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Partisan-Electoral Cycles in Public Employment: Evidence from Developed Democracies

Aaskoven, Lasse (2019) 'Partisan-Electoral Cycles in Public Employment: Evidence from Developed Democracies.' Political Studies. ISSN 0032-3217

Partisan-Electoral-Cycles in Public-Employment accepted version.pdf - Accepted Version

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According to both early empirical findings and theoretical expectations of partisan preferences, left-wing parties in government ought to prefer higher levels of public employment for both ideological and opportunistic reasons. In contrast, using country-fixed effects in a panel of 22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, this article finds no evidence of left-wing governments systematically increasing public employment. However, there is evidence that left-wing governments increase public employment in election years, which gives rise to an opportunistic, partisan-electoral cycle in public employment. In line with the logic of core-voter targeting and political budget cycles, incumbent left-wing parties seem to increase the number of their potential core voters when they are needed most.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: partisanship, public employment, political budget cycles, elections
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Government, Department of
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 02 Oct 2019 11:29
Last Modified: 02 Oct 2019 12:15

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