Research Repository

Stable Fractional Matchings

Caragiannis, Ioannis and Filos-Ratsikas, Aris and Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis and Vaish, Rohit (2019) Stable Fractional Matchings. In: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2019-06-24 - 2019-06-28, Phoenix AZ USA.

1902.06698v1.pdf - Submitted Version

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We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable fractional matchings can have much higher social welfare than stable integral ones, our goal is to understand the computational complexity of finding an optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) or nearly-optimal stable fractional matching. We present simple approximation algorithms for this problem with weak welfare guarantees and, rather unexpectedly, we furthermore show that achieving better approximations is hard. This computational hardness persists even for approximate stability. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first computational complexity results for stable fractional matchings. En route to these results, we provide a number of structural observations.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information: Notes: Accepted to Artificial Intelligence (AIJ)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Stable Matchings; Cardinal Preferences; Welfare Maximization
Divisions: Faculty of Science and Health
Faculty of Science and Health > Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, School of
SWORD Depositor: Elements
Depositing User: Elements
Date Deposited: 04 Sep 2020 13:05
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2022 19:33

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