidence helps to unpack how contested TAs have facilitated mobilisation and influenced the accountability of individual traditional leaders. Examples also point to a more general challenge of governance efficacy in municipalities with contested TA structures.

First, contested TAs appear to facilitate mobilisation against current power holders around existing issues of incompatibilities. As a public official noted, contesting factions (particularly traditional leaders challenging the current incumbents) can fuel existing grievances to mobilise support for themselves and against their rivalries.[63] This was evident in the case of the AmaMpondo community in Eastern Cape, where the parties to the customary kingship contest used the substantive issue of controversial land-use plans to gain grassroots support for themselves. An interviewed community elder, who was fiercely against the controversial land-use initiatives in the area, expressed strong allegiance and gratitude towards the currently dethroned TAs who actively supported the opposition against the local government's plans. The elder discredited the incumbent TAs (who had allied with the local state on the land-use

[62] The author conducted the interviews in Cape Town, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Ngquza Hill, Mbizana, and Bhisho in the spring and summer 2017. See Appendix A3.11 for more information.
[63] Interview with a public official in Pretoria, May 2017.

plans) and did not view them as legitimate leaders of the community. Moreover, while the participants in the two focus groups generally considered their communities to be peaceful, the ongoing TA contest was recognised as exacerbating communal tensions. Both of the focus groups reported that the kingship contest can spread to the grassroots level and 'causes divisions at the lowest level', as mobilisation around other substantive issues takes place along the contesting leadership lines.[64]

Second, TA contest is seen to facilitate forum-shopping behaviour whereby the state can select between the rival factions in a contested TA structure and formally nominate those leader candidates that will act in a manner favourable to the state's interests. This fosters elite-alliances that can undermine public goods provisions and increase grievances. The following interview extract describes the perspective of a currently dethroned traditional leader:

'*Because the government now picks and chooses whoever is going to be their puppet. […] in our case they will choose […] because you're gonna give him a bottle of whisky and he will sign off all the land'.*

More neutral interviewees also recognised the problem of accountability of the contested TAs. As one informant noted, for those traditional leaders that face contest or whose continuing power position is otherwise endangered, the temptation to abuse power in order to gain short-term profits is particularly high: 'so instead of playing long-term, they are looking at can I get something now before I vacate. They don't have that kind of long-term planning'. Reports from areas with contested TAs and an incumbent that is perceived unaccountable and co-opted by the local state elites support

[64] The focus group discussions took place in two villages in Mbizana local municipality. The participants were mostly household heads and sub-headmen.

this argument.[65] For example, in Mogalakwena municipality (Limpopo province), protests concerning land have taken place in response to decision-making by a contested chief and the local state.[66]

Aside facilitating mobilisation against the local administration and changing the rationale of the incumbent TAs, TA contest seems to harm governance efficacy by preventing development at the local level. In Kwazulu-Natal, the Mbuyazi clan has reportedly been deprived of considerable funds due to a TA contest.[67] The subsequent lack of development has led to protests in the area. This incapacitation of local governance in TA contest situations was brought up also in the key informant interviews. Describing a contested TA in Limpopo, a public official noted that 'everything stagnated there, up until that [the contested structure] was resolved'.

Albeit supporting the hypothesis, the reduced governance efficacy due to contested TAs points to a slightly different mechanism than theoretically suggested. Instead of deliberate lack of accountability, TA contest can also simply lead to decreased efficacy of policy initiatives and governance in general, which strengthens grievances and sparks protests. A representative of a contested traditional leadership alluded to this when stating their fears that the TA contest would continue contributing to grievances and eventually lead to the community rising against all authority sides due to neglect of general development and welfare.

[65] See Channel NewsAsia (2017), accessed through Lexis Nexis database.
[66] Similar outbursts of grievances have taken place in the Moses Kotane municipality, where a contested incumbent TA has been accused for abusing his authority and depriving development from the wider community.
[67] See Harper (2017), accessed through Lexis Nexis database.

3.8.Conclusion

This chapter has examined the implications of contested versus uncontested TAs for local-level stability in contexts portrayed by state–TA dualism. The chapter has combined data on local-level protests with new data on uncontested versus contested TA structures in South Africa in order to examine whether municipalities with contested TA structures experience more local instabilities than municipalities with uncontested TA structures. The empirical findings support the theoretical proposition. Municipalities where TA structures are factionalised into competing claimants for specific authority positions have recently experienced significantly higher scales of protests than municipalities with uncontested TA structures. The effect of contested TAs remains robust under various model specifications.

A few concluding remarks deserve attention here. First, the results contribute to an increasing number of studies that have demonstrated the influence of traditional governance institutions in the modern state. Corroborating the findings of recent empirical studies (Logan, 2009, 2013; Baldwin, 2015; Wig, 2016; De Juan, 2017; Wig and Kromrey, 2018), the results show that traditional institutions can yield significant influence in the local governance realities. Aside and through their de facto importance in the lives of local communities, TAs influence local-level grievances and contribute to mobilising people. The qualitative data has further highlighted how contested TA structures lower the efficiency of local governance institutions and facilitate contentious mobilisation around local issues of incompatibilities.

Second, the results highlight the importance of the structure of TAs for their societal implications. The main contribution of the chapter is to demonstrate that rather than being a question about negative versus positive implications, systematic factors – e.g. the contested versus uncontested nature of the TAs – influence the way TAs

contribute to local-level realities. It is noteworthy that the effects of contested TAs remain considerable even when expanding the analysis to cover municipalities without any state–TA dualism in place.

Aside supporting the theoretical proposition here, the findings bear general implications for the policy of recognising traditional leadership and outsourcing the institution authority at the local level. Specifically, the empirical findings suggest that governments concerned about the participation of TAs in local governance may want to investigate the historical cohesion and the current structure of the TAs that are to be recognised prior to their accommodation, as the recognition itself can exacerbate problems associated to contested TAs. In relation to this, future studies should pay closer attention to how contest over TA positions influences societies outside the context of state-recognition of TAs.

Furthermore, while the results suggest that contested TAs can escalate grievances and provide opportunities to protest, less focus has been given to the potentially constructive role of TAs. The conditions and the extent that TAs can yield positive influence at the local level remains understudied. Can historically cohesive traditional leaderships have a significantly positive influence in the quality of local governance or do they simply cause less trouble?

Finally, future studies should continue tracing the historical continuities in the variation of local-level governance institutions. Recent studies from Wig and Kromrey (2018) and De Juan (2017) demonstrate the continuing influence that pre-colonial institutions have on post-colonial societies. This chapter has found historically constructed contests over the customary right to govern to influence protest levels of local municipalities where TAs are recognised. To what extent historical coherence or contestation of local governance institutions influences such important outcomes as

democratisation or armed conflict dynamics should be the focus of future research. In light of the popularity of the policy of accommodation of TAs, it is vital to understand the extent to which historical dependencies determine the role that traditional leadership structures play alongside the local state structures.

3.9.Appendices

A3.1 Different types of traditional authority contests in local municipalities with state-recognised TA structures

Type of TA contest	**N**
Kingship	5
Senior traditional leadership (chiefs)	12
Headman	3
Multiple form of contest within a municipality	3

A3.2 Descriptive statistics of independent variables

	Obs	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev.	Source
Presence of TA contest in a municipality	111	0	1	.2072072	.4071434	Author
Proportion of contested TAs	111	0	1	.0979608	.2584407	Author
Number of TAs in a municipality	111	1	30	7.099099	5.463856	Author
Average nightlight	111	0701538	.2402316	.098931	0313519	
Log population density	110	9.013189	16.04859	12.413	1.196504	2011 Census
Share of black South Africans	111	.7379938	.9971096	.9557657	.0584399	2011 Census
Mines	111	0	1	.2882883	.4550202	U.S. geological survey (2005)
Pre-colonial centralis.	111	0	3	1.774775	1.310341	Wig (2016)
ANC share	111	.1212669	.9512468	.6987389	.1792136	Electoral commission of South Africa (2011)
Municipality staff per capita		136.4	50777.5	2109.754	6341.238	2011 Census
Log protests 2001-2003	110	0	7.164721	3.60663	1.450024	De Juan and Wegner (2017)
Neighbouring municipality protests	110	0	36.5368	17.88973	7.004917	De Juan and Wegner (2017)
Neighbouring municipality violent protest	110	0	16.47318	7.924784	3.362002	De Juan and Wegner (2017)
Neighbouring municipality share of contested TAs	110	0	2	.3712338	.5115143	Author

A3.3 Including municipality staff per capita measure[68]

	(1) (log) total protests	(2) (log) total protests	(3) (log) violent protests	(4) (log) violent protests
Presence of contested TA	0.326*		0.452**	
	(0.148)		(0.166)	
Proportion of contested TAs		0.483*		0.543*
		(0.204)		(0.211)
Number of TAs	0.020	0.020	0.018	0.018
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Average nightlight	0.319	0.407	1.772	2.077
	(3.289)	(3.255)	(4.170)	(4.164)
(log) Population density	0.184*	0.178*	0.142	0.130
	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.095)	(0.097)
Share of black South Africans	-0.324	-0.095	-2.662	-2.408
	(2.400)	(2.354)	(1.832)	(1.785)
Mines	0.422*	0.395*	0.378†	0.357†
	(0.169)	(0.162)	(0.200)	(0.198)
Pre-colonial centralization	-0.205†	-0.213†	-0.166	-0.174
	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.128)	(0.132)
ANC share	-1.693**	-1.689**	-0.874	-0.862
	(0.611)	(0.618)	(0.849)	(0.867)
(log) past protests	0.482***	0.493***	0.380***	0.396***
	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Neighbour protests	-0.025	-0.026		
	(0.018)	(0.018)		
Municipality staff per capita	-0.000†	-0.000†	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Neighbour viol. protests			-0.057†	-0.061*
			(0.029)	(0.030)
Constant	1.315	1.207	2.050	1.990
	(2.241)	(2.225)	(2.310)	(2.320)
Observations	104	104	104	104
R^2	0.722	0.719	0.669	0.660

A3.4 Models excluding metropolitan areas

	(1) (log) total protests	(2) (log) violent protests
Proportion of contested TAs	0.543*	0.652**
	(0.230)	(0.232)
Number of TAs	0.018	0.021
	(0.013)	(0.018)
Average nightlight	1.045	4.180
	(3.389)	(4.634)

[68] All models in this Appendix have standard errors, clustered by municipality, reported in parentheses; †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001, province dummies not reported in the tables

(log) Population density	0.175†	0.097
	(0.098)	(0.103)
Share of black South Africans	-0.255	-2.562
	(2.625)	(1.864)
Mines	0.365*	0.320
	(0.152)	(0.208)
Pre-colonial centralization	-0.221	-0.193
	(0.133)	(0.139)
ANC share	-1.604**	-0.803
	(0.603)	(0.897)
(log) past protests	0.494***	0.412***
	(0.088)	(0.084)
Neighbour protests	-0.026†	
	(0.015)	
Neighbour viol. protests		-0.074**
		(0.028)
Constant	1.234	2.285
	(2.206)	(2.122)
Observations	106	106
R^2	0.705	0.607

A3.5 Excluding outliers with extremely high protest levels

	(1) (log) total protests	(2) (log) total protests	(3) (log) violent protests	(4) (log) violent protests
Presence of contested TA	0.346*		0.551**	
	(0.143)		(0.185)	
Number of TAs	0.016	0.015	0.021	0.021
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Proportion of contested TAs		0.571**		0.827**
		(0.214)		(0.251)
Average nightlight	-3.119	-2.490	4.779	5.641
	(5.483)	(5.477)	(5.518)	(5.635)
(log) Population density	0.201*	0.202*	0.077	0.068
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.106)
Share of black South Africans	-0.022	0.147	-2.745	-2.357
	(2.740)	(2.707)	(1.868)	(1.828)
Mines	0.404†	0.363*	0.240	0.179
	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.206)	(0.213)
Pre-colonial centralization	-0.212†	-0.218†	-0.198	-0.217
	(0.121)	(0.125)	(0.131)	(0.137)
ANC share	-1.291*	-1.324*	-0.938	-0.987
	(0.539)	(0.544)	(0.905)	(0.924)
(log) past protests	0.417***	0.429***	0.361***	0.382***
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Neighbour protests	-0.018	-0.019		
	(0.015)	(0.015)		
Neighbour viol. protests			-0.070*	-0.076**
			(0.028)	(0.028)

Constant	0.797	0.646	2.802	2.608
	(2.406)	(2.384)	(2.120)	(2.136)
Observations	100	100	101	101
R2	0.653	0.651	0.538	0.526

A3.6 Neighbouring municipalities proportion of contested TAs included

	(1)	(2)
	(log) total protests	(log) violent protests
Proportion of contested TAs	0.552**	0.533*
	(0.205)	(0.226)
Number of TAs	0.016	0.022
	(0.013)	(0.018)
Average nightlight	1.201	2.916
	(3.178)	(4.002)
(log) Population density	0.185*	0.112
	(0.076)	(0.089)
Share of black South Africans	-0.112	-2.801†
	(2.170)	(1.589)
Mines	0.379*	0.356†
	(0.157)	(0.197)
Pre-colonial centralization	-0.206*	-0.164
	(0.115)	(0.125)
ANC share	-1.631**	-0.654
	(0.596)	(0.856)
(log) past protests	0.504***	0.419***
	(0.084)	(0.081)
Neighbour protests	-0.028†	
	(0.016)	
Proportion of contested TAs in neighbouring munic.	-0.206†	-0.097
	(0.121)	(0.169)
Neighbour viol. protests		-0.072*
		(0.028)
Constant	1.041	2.300
	(1.947)	(1.953)
Observations	110	110
R2	0.752	0.672

A3.6 Spatial models estimating (log) violent protests

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	SAR-model	SLX-model	SEM-model	SAR & SEM
Proportion of contested TAs	0.870*	0.626**	0.941**	0.913*
	(0.360)	(0.224)	(0.363)	(0.363)
Number of TAs	-0.008	0.012	-0.014	-0.016
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Average nightlight	-4.046	2.812	-2.304	-1.537
	(3.585)	(4.129)	(3.891)	(4.092)
(log) Population density	0.203†	0.132	0.291*	0.298**
	(0.117)	(0.096)	(0.117)	(0.112)
Share of black South Africans	-3.212	-1.992	-0.586	0.052
	(2.009)	(1.773)	(2.063)	(2.120)
Mines	0.367†	0.350†	0.294	0.270

	(0.216)	(0.197)	(0.222)	(0.222)
Pre-colonial centralization	-0.066	-0.173	-0.147	-0.188
	(0.084)	(0.128)	(0.100)	(0.123)
ANC share	0.321	-0.915	0.257	0.275
	(0.598)	(0.842)	(0.680)	(0.706)
(log) Past protests	0.444***	0.400***	0.448***	0.446***
	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.080)
Neighbour viol. protests		-0.062*		
		(0.030)		
SLX1		-0.171		
		(0.171)		
Constant	0.771	1.601	-2.412	-2.857
	(2.615)	(2.330)	(2.766)	(2.652)
lambda	0.166*			-0.114
	(0.097)			(0.181)
sigma^2	0.733***		0.692***	0.669***
	(0.102)		(0.098)	(0.103)
rho			0.355**	0.456*
			(0.131)	(0.186)
Observations	103	103	103	103
Log pseudolikelihood	-130.536	-116.578	-128.991	-128.792

A3.7 Measures of local spatial autocorrelation (Moran's Ii (log violent protests)

Municipality	**Ii**	**E(Ii)**	**sd(Ii)**	**z**	**p-value***
Matatiele	1.295	-0.010	0.698	1.868	0.062
Mbizana	-0.022	-0.010	0.395	-0.032	0.975
Ntabankulu	0.016	-0.010	0.435	0.060	0.952
Umzimvubu	0.140	-0.010	0.435	0.343	0.731
Amahlathi	-0.087	-0.010	0.435	-0.178	0.858
Mbhashe	0.174	-0.010	0.567	0.325	0.746
Mnquma	0.059	-0.010	0.489	0.141	0.888
Ngqushwa	-0.687	-0.010	0.698	-0.969	0.333
Nkonkobe	0.032	-0.010	0.489	0.086	0.931
Buffalo City	-0.739	-0.010	0.567	-1.285	0.199
Emalahleni	-0.141	-0.010	0.489	-0.269	0.788
Engcobo	-0.159	-0.010	0.395	-0.377	0.706
Intsika Yethu	0.361	-0.010	0.395	0.939	0.348
Lukanji	-0.139	-0.010	0.489	-0.264	0.791
Sakhisizwe	0.444	-0.010	0.435	1.044	0.297
Elundini	0.319	-0.010	0.364	0.904	0.366
Senqu	-0.905	-0.010	0.567	-1.578	0.115
King Sabata Dal.	-0.406	-0.010	0.435	-0.910	0.363
Mhlontlo	0.081	-0.010	0.435	0.208	0.835
Ngquza Hill	0.067	-0.010	0.489	0.157	0.875
Nyandeni	0.094	-0.010	0.435	0.239	0.811
Port St Johns	0.336	-0.010	0.698	0.495	0.621
Mangaung	0.000	0.000	0.000	.	.
Maluti a Phof,	-0.032	-0.010	0.698	-0.032	0.974
City of Tshwane	0.876	-0.010	0.489	1.812	0.070
Dannhauser	0.079	-0.010	0.993	0.089	0.929
KwaDukuza	0.152	-0.010	0.489	0.330	0.741
Mandeni	-0.388	-0.010	0.698	-0.541	0.588
Maphumulo	**-1.035**	**-0.010**	**0.435**	**-2.355**	**0.019**

Ndwedwe	-0.167	-0.010	0.489	-0.321	0.748
Ingwe	0.564	-0.010	0.435	1.319	0.187
Ubuhlebezwe	0.531	-0.010	0.435	1.243	0.214
Umzimkhulu	1.370	-0.010	0.489	2.822	0.005
Ezingoleni	0.046	-0.010	0.489	0.114	0.910
Hibiscus Coast	0.022	-0.010	0.567	0.056	0.955
Umdoni	-0.083	-0.010	0.698	-0.105	0.917
UMuziwabantu	0.545	-0.010	0.489	1.135	0.257
Umzumbe	-0.371	-0.010	0.364	-0.993	0.321
Vulamehlo	0.061	-0.010	0.435	0.162	0.871
Impendle	0.063	-0.010	0.567	0.129	0.898
Mkhambathini	-0.606	-0.010	0.489	-1.219	0.223
Richmond	-0.211	-0.010	0.435	-0.462	0.644
The Msunduzi	-0.617	-0.010	0.435	-1.395	0.163
uMshwathi	-0.240	-0.010	0.489	-0.471	0.637
Hlabisa	**0.764**	**-0.010**	**0.395**	**1.959**	**0.050**
Jozini	0.921	-0.010	0.489	1.904	0.057
Mtubatuba	0.030	-0.010	0.698	0.056	0.955
Umhlabuyalingana	1.536	-0.010	0.993	1.558	0.119
Msinga	-0.053	-0.010	0.435	-0.100	0.920
Nqutu	-0.016	-0.010	0.489	-0.013	0.989
Umvoti	0.000	-0.010	0.435	0.023	0.981
Emnambithi/Ladys.	0.037	-0.010	0.435	0.108	0.914
Imbabazane	0.244	-0.010	0.567	0.447	0.655
Indaka	-0.219	-0.010	0.567	-0.369	0.712
Okhahlamba	-0.109	-0.010	0.489	-0.204	0.839
Umtshezi	-0.066	-0.010	0.435	-0.130	0.897
Mfolozi	0.278	-0.010	0.489	0.588	0.556
Nkandla	-0.143	-0.010	0.395	-0.336	0.737
Ntambanana	0.385	-0.010	0.435	0.908	0.364
uMhlathuze	-0.576	-0.010	0.567	-0.998	0.318
uMlalazi	0.112	-0.010	0.395	0.308	0.758
Abaqulusi	-0.064	-0.010	0.435	-0.126	0.900
eDumbe	-0.082	-0.010	0.489	-0.149	0.882
Nongoma	0.160	-0.010	0.435	0.390	0.696
Ulundi	-0.331	-0.010	0.395	-0.814	0.416
UPhongolo	0.027	-0.010	0.435	0.085	0.932
Aganang	0.610	-0.010	0.489	1.268	0.205
Blouberg	0.280	-0.010	0.435	0.666	0.505
Lepele-Nkumpi	0.047	-0.010	0.364	0.157	0.876
Molemole	0.418	-0.010	0.435	0.984	0.325
Polokwane	-0.516	-0.010	0.489	-1.036	0.300
Ba-Phalaborwa	0.059	-0.010	0.489	0.141	0.888
Greater Giyani	-0.017	-0.010	0.567	-0.013	0.990
Greater Letaba	0.075	-0.010	0.489	0.173	0.862
Maruleng	-0.447	-0.010	0.435	-1.005	0.315
Ephraim Mogale	0.537	-0.010	0.567	0.964	0.335
Fetakgomo	-0.008	-0.010	0.567	0.004	0.997
Greater Tubatse	-0.493	-0.010	0.435	-1.110	0.267
Makhudutham.	-0.006	-0.010	0.489	0.007	0.994
Makhado	-0.258	-0.010	0.489	-0.508	0.611
Lephalale	-0.155	-0.010	0.698	-0.208	0.835
Mogalakwena	-0.027	-0.010	0.435	-0.040	0.968
Bushbuckridge	0.254	-0.010	0.435	0.606	0.545
Mbombela	**1.598**	**-0.010**	**0.489**	**3.289**	**0.001**
Nkomazi	**1.942**	**-0.010**	**0.698**	**2.795**	**0.005**
Thaba Chweu	0.300	-0.010	0.489	0.633	0.527
Albert Luthuli	0.548	-0.010	0.698	0.799	0.425
Mkhondo	-0.044	-0.010	0.489	-0.069	0.945
Pixley Ka Seme	-0.007	-0.010	0.698	0.004	0.997

Dr JS Moroka	-0.624	-0.010	0.567	-1.082	0.279
Thembisile	0.248	-0.010	0.698	0.370	0.712
Madibeng	**2.890**	**-0.010**	**0.489**	**5.930**	**0.000**
Moretele	0.537	-0.010	0.698	0.783	0.433
Moses Kotane	**2.088**	**-0.010**	**0.567**	**3.696**	**0.000**
Rustenburg	**3.564**	**-0.010**	**0.698**	**5.116**	**0.000**
Greater Taung	0.622	-0.010	0.698	0.904	0.366
Kagisano/Molopo	0.239	-0.010	0.567	0.439	0.661
Ditsobotla	0.360	-0.010	0.567	0.652	0.514
Mafikeng	0.527	-0.010	0.489	1.098	0.272
Ramotshere Moiloa	0.787	-0.010	0.567	1.405	0.160
Ratlou	0.192	-0.010	0.567	0.355	0.723
Tswaing	-0.251	-0.010	0.567	-0.425	0.671
Joe Morolong	0.539	-0.010	0.698	0.786	0.432

*Municipalities that are bolded show significant local spatial clustering of violent protests ($p<0.05$).

A3.9 Restricted protest data (specific protest categories)

	(1) Restricted protest counts	(2) Restricted violent protest counts	(3) State and service related protest counts
Proportion of contested TAs	0.556*	0.621**	0.627**
	(0.247)	(0.207)	(0.207)
TA presence	-0.133	0.023	-0.119
	(0.208)	(0.191)	(0.204)
Number of TAs	0.021	-0.002	0.009
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Average nightlight	-1.190	-0.326	-1.080
	(2.652)	(2.041)	(2.202)
(log) Population density	0.217***	0.184**	0.213***
	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.053)
Share of black South Africans	-0.683	0.046	-0.122
	(0.565)	(0.571)	(0.581)
Mines	-0.042		-0.166
	(0.138)		(0.156)
Pre-colonial centralization	0.044	0.081	0.056
	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.065)
ANC share	0.324	0.146	0.062
	(0.504)	(0.576)	(0.563)
Past protests	0.372***	0.346***	0.436***
	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.063)
Constant	-2.359***	-1.965***	-1.945***
	(0.548)	(0.563)	(0.563)
Observations	217	217	217
R^2	0.564	0.565	0.612

A3.10 Protests and riots in 2011-2013 using ACLED-data (logit models)

	(1) ACLED all municipalities	(2) ACLED only TA municipalities
Proportion of contested TAs	2.510*	2.986*
	(1.120)	(1.493)
Number of TAs	-0.024	0.110
	(0.041)	(0.069)
Average nightlight	12.602†	-11.590
	(7.613)	(13.004)
(log) Population density	0.316*	0.446
	(0.148)	(0.309)
Share of black South Africans	2.496†	-20.437†
	(1.428)	(11.725)
Mines	0.124	-0.097
	(0.550)	(0.743)
Pre-colonial centralization	-0.035	0.905
	(0.186)	(0.558)
ANC share	-0.488	-0.890
	(1.600)	(1.949)
Past protests	0.377	0.722
	(0.259)	(0.826)
Constant	-4.789*	16.558
	(1.868)	(13.323)
Observations	207	106
Log pseudolikelihood	-104.588	-48.204

A3.11 Qualitative data

As part of this research project, a small number of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in South Africa in the spring and summer 2017.[69] The table below reports basic information concerning the interviews and the questionnaire that guided the interviews and focus group discussions in Mbizana and Ngquza Hill municipalities is included. All interviews were recorded upon receiving consent from the interviewees/participants. The interviews lasted normally around 1.5-2h. Further information regarding the qualitative data, including the anonymised transcripts of the interviews, can be made available by the author upon request.

[69] The field research was given Ethical Approval by the Director of Research, Department of Government, University of Essex.

Affiliation of the interviewee	**Location**	**Time**	**Type of interview**
Academic	Cape Town	April 2017	Personal
Academic	Cape Town	April 2017	Personal
National public official (Focused on TA)	Pretoria	May 2017	Group and personal
National public official (Focused on TA)	Pretoria	May 2017	Group interview
National public official (Focused on TA)	Pretoria	May 2017	Group interview
Land rights activist	Pretoria	May 2017	Personal
Provincial public official (Focused on TA)	Pietermaritzburg	May 2017	Personal
Provincial public official (Focused on TA)	Cape Town - Pietermaritzburg	May 2017	Phone call
Traditional authority	Pietermaritzburg	May 2017	Personal
Civil society	Pietermaritzburg	May 2017	Personal
Civil society	Pietermaritzburg	May 2017	Personal
Journalist	Durban	May 2017	Personal
Human rights activist	Cape Town	May 2017	Personal
Civil Society	Matatiele	June 2017	Personal
Traditional authority	Ngquza Hill	June 2017	Pair
Traditional authority	Ngquza Hill	June 2017	Pair
Elder	Mbizana	June 2017	Personal
Provincial public official	Bhisho	June 2017	Personal
Community members	Mbizana	June 2017	Focus group
Community members	Mbizana	June 2017	Focus group

Questionnaire for the focus group discussions (all other interviews centred around the same thematic issues concerning the role of traditional authorities in South Africa):

1. Background of the respondents:
   - Community, district and municipality background, age, role/occupation, gender

2. <u>The role and efficacy of Traditional Leaders</u>
   2.1. Who are the traditional leaders in this area?

2.2. How would you say the headman and the senior traditional leader influence the lives and welfare of the community members?
2.3. Can you recall any examples of situations in which the traditional leaders helped the community to achieve/get an important improvement in the local conditions?
2.4. What about the King/Queen/paramount chief, how does he/she influence the lives and welfare of the community members?
2.5. What would you say is the main role of traditional authorities and when do you think they are most needed?
2.6. In some areas of South Africa, there are disputes over who the rightful traditional leaders of the communities are. Does this kind of situation influence your community? What kind of implications would you say these situations have for the community?
2.7. How do your traditional leaders respond to situations where there are grievances or disputes within the community? Are the actions of the traditional leaders generally successful or unsuccessful in resolving the issues?

3. Local level conflicts
   3.1. How peaceful or conflict-ridden would you say your community and the wider region are on a scale from 0 to 5 (0 being very peaceful and 5 being conflict-ridden)?
   3.2. In many parts of South Africa, there have been a lot of violent protests concerning lack of services and bad governance. From your perspective, does this region experience fewer or more protests and other instabilities than other regions that you are aware of?
   3.3. Would you say that this region has become more or less peaceful over the recent years? Why do you think this is so?
   3.4. Have you ever participated in a protest concerning public services or the way decisions have been reached?
   3.5. What would you say are the main challenges related to peace here?
   3.6. What do you think causes the(se) grievances and disputes?
   3.7. What would you say is the role of the traditional authorities in related to the conflicts?
   3.8. Can you recall any times when the traditional authorities intervened in a dispute situation and tried to resolve it?
   3.9. Who would you say is the best figure to try to resolve a dispute related to a) land, and b) public services?

4. Inter-authority relationship between traditional authorities and the local government
   4.1. How would you describe the relationship between the community's traditional authorities and the other public authorities?
   4.2. Would you say that it is good that the traditional authorities cooperate with the local ward and municipality councillors? Why is this so/is not so?
   4.3. Have you heard of any incidents where the councillors or some other agents tried to pressure the traditional authorities to act in a way that would be damaging for your community?
   4.4. What do you think motivates the local councillors in their decision-making process (private or collective interests)?
   4.5. What do you think motivates the traditional authorities in their decision-making process (private or collective interests)?

5. The relationship between the constituents and the authorities
   5.1. On a scale from 0 to 5 (five being a lot) how much do you trust the traditional authorities? Why is this?

5.2. On a scale from 0 to 5 (five being a lot) how much do you trust the local councillors? Why is this?
5.3. Can you recall any times when the traditional leaders failed to consult the community concerning an important issue? What were (would be) the implications of this kind of situation?
5.4. What would you say are the main challenges in the relationship between you and the different public authorities?
5.5. If the senior traditional leader/traditional council/kingship decides concerning an important issue for the community, do you normally respect that decision even if you disagree with it?

4. Customary institutional strength and civilian victimisation in armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa

4.1.Abstract

How does the strength of customary institutions influence the strategic use of violence against civilians in civil conflicts? Studies on wartime governance have sparked increasing interest in the role of civilian agency and authority in shaping armed groups' conduct in conflict. Customary institutions, such as traditional authority and indigenous leadership structures, can help to maintain social cohesion and enable collective action and coordination during an armed conflict. However, I propose that customary institutions that are considered legitimate and efficient can also threaten the interests of the armed groups and therefore attract one-sided violence. Strong customary institutions can facilitate resistance and are harder to co-opt than weaker institutions, thus presenting potential obstacles to an armed group's control over an area. I use geocoded Afrobarometer data to capture the strength of traditional leaders at a local level in 12 African countries and examine how this relates to acts of one-sided violence by state and non-state armed groups. The analysis indicates that areas with strong traditional leaders experience more one-sided violence than areas with weaker traditional rulers. In particular, rebel groups appear to target non-combatants in areas with strong traditional chiefs. This study suggests that while instrumental in managing communal and inter-group tensions, strong local customary institutions can

paradoxically attract more violence when they stand against the interests of armed groups fighting over the future political order of the state.

4.2.Introduction

Armed conflicts induce deadly violence and havoc upon the societies in which they occur. Yet violence during civil conflicts does not target all subnational regions and localities equally but varies considerably within state borders both in its intensity and type (Kalyvas, 2006). Specifically, one-sided violence by non-state and state armed groups that targets civilians varies across localities. Nor do armed conflicts occur in governance vacuums or tear down all pre-existing institutions and induce a state of anarchy. Armed parties act in a web of existing local governance institutions and social structures that vary in their shape and their strength (Kalyvas, 2003; Mampilly, 2011; Arjona, 2015; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, 2015; Arjona, 2016b; Kaplan, 2017).

This chapter investigates the role of customary institutions, particularly traditional leadership, in shaping the spatial dynamics of armed violence during civil conflicts.[70] Specifically, the chapter examines how the strength of these institutions, understood as their efficiency and local legitimacy, influences the occurrence of violence against civilians in civil conflicts. The recent shift to subnational units of analysis in conflict research and studies on wartime governance have sparked increasing interest in the role of civilians and their customary and cultural institutions in shaping armed groups' conduct in civil conflicts (Kalyvas, 2006; Arjona, 2016a, 2016b; Kaplan, 2017). Yet despite acknowledging the influence of civilian agency in

[70] Institutions refer to established codes of conduct, agencies, and rules that guide social interactions. Customary institutions allude to agencies and shared rules that derive their legitimacy from customs and norms of communities rather than from the state's codified system. They are thus the "social norms; customary laws and codes of conduct" and the social structures and networks that direct people's behaviour in a community (see Mazzucato and Niemeijer, 2002, p. 172; North, 1990).

conflict contexts, its implications for civilian victimisation remain little explicitly considered in cross-country studies on conflict dynamics. Further, the within-country studies that examine the influence of customary institutions on wartime realities have resulted in puzzling inferences that warrant comparative research across conflict contexts. For example, in some contexts, customary institutions appear to have safeguarded localities from violence by facilitating coordination and enabling communication between the locals and armed groups seeking to control an area or its resources (Kaplan, 2017). On the other hand, in some conflicts armed groups have violently targeted areas with strong customary institutions believed to threaten the interests and control of the armed actor (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017).

In line with recent wartime governance literature, I maintain that existing local institutions, i.e. customary institutions, affect the way communities are able to provide public order and uphold organisation and social cohesion in the course of an armed conflict (Kaplan, 2017; Arjona, 2016b). Customary institutions that are considered legitimate and effective, e.g. that are strong, are particularly useful in this regard. However, strong customary institutions can also pose obstacles to the control of armed groups, as they signal the potential to mobilise and are harder to co-opt than less legitimate and efficient institutions. Therefore, strong customary institutions can become targets of armed groups and drive rather than mitigate violence against civilians, even when contributing to the peacefulness of local relations. Specifically, this chapter argues that the stronger the customary institutions are in an area the more inclined armed groups are to use violence against civilians in order to seize control or gain access to local resources.

In order to test the theoretical proposition and empirically capture the strength of customary institutions, this chapter focuses on the institution of traditional authority.

Traditional authority is a leadership institution that derives its legitimacy from context-specifically constructed customs and norms rather than from the modern state (Holzinger et al. 2016).[71] As an all-encompassing and often hierarchical form of customary institution, traditional authority has an important role in maintaining public order and communal cohesion across sub-Saharan Africa (Goist and Kern, 2018). In rural areas, traditional chiefs and headmen are often more in control of the local service and public goods provisions than the local state, and the institution remains resilient also in more urban areas (Mengisteab, 2017).

The data for traditional authority strength comes from the Afrobarometer survey rounds 4 and 6 and covers 12 sub-Saharan African countries. Using survey items concerning the quality of local institutions, I capture customary institutional strength at a PRIO-GRID cell level as the public trust towards and the salience of local traditional authorities. I measure one-sided violence by state forces and non-state armed groups (rebels) in the post-survey years using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED). The results of the empirical analysis point to a positive relationship between traditional authority strength and incidents of one-sided violence. Specifically, rebel groups appear to target non-combatants in areas with strong traditional chiefs. While instrumental in managing communal and inter-group tensions, strong local customary institutions can paradoxically attract more violence when they stand against the interests of armed groups fighting over control of the state.

The chapter contributes to the literatures on wartime governance and spatial dynamics of armed violence. Considerable comparative research has explored how variation in economic conditions and natural resource endowments, population characteristics, geopolitics, and climate abnormalities influence variation in armed

[71] Traditional authorities yield considerable influence particularly in sub-Saharan Africa where the colonial period created bifurcated systems of the modern state and pre-colonial governance structures.

violence within states (Le Billon, 2001; Buhaug and Rød, 2006; Raleigh and Hegre, 2009; Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Detges, 2016; Fjelde *et al.*, 2017; Dulić, 2018). Local institutional quality, particularly state capacity, has also received increasing attention among scholars studying the determinants of political violence (De Juan and Pierskalla, 2015; Linke *et al.*, 2015; Wig and Tollefsen, 2016). While state institutions have primary responsibility in ensuring the well-being of the citizens, they often remain distant at the local-level in developing countries. As discussed in the previous chapters, customary institutions can substitute as well as co-exist with state institutions; inducing order, governing social interactions, and contributing to the production of public goods and services.[72] The de facto salience of customary institutions makes comparative research on their role in conflict situations crucial. Focusing explicitly on customary institutions, this study corroborates with research highlighting the active civilian agency during armed conflicts. Doing so, it contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the political geography of civilian victimisation.

4.3.Political geography of civilian victimisation in civil conflicts

A growing number of empirical studies focus explicitly on the determinants of violence against civilians, i.e. one-sided armed violence that directly and deliberately targets non-combatants. This sub-field of political violence aims to understand why and how civilians caught up in armed conflicts become targets of violence committed by state and non-state armed groups, rather than being mere 'collateral damage' of battles

[72] The significance of traditional authority in particular and customary institutions in general can become amplified in times of conflicts, when the state's rule is fundamentally undermined (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008; Raleigh and Linke, 2018).

between the conflict parties (Eck and Hultman, 2007; Fjelde *et al.*, 2017; Melander, Backer and Dunford, 2017).

A prominent branch within this field examines the across-group variation in violence against civilians and focuses on organisational and structural factors explaining this. For example, Weinstein (2005, 2007) contends that different mobilisation processes and variation in the organisation of armed groups explain inter-group variation in the conduct of brutalities against civilians. Accordingly, groups that are born in resource rich areas and rely on extractable natural resources tend to attract more opportunistic fighters and commit more indiscriminate violence than groups that rely on ideological and social ties to attract fighters (Weinstein, 2007). Similarly, Beardsley and McQuinn (2009) contend that groups with closer ties to the local population are more hesitant to use violence against civilians than groups with external resource endowments. Relatedly, groups with more heterogenous pool of combatants find it harder to police the conduct of the fighters (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006).

While this organisational argument uncovers factors explaining differences across groups – such as ties between the combatants and the local population (Beardsley, Gleditsch and Lo, 2015; Bakke, 2012) – it focuses less on understanding the spatial variation of violence against civilians when it does occur. Given the overall differences between groups, considerable variation exists within an armed group and its use of violence against civilians (Speight, 2013). Another branch of the literature highlights the strategic aspect of armed groups' commissions of civilian victimisation by asking more explicit questions about when and where an armed group uses one-sided violence. Balcells (2010) and Weidman (2011) study how pre-war local power dynamics influence subnational variation in violence against civilians during civil conflicts. Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsey (2004) propose that states use mass

violence against civilians in order to weaken the support base of insurgents that use guerrilla tactics. Similarly, Fjelde and Hultman (2014) argue that both state and non-state armed groups target civilians in areas that are associated with their opponent's support base. They see civilian victimisation as a means to weaken the enemy's military and political capacities (see also Eck and Hultman, 2007; Fjelde *et al*., 2017). Finally, recent empirical contributions suggest that violence against civilians is used in complex intrastate conflicts not only to weaken one's main opponent but also to gain ground in the inter-group competition among multiple armed actors and to secure access to a finite pool of resources (Speight, 2013; Wood and Kathman, 2015; Koren and Bagozzi, 2017; Raleigh and Choi, 2017).

The above studies importantly shed light on how armed groups use violence against civilians as a means to weaken their enemies and improve their standing vis-à-vis other armed groups and available resources. However, they have a tendency of overlooking the active agency of civilians. Civilians are differentiated along their associated connections to armed groups and these divisions are seen to influence local vulnerability towards violence. Yet variation in the institutional capacities of different localities remains under-explored. This is problematic, since – as the next section clarifies – the way civilians are organised and the types of institutions they have in conflict contexts can influence the strategic considerations of armed groups.

4.4.Customary institutions and wartime governance realities

A growing number of studies acknowledge the significance of customary institutions in shaping peace and wartime governance realities in the context of Latin America (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Klick, 2016; Kaplan, 2017), sub-Saharan Africa (Acemoglu, Reed and James A. Robinson, 2014; Baldwin, 2015;

Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2015; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2015; Wig and Kromrey, 2018), and South Asia (De Juan, Pierskalla and Vüllers, 2015; Jochem, Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili, 2016; Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili, 2016). While often far from democratic or unequal power structures, customary institutions – such as chieftaincies and indigenous governance structures – induce shared rules and norms guiding social interactions at the local level (Meagher, 2007; Raleigh and Linke, 2018). This induces social cohesion and trust among individuals, which are necessary for cooperation and organisation (Acemoglu, Reed and James A. Robinson, 2014; Jordan, 2015).

Of particular importance is the role of customary institutions during civil conflicts. Customs and norms that bond communities often become amplified during armed conflicts as the state's rule and institutions are fundamentally contested (Péclard and Mechoulan, 2015; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008). For example, in Liberia customary structures proved quintessential for communities during the civil war: 'the most enduring form of collective action that ensured community survival despite violent conflicts was undertaken by networks and organisations whose membership is based on clan-related identity' (Sawyer, 2005, p. 10). Similarly, in Somalia customary institutions have been critical in providing governance during the country's armed struggles – even enforcing informal pacts and local arrangements with transnational actors (Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot, 2008).

Beyond shaping community resilience in an armed conflict, customary institutions can influence the conduct of armed groups vis-à-vis localities and civilians. The resent work by Arjona (2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b) and others on rebel and wartime governance makes two important recognitions in this regard. First, in their efforts to control civilian behaviour, armed actors need to react and adapt to differing 'authority

structures, local norms, and social cohesion' (Arjona, 2014, p. 1372). Armed groups do not only impose control through the use of violence, but they co-opt and assimilate local structures in order to maintain their capacity to continue the struggle. Variation in the resulted wartime governance institutions does not solely depend on differences across armed actors; existing local institutions shape the strategies of armed groups (Mampilly, 2011; Arjona, 2014; Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, 2015).

Second, the efficacy and the legitimacy, i.e. the strength, of local institutions, influences the extent and shape of an armed group's rule over an area (Arjona, 2016a; Kaplan, 2017). On the one hand, strong local institutions can facilitate an armed group's governance by providing established ways to implement public order and rules (Mampilly, 2011; Kaplan, 2017). Functioning community organisations and clear structures of authority can facilitate repeated engagements and the establishment of informal agreements between a community and armed groups (Kaplan 2017). Simultaneously, however, the more effective and legitimate the existing institutions are, the more resistant they can remain against total control by armed groups (Arjona, 2016b). Civilians with cohesive social structures are better able to bargain with the armed groups and can therefore manage to uphold their own forms of rules and institutions (Kasfir, 2015). Strong local governance institutions give civilians better capacities to organise and sustain social cohesion that helps to retain collective action in an armed conflict situation (Arjona, 2016a, 2016b).

Local institutions are seen to be particularly influential from the perspective of the rebels. Rebels often rely on civilian support or compliance for extracting the necessary resources to continue their struggle. While violence has an instrumental role in forcing compliance in civil war contexts (Kalyvas, 2006), it is not the only available strategy to the rebels. However, local governance structures are also important to

consider from the state's perspective. Just like the rebel groups, state forces need to react to a variety of different local authorities and social structures in their interactions with civilians across the conflict zone.

Given that customary institutions, as prevalent local institutions, influence the resilience of civilians and their interactions with armed groups, how should we expect them to influence the use of one-sided violence by these armed groups? While rarely the explicit focus of the wartime governance literature, two outcomes can be logically derived from the literature. First, customary institutions that provide order and enable coordination can safeguard a locality from violence. For example, in Colombia existing customary governance structures appeared to enhance civilians' collective capacities and protect communities from brutalities by enabling repeated peaceful interactions between the locals and armed groups (Kaplan, 2017). More generally, empirical studies suggest that cohesive customary authority structures can reduce uncertainty in the interactions among and between groups at the local level and actively contribute to conflict mitigation and prevention at a subnational level (Krause, 2017; Wig and Kromrey, 2018). Second, the authority and collective action potential that customary institutions entail can also appear threatening from the perspective of an armed group and create incentives to use violence. Specifically, strong customary institutions signal a resistance potential and can be harder to co-opt than weaker institutions, which can render them targets of strategic violence. Below I argue that these mechanisms are parallel: While customary institutions are often instrumental for local cohesion and communication between groups, armed groups are more inclined to use violence against them when they are strong because of their perceived threat.

4.5.Theory: violence as a means to cut off local alternatives

Rather than seeing civilians merely as victims of indiscriminate violence during civil conflicts, this chapter builds on the premise that civilian agency shapes the rationale and therefore the conduct of the armed groups on the ground. In their efforts to succeed in and continue their armed struggle, armed groups often rely on local population for food, shelter, and other extractable material or immaterial resources (Weinstein, 2007; Koren and Bagozzi, 2017). I argue that the strength of customary institutions influences the incentives of an armed group to use violence against civilians to secure its interests. This does not preclude the significance of other factors – such as organisational differences, capacity, and local ties – on the overall sensibility of a group to use violence. However, given the different outcomes produced by these factors, I expect variation in customary institutional strength to influence the spatial distribution of one-sided violence by modifying the wartime institutional context in which any armed group finds itself.

By 'customary institutional strength' I refer to the legitimacy of customary institutions among locals and their efficiency in responding to the local needs. As Arjona (2016a) notes, it is the strength of local structures that influences the depth and type of order that external armed groups can impose on a locality. There is considerable empirical variation in the strength of customary institutions today.[73] This variation stems from multiple origins, such as different historical trajectories of customary rule, wider institutional and national contexts, and contestation within the customary structures. I argue that there are two mechanisms through which the strength of

[73] Scholars, such as Mamdani (1996) and Ntsebeza (2005) highlight the loss of legitimacy of customary authorities in sub-Saharan Africa as a consequence of the co-option and manipulation of them by the colonial powers. However, these views tend to neglect the continued public trust towards and salience of customary institutions and the empirical variation that exists in this.

customary institutions influences the strategic use of violence against civilians by state and non-state armed groups. First, the stronger the customary rule is the harder it is for an armed group to co-opt locals and guarantee their compliance. Second, strong customary authority institutions entail potential to overtly resist the order imposed by an armed group. Both of these processes decrease an armed group's incentive and capacity to take advantage of the existing structures and instead increase the incentive to violently target them in order to secure its interests within the conflict zone.

Theoretical mechanisms

In order to take advantage of the existing local institutions and to establish order and access to key resources armed groups need at least some level of cooperation from key local actors (e.g. local leaders) and general compliance among the locals (Arjona, 2016a). In other words, armed groups need to assimilate or co-opt existing local institutions. However, the level of cooperativeness and compliance among civilians is likely influenced by the strength of their own existing governance institutions. The stronger the customary structures are the less dependent the locals will be on armed groups to provide order and the less willing they will be to handout rule to the armed actor. From the perspective of an armed group, this poses a hindrance on establishing control and an uncertainty over civilian compliance. This incentivises the armed group to use violence in order to secure its interests and eliminate local alternatives to the order it seeks to impose.

Specifically, the more effective and legitimate local customary institutions are in providing public order and services, the less dependent they will be on the structures and organisation of armed groups. With functioning mechanisms to resolve local

disputes and regain a sense of normalcy during an armed conflict, civilians do not need to rely on armed groups to impose order. Furthermore, civilians that have access to their own viable customary structures outside the realm of armed groups tend to prefer maintaining their autonomy as much as possible rather than adopting foreign rules and norms instituted by armed groups (Arjona, 2016a). The allegiance of the civilians towards their own institutions and authorities creates two challenges of co-option for an armed group. First, leaders empowered by customary institutions face downwards accountability and pressures to not give their authority away to armed groups. Second, the group of civilians as a whole is more difficult to co-opt and/or assimilate into the armed group's governance structures.

This point can be traced back to Kalyvas' (2006) argument on the way local feuds and conflicts shape the dynamics of intrastate violence. Strong customary institutions benefit civilians by providing means to resolve local tensions and enabling the maintenance of shared rules and procedures even in the midst of an armed conflict (Wig and Kromrey, 2018). Therefore, individuals and groups will have less motivation to become informants or denouncers for armed groups or use them to intervene in the local feuds when customary institutions are strong. This makes it more difficult for armed groups to use local divisions to establish patronage networks. Violence against civilians in this scenario serves the strategy of weakening the local cohesion and ensuring better access to local resources and control.

The urgency of an armed conflict situation can further incentivise armed groups to use violence when facing a locality with strong customary institutions. Armed conflict shortens the time perspective of armed groups and therefore gives rise to the use of violence as a means to gain access to necessary resources (Koren and Bagozzi, 2017). Co-opting or assimilating strong customary institutions is likely to require more

time and accommodation than responding non-violently to weaker customs and lines of authority. Therefore, in the interest of imposing the desired wartime order, armed groups are more likely to target strong customary institutions violently.

The civil war in Sierra Leone exhibits these dynamics. On the one hand, the general weakening and corruption of customary institutions contributed to the grievances that led to the armed rebellion in the first place. Moreover, localities with internally contested traditional authority institutions saw escalation of local struggles during the armed conflict (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004). However, in terms of the violence committed by the state and rebel forces, areas with strong chieftaincy structures were disproportionally affected. As Raleigh and De Bruijne (2017) demonstrate, localities with strong traditional authorities experienced more violence than localities where the armed parties were able to co-opt local leaders and build stronger patronage networks. The rebel group Revolutionary Armed Forces violently targeted strong local chieftaincies while co-opting and assimilating those that were weakened by internal disputes. Similarly, the state focused its co-option efforts to those traditional authorities that had weaker local status and could be more easily assimilated into the state's own patronage networks (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017, p. 1238). Hence, while strong customary institutions mitigated local conflicts, they also attracted one-sided violence by armed groups.

Aside from being more difficult to co-opt, strong customary institutions can appear threatening from the perspective of armed groups and thus attract violence to weaken the perceived local threat. In their interactions with external armed groups, civilians often exhibit strategies beyond compliance and exit/escape, including some level of active resistance against violent actors (Arjona, 2016a; Krause, 2018). The stronger the local institutions are, the better capacitated civilians are to act collectively

and to mobilise resistance against an armed group (ibid.). Pre-empting future resistance or responding to actual resistance, an armed actor may choose to resort to targeted one-sided violence that weakens the collective action potential on the ground.

Ample evidence exists on the mobilisation potential of customary institutions. Within the field of electoral studies, traditional leaders are found to shift election results via mobilisation for their allied parties (de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). Mobilisation for protest movements and revolutions has also benefitted from existing customary structures. In a conflict context, localities with strong existing institutions are better capacitated to organise early warning mechanisms and respond rapidly to the changing conflict dynamics; 'social cohesion affords civilians greater chances to overcome fear, break the "law of silence" and revive communication, and implement collective strategies for protection' (Kaplan, 2017, p. 9).

While this capacity to organise collective action is beneficial for local cohesion and resilience during war and can contribute to communal peace, it presents a threatening scenario from the perspective of an armed group. This is because it invokes the possibility of active resistance either now or in the future (which the armed actor will want to have control over). Therefore, even without any actual resistance taking place, the armed group may choose to target the locality violently in order to weaken the existing institutions and prevent any future challenges against its interests.

In sum, I expect that the strength of customary institutions in an area signals both the prospects of co-opting the local structures to the advantage of the armed group and the resolve of civilians to organise collective resistance against the armed group. In localities with weaker customary institutions, armed groups have less to worry in regard to mobilisation against their interest and they likely find local actors more willing to cooperate and share governance authority. By contrast, in areas with strong

customary institutions, violence that targets these structures can be used as an instrument to neutralise local concurrence and enforce rule. This leads to the theoretical hypothesis.

H1: The stronger the customary institutions are – in the sense of local legitimacy and efficiency – the higher the rates of violence against civilians by state and non-stated armed groups will be.

If the mechanisms described above are in place, one should expect violence against civilians in areas of strong customary institutions to especially target local leaders and elites. Traditional authorities are critical junctures in customary institutions as they enforce rules and norms and act as intermediaries between locals and external actors. Hence, targeting these actors should inflate a heavy toll on the locality and weaken its institutions in general; reducing mobilisation potential and making it easier for an armed group to seize control. There is some anecdotal evidence that supports this line of argument. For example, in South Sudan, the government forces have allegedly targeted and killed traditional leaders within communities suspected to support the rebel forces. The reasoning behind these acts of violence is believed to be weakening of the social structures in place (Sudan Tribune, 2014). Similarly, in Nigeria, Boko Haram has reportedly targeted local traditional chiefs and replaced these with their own local strongmen (Zenn, 2012). The explicit targeting of customary leadership in order to make a locality more vulnerable as a whole and to gain access to resources is reported also in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Nantulya, 2017).

While these examples show the explicit targeting of customary institutions, they do not inform us about the relative strength of these institutions before the violence took place. Moreover, violence beyond the explicit targeting of leaders can also serve a strategy to weaken customary institutions as it exposes the failure of the local structures to protect and provide security. In order to test the theoretical argument presented here, a systematic empirical analysis is required.

4.6.Research design

This chapter's theoretical framework requires an empirical approach that captures both violence against civilians in a disaggregated level of analysis and variation in customary institutions across small geographical units. Therefore, I adopt an empirical approach that uses the geographically fixed PRIO-GRID cells as the spatial units of analysis. The PRIO-GRID vector network consists of spatial cells the size of 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees (approximately 55km x 55km at the equator) and covers all terrestrial areas in the world (Tollefsen, Strand and Buhaug, 2012). The choice of PRIO-GRID cells as the unit of analysis is motivated by three reasons. First, the fixed nature of the units facilitates replication of analysis over time and across studies. Second, the size of the grid cells enables the capturing of meaningful variation in the strength of customary institutions within subnational administrative areas, closer to the actual communities. The alternative strategy, using subnational administrative boundaries, would result in considerable variation in the size of the spatial unit as well as often too large units to capture variation in the strength of customary institutions. Third, while the inherently apolitical nature of the grid cells can be seen as a problem for capturing the influence of political institutions, it can be an advantage in studying non-state governance structures. Customary institutions and the communities adhering to these do not

perfectly overlap with administrative areas but cross state-induced boundaries. The following sections describe the main variables of interest before turning to the results of the analysis.

Independent variable

I capture my main explanatory variable of interest, the strength of customary institutions, by focusing on the institution of traditional authority. As previously outlined, traditional authority is a pivotal customary institution that is instrumental for social cohesion and bonding social capital in communities (Jordan, 2015; Mengisteab, 2017b).[74] The role of traditional authorities in fostering intra-communal cooperation and collective action, and as intermediaries between locals and external actors makes them particularly suitable as indicators of customary institutions that shape civilian agency during armed conflicts (Goist and Kern, 2018; Wig and Kromrey, 2018).

Data for traditional authority strength come from the Afrobarometer (2019) survey rounds 4 and 6, collected in the years 2008 and 2014. Afrobarometer surveys examine public opinion in over 35 African countries with each round capturing attitudes around the themes of governance quality, development, and democracy. Rounds 4 and 6 include a focus on the quality of different governance institutions. Specifically, I use two indicators that appear in both these survey rounds. The first indicator measures the respondent's experience in contacting traditional leaders in the past year.[75] I use this measure to capture the perceived effectiveness of traditional

[74] The institution of traditional leadership can be recognised and codified in the state's constitutional framework, yet it remains customary to the extent that its legitimisation derives from non-state, customary codes of conduct (Ubink, 2008; Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016).
[75] The question asks: During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: Traditional Leaders?

leadership with a higher value indicating higher perceived gains in contacting a traditional leader in an important issue. The second indicator measures the respondent's trust towards traditional leaders. This indicator is seen to capture whether the local traditional leaders enjoy legitimacy among their subjects in an area. Both questions are coded along a scale from 0 to 3 with 0 signifying none/not at all and 3 often/ a lot.

I use Afrobarometer's newly geocoded versions and its geographic point estimates in aggregating the responses to the PRIO-GRID level. At the grid-cell level I take the mean value of the two survey indicators to designate the strength of traditional authorities. The resulted independent variable is normally distributed with a mean value of 1.37 (round 6) and 1.29 (round 4) and standard deviations of 0.38 (round 6) and 0.43 (round 4).[76] Figure 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the variation in the strength of customary institutions measured as traditional authority strength across grid-cells in all available countries in round 6 and more closely in Nigeria.

[76] See the Appendix A4.1 for a descriptive statistics table for all variables and correlation measures for the independent variable across survey rounds.



Figure 4.1. Variation in traditional authority strength based on Afrobarometer round 6



Figure 4.2. Traditional authority strength in Nigeria, as in Afrobarometer round 6

The Afrobarometer is the only available data source to capture the strength of customary institutions across countries in a geographically disaggregated level. However, there are some concerns with relying on these survey data. First, a major limitation of the Afrobarometer data is that the included countries are not randomly selected and the surveys systematically exclude some countries, such as Somalia and DRC, that are historically among the most conflict prone countries. This is unfortunate as it would be interesting to test the theory in these contexts where the state actor is particularly weak, and the role of informal institutions can be even more accentuated. A second challenge is the inherent nature of the Afrobarometer surveys that measure individual perceptions, which are then used to capture a latent variable of customary institutional strength. The respondents' perceptions can vary according to a multitude to idiosyncratic and systematic factors, thus introducing measurement error or bias (see Wig and Tollefsen, 2017). A problem arises, if some respondents feel pressured to overestimate the strength of local institutions of fear for repercussions from the authorities. In order to investigate these concerns, I examine the respondents' beliefs about who sent the survey to be conducted. On average, the most widely held view is (correctly) that a research organisation sent the survey, alleviating concerns that respondents would be politically pressured in their answers. Furthermore, while respondents who believe a government agency sent the survey have rated their institutions slightly better, this difference is substantially small and statistically insignificant (results reported in Appendix A4.2).

A third challenge has to do with the level of measurement. The Afrobarometer survey are stratified and randomised at the village level and the Afrobarometer's own spatial unit of analysis is considerably smaller than the PRIO-GRID cells. Aggregating the measures on the PRIO-GRID cell level ensures an increased number of respondents

per unit than if the Afrobarometer spatial units were used. The average number (median) of respondents per grid-cell in round 6 is 16.[77] However, as the surveys were not originally conducted on this level of spatial disaggregation, the representativeness and the variance across the spatial units can cause concern.

Dependent variable

In order to measure the outcome of interest, one-sided violence (hereafter OSV) against non-combatants during intrastate armed conflicts, I use the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and their violence against civilians category (Raleigh *et al.*, 2010). One-sided violence refers to physical violence committed by an organised armed group that deliberately targets and injures unarmed civilians (ACLED 2017; Eck and Hultman, 2007; Melander, Backer and Dunford, 2017). This type of violence should be differentiated from instances where civilians are harmed as a result of battle events between armed groups and where violence does not directly and deliberately target civilians (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). This difference is crucial as the interest here is to examine how the customary institutions influence vulnerability of an area towards brutalities against the civilians, thus implying an intent in civilian victimisation.

I use ACLED's geocoded event data on state and rebel committed violence against civilians and create measures of counts of OSV-events in a given grid-cell. ACLED codes all severe and physical attacks on civilians (e.g. shooting, torturing, raping, kidnapping) and does not have a threshold of fatalities for an event to be included in the data. This operationalisation is preferred over the use of fatalities-based data, as it captures a broader range of civilian victimisation that customary institutional

[77] As a robustness tests I drop all grid-cells that have <15 respondents from the analysis to avoid observations with particularly high standard deviations. See Appendix A4.10.

strength can influence. For example, the ACLED dataset covers attacks by the Boko Haram in Nigeria where the armed group kidnapped civilians (irrespective of whether these attacks resulted in immediate fatalities). In order to make sure that the violence against civilians occurs within a context of a civil conflict, I restrict my focus to countries that have experienced active armed violence by state or non-state armed groups within the post-survey years, using the Uppsala Conflict Database's threshold of 25-battle related deaths in a conflict-dyad.

Finally, due to the Afrobarometer surveys being available for only two specific years (2008 and 2014) and partially for different countries, a cross-sectional over-time analysis is not feasible. Hence, I take the survey years as starting points in which the independent variables are measured and examine the geographical patterns of violence against civilians in the following years. The measure Rebel-OSV captures the count of all OSV events committed by organised non-state armed actors in the post-survey years in a given grid cell. Whereas, Government-OSV refers to the number of OSV events by the government forces in a grid cell.[78]

As a result of these coding decisions, I have two datasets composed of all grid cells in sub-Saharan Africa that store information on the strength of traditional leadership structures and that are located in countries that have experienced active one-sided or intrastate armed violence during the post-survey years. Accordingly, the post-2014 data consists of 786 grid cells in 10 countries while the post-2008 sample includes 524 grid cells in 7 countries. Table 4.1 shows the number and percentage of grid cells that have experienced OSV-events in the post-survey years.

[78] As a robustness test, I re-run the main models for round 6 data using the UCDP's Georeferenced Event Dataset and its one-sided-violence category for rebel and state actors. The models are reported in the Appendix A4.8.

Table 4.1. Number of grid cells experienced at least one OSV-event in the post-survey years

Type of OSV	**Post-2008**	**Post-2014**
Rebel	72 (13,7%)	68 (8,7%)
Government	138 (26,3%)	128 (16,3%)
Total number of grids	524	786

Control variables

I include the following variables in the empirical analysis in order to control for any confounding factors. The geopolitical location of the locality will likely influence both the relevance of customary institutions and the spatial patterns of OSV. Customary institutions are particularly salient in more rural and peripheral areas where the state's presence tends to be weaker. Simultaneously, non-state armed groups presence tends to be stronger in areas with a greater distance from a country's political and economic centre. In order to control for these geopolitical dynamics I include a variable measuring the average time (in minutes) it takes to travel to a nearest urban centre (Uchida and Nelson, 2009). I also control for the share of the agricultural land area within a grid cell (Bontemps, Defourny and Van Bogaert, 2009), as this can influence both the relevance of customary institutions as well as the rationale of armed actors to use violence against civilians.

Aside from the geopolitical dynamics, population density can influence both the independent and the dependent variable in that more densely populated areas tend to experience more armed violence (Fjelde *et al.*, 2017) and have better grounds for institutional development. I construct a variable population density by dividing the total local population by the land area of a grid cell. In addition, to measure the potentially intervening influence of the state's local economic capacities, I include a measure of nightlight emissions, using the DMSP OLS night-time light data (Elvidge *et al.*, 2014).

All of these covariates are accessed at the level of the unit of analysis through the PRIO-GRID database.

Furthermore, I control for ethnic affiliation of the local area with either the government or politically excluded groups, using the GeoEPR dataset. These data recodes geographical areas of all politically relevant ethnic groups and allows identification of groups that hold political power in a specific time period – in this case the survey year (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011). Previous literature suggests that armed groups use OSV strategically to target areas affiliated with their opponents. Hence, non-state armed groups are more likely to target areas affiliated with the government's ethnic support base while the government troops are more likely to victimise areas that are potential support bases for the rebels, i.e. areas of politically excluded groups (Fjelde and Hultman, 2014). The affiliation of an area with a conflict side can intervene in the relationship between customary institutional strength and OSV in two ways. First, areas affiliated with the government can benefit from better state public goods provisions which can systematically influence the perceived strength of the traditional authorities. Second, customary institutional strength can mediate the influence that affiliation has on OSV. Specifically, one could expect that areas affiliated with an armed side and that have strong customary institutions attract disproportionally OSV as a means to weaken the enemy's local institutions. The variable government constituency takes the value 1 if the settlement area of a group that holds a monopoly, dominant or senior position in the government intersects with a grid cell, and zero otherwise. The measure excluded groups captures the number of politically discriminated or excluded ethnic groups whose settlement area intersects with a grid cell.

In addition to the above, it is important to consider the possible endogeneity of post-survey level OSV and survey time traditional authority strength in regard to past violent events. In order to do this, I include a measure of time (in years) since a given grid cell last experienced OSV. Following Carter and Signorino (2010), I include squared and cubed versions of the variable measuring time dependency.[79] Moreover, I consider past battle-events (e.g. deadly armed events between the government and a rebel side) in a given grid-cell. Finally, I control for the spatial dynamics of OSV by including a mean of OSV-events by the respective armed sides in the adjacent neighbourhood cells.

4.7.Empirical results

Table 4.2 presents the main regression models estimating one-sided violence in the post-survey years of Afrobarometer round 6 and 4. I use a negative binomial regression estimation method to account for the dependent variable being 1) a count variable, 2) overly dispersed with high number of zeros and some high counts, and 3) inherently dependent on itself (an area experiencing an event is likely to experience more events in the same measurement period). Models 1-3 estimate counts for post-round 6 years while models 4-6 are based on round 4 data. Countries that have experienced active one-sided or intrastate violence in the post-2014 period (and have data on the independent variable) include Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Cameroon, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan. Countries included in the round 4 sample are Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar, and Mozambique.

[79] Furthermore, in the Appendix A4.9 report models estimating traditional authority strength as a function of past events of violence against civilians by state, rebel, and militia groups. The results (mostly non-significant) alleviate endogeneity concerns with regard to the specific findings in this study.

Table 4.2. Estimating violence against civilians in sub-Saharan Africa

	Post-2014 years (round 6)			Post-2008 (round 4)		
	Model 1 All-OSV	*Model 2* Rebel-OSV	*Model 3* Gov-OSV	*Model 4* All-OSV	*Model 5* Rebel-OSV	*Model 6* Gov-OSV
Traditional authority strength	0.508†	1.294**	0.241	0.445†	0.676†	0.572*
	(0.276)	(0.500)	(0.319)	(0.258)	(0.381)	(0.272)
(log) Agricultural area	0.192*	0.296†	0.156	0.047	0.043	0.083
	(0.096)	(0.170)	(0.109)	(0.099)	(0.132)	(0.100)
(log) Time to nearest urban centre	0.286	0.533	-0.034	-0.815*	-0.667	-1.006***
	(0.231)	(0.355)	(0.265)	(0.324)	(0.440)	(0.244)
(log) Nightlight emissions	0.692**	0.855**	0.541*	1.182***	1.268**	1.057***
	(0.232)	(0.331)	(0.242)	(0.253)	(0.427)	(0.209)
(log) Population density	0.047	-0.128	0.165	-0.256*	-0.262	-0.141
	(0.138)	(0.176)	(0.150)	(0.129)	(0.177)	(0.141)
Civil war events	-0.005	-0.115	0.025	1.795*	-6.633*	2.572**
	(0.080)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.878)	(3.036)	(0.838)
Government constituency	-0.090	-0.471	0.138	0.156	0.307	0.094
	(0.241)	(0.347)	(0.286)	(0.326)	(0.435)	(0.337)
N of excluded groups	-0.107	-0.544	0.195	-0.412	-1.037	-0.298
	(0.247)	(0.464)	(0.276)	(0.349)	(0.871)	(0.341)
All neighbour events	0.228***			0.183***		
	(0.047)			(0.037)		
Neighbour rebel OSV-events		0.344***			0.352***	
		(0.076)			(0.105)	
Neighbour gov OSV-events			0.239**			0.150
			(0.076)			(0.093)
Constant	-2.771†	-5.315*	-1.653	5.413*	3.618	4.839**
	(1.516)	(2.421)	(1.725)	(2.119)	(2.832)	(1.724)
Ln alpha	0.859***	1.155***	1.084***	0.814***	1.852***	0.490*
	(0.192)	(0.243)	(0.209)	(0.169)	(0.217)	(0.235)
Observations	485	485	485	447	447	447
Log pseudolikelihood	-463.611	-178.511	-383.259	-567.960	-304.701	-433.369

Source for the DV: Armed Conflict Location and Event Database; clustered standard errors; time since last OSV plus polynomials not reported; †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001.

The results give modest support to the theoretical argument. As expected, the strength of traditional authorities is positively correlated with incidents of violence against civilians across the two data samples. According to model 1, which estimates all violence against civilians committed by state or non-state armed actors in the post-

2014 years, the odds for a grid cell to *not* experience any violence against civilians drop from 82% to 76% when moving from a relatively weak customary institutional context to a locality with relatively strong traditional authority institutions (from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile of traditional authority strength). Similar correlation, albeit equally significant only at the 90% confidence level, is seen in the post-2008 model.

However, there are considerable differences in the relationship between the main independent variable and the two types of armed actors committing one-sided violence. Specifically, while the trajectory for government-OSV is also that of violence-inducing, the results are not statistically robust across models. Based on model 6, which estimates government-committed violence against civilians in post-2008 years, the strength of traditional authorities is significantly and positively correlated with the rate of violence. However, when analysing Afrobarometer round 6 data (model 3), traditional authority strength does not seem to have any influence on the spatial distribution of government-OSV in areas included in the analysis.

With regard to rebel-committed OSV, model 2 shows a highly significant and upward influence of traditional authority strength. Model 5 points to a similar direction, albeit with substantially and statistically weakened confidence. Overall, and while rebel-OSV is rare in general, non-state armed groups appear to target areas with strong customary institutions. Based on model 2, the probability of a grid cell to *not* experience any deadly violence against civilians drops more than 6 percentage points (from approximately 97%) when increasing traditional authority strength from its 10th percentile to 90th percentile level. This is a considerable effect in comparison to the other covariates. For example, an increase in the average neighbourhood OSV from zero to 2 events (mean neighbourhood OSV-events being 0.35 events) decreases the

probability of not having any rebel-OSV by roughly 4 percentage points. Figure 4.3 illustrates the marginal effects of traditional authority strength on predicted counts of rebel-OSV events, based on model 2.



Figure 4.3. Marginal effects of traditional authority strength on predicted count of rebel-OSV, based on round 6 data. The x-axis presents the empirically observed values of the independent variable.

In terms of the control variables, both types of OSV take place in more economically developed areas, as captured by the nightlight variable's positive coefficient. Violence against civilians also appears to be strongly spatially clustered and dependent on past incidents of civilian victimisation. The post-2008 models show a negative correlation between the distance to the nearest urban centre and acts of OSV; implying that rural areas are on average safer from violence than urban contexts. Notably, the round 4 data also suggest that past civil war events (battles between the government and non-state armed groups) bear different implications for OSV

committed by the different armed sides. In general, the models capture rebel-OSV better than government-OSV.

The main results here lend support to the argument that rather than ubiquitously violence-mitigating, customary institutions can also attract certain types of violence, particularly violence against civilians that is committed by organised armed groups. Yet both the substantive and the statistical differences in the results in relation to the different types of armed parties require further interpretation. According to the analysis, non-state armed groups use violence against civilians in areas with stronger traditional authority institutions, while the government's use of OSV is not as clearly related to the strength of customary institutions. Moreover, the results also differ between countries and timeframes included in the analysis (between rounds 4 and 6).

Differing levels of dependencies on local institutions might help to explain the observed variation. In particular, the government side could be less dependent on local customary structures in its access to necessary resources and therefore less influenced by the strength of these. Moreover, the government side often uses violence as a repressive measure against potential opposition. The rationale for this can be lower in so called hinterland areas where strong customary institutions are often located (Herbst, 2000; Mengisteab, 2017b) and the government's general presence is weaker. Instead, non-state armed groups that are dependent on local compliance for their resources may find strong chieftaincies with high social cohesion a more serious challenge that complicates co-option of local institutions and renders access to local resources more uncertain. Thus, rather than negotiating with the local authorities, non-state armed groups can become invoked to use more violence in these areas (Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017).

Descriptive evidence available in the ACLED data[80] links non-state armed groups in the sample data to atrocities that explicitly target customary institutions in areas where these are perceived strong. For example, in Kenya Al Shabab is reported to have targeted customary leaders in two localities with higher than average customary institutional strength. Similarly, in Kolofata and Mora municipalities in Cameroon, Boko Haram has targeted chiefs and their family members when terrorizing the civilian population. Several villages in Mali and Burkina Faso that are situated in grid cells with higher than average traditional authority strength have also seen explicit targeting of chiefs and other local elites. In fact, investigating the post-2014 data sample and all rebel-committed acts of OSV shows a considerable share of events explicitly mentioning the targeting of local customary authorities (15%). Furthermore, comparing these events in which customary actors are explicitly specified as targets with events without their naming suggests a significantly higher customary institutional strength in areas where customary leaders have been targeted.[81] This gives further support to the hypothesis as it links the violence committed by non-state armed groups with customary institutions in areas where they are strong. While this does not yet capture any causal mechanism, anecdotal evidence suggests that the implications of targeting customary leaders are that of weakening of the civilian capacities and gaining control over an area.

The type of non-state armed groups perpetrating OSV in the two data samples should also be considered as this can influence the relationship between armed actors and civilians. While there is considerable overlap between the data samples in regard to the active rebel groups, there are also some notable differences. Specifically, Islamist

[80] See the notes column in the datasets (ACLED, 2017).
[81] See Appendix A4.11.

armed groups, such as Boko Haram, AQIM, and Al-Shabaab, are particularly prominent in the post-2014 data sample. Albeit portrayed as traditional and patriarchal, these groups do not only strive to overthrow regimes in power but also pursue a radically different order to the extent of local institutions. Strong customary institutions, such as traditional leadership structures, can seem fundamentally threatening and of little use to these groups (Lia, 2017). Rather than trying to co-opt or co-exist with existing institutions, these groups can be especially inclined to deliberately target localities with strong customary rule in order to weaken any available alternatives to their own structures.

Alternative explanations, model specifications and robustness

The empirical findings here point to a positive relationship between the strength of customary institutions and civilian victimisation committed by non-state armed groups in particular. However, this found correlation does not explicitly capture the theorised mechanism and should be subjected to alternative explanations. The observed variation in the two data samples also point to some differences across time and countries that should be examined. Aside from alternative explanations, the specific operationalisation of the key variables is subject to active decision-making by the author and should be tested against alternative ways to grasp the variables.

One concern with the measure of customary institutional strength is the possible endogeneity of the variable with past violent events on the one hand and the general quality of local state institutions on the other hand. With regard to the latter, traditional authority strength might be endogenous to the strength of local state institutions. Indeed, Logan (2009, 2013) finds that these two types of local institutions correlate

positively with one another. With regard to the former, localities that have experienced higher levels of past one-sided violence might have a stronger sense of social cohesion and community as a reaction to violent actors, which can influence the way people perceive their authority institutions. In other words, the measure of traditional leadership strength might reflect the coming-togetherness of an attacked community. Therefore, the subsequent levels of violence would be explained by violence dependency rather than the theorised mechanism. While I control for the past one-sided violence by rebel and state forces, there are other types of civilian victimisation that might influence both traditional authority strength and rebel and state OSV.

In order to test the relationship between past violence and customary institutional strength more directly, I first estimate the level of traditional authority strength as a function of rebel, state, and militia past violence against civilians and other covariates that can influence the independent variable. The models (reported in the Appendix) find little evidence for an argument that past violence would significantly correlate with higher levels of traditional authority strength, hence alleviating our concern for the erroneous measurement of customary institutional strength. Furthermore, including a measure of militia violence against civilians, which is often related to rebel and/or state forces and their strategies, does not significantly change the interpretation of the results.

Table 4.3. Coefficients for traditional authority strength and local state strength in models estimating OSV by rebel and state forces in post-2014 and post-2008 years

	Post-2014 years (round 6)			Post-2008 (round 4)		
	Model 7 All-OSV	*Model 8* Rebel-OSV	*Model 9* Gov-OSV	*Model 10* All-OSV	*Model 11* Rebel-OSV	*Model 12* Gov-OSV
Traditional authority strength	0.850*	1.365*	-0.016	0.715*	1.106*	0.601*
	(0.433)	(0.669)	(0.511)	(0.289)	(0.475)	(0.306)
Local state strength	-0.352	-0.267	0.558	-0.576†	-0.886†	-0.104
	(0.426)	(0.793)	(0.688)	(0.325)	(0.496)	(0.388)
Constant	-1.424	-5.139*	-2.131	5.828**	4.497	4.894**
	(1.433)	(2.406)	(1.817)	(2.094)	(2.827)	(1.769)
Ln alpha	0.959***	1.125***	1.030***	0.791***	1.825***	0.487*
	(0.204)	(0.257)	(0.228)	(0.166)	(0.213)	(0.236)
Observations	630	485	485	446	446	446
Log-pseudolikelihood	-527.466	-178.311	-382.056	-566.114	-303.040	-433.176

Source for the DV: Armed Conflict Location and Event Database; clustered standard errors; other covariates not reported in the table; †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001.

Moreover, in order to make sure that the findings are not driven by the quality of the local state, I employ data capturing the strength of the local state. The variable is constructed similarly to the independent variable using the corresponding Afrobarometer questions concerning local council/councillors. As Table 4.3 illustrates, including this measure strengthens the correlation between traditional authority strength and rebel-OSV. Interestingly, the added measure of local state strength is itself negative correlated with OSV-events, yet this relationship is not statistically robust.

Thus far, the analysis has operationalised the independent variable as the mean of the perceived trust towards and salience of traditional authorities based on the Afrobarometer survey indicators. In order to scrutinise the robustness of the independent variable, the Appendix reports models using the mean values of the individual indicators instead of the joined measure. The results based on round 6 survey data imply that while both indicators have a violence-inducing direction, the indicator capturing the effectiveness of traditional leaders performs better. However, round 4

data show a somewhat different picture as the generally weaker relationship appears to be more driven by trust in traditional leaders. While both indicators seem individually relevant for the outcomes, the variations across data samples indicate interesting differences across countries under analysis.

In order to control for these country-specific dynamics, I conduct two additional tests. First, I report the post-2014 models with country-fixed effects in the Appendix. This strengthens the correlation between traditional authority strength and rebel-OSV. Second, I construct a cross-sectional over-time (two time points) dataset consisting of the available grids for countries included in both survey rounds (Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Uganda). The more robust results with round 6 data suggested that new countries included in the post-2014 sample (Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon) might be particularly influenced by the hypothesised relation between customary institutional strength and rebel-OSV. Therefore, I re-run the models focusing solely on the countries that appear at both survey rounds and allow measurement of the independent variable in two time points. The results support the general findings in terms of customary institutional strength and rebel-OSV, improving confidence in the found relationship.

Finally, in order to expand the geographical coverage of the analysis, I re-run the main models for the post-2014 sample but this time extrapolate data from round 4 if data for the main independent variable are missing for survey round 6. The results, which are reported in the Appendix, support the correlation between traditional authority strength and rebel-OSV. Moreover, the results report a positive and significant relationship between the independent variable and government-OSV. While these results should be approached in caution (the correlation between round 4 and 6

measures of traditional authority strength is moderate), they give further support to the main findings of the study.

4.8.Conclusion

This chapter has explored how the strength of customary institutions influences spatial variation of one-sided violence during civil conflicts. Empirically it has analysed the strength of traditional authority structures at the local level and its implications for one-sided violence committed by non-state and state armed forces. Two theoretical propositions can be considered as explanations for a systematic relationship between these two variables. First, customary institutions can be argued to make communities more resilient and better protected from violence in general. On the other hand, strong customary institutions can also be argued to appear threatening and more difficult to co-opt from the perspective of armed groups and thus attract violence in specific localities. I have argued that when it comes to acts of violence against civilians, it is the latter mechanism that takes prevalence (without disputing the generally pacifying influence of customary institutions).

The empirical results are modestly supportive of the argument and suggest that the more trusted and salient traditional authorities in a locality are, the more vulnerable that locality will be towards one-sided violence. Specifically, one-sided violence by non-state armed groups appears to take place in localities with strong customary institutions. This relationship between violence against civilians by non-state armed groups and strength of customary institutions is robust under multiple control variables, different operationalisation of the key variables, and model specifications. However,

the relationship between violence against civilians committed by state forces and the strength of customary institutions is not robust.

The empirical analysis corroborates the findings of previous research on the significance of existing local institutions in shaping the conduct of armed groups vis-à-vis the civilians. Furthermore, the results support the focus on customary institutions as social structures that shape the interaction between armed groups and civilians at a local level. It is notable that the influence of local customary institutions is robust to the inclusion of existing local state institutions, which themselves do not appear to have similar influence on the rate of violence against civilians. As the anecdotal evidence illustrates, non-state armed groups explicitly target customary leadership when resorting to the use of violence against civilians. Examples outside the data samples support the argument that the targeting of local chiefs and other social leaders is done to seize necessary control and secure access to local resources (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004; Raleigh and De Bruijne, 2017).

This chapter contributes to a more empirically nuanced understanding of how existing civilian institutions influence wartime realities of armed groups and civilians across conflict zones and how this shapes the strategic use of violence against civilians. However, there are important caveats to keep in mind. First, the non-state armed groups prevalent in the data sample are mostly of a specific type that is less prone to building governing structures upon existing local-level institutions and are more prone to be hostile towards existing local institutions. For example, in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon, Islamist groups account for most OSV. These groups tend to be revolutionary with regard to their aims for future order. For them, strong customary institutions can appear as concrete obstacles and threats to the ideal form of control and governance. Hence, these groups can be more inclined to target strong customary

institutions violently (rather than take advantage of them) than groups with aims of gaining power within the current political system (such as in Colombia). Further research attention should be paid to the interaction between the strength of customary institutions, the type of rebel groups, and the violent and nonviolent local outcomes that follow.

Furthermore, the lack of data to measure the independent variable over time on the one hand and to test the theorised relationship more directly on the other hand has constrained the empirical scope of this chapter. Measuring changes in the strength of local customary institutions would allow for a closer examination of the dynamics between violence and strength of local institutions. Moreover, while the anecdotal and descriptive data suggests that customary institutions are explicitly targeted in areas with locally strong traditional authorities, more systematic data that disaggregates the targets of violence against civilians would help us better understand the strategic use of violence. Finally, the focus on traditional leadership structures as an example of customary institutions has overlooked many other forms of institutions that may induce different local capacities and reactions from armed groups. While traditional leadership structures represent an all-encompassing community-level institution that can be identified across contexts, their hierarchical structure and their quasi-formal role in many contexts can render them particularly threatening from the perspective of external non-state armed groups. A better theoretical and empirical understanding of the types of local customary structures of civilians at the outset of violent conflicts would help to further asses how existing local institutions shape local resilience and vulnerability towards armed violence.

4.9.Appendices

A4.1 Descriptive statistics of included variables

Round 6 data:

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
All-OSV	786	1.584	9.95	0	191
Rebel-OSV	786	.709	6.555	0	127
Gov-OSV	786	.875	7.37	0	187
Traditional authority strength	630	1.369	.378	.325	2.531
(log) Agricultural area	784	3.324	1.25	0	4.613
(Log) Time to nearest urban centre	784	5.477	.519	4.075	7.692
(Log) nightlight emissions	784	.315	.547	0	3.096
(Log) population density	784	4.098	1.26	-.934	8.023
Civil war events	786	.183	1.402	0	26
Government constituency	786	.341	.474	0	1
N of excluded groups	609	.187	.456	0	3
Time since OSV	786	13.897	6.734	0	18
Time since OSV^2	786	238.416	134.208	0	324
Time since OSV^3	786	4203.744	2512.72	0	5832
All neighbour events	784	1.08	4.298	0	42.75
Neighbour rebel events	784	.487	2.932	0	42.375
Neighbour gov. events	784	.593	3.108	0	38.25
Local state strength	630	.971	.323	0	2
Militia-OSV	786	.557	2.083	0	20

Round 4 data:

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
All-OSV	524	1.832	7.574	0	115
Rebel-OSV	524	.981	6.139	0	106
Gov-OSV	524	.851	3.379	0	60
Traditional authority strength	513	1.289	.432	.2	2.875
(log) Agricultural area	524	3.334	1.328	0	4.612
(Log) Time to nearest urban	524	5.41	.521	4.102	7.692

centre					
(Log) nightlight emissions	524	.274	.536	0	3.174
(Log) population density	524	4.128	1.299	-1.031	7.899
Civil war events	524	.004	.062	0	1
Government constituency	524	.454	.498	0	1
N of excluded groups	457	.112	.348	0	2
Time since OSV	524	10.181	3.697	0	12
Time since OSV^2	524	117.3	51.427	0	144
Time since OSV^3	524	1381.147	654.335	0	1728
All neighbour events	524	1.377	4.098	0	48.125
Neighbour rebel events	524	.708	3.49	0	44.125
Neighbour gov. events	524	.669	1.318	0	17.25
Local state strength	523	1.038	.372	.143	2.25
Militia-OSV	524	.267	1.284	0	17

Pearson's correlation shows moderate and statistically significant correlation between the measures of traditional authority strength across the two survey rounds, r=0.415 (p<0.000). Shapiro-Wilk normality test shows that data for traditional authority strength in round 6 is normally distributed while the measure for traditional authority strength in round 4 shows some non-normality (p>0.05).

A4.2 OLS-regression of traditional authority strength and beliefs of the origin of the survey[82]

Who sent this survey?	Traditional authority strength (Round 6)	Traditional authority strength (Round 4)
Research group	-0.003*	-0.007†
	(0.001)	(0.004)
Government	0.003	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Politicians	-0.011†	0.015†
	(0.006)	(0.008)
Don't want to tell	0.028	-0.010
	(0.020)	(0.044)
Don't know	-0.008*	-0.007
	(0.003)	(0.005)
No one	0.008	0.001

[82] All models in the Appendix have robust standard errors reported in parentheses; †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001.

	(0.019)	(0.045)
Other	-0.003	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Constant	1.549***	1.680***
	(0.042)	(0.043)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	630	653
R^2	0.263	0.389

A4.3 Models including local state strength and militia OSV events

	Round 6 data			Round 4 data		
	All-OSV	Rebel-OSV	Gov-OSV	All-OSV	Rebel-OSV	Gov-OSV
Traditional authority strength	0.850*	1.365*	-0.016	0.715*	1.106*	0.601*
	(0.433)	(0.669)	(0.511)	(0.289)	(0.475)	(0.306)
Local state strength	-0.352	-0.267	0.558	-0.576†	-0.886†	-0.104
	(0.426)	(0.793)	(0.688)	(0.325)	(0.496)	(0.388)
Militia violence lagged	0.024	0.029	0.067	-0.039	-0.108	0.015
	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.080)	(0.032)
Agricultural area, log	0.131	0.290†	0.155	0.021	-0.002	0.080
	(0.097)	(0.163)	(0.111)	(0.095)	(0.134)	(0.099)
Time to nearest urban centre, log	0.036	0.526	-0.012	-0.829**	-0.723†	-1.004***
	(0.213)	(0.348)	(0.274)	(0.313)	(0.435)	(0.242)
Nightlight emissions, log	0.808***	0.805*	0.524*	1.174***	1.365**	1.032***
	(0.230)	(0.336)	(0.251)	(0.273)	(0.510)	(0.225)
Population density, log	-0.029	-0.148	0.168	-0.251†	-0.260	-0.145
	(0.125)	(0.182)	(0.153)	(0.131)	(0.180)	(0.143)
Civil war events	-0.007	-0.122	0.008	1.717†	-5.460*	2.542**
	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.087)	(0.891)	(2.588)	(0.846)
Government constituency	0.038	-0.436	0.197	0.231	0.441	0.100
	(0.222)	(0.366)	(0.295)	(0.311)	(0.428)	(0.333)
Time since last OSV	-0.422†	-1.281**	-0.309	-0.515†	-1.103*	0.115
	(0.253)	(0.318)	(0.259)	(0.299)	(0.497)	(0.221)
Time since last OSV^2	0.046	0.126*	0.035	0.073	0.186	-0.049
	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.118)	(0.048)
Time since last OSV^3	-0.002	-0.004†	-0.001	-0.004	-0.009	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Neighb. OSV	0.255***			0.178***		
	(0.062)			(0.034)		
N of excluded groups		-0.544	0.246	-0.281	-0.836	-0.279
		(0.457)	(0.284)	(0.340)	(0.831)	(0.348)
Neighb. Reb-OSV		0.351***			0.341***	
		(0.079)			(0.094)	
Neighb. Gov-OSV			0.193*			0.154†
			(0.086)			(0.091)
Constant	-1.424	-5.139*	-2.131	5.828**	4.497	4.894**
	(1.433)	(2.406)	(1.817)	(2.094)	(2.827)	(1.769)
Lnalpha	0.959***	1.125***	1.030***	0.791***	1.825***	0.487*
	(0.204)	(0.257)	(0.228)	(0.166)	(0.213)	(0.236)
Observations	630	485	485	446	446	446
Log pseudolikelihood	-527.466	-178.311	-382.056	-566.114	-303.040	-433.176

A4.4 Individual indicator models

	ROUND 6 data			ROUND 4 data			ROUND 6 data			ROUND 4 data		
	All-OSV	Rebel-OSV	Gov-OSV	All-OSV	Rebel-OSV	Gov-OSV	All-OSV	Rebel-OSV	Gove-OSV	All-OSV	Rebel-OSV	GOV-OSV
TA salience	0.764***	0.704†	0.837***	0.204	0.044	0.390†						
	(0.210)	(0.383)	(0.221)	(0.178)	(0.277)	(0.214)						
TA trust							0.068	0.688†	-0.334	0.382†	0.707*	0.326
							(0.273)	(0.393)	(0.244)	(0.222)	(0.338)	(0.208)
Agricultural area, log	0.142	0.302†	0.115	0.096	0.093	0.134	0.154	0.288†	0.174	0.046	0.033	0.102
	(0.096)	(0.176)	(0.108)	(0.103)	(0.133)	(0.107)	(0.095)	(0.171)	(0.113)	(0.097)	(0.131)	(0.098)
Time to nearest urban centre, log	-0.046	0.497	-0.202	-0.786*	-0.536	-1.021***	0.081	0.564	-0.041	-0.801*	-0.674	-0.988***
	(0.208)	(0.357)	(0.249)	(0.324)	(0.433)	(0.252)	(0.210)	(0.356)	(0.267)	(0.320)	(0.431)	(0.245)
Nightlight emissions, log	0.781***	0.674*	0.560*	1.178***	1.238**	1.031***	0.711**	0.799*	0.363	1.197***	1.304**	1.051***
	(0.200)	(0.312)	(0.219)	(0.256)	(0.423)	(0.210)	(0.231)	(0.342)	(0.243)	(0.250)	(0.408)	(0.215)
Population density, log	-0.022	-0.139	0.164	-0.300*	-0.325†	-0.199	-0.038	-0.137	0.167	-0.246†	-0.245	-0.155
	(0.124)	(0.184)	(0.149)	(0.135)	(0.183)	(0.148)	(0.124)	(0.179)	(0.152)	(0.126)	(0.176)	(0.142)
Civil war events	-0.015	-0.128	-0.008	1.690†	-6.838*	2.502**	-0.006	-0.107	0.024	1.722*	-6.777*	2.403**
	(0.082)	(0.102)	(0.069)	(0.880)	(3.371)	(0.863)	(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.088)	(0.872)	(2.972)	(0.847)
Government constituency	0.122	-0.257	0.226	0.183	0.380	0.080	0.009	-0.550	0.269	0.185	0.345	0.147
	(0.215)	(0.362)	(0.278)	(0.339)	(0.465)	(0.351)	(0.244)	(0.350)	(0.301)	(0.314)	(0.408)	(0.331)
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Neighb. OSV	0.249***			0.175***			0.257***			0.188***		
	(0.054)			(0.036)			(0.056)			(0.037)		
Excluded groups		-0.546	0.013	-0.397	-0.905	-0.335		-0.492	0.261	-0.386	-1.013	-0.264
		(0.449)	(0.267)	(0.359)	(0.919)	(0.348)		(0.463)	(0.267)	(0.341)	(0.803)	(0.330)
Neighb. reb-OSV		0.346***			0.338**			0.350***			0.366***	
		(0.082)			(0.113)			(0.078)			(0.103)	

Neighb. gov-OSV			0.231**			0.152			0.234**			0.158†
			(0.071)			(0.093)			(0.072)			(0.094)
Constant	-0.743	-3.837	-0.931	5.763**	3.864	5.537**	-0.857	-5.047*	-0.667	5.092*	3.024	4.838**
	(1.374)	(2.360)	(1.660)	(2.128)	(2.798)	(1.745)	(1.471)	(2.465)	(1.785)	(2.099)	(2.825)	(1.770)
Lnalpha	0.927***	1.217***	1.017***	0.833***	1.866***	0.511*	0.983***	1.156***	1.084***	0.811***	1.831***	0.501*
	(0.202)	(0.241)	(0.214)	(0.173)	(0.221)	(0.245)	(0.198)	(0.250)	(0.197)	(0.165)	(0.212)	(0.237)
Observations	630	485	485	457	457	457	630	485	485	447	447	447
Log pseudolikelihood	-525.654	-179.745	-380.236	-571.401	-306.536	-435.512	-529.975	-179.420	-382.690	-567.562	-303.514	-434.269

A4.5 Cross-sectional over-time models (traditional authority strength measured in 2008 and 2014, dependent variables in 2009-2014 and 2015-2017

	(1) All-OSV	(2) Rebel-OSV	(3) Gov-OSV
Traditional authority strength	0.513†	0.921*	0.456
	(0.293)	(0.464)	(0.286)
Local state strength	-0.714*	-1.066†	-0.622†
	(0.334)	(0.555)	(0.355)
Agricultural area, log	-0.103	-0.268†	0.119
	(0.105)	(0.149)	(0.098)
Time to nearest urban centre, log	-0.844**	-0.647	-0.981***
	(0.261)	(0.499)	(0.220)
Nightlight emissions, log	0.910***	0.852***	0.820***
	(0.176)	(0.255)	(0.167)
Population density, log	-0.231†	-0.277†	-0.084
	(0.121)	(0.154)	(0.144)
Civil war events	0.788†	0.733	0.517
	(0.463)	(0.525)	(0.540)
Government constituency	0.139	0.163	0.257
	(0.226)	(0.321)	(0.251)
Time since last OSV	-0.356**	-0.602**	-0.120
	(0.127)	(0.221)	(0.120)
Time since last OSV^2	0.034†	0.062*	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.017)
Time since last OSV^3	-0.001†	-0.002*	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Neighb. OSV	0.164***		
	(0.035)		
Neighb. reb-OSV		0.314***	
		(0.074)	
Neighb. gov-OSV			0.176***
			(0.052)
Constant	5.715**	4.398	4.187*
	(1.873)	(3.146)	(1.726)
Lnalpha	0.884***	1.686***	0.711**

	(0.158)	(0.209)	(0.247)
Observations	842	842	842
Log pseudolikelihood	-704.336	-335.251	-554.027

A4.6 Round 6 models with data for the independent variable extrapolated from round 4 (if data missing for grid cells in round 6)

	(1) All-OSV	(2) Rebel-OSV	(3) Gov-OSV
Traditional authority strength	0.829***	1.488***	0.643*
	(0.228)	(0.387)	(0.288)
Agricultural area, log	0.154†	0.221†	0.185†
	(0.081)	(0.122)	(0.101)
Time to nearest urban centre, log	0.172	0.382	-0.134
	(0.208)	(0.316)	(0.233)
Nightlight emissions, log	0.745***	0.630*	0.763***
	(0.215)	(0.292)	(0.227)
Population density, log	-0.019	-0.093	-0.032
	(0.123)	(0.151)	(0.137)
Civil war events	0.009	0.011	-0.021
	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.047)
Government constituency	-0.058	-0.720*	0.162
	(0.224)	(0.306)	(0.256)
N of excluded groups	-0.175	-0.563	0.006
	(0.231)	(0.418)	(0.268)
Time since last OSV	-0.473†	-1.293***	-0.391
	(0.252)	(0.286)	(0.240)
Time since last OSV^2	0.052	0.122*	0.049
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.036)
Time since last OSV^3	-0.002	-0.003†	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Neighb. OSV	0.214***		
	(0.044)		
Neighb. reb-OSV		0.253***	
		(0.065)	
Neighb. gov-OSV			0.280**
			(0.092)
Constant	-2.204	-4.360*	-1.113
	(1.405)	(2.204)	(1.536)
Lnalpha	0.925***	1.264***	1.171***
	(0.178)	(0.210)	(0.204)
Observations	609	609	609
Log pseudolikelihood	-570.813	-259.501	-437.874

A4.7 Including country-fixed effects (round 6 data)

	(1) All-OSV	(2) Rebel-OSV	(3) Gov-OSV
Traditional authority strength	0.691*	1.767**	0.621*
	(0.332)	(0.646)	(0.290)
Agricultural area, log	0.148	0.364†	0.075
	(0.116)	(0.187)	(0.114)
Time to nearest urban centre, log	0.008	0.626	-0.316

	(0.198)	(0.433)	(0.230)
Nightlight emissions, log	1.046***	0.846†	0.744***
	(0.180)	(0.471)	(0.166)
Population density, log	0.017	0.108	0.208
	(0.120)	(0.203)	(0.128)
Civil war events	0.099		
	(0.069)		
Government constituency	-0.668**		
	(0.243)		
Time since last OSV	-0.653***	-2.035***	-0.478***
	(0.137)	(0.364)	(0.130)
Time since last OSV^2	0.083***	0.221***	0.065**
	(0.022)	(0.055)	(0.020)
Time since last OSV^3	-0.003***	-0.007**	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Neighb. OSV	0.103**		
	(0.040)		
Constant	-0.893	-7.033*	-0.870
	(1.284)	(2.923)	(1.663)
Lnalpha	0.530*	1.911***	0.247
	(0.221)	(0.277)	(0.244)
Observations	630	630	630
Log pseudolikelihood	-504.461	-207.041	-401.831
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES

Source for the DV: Armed Conflict Location and Event Database; clustered standard errors; †p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001.

A4.8 Round 6 models with alternative outcome variables (UCDP one-sided-violence deaths by state and non-state armed groups):

	(1) Both rebel and state OSV	(2) Rebel-OSV	(3) State-OSV
Traditional authority strength	1.114	3.253**	-0.187
	(0.693)	(1.005)	(0.790)
Agricultural area, log	0.541**	3.810***	0.087
	(0.199)	(0.808)	(0.182)
Time to nearest urban centre, log	-0.719	1.799†	0.417
	(0.474)	(0.940)	(0.534)
Nightlight emissions, log	0.031	-0.626	-0.419
	(0.740)	(0.563)	(0.741)
Population density, log	0.410	0.134	0.755†
	(0.307)	(0.415)	(0.408)
Civil war events	-0.019	-1.131***	0.251
	(0.333)	(0.283)	(0.677)
Government constituency	-0.382	0.367	-0.966†
	(0.593)	(0.840)	(0.551)
Time since last OSV	-0.602**	-2.100***	-0.166
	(0.206)	(0.331)	(0.273)
Time since last OSV^2	0.033	0.193***	-0.006
	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.026)
Time since last OSV^3	-0.001	-0.005***	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Neighb. OSV	0.093***		
	(0.024)		
Excluded groups		-1.599**	0.489

		(0.605)	(0.589)
Neighb. reb-OSV		0.159***	
		(0.041)	
Neighb. gov-OSV			0.265†
			(0.147)
Constant	0.752	-25.438**	-4.736
	(3.009)	(8.362)	(3.632)
Lnalpha	3.095***	3.644***	2.993***
	(0.211)	(0.308)	(0.300)
Observations	630	485	485
Log pseudolikelihood	-344.127	-134.898	-196.248

The outcome here is the count of best estimates of civilian deaths caused by one-sided violence by state or formally organised non-state armed actors, as coded by the UCDP Georeferenced event dataset (Sundberg and Melander, 2013; Croicu and Sundberg, 2015). As with the main models, I use negative binomial estimation method to consider the overdispersion of the outcome variable.

A4.9 Estimating traditional authority strength

	Round 6 traditional authority strength	Round 6 traditional authority strength	Round 4 traditional authority strength
Time since last OSV-event by rebel or state actor	-0.004†		0.004
	(0.002)		(0.004)
Militia OSV	-0.003	-0.013	0.028***
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Agricultural area, log	0.014	0.015	0.079***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Time to nearest urban centre, log	0.078*	0.077*	-0.043
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.040)
population density, log	0.002	0.004	-0.158***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.020)
nightlight emissions, log	-0.279***	-0.274***	-0.103**
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.036)
OSV-events by state and rebel actors in 2010-2014		0.003	
		(0.002)	
Constant	1.047***	0.974***	1.888***
	(0.227)	(0.223)	(0.271)
Observations	630	630	513
Log pseudolikelihood	-208.055	-208.436	-218.881

A4.10 Dropping all grid cells with fewer than <15 respondents (round 6 data)

	(1) Both rebel and state OSV	(2) Rebel-OSV	(3) State-OSV
traditional authority strength	0.714	1.488*	-0.149
	(0.540)	(0.665)	(0.408)
Agricultural area, log	0.072	0.150	0.220†
	(0.093)	(0.186)	(0.114)
Time to nearest urban centre, log	-0.229	-0.110	-0.091
	(0.247)	(0.544)	(0.286)
nightlight emissions, log	0.782**	0.675†	0.535†
	(0.298)	(0.390)	(0.284)
population density, log	-0.040	-0.056	0.077
	(0.138)	(0.209)	(0.168)
civil war events	0.061	0.081	0.013
	(0.082)	(0.121)	(0.068)
government constituency	0.267	-0.488	0.518
	(0.272)	(0.420)	(0.327)
Time since last OSV	-0.419	-1.282***	-0.372
	(0.294)	(0.322)	(0.270)
Time since last OSV^2	0.053	0.142**	0.046
	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.041)
Time since last OSV^3	-0.002	-0.004**	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
neighb. OSV	0.199***		
	(0.056)		
excluded groups		-0.760	0.316
		(0.656)	(0.311)
neighb. reb-OSV		0.207*	
		(0.092)	
neighb. gov-OSV			0.215**
			(0.072)
Constant	0.090	-2.220	-0.801
	(1.578)	(3.403)	(1.797)
Lnalpha	0.903***	1.157***	1.059***
	(0.243)	(0.432)	(0.215)
Observations	437	338	338
Log pseudolikelihood	-412.080	-126.033	-307.601

A4.11 Test of equal variance (t-test) for traditional authority strength in rebel-targeted areas, grouped by whether targeting explicitly names traditional authority or not (round 6 data)

Group	Obs	Mean	St. error	St. deviation	95% interval
No explicit targeting of TA	35	1.309521	.0557638	.3299033	1.196195–1.422847
Explicit targeting of TA	10	1.519386	.1048088	.3314344	1.282292–1.75648
N	45	1.356158	.0504106	.3381645	1.254562–1.457753

	diff.	
Traditional authority strength	-0.210†	(-1.77)
N	45	

†p<0.1, *p<0:05, **p<0:01, ***p<0.001.

5. Conclusion

This thesis has engaged in a theoretical and empirical effort to better understand the role of traditional governance in peace and conflict dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa. The three preceding chapters have each focused on specific conditions and systematic variation in traditional governance structures that I argue give rise to differences in hybrid governance and therefore shape peaceful and violent outcomes within countries.

The first chapter examined how different types of state–traditional governance interactions influence the prospects for countries' intrastate peace. The key findings of this chapter demonstrated that a concordant interaction in which the state recognises and accommodates traditional governance can mitigate the risk of intrastate conflict amid limited state capacities. Overall, the chapter identified four approaches that the state can take vis-à-vis traditional governance structures. On the one hand, the state can exclude traditional authorities from the constitutionally recognised realm or leave them without any substantive role by recognising them solely symbolically. These approaches constitute discordant interactions that make coordination between the state and traditional governance difficult and give little incentives to traditional authorities to actively support the state. On the contrary, in concordant interactions the state outsources some form of authority to traditional governance structures either as separate entities in charge of specific functions (institutional multiplicity) or as an integral part of the state's governance hierarchies (institutional hybridity). I argued that the latter in particular facilitates governance coordination and gives traditional authorities higher stakes at maintaining the state stable. Besides pointing to the pacifying effect of institutional hybridity, the empirical findings demonstrated the

significance of colonial history in conditioning the role of traditional governance alongside the state.

In the second chapter, I zoomed into municipalities in South Africa in order to examine how internal aspects of state-recognised traditional authority structures influence local protests. The chapter presented new spatial data on contested and uncontested traditional authority structures in South African municipalities and employed a mixed methods research design to test the theoretical argument. I deliberately chose a country that is characterised by institutional hybridity, e.g. in which the state has recognised and incorporated traditional authorities into the state realm, and that I had found to strengthen intrastate peace. Rather than expecting the effects of institutional hybridity on intrastate peace to trickle down unchanged to the local level, I argued that we need to consider the internal cohesion of the recognised traditional governance structures. Specifically, I proposed that internally contested traditional authority structures contribute negatively to the accountability and credibility of the local government. Contested traditional authority structures change the rationale of incumbent traditional leaders, render it easier for the local state to co-opt them, and provide opportunities to mobilise against the current incumbents. The results of the statistical analysis supported the hypothesis and showed that municipalities with contested traditional authority structures have experienced considerably higher protest levels than municipalities with more cohesive traditional authority structures. Notably, this finding remained robust when expanding the analysis to cover municipalities without any traditional governance structures in place. The qualitative evidence also alluded to a slightly different mechanism linking traditional authority contest to governance-related protests. Namely, the lack of clarity over rightful authorities can lead to difficulties in implementing development and

governance interventions and thereby lower governance efficacy, which increases motivation and opportunities to protest against local government. Overall, these findings challenged the idea that competition over authority positions automatically increases accountability of political leaders towards their subjects.

In the last chapter, I switched my attention from low-level contentious politics to countries with armed violence. The role of customs and traditions can become further attenuated in these contexts as the limited state's legitimacy is fundamentally undermined. Building on the wartime governance literature I argued that the strength of customary institutions matters for how civilians are able to maintain social cohesion and provide governance even amid a civil conflict (Arjona, 2016b; Kaplan, 2017). However, rather than ubiquitously protecting a locality from violence, strong customary institutions can in fact attract violence against civilians. Traditional authorities that are considered legitimate and efficient by their subjects signal local autonomy and capability to mobilise collectively, which can appear threatening from an armed group's perspective. They can also render it harder for such an armed group to gain access to local resources. The empirical analysis, which leveraged spatially disaggregated Afrobarometer survey data to measure the strength of traditional authorities, showed rebel groups to target areas with strong traditional leaders. Descriptive investigation of rebel groups' acts of one-sided violence further pointed to considerable explicit and deliberate targeting of traditional leaders in areas with higher than average local perceptions of their trustworthiness and salience. On the other hand, governments' acts of violence against civilians were not robustly linked to the strength of customary institutions.

Contribution

The main findings in this thesis contribute to the study of peace and conflict in particular and political science more broadly in three ways. First, the thesis expands theoretically and empirically the study of governance institutions and conflict vulnerability. All three chapters have demonstrated that traditional governance, a form of governance that derives its legitimacy from non-state, context-specific customs, has a non-trivial influence in shaping within-country peace and conflict dynamics in the contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. The first chapter makes a novel contribution in this regard by demonstrating that this influence is not confined to the immediate communities adhering to traditional governance but that it carries all the way up to national-level politics and intrastate peace. The second and third chapters contribute to a growing body of research highlighting the de facto political influence of locally embedded socio-cultural institutions. This point was formulated clearly by one of the participants to a focus-group discussion in Amadiba, a traditional administrative area in Eastern Cape, South Africa:

They [traditional leaders] maintain peace in the community, they ensure that there is peace. They demarcate the land, give people sites on where to build their houses. (Focus-group participant, June 2017).

Beyond showcasing the relevance of traditional governance for peace and conflict dynamics, this thesis has strived to develop a more nuanced theoretical understanding of this relationship. For example, the second chapter demonstrates that rather than the presence of traditional authority structures per se explaining systematic

variation in local protests, it is the variation in the internal structural cohesion of traditional authorities that matters. Moreover, the theoretical model developed in the first chapter is a novel attempt to capture nuances in the institutional interaction between different governance realms in hybrid polities and to investigate their implications for a specific outcome. While the focus here has been on the outcome of intrastate peace, the typology can serve to study the implications of hybrid governance structures for other societally critical outcomes. For example, acknowledging and categorising different types of discordant and concordant interactions between state and non-state governance structures may help to understand variation in efficiency of development projects or outcomes of mobilisation efforts.

Second, the thesis contributes to the study of elite interactions and processes of co-option, which are closely linked to the themes of leadership accountability and legitimacy. This thesis proposes that accommodation of regional and local non-state authorities, such as but not limited to traditional authorities, can mitigate challenges against the state by enforcing inter-elite alliance and reducing incentives to mobilise against the state. However, the state's act of outsourcing governance functions and authority to non-state elites, as previously argued by Boone (2014, 2017), can simultaneously serve to decentralise political conflict and channel grievances toward local elites. The second chapter has provided interesting insights on this by exploring how the internal aspects of local leadership structures matter for the outcome of institutional hybridity at the local level. In addition to this, the third study provides a model on how the legitimacy and efficiency of local leadership influence co-option opportunities of external armed actors. Together these findings suggest that the state and other external actors face a steeper hill in co-opting local elites when these are internally cohesive and locally legitimate. Linked to this, the findings contribute to a

more nuanced understanding of leadership accountability in the case of hereditary authorities: in the absence of regular competitive elections among authority candidates, competition (for example based on the interpretation of customs) over an authority position can in fact reduce accountability rather than strengthen it, as conventionally theorised. This is because the uncertainty over the future of one's authority position incentivises a leader to maximise private gains in the short term rather than to strive to accommodate the interests of the subjects.

Third, the findings here highlight the active agency of civilians and their local forms of organisation and authority. Civilians are not passive receivers of development interventions or mere victims of armed conflicts, but their social networks and governance institutions mediate the shape and outcome of these processes. This thesis has shed light on some important institutional and internal aspects in traditional forms of governance that shape the resulting collective capacities at the local level. In particular, the last chapter demonstrated how the strength of traditional authority institutions influences wartime governance. However, the argument is more generalisable and calls for systematic focus on different forms of civilian agency when studying political processes. For example, the insights gathered in this thesis can benefit research on resilience, e.g. capacity to cope and adapt in the face of growing environmental stress and natural catastrophes. Traditional governance structures and other communal institutions are often important in constituting local resilience in vulnerable areas. However, based on the findings of this thesis, one should pay attention to the role of these institutions vis-à-vis the state and their internal structural cohesion and legitimacy among their subjects when assessing their likely contribution to the coping and adaptive capacities of communities.

Policy implications

In addition to its academic contribution, this thesis carries important policy implications. Governments, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations design their conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and development efforts on the basis of an understanding of the key beneficiaries, political authorities, and interlocutors that should be considered in order to achieve the aimed outcomes. Notably, policies aiming at increasing the legitimacy of international interventions and enabling local ownership of the efforts have translated into more attention to traditional and religious leaders and other actors defined as part of the civil society (von Billerbeck, 2016). Traditional leaders are called upon to facilitate peacebuilding efforts and to change harmful cultural practices (European Peacebuilding Liason Office, 2017; European Commission, 2018; The World Bank, 2018). While this thesis recognises and applauds the importance of considering the role of traditional governance structures when designing peace or development operations, it also warns against a one-size-fits-all or a romanticised approach to the role of traditional governance. Specifically, the theoretical models and empirical analyses here have alluded to three tangible aspects to be kept in mind when considering traditional authorities and other customary institutions: their formal role and relationship to the state, their internal structural cohesion and the implications of this on their contemporary role, and their relationship to their constituents, particularly their legitimacy among these. In general, the thesis serves to sensitise the policy community to the political nature of traditional authorities and the power relations embedded in local governance structures.

Notably, neither the policy implications nor the academic contribution outlined above should be considered tied to the region of sub-Saharan Africa. As discussed in

the introduction, forms of traditional governance maintain their relevance around the world (Holzinger *et al.*, 2018). Existing research demonstrates the substantive influence that tribal and indigenous governance structures can have on development and conflict outcomes for example in the contexts of Latin America and South East Asia (Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Ruiz-Euler, 2014; Jochem, Murtazashvili and Murtazashvili, 2016; Klick, 2016). Furthermore, the rights of traditional or indigenous communities and their governance structures are recognised in political processes within and beyond these regions. For example, the Colombian peace agreement in 2016 reaffirmed the *consulta previa* policy, which demands the state and private companies to consult ethnic and indigenous communities prior to any action in issues concerning their land.[83] This consultation policy, which originates from the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of the International Labour Organisation in 1989 (No. 169), has been accused for becoming a tool to co-opt certain traditional leaders willing to advance the cause of the state and private companies without proper consultation with the communities (Betancur, 2014). The theoretical and analytical models developed in this thesis seem highly relevant in this and any other political context that is portrayed by hybrid governance and policies of empowering or exclusion of traditional authority structures.

Limitations and way forward

This thesis has studied the role of traditional governance in peace and conflict outcomes, exploring multiple aspects in traditional authority structures and their institutional context that can be identified to vary systematically. I have theorised

[83] See section 73 in the Final Agreement (2016).

around three particular dimensions – institutional context, internal cohesion, and strength – and presented novel ways to empirically capture these dimensions and their relation to intrastate conflict, violence against civilians, and more low-intensity protests. Nevertheless, there are some major caveats in this study that should be acknowledged, as well as important future research avenues that can be identified. First, all three chapters have mainly relied on observational data and quantitative analysis that does not directly test the causal mechanisms theorised in the chapters. All chapters have explored anecdotal case evidence in order to scrutinise and strengthen the level of confidence in the theoretical mechanisms. In addition to this, the second chapter used primary qualitative evidence to discuss the plausibility of the theorised mechanisms. Yet, thick descriptive qualitative data or experimental research design would help to trace the theoretical chain from specific traditional governance conditions to the outcome and exclude alternative theoretical mechanisms explaining the correlations. Indeed, the qualitative interview data collected for the second chapter exposed plausible alternative mechanisms linking contested traditional authority structures to increased protest rates via lowered governance efficacy. While I remain confident in the plausibility of the main theoretical arguments presented in this thesis, future research should focus more explicitly on *how* changes in the formal role and type of traditional governance structure create a change in governance outcomes and whether without these changes the outcome would look considerably different.

Another methodological and theoretical limitation in this thesis concerns over-time dynamics. The first substantive chapter captures variation over time in state–traditional governance interaction. Yet the second and third chapters measure cross-sectional variation in traditional governance in specific time points. While all chapters control for past violence and try to separate the influence of traditional governance

from the processes that shape it, better empirical capturing of over-time changes (or continuities) in the studied dimensions of traditional governance structures would arguably strengthen the study. Specifically, it would allow us to better identify how over-time changes in traditional governance structures influence peace and conflict outcomes and vice versa. Furthermore, it would allow us to build a more comprehensive view on the nature of traditional governance and its stability versus change over time.

Linked to the above, this thesis has focused rather implicitly on the consequences of colonial and pre-colonial politics for contemporary forms of traditional governance. The first chapter discussed and found empirical support for the argument that colonial legacies matter for how traditional governance structures influence contemporary societies. The second chapter also built on the assumption that internally contested traditional authority structures often derive from disruptive colonial and interventionist politics. However, I have challenged the idea that contemporary traditional governance structures would be prisoners of their past and that using indicators that derive from the pre-colonial period would suffice in understanding their contemporary role. While I stand by the theoretical arguments put forward in this thesis, future research should explore why and to what extent we observe considerable path dependence in the capacities of traditional governance structures in particular and local governance capacities in general. For example, the strength of oral narratives and story-telling around constituting historical moments might play a role in constructing continuity in communities adhering to traditional rule.

Finally, there are several aspects that have not been at the core of the present thesis but deserve attention. Others have shown the influence of traditional leaders in contemporary party politics (de Kadt and Larreguy Arbesu, 2018). Beyond their

mobilisation power, traditional leaders have sometimes a more direct role in party politics as members of political parties or as political candidates themselves. For example, as alluded to in the first chapter, the involvement of chiefs in the electoral competition in the pre-war Sierra Leone further alienated them from the people and contributed to the rural grievances. Future iterations of the typology of state–traditional governance interaction should consider policies concerning the participation of traditional authorities in electoral competition. Moreover, while this thesis has shown hybrid governance structures to influence armed conflict processes in general, there are some types of conflicts in which the role of traditional governance structures should be given particular attention. Specifically, traditional governance structures can be highly influential in conflicts over land and when parties mobilise around ethnic or tribal identity. Traditional leaders often have vested interest in questions related to land use as they administer the use of communal land. Competition over land resources is projected to grow as climate change and economic interests render fertile land scarcer. In this light it is pivotal to investigate the formal and de facto governance hierarchies around the use of land and examine how these contribute to inducing or preventing land related conflicts. Similarly, asking questions about the role of traditional leaders in violent and nonviolent uprisings in which ethnic identities are politicised could help us understand mobilisation dynamics and the relationship between traditional authorities and armed or nonarmed group leaders.

Lastly, future research should look more closely into the transformation and adaptation of traditional governance structures. This issue is particularly important in the face of democratic consolidation and at least partially climate change-induced changes in rural livelihoods. The first chapter suggested that traditional governance structures become less important for intrastate peace in consolidated democracies. On

the other hand, examples from Malawi and Ghana show that traditional authorities can adapt to changing socio-political environments and needs (Tieleman and Uitermark, 2018; Walsh *et al.*, 2018). When and how traditional forms of governance are able to adapt to changing environment and what happens when they fail to do so are important questions to ask when trying to understand governance hybridity and its consequences.

Answering these and other questions concerning the contemporary role of traditional governance is important as chiefs and other customary institutions continue to exercise de facto powers and often de jure authority around the world. The insights gathered in this thesis will hopefully serve to understand, categorise, and measure different constellations of traditional and other non-state governance structures alongside state institutions. This will help to better grasp the complex governance and power dynamics that give rise to or prevent critical societal outcomes such as violent conflict or durable intrastate peace.

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